J-S42007-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DARYL BALKIM WILLIAMS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 684 WDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 27, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-11-CR-0002407-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 16, 2022

Daryl Balkim Williams appeals from the order that denied his petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

On November 9, 2016, Appellant was sentenced to seven and one-half 

to fifteen years of imprisonment upon his entry of a guilty plea to two counts 

of aggravated assault. Plea counsel failed to file a timely post-sentence 

motion or the requested direct appeal. Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA 

petition, which prompted the PCRA court to conclude based upon the docket 

entries that Appellant was entitled to reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. 

However, the court simultaneously appointed counsel for the purposes of 

reviewing Appellant’s pro se filings to determine “whether to pursue a direct 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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appeal on the part of [Appellant] or file a no-merit letter with the [c]ourt.” 

Order, 6/19/17. 

Instead, counsel filed an amended PCRA petition upon which the court 

held hearings concerning the voluntariness of Appellant’s plea and whether

plea counsel was ineffective in her representation in connection with that plea. 

The PCRA court ultimately denied the amended PCRA petition. On appeal, this 

Court vacated the order denying the petition and remanded the case to first 

allow Appellant to pursue his direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 229 A.3d 331 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision). The 

trial court accordingly entered an order reinstating Appellant’s appellate rights 

nunc pro tunc and dismissing his PCRA petition without prejudice. See Order, 

3/11/20. Thereafter, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, 

holding that Appellant’s untimely post-sentence motion failed to preserve the 

only claim of error he raised, namely that the trial court erred in denying his 

request to withdraw his guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 249 

A.3d 1138 (Pa.Super. 2021) (judgment order). 

Appellant next filed the timely, counselled PCRA petition at issue in the 

instant appeal. Therein, Appellant again asserted that plea counsel was 

ineffective in failing to adequately investigate Appellant’s mental health 

history or competency to enter his plea. Appellant maintained that counsel’s 

deficient performance rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. See

PCRA Petition, 2/7/22, at ¶¶ 16-19. Following a status conference, the PCRA 
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court found that no hearings or exhibits in addition to those already of record 

were necessary to address Appellant’s reiterated claims and ordered the 

parties to submit briefs on the issues. See Order, 3/18/22. Following a review 

of those submissions and the evidence of record, the PCRA court denied 

Appellant’s petition for the reasons stated in its December 12, 2018 opinion. 

See Order, 4/27/22. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the PCRA court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1 Appellant presents one question for our 

consideration: “Did the [PCRA] court err in failing to determine that 

[Appellant] should be granted relief under the [PCRA] based upon his trial 

counsel being ineffective?” Appellant’s brief at 4.

We begin with a review of the applicable law. “This Court’s standard of 

review regarding an order denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the 

determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is 

free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344, 347 (Pa.Super. 

2017). Further, “[i]t is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA 

court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 270 A.3d 

1221, 1226 (Pa.Super. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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1 Specifically, the PCRA court indicated that its December 12, 2018 opinion 

fully addressed Appellant’s claims of error. See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 

7/18/22. 
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Counsel is presumed to be effective, and a PCRA petitioner bears the 

burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Becker, 192 A.3d 106, 112 

(Pa.Super. 2018). To do so, the petitioner must plead and prove (1) the legal 

claim underlying his ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s 

decision to act (or not) lacked a reasonable basis designed to effectuate the 

petitioner’s interests; and (3) prejudice resulted. Id. The failure to establish 

any prong is fatal to the claim. Id. at 113. Further, “[i]n the context of a 

plea, a claim of ineffectiveness may provide relief only if the alleged 

ineffectiveness caused an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Thomas, supra

at 1226 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In establishing the prejudice prong of such a claim, “the defendant must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he 

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 

Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 370 (Pa.Super. 2006) (cleaned 

up). As one Court explained:

In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely 

resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffectiveassistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For 

example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to 

investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the 

determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by 

causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on 

the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led 

counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea.

Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
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Appellant’s argument that the PCRA court erred in denying his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel is as follows. Appellant advised plea counsel 

that he had a history of mental health issues, including schizophrenia, which 

prompted counsel to have his competency evaluated by Dr. Scott Scotilla, an 

expert in clinical and forensic psychology. During that evaluation, Appellant 

indicated that he was facing drug charges although that separate case had 

been resolved. See Appellant’s brief at 13. Appellant also informed 

Dr. Scotilla that he believed the outcomes of the present case would either be 

the dismissal of charges or a few months in jail, when in actuality he faced 

more than 100 years of imprisonment. Id. Appellant asserts that the 

discrepancies in the report create “a clear question as to whether the Appellant 

was competent to enter guilty pleas in this matter,” that plea counsel had no 

reasonable basis not to follow up on Dr. Scotilla’s report, and generically 

asserts that he suffered prejudice because “there is a reasonable probability 

that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error.” 

Id. at 14-15. 

We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The PCRA court was 

well within its discretion in determining that there was no arguable merit in 

Appellant’s claim that he was not competent to enter his plea. The court 

credited Dr. Scotilla’s findings that Appellant was fully capable of appreciating 

the charges he faced and in participating in his defense, that he was 

malingering in the sense of exaggerating his symptoms for his own benefit, 
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including so that he could qualify for disability benefits that he had previously 

been denied, and that his opinion about Appellant’s competency would not 

have been different had he known that Appellant was facing assault charges 

with a greater potential penalty than the charges Appellant identified. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/12/18, at 7-9. Further, Appellant has not come forth 

with any witness or other evidence that he had in fact been incompetent at 

the time he entered his plea.

Furthermore, Appellant’s boilerplate allegation of prejudice is insufficient 

to satisfy his burden of proof. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 

1096, 1106 (Pa. 2012) (“Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no 

reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioners burden 

to prove that counsel was ineffective.” (cleaned up)). Appellant has failed to 

establish that, had counsel followed up on Dr. Scotilla’s report, she would have 

made a different recommendation as to his plea, or that he otherwise would 

not have pled guilty. Cf. Rathfon, supra at 370-71 (affirming PCRA court’s 

determination as to prejudice that was based upon its crediting the 

defendant’s testimony that he would not have pled guilty had counsel not 

incorrectly advised him that he would be able to serve his sentence in the 

county jail). 

Accordingly, Appellant has failed to convince us that the PCRA court 

erred in denying his PCRA petition and that he is entitled to relief from this 

Court. 
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Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/16/2022