MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2024 ME	12

Docket: Pen-22-257

Argued: April	6,	2023

Decided: January	30,	2024

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and MEAD,	JABAR,	HORTON,	CONNORS,	LAWRENCE,	and	DOUGLAS, JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

RALPH	A.	TRIPP	JR.

LAWRENCE,	J.

[¶1]	 Ralph	A.	Tripp Jr. appeals	from	a	judgment	of	conviction,	entered	by	

the	 trial	 court	 (Penobscot	 County,	 Anderson,	 J.),	 for	 several	 drug-trafficking	

offenses,	possession	of	a	firearm	by	a	prohibited	person, and	criminal	forfeiture	

of property.		Tripp	argues that he	should	be	immune	from	prosecution	for	his	

drug-related	offenses, that	the	State’s	conduct during	its	opening	statement	and	

closing	 argument constituted	 error, and	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 erred	 by	 not

providing the	jury	with	clear	instructions.		We	conclude	that Maine’s immunity	

statutes do	not	apply in	 this	case, that any	prosecutorial	error did	not	affect	

Tripp’s	 substantial	 rights, and	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 sufficiently	 corrected	 any	

potential	confusion	stemming	 from	its	initial	jury	instructions.		We	therefore	

affirm the	judgment.
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I.		BACKGROUND

A. Factual	Background

[¶2]		“Viewed	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	jury’s	verdict,	the	record	

supports	the	following	facts.”		State	v.	McLaughlin,	2018	ME	97,	¶	2,	189	A.3d	

262.		Tripp	and	his	wife,	Amanda	Tripp,	resided	in	a	room at	a	rooming house	

located	in	Bangor.		After	the	Tripps	moved	into	the	rooming house,	residents	of	

the	building	noticed	an	increase	in	the	number	of	visitors	to	the	building,	both	

during	the	day	and at night,	with	the	most	traffic	occurring	on	the	weekends.		

Residents	 found	 hypodermic	 needles	 outside	 the	 building	 and	 in	 one	 of	 the	

shared	 bathrooms.	 	 Residents	 also	 frequently	 observed	 the Tripps	 letting	

visitors	into	the	building;	the	visitors typically	stayed	at	the	rooming house for	

less	 than	 fifteen	minutes.	 	On	multiple	 occasions,	 two	 prior	 residents	 of	 the	

rooming house	received	or	purchased	scheduled	drugs	from	Amanda	or	Tripp.		

[¶3]		On	the	morning	of	April	17,	2021,	Tripp	called	9-1-1	to	report	that	

a	person	was	unconscious	in	one	of	the	shared	bathrooms	of	the	rooming house.		

Soon	thereafter,	the	Bangor	Fire	Department arrived	on	the	scene,	and	Tripp	

let	 them into	 the	 rooming house	and then	directed	 them	 upstairs.	 	Once the	

Bangor	Fire	Department	was	upstairs,	the	Tripps	went	into	their	room,	denied	

knowing	 the	person,	and	refused	 to	answer	 the	paramedic’s	questions	about	
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the	person.		The	paramedics	found	the	person	in	the	shared	bathroom	with	his	

head	under	the	sink	and	his	feet	extending	into	the	hallway,	unconscious,	not	

breathing,	and	without	a	pulse.		Because	the	person’s	core	body	temperature	

was still	warm,	the	paramedics	attempted	to	revive	him.		After	their	attempts	

to	 revive	 the	 person	 failed,	 the	 paramedics	 pronounced	 him	 dead.	 	 The	

decedent’s	cause	of	death	was later determined	to	be	acute	intoxication	from	

the	combined	effects	of	cocaine,	heroin,	fentanyl,	methamphetamine,	ethanol,	

methylphenidate,	 sertraline,	 hydroxyzine,	 alprazolam,	 clonazepam,	 and	

buprenorphine.		

[¶4]		Bangor	Police	arrived	on	the	scene	while	the	paramedics	were	still	

treating	the	decedent.		Tripp	exited	his room after	a	police	officer	knocked, and	

he	 was	 arrested	 under an	 outstanding warrant.	 	 Because	 Tripp	 appeared	

intoxicated,	 he	 was	 transported	 to	 the	 hospital.	 	 At	 the	 hospital, he	 was	

questioned	by	a	police	officer.	 Tripp disclosed	the	decedent’s	first	name	to	the	

officer	and	said	that	the	decedent had	been	in	Tripp’s	room	on	a	few	occasions.	

[¶5]		While	executing	a	search	warrant	for Tripp’s	room,	the	police	seized	

a	 handgun	 with	 ammunition; approximately	 twenty-two	 grams	 of	 a	

fentanyl-heroin	 blend; thirty	 grams	 of	 cocaine; three	 grams	 of	

methamphetamine;	 various	 drug paraphernalia,	 including previously	 used	
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Narcan	 packaging and hypodermic	 needles; and	 baggies	 with	 powdery	

substances in	them.		The	police	also	seized	Amanda’s	phone,	which	contained	

several	 text	messages	regarding	drug	 transactions	 that	either	were	intended	

for Tripp	or	referenced	Tripp.		In	addition,	while	Tripp	was	being	admitted	to	

the	hospital, the	police	seized $1,138	in	cash	and	an	unknown	number	of	small	

bags	of	cocaine	from	Tripp’s	person.		

B. Procedural	History

[¶6]	 	 The	 State	 charged	 Tripp	 by	 complaint	 on	 April	 20,	 2021,	 with	

various	offenses,	and	a	grand	jury	indicted	him on	July	30,	2021.		The	State	later

filed	two	superseding	indictments,	one	on	September	29,	2021,	and	the	other	

on	November	24,	2021.		The	last indictment	charged	Tripp	with	one	count	of	

aggravated	trafficking	 of	a	 scheduled drug	 that	in	 fact	 caused	 the	 death	 of	a	

person	 (Class	 A), 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1105-A(1)(K)	 (2023); three	 counts	 of	

aggravated	 trafficking	 of	 scheduled	 drugs:	 fentanyl	 powder,	 cocaine,	 and	

methamphetamine	(Class	A), 17-A	M.R.S.	§ 1105-A(1)(B)(1),	(M)	(2023); one	

count	 of	 possession	 of	 a	 firearm	 by	 a	 prohibited	 person	 (Class	 C), 15 M.R.S.	
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§ 393(1)(A-1)(1) (2023); and	 two	 counts	 of	 criminal	 forfeiture,	 15	 M.R.S.	

§ 5826	(2023).

1		

1. Motion	to	Dismiss

[¶7]	 	 Tripp	 filed	 a	 motion	 to	 dismiss	 the	 indictment	 on	

September 24, 2021,	 and	 the	 trial	 court	 (A.	 Murray,	 J.)	 held	 a	 hearing	 on	

October 20,	 2021.	 	 In	 his	 motion,	 Tripp	 argued	 that	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1111-B	

(2021)2 barred	 prosecution	 of	 the	 State’s	 aggravated	 trafficking	 charges.		

Specifically,	 Tripp	 argued	 that	 the	 aggravated	 trafficking	 charges	 were	

“possession-based	conduct,” and	 therefore	he	was	immune	 from	prosecution	

1		On	April	13,	2022,	prior	to	the	start	of	trial,	Tripp	pleaded	guilty to	the charge	of	forfeiture	of	a	

firearm and	requested	that	the	trial	court be	the	finder	of	fact	with	respect	to	the charge	of forfeiture	

of	cash.		

2		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1111-B	(2021)	provides,

A	person	who	in	good	faith	seeks	medical	assistance	for	or	administers	naloxone	

hydrochloride	 to	 another	 person	 experiencing	 a	 drug-related	 overdose	 or	 who	 is	

experiencing	a	drug-related	overdose	and	is	in	need	of	medical	assistance	may	not	be	

arrested	or	prosecuted	for	a	violation	of	section	1107-A,	1108,	1111	or	1111-A	or	a	

violation	 of	 probation	 as	 authorized	 by	 chapter	 49	 if	 the	 grounds	 for	 arrest	 or	

prosecution	 are	 obtained	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 person’s	 seeking	 medical	 assistance,	

administering	naloxone	hydrochloride	or	experiencing	a	drug-related	overdose.

Amendments	 to	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1111-B	 (2021) became	 effective after	 Tripp’s	 crimes	 were	

committed but	prior	to	Tripp’s	conviction	and	appeal,	though	these amendments	are	not	relevant	for	

the	purposes	of	this	appeal.		See	P.L.	2021,	ch.	299,	§ C-1	(effective	Oct.	18,	2021);	P.L.	2021,	ch.434,	

§	 8	 (effective	 Oct.	 18,	 2021).	 	 Relevant	 to	 this	 appeal,	 however,	 are	 the	 subsequent	 substantive	

amendments	to	section	1111-B	that	were	made	while	Tripp’s	appeal	was	pending.		See	P.L. 2021,	ch.	

724,	§	1 (effective	Aug.	8,	2022);	P.L.	2021, ch. 759,	§ C-1	(effective	Aug. 8, 2022) (codified	at	17-A	

M.R.S.	§	1111-B	(2023)).		Therefore,	where	we	cite	the	2021	version	of	section	1111-B,	we	refer	to	

the	version	of	the	statute	in	effect	prior	to	the	amendments	effective	October	18,	2021.		Where	we	

cite	the	2023	version	of	the	statute,	we	refer	to	the	most	recently	amended	and	current	version	of

section	1111-B,	which	became	effective on August 8, 2022.
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under	section	1111-B,	because	 the	indictment	based	 the	charges	only	on	 the	

quantity	of	drugs	seized	and	did	not	allege that he	manufactured,	transferred,	

or	sold	any	scheduled	drugs.		The	trial	court	denied	Tripp’s	motion	to	dismiss	

on	November 1,	2021,	and	reasoned,

The	exemption	from	criminal	liability	statute	clearly	identifies	the	

four	 crimes	 for	 which	 a	 defendant	may	 not	 be	 prosecuted	if	 the	

grounds	 for	 the	 charge	 were	 obtained	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 person	

seeking	 medical	 assistance.	 	 The	 legislature	 did	 not	 include	

[a]ggravated	 [t]rafficking	 or	 any	 drug	 trafficking	 charge	 in	 the	

statutory	provision	exempting	a	defendant	from	criminal	liability.		

Nor	did	the	legislature	use	any	broad	language	about	possession	of	

drugs	in	the	[e]xemption	from	criminal	liability	statute.

2. Jury	Trial

[¶8]		The	trial	court (Anderson,	J.)	conducted	a	jury	trial	on	April	13-15	

and 19-21, 2022.		During	its	opening	statement,	 the	State	commented	on	 the	

events	that	occurred	prior	to	Tripp	calling	9-1-1,	as	well	as	Tripp’s	decision	to	

enter	his	room and	his	refusal	to	answer	the	paramedics’	questions.3		During	

closing	argument,	the	State	again	commented	on	Tripp’s	refusal	to	answer	the	

paramedics’	questions.

4 At	a	later	stage	of	the	State’s	argument,	the	trial	court

3		The	prosecutor	stated,	“You’ll	hear	that	[Tripp] and	Amanda	shut	themselves	into	[their	room],	

denied	knowing	[the	decedent],	and	refused	to	answer	even	basic	questions	from	the	medics	who	

were	trying	to	save	[the	decedent’s] life.”		

4		The	prosecutor	argued,	

You	heard	 that	[Tripp] and	Amanda	.	.	. shut	 themselves	into	[their	room] and	

wouldn’t	answer	questions	from	the	EMTs	or	paramedics.		They	wouldn’t	admit	to	
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sustained	Tripp’s	objection	to	the	prosecution’s comment,“And	I’m	going	to	ask	

you,	when	you	are	deliberating,	don’t	compromise	on	[the	decedent’s]	life,”	and	

issued	a	curative	instruction.5

[¶9]		At	 the	close	of	evidence	on	April	20,	2022,	 the	trial	court denied	

Tripp’s	motion	for	a	judgment	of	acquittal.		The	trial	court proceeded	to	orally	

instruct	the	jurors	and	then	gave	the jurors	a	written	version	of	its	instructions.		

At	one	point	during	the	oral	jury	instructions,	the	trial	court stated	that	it	was	

not	reading	aloud	a portion	of	the	instructions	because	the	instructions	were	

“exactly	the	same” as	those	it	gave	earlier	for	the	other	possession charges.		The	

knowing	this	person;	wouldn’t	say	who	he	was;	wouldn’t	help	to	identify	the	patient	

so	that	maybe	they	could	find	his	medical	history	or	anything	else	that	might	help	

them	to	try	to	resuscitate	this	person.		They	wouldn’t	tell	[the	EMTs	or	paramedics]

what	he	took.		Nothing.		They	were	panicked.		They	turtled.		They	shelled	themselves	

in	that	apartment	and	willed	it	to	all	go	away.		But	it	did	not.		They	did	not	expect	the	

neighbors	to	point	the	police	directly	to	[their	room],	which	they	did.

In	 addition,	 the	 prosecutor	 argued	 that	 Tripp	 “dragged	 the	 [decedent’s]	 body	 outside	 [of	 his	

room]”	and	that	“there,	under	the	sink,	is	likely	where	[the	decedent]	drew	his	last	breath	and	died,	

alone,	abandoned	by	his	friend,	abandoned	by	his	dealers	.	.	.	.”		

5		The	trial	court’s	limiting	instruction	stated,	in	full,	

I	just	wanted	to	say	something	briefly	based	on	the	last	comments	that	were	just	

made.	 	 I’ll	 be	 giving	 you	 full	 instructions	 on	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 case,	 including	

deliberation,	including	giving	up	a	well-reasoned	belief	simply	because	you	want	to	

go	home,	and	I’m	going	to	advise	that	you	don’t	do	that.	 I’m	going	to	talk	about	jury	

deliberations	and	giving	up	beliefs,	things	like	that.		So,	I	will	be	giving	you	the	proper	

instructions	on	that,	and	-- and	the	word	compromise	on	his	death	was	mentioned.		

It’s	not	correct	to	appeal	to	[a]	jury’s	sympathies	or	emotions	or	things	like	that	in	

an	argument.		I	will	be	telling	you	that	you	rationally	look	at	the	facts,	and	you	make	

your	findings	based	on	a	rational	application	of	the	facts,	and	you	come	out	and	give	

us	your	ver	-- your	verdict,	and	that	is	basically	what	you’re	going	to	have	to	do.
8

trial	 court, however, clarified	 that	 the	 jurors	 could	 read	 the	 skipped	

instructions	later	if	they	 felt	that	they	needed	to do	so.		The	oral	and	written	

instructions	also	referenced	the	attorneys’ explanations of	the	statutory	terms

“contributing	factor”	and	“cause.” In	addition,	the	oral	and	written	instructions	

directed	 the	jurors	 to	decide	 the	aggravated	 trafficking	charge	 first	and	only	

address	 lesser	 included	 offenses	 if	 necessary;	 to	 skip	 consideration	 of	 the	

charge	of	aggravated	trafficking	in	fentanyl	powder;	and to decide	the	charge	

of	trafficking	in	cocaine.	 The	trial	court later	issued	further	instructions	to	the	

jury	to	clarify the	order	of	the	jury’s analysis.		

[¶10]		As	to	the	count	charging	Tripp	with	trafficking	in	scheduled	drugs	

that	 contributed	 to	 the	 death	 of	 the	 decedent,	 the	jury	 returned	a	 not	guilty	

verdict,	 but	 the	 jury	 found	 Tripp	 guilty	 of	 the	 lesser	 included	 offense	 of	

aggravated	 trafficking	 in	 scheduled	 drugs (Class	 A),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 1105-A(1)(M).	 	 The	 jury	 also	 found	 Tripp	 guilty	 of	 trafficking in	 fentanyl	

powder,	cocaine,	and	methamphetamine,	and	of illegal	possession	of	a	firearm.		

The	trial	court separately	found	that	the	$1,138	seized	from	Tripp was	subject	

to	criminal	forfeiture.		
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3. Sentencing	

[¶11]		The	trial	court held	a	sentencing	hearing	on	July	18,	2022.		With	

respect	 to	 the	 charge	 of aggravated	 trafficking	 in	 fentanyl, the	 trial	 court

sentenced	Tripp	to	incarceration	for	a	term	of	twenty	years	with	all	but	twelve	

years	suspended	and	four	years	of	probation.		The	trial	court	sentenced	Tripp

to	incarceration	 for	terms	of	twelve	years each	 for	the	charges	of	aggravated	

trafficking	in	 cocaine	and	methamphetamine,	for	a	 term	 of	ten	 years	 for	 the	

lesser	included	offense	of	aggravated	trafficking	in	scheduled	drugs,	and	for	a	

term	of	three	years	for	illegal	possession	of	a	firearm,	with	each	sentence	to run

concurrently with	 his twenty-year sentence for	 aggravated	 trafficking	 in	

fentanyl powder.		Tripp	timely	appealed.		M.R.	App. P. 2B(b)(1).

II.		DISCUSSION

A. Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1111-B	(2023)	does	not	retroactively	apply	and

the	appropriate	version	of	the	immunity	statute	to	be	applied	in	this	

case	 is	17-A	M.R.S.	 § 1111-B	 (2021),	which	was	the	 version	of	 the	

statute	in	effect	at	the	time	that	Tripp’s	crimes	were	committed.

[¶12]		Tripp	argues	that	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1111-B	(2023) should	retroactively	

apply	to	this	case—rather	than	17-A M.R.S.	§	1111-B	(2021) applying—and	that	
10

the	more	 recently	 amended	 statute would	 provide	 him	 with	immunity	 from	

prosecution	for	all	charges	brought	against	him.6		

[¶13]	 	 “We	 review	 de	 novo	 whether	 a	 statutory	 amendment	 will	 be	

applied	retroactively	or	prospectively.”		MacImage	of	Me.,	LLC	v.	Androscoggin	

Cnty.,	2012	ME	44,	¶	21,	40	A.3d	975.		When	an	action	is pending	and	a statute	

applicable	 to	 that	 action	 is	 amended,	 “the	 legislatively	 created	 rule	 of	

construction	set	forth	in	1	M.R.S.	§ 302	(2023)	applies.”	 State	v.	Beeler,	2022	

ME	47,	¶ 1 n.1,	281 A.3d 637.		In	relevant	part,	section	302	provides,

The	repeal	or	amendment	of	an	Act	or	ordinance	does	not	affect	

any	punishment,	penalty	or	forfeiture	incurred	before	the	repeal	or	

amendment	takes	effect,	or	any	action	or	proceeding	pending	at	the	

time	of	the	repeal	or	amendment,	for	an	offense	committed	or	for	

recovery	 of	 a	 penalty	 or	 forfeiture	 incurred	 under	 the	 Act	 or	

ordinance	repealed	or	amended.		Actions	and	proceedings	pending	

at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 passage,	 amendment	 or	 repeal	 of	 an	 Act	 or	

ordinance	are	not	affected	thereby.

We	have	explained	that	“section	302	provides	a	rule	of	construction	only,	and	

the	rule	is	controlling	absent	clear	and	unequivocal	language	to	the	contrary.”		

Reagan	 v.	 Racal	 Mortg.,	 1998	 ME	 188,	 ¶	 7,	 715	 A.2d	 925 (quotation	 marks	

omitted).

6		Tripp	further	asserts	that	Maine’s	Saving	Statute,	1	M.R.S.	§ 302	(2023),	is	unconstitutionally	

overbroad	such	 that,	when	it	is	applied	in	conjunction	with	 the	amended	section	1111-B,	his	due	

process	 and	 equal	 protection	 rights	 under	 both	 the	 Maine	 Constitution	 and	 the	 United	 States	

Constitution	are	violated.		We	find	Tripp’s	arguments	unpersuasive	and	do	not	address	them	further.
11

[¶14]		Although	“punishment,	penalty	or	forfeiture”	is not	defined	within	

section	 302,	 we	 have	 applied	 the	 statute	 where the	 Legislature	 has	 made

amendments	 to	criminal	statutes.		See,	e.g.,	State	v.	Alley,	263	A.2d	66,	68-69	

(Me. 1970)(“Punishment	is	the	penalty	for	the	transgression	of	the	law,	and	the	

sentence	imposed	 by	 the	 trial	court	is	a	‘punishment’	 or	‘penalty’	within	 the	

terms	 of	 [section	 302].”	 (citation	 omitted)).	 	 We	 have	 also	 held	 that	 a	

“[p]unishment,	 penalty	 or	 forfeiture	is	incurred[] at	 the	 time	 the	 offense	 for	

which	 punishment	 is	 imposed	 is committed.”	 	 Id. at	 69	 (emphasis	 added)	

(alteration	and	quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶15]		This	general	rule	of	statutory	construction	may	be	overcome	if	a	

provision	 expressly	 cites	 section	 302	 or	 states	 explicitly	 that	 it	 should	 be	

applied	 to	pending	proceedings.		MacImage,	2012	ME	44,	¶	22,	40 A.3d	975.		

With	respect	to	an	amended	criminal	statute,	“[a]bsent	clear	and	unequivocal	

language	to	the	contrary,	a	statutory	amendment	does	not	affect	any	penalties	

that	 were	 incurred	 before	 the	 amendment	 took	 effect,	 nor	 does	 it	 apply	 to	

crimes	 committed	 prior	 to	 the	 time	 the	 amendment	 was	 enacted.”	 	 State	 v.	

Shepley,	 2003	ME	 70,	 ¶ 9,	 822	 A.2d	 1147 (emphasis	 added);	see, e.g., Beeler,	

2022	ME	47,	¶ 1	n.1,	281	A.3d	637.		Thus,	to	determine	whether	an	amended	

criminal	 statute	 retroactively	 applies,	 we	 have	 consistently	 examined	
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“(1) whether	 the	 Legislature	 expressed	 the	 intent	 to	 make	 the	 statute	

retroactive	 in	 its	 application”	 and,	 if	 so,	 (2)	 “whether	 that	 retroactive	

application	[of	the	statute]	violates	any	provisions	of	the	Maine	Constitution.”		

E.g.,	MacImage,	2012 ME	44,	¶¶ 21-37,	40	A.3d	975.

[¶16]	 	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 amended	 version	 of	 section	 1111-B	 must	

overcome	section	302’s general	rule	of	statutory	construction	in	order	to	have	

a	 retroactive	 effect	 on Tripp’s	 charged	 crimes.7	 	 The	 amended	 version	 of	

section 1111-B,	however, does	not	say	that	it	should be	retroactively	applied	to	

pending	actions.		Given the	absence	of	clear	and	unequivocal	language	to	the	

contrary,	 the	 newly	 amended	 section	 1111-B	 cannot	 retroactively	 apply	 to	

Tripp’s	criminal	penalties.	 Because	Tripp’s	penalties	were	incurred	at	the	time	

that	 his	 crimes	 were	 committed,	 see Alley,	 263 A.2d at 69,	 the	 appropriate	

immunity	 statute	 to	 be	 applied	 in	 this	 case	 is	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 § 1111-B	 (2021),	

which	 was	 in	 effect	 at	 the	 time	 that	 Tripp’s	 crimes	 were	 committed, see	

7	 	 Tripp	 argues	 that section	 302 should	 not	 apply	 in	 this	 case	 because	 immunity	 is	 not	 a	

“punishment,	penalty	or	forfeiture.”		Tripp’s	argument,	however,	is	contrary	to the	plain	language	of	

the	statute.		Section	302	plainly	states	that	“[t]he	repeal	or	amendment	of	an	Act	or	ordinance	does	

not	 affect any	 punishment,	 penalty	 or	 forfeiture	 incurred	 before	 the	 repeal	 or	 amendment	 takes	

effect.”		1	M.R.S.	 §	302	 (emphasis	added).		Retroactively	applying	 the	amended	version	of	section	

1111-B,	thereby	providing	Tripp	with	immunity to	prosecution,	would	certainly “affect”	the	penalty	

and	punishment	that	applies	to	Tripp’s	charged	crimes.
13

generally	 supra	 n.2.	 	 We	 therefore	 need	 not	 determine	 whether	 retroactive	

application	of	the	statute	would	violate	Tripp’s	constitutional	rights.

B. The	 trial	court	correctly	determined that,	pursuant	 to	17-A	M.R.S.	

§ 1111-B	 (2021),	 Tripp	 is not	 immune	 from	 the	 charges	 brought	

against	him.

[¶17]		Tripp	next	argues	that,	even	if	the	newly	amended	section	1111-B	

does	not	retroactively	apply	in	 this	case,	 the	 trial	court	erred	by	denying	his

motion	to	dismiss	on	the	ground	that 17-A	M.R.S.	§	1111-B	(2021) provides	him	

with	immunity	from	prosecution.		Tripp	asserts	that,	because	he	was	charged	

for	trafficking	based	on	his	possession	of	certain	quantities	of	scheduled	drugs,	

the	 State	 needed	 to	 prove	 possession at	 trial,	 and	 the	 Legislature’s	

cross-referencing	 the	 unlawful	 possession	 statute,	 17-A M.R.S.	 § 1107-A	

(2021),	 shows	 that	 it intended	 to	 include	 possession-based	 crimes	 in	 its	

immunity	statute.

8		

[¶18]		We	have	not	yet	had	the	opportunity	to	review	the	circumstances	

in	which	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1111-B	(2021)	provides	an	accused	with	immunity	and,	

therefore,	 this	 case	 presents	 “an	 issue	 of	 first	 impression”	 and	 “a	 matter	 of	

statutory	 interpretation	 that	 we	 review	 de	 novo.”	 	 Genujo	 Lok Beteiligungs	

8		The	subsections	of	the	unlawful	possession	statute	relevant	to	Tripp’s	argument	have	remained	

unchanged	since	that	time.		See	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1107-A	(2023).
14

GmbH	v.	Zorn,	2008	ME	50,	¶	25,	943	A.2d	573.		“When	interpreting	a	statute,	

we	 first	look	at	 the	 plain	meaning	 of	 the	 statutory	language,	 seeking	 to	give	

effect	to	legislative	intent,	and	consider	the	particular	language	in	the	context	

of	the	whole	statutory	scheme.”		Racal	Mortg.,	1998	ME	188,	¶	7,	715 A.2d	925

(“We	construe	the	language	[of	a	statute]	to	reach	a	harmonious	result	and	to	

avoid	 absurd,	 illogical,	 or	 inconsistent	 results.”).	 	 We	 look	 to	 the	 legislative	

history	of	the	statute	only	if	its	language	is	ambiguous.	 See	id.

[¶19]		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1111-B	(2021)	provides,	in	full,

A	 person	 who	 in	 good	 faith	 seeks	 medical	 assistance	 for	 or	

administers	 naloxone	 hydrochloride	 to	 another	 person	 experiencing	 a	

drug-related	 overdose	 or	who	is	experiencing	a	 drug-related	 overdose	

and	is	in	need	of	medical	assistance	may	not	be	arrested	or	prosecuted	

for	a	violation	of	section	1107-A,	1108,	1111 or	1111-A or	a	violation	of	

probation	 as	 authorized	 by	 chapter 49 if	 the	 grounds	 for	 arrest	 or	

prosecution	 are	 obtained	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 person’s	 seeking	 medical	

assistance, administering	 naloxone	 hydrochloride	 or	 experiencing	 a	

drug-related	overdose.

The	 statute	unambiguously	identifies	 the	 violations	 for	which	 the	accused	is	

immune	from	arrest	or	prosecution.		If the	accused,	in	good	faith,	either	sought	

medical	 assistance	 or	 administered	 naloxone	 for	 another	 person	 while	 that	

person	 was	 experiencing	 a	 drug-related	 overdose,	 the	 accused can	 seek	

immunity	from	arrest	or	prosecution	only	for	the	four	enumerated	crimes	within	

the	statute.
15

[¶20]		Our	conclusion	is	further	supported	by	considering	the	statute	in	

the	context	of	the	statutory	scheme	of	Chapter	45	(Drugs),	which	demonstrates	

that the	Legislature	intended	to	bar	prosecution	for	crimes	that	are	associated	

with	 drug	 use	 while	 still	 permitting	 prosecution	 for	 crimes	 that	 involve	

trafficking,	 furnishing,	 cultivating	 or	 fabricating,	 or	 importing	 drugs.		

Compare 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §§	 1107-A,	 1108,	 1111,	 1111-A	 (2021),	 with	

17-A M.R.S. §§ 1103	 to	1106-A,	1116	 to	1118-A,	1124	(2021).		Moreover, the	

Legislature	demonstrated	within	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1111-B	(2021)itselfthat	it	knew	

how	to	reference	both individual	statutes and	entire	chapters.		If the	Legislature	

wished	to	include	trafficking	crimes	in 17-A	M.R.S.	§ 1111-B	(2021),	it	would	

have	cited either to	those	statutes	specifically	or	to	Chapter	45	in	its	entirety.		

Cf. State v. Flemming,	377	A.2d	448,	456	(Me. 1977) (Dufresne,	C.J.,	concurring)	

(explaining	 that,	 if	 the	 Legislature	 intended	 to	 include	 terms	 within	 an	

amendment,	“it	could	easily	have	employed	apt	language	therefor.”	(quotation	

marks	omitted)).		The	trial	court therefore correctly	determined that Tripp	was	
16

not	immune	from	prosecution	under	the	version	of	section	1111-B	in	effect	at	

the	time	he	committed	the	charged	offenses.

C. Where	prosecutorial	error occurred	in	this	case,	such error	either	

did	not	affect	Tripp’s	substantial	rights	or	was	harmless.9

1. The	 State’s	 references	 to	 Tripp’s	 refusal	 to	 speak	 with	

paramedics	did	not	constitute	prosecutorial	error.

a. Tripp	did	not	invoke	his	right	to	remain	silent.

[¶21]	 	 We review	 for	 obvious	 error	 when	 a	 defendant	 “d[oes]	 not	

explicitly	object	 to	 the	 testimony	and	 the	prosecutor’s	comments	concerning	

his	[right	to	remain	silent].”		State	v.	Lovejoy,	2014	ME	48,	¶	19,	89	A.3d	1066.		

“[T]o	vacate	a	conviction	based	on	the	obvious	error	standard	of	review,	there	

must	be	(1) an	error,	(2)	that	is	plain,	.	.	.	(3)	that	affects	substantial	rights	.	.	.	

[and]	(4) the	error [must] seriously	affect[] the	fairness	and	integrity	or	public	

reputation	 of	 judicial	 proceedings.”	 Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 “The	

defendant’s	 burden . .	 .	is	 significant,”	 and	we	 have	 explained	 that	“[w]hen	 a	

9		In	this	case,	Tripp	does	not	allege	that	the	prosecutor’s	statements	were	made	in	bad	faith	and	

instead	focuses	on	the	impact	that	the	prosecutor’s	statements	had	on	his	trial.		Therefore,	our	review	

will	focus	on	Tripp’s	claim	of	prosecutorial	error and	an	assessment	of	the	impact	of	the	alleged	error	

on	Tripp’s	due	process	rights.		See State	v.	White,	2022	ME	54,	¶¶ 19-20 & n.9,	285	A.3d 262	(using	

“the	 term	 ‘error’	 instead	 of	 ‘misconduct’	 because	 our	 review	 focuses	 not	 on	 the	 prosecutor’s	

subjective	intent	but	on	the	due	process	rights	of	the	defendant”).		Further,	although	Tripp	alluded	

to	article	1,	section	6,	of	the	Maine	Constitution	in	his	appellate	brief,	he	failed	to	develop	an	argument	

based	 on	 that	 provision	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution, and	 we	 deem	 any	 state	 constitutional	 claims	

waived.		Contra	id. ¶	31	n.13.		We	 therefore	address only Tripp’s	claims	asserted	under	 the	 Fifth	

Amendment	of	the	United	States	Constitution.
17

prosecutor’s	statement	is	not	sufficient	to	draw	an	objection,	particularly	when	

viewed	in	the	overall	context	of	the	trial,	that	statement	will	rarely	be	found	to	

have	 created	 a	 reasonable	 probability	 that	 it	 affected	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	

proceeding.”		State	v.	Dolloff,	2012	ME	130,	¶	38,	58	A.3d	1032.

[¶22]	 	 The	 Fifth	 Amendment	 right	 to	 remain	 silent	includes measures	

that	 exist	 in	 multiple	 contexts,	 including	 “protections	 against	 compelled	

self-incrimination	both	before	and	after	arrest.”		Lovejoy,	2014	ME	48,	¶¶	20-22,	

89	 A.3d	 1066.	 	 Although	 we	 have regularly considered	 a	 defendant’s	 Fifth	

Amendment	 right	 to	 remain silent when interacting with	 law	 enforcement	

officers,	see, e.g.,	id. ¶	17;	State	v.	Rutherford,	2019	ME	128,	¶¶	3,	20,	214	A.3d	

27;	 State v. Nobles,	 2018 ME	 26,	 ¶¶	 22-26,	 179	 A.3d	 910,	 we	 have not	 yet	

considered	 whether	 the	 right to	 remain	 silent extends to	 situations	 where

paramedics, rather	than	law	enforcement	officers, question a	defendant about	

the emergency	situation	they	are	responding	to.		However,	we need	not	address	

this	question	now.

10 Even	if	the	right	to	remain	silent	extends	to	a	paramedic’s

10	 	 If, in	 the	 future, we	 were	 to	 consider	 whether the	 right	 to	 remain	 silent	 applied	 in	 such	

circumstances,	we	would	need	 to	square	a	defendant’s	right	 to	remain	silent	with	our	recognized	

health	 and	 safety	 exception.	 	 Compare Coppola	 v.	 Powell,	 878	 F.2d	 1562,	 1565	 (1st	 Cir. 1989)

(explaining	that	“[t]he	privilege [to	remain	silent] can	be	asserted	in	any	proceeding,	civil	or	criminal,	

administrative	or	judicial,	investigatory	or	adjudicatory”	and	that	“viability	of	the	privilege	depends	

on	whether	a	responsive	answer	to	the	question	might	result	in	harmful	disclosure”(quotation	marks	

omitted)),	with	State	v.	Lockhart,	2003	ME	108,	¶	18,	830 A.2d	433 (“[A]n	officer	is	permitted	to	ask	

questions	 to	 identify	 the	 suspect,	 check	 his	 or	 her	 identification	 and	 resolve	 any	 health	 or	 safety	
18

questioning, we	conclude	that	Tripp	failed	to	demonstrate	that	he	invoked	his	

right	to	remain	silent in	this	non-custodial	context.		Although	“we	have	never	

required	 the	 use	 of	 any	 specific	 words	 for	 a	 person	 to	 enjoy	 constitutional	

protection	for	his	or	her	silence,”	we	do	require	that	“the	record	demonstrate	

the	defendant’s	intention	to	exercise	the	constitutional	right	against	compelled	

self-incrimination.”		Lovejoy,	2014	ME	48,	¶	25,	89	A.3d	1066.		“Thus,	in	many	

contexts,	 a	 defendant	 is	 not	 deemed	 to	 have	 exercised	 the	 constitutionally	

protected	right	against	compelled	self-incrimination by	virtue	of	silence	alone.”		

Id.

[¶23]		“To	determine	whether	a	defendant	did	express	the	intention	to	

exercise	 this	 Fifth	 Amendment	 right,	 a	 court	 must	 consider	 the	 specific	

circumstances	 in	 which	 a	 defendant	 was	 questioned	 and	 the	 defendant’s	

response	to	that	questioning.”		Id. ¶	26.		Here,	after	Tripp	let	the	paramedics	

into	the	rooming house	and	directed	them	upstairs to	the	unconscious	person,	

he	went	into	his	room,	denied	knowing	the person,	and	refused	to	answer	the	

paramedic’s	questions	about	the	person.		He	was	not	in	custody,	and beyond	

remaining	 silent,	 Tripp	 did	 not	 expressly	 state	 nor	 otherwise	 manifest	 his	

concerns	 regarding	 the	 suspect	 or	 others.”	 (emphasis	 added)	 (alterations	 and	 quotation	 marks	

omitted)).
19

intention	to	exercise	the	constitutional	right	against	self-incrimination.		These	

facts	 are not	 sufficient	 to	 demonstrate	 Tripp’s	 invocation	 of	 his	 Fifth	

Amendment	 right	 against	 self-incrimination.	 	 Cf id. ¶ 26 (invocation	 of	 right	

against	 self-incrimination	 by	 terminating	 telephone	 conversation	 with	

detective	 after	 stating	 desire	 to	 speak	 with	 a	 lawyer	 and	 refusing	 to	 return	

detective’s	subsequent	phone	calls);	State	v.	Patton,	2012	ME	101,	¶	15,	50	A.3d	

544	(request	 to	speak	with	a	lawyer	during	pre-arrest,	pre-Miranda warning	

interaction	 with	 law	 enforcement	 constitutes	 invocation	 of	 right	 to	 remain	

silent);	see	also Wainwright	v.	Greenfield,	474	U.S.	284,	295	n.	13 (1986)	(noting	

that	“silence”	includes	“the	statement	of	a	desire	to	remain	silent,	as	well	as	of	

a	desire	to	remain	silent	until	an	attorney	has	been	consulted”).

b. The	 evidence	 of	 Tripp’s	 refusal	 to	 answer	 the	

paramedics’	 questions	 was	 admissible; therefore, the	

State’s	 references	 to	 this	 conduct	 did	 not	 constitute	

prosecutorial	error.

[¶24]	 	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 State	 elicited	 testimony	 that	 Tripp	 refused	 to	

answer	 the	 paramedics’	 questions	 regarding	 the	 decedent’s	 condition. As	

noted	above,	because	Tripp	did	not	invoke his	right	against	self-incrimination,	

this	testimony	was	admissible	at	trial.		See	Nobles,	2018	ME	26,	¶	26,	179	A.3d	

910.	 	 During	 closing	 argument,	 the	 State	 suggested	 that	 Tripp’s	 silence	

evidenced	a	consciousness	of	guilt.		“A	lawyer	is	permitted	to	argue	on	[her	or	
20

his]	analysis	of	the	evidence,	for	any	position	or	conclusion	with	respect	to	the	

matters	 stated	 therein,	 and	 the	 central	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 comment	 is	

fairly	based	on	 facts	in	evidence.”		Dolloff,	2012	ME	130,	¶ 43,	58	A.3d	1032	

(citation	 omitted);	see	 also	State	 v.	 Cheney,	 2012	ME	 119,	 ¶ 35,	 55	A.3d	 473	

(“The	State	is	free .	.	. to	forcefully	argue	to	the	jury	that	the	evidence	does	not	

support	or	is	not	consistent	with	the	defendant's	theory	of	the	case.”).		Because	

Tripp	did	not	invoke	his	right	to remain	silent, he	has	not	established	any	error,

let	 alone	 obvious	 error	 “so	 clear	 under	 existing	 law	 that	 the	 court	 and	 the	

prosecutor	were	required	to	address	the	matter	even	in	the	absence	of	a	timely	

objection.”		Nobles,	2018	ME	26,	¶	21,	179	A.3d	910 (quotation	marks	omitted).		

2. Although	 the	 State’s	 references	 to	 Tripp’s	 involvement	 with	

the	 decedent’s	 death	 constituted	 prosecutorial	 error,	 the

error	did	not	affect	Tripp’s substantial	rights.

[¶25]		Where	Tripp	did	not	object	 to	 the	State’s	closing	arguments,	we	

review	 for	obvious	error.		See	Lovejoy,	2014	ME	48,	¶	19,	89	A.3d	1066.		We	

review	“allegations	of	prosecutorial	[error] in	the	overall	context	of	the	trial.”		

Dolloff,	 2012	 ME	 130,	 ¶	 44,	 58	 A.3d	 1032.	 	 In Dolloff, we	 explained	 that	

“prosecutors	[must]	walk	a	careful	line”	due	to	the	“competing	obligations”	of	

making	“unflinching	and	assertive	efforts	to	prosecute	those	who	are	alleged	to	

have	 committed	 crimes”	 and “avoid[ing]	inviting	 a	jury	 to	make	its	 decision	
21

based	 on	 bias,	 prejudice,	 conjecture,	 or	 any	 other	 impermissible	 basis.”	 	 Id.

¶¶ 40-41.		We	also	summarized	the	types	of	statements	that	“will	almost	always	

be	 placed	 in	 the	 category	 of	 [prosecutorial	 error],” which	 include	

“[m]isrepresenting	 material	 facts	 in	 the	 record	 or	 making	 statements	 of	

material	 fact	 unsupported	 by	 any	 evidence	 .	 .	 .	 [and]	 [m]aking	 statements	

pandering	to	jurors’	sympathy,	bias,	or	prejudice.”		Id. ¶¶ 42-43.

[¶26]		In	this	case,	the	State’s	comments	regarding	Tripp’s	thoughts	and	

actions	 prior	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 paramedics	 and	 police	 constituted	

prosecutorial	 error because	 those comments	 were	 not supported	 by	 the	

evidence	presented	at	trial.		For	example,	no	evidence	was	presented	to	support	

the	prosecutor’s	comments	that	Tripp and	Amanda	“dragged	the	[decedent’s]	

body	 outside	 [of	 their	 room]”	 nor	 that	 the	 decedent	“likely	 .	 .	 .	 drew	 his	last	

breath	and	died,	alone,	.	.	.	[under	the	sink].” See	supra	n.4.	 These	statements

constituted	plain	error.		See Dolloff,	2012 ME 130,	¶	36,	58	A.3d	1032	(“An	error	

is	 plain	 if	 the	 error	 is	 so	 clear	 under	 current	 law,	 that	 the	 trial	 judge	 and	

prosecutor	 were	 derelict	 in	 countenancing	 it,	 even	 absent	 the	 defendant’s	

timely	assistance	in	detecting	it.”	(citations,	and	alteration	and	quotation	marks	

omitted)).		Nevertheless,	we	conclude	that	this plain	error did	not	affect	Tripp’s	

substantial	rights because the jury	acquitted	Tripp	on	the	charge	of	aggravated	
22

trafficking	of	a	scheduled drug	that	in	fact	caused	the	death	of	a	person.	 Thus,	

the jury	apparently did	not	give	any weight to	the	State’s comments,	and	the

prosecutorial	error could	not	have	been	sufficiently	prejudicial	to	have	affected	

the	outcome	of	the	proceeding.

3. The	 State’s request	 that	 the	 jury	 not	 compromise	 on	 the	

decedent’s	life	during	deliberations	was	harmless	because	the	

trial	 court	 gave	 a	 prompt	 curative	 instruction	 that	 directly	

addressed	 the	prosecutor’s	error and	adequately	eliminated	

any	prejudice.

[¶27]		“The	importance	of	bringing	alleged	error,	including	prosecutorial	

misconduct,	immediately	to	the	attention	of	the	trial	court	is	manifested	in	the	

standards	of	review	for	errors	that	were	objected	to	at	trial.”		Dolloff,	2012	ME	

130,	¶	31,	58	A.3d	1032;	see	M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	52(a).		Because	Tripp	objected	to	

the	 prosecutor’s	 statement	 asking	 the	 jurors	 to	 not	 compromise	 on	 the	

decedent’s	life	 during	 deliberations,	 “we review	 to	 determine	whether	 there	

was	actual	[error] and,	if	so,	whether	the	trial	court’s	response	remedied	any	

prejudice	resulting	from	the	[error].”		Lovejoy,	2014	ME	48,	¶	31,	89	A.3d	1066.		

“We	will	generally	defer	to	the	determination	of	a	presiding	Justice,	who	has	the	

immediate	feel	of	what	is	transpiring,	that	a	curative	instruction	will	adequately	

protect	against	the	jury	giving	consideration	to	matters	which	have	been	heard	

but	have	been	stricken	as	evidence.”		Dolloff,	2012	ME	130,	¶	32,	58	A.3d	1032
23

(quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 “Any	 concern	 created	 by	 improper	 statements	

made	by	a	prosecutor	is	likely	to	be	cured	by	a	prompt	and	appropriate	curative	

instruction,	especially	when	such	an	instruction	is	specifically	addressed	to	the	

prosecutor’s	[error].”	 Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 Therefore, a	 curative	

instruction	will	only	be	deemed	inadequate	to	eliminate	prejudice	“where	there	

are	 exceptionally	 prejudicial	 circumstances	 or	 prosecutorial	 bad	 faith.”	 	 Id.

(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶28]	 	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 trial	 court	 promptly	 provided	 a	 curative	

instruction	 upon	 Tripp’s	 objection	 to	 the	 prosecutor’s statement.	 	 As	 noted	

supra,	making	statements	pandering	to	jurors’	sympathy,	bias,	or	prejudice	is	

almost	always	error,	and	we	affirm	the	trial	court’s	categorization	of	the	State’s	

statement	as	error.	 In	its	curative	instruction—which	was given	immediately	

after	 holding	 a	 sidebar	 in	 response to	 Tripp’s	 objection—the	 trial	 court	

instructed	the	jury that	it	was	“not	correct	to	appeal	to	[a]	jury’s	sympathies	or	

emotions	like	that	in	an	argument”	and	that	the	trial	court	would	later	give	the	

jury	“proper	instructions”	on	deliberation	and	to	making	findings	“based	on	a	

rational	application	of	the	 facts.” See	supra	n.5.		Thus,	in	its	prompt	curative	

instruction,	 the	 trial	 court	 specifically	 addressed	 the	 prosecutor’s	 error and	
24

adequately	 eliminated	 any	 prejudice	 that	 may	 have	 resulted.	 	 We therefore

conclude that	such	error	was	harmless.

D. The	 trial	 court	 sufficiently	 corrected	 any	 potential	 confusion	

stemming	 from	 its	 initial	 jury	 instructions	 and	 therefore did	 not	

commit	obvious	error	because	Tripp’s	rights	were	not	substantially	

affected.

[¶29]		Because	Tripp	did	not	raise	an	objection	to	the	trial	court’s	jury	

instructions,	we	review	 for	obvious	error.		State	v.	Villacci,	2018	ME	80,	¶	9,	

187 A.3d	576.		Our	review	considers	“the	jury	instructions	in	their	entirety to	

determine	if	the	instructions	failed	to	inform	the	jury	correctly	and	fairly	in	all	

necessary	respects	of	the	governing	law.”		Id. (emphasis	added)	(alteration	and	

quotation	 marks	 omitted);	 see	 also	 State	 v.	 Clark,	 2021 ME	 12,	 ¶	 16,	

246 A.3d 1165 (“We	 review	 jury	 instructions	 as	 a	 whole	 for	 prejudicial	

error . . . .” (quotation	marks	 omitted)).	 	 The	 trial	 court	 has	 the	 discretion	 to	

provide	 the	jury	with	written	instructions	 that	cover	“all	or	a	part	of	what	is	

orally	provided.”		M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	30(b).

[¶30]	 	 In	 Lockhart,	 we	 concluded that	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 commit	

obvious	error	by	orally	providing instructions	to	the	jury	on	the	State’s	burden	

of	proof	but	not	including	them	in	the	written	instructions provided	to	the	jury.		

2003	ME	108,	¶	44, 830 A.2d	433.		In	our	review,	we	“[c]onsider[ed]	the	spoken	

and	 written	 instructions	 as	 a	 whole”	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 missing	 written	
25

instructions	substantially	affected	the	defendant’s	rights.	 Id.		In	reaching	our	

conclusion,	we	reasoned	that	the	defendant	“did	not	object	to	the	absence	.	.	.	

[of	 the	 instruction]	 in	 the	 proposed	 written	 instructions	 when	 they	 were	

discussed	by	counsel	and	the	judge.”		Id.

[¶31]		Here,	Tripp	is	mistaken	that	the	trial	court	instructed	the	jury	to	

rely	on	the	attorneys'	definitions	 for	the	statutory	element	of	a	“contributing	

factor.”		Rather,	the	trial	court	merely	referenced	the	attorneys’	“discuss[ion]	of	

the	meanings	 of	 the	words”	and	 proceeded	 to	 provide	 the	jury	with	 specific	

instruction	 on	 the	 law.	 	Although	 the	 trial	 court’s	 reference	 may	 have	 been	

confusing	in	isolation,	 when	looking	 at	 the	instructions	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 trial	

court	informed	the	jury	of	the	term’s	legal	meaning.

[¶32]	 	We	also	 find	 unconvincing	Tripp’s	assertion that	 the	 trial	 court

erred	by not	reading the	written	instructions	in	full.		Here,	the	trial	court	merely	

skipped	over	portions	that	were	“exactly	the	same”	as	the	identical	elements	in	

other	 charged	 offenses.	 	In	 addition,	 the	trial	 court	informed	 the	jury	 of the	

definitions	it	was	skipping and	why	it	was	skipping	them,	and	then	directed	the	

jury to	the	appropriate	location	in	the	written	instructions	to	refer	to	if	the	jury

had	 additional	 questions.	 	 Moreover,	 the	 trial	 court’s	 written	 instructions,	

which	Tripp	did	not	object	 to, provided	a	sufficient,	stand-alone	definition	of	
26

the	redundant portions.		Therefore,	the	oral	and	written	jury	instructions,	in	

their	entirety,	correctly	and	fairly	informed	the	jury	of all necessary	respects	of	

the	governing	law.

[¶33]	 	 Finally,	 we	 disagree	 with	 Tripp’s	 assertion	that,	 given	 the	trial	

court’s	 deviations	 and	 ambiguities	 between	 the	 oral	 instructions,	 written	

instructions,	and	jury	verdict	forms,	the	trial	court	obviously	erred	by	failing	to	

provide	 the	 jury	 with	 a	 clear	 roadmap	 of	 how	 it	 should	 analyze	 the	 several	

charges.	 	When	all	 the	jury	instructions	are	 taken	as	a	whole,	 the trial court	

provided	 the	 jury with	 a	 sufficient	 roadmap	 to	 reach	 a	 guilty	 or	 not	 guilty	

verdict	for	each	crime	as	charged.		Although	Tripp is	correct	that	the	written

instructions	appear	to	have	misstated the	steps	that	the	jury	should	have	taken	

as	they	analyzed	the	various	charges,	the	trial	court	appears	to	have	corrected	

the jury	 instructions	 and	 clarified	 the verdict	 form	 to	 account	 for	 these	

misstatements; answered	a	question	from	the	jury	as	to	the	correct	analysis	it	

should	 take	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 offenses	 as	 charged,	 including	 the	 lesser	

included	offense	for	 the	charge	of	aggravated	 trafficking	of	a	scheduled	drug	

that	in	fact	caused	the	death	of	a	person; and	clarified	that	the	jurors	“do	not	

have	to	take	up	[the	charges]	in	the	order	in	which	[the trial court]	mentioned	

them	in	[its]	instructions	or,	for	that	matter,	[as	they	appeared] in	the	verdict	
27

form.”	 	The	 trial	 court	 further	 clarified	 that	 the	 jury	 must	“do	 the	 thorough	

analysis” on	each	count,	but	the	analysis	on	each	count could “be	done	in	any	

order	that	[the	jury]	want[s]	to	do	it.”11		We	therefore	conclude	that	the	trial	

court	 appropriately	 and	 sufficiently	 corrected	 any	 potential	 confusion	

stemming	 from	 its	 initial	 jury	 instructions and	 that	 Tripp’s	 rights	 were	 not	

substantially	affected.		As	a	result,	the	trial	court	did	not	commit	obvious	error.		

See	State	v.	Lovejoy,	2014	ME	48,	¶	19,	89	A.3d	1066	(holding	that	elements	of	

obvious	error	include	that	the	error	affect	the	defendant’s	substantial	rights).

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Jeremy	 Pratt,	 Esq. (orally),	 and	 Ellen	 Simmons,	 Esq.,	 Camden,	 for	 appellant	

Ralph	A.	Tripp,	Jr.	

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Jason	Horn,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.(orally),	Office	

of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Penobscot	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2021-1115

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY

11		Tripp	did	not	object	to	any	of	these	curative	instructions.