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93–287 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 112–925 

STRENGTHENING THE INTEGRITY OF THE STUDENT VISA SYSTEM BY PREVENTING AND DETECTING SHAM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, 

REFUGEES AND BORDER SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 24, 2012 

Serial No. J–112–88 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York 

DICK DURBIN, Illinois 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

KOLAN DAVIS, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND BORDER SECURITY

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Chairman 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

DICK DURBIN, Illinois 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ORRIN HATCH, Utah 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

STEPHANIE MARTZ, Democratic Chief Counsel 

MATT JOHNSON, Republican Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Schumer, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of New York ................... 1 

Grassley, Hon. Charles, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa .......................... 3 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 3 

WITNESSES 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 21 

Gambler, Rebecca, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC ............................................... 5 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25 

Woods, John P., Assistant Director, National Security Investigations, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC ............................... 6 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

QUESTIONS 

Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for Rebecca Gambler ......................... 47 

Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for John P. Woods ............................. 48 

ANSWERS 

Responses of Rebecca Gambler to questions submitted by Senator Grassley .... 50 

Responses of John P. Woods to questions submitted by Senator Grassley 

(redacted) .............................................................................................................. 55 

(1) 

STRENGTHENING THE INTEGRITY OF THE 

STUDENT VISA SYSTEM BY PREVENTING 

AND DETECTING SHAM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES, AND

BORDER SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in 

Room SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. 

Schumer, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Schumer, Feinstein, and Grassley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Chairman SCHUMER. The hearing will come to order, and I want 

to thank my colleagues for coming. The majority of people here are 

Chucks. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Are what? 

Chairman SCHUMER. Chucks: Chuck Schumer, Chuck Grassley. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. All right. Well, thank you and good 

morning. Today’s hearing is on strengthening the integrity of the 

student visa system by preventing and detecting sham educational 

institutions, and I want to thank both my colleagues, the three of 

us, along with Senator McCaskill, who asked for a GAO report, oh, 

about nine months ago. And I think the GAO is now going to report 

to us. I have seen it, and I think you have done a very good job. 

It is an incredibly important topic. There are currently more 

than 850,000 active foreign students in the United States enrolled 

at over 10,000 schools, and by and large, the student visa system 

provides an enormous benefit to the U.S. It allows us to attract the 

world’s top talent to our country to study and hopefully to live here 

and create new companies, technologies, and jobs. Foreign students 

also stimulate our economy by spending money in our stores, restaurants, and providing our universities with additional capital in 

the form of full tuition payments. 

But as with all our immigration laws, we must balance the clear 

economic benefits of the Student Visa Program with the need to 

keep our country secure. It is well known by now that one of the 

September 11th terrorists entered the country on a student visa 
2 

and subsequently attended flight school. Two of the September 

11th terrorists received visitor visas and after entering the country 

illegally attended flight schools. And recently there has been a recurring problem in our immigration system; that is, the illegal use 

of student visas by foreign nationals to attend sham schools. These 

sham schools are not real institutions of learning, but rather operate solely for the purpose of manipulating immigration law to 

admit foreign nationals into the country. 

The latest phenomenon occurs in my colleague Senator Feinstein’s State, the Tri-Valley University in Pleasanton, California— 

I know she has been involved in this—where over 1,500 students 

from foreign countries obtained visas to enroll in an unaccredited 

school that failed to provide education. 

In my home State of New York, an English language school 

known as ‘‘Accent on Language’’ was recently shut down in April 

for being a sham school. 

So to get hold of the problem, Senators Feinstein, Grassley, 

McCaskill, and I asked the GAO to study the Student Visa Program to determine whether we are doing a good enough job to stop 

sham schools, and what the GAO found was very troubling. 

GAO found that ICE has not implemented fraud prevention practices to verify the legitimacy and eligibility of schools giving out 

student visas, both during their initial certification and after these 

schools begin accepting foreign students. 

GAO found that a significant number of schools certified to give 

out visas to international students are not even licensed by the 

State in which they operate. 

Most shockingly, of 434 flight schools that provide student visas, 

an astounding 167, 38 percent—let me repeat that—38 percent are 

not accredited by the FAA. This finding is especially worrisome 

since two of the 9/11 hijackers successfully applied for student 

visas to attend flight schools. 

GAO’s report found out a lot about the Tri-Valley case and that 

it is part of a larger trend of sham schools defrauding the Student 

Visa Program. 

In 2004, we required DHS to complete an audit of the 10,000 

schools in the U.S. that provide student visas. GAO found that 

eight years after the deadline for the completion of the audit, federal authorities only recertified 19 percent of the visa-issuing 

schools. 

In light of this report, Senators Grassley, Feinstein, McCaskill, 

and I will be introducing legislation that will combat sham schools. 

Our legislation, when passed, will achieve the following objectives: 

Require flight schools to be accredited by the FAA; require all 

schools to show proof of appropriate State licensure before they are 

able to give student visas; increase penalties for directors, officers, 

and managers of sham universities; and prevent top officials affiliated with a university shut down by ICE from being a director, officer, or manager of another school to avoid them opening up a new 

one after the old one is closed. 

It will require the officer at each university in charge of helping 

ICE give out student visas and ensure compliance to have a background check, undergo training, and go through e-verify before they 

can serve as a designated school officer; and, finally, require ICE 
3 

to visit every non-accredited school that gives students visas within 

a year of enactment to ensure legitimacy of the school. 

These are much-needed steps that dramatically reduce fraud and 

restore confidence in our Student Visa Program. 

With that, let me call on Senator Grassley, and then I will call 

on Senator Feinstein, each for opening statements. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY. You have had so many factual statements 

that I am not going to repeat, so I will put that portion of my statement in the record. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator GRASSLEY. I will just give a short summation here. 

I am glad that we have Mr. Woods here from Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement to explain how two departments under his 

purview have allowed for sham schools to operate. I want to hear 

assurances that interagency disagreements are a thing of the past 

and that counterterrorism officials and program officers are working together to root out fraud. 

I want to know what changes have been made by Secretary 

Napolitano’s Department since the report was initiated, including 

efforts to rein in crooked designated school officials. 

I want to know why the Department has not yet required background checks of designated school officials and why the Department has not yet changed its rules to kick a school out of the program if it is not complying. 

I want to know why non-FAA-certified schools continue to be a 

part of the program, continue to have access to the SEVIS data 

base, and are still allowed to bring in foreign students. 

I am also calling on Secretary Napolitano to immediately improve the oversight of schools and implement the GAO recommendations. The Department needs to get its act together, complete the recertification process, and use the resources more effectively. 

Additionally, and last, I am interested in hearing what legislative changes need to be made. Senator Schumer has already talked 

about the proposed legislation. This hopefully can be enacted 

promptly, and so far it looks like it is going to be in a bipartisan 

manner, and I hope that will continue so that we can salvage the 

integrity of our Foreign Student Visa Program and ensure safety 

for our citizens. 

Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Grassley. 

Senator Feinstein. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, first 

of all, for this hearing, you and Senator Grassley for the willingness to work together, and, I think, the recognition that we have 

a continuing problem. 
4 

I started on this right after 9/11, and looking at sham schools, 

there was one right next to my office in San Diego, and my staff 

pointed it out. And a number of arrests were made in California 

in the San Diego area. 

The thing is it continues on, and if you look at the Tri-Valley situation, which is 10 years after 9/11—and as you said, 38 percent— 

well, let me not confuse it, but let me say something about Tri-Valley. 

School officials enrolled 1,500 foreign students until a federal investigation exposed the school as a scam in February 2011. The 

school was authorized to only accept 30, but by May 2010, when 

ICE began its investigation, they had 939 international students, 

and by the fall of 2010, there were 1,555 students for a school that 

did not exist. They were caught giving student visas to undercover 

agents posing as foreign nationals who explicitly professed no intention of attending classes. So the federal agents said they did not 

intend to attend classes, but they still were accepted. 

Now, the 9/11 hijackers would not have been able to carry out 

attacks in the United States if they had been unable to enter the 

country from the beginning. They received valid visas to enter the 

United States in order to harm our Nation. And one of them, Hani 

Hanjour, entered the United States on a student visa in December 

2000 to attend an English-language school in my backyard, Oakland, California. After entering the United States, he never attended the English-language school but instead took refresher pilot 

training lessons at a flight school in Arizona. Flight schools were 

teaching people how to take off but not to land, and no one thought 

it was strange. 

And I think what Senator Schumer has just said, that 38 percent 

of these flight schools do not have the required FAA certification, 

there ought to be a strong penalty for that. They ought to be prohibited from operating without FAA certification and supervision, 

in my view. 

So now the Student Exchange Visitor Program is often unaware 

of when the FAA revokes certification for flight training providers, 

and we understand that your agency is working to correct this 

problem. 

I think the time has come, Senator Grassley and Mr. Chairman, 

to really get tough. We have had 10 years. It has been ‘‘try and 

fail.’’ And I am for some very strict criminal penalties. So I look 

forward to working with you in this regard. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. We appreciate your long-term leadership on this issue, and with this legislation maybe we can finally do what is needed to be done, and the 

report helps importune us on. 

We now have two witnesses today. The first is Rebecca Gambler. 

She is the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the 

GAO, the Government Accountability Office, which did our report. 

She joined GAO in 2002, has worked on a wide range of issues related to homeland security and justice, including border security, 

immigration, DHS management and transformation, and I have 

heard you testify before, and you are excellent. You know, you are 

the best of government employees, hard-working, and we are glad 

that you are in the GAO. And I am also proud that you have three 
5 

master’s degrees, one of which is from Syracuse University School 

of International Relations. 

John Woods is the Assistant Director of National Security Investigations for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, and 

he, I am proud to say, is a native New Yorker. I do not want to 

be too chauvinistic here. If you have California or Iowa connections, 

please state them in your opening remarks. But, in any case, he 

is a career enforcement officer, began in 1987 as an INS special 

agent. For the last 25 years, he has worked his way up to his current position. He is now chief of a 450-person division, manages a 

$160 million operational budget which oversees ICE’s investigative, 

regulatory, and technological programs. He is in charge of targeting 

transnational and national security threats arising from illicit travel, trade, and finance. 

So, with that, each of your statements will be read into the 

record, and we are first going to call on—it is logical to have the 

issuer of the report come first and then the response from Mr. 

Woods. 

Ms. Gambler, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, ACTING DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. GAMBLER. Good morning, Chairman Schumer and Members 

of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the invitation to testify at today’s 

hearing to discuss GAO’s work on the Student and Exchange Visitor Program, or SEVP. 

Within the Department of Homeland Security, ICE is responsible 

for managing the program to ensure that foreign students comply 

with the terms of their admission. ICE also certifies schools to be 

eligible to enroll foreign students in academic and vocational programs. As of January 2012, more than 850,000 active foreign students were enrolled at over 10,000 certified schools in the United 

States. 

I would like to focus my remarks this morning on two areas related to ICE’s management of SEVP. First, I will discuss the extent 

to which ICE has identified and assessed program risks. Second, I 

will discuss the extent to which ICE has implemented procedures 

to detect and prevent fraud and noncompliance on the part of certified schools. 

With regard to the first area, ICE does not have a process to 

identify and assess risks posed by schools in SEVP. In particular, 

we reported that SEVP has not evaluated information on prior and 

suspected cases of school fraud and noncompliance to identify lessons learned from such cases. For example, as of March 2012, ICE 

reported that it had withdrawn 860 schools from the program since 

2003, at least 88 of which were withdrawn for noncompliance 

issues. However, SEVP has not evaluated these schools’ withdrawals to determine potential trends in their noncompliant activities. We reported that such information could help SEVP focus its 

compliance efforts. 

Additionally, SEVP has not obtained and analyzed information 

from ICE criminal investigators on school fraud cases. Information 

from investigations could help provide SEVP with insights on the 
6 

characteristics of schools that have committed fraud and the nature 

of those schools’ fraudulent activities. ICE is beginning to study the 

potential risks posed by schools in SEVP, but these efforts are in 

the early stages of implementation. 

With regard to the second area, we identified weaknesses in 

ICE’s monitoring and oversight of SEVP-certified schools related to 

four key program controls. 

First, we reported that ICE has not consistently verified certain 

evidence initially submitted by schools in lieu of accreditation. 

Secondly, ICE has not consistently maintained certain evidence 

of selected schools’ eligibility for SEVP. Specifically, in our random 

sample of 50 school case files, 30 files did not contain at least one 

piece of required evidence, and ICE was unable to produce two 

school case files. 

Third, ICE does not have a process to monitor schools’ State licensing status and non-language schools’ accreditation status. 

Finally, we reported that some SEVP-certified schools that offer 

flight training do not have the FAA certifications required by SEVP 

policy to be eligible to offer flight training to foreign students. The 

specific FAA certifications are required by SEVP because FAA directly oversees these flight schools on an ongoing basis. As of December 2011, we found that about 38 percent of SEVP schools certified to offer flight training to foreign students did not have the 

required FAA certifications. 

ICE is taking actions to address these issues, such as working 

with the FAA to determine which schools have not met the requirements, and taking withdrawal actions against those schools as appropriate. 

In closing, ICE aims to facilitate study in the United States for 

hundreds of thousands of foreign students each year. Effective 

oversight of SEVP entails balancing this objective against the program’s potential risks. ICE has taken some steps to assess program 

risks and develop policies for certifying and monitoring schools. 

However, we reported that the program continues to face significant challenges and that ICE should take additional actions to improve its ability to prevent and detect potential school noncompliance and fraud. We have made a number of recommendations to 

ICE to strengthen its management and oversight of the program, 

and ICE has agreed with our recommendations. 

This concludes my oral statement, and I would be pleased to answer any questions the Members may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Ms. Gambler. 

Mr. Woods. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, HOMELAND SECURITY 

INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. WOODS. Chairman Schumer, Ranking Member Grassley, and 

Senator Feinstein, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the 
7 

Student and Exchange Visitor Program, or SEVP, and our response 

to the GAO findings in its recently released report. 

SEVP is one area that ICE continues to prioritize, and after reviewing GAO’s recommendations, we have already made progress 

in implementing them. SEVP is committed to maintaining national 

security while keeping the international student and exchange visitor visa issuance process efficient for schools and students. 

As you know, SEVP, within ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations Directorate, is funded by fees collected from students, exchange visitors, and participating schools. It manages information 

on nonimmigrants whose primary reason for coming to the United 

States is to study in a U.S. institution certified for inclusion in the 

Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, or SEVIS. This 

data base tracks foreign students, exchange visitors, and their dependents during their authorized stays in the United States. 

SEVIS also monitors the schools that have been approved by DHS 

to enroll foreign students and the exchange visitor programs designated by the Department of State to sponsor these visitors. SEVP 

regulates schools’ eligibility to enroll foreign individuals for academic and vocational training purposes and manages the participation of SEVP-certified schools in the program and nonimmigrant 

students in the F, J, and M visa classifications and their dependents. 

HSI’s Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit, or 

CTCEU, is the first national program dedicated to the enforcement 

of nonimmigrant visa violations. SEVP and CTCEU execute complementary missions to regulate foreign students and exchange 

visitors and to proactively develop investigations that bolster our 

national security. 

Each year, the CTCEU analyzes the records of hundreds of thousands of potential status violators using information from SEVIS 

and the US-VISIT data base, along with other information. The 

CTCEU resolves these records by further identifying potential violations that would warrant field investigations, and many times resulting in establishing compliance, or establishing departure dates 

from the United States, or effecting the arrest and removal of an 

individual violator. 

In its report, GAO made eight recommendations with which we 

have concurred. 

First, the GAO recommended an increased focus on detecting 

fraudulent schools. The collaboration between CTCEU and SEVP 

facilitates processing for millions of legitimate foreign students 

while ensuring that those who want to defraud our systems or do 

us harm are not allowed to remain in the United States. 

To combat student visa fraud, we established a School Exploitation Section of CTCEU and later the SEVP Analysis and Operations Center, which supports HSI’s main goal of preventing exploitation of legitimate student pathways into the United States and 

school fraud activity. 

As GAO noted, collaboration between SEVP and CTCEU is essential to identify and close loopholes in the issuance of student 

and exchange visitor visas. SEVP and CTCEU have a process to coordinate on criminal investigations of nonimmigrant students, designated school officials, and SEVP-certified schools in order to pro-
8 

vide law enforcement with high-quality, timely, analytical information and service support for school compliance and foreign student 

issues. 

The GAO also identified the need for increased communication 

regarding potential criminal cases. SEVP notifies CTCEU of all 

schools that SEVP places on its compliance list. Schools are reviewed based on leads from SEVP and HSI field offices, our own 

internal risk analysis, or information received through other 

means, such as tips from school employees or students. Schools are 

vetted based on a complex list of risk factors, and SEVP and 

CTCEU continue to work to develop additional criteria and ways 

to strengthen the process so that the programs can more aggressively identify fraud among noncompliant schools. 

As GAO outlined in its report, flight schools have a unique set 

of risks. SEVP is currently working with the FAA to ensure that 

all SEVP-certified flight schools obtain the required FAA certification. 

In coordination with the FAA, SEVP has developed a list of all 

SEVP-certified flight schools that do not have the required certifications. SEVP has contacted those flight schools that do not have 

the required certification and, in consultation with the FAA, is developing time frames to require those schools to re-obtain their 

FAA certification. Schools that do not meet the time frames will 

have their SEVP certification withdrawn. 

GAO also noted that determining whether a school meets certification or accreditation requirements can be complex and may 

change over time. A key part of SEVP’s mission is to certify that 

all enrolled F and M nonimmigrant students are in status. With 

the general exception of English language programs, which will be 

required to be accredited in December 2013, schools are not required to have national accreditation in order to obtain SEVP certification. 

If a petitioning school claims national accreditation, SEVP requires evidence of such accreditation. Some States impose their 

own licensing requirements on educational programs. Therefore, we 

are is developing procedures to require validation of any State license or other accreditation information they provide to us. 

GAO also had recommendations concerning recordkeeping. When 

SEVP was established in 2003, it inherited a large amount of decades-old paper records from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, which has presented a challenge in terms of 

records management. SEVP has worked diligently since receipt of 

the more than 10,000 school files to review and digitize these historical record. Working through the update and recertification process, we are ensuring that these files are updated, complete, and 

correct. 

Again, we appreciate the assistance of GAO’s findings, and we 

are working diligently to fully address the remaining concerns. 

With thousands of colleges, universities, and other institutions of 

higher learning in the United States, we remain the gold standard 

in education around the world. While we encourage a growing and 

robust foreign student population, we must also maintain our unwavering commitment to protecting our Nation’s security. 
9 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I 

would be pleased to answer any questions that you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Let me thank both witnesses. 

I will try to keep the questioning to five minutes so that we can 

have second rounds and because Senator Grassley has another appointment. 

First, I want to ask each of you, you have heard what our bill 

will do; you have seen our bill. Do you think the provisions of the 

bill will positively address the vulnerabilities in the Student Visa 

Program? And what might you add? First, Ms. Gambler. 

Ms. GAMBLER. We have had a chance to review the provisions of 

the bill, and those provisions certainly address a number of areas 

that we pointed out were challenges in ICE’s management of the 

program, including looking at how the accreditation process is certified and reviewed by SEVP and also looking at the extent to 

which ICE is monitoring whether or not flight schools have the required FAA certification. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Do you think we are leaving anything out? 

Is there anything that you would add or change in the bill? 

Ms. GAMBLER. I think the bill certainly addressed the different 

challenges that we pointed out with the program. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Good. Thank you, Ms. Gambler. 

And what about you, Mr. Woods? I do not know what kind of 

constraints you are under, but what is your—does your Department have an opinion on our bill? And do you have a personal opinion on our bill? 

Mr. WOODS. First of all, I had the chance to review the bill, and 

as a law enforcement agency, we appreciate the legislature’s efforts 

to enhance our law enforcement efforts. 

In due time, when it comes out for comment, we would be glad 

to provide an official stance from the agency, but at this time I 

would like to encourage your staff to work with our staff to ensure 

that—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. But do you think it is going in the right— 

this is your own personal opinion. You—— 

Mr. WOODS. My personal opinion is it is going in the right direction, yes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. All right. Second question—for you, Mr. 

Woods. What is the status of DHS’ actions to address noncompliant 

flight schools that remain SEVP certified? 

Mr. WOODS. Like I said in my opening statement, we have initiated work with the FAA to identify those schools that do not have 

the proper—which would be the 141—classification or certification 

to remain in SEVP, to remain a SEVP-certified school. 

As of now, we have identified, of the 469 schools that we have 

SEVP certified for flight training programs, 153 that do not have 

the proper FAA certifications. But when you drill that number 

down further, you will find 30 of these institutions have closed 

completely and are withdrawn from the program; 61 do not even 

offer flight training anymore as part of their curriculum. Although 

they have been certified by SEVP to offer flight training, they have 
10 

to take their I–17 and take that off their certification process. So 

that is an update issue. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Will it interfere with them granting visas 

when they should not? Will that stop them—‘‘interfere’’ is the 

wrong word. Will that stop them from granting visas when they 

should not if they do not have flight programs? 

Mr. WOODS. They would not be able to provide I–20s to students 

for flight training. They could provide it for other—many schools 

that provide flight training—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. I understand. But I am asking will it prevent—— 

Mr. WOODS [continuing]. Along with other—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Will it prevent them from falsely bringing— 

you know, wrongly bringing people into the country who should not 

be here? 

Mr. WOODS. Until their I–17 is updated, no, it will not. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. Keep going. So those 61 could still be 

committing—— 

Mr. WOODS. Yes. And we are working with the FAA on the remaining schools to determine a time frame on which they can reobtain their—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. So have you closed any new ones? Have you 

closed—— 

Mr. WOODS. At this point, 32 schools have been closed. 

Chairman SCHUMER. You closed them or you said 30 closed. 

Mr. WOODS. They are closed and out of business. But we did not 

close them, no. 

Chairman SCHUMER. So what is taking so long? That is my question. 

Mr. WOODS. We are working with the schools to make sure that 

they update their FAA certification so they can continue to bring 

in students if they wish to, but they have to have the right certification. And the FAA process is a time-consuming process, apparently. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. Now, let us see here. I have time for 

one more. 

The Border Security Act required recertification for all SEVP-certified schools by May 2004—that is eight years ago—and every two 

years thereafter. However, ICE began the first recertification cycle 

in May 2010, and as of March 2012, it only recertified 19 percent 

of the SEVP-certified schools. So two questions: As of July 20th, 

what percentage of schools has ICE recertified? What actions, if 

any, has ICE taken or plan to take to expedite this recertification 

process? You must admit it is going at a snail’s pace. 

Mr. WOODS. Yes, I would admit that. The process going back to 

2004, SEVP was not correctly funded to initiate a recertification 

program. With the fee rule in 2009, we were able to set up and 

fund the hiring of adjudicators to do the recertification process. As 

of now, we are fully staffed with adjudicators to do that process, 

and we are conducting somewhere between 350 and 400 recertifications a month, and we are up to 32 percent of the total school 

population. 

Chairman SCHUMER. My time has expired, Senator Grassley. We 

will have a second round. 
11 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I will follow the same line that Senator 

Schumer did. We have 167 flight training schools that did not have 

proper certification and were still SEVP certified. GAO said that 

ICE may not be aware of the flight schools that had their FAA certification revoked. They also identified one school that had lost its 

FAA certification but still enrolled foreign students. Obviously this 

is both a national security issue and something that is unacceptable. 

GAO recommended that ICE establish target time frames for notifying schools that lack certification so that they can re-obtain it. 

Homeland Security officials responded that they would work on 

those time frames and that it could be done by September 30th. I 

do not think this is an issue that should take months to resolve. 

So my question to you, Mr. Woods, and if you cannot be specific, 

I would take an answer in writing: What kind of time frames are 

we talking about? Are we talking about a day, a month, a week, 

or how long? And are they allowed to bring in foreign students during that process? 

Mr. WOODS. To answer your question, as of right now, we have 

notified every school that has certification to do flight training that 

does not have the proper FAA certification to go out and re-obtain 

their 141 certification. If they do not do that forthwith, as I said 

in my opening statement, they will be withdrawn from SEVP 

through the administrative notice to withdraw process. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Are they allowed to bring in foreign students 

during this process? 

Mr. WOODS. I think it is under review whether they are issuing 

I–20s for flight training or not, those institutions. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. For both you and Ms. Gambler, before 

I ask a question, I have this lead-in. There are several issues regarding the Student and Exchange Visitor Program, including lack 

of coordination within ICE, flight schools, and sham universities. 

On top of that, ICE is forced to verify in lieu of letters provided 

by unaccredited universities. Some would say that only accredited 

schools should be eligible to enroll foreign students. Doing so would 

reduce the workload of ICE to focus on accredited schools. It also 

may have prevented the Tri-Valley incident. 

Questions for both of you, two questions. Should unaccredited 

schools be able to participate in the SEVP program and bring in 

foreign students, or should we limit the program to accredited 

schools only? And, second, if we did take unaccredited schools out 

of the program, would you make any exceptions to that rule? First, 

Ms. Gambler. 

Ms. GAMBLER. It would really be a policy decision on the part of 

Congress or ICE to determine whether or not unaccredited schools 

should be allowed to participate in the program. What we looked 

at as part of our review, and as you mentioned, Senator, was that 

ICE was not consistently verifying evidence presented by schools in 

lieu of certification. 

As part of our review of a random sample of 50 case files, we 

looked at 34 case files for unaccredited schools, and we found that 

in seven of those cases, the case files were lacking evidence presented by schools in lieu of accreditation. 
12 

We also found instances during our review of prior cases of 

schools submitting false or fraudulently obtained in lieu of letters 

for accreditation. 

So certainly this is an area of risk to the program, an we recommended that ICE do a better job of assessing what the risks are 

to the program and what the characteristics are of schools that 

may be potentially noncompliant or fraudulent. And so we made 

recommendations to ICE to look at that. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Mr. Woods, would you answer my two 

questions? 

Mr. WOODS. Obviously the requirement for higher education to 

be accredited would greatly reduce the risk factors involved in 

school fraud for a SEVP-certified school. Currently the greatest 

concern that we do have is those higher education institutions that 

are not accredited, and we look at them as a higher risk factor for 

compliance and site visits to ensure that they are providing education to the students that they bring into the United States. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Should you limit the program only to accredited schools? 

Mr. WOODS. The difficulty in the accreditation process is that it 

changes from State to State. Many States have an accreditation 

process. Some have a licensing process. And we are working with 

each individual State to identify their process and our validation 

techniques to ensure that the documents that the schools provide 

are legitimate. And as I said, you know, I think some sort of State 

or national accreditation would reduce the risk factor for fraud. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I think I can wait for round two, so why don’t 

you go to Senator Feinstein. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. The way I look at this is it is process, process, process, and nothing happens. And it is exactly the same as 

it was before 9/11. 

My view is very clearly—Senator Grassley, you hit the nail on 

the head—a non-accredited school should not be permitted to take 

these students, and if you open a sham school, you go to jail. It is 

just that clear. And I think that is where we have to be. 

I think you have to be FAA certified to teach and to grant a pilot’s license. And if we have not learned this, I do not think we 

learned anything. 

I know the back of all of this is money. People have the lust to 

get the money, and it is cheating. It has got to stop because the 

Nation’s security is at stake. 

I wanted to ask one question here. Mr. Woods, one of the most 

troubling things that GAO found was that—and I would like to 

quote from the report—‘‘SEVP management has not referred potentially criminal cases to the enforcement arm in accordance with 

ICE’s procedures.’’ And that is CTCEU, which is the criminal unit. 

I gather relations are very bad between them. What can you say 

about that? 

Mr. WOODS. I would disagree with that. I would say that the relations maybe in the past when they were part of two different divisions were strained because there was a lack of communication. 

But now that they are both housed within the National Security 

Investigations Division and I oversee both units, I ensure that 
13 

there is crossover of our personnel, that agents are working in with 

the adjudicators. We set up over the past two years a School Exploitation Section, which focuses solely on school fraud. We set up 

the SEVP Operations and Analysis Section, which looks at the compliant schools. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me stop you. So you disagree with everything on pages 33 and 34 of the GAO report. Is that correct? 

Mr. WOODS. I do not disagree with everything. I am just saying 

I disagree that there is a lack of communication. I think communication has enhanced over the period of the last number of years, 

and I think we are working toward making one fluid step. The 

compliance list is shared with our enforcement program to ensure 

that if there are cases where we feel there are significant risk factors that we want to send investigators out to look at schools, we 

do. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. Let me read something. ‘‘However, in 

our interviews with eight ICE field offices, field investigators at 

two offices gave examples of SEVP officials’ continuing administrative activities when asked to cease such activity. In one case, investigators stated that the target and owner of a flight school became 

suspicious of increased attention by SEVP officials and fled the 

United States in 2011 to avoid prosecution. Our review confirms 

that the SEVP office was aware of the criminal investigation but 

continued to take administrative actions. 

‘‘In another ongoing case in California, field investigators stated 

that SEVP officials conducted a site visit to an institution following 

an owner’s indictment after the local ICE field office investigators 

instructed SEVP to stop administrative activities.’’ 

Mr. WOODS. And I would agree that there are some hiccups out 

there—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Hiccups? 

Mr. WOODS [continuing]. Where communication has failed. We 

have developed a new ‘‘Use These Lessons Learned.’’ We have developed a ‘‘School Fraud Handbook’’ at the end of 2010, beginning 

of 2011, to ensure that there is proper communication between 

both our enforcement and administrative programs. We are—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Sir, you are into process. We need to get into 

enforcement. I think that is the difference between us. I was where 

you were 10 years ago, but it has not worked. Nothing has 

changed, and the statistics and the GAO report indicates that. 

You know, at some point, I think you have got to accept the reality of it, and the reality is your failure to complete the mission. 

I am very frustrated. I do not usually talk this way. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Keep going. That is true. She is one of the 

most polite Senators. 

Senator GRASSLEY. It is probably an institutional problem as opposed to Mr. Woods’ problem. I mean, it is an institutional problem, 

but he has got to help us solve it. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, that is right. As you look through this 

and you look at the ICE response, you know, ICE will seek to withdraw schools, ICE agreed that SEVP adjudicators should verify all 

in lieu of, ICE noted that case files may be missing, ICE is developing a quality assurance process. It goes on and on and on, and 

nothing changes. 
14 

Chairman SCHUMER. Exactly. And the frustration we all have is 

this created a national crisis, and it is 11 years later, and we are 

still sort of developing things. Can you explain in common-sense, 

plain language, Mr. Woods, not, in all due respect, a bureaucratic 

answer, why is it 11 years later we have not had any prosecutions, 

we have had still a large number of the schools not addressed or 

looked at or examined? What is going on here? What is wrong? Do 

you lack the resources? Do you lack the will? Is it not a high 

enough priority of the agency? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Or is it philosophy? 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. Good question. Is it philosophy? Can 

you please give us a frank answer on this? We want to know what 

is wrong so we can help correct it. We are not out to just flagellate 

anybody. 

Mr. WOODS. I understand, Chairman Schumer. I feel your same 

frustration. I have been in this position for three years, and I have 

taken every effort we can to enhance and try to better the communication between our administrative SEVP program and the 

CTCEU, which is the basic headquarters element that talks to 

these agents that are out in the field and assists them on their investigations. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, is that—I am sorry to interrupt. Is 

the headquarters not giving the agents enough of an impetus to 

focus on this issue? Do they say there are other issues that are 

much more important? 

Mr. WOODS. No, that is not—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. The agents are not cooperating. 

Mr. WOODS. The agents are cooperating. In 2009, with the increased fee rule and the schools and students, we were able to obtain further resources to go out and combat the school fraud issues. 

Prior to that, the focus of the CTCEU, which was the CEU at the 

time, Compliance Enforcement Unit, was to focus on the individuals, the individual students that may cause a national security 

threat. We have expanded that program—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Instead of the schools. 

Mr. WOODS. Instead of schools. We have expanded that program 

at this point—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. And that lasted about seven years until you 

came in? Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. WOODS. That is when we had the resources to move forward 

on that issue, and we obtained those resources, and we moved forward to where now we focus on the institutions that provide the 

pathways for the fraud, and we focus on those. And we have dedicated agents in the field that every day focus on this. I think that 

is why this Committee and others are interested in this school 

fraud issue because we have increased our prosecutions of these 

cases. We have gone after the designated school officials. 

Chairman SCHUMER. It is three years since 2010, and the GAO 

did not give you good grades, so how do you explain that? 

Mr. WOODS. I am not saying we do not have a long way to go. 

We are moving forward, and we are trying to make the corrections, 

both administratively and through either procedure and policy, to 

ensure that we meet GAO’s requirements to all their eight rec-
15 

ommendations, to ensure that as we recertify institutions we keep 

proper records. 

Chairman SCHUMER. When will you meet these eight recommendations given your present level of resources and focus? 

Mr. WOODS. As I said, you know, we are moving forward. We are 

processing somewhere between—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. No, we need—that is not a good—when? A 

year? Five years? 

Mr. WOODS. The recertification process will take two years to 

complete of all the schools. Through that process, we will have the 

recordkeeping in order. We are in the process of hiring a new 

records manager. That will be done this year. We are in the process 

of developing risk factors which will be in place before the closeout 

of this fiscal year. So I would say for probably seven of the eight 

recommendations, with the end of this calendar year we will have 

them all in place. As for the recertification program and getting 

that up to 100 percent, it is a two-year process that will be rotating 

and continuing on. 

Chairman SCHUMER. So, in other words, all eight—at least you 

will have rules in place to meet all eight GAO recommendations by 

the December 31, 2012? 

Mr. WOODS. Correct. 

Chairman SCHUMER. That is a little bit—and then you say it will 

take you two years to get compliance to implement those rules and 

regulations? 

Mr. WOODS. It will take two years to recertify all the schools. 

When you talk about 10,000 institutions and doing 400 a month, 

that takes about two years to go through the whole process. And 

then we start again and start with—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. And just one other, and then I will 

defer to my colleagues. You know, one of the things that GAO recommended is that you do things—you spend the same amount of 

time investigating Stanford as you do investigating a Tri-Valley 

Flight School. Why don’t you start looking at risk to our country 

and focus on the schools that, you know, just on a first look are 

the ones who would create the danger? 

Mr. WOODS. Right now we have developed a risk scorecard for institutions that go on to our compliance list. We are enhancing that, 

working with DHS in the high-track process, and—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Is that being used now, that risk scorecard? 

Mr. WOODS. Yes, it is. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Since when? 

Mr. WOODS. Since January of this year. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I see. Pretty reasonable. Okay. I have asked 

a lot of questions. Let me defer to either of my colleagues. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Can I go ahead, please? 

Chairman SCHUMER. Yes, please. 

Senator GRASSLEY. You know, we have talked about this since 

September 11, 2001, but this is a problem that goes back to the 

1993 World Trade Center bombing because we had student visa 

violators involved in that, and we created SEVIS as a result of the 

1993 incident and I know, Mr. Woods, you are connected or you 

know a lot about that because you were on the Joint Terrorism 

Task Force from 1993 to 1995. And I do not say that to embarrass 
16 

anybody. I just say that you have a background and you know 

what this problem is. And I wonder if you are not connected with 

a lot of bureaucrat initiative, and you said you have been working 

hard, and I do not question that you probably have been working 

hard. But if heads do not roll—you know, you put out instructions, 

and if heads do not roll, you are never going to get any change of 

behavior. 

Let me lead to a question for you, Mr. Woods, dealing with designated school officials. We have learned that there are some of 

these DSOs who are bad actors and commit fraud in order to enroll 

foreign students. While these school officials must be U.S. citizens 

or legal permanent residents, there is no requirement that the 

school conduct a background check of them. Some educational institutions voluntarily do do that. 

Why doesn’t ICE require all schools who participate in the Student and Exchange Visitor Program to undergo background checks? 

And would you commit to issue a rule that would require background checks of DSOs? 

Mr. WOODS. In working with our Office of Policy, I would recommend to them that we issue a rule, absent legislation requiring 

it, that we do a background check on all designated school officials. 

That is one of the recommendations we have pending our policy 

program. 

Senator GRASSLEY. So do I interpret that to mean you are already in the process of issuing such a rule? 

Mr. WOODS. We are recommending that to our Office of Policy, 

yes. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Is that moving along fast enough that 

it is going to become a rule, or what is the impediment to getting 

that done in a certain time frame? 

Mr. WOODS. Again, there are competing priorities on rulemaking 

and which rules are going to be adopted by the Department, and 

we fall in line with the rest of the Department on policies and 

rules. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. For you, Ms. Gambler, do you think 

that the SEVP office lacks an enforcement-minded approach that 

is required of an agency whose mission is to protect the homeland? 

Ms. GAMBLER. As part of our review, we did hear from the criminal investigators in CTCEU that they were concerned that SEVP 

has not focused enough on compliance and oversight. Certainly it 

is a shared responsibility between SEVP and the criminal investigators to identify potentially noncompliant schools—that would be 

on the part of SEVP—and referring that information to CTCEU 

when it becomes potentially criminal in nature. 

At the same time, the criminal investigative side can really help 

SEVP identify potential risks to the program that could help SEVP 

target its compliance activities and, do a better job of certifying 

schools, checking the evidence at certification, and providing ongoing monitoring for schools to ensure that they are still eligible to 

be in the program. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Let me follow on something that would fit 

into what Senator Feinstein said about philosophy. In your view, 

is there more interest for the office to be a friend of the schools 

rather than a regulator? 
17 

Ms. GAMBLER. We did not specifically look at that issue, Senator, 

but, again, we did hear some concerns from the criminal investigators in CTCEU that SEVP was not putting enough emphasis on its 

compliance and monitoring mission. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. I thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Can we have Mr. Woods follow up on what 

Ms. Gambler said? Because it is right in line with both Senator 

Feinstein’s and Senator Grassley’s comments. What she is saying 

is your focus is sort of being more friends to the schools, helping 

them, as opposed to compliance and enforcement. Senator Feinstein 

asked about the attitude of people in the field on this issue. Would 

you address that, Mr. Woods? 

Mr. WOODS. Certainly. CTCEU is composed of special agents, law 

enforcement individuals. The Student and Exchange Visitor Program is composed of adjudicators, program analysts, and support 

staff. SEVP and CTCEU do have complementary missions where 

SEVP does not need to provide support and service to the designated school officials who maintain the SEVIS data base. They 

work hand in hand with school officials and the universities to ensure that they are complying with the law, complying with the regulations to bring students in. They have to strike a balance between the friendly side to the universities and the enforcement side 

to the universities. 

Additionally, where our special agents can focus strictly on criminal investigations, we move forward on those cases and have a 

strict enforcement mode. So SEVP does have a dichotomy where 

they need to balance both being a friend to the school and helping 

them to comply and also identifying sources of fraud that are systematic or egregious that we can enforce. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I am just very dissatisfied with the progress. 

I think this a very good GAO report, and what I am going to do— 

and it would be wonderful if you wanted to do it—is send this report with a letter from us that we have been watching this situation, that we are really concerned about the lack of progress that 

has been made, the vulnerability, the over-attention to process. 

Let me read something on page 36 of the report. ‘‘While the coordination standard operating procedure for SEVP, CTCEU, and 

ICE field offices requires that SEVP refer allegations or leads revealing possible criminal violations to the Enforcement Unit in a 

timely manner, the procedure does not have criteria for determining when certain noncompliant activity becomes potentially 

criminal.’’ It goes on and on. 

‘‘The SEVP Compliance Unit first shared its compliance case log 

with CTCEU in October 2011. Upon review of this information, 

CTCEU officials stated that several of the compliance cases could 

involve potential criminal violations. CTCEU officials identified examples of potentially criminal violations, including designated 

school officials sharing SEVIS passwords, a school not holding class 

but reporting attendance, a school reporting its own address as students’ addresses, and a school charging additional fees for showing 

students as compliant.’’ 

And it goes on like that. 
18 

It is so elemental, and yet—and it was elemental 10 years ago, 

that I really think we need to bring the Secretary’s attention to the 

failure of the system and ask for major reforms, and particularly 

an enforcement mode. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I agree. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Because these case studies—and it goes on 

and on and on. The sham—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. You said process, process, process. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes, exactly. That is my—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. I think it is a good idea to send a letter. We 

will ask Senator Grassley and Senator McCaskill as sponsors to do 

it. 

Now, I have a few more related questions. Some people say—and 

I would ask Ms. Gambler this—that the penalties are so low that 

the enforcement part of ICE does not bother. Do you think the penalties—and I guess I would ask Mr. Woods, too. We have a twoyear mandatory sentence for false accreditation and reporting, up 

to 15. Will those be sufficient? Are they tough enough? And will 

they then get Enforcement to do more? Because one of the ex—one 

of the reasons—I was going to say ‘‘excuses.’’ But one of the reasons 

they say is the penalties are not tough enough to merit criminal 

prosecution. Any comments on that, Ms. Gambler? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Mr. Chairman, we did not look at the penalty 

issue as part of our review. What we did focus on was really the 

extent to which ICE was effectively implementing the existing controls and processes it has in place. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Did you come across any of this, you know, 

that the penalties were too weak from any of the people you interviewed? 

Ms. GAMBLER. We did not hear that as a theme as part of our 

work, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Mr. Woods. Existing penalties, not the ones 

in our bill. 

Mr. WOODS. The Sentencing Guidelines for this type of activity 

are low in comparison, maybe, with other crimes. But that does not 

affect the amount of resources that we put at this program. We 

have dedicated agents that fall into the fee-funded rules that—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Not you. It is the prosecutors. They say, 

‘‘Hey, to go through a whole court case for a small slap on the wrist 

is not worth it to us.’’ Is that a factor? 

Mr. WOODS. That is a factor in every United States Attorney’s—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Do you think the penalties—— 

Mr. WOODS [continuing]. Office in the Nation. 

Chairman SCHUMER [continuing]. We have are strong enough? 

Mr. WOODS. Is what strong enough? 

Chairman SCHUMER. Are the penalties that we have in our bill 

strong enough to get the—— 

Mr. WOODS. Any enhancement in mandatory minimums usually 

brings—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Are these strong enough? 

Mr. WOODS. I think it is an improvement. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. Next, just one more. We are going to 

send you that in writing to get an official answer from your agency. 
19 

Mr. WOODS. Certainly. 

Chairman SCHUMER. And I would like you to show that to the 

Enforcement folks and let them answer it with you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. The last question I have, which Senator 

Feinstein and I discussed, is the issue of certification and not allowing non-certified—accredited, sorry, accreditation, certification 

of non-accredited institutions to take these students does have one 

difficulty. There are certain types of institutions of higher learning 

that do not have an accreditation process. Juilliard in my home 

State of New York would be one of those. We certainly want to let 

Juilliard take some foreign students. There are many talents musicians, singers, and whatever. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. That is a music school. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Yes. It is one of the best in the country. 

And so maybe what we could do is say that there has to be accreditation, the way Senator Feinstein did, but allow schools to apply 

for an exception if there are no accreditation process. Obviously 

with flight schools there is with the FAA, so none of them would 

be exempt. 

What do you both think of that idea? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Again, I think that is really a policy decision. 

What would be key is ICE, as our work has shown, consistently implementing whatever kind of—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. That is why we want to switch the burden 

of proof, so ICE has to implement unless there is an exception as 

opposed to doing it the other way. 

What do you think, Mr. Woods? 

Mr. WOODS. I think that is similar to the approach we take right 

now, which we call in lieu of letters to show that the school’s processes are accepted by other institutions that may be accredited and 

that they would take credits or the learning from that school. Like 

you said, there should be some exemptions, but I believe what we 

are doing and implementing based on the GAO report is validating 

to ensure that those letters and those—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. No, but it is taking forever—— 

Mr. WOODS [continuing]. Documents are true. 

Chairman SCHUMER. We would rather do it the other way. If you 

do not have certification, you are out until you can prove you 

should be in, as opposed to let us at a snail’s pace, as you even admitted, go through saying who is out and they are assumed to be 

in. What do you think? 

Mr. WOODS. I would agree with you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Oh, good. Okay. We are not happy with 

how ICE has handled this and SEVP has handled this, as you 

know. We hope that you will speed things up. We hope our legislation will help make things better for you. But we are not going to— 

I know I speak for Senator Feinstein, who is passionate about this, 

as well as Senator Grassley, and I believe Senator McCaskill. We 

need real change here, and we will do it legislatively, but we will 

also do it with the letter that she suggested as well as oversight, 

continued oversight. 

So if you do not have any more questions, Senator, then I want 

to thank both witnesses. I want to thank you for an excellent report, Ms. Gambler, and I want to thank Mr. Woods for being here 
20 

as well and answering our questions—many of them, quite frankly—which we appreciate. 

The record will stay open for seven days for additional written 

questions to be submitted by Committee Members, and the hearing 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(21) 

A P P E N D I X 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER CHARLES GRASSLEY
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC 
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27 
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31 
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33 
34 
35 
36 
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION

AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
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40 
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42 
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QUESTIONS

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHARLES GRASSLEY FOR REBECCA GAMBLER
48 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHARLES GRASSLEY FOR JOHN P. WOODS
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ANSWERS

RESPONSES OF REBECCA GAMBLER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY
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RESPONSES OF JOHN P. WOODS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY

HAVE BEEN REDACTED. 

Æ