COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

YORK COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS and 

 VIRGINIA MUNICIPAL GROUP 

 SELF-INSURANCE ASSOCIATION 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0384-97-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 SEPTEMBER 23, 1997 

DOLLIE M. MARSHALL 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Cecil H. Creasey, Jr. (Sands, Anderson, 

Marks & Miller, on brief), for appellants. 

 Hugh B. McCormick, III (Patten, Wornom & 

Watkins, L.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 York County Public Schools (employer) appeals from a 

decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission awarding Dollie 

Marshall medical and permanent partial disability benefits for a 

work-related knee injury. Finding credible evidence in the 

record to support the commission's decision, we affirm. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in the 

cause, and because this memorandum opinion carries no 

precedential value, we recite only those facts necessary to the 

disposition of this appeal. 

 On April 28, 1994, Mrs. Dollie Marshall twisted her leg in a 

standing pool of water while at work. This twisting tore the 

medial and lateral meniscus of her knee. Mrs. Marshall also 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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suffered from a torn anterior cruciate ligament (ACL), but this 

injury pre-existed the accident. Both parties have stipulated 

that Mrs. Marshall has suffered a compensable injury to her knee, 

and the only issues on appeal concern treatment of the torn ACL 

relative to the injuries suffered during the accident. 

 Dr. Treishmann, Mrs. Marshall's orthopedic surgeon, 

testified that the meniscus tears destabilized her knee. While 

he had already performed surgery to correct these tears, a 

further operation is necessary to repair the torn ACL in order to 

prevent future deterioration of the knee. He testified that the 

destabilization would not have occurred but for the accident and 

resulting torn meniscus. Accordingly, the commission awarded 

Mrs. Marshall future medical benefits and 25% permanent partial 

disability; the amount directly attributable to the meniscus tear 

and not the ACL tear. 

 Guided by well-established principles, we construe the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing 

below. See Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. 

App. 503, 504, 339 S.E.2d 916, 916 (1986). The commission's 

findings of fact will not be disturbed on review if there is 

credible evidence to support them. See Marketing Profiles, Inc. 

v. Hill, 17 Va. App. 431, 433, 437 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1993); Ogden 

Allied Aviation v. Shuck, 17 Va. App. 53, 55, 434 S.E.2d 921, 922 

(1993). In cases involving pre-existing injuries, the law is 

clear: "If the accident accelerates or aggravates a pre-existing 
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diseased condition, the injured party is entitled to 

compensation." Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Money, 174 Va. 50, 

55-56, 4 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1939); Ohio Valley Constr. Co. v. 

Jackson, 230 Va. 56, 334 S.E.2d 554 (1985). The fact that the 

accident alone would not have caused the injury without the 

pre-existing injury is immaterial. Money, 174 Va. at 55, 4 

S.E.2d at 741. 

 Employer first asserts that the ACL tear, and impairment of 

the knee flowing therefrom, is not causally related to the 

work-related injury and is, thus, not compensable. However, Dr. 

Treishmann testified that the ACL tear alone did not 

substantially affect Mrs. Marshall's knee, but that it was the 

combination of the two injuries which severely impaired her use 

of the limb. Because that determination is supported by credible 

evidence, it is binding and conclusive on appeal. See Greif 

Cos./ Genesco, Inc. v. Hensley, 22 Va. App. 546, 552, 471 S.E.2d 

803, 806 (1996). 

 Employer next asserts that the permanent partial disability 

award was improper because Mrs. Marshall had not proven the 

extent of the impairment. He reasons that because Dr. Treishmann 

has recommended further surgery to correct the torn ACL, Mrs. 

Marshall cannot have reached her maximum medical recovery until 

after the surgery. Yet the record indicates that the recommended 

surgery will not effect an improvement to her condition. It will 

merely cause a "slowing down or prevention of further 
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deterioration." Consequently, Dr. Treishmann was free to 

conclude, and the commission was free to believe, that Mrs. 

Marshall had reached maximum medical recovery. 

 Employer finally contends that Dr. Treishmann is only 

guessing at the level of impairment to her knee, so no award 

should be made. Dr. Treishmann, like any physician, makes 

estimates regarding all aspects of patient condition and 

treatment. He bases these estimates on his education, many years 

of experience as an orthopedic surgeon, and his first-hand 

examination of Mrs. Marshall. When the commision made its 

finding it considered Dr. Treishmann's estimate, the records upon 

which he based his estimate and, most importantly, the fact that 

appellants presented no evidence contrary to Dr. Treishmann's 

estimate. Since there was credible evidence in support of the 

commission's resolution of this issue, we find no merit in 

employer's argument that the award was contrary to law and the 

evidence. See Boblett v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 640, 652, 396 

S.E.2d 131, 137 (1990). 

 Accordingly, the decision of the commission is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.