Occasional Paper 10

The Future of Weapons of

Mass Destruction: Their

Nature and Role in 2030 

John P. Caves, Jr., and W. Seth Carus
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

DR. JOHN F. REICHART

Senior Director

MR. JOHN P. CAVES, JR.

Deputy Director, Distinguished Research Fellow

Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD Center) has been at the forefront of research on the 

implications of weapons of mass destruction for U.S. security. Originally focusing 

on threats to the military, the WMD Center now also applies its expertise and 

body of research to the challenges of homeland security. The Center’s mandate 

includes research, education, and outreach. Research focuses on understanding 

the security challenges posed by WMD and on fashioning effective responses 

thereto. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has designated the Center as 

the focal point for WMD education in the joint professional military education 

system. Education programs, including its courses on countering WMD and 

consequence management, enhance awareness in the next generation of 

military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates to defense and 

homeland security policy, programs, technology, and operations. As a part of its 

broad outreach efforts, the WMD Center hosts annual symposia on key issues 

bringing together leaders and experts from the government and private sectors. 

Visit the center online at wmdcenter.dodlive.mil. 


Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Occasional Paper, No. 10

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

June 2014

The Future of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction: Their 

Nature and Role in 2030

John P. Caves, Jr., and W. Seth Carus
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent 

the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press 

would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.

First printing, June 2014
Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

WMD in 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

WMD-Relevant Technological Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

WMD-Relevant Geopolitical Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

WMD in 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

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Foreword

In 2011, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

launched a project to envision the future of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). It chose the year 2030 as its time horizon. During the first year, we 

conducted a series of roundtable discussions with experts on global trends 

in political-military and technological developments. These discussions had a 

broad range and were not limited to WMD matters. During the second year, 

we established several working groups to focus on the WMD implications 

of future trends. Science and technology was the principal remit for the first 

group, geopolitics for the second, and military matters for the third, but all 

three groups concurrently considered the panoply of developments that could 

impact the future of WMD. While there was a great deal of commonality 

among each group’s findings, differences also emerged. As there can be no one 

definitive forecast of the future, but at best only educated guesses, the WMD 

Center chose to publish more than one set of findings rather than to produce 

a single integrated report. The Center thus hopes to enrich the larger debate 

about the future of WMD and to afford U.S. policymakers multiple perspectives to consider as they decide where to steer U.S. efforts to counter tomorrow’s WMD dangers.

John Caves and Seth Carus authored one set of findings. Mr. Caves cochaired the project’s working group whose principal remit was geopolitics, and 

Dr. Carus was the co-lead for the overall project. Their paper herein principally considers how the intersection of geopolitical and technological trends 

may shape the nature and role of WMD in 2030. Forrest Waller authored 

another set of findings. Mr. Waller led the project’s working group whose 

principal remit was science and technology. Fittingly, Mr. Waller’s forthcoming paper is first and foremost an examination of how science and technology 

trends may affect WMD by 2030. Both papers offer recommendations for U.S. 

policymakers in preparing for the envisioned WMD futures. 
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CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

Dr. Carus, Mr. Caves, and Mr. Waller benefited greatly from the insights and 

support of many others, and particularly our colleagues at the WMD Center. I am 

privileged to direct a center staffed with such outstanding individuals.

—Dr. John F. Reichart

Senior Director

WMD Center

National Defense University
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The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Acknowledgments

While the authors are solely responsible for the final content of their respective papers, they were able to reach their findings only as the result of the time and 

expertise freely availed to them by many knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Foremost among them are their colleagues in the Center for the Study of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, who contributed to the development of this paper 

and participated in the center’s larger project on the future of WMD. Of particular 

note are Dr. John Reichart, director of the WMD Center; Mr. Robert Peters, colead for the overall project and co-chair of the working group on military matters; 

Mr. Brendan Melley, co-chair of the working group on geopolitics; and Dr. John 

Mark Mattox, co-chair of the working group on military matters. Also of note are 

Mr. Paul Bernstein, Mr. Richard Love, Mr. Charles Lutes, Dr. Shane Smith, Ms. 

Lorena Bedford, Mr. Kenneth Rapuano, and Ambassador Linton Brooks.

Among the many individuals from outside the Center who helped make this 

project possible are leaders and experts of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, Air Force Research Laboratory in Albuquerque, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, 

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey Institute for International Studies, Center 

for Science, Technology, and Policy at the University of New Mexico, Central 

Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

We also are indebted to the many current and former U.S. Government officials and experts who participated in one or more of the center’s several workshops for the project. We further benefited from a highly productive exchange of 

ideas on the future of WMD during a workshop with knowledgeable representatives from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and the British Embassy in 

Washington, DC.
4 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

Executive Summary

The longstanding efforts of the international community writ large to exclude weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from international competition and 

conflict could be undermined in 2030. The proliferation of these weapons is likely 

to be harder to prevent and thus potentially more prevalent. Nuclear weapons are 

likely to play a more significant role in the international security environment, 

and current constraints on the proliferation and use of chemical and biological 

weapons could diminish. There will be greater scope for WMD terrorism, though 

it is not possible to predict the frequency or severity of any future employment of 

WMD. New forms of WMD—beyond chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons—are unlikely to emerge by 2030, but cyber weapons will probably 

be capable of inflicting such widespread disruption that the United States may 

become as reliant on the threat to impose unacceptable costs to deter large-scale 

cyber attack as it currently is to deter the use of WMD. The definition of weapons 

of mass destruction will remain uncertain and controversial in 2030, and its value as 

an analytic category will be increasingly open to question.

These conclusions about the future of WMD derive from judgments about relevant technological and geopolitical developments out to 2030. Technological developments will shape what WMD capabilities will be achievable in that timeframe 

while geopolitical developments will shape motivations to acquire and use WMD. 

Technologically, by 2030, there will be lower obstacles to the covert development of nuclear weapons and to the development of more sophisticated nuclear 

weapons. Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) are likely to be 1) more accessible to both state and nonstate actors due to lower barriers to the acquisition 

of current and currently emerging CBW technologies; 2) more capable, particularly in terms of their ability to defeat current or currently emerging defensive 

countermeasures; 3) more discriminate; that is, more precisely targeted and/or 

more reliably low- or nonlethal; and 4) harder to attribute (utilizing hitherto 

unknown agents and/or delivery mechanisms) than the traditional forms known 

today. No major new technological developments regarding radiological weapons are foreseen. 
5

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Geopolitically, the United States will remain the world’s most powerful country through 2030 but will be less dominant in an increasingly multipolar international system. Nonstate groups, potentially including terrorists, will grow in capabilities and importance. Sources of international conflict will remain and could 

intensify, and the risks for armed conflict, both inter- and intrastate, will grow. 

The “battle of narratives” will be an increasingly important part of armed conflict. 

Taken together, these developments and characteristics point to a world that 

in 2030 will be more prosperous, technologically capable, and connected, but one 

whose international relations will be more competitive and uncertain. The world’s 

gains will not be distributed equally, and its constituents will be more keenly aware 

of the inequalities. While the United States should remain the single most powerful actor, it will not be hegemonic. The share of global power held by Washington 

and its Western allies will have declined significantly. Pax Americana will be fading, but a new order policed by a similarly dominant power will not yet be visible 

much less in place. The commitment of the rising powers to the pillars of Pax 

Americana, including its nonproliferation norms and regimes, will be tested. 

More states are likely to cleave to or seek out the perceived security of nuclear 

weapons in this more uncertain environment, and some may test the political and 

military utility of new biological and chemical weapons capabilities made possible 

by technological developments, especially in the life sciences. There will be greater 

scope for WMD terrorism. Of particular concern will be how the diffusion of 

WMD technologies will increase the capacity of small groups and even lone actors, whose motivations and actions are inherently less subject to prediction and 

control, to acquire and employ the technologies of mass destruction even if done 

inadvertently.

How should the United States prepare for such a future? Since no future is 

preordained, it first must devote attention to shoring up the means by which it 

has been able to mitigate the spread and use of WMD to date: 1) sustaining its 

will and ability to meet its extended deterrence commitments and the benefitting 

allies’ perception thereof; 2) universalizing and deepening the international commitment to the principles, tenets, and implementation of the WMD nonproliferation norms and regimes; and 3) identifying, acquiring, and deploying the means 
6 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

to detect, track, and monitor the emerging technical means by which WMD can 

be developed and concealed. 

Whatever success the United States and like-minded nations can achieve in 

the above three areas should mitigate the anticipated future WMD challenges 

but should not be relied on to wholly preclude them. Therefore, the United States 

must also prepare for the above-described WMD circumstances of 2030. Foremost is recognizing that America and other countries are likely to become more 

reliant on deterrence and less on prevention to counter the dangers of a more 

WMD-proliferated world. This will put a premium on investing in the key attributes of effective deterrence: an unambiguous capacity to impose unacceptable 

costs on WMD-armed adversaries; the ability to defeat limited WMD attacks, 

particularly through missile defense and homeland security measures; the ability to attribute WMD attacks; and the effective strategic communication of our 

deterrence capabilities and will to employ them. 

Nuclear weapons will figure prominently in the deterrence strategies of a number of states in 2030. It will be imperative for the United States to maintain a robust, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent force in that environment. Accordingly, 

Washington should preferentially fund the modernization of its nuclear arsenal and 

supporting infrastructure to ensure a credible and effective nuclear deterrent to 2030 

and beyond. Deterring and responding to adversary nuclear weapons threats and 

potential employment must also figure more prominently and systemically in U.S. 

military plans, as well as in the education of U.S. military and civilian national security leaders, so the United States is better prepared to manage escalation challenges 

amidst increasing nuclear risks.

Washington further needs to anticipate and prepare for the possible reemergence of chemical and biological warfare as novel and more effective forms of 

these weapons emerge from rapid advances in the life sciences over the next two 

decades. Washington should assume that it will encounter the employment of 

hitherto unknown chemical and biological agents in military and civilian environments, and will need to develop a mindset, approaches, and capabilities for recognizing and responding to unknown agent attacks. It also should continue to invest 

in broad-spectrum defensive countermeasures that are better able to recognize, 
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The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

protect against, and treat a wide range of chemical and biological threats. Furthermore, it should be prepared to alter its negative security assurances with regard to 

the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons to respond to a heightened biological or 

chemical weapons threat from nonnuclear weapons states. 

With specific regard to WMD terrorism, the greater accessibility that terrorists should have to current and currently-emerging WMD technologies, and 

particularly those relating to CBW, will require the United States to maintain 

intense and multifaceted efforts to dissuade such entities from seeking WMD 

and prevent them from employing them. While it is not known what has most 

accounted for the paucity of terrorist use of even cruder forms of WMD to date, 

or at least employment that has resulted in mass destruction, the combination of 

strong international norms, intense law enforcement and military pressure, and 

improved defenses likely have all contributed to this desired outcome. It is only 

prudent to sustain and, where possible, intensify this multitude of deliberate obstacles to terrorist acquisition and employment of WMD. 

While the future cyber threat may foster consideration of strategic responses 

comparable to those made to the WMD threat, it would seem inappropriate and 

possibly disadvantageous to the United States to apply the WMD moniker to 

cyber weapons at this time. WMD have been given special priority for elimination 

or control. Several treaties also place specific limitations on their use, and making 

cyber weapons a form of WMD would automatically make those provisions apply. 

Until the United States better understands whether it wants to develop an international regime constraining cyberspace or to maximize its flexibility to utilize a 

capability in which it is the acknowledged world leader, there are no advantages to 

treating cyber weapons as WMD.
8 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

Introduction

This paper explores the possible nature and role of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the 2030 timeframe. That is, it endeavors to describe what will 

constitute WMD in that timeframe and why and to what extent actors may pursue, acquire, and even employ such weapons. It is a product of the Center for the 

Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction’s Project on the Future of WMD, an effort 

that began in late 2010 and involved consultations with a range of government 

officials and other experts as well as a literature review on relevant technological 

and geopolitical trends. 

The Center undertook this study keenly appreciative of the limitations inherent to any effort to project future developments, particularly beyond 5 years. 

We nonetheless hoped that thoughtful consideration about what might transpire with WMD over the longer term could usefully inform nearer term U.S. 

Government plans and investments for countering WMD that might have longer term implications. 

We understand that the role of WMD will be shaped to a greater or lesser 

extent by political, military, economic, and social forces that are themselves difficult to predict. In addition, we realize that the policies adopted and the actions 

taken by the U.S. Government will affect the shape of the future both for the 

security environment and for WMD in particular. For these reasons, we offer a 

picture of the future security environment painted with broad-brush strokes and 

generally avoid associating wide-reaching developments with specific foreign actors or circumstances. 

However, we are sensitive to the need for prudence; therefore, we focus on 

plausible developments that could pose serious challenges. Thus, for example, we 

consider it both more likely and prudent to assume that China, an emerging great 

power, will continue its rise, increasing the costs and risks to the United States of 

sustaining its current international position and security commitments. Fewer regrets are likely to attend U.S. international security interests if the Nation prepares 

for this future rather than for a less challenging alternative. Indeed, accepting that 

some dangers are more likely may help stimulate U.S. leaders to take actions to 
9

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

sustain U.S. national power over the longer term, such as measures to stimulate 

economic growth and manage the deficit.

Envisioning the future of WMD entails challenges beyond only those associated with projecting future developments generally. Because WMD have so seldom been employed, and countries that possess such weapons tend to be secretive 

about these capabilities and their intentions regarding them, there is a paucity of 

factual information from which to extrapolate on why countries will seek WMD 

and how they are likely to use them. Perhaps the most important and challenging 

question today is why these weapons have so seldom been employed, particularly 

those chemical, biological, and radiological weapons that are considered accessible 

to the violent extremists who are believed to be the most likely to employ them. 

Theories abound, but none can be proven; hence judgments about the future of 

WMD tend to be more intuitive than empirical.

Our judgments about the nature and role of WMD in the 2030 timeframe 

are developed in five sections. The first offers baseline observations about WMD 

in 2014. The second considers how technological trends could shape the nature 

and accessibility of WMD in 2030. The third discusses geopolitical trends that 

could influence how state and nonstate actors will view WMD in 2030. The 

fourth makes judgments about the role of WMD in 2030 in light of the foregoing discussion of technological and geopolitical developments. The final section 

offers considerations for U.S. policy in preparing for the WMD challenge of 

2030 that we envision. 

WMD in 2014

This section offers observations about WMD today, providing a baseline for 

our exploration of potential changes during the coming two decades. 

For the purposes of this paper, weapons of mass destruction are defined as 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. While it may 

seem unnecessary to make this observation, in actuality there are a variety of 

definitions of WMD in current use.1 Here we chose to adopt the official United 

Nations (UN) definition, which is used for disarmament, diplomacy, and arms 

control treaties:
10 

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Atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal 

chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the 

future which might have characteristics comparable in destructive 

effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.2

As a practical matter, the UN definition is interpreted as applying to all 

CBRN weapons even if they are not necessarily lethal. Significantly, this definition originated in the late 1940s to support the UN disarmament agenda by 

identifying weapons categories that deserved special consideration for elimination 

or control. So far, the international community has rejected attempts to expand 

WMD beyond CBRN weapons. Mindful that the UN definition explicitly allows 

for the possibility of entirely new forms of WMD emerging in the future—that 

is, other than CBRN—we address the prospects for that occurring by 2030 later 

in this paper.

There are several problems with the UN definition. Some types of CBR 

weapons can be employed to inflict discrete effects while conventional weapons 

can be employed in ways that are massively destructive. As a result, the UN definition includes weapons that may be incapable of causing either mass destruction 

or mass fatalities, while excluding some that actually have caused mass death and 

destruction. Thus, radiological weapons are now seen as the most likely to cause 

relatively localized effects. Many biological and chemical agents can be used in 

highly discriminate ways, including assassinations, and some chemical and biological agents such as foot and mouth disease may be useful mainly for disruption. 

Moreover, different types of WMD can have different political-military effects. 

For example, as discussed later, we believe that CBR weapons do not have the 

same deterrent effect as nuclear weapons. Finally, conventional weapons can be 

employed en masse to generate effects comparable to those of nuclear weapons, as 

evident from the impact of conventional bombing during World War II. It is also 

telling that more people were killed in the Rwanda genocide by simple weapons 

than have died from all uses of WMD in war.3

Alternative definitions are no more satisfactory. Some add high explosives 

(in the United States, this occurs mainly in the law enforcement community), 
11

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

which impractically would treat virtually all weapons of war used by modern militaries as WMD. Others count only those types of CBRN weapons that cross a 

certain vaguely-defined threshold of “mass destruction” or lethality, but there is 

no widely accepted definition of what constitutes mass destruction. Another approach would define WMD as weapons that are especially abhorrent and thus 

subjected to exceptional controls or outright prohibition. Yet while this is the case 

for CBRN weapons, for much of the international community it also is true for 

other types of weapons, such as antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.

The international community writ large seeks to exclude WMD from international 

competition and conflict. Only the five original nuclear weapons states are authorized under international law to possess nuclear weapons, and they are obligated 

by Article VI of the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to work toward the abolition of all nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete 

disarmament. Renewed attention and commitment to the achievement of that 

goal, including by the Obama administration, has followed Henry Kissinger, Sam 

Nunn, William Perry, and George Shultz’s articulation of a vision for the eventual 

elimination of all nuclear weapons in a January 2007 Wall Street Journal editorial.4

 Biological and chemical weapons are prohibited to all States Parties by the 

1975 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1997 Chemical 

Weapons Convention (CWC), respectively. There is, however, an exception in the 

CWC for nonlethal chemical agents used for law enforcement purposes that may 

loom larger in the future. Interestingly, no comparable treaty exists to prohibit 

radiological weapons, although there have been efforts to negotiate one.5

The achievement of these instruments’ goals is supported by other international nonproliferation agreements, regimes, programs, and initiatives, such as 

a number of regional nuclear weapons-free zone treaties, the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group and Australia Group, cooperative threat reduction programs, the Geneva 

Protocol, the Outer Space and Seabed treaties, and the Proliferation Security 

Initiative, as well as by ongoing efforts to extend the nuclear weapons control 

regime by bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force and 

negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.6

 Indeed, it could be argued that 

the international community has effectively marginalized the military role of 
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CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

chemical and biological weapons, and only nuclear weapons are seen to retain 

utility as a deterrent.

WMD proliferation is currently a limited problem set. Almost all states belong 

to, and are deemed compliant with, the major nonproliferation treaties. In 2013, 

Syria, a longstanding CWC holdout, joined the convention and agreed to a detailed plan for the elimination of its declared CW stocks and capabilities. In January 2014, Libya completed the elimination of its declared CW program.7

 These 

were important recent gains for the cause of WMD nonproliferation. 

A few countries, however, remain outside one or more of the aforementioned 

treaties that proscribe WMD. India, Israel, and Pakistan have never accepted the 

NPT, and North Korea withdrew in 2003. Egypt, North Korea, South Sudan, and 

Angola have never joined the CWC, while Israel and Burma have signed but not 

ratified it. A somewhat larger number of states, mostly in Africa but including 

Israel, have never joined the BWC, and others including Egypt and Syria have 

signed but not ratified it. In addition, a few of the States Parties to one or more 

of these nonproliferation agreements are suspected of violating their obligations 

under them. Iran figures most prominently among them, but the United States 

has questions about aspects of Russia’s, China’s, and a few others’ compliance with 

one or more of the treaties.8

 India and Pakistan, two of the four nuclear weapons 

states outside the NPT, are also a major concern because many think that conflict between these two rivals has the most potential to lead to an actual nuclear 

weapons exchange. Further, there is concern about the potential for some or all of 

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to fall under the control of radical Islamists active in 

the country either through an illicit acquisition or an assumption of state power. 

There have been two major adverse proliferation developments in recent 

years: North Korea’s self-proclaimed acquisition of nuclear weapons, supported 

by three nuclear device tests; and Iran’s suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons, 

supported inter alia by its refusal to heed the UN Security Council Resolutions 

that it suspend uranium enrichment and demonstrate that its nuclear program is 

strictly for peaceful purposes. While North Korea’s nuclear weapons program remains largely unconstrained, negotiations among Iran and the P5+1 states (China, 

France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) produced 
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an interim agreement in November 2013 to freeze most aspects of Iran’s nuclear 

program. This agreement is to be in effect for 6 months pending the negotiation 

of a permanent accord that would align Iran’s nuclear endeavors with international 

expectations.

Fears that these adverse proliferation developments will spur regional rivals, 

many of them U.S. allies, to seek their own nuclear weapons (which some have 

called a “nuclear cascade”) have not been borne out to date. Similar fears during the 1960s went largely unrealized. Whereas in 1963 President John Kennedy 

foresaw the possibility of 15 to 20 new nuclear weapons states within a decade,9

the actual proliferation pattern since has been more like one per decade. That 

the worst fears of nuclear proliferation then did not materialize had much to do 

with concerted efforts by the United States and other nations, including the negotiation and entry into force of the NPT and extended U.S. deterrence security 

commitments to major allies.10 Thus the current set of states of serious WMD 

proliferation concern is quite small, with Iran and North Korea at the forefront.

WMD are rarely employed. There has been no confirmed employment of radiological weapons.11 There has been no employment of a nuclear weapon since their 

initial use by the United States against Japan in 1945. The last confirmed state 

employment of biological weapons (and their only confirmed large-scale employment) was by Japan against China during World War II. Iraq’s large-scale use 

of chemical weapons against Iranian forces and its own population during the 

1980s was the last confirmed state use of these weapons prior to the CWC, and it 

provided essential impetus to the negotiations that resulted in that international 

convention. With the important exception of Syria’s CW use during its civil war, 

the only known instances of employment of biological and chemical weapons 

since the BWC and CWC came into force in 1972 and 1997, respectively, have 

been by violent nonstate actors. 

The most significant nonstate actor employment of WMD was by the apocalyptic Aum Shinrikyo in 1994. The cult made a major, though largely unsuccessful, 

investment in biological and chemical weapons development and perpetrated several attacks, two of which featured the chemical agent sarin and resulted in some 20 

fatalities.12 A decade earlier, another cult, the Rajneeshees, disseminated salmonella 
14 

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in fast food restaurant salad bars in Oregon, sickening about 750 people but killing no one.13 A lone U.S. scientist, Bruce Ivins, was determined to have mailed 

anthrax-filled letters in late 2001 and early 2002 that caused five deaths but had 

much broader disruptive effects.14 In 2006–2007, the terrorist group al Qaeda in 

Iraq employed chlorine tanks with high explosives that had little effect attributable 

to the chlorine in that country.15 In recent years, there have been reports of insurgent or terrorist chemical agent use against girls’ schools in Afghanistan, possibly 

involving pesticides, but with no fatalities.16 In 2013, a U.S. individual was arrested 

for mailing ricin with letters to a U.S. Senator and the President, but causing no 

casualties.17 Compared to the use of conventional weapons over the last few decades, 

these instances of WMD employment are rare and, contrary to the literal meaning 

of the term, not particularly destructive. Indeed, in some years the number of people 

killed through use of small arms and other conventional weapons can exceed the 

total killed by WMD in the previous hundred years.18

Syria’s CW employment in 2012–2013 broke from this post-CWC pattern 

in that it involved state use and large-scale casualties. It initially stoked fears of 

the dangerous erosion of the international norm against CW use and of the CW 

nonproliferation regime. Those initial concerns were fueled by reports of Syria’s 

small-scale employment of chemical weapons against rebels and civilians on its 

own territory on multiple occasions from December 2012 on and the muted international reaction.19 The United States was particularly cautious about concluding 

that the Syrian regime had used chemical weapons, and, once it did, about committing to any punitive action against the regime. 

Syria’s subsequent CW use in August 2013 in the vicinity of the Syrian village of Ghouta left little room for such qualification. Those attacks allegedly killed 

more than 1,500 people, 20 and investigations by Human Rights Watch21 and the 

United Nations22 directly or indirectly implicated the Syrian regime. The United 

States, France, and the United Kingdom each threatened military retaliation, 

though the likelihood of strikes diminished after the UK parliament voted against 

military action and President Obama thereafter decided to seek his own prior 

legislative authorization. Perhaps more significant to Damascus, press accounts 

indicated that the Syrian leadership also received complaints about the CW use 
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The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

from its three most important supporters, Hizballah, Iran, and Russia.23 Moscow 

ultimately preempted Western military retaliation by proposing that Syria surrender its chemical weapons,24 a proposal subsequently accepted by Syria, the United 

States, and the larger international community. 

Syria’s decision to join the CWC and eliminate its declared CW assets turned 

what had appeared to be a serious setback for the cause of prohibiting CW use 

and proliferation into an apparent victory.25 The stronger international reaction, 

including the prospect, however uncertain, of Western military retaliation, undoubtedly contributed to that favorable turn of events. But Syria’s decision may 

have been motivated less by fear than by opportunity. Recognizing that the United 

States and its major European allies were more likely to take direct action against 

Syria over CW than over the course of its civil conflict, Damascus may have concluded that abandoning its CW was a price worth paying to ensure a freer hand to 

prosecute its war, where it was beginning to gain the upper hand.26

Nuclear weapons are useful to states mainly for deterrence and prestige. Nuclear 

weapons have unrivaled utility for deterring serious threats to vital interests that 

arise from their demonstrated capacity to inflict extraordinary levels of destruction against which there is no effective defense (at least against the prompt 

effects of a nuclear weapon once detonated). No state possessing nuclear weapons has suffered a major invasion or other direct external threat to its regime 

survival, with the possible exception of Israel during the 1967 and 1973 ArabIsraeli Wars.27

Those possessing nuclear weapons justify and utilize them as deterrents, albeit 

by varying approaches. For example, China, which espouses a no-first-nuclear-use 

doctrine and fields a much smaller nuclear force than Russia or the United States, 

relies on the threat of retaliatory strikes to deter nuclear attacks upon it.28 Russia 

and Pakistan, each facing one or more conventionally superior rivals, rely on their 

nuclear forces to deter large-scale conventional attack as well as nuclear strikes. 

They accordingly reserve their right to first use and are prepared (or preparing) 

to use tactical nuclear weapons to defeat superior conventional forces, as well as 

longer-range nuclear weapons to strike adversaries’ strategic assets.29 During the 

Cold War, Washington relied on a similar approach to deter what it feared were 
16 

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superior Soviet conventional forces poised to invade Western Europe. Though the 

United States currently has no conventional military peer, it still reserves the right 

of first use of its nuclear weapons and accords to those weapons the mission of 

deterring a wider range of adversary aggression than just nuclear weapon use, but 

within a narrower range of contingencies and with the explicit goal of further 

reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons.30

While utilized and apparently effective for deterrence, nuclear weapons since 

1945 generally have not proven directly useful for coercion—that is, compelling 

another to take an action it does not want to take as opposed to deterring it from 

taking an action to which it might otherwise be inclined.31 No nuclear weapon has 

been employed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Threats to employ nuclear weapons except in the defense of the possessor’s most vital interests have been rare, 

and, when issued, have not been sufficiently credible to compel desired behavior. 

Of late, Russia’s nuclear saber rattling against Central European states negotiating 

with the United States to host U.S. missile defense assets did not dissuade those 

states from agreeing to host those assets. North Korea’s constant torrent of bloodcurdling threats against South Korea has become no more credible or compelling 

since the North tested its nuclear devices. 

It is easier to understand why nuclear weapons have not been directly useful 

for coercion in those situations involving opponents who are each nuclear-armed 

or credibly enjoy the protection of a nuclear-armed state than in situations where 

only one side wields them. Nuclear weapons states have been careful to limit their 

confrontations with other nuclear-armed states or their protected allies lest such 

confrontations escalate to devastating nuclear exchanges. This has been true even 

in those few cases where nuclear-armed or protected states came to conventional 

blows, including China’s intervention in the Korean War (where China was perceived as enjoying the protection of the nuclear-armed Soviet Union), the 1965 

Sino-Soviet border clashes, and the 1999 Indo-Pakistani Kargil conflict. It may be 

notable that each of those cases occurred within a few years of one or both of the 

antagonists’ or their protectors’ acquisition of nuclear weapons, perhaps reflecting 

an immature appreciation of the risks of nuclear war that would change with more 

experience. 
17

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis helps illustrate why nuclear weapons have not 

been useful for coercion since 1945. Moscow’s placement of nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba ultimately led to Washington’s agreement to withdraw its nucleararmed Jupiter missiles from Turkey and pledge not to invade Cuba in exchange for 

the Soviet withdrawal of its missiles. Yet the manner in which the Soviet nuclear 

gambit was exposed and perceptions of the Soviet withdrawal of its missiles—under the threat of U.S. military action implicitly backed by nuclear force—made the 

Soviets look like the bigger loser in Cuba. Moreover, the crisis became a testament 

to the unpalatable risks of nuclear brinksmanship and fostered more careful interactions between the two superpowers going forward as well as their engagement 

in nuclear arms control. 

But why have nuclear-armed states not found their nuclear weapons useful 

for coercing those who lack the protection of these weapons? That may be best 

explained in terms of the strong international norm32 that developed against the 

employment of nuclear weapons. That norm raised the political costs of employing 

these weapons for any purpose other than in defense of a state’s most vital interests to a prohibitive level. The United States played a central role in developing 

this norm by refraining from exploiting its initial nuclear weapons monopoly and 

subsequent superiority; it thus did not employ nuclear weapons in its early Cold 

War conflicts and confrontations, though some advocated their employment, for 

example, during the Korean War.33 Instead, Washington accorded these weapons a 

special status that helped shape global perceptions and practices. This norm is now 

reflected in the negative security assurances offered by the major nuclear weapons 

states34 and has likely helped to protect nonnuclear weapons states that are not 

aligned with a nuclear weapons state from actual nuclear attacks or credible, coercive threats of such attacks. There is no assurance going forward that the norm 

against nuclear aggression will remain as influential across the board or that some 

nuclear-armed actor will not prove exceptionally insensitive to it, but it seems to 

have been influential to date. 

Nuclear weapons also confer prestige in the view of some aspirant states. As 

the greatest powers since the advent of nuclear weapons have possessed these ultimate instruments of mass destruction, other states aspiring to great power status 
18 

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have felt the need for them. That apparently contributed to the United Kingdom, 

France, China, and India acquiring such weapons. North Korea, which claims to 

possess nuclear weapons, and Iran, which many suspect of pursuing them, often 

boast of their nuclear pursuits as hallmarks of technological prowess and befitting 

the international status they seek (for Iran, becoming a regional great power; for 

North Korea, being taken seriously by the great powers). 

Chemical and biological weapons have limited utility for deterrence, and their perceived utility for warfighting has declined since the end of the Cold War. In the past, 

some countries relied on chemical and biological weapons (CBW) as a component 

of their deterrent posture. For those lacking the resources and expertise to develop 

nuclear weapons in the near term, such as Syria and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, CBW 

had utility as a “poor man’s atomic bomb.” Even for some Western states that possessed nuclear weapons, such as the United States and United Kingdom, CBW 

were viewed as in-kind deterrents to Soviet employment of such weapons under a 

nuclear umbrella.35 But CBW are a poor substitute for nuclear weapons as instruments of deterrence due to several factors: 1) their effects are less predictable; 2) 

their effects are more susceptible to defensive countermeasures; 3) chemicals are 

far less efficient than fissile material in causing death and destruction; and 4) in 

contrast to nuclear and chemical weapons, the ability to inflict mass death and destruction through the deliberate use of biological weapons has never been openly 

demonstrated. As Saddam Hussein learned, possessing (1990–1991) or just being 

expected to possess (2003) chemical and biological weapons did not deter U.S.-

led international coalitions from invading his country or from overthrowing his 

regime in the latter conflict. 

Further limiting the contemporary deterrent utility of chemical and biological weapons are the treaties that comprehensively ban their possession and use, 

and which now have nearly universal acceptance. For this reason, pursuit of such 

weapons by states formally adhering to these treaties must be covert lest they be 

exposed as violating their treaty obligations. The norm codified in the CWC, the 

BWC, and the Geneva Protocol also inhibits those outside the treaty who are 

known or suspected of pursuing chemical weapons from flaunting that capability. 

Hidden weapons are not effective deterrents, though states could and may intend 
19

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

to unveil these capabilities in a crisis or during a conflict to achieve pre-war or 

intra-war deterrence.

According to many accounts, only Syria relied on chemical weapons for deterrence after the end of the Cold War, using its chemical arsenal to deter Israel. 

Syria was not a CWC state party, and its possession of chemical weapons was 

undisputed, if not fully acknowledged by the government. After Syria agreed to 

join the CWC in September 2013, its leadership cited three reasons for abandoning its chemical arsenal. First, it argued that the chemical weapons were usable 

only in retaliation for a nuclear attack. Second, the effectiveness of Israel’s chemical defenses made chemical weapons primarily a psychological weapon. Finally, 

the weapons had little utility in internal wars. Indeed, Bashar Assad reportedly 

claimed that by the late 1990s Syria’s main use for CW was as a bargaining chip 

to negotiate a Middle East WMD Free Zone.36 Whatever the truth of Assad’s ex 

post facto justifications, they communicate a sense that chemical weapons no longer have the deterrent utility some may have once ascribed to them. Indeed, Assad 

now claims that his country stopped producing chemical agents in 1997 for exactly that reason.37 Syria’s relatively recent covert effort to build a nuclear reactor, 

which was terminated or at least interrupted by an Israeli aerial strike in 2007, may 

have reflected its appreciation of the limits of its chemical weapons as a deterrent. 

Few states today seem to value CBW for their warfighting utility. With Syria’s decision to ratify the CWC in September 2013, North Korea, not a party to 

the CWC, is the only country widely acknowledged to have a substantial chemical weapons stockpile not declared for destruction under the CWC. Chemical 

weapons do not appear central to Pyongyang’s deterrent posture. Its deterrent 

capacity has long been underpinned by its ability to devastate Seoul with longrange artillery early in a conflict, whether firing conventional or chemical rounds, 

and more recently by its overt nuclear weapons program. While not a great deal is 

known about North Korea’s plans for using chemical weapons, it is reasonable to 

expect that its approach in this area, as in other military areas, derives from Soviet 

doctrine, in which chemical weapons were integrated into the conduct of operations. North Korea and Syria are both suspected of maintaining biological weapons programs, but less is known about those programs or how these states would 
20 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

use such weapons.38 As covert programs, though, their bioweapons capabilities are 

also more likely geared toward employment than deterrence. 

A few other countries are believed to maintain mobilization-based CBW 

programs. They may value currently available or potential future forms of CBW 

as secretly developed weapons for employment against unsuspecting or otherwise unprepared adversaries in conflicts of such seriousness that the advantages 

of employment are perceived to outweigh the political costs and military risks of 

resorting to proscribed weapons. Alternatively or additionally, such countries may 

intend their CBW for covert employment in small-scale operations where such 

use would be hard to confirm or attribute. Capabilities covertly developed and/or 

delivered have greater prospect of surprising adversaries and securing meaningful 

military advantages. Iraq demonstrated during its war with Iran that the largescale employment of chemical weapons against poorly prepared forces could be 

effective by blunting Iran’s human wave assaults. 

Notwithstanding CBW’s potential uses in some circumstances, the small 

number of countries known to be or suspected of retaining CBW programs suggests that there is little perceived advantage to acknowledged possession of such 

weapons and that most countries do not believe CBW provide military capabilities essential for their security in today’s environment. 

States find no utility in radiological weapons, and terrorists appear to find them of 

limited attraction. Although considered a weapon of mass destruction, fears in the 

late 1940s that countries would adopt radiological weapons as a supplement to or 

replacement for nuclear weapons proved unfounded. Although some countries 

have explored radiological weapons, no country is known to have introduced them 

into its arsenal. The only known or suspected state uses of radiological materials 

have involved assassinations rather than uses in armed conflict. There has been 

more interest on the part of terrorists, but the only documented incident of a radiological terrorist event was the placement of a radiological source in a Moscow 

park by Chechens.39

Detonation of an explosive radiological dispersion device (RDD) is unlikely 

to inflict many casualties except for people directly affected by the high explosive, because few are likely to remain near the detonation site long enough to 
21

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

receive sufficient radiation to cause serious injury. However, depending on the 

type of radioactive material used, such an attack could lead to long-term radioactive contamination that might have significant economic or societal impact. 

Passive RDDs are simpler weapons that entail the covert placement of an appropriate radiological source in sufficient proximity to the intended target set, 

though their effects are far more localized than those of an explosive RDD. The 

nonexplosive, aerosolized dissemination of respirable radioactive particles is the 

type of RDD likely to produce the most casualties.40 It is also the most challenging to engineer as it requires more specialized skills and capabilities to fashion 

the radioactive particles of the right size, though the approach is essentially the 

same as for the production of aerosolized solid biological or chemical agents. As 

for all RDDs, a major challenge for the maker is avoiding lethal exposure in the 

production process, a factor that may contribute to the general lack of terrorist 

pursuit of such weapons.

Terrorist interest in WMD has increased, but the limited resources and unsophisticated capabilities available to terrorists have constrained WMD terrorism. There is widespread concern about terrorist pursuit and employment of WMD. As most states 

have marginalized CBW over the past two decades, terrorist groups have begun to 

give greater attention to such weapons. Some, most notably al Qaeda, have explicitly 

expressed their interest in WMD and have been discovered pursuing them.41

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo organized both chemical 

and biological weapons programs, unsuccessfully employed biological agents, and 

employed chemical agents with some effect in 1994 and 1995.42 Militia groups in 

the United States began exploring biological agents in the 1990s and made several 

ineffective attempts to employ them.43 Al Qaeda organized chemical and biological 

weapons programs in the late 1990s that were primarily intended to produce relatively crude capabilities more suitable for inducing terror than causing mass casualties. More seriously, al Qaeda also made substantial investments in infrastructure to 

support development of more sophisticated biological weapons focused on anthrax. 

This latter effort was dismantled in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, 

and there is no indication that it has been revived.44 Some al Qaeda affiliates apparently retain an interest in chemical and biological weapons. 
22 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

The development and employment of CBRN weapons, however, is not a 

trivial matter. Resources and expertise are required, as well as the time and space 

to master new technologies. No state is known to have provided a terrorist with 

a WMD capability or with the expertise needed to create a CBRN weapon. The 

production of the fissile material required for a nuclear weapon still calls for the 

resources of a state. It is believed, however, that a sophisticated nonstate actor 

that somehow acquired fissile material would be capable of improvising a yieldproducing nuclear device. Fortunately, this has not yet been demonstrated. While 

the technical difficulties associated with producing some CBW or radiological 

weapons are considered surmountable by talented nonstate groups, there are few 

instances of terrorist groups actually doing it. Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 development 

and use of the nerve agent sarin is the most sophisticated case of WMD terrorism, but that effort fell well short of producing the military-grade agent the cult 

sought. Relatively unsophisticated employment of chemical weapons, such as the 

employment of chlorine by al Qaeda affiliated terrorists in Iraq, has provided no 

advantages over more traditional munitions. 

There are numerous multilateral initiatives intended to reduce the prospects for 

WMD terrorism. Indeed, it could be argued that there is more real international cooperation in addressing WMD terrorism than in tackling state proliferation, given 

disagreements among the major powers on dealing with the Iranian and North 

Korean nuclear programs. International agreements intended to prevent WMD terrorism include UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which obligates all states to 

act to preclude nonstate actors from acquiring or using WMD of any type. WMDrelated terrorism treaties include the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, which requires 

states to protect radiological materials and facilitate the investigation and prosecution of crimes, including acts of terrorism, involving radiological materials or nuclear devices, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.45

Supporting these formal agreements are informal arrangements such as the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Similarly, the Nuclear Security Summits 

initiated by President Obama were partially intended to promote efforts to keep 

fissile material out of the hands of terrorists. Counter-WMD terrorism activities are 

also sponsored by multinational organizations including Interpol, the Organisation 
23

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

We have a poor understanding of the motivations for acquisition and use of WMD. 

Intent may best address arguably the most important unanswered question about 

WMD today, namely why they are so rarely used. That is particularly puzzling for 

chemical, biological, and radiological weapons given that the requisite capabilities 

are generally considered to be accessible to state and nonstate actors alike, albeit at 

differing levels of technological sophistication. While the technological accessibility of these weapons is often grossly overstated, the reality is that even those who 

possess CBRN weapons rarely if ever use them. State and nonstate actors may 

have assessed the WMD capability available to them as ill-suited to their needs, 

preferring other capabilities. 

A combination of factors could reasonably explain why possessors have 

been reluctant to employ WMD in war. In some cases, we believe that CBRN 

weapons, and especially nuclear weapons, exist principally for deterrence. Official 

U.S. chemical and biological weapons policy during most of the Cold War thus 

reserved them for retaliatory strikes if an adversary employed them first. Similarly, nuclear weapons have rarely been considered warfighting tools; rather, they 

have been valued primarily for deterrence. However, even when the weapons are 

thought to have warfighting utility, most countries have been reluctant to employ 

them. Possible reasons for nonuse include the actors’ fear of unacceptable reprisals, 

concern that international responses might complicate the geopolitical environment in ways unfavorable to possessors, assessments that the weapons might not 

accomplish the desired military objectives due to the effectiveness of defensive 

countermeasures or other factors, lack of appreciation of their military potential 

by political or military leaders, and even moral considerations.

While the above comments are aimed primarily at state use of WMD, similar factors appear to be at work with nonstate actors. Terrorist groups have less 

ability to acquire CBRN weapons than states, but the evidence also suggests that 

most terrorists have had no interest in acquiring WMD. Terrorist groups may 

have rejected CBRN because they believe such weapons have no utility. Either 

they see no need for weapons that cause such effects (they may be able to achieve 
24 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

their desired outcomes with conventional weapons more readily at hand) or they 

and the people who support their cause may find WMD morally unacceptable. 

Unfortunately, we know that not all terrorist groups have reached that conclusion, 

including both the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which sought to acquire and 

use both chemical and biological weapons to cause mass casualties, and al Qaeda, 

which organized prior to 9/11 a biological weapons program intended to kill large 

numbers of people. Because such groups may be less inhibited by moral considerations or deterrence by retaliation, many Washington policymakers worry more 

about terrorist CBRN acquisition than state WMD programs.

WMD-Relevant Technological Trends

Looking now toward 2030, we consulted experts on scientific and technology 

trends bearing on CBRN weapons, as well as on the possibility that entirely new 

forms of WMD might emerge—that is, weapons beyond CBRN. We reached a 

number of conclusions regarding both areas.

By 2030, technological as well as proliferation developments are likely to reduce 

obstacles to the covert development of nuclear weapons as well as to the development 

of more sophisticated nuclear weapons. More sophisticated nuclear weapon designs 

are proliferating, and weaponization technologies that were once cutting edge are 

now integral to widely available commercial products. These developments should 

enable those with access to fissile material, primarily new and aspiring nuclear 

weapons states but perhaps also sophisticated nonstate actors, to produce largeryield weapons in packages that are smaller, more transportable, and easier to conceal. However, the differences between the resources and capabilities available to 

a nonstate actor and even a relatively small state are likely to remain substantial.

Acquisition of fissile material will continue to be the principal barrier to 

nuclear weapons development. International efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear 

materials have shored up this barrier, particularly for nonstate actors. Efforts to 

end new production of fissile material have been less successful. Technological 

advances, especially with regard to lasers, may afford state actors faster, cheaper, 

and less observable means to enrich uranium within the timeframe of this study. 

Laser isotopic separation (LIS) is a long understood approach for enriching 
25

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

uranium to a desired level in a single operation, but it has hitherto been more 

technologically challenging and costly than today’s widely utilized gas centrifuge technology even with the latter’s large facility footprint and long run times. 

Should one or more new LIS processes that leverage recent advances in laser 

and other technologies prove both effective and competitive, their subsequent 

penetration of the nuclear power market could enable state and commercial 

customers to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level with less time, cost, and 

signature.46 If that occurs, a world with a greater degree of nuclear weapons 

latency could emerge, with less opportunity to detect and stem nuclear weapons 

development programs before they mature. Other technological and commercial developments could also conceivably open new paths to the production or 

extraction and utilization of the few fissile materials other than U235 and Pu239. 

For example, thorium-fueled nuclear reactors could be used to generate the fissile material U233.

47

By 2030, nuclear weapons may not become more capable in terms of their 

ability to defeat defensive countermeasures in that there are no current or emerging defenses against their prompt effects. However, the appearance of more discriminate nuclear weapons in some state programs is possible. Russia is reportedly investing in “clean” as well as precision low-yield nuclear weapons to support 

its increased reliance on nuclear weapons to deter and defeat perceived security 

threats along its periphery, particularly from superior NATO conventional forces.48 New nuclear weapons that use less fissile material than traditional nuclear 

weapons to produce comparable effects would produce less of the fission products that are the principal source of enduring, secondary (fallout) radiation. Such 

“cleaner” nuclear weapons may be perceived as more employable, particularly on 

or near one’s own territory, because they have less enduring radiation effects and 

therefore inflict fewer casualties. 

The logical extension of the pursuit of clean fission-initiated nuclear weapons is the development of a pure fusion weapon, in which the atom’s power is 

released without the use of fissile material and thus without the generation of 

fission products.49 The United States and Russia are among a number of countries engaged in longstanding efforts to achieve pure fusion for energy purposes, 
26 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

which could provide an inexhaustible supply of safe, clean power. The National 

Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 

may one day be the first to achieve pure fusion. In February 2014, LLNL reported that it got more energy out of the fusion fuel than was put into it, an important but still early step toward the production of useful levels of fusion energy.50

However, the NIF’s complex, large-scale approach to producing energy from 

fusion is not directly translatable into a weapon. Moreover, current U.S. policy 

prohibits the development of new types of nuclear weapons, at least those with 

new or enhanced military effects, although substantial improvements are allowed under the rubric of life extension. Other states are not so constrained and 

may find different ways to develop pure fusion nuclear weapons. Opinion was 

split among the U.S. technical experts we queried as to whether a pure fusion 

weapon was feasible by 2030. But whether such nuclear weapons are in exotic 

or more traditional forms, significant obstacles to development and production 

are expected to diminish.

By 2030, scientific and technical advances are likely to make available chemical 

and biological weapons with more useful characteristics than current versions. CBWrelevant technologies are already diffuse and dual use, especially compared to 

those for nuclear weapons. Driven by commercial interests, the life sciences and 

related technologies are advancing rapidly on a global scale. There is also a growing convergence of chemistry and biology as commercial entities increasingly use 

the replicating processes of one to synthesize or express elements or organisms of 

the other. A common refrain from experts we consulted is that the pace of change 

is so great in the life sciences that they could not confidently predict where the 

technology would be in 5 years, much less 20. Experts consistently opined to us 

that technological developments pertinent to CBW could be expected to favor 

the offense over the defense in our timeframe of interest. Our overall conclusion 

is that it is impossible to predict the specific biological and chemical weapons 

capabilities that may be available by 2030, but clearly what will be possible will be 

much greater than today, including in terms of discrimination and the ability to 

defeat existing defensive countermeasures. 
27

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

To elaborate with regard to biological weapons, the means to acquire and weaponize naturally occurring pathogens are increasingly available and in more readily useable forms for state and nonstate actors alike. For example, the increasingly 

routine practice of geo-tagging images made available over the Internet can vector those interested in harvesting pathogens from nature to the specific source of 

virulent disease outbreaks when such images are posted as part of reporting on the 

outbreaks. Successive, selective culturing can be utilized to identify strains that are 

especially virulent or more resistant to existing medical countermeasures. Presterilized, multiliter bioreactors can be obtained over the Internet and used to multiply 

the desired strains. Commercially available agricultural sprayers can enable high efficiency dissemination of liquid pathogen solutions without special adaptations.

The foregoing capabilities do not involve genetic manipulation or bioengineering; they utilize longstanding biological knowledge and processes. More 

sophisticated understanding of biological systems (genomic and proteomic information) and processes (genetic modification, bioengineering) for manipulating 

those systems is emerging rapidly. While the amount of new data about biological 

systems is expanding more rapidly than understanding of their significance and 

utility, the expansion of such understanding is inevitable. That understanding can 

be expected to further reduce the barriers to the development of existing types of 

biological weapons and possibly also lead to the development and application of 

new and more capable weapons. Possibilities include making naturally occurring 

pathogens more stable in the environment and harder to detect; enabling de novo 

production of pathogens, especially viruses, that are not available or at least not 

readily so in nature (such as smallpox); and creating novel pathogens with hitherto unseen properties, perhaps even deliberately designed to have such properties 

through the exploitation of molecular modeling and engineering.51

Such advanced bioweapons capabilities are most likely to emerge out of 

state programs, but the underlying information as well as the tools for genetic 

manipulation will be widely available. It is therefore possible that new and highly pathogenic agents will emerge from the work of nonstate actors and even of 

individuals, who may or may not have malign intent. Indeed, one of the more 

serious concerns about the future of biology is that do-it-yourself biologists 
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will inadvertently create and release a dangerous pathogen into the environment 

with grave consequences.52

With regard to chemical weapons, chemical manufacturing is globalizing, and 

with it the skills and capacity that can be used for CW purposes. Commercial firms 

have exploited more powerful computing and other new technologies to create and 

screen large numbers of new chemical compounds. Some of those compounds may 

have utility for CW purposes. Microreactors could reduce barriers for state and nonstate actor production of ultrapure chemical agents if they are more widely adopted 

commercially. Microreactors currently constitute a niche in the chemical manufacturing sector but have the potential for broader adoption. More effective chemical 

agent delivery methods will emerge, leveraging encapsulation and nanotechnology. 

These delivery methods can also be utilized for biological agents.53

More sensitive information about existing nontraditional agents is reaching 

open sources despite efforts to prevent proliferation, making it likely that such 

agents will be more widely possessed by 2030. Another development that may 

be encountered at any time between now and our 2030 horizon is the combination of different CBW agents into single weapons, which would compound the 

difficulties of identifying the associated agents and countering their effects. Such 

combinations can group different types of chemical agents, chemical and biological agents, and different types of biological agents. A clear implication of rapid 

developments in the life sciences and related disciplines bearing on biological and 

chemical weapons is that we are likely to encounter unknown agents and must 

prepare accordingly.54

Ultimately, we believe that CBW agents will be 1) more accessible to both 

state and nonstate actors due to lower barriers to the acquisition of current and 

currently emerging CBW technologies; 2) more capable, particularly in terms of 

their ability to defeat current or currently-emerging defensive countermeasures; 3) 

more discriminate—that is, more precisely targeted and/or more reliably low- or 

nonlethal; and 4) harder to attribute (utilizing hitherto unknown agents and/or 

delivery mechanisms) than the traditional forms known today. 

No major new technological developments regarding radiological weapons are foreseen. Barriers to access are already low given the extensive medical and industrial 
29

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

utilization of radiological materials, the ready availability of high explosives, and 

the straightforward ways in which radioactive material can be coupled with high 

explosives to produce an explosive RDD. This is not expected to change significantly by 2030.

It is unlikely that entirely new forms of WMD will emerge by 2030, at least as 

WMD are defined by the United Nations. Technological developments have raised 

questions as to whether there will emerge new types of weapons with impacts 

comparable to CBRN.55 At least one international leader has foreseen such developments. In February 2012, then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin wrote:

In the more distant future, weapons systems based on new principles 

(beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical and other technology) will be developed. All this will, in addition to nuclear weapons, 

provide entirely new instruments for achieving political and strategic goals. Such hi-tech weapons systems will be comparable in effect 

to nuclear weapons but will be more “acceptable” in terms of political 

and military ideology. In this sense, the strategic balance of nuclear 

forces will play a gradually diminishing role in deterring aggression 

and chaos.56

We are more skeptical, at least out to the 2030 timeframe. Some of Putin’s 

“new principles” clearly relate to existing categories of weapons incorporated into 

the longstanding WMD definition and definitively banned by existing arms control 

agreements. The “genetic” weapons Putin referred to would be a type of biological 

weapon, and thus not a new type of WMD at all. It is less apparent what he means 

by psychophysical weapons, but he may be referring to biological or chemical agents 

that could alter a victim’s state of mind or physical functions in a nonlethal way. In 

either case, all of these weapons are restricted by the BWC and/or the CWC.

We investigated a number of candidates for new forms of WMD including 

weapons utilizing high-powered microwaves (HPM) or other forms of directed 

energy (DE), hypersonic kinetic energy, ultra-high explosives and incendiary materials, antimatter, and geophysical manipulation. Weapons utilizing HPM, other 
30 

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DE, or hypersonic energy hold great military potential, but they are either more 

disruptive than destructive or their destructive effects are more discriminate or 

localized than those currently associated with nuclear, biological, or chemical 

weapons. Such weapons, along with cyber weapons, could certainly amplify the 

effects of WMD attacks, for example, by disrupting communications and other 

electronic systems that are important to coordinating responses to WMD attacks. 

Ultra-high explosives or incendiary materials are more likely to approach a layman’s definition of a weapon of mass destruction; antimatter weapons, with the 

potential to inflict destruction on a greater scale than nuclear weapons, most certainly would meet such a definition. However, the experts we consulted considered 

the emergence of such weapons unlikely by 2030. 

The growing cyber threat could eventually force a reconsideration of the meaning 

of WMD. We also examined cyber weapons, but initially not as a potential new 

form of WMD. Cyber weapons were assessed only as to their ability to facilitate 

CBRN events, such as manipulation of supervisory control and data acquisition 

(SCADA) systems to cause a Bhopal-like release of a lethal chemical agent from 

a chemical manufacturing facility. Cyber weapons were found to indeed have 

the potential to enable CBRN incidents. If targeted facilities or their operators 

are dependent on information technology, it is possible to use cyber weapons to 

manipulate or otherwise disrupt their functions in ways that could result in the 

harmful release of WMD material or at least facilitate unauthorized access to the 

material, such as through the disabling or spoofing of security systems. Facilities 

and their operators are already dependent on information technology to varying 

extents and will become more so in the future, especially on networked systems. 

Cyber weapons can enable CBRN events not only through direct manipulation of 

SCADA systems or by interrupting connections to external sources of power, but 

also by causing human operators to misread situations and unintentionally take 

adverse actions. Indeed, since almost everything we do is dependent on information systems, cyber weapons can affect human operations by an exceedingly broad 

number of ways and means.

As we learned more about the scope of what cyber weapons might be capable 

of in the future, we concluded that they need to at least be part of the conversation 
31

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

about what will constitute WMD. This arises not because the first-order effects 

of cyber weapons are necessarily more lethal or physically destructive than other 

candidates we considered but ultimately dismissed as new forms of WMD. They 

likely would not be, though the second and third order could be quite substantial 

in these regards. Rather, it is because the sheer scale of societal disruption that 

cyber weapons may be able to inflict by 2030 could have such strategic impact as 

to provoke strategic-level responses. 

Societies in the 21st century will become increasingly vulnerable to forms of 

disruption, and such disruption may be as strategically important as destruction. They 

will become more dependent on networked information systems as commercial and 

governmental entities alike are driven to achieve greater efficiencies. SCADA devices allowing wireless connection, monitoring, and control of virtually every aspect 

of modern life, including life-sustaining medical implants in the human body, will 

make modern societies, and the upper socioeconomic strata of developing nations, 

more vulnerable to information system attack than ever before. As with the life sciences, the rapid pace of change in information technology is expected to accord an 

advantage to the offense over the defense for the foreseeable future. 

If the impacts of large-scale cyber attacks could be so great and our ability to 

defend against such attacks is so uncertain, it is reasonable to expect that we will 

become more dependent on the threat of an “overwhelming and unacceptable” 

response to deter such strikes, as Presidents have long been to deter the threat of 

traditional WMD attack. As the growing attention being paid to the challenge of 

“cross-domain deterrence” suggests, such deterrent threats should not be assumed 

to be limited to retaliation-in-kind. Of course, the effectiveness of such deterrence 

threats will depend to a large extent on our ability to attribute the source of cyber 

attacks, a major problem that will demand even greater focus going forward. 

WMD-Relevant Geopolitical Trends

An examination of WMD-relevant technological trends is necessary but insufficient to envisioning the future of WMD. It helps us understand what the 

future nature of WMD may be, but not its future role. One must plumb intent 

to hope to understand that role. Intent to acquire and use WMD, as with other 
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types of weapons, is driven by political-military considerations that are shaped by 

geopolitical circumstances and national or group interests as perceived through 

the prisms of historical experiences and, for some, religious and ideological beliefs. Understanding intent to acquire and use WMD in 2030 necessitates judgments about the geopolitical environment that will exist. To that end, we reviewed 

a number of studies of future trends by the U.S. and foreign governments and 

consulted experts at several think tanks. We offer the observations below about 

WMD-relevant aspects of the future geopolitical environment.57

The United States will remain the world’s most powerful country through 2030, 

but will be less dominant in an increasingly multipolar international system. The 

2008 financial crisis led to a cottage industry of analysts who proclaimed that the 

United States would soon be supplanted by China as the world’s most powerful 

country. Other pundits posited that an alternative bloc of countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the so-called BRICs)—was likely to supersede the Western 

powers. We do not expect the United States to be supplanted as the top power by 

2030, but we do anticipate a significant decline in its relative power as well as that 

of its Western allies. 

Several factors will account for the relative decline of the United States. The 

economic emergence of developing countries, most importantly China and India 

but also such states as Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Vietnam, and Nigeria, will erode 

the share of global wealth and power currently held by the United States and 

the Western powers generally. The U.S. National Intelligence Council projects, 

“Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global 

power, based upon GDP, population size, military spending, and technological 

investment. China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing that 

of the United States a few years before 2030.”58

Indeed, the world’s population and wealth are expected to increase overall, 

albeit with regional exceptions. By 2030 the global population will grow by 

approximately one billion people, and the number classified as middle class 

is expected to exceed those who are poor for the first time.59 Growth will 

be most pronounced in the developing world, especially in South Asia, the 

Middle East, and Africa, and will more than offset the stagnation or decline of 
33

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

the populations of most developed Western countries and Russia (the United 

States will be the exception). In what the U.S. National Intelligence Council 

refers to as a “tectonic shift,” the populations of the Western countries and 

increasingly most developing countries will significantly age.60 The financial 

burden resulting from aging populations may make it harder for many countries to sustain existing funding levels for national security. 

While the United States should remain the preeminent military and economic power out to 2030, it will not be hegemonic. It and its Western allies and 

partners will probably find it increasingly challenging to exercise global influence. 

As the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies foresees, “The international agenda will very likely cease to be essentially Western-driven and will shift 

to accommodate and address the priorities of a much broader and more heterogeneous range of states, and the concerns of citizens in newly-developed nations.”61

The United States will also find it more costly and risky to project power in 

the regions of the rising big powers, particularly in Asia. Rising big powers such 

as China and India can be expected to assert themselves. More actors will possess 

advanced conventional weaponry, such as long-range precision strike munitions 

and other access denial capabilities. As one British defense study observes, “It 

cannot be assumed that by 2029 the West will retain sufficient military advantage 

over rising powers in all circumstances. . . .”62 Thus greater uncertainties will attend the outcomes of U.S. conflicts with rising big powers, especially in their own 

regions. This could have important implications for the rich network of security 

arrangements the United States developed during the Cold War. Washington’s 

allies and partners can be expected to have more questions about U.S. willingness 

and ability to engage in conflicts with emerging powers in their defense, and may 

feel the need for alternative security measures.

Nonstate groups, potentially including terrorists, will grow in capabilities and 

importance. As the U.S. National Intelligence Council argues, “A growing number of diverse and dissimilar state, subnational, and nonstate actors will play 

important governance roles in an increasingly multipolar world.”63 To the extent 

the traditional nation-state cannot satisfy the needs of its populace, a governance gap could emerge that would supplement or even supplant the state in 
34 

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some circumstances. The National Intelligence Council worries that this diffusion of power could include acquisition of military technologies including 

weapons of mass destruction, precision strike conventional weapons, and cyber 

capabilities once limited to states. Others agree but couch the problem in other 

terms. The European Union also sees a diffusion of power it fears might result in 

greater political fragmentation.64

Failed states will continue to pose difficulties for the international community. 

Since the end of the Cold War, some states have failed to cope with challenges to 

their integrity and have either collapsed or lost significant control over portions of 

their territories and populations. Failed states and the ungoverned spaces they create can provide havens for nonstate actors to pursue illicit activities inimical to international security. A failed Somalia furnished a base for piracy that has required 

a multinational naval task force and other measures to contain. A breakdown of 

government authority in Mali in 2012 enabled Islamists to seize control of that 

country’s northern half, prompting French intervention to roll back the Islamists’ 

gains. Syria’s civil war raised concerns that its large chemical weapons stockpile 

could fall into the hands of terrorist groups. Failed states can be expected to be an 

enduring feature of the future environment. At least some of the states currently at 

risk for failure are nuclear-armed, including North Korea and Pakistan.

The result will be a continued threat of violence from nonstate actors. A British Ministry of Defence study foresees ongoing threats from terrorism.65 The U.S. 

National Intelligence Council also anticipates continuing threats from violent extremists, but it is more hopeful that Islamic terrorism has peaked and will decrease 

in the future, akin to the cyclical nature of earlier waves of international terrorism 

such as the anarchist movement of the late 19th century, the postwar anticolonialist 

terrorist movements, and the New Left in the 1970s.66

Sources of international conflict will remain and could intensify, and the risks for 

armed conflict, both inter- and intrastate, will increase. Most government studies 

of future conflict trends we consulted are pessimistic about the future, seeing a 

number of developments increasing the risks for interstate and intrastate armed 

conflict. These developments include 1) growing competition over key resources, 
35

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

2) greater ideological diversity and contention, and 3) instability historically associated with the transition to a more multipolar international system. 

A straight-line projection of recent trends would not support such pessimism. 

The post–Cold War world has experienced a decline in the number and intensity 

of intra- and interstate armed conflicts, continuing a long-term trend that began 

after World War II. We now live in one of the least violent eras in world history, 

whether the measure is the number or the intensity of armed conflicts fought by 

major powers, interstate conflicts involving smaller states, or intrastate conflict.67

Explanations vary for what John Lewis Gaddis called “The Long Peace” during 

the Cold War’s waning days, but fears of nuclear escalation likely played a major role in muting the great powers’ willingness to engage in even minor armed 

conflicts with other nuclear-armed states.68 The Human Security Report Project 

argues, “It is difficult to determine the causes of peace between developed states 

with any degree of precision—not because there are too few plausible explanations, but because there are too many.”69 Intrastate wars, which one analyst has 

called “societal wars,” now constitute the predominant form of armed conflict.70

Past performance, however, is not a guarantee of future performance. 

Competition over key resources (food, clean water, and energy) is likely to 

increase over the next two decades. This will be driven by growth in the world’s 

overall population and wealth and, to an uncertain extent, climate change. New 

technologies hold the promise of enabling global supplies of these resources to 

keep up with global demand,71 but there will be geographic disconnects between 

the sources of supply and demand. Key resource scarcities will be most acute for 

countries with persistently high population growth and the most youthful populaces, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South and East Asia.72 India and 

China are also likely to be major importers of key resources. The United States, in 

contrast, will likely remain a major food exporter and, in a dramatic turnaround, 

may become a net energy exporter by 2020.73 Efficient and reliable distribution 

systems will be required to match supply and demand across the globe, but as 

always there will be plenty of scope for deliberate and inadvertent obstruction of 

such systems. Increasingly powerful states with large import requirements may 
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seek to secure access to external resources in ways that bring them into conflict 

with other states. One U.S. Government study concludes:

Competition over resources might lead governments to become increasingly involved in managing them, ramping up tensions with 

other countries vying for the same resources. Effective global governance would be necessary to avoid such tensions escalating and to ensure against the risks of mercantilism and protectionism infecting the 

global economy. Such risks are greater in a multipolar world marked 

by wide divergences in domestic forms of capitalism and differences 

regarding how to manage the international system.74

While competition for resources may generate greater conflict among states, 

it does not follow that the inevitable result will be more armed conflict. As others have noted, predictions during recent decades that wars would be fought over 

contested resources such as water have rarely proven true. Indeed, past experience 

suggests that most such conflicts will be resolved well before escalating to the 

point of war.75 Yet greater competition over such basic resources would increase 

the risk of armed conflict.

Greater ideological diversity and contention are also foreseen. A U.S. study 

expects that a “world of surging middle classes, varying economic potentials, and 

more diffuse power will . . . exhibit an increasingly diverse ideological landscape.” 

It sees religion, particularly Islam, challenging “the West’s conception of secular 

modernity” and an intensification of nationalism, “particularly in regions—such 

as East Asia—where there are unresolved territorial disputes and countries’ fortunes may be rapidly changing.”76 A British Ministry of Defence study anticipates 

an increase in ideological conflict driven by “liberal democratic values, autocracy, 

religious, nationalist or other influences.”77 A European Union study is more optimistic that future developments, particularly the greater connectedness of the 

world of 2030, will lead to a convergence rather than a divergence of outlooks.78

Fundamental changes in the structure of the international system are expected to further increase the risk of armed conflict. Greater multipolarity and the 
37

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

transition thereto have historically been associated with greater instability and 

conflict among states in the international system. The aforementioned increased 

competition for resources and possibly over ideology will provide more opportunities for conflict both among and within states. More state and nonstate actors will 

have further access to advanced weaponry, which could increase both instability 

and the intensity of those conflicts that do break out. 

While the great powers will endeavor to avoid direct conflict with one another given the associated high costs and risks (for example, all or most of the 

likely major powers in 2030 are currently nuclear-armed), they can be expected 

to pursue their conflicts indirectly, such as through allies and proxies or by means 

that are difficult to attribute.79 The risk of direct conflict between great powers 

will not be negligible, though, given the ever-present possibility of miscalculation. 

The “battle of narratives” will be an increasingly important part of armed conflict. 

Globalization is expected to continue over the next two decades, making states, 

groups, and individuals even more connected, both through economics and communications. Greater connectedness will increase transparency and awareness of 

developments at home, regionally, and globally. It will provide greater scope for 

informing and mobilizing diverse sets of individuals and enhance the influence of 

nonstate actors in the international system. As a European Union study observes, 

“The citizens of 2030 will be very much more aware that they are part of a single 

human community in a highly interconnected world.”80

The importance of establishing the legitimacy of one’s resort to force can be 

expected to grow in an increasingly connected world. A U.S. military assessment 

explains that, “Modern wars are fought in more than simply the physical elements 

of the battlefield. Among the most important of these are the media in which the 

‘battle of narratives’ will occur.”81 As a British defense study observes, “Conflict 

will remain focused on influencing adversaries, neutrals and those at home, whose 

perceptions will be vital. . . . Influence activity, the battle of ideas, and perceptions 

of moral legitimacy will be important for success.”82 State and nonstate actors 

alike will exploit a wide variety of media and the 24-hour news cycle to that end.

The increasing importance of the “battle of narratives” to armed conflict could 

increase the appeal of weapons that are more discriminate or whose employment 
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is harder to attribute, including future forms of WMD with such characteristics. It 

could also constrain use of such weapons if the user loses control of the narrative. 

In essence, that is what happened to Syria during 2013, as discussed further below. 

WMD in 2030

What conclusions can be drawn about the future of WMD in the 2030 timeframe in light of the foregoing technological and geopolitical developments envisioned? The following broad thoughts are offered.

Longstanding efforts to exclude WMD from international competition and conflict 

could be undermined. The future role of WMD will be determined by many factors 

including technological and scientific advances, the changing geopolitical environment, the character of the military challenges confronting states, the status of 

terrorism, and the choices world leaders make. 

There are numerous reasons to worry that current and past progress toward 

marginalizing WMD and minimizing further proliferation will be jeopardized in 

the coming decades. Some of the concern may result from perceptions. Given past 

success in marginalizing CBR weapons, the main challenge will be to sustain the 

commitment to ensuring that those weapons remain marginalized. There is little 

room to reduce the role or legitimacy of those weapons further, but there is considerable risk that the existing regimes could be undermined. While it is the policy 

of the United States to further reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons, and the 

policy of many countries to eliminate all nuclear weapons, current trends suggest 

that it will be difficult. Indeed, it is possible that more countries will come to view 

nuclear weapons as essential to their security. Additional CBRN proliferation in 

even a single country could challenge existing regimes, as would the emergence of 

perceptions that some countries see new or increased utility in possessing or being 

seen to possess CBW.

Growing insecurity associated with a shifting and uncertain geopolitical environment, where the rise of new powers will reduce the United States and its 

Western allies’ share of global power, could increase the incentives for a number of 

states to acquire nuclear and even other WMD capabilities to deter and/or defeat 

aggression. The U.S. security umbrella has shaped the proliferation landscape for 
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The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

decades. In some cases, allies have explicitly relied on Washington in preference to 

developing indigenous capabilities. In other cases, the United States has used dependence on its military power as a nonproliferation tool to push for suspension of 

WMD programs.83 Should U.S. allies and partners come to doubt the credibility 

of U.S. security guarantees, they can be expected to look for alternative means to 

ensure their security. This may increase the appeal of WMD. Indeed, the greatest 

proliferation challenges during the coming decades may emerge from countries 

friendly to the United States, not from the so-called rogue states that have preoccupied our attention in the post–Cold War era.84

Reaching for nuclear weapons or other forms of WMD is not the only or 

necessarily the principal recourse for those who fear for their security against rising or otherwise hostile powers. Other options include establishing or strengthening alliances with like-minded nations, relying on the United Nations or other 

multilateral forums to prevent or respond to aggression, and attempting to accommodate the interests of the rising or otherwise hostile powers. However, the 

WMD option is less reliant on the interests and dependability of others. 

Technological trends, moreover, are expected to reduce barriers to the development of current and emerging forms of WMD, making such weapons increasingly accessible to more state and nonstate actors. These developments especially affect chemical and biological weapons, but are true to some extent even 

for nuclear weapons. Thus, while access to fissile material will remain a constraint 

on nuclear proliferation, the technology and equipment required to design and 

fabricate a nuclear device are increasingly available. Technological trends are also 

expected to enable WMD to be developed in ways that lack the traditional signatures monitored by national intelligence agencies and international nonproliferation observers. That would afford the international community less opportunity to 

detect and react to proliferation efforts before they mature.85

Nonproliferation regimes and their supporting monitoring and verification 

measures, whether national or international, will be hard pressed to adapt to 

these technological advances. Even if proliferation is detected, existing nonproliferation tools may have limited utility. For example, export controls may be less 

effective in an era when additive manufacturing (three-dimensional printing) 
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CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

will enable on-site manufacture of hardware needed to support WMD production. The CWC’s law enforcement exemption could also be more widely exploited than its drafters foresaw to the extent that more reliably low- and nonlethal 

chemical agents emerge in the future. Such technological developments could 

undermine confidence in the ability of nonproliferation agreements and regimes 

to dissuade and preclude proliferation. It could also lead some states to assume 

that WMD has proliferated more widely than has been observed and to act 

accordingly to safeguard their security, possibly by acquiring their own WMD. 

The smaller share of global power the United States and its Western allies 

will hold by 2030 will also test the commitment of the rising non-Western powers 

to the current nonproliferation and arms control treaties and regimes, which the 

Western nations have been the primary force behind establishing, implementing, and enforcing. The Soviet Union demonstrated contempt for the Biological 

Weapons Convention by intensifying its biological weapons program after joining 

the convention, and there is concern that Russia perpetuates that contempt if perhaps less expansively.86 Russia and China have been the principal constraints on 

stronger international action to compel Iran and North Korea to halt or abandon 

their suspected or acknowledged nuclear weapons programs. Likewise, some developing nations who are States Parties, especially many in the nonaligned movement, have resisted, or at best have been reluctant to support, efforts to reorient the 

OPCW toward a greater focus on nonproliferation, giving priority to protecting 

their domestic chemical industries from international interference.87 If the United 

States and its Western allies wield less international influence in the 2030 timeframe, and are less able or willing to commit their forces and treasure to upholding nonproliferation treaties and regimes, it is at least questionable whether new, 

non-Western rising powers will fill the void—particularly if new technological 

possibilities and changed geopolitical circumstances make WMD more accessible 

and useful for deterring and prosecuting conflict. 

We should stress that none of the challenges described here necessarily lead 

to a more proliferated world or to the breakdown of the nonproliferation regimes. 

They do suggest that proliferation prevention and nurturing nonproliferation 

norms will be difficult. Strong leadership will be required to sustain the regimes 
41

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

in this more challenging environment, and it remains doubtful that there is any 

alternative to a strong American role. It will be particularly difficult if U.S. security guarantees are no longer seen as credible and no plausible successor security 

architecture emerges.

Nuclear weapons are likely to play a more significant role in the emerging international security environment. The incentives for the retention or acquisition of nuclear 

weapons are likely to increase in 2030. This will arise most fundamentally from a less 

certain and secure geopolitical environment. In such a setting, the existing nuclear 

weapons states will be disinclined to part with or significantly pare their nuclear 

arsenals, and some nonnuclear weapons states that perceive their security to be at 

greater risk will be more inclined to acquire nuclear weapons or the means to obtain 

them in fairly short order. A common element of the various visions that have been 

articulated for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is the importance of 

resolving the sources of regional conflict, but that will be even harder in the shifting 

geopolitical environment of 2030.88 Nuclear weapons will remain valued because 

they will continue to possess an unparalleled capability for deterring threats to one’s 

most vital interests, given their demonstrated and unmatched capacity for prompt, 

massive destruction against which there is no effective defense. 

Just as Washington’s reliance on nuclear weapons waxed during its Cold War 

standoff with its Soviet peer competitor and then waned as it emerged as the world’s 

sole superpower, the pendulum will likely swing back toward greater reliance as one 

or more new peer competitors emerge. Russia will have no less reason to value its 

nuclear forces in 2030 given its unavoidable demographic decline and uncertain 

economic prospects. China may be challenging U.S. conventional military superiority by 2030, at least regionally, but it will not be conventionally powerful enough to 

forsake the deterrent value of its own nuclear arsenal. Even the United States did 

not abandon its nuclear weapons during its “unipolar moment.” As is the case today, 

India’s nuclear posture will be most informed by China. Pakistan will rely on its 

nuclear arsenal to compensate for its endemic conventional inferiority to India. Iran 

may well have acquired a nuclear arsenal by 2030, potentially spurring regional rivals 

to acquire or pursue their own nuclear weapons. If North Korea endures until 2030, 

it will likely continue to view its nuclear arsenal as an essential deterrent to external 
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aggression. The regime there tellingly observed that Muammar Qadhafi’s abandonment of his nuclear weapons program left him vulnerable to his Western-assisted 

violent overthrow.89 Other states may reach similar conclusions about Russia’s invasion of Crimea in March 2014. In 1994, Ukraine concluded an agreement with 

Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom whereby Ukraine would give 

up its nuclear weapons and the signatory states would respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. 

Russia revealed the hollowness of that promise in Crimea.

Nuclear weapons may even come to play an important, if implicit, role in the 

deterrence of large-scale cyber attacks. If the impacts of such attacks could be so 

great and our ability to defend against them is as uncertain as was discussed earlier, 

it is reasonable to expect the United States, at least, to become more dependent on 

the threat of an “overwhelming and unacceptable” response to deter such strikes, 

as U.S. Presidents have long done to deter the threat of traditional WMD attacks. 

As the growing attention to the challenge of “cross-domain deterrence” suggests, 

such deterrent threats should not be assumed to be limited to retaliation-in-kind. 

Of course, the effectiveness of such deterrence threats will largely depend on our 

ability to attribute the source of cyber attacks, a major problem that will demand 

even greater focus going forward. 

Nuclear weapons will also be more accessible to those who choose to develop 

them, as previously discussed. Fissile material production is the principal technological obstacle to nuclear weapons development, as functioning weapons designs 

are already available in open sources.90 Two U.S. allies who may be most inclined to 

pursue nuclear weapons to safeguard their security against a resurgent China either 

already produce their own nuclear fuel (Japan) or have developed their own plutonium reprocessing technology (South Korea).91 North Korea and Iran have most 

recently demonstrated that less advanced nations can master reprocessing and/or 

enrichment in the face of strong international opposition. The potential emergence 

by 2030 of commercially viable and prevalent laser isotopic separation techniques 

for enriching uranium could enable states to produce fissile material more quickly, 

cheaply, and covertly than current technologies permit. The force of nonproliferation 

regimes and norms may also erode as proliferation prevention becomes harder and 

rising powers may be less attached to them. More discriminate nuclear weapons may 
43

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

emerge that are viewed as more employable and thus more suitable for a broader 

range of political-military purposes, especially if other countries choose to emulate 

Russia in this regard. 

Current constraints on state acquisition and use of chemical and biological weapons 

could diminish. Technological and geopolitical developments could make CBW 

more attractive by the 2030 timeframe and undermine the calculus that has marginalized their role today. Ultimately, it will be their perceived military utility that 

will determine whether or not CBW recovers its former role. What factors might 

lead to such a reversal?

First, if the absence of chemical and biological threats leads to reduced focus 

on CBW defenses, the perceived military effectiveness of these weapons could 

grow. Given scientific and technological advances, retaining existing defenses may 

not be sufficient. Rather, it will be necessary that CBW defenses be seen as adaptive and flexible, and thus able to respond to unexpected new threats. 

Second, the dissuasive force of nonproliferation regimes and norms may be 

undermined if novel chemical and biological weapons emerge that are seen to 

offer distinct operational advantages to military and other state security forces 

relative to conventional alternatives. Agreements and norms are only means toward the accomplishment of national security goals. They are products of the 

geopolitical and technological circumstances of their time and should not be 

considered immutable even if they were originally conceived to be of indefinite 

duration. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was considered to be the cornerstone 

of nuclear arms control, but the United States withdrew from the treaty when 

technological and geopolitical circumstances changed. In this respect, it is worrying that Russian officials openly advocate developing genetic weapons despite 

their country’s BWC obligations.92

Third, even if a nonproliferation regime is not abandoned, exceptions and ambiguities in its text may be exploited or reinterpreted to provide at least a legal veneer 

for activities that previously would have been considered dubious at best. In 2002, 

Russia demonstrated that a CWC state party could employ chemical agents intended to incapacitate rather than kill as part of a domestic counterterrorism operation. Moscow escaped censure even though the agents killed at least 117 innocent 
44 

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civilian hostages.93 The muted international reaction to this use shows that there is a 

grey area in norms and legal prohibitions pertaining to CW. In particular, the Russian case suggests that the CWC exception for the use of temporarily incapacitating 

chemical agents for law enforcement purposes may provide cover for States Parties 

to develop, produce, stock, train with, and employ agents whose range of lethality 

may make them suitable for military as well as law enforcement purposes. Future 

technological developments may give rise to a broader range of agents that could 

exploit this CWC exception. In contrast, the BWC unambiguously prohibits any 

use of biological agents as weapons of war, including those based on new science 

unknown at the time the treaty was negotiated.

Finally, in a more interconnected world where the battle of narratives will 

play a larger role in determining the outcome of conflicts, the capacity to obfuscate or justify one’s use of force will become even more highly valued. Depending 

on circumstances, this could either inhibit or encourage proliferation of CBW. 

Indications that the Syrian regime employed small quantities of chemical agents 

on multiple occasions prior to their large-scale attacks on Ghouta in August 2013 

provoked no serious international reaction, given their limited impacts and the 

difficulty of confirming the employment.94 The lack of serious international reaction to those small-scale employments may have contributed to the subsequent attacks on Ghouta. The Ghouta attacks, however, were too large to obfuscate in the 

contemporary media environment. The swift exposure and strong international 

condemnation of the attacks, facilitated by social media that spread descriptions 

and images almost in real time, clearly played an important role in the regime’s 

decision to cease CW use and join the CWC.95

 To the extent it becomes possible to create WMD that are more discriminate and/or harder to attribute, international actors may have fewer qualms 

about employing them. We expect future scientific and technological developments to enable chemical and biological weapons that are more reliably low- or 

nonlethal (for example, incapacitating) and, for biological weapons, capable of 

being targeted against specific individuals or groups. On the nuclear side, there 

are indications that Russia is already investing in low yield and “clean” nuclear 

weapons to make their use more credible in line with their increased reliance on 
45

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

nuclear weapons to deter and defeat the major security threats they perceive. We 

also anticipate chemical and biological weapons whose employment is harder to 

attribute. Chemical and especially biological forensics are already very challenging areas. A historical attraction of chemicals and pathogens for assassinations 

has been their difficultly of attribution. As previously unknown chemical and 

biological agents are developed and employed, one can expect even fewer leads 

by which to trace their origins, at least initially. 

As Syria’s small-scale employment of chemical weapons in early to mid-2013 

illustrated, discriminate use of WMD may not be constrained by international 

pressure or nonproliferation norms. To the extent that future WMD attacks are 

substantially more discriminate in their effects than are expected from WMD 

today, such attacks are less likely to reinvigorate the existing norms against WMD 

employment by reminding the world how horrible these attacks can be. In such 

a situation, WMD would begin to look more like just another weapon, though 

perhaps one in need of a new umbrella term. 

There will be a somewhat greater scope for WMD terrorism by 2030, but it is likely 

to remain a low-probability but potentially high-consequence event. Chemical and 

biological weapons, which heavily utilize dual-use technologies, are most likely 

to feature in any future WMD terrorism incident. The increased diffusion of scientific and technological knowledge and capabilities through publicly accessible 

media such as the Internet should afford nonstate actors greater opportunity to 

directly acquire, assemble, and employ chemical and biological weapons. Ongoing efforts at the national and international levels to more fully account for and 

secure known radiological sources and develop alternatives to the use of especially 

dangerous radiological materials should reduce the accessibility of radiological 

sources, including fissile material, to nonstate actors.96 The disincentives for states 

to transfer WMD or enabling technology to a terrorist group intentionally are 

likely to remain strong, notwithstanding technological and geopolitical developments that may weaken constraints on states’ acquisition and even employment of 

WMD. These weapons will remain internationally proscribed relative to conventional weapons, and terrorists are inherently risky proxies to whom states should 

remain very wary of entrusting such sensitive capabilities. 
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The most serious nuclear terrorism risk arises from possible loss of state control of nuclear weapons. As recent events in the United States suggest, even mature 

programs can show alarming lapses in nuclear security, suggesting that we should 

not take for granted the continued ability of existing nuclear weapons states to 

ensure that they retain control over their arsenals. Should additional proliferation 

occur, as suggested above, there will be additional nuclear-armed states needing to 

learn and mature procedures for protecting their weapons. 

The most alarming prospect for nuclear terrorism, however, is political upheaval in, or even the collapse of, a nuclear-armed state that results in loss of 

control of one or more nuclear weapons. It is quite plausible that at least one 

nuclear weapons state could undergo such turmoil by 2030, which at least opens 

the prospect that terrorists may be able to obtain weapons. For prudential reasons, 

we should assume that any terrorist acquiring a nuclear weapon will try to employ 

it, although that outcome might not be inevitable.97

It is not evident, though, that nonstate actors overall will be more motivated 

to perpetrate WMD terrorism than they are today. As previously discussed, the 

paucity of WMD terrorism to date is probably more attributable to a lack of 

intent on the part of terrorist groups than to their inability to acquire WMD, 

especially unsophisticated forms of CBW. An increased risk of CBW terrorism in 

the 2030 timeframe will likely be concentrated in more technologically enabled 

small groups or even lone actors who are inherently harder to identify, influence, 

or interdict than larger, organized groups. This would create a growing possibility 

for what Martin Shubik called “Armageddon on the cheap.”98

Overall, we expect WMD terrorism to remain a low-probability, but potentially high-consequence threat. After all, only a single terrorist group needs to have 

the motivation, organization, technical wherewithal, and operational competence to 

transform WMD terrorism from a nightmare to a reality. While it is possible that 

2030 could arrive with no terrorist acquisition or use of CBRN weapons to inflict 

mass casualties, the danger is very real. 

It is impossible to predict future employment of WMD. Some prognosticators have 

made bold predictions as to the certainty of certain WMD employment events occurring within specific timeframes. We foresee greater scope for employment by 
47

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

both states and nonstate actors by 2030, but no one can predict with confidence 

whether and how often such attacks will occur or their severity. 

The prospects for WMD employment are not the result solely of chance. 

Other factors will include the accessibility of these weapons and the extent of 

additional proliferation, the strength of nonproliferation norms and the willingness of the international community to enforce them, the kinds of military threats 

facing countries capable of creating CBRN weapons, how nonstate actors perceive 

the utility of WMD to the achievement of their diverse causes, and the escalation dynamics in armed conflicts between states with WMD capabilities. The perceived success of any initial or early cases of WMD employment would influence 

the likelihood and nature of any subsequent employment. If the employment is 

considered successful, to include a manageable military, economic, and political 

response, it is likely to encourage future employment. If it is unsuccessful, it should 

inhibit subsequent attacks, at least until new approaches to avoiding the pitfalls of 

the unsuccessful attack(s) are devised. 

Denying the ability to predict WMD employment is not a very satisfying 

conclusion, but there appears to be no basis for making a more definitive judgment. U.S. policymakers should view their commitment to policies designed to 

prevent such employment in that light. 

The definition of WMD will remain uncertain and controversial in 2030, and its 

value as an analytic category will be increasingly open to question. The definition of 

WMD will remain controversial. In addition to the longstanding issues identified 

above, some observers want to incorporate new forms of warfare or new technologies, as evident by suggestions that cyber weapons should be considered a form 

of WMD or that nanotechnology might result in the creation of new types of 

weapons capable of causing mass destruction. 

Such discussions, however, open a different question: will the category of 

WMD remain useful during the next two decades? The 21st century strategic environment may require conceptual categories that take the changing nature of 

weapons and the changing vulnerabilities of societies to new and existing types 

of weapons into account. Technological trends appear to permit the development 

of new types of existing forms of WMD that are better targeted, less lethal, and 
48 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

less destructive, which will further complicate our understanding of this category 

of weapons. 

Policy Considerations

Following are some considerations for U.S. policy in light of the foregoing 

observations and judgments about the future nature and role of WMD. 

As regards WMD generally, the United States should anticipate greater challenges to dissuading and preventing WMD proliferation in the future. It should 

undertake investigations to determine to what extent and by what means—technologically, geopolitically, and normatively—these challenges can be blunted so 

as to mitigate their adverse impacts on proliferation prevention. In particular, the 

United States should investigate:

◆ how the nonproliferation benefits long demonstrated by U.S. extended deterrence commitments can be sustained or replaced in an era of rising new powers 

and tighter fiscal constraints 

◆ how the dissuasive force of norms against WMD acquisition and use can 

be sustained or enhanced as new powers arise and possibly more attractive forms 

of WMD emerge 

◆ how the capabilities of national and international nonproliferation monitors 

can be adapted to new technological realities to enable timely recognition and 

response to proliferation.

Assuming that the adverse impacts of these developments on proliferation 

prevention are not wholly avoidable, the United States should anticipate that deterrence will become more central to ensuring that it and its allies are not coerced 

or attacked with WMD. Increased reliance on deterrence will necessitate greater 

emphasis on, and sufficient investment in, key enablers of deterrence including:
49

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

◆ unambiguous capacity to impose unacceptable costs on WMD-armed 

adversaries 

◆ ability to defeat limited WMD attacks, particularly through missile defenses 

◆ ability to attribute WMD attack 

◆ effective strategic communication of our deterrence capabilities and will to 

employ them. 

While it is not known what has most accounted for the paucity of terrorist use of even cruder forms of WMD to date, or at least employment that has 

resulted in mass destruction, the combination of strong international norms, intense law enforcement and military pressure, and improved defenses have likely 

all contributed to this outcome. The United States should sustain and, where possible, intensify this multitude of deliberate obstacles to terrorist acquisition and 

employment of WMD. 

As regards nuclear weapons:

◆ The United States should sustain its strong support for the nuclear nonproliferation regime to mitigate forces tending toward greater nuclear weapons 

proliferation.

◆ At the same time, Washington should preferentially fund the modernization 

of its nuclear weapons arsenal and supporting infrastructure to ensure a credible 

and effective nuclear deterrent to 2030 and beyond. 

◆ Deterring and responding to nuclear weapons threats and potential employment should figure more prominently and systemically in U.S. military plans and 

in the education of military and civilian national security leaders so the Nation is 

better prepared to manage increasing nuclear risks.

As regards chemical and biological weapons:

◆ The United States should anticipate and prepare for the possible reemergence 
50 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

of chemical and biological warfare due to some combination of geopolitical and 

technological change.

◆ Washington should anticipate that it will encounter the employment of hitherto unknown chemical and biological agents and develop a mindset, approaches, 

and capabilities for recognizing and responding to unknown agent attacks.

◆ The Nation should continue to invest in broad-spectrum defensive countermeasures that are better able to recognize, protect against, and treat a wide range 

of chemical and biological threats.

◆ Even as it anticipates and prepares for possible reemergence of chemical 

and biological warfare, Washington should concurrently endeavor to adapt and 

strengthen nonproliferation regimes and norms to dissuade others from searching 

for and utilizing novel chemical and biological weapons. 

◆ The United States should respond strongly to any suspected nonproliferation treaty violations and be prepared to alter its nuclear weapons negative security 

assurances to react to a heightened biological or chemical weapons threat from 

nonnuclear weapons states.99

◆ An early nonproliferation regime challenge is to decide whether and how 

to tighten the current CWC law enforcement exemption to inhibit the further 

pursuit and utilization of low- or nonlethal chemical agents for malign ends.

As regards radiological weapons:

◆ The United States, working with the international community, should 

continue to promote efforts to reduce reliance on highly radioactive materials in 

medical and commercial applications, ensure adequate controls over those that are 

used, and continue to identify and eliminate orphaned material. 

As regards the WMD status of cyber weapons: 

◆ While the future cyber threat may foster consideration of strategic responses comparable to those made to the WMD threat, it would seem inappropriate 
51

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

and possibly disadvantageous to the United States to apply the WMD moniker to 

cyber weapons at this time. 

◆ In addition to the qualitatively different character of cyber from CBRN, 

there is the matter of disarmament diplomacy and international law. WMD have 

been given special priority for elimination or control. Several treaties also place 

specific limitations on the use of WMD, and making cyber a form of WMD 

would automatically make those provisions apply. 

◆ Until the United States better understands whether it wants to develop 

an international regime constraining cyberspace or to maximize its flexibility to 

utilize a capability in which it is the acknowledged world leader, there are no advantages to treating cyber weapons as WMD.
52 

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Notes

1 This section draws on W. Seth Carus, Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”: Revised and Updated, Occasional Paper 8 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2012).

2 See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 

1977, Publication 101, June 1979, 838–841.

3 Carus, Defining, 42, 87.

4 George P. Shultz et al., “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, 

January 4, 2007, A15.

5 The aforementioned efforts to negotiate a treaty prohibiting new forms of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD), dating from the late 1960s, focused mainly on radiological weapons, but were ultimately fruitless. One reason those efforts did not succeed may be that radiological weapons were not considered something that state actors were likely to pursue given 

their perceived lack of military utility. See Jerzy Zaleski, background paper for the discussion 

“New forms of WMD, transparency in armaments, and a comprehensive programme of disarmament—obsolete or ignored?” organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament 

Research and the Geneva Forum, May 6, 2011, 9, available at <www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/new-types-and-systems-of-wmd-consideration-by-the-cd-374.pdf>.

6 For a more comprehensive discussion of international arms control and nonproliferation agreements, see Amy F. Woolf, Mary Beth Nitikin, and Paul K. Kerr, Arms Control 

and Nonproliferation: A Catalogue of Treaties and Agreements, RL33865 (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2012), available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/

RL33865.pdf>.

7 “Libya Completes Destruction of its Category 1 Chemicals,” Organisation for the 

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, February 4, 2014, available at <www.opcw.org/news/

article/libya-completes-destruction-of-its-category-1-chemical-weapons/>.

8 See Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 

Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2013,” available 

at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/145181.pdf>. This is the unclassified version 

of this annual report; classified versions also exist. As this is written, Syria is beginning to 

dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal under international supervision, but it is too early 

to be certain about its ultimate compliance. Moreover, the International Atomic Energy 

Agency continues to have questions regarding Syria’s compliance with its Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. 

9 During a press conference on March 21, 1963, President John F. Kennedy stated, 

“I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face 

a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may [have] these weapons. I regard that as the 

greatest possible danger and hazard.” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 

News conference 52, available at <www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/PressConferences/News-Conference-52.aspx>.
53

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

10 Why states seriously considered or actually initiated nuclear weapons programs but 

then pulled back was examined by Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Robert J. Peters in their 

“nuclear roll back” research project in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University. A description of the project and their findings regarding South Korea and Taiwan are discussed in Hersman and Peters, “Nuclear 

U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback,” Nonproliferation Review

13, no. 3 (November 2006), 539–553.

11 When referring to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons 

employment, we mean their use against groups and not to the use of CBRN agents or 

isotopes for individual assassinations, of which there is a long history that is generally 

treated separately from discussions of WMD. Thus, for example, we do not count the 

2006 murder of former Russian spy Alexander Litvenenko by the contamination of his 

tea with a radioactive isotope.

12 Richard Danzig et al., Aum Shinrikyo: Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological 

and Chemical Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2011), 5, 

32. In the Tokyo subway attack, 13 were killed and approximately 6,000 sought hospital 

treatment (probably only a few hundred were seriously injured). At the Matsumoto residential complex, 8 were killed, and approximately 200 were injured.

13W. Seth Carus, “The Rajneeshees (1984),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of 

Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker, 115–137 (Cambridge, MA: MIT 

Press, 2000).

14 Scott Shane, “F.B.I., Laying Out Evidence, Closes Anthrax Case,” The New York 

Times, February 19, 2010, available at <www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/20anthrax.

html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>.

15 An assessment of the al Qaeda in Iraq chlorine car bomb attacks can be found 

in Michael Knights, “Born of Desperation: AQI’s Chlorine Car Bombs, 2006–2007,” 

in Mohammed M. Hafez and Maria Rasmussen, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of 

Mass Effect, Phase 2,” Workshop Report, appendix IV, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, Center on Contemporary Conflict, January 2012, 62–89.

16 For example, see Gwyn Winfield, “Is This It?” CBRNe World (Summer 2009), 6–7. 

There have also been a number of acid attacks against girls’ schools. One compilation 

of reported chemical attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq is “Chemical weapon terrorism in 

Iraq and Afghanistan,” compiled by William Robert Johnston, last updated September 

3, 2012, available at <www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wmdterrorism-1.html>. The 

accuracy of these reports is unknown.

17 Lisa Bose McDermott, “Texas Actress Pleads Guilty for Ricin-laced Letter Sent to 

Obama,” Reuters, December 10, 2013, available at <www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/10/

us-usa-crime-ricin-idUSBRE9B90ZG20131210>.
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18 Carus, Defining, 42. This calculation excludes the use of poison gas in Nazi concentration camps.

19 See “Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012–13,” Arms Control 

Association, available at <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-ChemicalWeapons-Activity>.

20 White House, “Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of 

Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013,” August 30, 2013, available at <www.whitehouse.

gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-usechemical-weapons-august-21>.

21 Human Rights Watch, “Attacks on Ghouta,” September 10, 2013, available at 

<www.hrw.org/reports/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta-0>.

22 United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, “Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in 

the Ghouta Area of Damascus on August 21, 2013,” available at <www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf>.

23 Adam Entous, Nour Malas, and Rima Abushakra, “As Syrian Chemical Attack 

Loomed, Serious Mishaps Doomed Civilians,” The Wall Street Journal, November 22, 

2013, available at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023039143045

79194203188283242>. According to this account, Hizballah had a specific reason for its 

anger at the Asad regime. Some of its soldiers, fighting in support of the regime, were operating near one of the target areas but were not warned of the attack, and some became 

casualties. 

24 Michael R. Gordon and Steven Lee Myers, “Obama Calls Russian Offer on Syria 

a Possible ‘Breakthrough,’” The New York Times, September 9, 2013, available at <www.

nytimes.com/2013/09/10/world/middleeast/kerry-says-syria-should-hand-over-allchemical-arms.html?_r=0>.

25 Reports of the Syrian regime’s employment of chlorine gas against opponents on 

multiple occasions during the first half of 2014 temper the apparent victory of Syria’s 

accession to the CWC. While chlorine is much less lethal than the nerve agents Syria has 

agreed to abandon, its use as an instrument of warfare would still be abhorrent and a clear 

violation of the CWC.

26 The price of the Western nations’ nonproliferation victory in Syria could prove 

to be the victory of the Syrian regime and its Iranian and Russian allies in the Syrian 

civil war. 

27 Neither Israel nor the United States acknowledges that Israel possesses nuclear 

weapons, but it is widely believed it does. While it is reported that the Israeli government hastily assembled two nuclear weapons on the eve of the 1967 war, there is also 

evidence that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser thought it would take Israel time 

to develop a weapon and in any case doubted that the Israelis would be able to employ 
55

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

them. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). By 

1973, however, Egypt and Syria are much less likely to have discounted the existence of 

Israeli nuclear weapons, but they still invaded. Israel certainly perceived the Egyptian and 

Syrian invasions as an existential threat and accordingly went on nuclear alert, but Egypt 

and Syria apparently did not intend to drive into the heart of Israel and threaten its 

existence but only to seize territory lost in 1967 and then negotiate a favorable termination of hostilities. Elbridge Colby et al., The Israeli “Nuclear Alert” of 1973: Deterrence and 

Signaling in Crisis (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2013). If this in fact was 

Egypt and Syria’s plan, it was an extraordinarily risky one, but that would be consistent 

with the aforementioned observation that a state’s possession of nuclear weapons is useful 

for deterring serious threats to vital interests.

28 The ongoing modernization and expansion of China’s nuclear force, however, 

should afford it more counterforce and preemptive strike options if it so chooses. For a 

review of China’s nuclear strategy, see M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s 

Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force 

Structure,” International Security 35, no. 2 (2010), 48–87.

29 For a discussion of Russian nuclear doctrine, see Stephen J. Blank, “Russia and 

Nuclear Weapons,” in Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Stephen J. 

Blank, 293–364 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011). For background 

on Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, see Feroz Hassan Khan, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear 

War in South Asia,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Reining in the Risk, ed. Henry D. Sokolski, 63–101 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).

30 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that “there remains a narrow set 

of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring conventional or [chemical and biological weapons] attack against the United States or its allies 

and partners,” but also indicated “[t]he United States will continue to reduce the role of 

nuclear weapons in deterring nonnuclear attacks.” The 2010 NPR also stated unambiguously that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any 

nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the NPT and in compliance with its nuclear 

nonproliferation obligations even if such states attacked the United States with chemical 

or biological weapons. Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, April 2010), available at <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

31 Nuclear weapons may, however, embolden some who possess them to pursue 

coercion by other means in the belief that their nuclear weapons will deter an unacceptable response from the target. Pakistan may have had this in mind when it instigated 

what became the 1999 Kargil conflict. See, for example, S. Paul Kapur, Nuclear Weapons, 

Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 125. 
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32 Some prefer to refer to a “taboo” on the use of nuclear weapons, while others find 

the term “norm” too value-laden and prefer a “tradition” of nonuse of such weapons.

33 Maurice Isserman, The Korean War (New York, Facts on File, Inc., 2003), 20.

34 Negative security assurances refer to assurances made by nuclear-armed states not to 

use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states that do not have nuclear weapons. 

They may be caveated; for example, current U.S. negative security assurances are extended 

to nonnuclear-armed states that also are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. For further information on negative security assurances, see Nuclear 

Threat Initiative, “Proposed International Legally-Binding Negative Security Assurances,” 

available at <www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-internationally-legally-bindingnegative-security-assurances/>.

35 For a discussion of U.S. retaliation-only doctrine, see Jonathan B. Tucker, War of 

Nerves (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), 60, 124, 126–127, 155, 217.

36 Beirut Al-Akhbar Online in English, October 14, 2013, reporting on an interview 

with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.

37 Ibid.

38 “The United States judges that North Korea may still consider the use of biological 

weapons as an option, contrary to the BWC [Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention]. . . . The United States is concerned, based on information available during the 

reporting period, that Syria, a signatory to the BWC, may be engaged in activities that 

would violate its obligations under the BWC if it were a State Party to the Convention.” 

See Department of State.

39 In November 1995, Chechen rebels alerted the Russian press that they had buried 

a radiological device in a Moscow Park. A partially buried container of cesium was 

found where the rebels indicated. In December 1998, however, Russian security forces 

reported that they discovered and defused a radiological bomb near a railway outside of 

the Chechnya capital of Grozny. See Lexi Krock and Rebecca Dreusser, “Dirty Bomb: 

Chronology of Events,” NOVA, available at <www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/dirtybomb/chrono.

html>. In June 2002, U.S. authorities arrested Jose Padilla on suspicion of planning to 

build and detonate a dirty bomb in a U.S city. That accusation, however, was not part of 

the charges brought against him in his trial, at which he was convicted of other terrorismrelated crimes. See “Jury finds Padilla guilty on terror charges,” CNN.com, August 16, 

2007, available at <www.cnn.com/2007/US/08/16/padilla.verdict/index.html>.

40 The increased casualty potential for radiological dispersion devices that disperse 

respirable radioactive articles in a nonexplosive way is discussed in Peter D. Zimmerman 

and Cheryl Loeb, Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited, Defense Horizons 38 (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, January 2004).

41 For an extended discussion of al Qaeda interest in and efforts related to WMD, 

see Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality
57

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010), 

available at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf>.

42 Danzig et al., 29–34, provides a detailed review of Aum’s sarin program.

43 Jonathan B. Tucker and Jason Pate, “Minnesota Patriots Council (1991),” in Toxic 

Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker, 

159–83 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: 

The Illicit Use of Biological Agents since 1900 (Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, 2001).

44 Mowatt-Larssen.

45 Concise descriptions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, “The 

Nuclear Terrorism Convention,” and other arms control and nonproliferation agreements 

are provided in Amy F. Woolf, Mary Beth Nitikin, and Paul K. Kerr, Arms Control and 

Nonproliferation: A Catalogue of Treaties and Agreements, RL33865 (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2012), available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/

RL33865.pdf>.

46 In September 2012 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the 

first U.S. commercial license for enriching uranium via laser isotopic separation to Global 

Laser Enrichment, a joint venture by General Electric and Hitachi. “Laser enrichment 

update: NRC issues license,” Optics.org, September 27, 2012, available at <http://optics.

org/news/3/9/34>.

47 Oliver Tickell, “The Promise and Peril of Thorium,” WMD Junction (Monterey, 

CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 5, 2012), available at 

<http://wmdjunction.com/121031_thorium_reactors.htm>.

48 Mark Schneider, “The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 

U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, National Institute Press, publication no. 0003, 2006.

49 Suzanne L. Jones and Frank N. von Hippel, “The Question of Pure Fusion Explosions under the CTBT,” Science & Global Security 7, no. 2 (1998), 129–150.

50 Geoff Brumfiel, “Scientists Say Their Giant Laser Has Produced Fusion Energy,” 

National Public Radio, February12, 2014, available at <www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2014/02/12/275896094/scientists-say-their-giant-laser-has-produced-nuclearfusion>.

51 These conclusions are not materially different than those in Committee on 

Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation 

Biowarfare Threats, National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future 

of the Life Sciences (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006).

52 For a useful review, see Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology,” The New Atlantis, no. 12 (2006), 25–45.

53 Many of these developments are discussed in the “Report on the Scientific 

Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology for the Third Special 
58 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” RC-3/DG.1, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 

Weapons, October 29, 2012, available at <www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=15865>. 

54 Mark L. Wheelis, “Biotechnology and Biochemical Weapons,” The Nonproliferation 

Review 9, no. 1 (2002), 48–53.

55 The international community has discussed this issue for more than 30 years. Jerzy 

Zaleski concisely summarizes the ultimately unproductive multidecade effort to define 

and ban new types of WMD as follows: “The history of the consideration of the item 

‘New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons’ shows how 

the original list of weapons that could have effects comparable to those of acknowledged 

weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) became shorter and shorter, as technical problems with weaponization of some proposed phenomena with potential 

military application led to the questioning of their military effectiveness. After decades of 

consideration of the item, only radiological weapons remain on the agenda of the Conference [of the Committee on Disarmament] although, paradoxically, there seems to be no 

serious interest in the Conference to negotiate a ban on such weapons.” See Zaleski, 9. 

56 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 20, 2012, available at <http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/

news/18185//>. 

57 Studies consulted included U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: 

Alternative Worlds, December 2012, available at <www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends>; European Union Institute for Security 

Studies, Global Trends 2030: Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World, 2011, 

available at <www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/espas-report-global-trends2030-citizens-in-an-interconnected-and-polycentric-world/>; U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment 2010, February 10, 2010, available at <www.jfcom.

mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf>; United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Director General, Concepts and Doctrine (DCDC), Global Strategic Trends—Out 

to 2040, Strategic Trends Programme, 4th ed., January 12, 2010, available at <www.mod.

uk/NR/rdonlyres/6AAFA4FA-C1D3-4343-B46F-05EE80314382/0/GST4_v9_Feb10.

pdf>; UK Ministry of Defence, DCDC, Future Character of Conflict, available at <www.

mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/Concepts/FutureCharacterOfConflict.htm>; UK Ministry of Defence, DCDC, The Future Land Operational 

Concept 2008, 2008, available at <www.scribd.com/doc/32871896/UK-MOD-FutureLand-Operational-Concept>; The Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Future Policy Survey: 

A New Foundation for the Netherlands Armed Forces, 2010, available at <www.deruijter.net/

uk/wp-content/uploads/article-Ministry-of-Defence.pdf>; Canadian Department of National Defence, The Future Security Environment 2008–2030, January 27, 2009, available 
59

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

at <www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/documents/CFD%20FSE/Signed_Eng_FSE_10Jul09_eng.

pdf>; and International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012, Executive Summary, 

available at <www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/name,33339,en.

html>. We also met with experts from the following think tanks during February 2012: 

Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA; 

Monterey Institute for International Studies, Middlebury University, Monterey, CA; and 

Center for Science, Technology and Policy, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM.

58 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030—Alternative Worlds, iv.

59 Ibid., 9.

60 Ibid., iv.

61 European Union Institute for Security Studies, 20.

62 UK Ministry of Defence, DCDC, Future Character of Conflict, 31.

63 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030—Alternative Worlds, 48.

64 European Union Institute for Security Studies, 129–137.

65 UK Ministry of Defence, Director General, Concepts and Doctrine (DCDC), 

Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2040, 17.

66 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030—Alternative Worlds, 71.

67 Gregg Easterbrook, “The End to War?” New Republic 232, no. 20 (2005), 18–21. 

A longer exposition of this thesis is Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why 

Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011).

68 Focusing on the Cold War confrontation, John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: 

Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security 10, no. 4 

(1986), 99–142, pointed to nuclear arsenals, the inherent stability of bipolar international 

systems, the absence of conflicts over resources between the competing blocs, the muting 

of the ideological dimension of the contest, limited domestic pressures promoting confrontation, and the positive effect of what he called the “reconnaissance revolution.” More 

recently, the Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2009/2010 (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2011), observed, “While the diversity of possible explanations for the decline in international conflict complicates the task of analysis, the fact 

that the Long Peace between the major powers is supported by so many different pillars 

almost certainly helps account for its durability.” Human Security Report Project, Human 

Security Report 2009/2010, 3.

69 Human Security Report Project, 3. Possible explanations include theories that 

liberal democracies rarely fight one another, globalization makes countries increasingly economically interdependent, the costs of conducting wars exceeds their perceived 

economic benefits, the growth of antiwar ideas and the decline of militaristic ideologies 

make war less attractive to political elites, the growth of multinational organizations has 

created conditions that make war less likely, the growing intensity of mediation activities 

makes settlements more likely (even if temporary), the decline in the number of countries 
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with youthful populations reduces a characteristic correlated with instability and conflict, 

and international alliances (especially the security architecture organized by the United 

States, supported by its nuclear deterrence) provide a protective shield against aggression 

for many countries.

70 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility (Fairfax, VA: Center for Global Policy, School of Public Policy, 

George Mason University, and the Center for Systemic Peace, 2011), 4.

71 Hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling technologies are already 

enabling the exploitation of gas and oil deposits in shale formations and other difficult or 

remote locations. The melting of Artic sea ice, a function of climate change, is expected 

to open up access to large oil and gas deposits beneath the Arctic Ocean. Technology has 

driven the dramatic expansion of global agricultural output over the last half century. 

72 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030—Alternative Worlds, viii.

73 Ibid., 36.

74 Ibid., 50.

75 Erik Gartzke, “Could Climate Change Precipitate Peace?” Journal of Peace Research

49, no. 1 (2012), 177–192. A critique of the “water causes war” thesis is offered by Wendy 

Barnaby, “Do Nations Go to War over Water?” Nature 458, no. 7236 (2009), 282–283. 

For a pessimistic view offered two decades ago, see Peter H. Gleick, “Water and Conflict: 

Fresh Water Resources and International Security,” International Security 18, no. 1 (1993), 

79–112.

76 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030—Alternative Worlds, 13, 15.

77 UK Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2040, 129.

78 European Union Institute for Security Studies, 13.

79 UK Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2040, 15.

80 European Union Institute for Security Studies, 13.

81 U.S. Joint Forces Command, 58–59.

82 UK Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2040, 16.

83 The classic examples are South Korea and Taiwan. Both countries, reliant on U.S. 

security guarantees, had nuclear weapons programs cancelled under pressure from Washington. See Hersman and Peters, 539–553.

84 A study by the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board, Report 

on Discouraging a Cascade of Nuclear Weapons States, October 19, 2007, 9, explicitly notes, 

“the states involved in a possible cascade—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Saudi 

Arabia, Egypt, Brazil, etc.—would not be rogue states,” available at <http://2001-2009.

state.gov/documents/organization/95786.pdf>.

85 Defense Science Board, Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, January 2014).
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The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

86 Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2013,” 12–13.

87 They stress that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an arms control treaty and should concentrate on disarmament until all chemical weapons (CW) 

possessor states are CWC members and all CW are destroyed. This inflexible position 

has made it difficult for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to 

meaningfully address nonproliferation issues such as terrorism or improving the efficacy 

of industry inspections.

88 For example, “Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers” is one of the “urgent” steps toward elimination 

identified in Shultz et al. Article VI of the NPT also couches the States Parties’ obligation 

to work toward the abolishment of their nuclear weapons in the context of “general and 

complete disarmament.”

89 Mark McDonald, “North Korea Suggests Libya Should Have Kept Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, March 24, 2011, available at <www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/

world/asia/25korea.html>.

90 Even nonstate groups such as Hizballah or Hamas should be able to construct a 

nuclear device given access to fissile material, according to the expert evaluation in Carson 

Mark et al., “Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?” in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The 

Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Paul 

Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, 55–65 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987). Some 

experts remain skeptical that any terrorist group could or would, as articulated in Brian 

Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008).

91 South Korea seeks Washington’s agreement to revise their bilateral Section 123 

agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation to authorize South Korea’s utilization of its 

“pyro-processing” technology, which the United States considers a plutonium reprocessing 

technology. The current 123 agreement prohibits South Korea from reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium. The United States and South Korea recently agreed to extend 

the existing agreement for 2 more years to permit time to resolve this issue.

92 Putin.

93 See “The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare,” 

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, n.d., available at <http://cns.miis.edu/

stories/02110b.htm>, for a discussion of the Moscow theater hostage crisis. 

94 Similarly, the international reaction to reports of the Syrian regime’s employment 

of chlorine gas against opponents on multiple occasions during the first half of 2014 has 

been limited as none of those incidents has been associated with large-scale fatalities.

95 The influential and timely Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, “Attacks of 

Ghouta,” drew heavily on the extensive social media accounts of the attacks, as HRW 

representatives explained at a workshop at National Defense University January 10, 2014.
62 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

96 Within the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency, National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission have programs 

to reduce the dangers from radiological materials, including through recovering orphaned 

and no longer needed radiological sources, by ensuring accountability for radiological materials, and developing substitutes for radioactive isotopes deemed particularly dangerous. 

NNSA also works with other countries to achieve the same objectives.

97 That at least some terrorist groups might see an advantage in possessing but not 

using a nuclear weapon is suggested by Lewis A Dunn, Can Al Qaeda Be Deterred from 

Using Nuclear Weapons? (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2005).

98 Martin Shubik, “Terrorism, Technology, and the Socioeconomics of Death,” Comparative Strategy 16, no. 4 (1997), 399–415.

99 Current U.S. policy excludes any nuclear response in the event of biological or 

chemical weapons use but explicitly leaves open the possibility of reevaluating this policy 

for biological weapons. See Department of Defense, 16.
63

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction

About the Authors

John P. Caves, Jr., is the Deputy Director of the Center for the Study of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU). He joined the Center in 2003, where nuclear 

and chemical weapons matters have been the principal focus of his work. Prior 

to joining the Center, Mr. Caves served as the Deputy Director for Counterproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). From 1997 to 

1999, he was the Country Director for Turkey, Spain, and Cyprus in the Office 

of European Policy, OSD. From 1986 to 1997, he served in a variety of positions within the Defense Security Assistance Agency, lastly as Deputy Director 

for Plans. In 1985, he addressed nuclear weapons policy issues in the Office of the 

Defense Adviser, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mr. 

Caves received his Master of Public Affairs degree in International Relations from 

Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He also holds a Master of Science degree in National Security Strategy from 

the National War College (Distinguished Graduate) and Bachelor of Arts degree 

from Boston College (summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa), where he majored in 

Political Science.

Dr. W. Seth Carus is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense 

University. His research focuses on issues related to biological warfare, including threat assessment, biodefense, and the role of the Department of Defense in 

responding to biological agent use. He also studies allegations of biological agent 

use and has written a working paper titled “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century” and several articles on that 

subject. He has been at NDU since 1997. From 2003 to 2013 he also served as the 

Center’s Deputy Director. From 2001 to 2003, Dr. Carus was detailed to the Office of the Vice President, where he was the Senior Advisor to the Vice President 

for Biodefense. Before assuming that position, he was on the staff of the National 

Preparedness Review commissioned to recommend changes in homeland security 

organization and supported the Office of Homeland Security while it was being 

established. Prior to joining NDU, Dr. Carus was a research analyst in the Center 
64 

CSWMD Occasional Paper 10

for Naval Analyses. From 1991 to 1994, he was a member of the Policy Planning 

Staff in OSD Policy. Before joining the government, he was a research fellow at 

the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Dr. Carus has a Ph.D. from The 

Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland.

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Occasional Paper Series

Occasional Paper 9

Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution

Susan J. Koch

June 2012

Occasional Paper 8

Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”

(Revised and Updated)

W. Seth Carus

January 2012

Occasional Paper 7

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

Looking Back, Looking Ahead 

Paul I. Bernstein, John P. Caves, Jr., and W. Seth Carus

October 2009

Occasional Paper 6

International Partnerships to Combat Weapons 

of Mass Destruction 

Paul I. Bernstein

May 2008

For additional information, including requests for publications and instructor’s notes, 

please contact the Center directly at WMDWebmaster@ndu.edu or (202) 685-4234 or visit 

the Center’s Web site at wmdcenter.dodlive.mil.