S. HRG. 113–611 

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE 

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION, 113TH CONGRESS 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON

NOMINATIONS OF 

HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON; HON. BRAD R. CARSON; DR. WILLIAM A. 

LaPLANTE, JR.; HON. ROBERT O. WORK; HON. MICHAEL J. McCORD; 

MS. CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH; MR. BRIAN P. McKEON; HON. DAVID B. 

SHEAR; MR. ERIC ROSENBACH; GEN. PAUL J. SELVA, USAF; VADM MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN; DR. LAURA J. JUNOR; MR. GORDON O. TANNER; MS. DEBRA S. WADA; MS. MIRANDA A.A. BALLENTINE; DR. 

MONICA C. REGALBUTO; ADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN; GEN JOHN 

F. CAMPBELL, USA; LTG JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA; GEN. JOSEPH F. 

DUNFORD, JR., USMC; MR. ROBERT M. SCHER; MS. ELISSA SLOTKIN; 

MR. DAVID J. BERTEAU; MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK; AND ADM HARRY B. 

HARRIS, JR., USN 

JANUARY 16; FEBRUARY 25; MARCH 11; JUNE 19; JULY 10, 17; 

DECEMBER 2, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION, 

113TH CONGRESS 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

93–919 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 113–611 

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE 

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION, 113TH CONGRESS 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON

NOMINATIONS OF 

HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON; HON. BRAD R. CARSON; DR. WILLIAM A. 

LaPLANTE, JR.; HON. ROBERT O. WORK; HON. MICHAEL J. McCORD; 

MS. CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH; MR. BRIAN P. McKEON; HON. DAVID B. 

SHEAR; MR. ERIC ROSENBACH; GEN. PAUL J. SELVA, USAF; VADM MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN; DR. LAURA J. JUNOR; MR. GORDON O. TANNER; MS. DEBRA S. WADA; MS. MIRANDA A.A. BALLENTINE; DR. 

MONICA C. REGALBUTO; ADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN; GEN JOHN 

F. CAMPBELL, USA; LTG JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA; GEN. JOSEPH F. 

DUNFORD, JR., USMC; MR. ROBERT M. SCHER; MS. ELISSA SLOTKIN; 

MR. DAVID J. BERTEAU; MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK; AND ADM HARRY B. 

HARRIS, JR., USN 

JANUARY 16; FEBRUARY 25; MARCH 11; JUNE 19; JULY 10, 17; 

DECEMBER 2, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

PETER K. LEVINE, Staff Director 

JOHN A. BONSELL, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

Page 

JANUARY 16, 2014

Nominations of Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon to be Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; Hon. Brad R. Carson 

to be Under Secretary of the Army; and Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr., 

to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition ............................... 1 

Statements of: 

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., to be Principal Deputy Administrator, National 

Nuclear Security Administration ........................................................................ 3 

Carson, Hon. Brad R., to be Under Secretary of the Army .................................. 5 

LaPlante, William A., Jr., Ph.D., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Acquisition ...................................................................................................... 6 

FEBRUARY 25, 2014

Nominations of Hon. Robert O. Work to be Deputy Secretary of Defense; 

Hon. Michael J. McCord to be Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); 

Ms. Christine E. Wormuth to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; 

Mr. Brian P. McKeon to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy; Hon. David B. Shear to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; and Mr. Eric Rosenbach to be Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense ......................................................

Statements of: 

Warner, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia, Retired ............... 155 

Nunn, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from the State of Georgia, Retired .................... 159 

Work, Hon. Robert O., to be Deputy Secretary of Defense .................................. 161 

McCord, Hon. Michael J., to be Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) ....... 163 

Wormuth, Ms. Christine E., to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy .......... 164 

McKeon, Mr. Brian P., to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

For Policy .............................................................................................................. 165 

Shear, Hon. David B., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and 

Pacific Security Affairs ........................................................................................ 167 

Rosenbach, Mr. Eric, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense .................................................................................................................. 168 

III

Page

IV 

MARCH 11, 2014

Nominations of Gen. Paul J. Selva, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade 

of General and to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command; and 

VADM Michael S. Rogers, USN, to be Admiral and Director, National 

Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Services/Commander, U.S. Cyber 

Command .............................................................................................................. 431 

Statements of: 

Kirk, Hon. Mark, U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois .................................... 433 

Selva, Gen. Paul J., USAF, for reappointment to the Grade of General and 

to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ........................................... 434 

Rogers, VADM Michael S., USN, to be Admiral and Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central Security Services; and Commander, U.S. Cyber 

Command .............................................................................................................. 435 

JUNE 19, 2014

Nominations of Dr. Laura J. Junor, to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Mr. Gordon O. Tanner, to be 

General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force; Ms. Debra S. Wada, 

to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; 

Ms. Miranda A.A. Ballentine, to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Installations, Environment, and Energy; and Dr. Monica C. Regalbuto, 

to be Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management ............ 541 

Statements of: 

Junor, Laura J., to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness ..................................................................................... 543 

Tanner, Gordon O., to be General Counsel of the Department of the Air 

Force ...................................................................................................................... 544

Wada, Debra S., to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs ..................................................................................................... 545 

Ballentine, Miranda A.A., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Installations, Environment, and Energy ............................................................ 545 

Regalbuto, Monica C., to be Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental 

Management ......................................................................................................... 547 

JULY 10, 2014

Nominations of ADM William E. Gortney, USN, for Reappointment to the 

Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command; GEN John F. 

Campbell, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. 

Forces, Afghanistan; and LTG Joseph L. Votel, USA, to be General and 

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command .............................................. 655 

Statements of: 

Gortney, ADM William E., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral 

and to be Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command ..................................................................... 658 

Campbell, GEN John F., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General 

and to be Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, 

U.S. Forces, Afghanistan ..................................................................................... 659 

Votel, LTG Joseph L., USA, to be General and Commander, U.S. Special 

Operations Command .......................................................................................... 660 

JULY 17, 2014

Nomination of Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, for Reappointment to 

the Grade of General and to be Commandant of the Marine Corps ................ 787 

Statement of: 

Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, for Reappointment to the Grade of 

General and to be Commandant of the Marine Corps ...................................... 789 

Page

V 

DECEMBER 2, 2014

Nominations of Mr. Robert M. Scher to be Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; Ms. Elissa Slotkin to be Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Mr. David J. 

Berteau to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel 

Readiness; Ms. Alissa M. Starzak to be General Counsel of the Department 

of the Army; ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the 

Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ................... 859 

Statements of: 

Scher, Robert M., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, 

and Capabilities ................................................................................................... 862 

Slotkin, Elissa, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs .................................................................................................................... 863

Berteau, David J., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness ............................................................................................... 864 

Starzak, Alissa M., to be General Counsel of the Department of the Army ....... 865 

Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral 

and to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command .................................................. 865 

APPENDIX ............................................................................................................... 1053 

(1) 

NOMINATIONS OF HON. MADELYN R. 

CREEDON TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; HON. BRAD R. CARSON TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY; AND DR. WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE, JR., 

TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR 

FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 16, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, 

Udall, Hagan, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Inhofe, Ayotte, 

and Blunt. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets today to consider the nominations of: Madelyn Creedon to be 

Principal Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA); Brad Carson to be Under Secretary of the 

Army; and William LaPlante, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force for Acquisition. 

We welcome our witnesses and their families. We extend our 

gratitude to the family members in particular, who are so critically 

important for the support of our nominees through the long hours 

that they work and the countless demands on them as a result of 

their careers in public service. 

To our witnesses, during your opening statements please feel free 

to introduce your family members and others who are here to support you today. 

Each of our nominees has an impressive record in public service. 

Ms. Creedon has served in positions of distinction throughout her 

time in Government service, positions including the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs; Assistant Administrator of the NNSA for Defense Programs; General Counsel for the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission; and a trial attorney in the Department of Energy (DOE); and of course, as counsel to this committee for over 17 years. I think we’re all familiar 

2 

with her deep knowledge of and passionate commitment to the national security of our country. 

Mr. Carson was a member of the House of Representatives representing the Second District of Oklahoma from 2001 to 2005. In 

2008 and 2009 he served on Active Duty with an explosive ordnance disposal battalion in Iraq and was awarded the Bronze Star 

for his service. Mr. Carson is currently serving as the senior-most 

legal advisor in the Department of the Army, the Army General 

Counsel. 

Dr. LaPlante began his career in the Johns Hopkins University 

Applied Physics Laboratory. He remained at the university for over 

25 years. During that time he held a variety of positions, including 

the Department Head for Global Engagement and Associate Department Head of the National Security Technology Department. 

Dr. LaPlante has been a member of the U.S. Strategic Command 

Senior Advisory Group, the Naval Research Advisory Committee, 

and the Defense Science Board. He is currently the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. 

When they’re confirmed—usually I say ‘‘if confirmed,’’ but I’ll be 

very optimistic this morning, so I’ll say ‘‘when confirmed’’—Ms. 

Creedon will take on a key leadership role in the Nation’s nuclear 

security apparatus, while Mr. Carson and Dr. LaPlante will help 

to guide the Army and the Air Force through the challenging fiscal 

environment that we now face and will face even more so in the 

Department of Defense (DOD). 

We look forward to the testimony of our nominees and hopefully 

to their confirmation, and we now call on Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first repeat 

what I’ve told those who are here at the table before the hearing. 

Unfortunately, my effort to segregate the two committees of the 

Environment and Public Works Committee and the Armed Services 

Committee has been unsuccessful again. We’re simultaneously having a meeting upstairs two floors, so I will be going back and forth. 

I will use your characterization of ‘‘when confirmed’’ also. 

Ms. Creedon, it’s nice to see you again. It’s very rare that you 

get someone who has such a deep background and interest in this. 

You’re predictable, and we appreciate that very much. Congress remains committed to the nuclear modernization promises that were 

made back when they were getting the votes for the New Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and I will be asking some questions about that. 

Secretary Hagel said earlier this month in Wyoming, and this is 

a quote, he said: ‘‘We’ve got some work to do on modernization and 

we’re going to invest in the modernization we need to keep that deterrent stronger than it’s ever been. And you have my commitment 

to do that.’’ 

That’s a quote by Secretary Hagel and I was very glad to hear 

that. When confirmed, you’ll play an important role in overseeing 

the efforts to meet these modernization commitments. NNSA’s successful execution and implementation of the nuclear modernization 

program will be essential to avoid delays in cost growth. This will 

3 

require the NNSA to implement changes in its organizational culture and improve the way it manages programs. 

I’m happy to see my good friend Brad Carson here from Oklahoma. I told him in my office yesterday that Joe Westphal has been 

one of my best friends long before he had the position that Mr. Carson’s going to be confirmed in. He was also from Oklahoma. He 

taught at the Oklahoma State University. So as long as we keep 

Okies in that position I’m happy about it, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] 

When I served on the House Armed Services Committee, I remember—I think I told you this story—that my last year on the 

House Armed Services Committee would have been 1949— 

1994——[Laughter.] 

Anyway, at that time I remember we had witnesses that said in 

10 years we’ll no longer need ground troops. I think we know that 

now, that we have some real serious problems. We talked about the 

drawdown, reducing the end strength from 490,000 to 420,000. No 

matter how many smart politicians, Pentagon officials, or academics you put around the table, you will never be able to predict 

the future and what our needs are going to be. 

Discussions are also ongoing about future mix of Active and Reserve component forces that will have far-reaching implications for 

the future of the force and its ability to meet our national security 

needs. 

Dr. LaPlante, the past several years have been challenging for 

the Air Force’s acquisition community. The lack of accountable 

leadership is one of the reasons for recent failures, including the 

cancellation of the Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS), 

a program that lost $1 billion in taxpayers’ dollars. Additionally, 

questions remain if the Air Force will be able to perform an audit 

by September 30, 2017. 

Other critical programs, such as the Long-Range Strike Bomber, 

are just beginning and ensuring an achievable and affordable acquisition program will be critical to maintaining our Nation’s nuclear triad and conventional global strike capabilities. 

Now, given your experience—and I really appreciate the time 

that you gave me in the office to go over things. I really believe 

that you have the background where you are going to be able to 

try some new things. 

Specifically, I have a chart that I’ve already explained to you, 

that we want to be sure that we explain to this committee. I’m 

looking forward to working with you and with all of those who are 

before us today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe. 

We’ll now call upon our witnesses for their opening statements. 

Secretary Creedon. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. CREEDON. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee. I’m honored to be 

here today and grateful to President Obama and Secretary Moniz 

4 

for nominating me to be the Principal Deputy Administrator at the 

National Nuclear Security Administration. 

I would also like to introduce and thank my husband, Jim 

Bracco, for being here today, but mostly for his patience over the 

years, for putting up with the many long nights and weekends at 

work and away from home, and with my being late to more things 

than I ever want to count, but mostly for being enthusiastically 

supportive of this new challenge. 

I want to thank my daughter Meredith and my son John, who 

have grown up to be incredible adults, for all of their support, even 

though today their support is virtual. I know that they will watch 

the Senate Armed Services Committee website tonight so that they 

can critique me in the morning. 

I also want to thank my parents, who still live in Indiana, 

Marilyn and Richard Creedon. Through my dad’s 35-plus years of 

service in the Army Reserve and my mom’s unending commitment 

to volunteerism, they have instilled in me dedication to public service and a deep commitment to my country. 

My over 30 years in Government service supporting national security have been a special privilege, and if confirmed to be Principal Deputy Administrator, I will have the honor to serve again 

with the dedicated and highly talented men and women of the 

NNSA. These men and women work every day to ensure that the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, to prevent the threats from nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, 

and to ensure that our nuclear-powered naval surface ships and 

submarines can steam all over the world to secure our freedoms. 

The NNSA has many challenges, but I have faith in the people 

of the NNSA and look forward to the opportunity, if confirmed, to 

work with all of them to address these many challenges. Just last 

week I had the pleasure of accompanying Secretary Hagel as he 

visited the NNSA’s Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, 

NM. While I was there in my role as the DOD Assistant Secretary 

and had been to NNSA sites many times, it was a wonderful reminder of the impressive work done by the men and women of the 

nuclear security enterprise. 

The NNSA’s work remains as important and impressive as it has 

ever been. Even in today’s budget environment and with Cold War 

facilities decaying around the complex, the commitment of the 

NNSA remains strong. It is a privilege to be asked to continue in 

public service, and particularly to be asked to serve at the NNSA. 

Maintaining nuclear security is a whole-of-government sport. The 

Departments of State and Defense, as well as Members of Congress 

and the personal and committee staffs, are all necessary to ensure 

a bright future at NNSA. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that 

this partnership remains strong. 

In closing, I also want to thank Senators Reed and Nelson and 

Senators Sessions and Vitter for their work on the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee when I was on the committee staff; and now Senator 

Udall for his support; and for all the continuing commitment to 

NNSA that all have given. 

I look forward to this new challenge and to your questions, and 

I thank you for your support. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much. 

5 

Now, Mr. Carson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD R. CARSON, TO BE UNDER 

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

Mr. CARSON. Senator Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Senators of the committee: I do have a prepared statement 

that I would propose I submit for the record and instead speak a 

bit more extemporaneously and briefly. 

Chairman LEVIN. That would be fine. 

Mr. CARSON. I would like to thank President Obama for nominating me to this position and to the Secretary of Defense for his 

support of the nomination. It’s been a great professional pleasure 

of mine for the last 2 years to serve as General Counsel to the Secretary of the Army, John McHugh. I look very steeply up to the example he has set. Joe Westphal, the Under Secretary, who Senator 

Inhofe has already mentioned, is a friend and a mentor as well. To 

Generals Odierno and Campbell, soldier’s soldiers, combat leaders 

extraordinaire, people who are respected not only within the Army 

but far outside of it. 

I have many friends here today from the Army’s Office of General Counsel and from across the Pentagon, and I am grateful to 

be part of their team and to have been a small part of the effort 

in the Army to try to do some good things. 

Of course, behind me is my wife Julie, who is an attorney herself, 

and she has sacrificed so much as I have pursued my own career, 

often at the expense of the things that she would have done for her 

own professional development. I am very grateful to her. 

The Army is an amazing place, filled with extraordinary people. 

I’m reminded of this most when I see any soldier who is under the 

age of 35, because I know that each of them joined knowing that 

they would be sent almost immediately upon the completion of 

training to Iraq or Afghanistan. They joined not to avoid the fight, 

because they wanted to be in the fight at its very hottest moments. 

The Army has sacrificed much: 4,843 casualties in Iraq, 2,401 as 

of today in Afghanistan, tens of thousands more wounded. All the 

Services have contributed much to these conflicts, but the Army 

has borne more than its sad share of those statistics. Perhaps even 

more notable, 15,000 Awards for Valor, 9 Medals of Honor, 30 Distinguished Service Crosses, and more than 600 Silver Stars. It is 

said when you go to Section 60 of Arlington National Cemetery 

you’ll see all the Services well represented, but you can’t overlook 

the contributions that the U.S. Army has made. 

I think my background in law, politics, higher education, and 

business have well prepared me to be the Under Secretary of the 

Army. One thing I can assure the committee is that if I am confirmed I won’t forget the example of those people I’ve mentioned 

and I will do my best to acquit myself in their honor. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. BRAD R. CARSON

Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee. It is a significant privilege to be considered for the important 

role of Under Secretary of the Army, and I appreciate the committee’s rigor and diligence as it considers my nomination. Before we begin, I would like to acknowledge 

6 

some of the many people who have played a part in this professional journey. I 

would like to first thank President Obama for demonstrating his continued trust in 

me with this second role in his administration. I am indebted to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel for his support and Secretary of the Army John McHugh for his 

strong example of leadership and management. I am grateful to Under Secretary 

Joseph Westphal for his mentorship. I would like to express my admiration for Chief 

of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno and his Vice Chief of Staff General 

John Campbell; it is only through close cooperation with military leaders that we 

can accomplish the Army’s important work. I would like to recognize my current 

staff at the Army General Counsel’s Office for their commitment to excellence and 

professionalism. I would especially like to thank my wonderful wife, Julie, who has 

been my constant companion and friend. 

Since 2001, soldiers have completed more than 1.7 million deployments, with 4 

in 7 deployments being to Iraq and Afghanistan. Every soldier under the age of 35 

today joined up knowing one thing for certain: that as soon as training was complete, he or she would be shipped half a world away and into the fight. The Army 

has 6,000 soldiers who have spent, quite incredibly, more than 5 whole years in Iraq 

or Afghanistan, and tens of thousands more who have spent 3 or 4 years in the 

fight. But perhaps the best measure of the Army is found not in these statistics, 

but in these: since 2001, soldiers have earned more than 15,000 awards of valor, 

including 9 Medals of Honor, almost 30 Distinguished Service Crosses, and nearly 

600 Silver Stars. 

It is humbling to work among professionals of such strong will and high caliber, 

but I believe my education and professional experiences have equipped me well to 

lead them. In addition to the breadth of experience afforded by my current post as 

Army General Counsel, I believe that my extensive and diverse background within 

law, higher education, politics, and business, has imbued me with all the necessary 

tools, the acumen, and the judgment to serve faithfully as Under Secretary of the 

Army. I recognize the honor of serving in the Army and with the Army, and, if confirmed as Under Secretary, I assure you, I will be untiring in my efforts to sustain 

the confidence placed in me. I am thankful for your consideration and appreciate 

the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Carson, and thank 

you for mentioning Joe Westphal, too, and Senator Inhofe did as 

well, because he’s a wonderful person who’s done a wonderful job. 

I am glad you made reference to him and I should have actually 

done that when I introduced you. 

Dr. LaPlante. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE, JR., PH.D., TO BE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Levin, 

Ranking Member Inhofe, and other members of this distinguished 

committee. Thank you for having the hearing and inviting us here 

to answer your questions. 

I’d like to start by thanking President Obama, Secretary Hagel, 

Secretary James, and Frank Kendall for their confidence in having 

me as the Principal Deputy, as well as nominating me for the Acquisition Executive. I want to offer a special thanks to Frank Kendall and former Air Force Secretary Mike Donley for their especially persuasive powers to bring me into the Federal Government. 

I would not be here if it wasn’t for them. 

With me today is my family: my wife Joann, my two daughters 

Clair and Caroline, Nathan, my sister Lyn, and my nephew August, who is supposed to be in first grade in Illinois this morning, 

but instead is here. August, I hope this is worth the travel for you. 

I have spent over 28 years, like many of you, around defense systems, technologies, acquisition programs, touching all aspects of 

those programs, all Services. This experience, along with the tenure on activities like the Defense Science Board, offers a first-hand 

7 

impression of the state and the challenges of defense acquisition. 

Of course, this has evolved and changed over the years, whether 

it was, for me at least, starting during the height of the Cold War 

in the mid-1980s, living through the drawdown and all that we 

went through in the mid-1990s with the lower force levels, the acquisition reform initiatives, as we called them, back in the late 

1990s, the first decade of the 2000s with the wars and the rapid 

acquisition that we had to do, and where we are, of course, today, 

which up until extremely recently had significant budget uncertainties. 

In all that time, like all of my colleagues who’ve been in those 

forums, I’ve formed impressions and opinions on the challenges of 

acquisition. Also, I come, though, from a community that desperately wants to make a difference. I come from a community that 

wants to find the game-changing technology, bring it to the 

warfighter, get it into production. I come from a community that 

wants to invent the clever way to do contracting so we finish a development contract on time. I come from a community that just 

wants to make a difference. 

It’s such an opportunity for me and a privilege to potentially be 

able to come into the Government and, if confirmed, be the Acquisition Executive. I’m under no illusions of the challenges in the system, of course. We’ve all seen the successes, we’ve all seen the misfires. I would say coming into the Pentagon, just in the last several 

months, I had my own impressions of what to expect. Many of 

those impressions were confirmed. I also found that there are nuances, of course, and subtleties that I had no appreciation for being 

outside the Government. 

Finally and probably most importantly, I found some surprising 

successes, some good news stories, some positive indicators, some 

of which I was unaware of, that I think we can build upon. What 

I would pledge to this committee is, if confirmed, I will build upon 

those successes, those bright spots, those best practices. I will directly take on the areas that we know need help in terms of improving acquisition outcomes. I’ll be transparent in doing so and be 

honest as I can be on the state of the programs. 

Again, I thank the committee for having the hearing and for inviting me here to answer your questions. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Dr. LaPlante. 

Let me now ask all of you the standard questions that we ask 

of our nominees. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Ms. CREEDON. I have. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

Mr. CARSON. No. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. No. 

Ms. CREEDON. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

8 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and 

briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 

for their testimony or briefings? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely 

manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Yes? Yes, Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, I have to go to the Banking Committee. I want to just say how enthusiastic I am about the nominees. Their service to the Nation already has been spectacular. I 

look forward to their rapid confirmation. 

I also want to commend the chairman on his attire today. He 

looks great in that West Point tie. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Finally, if we were as composed as August, we’d 

get more business done here in the Senate. That’s all I have to say. 

Thank you, August. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. That puts a lot of pressure on you to stay 

awake. But you’re allowed not to. 

Okay, thank you, Senator Reed, very much. 

Let’s start with 7 minutes for the first round of questions. 

First let me ask you, Secretary Creedon, the Air Force disclosed 

yesterday that 34 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) officers 

were implicated in cheating on their monthly proficiency tests. In 

your current position as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 

Strategic Affairs, are you responsible for the oversight of training 

and equipping those personnel? 

Ms. CREEDON. No, sir, I’m not. Those people fall within the military chain of command. 

Chairman LEVIN. You are not in that chain? 

Ms. CREEDON. Correct, I am not. 

9 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, so you are not involved in knowledge 

of this. You were informed about the same time we all were? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yesterday. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s totally understandable, given what your 

job is and the fact that you’re not in the chain of command. 

Secretary Creedon, let me ask you this about the NNSA, which 

has had a history of program delays and cost growth, particularly 

with its construction projects for new facilities. We, in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), had a provision which 

establishes in the NNSA an Office of Cost Analysis and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE). My question is the following: If you’re confirmed and when you’re confirmed, will you work without delay in 

standing up that office? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. The Department of Defense has a similar office 

to evaluate its programs. How do you envision those two offices 

working together on future projects? 

Ms. CREEDON. Senator, the CAPE Office in the Department of 

Defense has been very helpful over the course of the past 18 

months in providing assistance to the Nuclear Weapons Council in 

determining some of the costing for several life extensions, and 

they’ve also been very much involved with the NNSA, helping the 

NNSA come to grips with various costing methodologies both for 

life extensions and for construction projects. 

I would hope, if confirmed, to be able to continue to draw on the 

expertise at CAPE, particularly for their costing experience, which 

is deep and extensive, as we set up a similar organization in the 

NNSA. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Creedon, the NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency in the DOE. Can you explain the relationship between the NNSA and the DOE in setting safety and security regulations? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir. The statute that created the NNSA made 

it clear that the administration reports to the Secretary of Energy 

through the Deputy Secretary, and that the Secretary of Energy 

sets the overarching policies for DOE, including for the NNSA. The 

overarching policies and regulations that apply to the Department 

also apply to the NNSA. The NNSA does have authority to make 

modifications to those as necessary, should the Administrator make 

that decision. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Carson, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010 requires the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense to establish a plan to ensure DOD’s financial 

statements are validated as ready for audit by not later than September 2017. The Secretary of Defense has established the additional goal of ensuring that the statement of the Department’s 

budgetary resources is validated as ready for audit by not later 

than September 30th of this year. Is the Department of the Army 

in your opinion on track to achieve those objectives, particularly 

with regard to data quality, internal controls, and business process 

reengineering? 

10 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, Senator, the Army is on track to meet those 

goals. There’s a lot of work still being done, many challenges to be 

faced, but we are on track to achieve those goals. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you take all the steps you can and all the 

ones that are available and needed, if confirmed, to ensure that the 

Army moves to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable or 

unsustainable level of one-time fixes and manual work-arounds? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, I will do everything in my power to make sure 

that happens. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me ask you now about the servicemembers 

who are wounded or injured in combat operations. I think the 

American people and every one of us believe that they deserve the 

highest priority from our Government for support services, healing, 

recuperation, rehab, evaluation for return to duty, and successful 

transition from Active Duty, if required, and then continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

There’s a lot of challenges, obviously, that remain, despite the 

enactment of a lot of legislation and a renewed emphasis over the 

last few years. Can you give us your assessment of the progress to 

date by the Army to improve the care, management, and transition 

of seriously ill and injured soldiers, as well as the support needed 

for their families? 

Mr. CARSON. The Army’s faced a great challenge over the last 14 

years of conflict in meeting those requirements, but I think we are 

world leaders and are setting examples in every day making 

progress that will be followed around the world for decades to 

come. We are world leaders in this particular area. Our warrior 

transition units, the community-based warrior transition units, 

have been very successful in delivering basic care. 

I’ve been involved with Secretary McHugh in ensuring the behavioral health diagnoses for the tens of thousands of returning soldiers who’ve had difficulties there are satisfied. We are better in 

burn care, in rehabilitation for people with traumatic injuries. 

The Army has put forth a tremendous effort to meet this sacred 

obligation to our veterans and I think there are many lessons for 

other institutions to take from it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you satisfied and will you take steps to ensure that sufficient facilities and services are available to the redeployment of troops that are coming home from Afghanistan, particularly in the area of reintegration, medical services, so that we 

can accommodate the increase in the soldier populations at their 

home stations when that occurs? 

Mr. CARSON. I give you my word in that, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for your willingness to serve, and your 

families as well. 

Let me start with you, Dr. LaPlante. New Hampshire is very 

proud that the Air Force has selected Pease Air National Guard 

Base, the home of the 157th Air Refueling Wing, as the top National Guard base to receive the new KC–46A. We’re very proud of 

that, and I wanted to get an update on where we are based on your 

position, your current position, and preparing for this hearing, and 

11 

your new position, on the status of the KC–46A. Is it on track? Are 

we going forward? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Thank you, Senator. The program is on track and 

this past year in September it completed a successful critical design review with the contractor, with Boeing, and completed that 

actually about a month ahead of schedule. The program has to date 

had no engineering changes on the fixed price contract in the development. A reminder, the Government’s liability, if you will, in the 

program is capped under that fixed price arrangement. 

We are on track to begin first flight of the KC–46 later this year. 

All indications are the program is going well. I would also like to 

call out the trainer that was competed for and selected by the Air 

Force, the trainer for the KC–46. The actual trainer came in about 

$250 million under what the independent cost estimate was for 

that trainer. It’s on track. 

Senator AYOTTE. That is music to my ears and I’m really glad to 

know that that program is going so well and on track. 

On another note, unfortunately I want to ask you about a program from December 2012, where the U.S. Air Force cancelled an 

information technology program called the ECSS, that it had been 

working on since 2005. The Air Force scrapped the program after 

putting in $1 billion into the project, with no identifiable benefit to 

the military or taxpayers. There were also reports that the project 

would have required an additional $1.1 billion to fix and the system wouldn’t have been completed until 2020. That was obviously 

cancelled by the Air Force. 

Based on your experience and your preparation for this hearing, 

particularly in the position you’re going into, who is being held accountable in the Air Force for wasting $1 billion of tax dollars into 

a failed Air Force acquisition program? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Senator, your characterization of ECSS and the 

history is correct. From the accountability perspective, the direct 

answer to your question is in 2011 and 2012 it’s my understanding 

that the program manager for that program was removed and the 

program executive officer for that program was removed. 

Having said that, do you believe that we have firm accountability 

in the acquisition system and are comfortable with where it is? I 

am not. I think it is something, should I be confirmed, that I will 

put extra emphasis on. But again, your characterization of ECSS 

is correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. Why did it happen and how do we prevent it 

from happening again? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The best answer to why it happened from my perspective coming in to the Principal Deputy position and preparing 

for this hearing today was achieved by careful review of what’s 

called the acquisition incident report. That report should be available, has been available for the committee. It was commissioned in 

the way a mishap, an airplane crash, for example, report would be 

done, where an independent team came in, did fishbone analysis, 

as they call it, failure analysis, interviews, and got to root cause. 

It’s very, very sobering reading. It identified about six fundamental root causes, which in my assessment were probably baked 

in, unfortunately, at the very beginning. I will go through a few examples. 

12 

There was a lack of appreciation of the complexity of the data, 

the data that was going to go into this business system. When 

you’re going to an enterprise business system, of course, the commodity everybody uses is the data itself. Not understanding that 

data, not understanding how to get the quality of the data, was a 

foundational error in the program. 

Then two other quick things, but there are more: Not having a 

good transition plan. In other words, going from these legacy systems, the as-is, to the to-be vision, in some ways the to-be vision 

is often the thing that’s the easiest to come up with. That’s where 

we all dream of having a nice, seamless enterprise business system. The hard part and the part that was not done well was understanding the way to get from where they were with these legacy 

systems and this data to that to-be. Just like when there’s construction on a major highway you have to assume there’s still going 

to be traffic and how’s the traffic going to use the system, the user 

still had to use this as it was doing the transition. 

Those are foundational errors that were baked into the program. 

Senator AYOTTE. Here’s why your position that you’re going into 

in particular is so important and why this billion dollar loss disturbs me, as I know it disturbs all of us. The Air Force is proposing 

that all Active Duty A–10s be divested by 2016, plus the Air National Guard unit in Boise, ID, and that all Guard and Reserve 

units be divested by 2017, in order to save money in 2019. A billion 

dollars, that’s about $3.7 billion over the Future Years Defense 

Program. 

I think of that and I think $1 billion we lost on that, when we 

have the A–10s that are incredibly important for close air support, 

incredibly important for search and rescue, incredibly important to 

our men and women in uniform. In fact, General Odierno has said 

it’s the best close air support platform we have today. Despite this 

effort to divest it, General Welch has said it is the best airplane 

in the world at what it does. 

These are the things that you’re going to be facing, that if we 

waste $1 billion and then you come to us and say, divest a plane 

that our men and women, especially those on the ground, care 

about, they know, that it has saved lives. In your position this is 

very important that this not happen again, and we look for areas 

in the Air Force where you see this problem bubbling up, so that 

we can not waste taxpayer dollars and we can make sure that the 

dollars go to things that we know our men and women in uniform 

need. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your concerns 

on that particular platform. As we all know, there are very, very 

difficult force structure trades that are being made by the leadership and will be presented in the President’s budget. 

I would say what I’m learning in the short time on the job is it 

all costs money. It costs money to keep things, to maintain things. 

It also costs money actually to divest. I think there are some very 

difficult choices that the leadership is making with force structure, 

as you point out. I know the Air Force, I know General Welch, is 

keenly aware of your concerns, and that’s the fiscal environment 

that they’re facing, how to go to a different force structure. 

13 

Senator AYOTTE. I know my time is up, and obviously I do not 

believe that the A–10 should be divested, because I believe it’s very 

important. It saves lives. But not just that. What we need to avoid, 

stepping back from it is, it’s hard to say to the men and women 

on the ground, hey, we’re going to eliminate the A–10, but we wasted $1 billion on an information technology system. 

This is where you all, focusing on being better, need to make 

sure that the resources we have go to where they need to go, you’ll 

have a very important role in this new position. I look forward to 

working with you on that. 

Thank you. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Good morning to all of you. It’s terrific to see all 

three of you here. Secretary Creedon, I want to thank you for your 

long history of public service. You’ve taken on a lot of daunting assignments. This is another one for you. The NNSA is a vitally important agency. You are going to be responsible for some of our 

most sensitive and important programs. You really fit the bill in 

my estimation for the job that’s in front of you. I’m going to ask 

you some questions about the job the assignment you have. 

I’d be remiss if I didn’t acknowledge my good friend Brad Carson. 

We served in the House together. He’s a true patriot. If you look 

at Brad’s biography, he’s walked the walk, including deciding at a 

relatively old age, I think I can say, that he wanted to serve our 

country, went to Officer Training School, was deployed in Iraq if 

my memory is correct. 

It’s just fantastic that you’re going to have this opportunity to 

serve us, Congressman, in the Army, along with our friend John 

McHugh, with whom we also served in the House. I’m full-throated 

in support of your nomination and look very much forward to voting for you to take on this important assignment. 

Dr. LaPlante, I don’t mean to ignore you, but I have close connections with both of the other nominees. Thank you for your willingness to serve as well. 

I want to turn right to the NNSA, Secretary Creedon. Someone 

suggested that if we separated the nuclear enterprise from DOE 

we’d be better served. Would you share your thoughts on that debate and that discussion we’ve been having? 

Ms. CREEDON. Thank you, Senator Udall, and thank you very 

much for those kind words. They’re most appreciated. 

Senator UDALL. They’re well deserved. 

Ms. CREEDON. Thank you. 

Obviously, my views with respect to the NNSA at this point in 

time would be my personal views. But I happen to believe that the 

legislation that established the NNSA remains sound and that it’s 

in the long-term best interests of the NNSA to be part of the Department of Defense. I think having a cabinet-level agency responsible for looking out for assisting with the NNSA is really incredible and essentially important, particularly as we look to the longterm budget debates that we know are going to continue in the future as the budget goes down. 

14 

That said, there are significant internal management challenges 

with the NNSA that the NNSA has to deal with. But I think these 

challenges can be dealt with within the flexibility provided in the 

statute and that, at least at the moment—and obviously, if confirmed I’ll know a little better when I get back into the NNSA 

again. But at least at the moment, I haven’t identified any legislative changes that I think are necessary. 

Senator UDALL. Madam Secretary, if we could clarify for the 

record, you said Department of Defense. I think you meant Department of Energy. 

Ms. CREEDON. Energy, I’m sorry. The Department of Energy. 

Senator UDALL. You did mean Department of Energy? 

Ms. CREEDON. I’m sorry, I did mean Energy. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that, those insights. They’re valuable because again of your broad experience. 

I’d be remiss in my second question if I didn’t ask you about the 

recent news reports about what happened in Malmstrom. Do you 

have greater concerns about larger systemic issues associated with 

our ICBM force? 

Ms. CREEDON. Senator, from my observation sitting where I have 

over the course of the last 21⁄2 years—and obviously, it’s the military chain of command; I’m not in that chain of command—but it 

is very troubling. I think to me it’s even more troubling for all of 

those men and women who really do have a commitment, who 

show up every day, who are dedicated. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, I had the opportunity 

to travel with Secretary Hagel and we also went out to F.E. Warren Air Force Base and went out to one of the launch control centers, talked to the crew. He then had a very long discussion with 

some of the folks out there. We had lunch with them, had some 

pretty good one-on-ones, talked to the 20th Air Force commander. 

They are so committed and they try really hard. They live in a very 

difficult environment, and we need to support them fully, and it’s 

just a shame when there are just bad apples. 

Senator UDALL. Yes. We’re going to need to work on this, and I 

know you’re committed to it and focused on it, as am I. 

Let me turn to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) number, 

$350 billion. That’s the estimate that we’ll spend over the next 10 

years on nuclear forces, I should say. That includes the NNSA programs. Do you think that’s accurate? Could you mention what that 

investment’s going to purchase for us? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir. I think the CBO did a pretty good job. 

Obviously, determining the long-term costs of the entire enterprise 

depend a little bit on what you put in and what you put out. But 

I think CBO did a good job in getting what’s really at the heart 

of the long-term challenges. 

The NNSA challenges are with respect to both the modernization 

of the complex—there are two big facilities left to address. We need 

plutonium, we need highly enriched uranium processing facilities, 

and pretty much, NNSA needs assured, understanding, and reliable budgets. DOD’s budget bow wave is coming in a few years and 

it really has to do with the modernization of the platforms and the 

delivery systems—the submarine, the bomber, and whatever is the 

15 

future of the ground-based strategic deterrent, in other words the 

next Minuteman III. Those are the bulk of the costs. 

Senator UDALL. We’re going to be working, I know, to do what’s 

right to maintain our nuclear posture, but also keep control of 

costs. We just have to do that, and I know you agree. 

Let me turn to Congressman Carson. I’d be interested in your 

thoughts about what’s in front of you. I’d ask you the traditional 

question: What keeps you up at night as you anticipate taking on 

this important assignment? 

Mr. CARSON. These are extraordinary times in the U.S. Army, 

where we are trying to manage coming out of two wars and the 

many problems that dealing with that, that retrograde of equipment and with soldiers who are transitioning back into either garrison life or returning to the civilian world, along with their families. That’s an extraordinary challenge. 

We have a difficult budget climate and we have a drawdown in 

forces, while at the same time still trying to meet the needs of the 

National military strategy, which are quite robust. It’s that overall 

challenge of managing the Army that is a very difficult one. 

Senator UDALL. You’re up to it, I know, along with John 

McHugh. 

Dr. LaPlante, if I might I’d like to use what time I have remaining—and I’ll truncate my question. Basically, my question goes to 

the proposal that the Air Force has put forth that would involve 

developing an entirely new helicopter, given that we already have 

a series of machines, a group of machines, that I think get the job 

done. My concern is if we spend hundreds of millions of dollars so 

the Air Force has its own unique helicopter and at the same time 

we’re cutting funding for the space surveillance systems and other 

vital programs, to me that doesn’t fit. 

I’d be curious to hear your comments on this. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. In general, on items like new starts, whether for 

helicopters or airplanes, we’re in an environment now where we’re 

having to be very careful about starting anything new, and we’re 

looking very carefully, as we should, at what the tradeoffs are between something new versus extending life, extending what we 

have. 

I understand your concerns and I think in general the force 

structure decisions that the Air Force is currently making are 

going to be trading some of those very difficult things. I’ll be happy 

to work with you further on. 

Senator UDALL. I’d like to follow up with you in more detail. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Absolutely. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Once confirmed, I will set up a meeting with you to discuss modernization initiatives in greater detail. 

Senator UDALL. Thanks again to the panel and thank you for 

your willingness to serve our country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Creedon, in my opening statement I talked about our concern, and it’s not just mine. Others have the same concern. In fact, 

16 

when the New START treaty was put in place, there were some 

commitments that were made and those commitments have not become a reality. When you are confirmed what would be your effort 

in terms of trying to reach the level that was agreed upon prior to 

the voting on the New START treaty? 

Ms. CREEDON. Senator Inhofe, not only does the NNSA have substantial budget challenges in front of it, but so obviously does the 

Department of Defense in looking forward to the long-term modernization programs and investment programs to support the nuclear complex. The numbers that you’re referring to are what have 

been referred to as in the 1251 report. At least with respect to the 

NNSA at the moment, the NNSA budget request for fiscal year 

2014 was a little bit under the fiscal year 2012 1251 report and a 

little bit over the fiscal year 2011 1251 report. 

One of the challenges I think that has occurred over time is some 

of the elements that were supposed to be covered by those funds 

have ended up costing more. It’s caused a delay of the plutonium 

facility and also has caused a relook of the approach on the uranium facility. 

Senator INHOFE. I really believe that if anyone can do it, you can 

do it. I think the main thing we want to hear before this committee 

is that you do have a commitment to do your best to try to get us 

on track for security purposes. 

Ms. CREEDON. I absolutely do, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Carson, we talked in the office about you’re 

inheriting a little bit of a mess in terms of end strength, and it’s 

because it’s the understanding that the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense believes the Army end strength should be reduced to 

420,000 from 520,000 Active, and 315,000 from 358,000 on Guard, 

and then a comparable Reserve figure. 

I know you’ve had some time to look at this, and you’ve also 

heard from the Chief of Staff of the Army, who’s been quite outspoken on what his needs are. How are you going to handle that? 

Mr. CARSON. It is a difficult challenge, of course. The Chief of 

Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army himself have 

talked about how the drawdown will make it more and more difficult to meet the many requirements that are placed upon the 

Army. There’s really two questions there: What are the requirements that the Nation is going to ask of the Army, and what is the 

right size for the Army to meet those, and can the country afford 

an Army of that particular size? 

Drawdowns are always very difficult. Maintaining the right 

grade play, the right mix of officers and enlisted members in the 

Army as you reduce by 30,000 or 50,000 members, maintaining soldier and family resiliency, keeping morale up, the transition of 

those soldiers who are leaving to go back into civilian life. 

It’s going to be a great challenge, both on these strategic questions as well as on kind of the personnel and readiness side, to 

make sure we manage this drawdown in a way that is equitable 

and does justice to the sacrifice of our soldiers over the last decade. 

Senator INHOFE. It’s tough, because you’re going to hear from 

some of the uniforms that it could increase risk. Of course, risk is 

lives. It’s a tough issue to deal with. I know you will do everything 

you can to try to make that a reality. 

17 

Dr. LaPlante, again thank you for the time that you gave me in 

my office. I have a slide that the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA), the Tactical Technology Office, put together in 2012 that shows from approximately 1975 to the present. 

You see the chart here. The blue line is where it would be with 

commercial aircraft. When you get into—everything’s fine up 

through the F–117. Then with the F–18, the C–17, B–2, and the 

rest of them, you see what is going up. We had a chance to look 

at this. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

18 


116ful2.eps
19 

Senator INHOFE. The question I would want to ask you is, the 

last platform we didn’t have a problem with was F–117. Have you 

had time to look? Do you have an analysis or an idea of, if we were 

able to do that, why that same can’t be used as a model for some 

of the other platforms? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, thank you, Senator. As it turns out, being a 

member of the Defense Science Board, we in fact looked at some 

of this in studying adaptable systems, in fact with DARPA’s help, 

a few years ago. Part of that, we actually looked specifically at the 

F–117. A couple things I would offer that were in my view unique 

in listening and interviewing the principals who were there. 

The first was that it was a very small group of empowered, what 

I would call today a cross-functional team. That is, the requirements, the user, if you will, the program manager, the systems engineer, the lead contractor, am I told it was on the order of six to 

eight people who were all empowered to make decisions, that were 

in a protected environment. It was a highly classified program, but 

it also had top-level support. 

If you know some of the individuals that were there—and the 

one I happen to know, and some of you may know, is Dr. Paul 

Kaminsky, currently the Chairman of the Defense Science Board. 

He was in part of that time the program manager as an Active 

Duty colonel. 

It was quite a talented team. When you listen to how they did 

it, it’s remarkable. What it was, was it started with quick identification of what the hardest parts of the problem were, which in 

their case was the signature itself and getting it to fly, then going 

right to the prototyping and, if you will, experimentation to see if 

they could actually make this thing work. 

They had accidents, as Paul will tell you. They had fatalities. But 

within about 3 years they were able to wring out some of the fundamental problems there and were able to go right into production. 

There’s two pieces to that which I think are lessons for us. One 

is the requirements side. Dr. Kaminsky will give the story of when 

he was the program manager he was pressured, if you will, by 

some of the leadership in the Services at the time of why the airplane could not fly in all weather: Why don’t we add a radar so it 

can fly in all weather? Dr. Kaminsky knew that was going to be 

a very difficult challenge and he resisted. He said: ‘‘No, if we do 

that we’re not going to have the airplane.’’ He resisted it. He says 

to this day we wouldn’t have that airplane if he had to put that 

radar on it. 

Senator INHOFE. He had to do that first? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. It was understanding the requirements, resisting changes to the requirements as needed, and an empowered 

team. It proves it can be done, and I think it should be an inspiration for all of us. 

Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. I think that’s a great answer. You certainly 

would be one of the rare persons who could make that a reality. 

My time has expired. I’ll wait a few minutes for the second 

round. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator King. 

20 

Senator KING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Creedon, the Ohio-class submarine is aging and we’re getting 

to the point where we’re talking about a replacement. Are there 

particular challenges as we deliver the new reactor for the upcoming Ohio-class replacements? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, Senator. I would say the biggest challenge, 

frankly, is ensuring that there is stable and predictable funding 

with respect to that reactor. My understanding is the naval reactors program has the technology fairly well in hand at the moment, 

but it is a critical part of the success of that replacement submarine. 

Senator KING. Is multi-year funding part of the answer? 

Ms. CREEDON. Senator, I’m going to have to pass on that question. I will certainly look into it and get back to you. The NNSA 

part of it is the research and development part of it and so multiyear doesn’t really fit with the research and development part of 

it. The procurement side of that is on the Navy side and so that’s 

not an area of my expertise. I would have to get with the Navy and 

get back to you on that side. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Additional options may exist to reduce program costs and risks associated with 

transitioning from the Ohio-class to Ohio-class replacement. The Navy is investigating various contracting and acquisition scenarios to increase efficiencies and reduce costs of construction. 

Senator KING. You’re talking about continuity of funding for the 

research side year to year? 

Ms. CREEDON. I’m talking about the research side and the NNSA 

side, yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Some predictable funding level from year to year 

is an important part of your being able to meet this challenge? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. In your prior position you were working on countering weapons of mass destruction, nonproliferation. Do you see 

that as relevant experience to what you’re going to be doing now? 

Ms. CREEDON. Absolutely, sir. In my current job I have the policy 

responsibility for countering weapons of mass destruction at the 

Department of Defense, and the Department of Defense has primarily been focused on biological threats, chemical threats, and the 

NNSA has also been primarily focused on the nuclear threats. But 

there is also overlap where the two Departments work very closely 

together. 

Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, the NNSA, it’s essential that the two Departments work together so that we handle all aspects of the threats from weapons 

of mass destruction that face this country. 

Senator KING. It’s somewhat out of the scope of this hearing, Mr. 

Chairman, but I woke up this morning suddenly thinking about 

what happened in West Virginia, which was an accident. But it certainly raises the specter of what if it wasn’t an accident and how 

vulnerable we are and what that did to a third of the State of West 

Virginia by contaminating the water supply. It’s a daunting concept. 

Ms. CREEDON. It absolutely is, Senator. One of the things that 

right now in my current job I’m working on is a new strategy for 

21 

the Department of Defense for countering weapons of mass destruction. 

Senator KING. Godspeed. 

Mr. Carson, we’ve all—I suspect we’ve all—I know I have heard 

from my governor and my adjutant general. I think one of the 

toughest issues we’re going to face this year is the relationship between the Guard and the Reserve and the Regular Army. Do you 

have thoughts on how this force structure issue should be approached, how do we make sense of it, bearing in mind the interests of the States as well as the national interest? 

Mr. CARSON. I think it is going to be a very vexing problem for 

us, and I think the only solution is to commit not to engage in 

Army fratricide about the Active component/Reserve component 

mix, but instead to work together in consultation with the governors, with the adjutant generals (TAG) in the States, with the 

National Guard Bureau, and the Department of Defense. 

Everyone recognizes, myself especially as a reservist, that the 

Reserve components have played a heroic incredible role over the 

last 14 years of conflict, no longer simply a strategic reserve, but 

an operational asset to the Army and to the other Services, too. I 

don’t believe we’re going to go away from that, but we do have to 

look at the right mix as we come out of these wars, the right assets, what functionalities the governors, for example, would like to 

see in the Guard, what functionality we need to keep in the Active 

component, the kind of boots-on-the-ground dwell ratio. 

These are all very difficult questions and there’s no one solution 

to it other than to say you must be committed to working with the 

various stakeholders in the States, in the Guard, in the Active component, and through leadership bring everyone together, because in 

the end, whatever differences we may have seem quite superficial 

given the commonality of interests that the National Guard, the 

Reserve component altogether, and the Active component have. 

Senator KING. You see essentially a new analysis of needs and 

roles, as opposed to applying a rule of thumb of a ratio of two to 

one or three to two or whatever? 

Mr. CARSON. The Chief of Staff has talked about the historic 

ratio of the Reserve component to the Active component of about 

54 percent to 46 percent respectively. There’s been some discussion 

by him in particular about maintaining that role going forward. I 

don’t think it’s a new analysis. People value the contributions that 

have been made by the Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve over the 

last decade, the last 15 years. It’s taking what we’ve learned, taking that institutionalized knowledge, and then applying it for the 

rather austere budget climate we find ourselves in. 

Senator KING. By new analysis what I meant is we can’t just say 

because the ratio was 54 to 46 2 or 3 years ago that’s what it’s 

going to be ongoing. We have to stop and look and see, okay, what 

do we need and what are the roles. 

Mr. CARSON. That’s absolutely right. We have to look at what requirements we have in each of the components, and then resource 

them accordingly. 

Senator KING. A second issue that we’re going to have to struggle 

with is personnel costs. You know the figures that personnel costs 

are steadily eating up readiness and procurement and other parts 

22 

of the military. Congress learned about a month ago how difficult 

it is to even touch these issues. 

Do you have thoughts about how we can deal with the personnel 

cost issues without causing a firestorm of concern among Active 

Duty and retired military? Should we do it all in a prospective way, 

which means we don’t get the savings for a long time? How do we 

approach this? 

Mr. CARSON. It, too, is not an easy matter. 

Senator KING. ‘‘Not easy’’ is an understatement. 

Mr. CARSON. It’s particularly acute in the Army, though, because 

we are a people-centric Service, where about 46 percent of our 

budget goes to paying our soldiers. Those problems you talk about 

that are chronic in the Department of Defense are notable in the 

Army especially. 

I do prefer approaches that don’t prejudice the interests of people 

who have already made long-term commitments, whether it’s retirees, whether it’s people who are close to retirement. It is certainly 

better to start out on the front end, and those savings can be manifested over years. There are other ways to find savings. 

But it’s difficult—and this is my own personal view—to be making changes that are contrary to either the explicit or implicit 

promises we’ve made to servicemembers and for which they have 

made, set expectations for the future as well. Those are very difficult things to do, and to be avoided in the absence of profound 

countervailing benefits. 

Senator KING. I completely agree. I believe you have an explicit 

or implicit contract. People have expectations and that’s what’s 

going to make this problem exceedingly difficult to deal with. 

I’m almost out of time or I am out of time, but, Dr. LaPlante, 

I just want to call attention again to that chart that Senator Inhofe 

showed. If it takes 22 years to develop something from idea to completion in the private sector, you’d be out of business. That’s just 

ridiculous. By the time you get finished, the technology’s changed 

and you’re almost by definition building something that’s not state 

of the art. 

I think the example of the F–117 is a good example. We have to 

figure out how to deal with that. It’s just unacceptable to take 20 

years to develop a new weapon system. I commend to you to keep 

looking at that prior example. In my experience it takes a small 

group who have the power and the authority to make decisions. 

The larger the committee, the lesser the results. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, Senator, thank you, and I agree, and I look 

forward to working with you. Thank you. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator King. 

Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. LaPlante, on the A–10 issue that Senator Ayotte raised, I’m 

totally in agreement with the points she made. I would have made 

them if she hadn’t and that might have been the principal thing 

that you and I would have talked about. But that’s getting some 

attention, and it’s particularly getting some attention based on the 

comments of General Odierno and others who understand the 

ground support that that particular plane provides. I hope that’s 

23 

one of the things you’ll look at very carefully, and I think you said 

you’re going to do that. I just want to say I would have brought 

that issue up in more detail, but I think Senator Ayotte did a good 

job of covering our concerns about that. 

Secretary Creedon, thanks for coming by one day this week to 

talk about this assignment. I think the principle thing I would just 

want to raise again here would be the importance of the transfer 

Kansas City facility to that new campus. Everything from moving 

a 6-ounce tool to an 87,000-pound piece of milling equipment has 

had to happen as part of that big transfer of what you’re doing 

there. 

Then once that transfer’s completed, the other thing that I’d like 

you to comment on briefly is just the importance of what we do 

with the piece of property that the Federal Government has been 

on for half a century and now would be leaving, after all the work 

that’s done there and all the kinds of left-behind problems that 

that work would mean would have to be dealt with. 

Ms. CREEDON. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the new Kansas City 

plant, which goes by the acronym of KCRIMS [Kansas City Responsive Infrastructure, Manufacturing, and Sourcing], is a very 

important part of the modernization plan for the NNSA’s nuclear 

complex. As you know very well, it’s the electronics. But the real 

achievement with this new facility is that it’ll be a much better 

place for the workforce to work and they’ll be able to do the same 

work in half the space, and they get out of a building that they’ve 

been in since the late 1940s, early 1950s. It’s a long time coming 

and it’s definitely needed. 

That said, after our conversation yesterday I’ve done a little more 

looking into it and the old Bannister Federal Facility that has both 

the General Services Administration, the NNSA, and other Federal 

entities in it, it will be a challenge in the future. It’s absolutely 

something that, if confirmed, I will take on to make sure that in 

the end it is the best result for the community as well as for the 

NNSA to understand really how to deal and get rid of this old Federal facility in a way that’s really beneficial. 

Senator BLUNT. For my colleagues on the committee, this is a facility that, as the Secretary indicated, we’ve been at for 60, 70 

years now. Lots of nuclear work is done there. By this point, it’s 

pretty well located right in the center of lots of things and has 

great development potential, but only if the Government now deals 

with it in a way that allows somebody to in the future use it for 

that purpose. I’m pleased that Secretary Creedon understands that 

in the depth that she does, as did the nominee that had the agency 

that the committee reported out again just the other day after 

those names had to be dealt with another time. 

Mr. Carson, nice to see you again. We served in the House together for 4 years in districts that were pretty close together and 

we were able to do some things there. This is an important assignment for a lot of the reasons you’ve already been asked about today 

in terms of restructuring the military. 

While I’m in the mode of talking about Missouri facilities, I 

would just call your attention to Fort Leonard Wood, where General Odierno was in the last week. Secretary McHugh has visited 

there recently. I know General Odierno when he went to the chemVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
24 

ical school, the biological school, the radiological school, the nuclear 

school, all of which are there, said that this has unique possibilities, both because of the location and community support, to look 

at all of those homeland security applications. 

As everyone does when they visit there, he mentioned the level 

of community support and how important this base is seen to the 

people that surround it. One of the neighbors, by the way, is the 

Mark Twain National Forest, which gives us even more capacity to 

do some things on the base that might in other places be seen as 

intrusive or troublesome. I wanted to call his visit to your attention, but Secretary McHugh, who you and I also served with in the 

House, has been there as well. 

On the question that Senator King mentioned about the integrated armed services, I’ve seen some reports lately that there is 

a discussion of eliminating the Guard from the support services, 

the helicopter services, the Kiowa, the Apache helicopters—a lot of 

that has been done by Guard personnel, and a discussion that 

maybe that assignment would come back to the full-time force. 

I don’t know of any reason to believe that the Guard personnel 

that have done that haven’t done an extraordinarily capable job 

there. I will just continue to look, as I think you may have already 

responded to, the importance of having that integrated Armed 

Forces and looking at any comments that General Grass and others 

in the Guard have to make about this. 

But on the support generally of air support and other things that 

come to the Army from the Guard, do you want to comment on 

that? 

Mr. CARSON. Certainly. It was a real pleasure serving with you 

in Congress. I had my home in Oklahoma, of course, just down the 

road from I know your home, and we worked together a lot on 

issues. 

Senator BLUNT. Right across the border. 

Mr. CARSON. I hope at Fort Leonard Wood we’ll have a chance 

to visit that together and give me a good excuse to go back to our 

neighborhood. 

As has been reported, part of the Army restructuring is going to 

look at the aviation, both in the Active component and the Reserve 

component, with the idea of streamlining it. We have a number of 

assets, like our TH–67 training helicopters, that have to be replaced or supplanted by another airframe. The aviation community 

wants to come to what they call glass cockpit dual-engine aircraft, 

which are better for training and have more uses. They want to 

save some money in operations and sustainment costs that they 

can put into the long-term projects for the future of vertical lift, for 

example, the next generation helicopters that may some day replace the Apache and the Blackhawk. 

There is a restructuring that’s being examined. There’s been no 

final decision that I’m aware of on those kind of issues. As I was 

telling Senator King, I am confident that I will be a part of this 

process if confirmed to consult with the governors, the TAGs, and 

others to say, what functionality do you need in your National 

Guard aviation units, the 12 aviation brigades that are in the National Guard, what do you need here, so we can make sure that 

those requirements are satisfied. 

25 

Senator BLUNT. I would just suggest again that whatever you do 

there I think needs to, as you’ve already committed, to have the active communication with the Guard here, with the adjutant generals and the States, looking at the impact this has on the ongoing 

mission and recruiting capability and maintaining the numbers 

that these units have had, and look at the performance, as well as 

looking about whether that particular skill also continues to be a 

valuable skill for the States to have available in the State for the 

other work that the Guard does in addition to being able to be 

called up and used to support the full-time force. 

I think this will be an issue that a lot of members, including me, 

will take very seriously as it comes up, and I know you will, too, 

and I wanted to raise it with you today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blunt. 

Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Carson, I am very concerned about cyber security and in particular in recruiting and retention of cyber experts. In the NDAA 

for Fiscal Year 2014, I included language that would give career 

credit to newly commissioned officers with cyber security experience. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to ensure 

that we’re recruiting the best and the brightest into the field? 

Mr. CARSON. It’s a real challenge to recruit this highly in-demand skill set into the military, where our pay structure often 

can’t compete with that of the private sector. We are fortunate that 

we’ve established relationships with some major universities, including the one I used to teach at, the University of Tulsa, one of 

three universities that is working closely with the military, with 

Cyber Command, the National Security Agency, and others to try 

to recruit and train people to come into the military. 

These special programs like you mentioned can help do that. The 

Army has been fortunate that we have met most of the filling of 

the two new cyber brigades we’ve established. But it’s going to be 

a continuing challenge for us, simply because these skills are so 

highly in demand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Do you need any additional authorities to 

reach your goals? 

Mr. CARSON. I’m not sure at this time we do need any authorities, but I will commit to you that General Cardon, who runs Army 

Cyber Command, could come in and talk to you specifically about 

what our recruiting status is and if we do need some kind of special provisions to allow that. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. That would be helpful. 

I authored a bill last year called the Cyber Warrior Act, which 

leverages the talent pool that already exists within our National 

Guard, and because of the National Guard’s dual mission it’s an 

ideal place to attract those individuals. They might be working at 

Google by day and could be a cyber warrior for their Service on 

weekends and when their commitments are due. 

However, I’ve heard that this idea isn’t as well received as it 

might be because they think that it needs to reside within DOD 

and focus should be on Active, not Reserve, forces. My question is, 

please explain why, if you did create these units with a dual status, 

26 

it would be detrimental to the Army and the overall goal of protecting our Nation against cyber attack? 

Mr. CARSON. I don’t think it would be detrimental. That skill set 

needs to be in both the Active component and the Reserve component without doubt. I think some of the interesting ideas for recruiting—for example, the Navy has allowed direct commissioning 

of officers who had unique skill sets who didn’t have time to spend 

4 or 5 months in training and they spread it out over time. These 

are the kind of things we’re going to have to look at for our cyber 

warriors, if you will. 

But the skill set’s going to be needed in both the Active component and the Reserve component, and I don’t think that anyone’s 

denigrating the service of the Reserve community cyber community 

in any way. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Okay. 

Dr. LaPlante, I’m concerned that we aren’t able to move as 

quickly as we need to to get the best, most cutting edge technologies, particularly in the cyber theater. What changes would you 

propose in terms of implementing or improving Air Force’s cyber 

acquisition strategy? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Of course, being cyber, there’s many aspects of 

the problem. Let me first talk about the cyber resiliency part and 

then I’ll talk about the tools side. 

What we need to do, and we’ve just begun it in the Air Force, 

but much more work needs to be done, is bring the life cycle part 

of the acquisition system together with the program executive officers and to begin to, if you will, first understand what the cyber 

vulnerabilities are in your weapons system. While that sounds simple, it’s actually quite difficult, depending on what level of threat 

you’re talking about. Then, when you understand what it is, begin 

to put in what the mitigations are. 

The mitigations can be technical, but it’s also important to remind ourselves that mitigations can be just a different way to operate the system. Very simple what I just said, but it’s a very complex endeavor and, if anything, also because of the way programs 

buy things. We buy things by weapons systems, yet cyber works by 

being connected. You’re only as good as your weakest link, if you 

will, for a weapons system. 

We’ve already begun that. But I would say there’s much more 

work to be done there. Related to that, we’re beginning to come up 

with what I would call the beginnings of cyber resiliency metrics. 

That is, things that we can give almost in a requirements way to 

the program to say, you will build this system to this resiliency 

against that threat. 

But what I do think the Air Force and in fact the other Services 

continue to need is flexibilities in dealing with implementing new 

information assurance requirements. One of the concerns that a lot 

of us have is that as we continue to learn more about what the 

cyber threats are and we build up, let’s say, the requirements for 

building information assurance into the system, by the time it actually gets to a program office it may be 2 years later. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Right. That’s part of the problem. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. That’s part of the problem. We know what was 

a problem 2 years ago—— 

27 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Is not a problem today. 

Dr. LAPLANTE.—is not a problem today, and what’s a problem 

today we didn’t even imagine 2 years ago. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Right. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Anything that will help us build the resiliency 

and get the compliance part of the system to be much quicker in 

reacting and not just do the normal push out information assurance would be very helpful. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I think you need to, and I think you need 

to make recommendations about how to do that and change protocols accordingly. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, and I’d be happy, if confirmed, to work on 

that, work on that with you. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Turning to mental health, Mr. Carson, the 

issue of mental health, including the stigma surrounding post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as the rates of suicide in our 

Services, is critical. I receive monthly suicide data and I am very, 

very disheartened to see the number of servicemembers who fall 

through the cracks in our system. If confirmed, what are your 

plans to improve suicide prevention in the Army? What will you do 

to ensure the Army is providing appropriate mental health care to 

the servicemembers and their families? 

Mr. CARSON. It is a major priority of the U.S. Army, it has been 

for the last couple of years, to improve our suicide prevention programs and forestall suicides within the ranks among veterans who 

have served in the U.S. Army. We have about 125 to 180 suicides 

per 1,000—or for I guess 100,000 serving—125 to 185 suicides per 

year of Active Duty members. That rate of 25 or so, 22 to 25 per 

100,000, is in excess of what you find out in the civilian population 

at large. 

It comes from a number of fronts. We’ve put in together comprehensive soldier-family fitness programs, readiness and resilience 

programs. We have suicide prevention hotlines. We have suicide 

education standdowns. There is an almost heroic effort to try to 

deal with this problem, a problem that’s difficult to understand and 

to grapple with and has many different causes and is almost 

unique in each circumstance. 

A major part of that, though, is about our behavioral health 

treatment, whether it’s reducing the stigma associated with getting 

care and admitting to having behavioral health conditions. Secretary McHugh has been a real leader on this in how he’s treated 

PTSD and making sure diagnoses are uniform and fair and making 

sure that we’re out in the community educating people. 

It’s a multi-front war against suicide, but the Army is seized of 

this issue and realizes it is a matter of paramount importance. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To all the witnesses, 

I appreciate your service. 

Mr. Carson, in June the Army announced its plans to integrate 

women into combat roles, opening up positions within 27 brigade 

combat units. Then there are other initiatives under way, including 

28 

the Soldier 2020 initiative to examine the specifications for different billets within the Army. 

If you could just talk about the status of the Army’s plans to integrate women into combat roles, I’d appreciate it. 

Mr. CARSON. Absolutely. We have 147 mission occupation specialties that are not including those that are in the Special Forces and 

under their control. Of those, 133 are open to women today. There 

are 14 in the combat arms, combat engineers, that are not open to 

women. 

You have really two efforts going on. One is to look at those 14 

military occupational specialities (MOS) and establish occupational 

requirements for it, to revalidate those. The Army Research Institute, the U.S. Army Medical Research Environmental Medicine Institute, working with the Training and Doctrine Command, are all 

doing that kind of work. Over the next few months, in anticipation 

of the deadlines set for us by the Secretary of Defense, we’ll be 

talking about what the requirements are to serve in those particular MOSs. 

At the same time, of course, we have the direct ground combat 

exclusion of women. Even if it was in one of the 133 eligible MOSs, 

you couldn’t necessarily serve in a combat unit or one that was 

closely associated with it. We are in the process right now of opening up all of those, of notifying Congress about those. Over the next 

few months we’ll be opening up 33,000 positions across the Army 

to women in those so-called closed positions. 

We’re working on both the closed occupations and the closed positions. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you. 

One program I’ve been impressed with in the Army is the Soldier 

for Life program. My first bill, which was enacted as part of the 

NDAA, was the Troop Talent Act of 2013, which largely focused on 

the credentialing of Active Duty service personnel for the skills 

they obtain with credentials that are meaningful in a civilian workforce, designed to help folks get traction quicker as they move back 

into the private workforce. 

Could you talk a little bit about efforts under way and your focus 

on that issue to assist either in Soldier for Life or more broadly in 

the sort of credentialing work that’s being done within the Army? 

Mr. CARSON. I think working on these issues of soldiers who are 

transitioning out into civilian life are extraordinarily important 

ones and ones I will be very committed to work on as the Under 

Secretary. The veterans unemployment rate is much higher than 

the national average. You just look at it in the unemployment payments that the Army is making. Ten years ago we spent about $90 

million a year on unemployment compensation. Today we spend 

$500 million on unemployment compensation. 

We’re trying to deal with these problems through a number of innovative programs, working with the Department of Labor, others, 

the Veterans Opportunity to Work program, the Army Career and 

Alumni programs, Soldier for Life, working with private sector employers, to where we have close relationships so they know the 

quality and the skills that soldiers have. 

There’s a number of programs. Again, it’s a multi-front war on 

this problem, and I promise as the Under Secretary I’ll both conVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
29 

tinue and work with you and others who are interested in these 

issues, because that transition is a difficult one for many soldiers 

and in an era of downsizing of the Army those programs are going 

to be among the very most important ones that we have. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you for that. 

Secretary Creedon, I think a question was asked on this topic before I came in, dealing with the recent controversy over the exam 

and how that’s being done. I know some of the military personnel 

in charge of nuclear weapons are not directly in the oversight of 

NNSA, but there have been a number of incidents sort of touching 

upon this issue that raise questions about just the general morale 

level. These have come up in recent media reports about the Air 

Force. 

Are you concerned that there’s a lack of focus among officers 

within U.S. Strategic Command and how that has affected attitudes and focus within the NNSA, and in particular what do you 

see yourself doing to contribute to a morale uplift? I know there’s 

been an awful lot of reports of low morale within some of these personnel MOSs. 

Ms. CREEDON. First, Senator, I have to certainly share the disappointment with the announcement that came out yesterday with 

respect to the Air Force. That said, the vast majority of the Air 

Force as well as the Navy nuclear folks—and I know it’s probably 

not well known, but there is also a really incredible cadre of Army 

nuclear folks, known as Army 59s, that, even though the Army 

doesn’t have nuclear weapons, they play a key role in just making 

sure that the complex runs smoothly. 

But nevertheless, morale is a huge problem. I think it’s something that hurts most those who do the job best and who are mostly committed to it, and that’s something that I really want to make 

sure, at least within the context of the NNSA, if confirmed, that 

the NNSA sees that they are highly valued, they’re essential to 

maintaining a strong, effective, secure deterrent, and that they 

really do play a key role. I think sometimes they don’t think that 

the nuclear deterrent is always valued. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you for that. 

Dr. LaPlante, a parochial question. The Ballston area in Northern Virginia is a real concentration of Government offices connected to research, so DARPA, the Office of Naval Research (ONR), 

the Air Force’s Office of Scientific Research, National Science Foundation, some work done down at Defense Geospatial Intelligence 

Agency. What are your views about how the Air Force can work together with DOD and these kind of allied Federal research institutions to do more research and development as we face the budgetary challenges that we’re all familiar with? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. First, I would say I know Ballston well. If anybody has been with ONR, DARPA, or the Defense Science Board, 

you’re actually spending time in Ballston all the time. We all know 

Ballston well. 

In general, obviously, the science and technology, particularly in 

the times that we are in, where we’re drawing down, is, if anything, even more important. Regardless of the geography of it, 

science and technology is a priority for the Air Force and for being 

the superior force in 2020, 2023. 

30 

I would pledge that any community outreach, any geography 

issues that the Air Force has, whether it’s in science, technology, 

or others, we will engage the local community and we will be openminded and transparent in what we do. But again, without committing to anything, I am a fan of the concentration in Ballston because I’ve experienced it myself. I would commit to being transparent with anything that the Air Force does. 

Thank you. 

Senator KAINE. Just quickly, you indicate as we draw down these 

scientific and research investments will become even more important. Could you just explain what you mean by that? I think I 

know what you mean, but I’d like to make sure. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Sure. I think it goes somewhat as follows: that 

when we’re bringing force structure down, when we’re beginning to 

look at what is essential versus what’s not essential, what we’ve always relied upon in the United States is having a superior, a technological military. We’re not going to change that. 

What does it mean in today, 2014, to think about what it will 

mean to be technologically superior 10 years from now? It’s going 

to come very, very fast. I was on a study just a few months ago 

on 2030 technologies. 2030 is 16 years from now. 1998 doesn’t seem 

very long ago. 

We have to be doing that work now. We have to be doing it in 

addition to perhaps something we haven’t done before, which is 

technology scan. The breakthroughs may be international. They 

may not be domestic. This is the time, in my judgment and many 

other people’s judgment, that we have to be emphasizing science 

and technology, for that reason. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for your service to our country. Secretary Creedon, I want you to know everyone in Indiana is very 

proud of you and what you’ve accomplished. 

Mr. Carson, it is nice to see another Blue Dog alum here and we 

wish you the very best. 

Dr. LaPlante, you’re not from Indiana, but we’re still proud of 

you. 

Congressman Carson, the first question I want to ask you is 

about suicide prevention. It is something that we all have worked 

very hard on. I certainly have had a big focus on this. It is part 

of the defense bill that we moved forward that we have a study 

that’s coming out in February as to how to best aid our men and 

women who serve in the Armed Forces. 

One of the areas that we had worked on in our office was to try 

to, as part of the physical health assessments that’s made of each 

soldier each year, that a mental health assessment be made, and 

that we talk to the commander of each individual, who is there and 

who sees them every day, who can tell if there’s changes, and also 

to do some screening. 

We’re supposed to get that report back in February from the Office of the Secretary of Defense as to how this will work moving 

forward. We would like to work with you, with the Army, obviously 

with all of the branches, but as someone with the Army, to try to 

31 

help us in this process, because we’ve lost more young men and 

women to suicide than in combat last year. 

I want to know the Army’s—I shouldn’t say willingness; I’m sure 

you’re willing. But we’d love to have you as a great partner in this 

effort to try to end this scourge. 

Mr. CARSON. I can assure you you will have our very much utmost partnership in this effort. 

Senator DONNELLY. Additionally, Mr. Carson, you mentioned before 46 percent of the Army budget now is personnel. In your mind, 

is there a red line that we get to that, we can’t cross that line in 

terms of that percentage that’s dedicated to personnel, as opposed 

to equipment or other areas? 

Mr. CARSON. That number is historically rather stable in fact, 

that while the Army budget has fluctuated over time, that 45, 50 

percent is being spent on military personnel, not including our civilian personnel, is more or less stable in the Army budget. I think 

that’s a good number. We are a people-centric Service. We spend 

much more than the other Services do on our soldiers, and that 

number is probably going to be one we try to maintain. 

Senator DONNELLY. Do you see it remaining in that neighborhood, that percentage, as we move forward? Because I know there’s 

concern, for instance with the Navy. Where it was one third, it’s 

about half now. Unless some changes come through in the future, 

you’re heading up towards two-thirds. Do you see it in the Army 

as being a stable number? 

Mr. CARSON. I think we will budget to try to make it a stable 

number. That means we have to make cuts in number of people, 

let’s say, or in other areas, try to make this all balance, because 

the Army has a view of what a balanced Army budget looks like, 

the amount we spend on procurement or research and development. But we are greatly concerned, and the Chief of Staff has spoken quite eloquently about this, about the inexorable rise of compensation costs, whether it’s health care benefits, whether it is pay 

raises, benefits, these kinds of things. 

I know Congress is very interested in this question. We are as 

well, because as the most people-centric Service to keep that number stable we do have to get a handle on that increasing slope of 

compensation. 

Senator DONNELLY. Secretary Creedon, don’t take offense at this, 

but I want to invite Mr. Carson and Dr. LaPlante to Crane Naval 

Warfare Center. You’re invited as well, but these two for very specific reasons. 

Dr. LaPlante, we do a lot of work on counterfeit and counterfeit 

detection there in terms of parts and supplies and equipment. Naturally, in the position that we are hoping you are ascending to, 

what do you see as your role in preventing the introduction of 

counterfeit parts into the Air Force process? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I would tie counterfeit parts, unfortunately, as 

part of the broader cyber resiliency issue. What we typically talk 

about is we talk about the supply chain, and that is understanding 

for our weapons systems where we’re getting the parts and that in 

fact these parts are truly what we think they are. 

I would view the counterfeit part issue in terms of the job I’m 

nominated for to be part of building the resiliency into that system. 

32 

I think there are for selected military programs—we have gone to 

Trusted Foundries, as you may know. In my view there’s a limit 

to how much you can do with Trusted Foundries, only because 

there’s a certain throughput. But I think we’re going to have to 

start to build resiliency into starting with our most critical systems 

end to end, and that’s going to include looking at the supply chain 

and the parts. 

Senator DONNELLY. I was wondering if you are a proponent, as 

I am, of more aggressive forensic measures, because, as you said, 

we certainly hope they are from trusted suppliers or whatever, but 

constant spot check or determination on a lot of what we come 

through, because of the critical nature of making sure these parts 

are reliable and perform as advertised. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Absolutely. We talked earlier about science and 

technology. I think this is an area that we should be investing in 

in science and technology, noninvasive ways of doing surveillance 

testing on large populations of ships, for example, to detect anomalies and things that are in there, Trojan horses, whatever. I think 

that is an active, important area of research that we should be 

doing. 

Senator DONNELLY. Secretary Creedon, you have done so much 

work in the nuclear area and in keeping our Nation safe. Just recently we went through some challenges with North Korea. As we 

look forward, looking at the government that they have there, the 

actions that have been taken there—and I’m not asking you to be 

an expert on all things North Korean, but what do you think are 

the key steps in making sure that we’re able to continue to move 

forward, continue to counter that threat, and what do you think 

are the things that they respond to more than anything? 

Ms. CREEDON. Senator, from my current position one of the 

things that we’ve been very instrumental in is ensuring that the 

United States is well protected from whatever the North Koreans 

end up doing with respect to the development of their long-range 

missiles, as well as their short-range missiles, which are a threat 

to the theater and to our forces over there. 

We’ve been very instrumental in March with respect to the Secretary’s announcement to expand the capacity and the capability of 

the ground-based strategic deterrent, to add 14 additional ballistic 

missile defense interceptors at Fort Greely in Alaska. The challenge now is to continue to improve those interceptors so that they 

become safe and efficient. 

From a nonproliferation, counterproliferation, proliferation perspective with respect to North Korea, it’s absolutely essential that 

we do everything possible to prevent them from achieving their 

goals in their program, from getting the materials, the technologies. Whatever it is that they need to advance their program, 

we have to work to be able to prevent them from getting those 

things; also with respect to making sure that our allies in the region also feel that our extended assurance and deterrence is secure 

and viable. I think we did that too not too long ago when we had 

the B–52 flyover of the Korean Peninsula. 

I think all of these things need to continue to press forward so 

that we maintain a good posture with respect to North Korea. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. 

33 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly. 

We will have a second round. We can have perhaps 3 minutes 

for the second round. If we need a third round, we will. 

Senator Donnelly raised an issue of counterfeit parts and I want 

to make sure, Dr. LaPlante, that you are aware of the investigation, which was a very extensive investigation that this committee 

held, into counterfeit parts. Millions, literally millions of counterfeit parts, have found their way into our weapons systems. I would 

hope that you would find out what we had to say, that you would 

study what we did in the 2012 defense authorization bill, mainly 

in the area of holding the contractors accountable for those parts 

and accountable for the correction of those parts. 

We’ve had a lot of effort now on the part of some contractors to 

change our law and to not hold them accountable. But hopefully 

that’s not going to happen. We would urge you to read this report. 

It’s a pretty disturbing report. Mainly the source is Chinese. We 

looked at the electronic parts, where they rip apart old computers, 

take the parts and wash them, put new numbers on them. They 

do it openly. It’s quite an amazing operation that they’re running 

there, and we’re going to do everything we can to stop it, at least 

as far as weapons systems are concerned. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Senator Levin, I know about the report. I will 

definitely review it carefully, and I consider it extremely important. 

As we say, it’s part of that broader cyber issue. I look forward to 

working, if confirmed, with you on that. Thanks. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Carson, when you take this position you 

will become the second Chief Management Officer of the Department of the Army. It’s only a few years ago that we said that the 

position that you’ll be confirmed to is the Chief Management Officer. We did this in 2007 out of frustration with the inability of the 

Military Departments to modernize their business systems and 

processes. We chose to have the Under Secretary serve concurrently as Chief Management Officer because no other official in the 

Department of the Army other than the Secretary sits at a high 

enough level to cut across all the stovepipes and to be able to implement comprehensive change. 

We hope that you will make modernization of the Army’s business systems and processes a top priority. 

Mr. CARSON. I assure you I will consider it a very top priority. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you think you have the resources and the 

authority needed to carry out the business transformation of the 

Department of the Army? 

Mr. CARSON. I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you find out that that’s not true, for whatever reason, you would let us know? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, of course. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. No, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Then Senator King or Senator Kaine? 

Senator KING. One brief follow-up. Mr. Carson, I don’t expect you 

to have this data at hand, but perhaps you could supply it. I’d be 

interested in knowing, in that personnel cost figure that you were 

34 

talking about, the breakdown within that figure of Active Duty 

versus retired in terms of costs, of health care, retirement. Do you 

see what I mean? 

Mr. CARSON. Absolutely. I will get that to you, Senator. 

Senator KING. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Army retiree expenses are paid into the Department of Defense’s retiree accrual 

fund, and the fund distributes payments to retirees. In fiscal year 2013, the Army 

paid about $7.1 billion of the approximately $61.1 billion in its military pay budget 

to the retiree accrual fund. This represents about 11.6 percent of the Army’s military pay budget in that fiscal year. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. No additional questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Again, we thank you, thank you all, 

for your service and for what you’re embarked upon in the new positions that you’ll be confirmed to. We thank your families, your 

supporters, particularly August. You’ve done a wonderful job, and 

I know how important it is to an uncle to have a nephew or a niece 

there by his side or her side. I only have one nephew, a lot of 

nieces. 

But it’s a good thing that you skipped school today. Don’t do that 

too often, though. This has to be a special occasion. But we again 

know how important it was to your uncle that you be here today. 

We will stand adjourned, and we will move these nominations as 

quickly as possible—even quicker than usual in the Senate these 

days. 

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES

Question. Section 3141 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2002 stated that the Principal Deputy Administrator shall be appointed ‘‘from 

among persons who have extensive background in organizational management and 

are well-qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and materials 

disposition programs of the administration in a manner that advances and protects 

the national security of the United States.’’ 

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to 

perform these duties? 

Answer. I have had over 30 years of experience in a variety of executive and legislative branch positions. In addition to my current position as an Assistant Secretary 

of Defense, I have served in management positions at the Department of Energy 

(DOE), including as the first Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). I also served as the General Counsel of the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. I was honored to serve 

for many years as a member of the staff of the Senate Committee on Armed Services with responsibilities directly related to those of the Principal Deputy Administrator of the NNSA. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on understanding the many specific responsibilities and interactions that are necessary to ensure that I can effectively carry out 

the duties of the office of the Principal Deputy Administrator of the NNSA. I firmly 

believe that there are always actions that I can take to improve my ability to perform successfully in any position. That said, some of the key areas on which I will 

focus are program and project management execution, safety and security, maintaining science excellence and ensuring that the NNSA meets is national security 

commitments. 

35 

Question. Section 3141 goes on to state that the Principal Deputy Administrator 

‘‘shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of activities among the elements of the administration.’’ 

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the 

Administrator of the NNSA would prescribe for you? 

Answer. While there is currently not a permanent Administrator in place to provide guidance to this question, history would indicate that the Principal Deputy 

would, among other duties and tasks, focus on the internal workings of the NNSA, 

the budget, and interactions with Congress and other departments and agencies. 

Question. Are there any special projects or assignments on which you will focus? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with the Administrator to 

identify specific projects and assignments. I would also expect that some projects 

would focus on restoring the trust in and credibility of the NNSA. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. What is your understanding of the role that you will play in the overall 

administration of the NNSA, in the event that you are confirmed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to be focused on the internal workings of 

the NNSA, the budget, and interactions with Congress and other departments and 

agencies. This would be consistent with the roles undertaken by my predecessors. 

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Principal Deputy Administrator? 

Answer. The challenges that will confront the Principal Deputy are the same that 

confront the NNSA itself. Implementation of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and 

the President’s nuclear security agenda will be significant challenges, as will ensuring the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile and maintaining 

a highly skilled, trained, and capable workforce at NNSA, its labs and plants. Doing 

all this under increasingly constrained budgets will be even more challenging. 

NNSA is midway through its first major life extension program and is beginning 

work on the second even more challenging life extension program. Two major manufacturing capabilities are in need of replacement, threats from nuclear terrorism and 

proliferation have become more complex, work is underway on a new reactor for the 

Ohio-class replacement submarine, and the amount of money available to address 

all of these challenges is decreasing. In addition, confidence in the management of 

the NNSA has been questioned. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I will develop close 

working relationships with key partners at NNSA headquarters and field offices, the 

labs and plants, with other relevant executive branch partners, and with Congress, 

to understand and address the various problems, issues, and concerns. I would work 

to establish clear expectations, clear plans and requirements, clear lines of communications, authority and responsibility, and generally work to restore the credibility 

of and trust in the NNSA. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Principal Deputy Administrator? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on those serious problems mentioned above. Resolving these problems will take time and the patience of NNSA stakeholders, as 

well as their support and partnership. Reestablishing these baseline relationships 

will be the key to success. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Administrator, 

the leadership of the NNSA and its operating contractors, and the whole NNSA 

team to achieve this goal. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator of the NNSA and the 

whole NNSA team, as well as other departments and agencies, to identify, understand, and prioritize the problems facing NNSA, and to develop appropriate 

timelines to resolve these problems. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues that must be addressed by the Principal Deputy Administrator? 

Answer. If confirmed, and working in conjunction with the Administrator, I would 

make reestablishing solid baseline relationships an overarching priority. I believe 

this can be achieved while working on the specific problems that face NNSA. In addition, if confirmed, I would also focus on ensuring that the highly-skilled and talVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
36 

ented NNSA workforce is closely involved in identifying and resolving the many 

challenges that face the NNSA. An additional priority would be to establish stability 

in the program, budget, and workforce. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the NNSA’s budget and management structure to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear weapons 

stockpile for the Nation? 

Answer. Achieving this goal will become increasingly more difficult in the face of 

declining budgets. As a result, focusing on improving NNSA’s overall process to accurately estimate costs, establish clear program requirements, and execute those 

programs will be a priority of mine, if confirmed. I would expect to work closely with 

the Administrator, the NNSA leadership and the new Under Secretary for Management and Performance to achieve these goals. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Principal 

Deputy Administrator with the following Officials: 

The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would report through the Administrator to the Deputy 

Secretary and Secretary and represent the Administrator with these officials in his 

absence. 

Question. The Administrator of the NNSA. 

Answer. If confirmed, the Administrator would be my immediate supervisor. 

Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the immediate supervisor for the Deputy 

Administrators for Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Naval 

Reactors. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management. 

Answer. Within the NNSA, the Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and 

Operations is the principal interface with the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 

Environmental Management (EM). If confirmed, I would interact with the Under 

Secretary for Management and Performance on EM matters, given that the Assistant Secretary for EM reports to that Under Secretary, as well as the Assistant Secretary. 

Question. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and 

Biological Defense Programs. 

Answer. NNSA’s Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the main counterpart to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. If confirmed, I would represent the interests of the Administrator and the NNSA with this Deputy Administrator, as called for. 

Question. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

Answer. The Administrator is the principle interface with the Chairman and the 

member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. If confirmed, I would represent and support the interests of the Administrator and the NNSA to the Chairman of the NWC 

as appropriate. 

Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. 

Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the principal interface with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. As necessary, in the absence 

of the Administrator, I would represent the interests of the Administrator and the 

NNSA with the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command. 

Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy. 

Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the principal interface with the nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy. As necessary, I would 

represent the interests of the Administrator and the NNSA with these officials. 

Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Facilities and Operations. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the immediate supervisor to the Associate 

Administrator of NNSA for Facilities and Operations (Infrastructure and Environment). 

Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Management and Administration (APM). 

Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the immediate supervisor to the Associate 

Administrator of NNSA for Management and Administration. 

Question. The DOE Director of Health, Safety, and Security. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the interests of the Administrator and the 

NNSA as called for. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Energy for Science and the Director of the Office of Science. 

37 

Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the interests of the Administrator and the 

NNSA as called for. 

Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the interests of the Administrator and the 

NNSA as called for. 

MANAGEMENT OF THE NNSA

Question. What is the role of NNSA’s Management Council and, if confirmed, 

what would be your relationship with the Council? 

Answer. If confirmed, as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I understand that 

I would be the lead official of the NNSA Management Council. 

Question. In your view, are there any changes needed to the management structure of the NNSA? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would consult directly with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Administrator, and the Deputy and Associate Administrators regarding 

what changes need to be made to the management structure of the NNSA. 

Trust is clearly an issue that remains a challenge within the nuclear security enterprise, between headquarters and the field. What may assist in addressing this 

issue is to further clarify lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability within 

the entire NNSA enterprise. I understand the Secretary has begun to address these 

management issues. It will also be critical to assess business processes to operate 

more efficiently as well as NNSA’s capabilities for cost estimation and program execution. 

Question. In your view are there clear lines of authorities and responsibilities in 

the NNSA? 

Answer. I am aware of the relationships prescribed under the NNSA Act and 

know that governance of the NNSA will be a critical area to focus on if I am confirmed. I would expect to work closely with the Congressional Panel currently conducting a review of NNSA governance. I understand the Secretary has begun to implement reforms that would clarify lines of authority and responsibility specifically 

in the areas of safety and security across the Department to include the NNSA, and 

if confirmed would work to understand and implement these reforms. 

Question. Do you believe that any changes are needed to ensure clear lines of authority and responsibility? 

Answer. I understand the Secretary has begun to implement reforms that would 

clarify lines of authority and responsibility specifically in the areas of safety and security across the Department to include the NNSA. If confirmed, I would consult 

directly with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Administrator, and the Deputy and Associate Administrators regarding what changes need to be made to the 

management structure of the NNSA. 

Question. As Principal Deputy Administrator, how will you address the findings 

and recommendations from the dozens of reports that have been published in the 

past 2 decades regarding management problems at NNSA/DOE? 

Answer. I am very familiar with the many reports that have been published over 

the years identifying management challenges at DOE and NNSA. If confirmed, I 

will work with the Secretary and the Administrator to continue to tackle these challenges. I would also want to personally engage with the members of the Congressional Advisory Panel who have been charged with examining the governance structure, mission, and management of the nuclear security enterprise. 

WEAPONS PROGRAMS WORK FORCE

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA 

to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design capabilities, in the 

Federal NNSA workforce and at the labs and the plants? 

Answer. If confirmed, recruiting and retaining world class talent within NNSA’s 

Federal and contractor workforce will be a priority of mine. As the Federal agency 

responsible for the management of the nuclear security enterprise, including one of 

a kind detection and forensic capabilities, I believe it is essential for NNSA to provide meaningful and challenging professional opportunities that attract and retain 

dedicated professionals. Central to this effort is fostering an enterprise-wide sense 

of purpose in NNSA’s nuclear security mission. Particular attention must be placed 

on ensuring that, as the current NNSA workforce ages, the administration maintains partnerships with the academic and university communities through pipelines 

that encourage and attract the world’s best engineers, scientists, and technical experts. Also key to the health of the Labs is maintaining the ability to utilize the 

independent research and development (R&D) funds. 

38 

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA 

to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are maintained in NNSA 

workforce and at the labs and the plants? 

Answer. Successful Federal workforce planning is essential for NNSA to retain 

the appropriate degree of technical skills within the workforce. A combination of 

well-designed recruitment and internship programs, academic partnerships, continued collaboration with minority serving institutions, and outreach programs with 

the science and academic community is something I believe will remain critical to 

NNSA’s laboratories and plants. 

Question. In your view, what are the critical skills that are needed in the NNSA 

complex wide? 

Answer. The success of NNSA’s laboratories, plants, and facilities in large part 

relies upon the Federal and contractor workforce maintaining a diverse set of critical skills. Within the national security laboratories, as the fiscal year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan addresses, the critical skills and knowledge 

needed include nuclear design and evaluation, computing and simulation, manufacturing and fabrication, electrical, mechanical, and materials engineering, project 

management, nuclear criticality safety engineering and nuclear design code development. Many of these same skills are also essential for the nuclear nonproliferation, 

counterterrorism, and emergency response work of the NNSA. These are just some 

of the essential skills that underpin the important work across the NNSA complex 

and programs. 

SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Question. What role, if any, will you have in ensuring safety and security in the 

nuclear weapons complex? 

Answer. If confirmed, the safe and secure operation of the nuclear weapons enterprise, personnel, and assets will be my top priority. I will work in partnership with 

the Administrator, and in accordance with the Secretary’s vision to ensure a strong 

professional culture that values security and safety. This includes executing existing 

security and safety best practices and working with DOE and NNSA leadership to 

provide an operationally safe and secure complex. I will also collaborate closely with 

the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) to ensure that NNSA appropriately applies safety best practices and policies throughout the nuclear security 

enterprise. 

Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security threats to the 

facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons complex? 

Answer. I understand the critical importance of maintaining safety and security 

at all NNSA sites. If confirmed, I will emphasize NNSA’s commitment to proactively 

mitigate cyber, physical, materials, and transportation security threats, and ensure 

operational safety standards are met. 

Question. What role, if any, will you have in ensuring operational nuclear safety 

in the nuclear weapons complex? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe and secure operation of the 

nuclear weapons enterprise and the dedicated professionals serving in NNSA’s Federal and contractor workforce. I will work to ensure that NNSA sites, plants, and 

staff are properly equipped and trained to effectively execute all applicable safety 

and security standards and laws. 

Question. What role, if any, will you have with the DNFSB? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DNFSB on their recommendations. I am quite familiar with the DNFSB’s statutory responsibility to review the 

design and ensure adequacy of operational nuclear safety controls at defense nuclear 

facilities. It is critically important for the NNSA to work proactively with the 

DNFSB early in the design and execution process so as to resolve any operational 

nuclear safety concerns that could later play a role in the eventual cost of the 

project. 

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. What is your view of the Stockpile Stewardship Program’s progress towards its goal of being able to continuously certify the U.S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear 

testing? 

Answer. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has been very successful to date in 

maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent without the need for underground nuclear explosive testing. Some of the various experimental facilities that 

underpin the success of the program are the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; the Z machine at Sandia National LabVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
39 

oratories; the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory; and the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research 

Facility at the Nevada National Security Site. Underlying the success of all these 

facilities are the laboratory computational facilities. If confirmed, I will visit all the 

sites in the NNSA enterprise to meet the workforce and see the capabilities that 

assess the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons and the experimental tools that contribute to broader national security. I will work to ensure that 

these facilities are maintained so that the NNSA can continue to make the necessary certifications in the absence of underground nuclear explosive testing. 

Question. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges confronting the Stockpile Stewardship Program? 

Answer. The greatest challenge that currently confronts the Stockpile Stewardship Program is an unpredictable budget environment. NNSA must balance planned 

life extension programs and infrastructure modernization investments while maintaining the scientific research and experimental capabilities required certifying the 

stockpile. I also believe that steady, continued investments in science and engineering at all of the sites remains a core requirement in order to maintain and attract 

the high quality staff essential to the long-term mission of maintaining the deterrent without returning to underground nuclear explosive testing. 

Question. Do you fully support the goals of the Stockpile Stewardship Program? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In your view what additional capabilities will the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program need in the next 5 years? 

Answer. I am not aware of any major additional capabilities required beyond 

those already described in the fiscal year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, but requirements will have to be mapped against resource constraints. 

NNSA needs to have the means to ensure that new technical and policy expertise 

relating to nuclear policy is ‘‘grown’’ in NNSA as the nuclear workforce continues 

to age. It is also critical that NNSA have consistent and predictable funding. 

LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

Question. As a result of the 2010 NPR, the Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out 

a schedule over the next 20 years that involves numerous demands on the NNSA, 

these are the B–61 life extension program, the interoperable warhead, the W–88/ 

87 joint fuse program, the warhead for the long-range stand off weapon, in addition 

to the maintenance of the existing stockpile systems (W–88, W–87, W–76, W–78, B– 

61, B–83, and W–80). 

What do you see as some of issues in this ambitious schedule that concern you? 

Answer. In my current capacity as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 

Strategic Affairs, I am very much aware that nuclear modernization work of this 

kind is expensive, technically demanding, and time consuming. The Nuclear Weapons Council has developed a strategy for managing the cost, scope, and schedule of 

these modernization activities. This strategy should help refine the concurrent nature of this work to better map our requirements, planned resources, and workforce 

capabilities. Of course maintaining the budget needed to achieve the strategy will 

be a challenge. 

Question. Are you concerned this schedule is achievable if sequestration continues? 

Answer. I am very concerned about the effect of sequestration and general budget 

constraints on this schedule. Consistent and predictable funding is essential to 

maintaining the planned schedule for such complex and technically challenging 

modernization programs. Given my experience at DOD, I am well aware how sequestration, as well as continuing resolutions, can cause crippling uncertainty for 

the people and the programs. 

Question. The NNSA is in the early stages of an effort to develop an interoperable 

warhead for the W–88 and W–78 systems. 

If the cost of the interoperable warhead become prohibitive would you support life 

extensions of the existing systems? 

Answer. I believe that this decision would be in the purview of the Nuclear Weapons Council, which has full awareness of and the statutory responsibility to consider 

various technical, military, and budgetary options and issues. 

Question. Do you support the current scope of the B–61 mod 12 life extension program? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Are you concerned about the overall cost of the B–61 mod 12 life extension program and if so what particular issues are of concern? 

40 

Answer. The B61–12 LEP was chosen as the option that meets military requirements at the lowest cost. If confirmed, I will continue the NNSA’s commitment to 

a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. This includes sustaining and maintaining the nuclear stockpile, and modernizing the nuclear infrastructure and delivery systems. The President has said that the United States will retain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, as long as nuclear weapons exist. Modernizing 

the stockpile is essential to achieving that goal but will become more challenging 

in a constrained budget environment. 

Question. The Senate Appropriations Committee has proposed a reduction of $168 

million to the President’s fiscal year 2014 request for the B61 Life Extension program. What impact will this have on the B61 LEP in terms of cost and schedule? 

How might it affect other planned LEPs? 

Answer. A cut of this magnitude would substantially delay the overall schedule 

and could jeopardize the overall effectiveness of the weapon system. A slip to the 

B61–12 LEP could also adversely impact the schedule for future LEPs. 

OVERALL MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your view on the relationship and the relative duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Energy as found in the Atomic Energy Act and the 

Administrator of the NNSA? 

Answer. The NNSA Act states that the Secretary establishes overarching policy 

for the DOE and the NNSA and may direct DOE officials to review NNSA programs 

and activities. These DOE officials can then make recommendations to the Secretary 

regarding administration of the NNSA program and activities. Having served as the 

Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs during the first year of the NNSA, I 

have an appreciation for the critically important role of the Secretary in ensuring 

the mission of NNSA is successfully executed, and the need to work cooperatively 

with the other organizational units of the DOE. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any organizational structure issues in the 

NNSA that should be addressed to improve management and operations of the 

NNSA, or that you would address if confirmed? 

Answer. I believe the statutory structure of the NNSA is sound and that the primary challenge lies with implementing that structure. The challenges related to site 

security and major project management have been among the most significant. If 

confirmed, I will focus on implementing and then sustaining the reforms to security 

that have been put forth by Secretary Moniz and implementing additional reforms 

as needed. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, Deputy Administrators, 

Associate Administrators and the leadership of the NNSA facilities to build on improvements to NNSA’s project management, program review, and cost estimation 

expertise. This collaborative effort will include creating an implementation plan to 

stand up NNSA’s Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation as directed by 

the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014. 

Question. The NNSA and DOE has been plagued by cost overruns and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear facilities, nuclear weapons modernization programs, and nuclear stockpile stewardship facilities. 

How serious are these cost overruns in your view? 

Answer. Cost overruns are a very serious issue. NNSA is challenged in the coming 

years with a significant uptick in work activity related to modernization of the 

stockpile and responsive infrastructure. If cost overruns persist, NNSA’s critically 

important mission could be adversely affected. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure they are not repeated 

in the future? 

Answer. If confirmed, and as I stated before, I will work with the Administrator, 

Deputy Administrators, and Associate Administrators to build on improvements to 

NNSA’s project management, program review, and cost estimation expertise in an 

effort to ensure we are committing to work that can be delivered on time and on 

budget. This collaborative effort will include creating an implementation plan to 

stand up NNSA’s Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation as directed by 

the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. 

Question. Do you believe that the expertise of DOE personnel serving outside the 

NNSA can be helpful to you if confirmed? If so, how do you expect to utilize this 

expertise if you are confirmed? 

Answer. Yes. DOE relies upon an exceptionally skilled workforce at the laboratories, plants, and headquarters. If confirmed, I would enthusiastically utilize the 

world class expertise that exists throughout the complex to drive favorable outcomes 

to NNSA’s toughest challenges. 

41 

Question. Are you aware of any limitations on your authority, if confirmed, to 

draw on that expertise? 

Answer. No. I am not aware of any limitations on my authority, if confirmed, to 

draw on the expertise that resides within DOE. If, however, any are identified, I 

will work promptly with the Administrator, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to 

resolve any issues. 

Question. What is your view of the extent to which the NNSA is bound by the 

existing rules, regulations, and directives of DOE and what flexibility, if any, do you 

believe you would have in implementing such rules, regulations, and directives? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will adhere to the NNSA Act, which sets forth the relationship between the DOE and NNSA. DOE and the NNSA have a unique partnership in order to ensure the integrity of the nuclear security enterprise. I anticipate 

working closely with the Administrator in conjunction with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary and the other senior leadership throughout the Department to ensure 

the NNSA runs smoothly and efficiently. 

ADVISORY BOARD

Question. The NNSA had an external advisory board, which included technical 

and other subject matter experts to provide advice to the NNSA. The charter for 

the board was allowed to expire. In your view is there any benefit to reconstituting 

an advisory board? Why or why not? 

Answer. I believe there is great value gained by receiving advice and counsel from 

external groups comprised of subject matter experts. If confirmed, I will work with 

the Administrator to determine the most appropriate format to utilize outside expertise. 

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. DOE and the NNSA have looked at, and have in some circumstances 

used, third party or other alternate financing options for construction projects. 

If confirmed, would you commit to review carefully any NNSA proposal to undertake construction projects with funding approaches that deviate from the traditional 

line item funding approach? 

Answer. Yes. If the NNSA finds that third party financing arrangements are beneficial in the future, if confirmed, I would commit to ensuring that Congress is fully 

informed of all plans to use third party financing and that all projects are consistent 

with executive branch and statutory requirements. 

Question. In addition, would you commit to keep the committee fully informed of 

any such proposals, to fully coordinate any proposal with the Office of Management 

and Budget, and to ensure that any such proposals include a business case documenting that any alternative financing approach is in the best interests of the taxpayer? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. One of the goals of the effort to modernize the nuclear weapons complex 

is to reduce the number of square feet of building space. 

As the NNSA proceeds with construction projects in the future, would you commit 

to support the goal, and work to include in the total project cost of any new facility 

the cost to dispose of any buildings or facilities that are being replaced? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In some instances the disposition of old buildings might be more appropriately handled by the Office of Environmental Management (EM). In your view 

under what circumstances should EM be responsible for the disposition and under 

what circumstances should the NNSA be responsible? 

Answer. I support the current division of labor where EM disposes of facilities 

with process-related contamination (i.e. contamination not commonly managed in 

private sector operations, typically radioactive contamination) and NNSA disposes 

of all other facilities. I understand that discussions are ongoing between NNSA and 

EM to develop more specific criteria for transfer, and if confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I would support this work to further clarify roles and responsibilities in this area. I recognize that the current inventory of process contaminated 

surplus facilities DOE-wide will require substantial time and resources to disposition and these process contaminated facilities tend to present higher risks than 

other surplus facilities, so I would support looking at ways for NNSA to complete 

prudent risk reduction activities while awaiting transfer to EM. 

Question. Do you believe that clear criteria exist on which to make disposition determinations? 

42 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review carefully the existing criteria for their adequacy. If necessary, I will make recommendations to the Administrator to clarify relevant criteria. 

Question. The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Plan (FIRP) was terminated in 2013. This program was intended to reduce the large backlog of deferred 

maintenance for NNSA facilities. 

With the termination of FIRP, how do you believe NNSA should continue to address its backlog of deferred maintenance? 

Answer. I understand, since the termination of FIRP, NNSA’s deferred maintenance backlog has increased. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I 

would support NNSA efforts to prioritize the existing resources and identify opportunities for enterprise-level solutions to reduce the maintenance backlog. 

Question. As Deputy Administrator, how will you ensure the deferred maintenance backlog continues to be reduced? 

Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator I will prioritize NNSA’s 

existing resources and identify opportunities for enterprise-level solutions to reduce 

the maintenance backlog. 

ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT

Question. What responsibility do you believe the NNSA should have for funding, 

managing, and disposing of its current and future hazardous waste streams and for 

future environmental restoration? 

Answer. I believe that as the landlord of its eight sites, NNSA is responsible for 

managing and disposing of its current and future hazardous waste streams and ensuring that these operations do not create future environmental restoration obligations. Environmental restoration, however, is not a core NNSA capability—NNSA’s 

responsibility is to ensure that EM, the partner DOE program with that core capability, and all NNSA stakeholders, including Congress, are aware of NNSA’s requirements. This will require close teamwork and partnership between NNSA and 

EM. If confirmed, I will work to ensure NNSA and EM work together to meet these 

needs. 

Question. What specific steps do you believe the NNSA should take to negotiate 

programmatic responsibilities for environmental activities between the NNSA and 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management? 

Answer. NNSA and EM are partners, each with their own core capabilities. NNSA 

works with its EM counterparts at all levels to ensure each understands the total 

requirement and how they will work together to protect workers, the environment, 

and the public. I think the division of responsibilities between NNSA and EM is 

well understood, but if confirmed, I will commit to review this relationship and to 

ensure its continued success. 

Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you will play in this process? 

Answer. If confirmed I would work to ensure that environmental restoration, 

waste management, and facility disposition goals are included as appropriate in 

each relevant senior manager’s performance goals, including mine, and are addressed in all strategic plans and budget submissions, and that each funding decision is fully informed by the risks it accepts. 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements needed in 

the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs? If so, what improvements would 

you recommend? 

Answer. NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) programs are vital to 

U.S. national security and are a first line of defense in reducing the risk of nuclear 

terrorism and proliferation. If confirmed, I would commit to working with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Administrator, and Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, as well as other strategic partners, to consider the future of 

the DNN programs as we move towards the goal of permanent threat reduction 

where possible, vice a prevention-focused approach. Great progress has been made 

to date on securing vulnerable nuclear material worldwide, but much work remains 

to address the nuclear terrorism and proliferation threat. 

In this fiscally constrained environment, it will be critical to continue to move 

some of our foreign cooperative relationships from assistance to partnership. In addition, we need to engage our international partners to ensure that work completed 

to date is maintained and sustained. 

Question. NNSA has significantly expanded its work in the Megaports program 

in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security and to secure vulnerable 

43 

weapons usable materials worldwide, the Global Lockdown program, which is being 

implemented in cooperation with the Department of Defense (DOD). 

If confirmed, would you commit to keeping Congress fully informed as to the success of, as well as any problems with these cooperative relationships? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would commit to keep Congress fully informed of 

these cooperative relationships. From my current vantage point as the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, I see the tremendous interagency 

cooperation among the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and if confirmed, I will work to ensure those important 

relationships continue. These relationships leverage expertise and resources and ensure there is no duplication of effort and no major gap in addressing the broad scope 

of nuclear security issues at home and abroad. 

Question. The NNSA has responsibility for the bulk of the Federal Government’s 

basic research on radiation detection technologies as well as other nuclear technologies, such as those used in nuclear forensics. 

If confirmed, would you commit to undertake a review of the nonproliferation 

R&D program to ensure that it is adequately funded and fully coordinated with the 

activities of other Federal agencies? 

Answer. I understand that an external review of the R&D program was completed 

in May 2011, and that the recommendations from that review have been implemented. 

If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator 

for DNN to ensure these critical R&D activities are fully supported and coordinated. 

Question. The NNSA nonproliferation programs have occasionally had implementation issues that have resulted in large carryover balances. 

In your view is the management in place to implement the new Global Lockdown 

program and to ensure that the funds are spent in a timely and effective manner? 

Answer. I understand there has been tremendous success in achieving President 

Obama’s 4-year effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material worldwide but that 

much work still remains for the future. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and Deputy Administrator for DNN to ensure the continued implementation 

of the Global Lockdown program and that funds are spent in a timely and effective 

manner. 

Question. If not, what changes would you recommend? 

Answer. I am not in a position to recommend any changes at this time. If confirmed, I would discuss this further with NNSA and DNN leadership. 

NATIONAL LABORATORIES

Question. The NNSA, as the steward of the three National Security Laboratories, 

has a responsibility to ensure that the labs are capable of meeting their broad national security obligations, not just those of the NNSA. 

What is your view on the role of the three National Security laboratories in addressing broad national security challenges and the role of the NNSA in overseeing 

those activities? 

Answer. The three National Security Laboratories have a unique role in ensuring 

a variety of national security challenges are met. Maintaining the vitality of the laboratories and sites and the core competencies of the workforce at each site must be 

a priority for the NNSA. NNSA laboratories and sites possess unique capabilities 

that other agencies utilize to serve their national security missions. Supporting 

these national security missions not only advances the Nation’s security interests, 

but also exercises, challenges, and augments workforce skills and laboratory capabilities. In addition, there are often direct benefits back to NNSA’s programs. I firmly believe in order to recruit and retain top-notch personnel you must provide them 

challenging and interesting work—including national security work—as well as 

world-class laboratory equipment and facilities in which to work. NNSA has a role 

to enable this kind of work and a responsibility to understand the benefits from 

these efforts. NNSA also has a responsibility to oversee the work of the laboratories 

to ensure they perform the work entrusted to them and they do so safely and securely. 

Question. In your view are there any changes that are needed to facilitate or improve the work for others program at the three National Security Laboratories? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the interagency work performed at the three 

laboratories and make a recommendation to the Administrator about any changes 

that may need to be made. 

44 

Question. The three NNSA laboratories are Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) run under a government-owned, contractor-operated 

model. 

Do you see these laboratories as simply contractors, or partners in carrying out 

NNSA’s mission? 

Answer. As FFRDCs, the three NNSA laboratories have a special long-term relationship with NNSA. As such, they have access to information, equipment and property beyond that of normal contractual relationships and operate in the public interest with objectivity and independence, free of organizational conflicts of interest. 

The NNSA contractor operators of the labs and plants have special and unique national security responsibilities. NNSA relies on the technical expertise of the three 

laboratories as they are integral to the mission and operation of NNSA. I do, however, believe the relationships between Federal employees and the laboratories, as 

well as the plants, must be strengthened. 

Question. Do you believe the directors of the three NNSA laboratories have a statutory duty to provide objective advice and opinions to Congress? If so, how will you 

ensure Congress receives such advice? 

Answer. The directors of the three NNSA laboratories have a statutory duty to 

provide their advice and opinions to Congress as directed by various reporting requirements, such as the requirement at title 50 U.S.C. § 2525 to provide a Stockpile 

Assessment Report which is transmitted to Congress through executive agencies 

and the President. If confirmed, I will make sure these statutory requirements are 

carried out. 

MATERIALS DISPOSITON PROGRAM

Question. The NNSA is responsible for implementing the U.S. commitment to the 

Russian Government to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons grade plutonium. 

There are many issues and challenges facing the program including the fact that 

it is substantially over budget. 

What role will you play in ensuring that all aspects of this program will be on 

schedule and on budget and if necessary to review alternative disposition technologies? 

Answer. In my current capacity at DOD, I am aware that the Department is conducting a review of options for plutonium disposition and that the Secretary of Energy will make a determination on the path forward in the near future. If confirmed, 

I would work with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, the NNSA Administrator and 

Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, other U.S. Government 

leaders, as well as our international partners to ensure that we are pursuing our 

commitments in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement with Russia and that the Secretary’s guidance is implemented. 

Cost overruns are always a concern but even more so in today’s fiscal climate. If 

confirmed I will work with the Administrator to implement the Secretary’s decision 

effectively and efficiently. 

NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

Question. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) supports nuclear weapons experimental work but also has the capability to support a broad range of science and energy research challenges. 

If confirmed, what role, if any, will you play in ensuring the success of the NIF 

and to ensure that NIF is fully utilized? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator in maintaining NIF as a 

central part of the NNSA enterprise. It is an essential facility for understanding our 

nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear explosive testing to ensure a 

safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. NIF also contributes important capabilities to basic science and energy research. 

Question. What are the future implications to the facility and the stockpile stewardship program if NIF does not achieve sustained ignition? 

Answer. The work at NIF is vitally important to ensuring the safety, security, and 

effectiveness of our nuclear weapons stockpile. All of NIF’s experiments contribute 

to our knowledge of nuclear weapons characteristics and, in turn, to implementing 

our stockpile stewardship program. 

Question. Do you believe NIF should be utilized primarily to support stockpile 

stewardship activities, energy research, or basic science? 

Answer. NIF was built as a stockpile stewardship tool and I support its use to 

maintain the stockpile. 

45 

CONTRACTOR-OPERATED FACILITIES

Question. What recommendations, if any, would you make to improve oversight 

of and contractor management of the facilities in the nuclear weapons complex? 

Answer. Before making any specific recommendations, and if confirmed, I would 

review the existing system to understand the existing oversight methodologies. As 

needed I would then work to ensure that there are clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability for both Federal and contract staff; that performance expectations are understood to achieve mission requirements in an efficient and effective manner; and that there is a strong emphasis on strengthening the safety and 

security culture. I understand that NNSA is making headway in its efforts to hold 

its contractors accountable for performance, particularly in its capital construction 

projects. I would hope to build upon these early successes. 

Question. In your view what is the role of the NNSA field offices in the oversight 

of the contractor-operated facilities? 

Answer. The NNSA field offices, as the first line of oversight, are best positioned 

to recognize potential issues before they become problems. For them to be successful 

the partnerships between headquarters and field and between Federal and contractor employees must be strong. 

Question. Do you believe that recent problems contractor-operated facilities have 

resulted from too little government oversight? 

Answer. The Department has been criticized for both too little and too much oversight in regards to contractor-operated facilities. Before I take a view on the problem in specific instances, I would need to evaluate the situation in greater detail. 

I understand that NNSA is working to improve oversight mechanisms, to include 

clarifying roles, authorities, and functions for the organization. If confirmed I would 

work to ensure that the right balance of oversight for the specific activity is 

achieved and maintained. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Administrator? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

MIXED OXIDE FUEL

1. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Creedon, in his fiscal year 2014 budget request, 

the President sought to end the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Fabrication Facility at the 

Savannah River Site. Is this an opinion you share and would you recommend lowered funding for MOX in the upcoming budget cycle, if confirmed? 

Ms. CREEDON. The Department is committed to the U.S. Plutonium Disposition 

mission and to fulfilling its obligations under the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. However, the U.S. plan to dispose of surplus 

weapon-grade plutonium by irradiating it as MOX fuel has proven more costly than 

anticipated. As described in the fiscal year 2014 budget request, the administration 

46 

is conducting an analysis of disposition technology options to determine how best 

to complete the mission. 

I understand that the analysis has not yet been finalized. If confirmed, and in 

conjunction with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Administrator, I commit to 

work closely with Congress to ensure the United States meets its plutonium disposition obligations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

2. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Creedon, according to a January 2014 Department 

of Energy Inspector General (IG) report on the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Management of the $245 million Nuclear Materials Safeguards 

and Security Upgrades Project (Phase II) at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the 

project ‘‘suffered from a number of project management weaknesses.’’ As a result, 

the report said ‘‘the project will be delayed by approximately 1 year and will require 

an additional $41 million more than anticipated to complete.’’ Can you address this 

IG finding? 

Ms. CREEDON. The Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrade Project 

(NMSSUP) is a project that upgrades security at Los Alamos National Laboratory’s 

(LANL) Technical Area-55, a facility that houses high-security plutonium assets and 

operations. I understand the project is scheduled to be completed in the spring of 

2014. The original Total Project Cost (TPC) for NMSSUP was $245 million. The 

NMSSUP project is currently tracking to deliver at or below the original TPC. 

In April 2010, the original TPC was reduced to an estimated cost of $213 million. 

This was done without a thorough understanding of the risks and based on unreliable Earned Value Management System data. In September 2012, LANL issued stop 

work orders to contractors due to ongoing quality concerns with construction, and 

in October 2012, LANL suspended work on the project because the expected cost 

would exceed the $213 million budget. 

Subsequently, after NNSA’s Office of Acquisition and Project Management (NA– 

APM) was established, project management responsibility and accountability was 

transferred to NA–APM by the NNSA Administrator and the Acquisition Executive. 

In January 2013, LANL proposed increasing the TPC to $254 million; however, NA– 

APM rejected that proposal and instead reached an agreement wherein the contractor would absorb $10 million of the overrun. As a result, the revised TPC became $244 million, $1 million below the original TPC. 

3. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Creedon, how will you ensure there are no more 

delays or cost growth in this project? 

Ms. CREEDON. I understand that NNSA has taken actions to foster an improved 

culture of responsibility and accountability for delivering work on time and on budget. Some of these reforms that have been administered by NA–APM have included 

hiring a new Federal Project Director (FPD) with Level 3 project management certification. NNSA provided the new FPD with full Contracting Officer’s Representative authority. The FPD was also given additional Federal and contractor support 

to execute his responsibilities. A new highly qualified contractor project manager 

was also put in place on the NMSSUP project. 

My understanding is that the NMSSUP project is currently in acceptance testing. 

The total project cost will not be known until the project is accepted. I understand 

that NNSA intends to ensure that the contractor is held accountable for any defects 

and charged accordingly as NNSA previously did with the $10M in unallowable 

costs. 

The NMSSUP project represents a significant cultural change for the NNSA. NA– 

APM and the NMSSUP Project Team demonstrated that with the right team, focused attention to detail, and top to bottom leadership involvement even a troubled 

project can be righted when clear expectations are set and all parties accept accountability for their role in project delivery. If confirmed, I will work to ensure 

there is a successful conclusion to this and all other projects. 

NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES

4. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Creedon, in your responses to the advance policy 

questions, you discuss the health of our three national security laboratories. You say 

that, ‘‘Maintaining vitality of the laboratories and sites and the core competencies 

of the workforce at each site must be a priority . . .’’ In the past, I have heard conVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
47 

cerns about the loss of expertise and core competencies of our national labs supporting our nuclear deterrent. Do you share these concerns? 

Ms. CREEDON. I am concerned about retaining critical skills at the laboratories 

and sites because it’s the people that enable the laboratories and sites to deliver the 

best products for national security. If confirmed, I will face this challenge head on 

by ensuring NNSA’s talented and highly skilled workforce—contractor and Federal—is sustained through effective workforce recruitment, mentoring, and development. This workforce is the NNSA’s chief asset. 

5. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Creedon, if you do share these concerns, what is 

causing this problem? 

Ms. CREEDON. There are competing factors that stress our critical skills. As we 

move further from the end of the Cold War, our ability to recruit topflight talent 

into a nuclear weapons program is increasingly challenging, as nuclear weapons are 

not viewed as an attractive [long-term] career. Over time the number of scientists 

with certain skills, such as testing, has significantly decreased as it has been 20 

years since the last nuclear test. I am most concerned that we ensure that the laboratories and facilities are able to attract the best and the brightest, and that the 

experiences are passed to the next generation so that they can further develop the 

skills needed to maintain and certify the stockpile in the absence of testing. Key 

to evolving the skills and attracting the top talent to maintain the stockpile of the 

future are the facilities, computational, and experimental capabilities to ensure the 

generation charged with this responsibility will have the skills to undertake the responsibility. If confirmed, I will examine how to strengthen NNSA’s ability to attract and retain the next generation of scientists and engineers needed to accomplish the mission. 

6. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Creedon, how serious is this problem? 

Ms. CREEDON. I believe the ongoing erosion of the workforce is a serious problem 

that demands an immediate and long-term strategy at the Department. If confirmed, I intend to focus on this important challenge. 

7. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Creedon, what can we do about this problem? 

Ms. CREEDON. This challenge must be met through workforce planning to ensure 

that the Department is recruiting and then retaining professionals with the core 

competencies, knowledge, and technical expertise NNSA needs to execute its mission. We also have to make sure that the NNSA, its laboratories and facilities are 

seen as and are the best place to be working in the fields that are most critical. 

As I addressed in my APQs, maintaining the vitality of the laboratories and sites 

and the core competencies of the workforce at each site must be a priority for the 

NNSA. I firmly believe in order to recruit and retain top-notch personnel they must 

have challenging and interesting work as well as world-class laboratory equipment 

and facilities in which to work. Moreover, this work must be valued by the nation. 

If confirmed, I will work with the laboratories, the academic community, and 

other institutions that are able to assist NNSA in meeting its responsibility to have 

the most talented and capable Federal workforce. 

[The nomination reference of Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 6, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon, of Indiana, to be Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice Neile L. Miller, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

48 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON

Madelyn Creedon was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs on August 2, 2011. In this capacity she supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in overseeing policy development 

and execution in the areas of countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), U.S. 

nuclear forces and missile defense, and Department of Defense (DOD) cyber security 

and space issues. 

Prior to her confirmation, Ms. Creedon was counsel for the Democratic staff on 

the Senate Committee on Armed Services and was responsible for the Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces as well as threat reduction and nuclear nonproliferation issues. 

In 2000, she left the Senate Armed Services Committee to become the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration, 

Department of Energy (DOE), and returned to the committee in January 2001. 

Prior to joining the Senate Armed Services Committee staff in March 1997, she 

was the Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy for National Security Programs at 

the Department of Energy, beginning in October 1995. 

From November 1994 through October 1995, Ms. Creedon was the General Counsel for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. This Commission, 

under the Chairmanship of former Senator Alan Dixon of Illinois, was responsible 

for recommending to the President military bases for closure or realignment. 

From 1990 through November 1994, Ms. Creedon was counsel for the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services, under the Chairmanship of Senator Sam Nunn. 

While on the committee staff she was responsible for DOE national security programs, DOE and DOD environmental programs, and base closure transition and implementation programs. 

Before joining the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Ms. Creedon 

was a trial attorney and Acting Assistant General Counsel for Special Litigation 

with the DOE Office of the General Counsel for 10 years. 

Born and raised in Indianapolis, IN, Ms. Creedon is a graduate of St. Louis University School of Law, where she was captain of the moot court team. Her undergraduate degree is in political science from the University of Evansville, Evansville, 

IN. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate, and certain senior military officers as determined by the committee, to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon in connection 

with her nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

49 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Madelyn Raub Creedon 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. 

Department of Energy. 

3. Date of nomination: 

January 6, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

November 1, 1951; Indianapolis, IN. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to James J. Bracco. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Meredith Creedon Bracco; May 2, 1981. 

John Edward Bracco; November 12, 1984. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Broad Ripple High School, Indianapolis IN; 1964–1969; High School Diploma 

University of Evansville, Evansville, IN; 1969–1973; BA 

Tulane University School of Law, New Orleans, LA; 1973–1974 

St. Louis University School of Law, St. Louis, MO; 1974–1976; JD 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, January 2001–August 2011 

Assistant Secretary of Defense/Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, August 2011–Present 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Energy, July 1980–February 1990 

Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 1990–November 

1994 

General Counsel, Base Closure and Realignment Commission, November 1994– 

October 1995 

Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy, October 1995– 

March 1997 

Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 1997–July 2000 

Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2000–January 2001 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Daughters of the American Revolution 

Women in Aerospace 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None. 

50 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

DOE Secretary’s Achievement Award, 2001 

DOE Distinguished Service Award, 1990 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Public Speaking Engagements: 

1) Remarks to the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Cyber and Space 

Symposium, Omaha, NE, November 15, 2011 

2) Remarks to the Monitor Exchange Publications and Forums 4th Annual Deterrence Summit, Arlington, VA, February 15, 2012 

3) Keynote address at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 

(AIAA) 10th Annual U.S. Missile Defense Conference, Washington, DC, 

March 26, 2013 

4) Featured speaker at The Space Foundation 28th National Space Symposium, 

Colorado Springs, CO, April 16, 2012 

5) Remarks to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Annual Missile Defense Conference, London, UK, May 30, 2012 

6) Remarks to the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) Space Council Meeting, Washington, DC, June 14, 2012 

7) Remarks to the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Deterrence Symposium, La Vista, NE, August 9, 2012 

8) Keynote address at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 

Workshop on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, November 28, 2012 

9) Remarks to the Department of Defense (DOD) 20th Anniversary Cooperative 

Threat Reduction (CTR) Conference, Washington, DC, December 3, 2012 

10) Keynote speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) 112th 

Annual State Conference Formal Banquet, Indianapolis, IN, May 18, 2013 

11) Remarks to the Stimson Center on Deterrence, Washington, DC, September 

17, 2013 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

Articles and Other Publications: 

1) Madelyn R. Creedon, ‘‘Space and Cyber: Shared Challenges, Shared Opportunities’’ Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2012, available at 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/spring/springl2.pdf. accessed on August 12, 

2013. Article attached. 

2) Madelyn Creedon, ‘‘Ash Carter Got It Right in Aspen, Top DOD Nuclear 

Weapons Official Responds,’’ Defense One, July 30, 2013, available at http:// 

www.defenseone.com/ideas/20l3/07/ash-carter-got-it-richt-aspen-top-dod-nuclear-weapons-official-responds/67721/?oref=d-river. accessed on August 12, 

2013. Article attached. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

51 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

MADELYN R. CREEDON. 

This 13th day of January, 2014. 

[The nomination of Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on January 28, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Brad R. Carson by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has had a significant and positive impact on 

the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army. The framework established by the 

act has improved inter-Service relationships and strengthened the ability of the 

Services to work with the combatant commands. I do not see the need for any modifications. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. No modifications are needed at this time. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I believe that, if confirmed, my diverse political, military, legal, and business experiences have well prepared me to execute the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army. I currently have the honor and privilege of serving as the General Counsel of the Army, a position in which I have had legal oversight of every 

issue arising from the Army’s global operations. In addition to myriad routine matters, I have assisted Secretary of the Army John McHugh in developing militarywide responses to particularly vexing problems and issues, such as ensuring that 

soldiers with behavioral health conditions are properly diagnosed, creating wholesome environments at all Army child development centers, and eradicating sexual 

assault. More generally, I have been asked to advise at nearly every meeting of the 

Army’s senior leaders, where issues of readiness, modernization, operations, and 

personnel are discussed and decided. 

It is helpful to also briefly summarize my education and professional career. Before joining the Department of the Army, I was a professor in the College of BusiVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
52 

ness and the College of Law at the University of Tulsa, where I led a research institute devoted to energy issues and taught courses in property law, energy policy, negotiations and game theory, and globalization. I attended Baylor University, where 

I graduated with highest honors and was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa. Studying 

as a Rhodes Scholar at Trinity College, Oxford, I earned a B.A./M.A. in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. Upon returning to the United States, I graduated from the 

University of Oklahoma College of Law, where I was recognized as the Outstanding 

Graduate. I entered the practice of law at Crowe & Dunlevy, the largest firm in the 

state of Oklahoma. During my early years of legal work, I focused on commercial 

litigation, with a particular emphasis on antitrust. From 1997 through 1998, I was 

a White House Fellow, serving in DOD. After completing the White House Fellowship, I returned to practicing commercial litigation at Crowe & Dunlevy. In 2000, 

I was elected to represent the 2nd District of Oklahoma in the U.S. House of Representatives. As a Congressman, I worked closely with other members of the Oklahoma delegation to protect and enhance the state’s military installations. In 2005, 

after leaving politics, I was a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Thereafter, I was a Director and then Chief Executive Officer of 

CNB, LLC, where I oversaw a company with revenues in excess of $400 million per 

year. From 2008 to 2009, as an officer in the U.S. Navy, I served in Iraq on active 

military duty with the 84th Explosive Ordnance Battalion of the U.S. Army, as the 

Officer-in-Charge of Weapons Intelligence Teams in Multi-National Division-South. 

For my service, I was awarded the Bronze Star and Army Achievement Medal. 

I believe that these varied experiences have prepared me for the extraordinary 

challenge of serving as Under Secretary of the Army. I know first-hand the legal 

and policy issues facing the Department of the Army in this time of continued war 

and budget austerity. If confirmed, I will commit to using my skills and experience 

to diligently and effectively perform the duties of Under Secretary. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 3015 of title 10, U.S.C., states the Under Secretary of the Army 

shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Army 

may prescribe. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary 

of the Army? 

Answer. By statute, the Under Secretary of the Army performs such duties and 

exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. By regulation, the 

Under Secretary is the Secretary’s principal civilian assistant and advisor. To that 

end, the Under Secretary is charged with communicating and advocating Army policies, plans, and programs to external audiences, including Congress, foreign governments, and the American public. The Under Secretary also advises the Secretary on 

the development and integration of Army programs and the Army budget. Finally, 

pursuant to section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, the Under Secretary is the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the Department of the Army, responsible for business operations. In accordance with section 

908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the Secretary 

of the Army acts through the Under Secretary to carry out initiatives necessary to 

the business transformation of the Army. 

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties 

and functions of the Under Secretary of the Army, as set forth in section 3015 of 

title 10, U.S.C., or in DOD regulations pertaining to functions of the Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the duties and functions currently assigned to, 

and performed by, the Under Secretary, discuss my findings with the Secretary of 

the Army, and recommend to the Secretary any changes that I believe necessary. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if any, do you expect will be prescribed for you? 

Answer. I am confident that the Secretary will assign me duties that most appropriately support his efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army is effectively 

and efficiently administered. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship with: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as head of DOD, possesses full authority, direction, and control over all of its elements. If confirmed, and subject to the authority, 

direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army, I would communicate with the 

Secretary of Defense on matters involving the Department of the Army. I would coVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
53 

operate fully with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Department of the 

Army fulfills the administration’s national defense priorities and, mindful of my role 

as the Army’s CMO, I would make certain that the business operations of the Army 

are effectively and efficiently organized and managed. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and exercises such 

powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Deputy Secretary is also the 

CMO of DOD. If confirmed, and subject to the authority, direction, and control of 

the Secretary of the Army, I would be responsible to the Secretary of Defense—and 

to his Deputy—for the operation of the Army. 

Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of DOD. 

Answer. The Deputy CMO of DOD assists the Deputy Secretary of Defense in synchronizing, integrating, and coordinating business operations within DOD. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will work in close coordination with the Deputy CMO 

on the full range of matters involving the management of DOD. 

Question. The Director of the Business Transformation Agency. 

Answer. To my knowledge, the Secretary of Defense disestablished this agency in 

2011. The functions have been transferred to DOD Deputy Chief Management Officer. Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. If 

confirmed, I would cooperate fully with the Chairman in the performance of his responsibilities. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and such other duties as 

may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. 

If confirmed, I would cooperate fully with the Vice Chairman in the performance 

of his responsibilities. 

Question. The Secretary of the Army. 

Answer. The Secretary of the Army is the head of the Department of the Army 

and is responsible for, and has authority to conduct, all of its affairs. If confirmed, 

my relationship with the Secretary of the Army would be close, direct, and supportive. As CMO, I would be accountable to the Secretary for the effective and efficient organization and management of the Army’s business operations and for carrying out initiatives he approves for the business transformation of the Army. I understand that all of my actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs his duties under the authority, 

direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the 

Secretary. The Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed for him by law as 

a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is vital that all leaders of the Department 

of the Army, civilian and military, work closely together as one team to face the 

many challenges confronting the institution; if confirmed, I would coordinate with 

the Chief of Staff of the Army in the performance of my duties. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works has, as a principal 

duty, the overall supervision of Army functions relating to programs for conservation and development of national water resources, including flood control, navigation, and shore protection. If confirmed, I would continue the close professional relationship with the Assistant Secretary that I have developed as General Counsel, and 

I would cooperate fully with the Assistant Secretary to carry out the Army’s civil 

works activities. 

Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Army. 

Answer. The four other Assistant Secretaries of the Army set the Army’s strategic 

direction by developing and overseeing policies and programs within their respective 

functional areas. If confirmed, I will continue the close professional relationships 

with each of the Assistant Secretaries that I have developed as General Counsel. 

I will foster an environment of cooperative teamwork, which will ensure we work 

together effectively on both the day-to-day management and long-range planning 

needs of the Army. In particular, in my role as the CMO of the Army, I will coordinate with the Assistant Secretaries in addressing any matter related to business operations or business transformation that may impact their respective domains. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Army. 

Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal and ethics officer of the Department of Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials. 

54 

The General Counsel’s duties include providing legal and policy advice to officials 

of the Department of the Army, as well as determining the position of the Army 

on all legal questions and procedures. If confirmed, and particularly given my experience serving as Army General Counsel, I would establish and maintain a close 

professional relationship with the new appointee, and would actively seek his or her 

guidance to ensure that Army policies and practices are in strict accord with the 

law and the highest principles of ethical conduct. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Army. 

Answer. The Inspector General of the Army is charged with inquiring into, and 

reporting on, the discipline, efficiency, economy, morale, training, and readiness of 

the Army, as so directed by the Secretary of the Army or the Chief of Staff of the 

Army. As General Counsel, I have worked closely with The Inspector General. If 

confirmed as Under Secretary, I am confident that this strong professional relationship would continue. 

Question. The Surgeon General of the Army. 

Answer. The Surgeon General is a special advisor to the Secretary of the Army 

and to the Chief of Staff of the Army on the military health service system. In that 

role, The Surgeon General is charged with maintaining a medically ready military 

force, as well as a trained and ready medical force. If confirmed, I intend to continue 

my close professional relationship with The Surgeon General to ensure that the 

Army’s health care systems and medical policies effectively and uniformly support 

the Army’s objectives, responsibilities, and commitments across the total force. In 

particular, I plan to focus on the advancement of key Behavioral Health (BH) initiatives, such as the BH System of Care (which logically and cohesively unifies eleven 

major BH programs into a cohesive, evidence-based system), and the BH Data Portal (which is an nationally-recognized automated method for collecting and displaying real-time treatment data during patient visits). 

Question. The Army Business Transformation Office. 

Answer. In accordance with section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2009, the Secretary of the Army established the Office of Business 

Transformation to assist the CMO of the Army in carrying out business transformation initiatives. The Office of Business Transformation is headed by the Director of Business Transformation, who is appointed by the Army’s CMO. If confirmed, 

I intend to work closely and directly with the Army Business Transformation Office 

in carrying out our important duties. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army. 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army is the legal advisor to the Chief 

of Staff of the Army, the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also 

directs the members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the performance of 

their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the administration 

of military discipline. As General Counsel, I have worked closely with the Judge Advocate General on a wide range of matters. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I look 

forward to continuing this close professional relationship. 

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined 

by the Secretary of Defense. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau serves also 

as the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the 

Army. If confirmed, I would work with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to 

utilize the talents available in the Reserve components to strengthen the Army. 

Question. The Director of the Army National Guard. 

Answer. The Director of the Army National Guard serves as the principal advisor 

on National Guard matters to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of 

the Army. If confirmed, I would seek the input of the Director of the Army National 

Guard on all matters of policy and procedure that would impact the more than 

350,000 soldiers in the Army National Guard. 

Question. The Army Chief of Chaplains. 

Answer. From the earliest days of the Army, chaplains have been an integral part 

of the total force. Chaplains are often the first to respond to incidents of death, combat casualty, suicide, and sexual assault. The programs that the Chaplains lead 

serve to bolster soldier and family resiliency in these difficult times. The Army Chief 

of Chaplains leads the Army Chaplains Corps in its primary mission of providing 

religious support to the Army, and advises the Secretary of the Army and Chief of 

Staff of the Army on all matters of chaplaincy. As General Counsel, I have worked 

55 

closely with the Army Chief of Chaplains, and, if confirmed as Under Secretary, I 

would continue this productive partnership. I understand the importance of, and 

value in, consulting with the Army Chief of Chaplains in the exercise of my responsibilities. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, that you would confront if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. The Army stands at a critical moment in its history, challenged to reshape into a leaner force still capable of meeting the Nation’s strategic priorities. 

The base budget of the Army is being squeezed by the rising costs of compensation, 

health care, and, to a lesser degree, procurement. Nonetheless, the Army’s obligations remain unchanged: training and equipping soldiers, guaranteeing high quality 

medical care for wounded warriors, enhancing readiness, offering quality housing, 

modernizing Cold War-era equipment, and meeting stringent recruiting and retention goals, to name just a few examples. If confirmed, I will do everything in my 

power to ensure the Army meets these important, often sacred, obligations, no matter the fiscal environment. 

But, to meet both its near-term and long-term challenges, the Army must create 

and use a new operating framework. The Army must reduce its overhead, especially 

as total force structure is thinned. The Army must pay attention not only to monetary obligations, but also to drivers of cost. The Army must develop, publish, and 

monitor metrics by which the success or failure of change can be determined. More 

generally, the Army must move from a budget-based culture to a cost-based approach. This transformation cannot take place without the active involvement of the 

Army’s senior leaders. The greatest challenge that I will face as Under Secretary, 

if confirmed, is to assist in this process while ensuring that soldiers are prepared 

and their families are protected. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize and what plans would you have, 

if any, for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on my responsibilities as CMO, which primarily 

lay in transforming the business operations of the Army. As the principal civilian 

advisor to the Secretary of the Army, I will also prioritize issues in concert with the 

Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army. The priorities of the Secretary of the 

Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army distill to two basic challenges: managing 

the drawdown of the Army, while simultaneously tending to the Army profession. 

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major lessons that the Department of the 

Army has and should have learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) regarding its title 10, U.S.C., responsibilities for 

manning, training, and equipping the force? 

Answer. Thirteen years of war have reinforced time-honored lessons, while offering up new ones as well. I would like to highlight a few particularly important ones 

here, without making any pretention to comprehensiveness. First, OIF and OEF 

have shown that the Army must continue to develop agile and adaptive leaders capable of operating with disciplined initiative. This is especially important at the junior level, where this capability has proven vital to mission accomplishment throughout the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the Army’s training at the Combat Training Centers has proven to be an effective and flexible means of ensuring 

the mission readiness of deploying units. Third, physical and psychological resiliency 

is an important attribute in soldiers and their families, and there is evidence that 

resiliency can be improved through appropriate intervention. Fourth, cultural 

knowledge of our allies and adversaries is invaluable and is a key attribute to be 

developed throughout the Army. Fifth, programs such as the Rapid Equipping Force 

and processes such as the Urgent Operational Needs requests have effectively and 

expeditiously delivered needed materiel to warfighters. Sixth, modern conflicts involve joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational actions, and require 

a ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach. Seventh, the All-Volunteer Force proved capable 

of sustained warfighting. Eighth, the Army was able to adapt to the many challenges it encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq because of its institutional side, the 

sustaining base. Ninth, adversaries are innovative and adaptive, learn from recent 

operations, and will exploit any weaknesses. Tenth, long wars mean long-term consequences for the Nation and the Army. Eleventh, and most generally, the Army 

must always maintain its focus on continual training and the maintenance of capabilities to meet the needs of combatant commanders. 

56 

The Center for Army Lessons Learned is leading the effort to capture the most 

important lessons learned from OIF and OEF at the strategic, operational, tactical, 

and institutional levels. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that these lessons are 

not lost or forgotten, but are inculcated throughout Army doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. 

Question. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you address as a matter of urgent priority? 

Answer. Although all of these priorities are important, the most critical is that 

the Army has the right capabilities and the capacity to meet the Nation’s national 

security requirements. If confirmed, I would work aggressively in support of the Secretary of the Army to ensure that the Army is trained and ready to meet combatant 

commander requirements. 

ARMY MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING PROCESS

Question. Over the past several years, the Army’s planning, programming and 

budgeting process has not kept pace with rapidly changing requirements. While this 

is more understandable for operational events like the presidential decision to surge 

additional forces into Iraq, it is less understandable with respect to long-term programmatic decisions such as the modular conversion of Army brigades or the more 

recent decision to increase Army end strength. It has become routine for the Army 

to submit ‘‘placeholders’’ instead of actual program plans in budget requests, and 

to purchase temporary facilities followed almost immediately by additional funding 

requests to buy permanent facilities to replace the temporary ones. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s management and planning process and any changes or reforms of these processes currently underway? 

Answer. The Army’s primary management and planning process is the Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system. PPBE is a common process 

for the entire DOD, customized to meet the needs of the individual Services. As required by the Government Performance and Results Act, the Army also has a strategic plan which is monitored through the Army Campaign Plan process. The PPBE 

process works best when future conditions and fiscal projections are relatively stable; recent events, including the drawdown of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, sequestration, and the frequent changes in the DOD’s fiscal outlook have challenged 

the Army’s ability to react quickly to changing circumstances and have made Future 

Years Defense Program projections less relevant. I believe the fundamentals of these 

processes are sound, but it is possible that they may need to be modified if less predictability is going to be the ‘‘new norm’’. If confirmed, and subject to the direction 

of the Secretary of the Army, I would make it my priority to assume an active and 

informed leadership role in the management of the Headquarters, Department of 

the Army planning, programming and budgeting process, while seeking appropriate 

improvements in the systems by which we develop, prioritize, and resource our requirements, particularly for the longer term. So, too, I will make it a priority to 

streamline and improve the Army Campaign Plan, working with the Secretary of 

the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and other members of the Secretariat. 

Question. If confirmed, what additional changes would you propose, if any, to correct or improve management and planning processes? 

Answer. If confirmed, and subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Army, 

I intend to explore ways to make our processes more agile and more responsive, so 

that we may react more quickly to changing fiscal and strategic conditions. I also 

intend to examine the Army’s Strategic Planning Process to ensure it fully captures 

the priorities of the Secretary of the Army and then employ proven performance 

measurement techniques to ensure we are making progress towards our desired outcomes. 

Question. In your view, does the Army have enough people with the right skills 

to manage the changes being attempted, or is the Army undertaking more organizational change than it is capable of accomplishing during a time of war? 

Answer. I believe that the Army has the right leaders, civilian and military, to 

manage the organizational change necessary to keep the Army relevant and able to 

execute the demands of the National Military Strategy. The Army has an excellent 

leader development program and recognizes the value of investing in its people. 

Both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army have consistently 

made leader education and training one of their highest priorities, and I am confident we are heading in the right direction in this area. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes in management would you propose, if any, 

to reduce or eliminate the Army’s chronic cash flow challenges? 

Answer. The Army does its best to accurately forecast its fiscal needs and ensure 

they are represented in the President’s budget submission. Changing conditions, esVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
57 

pecially those in war zones, unexpected pricing changes, and the delay between the 

time the Army finishes work on its budget and the time it is appropriated by Congress, have, in the past, resulted in cash flow problems. If confirmed, I will strive 

to ensure Army requirements are included as part of the President’s budget request, 

and, then, as we enter into the execution phase in a fiscal year, I will assist the 

Secretary of the Army in monitoring that fiscal execution and participate in the decisionmaking to reprioritize and reallocate funding to meet emergent needs. 

Over the last several years, Continuing Resolutions and sequestration resulted in 

significant uncertainty in our normal budget and execution processes. Continuing 

Resolutions have become routine, having extended into or beyond the first quarter 

in each of the last 5 years. Continuing Resolutions initiate the fiscal year under restrictions that disallow timely execution of planned programs and perpetuate fiscal 

uncertainty. Under these circumstances, the Army must take a conservative approach until the appropriations are known. Once appropriations are received, the 

Army must then execute them within very abbreviated timelines. This often leads 

to sub-optimal execution decisions. 

In order to more efficiently use the resources Congress provides for national defense, I will work with Congress to develop a comprehensive budget request to reflect the Army’s funding requirements, as well as emphasize the importance of receiving appropriations on time, if I am confirmed. 

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 designates the Under Secretary of the Army as the Army’s Chief Management 

Officer (CMO). Section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2009 requires the CMO of each of the Military Departments to carry out a 

comprehensive business transformation initiative. 

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Under Secretary in his capacity as CMO of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 

section 904, responsibility for the business operations of the Department of the 

Army is assigned to the Under Secretary of the Army as the CMO. The Secretary 

of the Army has provided all the authority necessary for the CMO to effectively and 

efficiently organize and administer the business operations of the Army. The CMO 

is further responsible for developing a comprehensive business transformation plan 

and a business systems architecture and transition plan. 

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify 

you to perform these duties and responsibilities? 

Answer. My education and combined professional experiences as a lawyer and 

professor of business law, my service as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, and my current position as a senior Army leader have prepared me for the 

duties expected of the CMO of the Army. In particular, as the General Counsel of 

the Army, I have had wide exposure and gained intimate working knowledge of the 

many important and complex issues impacting the Army. 

Question. Do you believe that you have the resources and authority needed to 

carry out the business transformation of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. I believe the Army has dedicated adequate resources to business transformation. I believe, and I know Congress concurs, that business transformation is 

essential to all Military Departments, and, if confirmed, I will continue to ensure 

that resource constraint does not inhibit changes needed in the Army’s business operations. 

If confirmed, I will also consult with the Secretary of the Army, the Office of Business Transformation, and the Deputy CMO of DOD to assess if any additional authorities are needed to continue to drive the transformational effort to success. 

Question. What role do you believe the CMO should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the Military Departments? 

Answer. Over the last 2 years, the Army has put in place a robust governance 

mechanism whereby the Army Business Council synchronizes business activities 

and ensures alignment with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Army 

has also been steadily improving the planning and coordination needed to comply 

with OSD directives and OSD investment requirements, while at the same time maturing the Army Business Mission Area’s enterprise architecture. Just as important, 

the Under Secretary’s office and the Office of Business Transformation have fully 

integrated business management decisions within the overall Army Campaign Plan. 

If confirmed, I intend to capitalize on that success and maintain the synchronization 

between OSD and the Army. 

58 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions 

establishing the position of CMO? 

Answer. The Army has seen substantial benefits from the original legislation that 

established the CMO and the Business Transformation Office. Senior leaders emphasize the critical role these institutions have played in optimizing processes, reducing systems investments, and communicating with the DOD Deputy CMO. All 

of this flows from the unique enterprise-level view that the CMO can provide across 

different functions. If confirmed, and in concert with the Secretary of the Army, I 

will review our current approach and then determine whether any provisions should 

be recommended for amendment or change. 

ACQUISITION ISSUES

Question. What is your assessment of the size and capability of the Army acquisition workforce? 

Answer. Over the past 5 years, the Army has made great strides in identifying 

the necessary skills and in promoting the growth, training, and development of the 

acquisition workforce. However, mounting fiscal pressures may impede the Army’s 

ability to attract, recruit, and retain talented personnel within our acquisition workforce. As the Army considers the size of the future force and assesses reductions in 

civilian personnel, I am concerned about a consequent loss of knowledge, critical experience, and expertise that the Army needs to further its missions. The Army relies 

on an experienced and competent acquisition workforce to oversee the development 

and procurement of complex weapon systems, business systems, and other equipment and capabilities. Continued challenges presented by sequestration, pay and 

hiring freezes, and other reductions may cause attrition that would undo the positive gains achieved over the past few years in the development of a professional and 

experienced acquisition workforce. 

Question. If confirmed what steps would you take to ensure that the Department 

of the Army has an acquisition workforce with the size and capability needed to 

manage and reverse the acquisition problem? 

Answer. I fully support ongoing initiatives to grow the capacity and capability of 

the Army acquisition workforce. The Army requires critical skills in a diverse range 

of disciplines, to include contracting, program management, systems engineering, 

cost estimating, risk management, and test planning and management. If confirmed, I will vigorously support and advance efforts to enhance the growth of the 

acquisition workforce and cultivate its expertise in all critical areas. 

Question. Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of the Army and 

the other Military Departments continue to be subject to funding and requirements 

instability. 

Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program 

costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems? 

Answer. The continued instability of the Army’s fiscal environment has had a significant impact on long-term program costs and fielding schedules of major weapon 

systems. Major weapon systems programs involve the expenditure of significant resources over several years to design, develop, test, and field cutting-edge capabilities. Successful execution of these programs calls for predictable and stable resources in order to meet planned program milestones and timelines. Indiscriminate 

reductions under the Budget Control Act, as well as recurring funding shortfalls 

under Continuing Resolutions, significantly impede the Army’s ability to execute 

these programs. These reductions result in fewer procurement quantities, delayed 

development or testing activities, and restructuring of the Army’s program execution 

plans. Increased costs almost inevitably ensue. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to address 

funding and requirements instability? 

Answer. I believe that the single most important step the Army can take to address funding instability is to encourage and support the budget, appropriations, 

and authorization committees in Congress in passing consistent, stable, and longterm funding and authorization bills from which the Army can effectively and efficiently plan. If confirmed, I will diligently communicate with Congress with respect 

to the grave importance of stable funding to the Army. 

Requirements stability is a prerequisite for successful acquisition programs. The 

Army has made significant strides in developing processes to review requirements 

in its major acquisition programs in an effort to identify potential tradespace. These 

efforts must be reinforced to ensure the success of the Army’s acquisition efforts. 

Question. The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack clearly defined and 

stable requirements, include immature technologies that unnecessarily raise proVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
59 

gram costs and delay development and production, and fail to solidify design and 

manufacturing processes at appropriate junctures in the development process. 

Do you agree with the Comptroller General’s assessment? 

Answer. Many of the deficiencies the Comptroller General cites are indeed common problems. The Army has undertaken significant efforts to prevent unrealistic 

program cost and schedule estimates, confront ill-defined and unstable requirements, reduce reliance on immature technologies, and address concerns related to 

any design and manufacturing processes across all of its acquisition portfolios. Consistent with the DOD’s Better Buying Power initiative, the Army has instituted 

processes to manage the review and validation of weapon system requirements and 

emphasizes affordability in all acquisition programs. If confirmed, I will advocate for 

sound and affordable acquisition strategies, working in close collaboration with the 

Army’s requirements, resourcing, and acquisition organizations. 

Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the Army should 

take to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would advocate (in close collaboration with the requirements, resourcing, and acquisition organizations within the Army) for sound and affordable acquisition strategies to ensure that cost growth is avoided. Moreover, I 

would work closely with Army requirements, resourcing, and acquisition communities to promote cost-informed trade-offs in system requirements in order to reduce 

risk and ensure that programs remain affordable across their lifecycles. 

Question. By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of products, including major 

weapon systems. Yet, the Department places far less emphasis on staffing, training, 

and managing the acquisition of services than it does on the acquisition of products. 

What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to improve the staffing, 

training, and management of its acquisition of services? 

Answer. The Army established an Army Senior Services Manager (SSM) in 2010 

to focus oversight and improve services acquisition. The SSM provides governance, 

coordination, and comprehensive analysis of services acquisition across all Army 

commands. If confirmed, I will work with the SSM and Army commands and organizations to continue these efforts, identify areas for improvement, and monitor 

progress. 

Question. Do you agree that the Army should develop processes and systems to 

provide managers with access to information needed to conduct comprehensive 

spending analyses of services contracts on an ongoing basis? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. The Army was the first Service to initiate the processes and 

systems needed to address this matter through its implementation of the Request 

for Service Contract Approval Form. This form is a checklist that helps identify inherently governmental functions, tasks that are closely associated with inherently 

governmental functions, authorized and unauthorized personal services, and critical 

functions. This form was developed for use in conjunction with the Contractor Manpower Reporting Application and Panel for Documenting Contractors processes. The 

Army has worked with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; and Comptroller to expand these initiatives. This unified effort is intended to address the broader area of Total Force Management and management of service contracts. 

Question. The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of governmentwide contracts and multi-agency contracts. DOD is by far the largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85 percent of the dollars awarded under one 

of the largest programs. The DOD Inspector General and others have identified a 

long series of problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition 

planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures, and failure to monitor contractor performance. 

What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to ensure that its use 

of interagency contracts complies with applicable DOD requirements and is in the 

best interests of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy has 

issued policy, procedures, and guidance concerning the use of interagency contracts. 

This policy directs acquisition officials to determine whether the use of an interagency acquisition represents the best procurement approach in terms of cost, 

schedule, performance and delivery. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of 

the Army to assess the Army’s compliance with these policies, and I will examine 

the Army’s internal processes to ensure that the concerns identified by the Inspector 

General are addressed. 

Question. On November 1, 2010, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) established the Deputy Assistant SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
60 

retary of the Army for Services (DASA(S)) in response to the September 2010 directive ‘‘Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending’’ from the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). 

In your view, has the establishment of this position helped or hindered that 

Army’s ability in obtaining cost-effective and efficient services to achieve their missions? 

Answer. I believe the Army’s establishment of a single responsible official to oversee services acquisition has led to improvements in its planning, coordination, and 

execution. In December 2011, as part of Headquarters streamlining, the DASA(S) 

functions were realigned under the SSM. The SSM is a member of the Senior Executive Service with a permanent staff, and his sole mission is to improve Army services acquisition oversight and management. The SSM office has provided improved 

visibility of services requirements forecasts, funding, and cost savings. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to ensure that 

this position is necessary? 

Answer. The Army has already recognized the Senior Service Manager function 

as an essential component in our institutional goals to increase efficiency and effectiveness in services acquisition. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Army’s 

regular review of services requirements and execution; support the development of 

a services business intelligence capability to provide Army leaders end-to-end understanding of services acquisitions requirements, performance, and cost; and ensure 

the Army continues to work with the Defense Acquisition University to incorporate 

services acquisition management practices into training courses. 

AUDITABLE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Question. Section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010 requires the Chief Management Officer of DOD to establish a plan to ensure 

that DOD’s financial statements are validated as ready for audit by not later than 

September 30, 2017. The Secretary of Defense has established the additional goal 

of ensuring that the statement of DOD’s budgetary resources is validated as ready 

for audit by not later than September 30, 2014. 

In your opinion, is the Department of the Army on track to achieve these objectives, particularly with regard to data quality, internal controls, and business process re-engineering? 

Answer. Yes, the Army is on track to achieve the congressionally-mandated audit 

readiness objectives. The Army has been implementing and testing internal controls 

and is currently achieving increasingly higher success rates in monthly testing. 

Business processes have been thoroughly examined, end-to-end, and have been reengineered for efficiency. At the same time, the Army is ensuring that quality data 

which is accurate, complete, and documented, is successfully transitioned from legacy systems into the Enterprise Resource Planning environment and into financial 

statements. 

Question. If not, what impediments may hinder the Army’s ability to achieve this 

goal and how would you address them? 

Answer. While the Army is indeed on track to achieve the congressionally-mandated audit readiness objectives, key challenges should not be ignored. These challenges include maintaining: robust and continuous leader involvement, a competent 

workforce, accountability and oversight, a well-defined and streamlined business architecture, effective internal controls, and compliant financial systems. Each of 

these challenges is identified in the Army’s Financial Improvement Plan (FIP), with 

corrective actions identified for each noted current deficiency. The Army FIP is consistent with the DOD Financial Improvement and Audit Plan and is geared to remove the obstacles to a successful audit. 

Question. In your view, are the steps that the Army needs to take to meet the 

2014 goal consistent with the steps that DOD needs to take to achieve full 

auditability by 2017? 

Answer. Yes. The Army plan is consistent with the DOD plan. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Army moves 

to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable or unsustainable level of onetime fixes and manual work-arounds? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure accountability, leadership, and consistent governance of this important project. 

ARMY MODERNIZATION

Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not been successful 

over the past decade or more. Since the mid-1990s, Army modernization strategies, 

61 

plans, and investment priorities have evolved under a variety of names from 

Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, 

to Future Combat System and Modularity. Instability in funding, either as provided 

by DOD or Congress, has been cited by the Army and others as a principal cause 

of program instability. For the most part, however, the Army has benefited from 

broad DOD and congressional support for its modernization and readiness programs 

even when problems with the technical progress and quality of management of those 

programs have been apparent—the Future Combat System is a recent example. 

What is your assessment, if any, of the Army’s modernization record? 

Answer. The Army has had many notable successes in ensuring that soldiers in 

combat have the best equipment ready and available. The Army has fielded weapon 

systems that provide soldiers with improved mobility, protection, lethality, and a decisive advantage over our Nation’s enemies. There have been some notable struggles, too, over the past 2 decades, and the Army is committed to drawing the right 

lessons from the less successful acquisition programs. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will work to ensure that warfighter needs are met, while remaining fully 

cognizant of the lessons learned from canceled acquisition programs. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to take to achieve 

a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program for the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army and the Chief 

of Staff of the Army to sustain a versatile and tailorable, yet affordable and costeffective modernization strategy. The Army has initiated a much longer timeframe 

(30 years) for review of its modernization programs than it has had in the past. This 

wider lens of review will help to stabilize programs and to better predict investments. This change in temporal scope, in conjunction with the continued support of 

Congress in providing predictable appropriations, will help the Army achieve a stable modernization strategy and program. If confirmed, my focus will be on ensuring 

that soldiers and units are enabled, trained, and ready to meet the future challenges 

they may face. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s modernization investment strategy? 

Answer. Given today’s significant fiscal pressures, the Army’s investment in modernized equipment and capabilities will likely see across-the-board reductions in the 

near term. The Army’s investment strategy in soldier weapon systems and capabilities will focus on making prudent investment decisions with limited resources to enable the Army to field the best capabilities into the future. In the near term, equipment investment will prioritize efficient acquisition, to include multi-year procurements, scaled-down weapon system requirements to address affordability constraints, and divestiture of outdated legacy systems as appropriate. Limited resources will be likely invested in key modernization programs such as the Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV), and the 

deployed network. Upgrades to existing platforms like the Apache and Blackhawk 

helicopter, the Abrams tank, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), and the Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzer (PIM) will improve current capabilities. The Army will 

also continue to prioritize long-term investment in Science and Technology to mature critical enabling technologies that support future, next-generation capabilities 

for the Army. Overall, the Army will focus its attention on investments that provide 

improved force protection, mobility, lethality, and situational awareness in combat. 

Question. In your view does the Army’s modernization investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and future capabilities that meet requirements across the spectrum of conflict? 

Answer. In my view, the Army’s investment strategy in this area does address requirements across the spectrum of operations that will be found in current and future conflict environments. The Army’s ability to field these needed capabilities depends, however, on the availability of stable and adequate resources. 

Question. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any, would you pursue in this regard? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support ongoing efforts to ensure that the Army’s 

equipment modernization strategy continues to be informed by evolving threats, 

emerging warfighter requirements, the rapid pace of technological change, industry 

research and development, as well as resource constraints. My efforts would strive 

to find the most cost-effective ways to upgrade the Army’s current combat platforms 

while also making critical investments in the capabilities needed to fight in future 

operational environments. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to ensure that all 

these initiatives are affordable within the current and projected Army budgets? 

Answer. The Army has made great strides in the past several years in conducting 

portfolio affordability analysis. This effort examines all life cycle costs, including 

62 

procurement, training, and sustainment. If confirmed, I hope to further these efforts 

and ensure the Army’s modernization strategy is consonant with its level of resources. 

Question. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely have to be taken 

should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is planned to fund the Army’s 

modernization efforts? 

Answer. Consistent with the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the 

Army’s Strategic Vision, the Army will defend the Nation against all current and 

emerging threats by employing a balanced modernization strategy across all of its 

portfolios and by maintaining a proper balance between current and future readiness. 

Question. In your view, should the Army trade-off requirements within a program 

in order to make that program affordable? 

Answer. Yes, the Army already does this with all of its programs that are in development, and should continue to do so. As part of a program’s affordability assessment, the Army must assess the individual cost of each capability associated with 

the proposed system and ensure the overall program remains affordable. 

ARMY WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the following research, 

development, and acquisition programs? 

Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). 

Answer. The Army’s IFV is reaching the limit of its capacity to receive upgrades 

that have proven critical for soldiers in combat operations. A new IFV remains a 

key requirement and priority for the Army. The GCV program is currently geared 

toward providing the Army with an IFV capability for rapidly deploying an overmatching infantry squad anywhere on the battlefield. Nevertheless, the current fiscal realities have challenged the Army’s ability to afford ongoing development of a 

GCV program. 

Question. Stryker Combat Vehicle, including the Stryker Mobile Gun variant. 

Answer. The Stryker Combat Vehicle is an acquisition program that has proven 

to be highly successful in Iraq and Afghanistan. Blast-deflecting double v-hull improvements on the Stryker Combat Vehicle have saved lives in Afghanistan, and the 

Army continues to procure vehicles under existing equipping plans. The Stryker Mobile Gun System has also performed well in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). 

Answer. The JLTV is a Joint Army and Marine Corps development program 

which consists of a Family of Vehicles (FoV) with companion trailers that are capable of performing multiple mission roles. The JLTV will be designed to provide protected, sustained, networked mobility for personnel and payloads across the full 

spectrum of military operations. JLTV addresses force protection performance and 

payload limitations in current High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles 

(HMMWVs), while providing more off-road mobility, fuel efficiency, and reliability 

than Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicles. 

Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization. 

Answer. The Abrams Tank remains the best tank in the world, and the age of 

the current tank fleet is low—only 3 to 4 years on average. As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Army plans incremental improvements to the Abrams tank in 

order to buy back power deficiencies, improve protection, and provide the ability to 

accept future network and protection upgrades. These improvements will enable the 

Abrams Tank to maintain its leading edge in measures of survivability, lethality, 

and maintainability through 2050. 

Question. M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle modernization. 

Answer. The Bradley FoV has been an integral part of the Army’s force structure 

for decades, but requires modernization. The Army plans to make incremental improvements to the Bradley variants that will buyback power deficiencies, improve 

protection, and provide the ability to accept future network and protection upgrades. 

These improvements will enable the Bradley FoV to play a vital role in the Army 

for years to come. 

Question. Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) Self-Propelled Howitzer modernization. 

Answer. The Army is fully committed to PIM, as it is one of the Army’s most critical modernization programs. The PIM system will replace the Army’s current 

M109A6 Paladin Howitzer starting in fiscal year 2017. PIM’s new chassis will provide additional size, weight, and power capacity over the current Paladin fleet. The 

first PIM system is expected to be delivery in mid-2015. PIM will provide the Army 

63 

Armored Brigade Combat Team with a highly responsive indirect fire system capable of keeping pace with the Abrams and Bradley. 

Question. Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV). 

Answer. The AMPV will replace the M113 FoV, which has become operationally 

irrelevant due to inadequate mobility, survivability, and force protection, as well as 

the lack of size, weight, power, and cooling necessary to incorporate future technologies and the Army network. The AMPV will replace five M113 FoV mission 

roles with the following variants: Mission Command, Medical Treatment, Medical 

Evacuation, General Purpose, and Mortar Carrier. 

Question. OH–58D Kiowa Warrior modernization. 

Answer. The Kiowa Warrior has been a reliable capability for our Army for many 

years and, at this time, the Army is conducting a holistic review of the Aviation 

portfolio that may potentially involve a restructuring. It is my understanding that 

any restructuring of the force would likely look to divest legacy capabilities and retain the Army’s most modern, dual-engine platforms. 

Question. AH–64E Apache modernization. 

Answer. The Apache is the Army’s only heavy combat helicopter and is an invaluable asset on the modern battlefield, providing an immeasurable contribution to 

combat power. The Apache’s history dates back to the 1980s, and the latest version, 

AH–64E, is the second remanufacture of the proven system. Remanufacturing and 

upgrading such a sophisticated asset is far more economical than developing a new 

system, especially since the Apache is unmatched by any other combat helicopter 

in the world. 

Question. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS). 

Answer. The Army has explored the availability of an affordable aircraft that will 

meet the AAS requirement through a series of voluntary flight demonstrations; however, it has been determined that there is currently no commercially available AAS 

alternative that would not require significant development. At this time, the Army 

is assessing the Aviation portfolio holistically to determine courses of action to address this requirement. 

Question. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN–T). 

Answer. The WIN–T program provides the Army a secure, high-speed, high-capacity networking backbone for mobile, ad-hoc networks in tactical environments, and 

underpins the Army’s Tactical Network modernization efforts. Developmental efforts 

to date have supported successful development of key networking capabilities that 

have been tested and are currently deployed and utilized by warfighters in Afghanistan today. WIN–T is vital to the Army’s endeavors to develop and field networks 

for tactical environments. 

Question. Joint Tactical Radio System. 

Answer. These radios comprise a critical aspect of the Army’s and the DOD’s network modernization effort and are the foundation of the Army’s tactical network and 

communications. The radios provide manportable, vehicle-mounted, and aerial communication and data transport services for the Army’s tactical network. It is my understanding that the Army is developing and executing a full and open competition 

acquisition strategy designed to leverage industry innovation and capability. 

Question. Joint Multi-Role Rotorcraft Program. 

Answer. I understand that the Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator is a 

Science and Technology effort to help inform capabilities and requirements for the 

planned Future Vertical Lift-Medium Program. 

Question. Small arms modernization. 

Answer. The Army’s Small Arms Modernization Program provides for the maturation, demonstration, testing, and evaluation of emerging technologies in small arms. 

The Army is focused on developing improvements that will enhance the lethality, 

target acquisition and tracking, fire control, training effectiveness, and reliability of 

weapons. Specific focus areas include maturing technologies that demonstrate lightweight materials, wear resistant/protective/anti-reflective coatings, observational/situational awareness improvements and equipment enhancements. These improvements would provide benefits to weapons, fire control equipment, optics, gun barrels, training devices, suppressors, component mounts, weapon mounts, and weapon/ 

ammunition interfaces with the ultimate goal of providing soldiers world-class weapons systems for the current and future battlefield. 

Question. Personal protective equipment modernization. 

Answer. The Army provides soldiers with the best protective equipment in the 

world. Over the past 10 years, the Army has fielded, and continuously improved, 

protective equipment that saves soldiers’ lives. Soldiers are equipped with a complementary suite of protective capabilities (body armor/combat helmets) that guard 

against multiple threats associated with ballistic, blast, and blunt force events, including ballistic projectiles and fragmentation from Improvised Explosive Devices 

64 

(IEDs). The Army is committed to making additional improvements to its current 

state-of-the-art personal protection equipment, to include reductions in weight, innovative solutions like the Pelvic Protection System, and improved performance 

against bodily injuries such as traumatic brain injury. 

Question. Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS). 

Answer. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS–A) provides 

Army operational and tactical commanders automated intelligence capabilities and 

connectivity to the Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E). It processes, 

fuses, and exploits data and information, and provides the Army the ability to receive national, theater, joint, and tactical sensor data; task sensors; and control select Army sensors. DCGS–A is the Army’s enterprise solution to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements. Because DCSG–A is primarily a 

software system, the acquisition strategy emphasizes evolutionary development over 

the life of the program. 

MINE-RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s long-term 

strategy for the retention, disposal, utilization, and sustainment of its large MineResistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle fleet? 

Answer. The Army intends to keep more than 8,500 of the best variants of 

MRAPs, while divesting itself of older, less capable versions that are too costly to 

ship, reset, upgrade, and sustain. Some MRAPs will be kept in CONUS for training. 

Others will be maintained in pre-positioned stocks strategically placed around the 

globe, where they will be ready for future contingencies. Vehicles that the Army 

does not keep will be made available to other agencies, activities, and nations. I believe the strategy for MRAPs is appropriate, and, if confirmed, I will work with the 

Secretary of the Army to ensure the MRAP strategy is continually refined and assessed. 

EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET

Question. Congress has provided the Army with billions of dollars over the years 

to cover the costs to repair and replace equipment worn out by combat operations 

and prepare forces for rotations in support of operations in Afghanistan and previously in Iraq. 

In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only prepare Army forces 

for OIF/OEF but to also improve the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies? 

Answer. A fully-funded Reset program would ensure that equipment lost in theater is replaced and equipment degraded by prolonged use in harsh environments 

is returned to a fully ready state. The extreme temperature variations and high altitude in Afghanistan add stress to aircraft engines and airframes as much as five 

times greater than the Army’s normal operations tempo, while the rugged mountain 

terrain in that country accelerates wear and tear on ground equipment. The sequestration in fiscal year 2013 negatively impacted the Army Reset program, but the 

Army’s fiscal year 2014 request will begin to address funding shortfalls in the program and improve equipment readiness. Due to the length of time required to plan 

and execute depot repair programs, Reset funding must continue for 3 years after 

the last piece of equipment leaves Afghanistan. Major weapon systems and equipment requiring Reset include aircraft, weapons, radios, MRAPs, and tactical 

wheeled vehicles. 

Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Army constantly evaluates depot production requirements and adjusts its needs to meet current and anticipated demands 

and funding levels. Currently, our depots are operating at the levels required to 

meet Army needs. The Army does have extra capacity above the current operating 

levels and can increase production through additional overtime or hiring actions in 

response to any funded need to accelerate repair of equipment returning from current operations. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe should be taken to increase 

the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and 

training? 

Answer. I do not believe that any additional steps are required at this time to 

increase the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment. The industrial base, both organic 

and commercial, has successfully demonstrated that it has the capacity to respond 

to the needs of the Army for operations and training. 

65 

Question. What impact do you believe the decision to send additional Army forces 

to Afghanistan is likely to have on equipment available for continued operations in 

Iraq and for non-deployed unit training at home? 

Answer. Withdrawn by committee. 

Question. What are your views regarding the Army’s stated requirement that it 

needs 3 years of overseas contingency operations funding post-Afghanistan retrograde to reset the force? 

Answer. The Army has a deliberate and well-considered plan to retrograde and 

Reset equipment out of Afghanistan. The 3-year period is the actual time needed 

for some equipment to be retrograded from theater, inducted into a depot, and then 

repaired. Indeed, many of the Army’s more complex systems, such as aircraft, take 

more than 1 year to complete the induction and repair process alone, and aircraft 

with battle damage will often take 18–24 months to repair. Over the last year, 

depot-level maintenance Reset workload has exceeded 87,000 pieces of equipment, 

and the Army has Reset more than 292,000 pieces of other equipment in that same 

period. 

ARMY-RELATED DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the systems and processes for identifying, evaluating, and managing risk in the Army’s organic and commercial defense industrial base? 

Answer. The Army is actively engaged in several efforts to identify, evaluate, and 

manage risk in its organic and commercial defense industrial base. The Army is 

working with OSD’s Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy office in the ongoing 

sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier effort that is designed to establish early-warning indicators of risk at all the defense supply-chain tiers. The Army, in cooperation with industry, is conducting a comprehensive combat vehicle portfolio industrial base study 

and a similar study for tactical wheeled vehicles. The Army has also created a strategic plan to identify and retain critical skill sets within the organic industrial base. 

The Army recognizes that a healthy industrial base is a treasured national security 

asset. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue in systems and 

processes to improve identification, monitoring, assessment, and timely actions to 

ensure that risk in the Army-relevant sectors of the defense industrial base is adequately managed in order to develop, produce, and sustain technically superior, reliable, and affordable weapons systems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would assess existing systems and processes used to identify risk to the industrial base, monitor its overall health, and I would implement 

any improvements deemed appropriate to ensure that it remains reliable, cost-effective, and prepared to meet strategic objectives. 

ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the role that Army 

science and technology programs have played and will play in developing capabilities for current and future Army systems? 

Answer. Over more than a decade of war, the world has witnessed the value and 

impact that technology brings to the battlefield and how capabilities, enabled by 

technology, are critical to our warfighters. The Army’s Science and Technology mission is to enable soldiers to continue to dominate the battlefield, today and tomorrow. To that end, the Army has established a 30-year modernization plan to guide 

Science and Technology investments. I believe that to prevent, shape, and win future conflicts in an ever-changing world, Army Science and Technology must deliver 

timely technological solutions that address top priority capability gaps. 

Question. Given the projected budget reductions, how will you ensure that Army 

science and technology programs will successfully transition to operational 

warfighting capabilities? 

Answer. Science and Technology remains a critical investment to ensure our soldiers maintain a technological edge over potential adversaries. These investments 

are required to develop and mature enabling technologies. If confirmed, I would support efforts to preserve investment in this area and ensure that it successfully transitions to the Army’s current and future acquisition programs. Given the great uncertainty about, and increasing complexity of, future national security threats, it is 

especially important that the Army also continues investing in basic research and 

development. 

Question. If confirmed, what metrics would you use to judge the value and the 

investment level in Army science and technology programs? 

66 

Answer. If confirmed, I would consider a variety of metrics to assess the value 

of our investment in science and technology programs, to include measures evaluating our success in transitioning these efforts into fielded capabilities, as well as 

our effectiveness in fully leveraging investment by industry, other Services, and 

other government research institutions. 

ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS

Question. What role should Army laboratories play in supporting current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army missions? 

Answer. Army laboratories deliver technology-enabled solutions needed for current conflicts and help develop technologies that will enhance the Army’s future capabilities that will be needed to prevent, shape, and win future conflicts. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army laboratories and research and development centers have a high quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can continue to support deployed forces and develop next generation capabilities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I promise to learn more and in great detail about the specific issues and challenges facing Army laboratories and centers in order to best ensure they have the necessary tools and personnel to effectively perform their missions. I fully recognize the important role that the science, technology, engineering, 

and mathematics workforce and laboratory facilities have in facilitating the Army 

of the future. 

Question. Do you support the full utilization of authorities established by Congress under the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration program that is currently 

being run in many Army Research, Development, and Engineering Centers (RDEC)? 

Answer. Yes, I have been informed that the authorities established by Congress 

under the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration Program have given the laboratories 

and centers the flexibility and tools necessary to manage and incentivize Army personnel performing this critical function. 

Question. Do you believe that all RDECs in the Army’s Research, Development, 

and Engineering Command (RDECOM) need enhanced personnel authorities in 

order to attract and retain the finest technical workforce? Would you support expansion of the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration authorities to all of RDECOM’s laboratories and engineering centers? 

Answer. It is my understanding that all the RDECOM laboratories and centers 

are currently part of the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration, and that this gives 

important management flexibility for the laboratory directors to shape their workforce and remain competitive with the private sector. If confirmed, I would assess 

the effectiveness of these existing authorities and recommend changes as needed 

and appropriate. 

Question. Do you believe that the Army’s laboratories and engineering centers 

should have a separate, dynamic personnel system, uniquely tailored to support laboratory directors requirements to attract and retain the highest quality scientific 

and engineering talent? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would fully examine this issue to better understand the 

potential benefits and costs of such a system. However, with the exception of a few 

organizations, it is my understanding that the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration 

program provides the laboratory directors with the ability to attract and retain the 

highest quality scientific and engineering personnel. 

Question. How will you assess the quality of Army laboratory infrastructure and 

the adequacy of investments being made in new military construction and 

sustainment of that infrastructure? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would engage with the appropriate Army organizations to 

better understand the challenges facing our Science and Technology infrastructure 

and develop solutions to ensure we are making the necessary investments in this 

important area. 

ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army’s test and evaluation 

infrastructure is robust enough to ensure that new systems and technologies are 

tested to verify their combat effectiveness and suitability? 

Answer. If confirmed, I promise to become more keenly acquainted with the specifics regarding test infrastructure capabilities, and I will work to ensure the appropriate level of funding for test and evaluation infrastructure and instrumentation 

is budgeted. 

Question. What metrics will you use to assess the quality of the Army’s test and 

evaluation infrastructure? 

67 

Answer. At this time, I do not have sufficient information to adequately answer 

this question; however, if confirmed, I would assess the Army’s capability to accomplish all essential testing requirements. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that weapon systems and other 

technologies that are fielded by the Army are adequately operationally tested? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that operational test protocols are observed, 

and I will support the continuation of the Army’s current practice of conducting 

independent operational testing by organizations not associated with the programs 

undergoing test and evaluation. 

ARMY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. What major improvements would you like to see made in the Army’s 

development and deployment of major information technology systems? 

Answer. Information technology (IT) is critically important to both industry and 

government. For the Army, IT is an enabler that provides warfighters an edge in 

combat operations. On the business side of the Army, IT is used to automate complex, critical business processes. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the development and deployment of major IT systems facilitate simplifying, streamlining, and 

clarifying the interdependencies in the Army’s Enterprise Architecture. 

Question. How will you encourage process and cultural change in organizations 

so that they maximize the benefits that new enterprise information technology systems can offer in terms of cost savings and efficiency? 

Answer. Leadership. 

Question. What is the relationship between Army efforts at implementing enterprise information technology programs and supporting computing services and infrastructure to support Army missions and efforts being undertaken by the Defense Information Systems Agency? 

Answer. The Army is in close, regular collaboration with the Defense Information 

Systems Agency (DISA). As DISA’s largest supported organization, the Army believes that this partnership is critical. If confirmed, I would continue the trend of 

developing Army enterprise information technology from a joint requirements perspective. Current examples of this approach include Defense Enterprise Email, the 

Joint Information Environment and enterprise license agreements that leverage the 

buying power of the entire DOD. 

CONTRACT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Question. DOD has engaged in the privatization of many of its support functions. 

As a result, the Department now relies heavily on contractors to perform acquisition, budget, and financial management functions that are critical to the execution 

of the Department’s mission. Senior DOD officials have informed the committee both 

formally and informally that, because of reductions in the acquisition work force, the 

Department now lacks the capability to effectively oversee the work performed by 

its support contractors. 

Do you believe that the Army has become too reliant upon contractors to perform 

critical functions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will examine this issue very closely. It is important to ensure that inherently governmental functions are not outsourced, and, if confirmed, 

I will scrutinize those areas where the distinction may have been blurred. From an 

operational perspective, the Army has processes in place to identify critical functions 

that should rarely be outsourced; if an Army command believes that using contractors for a critical function poses unacceptable operational risk, it is able to bring 

that work in-house. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to ensure that 

it has the resources it needs to provide effective oversight for its support contractors? 

Answer. In order to ensure the Army has the resources it needs to provide effective oversight for its support contractors, I believe that an appropriately sized and 

sourced workforce is necessary. A critical component of effective compliance is ensuring the Army has sufficient organic personnel for oversight, to include a robust 

number of contracting officer representatives supporting the operational and institutional Army. If confirmed, I will work toward this end. 

Question. The privatization of functions previously performed by DOD employees 

now extends to many functions performed on the battlefield. As a result, many functions that were performed by DOD personnel as recently as the Gulf War have been 

performed by contractor personnel in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Do you believe that DOD has reached, or exceeded, an appropriate balance in providing for the performance of functions by contractors on the battlefield? 

68 

Answer. The use of the appropriate form of labor for specific functions is an important issue that requires constant rebalancing as missions and priorities change. 

I believe that DOD needs to evaluate functions on a case-by-case basis and source 

them as appropriate. The force of the future may not look the same as yesterday’s 

force, or even the current force. The Army must do its part to take into account current, specific circumstances when determining the appropriateness of a labor source. 

Question. Where do you believe that DOD should draw the line between functions 

on the battlefield that can and should be performed by contractors and functions 

that should only be performed by DOD personnel? 

Answer. I believe it is vital that the Army retain sufficient critical enablers within 

the Active and Reserve components so that we can reduce the need for contractors 

on the battlefield. The Army must also ensure that it retains essential oversight 

personnel in the case of unforeseen requirements. Any use of contractors on the battlefield should be based on an appropriate and comprehensive assessment of risk. 

Question. Do you believe that contractors on the battlefield are subject to appropriate levels of control and accountability for their actions, or would additional regulation be appropriate? 

Answer. I believe that we must continually evaluate how effective our policies and 

regulations are at maintaining appropriate levels of control and accountability. The 

true challenge is ensuring proper oversight and enforcement of our existing regulations. 

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reported that 

Federal agencies including DOD have spent more than $5 billion for private security 

contractors in Iraq since 2003. 

Do you believe the Army should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly 

hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations? 

Answer. Contractors have served alongside soldiers throughout our Nation’s history. While contractors may not always be the preferred method, they sometimes 

provide resource options critical to meeting commanders’ requirements. The key is 

determining and clearly demarcating the line between soldier and contractor responsibility according to the situation. In certain cases, contractors may not be appropriate. In other cases, contractors may be the best sourcing solution to quickly fill 

a critical need on short notice. 

I believe that unit commanders and leaders at all levels play a valuable role in 

determining those missions best suited for contractors depending upon the situation. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that commanders have the training, experience, and flexibility to make these difficult choices. For example, in particular local political situations, capabilities such as entry control and convoy security may be best handled 

by a contractor. In other locations and times, this may not be the case. 

Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to 

perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives 

in Iraq? 

Answer. I do not believe that time has shown, or that history will prove, the use 

of private security contractors to have undermined accomplishment of our objectives 

in Iraq. 

While contractors may augment Army organizations by freeing up soldiers to conduct more dangerous combat operations, it is certainly critical to ensure that contractors possess the appropriate training and situational awareness. Contractors, 

just like their civilian and military counterparts, must understand their role and 

consistently function in support of operational and strategic objectives in an area. 

When contractors are untrained or unaware of the impact of their actions, they may 

negatively impact strategic-level objectives, resulting in long-term consequences. 

(The same can also be said for government personnel, whether civilian or military, 

but there is more flexibility to quickly effect change in those populations.) I believe 

that proper oversight and control mechanisms are imperative to ensure that the actions of the military, government civilians, and contractors are fully consistent with 

law and durably support the objectives of the United States. 

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act 

in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives? 

Answer. The Army and DOD have implemented policies to increase oversight and 

management of Private Security Contractors (PSCs) accompanying the force. These 

include contract requirements for training PSC employees on the authorized use of 

force, increasing use of past performance databases, and prosecuting contractor emVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
69 

ployees that violate use of force laws under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 

Act of 2000. Successful oversight is rooted in relevant training for contracting officers and commanders, vigilant monitoring and enforcement of applicable laws and 

regulations, and awareness of the full range of corrective measures available to the 

Government in the event of non-compliance. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to 

ensure we build on these past improvements. 

INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in the past have testified 

that the military services under-invest in both the maintenance and recapitalization 

of facilities and infrastructure compared to private industry standards. Decades of 

under-investment in DOD installations has led to substantial backlogs of facility 

maintenance activities, created substandard living and working conditions, and 

made it harder to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity. These challenges have been exacerbated by current budget pressures. 

What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment? 

Answer. The majority of Army infrastructure and facilities are in good shape. This 

is the result of significant investments in sustainment and construction over the 10- 

year period ending in 2012. These construction investments significantly modernized 

facilities that supported the Army during transformation and realignment. However, 

the Budget Control Act for 2011 reduced the Army’s ability to make continued and 

necessary investments in our infrastructure and facilities. Prolonged under-investment in sustainment will cause Army infrastructure and facilities to degrade much 

faster and, in turn, will increase energy consumption and overall operating costs. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities? 

Answer. As the Army’s end strength and force structure decline alongside its 

available funding, millions of dollars will be spent maintaining underutilized buildings and infrastructure. Trying to spread a smaller budget over the same number 

of installations and facilities will result in rapid decline in the condition of Army 

facilities. To save money and free up resources, the Army must reduce energy consumption at installations, reduce lease costs by moving to facilities opened up 

through restationing and force reduction decisions, and synchronize routine stationing actions to minimize costs. Greater efficiency is the watchword. 

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENTS

Question. DOD has requested another Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

round. 

Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why? 

Answer. Yes, for the many compelling reasons stated in my answer to question 

76. If the Army is unable to make the tough decisions necessary to identify inefficiencies and eliminate unneeded facilities, scarce resources will be diverted away 

from training, readiness, and family programs. Additionally, the quality of Army installation services that support the warfighter will suffer. 

Question. If confirmed, and if Congress were to authorize another BRAC round, 

how would you go about setting priorities for infrastructure reduction and consolidation within the Department of the Army? 

Answer. BRAC legislation provides for developing closure and realignment recommendations based on specific selection criteria. I would prioritize Army recommendations consistent with congressionally-approved BRAC selection criteria, 

Army force structure, and stationing plans. 

Question. If confirmed and if Congress were to authorize another BRAC round, 

what is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Army in working with local 

communities with respect to property disposal? 

Answer. I understand that BRAC law ordinarily provides for local communities, 

through designated Local Redevelopment Authorities (LRA), to prepare reuse plans 

that will guide future development and use of the property. The Army gives substantial deference to those plans in disposing of the property. BRAC law also usually provides Economic Development Conveyance authority, under which the Army 

can convey property directly to a LRA to further enable those local reuse plans to 

be implemented. 

Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round resulted in 

major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far less money than originally estimated. 

What is your understanding of why such cost growth and lower realized savings 

have occurred? 

70 

Answer. I understand that BRAC 2005 was primarily focused on transformation. 

Nearly half of the recommendations from 2005 were intended to take advantage of 

opportunities that were available under BRAC authority to move forces and functions to where they made sense, even if doing so would not save much money. This 

transformation effort cost over $29 billion and resulted in a small proportion of savings, but it allowed the Army and DOD to redistribute its forces and personnel within its infrastructure in a way that is typically difficult when not in the middle of 

a BRAC round. The remaining recommendations implemented under BRAC 2005 

paid back in fewer than 7 years—even after experiencing cost growth. 

Question. How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a future BRAC 

round? 

Answer. Unlike BRAC 2005, which was implemented during a time that drove the 

need for transformation, a future BRAC round would be implemented as Army end 

strength is declining and the need for efficiencies is paramount. Consistent with 

BRAC law and selection criteria, the Army would make savings a priority in the 

development of specific recommendations. 

END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

Question. The Department last year laid out a defense strategy that proposes an 

eventual end strength of 490,000 for the Army, which the Army is on pace to hit 

by the end of 2015. 

What is your understanding of the Army’s ability to meet these goals without forcing out many soldiers who have served in combat over the past 10 years with the 

implicit promise that they could compete for career service and retirement? 

Answer. The Army is committed to retaining the best qualified and most talented 

soldiers. Competitive selection boards and retention programs will enable soldiers 

currently serving in the Army, including those who have served in combat, to compete for continued service. Reduction programs will focus on overstrength Military 

Occupational Specialties, identifying those that should depart our ranks through a 

qualitative assessment of potential for continued contribution. 

Question. To what extent will the Army have to rely on involuntary separations 

in 2014 through 2018? How will sequestration affect this? 

Answer. I understand that the Army will rely on involuntary separations to meet 

end strength goals through fiscal year 2017. The present assessment is that continued sequestration is unlikely to impact these programs unless current end strength 

targets change. 

Question. What programs are in place to ensure that separating and retiring 

servicemembers are as prepared as they can be as they enter a struggling economy? 

Answer. In coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Labor, the Army has developed an enhanced version of its Transition Assistance Program. Called the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP), this commander’s program features soldier counseling and training sessions, employment 

and career workshops, and education opportunities, all while maintaining leadership focus on, and involvement in, each soldier’s transition process. ACAP affords 

soldiers the opportunity to prepare for successful post-Service careers. 

Question. How fast can the Army responsibly and fairly reduce end strength while 

maintaining the integrity and readiness of combat units? 

Answer. The Army believes that it can responsibly reduce end strength by 15,000 

to 20,000 per year, while still maintaining operational readiness. 

Question. How does the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, which restores $22 billion 

to the DOD budget in 2014, and an additional $9 billion in 2015, affect the Army’s 

end strength reduction plans? 

Answer. I have been informed that the Bipartisan Budget Act and the funds it 

restores will not impact current personnel drawdown programs. 

Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping 

tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past few years? 

Answer. The Army believes that, if reduction measures are required beyond fiscal 

year 2017, additional tools may be required to target specific overstrength skills and 

occupational specialties. 

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY FORCE SHAPING TOOLS

Question. Over the past several years, Congress has provided the services force 

shaping tools to allow them to accomplish their drawdowns responsibly and humanely while maintaining grade structure and critical specialties. 

What voluntary and involuntary measures does the Army plan to use in the next 

2 years to reach and maintain its target end strength of 490,000? 

71 

Answer. The Army will continue to support requests for voluntary separation, 

where possible. In some cases, service commitments may be waived to allow soldiers 

to separate prior to fulfilling their remaining obligations. Involuntary separations 

will continue through fiscal year 2015 in support of a reduced end strength 

(490,000). Officer Separation Boards, Selective Early Retirement Boards, Selective 

Continuation, Selective Retention Boards, Qualitative Service Program, Precision 

Retention and a reduction in overall accessions will allow the Army to meet end 

strength goals. 

Question. How will the Army ensure that it retains the best personnel, given that 

these individuals often have multiple opportunities in the private sector and may 

be more likely to accept monetary or other incentives to leave early? 

Answer. The Army will work to sustain robust promotion selection rates as a 

means to incentivize continued service for the best-qualified soldiers. Existing programs allow the Army to identify and retain the best talent while releasing those 

soldiers serving in over-strength skill sets. Soldiers who desire to leave the Army 

prior to fulfilling remaining service obligations may request separation if they meet 

criteria to participate in early release programs. 

Question. How does the Army plan to attain the proper grade mix in senior enlisted and officer communities to avoid the grade disparities that can take years to 

correct? In your view, does the Army require any additional legislative authority to 

allow end strength reductions by offering early retirement or other early separation 

incentives? 

Answer. End strength reduction programs target soldier populations in which the 

inventory exceeds requirements. The Army proposes to shape the future force based 

on grade and skill through a combination of reduced promotion opportunities, involuntary losses, and decreased demand and accessions. The Army will release soldiers 

in overstrength areas based on specific current and future requirements. I have 

been informed that the Army will not require any additional legislative authority 

to meet end strength requirements for fiscal year 2015. 

ANNUAL INCREASE IN RATES OF BASIC PAY BELOW THE EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX

Question. The Department requested an across-the-board pay raise for 2014 for 

military personnel of 1 percent, versus a 1.8 percent rise in the Employment Cost 

Index (ECI) benchmark, and has indicated that in order to restrain the growth of 

personnel costs, similar below-ECI pay raises may be necessary over the next several years. 

What is your assessment of the impact on recruiting and retention of pay raises 

below ECI in 2015 through 2018? 

Answer. Compensation is, and has always been, an important component in motivating men and women to join the Army and remain in service for a career. The 

precise impact of lower pay raises on future recruiting and retention efforts is unclear. But continued authority to leverage limited bonus and targeted incentive programs may well mitigate any adverse impact of this proposal, especially in critical 

specialties. 

ANNUAL INCREASE IN RATES OF RETIRED PAY BELOW THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

Question. Section 403 of the recently enacted Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 reduces the annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for military retirees under the 

age of 62 to CPU minus 1 percent. Monthly retired pay for those individuals would 

be readjusted upward at age 62 as if the COLA reduction had not taken place and 

retirees would receive full annual COLAs thereafter. 

In your view how will this change to the law impact the Army’s planning and programming assumptions about projected force and end strength requirements, retention, and advancement opportunities? 

Answer. It is unclear whether or how this provision of law may affect retention 

or the propensity of individuals to serve in the Army in the future. I have been informed by experts in the Army that this change in law will have little to no impact 

on current promotions, which are based on requirements. The Army is uncertain 

about the impact this provision will have on end strength, as retention is a significant driving force of this number. 

Question. What impact will this change have on the Army’s annual budget and 

personnel costs? 

Answer. This adjustment will reduce the amount the Army is contributing to trust 

funds that cover expenses related to military retirement payments for our soldiers. 

While the associated Army savings will approach $200 million per year, I am concerned about the impact on recruiting, retention, and soldiers and their families. 

72 

Question. Do you support section 403 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013? Why 

or why not? 

Answer. Compromise is the art of politics. I understand that the enacted adjustment to COLA for military retirees will certainly help DOD control the growth of 

military compensation costs; it is difficult to project the degree, if any, to which this 

change will impact recruiting and retention. Nonetheless, adjustments to the COLA 

are not, standing alone and in absence of countervailing benefits, a particularly desirable course. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do Department of the Army policies concerning religious 

accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging 

on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. Yes. Army policies appropriately accommodate the varied religious practices of soldiers, including those with no religious belief. Army and DOD policies are 

intended to protect both the free exercise of religion, while avoiding the appearance 

of an official endorsement of any particular religion. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will ensure that these policies are strictly enforced. 

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and discipline? 

Answer. Yes. The Army values the rights of soldiers to observe and practice their 

diverse religious faiths, or to have no religious faith at all. Army policy permits soldiers to request waivers of regulations when necessary to accommodate religious 

practices, and these waivers will be granted unless a compelling military necessity 

otherwise exists. 

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers 

offered by Army chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the 

proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her 

religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs? 

Answer. Yes. Army chaplains are well-trained to provide prayers in pluralistic settings, where sensitivity to diverse religious beliefs is at a premium. At the same 

time, chaplains, while providing ritualistic services on many occasions in both private and public settings, are never required to act in a manner inconsistent with 

the tenets of their endorsing agencies or in conflict with their individual convictions, 

beliefs, or religious traditions. 

Question. Recent press coverage focused on two separate events involving unitlevel Army equal opportunity training at Fort Hood and Camp Shelby that incorporated the views of an outside organization that certain organizations were ‘‘extremist’’ because of their faith-based opposition to same-sex relationships. The training appeared to officially endorse the views of the outside organization because it 

did not expressly state that the views of the outside organization did not represent 

the views of the Department of the Army or DOD. As a result some individuals who 

received the training were confused about the official views of the Army and became 

concerned that their affiliation with the organizations that were inappropriately 

identified as ‘‘extremist’’ could subject them to administrative or disciplinary action 

in accordance with Army policy prohibiting active support to extremist organizations. In fact, two of the organizations are included in the annual Combined Federal 

Campaign to which members of the Army may make charitable contributions. 

What are your views on the permissible extent to which an individual soldier or 

Army civilian employee may express, in public or in private, sincerely-held personal 

views based on religious belief or conscience to oppose recognition and acceptance 

of same sex relationships or marriage? 

Answer. Soldiers and Army civilian employees may express their sincerely-held 

personal beliefs, whether based on religious tenet or philosophical conviction, about 

the acceptance of same-sex relationships or same-sex marriage. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to establish policy to clearly 

articulate the appropriate balancing of expressions of sincerely-held religious belief 

or matters of conscience by individual soldiers or civilian employees in the Army 

workplace? 

Answer. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will ensure that the Army always protects the constitutional right of soldiers and Army civilians to hold and express religious beliefs and matters of conscience. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the development and presentation of training delivered within the Department of the Army is 

properly supervised and does not include views from organizations outside the Army 

73 

or DOD that are inconsistent with official policy except when including those views 

is essential for the purpose of the training and are properly cited as the views of 

an outside organization? 

Answer. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will support and sustain the measures, recently directed by the Secretary of the Army, that require all training materials and instruction to reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army. It 

is inappropriate for training presentations to include material that is found on the 

internet or gleaned from some other informal source which is not approved by the 

Army. This action by the Secretary of the Army will ensure that incidents such as 

those referenced in this question do not occur again. 

Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) to ensure religious tolerance and respect? 

Answer. The USMA is working diligently to create an environment in which Cadets, faculty, and staff, are supported in their personal faith choices, whatever those 

may be. USMA leaders have reached out to members of all faiths and have implemented policies to ensure religious tolerance and respect. If confirmed, I will see 

that these values of religious tolerance and respect are realized at USMA. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. How would you evaluate the status of the Army in successfully recruiting and retaining high caliber personnel? 

Answer. I understand that the fiscal year 2013 Army recruiting mission was extremely successful, attracting high-quality recruits comprised of 98 percent High 

School Diploma Graduates and only 1.2 percent Category IV accessions across the 

Active and Reserve components. These new soldiers are a reflection of the best of 

America, highly qualified and with a genuine desire to serve. 

Although consistently succeeding in meeting retention needs, the Army retains 

only the most highly-qualified soldiers. This is a remarkable feat given that, in recent years, the Army has increased retention standards, demanding the highest 

qualifications and performance from those who would remain in the force. The soldiers the Army enlists and retains today and in the near future, are among the 

smartest, most fit, and most capable young people in our Nation. 

Question. How would you evaluate the recruiting and retention of uniformed and 

civilian health care professionals? 

Answer. The Army has a two-pronged approach for recruiting military health professionals: directly recruiting fully-qualified health care professionals for military 

health care positions and recruiting individuals into various military health care 

training programs, such as the Health Professions Scholarship Programs. The Army 

has been very successful in recruiting students into these training programs, upon 

completion of which the student incurs an active duty service obligation. However, 

the recruitment of fully-qualified health care providers remains a challenge, exacerbated by national shortages in various physician subspecialties. The Army uses a 

variety of retention incentives, such as Special Pays and Professional Health Education Training opportunities that have proven very effective in retaining military 

healthcare providers. 

Recruiting BH professionals continues to present a particular challenge. In 2013, 

more than 2,900 prescreened health care professional candidates were referred; of 

these, approximately 625 were behavioral health (BH) professionals. The ability of 

colleges and universities to produce more qualified BH professionals has not kept 

pace with the ever-increasing need for BH services. The Army must compete with 

other government agencies, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs, as well as 

the private sector, to recruit from the field of qualified candidates. If confirmed as 

Under Secretary, I will support efforts to reinforce our recruiting and retention successes, with a view to positioning the Army to compete favorably as an employer 

of choice. 

Question. What initiatives would you take, if confirmed, to further improve Army 

recruiting and retention, in both the Active and Reserve components, including 

health care professionals? 

Answer. Inevitably, the recruiting environment will become more challenging. If 

confirmed, I will work to ensure accession programs are appropriately resourced to 

allow the Army to continue to recruit and retain the highest quality soldiers. I have 

been informed of several promising initiatives, including working with the Department of Education to improve recruiter access in public schools, evaluating non-cognitive testing measures for applicant screening, and facilitating senior leader engagement with students and leaders at top-tier educational institutions across the 

Nation—particularly those hosting undergraduate and graduate medical programs— 

about opportunities for service in the Army. 

74 

GI BILL BENEFITS

Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act in 

2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill) that created enhanced educational benefits for servicemembers who have served at least 90 days on active duty since September 11. The 

maximum benefit would roughly cover the cost of a college education at any public 

university in the country. One purpose of the act was to recognize and reward the 

service of those who served voluntarily after September 11, particularly those who 

do not serve full careers and qualify for retirement benefits. 

What is your assessment of the impact of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on recruiting and 

retention in the Army, including the provision of transferability for continued service? 

Answer. The Post-9/11 GI Bill has enhanced the Army’s ability to recruit and retain soldiers. In particular, giving soldiers the ability to transfer their Post-9/11 GI 

Bill benefits has greatly aided our effort to retain quality mid-grade and career soldiers. 

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward-thinking management of 

senior executives. 

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields? 

Answer. My vision is for the Army to have a well-developed senior executive workforce capable of partnering with senior military officers to lead the Army in accomplishing assigned missions. The Army is already a leader in strengthening civilian 

talent management, especially through the Talent and Succession Management 

process. This is an annual opportunity for communication with senior civilians, their 

supervisors, and the Army regarding each person’s future potential and readiness 

for new assignments. If confirmed, I will continue these measures and augment 

them to ensure transparency and fairness. This will allow the Army to attract and 

retain the best talent for all positions, including those in acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields. 

Question. Do you believe that the Army has the number of senior executives it 

needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department into the future? 

Answer. I believe the Army presently has the number of senior executives it 

needs. As with any large organization, we have a steady influx of new talent to replace those we lose to retirement and to other Federal agencies and the private sector. In anticipation of those losses, the Army has implemented the Senior Enterprise 

Talent Management Program, which is designed to build a bench of high-potential 

GS–14 and GS–15 leaders that establishes a robust talent pool ready and capable 

of assuming executive level positions in the future. 

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from the Army and the Federal Government for support 

services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis over 

the past several years, many challenges remain. 

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Army to improve 

the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured soldiers and their 

families? 

Answer. I believe the Army has made great strides by implementing and continuously improving three programs: the Warrior Care and Transition Program, the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, and the Soldier for Life program. All three 

programs are designed to address the care and transition of wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to support 

these vital programs for our most vulnerable soldiers and their families. 

Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based? 

What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected? 

Answer. The strength of the Army’s Warrior Care and Transition Program is the 

dedicated and highly-trained cadre of nearly 4,000 military and civilian personnel 

who currently staff the 29 Warrior Transition Units, 9 Community-Based Warrior 

Transition Units, and 49 Soldier Family Assistance Centers. If I am confirmed, it 

will be a priority for me to continue to support the efforts of the many highly-dediVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
75 

cated professionals who are making a difference at these facilities every day. They 

make sure Wounded Warriors are afforded the support, guidance, and assistance 

they require to recover, return to the force, or successfully transition to Veteran status, and integrate well into their communities. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Army’s support for wounded personnel, and to monitor 

their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, 

the Chief of Staff of the Army, the leadership of the Warrior Transition Command, 

and the rest of the Army to ensure that we continue to make the changes and improvements necessary to maintain and enhance the support to soldiers who require 

medical care. The Nation and the Army owe our soldiers no less. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The number of suicides in the Army continues to be of concern to the 

committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs 

and policies for the Department of the Army to prevent suicides and increase the 

resiliency of soldiers and their families? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on providing clear guidance, effective policy, and 

sufficient resourcing for the Ready and Resilient Campaign. One of the primary purposes of this Campaign is to reduce suicides throughout our Army family by integrating suicide prevention efforts across the Army and providing support to our soldiers, civilians, and family members. I am committed to ensuring that best practices 

are incorporated throughout the Army. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Soldiers and their families in both the Active and Reserve components 

have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational 

deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for soldiers and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced? 

Answer. For more than a decade, the Army has continuously asked its soldiers 

to be apart from their families during long deployments, commit to Permanent 

Change of Station moves to unfamiliar climes, and cope with the vagaries of a high 

operational tempo. The Army understands that soldiers must have peace of mind 

that their families are well cared-for at all times, and is therefore 100 percent committed to ensuring family readiness. Family readiness is the state of being prepared 

to effectively navigate the challenges of daily living in the unique context of military 

service. The Army has invested in a wide array of Family Programs to make this 

concept a reality. Initiatives such as the Extraordinary Family Member Program 

(which considers family members with special needs during the assignments process), Child Development Centers (which provides soldiers with affordable, quality 

day care), and the Financial Readiness Program (which offers soldiers financial 

counseling) are just a few examples of the different ways the Army is committed 

to helping its soldiers. If confirmed, I will commit to maintaining family readiness 

by wholeheartedly supporting such programs. 

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global 

rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end strength? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would not change the overall direction of Army Family 

Programs. My goal would be an Army of strong and resilient soldiers and families 

who will thrive as we reduce our deployed footprint. With the restructuring of the 

Army and the current austere fiscal climate, I would apply resources to programs 

and services that have the greatest impact on sustaining soldier and family readiness and resilience. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness, as well 

as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a military installation? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue the existing structured partnership 

with the Guard and Reserve to support all Army families, regardless of their component or geographic location, and to ensure the most efficient and effective delivery 

of programs and services wherever and whenever they are needed most. I will also 

continue to partner with the sister Services and local communities to fill gaps in 

programs, to provide alternatives to government-provided services, and to support 

76 

geographically-dispersed soldiers and families in order to reduce stress on Army 

families. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to sustain Army family support, 

given current fiscal constraints? 

Answer. Despite the fiscal climate, I would not change the future direction of military Family Programs. I would, however, ensure that scarce resources are dedicated 

to the programs and services that have the greatest impact on sustaining soldier 

and family readiness and resilience. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active-Duty and Reserve personnel, retirees, and families. 

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Army MWR programs, particularly 

in view of the current fiscal environment and, if confirmed, are there any improvements you would seek to achieve? 

Answer. Family and MWR programs provide a comprehensive network of quality 

support and leisure services that enhance quality of life for soldiers, family members, and retirees. Sustained reductions to these programs may negatively impact 

future readiness and unit cohesion. Where possible, I will strive to improve program 

offerings while focusing on delivering affordable, quality services that best enhance 

the readiness and resilience of the military community. 

ARMY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WORKFORCE

Question. Section 955 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013 required the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to reduce the size of the 

civilian personnel workforce by 5 percent over the next 5 years. The plan developed 

by the Secretary does not meet this objective. Since the time that section 955 was 

enacted, the Department has implemented hiring freezes and furloughs due to sequestration. As a result, the DOD civilian personnel workforce is substantially 

smaller than it was when section 955 was enacted or at the time the plan was submitted. 

Do you agree that the Army civilian employee workforce plays a vital role in the 

functioning of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. Absolutely. 

Question. How does the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, which restores $22 billion to the Department’s budget in 2014, and an additional $9 billion in 2015, affect the 

Army’s civilian personnel workforce plans? 

Answer. The Bipartisan Budget Act will enable the Army to avoid further reductions in key mission areas. Civilian employees play a vital role in nearly all missions, so the Army expects to have fewer personnel reductions and enough funding 

to replenish the skills lost through natural attrition. This will allow the Army to 

hire the next generation of skilled professionals and to ensure mission-essential 

trades and crafts are integrated into the future workforce. In short, the additional 

funding will allow workforce planning to be accomplished in a calculated way. 

Question. In your view, would it be preferable for the Army to make planned, 

prioritized reductions to the civilian workforce, or to downsize using arbitrary reductions based on hiring freezes and workforce attrition? 

Answer. In my view, the Army must use all tools available to shape our civilian 

force while ensuring that the Army remains capable of meeting its mission objectives. As the Army transitions to a force that is operationally adaptable, it is crucial 

to employ solid workforce planning that will ensure that our civilian workforce possesses the skills and experience necessary to sustain the Army mission. Recently, 

the Army has used hiring freezes, workforce attrition, voluntary early retirement, 

voluntary separation incentives, and reductions in force to achieve the mandated civilian reductions. The use of planned, prioritized reductions is certainly preferable, 

and if confirmed, this will be one of my goals. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more than 3,000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including 2558 unrestricted reports, 

and an additional 816 restricted reports. Moreover, DOD’s most recent survey indicates that the actual number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 

percent of Active Duty women and 1.2 percent of Active Duty men surveyed reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in the previous 

12 months. This survey has been criticized by some because its conclusions are exVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
77 

trapolated from an unscientific sample set and the questions asked in the survey 

were too imprecise. Both former Secretary of Defense Panetta and Secretary Hagel 

have implemented new initiatives for addressing sexual assault in the military. 

What is your assessment of the Army’s implementation of the new policies for addressing sexual assault offenses? 

Answer. In my assessment, the leadership demonstrated by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army in starting an unprecedented number of program and policy initiatives to end sexual assault—more than 20 over the past 

year—will have a decidedly positive impact on the reporting, investigation, and 

prosecution of these offenses; on increasing the accountability of military leaders at 

all levels; and on fostering cultural change. In the last 12 months, the Army has: 

• Implemented a Special Victims Counsel Program available to all 

servicemembers and their dependents who are victims of sexual assault; 

• Added sexual assault prevention and response as a rated category for all 

officer and non-commissioned officer evaluations; 

• Required Command Climate Surveys for every officer assuming a new 

command; 

• Raised the level of leadership of the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault 

Response and Prevention (SHARP) office to the Senior Executive Service 

level; 

• Instituted expedited transfer of victims; 

• Expanded the implementation of its special victim capability for the investigation and prosecution of offenses by instituting trauma-informed investigation training and increasing the number of special victim prosecutors; 

• Credentialed thousands of Sexual Assault Response Coordinators 

(SARCs) and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocates 

(SAPR VAs); 

• Required judge advocates to now serve as investigating officers in Article 

32 proceedings; 

• Enhanced victim participation in the post-trial process of military courtsmartial; 

• Required administrative separation of soldiers convicted of sexual assault 

offenses; and 

• Improved commander awareness of soldier misconduct. 

The Army also continues to develop metrics to measure its progress in addressing 

sexual assault and harassment. The tools used by the Army to evaluate its prevention programs include: 

• Workplace and Gender Relations Surveys; 

• Personnel Screening and Certification; 

• DOD and Department of the Army Inspector General; Inspections, workplace inspections, and Annual Command Assessments 

• Annual reports to Congress, OSD, J–1, and Army senior leaders; 

• Quarterly reports to OSD, J–1, and Army senior leaders (including statistics and analysis); 

• Annual OSD and USMA Assessments; 

• DOD Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military 

Service Academies; 

• Annual ‘‘I. A.M. Strong’’ Sexual Harassment/Assault Prevention Summit 

Command Outbriefs; 

• Command Climate Surveys within 30 days of assuming command, again 

at 6 months, and annually thereafter for the Active component; 

• Command Climate Surveys within 120 days of assuming command for 

the Reserve component; 

• Initial Entry Training Surveys; 

• SAPR program compliance inspections; 

• Department of Defense Safe Helpline feedback (for trends); 

• Workplace inspections; 

• Army Operational Troops Survey (OTS); 

• Health-of-the-Force installation visits; 

• Senior leader-conducted focus groups; 

• SHARP Red Team Assessments; 

• Army SHARP Standdown Plan (directed by the Secretary of the Army); 

and 

• Army Directive 2013–20, Assessing Officers and Noncommissioned Officers on Fostering Climates of Dignity and Respect and on Adhering to the 

Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program. 

78 

These changes demonstrate the Army’s committed, holistic approach to effectively 

change culture, prevent sexual assault and harassment in the ranks, provide worldclass support for victims, and prosecute offenders to the fullest extent of the law. 

Assessment of the impact of these many policy changes, along with implementation 

of the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 in 

the coming year, will be a top priority of mine, if confirmed. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred? 

Answer. I firmly believe that commanders must lead the effort to change Army 

culture. The Army relies on commanders to ensure that our soldiers are properly 

trained, equipped, safe, and healthy. The Army relies on commanders to ensure that 

standards are met or exceeded, to maintain order in the ranks, and to instill values 

in our troops. The Army also relies on commanders to discipline soldiers when these 

standards are not met. As part of these responsibilities, commanders are ultimately 

responsible for fostering respect within their units, creating a climate in which sexual assaults and sexual harassment are not tolerated, and cultivating an environment in which victims feel comfortable reporting all forms of misconduct. To carry 

out their responsibilities, commanders must have the authority and the tools to address the problem of sexual assault in our ranks. In turn, the Army must hold commanders accountable in the event of failures, as is contemplated by the new rating 

evaluation requirement. These crimes violate the trust that is at the core of the 

Army profession. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. Requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine 

whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted would in effect create a 

parallel justice system for sexual assault cases, in which commanders handle some 

offenses but not others. In addition to generating confusion and inefficiencies in the 

military justice system, I believe that this change might undermine the Army’s efforts to change the military culture in which sexual assaults have occurred. Within 

the Army, commanders are responsible for their soldiers’ performance, safety, morale, and well-being. In carrying out their responsibilities, it is critical that commanders have the authority and the tools to address problems within their ranks, 

including sexual assault. Rather than removing commanders from their role within 

the military justice system, the Army should instead hold them accountable for ensuring that all victims feel comfortable in reporting misconduct and all soldiers believe that the system is fair and transparent. 

Question. What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army 

has in place to provide victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and 

legal help that they need? 

Answer. I believe that the Army is dedicated to providing sexual assault victims 

with extensive medical, psychological, and legal support services. The Army is learning from the increasing body of peer-reviewed research about the neurobiology of 

trauma and how it affects the needs, behavior, and treatment of victims of sexual 

assault and other traumatic experiences. The Army is committed to both understanding this research and in implementing innovative and successful strategies to 

combat the effects of Military Sexual Trauma. All sexual assault victims are assigned a SARC and SAPR VA. When a victim of sexual assault presents to any Military Treatment Facility in the Army, his or her care is managed by a Sexual Assault Clinical Provider (SACP) and Sexual Assault Care Coordinator (SACC) from 

initial presentation to completion of all follow-up visits related to the sexual assault. 

The victim will be offered a Sexual Assault Forensic Exam, and if not already accompanied by a SARC or SAPR VA, the SACP or SACC will coordinate that process 

and explain reporting options. The SARC or SAPR VA will also provide a referral 

to appropriate services. With the implementation of the Special Victim Counsel Program, the victim will also be notified of the availability of a Special Victim Counsel 

by the SARC. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional 

sexual assaults? In your view, are these steps adequate? 

Answer. In 2013, the Secretary of the Army listed the prevention of sexual assault 

as first among his published priorities for the Army. In June 2013, the Chief of Staff 

of the Army also stated the prevention of sexual assault is his top priority. Conforming to this important guidance, the Army has made the prevention of sexual 

assault a matter of utmost importance. Leaders at every echelon are committed to 

preventing sexual assaults and caring for victims, and the Army is working diligently to ensure that all soldiers share these commitments. For example, from the 

day they join the Army and continuing throughout their careers, soldiers receive 

79 

training on sexual assault prevention. I recognize that training alone will not stop 

sexual assaults, but it has brought unprecedented awareness of the issue to the 

force. To eliminate sexual assaults, the Army must change the culture of the force, 

which includes eliminating the stigma associated with reporting these crimes, regardless of whether the reporting soldier is a victim or a bystander. The Army continues to look for new and innovative ways to combat the difficult problem of sexual 

assault. With continued command emphasis, education throughout all of our ranks, 

and resources devoted to victim care, I believe the Army will achieve the necessary 

cultural change. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the 

Army has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. I believe that the Army has invested a substantial amount of resources 

and training toward the investigation and response to sexual assault allegations. 

The U.S. Army Military Police provides Special Victim Unit Investigative Training 

that focuses on memory and trauma, common victim behaviors, alcohol-facilitated 

sexual assaults, sex offender behaviors, male victimization, and the innovative victim interviewing technique that has resulted in a more in-depth and complete recollection of events than traditional methods of questioning. Investigators and attorneys from all three Services, as well as the Coast Guard and National Guard Bureau, attend this training, and I am told that it is the best education available to 

investigators and attorneys anywhere in the Federal Government. 

The Army also has a dedicated group of nearly 30 Sexual Assault Investigators 

(SAI) in the Criminal Investigation Command (CID), each of whom is specially 

trained to ensure that allegations of sexual assault are fully and appropriately investigated. The Judge Advocate General also manages 23 specially-trained Special 

Victim Prosecutor (SVP) Teams comprised of SVPs, paralegals, and SAPR VAs. Special Victim Investigators collaborate closely with Special Victim Prosecutors, who 

are hand-selected at the Department of the Army level for their expertise in the 

courtroom and their ability to work with victims. 

Developing a properly trained cadre of investigators is extraordinarily important 

in our efforts to increase reporting because victims’ willingness to initiate and follow 

through with investigations is directly related to whether they feel supported and 

believed. If their initial contact with law enforcement is an unpleasant one, victims’ 

likelihood of pursuing cases is virtually nil. This is an issue that I am particularly 

interested in and that I will continue to monitor closely if confirmed as Under Secretary. 

Question. Do you consider the Army’s current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective? 

Answer. Yes, I believe the Army’s system for receiving and processing reports of 

sexual assault, including both restricted and unrestricted reports, is effective, although this is a matter in which I will maintain a strong interest, if confirmed. 

Since implementing the ‘‘restricted’’ reporting option (which does not initiate a law 

enforcement investigation) in 2004, the number of total reports has continued to increase. This option has been a very beneficial reform in the system; anecdotally, it 

is credited with bringing a considerable number of victims forward who would not 

have otherwise done so. Though the Army prefers for reports to be ‘‘unrestricted’’ 

so that it may hold perpetrators accountable and remove them from the ranks, by 

giving victims control over triggering the investigation, the restricted option gives 

them time to understand the process, seek the counseling and care they need, and 

to consult with an attorney if they wish. The conversion of restricted reports to unrestricted is continuing to increase, which I believe to be evidence of the success of 

our numerous SAPR initiatives and an indication that victims are gaining more 

trust in the system. I am optimistic—although definitive data is elusive—that the 

increase in reports for fiscal year 2013 reflects growing confidence in our system. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to look for innovative ways to 

combat this difficult problem. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of resources in the Army to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct and to hold perpetrators accountable for 

their actions? 

Answer. I believe we have adequate numbers of and appropriate training for 

criminal investigators, forensic laboratory examiners, and prosecutors to ensure the 

successful investigation of sexual assaults and to hold offenders accountable. The 

CID has 747 authorized agents at 71 Field Investigative Units to conduct sexual assault investigations. The average experience level for the 22 civilian SAIs is 18.1 

years and 8 more SAIs have been added this year; these investigators are exclusively assigned to handle sexual assault cases. Roughly 76 percent (54 of 71 Army 

installations with a CID office) have SVU-trained agents assigned, and the goal is 

to have SVU-trained agents at all CID field offices this year. In addition, the ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
80 

manding General of CID and the Army Judge Advocate General have closely aligned 

their forces and efforts to provide outstanding support to enable commanders to address these serious crimes and to hold offenders appropriately accountable. These 

leaders have prioritized the investigation and prosecution of sexual assaults and 

have dedicated considerable resources to ensuring that sexual assault victims receive the full efforts of the best-trained and most experienced investigators and 

prosecutors. 

Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the 

confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect? 

Answer. I am not aware of any problems with regard to the way confidential reporting procedures have been implemented. First and foremost, the Army must ensure that each victim gets necessary care and treatment. Toward this end, I understand the need for the restricted option, and respect a victim’s choice to select that 

option as he or she sees fit. Ultimately, however, the Army’s goal is to ensure that 

victims feel confident enough in the Army’s process to report sexual assault through 

the unrestricted reporting process, which will trigger thorough criminal investigations, ultimately allowing the military justice system to work in a fair, impartial 

way. It is very important that the Army ensures that all soldiers understand what 

the reporting options are, to whom they may confidentially report, and those who 

have a duty to report if they are made aware of any allegation of sexual misconduct. 

Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian 

leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault? 

Answer. Senior military and civilian leaders are responsible for ensuring that all 

Army policies relating to sexual assault are implemented fully. They are also responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of these efforts, and for making changes 

to those programs and policies, when appropriate. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 also contemplates that the Secretary of the Army may 

review some sexual assault cases. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Army 

continues to assess and improve its policies and programs to combat and respond 

to sexual assault. 

Question. Do you believe that sexual assault continues to be an underreported 

crime in the Army? 

Answer. Yes. The research is clear that sexual assault is one of the most underreported crimes in society at large, and this is no less the case in the Army or other 

Military Services. The Army is working hard to foster a climate in which victims 

trust their chains of command to support them if and when sexual offenses occur, 

victims know that they will receive all necessary services and support from the 

Army, victims are confident their allegations will be taken seriously, and that all 

incidents of sexual assault and harassment will be thoroughly investigated. The increase in reporting during this past fiscal year is possibly reflective of victims’ growing confidence in our system. 

Question. If so, what are the barriers that discourage or prevent victims from coming forward? 

Answer. There are no doubt many reasons a victim does not always come forward 

to report a sexual assault, whether in the civilian world or in the military. Data 

from the 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members 

shows that victims of sexual assault often do not come forward because of privacy 

concerns. Sexual assault is the most personal and intrusive of crimes, and victims 

report feeling reluctant to report this crime because they feel ashamed or embarrassed and because they feel that others might blame them or retaliate against 

them. Another one of the biggest barriers for victims is the fear of being ostracized 

by their peers in the unit—and this is an issue whose remedy lies directly in the 

hands of the leadership and authority of the commander. I believe that commanderdriven change in unit culture and compassionate, thorough support of victims are 

critical to address these concerns. 

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to remove barriers 

to reporting sexual assaults? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will begin by focusing on victim care and commander accountability. The Army has made significant programmatic changes to ensure victims receive the support they need when they come forward to report a sexual assault. I intend to evaluate the effectiveness of these (and related) efforts, and to look 

for ways to continue to improve the Army’s programs and policies for victim care. 

I also believe that effective leadership training, demonstrated values and accountability of leaders at all levels is essential. 

In response to the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies for Academic Program Year 2011–2012, the Secretary of Defense wrote to the Service Secretaries and the Under Secretary of Defense for PerVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
81 

sonnel and Readiness stating: ‘‘Despite our considerable and ongoing efforts, this 

year’s Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service 

Academies demonstrates that we have a persistent problem. I am concerned that 

we have not achieved greater progress in preventing sexual assault and sexual harassment among academy cadets and midshipmen. These crimes and abhorrent behavior are incompatible with the core values we require of our Armed Forces’ future 

officers. A strong and immediate response is needed.’’ 

Question. What has the Army done to respond to the Secretary of Defense’s requirement for a strong and immediate response? 

Answer. I have been advised that, under the USMA Superintendent’s guidance, 

Cadets established the Cadets Against Sexual Harassment and Assault committee, 

a SHARP-trained group of Cadets who are dedicated to preventing and responding 

to sexual assault at the USMA. Additionally, the Superintendent has met with all 

company commanders, regimental commanders, the brigade staff, and the Corps of 

Cadets to address leadership responsibilities, and he has emphasized each member’s 

responsibility for establishing a positive command climate in his or her unit that 

is based on dignity and respect for all. The Superintendent addressed the same subject during his briefings to the staff and faculty at the beginning of first semester, 

academic year 2013–2014, and he will continue to deliver this message to cadet 

groups throughout the second semester of this academic year. 

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to address the findings 

contained in this report? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Secretary of the Army, the 

Chief of Staff of the Army, the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the USMA Superintendent and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 to ensure that 

the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program, both Army-wide 

and at USMA, remains a top priority for Army leaders throughout the Army. 

ARMY POLICIES REGARDING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s policy with respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of soldiers who have been determined to 

have used illegal drugs? Do you agree with this policy? 

Answer. In 2012, the Secretary of the Army directed revisions to the criteria and 

retention authorities for drug and alcohol-related separations. In short, the revised 

policies reflect an increased responsibility on the part of the soldier to remain resilient and follow substance abuse rehabilitative treatment, and it holds commanders 

responsible for processing administrative separations. The revised policy directs 

commanders to process administrative separations for those soldiers who commit repeated offenses, such as two serious incidents of alcohol-related misconduct within 

a 12 month period, or for soldiers who test positive for illegal drugs twice during 

their careers. The decision authority for retention is now the first general officer in 

the chain of command with a judge advocate or legal advisor. 

These revisions make the Army policy more responsive to the drug use and highrisk behavior trends that were identified in the Army. I believe the revised policy 

is well suited to assist the Army in identifying and retaining those soldiers who 

demonstrate the responsibility and maturity to learn from their incidents of highrisk behavior. At the same time, it provides commanders the necessary tools to process soldiers out of the Army who are unwilling to change. I support the current policy. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on Active Duty of soldiers who have been determined to 

have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with 

this policy? 

Answer. My previous response concerning the Army’s disciplinary policy on illegal 

drug use outlines the Army’s focus on both soldier responsibility and command responsibility. The Army policy, which allows for soldiers with a single alcohol incident or a single positive drug test to be referred for evaluation, intensive education, 

or outpatient treatment, reflects the Army’s understanding of soldiers in terms of 

their ages and their representation of American society at-large. The Army understands that younger soldiers may make poor decisions and makes allowances for 

this by providing commanders with the flexibility to retain soldiers who have the 

potential to learn from their mistakes and maintain Army standards. I support this 

policy. 

Question. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient resources for implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what 

ways have resources been insufficient? 

82 

Answer. I have been advised that, while the Army has increased resourcing over 

the past decade to combat the abuse and/or misuse of both legal and illegal substances, capability gaps still exist that require funding. These gaps primarily reside 

within the Reserve component (Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve) in 

the deterrence, prevention, and treatment realms. If confirmed as Under Secretary, 

I will work to bridge these gaps. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. I agree with the 2006 memorandum of Deputy Secretary England and 

the 2009 Executive Orders of President Obama that require all Department of Defense directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures to fully comply with 

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Since 2006, the Department of the 

Army has reviewed and updated all Army regulations, policies, practices, and procedures to ensure such compliance. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. I support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised 

Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, and Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E. Current Army directives comply fully with the provisions of the 

Geneva Conventions, as noted above. 

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military operations for U.S. 

Forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 

Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. It is entirely appropriate and consistent with effective military operations to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 and establish a 

standard for the conduct of detainee operations that applies the Law of Armed Conflict in all military engagements, no matter how characterized, and in all other military operations. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under 

Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

COMBAT INTEGRATION

1. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, in your testimony you stated that in the next 

few months the Army would be opening 33,000 positions that were previously closed 

to women due to the direct combat exclusion. How many of these positions have already been opened? 

83 

Mr. CARSON. The notification to Congress to open 33,000 positions occurred in 

January 2014; we will open these following expiration of the required 30 continuous 

days of congressional session. These 33,000 will be in addition to the approximately 

22,000 positions the Army has already opened since May 2012. 

2. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, why is it taking so long to open them? 

Mr. CARSON. I understand that the integration of women into previously closed 

units is proceeding well. We began our work in 2012, focusing on the 14 Military 

Occupational Specialties (MOS)—such as the enlisted Combat Engineer MOS and 

the three enlisted MOSs in the Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery branches—that 

were closed because their missions were related to direct ground combat. Our plan 

calls for all decisions on closed positions and occupations to be made by 2015, and 

we are on schedule to meet that goal. 

3. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, are there intermediate steps that you feel are 

necessary before you make this shift? 

Mr. CARSON. To ensure success, the Army has directed Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) to conduct a Gender Integration Study. The Gender Integration Study surveys soldiers in formerly closed combat arms MOSs and female soldiers currently serving in the Army. I have been told that the results of this extensive study will help the Army develop strategies to ensure the successful integration 

of women into combat units and combat arms MOSs. I support the Gender Integration Study as a necessary intermediate step to opening closed positions and occupations. 

4. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, you specified that the Army is in the process 

of revalidating occupational standards for 14 previously closed MOSs. How many positions are included in those closed specialties? 

Mr. CARSON. I understand that there are approximately 100,000 positions in the 

now-closed specialties. 

5. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, at what pace are you opening up these positions? 

Mr. CARSON. The Army’s plan has three decision points: December 2014 for the 

enlisted Combat Engineer MOS 12B, March 2015 for the three Field Artillery 

MOSs, and July 2015 for the remaining occupations and Army schools that are currently closed to women. We will decide to either notify the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense of our intent to open additional occupations and positions or request an 

exception to policy to keep the remaining occupations and positions closed if we cannot meet the Secretary of Defense’s stated guidelines. 

6. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, how many of these positions have already 

been opened? 

Mr. CARSON. To my knowledge, the Army has opened 22,000 positions since May 

2012. 

7. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, are you on schedule to meet the timeline 

specified by the directive of Secretary Panetta and Chairman Dempsey? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

8. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, in your testimony you mentioned that the 

Army is revalidating the occupational requirements for the previously restricted 

MOSs. Could you please describe the methodology the Army is using to determine 

combat effectiveness? 

Mr. CARSON. Currently, TRADOC is conducting a Physical Demands Study to establish occupation-specific accession standards for the specialties that are currently 

closed to women. The U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine is 

assisting TRADOC by developing valid, safe, legally defensible physical performance 

tests to assess soldiers’ abilities to perform the critical, physically demanding duties 

inherent in currently closed MOSs. 

9. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, is the expertise of service women, and in particular of those women who have already participated in combat operations and accompanied Special Forces into the field as members of Female Engagement Teams, 

being sought out and utilized to inform this process? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes they are. We are using a multitude of venues to gain lessons 

learned from the experiences of female soldiers, particularly those who have deployed, operated in Female Engagement Teams, and/or been members of Cultural 

84 

Support Teams. Their successes enabled the Army to start opening positions in May 

2012. 

10. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Carson, in your testimony you stated that the Army 

is not responsible for integrating the MOSs associated with Special Forces. Could 

you clarify what role the Army has in selecting individuals for service in its Special 

Forces and providing guidance to Special Forces in ensuring that the most qualified 

candidates are allowed to compete for positions, regardless of gender? 

Mr. CARSON. It is my understanding that Special Forces is an Army occupational 

specialty and the assessment, selection, and training of Special Forces soldiers are 

all conducted by Army personnel at the certified Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

Center of Excellence. However, Special Forces is funded by U.S. Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM), and the Army must coordinate changes to the Special Forces 

MOSs with that combatant command. The Army, through U.S. Army Special Operations Command, is working with SOCOM to ensure the most qualified candidates 

will be able to compete for positions, regardless of gender. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT AND AUDITABILITY

11. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, if confirmed, you would, of course, serve as the 

Chief Management Officer (CMO) in charge of overseeing, among other things, the 

Army’s business transformation and financial improvement efforts. In your testimony, in response to Chairman Levin’s question, you said that the Army is ‘‘on 

track’’ to meet both the Statement of Budgetary Resources September 30, 2014, and 

the Financial Statements September 30, 2017 auditability deadlines, but some challenges remain. As to both the legislatively-required 2014 and 2017 deadlines, what 

are the greatest areas of risk to the Army’s ability to do so? 

Mr. CARSON. Though the Army has clearly achieved several significant milestones, 

I understand that key challenges remain. First, the deployment of our Enterprise 

Resource Planning (ERP) systems requires us to undergo considerable financial 

management changes, a major challenge for an organization as large and complex 

as the Army. Second, our dependence on service providers for significant portions 

of our business processes also poses a risk to meeting these objectives. A third challenge we face is quickly and effectively implementing any corrective actions resulting from the ongoing audit by an independent public accountant. Finally, funding 

uncertainties, government shutdowns, and furloughs present risks to achieving 

auditability. 

12. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, how is the Army mitigating those risks and 

what additional steps would you take to adequately address these risks? 

Mr. CARSON. I understand that the Army will continue the activities that have 

facilitated success to date, particularly by following the guidance established by the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The Army will ensure 

change management is successful by implementing effective controls and processes 

and transforming our financial management organizations to be more effective and 

efficient. We are working closely with our service providers to ensure they follow 

these new controls and processes. As weaknesses from our current Exam 3 are identified, we will implement corrective action plans. The Army leadership, both military 

and civilian, will continue the active engagement that has helped establish the requisite accountability for audit readiness support at all levels and across all Army 

commands. 

13. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, who should be held accountable if the Army 

misses either the 2014 or the 2017 deadline? 

Mr. CARSON. Army senior leaders, including the Under Secretary, should be held 

accountable. 

14. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, has the Army, in your view, been successfully 

implementing Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in connection with its 

auditability goals? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. BPR is the centerpiece of our business process improvement 

and audit readiness efforts. By leveraging our successful deployment of the General 

Fund Enterprise Business System and the results of several audit examinations, we 

have been continually reengineering our processes to improve efficiency and audit 

readiness. The Army Financial Improvement Plan is focused on long-term, sustainVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
85 

able business process improvements rather than short-term, manually-intensive efforts that are difficult or impossible to sustain. This approach has resulted in several ‘‘quick wins’’ that have confirmed the appropriateness and sustainability of the 

Army’s plan. 

Using an end-to-end process reengineering approach, we have analyzed all Army 

financial and financial feeder systems, processes, and controls to ensure comprehensive process optimization and accountability. Also, we are linking IT portfolio optimization, enterprise architecture, Lean Six Sigma-informed continuous process improvement, and best business practices into a very powerful, synergistic method of 

evaluation across all Army core business processes. While we have made significant 

progress, there remains work to do. However, I am confident that our efforts will 

broaden over the coming years. 

15. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, in June 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates said that the Department of Defense (DOD) must significantly improve the 

effectiveness and efficiency of its business operations stressing the importance of 

changing how DOD does business. Yet, to date, DOD has struggled to implement 

successful business transformation because it has failed to fully utilize BPR. Do you 

agree with Secretary Gates’ comments and, if so, how will you improve the efficiency 

of the Army’s business operations? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, I believe that this was an accurate assessment at the time. In 

the years following Secretary Gates’ comments, I understand that the Army has 

made significant strides in BPR and in improving the efficiency of the Army’s business operations. We just released our 2014 Business Transformation Report that 

highlights many of our successful efforts in 2013. Going forward, if I am confirmed 

as Under Secretary, I will continue to emphasize four efforts to improve business 

operations: (1) achieving audit-readiness goals for 2014 and 2017; (2) improving the 

way we make cost-informed decisions for enterprise functions; (3) ensuring the 

alignment of the activities of the Headquarters, Department of the Army with those 

of DOD and Army operating forces; and (4) increasing momentum in improving the 

efficiency and effectiveness of our business operations. On the fourth point, we will 

continue to drive costs down on the business portfolio by reducing systems and reengineering high-cost processes. Also, we will increase our BPR efforts to streamline 

processes and optimize the systems that support it. Finally, we will maintain our 

support to the Army’s enterprise-wide Lean Six Sigma program in order to accelerate Army-level BPR and help lower-level commands to make their own processes 

more efficient. 

16. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, how will you measure the success of your efforts? 

Mr. CARSON. I think that an actively managed performance assessment system is 

the key to measuring success, understanding our costs, and helping the Army make 

better resource-informed decisions. The Army Campaign Plan and the Army Business Management Strategy establish our measures, and our business governance 

structure provides the mechanism for Army leaders to routinely review progress, 

identify problem areas, and develop timely strategies to overcome obstacles. In addition to these, we will cooperate with the DOD Inspector General and Government 

Accountability Office (GAO), undergo external and internal audits, and utilize other 

sources of assessment to assist efforts to refine our performance measures. If confirmed as Under Secretary and Chief Management Officer (CMO), I will work to ensure that we have the right performance assessment mechanisms in place to measure progress and adjust our plans as needed. 

17. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, what do you believe is the role of ERP systems 

in improving how the Army does business? 

Mr. CARSON. The Army’s four ERP systems are the backbone to a connected and 

integrated Army business environment. While each ERP has a unique functionality, 

they share valuable data, reduce inefficiencies in our business activities, and provide 

the internal controls and traceability required for a credible financial management 

system. Our ERPs are paramount for achieving audit-readiness. 

18. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, how do you plan to implement lasting cultural 

change so that new processes are both welcomed and quickly accepted by Army personnel in connection with the Army’s financial improvement/business transformation efforts? 

Mr. CARSON. In my opinion, active, multi-echelon change management is the key 

to ensuring that Army personnel readily adopt new processes. I believe that education and training are the most important elements for lasting, transformative culVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
86 

tural change. To that end, we are reviewing our education and leader development 

programs to place more emphasis on leader roles in performance assessment and 

process improvement. Likewise, we are reengineering our institutional training programs to include hands-on training across the full range of our new ERP systems. 

I also feel that to effect change, we must also be responsive to user and customer 

feedback. I am confident that our change management plans include the right mechanisms to receive and consider user inputs and that our culture and personnel will 

adapt as necessary to embrace these new processes. 

19. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, if confirmed, how would you make the redesign 

of the Army’s business processes, wherever warranted, a priority? 

Mr. CARSON. The Army has specified the improvement of business processes as 

a major objective of the Army Campaign Plan, and Under Secretary Westphal recently published the Army Business Management Strategy to provide detailed guidance in this area. If confirmed, I will employ the principles in these documents to 

take an active role in this important Army priority, which spans across all of our 

major end-to-end processes and is driven by the development and successful fielding 

of our ERP systems. I plan to press for the optimization of business processes and 

the rationalization of the business Information Technology (IT) portfolios that support them. Reducing costs and improving effectiveness across our business operations would be among my main priorities if I became Under Secretary. 

20. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, what lessons did you learn from the Air Force’s 

failed Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) program? 

Mr. CARSON. The Air Force was very forthcoming about their ECSS challenges 

when discussing ERP management with us. The biggest lesson from ECCS—which 

was reinforced during our successful fielding of the General Fund Enterprise Business System—is to reengineer existing business processes to work within the ERP 

software rather than customizing the software to fit existing processes. We also understand the importance of having the right expertise on our government teams to 

advise process owners on BPR efforts to align with the ERP software, and not relying solely on the contracted system integrator to perform this function. We have also 

taken steps to maintain stability within our acquisition teams. Lastly, we understand the importance of internal Army oversight processes over program duration. 

I am confident we have learned the right lessons and have incorporated them into 

our plans to ensure the successful fielding of Army ERPs and other business IT systems. 

21. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Carson, how would you ensure that the Army effectively 

implements these lessons to current and future ERP procurement efforts? 

Mr. CARSON. As the CMO of the Army, I would play a very hands-on managerial 

role in the governance structure we have established to continue to drive positive, 

meaningful change in the way the Army does business. If confirmed, I will direct 

the continuation of our robust audit and testing schedules to ensure we remain on 

track. I look forward to a productive relationship and open dialog with our acquisition executive as we apply those lessons to complete the fielding of ERPs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

22. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, in your view, how has the Army National Guard 

performed in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Mr. CARSON. The Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve 

(USAR) have performed admirably in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

23. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, could we have accomplished the missions in Iraq 

and Afghanistan without the National Guard? 

Mr. CARSON. No. 

24. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, as the Army tries to maintain readiness and 

necessary force structure under tighter budgets, do you believe it makes sense for 

us to increase our reliance on the National Guard? 

Mr. CARSON. It is my understanding that the Army plans to continue its reliance 

on the Reserve component for operational depth and critical expertise in meeting 

the National Military Strategy. 

87 

INVOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS

25. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, to what extent has the Army utilized involuntary separations to achieve end strength reduction goals? 

Mr. CARSON. To my knowledge, the majority of end strength reductions have been 

focused on reduced accessions and normal attrition. The Army has used limited involuntary separations to meet end strength goals for both officers and enlisted personnel. 

26. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, how many enlisted soldiers and officers have 

been involuntarily separated? 

Mr. CARSON. I have been told that under the Qualitative Service Program (QSP), 

the Army selected 123 Active component (AC) Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) and 

37 NCOs from the ARNG and USAR for denial of future service in fiscal year 2013. 

In fiscal year 2014, the QSP denied continued service to 497 NCOs from the AC 

and 9 NCOs from the ARNG and USAR. Under the Selective Early Retirement 

Board for fiscal year 2013, 103 colonels and 136 lieutenant colonels were selected 

for early retirement. 73 officers have also been identified for early termination of 

selective continuation on active duty. 

27. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, are the soldiers being separated well-performing 

soldiers with multiple combat tours? 

Mr. CARSON. I understand that, in some cases, those identified for separation 

were well-performing soldiers with multiple combat tours. While it is certainly lamentable that some honorable soldiers’ careers will be truncated, the Army is also 

concerned that the overall force may not have the proper rank structure or mix of 

specialties without involuntary separations. The Army recognizes and appreciates 

the many hard sacrifices its soldiers and their families make daily. However, we 

maintain that a reasoned, measured approach to involuntary separations is necessary to ensure that the Army’s force structure can properly meet mission needs 

and that we do not repeat the mistakes made during the Cold War drawdown that 

left the force imbalanced. 

28. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, to what extent do you anticipate that the Army 

will have to use involuntary separations to achieve future end strength reductions? 

Mr. CARSON. The Army will continue to use involuntary measures to shape the 

force to the minimum extent possible; reduced accessions and natural attrition will 

remain our primary levers to meet end strength. 

29. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, setting aside the impact on a soldier who is involuntarily separated, when soldiers see their brothers and sisters in arms, especially those not eligible for retirement, forced to leave the Army after multiple deployments and years of faithful service, what impact could this have on unit morale 

and readiness? 

Mr. CARSON. Involuntary separations remain difficult and inevitably impact the 

morale of the force. As discussed above, the Army will eschew the use of involuntary 

separations except when it is absolutely necessary. We will also continue to actively 

communicate to the soldiers and their families about the impact of budgetary constraints and the possibility of involuntary separation. 

30. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, do I have your commitment that you will work 

to avoid involuntary separations? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure that lower accessions 

and natural attrition will remain the Army’s preferred means to meet end strength 

requirements. However, budgetary constraints will likely require some involuntary 

separations. 

31. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, are you aware of the requirement in section 525 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 regarding reports 

on involuntary separation of members of the Armed Forces? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

32. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, will you ensure the Army complies with this reporting requirement? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. 

88 

WOUNDED WARRIORS

33. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, recently the Army announced changes to the organization of its Warrior Care and Transition Program. Can you describe those 

changes? 

Mr. CARSON. Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) are located at major Military 

Treatment Facilities and provide support to wounded, ill, and injured soldiers who 

require at least 6 months of rehabilitative care and complex medical management. 

The Army is restructuring the WTUs in response to the scheduled withdrawal of 

troops from Afghanistan and the decline in the number of combat-wounded. The 

transition will be completed by 30 September 2014. The changes are designed to improve care and transition of soldiers through increased standardization, increased 

cadre-to-soldier ratios, improved access to resources on installations, and reduced 

delays in care. They are not related to budget cuts, sequestration, or furloughs. The 

restructuring includes inactivation of the WTUs at Fort Irwin, CA; Fort Huachuca, 

AZ; Fort Jackson, SC; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ; and the U.S. Military 

Academy, West Point, NY. As of 21 January 2014, each location has fewer than 35 

soldiers assigned. 

The restructuring plan also includes the inactivation of nine Community Based 

Warrior Transition Units (CBWTUs) in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Puerto Rico, Utah, and Virginia. The CBWTUs currently provide services for Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers who do not require dayto-day care, allowing soldiers to continue their recoveries closer to home. CBWTU 

soldiers will be re-assigned to 13 new Community Care Units (CCUs) at WTUs located on Army installations. The Army will establish these CCUs at Fort Carson, 

CO; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, Forts Hood and Bliss, TX; Fort Riley, KS; Fort 

Knox, KY; Forts Benning, Stewart, and Gordon, GA; Fort Bragg, NC; and Fort 

Belvoir, VA. Forts Belvoir and Knox will each have two CCUs. The Puerto Rico 

CBWTU will become a Community Care detachment under the mission command 

of the Fort Gordon Warrior Transition Battalion. Soldiers will not have to move to 

those installations or change their care plans to receive medical attention after this 

reorganization. 

34. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, why were those changes made? 

Mr. CARSON. As of 21 January 2014, the WTU population was 7,078. This represents a decline of approximately 3,000 soldiers in the Army-wide Warrior Care 

Transition Program population over the past 14 months, a result of reduced contingency operations (fewer soldiers are arriving into WTUs/CBWTUs as fewer units deploy) and reduced mobilization of ARNG and USAR soldiers. These changes will 

allow the Army to scale the program to best meet the needs of the declining population. 

35. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, how can we sustain and improve the quality 

support we are providing to our wounded warriors and their family members? 

Mr. CARSON. The Army recognizes the care of our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers as a sacred obligation. Be assured that the Army will not falter in its commitment to the best care and transition of our wounded warriors and their families. 

They will continue to receive the best possible care and support as they transition 

either back to the force or into civilian life as veterans. 

The Army is constantly looking at ways to improve the care and support for our 

wounded, ill, and injured soldiers and their families. To that end, the Army has developed numerous programs. The implementation of the Army’s System of Health 

has empowered soldiers and their families with tools to improve their resiliency as 

they heal. The Army has also established Soldier Centered Medical Homes, which 

bring health care to soldiers in need. Moreover, the Warrior Transition Command 

conducts an annual review that includes all key Army stakeholders to ensure we 

provide quality care to our soldiers and their families. 

The Army has also reorganized as part of ensuring that wounded warriors receive 

optimum care. The force structure changes discussed above reflect the inherent 

scalability of this program, which can expand or contract while continuing to meet 

the evolving need. The standardization of care and transition services brought about 

by the force structure changes will continue to ensure that all soldiers receive quality services and support across the Army. 

In addition, the Army Medical Command and the Warrior Transition Command 

actively participate in the congressionally-mandated Interagency Care Coordination 

Committee which has studied and has made informed recommendations for improvements to the Services’ individual programs for wounded, ill, and injured miliVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
89 

tary members. These recommendations have been incorporated into the Warrior 

Care and Transition Program. 

The Army also uses information gleaned from independent sources to ensure continuous improvement; the Army Inspector General, DOD Inspector General, Recovering Warrior Task Force, GAO, and other auditing agencies monitor satisfaction 

levels of our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. They provide timely and accurate 

information that allows the Army to continue to both sustain and improve the quality support we are providing to our wounded warriors and their family members. 

MODERNIZATION

36. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, what are the Army’s top modernization priorities? 

Mr. CARSON. My understanding is that, given significant fiscal pressures, the 

Army’s investment in modernized equipment and capabilities will likely see reductions in the near-term. The Army will continue to prioritize a range of investments 

focusing on incremental upgrades to existing systems and new developmental programs. The Army’s top priorities include the Network, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, 

Paladin Integrated Management program, Armored Multipurpose Vehicle, and aviation platforms such as the Apache, Chinook, and Blackhawk helicopters. 

37. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Carson, do you believe the fiscal year 2014 omnibus bill 

adequately resources the Army’s modernization priorities? 

Mr. CARSON. The amount requested in the President’s budget submitted in fiscal 

year 2014 adequately addressed the Army’s requirements for modernization priorities. We are currently assessing the impacts of the fiscal year 2014 appropriation 

on our equipment modernization investments. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

ARMY

38. Senator LEE. Mr. Carson, with the military’s role in Afghanistan coming to 

an end and reduced budgets due to sequestration, the Army will likely need to undergo some form of restructuring. What are the biggest factors that you will consider and will drive the way in which Army restructures in the coming years? 

Mr. CARSON. The enduring priority of the Army is to preserve the high-quality 

All-Volunteer Force. The Army is committed to the Total Force Policy, in which the 

ARNG and USAR play key roles. In an era of likely budget austerity, the biggest 

factors driving restructure will be the need to meet the force and readiness requirements of the National Military Strategy, while ensuring that the drawdown in Army 

end strength is managed efficiently and equitably. 

39. Senator LEE. Mr. Carson, the National Guard played a key and essential role 

in the conflicts of the past decade. Do you believe that its role and relationship to 

the Active components will change as our troops withdraw from Afghanistan? 

Mr. CARSON. I believe that the ARNG provides operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet our Nation’s defense needs across the range of military operations. It is my understanding that there will be continuity in the relationship between the AC and Reserve components after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. 

40. Senator LEE. Mr. Carson, how should the National Guard figure into the 

Army’s need to cut costs in future years? 

Mr. CARSON. It is my understanding that the fiscal environment will likely result 

in cuts to all components of the Army. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will work 

to ensure that the cuts are distributed fairly across the components and are based 

solely on the best interests of the Nation. 

[The nomination reference of Hon. Brad R. Carson follows:] 

90 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 6, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Brad R. Carson, of Oklahoma, to be Under Secretary of the Army, vice Joseph W. 

Westphal. 

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Brad R. Carson, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF BRAD R. CARSON

Education: 

Baylor University 

• 1985–1989 

• B.A., History 

Oxford University 

• 1989–1991 

• B.A./M.A., Politics, Philosophy, & Economics 

University of Oklahoma 

• 1991–1994 

• J.D. 

Employment record: 

Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. 

• Attorney 

• September 1994–August 1997 

• Tulsa, OK 

Department of Defense 

• White House Fellow 

• September 1997–December 1998 

• Washington, DC 

Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. 

• Attorney 

• January 1999–February 2000 

• Tulsa, OK 

U.S. Congress 

• Congressman (2nd District - Oklahoma) 

• January 2001–January 2005 

• Washington, DC 

Harvard University 

• Fellow, Institute of Politics 

• February 2005–May 2005 

• Cambridge, MA 

Cherokee Nation Businesses, L.L.C. 

• Chief Executive Officer/Director of Business Development 

• June 2005–November 2008 

• Catoosa, OK 

U.S. Navy 

• Officer-in-Charge, MND–S, Weapons Intelligence Teams 

• December 2008–December 2009 

• Basrah, Iraq 

University of Tulsa 

• Associate Professor & Director, National Energy Policy Institute 

• January 2010–December 2011 

• Tulsa, OK 

Department of Defense 

91 

• General Counsel, U.S. Army 

• January 2012–present 

• Washington, DC 

Honors and awards: 

Military Awards 

• Bronze Star 

• Army Achievement Medal 

Academic Awards 

• Rhodes Scholar 

• Bledsoe Award for Outstanding Law School Graduate at the University 

of Oklahoma College of Law (1994) 

• Phi Beta Kappa 

• Magna cum laude, Baylor University 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate, and certain senior military officers as determined by the committee, to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Brad R. Carson in connection with 

his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Brad Rogers Carson. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Under Secretary, U.S. Army. 

3. Date of nomination: 

November 21, 2013. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

Winslow, AZ; March 11, 1967. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Julie Kruse Carson. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Jack David Carson; age 8. 

92 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Baylor University, B.A., 1989, 1985–1989 

Oxford University, B.A./M.A., 1991 (1989–1991) 

University of Oklahoma, J.D., 1994 (1991–1994) 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

U.S. Congressman, 2nd District of Oklahoma, January 2001–January 2005, Washington, DC. 

Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 2005–May 

2005, Cambridge, MA. 

CEO & President/Director, Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC, June 2005–December 2008, Catoosa, OK. 

Officer-in-Charge, Weapons Intelligence Teams, MND–S, December 2008–December 2009, Iraq. 

Associate Professor of Business, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa, 

December 2009–January 2012, Tulsa, OK. 

Director, National Energy Policy Institute, University of Tulsa, December 2009– 

January 2012, Tulsa, OK. 

General Counsel, U.S. Army, Department of Defense, 2011 (confirmed)/2012 (assumed duties)–present. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

White House Fellow, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1997–1998 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Oklahoma Bar Association, Member, 1994–present. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

U.S. Congress, 2nd District of Oklahoma. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

Obama for America National Finance Committee, 2006–2008. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

Williams for City Council, 2011, $500 

Smith-Soap for Chief, 2011, $5,000 

Obama Victory Fund, 2011, $1,000 

Reid for Senate, 2010, $1,000 

Edmondson for Governor, 2010, $4,000 

Gumm for Senate, 2010, $1,000 

Williams for House, 2010, $500 

Burrage for Senate, 2010, $2,000 

Boren for Congress, 2010, $2,000 

Paddock for State Superintendent, 2010, $750 

Adelson for Mayor, 2009, $3,000 

AmeriPac, 2008, $2,500 

Adelson for Senate, 2008, $2,000 

Hoskin for House, 2008, $250 

Rice for Senate, 2008, $250 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Bronze Star, 2009 

Army Achievement Medal, 2009 

Board of Directors, National Job Corps Association, 2005-2008 

U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce Ten Outstanding Young Americans, 2002 

93 

Rhodes Scholar, 1989–1991 

White House Fellow, 1997–1998 

Exceptional Contribution to Legal Services of Eastern Oklahoma, 1996 

Bledsoe Award for Outstanding Law School Graduate from The University of 

Oklahoma, 1994 

Adjunct Professor of Law (Law and Literature), University of Tulsa College of 

Law, 1997 

Legal Services of Eastern Oklahoma, Board of Directors, 1997 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

‘‘The Liberal Moment What Happened?’’ in Symposium Issue of Democracy: A 

Journal of Ideas (along with Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, Danielle Allen, William Galston, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Reich, Katha Pollit, and Joe Klein) (Spring 

2010) 

‘‘The Claremore Diarist’’ in The New Republic (November 22, 2004) 

‘‘Does the Democratic Party Have a Future?’’ in The Weekly Standard (September 

16, 2002) (review of The Emerging Democratic Majority by Judis and Texeira) 

‘‘Pay to Play,’’ in Blueprint Magazine (May 31, 2005) 

‘‘The Fall of the House of Representatives’’ in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas (September 2006) (review of The House: A History Of The House Of Representatives by 

Remini) 

‘‘Smart Development Subsidies’’ in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas (part of ‘‘20 

Ideas for the Next President’’) (Spring 2008). 

Tate v. Browning-Ferris Industries: Oklahoma Adepts A Common Law Action For 

Employment Discrimination, 46 Okla. L. Rev. 557 (1993). 

Legal Issues Facing Small Businesses And Their Owners (with Michael Troilo) in 

Human Resource Management in Small Business (New Horizons In Management) 

(eds. Cooper and Burke) 

Federal Appellate Practice (with Robert E. Bacharach) in Appellate Manual For 

Oklahoma Lawyers (eds. Muchmore & Ellis) (3 vols.) (1997) 

The Economics of Renewable Energy, in The Handbook of Energy Finance (Wiley. 

2012) (ed. Simians) 

Renewable Energy Economics (available at www.ssm.com) 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

N/A. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

94 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

BRAD R. CARSON. 

This 6th day of December, 2013. 

[The nomination of Hon. Brad R. Carson was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on January 28, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on February 12, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. William A. LaPlante by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions, 

particularly with respect to the role of the service acquisition executives? 

Answer. I agree with the goals of these defense reforms; indeed they have yielded 

a demonstrated improvement in the joint warfighting capabilities of the U.S. military. I do not currently see the need for any modifications. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. None at this time. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition? 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition is the Service 

Acquisition Executive (SAE) for the Air Force, the senior position authorized to exercise, on behalf of the Secretary, overall responsibility for acquisition functions 

within the Air Force. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I possess more than 28 years of experience in defense technology including positions at the MITRE Corporation and the Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory. I have also served as member of the Defense Science Board, a 

special advisor to the U.S. Strategic Command’s Senior Advisory Group and Naval 

Research Advisory Committee. 

Prior to entering public service, I was the Missile Defense Portfolio Director for 

the MITRE Corporation. In this role, I led a technical team providing analytic and 

system engineering expertise across the Missile Defense Agency portfolio of ballistic 

missile defense systems. Previously, I was the Department Head for Global Engagement at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) 

where I was responsible for all of APL’s work supporting offensive military capabilities. Additionally, I was a member of APL’s Executive Council and served on many 

other Laboratory leadership initiatives. As a senior manager at both MITRE and 

JHU/APL, I’ve had the opportunity to successfully lead large organizations with significant technical missions in support of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its 

major research and acquisition programs. 

In the brief time I have been in the government, I have been extremely impressed 

with the dedication and professionalism of the Air Force acquisition workforce as 

well as OSD. I am absolutely committed to help the Air Force Acquisition Enterprise achieve the levels of excellence, including improving acquisition outcomes, that 

I know it can. 

95 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition? 

Answer. No; however, if confirmed, important to my success in this role will be 

my continued interaction, engagement and collaboration with other senior leaders 

engaged in the defense establishment, such as the other Component Acquisition Executives, the Defense Acquisition Executive, and the Air Force leadership. Additionally, continued interaction, engagement and collaboration with the scientific community and defense industry will be a foundation of acquisition success. I intend to 

heavily leverage my network of defense and technology experts across the government, industry, and academia. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be with: 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD(AT&L) is DOD’s most senior acquisition official. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Mr. Kendall on all matters related to acquisition, technology, 

and logistics programs impacting the Department of the Air Force. In my present 

role, I have a very good professional relationship with Mr. Kendall and I have found 

him to be extremely effective and helpful to Air Force efforts to execute our largest 

and most visible programs. 

Question. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Principal Deputy on all 

matters related to acquisition, technology, and logistics programs impacting the Department of the Air Force. In my present role, I have a very good professional relationship with Mr. Estevez and if confirmed, I look forward to continuing that relationship. 

Question. The Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force. If confirmed, I look 

forward to continuing the solid working relationship of the past as a direct report 

responsible to the Secretary for all acquisition, research, and development. In my 

present role, I have already had significant interaction with Secretary James and 

have found her to be extremely engaged and supportive of Air Force acquisition success. 

Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject to the Secretary of the Air Force’s direction and control, to act for and with the authority of 

the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters for which the Secretary is responsible; 

that is, to conduct the affairs of the Department of the Air Force. If confirmed, I 

would continue to foster a close working relationship with Mr. Fanning to ensure 

that policies and resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Air Force. 

Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Assistant Secretaries of 

the Air Force and foster teamwork and information sharing in order to carry out 

the goals and priorities of the Department of the Air Force and in cross cutting 

areas where horizontal integration of Air Force people and resources is required and 

provides best value to DOD, the combatant commanders, and the taxpayer. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is subject to the authority, direction, 

and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, presides over the Air Staff, and is a 

principal advisor to the Secretary. In addition, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff he is a military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and 

the Secretary of Defense. The relationship between the Assistant Secretary and the 

Chief of Staff is extremely important. If confirmed, I would continue to foster a close 

working relationship with General Welsh to ensure that policies and resources are 

appropriate to meet the needs of the Air Force and respect his additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force. 

Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief ethics official of 

the Department of the Air Force and serves as the senior legal advisor to Air Force 

leaders. He is responsible, on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and efficient provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I will continue to foster a good working relationship with the General Counsel. 

Question. The Service Acquisition Executives of the Army and Navy. 

96 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing the close working relationship 

with Mr. Sean Stackley and Ms. Heidi Shyu. A strong national defense will require 

joint capability portfolios, reduction of program redundancy, improved joint interoperability across service centric platforms, and increased joint R&D and acquisition 

initiatives with new organizations and processes that cut across traditional stovepipes. As senior leaders in acquisition in the Department, all three SAEs must work 

together to reshape the defense enterprise. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition? 

Answer. The Air Force Acquisition Enterprise is exceptionally capable and continues to deliver the world’s best and most advanced weapons and other capabilities. 

After having been in the Principal Deputy position for over 8 months, I have a much 

better understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing the Air Force Acquisition Enterprise. My initial assessment is that the Enterprise has the following 

areas of concern that require attention: the challenges linked to declining and unstable budgets as well as the need to better manage and develop the acquisition 

workforce. Furthermore, while progress has been made on acquisition improvement 

via initiatives such as Better Buying Power, the Air Force acquisition community 

will need to continue to improve cost and schedule performance. The often well cited 

challenges to do better up front systems engineering, robust risk management, assessment of technology maturity levels, and disciplined approaches to requirements 

development and changes, are all areas that are improving in the Air Force but still 

have ways to go to systemically improve acquisition outcomes across the enterprise. 

This must be sustained over a long term to have lasting impact, and if confirmed, 

will be my areas of emphasis. 

The budgetary environment challenges acquisitions directly by impacting the dollars available to develop, procure, field and sustain systems, as well as indirectly, 

including the recent furloughs and government shutdown cutting into the time 

available for the workforce to accomplish essential tasks. Budgetary limitations and 

instability will be a fact of life for the foreseeable future. While both the Air Force 

and DOD are taking steps to mitigate these challenges, there is no doubt the current environment will impact existing programs. Minimizing the impact to key programs like the KC–46 Tanker, F–35, the Long-Range Strike Bomber and others, is 

a major challenge. Additionally, I have witnessed how budget uncertainty has made 

it extremely difficult for our program managers to manage established cost and 

schedule baselines; for example driving decisions toward short term contracts and 

strategies that may be less efficient for the taxpayer than longer term ones (such 

as multi-year contracts). 

The performance of the workforce is even more impressive given the environment 

in which they are performing. With the likelihood of a shrinking workforce, it is essential we develop a workforce structure that is agile enough to realign program 

staffing and skill mix to meet evolving mission needs. The desired end state should 

be to ensure solid functional career management while permitting the flexibility to 

better realign the workforce when necessary. We also need to closely monitor the 

morale and associated attrition rates of our highly skilled early career personnel— 

the past year has impacted our workforce in ways we are still trying to understand, 

and we must minimize any negative effect on the broader long-term effort to revitalize the acquisition workforce. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on forcing the Enterprise to determine if a capability requirement is worth the cost. In my current position, I have stressed how 

requirements can drive cost, with the intent of guiding the community to evaluate 

how changing or reducing a requirement, even slightly, can have significant cost 

and schedule ramifications. Cost/schedule versus capability trade-off curves are a 

valuable tool in identifying which requirements are key cost drivers and can assist 

in the assessment of which requirements can be reduced. The Configuration Steering Boards (CSB) and the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council (AFROC) provide two forums to evaluate requirements priorities and trade-offs, and while the 

AFROC has been essential to this task, I am seeking to increase the effectiveness 

of CSBs in this regard. Finally, the acquisition community has demonstrated its 

commitment to cultivating a strong working relationship with the requirements 

community, and the teamwork between acquisitions and requirements will continue 

to pay dividends as we face a challenging future. 

97 

While there are a number of initiatives in work to help the Air Force reduce the 

cost of programs, I think the most important thing I can do is to increase the senior 

leadership emphasis on execution. I will personally hold Program Executive Officers 

(PEO) and individual program managers accountable for the outcomes of their programs. To enable this, quarterly and Annual Acquisition Performance Assessments 

of the Acquisition Enterprise are reported and assessed. These can be an invaluable 

tool to evaluate the state of acquisition cost, schedule, and performance. 

Workforce qualifications are another major challenge facing the enterprise. It will 

be essential that personnel in key positions have knowledge and experience in specific program domains and phases. I have been impressed in my short tenure as 

Principal Deputy in the quality of the workforce in our key programs; challenges 

that need attention are to build depth in the talent as well as building mechanisms 

for increased mobility and flexibility to quickly move top talent to high need programs. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with our new Secretary of the Air Force 

as well as our Chief of Staff of the Air Force to establish an action plan that aligns 

with their priorities for Air Force Acquisition in order to address these areas. I see 

these challenges as an opportunity to revamp the Air Force Acquisition Enterprise 

to be more efficient and effective. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish for Air Force acquisition, research, and technology? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to focus on what I consider some of the Air Force’s 

most challenging problems in the acquisition arena. My preliminary assessment is 

that our effectiveness is often measured by how well we execute our most visible 

programs; however, the discipline and tradecraft with which we do so also makes 

us successful in the execution of our less visible, smaller programs. Rightfully so, 

acquisition performance will be judged by our weakest programs, not our strongest. 

We must continue to develop and grow our acquisition workforce to ensure it can 

keep our most critical acquisition programs on track, but so that we can also ‘‘own 

the technical baseline’’ for our weapon systems and other capabilities. We must 

strengthen our organic ability to develop, produce, field and sustain the most technologically advanced systems this world has ever known. I believe this priority is 

consistent with our new Air Force Secretary’s priority to take care of people, which 

includes recruiting, training and shaping a quality force. 

Sound resource execution is another critical focus item so that we can more effectively stretch the benefit of every dollar with which we are entrusted. Our Secretary 

of the Air Force (SECAF) has identified as a priority the need to ensure our Air 

Force remains the most capable in the world at the lowest possible cost. In this environment of declining resources and budget uncertainty, we must be extremely efficient and effective in how we plan to use, and ultimately spend our scarce fiscal 

resources. Mr. Kendall’s Better Buying Power Initiatives are a good set of guiding 

principles that help us to be effective resource stewards. 

Finally, we have a responsibility to develop and deliver the Air Force capabilities 

required to fight and win in the 2023 timeframe and beyond. Among other things, 

this means being able to fight and win in highly contested environments, including 

being challenged in space, control of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and cyber. I believe this priority meshes well with our SECAF’s priority to balance today’s readiness with tomorrow’s modernization. As we preserve the Service’s current readiness 

posture, our Air Force must also make investment decisions that will ensure we remain the most capable Air Force in the world in the 2023 and beyond timeframe. 

This requires that we invest in important science and technology advancements, 

maintain a global technology horizon scan to identify emerging disruptive technologies, and developing comprehensive modernization and recapitalization strategies designed to keep our Air Force the greatest in the world. 

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION

Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems 

is affordable given decreasing defense budgets, the historic cost growth trends for 

major systems, and the continuing costs of ongoing contingency operations? 

Answer. Yes. Air Force Acquisition is responsible to uniformed servicemembers 

and the American taxpayers to ensure that they have the best equipment at the 

best value. I support USD(AT&L)’s affordability initiative to establish goals and 

caps to ensure funding limitations are identified early and revalidated at milestone 

98 

decisions. If programs exceed their affordability goals, the Air Force will make a decision to restructure the programs so they are affordable. 

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue? 

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the requirements and resource communities to ensure programs have clear, achievable requirements and realistic funding profiles. 

Question. What would be the impact of a decision by the Department to reduce 

purchases of major systems because of affordability issues? 

Answer. Air Force requirements are carefully structured to ensure the service can 

support its needs based on current threats. Any reduction of major systems will affect our overall. Any reduction of major system purchases will result in reduced 

force structure. Such reductions to planned force structure will impact the Services 

ability to meet COCOM requirements, thus affecting readiness. I am committed to 

ensuring that all Air Force programs meet their affordability goals to best support 

the warfighter. 

Question. Specifically, are sufficient funds allocated in future years’ budgets to 

execute the Air Force’s current acquisition plans for major systems, including, but 

not limited to, the F–35, KC–46, the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS–B). 

Answer. The deep cuts brought on by sequestration-level funding has forced the 

Air Force to make profound cuts to readiness and major defense acquisition programs funded out of investment accounts in order to achieve the targeted reduction 

amounts in the first few years of the fiscal year defense plan. When forced to make 

tough decisions, I understand the Air Force will favor new capabilities over upgrades to legacy forces. I understand the top three acquisition priorities remain the 

KC–46, the F–35, and the LRS–B. As best as possible, the Air Force will aim to 

protect these programs in the current fiscal environment. 

Question. Nearly half of DOD’s major defense acquisition programs have exceeded 

the so-called ‘‘Nunn-McCurdy’’ cost growth standards established in section 2433 of 

title 10, U.S.C., to identify seriously troubled programs. Section 206 of the Weapon 

Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) tightened the standards for addressing such programs. 

Answer. The Air Force is committed to reducing costs across all acquisition programs. The Air Force closely tracks execution and provides guidance as necessary 

to keep efforts ‘‘on track’’. The number of Nunn-McCurdy breaches has declined significantly since the mid-2000s (fiscal year 2005–2008 had 26 breaches over 14 programs). Over the past 3 years, the Air Force has had 5 programs declare a significant or critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. Of those, three are no longer Major Defense 

Acquisition Programs (MDAP) (C–27J, C–130AMP, and National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite System), one was driven by a combination of 

quantity reductions and cost growth (Global Hawk), and one resulted from restoration to MDAP status (EELV). This past year, the Air Force had no Nunn-McCurdy 

breaches. 

Question. In your opinion, what is the root cause for cost growth in the Department’s major weapon system programs? 

Answer. The 2013 USD/AT&L Report on the Performance of the Acquisition System lists three dominant root causes of Nunn-McCurdy cost growth over the past 

3 years. Poor Management effectiveness was the primary root cause and included: 

poor systems engineering to translate user requirements into testable specifications; 

ineffective use of contractual incentives; poor risk management; and poor situational 

awareness. Additional dominant root causes are unrealistic baseline cost and schedule estimates and changes in procurement quantities. 

Question. To what extent does requirements creep and changes in requirement 

quantities impact cost growth triggering Nunn-McCurdy breaches? 

Answer. These two factors may impact Unit Cost growth. Changing requirements 

based on warfighter needs can lead to cost and schedule growth. However, as the 

Air Force has worked to better integrate the requirements and budgeting process, 

changing requirements is being seen less as a driver, and I expect that to remain 

so, especially as we move into an era of decreased budgets. Although over the past 

3 years, only 22 percent of Nunn-McCurdy breeches were driven by changes in procurement quantities, I am concerned with the impact budget reduction-driven 

changes in quantities will have on Defense programs in an environment of declining 

resources. 

Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address the out-ofcontrol cost growth on DOD’s major defense acquisition programs? 

Answer. DOD, in concert with recent legislation such as WSARA, has begun to 

address much of the cost growth seen in the past. This may be evidenced by the 

reduced number of Nunn-McCurdy breaches over the past few years. As a cautionary note, many of the WSARA reforms as well as the related Better Buying 

99 

Power initiatives are going to take years to affect the final acquisition outcomes of 

programs; for that reason it is critical that the enterprise be persistent in their dissemination and application. If confirmed, I am committed to working with fellow 

SAEs in supporting the Department’s efforts in Better Buying Power implementation and related foundational reforms of WSARA. The intent of this effort is to contain cost growth to provide the warfighter increased capability with decreased 

costs—truly better buying power. I am particularly focused on controlling cost and 

schedule growth of development programs as that is where we can perhaps see the 

biggest impact in the near to mid-term. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe that the Air Force should consider 

taking in the case of major defense acquisition programs that exceed the critical cost 

growth thresholds established in the ‘‘Nunn-McCurdy’’ provision? 

Answer. Under such circumstances, there are mechanisms in place that allow for 

major restructuring or termination of poorly performing programs. While program 

terminations are rare, the Air Force leadership, working in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff has the authority to cancel programs. In this era of sharply declining budgets, it would not be surprising to see 

program terminations used more frequently in the case of troubled programs. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Defense Acquisition Executive and 

PEOs to ensure the Air Force continues to avoid programs exceeding thresholds. 

PEOs have been tasked with implementing Program Integration precepts which organize and synchronize the analyses and outputs that programs must carry out into 

a comprehensive process. Examples of analyses are cost estimating, schedule management, earned value management, and integrated risk analysis. The program integration function assists them in overseeing proper and efficient execution of the 

efforts within their respective portfolios. 

Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the Nunn-McCurdy provision, 

as revised by section 206? 

Answer. I do not currently envision any required changes to the current provision. 

Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to recommend terminating a program that has experienced critical cost growth under Nunn-McCurdy? 

Answer. If a program has a Nunn-McCurdy breach, then OSD conducts a review 

and certification process to meet the requirements as laid out in title 10, U.S.C., 

section 2433. My recommendation to continue or terminate a program would be 

based on an assessment of program execution performance, remaining risk, and Air 

Force needs. 

Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether someone should be 

held accountable for Nunn-McCurdy breaches? 

Answer. An investigation into the decisions, and information available at the time 

of the decisions, are considered prior to making an accountability determination for 

anyone in the acquisition execution chain. Using well established best practices, we 

must arrive at root cause of acquisition failures before moving to the steps of assessing accountability. Accountability must also be directly tied to authority and resources. If an individual did not have the authority or the resources to properly execute their program due to budget, cost, schedule, technical or other factors outside 

of their control, then the individual cannot and should not be held accountable. In 

all cases, if confirmed I am committed to giving our program managers and PEOs 

the right authorities, responsibilities, and then holding the chain of command accountable for the outcome. 

POSSIBLE REVISIONS TO DODI 5000.02

Question. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Frank Kendall has recently released revisions to Department of Defense Instructions (DODI) 5000.02, which governs the defense acquisition system. 

What are the top five changes to this instruction you would recommend to streamline or otherwise improve the defense acquisition system? 

Answer. I am still in the process of reviewing the recent revision to DODI 

5000.02, but if confirmed, I look forward to working with Mr. Kendall on continuing 

to streamline and improve the defense acquisition system. 

Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the review effort? 

Answer. My understanding is the objectives of the review was to publish a revised 

instruction that: decreased emphasis on ‘‘rules’’ and increases emphasis on process 

intent and thoughtful program planning; provides program structures and procedures tailored to the dominant characteristics of the product being acquired and to 

unique program circumstances, (e.g., risk and urgency); enhances the discussion of 

100 

program management responsibility and key supporting disciplines; and institutionalizes changes to statute and policy since the last issuance of DODI 5000.02. 

OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS

Question. The Department estimates that operating and support (O&S) costs account for up to 70 percent of the acquisition costs of major weapon systems. Section 

832 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 requires 

the Department to take a series of steps to improve its processes for estimating, 

managing, and reducing such costs. 

What is the current status of the Air Force’s efforts to implement the requirements of section 832? 

Answer. The Air Force has implemented the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, section 

832 through comprehensive guidance on assessing, managing and controlling operating and support (O&S) cost for major weapon systems. The Air Force is working 

with key stake holders on readiness and O&S funding drivers to balance readiness 

and cost in weapon system sustainment strategies. Examples of ongoing section 832 

related initiatives include: implementation of guidance requiring life cycle 

sustainment planning documents to include comprehensive sustainment strategy 

and cost information; implementation of independent logistics assessments to ensure 

effectiveness of sustainment planning; and the establishment and monitoring of program affordability targets. 

Question. What steps remain to be taken to implement section 832, and what is 

the Air Force’s schedule for taking these steps? 

Answer. The Air Force, in a collaborative effort between acquisition and 

sustainment leadership, is taking steps to increase the effective implementation of 

performance based product support per guidance from OSD (AT&L). Current actions 

expected to be completed in 2014 include establishing a program evaluation methodology, identifying a high payoff target program list, and finalizing implementation 

strategy recommendations. 

Question. Regarding section 832(b)(8), what Air Force processes are being performed to ensure O&S costs are reduced by ensuring the depot maintenance considerations are part of the entire acquisition process? What additional processes are 

required to further bring down O&S costs by ensuring depot maintenance considerations are part of the entire acquisition process? 

Answer. Through implementation of statute and regulation, Air Force guidance 

requires early and continuous consideration of depot maintenance including at oversight reviews and in life cycle planning documentation. Additionally, the Air Force 

is already taking steps to shift the organizational and cultural focus of acquisition 

headquarters to adopt an Integrated Life Cycle Management and portfolio perspective. I have no additional process recommendations, but if confirmed, I will continue 

to look for opportunities to reduce O&S costs. 

Question. What steps, if any, are needed to ensure that the requirements and acquisition communities fully and effectively collaborate to understand and control the 

O&S costs prior to and early in product development, when it is possible to have 

the most significant impact on those costs? 

Answer. In November 2012, as a direct result of the Acquisition Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) 2.0 effort, the Air Force implemented policy titled ‘‘Implementation of Contractual and Requirements Sufficiency’’ to address Life Cycle Affordability Cost versus Capability Tradeoff Analysis at all requirements and acquisition review boards. The policy mandates cost/schedule versus capability/design 

trade-off curves (metrics) throughout the life of the program. Implementing Commands, such as Air Force Materiel Command, support the requirements sponsor by 

providing the analysis for all developmental Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) documents. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force needs to take 

to bring O&S costs under control? 

Answer. In concert with the logistics community, Air Force Acquisition is focusing 

efforts on the design, development, and delivery of life cycle supportable and sustainable systems and the appropriate support equipment. The goal is to enhance 

warfighter mission capabilities while minimizing corrosion, environment, safety, and 

occupational health risks along with minimizing life cycle system product support 

costs. The Air Force is also linking weapon systems sustainment resources to readiness measures to optimize cost versus readiness. 

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

Question. One of the premises for WSARA was that the best way to improve acquisition outcomes is to place acquisition programs on a sounder footing from the 

101 

outset by addressing program shortcomings in the early phases of the acquisition 

process. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Developmental Test and Evaluation reported in May 2008 that ‘‘the single most important step necessary’’ to address high rates of failure on defense acquisition programs is ‘‘to ensure programs 

are formulated to execute a viable systems engineering strategy from the beginning.’’ 

Do you believe that the Air Force has the systems engineering and developmental 

testing organizations, resources, and capabilities needed to ensure that there is a 

sound basis for key requirements, acquisition, and budget decisions on major defense acquisition programs? 

Answer. The Air Force has been successfully building towards achieving the systems engineering resources and capabilities required to perform important acquisition activities. Sound systems engineering, especially early on, is fundamental to ensuring there is a sound basis for requirements and that they are affordable, as well 

as ensuring we implement and execute a successful acquisition program strategy. 

To this end, the Air Force continuously evaluates the resources and capabilities necessary to supply systems engineering support to acquisition programs. In the process of getting to the necessary systems engineering workforce resource levels, the 

Air Force has been consistently hitting our yearly goals and there is a plan in place 

for more improvements for fiscal year 2014. In addition, there is currently a significant enterprise-level effort to evaluate and improve deficiencies in Air Force systems 

engineering capabilities to enable high quality engineering decisions, improve engineering discipline through technical information management and standardization, 

as well as continuously address engineering workforce issues. 

In terms of test and evaluation, the Air Force test personnel, facilities, equipment 

are first class, adequate and efficient. The Air Force Materiel Command reorganization to a 5-center construct has improved management of developmental test. At 

this time, my concern is that budget pressures will reduce available test resources 

which may ultimately increase weapon system cost and warfighter risk. 

Question. Are all the steps which the Air Force takes to ensure a viable systems 

engineering strategy necessary to achieve the goals articulated in the 2008 Report? 

Specifically, which processes and procedures provide little or no value added, or for 

which any value added is outweighed by the cost or schedule delay of the processes 

or procedures. In addition, what elements of organizations and layers of review are 

redundant and unnecessary, add cost, or create schedule delays without adding commensurate value. 

Answer. Section 102 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act required systems engineering to support key three key requirements. 

1. Acquisition and budget decisions made for each major defense acquisition program prior to Milestone A approval and Milestone B approval through a rigorous systems analysis and systems engineering process. 

2. Include a robust program for improving reliability, availability, maintainability, and sustainability as an integral part of design and development within 

the systems engineering master plan for each major defense acquisition program. 

3. Identify systems engineering requirements, including reliability, availability, 

maintainability, and lifecycle management and sustainability requirements, 

during the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System process, and incorporate such systems engineering requirements into contract requirements 

for each major defense acquisition program. 

All three of the key requirements have been implemented and I consider value 

added. The program Systems Engineering Plan and the execution of this plan is key 

to accomplishing the requirements. In addition, the Air Force has streamlined program technical oversight reviews, when determined necessary by the Air Force 

Chief Engineer, to minimize added cost while being value added to ensure program 

success. The Air Force assists the Deputy Assistant of Secretary of Defense Systems 

Engineering Program Support Reviews which are completed for ACAT ID, MAIS 

programs, and special interest programs. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Air Force’s implementation to date of 

section 102 of WSARA, regarding systems engineering? 

Answer. I am pleased by the good working relationship that Air Force acquisition 

has with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering. We 

work with his staff to make improvements in WSARA focus areas and we collaborate to document the status of Air Force systems engineering in the annual WSARA 

Report. 

Specifically, the Air Force is making progress implementing two important areas 

cited in section 102 of WSARA, early systems engineering and reliability. In 2013, 

102 

SAF/AQ helped establish the Air Force Requirements Review Group (AFRRG) in 

order to increase program success by tightening the linkage between requirements 

development and acquisition. SAF/AQ participates in the AFRRG, allowing Air 

Force engineers to ensure tight linkage between requirements, technology maturity, 

and accomplishment of sufficient early systems engineering to inform cost and capability analyses. 

In the area of reliability, the Air Force continues to collaborate with OSD and the 

Army and Navy through the Service Leads meetings held by DASD(SE). We have 

aided efforts refining the DAES Reliability Growth Curve (RGC) reporting requirement mandated under DTM 11–003, the development and review of the OSD R&M 

engineering management guide, improving RAM–C Rationale Report Guidance, and 

the ongoing human capital initiatives for the RAM workforce. 

Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to implement this provision? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to refine Air Force engineering enterprise 

governance to enable high-quality engineering decisions and seamless communication. Air Force engineers must have the technical expertise to build a strong collaborative partnership with industry to ensure we acquire and field the capabilities the 

Air Force needs while ensuring the American taxpayers’ interests remain a priority. 

Furthermore, hiring the best and brightest talent is challenging in this fiscal environment but must also continue to be a priority. I will exercise my authority as Air 

Force Scientist and Engineer Career Field Functional Authority to explore and pursue, as cited in section 102, additional authorities or resources needed to attract, 

retain, and reward systems engineers with appropriate levels experience and technical expertise to meet Air Force needs. 

TECHNOLOGICAL MATURITY

Question. Section 2366b of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Milestone Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to certify that critical technologies 

have reached an appropriate level of maturity before Milestone B approval. 

What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that the Air Force 

complies with the requirements of section 2366b? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Air Force continues to comply with 2366b 

certification requirements. The Air Force has established robust compliance processes that I will monitor and continue to improve upon. For example, the Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) process has been reestablished and guidance is 

being published to ensure a formal, independent assessment of critical technologies. 

In accordance with this guidance, TRAs will be conducted by a team of subject matter experts, carefully selected from the Centers’ engineering and scientific community, prior to Milestone B. These experts will verify the technologies are sufficiently 

mature to meet the Milestone B 2366b certification requirement, and their TRA report will be approved by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, 

Technology, and Engineering before a program is recommended to proceed to Milestone B. 

Question. Are you satisfied that technology readiness assessments adequately address systems integration and engineering issues which are the cause of many cost 

overruns and schedule delays in acquisition programs? 

Answer. No. While technology readiness assessments are essential to help avoid 

many cost overruns and schedule delays, they are not sufficient as a stand-alone solution for systems integration and engineering risks. The expertise of a professional 

engineering workforce within the Air Force acquisition community to perform early 

systems engineering analysis is also critical to addressing these challenges. This 

workforce must balance the integration of: 

(1) Overall systems engineering design and process, 

(2) Concerns for operational mission requirements, 

(3) The state of current available technologies (TRLs 8 & 9), 

(4) Near-term technologies in laboratory development (TRLs 4–6), and 

(5) Increasingly stringent concerns for funding and schedule realism. 

An engineering workforce effectively addressing these issues earlier in the program will help mitigate cost overruns and schedule delays in future systems. 

Question. Beyond addressing technological maturity issues in acquisition programs, what other steps should the Air Force take to increase accountability and 

discipline in the acquisition process? 

Answer. It would be unreasonable to hold a program manager accountable for program failures for which he/she has inadequate authorities or resources to affect outcomes. If confirmed, I will continue to improve accountability and discipline in acquisitions by first ensuring program managers have the adequate authorities to exeVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
103 

cute their missions. I am committed to vigorously defending the authorities granted 

to the program manager and ensuring he/she continues to have the required expertise and resources to lead our programs successfully. Finally, the culture must allow 

for program managers to be able to ‘‘raise a flag’’ if they assess the program they 

are to manage is not executable. 

Question. What features of an acquisition program, in your view, contribute most 

to the effective maturation and integration of advanced technologies? 

Answer. Competitive prototyping, when practical and affordable, is important because it drives technology maturation early in the acquisition, enables effective systems engineering, and allows the warfighter to see the potential capability demonstrated in an operational or relevant environment. This leads to the most effective 

maturation of technology with the minimization of programmatic risk. 

CONCURRENCY

Question. Some of the Department’s largest and most troubled acquisition programs appear to have suffered significantly from excessive concurrency—the effort 

to produce a weapon system, even as it is still being designed. 

What impact do you believe that such excessive concurrency has on our efforts 

to produce major weapon systems on schedule and on budget? 

Answer. With any strategy there are risks of cost growth and schedule slippages. 

Concurrency is often highlighted as a reason for cost growth. Unfortunately, research into this acquisition strategy is sparse. A study published in the July 2011 

edition of the Defense Acquisition Research Journal found that ‘‘concurrency by 

itself is insufficient to predict cost growth’’. There may be other factors, such as 

quantity, requirements and budget changes that create cost growth. Surprisingly, 

the study found that ‘‘too little concurrency was actually more problematic than too 

much concurrency’’ and could contribute to greater cost growth. 

Mr. Kendall has spoken extensively on this subject. He has noted that excessive 

concurrency can drive cost growth and result in major schedule disruptions that 

produce further inefficiency. One must keep in mind that the acceptable degree of 

concurrency between development and production depends on a range of factors including the risk associated with the development phase, the urgency of the need, 

and the likely impact on cost and schedule of realizing that risk. A careful balance 

must be struck on every program, taking all these factors and others into account. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the DAE and PEOs to ensure that balance is carefully assessed and properly managed. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address this issue? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will weigh the risks with the potential rewards of concurrency and make informed decisions that are in the best interest of the Air Force 

and the taxpayer. 

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that it is useful and 

appropriate to require prime contractors on major defense acquisition programs to 

share in concurrency costs? 

Answer. If the driving reason for taking on concurrency would benefit the prime 

contractor in executing the contract and the risks and rewards were acceptable to 

the Air Force, I believe that both parties should share in the concurrency costs and 

share in both the risk and reward. 

Question. In your view, would a requirement for such cost sharing reduce the likelihood of excessive concurrency in the development and production of major weapon 

systems? 

Answer. Yes. If both parties have ‘‘skin in the game,’’ then the likelihood of taking 

on concurrency will be a deliberate decision by both parties to accept the risks and 

rewards. 

UNREALISTIC COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS

Question. Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly optimistic cost and schedule 

estimates and unrealistic performance expectations. Section 201 of WSARA seeks to 

address this problem by promoting early consideration of trade-offs among cost, 

schedule, and performance objectives in major defense acquisition programs. 

Do you believe that early communication between the acquisition, budget, and requirements communities in DOD can help ensure more realistic cost, schedule, and 

performance expectations? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure such 

communication? 

104 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to shift the organizational and cultural focus of acquisition headquarters to adopt an Integrated Life Cycle Management and portfolio perspective. This will help address WSARA section 201 and will 

align acquisition headquarters with life cycle organizational changes already made 

in the field headquarters and amongst the PEO organizations. The main shift will 

be having our acquisition program element monitors partnering with the O&S program element monitors and other functional staff to ensure that all actions are a 

result of total life cycle deliberative process. 

Question. DOD has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule, and performance expectations more realistic and achievable. 

Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development can help improve the performance of the Air Force’s major acquisition programs? 

Answer. Yes. While not a panacea, using an incremental acquisition approach (e.g. 

block) can help improve program performance. This approach is premised on knowledge-based, incremental development that provides increasing degrees of 

warfighting capability with each block. This is the preferred strategy that provides 

the most effective balance of technical risk, financial resources, and the Air Forces’ 

operational needs. 

Question. What risks do you see in the Air Force’s use of incremental acquisition 

and spiral development? 

Answer. If implemented correctly, there would be modest to very little technical 

risk to using such a strategy. If not correctly implemented, incremental development 

could result in the program being overwhelmed with frequent milestone or fielding 

decision points and associated approval reviews. It is important to structure programs so multiple activities or build phases may be approved at any given milestone 

or decision point, subject to adequate planning, well-defined exit criteria, and demonstrated progress. Having a well-trained acquisition workforce is critical to mitigating the risk since the use of incremental development can lead to additional complexities in all phases of the program including testing, management, sustainment, 

and security. 

Question. In your view, has the Air Force’s approach to incremental acquisition 

and spiral development been successful? Why or why not? 

Answer. The Air Force has had successes with both incremental acquisition (Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, F–16, F–15) and spiral development (Ops 

software for Air Operations Centers). We consider both approaches fundamental in 

our acquisition strategies. However, using incremental/spiral development strategies 

with the emerging technologies in MDAP or MAIS programs must be evaluated on 

a case-by-case basis as there is no one solution that works best. We have found that 

incremental acquisition/spiral development approaches using mature technologies 

are critical in both IT and non-IT systems as they allow capability to be delivered 

to the warfighter faster. 

Question. What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure that the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime can accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches? 

Answer. While the Service is working to make our processes more flexible and 

complementary to accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches, more can be done to take additional steps to make these approaches more 

amenable. We can start with working on budgeting models that are more flexible 

to shorter timelines. This is similar to the concerns raised in the section 804 report 

about the budgeting lag and difficulty in differentiating appropriations for some of 

the new technology. 

For testing, we have to continue to strengthen the integrated testing approach to 

ensure that we are using dollars and testing activities more efficiently. We have 

made strides in the requirements community in implementing methodologies that 

allow us to set high level requirements through the formal process and standing up 

lower level boards to manage requirements for increments and releases, but we need 

to continue on working on setting realistic and executable requirements up front. 

Finally, demanding open architecture designs for our programs is critical to helping 

enable cost effective spiral development; this leads to a need for government and 

industry to arrive at mutually agreeable terms on data rights ownership. 

Question. How should the Air Force ensure that the incremental acquisition and 

spiral development programs have appropriate baselines against which to measure 

performance? 

Answer. As part of implementing statute and regulation, Air Force guidance requires each program or increment to have a baseline establishing program goals— 

thresholds and objectives—for the minimum number of cost, schedule, 

105 

supportability, and performance parameters that describe the program over its life 

cycle. 

FUNDING AND REQUIREMENTS STABILITY

Question. The poor performance of major defense acquisition programs has also 

been attributed to instability in funding and requirements. In the past, DOD has 

attempted to provide greater funding stability through the use of multi-year contracts. More recently, the Department has sought greater requirements stability by 

instituting Configuration Steering Boards (CSB) to exercise control over any 

changes to requirements that would increase program costs. 

Do you support the use of CSBs to increase requirements stability on major defense acquisition programs? 

Answer. Yes. In my current position, I have received a CSB briefing on every 

ACAT I program. I have found them to be an effective forum for stabilizing requirements of major defense acquisition programs. CSBs provide a collaborative environment for rigorous scrutiny on controlling derived requirements and I believe they 

will continue to be a value-added function. 

Question. What other steps if any would you recommend taking to increase the 

funding and requirements stability of major defense acquisition programs? 

Answer. Funding and requirements stability are critical to stable, successful programs. The acquisition community has an obligation to work closely with the requirements and other stakeholder communities to ensure programs have clearly defined and achievable requirements with realistic funding profiles. I have found that 

the Defense Acquisition Management System tends to have optimism baked in 

(overoptimistic schedules, cost estimates, execution plans). The acquisition community must guard against overoptimistic planning and remain engaged with stakeholders throughout the process to enable requirements and funding profiles that are 

inherently stable because they are realistic and affordable. 

Question. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has recently 

launched an initiative to ensure ‘‘appropriate trade-offs are made among the lifecycle cost, schedule, and performance objectives, and procurement quantity objectives in the establishment and approval of military requirements.’’ Specifically, the 

JROC has issued guidance that ‘‘encourages Program Managers, Program Executive 

Officers and Component Acquisition Executives, in coordination with the requirements sponsor, to officially require requirements relief, through the appropriate requirements validation authority, where Key Performance Parameters appear out of 

line with an appropriate cost-benefit analysis.’’ 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure the continued success of this initiative? 

Answer. The Air Force has taken steps to incorporate the appropriate trade-offs 

during the requirements development and validation process as part of the Capability Based Analysis and Analysis of Alternatives. During program execution, the 

Air Force continues to address trade-off opportunities in CSBs and Air Force Review 

Boards. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Secretary, Chief, and other 

departmental offices to foster a culture of teamwork with the Requirements and Resource Communities to ensure the programs started have firm cost goals in place, 

appropriate priorities set, and the necessary analysis to make these informed tradeoffs to keep programs within affordable limits while meeting warfighter needs. 

FIXED PRICE-TYPE CONTRACTS

Question. Recent Congressional and DOD initiatives attempt to reduce technical 

and performance risks associated with developing and producing major defense acquisition programs so as to minimize the use of cost-reimbursable contracts. 

Do you think that the Air Force should move towards more fixed price-type contracting in developing or procuring major defense acquisition programs? Why or why 

not? 

Answer. I prefer not to make blanket statements regarding the use of contract 

types as I believe it’s important to match the contract type to each specific and 

unique circumstance. That said, cost-type contracts are generally the best option to 

explore concepts, mature technologies and buy down risk during development. Costtype contracts may also be appropriate during system integration when performing 

Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP). Once a program is in production, fixed-price 

contracts become a more appropriate contract type. What is fundamental is to understand risk. 

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for the Air Force to use a cost-type contract for the production of a major 

weapon system? 

106 

Answer. Initial production of satellites is a situation where cost-type contracting 

is often appropriate. Often in this situation, the LRIP number is so low that the 

initial production space vehicles may begin production prior to the LRIP space vehicles completing final integration testing. Production actuals are key to an effectively 

negotiated fixed-price agreement. The low production volume for satellites does not 

usually allow cost visibility to be carried over until later production lots enter production. 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department continues to struggle with the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms. 

Further, the Department also has struggled with moving technologies from DOD 

programs or other sources rapidly into the hands of operational users. 

What impediments to technology transition do you see within the Air Force? 

Answer. I see resource constraints and risk as the greatest impediments to technology transition. Technology transition has a cost and in our current fiscally constrained environment, this is among the greatest impediments. The Air Force will 

continue to carefully assess costs associated with sustaining existing weapon systems vice recapitalizing with new ones, all while ensuring we continue to meet the 

needs of the warfighters. Our industry partners continue to invest in and share incredible technological advances, but, we simply cannot afford to pursue them all. 

Those the Air Force chooses to pursue introduce risk into development programs, 

especially in instances where the technology has never before been integrated into 

similar capabilities or designs. It is imperative that defense program managers perform adequate risk assessments of such technologies and develop well thought out 

risk mitigation plans. Once a choice is made to pursue a new technology, the program team must effectively utilize early systems engineering and integration, sound 

technology maturation techniques and carefully manage associated lifecycle costs. 

Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will facilitate effective communication of capability gaps 

and promising technologies between the warfighter and S&T communities. As a 

former member of the Defense Science Board, and a key contributor to the recent 

DSB Study on ‘‘Technology Enablers for Military Superiority in 2030,’’ I am committed to finding, developing, and transitioning technology into our systems. I will 

further champion the continued investment in innovative technologies important to 

ensuring the best Air Force in the world remains the most capable in the future. 

For those technologies that we pursue, I will emphasize strong early systems engineering and integration, and when appropriate, prototyping, to reduce schedule and 

cost risks. I also look to collaborate with organizations such as small business. 

Small businesses drive the majority of our technology revolutions, while our large 

prime contractors lead integration, prototyping, and major program production. If 

confirmed, I will place increased emphasis on large prime contractor partnerships 

with innovative small business companies. 

Question. What can be done from a budget, policy, and organizational standpoint 

to facilitate the transition of technologies from science and technology programs and 

other sources, including small businesses, venture capital funded companies, and 

other non-traditional defense contractors, into acquisition programs? 

Answer. If confirmed, with regards to policy, I will focus on ensuring the 

warfighter’s prioritized capability gaps are appropriately communicated and aligned 

with the efforts of our laboratories and industry partners, to include small businesses and venture capitalists. I will continue to coordinate efforts with my counterparts in the other Services and in OSD to maximize the return on our investment 

and continue to sustain/modernize the most capable warfighting force in the world. 

With regards to budget, I will ensure appropriate cost assessments are accomplished for technologies available for transition, enabling effective decisions in a fiscally constrained environment. I intend to reach out to the small business, venture 

capital, and non-DOD traditional industrial base to leverage technology innovations 

of benefit to the future Air Force. 

Finally, if confirmed, I will continue to assess, and when necessary, make required organizational adjustments, to maximize our ability to effectively transition 

technologies from our S&T community to the warfighter. 

Question. Do you believe that the Air Force’s science and technology organizations 

have the ability and the resources to carry technologies to higher levels of maturity 

before handing them off to acquisition programs? 

Answer. The Air Force Research Laboratory has the ability to mature technology 

to Technology Readiness Level (TRL)/Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) 6/7 and 

107 

then in partnership with our Program Executive Officers and Centers to take that 

technology to TRL/MRL levels of 8 or 9 where it can be transitioned into a program 

of record. The Research Laboratory does a phenomenal job balancing the resources 

associated with research, applied research and technology development. If more resources are prioritized for increasing the level of maturity, then resources for longerterm activities decrease or fewer projects are selected to be matured at a higher 

level. 

A major challenge is securing funding for the demonstration and evaluation of 

technology that is at TRL/MRL 6/7. This is why the role of our Program Executive 

Officers is so important. They serve as the transition agent between the lab and the 

warfighter. 

Question. What steps if any do you believe the Air Force should take to ensure 

that research programs are sufficiently funded to reduce technical risk in programs 

so that technological maturity can be demonstrated at the appropriate time? 

Answer. With limited funding, it’s critical we prioritize our efforts and allocate resources appropriately. To accomplish this, we must clearly understand our 

warfighter’s capability gaps, the potential capability inherent in the new technology, 

and the cost associated with maturing, integrating and transitioning it to the 

warfighter. These steps will enable effective investment in research programs that 

will maximize the benefit to the warfighter and ensure the continued national security of the United States. 

Question. What role do you believe Technology Readiness Levels and Manufacturing Readiness Levels should play in the Air Force’s efforts to enhance effective 

technology transition and reduce cost and risk in acquisition programs? 

Answer. TRLs and MRLs play an important role in communicating the development stage of the technology and the risk associated with pursuing various research, development, test, and evaluation or acquisition decisions. TRLs and MRLs 

are tools that should be considered by stakeholders in determining whether to proceed with the next stage of technology development. As a guide, TRL/MRL 6 indicates a technology has reached the point where it should be considered for demonstration. However, as Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall often says, TRLs 

do not end the conversation about risk. TRLs may start the risk conversation, and 

they may provide a convenient shorthand benchmark, but they do not provide the 

answer to the question is the risk acceptable to proceed. Mr. Kendall believes, as 

do I, good program managers will take the TRL assessment and then perform a professional risk assessment and produce well thought out risk mitigation plans before 

moving forward. 

Question. What is your view of the Rapid Innovation Program established pursuant to section 1073 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011? 

Answer. The Rapid Innovation Program has been an excellent means for the Air 

Force to communicate critical needs and solicit vendors to respond with innovative 

technology solutions. The response to the program has been overwhelming, and instrumental to the transition of capability by small businesses. Over the last 3 years, 

the Air Force has received submissions from thousands of vendors offering solutions 

to critical Air Force needs. We have awarded over 60 projects directly to small businesses and anticipate awarding another 25 by the end of the year. 

Question. What do you see as the major challenges to successful implementation 

of this program? 

Answer. The main challenge is centered on the overwhelming vendor response to 

the program. Since the Rapid Innovation Fund started 3 years ago, we have reviewed over 2,200 white papers on innovative solutions to our critical needs. Setting 

up and managing the program to review these white papers, down-selecting only the 

most compelling, and awarding contracts on the top 3 percent is challenging. We 

are up to this task but it does take time to complete. The pressure on our acquisition team, especially our contracting officers, intensifies greatly with budget uncertainty. Last year due to the length of the Continuing Resolution Authority, many 

of our contracts were not signed until September, the final month prior to expiration 

of the funds. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that funds authorized 

and appropriated for this program are spent in the most effective manner possible 

to promote the objectives of the program? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and improve the established robust processes to increase the likelihood that these technologies transition into programs of record. We have Air Force transition agents identify critical focus areas, 

a fair and open competition where subject matter experts from the field select winning proposals, and rely on our transition agents to execute the contracts. Ensuring 

direct Program Executive Office sponsorship from the beginning is the way to guarantee a very effective use of the appropriated monies. If confirmed, I will continue 

108 

to capitalize and build on these processes to enable decentralized execution with our 

transition agents to ensure we have a high rate of success. 

MULTI-YEAR CONTRACTS

Question. The statement of managers accompanying section 811 of the NDAA for 

Fiscal Year 2008 addresses the requirements for buying major defense systems 

under multi-year contracts as follows: ‘‘The conferees agree that ‘substantial savings’ 

under section 2306b(a)(1) of title 10, U.S.C., means savings that exceed 10 percent 

of the total costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts, except that 

multi-year contracts for major systems providing savings estimated at less than 10 

percent should only be considered if the Department presents an exceptionally 

strong case that the proposal meets the other requirements of section 2306b(a), as 

amended. The conferees agree with a Government Accountability Office (GAO) finding that any major system that is at the end of its production line is unlikely to 

meet these standards and therefore would be a poor candidate for a multi-year procurement contract.’’ 

What are your views on multi-year procurements? Under what circumstances do 

you believe they should be used? 

Answer. I believe multi-year contracts are appropriate if the business case indicates they will provide significant savings and if there is a strong commitment to 

the procurement. The economies of scale linked to multi-years have the potential to 

generate substantial savings and can present strong incentives for suppliers to reduce negotiated price and cost. Because they create a multiple-year funding commitment with penalties, the Business Case supporting such a determination must clearly demonstrate an advantage to the Air Force and the taxpayer. 

Question. What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that constitute ‘‘substantial savings’’ for purposes of the defense multi-year procurement statute, title 

10, U.S.C., § 1A2306b? 

Answer. There is historical support for 10 percent cost savings as being adequate 

to justify the pursuit of a multi-year contract. While this is a good rule of thumb, 

it is not an absolute determining factor. Thorough analysis is required. The associated business case analysis should demonstrate the savings associated with the contract would be substantial in terms of the relative difference in price the Service 

would pay otherwise for annual procurement and in terms of dollars saved for the 

taxpayer. 

Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, do you anticipate that 

you would support a multi-year contract with expected savings of less than 10 percent? 

Answer. It is difficult to answer this question in absolute terms. While generally, 

I would like to see a business case analysis projection of at least 10 percent savings 

before proceeding, there may be rare circumstances when I might support pursuing 

a multi-year with just short of 10 percent projected savings. For example, if I had 

strong confidence in the government contract negotiation team’s ability to achieve 

an excellent price for the Department, and if I had equal confidence the Air Force 

will acquire the systems I might consider supporting the multi-year. 

Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, would you support a 

multi-year contract for a major system at the end of its production line? 

Answer. I cannot imagine under what circumstances I would support a multi-year 

contract for a major system at the end of its production line; however, there may 

be a future situation where this would be appropriate. The Business Case supporting such a determination would have to clearly demonstrate an advantage to 

the Air Force and the taxpayer. 

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a multi-year contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost, scheduling, or performance outcomes but 

which might otherwise comply with the requirements of the defense multi-year procurement statute, title 10, U.S.C., § 2306b? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the DAE and PEOs to correct circumstances which may have led to unsatisfactory program histories. Once a 

program has demonstrated a capability to deliver satisfactory cost, schedule, and 

performance outcomes, it may become a candidate for multi-year procurement. The 

Business Case supporting such a determination would have to clearly demonstrate 

an advantage to the Air Force and the taxpayer. 

Question. What is the impact of the Department’s current budget situation, in 

your view, on the feasibility and advisability of additional multi-year procurement 

contracts for major weapon systems? 

109 

Answer. Given ongoing budget uncertainties, additional multi-year procurement 

contracts for major weapons systems would have to be on a longstanding program 

with many years remaining and the Business Case supporting such a determination 

clearly demonstrates an advantage to the Air Force and the taxpayer. 

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should the Air Force ever break a 

multi-year procurement? 

Answer. The circumstances that I would consider ever breaking a multi-year procurement would be if the contractor fails to perform, the Air Force has significant 

changes to requirements, or the Business Case supporting such a determination 

clearly demonstrates an advantage to the Air Force and the taxpayer. 

CONTINUING COMPETITION AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Question. Section 202 of WSARA requires DOD to take steps to promote continuing competition (or the option of such competition) throughout the life of major 

defense acquisition programs. 

What is your view on the utility of continuing competition as a tool to achieve 

long-term innovation and cost savings on major defense acquisition programs? 

Answer. I agree that implementing appropriate measures to ensure competition 

throughout the life of a program, such as those identified in section 202, can be a 

valuable tool to achieve long-term innovation and cost savings. 

Question. Do you believe that such continuing competition is a viable option on 

major defense acquisition programs? 

Answer. Continuing competition is a viable option on many major defense acquisition programs, but may not be viable for all areas of all major programs. It does 

require continued effort and management. 

Question. If so, what steps if any can and should the Air Force take to address 

this issue? 

Answer. The Air Force should continue to address long-term competitive effects 

of program decisions during periodic system or program reviews. 

Question. Section 203 of WSARA requires the use of competitive prototypes for 

major defense acquisition programs unless the cost of producing such prototypes 

would exceed the lifecycle benefits of improved performance and increased technological and design maturity that prototypes would achieve. 

Do you support the use of competitive prototypes for major defense acquisition 

programs? 

Answer. Yes, I support the USD(AT&L) implemented policy changes to address 

WSARA that increased focus on early and competitive prototyping and all efforts 

that will result in improvements in the Defense acquisition process. Competitive 

prototyping has the clear benefit of protecting procurement flexibility by keeping 

multiple competitors in the hunt during system development. In addition, it is key 

to addressing several critical program issues, to include risk management, assessment of technology maturation and integration, identification of potential problems 

and assessment of the framing assumptions upon which requirements are based. 

This contributes to the assessment of potential trade-offs between requirements and 

cost. It is also useful in establishing reliability growth potential and to help prepare 

systems for manufacturing. Finally, it supports efforts to maintain the Defense industrial base by funding companies to continue to develop technologies and systems. 

Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the use of competitive prototypes is likely to be beneficial? 

Answer. Competitive prototyping is likely to be beneficial when more mature designs are required to begin manufacturing planning, to reduce technological risk, to 

aid in developing operational requirements, and the competition is likely to result 

in lower costs. Competitive prototyping can be especially cost-effective when it can 

be focused on individual subsystems and components or focused on integration challenges, rather than prototyping full systems. Subsystem and component prototyping 

is beneficial when there are critical technologies that require significant innovation 

and maturation prior to system integration. Competitive prototyping of integration 

issues is valuable for programs that involve mature platforms, subsystems, and components. 

Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the cost of such prototypes is 

likely to outweigh the potential benefits? 

Answer. Competitive prototyping is likely to be cost prohibitive when it requires 

complete prototypes of complex systems, especially those with significant integration 

and technology maturation issues. Additionally, there are certain sectors of the industrial base that are low volume and highly technically specialized that may not 

support more than a single vendor. 

110 

Question. Section 207 of WSARA required the Department to promulgate new regulations to address organizational conflicts of interest on major defense acquisition 

programs. 

Do you agree that organizational conflicts of interest can reduce the quality and 

value of technical support services provided to the Air Force and undermine the integrity of the Air Force’s acquisition programs? 

Answer. I agree that organizational conflicts of interest can increase risk and that 

the quality and value of technical support services provided to the Air Force would 

be impacted. It could also undermine the integrity of the Air Force’s acquisition programs. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps the Air Force has taken to implement section 207 and the new regulations? 

Answer. The Air Force revised acquisition policy and contracting guidance to implement the requirements of section 207, including reiterating restrictions on lead 

system integrators and inherently government functions. 

Question. What additional steps if any do you believe the Air Force should take 

to address organizational conflicts of interest in major defense acquisition programs? 

Answer. I believe the current statutory and regulatory framework is adequate to 

protect the government’s interests in this area, but will continue to look for opportunities to reduce risks to programs. 

Question. What are your views on the use of system engineering and technical assistance contractors that are affiliated with major defense contractors to provide 

‘‘independent’’ advice to the Air Force on the acquisition of major weapon systems? 

Answer. It is critical for advice to the Air Force to be truly independent. In those 

instances where subject matter expertise is required, I will seek to avoid any conflicts of interest so that advice received is truly unbiased. 

Question. What lines do you believe the Air Force should draw between those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently governmental and those that may be 

performed by contractors? 

Answer. It is my understanding that new Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations 

Supplement provisions, coupled with heightened awareness of the issue among the 

contracting workforce and changes in the defense industrial base, have gone a long 

way to ameliorating the issue making the likelihood of unmitigated Organizational 

Conflicts of Interests less common. I will continue to support these efforts. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure that defense 

contractors do not misuse their access to sensitive and proprietary information of 

the Air Force and other defense contractors? 

Answer. Policies emphasize reliance upon competition at the prime and subcontract levels to provide for innovation, flexibility, reduced life cycle costs, and increased quality. The Air Force expects their program managers and contracting officers to pay close scrutiny to the government’s best interests when a contractor may 

propose the use of its own resources when other capabilities are available, and we 

Reserve the right to consent to subcontracts to ensure that the government’s interests are adequately protected. I will continue to support these efforts. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure that defense 

contractors do not unnecessarily limit competition for subcontracts in a manner that 

would disadvantage the government or potential competitors in the private sector? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support Air Force policies that emphasize reliance 

upon competition at the prime and subcontract levels to provide for innovation, 

flexibility, reduced life cycle costs, and increased quality. The Air Force expects their 

program managers and contracting officers to pay close scrutiny to the government’s 

best interests when a contractor may propose the use of its own resources when 

other capabilities are available, and the Air Force Reserves the right to consent to 

subcontracts to ensure that the government’s interests are adequately protected. 

CONTRACTING FOR SERVICES

Question. Do you believe that the Air Force can do more to reduce spending on 

contract services? 

Answer. The Air Force uses a mix of military, civilians and contractors to accomplish its mission, and in today’s fiscal environment, we are looking at each for potential savings without compromising mission effectiveness. In services acquisition, 

we are examining opportunities to reduce costs through the use of enterprise-wide 

vehicles as well as partnering with other Services and agencies. We need to improve 

understanding of types of services being contracted and ways they can be made 

more efficient. 

111 

Question. Do you believe that the current balance between government employees 

(military and civilian) and contractor employees is in the best interests of the Air 

Force? 

Answer. I believe we must continue to examine this balance and to ensure that 

inherently governmental functions are not outsourced. Additionally, we must assess 

the work accomplished by military, civilian, and contractor personnel to achieve the 

correct balance. For services acquisition projects, the Air Force does have a process 

to conduct these discussions during the requirements definition phase. 

Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to control the Air 

Force’s spending on contract services? 

Answer. The Air Force has made significant improvements in the management of 

services acquisition—from requirements review to contract execution. If confirmed, 

I will continue to refine these processes, raise visibility and oversight, and partner 

with Major Command Commanders and the Program Executive Officer for Combat 

and Mission Support to maximize the effectiveness of available services resources. 

Question. Do you believe that the Air Force has appropriate organizations, capabilities, and procedures in place to manage its service contracts? 

Answer. Through the Single Manager for Services and Program Executive Officer 

structures, the Air Force has successfully put in place the right capabilities and 

processes to manage services acquisition. Even with these advances, the Service is 

still examining methods to increase effectiveness, such as engaging senior leaders 

to improve their understanding of services related to their mission area. We recognize this is an important area to manage and improve for the taxpayer. 

Question. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to develop such organizations, capabilities, and procedures? 

Answer. N/A 

Question. Section 863 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD to establish 

a process for identifying, assessing, reviewing, and validating requirements for the 

acquisition of contract services. 

What is the status of the Air Force’s efforts to implement the requirements of section 863? 

Answer. Focused on these same areas, the Air Force instituted a requirements review process for services acquisitions in 2008 and continues to refine it to address 

the requirements in section 863 and meet the needs of the Service. 

Question. What steps remain to be taken, and what schedule has the Air Force 

established for taking these steps? 

Answer. While the Major Command Commanders and SAF/AQ are involved in the 

current requirements review process, the Service is expanding the involvement of 

senior leaders who oversee their functional services and expect to formalize their involvement in this process during fiscal year 2014. 

Question. What additional steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to improve 

the Air Force’s management of its contracts for services? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to engage with senior leaders within the Air 

Force and across the Department on requirements, acquisition strategies and methodologies for managing the execution of services acquisitions. I will work similarly 

with OSD AT&L. 

Question. Do you believe that the use of Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity 

(IDIQ) contracts are beneficial or harmful for the acquisition of services? 

Answer. If used correctly, Single- and Multiple-Award IDIQ contracts are very 

beneficial. Our acquisition teams perform market research to determine the appropriate strategy to meet the mission requirement. In services acquisitions, the Air 

Force has been using Multiple-Award IDIQ contracts extensively as they provide a 

continuous opportunity for competition among a set of qualified contractors. 

CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more 

reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively 

by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in 

areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many 

cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and 

task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees. 

In your view, has the Air Force become too reliant on contractors to support the 

basic functions of the Department? 

Answer. I recognize this is an area of concern. The Service must continue to examine mission requirements and ensure that inherently governmental functions are 

112 

not outsourced. If confirmed, I will review the Air Force use of contractors in basic 

functions. 

Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal services contracts is in the best interest of the Air Force? 

Answer. I believe the appropriate use of personal services contracts is in the best 

interest of the Air Force. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and title 10, 

U.S.C., section 129, restrict the use of personal services contracts. While not extensive, the Air Force does use it where authorized, such as in the medical support 

area. If confirmed, I would continue to work with leaders across the Air Force to 

ensure compliance with applicable laws and policies. 

Question. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of personal conflict 

of interest standards and other ethics requirements to contractor employees who 

perform functions similar to those performed by government employees? 

Answer. While they are prohibited from making decisions on behalf of the government, I believe the rule set for these personnel should more closely mirror the rule 

set of a government employee. 

CONTRACTING METHODS

Question. In recent years, DOD has relied heavily on time-and-materials contracts 

for the acquisition of services. Under such a contract, the Department pays a set 

rate per hour for contractor services, rather than paying for specific tasks to be performed. In some cases, contractors have substituted less expensive labor under timeand-materials contracts, while continuing to charge Federal agencies the same hourly rates, resulting in effective contractor profits of 25 percent or more. 

What is your view of the appropriate use of time-and-materials contracts by the 

Air Force? 

Answer. In general, I prefer the use of almost any other type of contract for services, but there are still limited situations where time-and-materials contracts are 

appropriate. For example, time-and-materials contracts may be appropriate when 

the Government lacks historical data on the nature of work to be performed or there 

is a large variation in the work to be performed. These situations prevent the reasonable estimation of the resulting work and labor mix for an effective task-based 

contract. If confirmed, I will strive to limit the use of time-and-materials contracts 

to only appropriate situations and provide effective oversight to prevent contractor 

abuse. 

Question. What steps if any do you believe the Air Force should take to minimize 

the abuse of time-and-materials contracts? 

Answer. The Air Force began focusing on reducing the use of time-and-materials 

contracts several years ago and if confirmed I will continue these efforts. In fiscal 

year 2006, the Air Force spent approximately $3 billion on time-and-materials contracts and that number was reduced to $371 million in fiscal year 2013. 

Question. Section 802 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires DOD to promulgate regulations to ensure the review and justification of any ‘‘pass-through’’ contracts on which more than 70 percent of the work will be performed by subcontractors. 

What is your understanding of the status of the Department’s efforts to implement the requirements of section 802? 

Answer. It is my understanding that a FAR case, 2013–012, was initiated for this 

statutory provision. I also understand as part of the rule making process some concerns were raised and I believe those have been resolved and the case is moving 

forward in the process. 

Question. What additional steps if any do you believe the Air Force should take 

to address the problem of unjustified pass-through contracts? 

Answer. I support the idea of the language because it is in the best interest of 

the Air Force and cost to the taxpayer. 

BETTER BUYING POWER

Question. DOD’s Better Buying Power initiative provides acquisition professionals 

with important guidance on how to achieve greater efficiency, enhanced productivity 

and affordability in how the Department procures goods and services. 

What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force’s acquisition and contracting professionals implement this guidance, and achieve intended 

results? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that all Air Force acquisition and 

contracting professionals implement this guidance and achieve the levels of success 

already seen to date. In my current position, I have been actively engaged in promoting the concepts behind Better Buying Power to our workforce, through visits 

113 

to the field and recognition of our personnel on individual successes and cost savings. Additionally, the Air Force has set policy and guidance on a wide variety of 

initiatives including Better Buying Power, and integrated these tenets in all levels 

of acquisition reviews. This active engagement is just the first step towards institutionalizing the process and making it the new way of doing business. 

Question. Which elements of this guidance, if any, do you disagree with and would 

not expect to fully implement, if confirmed? 

Answer. OSD’s Better Buying Power initiatives are positive steps towards achieving successful program management and acquisition excellence. If confirmed, I look 

forward to working with USD(AT&L) to implement the initiatives to the maximum 

extent possible. 

Question. How would you measure how effectively the Air Force’s acquisition and 

contracting workforce is implementing the tradecraft and best practices called for 

under this initiative? 

Answer. Some of the initiatives are easier to measure effectiveness than others, 

but one concrete example on which we are already seeing great returns is the implementation of ‘‘should cost’’. The ‘‘should cost’’ strategy is aimed at seeking out and 

eliminating low- and non-value added aspects of program costs. Managers are then 

‘rewarded’ by being given the opportunity to utilize those savings as additional resources to support efforts within the program, the portfolio itself, or elsewhere within the Department’s acquisition community as deemed appropriate and necessary. 

The Air Force is actively gathering should cost data and reporting our successes to OSD. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force realized $673 million in should-cost savings. Additionally, in fiscal year 2013, only one program requested a should cost 

waiver, down from 79 percent of programs in fiscal year 2012, which indicates that 

these initiatives are becoming second nature. This is just one example of how the 

Air Force has already accepted and begun to implement Better Buying Power. If 

confirmed, I will continue to implement Better Buying Power to the maximum extent possible, and I am confident we will continue to see cost savings and other efficiency trends throughout the Air Force. 

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to implement the following elements of the Better Buying Power initiative? 

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to the Air Force being the leader in implementing Better Buying Power initiatives throughout DOD. The Air Force has been 

at the forefront through preliminary implementation and will continue to realize 

cost savings as these new processes become more familiar. 

(1) Sharing the benefits of cash flow 

I agree with the Department’s initiative to better align profitability with performance goals, and with including the use of cash flow as another incentive. If confirmed, I will emphasize training and education for contracting officers on the benefits from cash flow as an incentive tool during negotiations. 

(2) Targeting non-value-added costs 

The Air Force continues to make great progress with respect to identifying opportunities to reduce and eliminate non-value added costs. The Air Force is primarily 

doing this through our concerted efforts aimed at implementing should cost based 

management practices. The program executive officers are actively instilling a culture within their portfolios that requires their program managers to continually 

scrutinize each element of cost under their control and assess how it can be reduced. 

This should cost strategy is aimed at seeking out and eliminating low- and nonvalue added aspects of program costs. Managers are then ‘rewarded’ by being given 

the opportunity to utilize those savings as additional resources to support efforts 

within the program, the portfolio itself, or elsewhere within the Department’s acquisition community as deemed appropriate and necessary. 

(3) Mandating affordability as a requirement 

The Air Force has already taken steps to improve management of long-term affordability for Major Defense Acquisition Programs in the establishment and tracking of Affordability Goals/Caps at the next Milestone review. If confirmed, I would 

continue to work with the user community to improve articulation of long-term affordability constraints during the requirements process. 

(4) Eliminating redundancy within warfighting portfolios 

The staff is working hand-in-hand with the acquisition staffs of the Navy and 

Army to assure everyone is meeting the intent of this initiative. Last month the 

Senior Acquisition Executives provided a status to AT&L regarding joint efforts to 

address this initiative. The Air Force feels comfortable that processes and guidance 

are well-established for the larger ACAT Programs across the Services. While the 

114 

Air Force believes that there are many processes in place to help eliminate redundancy in the smaller ACAT programs, if confirmed, I will continue to work together 

to assure duplication is eliminated. 

INTERAGENCY CONTRACTING

Question. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits associated with the 

Air Force’s use of interagency contracts? 

Answer. A risk of interagency contracts is additional costs and fees which could 

result in higher costs to the Air Force. One of the primary benefits of interagency 

contracts is the ability to leverage existing contracts to expedite contract award and 

delivery while reducing duplication of effort. Interagency contracts can create an efficient use of scarce resources and provide better support to our warfighter. The use 

of existing vehicles makes sense and is encouraged when it results in faster delivery 

for the warfighter at a fair and reasonable price. 

Question. Do you believe additional authority or measures are needed to hold Air 

Force or other agency personnel accountable for their use of interagency contracts? 

Answer. No. The Air Force has a process that requires any Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) or interagency transfer of funds to be reviewed 

by the contracting officer. This ensures the contracting officer engages the requiring 

activity to use the most cost effective mechanism to receive the supply or service. 

This review has been effective in ensuring the appropriate use of interagency contracts while also maintaining control and accountability of MIPR’d funds. 

Question. Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for assuring that the 

work requested by Air Force personnel is within the scope of their contract? 

Answer. Yes. Contractors are required by the terms and conditions of their contract to inform the contracting officer if they believe work is outside the scope of 

the contract. If asked to perform work outside contract scope, the contractor must 

request the contracting officer modify the contract and reach an agreement on the 

work and resulting consideration. 

ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Question. Most of the Department’s Major Automated Information System (MAIS) 

acquisitions are substantially over budget and behind schedule. In particular, the 

Department has run into unanticipated difficulties with virtually every new business system it has tried to field in the last 10 years. Section 804 of the NDAA for 

Fiscal Year 2010 required DOD to establish a new acquisition process for information technology. 

What role if any do you expect to play, if confirmed, in oversight and management 

of the Air Force’s acquisition of information technology? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the MAIS stakeholders, to include 

USD(AT&L), the Chief Management Officer, the Chief Information Officer and functional communities, to provide rigorous oversight and efficient management. I will 

actively engage in efforts to implement important lessons learned from previous IT 

acquisition efforts. 

Question. Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of business systems require different acquisition strategies or approaches? 

Answer. Yes, I believe there are unique challenges associated with the acquisition 

of information systems that call for the use of acquisition approaches different from 

those normally used by the Department for acquiring weapons and other systems. 

Under Secretary of Defense Kendall often says that all acquisitions should be tailored to the nature of the product being acquired. He has further noted that as a 

class, business systems are products having characteristics that tend to dictate a 

specific type of program structure. Additionally, there is an existing requirement to 

keep Air Force business systems relevant with evolving technology and ensure both 

current and planned systems are meeting mission needs in a cost-effective way. In 

particular, the success of the Service with these programs depends on the ability 

to recognize, plan and execute to a roadmap for how each acquired system will exchange very vast and complex sets of data within our existing (‘‘As-Is’’) and future 

(‘‘To-Be’’) information architectures. Air Force decision-makers at all levels must 

have clear policy and an effective governance structure that they can translate into 

execution of a tailored strategy to smartly acquire business systems—particularly at 

the program manager level. Likewise, end-users must be accepting of the changes 

a new business system will likely have on their operating culture. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to address 

these problems? 

Answer. The Air Force is addressing these problems by moving away from largescale Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) programs, like the former Expeditionary 

115 

Combat Support System (ECSS), in favor of smaller-scoped capability-based increments. 

A perfect example of the Air Force’s current efforts is the Logistics Transformation Maintenance Repair and Overhaul initiative (MROi). MROi is the first 

critical increment to transforming the Air Force’s entire logistics IT required 

functionality. Subsequent capability initiatives will follow MROi, building upon each 

other to ultimately achieve critical improvements across all areas of the Air Force’s 

logistics enterprise. 

With both MROi and future business systems acquisition, the Air Force will implement a more robust requirements definition process up front that fully maps out 

our existing and required end-state architectures before pursuing any materiel solution through the use of Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) and related architecture disciplines. Another key element of the application of these architecture and 

BPR disciplines is the ability to scope the delivered IT solution to a user-defined 

capability as opposed to a developer-defined software release that may not be the 

most effective solution for the user. This user focus serves as the basis for determining the appropriate increments. The architecture and BPR disciplines provide 

the means to manage and deliver smaller-scoped solutions and satisfy mission objectives. This BPR rigor also ensures that the users’ requirements are defined correctly 

up front and remain stable through the lifecycle of the program. 

Question. What steps has the Air Force taken to implement the requirements of 

section 804? What steps remain to be taken? 

Answer. On November 26, 2013, OSD published a new DODI 5000.02 that further 

clarifies policies, streamlines defense acquisition procedures and eliminates redundant/conflicting guidance. As a result, the core processes within DODI 5000.02 and 

the former Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL) process are better aligned. The Air 

Force has also strengthened the processes associated with Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) and IT certification to further ensure acquired capabilities meet mission needs. OSD DCMO, now working in concert with USD(AT&L) is further refining these processes to better integrate its key assertions into DOD acquisition guidance, in part as a result of its previous joint efforts with the Air Force. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Chief Information Officer 

of the Air Force to take these steps? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with our CIO to identify and 

take steps needed to improve acquisition of information technology and to leverage 

use of a common technology baseline across Air Force IT systems. This common 

baseline will facilitate common hosting standards and promote consistent security 

practices and sustainment methods allowing us to bring new capabilities online 

more quickly and at lower cost. If confirmed, I will also work with the CIO to ensure 

cyber security is built into Air Force systems, leveraging the processes of the newly 

defined Risk Management Framework. 

Question. Some have argued that the current test and evaluation process does not 

appropriately address the unique circumstances applicable to the acquisition of information technology systems. 

What steps if any do you believe the Air Force should take to improve the test 

and evaluation process for information technology systems, including their 

vulnerabilities in the face of a growing cybersecurity threat environment? 

Answer. The Air Force needs to better integrate developmental test, operational 

test, and certification and accreditation activities to the greatest extent practical. 

Programs should utilize early user involvement, automated testing, and continuous 

monitoring of deployed capabilities. To better address the growing cybersecurity 

threats, programs will need to engineer and test mission assurance and cyber security from the ground up. 

Question. The Air Force planned for the Expeditionary Combat Support System 

to be an ‘‘underlying business system intended to tie . . . [the Service’s] transformation efforts together and provide a holistic, end to end view of the . . . [Air 

Force’s] logistics enterprise.’’ This was to be accomplished using commercial off-theshelf software. Unfortunately, after approximately 7 years and $1.03 billion the program was cancelled. 

What lessons have you and the Air Force learned from this episode and how will 

future MAIS programs be structured differently to ensure such a result does not 

occur in the future? 

Answer. The Air Force has learned a great deal from Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) and is following through on the specific recommendations made 

in the Acquisition Incident Review (AIR) report. Specifically, the AIR report found 

four contributing causes and six root causes to the failure of ECSS. The four contributing causes were a confusing and sometimes ineffectual governance structure; challenges with tactics, techniques and procedures of acquisition tools; difficulty of 

116 

changing from our legacy systems; and a high rate of churn among personnel and 

organizational structures. The six root causes were the Air Force’s lack of understanding of the data, lack of understanding of the ‘‘As-Is’’ and ‘‘To-Be’’ architectures, 

lack of a transition plan, lack of an execution plan, an unrealistic development environment, and the fact that the right culture was not in place for ECSS to be successful. 

Following the release of the AIR report the Secretary of the Air Force directed 

a review of existing major Air Force business systems to determine to what extent 

the ECSS AIR lessons learned were being incorporated, and recommended specific 

actions in addition to the AIR report to further ensure mistakes made during ECSS 

are not repeated on future programs. The Air Force is taking steps to ensure the 

recommendations from both the AIR report and the Secretary of the Air Force-directed review are fully implemented. 

Several examples of Air Force actions to implement lessons learned include: 

Standardizing practices to increase collaboration with functional stakeholders earlier on in the acquisition process; Blueprinting current architecture for our existing 

core logistics systems; Applying rigorous Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) before determining whether new materiel solutions are required and should be pursued; Establishing Integrated Functional and Program Executive Office teams to 

bolster co-accountability for program outcomes among key stakeholders; Increasing 

training opportunities for end-users on technology transition management curricula. 

Question. The Department’s Information Technology Enterprise Strategy and 

Roadmap, dated 6 September 2011, proposes overhauling IT policies to provide improved access to information, common identity management, standardized Department-wide services/applications/tools, streamlined IT acquisition, consolidated data 

centers, and cloud computing services. 

What reorganization, if any, do you believe will be needed in the IT acquisition 

structures of the Air Force to achieve these objectives? 

Answer. At this time, I do not believe the Air Force needs to reorganize in the 

IT acquisition structures to achieve these objectives. The Air Force is taking steps 

to clearly define roles and responsibilities, develop common standards and to empower the CIO to provide strategic direction and corporate investment inputs. These 

steps will move us closer to these objectives and ultimately, improve warfighting effectiveness across the cyber mission area. 

Question. In your view, how fundamentally different, in ways relevant to procuring needed defense capability effectively, is acquiring information technology 

products and services from how the Air Force more typically procures products and 

services? 

Answer. The fundamental difference in procuring information technology products 

and services is the greater use of rapidly evolving commercial technology. 

Leveraging this commercial technology allows the Department to more quickly deploy capabilities through shorter delivery cycles, incremental and concurrent development and test, use of established standards, use of common infrastructures and 

integrated cyber-security. With shorter timelines and incremental capabilities, there 

is a greater need for architecture and integration. The interim DODI 5000.02 identifies models tailored for IT to better enable rapid delivery and an incremental build 

process to reach full system functionality. 

Question. What specific changes, if any, would you recommend to improve how the 

Air Force procures MAISs? 

Answer. I would recommend clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the 

many MAIS stakeholders, to include AT&L, CIO, DOT&E and the Chief Management Office. Additionally, in order for MAIS acquisitions to be successful, there 

must be efficient execution authority, improved governance and stable requirements 

throughout the process. 

Question. In your view, what are the implications of the challenges and differences you discussed above on efforts by the Air Force to procure effectively cybersecurity products and services? 

Answer. One implication is that much more collaboration will be required in order 

to procure effective cyber-security products and services. As we move towards more 

common and integrated capabilities, the shared opportunities will be greater, but so 

will the shared risks. The Air Force, other members of DOD and the Federal Agencies must act in concert to implement cyber capabilities and security. Stakeholders 

need to collaborate on everything from architectures, to acceptable common technologies, to cyber-security strategies, and how to best access and share information. 

Collaboration must be part of our culture. Having been a member of the recent Defense Science Board Task Force on Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced 

Cyber Threat, I am under no illusions that making our combat systems cyber resilient to a competent adversary will be simple or easy. The magnitude of the chalVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
117 

lenge to all of the Department here is significant and will be so for the years ahead. 

We will need to systemically build resiliency in at the beginning, continually assess 

end-to-end potential vulnerabilities, and then implement countermeasures (whether 

they be material solutions or new concept of operations/TTPs). 

Question. Are there any special acquisition authorities not currently available that 

if authorized could help address some of the observed IT and cybersecurity-related 

acquisition shortfalls? 

Answer. While not specifically an acquisition authority, a major challenge with IT 

acquisition is the application of funding rules that are based on traditional, non-IT 

weapon system procurement. As identified in the 804 report, IT programs are currently funded with a mix of three principal appropriations (Research and Development, Procurement, and Operations and Maintenance), each with unique rules and 

definitions that are based on funding for traditional weapon system models. IT acquisition would benefit greatly from a specific appropriation designed for unique IT 

needs and challenges. A specific IT appropriation would also help the Air Force articulate, support and defend the type and amount of funding needed to meet requirements. 

Question. In your view, does the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) deliver enterprise computing services and provide IT infrastructure in an operationally 

responsive and cost effective manner? 

Answer. It does, in most cases. Air Force systems continue to move to the DISA 

services, to leverage this common, enterprise suite of capabilities. The Air Force is 

working closely with DISA to characterize Air Force IT infrastructure requirements 

and develop a streamlined process for hosting Air Force systems. The Service expects DISA to gain efficiencies through economies of scale and a la carte menu of 

services. 

Question. What specific recommendations would you make to improve DISA’s delivery of telecom and IT contracting, enterprise services, and computing/application 

hosting? 

Answer. Air Force engagement with DISA is essential to ensure that the IT infrastructure and services DISA provides meet Service needs. Competitive pricing, 

clearly defined standards and interfaces, and increased collaborative engagement 

will continue to facilitate movement to DISA services. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. Section 852 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund provides a continuing source of funds for this purpose. 

Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is still needed 

to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees with the right skills to run 

its acquisition programs in the most cost effective manner for the taxpayers? 

Answer. Yes. With the pressure on O&M budgets, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF) has become even more important to providing 

a highly capable acquisition workforce. As O&M funds have been reduced, the Air 

Force has become much more reliant on DAWDF to train and develop the acquisition workforce with both Defense Acquisition University and Air Force specific 

courses. If confirmed, I would also like to explore utilizing the fund to replenish 

skilled personnel losses from retirements and attrition as well to adjust the personnel skill mix as future needs dictate. 

Question. What do you see as the most significant shortcomings, if any, in the 

quality of the Department’s acquisition and contracting workforce? 

Answer. I believe the Air Force has an exceptional workforce that is executing 

very difficult tasks. The workforce receives excellent training from Defense Acquisition University and other sources; however, if confirmed, I intend to increase the 

emphasis of on-the-job experience to put into practice the training received. The Air 

Force needs to continue to address development of practical application skills emphasizing technical and business acumen because classroom training is not enough. 

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing these shortcomings? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with OSD(AT&L) and Air Force acquisition leadership at all levels to continue to improve the training and development provided to the acquisition workforce. In my current role, I’ve been directly 

involved in leading and communicating workforce requirements through multiple forums including the OSD(AT&L) acquisition workforce Senior Steering Board and 

Business Senior Integration Group as well as the Air Force Leadership and Development Review. Additionally I will continue to work closely with the Air Force’s DirecVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
118 

tor, Acquisition Career Management who manages the Air Force Acquisition Professional Development Program. 

Question. How do you communicate those shortcomings to such organizations as 

the Defense Acquisition University? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will communicate shortcomings via the forums identified 

above. Additionally, the Air Force Defense Acquisition Career Manager and Functional Managers routinely communicate training requirements to the Defense Acquisition University and OSD counterparts. 

Question. What specific skill sets or core competencies if any do you believe to be 

vital the Department’s ability to procure goods and services effectively and are lacking within the Department’s acquisition and contracting workforce? 

Answer. I believe improved business acumen is vital to acquisition excellence. The 

Air Force should strive to leverage experience from commercial industry as well as 

promote, track and leverage business experience within the workforce. 

Question. Do you believe that the Department’s human capital plan for the acquisition workforce includes adequate measures to acquire or reconstitute these vital 

skill sets or core competencies? 

Answer. Yes. I believe the incorporation of the DAWDF into the Department’s 

overall approach to the acquisition workforce has been the most important addition 

to its human capital plan. 

Question. What steps if any would you take if confirmed to improve the Department’s human capital plan for the acquisition workforce? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with OSD(AT&L) to make replenishment of the acquisition workforce a focus of the human capital plan. I will advocate 

use of the DAWDF to enable continued entry level hiring of recent college graduates 

in order to backfill as members move up, separate or retire. I will also explore modifying existing demo programs to better target shortage skills using direct/expedited 

hiring authorities. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of science and technology programs in meeting the Air Force’s transformation goals and in confronting irregular, 

catastrophic, traditional and disruptive threats? 

Answer. The Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Program prepares and 

equips the warfighter to face threats in an uncertain future. The Air Force S&T Program investigates game-changing technologies to affordably transition the ‘‘art-ofthe possible’’ into military capabilities. The Air Force invests in research that addresses urgent, near-term warfighter needs as well as research that will provide 

revolutionary capabilities in the future. 

Question. If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding funding targets 

and priorities for the Air Force’s long-term research efforts? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will actively work with the Air Force S&T Executive, the 

Air Force Chief Scientist and Air Force Research Laboratory leadership to develop 

affordable research priorities and resource those priorities accordingly. 

Question. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to assess whether the 

Air Force is making adequate investments in its basic research programs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Air Force’s S&T investment supports a balanced foundation of basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development that will provide demonstrated transition options for future 

warfighting capabilities. The Air Force is currently working with OSD and Service 

counterparts to identify appropriate leading indicators (such as metrics) to assess 

S&T investments. 

Question. Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between and among the 

science and technology programs of the military services and defense agencies such 

as DARPA? 

Answer. While there is always room for communication improvements, I believe 

there is sufficient coordination. The Air Force, working with the other Services, 

OSD, and their Agencies, have an extensive formal coordination mechanism for S&T 

focused on areas with Defense Department-wide utility. Currently, they have organized into 17 Communities of Interest covering technology areas such as materials 

and manufacturing, cyber security, and autonomy. Service representatives are engaged daily in nurturing and growing this formal approach to address S&T needs 

and priorities. 

Additionally, informal coordination, discussions, and debates that happen at the 

individual researcher or program manager level with counterparts in the other Services and Agencies through professional societies and other avenues are just as important. 

119 

In many areas such as hypersonics, lasers, and cyber technology, AF partnerships 

with DARPA, other agencies, and sister Services are pushing the new capabilities 

that will keep the Air Force the best in the world. 

Question. What is the Department’s role and responsibility in addressing national 

issues related to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education and 

workforce development? 

Answer. Nurturing the next generation of science, technology, engineering, and 

mathematics (STEM) professionals is an Air Force, DOD and national concern. To 

maintain the U.S. military’s decisive technological edge, the Department must be 

able to recruit, retain and develop a capable STEM workforce in the face of worldwide competition for the same talent. An objective of the STEM Strategic Communication Plan is to encourage all airmen to attract tech-savvy students to an Air 

Force career. 

Question. What steps if any would you take to support efforts to ensure that the 

Nation has the scientific and technical workforce needed for its national security 

technological and industrial base? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continue supporting efforts to recruit, retain and develop a world-class STEM workforce for the Air Force and the Nation. 

The Air Force has successfully used tools such as the Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART) Scholarship Program. Over the past 8 years, 

the Air Force has averaged providing 60 scholarships per year to scientists and engineers. After payback of the recipient’s commitment, the Air Force has retained 88 

percent of scholars in Air Force jobs. Additionally, the Air Force is updating the 

Bright Horizons STEM workforce strategic roadmap published in 2011. This roadmap addresses the ‘‘people’’ dimension of delivering and operating required technology by having the right STEM qualified people in the right place, at the right 

time, and with the right skills. 

Question. How would you use science and technology programs to better reduce 

technical risk and therefore potentially reduce costs and schedule problems that accrue in large acquisition programs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to deliberately align S&T planning, 

technology transition planning, and development planning. The linkages between 

these activities are critical to initiating acquisition programs with mature technologies and credible cost estimates. 

Question. Do you feel that the science and technology programs of the Air Force 

are too near-term in focus and have over-emphasized technology transition efforts 

over investing in revolutionary and innovative research programs? 

Answer. No. A top priority of the Air Force S&T Strategy is to execute a wellbalanced, integrated program. I am confident that the Air Force S&T portfolio is 

properly balanced between meeting current warfighter capability needs and discovering and developing innovative new technology opportunities. 

Question. Are you satisfied that the Air Force has a well-articulated and actionable science and technology strategic plan? 

Answer. Yes. The Air Force is currently updating the Air Force S&T Strategy, 

which was signed by Air Force Leadership 2010. This flexible strategy allows the 

Air Force to adapt its S&T program to dynamic strategic, budgetary and technology 

environments. Additionally, the priorities in the strategy will shape actionable S&T 

plans. 

Question. Do you see a need for changes in areas such as hiring authority, personnel systems, financial disclosure, and ethics requirements, to ensure that the Air 

Force can recruit and retain the highest quality scientific and technical workforce 

possible? 

Answer. An objective of the Air Force STEM Strategic Communication Plan is to 

build the understanding and recognition that the Air Force’s success is based on the 

innovation and technical contributions of airmen. The Air Force is updating the 

Bright Horizons STEM workforce strategic roadmap published in 2011. This roadmap is investigating these areas and others to assure technologically superior 

warfighting capabilities through attracting, recruiting/accessing, developing, and retaining a world class STEM workforce. 

Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of the Military Accessions Vital 

to National Interest Program to recruit non-U.S. citizens who graduate from U.S. 

universities with advanced degrees in scientific and technical fields of critical national importance? 

Answer. Citizenship is required for commissioned service in the military. The 

military does not commission scientists who do not meet citizenship requirements. 

The Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program (MAVNI) is a pilot 

program that could be considered useful in its ability to utilize the limited authority 

provided in law to enlist non-citizens in the military service to fill critical skills. To 

120 

date, the Air Force has only used MAVNI to enlist people with certain language and 

associated culture capabilities to meet a critical strategic need. 

Question. What steps if any would you take if confirmed to ensure the continued 

effectiveness of this program? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with other Air Force and DOD leaders to ensure 

we are taking full advantage of all authorities within the law to acquire military 

and civilian forces to meet our science and technology needs in the Air Force. 

TEST AND EVALUATION

Question. The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these systems are put into production. 

What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of the Air Force’s acquisition programs? 

Answer. I support the independence of the Director of Operation Test and Evaluation as granted by title 10, U.S.C., (title 10 U.S.C. 2399, Operational Test & Evaluation of Defense Acquisition Programs). This independence is important to ensuring 

the Department’s acquisition systems are realistically and adequately tested in their 

intended operational environment. Third party verification of system performance is 

a necessary and important step in acquiring weapon systems. 

Question. Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation conducted by 

the contractors who are developing the systems to be tested? 

Answer. The level of test and evaluation conducted by contractors in developing 

systems to be tested is appropriate; however, it is important to ensure government 

representatives lead the testing and perform effective oversight of all contractor test 

events. 

Question. What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the standard testing process? If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that all equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is subject to appropriate operational testing? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure capabilities provided in response to urgent operational requirements are balanced with testing that ensures 

the system is reasonably safe and effective within resource and time constraints. 

Many times this balance is achieved by the combined efforts of the acquisition and 

operational communities, sometimes taken to the extent of the design engineers 

working side by side with the warfighter to resolve issues in real time. In addition 

to meeting the urgent mission needs, the initial operational data derived during this 

activity actually adds to a more realistic, complete and robust operational test regime than an isolated test alone. Sometimes when a capability is fielded, the innovative warfighter effectively uses the capability in a way other than expected or 

tested; this drives a constant evolution of concept of operations and test planning 

and execution to maximize effectiveness. 

Question. Do you believe that the developmental testing organizations in the Air 

Force are adequate to ensure an appropriate level of developmental testing, and 

testing oversight, on major defense acquisition programs? 

Answer. Yes. The AFMC reorganization with the 5-center construct is an improvement in consolidating leadership and management of development test in order to 

ensure an appropriate level of developmental testing and testing oversight. The reorganization is leading to increased test efficiency and cross flow of information 

among the test organizations located at the Arnold Engineering Development Complex, 96th Test Wing at Eglin AFB and the 412th Test Wing at Edwards AFB. However, reduced budgets could have a negative impact on testing as resources continue 

to shrink. 

Question. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to address any inadequacies in such organizations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with AF/TE to continue to look at Air Force test 

organizations to ensure structures support the Air Force vision for 2023. Continued 

test efficiencies need to be investigated to accommodate budget constraints. Part of 

this investigation should include, where appropriate, increased integrated developmental and operational testing. Duplication of test effort must be avoided to ensure 

resources are used as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

Question. As systems grow more sophisticated, networked, and software-intensive, 

DOD’s ability to test and evaluate them becomes more difficult. Some systems-ofsystems cannot be tested as a whole until they are already bought and fielded. 

Are you concerned with Air Force’s ability to test these new types of systems? 

Answer. Yes. These new complex systems deserve a healthy concern and respect 

so they are not underestimated and are addressed adequately. The Air Force needs 

121 

to continue to conduct robust Developmental and Operational Test of all new systems to ensure they are safe and meet their intended purpose. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to improve 

its test and evaluation facilities to ensure adequate testing of such systems? 

Answer. First and foremost, the Air Force must maintain its unique core set of 

T&E infrastructure and associated workforce. These must be preserved as a national asset to provide T&E capabilities to support national defense. The Air Force 

must continue to assess test facilities to ensure they are sized, operated, and maintained appropriately to provide for the mission. 

Question. In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient capabilities to test and 

evaluate the cybersecurity of its new information technology systems and networks? 

Answer. The cyber world is rapidly progressing and evolving and the Air Force 

must continue to work hard to keep pace with this evolution. ‘‘Sufficient capabilities’’ is a constantly changing standard in this rapidly changing world. Underestimating its dynamism is to be left behind. 

Question. What steps, if any, would you propose to take, if confirmed, to enhance 

this capability? 

Answer. We will continue to build on the Air Force Chief Scientist’s, Cyber Vision 

2025, which provides a blueprint for cyber S&T and includes test and evaluation 

shortfalls. In addition, the Air Force will continue to support the tri-Service/OSD 

Technical Assessment Sub-Working Group for Cyber issues. 

Question. Some have argued that testing takes too long and costs too much. Others contest this view pointing out that testing and evaluation is an essential tool 

to assist in the development of weapon systems and ensure that they perform as 

intended. The Armed Services Committee has expressed concern that problems with 

weapons systems have been discovered during operational testing and evaluation 

that should have been discovered during developmental testing and corrected during 

subsequent development. 

Do you believe that major defense acquisition programs are helped or hurt by cutting tests budgets and reducing the time available for developmental testing? 

Answer. Reduced test budgets and time are detrimental to Major Defense Acquisition Programs and inherently increase costs over the life of the system and delays 

fielding to the warfighter. 

Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the program management community and the testing and evaluation community work collaboratively and effectively in a way that maximizes the likelihood that developmental testing and evaluation will detect and identify problems timely in software 

and hardware to provide opportunities to correct them before production and before 

operational testing and evaluation begins? 

Answer. If confirmed, to ensure that the program management community and 

the test and evaluation community work collaboratively and effectively I would continue to ensure an emphasis is placed on integrated T&E. In my current position, 

I have taken steps to foster this collaboration, meeting bi-weekly with the Air Force 

T&E executive. Linkages for coordination between developmental test, operational 

test, live fire test and evaluation and modeling and simulation must be maintained 

through communication among the various agencies as well as the program management office. 

Question. To what extent do you think that dedicated operational testing can be 

more efficiently integrated into developmental and live-fire testing in a way that is 

also sufficiently rigorous? 

Answer. I support increased integration of operational testing into developmental 

and live-fire testing. The newly revised DODI 5000.02 emphasizes integration of developmental and operational testing where possible. The key is early involvement 

of operational testers in the development of the Test and Evaluation Master Plan. 

Early collaboration between weapons designers, developmental testers and operational testers allows test scenarios to be developed that provide the needed data 

for the developer and in turn can be utilized by the operational tester in determining operational suitability. This integration can also uncover operational issues 

early in the development cycle when resolution is possible with less impact to cost 

and schedule. 

Question. Noted defense analysts Andrew Krepinevich and Todd Harrison have 

argued the formal requirements of a weapons system should also include a statement as to how a weapons system will be tested. Therefore, a testing program will 

be identified before awarding contracts. The purpose of this proposal is to enable 

the contractor to have a much better understanding of what the military hopes to 

achieve. 

Do you agree with this proposal? 

122 

Answer. A proposal limiting the development of test protocols to one single stage 

of the acquisition process may not fully address the complexity of the issue. However, I agree that testing should be a consideration early in the acquisition process. 

There should be early focus on the development of requirements that are operationally relevant, technically feasible and testable. The Air Force saw this need when 

forming the AFRRG in 2012. AF/TE was included in this Group that reviews all requirements documents for new weapons development in the future. The AFRRG 

tightly couples requirement, technical, acquisition and test and this process should 

improve Air Force performance in this area. 

AIR FORCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. What is your assessment of the health and status of the key elements 

of the Air Force’s industrial base, including the Air Logistic Complexes? 

Answer. The readiness of the Air Force to provide the capabilities inherent in 

Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power is sustained by the products and 

services purchased from the national technology and industrial base. Without the 

support of both the organic and the commercial components of the industrial base, 

the Air Force would not be ready to respond to the needs of the Nation. From the 

laces in boots to the electronics in air, space, and cyber systems, the Air Force 

draws upon a broad and diverse network of suppliers. 

Through this dynamic network, the Air Force equips airmen, maintains bases, 

laboratories, and ranges, modernizes current systems, and designs, develops, and 

procures new capabilities to remain the world’s preeminent Air Force. I assess the 

overall health of this dynamic network of suppliers and sustainers as sufficient for 

the current needs of the Air Force. 

As I look to the ability of the industrial base to support future requirements in 

military-unique areas such as tactical aircraft and strategic missiles, I have some 

concerns about whether the Air Force can sustain the current level of these key industrial capabilities during this period of fiscal challenges. In addressing these concerns, the Air Force is collaborating with the other elements of the Defense Department to ensure thorough analysis leading to informed decisions about mitigating 

these concerns. 

Question. In your view, is DOD’s sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2) activity providing useful information to assist the Army in maintaining and improving key elements of its industrial base? 

Answer. The Air Force recognizes and supports the need to understand the network of firms providing goods and services to the Air Force and how the demands 

of the Air Force interact with those of the other Services and Defense Agencies. 

Since the inception of the S2T2 concept, the Air Force has collaborated with OSD, 

the other Services, and Defense Agencies to define, develop, and mature the S2T2 

concept into a useful tool. This is an ongoing effort. In its current state, the S2T2 

effort has been useful in validating known areas of concern such as the industrial 

base supporting solid rocket motors and fuzes. I look forward to the continued development of the S2T2 effort and its eventual maturation. 

SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH PROGRAM

Question. What do you see as the major successes and challenges facing the Air 

Force SBIR program? 

Answer. Successes and challenges exist for the Air Force SBIR program. In terms 

of success, the Air Force Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Commercialization Readiness Program (CRP) established a successful process to mature 

SBIR developed technologies to acceptable readiness levels for Air Force customers. 

Using this process, transition plans have been implemented in the last several years 

between innovative small businesses and customers, with 43 producing technologies 

now in the hands of the warfighter. One example of a program is enhanced communication via an ultra-light, manportable, collapsible antenna which reduces acquisition costs by $40 million over 5 years and support costs by 90 percent. This technology has also been utilized domestically during Hurricane Sandy and recent tornado events. 

Challenges remain with matching Air Force acquisition and sustainment programs to high risk technologies typically at the technology and manufacturing readiness levels of 4 or 5. Program Managers are under tight budgets and schedule constraints, and they are more inclined to avoid risk and seek out higher readiness 

technologies at the 7 or 8 levels. Although maturation is the strength of the Air 

Force SBIR Commercialization Readiness Program, it remains difficult to convince 

program managers to align future program dollars to a technology that is still maturing. 

123 

Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that the Air Force 

has access to and invests in the most innovative small businesses? 

Answer. I believe the current call and response process where the Service solicits 

proposals to address capability gaps can be augmented by a more proactive, aggressive search process to seek out those small businesses that may be new startups 

or unfamiliar with the SBIR program. Enhancing the visibility of the SBIR program 

and our communication channels among stakeholders will serve to enhance our effectiveness in delivering cutting edge capabilities to our warfighters. 

In my current position, I am planning to conduct a Small Business Roundtable 

next month, which for the first time will put Program Executive Officers, major defense contractors, and SBIR and other Small Business representatives together discussing priorities, budgets, concerns, and communication improvements to enhance 

our access and ability to invest in most innovative Small Businesses. Several targeted Industry Days are planned this year to seek out small businesses that have 

innovative solutions and capabilities for our mission needs. 

If confirmed, I will continue to maintain a strong partnership with our Air Force 

Small Business team and ensure our Program Executive Officers focus their efforts 

to achieve our objectives with our Small Business partners within industry. 

Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that successful SBIR 

research and development projects transition into production? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe successful transition requires far better communication between the supply and demand entities involved. The warfighter end user 

must be central in articulating the demand via the Major Commands, PEOs, laboratories, and the small business community. We have the tools, including a network 

of transition agents, to facilitate the development of innovative solutions, and I intend to ensure that the demand function is well-articulated and to industry. The 

targeted Industry Day approach previously mentioned is one such effort, as are the 

multi-party roundtables. 

TECHNICAL DATA

Question. Do you believe that the Air Force has been as aggressive as it should 

have been in: (1) securing ownership of technical data in connection with items and 

processes associated with major weapon systems that it procures when doing so 

would best serve the Government’s interests; and (2) asserting ownership rights 

over this data in a manner sufficient to ensure competition for the production and 

maintenance of these systems over their lifecycle? 

What steps if any will you take if confirmed to ensure that the Air Force obtains 

the technical data rights that it needs to avoid being locked into unnecessary solesource follow-on production and sustainment to incumbents to the detriment of the 

taxpayer and the warfighter? 

Answer. In the past, the Air Force abrogated its rights to data through Total System Responsibility agreements for a number of our major weapons systems. However, for the past several years several improvements have been made. The Air 

Force has been prudently pursuing its deliverables and data (license) rights requirements in the best interests of the government, seeking ‘‘license rights’’ vice ‘‘ownership’’ of contractor developed technical data. 

If confirmed, I will continue efforts to actively implement the Defense Department’s Better Buying Power focus area of open systems architecture enforcement 

and effective management of data rights in order to ensure competition and lower 

lifecycle costs. I will also continue efforts to actively secure the required deliverables 

and data (license) rights as appropriate in order to promote new strategies to compete sustainment and modernization efforts that were previously sole source to the 

original contractor. 

NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Question. Some elements associated with the acquisition of Nuclear Command, 

Control and Communications (NC3) systems are fragmented between two Air Force 

acquisition organizations—Space Systems (SAF/AQS) and Global Power Systems 

(SAF/AQP). The primary result of this fragmentation is the Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Site Terminals (FAB–T), which are to be installed in command post 

and airborne platforms. SAF/AQS has oversight of the procurement while the actual 

implementation in nuclear command and control platforms is found in SAF/AQP. 

This mismatch between acquisition programs (and requirements) has been documented in a recent General Accountability Office Report ‘‘Space Acquisitions – DOD 

Needs More Knowledge Before It Commits to Producing Satellite Terminal Critical 

to Nuclear Mission’’, GAO–14–24SU, December 2013. The primary outcome of this 

mismatch is that the Air Force cannot install the FAB–T terminals its airborne platVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
124 

forms, principally the B–2 and B–52 aircraft but also Navy E–6B aircraft as well, 

causing a cascade of cancelled programs associated with these aircraft that were to 

use the FAB–T systems. 

Have you read this GAO report? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree with its findings? 

Answer. I agree with the GAO’s recommendations to develop and approve a risk 

mitigation plan to address remaining FAB–T cost, schedule, and performance risks, 

and to direct the FAB–T program to establish agreements with user platform organizations. However, I disagree with the recommendation to delay production decisions. 

Question. Where you agree what will you do to correct the deficiencies found in 

the report? 

Answer. DOD initiated an updated risk mitigation plan for FAB–T in July 2013 

that addresses the risks noted in the GAO report. The FAB–T program office continues to execute a risk mitigation process that involves leadership, stakeholders, 

and the contractor. If confirmed, I will remain committed and will work with the 

Program Executive Officer and FAB–T Senior Materiel Leader to manage the key 

risks on this critical program. 

Additionally, the FAB–T Program Office will formally produce Memorandums of 

Agreement with each platform program office to further stabilize terminal and platform requirements. These agreements will be finalized following the production contract award to simplify the process for each platform. 

Question. Where you disagree, please explain why. 

Answer. The Department believes that programmatic actions taken to date have 

reduced program risk to an acceptable level and support the current acquisition 

strategy. While we appreciate the GAO concerns over manufacturing and technology 

readiness, the Department is confident that the winning bidder of the FAB–T production contract will be ready to deliver the system. Based on over 10 years of working on the Boeing development contract, the government has an in-depth understanding of the design and its readiness for production. Raytheon already has three 

other AEHF terminals currently in production. Delaying the down-select decision to 

a production vendor will jeopardize critical national leadership command and control capabilities and add significant cost, effectively negating the savings created 

through healthy competition. 

Question. Do you agree the matching of requirements and acquisition for nuclear 

command, control and communications is fragmented, as evidenced by the two acquisition organizations (SAF/AQS and SAF/AQP) responsible for the program? 

Answer. No. Matching requirements and acquisition is a fact of life for all acquisition programs. This often must occur across Program Executive Officers and Major 

Commands; however, there are robust requirements and acquisition processes in 

place that ensure key interfaces and program interrelationships are properly managed and integrated at all levels. As with all SAF/AQ Capability Directorates, these 

two staff acquisition organizations (SAF/AQS and SAF/AQP) understand these processes in detail, and work across the acquisition and requirements communities to 

ensure this integration occurs. 

Question. What lessons do you think can be learned from the FAB–T program and 

applied to future nuclear command and control acquisition programs? 

Answer. The lessons from the FAB–T program apply not only to NC3 programs 

but to all acquisition programs. They include: (1) program and requirements instability increase system cost and delay the schedule; (2) competition can be an effective tool to lower technical and schedule risk, and overall program costs; and (3) life 

cycle costs drive the ultimate affordability of these systems in the context of other 

requirements that also must be met. 

Question. If confirmed, are you committed to fixing this acquisition problem and 

once confirmed will you brief the congressional defense committees on plans to fix 

this structural acquisition problem? 

Answer. While I disagree the SAF/AQ organizational structure was a contributing 

factor to the problems the Air Force faced on FAB–T, if confirmed I will work in 

cooperation with the USD(AT&L) and Congress to continue to apply the lessons 

learned from FAB–T and other programs to improve all aspects of the acquisition 

process. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

125 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the 

ASAALT? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

TOP ACQUISITION PRIORITIES

1. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, please identify the Air Force’s top major systems acquisition priorities and, for each priority, please identify what you view as 

the critical pathway to obtaining capability to be delivered by those programs on 

time, on budget, and with the required capability. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Air Force’s top three priorities remain the KC–46, the F–35, 

and the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS–B). 

At this point in the development of the LRS–B, stable requirements are essential 

to keeping the program on track. The capability level requirements for the LRS– 

B—approved by DOD—set affordable, achievable, realistic requirements balanced by 

cost considerations. In order to reduce system and program complexity the program 

has minimized new development, allowing integration of mature technologies/existing systems. Industry is actively designing the system to stable, agreed upon requirements. It is important that we also maintain schedule performance to successfully achieve our program milestones. 

For the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter program, mission software, the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), and reliability and maintainability are items on 

the critical pathway that must be delivered on time, on budget, and with the required capability. 

Overall, flight envelope testing for Block 2B (initial warfighting capability) mission software is 86 percent complete, and high angle of attack testing is 70 percent 

complete. Looking forward in 2014, the F–35 Joint Program Office (JPO) expects to 

complete Block 2B flying qualities, weapons environment, and software testing and 

continue Block 3F (full warfighting capability) envelope expansion and software 

flight testing. The Program Executive Officer (PEO) remains moderately confident 

Block 2B will release on time in support of U.S. Marine Corps initial operating capability (IOC) in 2015. The PEO is also moderately confident in an on-time delivery 

of Block 3i (which provides updated processors and the same operational capability 

as Block 2B) to support USAF IOC in 2016. However, there is some risk with the 

on-time delivery of Block 3F to support USN IOC in 2018. 

Maturation of ALIS is a continuing challenge. A revised development plan is in 

work and expected to be complete next month. It will include fixes to support Block 

2B fleet release and U.S. Marine Corps IOC in 2015. As a result of performance 

issues at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, the JPO implemented independent software reviews, brought in expertise from across the Lockheed Martin enterprise, and 

increased visibility (at Program Executive Officer and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) levels). A joint government/contractor Red Team determined in December 2013 that although there are issues, the ALIS architecture is sound. The team 

is continuing to provide recommendations to improve system performance and 

robustness. 

Reliability and maintainability remain below projected growth curves, but we are 

optimistic they will improve. The JPO and Lockheed Martin have identified the top 

20 design-controllable reliability and maintainability ‘‘degraders’’. Revised reliability 

and maintainability goals will be finalized in March 2014. Air vehicle availability 

126 

and not-mission capable for maintenance rates have improved steadily since October 

2013. 

The KC–46 program remains on schedule and contract costs remain stable. Maintaining both requirements and funding stability has been, and will continue to be, 

key in ensuring the success of the KC–46 program. Requirements stability to date 

on the KC–46 program is evidenced by zero engineering changes and the program 

having met every contractual milestone since contract award 36 months ago. A cornerstone of this stability has been the support provided by both DOD and Congress 

in maintaining funding required to execute the program. All four EMD aircraft are 

in assembly at the production facility and preparations are well underway for flight 

test. The first provisional tanker aircraft will be delivered to accomplish first flight 

this summer, followed by the first KC–46 aircraft delivery and first flight scheduled 

for early calendar year 2015. 

2. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, at this point, do you expect any of those programs to experience significant or critical cost growth over their original or revised 

acquisition program baseline costs and if so, why? Please explain your answer. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I do not anticipate any additional government cost growth in KC– 

46 Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract. The contract is a Fixed 

Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) vehicle which establishes a $4.9 billion ceiling price; 

this is the Government’s maximum financial liability, assuming no program 

changes, and shields the taxpayer from increased costs. Regarding acquisition program baseline cost, I do anticipate some cost growth in KC–46 life cycle Operating 

and Support (O&S) costs due to the Air Force decisions to increase KC–46 crew ratios and the flying hour program post-fiscal year 2020 in order to take advantage 

of the enhanced capabilities of the weapon system. These increased costs are not a 

result of the aircraft development program, but simply a change in field operations. 

There is no projected increase in Air Force Total Obligation Authority, as other 

tanker manpower and flying hour resources will be repurposed to KC–46 in the outyears. This increase in projected O&S costs was reported in the 2012 KC–46 Selected Acquisition Report. 

I do not expect the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter program to experience significant 

or critical cost growth over the revised acquisition program baseline cost. The F– 

35 program was rebaselined in March 2012 after declaring a critical Nunn-McCurdy 

breach. I believe the F–35 program was put on sound footing with a realistic budget 

and schedule when it was restructured after the Nunn-McCurdy breach. 

At this point in the development of the LRS–B, stable requirements are essential 

to keeping the program on track. The capability level requirements for the LRS– 

B—approved by DOD—set affordable, achievable, realistic requirements balanced by 

cost considerations. In order to reduce system and program complexity the program 

has minimized new development, allowing integration of mature technologies/existing systems. Industry is actively designing the system to stable, agreed upon requirements. 

MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION REFORM

3. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, at your confirmation hearing, in response to 

Senator Ayotte’s question regarding the failed $1 billion Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) program, you conceded that the Air Force does not have ‘‘firm 

accountability in the acquisition process.’’ ECSS, in particular, had six different program managers and five different program executive officers during its 8-year acquisition lifecycle. 

Some have proposed addressing this problem by better empowering program managers (PM) to make decisions important to the effective management of a given program and holding them accountable for those decisions by aligning their tenure with 

key investment decision-points, or milestones, during a given program’s acquisition 

lifecycle. What do you think of this proposal? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Wherever possible, it is my belief we should empower PMs to 

proactively make key decisions and effectively manage their programs. For there to 

be real accountability, we must first ensure PMs and PEOs have the required authorities and resources to effectively manage their programs. With those required 

authorities and resources, PEOs and PMs are then in a position from which they 

can execute effective programs. The PEOs and PMs have a responsibility to use the 

chain of command to communicate all systemic and institutional process issues that 

impede program success. Mr. Kendall’s new OSD Interim 5000.02 reinforces the responsibility and accountability of the Service Acquisition Executives (SAE), PEOs 

and PMs for the programs that they manage. If confirmed I will work to ensure that 

127 

our acquisition professionals have the necessary resources and an unfettered line of 

authority to be successful at program management. In instances where programs 

are managed ineffectively, I will hold acquisition professionals accountable for their 

failures. 

I support the requirement that a major defense acquisition program manager’s 

tenure be aligned to key milestones during a program’s acquisition lifecycle, with 

provision for waivers, as called for by title 10, U.S.C., § 1734, and DOD and Air 

Force policy. 

The Air Force has taken a number of steps to strengthen its management of PM 

and PEO tenure. AFI 36–1301 specifies that for ACAT I PMs and Deputy PMs, tenure should be through completion of the major milestone that occurs closest in time 

to the date on which the person has served in the position for 4 years; and that 

for all key leadership positions, including ACAT II PMs, PEOs will recommend appropriate tenure periods to the SAE based on program requirements. Determination 

of tenure is restricted to the SAE and this responsibility is not delegated to lower 

levels. Personnel selected for these key leadership positions will not be eligible if 

they decline to sign the required tenure agreement. 

Our goal is to balance PM tenure and the career development demands to grow 

future acquisition leaders. We are using the flexibility provided in title 10, U.S.C., 

§ 1734, and DOD policy to tailor PM tenure appropriately, based on the program 

and its point in the acquisition life cycle. 

4. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, would you be committed to instituting such an approach? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. I support the requirement that a major defense acquisition 

program manager’s tenure be aligned to key milestones during a program’s acquisition lifecycle, with provision for waivers, as called for by title 10, U.S.C., § 1734, and 

DOD and Air Force policy. 

The Air Force has taken a number of steps to strengthen its management of PM 

and PEO tenure. AFI 36–1301 specifies that for ACAT I PMs and Deputy PMs, the 

tenure should be through the program milestone closest to 4 years; and that for all 

key leadership positions, including ACAT II PMs, PEOs will recommend appropriate 

tenure periods to the SAE based on program requirements. Determination of tenure 

is restricted to the SAE and this responsibility is not delegated to lower levels. Personnel selected for these key leadership positions will not be eligible if they decline 

to sign the required tenure agreement. 

Wherever possible, I empower PMs to proactively make key decisions and effectively manage their programs. PEOs and PMs are fully encouraged to use the chain 

of command to communicate all systemic and institutional process issues that impede program success. Additionally, Mr. Kendall’s new OSD Interim 5000.02 reinforces how Service Acquisition Executives (SAE), PEOs and PMs are responsible 

and accountable for the programs they manage. If confirmed I will hold acquisition 

professionals accountable to the maxim extent possible. 

5. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, how would you otherwise ensure 

greater accountability for acquisition managers of the Air Force’s largest weapons 

procurement programs? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. If confirmed, I would institutionalize greater accountability in a 

deliberate and fair-minded manner. Ensuring greater accountability encompasses a 

range of potential factors. Using well established best practices, we must arrive at 

root cause of acquisition failures before moving to the steps of assessing accountability. Accountability must also be accompanied by appropriate authorities and responsibilities for it to be truly real. 

Of critical importance is the need to consider the extent to which acquisition mangers do not have the authority or the resources to properly execute their program 

due to budget, cost, schedule, technical or other factors outside of their control. The 

culture must allow for program managers to be able to ‘‘raise a flag’’ if they assess 

the program they are to manage is not executable. In all cases, if confirmed I am 

committed to giving our program managers and PEOs appropriate authorities and 

responsibilities, and then holding the chain of command accountable for the outcomes. 

6. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, during your testimony, you cited root and contributing causes to ECSS’ failure identified in the ECSS Acquisition Incident Report 

(AIR). In your view, how effectively is the Air Force addressing these causes in other 

similar business systems or other major automated information systems? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. In my view, we are effectively addressing the ECSS AIR team’s 

findings across our defense business system portfolio. Upon completing the ECSS 

128 

AIR in mid-2013, the AIR Team briefed lessons-learned to all levels of Air Force requirements and acquisition organizations. The requirements community and program managers are asked to link AIR recommendations to all applicable points in 

the acquisition strategy and planned milestones. These are briefed at Air Force governance boards, program milestone events and management reviews to ensure any 

need for course correction is detected and implemented early in the program’s 

lifecycle. 

In addition to the ongoing reviews that take place, the Under Secretary of the Air 

Force directed a review of our Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) to 

analyze the extent to which the AIR lessons-learned are being implemented and determine where the Air Force should make additional improvements. This MAIS review was accomplished under the direction of the Air Force Deputy Chief Management Officer in August 2013. The review used the AIR findings as the basis for assessment across five business systems of varying size and scope. The review afforded the Air Force the opportunity for both internal stakeholders (i.e., program 

and functional managers) and an external group of experts to look for problems 

similar to those of ECSS in existing programs. The findings (strengths, weaknesses 

and recommended corrective actions) were reported to Air Force program acquisition 

executives and Headquarters functional sponsors to help ensure our major business 

initiatives are on a solid path to success. 

The MAIS review complements work the Air Force has done to improve business 

systems acquisition. As an example, with Defense Enterprise Accounting Management System (DEAMS), the Air Force adopted a seven-phase release strategy with 

each phase being comprised of small, manageable increments. This strategy allows 

for the development and deployment of must-have capabilities to meet the Financial 

Improvement Audit Readiness (FIAR) goals across the Air Force and their Defense 

Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS) and U.S. Transportation Command partners. 

7. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, would you take any additional 

steps to make sure that these lessons have, in fact, been learned so that ECSS’ failures are not repeated? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, as the Service’s Acquisition Executive, I will make every effort to ensure the Air Force’s ECSS AIR Report lessons learned are fully considered 

and the right actions are taken to ensure mistakes made during ECSS are not repeated. I will regularly review programs that require my oversight and with specific 

regard to our defense business systems I will work with Major Automated Information System (MAIS) stakeholders, to include the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Aquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Chief Management Officer, the Chief Information Officer and functional communities to better articulate roles and responsibilities and efficient management. I will work closely with 

the functional users to ensure programs are built on a robust foundation of documented data decomposition, carefully mapped requirements, extended use cases, 

and well laid-out transition plans that move us from the current, to the interim, and 

ultimately to the desired end-state environments. I will monitor potential cost drivers in our MAIS programs through rigorous Configuration Steering Boards (CSB) 

to ensure we regularly revisit technical requirements and schedule metrics to drive 

program affordability. 

Additionally the AIR report pointed out shortcomings in how we assign and tenure our Program Managers. I will ensure that our Air Force Program Managers 

have the highest level of training and experience and placed in the right jobs. Specifically, I will work with our acquisition career management community to ensure 

Key Leadership Position (KLP) tenure agreements strike the appropriate balance 

between tenure and the career development demands to grow our future acquisition 

leaders. I will also make sure our Program Managers are empowered with the guidance they need to make and act on their decisions and that our policies hold the 

right people accountable for program outcomes. This is particularly relevant to the 

November 2013 release of DOD 5000.02 Interim acquisition policy. Upon its release, 

my office promptly engaged our counterparts at Headquarters Air Force and the 

Program Executive Offices to help broadcast the most critical changes in guidance 

and helped reduce uncertainty among stakeholders in how the new policy should be 

implemented. I plan to remain engaged on this topic and will pursue opportunities 

to help shape internal reforms within the Air Force and DOD to mitigate encumbering regulations and will reexamine the decision processes and metrics applied at 

each stage of the acquisition lifecycle to make sure we have established the most 

effective tools to assess each program’s value and affordability. 

129 

8. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, in May 2009, then-Secretary of the Air Force 

Michael B. Donley and then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Norton Schwartz 

released the Air Force Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP) to rebuild an ‘‘acquisition culture that delivers products and services as promised’’ and ‘‘on time’’. The 

plan outlined five target areas to realign the Air Force’s culture with acquisition 

‘‘best practices’’, including: (1) revitalizing the Air Force acquisition workforce; (2) 

improving requirements generation process; (3) instilling budget and financial discipline; (4) improving Air Force Major Systems source-selections; and (5) establishing clear lines of authority and accountability within acquisition organizations. 

In your view, has the AIP been fully implemented? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, it has been implemented and we requested the Air Force 

Audit Agency to validate our implementation (see their report F2011–0008–FC3000 

29 July 2011). All improvement efforts must be continuously sustained and kept in 

the forefront of our minds to be effective over time. The 2012 follow-up review produced more recommendations and our assessment was in the areas that were applicable and had value, were largely already in work or had been completed. 

We have seen improvements in unit price, overall costs and performance. NunnMcCurdy breaches as well as successful protest are measurably lower in recent 

years. Areas to see improvement and requiring focus continue to be schedule—particularly during development. If confirmed, this will be an area of emphasis. 

9. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, what target areas has the Air Force yet to address satisfactorily? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Air Force 2009 AIP implemented 33 initiatives across five 

areas (Revitalize the Acquisition Workforce; Improve Requirements; Budget/Financial Discipline; Improve Source Selection; Acquisition Organization) and yielded over 

170 process improvements. Although we have closed out AIP, Air Force Acquisition 

continues to seek improvement opportunities. 

For our workforce, we’re creating succession plans for acquisition leadership in 

functional specialties, working to ensure we grow our key leaders. We continue improving the qualifications and proficiency of the Acquisition workforce by concentrating on the development of practical application skills, qualifications, and business and technical acumen necessary to successfully execute the mission. At the 

same time, we’re concentrating on growing and strengthening our systems engineering workforce with the right technical expertise needed to perform early systems engineering analysis. 

We continue to work on decreasing the length of time to field major systems to 

the warfighter to reduce the years that it is currently taking from the original projection to deliver capabilities. Specifically, development programs take too long. 

Using an incremental acquisition approach (e.g. block) can help improve program 

performance. This approach is premised on knowledge-based, incremental development that provides increasing degrees of warfighting capability with each block. 

An incremental acquisition approach is the preferred strategy that provides the 

most effective balance of technical risk, financial resources, and the Air Forces’ operational needs. As a result, we’re implementing procedures and processes to ensure 

we utilize incremental acquisition strategies with technologies that are established 

and mature, while enabling technologies still in development to be injected into future increments of the program once they have matured. 

Finally, we continue to work with the requirements community to prevent requirements creep, control costs, and scope requirements to enable us to more successfully utilize incremental acquisition approaches. 

10. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if you are confirmed, how would you ensure 

that they are addressed? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. If confirmed, I will address these issues by creating actionable initiatives for what I consider to be some of the Air Force’s biggest challenges in the 

acquisition arena. 

My first priority is to ensure the Air Force’s most critical programs stay on track. 

To do this, we must continually assess requirements and their costs throughout the 

acquisition lifecycle. Consequently, I am working with the requirements community 

to ensure we institutionalize the use of cost/capability trades, working to build more 

rigor into the Developmental Planning process, and strengthening the oversight and 

review processes. 

The Air Force must also address Technology Development and maturity early in 

the acquisition process; therefore, I am working with the requirements community 

to ensure we use incremental acquisition strategies when appropriate. Further, if 

confirmed I will focus on strengthening the government program offices in gaining 

access to top technical talent to manage and assess technology risk. 

130 

Sound resource execution is another critical focus item that must be addressed so 

we can more effectively stretch the benefit of every dollar with which we are entrusted. OSD’s Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives are a good set of guiding principles that can help the Air Force be effective resource stewards. Our acquisition 

workforce will ensure the BBP 2.0 initiatives are implemented to produce the greatest benefit in affordability, should cost, and stronger partnerships with the requirements community. 

11. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, particularly in the KC–46A tanker replacement program, your predecessor successfully put in place a strict change management governance approach that was intended to freeze requirements early and ensure that this program did not experience requirements creep, and commensurately 

excessive cost-growth, during its acquisition lifecycle. Do you believe that the Air 

Force should take a similar approach to other sufficiently similar major defense acquisition programs? If so, if confirmed, how would you institute such an approach? 

Or, if not, why not? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to stress the relationship between 

requirements instability and cost/schedule growth and system affordability. The 

KC–46 change management governance approach is an excellent example of the 

commitment required to guard against requirements creep and its deleterious effects. 

As I have started in my current position, I will continue to strengthen the role 

of the CSB as one of the change management governance oversight mechanisms 

that enables the acquisition and requirements communities to work in concert to 

shield programs from requirements instability. In my current role, I have already 

reached out to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Deputy Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force for Operations, Plans and Requirements to explore methods to more 

closely link the efforts of the requirements and acquisition communities. In order 

to achieve true requirements stability, there must be a strong commitment among 

all stakeholders. This is an area that will yield good acquisition outcomes with proper leadership focus. 

BETTER BUYING POWER INITIATIVE

12. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, what is your view of the BBP initiative, started by then-USD(AT&L) (later Deputy Secretary) Ash Carter and continued by 

USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I strongly endorse AT&L’s BBP initiatives, and in my currently 

delegated role of Service Acquisition Executive, I have emphasized them in my priorities for the Air Force Acquisition Enterprise. The BBP 2.0 initiatives represent 

a collection of many tried and true best practices that DOD acquisition community 

should be implementing consistently. More than anything else, BBP 2.0 is a framework to train and teach the acquisition workforce time tested methods of acquiring 

systems and services. 

The BBP initiatives certainly call for a significant cultural reawakening in the acquisition workforce which has been taking place now for several years. In fact, I 

have found that there are some BBP initiatives that pockets of leaders in the Air 

Force Acquisition Enterprise were executing prior to the initial publication of the 

AT&L BBP initiatives. 

I am pleased with the positive gains the community has made, for example, in 

the implementation of Should Cost initiatives, Cost/Capabilities Trades, Affordability initiatives and other cost control measures. I have witnessed the benefits of 

BBP initiatives in our major acquisition programs, as well as in the Air Force acquisition of services. If confirmed, I will continue to implement BBP to the maximum 

extent possible, and I am confident we will continue to see cost savings and other 

efficiency trends in our Air Force acquisition programs. 

13. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, in your view, how successfully has the Air 

Force acquisition workforce implemented its tenets? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. We are actively working on the implementation of the BBP initiatives and some efforts are easier to measure effectiveness than others, but one concrete example on which we are already seeing great returns is the implementation 

of ‘‘should cost.’’ The ‘‘should cost’’ strategy is aimed at seeking out and eliminating 

low- and non-value added aspects of program costs. Managers are then ‘rewarded’ 

by being given the opportunity to utilize those savings, if necessary, as additional 

resources to manage program risk within the baseline program, or have the funds 

returned to the Air Force or OSD for high priority needs. 

131 

The Air Force is actively gathering should cost data and reporting our successes to OSD. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force realized $673 million in should-cost savings. Additionally, in fiscal year 2013, only one program requested a ‘‘should cost’’ 

waiver, down from 79 percent of programs in fiscal year 2012, which indicates that 

these initiatives are becoming second nature. This is just one example of how the 

Air Force has already accepted and begun to implement BBP. 

OSD’s BBP initiatives are positive steps towards achieving successful program 

management and acquisition excellence. If confirmed, I will continue to implement 

BBP to the maximum extent possible, and I am confident we will continue to see 

cost savings and other efficiency trends throughout the Air Force. 

14. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, how would you ensure its continued implementation? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The BBP initiatives are a responsible framework for improving our 

acquisition workforce skills and capabilities. A total of 16 initiatives have been delegated to the Service Acquisition Executives for implementation. 

If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that all Air Force acquisition and contracting professionals implement this guidance and achieve the levels of success already seen to date. In my current position, I have been actively engaged in promoting the concepts behind BBP to our workforce through visits to the field and recognition of our personnel on individual successes and cost savings. Additionally, the 

Air Force has set policy and guidance on a wide variety of initiatives including BBP, 

and integrated these tenets in all levels of acquisition reviews. This active engagement is just the first step towards institutionalizing the process and making it the 

new way of doing business. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with USD(AT&L) to implement the initiatives to the maximum extent possible, and will assure that the senior executives assigned to implement the initiatives are accountable for their implementation successes. 

CONTRACTING NEGOTIATORS

15. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, what kinds of experience and 

knowledge would you look for in the individuals who negotiate major contracts for 

the Air Force? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I expect any Airman negotiating major Air Force contracts to possess the appropriate and significant level of professional training, hands-on experience, and requisite knowledge of the specific mission area as well as tough negotiating skills. What I also look for are individuals who think conceptually and listen 

critically. I expect airmen to possess the acumen, judgment, and character of an Air 

Force Contracting Professional. Above all, I look for integrity. 

16. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, do you feel the Air Force has a sufficient number of such experts in its acquisition workforce? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. While I feel that we have many such experts, I cannot say that 

we have a sufficient number of them. Experience takes years to build, and while 

we are actively doing so, retirement eligibility, competition with other agencies and 

competition with industry for such experts continues to impact our retention. I am 

concerned and will focus on the mobility of Air Force contracting experts—that is 

our ability to surge our best experts to emerging high priority contracting needs. 

Again, if confirmed this is an area I am committed to improving. 

PROGRAM MATURITY

17. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

has consistently reported that the use of insufficiently mature technologies has resulted in significant cost and schedule growth in the major acquisitions of the Air 

Force and the other military departments. Do you believe that the use of insufficiently mature technologies drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapons systems? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. It is my goal that all Air Force major acquisitions achieve a 

high level of technology maturity by the start of system development to ensure a 

match between resources and requirements. Continuing to exercise the well-established Air Force Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) process, which includes an 

independent assessment of critical technologies, will help to ensure the necessary 

resource/requirements match. Understanding and then actively managing programmatic and technical risk is foundational for successful acquisition. 

132 

18. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, do you believe the Air Force has made 

progress in ensuring the right amount of technology knowledge is in place before 

embarking on major programs? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. While the Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) serves to 

ensure an alignment between resources and requirements prior to major program 

initiation, the TRA by itself does not address systems integration and engineering 

risks. The expertise of a professional engineering workforce within the Air Force acquisition community to perform early systems engineering analysis is critical before 

embarking on major programs. This workforce can balance the integration of: 

(1) Overall systems engineering design and process, 

(2) Concerns for operational mission requirements, 

(3) The state of current available technologies (Technology Readiness Levels 

(TRL) 8 & 9) 

(4) Near-term technologies in laboratory development (TRLs 4–6), and 

(5) Increasingly stringent concerns for funding and schedule realism. 

Effectively addressing these issues earlier in the program will help mitigate cost 

overruns and schedule delays in future systems. Again, the TRA is a successful instrument for measuring knowledge points, but it must be augmented by a competent and professional workforce. 

19. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, as to major defense acquisition 

programs, what steps would you take to make sure that critical technologies have 

indeed reached an appropriate level of maturity before Milestone B approval? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. If confirmed, I will ensure the Air Force continues to apply its 

well-established Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) process to ensure major 

defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) meet the Section 2366b of title 10, U.S. Code 

certification requirement that program technology be demonstrated in a relevant environment. The Deputy assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology 

and Engineering facilitates the Air Force TRA process on my behalf and ensures 

that a formal, independent assessment of critical technologies has been completed 

prior to recommending a program proceed to Milestone B. 

20. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, the USD(AT&L) has also issued a memorandum directing that the largest DOD acquisition programs undergo competitive 

prototyping to ensure technological maturity, reduce technical risk, validate designs, 

reduce cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine requirements. 

Do you support this requirement, and if so, why? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, I support the USD(AT&L) policy changes to implement the 

Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which provides for early and competitive 

prototyping as well as other efforts to improve the Defense acquisition process. Competitive prototyping, when practical and affordable, drives technology maturation 

early in the acquisition, enables effective systems engineering, allows the warfighter 

to see the potential capability demonstrated in an operational or relevant environment, and leads to effective maturation of technology while minimizing programmatic risk. Wherever appropriate, I believe prototyping should be used to directly support initial system designs as well as experimentation. 

COST GROWTH

21. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, GAO has reported that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates by the Air Force and the other military 

departments is a major contributor to cost growth and program failure. Do you believe this is still the case within the Air Force? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Air Force has made great progress toward improving the accuracy of cost and schedule estimates. In addition, Air Force senior decision makers 

now consider independent cost assessments in annual resource programming and 

budgeting decisions. 

Since the passage of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, the Air 

Force continues to improve the quality of cost and schedule estimates that form the 

baselines for our major acquisition programs. Independent cost estimates are developed that form the cost baseline for all our major acquisition programs. In addition, 

we are more rigorously budgeting to the cost baseline which facilitates program stability. New policy guidance and procedures require annual, independent cost estimates on all major acquisition programs. 

In my current position, I have stressed how requirements can drive cost by evaluating how changing or reducing a requirement, even slightly, can have significant 

cost ramifications. 

133 

We have also addressed improving our cost estimating workforce in recent years 

by working with the Defense Acquisition University to improve the cost estimating 

curriculum required for their Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act certification. These actions and improvements have resulted in more realistic, objective 

cost and schedule estimates in support of the budget process and acquisition decisions. 

The Air Force is committed to improving cost and schedule estimates and enhancing program success across all acquisition programs. The Air Force closely tracks 

execution and provides guidance as necessary to keep efforts ‘‘on track’’. The number 

of Nunn-McCurdy breaches has declined significantly since the mid-2000s (fiscal 

year 2005–2008 had 26 breaches over 14 programs). Over the past 3 years, the Air 

Force has had five programs declare a significant or critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. 

Of those, three are no longer MDAP programs (C–27J, C–130AMP, and National 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)), one was 

driven by a combination of quantity reductions and cost growth (Global Hawk), and 

one resulted from restoration to MDAP status (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

(EELV)). This past year, the Air Force had no Nunn-McCurdy breaches. 

22. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, what steps would you take to ensure that cost 

and schedule estimates are fair and independent and provide a sound basis for Air 

Force programs? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Since the passage of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 

of 2009, the Air Force continues to improve the quality of its cost and schedule estimates and we are more rigorously budgeting to them. New policy guidance and procedures have been adopted that require annual, independent cost estimates on all 

major acquisition programs. Additionally, the Air Force routinely develops independent schedule assessments on major acquisition programs. This has resulted in 

more realistic, objective cost and schedule estimates in support of the budget process 

and acquisition decisions. Finally, there has been a cultural shift to emphasize 

starting programs where the service is fully committed with funding and fit within 

affordability caps derived from realistic budget assumptions. 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION

23. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, in your advance policy questions, you note 

that information technology (IT) acquisitions would benefit from having a specific 

appropriations account. Would it be restricted only to major defense automated systems? Please explain this concept more fully. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I was expanding on a specific point that was raised in the ‘‘A New 

Approach for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in the Department of 

Defense’’ report to Congress from November 2010. The specific appropriations account was one item in a larger response stating that, ‘‘The PPBE system, used to 

build the entire DOD budget, operates on a timeline that is mismatched to the fastpaced IT commercial marketplace. It is unreasonable to expect the funding process 

for the entire DOD to be shortened sufficiently to respond to the rapid changes of 

the IT environment, yet PPBE flexibility is needed.’’ This is an example of one potential action that could be taken to provide DOD with more flexibility in procuring 

all IT, not just major automated information systems, while also providing more 

oversight into the resources spent on IT. The report stated, ‘‘The funding appropriation would have the flexibility for development, procurement, and operations and 

maintenance to permit funding a range of potential IT materiel solutions based on 

a sound business case.’’ Additionally, the single IT appropriation would contain provisions for performance-based metrics that must be established before funds could 

be obligated and would offer complete transparency to ensure accountability to oversight officials. If aligned into a portfolio approach, the single IT appropriation would 

allow flexibility when selecting options for developing and procuring a new system. 

Overall, options need to be explored in how to fund IT systems and the single IT 

appropriation is one example of an idea that could be implemented to result in faster, more responsive IT. 

FAMILY OF ADVANCED BEYOND LINE-OF-SIGHT TERMINALS

24. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, significant technical challenges on the Family 

of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB–T) program have led to severe 

schedule delays and cost increases. Consequently, after more than a decade since 

program initiation, important nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 

capabilities are yet to be delivered and fielded to the warfighter. Recently, it has 

134 

been reported that the Air Force has decided to initially move forward with producing only command post terminals (84 units) and deferring production of terminals designed to be installed on strategic bomber aircraft (132 units). Does this reduction in production units mean the FAB–T program will breach the Nunn-McCurdy critical unit cost increase threshold, or are the bomber aircraft terminals still a 

part of the program? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Department still has a validated FAB–T requirement to procure an AEHF capability on the 132 B–2, B–52 and RC–135 force element platforms, but procurement has been deferred beyond the Future Years Defense Program. We have prioritized procuring the command post terminals first in order to 

deliver Presidential and National Voice Conferencing by the fiscal year 2019 Initial 

Operational Capability date. I do not foresee the potential for a Nunn-McCurdy unit 

cost breach at this time 

25. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, to what extent is there or should there be a 

Plan B to mitigate risk and help ensure needed capabilities are delivered in case 

the FAB–T program continues to experience delays and cost increases? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The current Air Force acquisition strategy, approved by the 

USD(AT&L) in 2012, brings an alternate source to the FAB–T development, effectively implementing a Plan B. The decision to complete development from both 

sources on firm fixed price contracts greatly mitigates the cost, schedule, and performance risks previously associated with the program. Further, this plan introduces competition into the FAB–T program which is expected to provide better cost 

effective capability then having a single supplier. 

26. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, what assurances can you provide that the program is on the right track? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I believe programmatic actions taken to date have reduced program risk to an acceptable level and support the current acquisition strategy. Last 

year, the Department initiated an updated plan for FAB–T with a rigorous risk 

mitigation process involving leadership, stakeholders, and contractors. Based on 

over 10 years of working on the Boeing development contract and recent test activity on that program, the government has an in-depth understanding of the design 

and its readiness for production. Currently, Raytheon has three other AEHF terminals in production. The FAB–T program is on track to select a single source for production of command post terminals in the second quarter of fiscal year 2014. I am 

confident the winning bidder will be ready to deliver a system that meets requirements and affordability goals. I look forward to working with the USD(AT&L); the 

Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space; and the FAB–T program manager 

to ensure the program is ready for a successful Milestone C decision. 

MILITARY SPACE ACQUISITIONS

27. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, since 2006 DOD has funded the fixed costs 

of its supplier under the EELV program under a contract line-item known as 

Launch Capability. This expenditure is in excess of $1 billion annually and is executed on a cost-plus basis today. As you may know, in a November 2012 Acquisition 

Decision Memorandum (ADM), USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall directed the Air Force 

to aggressively reintroduce competition into the EELV program. In your view, what 

does the aggressive reintroduction of competition into the EELV program mean? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. In my opinion, ‘‘aggressive reintroduction of competition’’ means 

taking steps wherever possible to establish a competitive environment, even if that 

competitive environment only covers a portion of the mission. Furthermore, it 

means posturing ourselves for increased competition (competition growth) as we 

move forward to 2018. The Air Force is taking steps to do this: 

• We will compete portions of the launch manifest each year in 2015, 2016, 

and 2017 if there is even one New Entrant ready to compete; i.e., they have 

successful launches and have completed the required certification steps 

• We will work early with declared New Entrants to certify their systems 

as ready as evidenced by our Cooperative Research and Development 

Agreement with SpaceX 

• We will award early integration contracts supporting timely space vehicle 

integration to meet launch schedules 

• We have added government team resources to assure timely review of 

certification products, data and other supporting information throughout 

the certification process 

135 

The Air Force is committed to competition within the EELV program and is aggressively taking steps to do so while ensuring its responsibilities to deploy National 

Security Space payloads into their orbits safely and with acceptable risk. 

28. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if you are confirmed, how would you ensure 

that this directive is implemented in that program? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I will continue to work closely with the USD(AT&L), and the Program Executive Officer for Space to introduce competition into the EELV program. 

In my current role, I recently met with the USD(AT&L) to discuss the status of the 

program and will continue to provide him additional information on the competitive 

request for proposal later this spring. We will continue those actions I previously 

described toward strengthening the competitive environment for launch. 

29. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, given that the recently revised National Space 

Transportation Policy removed the previous policy that the Secretary of Defense 

fund the fixed costs of its launch provider, what actions does the Air Force plan to 

take to phase-out this Launch Capability contract line item, reduce the complexity 

of the existing contract structure, and establish a level playing field for all potential 

offers of national security space launch? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Air Force reduced the complexity of the EELV contract for the 

current economic order quantity commitment through consolidation of the entire effort into a single contract. In accordance with the recently revised National Space 

Transportation Policy, we ensured the new EELV contract only pays for the capability to launch the 36-core buy and the previously purchased cores that haven’t yet 

launched. We are currently working on the strategy for the next phase of the EELVclass program which will start in fiscal year 2018 with procurement of launch services for satellite launch requirements starting in fiscal year 2020. As part of this 

strategy, the Air Force does not intend the future contract to contain a contract line 

item structure similar to the one currently in place. The approach for this next 

phase will balance mission assurance with cost and satellite requirements within a 

full-and-open competition environment for certified providers 

30. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, what additional steps, if any, would you take 

in this regard, if you are confirmed? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. If confirmed, I will continue to work with potential competitors to 

understand their concerns and ensure we comply with National Policy, Federal Acquisition Regulation, and Department of Defense (DOD) requirements. 

31. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, what do you see as the main challenges to 

achieving full-and-open competition in the EELV program? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I see three main categories of challenges to achieving full-and-open 

competition: 

First, industry developments. To have full-and-open competition you must have 

competitors. While New Entrants, especially SpaceX, have made great strides in developing their launch systems, we still do not have any other provider capable of 

doing the entire mission required to be executed by the United Launch Alliance 

today. The new entrants have a lot of work ahead of them and I will be watching 

their progress with great interest and enthusiasm. 

Second, mission assurance. We have had a tremendously successful run in the 

launch business in great part because of the strong engineering disciplines imposed 

upon our current launch systems. We do not want to lower our standards. So we 

must find an effective way to assure quality and mission assurance for New Entrants in a timely and affordable way. We are well on our way with SpaceX, but 

there is much work to go as mutually agreed to in our Cooperative Research and 

Development Agreement with them. 

Third, wise purchasing. We will be challenged to establish a fair competition that 

complies with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, treats all competitors fairly, aggressively pursues a good deal for the U.S. Government, and at the same time postures us for success given possible developments in the domestic and international 

defense and commercial launch markets. 

I think our team is up to this challenge, but it is indeed a tough job. 

32. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, would you encourage a move to 

full-and-open competition if more than one launch company was certified to launch 

EELV-class payloads? If so, how so? If not, why not? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, if confirmed I will continue to encourage a move to competitive procurement if more than one company is certified. However, this would in the 

near term be a limited competition versus full and open, as it would be limited to 

136 

the certified competitors. The first opportunity for competition is in fiscal years 

2015–2017, where a limited number of missions are available for competition. I envision a competitive procurement for all launches starting in fiscal year 2018 if more 

than one provider is certified. 

33. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, as to military space procurement generally, 

do you see a need for any changes/modifications to DOD’s or the Air Force’s current 

acquisition policies? If so, what areas might be appropriate for change, and why? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The USD(AT&L) recently released a revision to the DOD instruction (known as DODI 5000.02) that governs the defense acquisition system. I am 

still reviewing the instruction and how it specifically addresses military space procurement. Overall, I agree with its objectives that emphasize thoughtful program 

planning; tailored program structures and procedures that account for unique program circumstances, such as high-cost first article acquisitions like space programs; 

and program management responsibility. I see an opportunity under the new revision to implement changes to oversight and program structure of our space programs such as improved cost management and incentives. I think there are some 

excellent opportunities to drive down the cost of commercial satellite communications services through investment versus leases, and we continue to work with 

AT&L to identify the specific policy changes that might be required to implement 

these approaches. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the USD(AT&L) on 

continuing to streamline and improve the defense acquisition system. 

34. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, the Air Force has only recently taken significant steps to gain insight into contractors and their costs for major space and other 

programs. These efforts have benefitted the Air Force, helping to lower prices for 

space launch services and key satellites. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure 

the Air Force continues and strengthens these efforts? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. If confirmed, I will continue to implement USD(AT&L) BBP initiatives to the greatest extent possible. We continue to make excellent progress reducing and eliminating non-value added costs especially through our ‘‘should cost’’ efforts. The ‘‘should cost’’ concept enables us to understand a system’s cost elements 

in great depth, and then, through prudent, cost-benefit based considerations of the 

associated risks, implement measures that eliminate or reduce non-value added 

costs. As an example, effective ‘‘should cost’’ management, along with other affordability initiatives made possible by good collaboration between DOD and Congress, 

enabled over $1.6 billion of savings over buying the vehicles separately for the procurement of the fifth and sixth Advanced Extremely High Frequency production satellites. In addition, we must continue to grow the quality of our workforce to ensure 

personnel in key positions have the right knowledge and experience to ‘‘own the 

technical baseline’’ and drive these BBP initiatives. 

Additionally, the complexity and high-unit cost of space systems creates a strong 

imperative for a high level of insight into our program costs. We learned this in 

EELV where the commercial nature of the original program did not provide such 

insight. So, as the market contracted and costs rose we did not have the data we 

needed. As you noted, we corrected that problem in EELV and have learned that 

lesson. I will apply these hard-learned lessons by continuing to ensure we have cost 

visibility into our expensive launch and space programs 

35. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, we know that several prime space contractors 

have likewise taken actions to increase efficiencies and streamline operations. This 

is a welcome trend—but not without risk. How is the Air Force staying abreast of 

these changes and assuring that key areas of expertise are not being lost or that 

technical risks are not significantly increased? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I believe our understanding of and collaboration with the network 

of suppliers that provide space products and services to the Air Force will help us 

manage these risks. If confirmed, I will continue to support initiatives that accomplish this, such as the DOD’s sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2) activity and the 

numerous government-industry forums, councils, and committees the Air Force participates in along with the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 

In addition, I believe we must continue our efforts to recruit, retain and develop 

a world-class acquisition workforce to ensure technical risks, regardless of origin, 

are properly managed. In my current role, I’ve been pleased with the quality of our 

acquisition workforce and their ability to manage space acquisition programs. However, we must maintain a constant focus on growing our expertise to ensure implementation of efficiency initiatives and streamlining does not incur undue programmatic risk. 

137 

36. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, fixed-price contracts are a preferred approach 

for satellites that are in the production phase. Yet, for the past decade, the Air 

Force has maintained an acquisition workforce that is accustomed to working in a 

cost-plus environment as it recapitalized the majority of its space portfolio. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Air Force adjusts within this environment 

to more extensively use fixed-price contracts, where their use is, in fact, warranted 

and appropriate? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. If confirmed, I will continue to support fixed-price contracting 

where appropriate. In order to do this more extensively, I will work closely with the 

Program Executive Officer for Space to assess and adjust training and development 

opportunities for the space acquisition workforce that continue to grow the necessary skills to effectively implement fixed-price contracting approaches. We have 

begun to manage one of our major satellites under a fixed-price contract and are 

in the process of transitioning a second and preparing a third. I am fully utilizing 

this opportunity to evolve the space acquisition workforce to operate efficiently and 

effectively in a fixed-price environment. 

37. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, in your view, how will the Air Force’s oversight and insight into space programs change in a fixed-price contract environment? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Air Force is responsible for providing space capabilities and 

must be an informed consumer. To accomplish this task, we will continue to provide 

oversight to space programs and require insight into contractor execution. When 

doing this, we must only implement fixed-price contracts where appropriate; and 

even when contracts are fixed-price, we must continue to closely monitor cost and 

schedule performance, demand in-progress testing and thorough evaluation of test 

results while at the same time enforce our mission assurance engineering disciplines 

on our space system development efforts. I anticipate fixed-price contracts for mature, lower-risk acquisitions to reduce costs in government oversight and contract 

execution. For example, the Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) program is an example 

of a mature, low-risk acquisition where we were able to substantiate the cost data 

and use a firm-fixed price contract. The risks with providing capability to the 

warfighter are low and there are other, available commercial options that provide 

similar capability. These factors allowed the Air Force to successfully leverage a 

commercial business model to yield efficiencies. In other cases, fixed-price contracts 

for higher risk, more complex acquisitions with unique mission requirements may 

require a higher level of government focus. For instance, the FPIF contract for 

AEHF 5/6 still requires significant government oversight to manage the higher risks 

associated with Nuclear Command, Control and Communications requirements and 

where substitute options are unavailable on the commercial market. These two programs highlight our ability to continue to provide oversight and leverage efficiencies 

from fixed-price contracts while maintaining focus on mission assurance and system 

activities. 

38. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, how will the size and composition of the Air 

Force’s acquisition workforce change in light of these changes? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. When considering fixed-price contracting for our space systems, 

there are several factors that influence the size and composition of the space acquisition workforce that need to be evaluated. Some of the factors include different 

oversight requirements based on contract risks, cost savings or cost/risk avoidance 

functions such as ‘‘should-cost’’ analyses, and the development of more resilient architectures. We have been able to reduce workforce requirements for WGS by focusing on higher level oversight of cost, schedule, and performance. This has allowed 

us to realign that workforce to higher risk acquisitions that are critical to develop 

more affordable and resilient space systems architectures. If confirmed, I will work 

with the Program Executive Officer for Space to evaluate the size and composition 

of the space acquisition workforce to ensure that we are able to efficiently and effectively complete our missions. 

39. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, many government groups have pointed out 

problems in the synchronization of space systems’ development, such as ground control systems not being ready when satellites are launched, or user equipment not 

being available for the warfighter when advanced signals and information are being 

produced by satellites. In some cases, the gap between the availability of a satellite 

and its user equipment has added up to a delay of many years. What are some options you think will help to reduce these problems and improve coordination on 

space systems Government-wide? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I believe we must continue to improve the way we manage the 

space enterprise and our acquisition processes to field capabilities that are complete 

138 

and useful to the warfighter. Although we coordinate all of our capability fielding 

plans with the combatant commands, budgetary limitations and instability often 

force changes to these plans that can push a system’s synchronization to a less optimal state. We can help mitigate these concerns by ensuring our space systems are 

affordable, and where practical, commit to longer-term plans that stabilize capability delivery. Additionally, we must continue to communicate and collaborate 

across the separate acquisition programs that make up an end-to-end space capability. 

40. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, do you believe this problem is rooted in a lack 

of focused leadership for space systems? If so, how would you address this issue if 

confirmed? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I don’t believe this problem is rooted in a lack of focused leadership for space systems. I understand that the Air Force’s Space Launch Broad Area 

Review (BAR) in 1999 and later, the congressionally-directed Space Commission in 

2000 took a hard look at how space activities should be managed. The Air Force 

adopted many of the BAR and Commission’s key findings, to include assigning Air 

Force Space Command responsibility for providing the resources to execute space research, development, acquisition, operations and sustainment under one four-star 

commander. This construct created a strong center of advocacy for space systems 

and resources, and I believe maintains the proper level of leadership focus on our 

space systems. 

41. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, multiple organizations are responsible for acquiring satellite communications for DOD, including the Air Force, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Navy, among others. Additionally, each Military 

Service is responsible for acquiring satellite communications terminals. To what extent should there be a single acquirer of satellite communications for DOD? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. As you state, currently the Air Force procures wideband and protected military space and ground control segments, while the Navy procures 

narrowband military space and ground control segments. Similarly, each individual 

service procures associated terminals that best match their warfighting requirements. Finally, DISA leases commercial satellite bandwidth to augment overall Department capabilities. I do think the Department can do a better job delivering 

these capabilities in the future. A number of ongoing activities, as evidenced by the 

Protected Satellite Communication Services Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and our 

commercial satellite communication pathfinder efforts are underway. 

I don’t believe a single acquirer of satellite communications is the answer to these 

problems. Each individual service is best equipped to develop and procure terminals 

that best match their unique needs. Similarly, there resides a level of technical expertise within the Air Force and Navy focused on wideband and protected, and 

narrowband satellite communications, respectively. While in theory that expertise 

could be consolidated into a single organization, the costs associated with consolidation may outweigh the benefits. That said, I believe opportunities remain to increase 

communications, collaboration, and integration between the separate organizations 

to improve the overall efficiency, effectiveness, and synchronization of satellite communications capabilities. 

42. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, to what extent does DOD have the knowledge 

it needs to determine its short-term to mid-term communications bandwidth-needs 

to enable long-term leases of commercial satellite communications bandwidth? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. To my knowledge, DOD is following a rigorous process to improve 

its knowledge and detailed understanding of its short-, medium-, and long-term 

commercial SATCOM bandwidth requirements. The DOD process accounts for the 

specifics of near-term requirements while utilizing a scenario-based process that 

documents, prioritizes and validates requirements for the medium- and long-term 

periods. This information can enable the use of longer-term leases and potential new 

acquisition approaches for more cost-effective methods to provide commercial satellite bandwidth to the warfighter. 

43. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, when will acquisition and budget decisions 

need to be made on the way forward for providing space system capabilities following the fifth and sixth Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) geosynchronous 

Earth orbit satellites, and the third and fourth highly elliptical orbit sensors, the 

fifth and sixth Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites, the final two 

Defense Meteorological System (DWSS) program satellites, and the Space Based 

Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite? 

139 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Overhead Persistent Infrared AoA is expected to commence 

in 2014 to inform the way ahead to meet future requirements in a cost-effective 

manner. Currently, we anticipate the AoA’s preliminary results to inform the fiscal 

year 2016 President’s budget, with the final results of the AoA informing the fiscal 

year 2017 President’s budget. The acquisition development decision is projected for 

fiscal year 2018. 

We expect the Protected Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Services AOA, 

which will recommend how to best provision for protected military SATCOM capabilities beyond the sixth AEHF satellite, to provide recommendations in 2014 that 

will inform the fiscal year 2016 budget formulation. Final budget and acquisition 

decisions will have to be made by fiscal year 2017. 

Acquisition and budget decisions are currently being considered within the fiscal 

year 2015 budget process for the Weather System Follow-on (WSF) effort. These decisions are being informed by the Space-Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM) 

AOA, which included an assessment of the SBEM capabilities provided by the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), as well as civil and international 

SBEM partners. 

The SBSS Block 10 system is the Air Force’s only dedicated, operational spacebased space situational awareness asset. Providing over 28 percent of all deep space 

collects in the space surveillance network and delivering vital mission data products 

to the warfighter, it is a cornerstone capability for deep-space Space Situational 

Awareness. In order to mitigate a critical capability gap post-SBSS Block 10 end of 

life (September 2017), acquisition and budget decisions are currently being considered within the fiscal year 2015 budget process. 

44. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, what are the primary schedule-drivers for 

making these decisions? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. For SBIRS, the primary schedule drivers for making these decisions are the predicted replenishment windows to avoid critical capability gaps to 

our warfighters and leadership. We also incorporate the acquisition, budgeting, and 

other process timelines to determine when decisions must be made. 

For AEHF, current functional availability analysis indicates replenishment for a 

four satellite AEHF constellation needs to start in fiscal year 2027. As such, we 

need to make a decision no later than fiscal year 2017. The Protected SATCOM 

Services AoA and a number of ongoing risk reduction activities posture us to start 

that acquisition in time. 

The Air Force’s path forward for the next generation weather system (follow-on 

to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program) will be informed by the SpaceBased Environmental Monitoring (SBEM) AoA. The AoA was recently completed by 

the Air Force and submitted to OSD CAPE for a sufficiency review and to Joint 

Staff for their review and validation process. The AoA evaluated the contribution 

of DOD, civil, and international SBEM systems to fulfill the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council (JROC)-endorsed capability gaps. This analysis will allow DOD 

to focus on a military solution to fulfill those capability gaps. The Air Force is formulating this strategy to inform the fiscal year 2015 budget. 

Analyses and risk reduction efforts are underway to inform future decisions regarding timely space situational awareness of the geosynchronous regime. Many of 

these efforts should complete within the next 1 to 2 years. 

45. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, do you believe that the Air Force should pursue a more disaggregated approach to the architectures for its space systems, such 

as fielding more numerous but simpler and smaller satellites or hosting payloads 

on commercial satellites? Why or why not? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Disaggregation is a concept that may offer advantages in areas of 

resiliency and affordability in certain situations; however, it is premature to embark 

on such a sweeping architectural solution to established mission areas without further rigorous study and analysis. I do believe that the Air Force should consider 

disaggregated approaches when determining how to best meet the mission needs, 

especially in a fiscally constrained environment. We expect the ongoing Protected 

SATCOM Services and soon-to-be Overhead Persistent Infrared systems AoA will 

examine disaggregated and other architectures in detail to inform the best approach 

to address requirements in the future. Furthermore, the Air Force and the National 

Security Space community have enacted requirements for protection as key performance parameters on all future space systems, with space situational awareness 

being a key architectural design consideration enabling our Nation’s National Security Space (NSS) systems to operate in a contested space environment. There is no 

‘‘silver bullet’’ that applies to all situations; the right answer will possibly be a mix 

140 

of disaggregation, hosted payloads, in situ Space Situational Awareness, commercial 

services, and simpler satellites architected across the entire NSS enterprise. 

46. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, if you agree that the Air Force should take 

such an approach, how would you ensure that it does, if confirmed? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The question of whether a disaggregated approach is the best approach to meet a particular need should be addressed during the materiel solution 

analysis phase of an acquisition program, prior to Milestone A. The Analyses of Alternative in particular should consider disaggregated architectures. As the Service 

Acquisition Executive, I can personally ensure that disaggregated approaches will 

be considered during my review at this Milestone. 

47. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, considering DOD’s interest in disaggregated 

space systems, what efforts do you believe are needed in the launch area to develop 

domestic launch capabilities that are appropriately responsive and inexpensive in 

order to make disaggregation of national security space systems effective? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Disaggregated space systems could mean smaller satellites which 

could eliminate the need for larger boosters. The larger boosters are more expensive, 

take longer to build, and require more time on the pad. However, having multiple 

satellites going to similar orbits may mean EELV-class launch vehicles provide the 

best value by launching multiple satellites on the same booster. Regardless of the 

outcome, having additional launch providers on contract through the Rocket Systems Launch Program or EELV program will provide more options for a variety of 

system architectures. 

48. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. LaPlante, I understand that the position of Air Force 

Program Executive Officer for Space Launch may be subsumed under the Program 

Executive Officer for Space. Do you believe that this change should be made? Please 

explain your answer. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, I believe this change should be made. The program needed 

to get as good at the ‘‘business of launch’’ as they were at ‘‘day of launch.’’ We separated the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Space Launch to achieve cost control 

and focus on implementing a new acquisition strategy that maintains mission success, reduces costs, prevents or mitigates cost or redesign impacts to space vehicles, 

and sustains the program to assure access to space. This mission was accomplished 

and with the award of the Launch Vehicle Production Services and Capability contract, the program was placed back under the Program Executive Officer for Space 

on December 12, 2013. This was done in consultation with the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Air Force Space Command Commander. The EELV program is well aligned under the Program Executive 

Officer for Space who, as commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center, is 

also the EELV launch certification decision authority, as well as the New Entrant 

certification authority. To ensure a smooth transition, several existing members of 

the former PEO for Space Launch team will continue working the program through 

at least fiscal year 2015. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PRIORITIES

49. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. LaPlante, Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark 

Welsh has made it quite clear the Air Force’s top three acquisition priorities going 

forward are the F–35, the KC–46, and the LRS–B. He has also recently added a 

replacement for the aging E–8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

(JSTARS) as another top priority. Considering the effects of sequestration, is it realistic to believe the Air Force will be able to execute current acquisition plans for 

these major systems? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I believe we will be able to execute the current acquisition plans 

for the F–35, KC–46, and LRS–B programs in addition to JSTARS. As General 

Welsh has testified, we must recapitalize the aging fleets these capabilities are targeting. The effects of sequestration will undoubtedly threaten each of our top priority programs and lower priority programs, but the Air Force leadership is committed to ensuring the Service makes the required investments to execute its core 

missions against the expected threats in the 2023 and beyond timeframe. Budget 

constraints will make this challenging; however, when faced with difficult choices 

we will favor recapitalization over modernization, keeping these important programs 

in the foremost of our priorities. The JSTARS acquisition will take advantage of maVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
141 

ture technology and more efficient commercial airframes to reduce acquisition risk 

and lifecycle costs. 

50. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. LaPlante, how do you intend to continue modernizing 

our Air Force fleet in the face of budget constraints? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. There are some things we cannot modernize to keep it viable 

against the threat after 5 or 10 years. There are some places we have to recapitalize 

and that is going to take money away from the modernization program, which is 

being hit by sequestration. 

Continuing to modernize the Air Force fleet while living with severe budget constraints requires sound resource execution so we can more effectively stretch the 

benefit of every dollar with which we are entrusted. Our Secretary of the Air Force 

has identified as a priority the need to ensure our Air Force remains the most capable in the world at the lowest possible cost. In this environment of declining resources and budget constraints, we must be extremely efficient and effective in how 

we plan to use, and ultimately spend our scarce fiscal resources. 

The Air Force must own the technical baseline for acquisition programs. Strong, 

stable program offices, augmented by experts and reach-back to the Laboratories, 

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and University Affiliated Research Centers are required in order for the government to own the technical baseline. Furthermore, this process must be institutionalized into the life of each program, rather than depending upon our industrial partners to manage technical performance, dictate sustainment solutions and shape evolutionary technical solutions. 

I want the Air Force acquisition community to design, develop and field systems 

for our Air Force that will be resilient to the capabilities of our anticipated peer 

competitors of 2023 and beyond. To do this we must make smart investment decisions and leverage experimentation and innovation. To ensure Air Force investment 

solutions and strategies support capabilities that will enable effectiveness in the 

highly contested domains beyond 2023, the Air Force must position itself through 

significant science and technology and advance research investments. 

We will continue our heightened focus on the high priority programs. I am committed to launching these programs right and keeping them on track. The Air Force 

currently lists F–35, KC–46 Tanker, LRS–B, and replacement for aging E–8C 

JSTARS as our top priorities. 

JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

51. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. LaPlante, how will the Air Force attempt to complete 

the acquisition of a replacement for JSTARS without compromising what has become a critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Although the primary role of JSTARS is Battle Management Command and Control, it also provides critical Ground Moving Target Indicator data to 

the ISR Enterprise. If a JSTARS replacement program is pursued, the Air Force 

will continue to maintain and operate the E–8C JSTARS fleet, with fewer aircraft 

in the short term, to support mission requirements. As the JSTARS replacement 

aircraft become available, the remaining E–8C legacy fleet will be brought down. 

52. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. LaPlante, would the Air Force consider standing 

down legacy aircraft to facilitate paying for new aircraft with the savings generated? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. Sequestration has created a very constrained budget environment for the Air Force, forcing the Service to make some very difficult decisions. 

During his testimony last year before the Senate, General Welsh discussed as a result of sequestration impacts we have been faced with difficult budget choices. He 

further stated that in those instances we will favor recapitalization over modernization. As the Air Force leaders make difficult force structure divestiture decisions, 

they will work to ensure that they are timed such that there will not be a loss of 

important capability for the warfighter. 

53. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. LaPlante, what would be the associated risk of such 

a decision? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The consideration to stand down legacy aircraft in order to facilitate paying for new aircraft with the savings generated, would be approached with 

a balanced risk perspective. Ultimately, the Air Force would retain a reduced capability to support combatant commanders during the transition period. 

142 

54. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. LaPlante, is the Air Force totally committed to replacing the JSTARS or might we be looking at another round of upgrades, beyond what 

is already taking place, to the current fleet? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. At this time, the AoA and other supporting analyses support replacing the current E–8C JSTARS. 

55. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. LaPlante, what would be the impact of an Air Force 

decision to scrap plans to replace the JSTARS in favor of further upgrades? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Scrapping the JSTARS replacement would commit the Air Force 

to an aircraft that is likely unaffordable in the long term. Legacy JSTARS operations and sustainment costs are high and are projected to continue to increase. 

Legacy JSTARS also has a significant bow-wave of needed communications and avionics modernization efforts within the FYDP, with larger bills for modernization of 

the radar just outside the FYDP. In contrast, recapitalizing the JSTARS fleet will 

provide the AF with a more cost-effective airframe, a modern sensor, updated communications, and manned Battle Management. A JSTARS replacement ensures affordable dominance of the JSTARS Battle Management and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance mission areas through the 2040s. 

56. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. LaPlante, what level of involvement has/will combatant commanders and other consumers of J–STAR-provided ISR play in planning for 

the aircraft’s ultimate replacement? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Combatant commanders’ (CCDR) requirements are considered 

throughout the Joint Capability Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS) 

process of developing the requirement and pursuing the replacement capability for 

the E–8C JSTARS. Specifically, the CCDR’s Operational Plan requirements and Integrated Priorities Lists were reviewed and integrated into the overall requirements 

development process. Additionally, CCDRs and the military services (as force providers) participate in all Functional Capability Boards and Joint Capability Boards 

to provide input and concurrence on proposed Capability Development Documents, 

Capability Production Documents, and Acquisition plans. This coordination ensures 

awareness and validation that proposed solutions will effectively meet operational 

needs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

AIR FORCE AUDITABILITY

57. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, Secretary Hagel said that DOD needs 

‘‘auditable statements . . . to reassure the public, and Congress, that we are good 

stewards of public funds.’’ Do you share Secretary Hagel’s belief that we need 

auditable statements to ensure the Air Force is a good steward of our tax dollars— 

especially in this period of difficult budget cuts? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, I share Secretary Hagel’s belief that the Department needs 

auditable financial statements and I agree that auditable financial statements provide Congress and the American public confidence that the Air Force manages the 

taxpayer’s funds in an efficient and transparent manner. The current budget environment makes this effort even more urgent. 

58. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, as required by section 1005 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013, do you understand that submitting an audit-ready statement of budgetary resources by September 30, 2014 is 

not just a goal, it is the law? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. I fully understand that section 1005 of the NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2013 requires an audit-ready Statement of Budgetary Resources. If confirmed, 

I will actively support DOD and the Secretary of the Air Force’s continued focus on 

financial auditability. 

59. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, I am concerned that the Air Force may not 

be on track to meet the audit deadlines. Do you share this concern? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Air Force is on a well-designed, albeit aggressive, path to assert audit readiness by the mandated deadline of September 30, 2014. The Air Force 

plan has been reviewed and integrated with the OSD FIAR plan that integrates the 

entire DOD business environment but, it is still not without risk. However, the Air 

Force is seeing successes on the path to audit readiness, to include seven favorable 

opinions with two more assertions currently under examination. If confirmed, I will 

143 

make it a priority to assist in any way I can to ensure the Air Force meets these 

deadlines. 

60. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, what are your greatest challenges in meeting 

the audit deadlines? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Our biggest challenge will be that the Air Force’s current 1960s 

accounting system does not comply with the Federal requirement to use the standard government general ledger structure of accounts at the detailed, transaction 

level. The Air Force’s ultimate solution to this challenge is to field a modern accounting system, the DEAMS, as quickly as possible. Recent indications are that the 

system is working pretty well, with dramatic performance improvements in the last 

year. The interim solution for remediation of shortcomings in the legacy environment is to use a DFAS-developed data analysis tool that sorts and matches data 

from multiple systems. Furthermore, the Air Force continues to collaborate within 

the Department to share lessons learned, establish performance measures, and consolidate efforts where applicable. Finally, some of the feeder systems to the financial 

systems being used are acquisition/contract related systems. If confirmed, those systems will fall within my purview and I will do everything in my power to ensure 

they are compliant with audit requirements. 

61. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, how can Congress help the Air Force in meeting the audit deadlines? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Air Force is fully committed to meeting the requirement of 

becoming audit ready. The Air Force has consistently acknowledged to you that is 

the 2014 audit deadline required an aggressive strategy that is not without risk. We 

do not consider any one achievement or failure on our path to audit readiness as 

a defining action. The Air Force is on an aggressive path towards audit readiness 

and will not relent. Your assistance in implementing a more predictable appropriations cycle free from protracted continuing resolutions or government shut downs 

would be most helpful. This would minimize the disruption of the government and 

contractor resources working to make the Air Force audit ready. 

A–10

62. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, please provide a detailed, itemized list of how 

the Air Force has modernized the A–10 since September 11, 2001. The list should 

clearly delineate the name of the modernization investment, how much was spent 

on the modernization, the purpose of the modernization investment, and the current 

status of the modernization investment (e.g. completed or still ongoing). For each 

of these modernization items, where possible, it should be made clear what kind of 

life extension the modernization investment was intended to provide. The itemized 

list should provide the total amount of money spent on A–10 modernization since 

September 11, 2001. The list should clearly delineate which modernization programs 

the Air Force has decided to cancel, when this decision was made to cancel the program, and what the rationale was for this decision. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Since 11 September 2001, the Air Force has invested over $2.85 

billion in major modernization for the A–10, for enhanced capabilities, improved 

sustainment and life extension. 

Note: Unless noted, program does not contribute to service life extension. Programs are listed from oldest to current, and reflect funding spent, to date. Estimates 

provided where actual figures were not available within the time constraint. 

Completed Programs: 

Program Name: A–10 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) 

Funding: $786 million, Weapon System Support and National Guard and Reserve 

Equipment Account (NGREA) 

Purpose: To extend service life of legacy wings to 16,000 Equivalent Flying Hours 

(EFH) to meet Air Combat Command Required Service Life. 

Status: Complete. 2004 wing fatigue test results determined maximum life extension of A–10 to ∼13,000 EFHs, necessitating A–10 Wing Replacement Program. 

Life Extension: Extends legacy thin- and thick-skin wings from original 8,000 

EFH service life to 13,000. 

Program Name: Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System 

Funding: $39 million, Investment 

Purpose: To provide enhanced capabilities to pinpoint location of aircraft and to 

improve navigation. 

Status: Complete. 

144 

Program Name: Multi-Function Color Display 

Funding: $30 million (estimated), NGREA 

Purpose: To provide ANG and AF Reserve aircraft with a moving map capability 

ahead of deployment of Precision Engagement. 

Status: Complete. 

Program Name: Propulsion Upgrade Program 

Funding: $29 million, Investment 

Purpose: To provide additional thrust at low and medium altitudes to minimize 

time in high-threat airspace. Status: Complete. Efforts limited to RDT&E. Fielding estimated to cost >$2 billion; not implemented. 

Program Name: Precision Engagement Program 

Funding: $546 million, Investment 

Purpose: To bring smart munitions, stores management, situational awareness 

and enhanced safety to the A–10. Includes aircrew training-related devices. 

Status: Complete. 

Program Name: Situational Awareness Data Link 

Funding: $55 million, Investment 

Purpose: To provide pilots with a more detailed situational picture of the air battle space. 

Status: Complete. 

Program Name: Aircraft Protection/Countermeasures Systems 

Funding: $98 million, Investment 

Purpose: To provide enhanced aircraft and pilot protection in high-threat environments. Includes AAR–47, Countermeasures Dispensing and Infrared Countermeasures programs. 

Status: Complete. 

Program Name: Single ARC–210 Secure Line-of-Sight/Beyond Line-of-Sight Radio 

Funding: $85 million, Investment 

Purpose: Upgrades voice radio for secure line of sight and beyond line-of-sight 

communications. 

Status: Complete. 

Program Name: On-Board Oxygen Generating System 

Funding: $9 million, Investment 

Purpose: To provide one Active Duty squadron with a self-contained, continuously 

generating oxygen system. 

Status: Complete. 

Program Name: Second ARC–210 Secure Line-of-Sight/Beyond Line-of-Sight Radio 

Funding: $11 million, NGREA 

Purpose: To upgrade ANG and AF Reserve aircraft with a second secure line-ofsight and beyond line-of-sight (satellite) radio to allow near-instantaneous communications with the ground and command and control assets/locations. 

Status: Complete. 

Continuing Programs: 

Program Name: Operational Flight Programs (OFP) 

Funding: $307 million, Weapon System Support and Investment 

Purpose: To provide integration of hardware and software-based capabilities, as 

well as to perform Post-Fielding Support (sustainment) on the existing aircraft software baseline and maintain a Systems Integration Lab. 

Status: Suites 3, 4, 5, 6, 7A, and 7B are fielded. The Secretary of the Air Force 

directed that Suite 8 development be continued through fiscal year 2014. An organic 

Systems Integration Lab will be complete in October 2014 at Hill AFB, UT. PostFielding Support continues indefinitely. 

Program Name: A–10 Wing Replacement Program 

Funding: $695 million, Investment 

Purpose: To procure a replacement wing for the A–10 based on the existing thickskin wing with targeted structural enhancements. 

Status: Installs ongoing through fiscal year 2017. 

Life Extension: Allows aircraft to reach 16,000 EFH Required Service Life. 

Program Name: Mode S/5 

Funding: $35 million, Investment 

Purpose: To provide enhanced Identification, Friend or Foe capabilities. 

Status: Mode S is complete. Mode 5 software development is ongoing with the continuation of Suite 8 in fiscal year 2014. Mode 5 FOC mandate is fiscal year 2020. 

Program Name: Helmet-Mounted Cueing System 

145 

Funding: $46 million, Investment and NGREA 

Purpose: To provide off-bore sight cueing, targeting and situational awareness to 

more rapidly engage targets in the battle space. 

Status: Installs ongoing through the first quarter of fiscal year 2015. 

Program Name: Lightweight Airborne Radio System V12 

Funding: $17 million, NGREA 

Purpose: To upgrade ANG and AF Reserve aircraft with an enhanced combat 

search and rescue radio. 

Status: Installs ongoing through the first quarter of fiscal year 2015. 

Program Name: Turbine Engine Monitoring System/Airborne Data Recorder 

(TEMS/ADR) 

Funding: $11 million, Investment 

Purpose: To upgrade existing TEMS units to provide enhanced engine monitoring 

and reporting, as well as flight parameter reporting to assist Aircraft Structural Integrity Program engineers in assessing structural health. 

Status: Installs ongoing through fiscal year 2014. 

Program Name: Rapid Innovation Funds 

Funding: $10 million, Investment 

Purpose: Funds multiple, small studies to meet needs/gaps in A–10 capabilities. 

Status: Ongoing through fiscal year 2014. 

Program Name: Portable Aircraft Test System (PATS)-70 

Funding: $50 million, Investment 

Purpose: To address obsolescence issues with legacy A–10 aircraft testers. Combines multiple legacy testers into a single unit to reduce logistics footprint and ease 

maintenance burden. Planning follow-on effort via PATS–70A to further consolidate 

and improve testing capabilities. 

Status: Awaiting Milestone C decision with first fielding projected in April 2014. 

Program Name: On-Board Oxygen Generating System 

Funding: $4 million (estimated), NGREA 

Purpose: To provide Air Force Reserve aircraft with a self-contained, continuously 

generating oxygen system. 

Status: Installs begin in fiscal year 2014. 

Program Name: Aircraft Parking Brake 

Funding: $4 million, NGREA 

Purpose: To provide ANG and Air Force Reserve aircraft with an aircraft parking 

brake. 

Status: Acquisition and source selection ongoing with first installs planned in fiscal year 2014. 

Program Name: Covert Overt Lighting Assembly 

Funding: $1.5 million, NGREA 

Purpose: To provide ANG and AF Reserve aircraft with landing lights compatible 

with night vision (covert) and traditional (overt) operations. 

Status: Acquisition and source selection ongoing. 

63. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, is it true that Air Combat Command has 

issued an official notification to cease Suite 8 development immediately with the exception of work required to preserve and store Suite 8 work to date? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Secretary of the Air Force directed that Suite 8 development 

be continued through fiscal year 2014. 

64. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, if this is accurate, what impact will this have 

on the ability to conduct future subsystem modernization? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. As previously stated, the Air Force will continue development of 

OFP Suite 8 through fiscal year 2014. Also, in order to facilitate integration of required software updates, the Air Force is standing up an organic software integration laboratory (SIL). The SIL will provide us the ability to make software updates 

and modifications as required. 

65. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, the Operational Flight Program (OFP) provides the mechanism to drive the central computer and its interface with many subsystems. Any updates to existing hardware or software within these subsystems require an OFP update. Does this decision represent a decision to end all future A– 

10 modernization efforts? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. As previously stated, the Air Force will continue development of 

OFP Suite 8 through fiscal year 2014. 

146 

66. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, do you believe this action violates section 143 

of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 that prohibits DOD from using any funds to ‘‘prepare to retire’’ the A–10? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Because the Secretary of the Air Force has directed that development of OFP Suite 8 continue through fiscal year 2014, we believe this issue to be 

moot. 

67. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, what are the operating costs per hour for the 

A–10, compared to the F–15E, F–16, B–1, AC–130, and B–52? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Operational Cost Per Fly Hour (OCPFH) is a historically 

based metric from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) system that provides visibility into the total cost to operate an aircraft during a specific year. The 

OCPFH is calculated by dividing the total operating and sustainment costs (excluding hardware modifications) associated with a weapon system by the total flying 

hours flown in the same year. The following represents the fiscal year 2013 OCPFH 

(TY$): 

A–10 ............................................................................................................................................................................... $17,398 

F–15E ............................................................................................................................................................................. $37,504 

F–16 ............................................................................................................................................................................... $22,954 

B–1 ................................................................................................................................................................................. $54,218 

AC–130 ........................................................................................................................................................................... $37,492 

B–52 ............................................................................................................................................................................... $67,475 

AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

68. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, please provide a list of all canceled acquisition 

category (ACAT) 1, 1A, and 2 Air Force acquisition programs since September 11, 

2001, in which the Air Force did not end up procuring the item. The list should include how much the Air Force spent on the program before it was canceled. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. There are 12 Air Force acquisition programs (5 ACAT I, 4 ACAT 

IA, and 3 ACAT II) since September 11, 2001, in which the Air Force did not procure the item. 

[In millions of dollars] 

Name Reviewed Status 

Amount 

Spend 

Prior to 

Canx 

Full Name Type ACAT 

AFNet Inc 2 Terminated-2013 

(TY$).

29.1 Air Force Intranet Increment 2 (AFNet Inc 2) ......... IAC 

AFNet Inc 3 Terminated-2013 

(TY$).

29.8 Air Force Intranet Increment 3 (AFNet Inc 3) ......... IAC 

BCS–M ...... Terminated-2009 

(TY$).

98.8 Battle Control System—Mobile (BCS–M) ............... MAIS IAC 

ECSS Inc 1 Terminated-2012 

(TY$).

894.9 Expeditionary Combat Support System Increment 1 Unbaselined 

MAIS 

IAM 

CVLSP ........ Terminated-2012 

(TY$).

6.1 Common Vertical Lift Support Platform ................. Pre-MDAP IC 

NPOESS ..... Terminated-2012 

(BY 2002).

2,837.6 National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 

Satellite System.

MDAP IC 

CSAR–X ..... Terminated 2009 

(TY$).

33.0 Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle 

(CSAR–X).

Pre-MDAP ID 

E–10 .......... Terminated-2007 

(TY$).

98.2 E–10 Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft 

Program.

MDAP ID 

TSAT .......... Terminated-2009 

(TY$).

2,507.4 Transformational Satellite Communications System.Pre-MDAP ID 

B–52 EHF .. Terminated-2013 

(TY$).

21.7 B–52 Extremely High Frequency ............................. II 

B–52 SR2 .. Terminated-2013 

(TY$).

9.8 B–52 Strategic Radar Replacement ....................... II 

GEMS ......... Terminated-2011 

(TY$).

281.3 Ground Element Minimum Essential Emergency 

Communications Network (MEECN) System.

II 

69. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, please provide a list of all ACAT 1, 1A, and 

2 Air Force acquisition programs since September 11, 2001, in which the program 

costs were more than 25 percent greater than initial cost estimates. The list should 

147 

include the initial cost estimate, how much the program ended up costing, and the 

difference between the two. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Answer: 

AIR FORCE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

70. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, how many Air Force civilians does the Air 

Force currently employ? What was this number in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013? 

What was this number on September 11, 2001? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The number of Air Force full-time U.S. (appropriated funded) civilians employed by end of fiscal year: 

2010 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 139,428 

2011 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 147,861 

2012 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 143,351 

2013 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 141,253 

The number of Air Force full-time U.S. civilians employed on September 11, 2001 

was 140,425. 

71. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, how has the total number of Air Force civilians 

changed annually over this period (2010 to present) compared to the total number 

of uniformed Air Force end strength, i.e. provide the annual total Air Force civilian 

number for 2010 to present, as well as the same number for uniformed personnel? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The data below reflects the inventory of Air Force full-time U.S. 

(appropriated funded) civilians and Active Duty military personnel (includes officer, 

enlisted, and cadets) as of the end of each fiscal year. 

Fiscal Year Civilian Military 

2010 ........................................................................................................................................................ 139,428 333,113 

2011 ........................................................................................................................................................ 147,861 333,243 

2012 ........................................................................................................................................................ 143,351 331,880 

2013 ........................................................................................................................................................ 141,253 332,320 

72. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, how many Air Force civilians serve in each 

major command? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The number of U.S. full-time (appropriated funded) civilians at the 

end of fiscal year 2013 for each major command (Excludes Field Operating Agencies, 

Direct Reporting Units, Air National Guard or HQ USAF). 


116ful1.eps
148 

Air Combat Command (ACC) ......................................................................................................................................... 9,899 

Air Education and Training Command (AETC) .............................................................................................................. 14,196 

Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) .................................................................................................................... 2,391 

Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) ............................................................................................................................. 59,146 

Air Mobility Command (AMC) ......................................................................................................................................... 8,017 

Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) .............................................................................................................................. 12,768 

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) ............................................................................................................................... 7,317 

Air Force Special Ops Command (AFSOC) ..................................................................................................................... 1,518 

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) ............................................................................................................................................. 3,058 

U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) ...................................................................................................................................... 1,667 

Total ....................................................................................................................................................................... 119,977 

73. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, how many of these Air Force civilians serve 

in the area of acquisitions? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. As of September 30, 2013, there were 24,993 Air Force civilian 

personnel serving in acquisition positions throughout the Air Force such as program 

management, contracting, engineering and science, product support/life cycle logistics and T&E. 

74. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, how many of these civilians serve in headquarters elements? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. As of September 30, 2013, there were 762 Air Force civilian personnel serving in management headquarters acquisition positions throughout the 

Air Force. 

75. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. LaPlante, how many of these civilians serve in Headquarters, Department of the Air Force? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. As of September 30, 2013, there were 223 Air Force civilian personnel serving in Headquarters USAF acquisition positions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

AIR FORCE ACQUISITION

76. Senator LEE. Dr. LaPlante, there have been many reports in the press in the 

past month regarding the cost of the F–35 and efforts of both DOD and the contractors to bring these costs down. The program manager at Lockheed Martin stated 

that the cost of an F–35A would be around $75 million by 2019. What do you believe 

needs to be done to make these cost projections realistic? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The F–35 JPO, in collaboration with the contractors, must continue to study and pursue affordability measures that further reduce costs. The F– 

35 JPO has already made significant progress in reducing the production cost of the 

aircraft. Lot over lot, the unit cost of the F–35 aircraft continues to come down. As 

an example, the average aircraft unit recurring flyaway decreased 3.2 percent from 

low rate initial production (LRIP) Lots 5 to 6 and 4.7 percent between LRIP lots 

6 and 7. More work needs to be done and if confirmed I will work closely with the 

Navy SAE and USD(AT&L) to continue reducing the F–35A fly-away cost. 

77. Senator LEE. Dr. LaPlante, what do you believe should be done to lower not 

just the acquisition costs of these aircraft but bring down the lifecycle costs as well? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The F–35 JPO and the contractors are already working on ways 

to lower the lifecycle costs of the program. Some of the affordability initiatives being 

pursued include the stand-up of a Cost War Room manned by F–35 JPO, Lockheed 

Martin, and Pratt & Whitney personnel; injecting competition into long-term 

sustainment based on Industry Day discussions (support equipment, global supply 

chain, training center operations); establishing an affordability database containing 

items for evaluation; and exploring contract efficiencies. In addition, the F–35 JPO 

is analyzing other ways to reduce costs such as obtaining technical data and data 

rights where it is cost effective to do so; streamlining the supply chain; implementing efficiencies in the assembly line; eliminating production scrap, rework, and 

repair; and implementing process improvements. 

78. Senator LEE. Dr. LaPlante, what are your biggest acquisition priorities for the 

Air Force? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. My five biggest acquisition priorities for the Air Force acquisition 

community are: 

149 

First, continue our heightened focus on the high priority programs. I am committed to launching these programs right and keeping them on track. The Air Force 

currently lists F–35, KC–46 Tanker, LRS–B, and replacement for aging E–8C 

JSTARS as our top priorities. 

Second, continuously improve relationships and transparency with stakeholders, 

including the USD(AT&L), Capitol Hill, Industry, and the Laboratories. Through 

regular meetings, briefings, and other discussions, I will lead by example, and require our acquisition workforce to share the Air Force message with our stakeholders to help promote a culture of transparency. 

Third, the Air Force must own the technical baseline for acquisition programs. 

Strong, stable program offices, augmented by experts and reach-back to the Laboratories, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and University Affiliated Research Centers are required in order for the government to own the technical baseline. Furthermore, this process must be institutionalized into the life of 

each program, rather than depending upon our industrial partners to manage technical performance, dictate sustainment solutions and shape evolutionary technical 

solutions. 

Fourth, in concert with OSD, I will continue to implement highest impact BBP 

2.0 initiatives as my fourth acquisition priority. Included in this goal are implementing ‘‘should cost,’’ building strong partnerships with requirements, employing 

appropriate contract types, eliminating unproductive processes and bureaucracy, enforcing open system architectures and effectively managing data rights, improving 

the acquisition of Services outside traditional acquisition, ensuring technical development is used for true risk reduction, increasing the cost consciousness of the 

workforce, and increasing small business roles and opportunities. 

Finally, I want the Air Force acquisition community to design, develop and field 

systems for our Air Force that will be resilient to the capabilities of our anticipated 

peer competitors of 2023 and beyond. To do this we must make smart investment 

decisions and leverage experimentation and innovation. To ensure Air Force investment solutions and strategies support capabilities that will enable effectiveness in 

the highly contested domains beyond 2023, the Air Force must position itself 

through significant science and technology and advance research investments. Our 

program office personnel must be versed in cost and capability tradeoffs and analyses, and dedicated to should cost and other efficiency initiatives to generate savings 

for reinvestment. The result will be that all Air Force systems and capabilities will 

be able to operate through degraded conditions, including contested environments, 

and can withstand operational and engineered challenges in a variety of environments, including cyber, electronic warfare and space. 

79. Senator LEE. Dr. LaPlante, how do you plan to balance the need to acquire 

the best quality equipment while finding areas to save money in the budget? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I have a commitment to the warfighter to acquire the best quality 

equipment and to the American taxpayers, minimize costs; and I plan to balance 

those priorities. In my current position, I have stressed how requirements can drive 

cost, with the intent of guiding the community, to evaluate how changing or reducing a requirement, even slightly, can have significant cost ramifications. 

Cost/schedule versus capability trade-off curves are a valuable tool in identifying 

which requirements are key cost drivers and can assist in the assessment of which 

requirements can be reduced. The CSBs and the Air Force Requirements Oversight 

Council (AFROC) provide two forums to evaluate requirements priorities and tradeoffs, and while the AFROC has been essential to this task, I am seeking to increase 

the effectiveness of CSBs in this regard. Finally, the acquisition community has 

demonstrated its commitment to cultivating a strong working relationship with the 

requirements community, and the teamwork between acquisitions and requirements 

will continue to pay dividends as we face a challenging future. 

[The nomination reference of Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr., follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 6, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

150 

William A. LaPlante, Jr., of Maryland, to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 

vice Sue C. Payton. 

[The biographical sketch of Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr., which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DR. WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE, JR. 

Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr., is the Principal Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force (Acquisition), Washington, DC. He is the senior civilian assistant to the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition). His duties include providing expert advice and guidance on Air Force acquisition programs and procurements. Dr. 

LaPlante is also responsible for development and execution of policies and procedures in support of the operation and improvement of the Air Force’s acquisition 

system. He oversees an Air Force research and development, test, production, and 

modernization program portfolio of over $40 billion annually. 

Dr. LaPlante has more than 28 years of experience in defense technology including positions at the MITRE Corporation and the Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory. He has also served on the Defense Science Board (DSB), U.S. 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Senior Advisory Group and Naval Research Advisory Committee. He has also taught as an adjunct lecturer in the Department of 

Mechanical Engineering at the Catholic University of America. 

Prior to entering public service, Dr. LaPlante was the Missile Defense Portfolio 

Director for the MITRE Corporation. In this role, Dr. LaPlante led a technical team 

providing analytic and system engineering expertise across the Missile Defense 

Agency portfolio of ballistic missile defense systems. Previously, he was the Department Head for Global Engagement at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory (APL) where he was responsible for all of APL’s work supporting offensive military capabilities. Dr. LaPlante was a member of APL’s Executive Council 

and served on many other Laboratory leadership initiatives. His earlier APL work 

included Associate Department Head of the National Security Technology Department and Program Area Manager for the Strategic Submarine Security Program. 

Dr. LaPlante has also served on numerous prestigious scientific boards. He was 

appointed to the Defense Science Board in 2010 where he co-chaired a study on Enhancing the Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces and participated in studies on technology and innovation enablers, missile defense, cyber resiliency and contractor logistics. Dr. LaPlante chaired a Commander, STRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group 

study on nuclear planning factors and participated in various studies sponsored by 

the National Academy of Sciences, the Naval Research Advisory Committee, 

STRATCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics). 

Education 

1985 - Bachelor of Science degree in engineering physics, University of Illinois 

1988 - Master of Science degree in applied physics, Johns Hopkins University 

1998 - Doctorate in mechanical engineering, Catholic University of America 

Career Chronology 

1985, Began career at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 

Laurel, MD 

1993–1998, Chief Scientist and Technical Director for several large at-sea submarine security experiments, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 

Laurel, MD 

1998–2001, Program Area Manager for the Strategic Submarine (SSBN) Security 

Program, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD 

2001–2003, Business Area Executive for Undersea Warfare and Associate Department Head, National Security Technology Department (Undersea Warfare, Homeland Security, and Biomedicine), Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD 

2003–2011, Department Head, Global Engagement Department, Johns Hopkins 

University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD 

2011–2013, Missile Defense Portfolio Director, MITRE Corporation, Mclean, VA 

2013–present, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), 

Washington, DC 

151 

Other Achievements 

Defense Science Board Member 

STRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group Member 

Lecturer, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Catholic University of America 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate, and certain senior military officers as determined by the committee, to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr., in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

William Albert LaPlante, Jr. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition). 

3. Date of nomination: 

October 30, 2013. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

October 9, 1963; Philadelphia, PA. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Joanne Marie Hogan. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Claire LaPlante, 19 

Caroline LaPlante, 14 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1985, B.S. Engineering Physics 

Johns Hopkins University, 1988, M.S. Applied Physics 

Catholic University of America, 1998, Ph.D. Mechanical Engineering 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

152 

May 2013–Present: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), U.S. Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC 

May 2011–May 2013: Missile Defense Portfolio Director, MITRE Corporation, 

McLean, VA 

1985–April 2011: Department Head, Global Engagement, Johns Hopkins Applied 

Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD 

Aug. 1998–May 2013: Lecturer, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Catholic 

University of America, Washington, DC 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Member, Defense Science Board, 1/2010–5/2013 

Advisor, U.S. Strategic Command Advisory Group, 2005–2013 

Member, National Academies Committee on Distributed Remote Sensors for Undersea Warfare, 2005–2007 

Member, Naval Research Advisory Council Committee on Protection of Critical 

Undersea Infrastructure, 2007–2009 

Member, Strategic Systems Steering Task Group, 2003–2011 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None (no positions held with fiduciary or governance responsibilities). 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Member - American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None. 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

None. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

2002 - Journal of Vibration and Control, ‘‘Active Control of Vibration and Noise 

Reduction from Fluid-Loaded Cylinder using Active Constrained Layer Damping.’’ 

2006 - Report of the Defense Science Board, ‘‘Information Management for Net 

Centric Operations.’’ Vol. I and II. 

2007 - Committee on Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare, 

Naval Studies Board, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Research Council of the National Academies, ‘‘Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval 

Undersea Warfare.’’ 

2009 - Report of the Defense Science Board, ‘‘Time Critical Conventional Strike 

from Strategic Standoff.’’ 

2010 - Report of the Defense Science Board, ‘‘Enhancing Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces.’’ Part A and B. 

2011 - Report of the Defense Science Board, ‘‘Science and Technology Issues of 

Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility.’’ 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

Spoke at National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Gulf Coast Chapter Air 

Armament Symposium on November 5, 2013. No written speech was prepared and 

no transcript was taken. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

153 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE, JR. 

This 17th day of December, 2013. 

[The nomination of Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr., was reported to 

the Senate by Chairman Levin on January 28, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on February 12, 2014.] 

(155) 

NOMINATIONS OF HON. ROBERT O. WORK TO 

BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; HON. 

MICHAEL J. MCCORD TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); MS. 

CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH TO BE UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY; MR. 

BRIAN P. MCKEON TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

POLICY; HON. DAVID B. SHEAR TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS; 

AND MR. ERIC ROSENBACH TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, McCaskill, 

Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, 

Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, and Fischer. 

Other Senators present: Senators Nunn and Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets today to consider the nominations of Robert Work to be Deputy Secretary of Defense; Michael McCord to be Under Secretary 

of Defense, Comptroller; Christine Wormuth to be Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy; Brian McKeon to be Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy; David Shear to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; and Eric 

Rosenbach to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 

I thank everybody for their understanding of the scheduling difficulties that we faced between last week’s snowstorm and this 

156 

morning’s floor votes and the need to shift the hearing to a 9 

o’clock start. 

We welcome our nominees and their families. We thank them for 

the support that those families provide to our nominees. Our nominees should feel free, during their opening statements, to introduce 

the family members who are here to support them today. 

We’re also delighted, all of us, to welcome back two dear friends 

and former chairmen of this committee, Senators Nunn and Warner. They’re here to introduce two of our nominees. 

Senators Nunn and Warner have an extraordinary record of public service, including, between the two of them, more than 50 years 

of service on this committee. By the way, Senator Warner first appeared before this committee 45 years ago, almost to the day, for 

a February 6, 1969, hearing on his nomination to the position of 

Under Secretary of the Navy. 

Now, I’m not exactly sure why our nominees here this morning, 

all stood until the gavel banged. That’s never happened before. I 

finally figured it out. It’s because Senators Warner and Nunn were 

here. I think it’s in your honor, not in ours, that we saw our nominees standing here this morning. In any rate, we’re all delighted 

to have you back here with us. 

Mr. Work is well known to us from his service as Under Secretary of the Navy from 2009 to 2013. 

Mr. McCord has spent almost 30 years in service to our country, 

including 5 years as the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Deputy 

Comptroller; before that, of course, Mike spent 21 years on the 

staff of this committee, and many of us remember his great expertise, his work ethic, and his commitment. They qualify him well for 

this job. 

Ms. Wormuth has served in senior national security positions in 

the executive branch from 1996 to 2002 and from 2009 to the 

present; most recently, as Special Assistant to the President for Defense Policy and Strategy, and as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Force Development. 

Mr. McKeon has spent the majority of his 29-year career in national security affairs, including 12 years on the professional staff 

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he is currently the 

Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff of the National Security 

Council. 

Mr. Shear spent his 31-year career in the Foreign Service and 

serves currently as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam. 

Mr. Rosenbach has held a variety of national security-related positions in academia and in the private sector, and has served our 

country as an intelligence officer in the Army, as a professional 

staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and 

as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy. 

The security challenges that we face as a Nation are complex, 

and they’re growing. Our nominees are going to be asked to help 

manage them in a time of decreased budgetary resources and increased budgetary uncertainty. I believe they’re all well qualified 

to do just that. 

Senator Inhofe. 

157 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d echo the same remarks about Senator Warner and Senator 

Nunn. Nice to have you back. You haven’t changed a bit, either one 

of you. 

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Clapper stated, on 

February 12, ‘‘Looking back over my now more than a half century 

in intelligence, I’ve not experienced a time when we’ve been beset 

by more crises and threats around the globe.’’ Based on what I’ve 

seen and heard in many travels over the years, I think that’s exactly right. Yet, over the last few years, massive cuts to our military, our national security, including half a trillion dollars cut before sequestration took effect have resulted in deep decline in military readiness and capabilities. 

We know what’s happened to the Navy and the Air Force and the 

Army, in terms of the cuts in end strength. It’s something that’s 

disturbing. I think, particularly the speech that was made yesterday by Secretary Hagel. I’m going to read one of the quotes that 

I wrote down. He said, ‘‘American dominance on the seas, in the 

skies, and in space can no longer be taken for granted.’’ I never 

thought I’d see that, but, that was the statement. Even though the 

recent budget deal provides some minor sequester relief, our military is still subject to nearly $77 billion in sequester cuts in 2014 

and 2015. Protecting the United States is more than just the resource levels, however. Resourcing must directly address the 

threats that we face using an effective and comprehensive strategy. 

Instead, the President and his administration continue to base 

their strategy and justify cutting national security spending on the 

naive world view that, ‘‘the tide of the war is receding’’ and ‘‘al 

Qaeda is on the run and on a path to defeat’’. If you look across 

the Middle East and northern Africa, we know better than that. 

Even the top intelligence official, Director Clapper, told us, during 

testimony, that al Qaeda isn’t on the run and, instead, is morphing 

and franchising. Tragically, this is what happens when strategy is 

driven by hope rather than reality. 

We’ve talked about this before, and I won’t go into any detail 

now, as I was going to, but, in terms of the defense acquisition 

process, making sense of a convoluted and cumbersome acquisition 

process and instituting commonsense reforms will be a vital step 

towards maximizing taxpayer dollars and delivering necessary 

technology, on budget and on schedule. 

I’m also deeply concerned about recent headlines that depict ethical and leadership failings of some of our military leaders. I know 

firsthand that the vast majority of our military cadre are strong 

and ethical leaders who serve our Nation with distinction. However, the failings of some have the potential to undermine the service of the rest. 

I expect the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs, and all of the senior officers to renew their commitment to 

integrity and to firmly address failures in a transparent manner. 

If confirmed, the nominees today will be responsible for addressing 

these challenges. I look forward to the hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe. 

158 

We’re first going to call on Senator Warner, who’s going to be introducing the nominee for Deputy Secretary, and then we’re going 

to turn over to Senator Nunn to introduce Mr. McCord. 

John Warner, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, FORMER U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 

Senator WARNER. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished 

ranking member, and colleagues and friends of many, many years. 

It’s a special occasion for me, and I thank the chair for his thoughtful recollection that 45 years ago I did appear here. It’s the symbolism of the wonderful Nation that we have and are preserving 

today to give the opportunity to people for public service. My Nation has been more than generous to me in that opportunity to 

have public service. 

We’re here today, my friend Sam Nunn and I, to introduce two 

individuals, one of whom I associate myself with your remarks, 

even though I haven’t read them about Mike McCord. [Laughter.] 

Mr. McCord served on our committee 21 years, and did a marvelous job, and he’s here today with his family. 

Bob Work, I’ve come to know, because he was, by parallel, Under 

Secretary of the Navy, the position I held under Melvin Laird and 

David Packard. As I reflected last night on the Laird-Packard 

team, Bob Work is much like David Packard. Packard founded 

Hewlett-Packard. Bob Work spent 27 years in the U.S. Marine 

Corps, advancing through all the positions of officer. He was number two in his basic class. I hasten to mention, I was in the Marine 

Corps, but I didn’t rank number two. He was number one in his 

field artillery class. I went to communications school, and again, I 

was not number one. We have one parallel; we both served as 

Under Secretary. But, his career is far more distinguished in uniform than mine. He went on to take over positions of his skill, for 

which he was known in the Marine Corps, as an absolute expert 

analyst, an absolute hands-on manager. He carried those learning 

experiences of the Marine Corps right straight through as Under 

Secretary of the Navy. 

There’s an old saying in our business, Is this person a workhorse 

or a show horse? I don’t know about his showmanship, but I do 

know that Bob Work is a workhorse. He’s well known. His writings 

are prolific on the subjects of military, the most arcane aspects of 

our military. He’s well known on taking on budgets. Given the dramatic announcements by the Secretary of Defense yesterday and 

the goals that the administration has set for the Defense Department, Bob Work and, I believe, Mike McCord, are the two right individuals to be in partnership with Secretary of Defense Hagel and 

get this job done. 

Gentlemen of the committee and ladies of the committee, I thank 

you for the privilege of appearing this morning. I’ve rarely seen— 

and I examined the biographic achievement of all these nominees— 

a better qualified group to come before the Senate and seek confirmation and to serve in public service. On behalf of the men and 

women of the Armed Forces, I would simply say, in the case of Bob 

Work, that we’re very pleased, Bob, that you and your lovely wife 

have reenlisted. 

159 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Warner. 

Senator Nunn. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, FORMER U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA 

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, Senator McCain, Senator Reed, 

other members of the committee. I’m delighted and honored to be 

here. 

I associate myself with the remarks of Senator Warner about Bob 

Work, and all of these nominees. I’m here to introduce a member 

of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, as has been mentioned, for 21 years, Mike McCord. I’m very, very proud to have a 

chance to be with Mike and to meet his new bride and to see his 

family, and to be with all the members of the committee. 

Being here with Senator Warner does bring back a lot of memories. One of those memories that I have so vividly was an individual by the name of Ed Braswell. I just received notice yesterday 

that Ed died, in the last couple of days, and I have certainly been 

in touch with his family. But, Ed served this committee with distinction as the chief of staff—general counsel, we called the leader, 

back in those days, of the staff. It reminded me of Ed’s tremendous 

service to the committee and to the Senate and to the Nation, and 

it also reminded me of the work we often take for granted of all 

of our staff people that have done such a tremendous job in the last 

40 years while I followed this committee, and even before that, in, 

basically, putting the security of our Nation first. I thank Ed for 

his service, and certainly, Mr. Chairman, I would hope someone 

would put something in the record about Ed’s service, because he 

was indeed a tremendous leader here, a man of great, great integrity. 

Senator WARNER. May I associate myself with the remarks about 

Ed Braswell? I remember him very well, as we all did. He exemplified the type of person that joins the staff of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee. He set the gold standard. 

Senator NUNN. That’s exactly right. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a great pleasure of introducing Mike 

McCord today. Mike currently serves as the DOD’s Deputy Comptroller, a position he’s held for approximately 5 years. He’s fully 

prepared for his critical role, if he is confirmed, as our Nation’s 

Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller. 

Mike is well-known to the committee, having served 21 years 

here. Mike joined the Senate Armed Services Committee staff when 

I became chairman in 1987. He was recruited by a couple of people 

that I know that Senator McCain and Senator Levin and other 

members of this committee may recall, and that’s Arnold Punaro 

and John Hamre. Of course, John went on from a position that 

Mike has been nominated for, as Comptroller, to be the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, and now Chair of the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, and he’s served our country with great 

distinction. 

Mike, John’s path is a pretty good one to follow, there, and you’re 

doing it with tremendous skills. 

160 

I believe our Nation is fortunate to have a nominee with the experience, the knowledge, and the credibility that Mike brings to 

this position, particularly at a critical time for the Department of 

Defense budget, as you all know. 

First, Mike brings a background and spirit of nonpartisanship 

and a long history of working both sides of the aisle. While at this 

committee, he served more than 10 years in the majority and more 

than 10 years in the minority. He served under four chairmen— 

Senator Thurmond, Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and myself. At 

the Defense Department, he served under both political party Secretaries, Bob Gates, Leon Panetta, and Chuck Hagel. He’s worked 

in the same nonpartisan fashion over the years with both the 

Budget Committee and the Appropriations Committee, two other 

key committees, where he has built respect and goodwill. 

Second point is that Mike has served our Nation for almost 30 

years in a number of critical national security and budgetary positions. His career spans from the last years of the Cold War through 

the fall of the Berlin Wall, Operation Desert Storm, the post-Cold 

War drawdowns of the 1990s, Bosnia and Kosovo, September 11, 

as well as our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mike has seen buildups, he’s seen wars, and he’s seen drawdowns at the conclusion of 

wars. 

Mike was a key member of this staff during the turbulent years 

of the post-Cold War period when our budgets—not only our budgets, but indeed our strategic views and map of the world was rearranged. While here at the Armed Services Committee, his oversight 

responsibilities included defense budget matters, oversight of the 

Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review, supplemental funding 

for contingent operations and natural disasters, ensuring compliance with discretionary and mandatory spending targets, and advising the committee on fiscal and budget policy issues. 

During our work together on this committee when I was chairman, Mike also exhibited his deep understanding of our broader 

fiscal challenges in his work with me on entitlement, spending 

caps, and budget resolutions over many years. We all know the Defense Department’s place in the overall budget is enormously important, but it gets squeezed in many directions because of other 

matters beyond the Defense Department. Mike’s knowledge there, 

I think, will serve his position as Comptroller very well. 

In his current role as Deputy Comptroller, Mike provides guidance to the Comptroller, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense on all budget, fiscal, and financial management matters. He’s a member of numerous senior-level decisionmaking bodies inside the Department on budget, program, strategy, financial management, and legislative matters. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, with Mike’s depth of experience 

and leadership skills, I can’t think of anyone who’s better prepared 

or equipped to serve our Nation as the Department of Defense’s 

Comptroller. The committee wisely confirmed Michael McCord several years ago for his current position, and I urge you to do so 

again, and I urge his confirmation by the full Senate. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Nunn. 

161 

Both you and Senator Warner’s words mean, I know, a great deal 

to the nominees and to this committee, and we appreciate your 

being here. We’re privileged to be in your presence, as always. We 

look forward to many, many future years of being associated with 

both of you in some way or another. 

Of course, you have busy lives to lead and schedules to follow, 

so you’re free to leave, should you deem fit, at any time. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add a word about 

Bob Work. I dwelled on the Marine Corps, because of personal reasons, with him. But, he went on into the private sector to do extensive analytical work, and is now Chief Executive Officer of the Center for New American Security. We worked very closely together, 

both when he was Under Secretary and in his new position. Again, 

this man looks into the future and is able to make the tough decisions and priorities that are facing this Department right now. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you again. Thank you both. 

We’re going to be calling on the witnesses, for their opening comments and any introductions that they wish to make, in the order 

that they’re listed on the notice of this hearing. Before that, 

though, I will ask all of you to answer, at one time, the following 

questions, which are standard questions we ask of all our civilian 

nominees: 

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing 

conflicts of interest? 

[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which 

would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

[All six witnesses answered in the negative.] 

Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the 

record in hearings? 

[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, 

before this committee? 

[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic 

forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a 

duly-constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing 

such documents? 

[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Thank you very much. 

First, we will call upon Mr. Work. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT O. WORK, TO BE DEPUTY 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Mr. WORK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

162 

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee, I’m really honored to appear before you 

today as President Obama’s nominee as the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense. I firmly believe there is no higher calling than serving 

one’s nation, and I am deeply humbled by the confidence that the 

President and Secretary Hagel have shown in me by nominating 

me for this demanding role. 

Before continuing, I would like to thank several people here 

today. First, I’d like to thank Senator Warner for doing me the 

honor of introducing me, and for his kind remarks, and for both 

Senator Warner and Senator Nunn for everything they have done 

in service of this hallowed institution, as well as this great Nation. 

I’d next like to introduce and thank my wife of 35 years, Cassandra, and my wonderful daughter, Kendyl, for being by my side 

today and for supporting me as I once again am being considered 

for demanding years in Government service. 

I’d also like to recognize my younger brother, Skip. He retired as 

a Marine Master Sergeant, and I really appreciate his presence and 

support here today, as well as those of my colleagues from the Center for a New American Security, some of whom actually made it 

here today. I thank them. 

Finally, I appreciate my five friends and colleagues here for joining me on this panel, as well as for volunteering to serve 3 more 

years in the administration, and especially for agreeing to answer 

all of the hard questions that I’m certain are surely to come. 

I think the next 3 years are really going to be a period of extraordinary challenge and opportunity for the Department of Defense. 

The decision made by the administration, Congress, and the Department will impact the capabilities and capacities of our Armed 

Forces far into the future. 

To reach the best decisions, I think all concerned will need to address these issues deliberatively, collaboratively, and with a spirit 

of cooperative purpose. For my part, if confirmed, I pledge to you, 

the President, Secretary Hagel, and all of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, contractors, and their families, that I will 

spend every waking day doing everything humanly possible to address forthrightly the pressing national security challenges that 

face our country, and to improve both the warfighting capabilities 

and health, welfare, and resiliency of our superb total force. 

While so doing, I will continuously strive to improve the Department’s management, programming, and budgeting processes, guided by the principle that fiscal discipline and accountability can coexist with prudent discussions on national defense without harming national security or threatening commitments made to our 

servicemembers, past and present. 

In closing, if the Senate chooses to confirm me as the next Deputy Secretary of Defense, I will make every effort to justify your 

decision, and I vow to work with every Member of Congress to 

maintain what I believe to be the greatest military in the world, 

so help me God. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering the committee’s questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. Work. 

Mike McCord, welcome back to the committee. 

163 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL J. MCCORD, TO BE UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

Mr. MCCORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, 

members of the committee. 

I have so much to be thankful for, being here today. First, I am 

grateful to the President for nominating me to this important position, and to Secretary Hagel for his confidence in me. It’s been an 

honor and a privilege to serve with Secretary Hagel and with 

former Secretaries Gates and Panetta over the past 5 years. 

I’m also thankful to the President and the Secretary for choosing 

Bob Work to be our next Deputy, and Christine Wormuth to be our 

Under Secretary for Policy. I’ve enjoyed a great working relationship with both of them over the past several years. I have not 

worked as closely with Brian, Eric, or Ambassador Shear yet, but 

it’s a real pleasure to be here with them and all our nominees 

today. 

It’s especially meaningful to me to be back here with the committee, where I served on the staff for 21 years and had the opportunity to learn from the outstanding Senators who have led this 

committee as Chairman and Ranking Member during my time 

here. Mr. Chairman, you, Senator McCain, who joined this committee, I notice, the same day I joined the staff, back in 1987, and 

our two former chairmen, Senator Warner and Senator Nunn. I’m 

very honored they’re here today, and I’m especially grateful to Senator Nunn for making the trip all the way here and for his kind 

introduction. 

Chairman Levin, it’s an honor to be part of your staff for 11 

years. Although it’s too early to start saying goodbye, I want to recognize not just what you’ve done as a Senator, but the way you’ve 

done it, with the highest standards of integrity. I’m always proud 

to tell people that I worked for Sam Nunn and Carl Levin. 

Senator Inhofe, I saw your dedication to our country and our 

military firsthand as chairman and ranking member of the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, back when I was 

supporting Senators Chuck Robb and Daniel Akaka. It’s a pleasure 

to work with you again. 

I also want to recognize my former colleagues on the staff, led 

by Peter Levine and John Bonsell, for the work they do to uphold 

the committee’s high standards of bipartisanship and dedication, 

and especially the 52-year winning streak. 

Most importantly, I want to thank my family. First and foremost, 

my wife, Donna—other shoulder. [Laughter.] 

I could not serve without her love and support, and I’m so lucky 

today and every day to have her. My mother, Ann, and sister, 

Cathy, have joined us today. This is their second trip from Ohio in 

2 weeks for this hearing, and I thank them for that. Donna and 

our daughter-in-law, Kim, and granddaughter, Charlotte Rose, are 

here. Charlotte’s in the front row. My wife’s law partner and friend, 

Ann Jones. I’m so happy all of them are here to share this important day in my life. 

Finally, I want to recognize Bob Hale, who is not here, but for 

the outstanding job he’s done as our Comptroller for the past 5 

years. He’s given the job his all, and he’s been a great friend and 

mentor to me. The team that Bob and I lead take great pride in 

164 

what we do. Our people work extremely hard to ensure the Department accomplishes its missions; in particular, meeting the needs of 

a military at war. These past few years have been especially challenging, as we work through the longest continuing resolutions in 

the Department’s history, a sequester and a shutdown and furloughs, all while supporting the demands of our wartime operations. 

Should I be confirmed, I’ll continue to lead our Comptroller organization as we support our military and our Nation. We face many 

challenges, going forward, in this era of dynamic security changes 

and constrained resources, but I’m confident we’ll continue to meet 

those challenges. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mike. 

Charlotte, as a grandfather, I know how important it is to your 

grandpa that you’re here today supporting him. 

Ms. Wormuth. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, TO BE UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Ms. WORMUTH. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, and members of the committee. 

It’s a privilege to appear before you this morning. I very much 

appreciate the opportunity to answer any questions you may have 

regarding my nomination as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

I’d like to thank President Obama and Secretary Hagel for their 

support of my nomination. I’ve had the privilege to serve President 

Obama, former Secretaries Gates and Panetta, and now Secretary 

Hagel, for the past 5 years, and, if the Senate chooses to confirm 

me for this position, I look forward to continuing to support the 

men and women of the U.S. military. 

I began my service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 

1995, and was a member of the career Civil Service for 7 years. I 

grew up professionally in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) Policy, and, over the years in and out of government, I’ve 

continued to be very impressed with the quality of our national security workforce. They’re hardworking, patriotic individuals who 

serve with dedication alongside their military colleagues. I’m very 

humbled and honored by the opportunity to serve with them as 

Under Secretary, if confirmed. 

I wouldn’t be here before you today as someone who’s pursued a 

career in international affairs and public service without the support and inspiration I’ve drawn from my mother, Deanna 

Wormuth. I’d also like to thank other members of my immediate 

family, who are such an important part of my life and who, in 

many ways, have made my service in Government possible. My sister, Jennifer Wormuth, who’s a surgeon in Baltimore, is here. My 

husband, Drew Kuepper, who also works in Government and is a 

retired Navy officer. Finally, I’d like to thank my two amazing 

daughters, Rachel and Madeleine, who keep me grounded and remind me every day what matters in life. Thank you all for being 

here today and for being with me every day. 

Senators, we live in a globalized, rapidly changing world at a 

time when the United States faces a number of challenges, as SenVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00172 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
165 

ator Inhofe noted, but there are also opportunities to shape a more 

peaceful world. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with 

you all in Congress, with this committee, in particular, and with 

the executive branch, to advance U.S. national security interests in 

this environment. 

I would support Secretary Hagel in building and sustaining 

strong defense relationships with countries around the world, with 

a goal of preventing crises wherever possible and ensuring our military is ready to respond to crisis, if needed. 

I would also make it a priority to provide day-to-day leadership 

and management of the Office of Secretary of Defense Policy organization so that it continues to provide excellent support to Secretary Hagel and to the President. 

Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee, I’m 

grateful for your consideration this morning, and I look forward to 

your questions. I will make every effort to live up to the confidence 

that’s been placed in me with this nomination. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Ms. Wormuth. 

Mr. McKeon. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN P. MCKEON, TO BE PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, I’ve submitted a slightly longer 

statement, for the record, which I will try to abbreviate now. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the committee, it’s a distinct honor to appear before you as the President’s 

nominee to be the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy. I would like to thank the President and the Secretary of Defense for their confidence in me in selecting me for this position. 

I would also like to express my deep appreciation to the Vice President, for whom I worked for nearly 25 years in the Senate and in 

the White House, and who’s been a great mentor and friend to me. 

I would not be here today without the strong support of my family, particularly my parents and my wife. I owe a great debt of 

gratitude to them, particularly my wife. She spent nearly 25 years 

working for five different Senators, so she understands and has patiently tolerated the long hours required of working in the Senate 

and in the White House. 

I’m also joined today by my mother-in-law, Hope, and my nephew, who shares my name and works here in the Senate for one of 

your colleagues. 

I’ve been fortunate to spend my professional life working in all 

three branches of the Federal Government. In addition to working 

here in the Senate and the White House, I clerked for a Federal 

judge who was put on the bench by Senator Warner, so I should 

thank him, since he is here, for appointing Judge Doumar. It gave 

me a great opportunity. 

My over 20 years of service in this chamber, and 5 years in the 

executive branch, have given me a strong appreciation for the challenges that confront our country, long experience in national security policy, and a deep knowledge of how the two political branches 

operate. I believe I have demonstrated an ability to manage people 

166 

as well as complex policy issues to get things done and to work well 

across party lines. 

I also continue to have great respect for the role of Congress in 

national security. The most seminal change in the American defense establishment in the last several decades, the GoldwaterNichols Act, would not have occurred without the persistence of 

Congress. 

The debates in this chamber on the Gulf and Balkan wars, in 

significant treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, were 

among the most memorable of my time here. They were also among 

the most important, for, in a democratic society, matters of war 

and peace must be publicly debated and require the informed consent of the American people through their representatives here in 

Congress. 

I’m fully aware that not all wisdom resides in the executive 

branch, and I recognize that we will not always agree, but we are 

all motivated by the same commitment to protecting the country in 

our national interests, and I pledge that, if confirmed, I will help 

the Department to maintain a regular dialogue with the committee 

and its well-respected professional staff. 

In my time at the White House, I’ve worked closely with many 

OSD Policy employees, including Ms. Wormuth. Just as the ranks 

of the uniformed military are filled with highly dedicated professionals, so too is OSD Policy. These women and men have gone 

through a difficult period in the last year with widespread furloughs resulting from sequestration, followed by the shutdown of 

the Government in October. Our Government is only as strong as 

its people, so an important priority, if confirmed, will be to focus 

on our human capital. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. BRIAN P. MCKEON

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the committee, it is a distinct honor to appear before you as the President’s nominee to be Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

I would like to thank the President and the Secretary of Defense for their confidence in me in selecting me for this position. I would like also to express my appreciation to the Vice President, for whom I worked for nearly 25 years in the Senate and in the White House and who has been a great teacher, mentor, and friend. 

I should also thank former National Security Adviser Tom Donilon for giving me 

the chance to serve in my current position on the National Security Council staff, 

and to Susan Rice for keeping me on when she succeeded Mr. Donilon and for supporting my possible move to a position in the Department of Defense. 

I would not be here today without the strong support of my family, particularly 

my parents and my wife. My father, who hitchhiked from his home in New York 

to Michigan to attend college and paid for his studies by working in an auto factory 

at night—taught me the value of hard work, that every day brings new opportunities, and that politics is a noble profession. My mother, as much as anyone, drove 

me to succeed in school and to reach my full potential. My wife, who spent nearly 

25 years working in this chamber for five different Senators, has, simply put, made 

me a better person. She has provided unstinting love, support, and friendship, while 

patiently tolerating the long hours required of working in the Senate and the White 

House, for which I am deeply grateful. 

Finally, I would like to thank the committee and its staff for scheduling this hearing today, so soon after the nomination was submitted. I worked on hundreds of 

167 

nominations in my time on the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations, so I 

fully appreciate the preparatory work required to convene a hearing of this nature. 

I have been fortunate to spend my professional life working in all three branches 

of the Federal Government. My over 20 years of service in this chamber and 5 years 

in the executive branch have given me a strong appreciation for the many challenges that confront our country, long experience in national security policy, and a 

deep knowledge of how the two political branches operate. I believe I have demonstrated an ability to manage people as well complex policy issues, to get things 

done and to work well across party lines. 

I also have great respect for the role of Congress in national security. The most 

seminal change in the American defense establishment in the last several decades— 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act—would not have occurred without the initiative and persistence of Congress. The debates in this chamber in the 1990s on matters such as 

the Gulf War, the Balkan conflicts, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance were among the most memorable of my time 

here, and among the most important, for in a democratic society, matters of war 

and peace must be publicly debated and require the informed consent of the American people, through their representatives in Congress. I am fully aware that not 

all wisdom resides in the executive branch, and I recognize that we will not always 

agree. But we are all motivated by the same commitment to protecting the country 

and our national interests. I pledge to you that, if confirmed, I will help the Department maintain a regular dialogue with the committee and its professional staff. 

Throughout my tenure working in the Senate, this committee had a well-deserved 

reputation for bipartisanship, productivity and a strong professional staff, a reputation that continues today. 

In my time in the White House, I have worked closely with many Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy employees. Just as the ranks of the uniformed 

military are filled with highly dedicated professionals, so, too, is OSD Policy. The 

women and men of OSD Policy have gone through a difficult period in the last year, 

with widespread furloughs resulting from sequestration, followed by the shutdown 

of most government operations in October. Our Government is only as strong as its 

people, so an important priority, if confirmed, will be to focus on our human capital, 

as did Under Secretaries Flournoy and Miller, so that we can continue to recruit 

and retain talented professionals. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. McKeon. 

Now Ambassador Shear. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID B. SHEAR, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY 

AFFAIRS 

Ambassador SHEAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, and members of the committee. I’m honored to appear before you today, and I appreciate the opportunity to answer questions you may have regarding my nomination to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. 

I wish to thank the President for nominating me for this position 

and to thank Secretary Hagel for supporting my nomination. 

I’d also like to thank my family and friends for their strong support. My wife, Barbara, and my daughter, Jennifer, could not be 

with us today, but they’re here in spirit. 

I’m joined, instead, by my big brother, George, his wife, Diana, 

and their daughter, Laura. My brother, George, has served as an 

inspiration to me throughout my life, but particularly in my youth, 

when he was a U.S. Navy officer. 

I’d like to thank the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines with 

whom I’ve worked closely throughout my career. Their commitment 

to our Nation is a testament to the continued strength of our military traditions. If confirmed, it would be an honor for me to help 

build on those traditions. 

168 

The mission of the Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Office is 

critical to our Nation’s security. The Asia-Pacific region boasts over 

half the world’s population, half the world’s gross domestic product, 

and nearly half the world’s trade. It presents the United States 

with profound challenges and opportunities. These include the continued fight against terrorism, the military and political transition 

in Afghanistan, the rise of China, and the need to strengthen our 

alliances and partnerships. 

The administration has responded to these challenges and opportunities in East Asia by implementing the rebalance, a whole-ofgovernment approach to strengthening our economic, diplomatic, 

and military positions in the region. If confirmed, I hope to help 

implement the balance as we draw down from Afghanistan, support a stable Afghan political transition, and continue to fight al 

Qaeda and other terrorist groups. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve worked closely with the military throughout 

my Foreign Service career. I believe my work demonstrates that 

close coordination between the diplomatic corps and the military 

ensures the effective execution of national security policy. 

At the Embassy in Tokyo, I worked with U.S. forces to strengthen our alliance while adjusting our presence in Japan. While serving with the State Department’s Office of Korean Affairs, I coordinated U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance issues with OSD and the 

Joint Staff. Most recently, as Ambassador to Vietnam, I helped to 

build a new partnership that includes a growing security cooperation component, adding both Navy and Coast Guard officers to our 

Defense Attache office. The Pacific Command has been a partner 

throughout my career. 

My assignment as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuala Lumpur and 

as Ambassador to Vietnam have allowed me to hone my skills as 

a leader and manager of large groups of people in a constrained fiscal environment. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this 

committee and the whole of Congress to address the national security challenges we face in order to keep America safe, secure, and 

prosperous. I will make every effort to live up to the confidence 

that has been placed in me. I’m grateful for your consideration, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Ambassador. 

Mr. Rosenbach. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC ROSENBACH, TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE 

Mr. ROSENBACH. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Inhofe. Thank you very much for the privilege of appearing before 

you in the committee today. I appreciate everything that you and 

the other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee do to 

help our military, and I look forward to answering your questions 

about my nomination for Assistant Secretary of Defense. 

I’d like to start by thanking my family. First of all, my wife, 

Alexa, and my two kids, Max and Sophia, who are here today. 

Their support and understanding, in particular over the last several years when I’ve been in the Pentagon, has been heartwarming 

and essential to me surviving. 

169 

I’d also like to thank my parents, Bill and Colleen, who are here. 

Without them, I wouldn’t be here today. It’s their love and hard 

work that got me here. 

I also would like to explicitly thank the service men and women 

of the U.S. military. The last decade has been hard on the country, 

but particularly hard on them and their families. We should always 

remember what they do. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve been in and around the military my entire 

life. My father served in Vietnam. I was born—and raised—at the 

U.S. Air Force Academy. I moved to and grew up in Gettysburg, 

and the battlefields there. I served on Active Duty in the Army in 

the military. I’m now working in the Pentagon. I can say, with all 

honesty, I see no higher honor than serving as Assistant Secretary 

of Defense and focusing, in particular, on Homeland defense and 

defending our country and working closely with the National 

Guard, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Cyber Command, and U.S. 

Strategic Command, in particular. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staffs, 

in particular. As a former member of the Senate staff, I know 

that’s important. I’ll make every effort, if confirmed, to live up to 

your expectations. I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

We’re going to have a 7-minute first round of questions. I think 

we’re still, with that number of minutes, able to make our 11:15 

expected cutoff time, since the Senate will begin a series of votes 

at that time. 

Let me start with you, Mr. Work. Secretary Hagel, yesterday, 

previewed the Department’s 2015 budget request, which is not 

going to be released in full until a few days from now. He included 

numerous personnel-related proposals that are intended to slow the 

growth of personnel costs. Among those proposals are a 1-percent 

pay raise for most military personnel, which is lower than the currently projected 1.8 percent that would take effect under current 

law; a pay freeze for 1 year for general and flag officers; a reduction in the growth of the housing allowance over time to 95 percent 

of housing expenses rather than the 100 percent currently covered; 

a phased-in reduction in the annual direct subsidy provided to military commissaries; changes to the TRICARE health program to encourage greater use of the most affordable means of care; some fee 

increases for retirees in TRICARE; and, of course, the reduction in 

the Army’s Active Duty end strength to 450,000, down from the 

currently planned 490,000. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Work, what is the relationship between 

those proposals and our need to invest in modernization and readiness? 

Mr. WORK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is one of the big issues that I dealt with as the Under Secretary of the Navy, and I expect it will be one of the issues that 

I’ll deal with, if confirmed, as Deputy Secretary. 

The rate of increase in personnel costs, especially since 2001, has 

been far above the rate of inflation. As a result, today, by at least 

all accounts, our servicemembers, men and women, are being compensated about 10 percent above their average civilian counterpart. 

170 

I think what Secretary Hagel—and Chairman Dempsey—are trying 

to signal is that we want to compensate our men and women for 

everything that they do for their Nation, but we need to slow down 

the growth of personnel compensation so that we can spend more 

money on readiness and modernization. There is a direct link. It’s 

a very, very important and difficult issue, but one, if confirmed, I 

look forward to working with the committee and the members of 

the Department on trying to come to the right answer. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. McCord, do you have a comment on that? 

Mr. MCCORD. Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with Mr. Work’s 

comments. I think the chiefs wrestle with this when we go through 

our budget deliberations in the building, and the tradeoff is exactly 

as you state. They very directly feel it’s the people who have to 

train and equip the force for today, as well as tomorrow, that there 

is a direct tradeoff between military capability and being able to 

control our compensation costs. I think the Secretary made clear 

that we are totally respecting the work that our warfighters do, we 

are just trying to restrain the growth a little bit. The compensation 

of our military is about a third of our budget; including military 

and civilian, it’s about half. We cannot leave that area completely 

untouched. However, as has been the case every year that we have 

made some proposals in this area, they are disproportionately 

small. We are relatively protecting compensation, just recognizing 

the need that we have to make some savings there to do what we 

need to do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Work, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air 

Force has concluded that the Department can and should place 

greater reliance on the Air Reserve components more than we have 

previously planned to do, and that a shift to placing a larger portion of the Air Force’s capability in the Air Reserve component 

should be made even if we weren’t facing these budget reductions. 

These are strong positions that were unanimously adopted by the 

Commission, which included a former Secretary of the Air Force 

and a former Under Secretary of the Air Force. I’m wondering 

whether you have been briefed on the Commission’s report, and, if 

so, what your reaction is. 

Mr. WORK. Mr. Chairman, I haven’t been briefed, but I have read 

the report in full, and have digested it. 

In essence, the Commission recommends shifting about 28,000 

Active Duty airmen to the Reserve, primarily in the areas of cyber, 

pilot training, space, and special ops. This would save about $2.1 

billion a year, and would increase the proportion of the Reserve 

contribution to the U.S. Air Force total force from about 35 percent 

to 42 percent. 

If confirmed, I will work with the Department to try to understand whether all of these recommendations could be implemented, 

but the general thrust of the report, that we need to take a very 

close look at, the balance between the Active and the Reserve 

Force, is an important one, and one that I wholly endorse. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Work, last year, Secretary Hagel began to 

implement his plan to reduce the Department of Defense staff by 

20 percent. Last year’s authorization act contains a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for streamlining 

171 

Department of Defense management headquarters by reducing the 

size of staffs, eliminating tiers of management, cutting functions 

that provide little value—or little additional value, consolidating 

overlapping and duplicative program offices. The objective is to reduce aggregate spending for management headquarters by not less 

than $40 billion, beginning in fiscal year 2015. 

What is your view on reductions to the size and composition of 

the Department’s management headquarters? 

Mr. WORK. I fully endorse Secretary Hagel’s thrust here. We 

have long been focused, in the Department—or when I was the 

Under Secretary, we were long focused on taking overhead and taking forces out of what we would refer to as ‘‘tail’’ and put it into 

‘‘tooth’’, combat power. This is a first step, I believe. The 20-percent 

reduction that Secretary Hagel has ordered, all of the Department 

staffs as well as the combatant commander staffs, is an important 

first step and will reap important savings that we’ll be able to plow 

back into capabilities and capacities that our warfighters need. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Wormuth, thank you for the time we spent together yesterday to go over some of these problems that we have. 

I do want to concentrate my questions on the current strategy 

that we have, but, before doing that, just one comment, and if it’s 

going to be longer, we can do it for the record. Mr. Work, this is 

addressing the acquisition reform problem that we’ve been talking 

about for years and years, and that you’ve been close to. Do you 

have any comments on what your ideas are, in the near future, on 

that type of reform? 

Mr. WORK. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Under 

Secretary of Defense Kendall, who is really being aggressive in this 

regard. I think we have to take a look at the way we generate requirements. I think all of us realize that sometimes we overshoot 

the mark on requirements, which add costs. All of the better business buying approaches that Secretary Kendall is asking for, I fully 

endorse. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that’s good, Mr. Work. If you don’t mind, 

for the record, getting as much detail as you can to give us your 

recommendations as to how to address this type of reform. 

Mr. WORK. I will do so, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I understand that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Honorable Frank Kendall, directed a number of parallel 

efforts to institute a continuous improvement process for the defense acquisition system and I support this ongoing effort. Prominent elements include: Better Buying 

Power 2.0 initiatives, an interim policy update to the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, ‘‘Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,’’ a more 

dynamic coupling of military requirements and defense acquisition processes, and 

a review of current statutes aimed at suggesting a comprehensive consolidation and 

streamlining of legislative prescriptions for defense acquisition. If confirmed I will 

review this work, which is described in more detail below, and will seek out additional steps to improve defense acquisition. 

BETTER BUYING POWER

Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0, which is a second iteration of the BBP initiatives 

that were introduced by Dr. Ashton Carter when he was the USD(AT&L), identifies 

efficiencies and improvements across the Defense of Defense (DOD) acquisition sysVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00179 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
172 

tem. It focuses Defense-wide review of critical process elements ranging from requirements generation to system engineering, cost control, and life-cycle 

sustainment. It also addresses professional training and shaping of the Defense Acquisition Workforce (DAW). Stimulated by problem identification, definition, and 

resolution, BBP is also a pragmatic forum actively pursuing incremental efficiencies 

solicited from the entire DAW. Proposals for improvement are tested and refined before implementation into a growing body of acquisition best practices. The goal is 

to deliver better value to the taxpayer and improve the way the Department acquires goods and services in support of the warfighter. 

BBP 2.0 consists of 34 initiatives organized into 7 focus areas: 

• Achieve affordable programs • Control costs throughout the product life cycle • Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and Government • Eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy • Promote effective competition • Upgrade tradecraft in acquisition of services • Improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce 

One notable addition is a new focus area on increasing the professionalism of 

DOD’s acquisition workforce. BBP 2.0 recognizes that people are essential to changing the way DOD provides critical capabilities to the warfighters. Within this area, 

Mr. Kendall is introducing four new initiatives: (1) establish higher standards for 

key leadership positions; (2) establish stronger professional qualification requirements for all acquisition specialties; (3) increase the recognition of excellence in acquisition management; and (4) continue to increase the cost consciousness of the acquisition workforce by focusing on culture change. 

DODI 5000.02 UPDATE

Interim DODI 5000.02, ‘‘Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,’’ provides 

fundamental guidance for Defense components. This interim policy released on November 25, 2013: 

• Promotes best practices and flexibility to produce improved acquisition 

outcomes; and 

• Reflects many of the BBP initiatives to include a substantially increased 

emphasis on improved business arrangements, program affordability, and 

what a program ‘‘should cost’’ the government, rather than what the expectations are that it ‘‘will cost’’ the government if no cost savings initiatives 

are attempted. 

The product of close collaboration with DOD acquisition, requirements, and resource experts, this interim policy includes a series of program acquisition models 

that are tailored to the unique characteristics of the product being acquired and to 

the totality of circumstances associated with the program, including operational urgency and risk factors. 

DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND DEFENSE ACQUISITION

In previous years, enhancements to the Defense acquisition process resulted in 

synchronization of requirements documentation at specific contractual milestones in 

product design, development, and production. BBP initiatives pursue a more profound integration of requirements and acquisition within Services and agencies to 

promote a dialogue to refine needs apace with evolving knowledge of product design 

and limitations. 

Interim DODI 5000.02 adds a checkpoint immediately before the Engineering and 

Manufacturing Development phase to ensure that military needs and acquisition activities are fully aligned. This new decision point confirms that Requests For Proposals from potential contractors are informed by the latest validated requirements 

of joint military needs authority. 

The BBP process also fosters expansion of the use of Configuration Steering 

Boards across the Department to ensure continuous examination of requirements, 

resources, and associated acquisition activities within the defense component organizations. This dynamic interaction of the principal authorities involved in investment 

decisions for warfighting capabilities aims to deliver affordable solutions by focusing 

on tradespace and increasing knowledge of technology options and associated costs. 

AT&L LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

The process of updating DODI 5000.02 revealed that the current body of laws associated with major system acquisition has placed an unnecessarily complex burden 

upon Program Managers. As a result, USD(AT&L) initiated an effort to comprehenVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00180 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
173 

sively review current applicable statutes and regulations and is drafting a legislative proposal to simplify the existing body of acquisition law and regulations while 

maintaining the overall intent of existing statutes. In a February 2014 Defense 

News article, Mr. Kendall reaffirmed that this initiative ‘‘is not to really change any 

of the intent behind the existing laws, but just to simplify that body of law, make 

it more comprehensible, make it easier to implement and make it something that 

is much more focused on results and not as confusing and complex for everybody.’’ 

Using the interim DODI 5000.02 as a starting point, the proposal will focus on 

areas such as Milestone certification, oversight regime overlap, duplicative documentation and reports, and proposed changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 

the DOD FAR Supplement, and service supplement. Service program deep dive case 

studies will highlight key areas of interest and provide specific examples of statutory burden. 

Congressional and industry-targeted engagement will also inform the effort. In 

order to ensure coordination and transparency, meetings have occurred with Senate 

and House Armed Services Committees professional staff and leadership. These engagements, in addition to industry-targeted opportunities, will continue. 

The proposal should be finalized in time to be included in the National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016; however, some elements may be included in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015. 

Senator INHOFE. Ms. Wormuth, you’ve had these positions working very closely with the administration. The President’s letter, at 

the front of the January 2012 Defense Strategy Guidance, he stated that we have, ‘‘put al Qaeda on a path to defeat’’. In opening 

statement, I mentioned other statements that he made, ‘‘The tide 

of war is receding,’’ ‘‘We have al Qaeda on the run,’’ and all of that. 

But, when we asked the Director of National Intelligence, James 

Clapper, if al Qaeda is on the run, on a path to defeat, he answered, ‘‘No, it is morphing and franchising.’’ General Michael 

Flynn, who is also on the same panel—this was a couple of weeks 

ago—the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, said, simply, 

‘‘They are not.’’ 

If you look at the chart over here, Ms. Wormuth, this shows what 

they’re concerned with, what’s happening with al Qaeda. Does it 

look like to you, that they are on the run or these statements that 

are made by the President? 

[The chart referred to follows:] 

174 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, in my view, I would say that we have 

significantly degraded the core of al Qaeda, but I would certainly 

agree with Director Clapper that the broad al Qaeda threat has 

metastasized, and we are very concerned about the threat posed by, 

for example, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda and Associated Movements, and other groups. This is, I believe, a significant threat that we, in the Department, have to be very, very attentive to. 

Senator INHOFE. You do agree, though, with James Clapper? 

Ms. WORMUTH. I agree that the threat has metastasized, yes. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, okay. All right, that’s a good question. Metastasized, does that mean it’s bigger or smaller? 

Ms. WORMUTH. I think it has spread and it’s a nodal threat. 

Senator INHOFE. We think al Qaeda—you can follow up on that— 

is spreading. North Korea has the nuclear weapons. We all know 

what’s happening out there and the threats that are different today 

than they’ve ever been in the past. Under the current strategy, I 

don’t think that the strategy is working, and also, when you hear 

statements by General Odierno, who talks about what is happening 

with the current strategy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 

Admiral Greenert, his statement saying that we will preclude our 

ability to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, both in the 

near term and the long term. The same thing with General Amos. 

We will have fewer forces to provide less trained and arrive later 

in the fight. 

I would say, to all of you, that, with the strategy that I think 

clearly is not working, we would have, maybe, one of two choices, 

to either change the strategy to try to enhance our abilities, and 

that would cost more—that would be more resources, or it would 

be to lower the expectations of the American people that we’ve alVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00182 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE

225ful3.eps
175 

ways had. I will repeat the question. I’ll ask each one of you if you 

agree with the statement that was made yesterday by Secretary 

Hagel when he took option number two—he said, ‘‘The American 

dominance on the seas, in the skies, and in space can no longer be 

taken for granted.’’ Do you agree with that? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, I think what Secretary Hagel is perhaps 

getting at there is that we are not taking for granted our position 

in the world, and, in fact, are doing everything we can to make 

sure that we have the capabilities we need and the ready forces we 

need to confront challenges. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. I don’t agree with that. I read this thing, 

that ‘‘can no longer be taken for granted’’. 

Anyone else want to comment on that? [No response.] 

Nobody? 

Mr. WORK. Sir, there is a broad proliferation of guided weapons. 

The United States has enjoyed a monopoly in guided weapons for 

about 20 years. That monopoly is eroding. When that happens, operations in the air and on the surface of the ocean and under the 

surface of the ocean become much more challenging. 

I think what Secretary Hagel is saying is, given the current 

trends, we really have to be careful or we will be faced with a situation where, when we fight, we could take more losses. That’s one 

of the reasons why one of his key themes was to maintain technological superiority, and he made such a big issue of that in his 

speech. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, but I would say that it’s the strategy that 

I look at this and I say we’re going to have to change, because this 

expectation is there. All the Chiefs that I quoted a minute ago, 

they know that the problems that are out there, and they are 

greater. That means greater risk, which means loss of more lives. 

This is a great concern to me, and I’d like to have any of you, for 

the record, to respond in any more detail than you already have, 

because, to me, it’s very simple. When he made the statement, he 

said, ‘‘American dominance of the seas, in the skies, and in space 

can no longer be taken for granted.’’ I’d like to get that for the 

record, and I’m not really satisfied at the responses we’ve had. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Mr. WORK. As I said in my testimony, the United States is losing the virtual monopoly that it has enjoyed in precision-guided weapons. In recent years, a number 

of adversaries and potential adversaries have fielded military systems that can target and strike our ships and aircraft, as well as the forward bases from which they 

operate. Space is no longer a sanctuary and increasingly sophisticated adversaries 

are seeking to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space. 

For these reasons, it is essential that our defense program sustain investments 

in the types of capabilities that will be required to address these proliferating 

threats. Priorities for investment, in my opinion, include defenses against ballistic 

and cruise missiles, fifth-generation combat aircraft, undersea warfare platforms, 

standoff attack weapons, and more resilient systems for intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and timing and positioning. The joint 

force must also develop new operational concepts for maintaining freedom of action 

in the face of anti-access/area denial threats. 

Mr. MCCORD. The Department of Defense (DOD) can no longer afford to conduct 

business as usual given the dynamic security and fiscal environments we face. DOD 

has protected its investments in capabilities to counter anti-access/area-denial 

threats as well as those who seek to constrain the ability of U.S. forces to operate 

freely across domains. Ensuring we can continue to counter such threats is motivating many of the Department’s modernization efforts. If the Department does not 

176 

invest in new capabilities and develop new ways of operating, the Joint Force likely 

will face challenges projecting power in the future. 

Ms. WORMUTH. Yes. Over the past decade or more we have witnessed the proliferation of advanced technologies to a number of states and even to non-state actors, including U.S. adversaries. Systems such as guided anti-ship weapons, quiet 

submarines, advanced surface-to-air missiles, modern fighter aircraft and air-to-air 

missiles, long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, sensor platforms, and command 

and control systems can be used by adversaries to impede U.S. access to theaters 

of operation, threaten forces at forward bases, and contest for control of access to 

sea and airspace and potentially interfere with U.S. operations. For example, China 

has successfully tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon and, along with other 

countries, is developing electronic warfare and laser systems that can interfere with 

the operation of U.S. military satellites. 

As a result, U.S. power projection operations are facing threats that we did not 

encounter in the past. It will take substantial and sustained investments in new capabilities, operating concepts, and infrastructure to maintain U.S. flexibility and the 

freedom to operate in these areas. The Department is paying close attention to these 

developments and is making needed investments to ensure that U.S. forces can operate in non-permissive environments. 

Mr. MCKEON. I agree that we cannot assume that adversaries will not seek to 

challenge our dominance in these spheres. Based on the trajectory of current trends 

in the threat environment, if the Department does not invest in new capabilities 

and develop new ways of operating, the Joint Force will face challenges projecting 

power into some environments. I understand that the need to counter these threats 

is motivating many of the Department’s modernization efforts. 

Mr. ROSENBACH. I agree that the United States cannot assume that significant 

U.S. conventional capabilities will go unchallenged in the future. The diffusion of 

advanced technology enables potential adversaries—state and non-state actors 

alike—to try to blunt traditional U.S. power projection capabilities. Those seeking 

to deny U.S. forces operational access across the air, maritime, cyber, and space domains are growing in sophistication and in number. As a result, the Department 

must prioritize investments in capabilities needed to overcome these challenges. 

Mr. SHEAR. I agree that we cannot take our position in Asia for granted and that 

improving it will require constant effort. Actors in the Asia-Pacific region, as elsewhere across the globe, seek to constrain the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely 

across domains. For this reason, the Department has been engaging China, 

strengthening our alliances, and seeking new partners. I also understand that the 

Department is doing everything it can to ensure that the United States possesses 

adequate capabilities that can counter anti-access/area-denial threats. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Let me now call on Senator Reed, and also turn the gavel over 

to him for the balance of this morning’s hearing. 

Thank you. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your commitment to serve the Nation. 

I first want to recognize Senator Warner and Senator Nunn, 

whose bipartisan, thoughtful, and patriotic leadership has set the 

standard for this committee. Thank you, Senators. 

I also have to commend the people whose shoes you are stepping 

into. Ash Carter, Bob Hale, and Christine Fox have done a superb 

job at the Department of Defense. All of you have predecessors who 

you can be proud of and you can match your effort against theirs 

and they’re a good target to aim for. 

The questions we’ve been debating go toward the heart of a fundamental issue. Do budgets drive strategy, or do strategies drive 

budgets? 

Mr. Work, you’ve indicated that you don’t feel, given the Budget 

Control Act (BCA), as modified by the Ryan-and-Murray agreement, which this Congress supports—in fact, we give you the resources—is adequate to fully carry out the strategy. Is that a fair 

comment of your position? 

177 

Mr. WORK. I very much agree with the statements of Secretary 

Hagel and Chairman Dempsey, yesterday, who said that if we go 

to the full BCA levels from 2016 and beyond, that the risks will 

be elevated, and our ability to perform all parts of the strategy, 

which I believe is a very coherent strategy, as published in January 

2012, being able to fully implement that strategy would be very difficult at the BCA levels. 

Senator REED. That is a direct result of the budgets that Congress has agreed to, so far? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir, it is. 

Senator REED. Part of the response to the threats around the 

globe is to at least reevaluate the budget priorities that we’ve given 

the Department of Defense—we, in Congress, have legislated. Is 

that fair? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Now, let’s take the other side of the question. 

We’ve dealt with the budget. In your view, it seems to be less than 

adequate to meet the strategy. What are the threats? Because I 

would like to think, simply, that you take the threats, you craft a 

strategy, and then you come to us and we give you adequate resources. Can you just briefly describe what you think the threats 

are to us, and how DOD is responding? 

Mr. WORK. There’s a broad range of threats, Senator. A rising 

power in the Asia-Pacific—it’s rising very quickly. It has the means 

to compete with us militarily in a way that many of our former 

competitors have not. We have a broad problem in the Middle East 

that we can see the results of the Arab Spring and all of the problems that are happening in Syria, and the attendant reactions—or 

the attendant results on terrorism. We are focused very much on 

Iran and preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power. We have 

a lot of small-scale contingencies around the world in which we 

must watch carefully. 

Counterterrorism, cyber terrorism—or cyber warfare—rising 

powers, potential nuclear regional powers, these are all very, very 

big challenges that the Department has to face. 

Senator REED. In some respects, we are in a world—and that’s 

why it’s much more complicated than perhaps in retrospect, the 

Cold War—where we have a range of challenges. Senator Inhofe’s 

description, accurately, of the dispersion of al Qaeda, raises a special operations challenge, an intelligence challenge, a cyber challenge, et cetera. A lot different than a rising maritime power requiring surface vessels and major fleets and aircraft, or a conventional force, like the North Koreans. We are now at a stage where 

we have to cover down on all our bets. Is that one of the things 

that complicates your life, in terms of strategizing? 

Mr. WORK. It certainly complicated my life as the Under Secretary of the Navy as we tried to balance all of the requirements 

with force structure. If confirmed, it would just be magnified as we 

take a look at the joint force and all of the capabilities and capacities that we need to address these threats. 

Senator REED. Let me follow up, one of the points, I think, of the 

many that Senator Inhofe made that were right on target, which 

is the acquisition process. Fortunately, you had great support from 

people like Sean Stackley, et cetera, in your service in the Navy, 

178 

but there are programs in the Navy that are consuming significant 

resources and have yet to produce the kind of results that were anticipated when the programs were initiated. A lot of discussion recently is about the littoral combat ship (LCS), but this acquisition 

process is something that everyone in your job has worked on, 

every Secretary of Defense has worked on. We haven’t got it right 

yet. I would join Senator Inhofe in urging you to specifically focus, 

along with Secretary Kendall, on improving that. There’s no silver 

bullet, in terms of saving resources and shifting them, but that’s 

something we have to do, and have to do better. 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Mr. McCord, I’d again, thank you for your extensive work. You have a valuable role. One is to make sure that the 

money is well and wisely spent. The goal is to have as they say, 

a clean audit of the Department of Defense. Can you give us an 

idea of any initiatives that you’re going to undertake to improve 

the auditing quality and the financial controls in the Department 

of Defense? 

Mr. MCCORD. Thank you, Senator Reed, yes. That effort’s very 

important to us, and one of the things that’s very helpful to us is 

that it’s a shared goal between us and Congress and the Armed 

Services Committees. We have a goal that Secretary Panetta set for 

2014 for the Statement of Budgetary Resources, and we have a 

larger goal for 2017. 

I believe that we’re on track, we’re making progress toward those 

goals. The plan that we have in place, that Mr. Hale’s put in place, 

I support that plan. I’m going to stay with that plan, as long as 

I see that it’s making the kind of progress that we’ve been making 

recently with the Marine Corps audit, for example. But, certainly 

I will come back to you and I will work within the Department to 

change that plan if I see that we are off track. But, right now, I 

believe we’re on track. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McCord, welcome back. Do you remember the first year we 

passed a requirement for an audit? 

Mr. MCCORD. I was here at that time, Senator, yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Was it in the 1980s? 

Mr. MCCORD. I’m remembering it’s 1990, but I might be mistaken, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. You understand there might be a slight germ 

of doubt or cynicism about this latest claim that this year we’re 

going to have a clean audit? 

Welcome, our old friend, Chairman Warner, and Senator Nunn. 

It’s great to see these two great public servants with us. 

Ms. Wormuth, I’ve heard a lot of good names—‘‘nodal threat’’— 

it’s a ‘‘nodal threat,’’ is that what al Qaeda is? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, what I meant by that was, it’s diffused, 

and there are cells that are—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I see. 

Ms. WORMUTH.—geographically distributed—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You still didn’t answer the question, whether 

it’s growing or receding. Is the threat of al Qaeda growing or recedVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00186 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
179 

ing? I note your statement about, ‘‘core al Qaeda,’’ whatever that 

is worth. Is it growing or receding? 

Ms. WORMUTH. I would describe—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Is the tide of war receding or growing? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, I would describe it as a persistent 

threat. 

Senator MCCAIN. You won’t answer the question, is that it? It’s 

a simple question. Is it receding or growing? It’s not a very complicated question. 

Ms. WORMUTH. I think it’s persistent. 

Senator MCCAIN. You won’t answer the question. Is that it? I’m 

asking you, again, for the third time. Is it receding or growing? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, I think, in saying it’s persistent, I’m attempting to answer your question. I think there are—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Actually—— 

Ms. WORMUTH.—there are elements—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Actually, you—— 

Ms. WORMUTH.—of al Qaeda—— 

Senator MCCAIN.—are not. Actually, you are not. It’s a pretty 

simple question. We look at al Qaeda, and we decide, over the past 

few years, whether it is a receding threat or a growing threat. 

Since you keep saying ‘‘persistent,’’ you’re in disagreement with the 

Director of National Intelligence, which either means you refuse to 

answer the question or you’re not well informed. 

Ms. WORMUTH. There are elements of the threat posed by al 

Qaeda that I would say are growing. 

Senator MCCAIN. Which parts would you say are growing? 

Ms. WORMUTH. But, just for example, al Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula, the activities in Yemen, that is a growing threat, I 

think, of considerable concern to us. 

Senator MCCAIN. Obviously you don’t agree with the map that 

Senator Inhofe just put up, because it’s spreading all over North 

Africa, Ms. Wormuth. Anybody who doesn’t know that has either 

been somewhere else or not knowing what’s going on in the world. 

Mr. Work, as the former Navy Under Secretary, you wrote a very 

candid paper about the LCS program. I have a memorandum from 

Secretary Hagel to the Chief of Naval Operations. I don’t know if 

you’re aware of it, or not. He says, ‘‘Therefore, no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward,’’ talking about the LCS. 

Do you agree with that assessment? 

Mr. WORK. As I understand it, what the assessment is saying is, 

we will stop building the flight-zero-plus LCS at 32 ships, and we 

will consider follow-on ships, small combatants. A modified LCS 

could be one of the options. A domestic or foreign design could be 

one of the options. 

I think this is very normal with Navy shipbuilding. We build—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You think it’s normal? You think it’s normal 

that the cost overruns associated with this ship, the fact that we 

don’t even know what the mission is, that there’s been this whole 

idea of moving different modules off and on—you disagree with the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) statement, regarding the 

cost overruns? This is normal, Mr. Work? 

Mr. WORK. Sir, up until 2007, 2008, 2009, when the program almost imploded, there were significant cost overruns. When SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00187 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
180 

retary Mabus, Secretary Stackley, and I arrived in the Department 

of the Navy in 2009, I believe, since then, the program has met its 

cost targets. In 2001, the guidance to the Department of the Navy 

was to be able to build three LCSs for the price of one Arleigh 

Burke. The Department of the Navy is doing that today. 

I think you have to look at the performance of the—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Sort of makes it hard to understand why Secretary Hagel would assess at 32 when the original plans, as presented to Congress for their approval, was 52 ships. 

By the way, was anybody ever held responsible for these failures 

in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010? 

Mr. WORK. Those happened in the administration prior to ours, 

so I don’t know what—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Everything’s been fine under this administration, as far as the LCS is concerned? 

Mr. WORK. I believe that the program is on solid ground and is 

meeting its cost targets, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. You do believe that? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. You’re in direct contradiction to the Government Accountability Office study of 2013. 

Mr. WORK. I haven’t read that particular—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You haven’t read it? 

Mr. WORK. No, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Wow. I’m stunned that you haven’t. But, the 

fact is that the ship has still not had a clear mission, the modules 

that were supposed to be moving back and forth have not. We have 

not pursued the fly-before-you-buy policy, and do you remember the 

original cost estimate for an LCS? 

Mr. WORK. It was $220 million for the C frame, Senator, and, depending on the number of modules that you would buy, the total 

cost for a missionized LCS, average cost, was supposed to be no 

more than $400 million, in fiscal year 2005 dollars. 

Senator MCCAIN. What is it now? 

Mr. WORK. I haven’t been briefed on the most recent cost. I’ll do 

that, if confirmed, and look at it. But, I know that we’re on 

track—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you for doing that. What’s the cost now? 

You don’t even know the cost now, Mr. Work? 

Mr. WORK. I believe the average cost, with modules, is about 

$450 million, but not in fiscal year 2005 dollars. If you take a look 

at the original costing factors, I believe the cost of today’s LCSs are 

very close to the costs that were set, back in 2002–2003. 

Senator MCCAIN. Given that, then it’s hard to understand why 

the Secretary of Defense would curtail the production of it by some 

24 ships. Mr. Work, every objective study, whether it be the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Government Accountability Office, every other objective observer, the LCS has not been 

anywhere near what it was presented to for Congress by funding. 

This, again, makes me wonder about your qualifications, because 

the one thing that we are plagued with is significant cost overruns 

and lack of capability. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

181 

Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Warner, Senator Nunn, thank you for your tremendous 

service. I am blessed to follow Senator Lugar, and he and Senator 

Nunn will be in my home State tonight to talk about these issues. 

Thank you for everything you’ve done for our country. 

Mr. Work, what I’d like to start off with is that article yesterday 

in Reuters, ‘‘Iraq Signs Deal to Buy Arms from Iran’’. Now, they 

have come here and talked to us about possible arms purchases. 

One of the big problems has been, how do you sell arms to a country where the army is 93 percent Shia and they have purchased 

them from Iran? Where does that leave us there now? 

Mr. WORK. Sir, I haven’t been briefed on the particulars of the 

report. If confirmed, I would take a look seriously at these and 

work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as the 

other Under Secretaries, to look at this issue very closely. 

Senator DONNELLY. In this position, what are your ideas on how 

to get Iraq in a better place in regards to how we view it, the sectarianism just seems to continue to grow, which will, as it looks, 

if it continues that way, lead to a possible implosion there? 

Mr. WORK. The sectarian violence in Iraq is very troubling. I 

know that the Department is looking at different aid packages for 

the Iraqi security forces, and, if confirmed, I would look very hard 

at this issue. But, I have not been briefed on any particular plans 

in this regard. 

Senator DONNELLY. Let me ask you about Syria and the presence 

of al-Nusra and other al Qaeda-related forces. Do you see those 

forces growing in Syria right now? What strategies do you have in 

mind as to how to deal with that? 

Mr. WORK. As DNI Clapper has said, Syria is now the magnet 

for many of the foreign fighters of the global jihadi movement. You 

even see different types of al Qaeda affiliates, or people who are 

associated with the movement, starting to fight against themselves. 

The Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) in the Levant, are actually fighting 

against al-Nusra. This is a very big problem, as DNI Clapper has 

stated. If confirmed, I’d look forward to working with Ms. 

Wormuth, if she is confirmed, and also the uniformed officers, to 

look at all military options that are on the table. 

Senator DONNELLY. Ms. Wormuth, do you have any ideas on 

this? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, I would agree with Mr. Work, that we 

would want to work, I think, carefully with our interagency partners, with our European partners who share our concerns about 

the growing extremism in the region. We’ve already been doing 

quite a bit of work with the Jordanian armed forces and the Lebanese armed forces to try to help them enhance their border security. But, we’re certainly concerned about the flow of foreign fighters into Syria. 

Senator DONNELLY. Let me ask you, Ms. Wormuth, about military suicide, as well. I see this as an incredible challenge, an incredible problem, and an obligation we have to eliminate. I was 

wondering your views on how we can reduce it to zero. 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, I share your view that this is a terrible 

problem, and it’s a very perplexing problem, I think, that the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00189 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
182 

partment of Defense has been putting a lot of energy in, in the last 

several years. 

If I were to be confirmed, I would certainly want to do everything 

possible to work with the Under Secretary Organization for Personnel and Readiness (P&R) to try to find as many solutions as 

possible. I think we need to look at the number of providers we 

have to provide counseling, to try to look at what we can do to help 

servicemembers deal with some of what we think are the underlying causes of suicide—financial issues, substance abuse, for example. But, it’s a very difficult problem, but one, I think, that we 

have to continue to put energy against. 

Senator DONNELLY. As I mentioned to you yesterday, we are expecting a report from DOD, in line with a piece of legislation I have 

authored. Your assistance in helping to provide that to us, I would 

appreciate it a great deal, because this is a problem not only for 

those who are deployed, but also at home, as well. It seems, when 

we lost more young men and women to suicide than in combat in 

2012, this would be right at the very top of the plate of everything 

we’re trying to do. 

Mr. McCord, one of the things that, in reviewing numbers, has 

seemed to become clear is that, in many cases, the Guard can do 

it for a lower cost. When the Reserve or the Guard operates at 

about one-third of the cost of Active Duty, how will this factor into 

your recommendations, going forward, as we look at some of the 

changes that Secretary Hagel and others have talked about and in 

the budget environment we’re in? 

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, you’re correct that cost is one of the factors that we have absolutely taken into account as we’ve gone 

through the recommendations, starting last summer, with these socalled Strategic Choices and Management Review leading on into, 

then, the budget that will be delivered to you next week. As you 

say, the Reserve component forces are less expensive when they’re 

not mobilized. That difference tends to shrink quite a bit once 

called up. 

The other main factor that we’re considering, though, is the deployment times, the so-called ‘‘dwell times’’ that are the standard 

and the understanding that things like 1-to-3, 1-to-5 ratios—that 

we have to balance what’s realistic of what we get out of the Reserve components while still maintaining the dwell-time commitments that we’d like to make with them. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. 

Ambassador Shear, when we look at North Korea, we see possibly a string of some of the most unstable decisions one could look 

at. What is your impression of the decisionmaking chain there, how 

those decisions are made? Who will we reach out to, to try to put 

some influence on decisions that are made there? 

Ambassador SHEAR. Senator, I think the decisionmaking chain in 

North Korea is extremely unclear. They are in the midst of a succession, a political succession in which Kim Jong-un is trying to secure his leadership. We will be watching that very closely, of 

course. We want a complete verifiable and irreversible 

denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, through authentic and 

credible negotiations. We consistently reach out to the Chinese, 

among others, to encourage them to use what leverage they have 

183 

with North Korea to encourage the North Koreans to be more moderate. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly. 

Senator Wicker, please. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, for Mr. Work, you are a former Marine Corps officer and 

former Under Secretary of the Navy, so you know a lot about amphibious warships. I have a yes-or-no question to ask you, but let 

me preface it by saying I believe they are a necessity to project 

American influence in regions such as the Asia-Pacific. I hope you 

agree. Amphibious ships are versatile, interoperable, and survivable platforms that are able to meet the full range of military and 

humanitarian missions abroad. 

I do remain seriously concerned that our Navy may be unable to 

support all requests for amphibious ship support from our combatant commanders. I secured a provision in the most recent National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that calls for the Commandant 

of the Marine Corps to report to Congress on the number of amphibious ships required for the Marine Corps to execute the President’s national security strategy. This committee eagerly awaits 

the Commandant’s findings later this year. 

Mr. Work, if you are confirmed, will you pledge to meet with me 

and other members of the committee within 30 days to discuss, in 

plain English, the Department of Defense’s plan to provide sufficient amphibious ships to execute the full range of operational requirements from the combatant commanders? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir, I will. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. I appreciate that, and I 

look forward to a further conversation. 

Mr. WORK. Sir, if I could make one correction, for the record. I 

am a marine and a former Under Secretary. 

Senator WICKER. When I was reading that statement, I expected 

to be challenged. [Laughter.] 

At least in the minds of all the marines in the audience and 

within the sound of my voice. Thank you for clarifying that. If I 

had seen Senator Roberts on the floor, he would have made that 

correction, also. 

Now, let me move to Mr. McKeon. There’s been some publicity 

about a letter that Senator Ayotte and I wrote to you on February 

20, 2014, citing, at the outset, a January 29, 2014, New York Times 

report that the Obama administration has known, for years, about 

potential Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces Treaty, the INF Treaty, that bans testing, production, and 

possession of medium-range missiles. Apparently, American officials believe Russia began conducting flight tests of a new groundlaunched cruise missile, in violation of the INF Treaty, as early as 

2008. Now, this would have been very helpful information to the 

Senate when we were discussing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 2010. 

Senator Ayotte and I wrote a letter asking, in part, ‘‘As the Senate Armed Services Committee considers your nomination to be 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, we request 

that you provide the committee with answers to the following quesVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00191 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
184 

tions. Number one, were you aware of any intelligence regarding 

potential Russian violations of the INF Treaty in 2010, when we 

were considering the new treaty with the Russian Federation?’’ 

Which has apparently violated the previous treaty. ‘‘Number two, 

do you believe that the Senate should have been made aware of 

any potential Russian violations of the INF Treaty during consideration of the New START treaty? Number three, do you believe the 

Senate was made aware of any potential Russian violations of the 

INF Treaty during consideration of the New START treaty? If so, 

please provide details.’’ And, ‘‘Number four, questions of how to respond to arms-control cheating and noncompliance are ultimately 

policy decisions. One year from now, if Russia is not in compliance 

with this treaty, in your current position or in the position for 

which you are nominated, do you believe the United States should 

continue to comply with the older treaty, the INF Treaty?’’ 

We sent this to you on February 20, 2014, in anticipation of this 

hearing, and, at the close of business yesterday, we still did not 

have an answer to this letter. Turns out that, around 8 p.m. last 

night, after most staff had left, and after the Senate had finished 

voting and people were on their way home, a letter was delivered 

to the committee, in answer to Senator Ayotte’s and my letter. It 

was delivered at the codeword security level [TS/SCI]. 

Senator Ayotte and I are under some very serious constraints in 

asking you about this letter today. If I were cynical, I would wonder why this letter was not responded to earlier so that Senator 

Ayotte and I and our staffs and people with codeword security 

clearance who advise us on this side of the aisle in the committee 

could thoroughly look at the letter, consider the answers, and ask 

you questions in a non-classified manner. If I were cynical, I would 

question the fact that the response was delivered so late and in 

such a way that we’re really not able to get into the answers to our 

questions in this hearing. 

Let me just ask you in this way, Mr. McKeon. President Obama 

recently gave a speech calling for further cuts to our nuclear deterrent. He stated, ‘‘We need to work with Russia on new arms-control 

agreements that go beyond New START levels.’’ Did you play a role 

in drafting this speech, sir? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, I probably saw drafts of the speech. I 

think you’re referring to the speech that he gave in Berlin during 

his trip to Germany last June? 

Senator WICKER. Yes, I am. 

Mr. MCKEON. I probably saw drafts, and maybe I made comments, but I don’t recall with any specificity. 

Senator WICKER. Can you say whether the President knew about 

these major violations of the arms control agreement at the same 

time he was making a speech calling for further cuts and for further working with the Russian Federation on arms control? 

Mr. MCKEON. I don’t know when the President has been informed of the issue that you’ve described. I’d have to check on—— 

Senator WICKER. You don’t know what the President knew, and 

when he knew it? 

Mr. MCKEON. That’s correct. 

If I could answer, briefly, your reference to the letter, I apologize 

that it got here so late last night. I very much wanted to get it here 

185 

earlier. I was coordinating with the committee staff to inform them 

of our progress to try to get it here. One of the great joys of working in the executive branch, as opposed to the legislative branch, 

is, you get to coordinate your letters with about 50 people, and the 

clearance process took longer than I would have liked. I apologize 

that you got the letter so late. 

What I can say about that issue, sir, is, as you know from the 

letter, which I hope you’ve read by now, is that we are concerned 

about the Russian activity that appears to be inconsistent with the 

INF Treaty. We’ve raised this with the Russians. The Russians 

have come back to us with an answer which we do not consider to 

be satisfactory, and we’ve told them the issue is not closed. 

Senator WICKER. When did you raise it with the Russians? 

Mr. MCKEON. It’s been raised with the Russians by several officials—this particular issue that you’re referring to—over the course 

of the last 6 to 8 months, but I don’t know the specific dates. I’d 

have to check on that. 

Senator WICKER. If you can supply that to the committee in a 

non-classified answer, I would appreciate it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

This matter was raised by senior administration officials in three meetings with 

Russian officials in May 2013, including by Deputy Secretary of State William J. 

Burns and Acting Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller. It was raised with 

a Russian official by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller in December 2013. It was also raised in meetings with Russian officials by Acting Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller in June 2013, August 2013, October 2013, November 2013, and February 2014. 

Senator WICKER. Let me just say—I don’t know whether you can 

answer this or not, based on the letter that you sent, but if you had 

such information during the context and during the timeframe of 

the 2010 deliberations on the New START treaty, you would have 

felt dutybound to give that information to members of the Senate 

who were voting on the treaty, would you not? 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, as you may recall during September 2010, on 

the eve of the vote in the Foreign Relations Committee in mid-September, there was an issue that the Intelligence Community (IC) 

flagged for us and for this committee and the Foreign Relations 

Committee, and I believe it was literally the day before the committee’s vote. General Clapper, when he appeared in an all-Senators briefing, late that month, which was focused primarily on the 

National Intelligence Estimate on the IC’s ability to monitor New 

START, raised this issue, as well, and told that the Senators that 

were there in the Senate briefing about this issue that had been 

raised in the middle of September that implicated possibly New 

START, possibly INF. 

I believe, sir, that the IC and the executive branch were committed to providing timely information about potential concerns. 

Senator WICKER. I don’t think I can ask you the substance of 

what was told to the committee, can I, in this setting? 

Mr. MCKEON. No, I’m afraid not. 

Senator WICKER. Yes, okay. 

You can understand the position that places the committee 

today. 

Mr. MCKEON. I do, sir, and I can’t really get around it. The information that is involved here is highly classified. As General ClapVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00193 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
186 

per said when he was here 2 weeks ago for the threats hearing 

when he was asked about this issue, he said a lot less than I did 

and wanted to defer all of it to a closed session, which I believe you 

are having later this week. 

Senator WICKER. Let me just say that I have very serious concerns about this, and I will alert members of the committee and 

members of the Senate that I do not believe this committee and 

this body was provided with all of the information that you had 

and that we needed to know to cast a fully informed vote on the 

New START treaty. But, we will follow up in the proper context. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your service to our Nation, both in your past 

and what you will do when you’re confirmed, which I assume will 

happen, and I’m proud to be here and to support your nomination. 

Mr. Work, let me begin with you and ask you a couple of questions about the HH–60G Pave Hawk combat rescue helicopter. The 

NDAA included the replacement of the aging 30-year-old helicopters that have served to rescue our downed warfighters in the 

past—in that measure. The Senate approved it. It has also included 

it in the budget, $330-plus million, for this fiscal year, to support 

the development of the replacement airframe. I’d like a commitment from you that this program will be carried forward, as is the 

intent and mandate of Congress. 

Mr. WORK. Senator, I don’t know if I can make a firm commitment. I promise and I’d vow to work with Congress to work 

through this issue. As it was briefed to me, the Department is 

struggling to try to come up with the overall size and capability 

and capacities of the combat rescue force. It may be that the Department would come back and recommend some changes. But, I 

will promise and vow that I will work closely with you and all 

members of the committee and Members of Congress to make sure 

that this issue is looked at very carefully. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You’d agree, wouldn’t you, that the mission of rescuing our warfighters in peril is one of predominant urgency? 

Mr. WORK. It’s a very, very high priority mission. Yes, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. The 30-year-old helicopters that now do 

that mission have to be replaced, do they not? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir, they do. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. It would seem that this project is one that 

has to be reauthorized and that the spending has to be made in 

some form, does it not? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir. I spoke with the Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Air Force, and they are looking at this very hard. I look forward 

to being briefed fully on it, if confirmed. I look forward to working 

with you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would like your commitment, on behalf 

of myself and other colleagues who are very intent that the will of 

Congress be carried out, that this project go forward. 

Mr. WORK. I commit that anything in the law, Department of Defense will follow through. There will be cases where we might come 

187 

back and recommend alternatives, but the mission remains the 

same. There will be systems purchased, and I guarantee you that 

we will work with Congress to find the right answer. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. The question will be one of perhaps timing and alternative forms of the contract that’s authorized, but the 

mission has to be accomplished, and the helicopters have to be replaced. 

Mr. WORK. That is correct, is my understanding, yes, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Turning to the base realignment and closure (BRAC) proposal 

that the Secretary of Defense made yesterday—and I’m not going 

to expect that you would contradict the Secretary of Defense. The 

recommendation made last go-around was not adopted by the Senate or Congress. The reason is, quite simply, in my view, BRAC is 

not cost-efficient. Do you have some facts that would contradict 

that contention? 

Mr. WORK. Sir, I believe all of the prior BRAC rounds, up to 

2005, did achieve savings, and the 2005 BRAC round was broken 

up between what was called a ‘‘transformational BRAC’’ and an ‘‘efficiencies BRAC’’. The efficiencies BRAC did achieve significant 

savings. I believe what the Department of Defense is asking is, in 

the future, if we are granted the authority for a BRAC, that we 

would approach the problem in that regard. I would expect to see 

savings. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Isn’t there excess capacity in overseas 

military installations? 

Mr. WORK. I believe there is. I have not been briefed fully, but 

I understand that the Department is looking carefully at the 

laydown of bases in Europe and will be coming back and making 

recommendations on modifications to that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Has any actual action been taken to eliminate that excess capacity? 

Mr. WORK. Since 2001, I don’t know the exact figures, sir. I will 

get back to you, on the record. But, since 2001, there has been significant reductions in basing structure overseas, but I just don’t 

know the numbers off the top of my head. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I’d appreciate the numbers, if you can provide them. Thank you, Mr. Work. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Between 2000 and 2011, the Department decreased the number of sites in Europe 

from 523 to 366 (a 30-percent reduction). Of the 366, an additional 70 sites were 

in the process of being returned to host nations, with another 62 identified for possible return. These returns are being validated through the European Infrastructure 

Consolidation (EIC) process, along with options for additional reductions. Once the 

EIC initiative is complete the Department expects the number of European sites 

will have decreased by more than 55 percent since 2000. 

188 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Just to finish on this topic, shouldn’t we 

be closing or eliminating that excess capacity before we talk about 

another round of BRAC, which, in many ways, has been extraordinarily costly? I would appreciate, also, the numbers on BRAC 

that support its supposed cost-effectiveness. 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir. I believe Secretary Hagel and the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs believe that these can work in parallel, that 

there is over-capacity both in our continental U.S. infrastructure as 

well as overseas, and that we would hope to work with Congress 

in a parallel fashion to reduce it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I understand that historically savings from Base Realignment and Closure 

(BRAC) have been substantial. The first four rounds of BRAC (1988, 1991, 1993, 

and 1995) are producing a total of about $8 billion in savings, and BRAC 2005 is 

producing an additional $4 billion in annual, recurring savings. 

I understand that even though the BRAC 2005 round required an investment of 

$35 billion, that investment is paying the Department $4 billion a year—in perpetuity. Thirty-five billion dollars is a significant investment, but also an aberration 

when compared to the cost of BRACs generally. BRAC 2005 were higher because 

half of the recommendations were not designed to save money but to achieve other 

goals. This portion of BRAC 2005—the so-called ‘‘Transformation BRAC’’—was comprised of reorganizations and movements of functions to transform infrastructure 

(and of a nature that could only be accomplished as part of the BRAC process). This 

portion of BRAC 2005 cost $29 billion and is saving $1 billion annually—but these 

recommendations were pursued because of their transformational value to the Department, regardless of the cost. 

If one isolates the remainder of the BRAC 2005 (the Efficiency BRAC portion of 

BRAC 2005), these recommendations had a payback of less than 7 years—one sees 

a [one time] cost of $6 billion and savings of $3 billion per year in perpetuity. This 

is similar to what the Department experienced in the 1993/1995 rounds, and it is 

what I understand the Department expects from the BRAC 2017 round it is requesting. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Turning to the utilization of our National 

Guard and Reserve in force, Ms. Wormuth, I’d like to ask you to 

take a very close look as to whether Executive Order 13223, which 

was enacted on September 14, 2001, by President Bush, is still necessary. As you probably know, the order enables up to 1 million 

members of the Reserve component to be called up for Active Duty 

for up to 2 years. This year, we’re completing our major force presence in Afghanistan. That’s the action that necessitated the order. 

Although the Department has good force management plans now in 

place, I think that rescission of this Executive order, the withdrawal of it, would be a powerful symbol of the stability to guardsmen, their family, and their employers. I’d ask for your comment. 


225ful2.eps
189 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, I would be happy to go back to the Department, if confirmed, and work with, again, P&R—in particular, 

the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs—to look at that order 

and to assess whether we continue to need those authorities. We 

also have additional mechanisms to access the Reserve component. 

I think it’s very fair to go back and look at the range of callup authorities we have, to see which ones continue to be useful in the 

future. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Would you agree that rescission of that 

one would send a message about the stability and the new era that 

we’re entering to our National Guard and Reserve? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, I would want to look carefully at the Executive order before making a final recommendation to the Secretary. I certainly think we are looking to find policy ways to move 

off of the perpetual war footing that we’ve had for the last 10 

years. But, again, without looking in detail at the Executive order, 

I wouldn’t want to make a commitment at this time. I’d commit to 

look at it for you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Thank you very much. My time has expired. I have a lot more 

questions. I may submit some more for the record. I thank all of 

you for being here today and for your very helpful and informative 

answers. 

Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator Ayotte, please. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. 

Let me follow up, Mr. Work, on the question that Senator 

Blumenthal asked you with regard to BRAC. I would like you to 

give us a commitment that the Department of Defense will not undertake BRAC without the approval of Congress, and will also not 

try to undertake BRAC through a workaround that undermines the 

will of Congress without seeking our approval for a BRAC round. 

Will you give me that commitment? 

Mr. WORK. Senator, as I understand, the wording of the speech 

yesterday was that Secretary Hagel believes that there are some 

authorities that the Department could use, but I don’t know what 

those authorities are. I commit to you that, if confirmed, I will 

work with the Department to get back to you. Of course, we would 

not start a BRAC unless we are given explicit approval in the law. 

Senator AYOTTE. I take that as a lack of commitment. That troubles me, because I believe that Congress should be in the position 

to approve BRAC and that there should not be a runaround done. 

That troubled me in the Secretary’s comments yesterday, and I believe this is a very important issue for the authority of this committee, in particular, that Congress should be the body to approve 

a BRAC round, not for the Department of Defense to undertake 

this on its own initiative without the full approval of Congress. I 

do expect an answer on that. 

I would like to know, from the Secretary, in particular, what authority he believes he does have, so that we can be aware of it here, 

so that we can exercise appropriate authority to make sure that 

190 

our voices are heard here on the policy matters. I think this is a 

very important issue, and I would like a followup answer to that. 

Mr. WORK. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I understand that the Department only has authority to undertake a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round if Congress authorizes it to do so; that is why 

the Department has repeatedly submitted legislation to authorize a BRAC round. 

I also understand that the Secretary of Defense has the authority to close and realign military installations outside of a traditional BRAC round, provided that action does not trigger the thresholds established in section 2687 of title 10, U.S.C. 

If the action exceeds the thresholds in the statute, the Secretary still has the authority to undertake the action, but only after satisfying the study and congressional 

reporting requirements and waiting the specified period of time. This is the authority to which the Secretary referred. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Mr. McKeon, I wanted to follow up on some of the questions that 

my colleague Senator Wicker asked you with regard to the INF— 

potential Russian INF Treaty violation. I understand that the answer, in terms of what you said to this committee, is that, in fact, 

there was information provided—I believe it would have been to 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—that would be addressing the potential New START treaty in September 2010. But, obviously, we can’t discuss the substance of that information in this 

setting. Is that what you just testified to, that there was information provided to that committee about potential matters related to 

the INF right before—and that was on the eve of the vote, I believe 

you said? 

Mr. MCKEON. What I said, Senator, was, there was a briefing by 

the Intelligence Community. I am informed by a former colleague 

from the Foreign Relations Committee that it was for the senior 

staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Intelligence Committee, and this committee, as well as the Senate leadership, and 

that was on or about September 15, 2010. Later that month, after 

the committee had voted, General Clapper appeared, in a all-Senators briefing, where he raised the same issue. 

Senator AYOTTE. Now, without getting into the substance of the 

material that was provided, just to be clear, that wasn’t all the information that the Intelligence Community possessed at the time 

that may have related to potential Russian INF violations, was it, 

Mr. McKeon? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, I’m hesitant to get into any more detail 

about this issue. I’ve laid it out in great detail in my 3-page letter 

to you. 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me reframe the question. In a more generic 

fashion, one of the responsibilities that is very important is that we 

receive a compliance report on treaties, correct? There’s a compliance reporting mechanism that comes forward to Congress? 

Mr. MCKEON. That’s correct. There’s a statutory provision that 

requires it. 

Senator AYOTTE. That’s right. When there is a situation where 

there is ambiguity as to whether a particular country has complied 

with a treaty of the United States, do you believe, when there’s an 

ambiguity, that the Intelligence Community has a responsibility to 

brief policymakers, and that policymakers, in turn, have a responsibility to brief the U.S. Senate, whether they are calling it ambiVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00198 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
191 

guity or not? How do you know, and when do you then brief the 

U.S. Senate? 

I think this is a very important issue for us, particularly when 

we are considering new treaties, when the Intelligence Community 

may be aware, even if they are unsure what it means. How do you 

draw that line? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, as somebody who worked up here for 20 

years, I think it’s essential that there be a regular dialogue between the executive branch and Congress on issues. The administration, as I understand it, the State Department in particular, regularly updates the Foreign Relations Committee on compliance-related issues, and has done so throughout the tenure of President 

Obama. 

When we came into office, the compliance report, the annual report that you referred to, had not been submitted for several years, 

so we had some work to do to make up for the work that had not 

been done in the last few years of the Bush administration. As a 

general matter, I agree with you that we have to have a regular 

dialogue with the national security committees on compliance 

issues. 

Senator AYOTTE. Can you tell me, in answer to my specific question, if there is a potential violation of a treaty, generically, and the 

Intelligence Community has information that exists that they’re 

not sure whether it is a violation or it isn’t a violation—in other 

words, it could potentially be a violation—do you believe that’s the 

type of information that should be provided to Congress? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, that’s a fairly broad and abstract question, and I’d rather get into a specific issue with you in a closed 

session or in private, if you would permit me. Because I know what 

you’re getting at, and I don’t think it’s right for me to talk about 

it in an unclassified forum. 

Senator AYOTTE. Fair enough. We will get into it in a classified 

forum. 

Let me just say, for the record, that I believe that we were not 

fully informed—meaning, I wasn’t even in the U.S. Senate then, 

when the New START treaty was taken up, and that, regardless 

of how the Intelligence Community viewed particular information, 

that Congress should be fully informed. I do look forward to taking 

up the specific issue with you, in a classified setting, but it’s not 

just you. Mr. McKeon, I appreciate that you’re here before us 

today. There were certainly other individuals that certainly should 

be questioned about this. I don’t mean to single you out, here. This 

is a very important issue for Congress. 

I have other questions that I will submit for the record. 

I know my time is up, but, very quickly—would you agree with 

me that a violation of the INF Treaty is a serious matter? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes, I would. 

Senator AYOTTE. I thank you very much, and I thank all the witnesses for being here today. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator King, please. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Work, industrial base. What sections of the industrial base 

do you believe are under the greatest threat as we go through this 

192 

continued period of budget tightness, budget austerity? Do you see 

mitigation measures we can take so that we have the industrial 

base that we need when we need it? 

Mr. WORK. Senator, I think there are large portions of the industrial base that are in threat simply because the amount of spending 

and investments and research and development (R&D) have been 

coming down. The aerospace community, right now, has two tactical fighter production lines. We’ve stopped building our wide-body 

aircraft. We do have the bomber coming online, as well as new unmanned systems. I don’t know the exact state. If confirmed, I’d 

have to ask Secretary Kendall. 

The shipbuilding industrial base right now is, I think, solid, but 

it is under pressure because of lower investments. Once again, if 

confirmed, I’d work with Secretary Kendall, who has a very, very 

good feel for this, and would work with Members of Congress to address industrial-base issues. 

Senator KING. Do you agree that this is a significant issue that 

we need to pay attention to, just as we do compensation, training, 

and other matters under the jurisdiction of this committee? 

Mr. WORK. I absolutely do, yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Ms. Wormuth, what’s your opinion of the appropriate force level and capacities that the United States should retain in Afghanistan after 2014? What’s your understanding of the 

latest date that we can wait until in order to get some resolution 

of that important policy question? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, I think the President is still reviewing 

options for what our enduring presence should be after 2014, but 

I think we’re looking at the kinds of capabilities we need to both 

pursue our counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan, but also our 

train-and-advise mission with the Afghan national security forces. 

As we look at that, we are, again, weighing the options, and there 

are a variety under consideration. 

It is very important that we sign a bilateral security agreement 

with Afghanistan. My understanding is that the President will be 

speaking with President Karzai this morning and will be raising 

that topic, and there will be a readout of that call. 

Senator KING. I’d like to listen in on that call. That’ll be a pretty 

interesting call, I suspect. 

Ms. WORMUTH. I think as we move further into the spring and 

early summer, we are going to come to some decision points, in 

terms of our ability to move forces out of the region. Even more 

than our own forces, our coalition partners, who don’t necessarily 

have the same flexible logistics system, they are going to be approaching decision points, in terms of very much needing to have 

that agreement or having to make decisions to move forces out. 

Senator KING. As a policy advisor, what is your personal opinion? 

Do you believe we’re going to have to maintain some force in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Ms. WORMUTH. I think it’s important that we find ways to support the Afghan security forces and the government, in terms of 

bringing more stability to the region. I haven’t been fully briefed 

on the options that are being considered, but we need to, I think, 

pursue a variety of mechanisms to be able to help the Afghans 

have stability. Again, we have significant contributions and comVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00200 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
193 

mitments from international partners that I think are going to be 

important, in addition to what military capabilities we may retain 

in place. 

Senator KING. The counterterrorism basis is an important consideration, as well. 

Ms. WORMUTH. Yes, Senator, absolutely. 

Senator KING. Mr. McKeon, we just received a worldwide threats 

briefing from the leaders of the Intelligence Community, and a 

common theme was cybersecurity. In fact, I think every hearing in 

defense and intelligence that I’ve been in, practically for the past 

year, has talked about cybersecurity. If confirmed, will this be a 

high priority for you in dealing with this threat? What do you consider the appropriate role for the Department to play in defending 

commercial assets from cybersecurity threats? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, as a general matter, I agree with you 

about the concern of the threat. As to the specific duties that I may 

undertake, if Ms. Wormuth and I are both confirmed, I think we 

have discussed, in general terms, about having a division of labor 

so each of us are focusing on a set of issues, but we’ve not completed those discussions. Since she outranks me, she’ll get the first 

choice, I suspect, of which issue she would like to work on. 

In terms of our protection of the defense industrial base, I’ve not 

been deeply briefed on the DOD programs on this, sir, so I’d have 

to get back to you on that. 

Senator KING. I just hope that this is a priority for this panel, 

for this administration, because I think this is our area of maximum exposure. The incident that occurred—I see Senator Manchin 

is no longer here—but, the incident that occurred in West Virginia 

was an accident, and it could have easily been an act of some kind 

of sabotage akin to a cyber attack. We’re vulnerable, and your title 

is the Department of Defense, and I hope that you will take this 

as a very serious threat before it materializes. 

Ambassador Shear, southeast Asia. What’s our role in these territorial conflicts that are in the region in the South and East China 

Sea? My concern is, we have mutual defense treaties with Japan, 

South Korea, the Philippines, and I would certainly hate to see a 

Guns of August situation, where minor conflicts escalate into something which engages us in a major conflict in that region. 

Ambassador SHEAR. Senator, we are very concerned about the 

possible effects those territorial claims could have on regional peace 

and stability. We watch it very closely. We, of course, support a 

peaceful negotiated solution to those conflicting claims. We would 

look with great concern on the use of force or coercion in the region. While we don’t take sides in those territorial disputes, we do 

believe that claims should be based on customary international 

law, and that claims should be generated from land features, and 

that they should be consistent with international law. 

We, of course, consult very closely with the Chinese as well as 

with our allies, on this issue. 

Senator KING. Thank you very much. 

I’ll have other questions I’ll be submitting for the record. 

Thank you all. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Senator Fischer, please. 

194 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My thanks also to 

the Ranking Member and to the panel for being here today. I appreciate it. 

Mr. Work, in your previous position with the Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments, you wrote about making some significant changes to the Navy’s force structure, particularly about focusing on smaller platforms, as opposed to large surface ships. Do you 

think that we need any kind of paradigm shift for our nuclear 

forces? 

Mr. WORK. Senator, I believe the current plan for our nuclear 

forces is very sound. Secretary Hagel is committed to the triad and 

having a safe, secure nuclear deterrent. We’re moving to a threeplus-two warhead scheme in which we go to three interoperable 

warheads for our intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and our 

submarine-launch ballistic missiles, and only two air-delivered 

weapons. I think this is a very sound approach. We need to really 

focus in on costs now, and I applaud Congress for writing into the 

2014 NDAA to establish an Office of Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE)-like capability at the NNSA so that we can reduce costs as we pursue this plan. 

Senator FISCHER. You would share the views of your predecessor, 

Dr. Carter? When he was here before the committee, he and I had 

a conversation on this, and he stated that the impact of sequestration on the deterrent was the last thing that we would want to do 

serious damage to. Would you agree with his assessment on that? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, ma’am, I would. Secretary Hagel indicated that 

keeping the nuclear deterrent safe was job number one. 

Senator FISCHER. I was encouraged to hear the Secretary say 

that in his comments yesterday, in support of all the legs of the 

triad. 

Do you know if there is any contemplation in the future at looking at changing any of the structure on the triad, any of the emphasis on any of the different legs of the triad? 

Mr. WORK. Ma’am, I’m not aware of it. If confirmed, this is one 

of the issues that I expect I would be centrally involved in. 

Senator FISCHER. With our nuclear forces, it’s not a big part of 

the budget. I’m sure you know it’s about 4 percent of the national 

defense spending in 2014. Do you think we’re getting a good bang 

for our buck on that? 

Mr. WORK. I believe we do. I think we should always look at 

every part of our program, and our nuclear deterrent is absolutely 

at the top of the list. Pursuing that in the most cost-effective way 

I think is a principle that we should all aspire to. 

Senator FISCHER. How do you think we’re doing on modernization? 

Mr. WORK. I believe the Ohio replacement program is proceeding 

apace. That is going to be a very difficult program, simply because 

of the costs, and the impacts on the Navy’s shipbuilding budget are 

a matter of concern, I think, for everyone in the Department. I understand that moving with the B–61 is proceeding—the air-delivered bomb. Also, there is a well-thought-out plan. I believe the plan 

is well resourced right now. It’s under stress, like all of the other 

parts of the budget. If confirmed, I vow to work with you and other 

195 

Members of Congress to make sure we have a safe nuclear deterrent. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you for that. Do you believe there are 

ways around sequestration so we can make sure that we do maintain the strength of our nuclear deterrent? If so, can you share 

those? 

Mr. WORK. At the full BCA sequestration levels, prioritization is 

key. Secretary Hagel said the nuclear deterrent is at the very top 

of the priority list. I would expect it to remain there. The 

workaround in sequestration is really being ruthless about your 

prioritization. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

I think this next question would apply to the nominations of Ms. 

Wormuth and also Mr. McKeon. I’d like for you to provide me with 

a written explanation of the Department’s understanding of section 

8128 of the omnibus appropriations bill. I’m going to make a statement, here, more so than a question. 

It’s clear to me that this section prohibits the Department from 

undertaking any environmental studies related to the ICBM silos. 

If the Department has any different interpretation or is taking any 

action to the contrary, I want to know. 

I’ll get you that question for the record so that you can respond 

in writing. I would urge you to do so quickly. Would you please get 

me an answer to that when you receive it, then? 

Ms. WORMUTH. We will do so, Senator. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. Work? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FISCHER. Mr. McKeon? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes, Senator, we’ll do that. 

Senator FISCHER. Okay. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer. 

Before I recognize Senator McCaskill—I’ve conferred with Senator Inhofe—we have votes beginning at 11:15 a.m.—about five 

votes. We’re going to continue the hearing. Senator Inhofe and I 

will go to the floor as quickly as possible, and return. In the interim, I would ask my colleagues, based on seniority, to take the 

chair in my absence. We will allow everyone to ask their questions 

before we adjourn the hearing. If a Republican colleague returns, 

obviously we will alternate back and forth. 

With that general plan, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Thank you all. You have an amazing responsibility in front of 

you. I appreciate, as all Americans do, your willingness to serve. 

We have been grappling with the tenacious and overwhelming 

problem of sexual assault in the military. Senator Gillibrand and 

I have worked together on a number of historic reforms that have 

been signed into law that you will have the responsibility of implementing. I know I can speak for her in this regard, that we’re going 

to hold you accountable, that we’re going to be paying very close 

attention to how all of this is done. 

I wanted to take, though, a minute to ask some technical questions about the Gillibrand proposal, in terms of where we do have 

196 

a policy disagreement which would remove the command from any 

disposition authority on any crimes in the military, with a few exceptions—but, the vast majority of crimes, including writing bad 

checks and bunk theft and all of the things that currently are handled within the system with the current command disposition authority. 

I have read the letter, from Elizabeth King, where she talks 

about the requirement that we would now have to have O–6s—colonels or Navy captains—in all of these new offices that would have 

to be stood up, the disposition offices. For some inexplicable reason, 

the amendment does not allow any new resources to be spent. 

Which means we would have to pull these O–6s from existing billets. 

What I need from you, Mr. Work—and you’re probably not prepared to answer it today—I need numbers. I need to know how 

short we are. The head of legislative affairs for the Defense Department says there’s not enough O–6s to do it and that they would 

have to be pulled from positions they now hold as judges and as 

trial counsel and as supervising victim advocates. We would still be 

short, in terms of how many O–6s we have. 

The question is, how would we do this if we have no new resources? Has there been any estimates done of the administrative 

costs of standing up these offices, which clearly—justice delayed is 

justice denied—if we’re going to be trying to handle a bunk theft, 

a barracks theft in Afghanistan out of an office in the United 

States, has there been any calculation done of the time it was going 

to take for these decisions to be made? Or are we envisioning 

standing up these new disposition authority offices around the 

globe? Are these going to be new Judge Advocate General (JAG) offices that will be put various places? 

I know some thought has to have been given to this, and I think 

it would be important for us to know the technical ramifications of 

no new resources being allowed to be used for this if, in fact, this 

were to pass into law. 

Mr. Work, if you would make a commitment to try to get those 

numbers back to this committee, I think it would be very helpful. 

Mr. WORK. I absolutely will, yes, ma’am. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I understand that the Services have considered how they would implement a system that would require judge advocates in the grade of O–6 or higher to exercise 

prosecutorial discretion over many offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I also understand that the Services have estimated that this would require at 

least 74 O–6 judge advocate disposition authorities. That accounts for approximately 

one-fifth of all authorized O–6 judge advocates across the Services. The requirement 

that these 74 new billets be filled by O–6 judge advocates who ‘‘have significant experience in trials by general or special court-martial’’ would further limit the pool 

of O–6s who can be detailed to those new billets. As there are no Active Duty O– 

6 judge advocates without current assignments, reassigning 74 O–6 judge advocates 

to duties required by the bill would necessarily remove these senior judge advocates 

from critical billets as military judges, supervisory prosecutors and defense attorneys, and staff judge advocates. Additionally, I understand that many junior judge 

advocates and support personnel would also be required to staff these new offices. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

On Prisoner of War/Missing-in-Action (POW/MIA). Ms. Wormuth, 

are you familiar with the long problems we’ve had in this area? 

197 

Ms. WORMUTH. Senator, yes, I’m broadly familiar with the issues 

with Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). 

Senator MCCASKILL. No, we’re talking about—not GTMO—we’re 

talking about recovering remains. 

Ms. WORMUTH. I apologize, Senator. Yes, I’m familiar broadly, 

with that area, as well. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We get daily complaints about the dysfunction at Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command. I have never seen 

a more inexcusable turf war in my life than the turf war that has 

gone on within this important responsibility within the military. 

Here’s the problem we have right now. By the way, you know how 

long we’ve been talking about this? Decades. For decades, we have 

been talking about this. It’s embarrassing, if you go back and read 

old GAO reports and old committee hearings on this subject, how 

long this problem has been identified and not fixed. Here’s what 

you have. It’s a little bit like Arlington National Cemetery. When 

you have too many cooks in the kitchen, when there’s a problem, 

guess what everybody does? That’s what you have going on right 

now. You have one function blaming the other function, and one 

part of the office blaming the other part of the office. I’ve taken 

enough time to get into this that, I will tell you, it is a mess. You 

have an opportunity to clean this up. You have an opportunity to 

do a clear chain of command and accountability in this area. It is 

costing millions of dollars for every recovery we have. Millions. 

Now, I don’t think any American will begrudge us spending this 

money to recover remains of our fallen. But, there’s just a lot of 

work to be done here, and I want to be comfortable, Ms. Wormuth, 

that you are aware of it, because I believe it’s going to fall in your 

folder. 

Ms. WORMUTH. Yes, Senator, it will. It is a very solemn obligation. It’s one that I take seriously, it’s one the Department takes 

seriously. Certainly, we do have significant problems in this area. 

My understanding is that Secretary Hagel has very recently required that the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provide recommendations to him, within 30 days, on how we would 

propose to restructure the community to make it more effective and 

to have greater accountability. 

I would be happy, if confirmed, to work with you and talk with 

you about the results of those recommendations. As you probably 

are also aware, we have other studies that our CAPE organization 

has undertaken in this area very recently. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes, I’m aware of the CAPE study. My subcommittee that has looked at this really closely will be happy—it’s 

on the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Subcommittee—but, we’d be happy to share with you, not only all the 

information we have, but, obviously, protecting whistleblowers giving you a taste of how bad it is. 

Finally, Mr. Work, I want to just quickly go to our airborne electronic attack capability. If we have radar and surface-to-air missile 

batteries, if we have an anti-access aerial denial contested environment, right now, the only aircraft that can provide the capability 

of an airborne electronic attack, which is pretty important for our 

country to have, is the EA–18 Growler. With these challenges on 

the horizon and the need for our capability in this area of electronic 

198 

attack, can you talk about how we would benefit from additional 

electronic warfare capabilities? 

Mr. WORK. Senator, airborne electronic attack, and all aspects of 

electronic attack, are going to be absolutely critical in this area of 

proliferating threats, as you have said. These type of capabilities 

are absolutely critical to support our aviation component, as well 

as other components of the joint force. The EA–18G is one critical 

component. It’s a world-class platform. There are other capabilities 

that the Department is considering, such as stand-in jammers and 

other expendable decoys, et cetera. It’s a very, very important subject. If confirmed, I would look very carefully at this, along with all 

other aspects of the force structure, to determine we have the proper mix of capabilities and capacities to meet our requirements. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If we were to abandon the Growler, I would 

be anxious to hear what the capabilities would be to replace it, and 

where they are in the pipeline. I want to make sure that we do not 

leave ourself exposed in this critical area, going forward. 

Mr. WORK. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you all very much. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Kaine, please. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To the witnesses, thank you for your service and for being here 

today. 

Mr. McCord, I’d like to ask you some questions and really focus 

on the speech that was delivered by Secretary Hagel yesterday, to 

just make sure I follow the concept. We do not have the budget. 

Secretary Hagel will be here next week, so I’m not going to get into 

line items, but just the concept in the speech in the one particular 

area that he mentioned. 

My read of the speech is that a lot of the speech is about the continuing effect that full sequester cuts would have on the military 

budget, but also on the national security strategy of the Nation. Is 

that a fair statement? 

Mr. MCCORD. That’s correct. I think the Secretary did, yesterday, 

and will continue to try and distinguish between the path that 

we’re going to present to you in the budget and a strict adherence 

to the BCA caps for the remainder of the period through 2021, and 

what a difference that’s going to make to us. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. McCord, I gather, from reading the speech, 

that, just as you indicate, the intent, when the budget comes, is to 

present us with alternative scenarios. A first scenario would be the 

full-sequester version, acknowledging the relief that the 2-year 

budget provided, to the tune of about $30 billion in 2014 and 2015, 

but then, assuming that there’s no additional sequester relief, that 

will be the budget that is presented, the full-sequester version. 

Then there’s also an intention to deliver an alternative, which I 

would call the national security version, which would take the sequester version, but provide an additional $115 billion of relief 

from sequester cuts, at least through the end of 2019. Is that your 

understanding? 

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, that’s pretty accurate. Let me just rephrase it a little bit, though. 

199 

The budget that we’ll present is the higher level. That will be the 

President’s budget, the higher level. The sequester alternative 

would really be described as a notional alternative, to illustrate the 

differences. But, there’s not going to be two budgets. 

Senator KAINE. I see. 

Mr. MCCORD. There will be one, and it will be higher than the 

BCA caps for 2019. 

Senator KAINE. But, the committee members and the public and 

all of the Senate will be able to look at the submission with both 

the President’s budget submission and the discussion of what full 

sequester would mean, and see, essentially, the delta, in key line 

items and programs, between a full sequester and this sort of national security version that adds $115 billion back. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCORD. We would certainly attempt—the Secretary and 

the Chiefs that will follow him, the Service Secretaries—to illustrate the major differences. As you say, not an excruciating lineitem differential, but the major import of that difference. Yes, sir. 

Senator KAINE. Just for the record, I would note that I think the 

format of this budget sounds like it will be very helpful, and it was 

a format that was, I think, suggested in a letter from Senators 

Levin and Inhofe to Secretary Hagel last summer. We really need 

to see what the delta is between an optimum and full sequester. 

I look forward to it. 

My quick reading of the math on this would suggest, if we just 

go by what the Secretary said in his speech yesterday, that, if we 

opt for the President’s budget—just wave a magic wand and say 

we’ll do it, the national security version—DOD would still have absorbed over 60 percent of the sequester cuts, even if you add back 

in the $115 billion and the $30 billion that we provided as sequester relief in the 2014–2015 budget we just passed. Is that your general understanding? 

Mr. MCCORD. That sounds accurate, Senator, and I could certainly provide detailed figures for the record if you desire. 

Senator KAINE. I will ask that question in writing—because I 

think it’s important to know that, based on the reading of the 

speech of the Secretary, DOD is not coming with a presidential 

budget submission asking for the elimination of sequester. I think 

what we will see is a budget where DOD and the President are 

saying, ‘‘We’ll take 60 percent of the sequester cuts—whether we 

like them or not, we’ll take 60 percent of the sequester cuts. Give 

us, in addition to what has already been done, additional sequester 

relief to avoid 40 percent of the sequester, in the interests of national security.’’ It sounds like that’s what we’ll see with the presentation of the budget coming later in the week or next week. 

Mr. MCCORD. Yes, Senator, since the BCA was passed, every 

year we have gotten some relief in some form from the absolute 

cap, but we’ve also gotten much less than we requested, every single year, from 2012, 2013, 2014. We’ve been cut about $80 billion— 

over $80 billion below what we requested each in those years. However, we have gotten about $40 billion more than the absolute 

worst-case, lowest BCA caps, which were delayed 1 year, and then, 

as you alluded to, modified by the Murray-Ryan proposal in 2014– 

2015. There’s been a middle ground that has been where we have 

taken a substantial part, more than half of the total sequestration 

200 

cuts, but not the entire amount. That informs the look, going forward in our budget, that is above the absolute sequester, but certainly mindful of the fiscal realities that we’re going to take reductions from what we had proposed before. 

Senator KAINE. Let me just use one example that I spoke with 

you and Mr. Work about yesterday. Then I’ll ask each of you a 

question. This deals with carriers. 

Secretary Hagel, in his speech yesterday, said, ‘‘The spending 

levels proposed under the President’s budget plan would also enable the Navy to maintain 11 carrier strike groups. However, we 

will have to make a final decision on the future of the George 

Washington aircraft carrier in the 2016 budget submission. If sequestration spending levels remain in place in fiscal year 2016, she 

would need to be retired before her scheduled nuclear refueling and 

overhaul. That would leave the Navy with 10 carrier strike groups. 

But, keeping the George Washington in the fleet would cost $6 billion, so we would have no other choice than to retire her, should 

sequestration-level cuts be reimposed. At the President’s budget 

level, we would pay for the overhaul and maintain 11 carriers.’’ 

I’d like to ask both Mr. Work and Mr. McCord this. Do you support the presidential position, as outlined in the Secretary’s speech, 

about the importance of maintaining an 11-carrier Navy? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, Senator, I do. The law of the land requires 11 

carriers, and, if we had to go to the full sequestration level, we 

would have to get relief from the law. Secretary Hagel has made 

clear that, if we can remain at the President’s budget, that we 

would retain 11 carriers. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. McCord? 

Mr. MCCORD. I would agree with that, and this is going to be one 

of those most clear differences that we’ve been discussing about sequester path versus the President’s budget path. 

Senator KAINE. Just to clarify what Mr. Work said, the maintaining of an 11-carrier Navy is not just a presidential policy that we 

will see in the budget, as elaborated yesterday by the Secretary, it 

is also a statutory requirement. Correct? 

Mr. MCCORD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ll look forward to seeing how the presidential budget supports 

this statutory policy of the 11-carrier Navy. I appreciate your testimony. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

Senator Gillibrand, please. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up from Senator McCaskill’s questions. We had 

information that there’s too many JAGs, actually. This is a letter 

from Dana Chipman, Lieutenant General USA, Judge Advocate 

General, and he writes, ‘‘As our Army begins to take the steps necessary to draw down to 490,000 Active component (AC) end 

strength, the JAG Corps must rebalance appropriately and be postured for the future. Historically high promotion and retention 

rates in recent years have created an excess of Judge Advocate 

Generals. Deliberate steps taken in a thoughtful manner will retain our ability to support the Army and the joint force. To do so, 

201 

I have requested authority to conduct selective early retirement for 

a portion of our JAGs.’’ 

As you do your analysis for Senator McCaskill, please recognize 

that, according to our information, we have an excess of JAGs. Isn’t 

it true, though, that JAGs are stationed all over the world, not just 

in the United States? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, ma’am, it certainly is. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Isn’t it true that, today, when there is a serious crime that’s taken place, there are sufficient lawyers to investigate those crimes, there’s investigative units, and the lawyers, in 

fact, do recommend to their commanding officers how to proceed in 

the cases? 

Mr. WORK. I believe that is correct, yes, ma’am. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Those same lawyers can be used today, but 

just not in their own chain of command? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, ma’am. I haven’t been fully briefed on the 

laydown of JAGs so I would have to get back to you. But, what you 

have described is what I understand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Moving to a related issue, do you think it’s appropriate for a commander to ignore the advice of counsel or an Article 32 investigating officer when they recommend proceeding to prosecution, 

based on evidence supporting a sexual assault crime? 

Mr. WORK. No, ma’am. I believe the commanding officer should 

be able to make those type of decisions. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Do you think he should disregard the advice of counsel in an Article 32 hearing that says there’s evidence 

a serious crime has been committed? 

Mr. WORK. Ma’am, I believe the commander always listens to the 

JAG and to the advice of counsel and makes the best judgment 

that he or she can to make sure that justice is served. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. If you believe he can decide not to pursue 

a prosecution if there is sufficient evidence that a crime has been 

committed, on what basis do you think he should make that decision? 

Mr. WORK. I know of no cases where personally, a commanding 

officer knew of enough evidence to pursue prosecution, and elected 

not to do so. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. There are documented cases. In fact, recently, both the Washington Post and the Associated Press (AP) 

have run stories on ethical issues, and senior leaders specifically. 

The AP, after a 4-year Freedom of Information Act request, finally 

got documentation for a base in Japan, and found at least two 

cases where the attorney’s judgment in the Article 32 hearing was 

disregarded, where the recommendations were to go forward, based 

on the evidence, and commanders declined to prosecute. There’s at 

least two cases that the AP was able to report. I daresay—and I 

fully request all cases from the military, where counsel was disregarded or where a commander chose not to move forward after 

an Article 32 hearing where there was evidence that a crime had 

been committed and the recommendation was to go forward. I’d 

like you to investigate that and submit that information for the 

record. 

Mr. WORK. Yes, ma’am. 

202 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I understand that, based on a preliminary review of recent cases across the Services, in 2012, sexual assault-related charges were referred to court-martial in every 

case in which a staff judge advocate recommended that the case go forward. At this 

time, however, I do not have any information about instances in which a convening 

authority disagreed with the recommendations of an Article 32 investigating officer, 

or in which a convening officer decided to refer charges after a staff judge advocate 

or Article 32 investigating officer recommended against doing so. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Because, just because you’ve never seen it 

doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen. In fact, one victim survivor that I 

spoke to said she was supposed to go to trial and 4 days before the 

trial, her command changed, and her new commander looked at the 

file and said, ‘‘I don’t think a crime has been committed. He might 

not have been a gentleman, but it wasn’t a rape.’’ He decided the 

trial would not go forward. There’s a third example that I, at least, 

know about, anecdotally. 

I’d like you to do a full review of all cases when that happens, 

because, to say it’s never happened, we have evidence of three 

cases where it exactly did happen and that’s concerning. I’d like 

you to investigate that. 

Mr. WORK. Ma’am, I totally agree. I just don’t know of any personal instances. But, I read the exact same report about Japan that 

you referred to, and it’s extremely troubling. If confirmed, this is 

one of the top priorities of the Department, and I assure you that 

everyone is looking at this very closely. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. If a commander decided not to prosecute, 

despite the evidence, what would be permissible reasons or acceptable reasons, in your mind, for him not to proceed? 

Mr. WORK. Ma’am, it’s a hypothetical question. I would have to 

know the exact nature of the evidence against them and to talk 

with the commander and see what the judgment would be. A commander should listen to the JAG, make his best judgment, as the 

commander, on how to proceed. I believe, in most cases, if the JAG 

feels there is enough evidence, that most commanders would proceed. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. But, what about the instances where they 

don’t proceed or wouldn’t proceed? What do you think are legitimate reasons not to proceed, when the evidence says a crime’s been 

committed? 

Mr. WORK. Ma’am, when I was the Under Secretary of the Navy, 

we looked at this very, very closely, and the only time that this 

happens is when a JAG feels that the evidence is not sufficient to 

move forward. In most cases, or in many cases, the commander decides to go forward, even if the JAG feels that there is not enough 

evidence to support an ultimate conviction. It works both ways. It’s 

important for us to understand that the commanders are trying to 

make the best judgment that they can. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Yes, but I’m not interested in cases where 

innocent accused are convicted. I’m not interested in cases going 

forward where there is no evidence that a serious crime’s been committed. Just moving forward because you want to be perceived as 

being tough on sexual assault is not the right answer. 

Mr. WORK. I didn’t—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. You have to understand. In this country, 

justice is blind. You do not tip the scales of justice in favor of a 

203 

victim or an accused. You have to have blind justice. My question 

to you is specific. What possible reason would a commander disregard facts and evidence that trained prosecutors have already developed through an Article 32 hearing to say, ‘‘I don’t think we 

should go forward’’? Do you think morale is a reason why you 

shouldn’t go forward? Do you think the fact that the accused may 

be popular or well decorated or a great soldier—are those good reasons why you don’t go forward to trial? Because if you think they 

are, that is the point of why this reform is so necessary. 

I do not believe the commander should overrule the judgment 

based on evidence. I believe the decision should only be based on 

the evidence. If there’s evidence a serious crime has been committed, you move forward. If there’s not evidence that a serious 

crime has been committed, you don’t move forward. Not based on 

politics, not based on who you like better, not based on who’s more 

effective for your unit, not based on who you just happen to like. 

It’s not relevant, and it’s not appropriate. This is why victims and 

survivors have told us over and over again, ‘‘We don’t trust the system. We don’t trust the chain of command. We don’t believe justice 

will be done.’’ 

The last DOD survey specifically said the number-one reason 

why victims did not report these crimes is because they believed 

that nothing would be done. The second reason cited is, they believed they would be retaliated against if they report it. 

That’s where the breach of trust has been. I really want to hear 

from you why you think that discretion is needed, whether there’s 

evidence or no evidence. Why do you need discretion if there’s evidence of a serious crime? What kind of discretion do you think is 

legitimate? 

Mr. WORK. Ma’am, again, it’s a hypothetical question, and I believe that the record shows that JAGs are more likely to press forward on prosecutions than their civilian counterparts. I believe 

that most commanders are—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. There’s no evidence of that, sir. The only 

evidence we have are 100 cases where the decision about whether 

to keep it by the DOD’s prosecution was made. You don’t know if 

the civilian system said, ‘‘If you want jurisdiction, take it. It’s your 

judgment.’’ You don’t know that those cases were reviewed. That 

information is not provided. That evidence is misleading, and your 

conviction rate for some of those cases was closer to 50 percent. 

Today in the military, your conviction rate is about 95 percent for 

the cases that you take up. Arguably, you didn’t perform as well 

as you needed to, because there wasn’t evidence; or maybe there 

were innocent accused. 

I do not think you can say that with a straight face. There are 

no facts or evidence that back that up. If you have it, please send 

it to me. 

Mr. WORK. Very well, ma’am. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I understand that on July 23, 2013, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

sent a letter to Chairman Levin indicating that, in the previous 2 years, commanders had exercised jurisdiction in 93 sexual assault cases after civilian authorities had either failed to pursue a full investigation or formally declined to prosecute. 

I also understand that because the military justice system has some military-specific offenses without civilian counterparts, there are sometimes instances where the 

204 

military can bring a prosecution when civilians cannot. Additionally, I understand 

that the Vice Chairman noted that the 93 sexual assault cases referred to above include 73 in which courts-martial had been completed, resulting in 52 convictions, 

a 71 percent conviction rate. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I’m going to submit a question for the 

record, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McCord, it’s just specifically for you. 

We’ve heard reports that you are restructuring how the Army uses 

the Defense Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS), and the plan 

could severely impact the effect on civilian employees working in 

DFAS sites, like the one in Rome, NY. What I would like is a commitment from you to give me information in advance of these kinds 

of decisions. I don’t want to have to hear this kind of report 

through back channels. Do I have your assurance that my office 

will be kept apprised of all future action relating to changes to the 

DFAS’s mission and force structure? 

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, yes, I’ll work with the Army in that. The 

Army is the one really undertaking the study, and the Army is the 

customer, and so, DFAS does work for the Army. The Army is looking at how to possibly revise some of their operations but, we will 

work together with them to get you information on any conclusions 

that they reach. I understand they are not at that stage yet. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m going to submit, for the record, questions 

about cyber. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

There being no further questions, thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your testimony. 

Senator INHOFE. One question. 

Senator REED. Certainly, Senator Inhofe. Please go ahead. 

Senator INHOFE. Just quickly. 

There’s not time to pursue this, Mr. Work, but I’ve been concerned about the changes that take place with the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E), Dr. Gilmore—coming 

along and changing the standards after the fact. I would like to ask 

if you would just respond, in some detail, for the record. What is 

the proper managerial relationship between the Deputy Secretary 

and the DOT&E? Would you do that? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, sir. The DOT&E is a direct report to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He works 

closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for the—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, I understand that, but I would like to have 

you talk about the problems that I see that are taking place, that 

you have a set of standards that is set, and then you come along 

later, change that set of standards, when decisions have already 

been made predicated on the standards that came out of the legitimate process. That’s my concern. 

Mr. WORK. It’s a very valid question, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Go ahead. 

Mr. WORK. Essentially, I think DOT&E should work with the established criteria, like the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC), to come forward and say, ‘‘I believe a requirement isn’t 

correct.’’ If the JROC agrees with him, they can make that change 

so that the entire system then is working towards a common requirement. 

205 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I understand that by statute, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is 

the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on operational test and evaluation, 

providing, among other responsibilities, independent and objective evaluations of the 

operational effectiveness and suitability for use in combat of weapons, equipment, 

and munitions. If I am confirmed, I will meet regularly with the Director with respect to issues associated with the operational and live-fire testing being conducted 

by the Department. I believe that the Director plays a critical role in validating system performance, and ensuring the effective stewardship of our resources. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Again, thank you to the witnesses. 

There are votes pending. With that, I adjourn the hearing and 

thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Robert O. Work by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I do not believe that modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions are necessary at this time. However, if confirmed and appointed, I will consider this question as I perform my duties as Deputy Secretary of Defense. If I come 

to believe that modifications are necessary, I will recommend appropriate amendments to the act. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I do not believe that modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions are necessary at this time. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and each of the following? 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense assigns the duties performed by the Deputy 

Secretary and is the Deputy Secretary’s immediate superior. The Deputy Secretary 

performs the duties of the Secretary of Defense when the Secretary is unable to do 

so. The Deputy Secretary serves as the Department’s Chief Operating and Management Officer (COO/CMO) and focuses primarily on the daily activities of the Department, including financial management, acquisition, civilian and military personnel 

policy and the implementation of policy and strategy decisions. As a result, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary must have a close working relationship and the Secretary must be able to rely completely on the Deputy Secretary. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The five Under Secretaries establish policy and provide oversight over 

major Departmental functions, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 

Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary oversees the Under Secretaries and coordinates their activities. The Deputy Secretary must work closely with the Under 

Secretaries, ensuring that they understand the Secretary’s guidance and implement 

that guidance faithfully. The Deputy Secretary must also resolve differences of opinion between or among the Under Secretaries, referring to the Secretary those important issues that require his decision. 

Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense 

(DOD). 

206 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary, who is the Chief Management Officer, supervises 

the Deputy Chief Management Officer, assigning tasks, providing oversight, and ensuring accountability. The Deputy Secretary must be able to rely on the Deputy 

Chief Management Officer to monitor the Department’s performance in attaining 

management goals and keep the Deputy Secretary informed. The two must keep in 

constant communication to ensure seamless oversight of the Department’s management program, and immediate intervention when required. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. There are two categories of Assistant Secretaries. Most of the Assistant 

Secretaries fall under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretaries. 

For those Assistant Secretaries, the Deputy Secretary exercises oversight through 

the Under Secretaries. For Assistant Secretaries who report directly to the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary should exercise a broader and more direct oversight, 

working closely together to ensure the Secretary’s guidance is accomplished efficiently and effectively. 

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary must have complete confidence in 

the professional military advice of the Chairman and Vice Chairman, work closely 

with them, and communicate direction to the combatant commanders through them. 

The Deputy Secretary works most closely with the Vice Chairman, particularly on 

matters regarding budgeting, programming, and requirements. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary assists the 

Secretary in providing direction to and oversight of the Secretaries of the Military 

Departments. The Deputy Secretary also helps resolve differences of opinion between the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Question. The Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments are the 

Under Secretaries of the Army, Air Force and Navy. They report to the Secretaries 

of the Military Departments. The Deputy Secretary and Deputy Chief Management 

Officer of DOD work closely with the Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments to ensure that the management program of DOD, as implemented in the 

respective Military Departments, is carried out consistently with the direction of the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Service Acquisition Executives. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L) perform essential roles in the Department’s acquisition program, including providing guidance to, and oversight of, the 

Service Acquisition Executives. The Deputy Secretary works primarily through the 

USD(AT&L) when dealing with the Service Acquisition Executives. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services. 

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services perform two vital roles for 

the Department. In their roles as Service Chiefs, they normally work with the Deputy Secretary through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. In their roles 

as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they normally work with the Deputy Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy Secretary 

seeks to ensure that the Chiefs of Staff in both of their roles have the resources 

necessary to accomplish their assigned missions and that they have ample opportunity to provide their professional military advice on significant matters. 

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau on important issues regarding the States and the National Guard. The Deputy Secretary relies on the Chief of the National Guard to be a clear and persuasive 

channel of communication between the Department and the States on all National 

Guard matters. 

Question. The Judge Advocates General of the Services. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary normally works through the General Counsel of 

DOD in dealing with the Judge Advocates General and the Staff Judge Advocate 

to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Because the Judge Advocates General 

have an important role in providing legal advice to senior officials, military and civilian, in the Military Departments, the Deputy Secretary ensures that the Judge 

Advocates General are able to perform that vital function. 

Question. The Inspector General of DOD. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary relies on the Inspector General to provide candid 

information on significant issues addressed by the auditors, inspectors, and invesVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00214 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
207 

tigators in the Inspector General’s office. The Deputy Secretary plays a direct role 

in ensuring the independence of the Inspector General. 

Question. The General Counsel of DOD. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary receives legal advice on all issues from the General 

Counsel, so he or she must have a close and candid relationship with the General 

Counsel. The General Counsel must feel that he or she may approach the Deputy 

Secretary with legal advice at any time, on any issue. 

Question. The Director of National Intelligence. 

Answer. When addressing matters of significance affecting both the Department 

and the Intelligence Community, the Deputy Secretary works with the Director of 

National Intelligence. The Under Secretary for Intelligence assists the Deputy Secretary in maintaining a close relationship with the Director of National Intelligence. 

DUTIES OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Question. Section 132 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the duties of the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. 

Assuming that you are confirmed, what duties do you expect the Secretary to prescribe for you? 

Answer. I expect the Secretary to assign me the primary duties of being prepared 

to perform his duties in his absence, assisting him in leading the Department, providing him my best professional and candid advice, and performing the statutory 

duties of Chief Management Officer. In addition, I expect that the Secretary will assign me additional duties in areas that will assist him in accomplishing his many 

missions. 

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify 

you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I have either been a part of or analyzed and studied DOD and the armed 

services my entire life. 

My first 17 years were spent as military dependent in a Marine Corps family. I 

learned first-hand what it was like moving every 2 to 4 years, sometimes unexpectedly. I lived on bases, off bases, and in foreign countries. I changed neighborhoods 

and schools, lost track of old friends and made new ones, and watched my Mom cope 

with my Dad’s long absences. 

After 4 years of preparing for a commission in the U.S. Marine Corps through the 

Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, I spent 27 years as a Marine artillery officer, 

retiring at the rank of colonel. I commanded at the platoon, battery, battalion, and 

training base level. At different times I served as the personnel, intelligence, and 

assistant operations officer in an artillery battalion, assistant operations and logistics officer in an infantry regiment, and operations officer in an artillery regiment. 

I also spent time on the Headquarters Marine Corps staff as the Enlisted Force 

Planner and director of Marine Corps space plans and operations. As the head of 

the Strategic Initiatives Group, I provided analytical support to the Commandant 

of the Marine Corps on a variety of issues, including during the 1997 Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR). My time in the Marine Corps taught me much about leadership, strategy, operations, tactics, programming, and budgeting. 

I was married for 23 of my 27 years in the Marine Corps, and was a father for 

11. I watched my wife cope with frequent moves and the stresses of me being away. 

I missed some of her birthdays and our anniversaries. Then, I missed some my 

daughter’s birthdays, school plays, and dance recitals. As a former member of a 

military family, I knew how hard it was to be constantly on the move and not having my dad around. But now it was me often leaving my wife and daughter to take 

care of themselves. 

My last 2 years on Active Duty was spent as the Military Assistant and Senior 

Aide to Richard Danzig, 71st Secretary of the Navy. During this time, I observed 

what it was like to lead a Military Department, where strategy, Service culture, politics, programming, and budgeting come into play. I observed the 2001 QDR from 

the Department of Navy level, recognizing the Navy-Marine Corps Team was very 

much more than the sum of its two parts. In the process, I became an ardent 

Departmentalist, seeking cooperation and understanding across institutional boundaries. 

After retiring, I spent most of the next 8 years at the Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, a national security Think Tank, first as a Senior Fellow 

and later as Vice President for Strategic Studies. I studied, wrote, and spoke extensively on strategy, global posture, revolutions in war, and maritime affairs. I assisted the Red Team for the 2006 QDR, testing key assumptions and challenging 

major objectives. 

208 

This body of experience prepared me well to be Under Secretary of the Navy. The 

Department of the Navy is a microcosm of DOD, with two Services (the Navy and 

Marine Corps) and a $140–$160 billion annual budget. As Under Secretary, I was 

the principal deputy and advisor to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief Operating/ 

Management Officer of the Department, and Chief of Staff for the Navy Secretariat. 

As such, I assisted the Secretary in pursuing his priorities and agenda, supervising 

the organize, train, and equip function of both the Navy and Marine Corps; developing Departmental policy, capabilities, and capacities; and fashioning a balanced 

program. I worked extensively with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, the Chief 

and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant and Assistant Commandant 

of the Marine Corps, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and Under Secretaries 

of the Army and the Air Force, and the senior military leadership of the Army and 

Air Force. I learned the rhythm and processes of the Pentagon, and how to make 

things happen. I led the Department’s efforts on the 2010 QDR, and participated 

in the 2011 Strategic Review. Throughout this time, I gained a great appreciation 

for DOD civilians, who are a vital part of the Total Force. 

For the last year, I have been the Chief Executive Officer for the Center for a 

New American Security, where I have tried to build a series of programs that view 

the entire range of national security issues, including strategy and statecraft; responsible defense; technology and national security; energy, environment and security; military, veterans and society; and Middle East and Asian studies. 

Throughout my career, I have valued and sought out opportunities to better educate myself. I have a Masters in Science in Systems Management, a Masters of Systems Technology (Space Systems Operations); and a Masters in International Public 

Policy. 

Although no job will ever prepare someone for the expansive responsibilities of the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, I believe this body of experience qualifies and prepares 

me to tackle the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed and appointed, I would begin immediately to establish 

close working relationships with those whom I will work daily on national security 

issues, including: 

• Secretary Hagel and his personal staff; 

• The Under Secretaries of Defense, Director of Cost Evaluation and Program Evaluation (CAPE), the Deputy Chief Management and Information 

Officers, and other senior officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; 

• The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior 

leadership in the four armed services; 

• The three Service Secretaries and Under Secretaries; 

• Senior leadership at the Office of Management and Budget and the Cabinet departments who work national security issues; 

• Senior leadership in the White House and on the National Security Council staff; and 

• Leadership in Congress, particularly those who sit on the congressional 

defense committees. 

I would review the analysis and conclusions of the Strategic Choices and Management Review and the 2013 QDR in order to understand what had happened and 

the OSD decisions made since I left my job as Under Secretary of the Navy in 

March 2013. 

I would also begin detailed study of the fiscal, administrative, and operational 

issues that the Secretary assigns to me. I would spend time analyzing the business 

processes of the Department so that I could evaluate whether any changes may be 

appropriate and so advise the Secretary. 

Question. What changes to section 132, if any, would you recommend? 

Answer. I would not recommend any changes to section 132 at this time; I believe 

section 132 adequately provides for the duties of the Deputy Secretary. If I am confirmed and appointed, I will consider this issue while performing my duties, and if 

I determine that changes may be necessary, I will suggest them to the Secretary 

for consideration as a legislative proposal. 

NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS

Question. Section 132 was amended by section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, to provide that the Deputy Secretary 

serves as the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of DOD. The Deputy Secretary is 

to be assisted in this capacity by a Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO). 

209 

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO of DOD? 

Answer. The primary duty of the Chief Management Officer is to provide leadership and to ensure accountability for the business operations of DOD. These operations involve all of the Department’s components and cut across the responsibilities 

of the Under Secretaries of Defense. As such, they require leadership and accountability at a high level. In this role, the CMO should ensure that the business functions of the Department are optimally aligned to support the warfighter, that they 

form a simplified, efficient, and effective business environment, and that DOD maintains a strategic perspective and has the capacity to carry out its plans. 

In addition, the CMO’s role is to lead, oversee, and support the roles of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and agency heads in managing their business 

operations, as well as provide direction to DOD’s Deputy CMO and the CMOs of the 

Military Departments. 

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify 

you to perform these duties and responsibilities? 

Answer. As the former Under Secretary and CMO of the Navy, I am very familiar 

with the array of management and business challenges that continue to confront 

DOD. Additionally, I spent my previous career, first as a military officer and then 

as a member of a number of think-tanks and academia, analyzing defense issues 

such as transformation, strategy, and programs. This experience has provided me 

with the background and expertise to serve as the Department’s CMO. 

Question. Do you believe that the CMO and DCMO have the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of DOD? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Secretary of Defense has recently announced a series of reforms following his Organizational Review to further strengthen the Deputy CMO to provide full spectrum oversight of OSD and DOD management, administration, and compliance. I am not currently in a position to determine 

if the CMO and Deputy CMO have the appropriate authority and resources to carry 

out their roles in light of these changes. If confirmed, I will examine the authorities 

and resources available to both functions to determine if they fully address the 

need. 

Question. What role do you believe the DCMO of DOD should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the Military 

Departments? 

Answer. The most important role the Deputy CMO can play regarding specific 

business systems is to ensure that the Department’s overarching and functional 

business strategies and standards are clearly articulated at all levels and the Military Department’s systems implementation plans will achieve these strategies. On 

occasion, there may be specific business systems that require the attention of the 

Deputy CMO to ensure alignment and resource prioritization across the budget horizon. 

Beyond defense business systems, however, there is a significant role the Office 

of the Deputy CMO can play in helping the Deputy Secretary lead efforts across the 

Department to increase its efficiency and effectiveness. I have read the Secretary’s 

December 4th public statement that strengthens the role of the Office. This is an 

important step in gaining better control and oversight of the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Defense agencies and activities, and the Department as a whole. If 

confirmed, I will review the decisions made and make new ones, if necessary, to 

strengthen to the role of the Deputy CMO. 

Question. Do you believe that the DCMO should have clearly defined decisionmaking authorities, or should the DCMO serve exclusively as an advisor to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO? 

Answer. I believe that the Deputy CMO should meet the statutory responsibilities 

currently in law, as well as have the responsibilities assigned by the CMO and the 

Secretary of Defense. There may be areas or circumstances where it would be appropriate for the Deputy CMO’s duties to include independent decisionmaking authority and others where it would not be appropriate. This should be determined by the 

CMO or the Secretary. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions 

establishing the positions of CMO and DCMO? 

Answer. At this time, I believe the statutory authorities for the positions of the 

Chief Management Officer and the Deputy Chief Management Officer are sufficient. 

If confirmed, I would inform Congress if I determined that any changes in statute 

were necessary to more effectively perform the duties of this office. 

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

210 

Answer. Clearly, the first challenge and responsibility is to get the entire Department working behind the Secretary’s priorities. While doing so, the Deputy Secretary must be cognizant that the Department confronts a broadening range of missions within a complex strategic environment while it must carefully manage its diminished resources. Indeed, the dynamic fiscal environment is a major challenge 

since it relates to the principal function of the Deputy and CMO roles. Continued 

fiscal uncertainty generates potentially cascading effects across all elements of the 

Department enterprise. Having a stable fiscal picture will help the Department 

avoid inefficiencies and maximize the resources allocated to it. Another challenge 

will be the implementation of our National Security Strategy, consciously and deliberately managing risk and applying resources in accordance with the priorities of 

that strategy. This includes successful implementation of our plans in Afghanistan 

and adapting our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region. 

I also foresee the need to carefully manage our Science & Technology investments. 

I agree with recent comments from the Under Secretary for AT&L about not taking 

our technological dominance for granted. We should deliberately prioritize our longterm needs and carefully allocate funding to key programs and potential gamechanging technologies that meet our strategic requirements. 

Another major challenge is the need to assess and define our force structure design in accordance with our strategy and to make resource-informed decisions about 

our force levels. A force sizing construct will be a key aspect of the upcoming QDR 

to help define those force levels, against various levels of risk. Finally, as we go forward with force level cuts and management overhead reductions, we must keep 

faith with our Total Force. We cannot overlook the contributions that have been 

made by our servicemembers, civilians, and their families over the last decade of 

conflict. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary and the senior 

leadership of the Department and the components in addressing these myriad challenges. I would anticipate that the deliberations of the QDR, and the insights offered by Congress and the National Defense Panel, will help generate solutions to 

them. 

Question. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with respect to 

issues which must be addressed by DOD? 

Answer. Secretary Hagel has defined a set of broad priorities that establish the 

essential framework for resolving the Department’s critical challenges. 

The first involves a focus on institutional reform. We can set an example here for 

the components by scaling back our headquarters and adopting better business practices. We need to direct more resources to invest in concrete military capabilities 

and readiness, as well as make Defense organizations flatter and more responsive 

to today’s threats and priorities. 

Next we must re-evaluate our force planning and force-sizing construct. We need 

to ensure our strategy is aligned with how the Military Departments are organizing, 

training and equipping the force. The QDR will provide direction for that, with a 

force planning construct reflecting priorities and modern threats. 

The Secretary’s third priority is avoiding a long-term readiness challenge. This 

mandates finding a balance between force size, investment accounts, and readiness 

levels. Sequestration fell hard on the Department’s future readiness accounts. The 

parameters for force planning in the QDR should assist the Department in precluding a readiness crisis and identifying the implications for Congress. 

Fourth, the Department must protect investments in critical military capabilities. 

This challenge requires us to preserve and extend emerging priority capabilities–especially space, cyber, special operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). A critical aspect of this challenge is the ability to maintain access 

in traditional and emergent domains. Our access is being increasingly contested. We 

must recognize that future adversaries will learn much from the last decade of war 

and avoid our traditional advantages. Maintaining a technological edge will be key 

to our ability to maintain access and secure our interests. 

Fifth, we must achieve a balanced strategic posture. This will include a capability/ 

capacity balance for the military. In particular, defining the right balance of Active 

and Reserve components is necessary. We should leverage the potential of our Reserve component, ensuring that we define the training readiness, responsiveness 

and mobilization timelines required for their deployment. Balancing the military 

properly will also include an examination of forward-stationed and home-based 

forces. The force must also be balanced between its readiness for conventional, irregular, and unconventional warfare. The QDR will help define the balance required 

for general purpose and Special Operations Forces. 

211 

Finally, personnel and compensation policy is a priority. We must find the proper 

balance between compensation and other defense priorities in a time of scarce resources. The Department and Congress will need to work together to find comprehensive solutions that allow us to recruit and retain the quality of today’s force, 

while also providing the resources to train and equip that force for their missions. 

Question. The Budget Control Act, as amended by the recent Murray-Ryan budget 

agreement, calls for reductions in defense spending in excess of $900 billion. 

Do you believe that a national security spending reduction of this magnitude can 

be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our national security? 

Answer. Based on my experience as Navy Under Secretary, and as an outside analyst, my answer would be ‘‘no’’. I believe the Department has expressed similar 

views. The BCA-level of funding will require significant force structure reductions, 

undermine readiness and delay modernization. My understanding is that the Department believes these actions will leave it unable to meet fully the current Defense Strategy. 

Question. If confirmed, will you report to the committee on the impact of these 

reductions personnel, readiness, infrastructure, and modernization? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress to define the impacts of potential reductions to the Defense budget and its impact on all the interrelated pillars of our security. 

STREAMLINING HEADQUARTERS

Question. Last December, Secretary Hagel began implementation of his plan to reduce DOD staff by 20 percent. He expects this effort to save $1.0 billion over a 5- 

year period by eliminating contract and civilian workers while reorganizing certain 

offices, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy. 

Answer. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 contains a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for streamlining DOD management headquarters by reducing the size of staffs, eliminating tiers of management, cutting 

functions that provide little or no addition value, and consolidating overlapping and 

duplicative program offices. The objective is to reduce aggregate spending for management headquarters by not less than $40.0 billion beginning in fiscal year 2015. 

Question. What is your view on reductions to the size and composition of DOD 

management headquarters? 

Answer. I understand Secretary Hagel said he expected to save at least $1 billion 

over the next 5 years. Given the fiscal challenges the Department faces, I fully support his efforts to reduce the size of headquarters. I am not familiar with the specifics of headquarters reduction plans, but, if confirmed, I believe it would be prudent to review these reductions to determine if additional savings can be achieved, 

and also to ensure these reductions do not create unacceptable risks to our national 

security interests. 

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in ensuring that the expected savings are achieved? 

Answer. Again, I am not familiar with the specifics of headquarters reduction 

plans. However, if confirmed, it will be my responsibility to make sure these savings 

are realized. 

Question. Do you believe that DOD can achieve significant additional savings in 

this area? 

Answer. I do believe the Department can achieve savings by reducing headquarters. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that happens. Until given the opportunity to review those plans and the associated risk, however, I think it would 

be unwise to speculate on a specific savings number without understanding the 

functions involved and potential downsides in acquisition, cyber-security, intelligence, et cetera. 

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. GAO recently reported that ‘‘the DOD systems environment that supports [its] business functions is overly complex and error prone, and is characterized 

by: (1) little standardization across the department; (2) multiple systems performing 

the same tasks; (3) the same data stored in multiple systems; and (4) the need for 

data to be entered manually into multiple systems. . . . According to the department’s systems inventory, this environment is composed of 2,258 business systems 

and includes 335 financial management, 709 human resource management, 645 logistics, 243 real property and installation, and 281 weapon acquisition management 

systems.’’ 

212 

If confirmed, what key management performance goals would you want to accomplish, and what standards or metrics would you use to judge whether you have accomplished them? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would strive to achieve the four key goals and five guiding 

principles that are identified in the Department’s Strategic Management Plan. Each 

goal has associated performance measures to track progress. If confirmed, I would 

use the plan’s upcoming development cycle to carefully review the strategic goals, 

initiatives, and performance measures included in the plan. I will ensure that future 

plans demonstrate clear alignment with the Department’s strategic objectives and 

that initiatives and measures are clear, consistent, relevant and outcome-based. 

Question. Would you agree that the Department will not be able to put its financial house in order until it effectively addresses this problem? 

Answer. While I would agree that a simpler DOD systems environment will make 

it easier to achieve financial objectives such as audit readiness, it is only part of 

the holistic approach to financial management that is needed to achieve the Department’s goals. The Department has reported that it is making better business management a priority with a simpler business system environment as a component of 

the broader agenda for improvement. 

Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of DOD’s 

business systems? 

Answer. Yes, I believe these are elements of what is required for overseeing such 

a large and complex organization. However, I would caution anyone from underestimating the challenges of changing DOD’s business practices and processes by 

just looking at technical systems. The Department is far more complicated and requires far more than these technical tools for simplifying, strengthening, and leaning out the business environment. 

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD’s enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements of section 2222? 

Answer. It is my understanding that strengthening DOD’s business processes and 

tools is a goal of the OSD transition plan. If confirmed, I will review those plans 

and ensure we are meeting the full intent of section 2222 in our revised organization structure and processes. 

Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate 

financial and business information in managing operations and holding managers 

accountable? 

Answer. Timely and accurate financial and business information is very important 

to the overall management of DOD’s business operations. It allows senior leaders 

to make fact-based decisions about the most effective and efficient allocation of resources, while ensuring good stewardship of the taxpayers’ dollars. If confirmed, I 

will continue to emphasize the Department’s on-going efforts to improve our business processes and systems which will better enable effective leadership and management. 

Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information 

available to DOD managers? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would take my role as Chief Management Officer/Chief 

Operating Officer and chair of the Deputy’s Management Action Group seriously. In 

these roles, I would hold the Department’s senior leaders accountable for meeting 

DOD’s objectives, including those identified in the Strategic Management Plan and 

Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan that are directly linked to improving financial and business information. 

AUDIT READINESS

Question. Former Secretary Panetta stated: ‘‘While we have reasonable controls 

over much of our budgetary information, it is unacceptable to me that DOD cannot 

produce a financial statement that passes all financial audit standards. That will 

change. I have directed that this requirement be put in place as soon as possible. 

America deserves nothing less.’’ 

What is your understanding of the efforts and progress that have been made in 

DOD toward the goal of being able to produce a clean audit? 

Answer. My understanding is that DOD, as an agency, has made significant 

progress, particularly in the last 4 years. Secretary Hale worked with the Services 

and agencies to provide a coherent set of priorities and Secretary Hagel is fully engaging the entire leadership team. In my former position as the Department of Navy 

CMO, I saw how challenging this effort can be, and am gratified to see the Marine 

Corps recently achieve an important initial milestone (an unqualified opinion on the 

213 

current year of their budget statement). If confirmed, I intend to sustain the leadership emphasis in this area. 

Question. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory goal to achieve 

an auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources by the end of fiscal year 2014 or 

are additional steps necessary? If so, what are those steps? 

Answer. I understand that the Department has told Congress that, while it is too 

soon to know for sure because remediation efforts are ongoing, they expect most 

budget statements to be ready for audit by September 2014. Because of years of 

budget turmoil and other problems, some may not be ready. Once the audit begins, 

I understand that the Department plans to conduct the audit in a cost-effective 

manner by starting with the current year. I also know that this whole project will 

be extremely challenging. 

Question. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory goal and achieve 

an auditable financial statement by the end of fiscal year 2017 or are additional 

steps needed? If so, what are those steps? 

Answer. I know from my time as Navy Under Secretary that the Department is 

fully committed to this goal and has a plan to meet the target. I understand that 

the Department believes it is on track to meet this target despite the technical complexity of the problem and the scale of the Department’s resources. However, I am 

not currently in a position to make a specific prediction about timing. 

Question. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory goal ‘‘to ensure 

a full audit is performed on the financial statements of DOD . . . ’’ for fiscal year 

2018 and that audit will be completed by September 30, 2018 or are additional steps 

needed? If so what are those steps? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Department is fully committed to this goal 

and timing and believes it is on track to meet the goal. However, I am not currently 

in a position to make a specific prediction about timing. 

Question. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory goal and submit 

to Congress the results of the audit to be completed by September 30, 2018 or are 

additional steps needed? If so, what are those steps? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Department is fully committed to this goal 

and timing and believes it is on track to meet the targets. However, I am not currently in a position to make a specific prediction about timing. 

Question. Do you believe in order to meet its statutory goal to conduct a full audit 

that the Department will have to place a monetary value on all of its property? 

Answer. Yes. My understanding is that the Department will need to follow the 

government accounting and auditing rules, as well as its own policies. Those rules 

require property valuation. I know that the policies also provide some flexibility to 

make sure that the cost of accomplishing this valuation does not exceed the value 

of the information. 

Question. Do you believe that the Department can achieve a clean audit opinion 

through better accounting and auditing, or is the systematic improvement of the Department’s business systems and processes a prerequisite? 

Answer. I believe that the Defense Department will need to do both. Over the past 

5 years, the Department has made significant progress in audit readiness, despite 

the fact that it doesn’t have modern business systems across the enterprise. However, the Department needs to continue efforts to improve and streamline the systems environment for operational efficiency, as well as to sustain cost effective annual financial audits. 

Question. When do you believe the Department can achieve a clean audit? 

Answer. The Department is fully committed to the goal of having audit ready 

statements by September 2017. After achieving audit readiness, experience in other 

Federal agencies suggests that it usually takes several years to secure a clean audit 

opinion. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to sustain the commitment of 

the Department’s top leadership to the long-term goal of transforming the Department’s financial management? 

Answer. I understand the Department has made substantial progress in transforming business operations, to include financial management. This progress is most 

visible in the audit readiness area, but I understand progress has also been made 

in reducing improper payments and the number of Anti-Deficiency Act violations reported. However, there is still a long way to go. Sustaining gains will continue to 

demand the attention and commitment of senior leadership. When I served as CMO 

in the Department of the Navy, I knew how difficult the problem appeared at the 

beginning, but we pressed forward and made solid progress. If confirmed, I intend 

to continue to make this a priority, not only for the Comptroller, but for all DOD 

leaders. 

214 

Question. Do you think that having the Deputy Secretary of Defense ‘‘dual-hatted’’ 

as the CMO is consistent with the prioritization and sustained day-to-day focus 

needed for the success of the Department’s financial improvement efforts? 

Answer. Yes, based on my 4 years as Under Secretary of the Navy where I had 

both ‘‘hats’’ in a $140 billion enterprise. While demanding in terms of management 

time, this ‘‘dual-hat’’ approach provides the high-level attention necessary to make 

progress on important but difficult initiatives such as financial improvement. 

Progress on financial initiatives also requires a close working relationship between 

the Comptroller and the CMO/DCMO leadership. I believe that relationship is working today and if confirmed, I will work to sustain it into the future. 

BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

Question. Since 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated 

DOD’s approach to business transformation as ‘‘high risk’’ due to its vulnerability 

to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement. However, GAO has recently found that 

the Department’s senior leadership has shown commitment to transforming business system operations and has made progress in establishing management oversight and developing a strategic plan to guide transformation efforts. Nonetheless, 

in GAO’s view, the Department needs to take additional action to further define 

management roles and responsibilities and to strengthen strategic planning. 

Do you believe that the Department needs to more clearly define roles and responsibilities, as well as relationships among key positions and governance entities? 

Answer. The Department has clearly defined roles and responsibilities among key 

positions and governance entities; however, I understand that Secretary Hagel recently announced a plan to realign certain reporting relationships and functions to 

the Deputy CMO to provide full spectrum oversight of OSD and DOD management, 

administration, and compliance. He further seeks to strengthen the role of the CIO 

in the Department. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary to 

implement those changes so that the Department can best meet the challenges that 

lie ahead. 

Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve 

this objective? 

Answer. I believe that Secretary Hagel’s plan will improve the Department’s ability to transform its business operations and its systems. My understanding is that 

the plan is intended to strengthen both the Deputy CMO’s role in full spectrum 

management and the DOD Chief Information Officer’s role in overarching IT oversight. If confirmed, I look forward to driving implementation of the Secretary’s announced realignments so that management improves not only for business systems, 

but also across the Department. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to further refine strategic goals, performance measures, and other elements of the Department’s strategic 

management plan? 

Answer. The Department’s Strategic Management Plan is updated on a regular 

basis. If confirmed, I would use the plan’s upcoming development cycle to carefully 

review the strategic goals, initiatives, and performance measures included in the 

plan. I will make sure that future plans demonstrate clear alignment with the Department’s strategic objectives and that initiatives and measures are clear, consistent, relevant and outcome-based. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to more clearly define 

the Department’s strategic planning process, including mechanisms to guide and 

synchronize efforts to develop strategic plans; monitor the implementation of reform 

initiatives; and report progress, on a periodic basis, towards achieving established 

goals? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that initiatives and measures are 

clearly linked to the overall strategic objectives of the Department. I believe establishing clear and meaningful outcome-based performance measures, periodic reporting, and use of these measures to inform management decisions is critical to success. Achieving these goals requires coordination among all of the Department’s senior leaders. 

Question. Do you believe that the Deputy Chief Management Officer should have 

control over funds for the components’ business systems programs to ensure that the 

components follow guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Department’s business transformation efforts? 

Answer. I believe the components should maintain control over their funds for 

business systems programs; however, the Deputy Chief Management Officer needs 

to be able to confirm that components are following Department processes and guidance. As the Navy Chief Management Officer, it was my experience that the Deputy 

215 

Chief Management Officer had sufficient ability to ensure components followed guidance on business transformation through the Defense Business Council. However, 

if confirmed, I would notify Congress if I assess that further controls over funds 

were necessary. 

ACQUISITION OF BUSINESS SYSTEMS

Question. Most of the Department’s business transformation programs are substantially over budget and behind schedule. At the request of the Armed Services 

Committee, GAO reviewed DOD’s 9 largest Enterprise Resource Programs (ERP), 

which are intended to replace more than 500 outdated business systems, and reported that 6 of the 9 had experienced schedule delays ranging from 2 to 12 years 

and incurred cost increases ranging from $530.0 million to $2.4 billion. GAO reported that DOD has failed to follow good management practices for developing 

schedules and cost estimates for many of these programs. 

If confirmed, how would you work with the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the 

Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), the Chief Information Officer (CIO), and the Under Secretaries of Defense to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work directly with the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), the Deputy Chief Management 

Officer, the Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments, the Under Secretaries of Defense, and the DOD Chief Information Officer to implement better 

management practices and lessons learned. Successful ERP implementations require 

integrated, end-to-end thinking and therefore must consider policy, business process, 

and acquisition equities. Each of these officials has an important role to play in addressing the planning, implementation, and change management challenges that 

historically have hamstrung the Department’s ability to deliver programs such as 

ERPs in accordance with established cost and schedule baselines. 

Question. What lessons can be learned from acquisition management of the Air 

Force’s now cancelled Expeditionary Combat Support System? 

Answer. I am not familiar with the details as to what happened regarding the 

Expeditionary Combat Support System. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department 

implements a full range of management controls to our business systems modernization efforts and will ensure that the lessons learned from Expeditionary Combat 

Support System are incorporated into our processes. 

Question. DOD must implement a full range of business systems modernization 

management controls to ensure that its business system investments are the right 

solutions for addressing its business needs; that these investments are being managed to produce expected capabilities efficiently and cost-effectively; and that, ultimately, its business stakeholders are satisfied. 

What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that both the 

corporate and component investment management processes are appropriately defined and institutionalized? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Department’s senior leadership to ensure our collective investment processes are balanced and focused on achieving the 

enterprise needs of the Department. I will review the Department’s investment review process for business systems and ensure it provides the necessary framework 

so that component investments are aligned with the Department’s strategy. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that 

business system investments are managed with the kind of acquisition management 

rigor and discipline that is embodied in relevant guidance and best practices, so that 

each investment will deliver expected benefits and capabilities on time and within 

budget? 

Answer. I am not aware of any additional steps being necessary at this time. If 

confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Information 

Officer, and the Military Departments to identify opportunities to strengthen business system development acquisition processes and practices to improve our investment outcomes. 

Question. Do you believe that unique challenges to acquiring services related to 

information-technology (IT) systems may require an acquisition strategy or approach different from those used for acquiring property or services unrelated to IT 

systems? 

Answer. I believe DOD should ensure acquisition strategies or approaches are 

structured and tailored to best suit the required product, including information technology systems. If confirmed, I will ensure that we appropriately manage business 

system requirements development and acquisition. 

216 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that 

requirements management, systems testing, and data quality are improved and to 

help resolve other problems that have continued to hinder the Department’s efforts 

to implement its automated systems on schedule, within cost and with the intended 

capabilities? 

Answer. I believe the Department must place appropriate management emphasis 

on the entire business system process, from requirements development to fielding. 

If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Information 

Officer, and the Military Departments to strengthen our efforts in this area. 

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. Congress enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 

(WSARA), without a dissenting vote in either House. WSARA is designed to ensure 

that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high 

cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process. 

What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process? 

Answer. When I first took office as the Under Secretary of the Navy in 2009, Congress had just passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which has become a valuable tool for the Department. I supported the implementation of WSARA 

at that time, and I continue to support the improvements in the area of Defense 

acquisition organization and policy. If confirmed, I would continue to support the 

efforts to improve the defense acquisition system consistent with the direction provided in WSARA. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition 

process—requirements, acquisition, and budgeting? 

Answer. My time as the Under Secretary of the Navy taught me the value of 

strong communications and interactions between the requirements, acquisition, and 

financial communities. Given the complex nature of the acquisition process, it is important to review all three aspects of the process holistically and not independently. 

If confirmed, I will work to effectively synchronize these processes to balance 

warfighters needs with budget and acquisition realities. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition accountability? 

Answer. Short, clear lines of authority and accountability for acquisition were established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I emphasized this chain as Under Secretary 

of the Navy and would continue to do so, if confirmed. Further I will hold those responsible for establishing requirements, budgets, and acquisition programs accountable for meeting the needs of the warfighter. I also believe our industry partners 

must be held accountable for their performance as well, and that incentives and rewards should align with actual performance and outcomes. 

Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems 

is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current 

operations, and asset recapitalization? 

Answer. I believe it is critical that we ensure major systems are affordable. The 

constrained budget environment facing the Department for the foreseeable future 

increases the pressure on the Department to maintain affordability. If confirmed, I 

will examine the cost balance between current operations, readiness and weapon 

system acquisition and assess our risks in those areas. I will work with the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to manage weapon 

system cost growth. 

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against 

the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to manage weapon system cost growth. We must 

spend the Department’s resources prudently given our projected top line. That is 

why I support steps, such as those included in the Department’s Better Buying 

Power initiatives, to manage requirements, improve affordability, and ensure completion where possible. 

Question. Do you believe that the Department has adequately addressed its shortfalls in systems engineering and developmental testing capabilities, or does more remain to be done in these areas? 

Answer. Systems engineering and developmental test and evaluation are essential 

to weapon system program success. Based on my experience in the Navy, I believe 

the Department has strengthened its system engineering and developmental test capabilities. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and other stakeholders in the 

217 

Department to evaluate what more needs to be done to ensure that the Department 

has adequate systems engineering and developmental testing capabilities. 

Question. Do you believe that additional steps are needed to ensure that WSARA 

principles are implemented on current major programs like the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF) program? 

Answer. Maintaining major acquisition programs on schedule and within budget 

is a high priority for me and the Department. If confirmed, in conjunction with the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I will review 

major programs, to include the JSF program, to assess whether WSARA principles 

have been implemented, and will determine if additional steps are required. 

Question. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) 

Frank Kendall recently released an updated Defense Department Instruction 

5000.02. He has stated that the rewrite had ‘‘to do with the need for a requirements 

decision point during what is the risk-reduction phase, the technology demonstration phase.’’ The latest version of 5000.02 is to put a ‘‘place to finalize requirements 

. . . we added a new decision point, which I’ll participate in for major programs, but 

it’s largely a Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Staff, service, requirements community decision’’ between Milestone A and Milestone B. 

Are you familiar with Under Secretary Kendall’s rewrite of DODI 5000.02? 

Answer. I am generally familiar with Under Secretary Kendall’s focus on 

strengthening our acquisition process, but I am not familiar with the recent rewrite 

of DODI 5000.02. 

Question. Do you believe a new decision point is necessary to finalize requirements between Milestone A and Milestone B? 

Answer. I believe that we need to fully assess requirements and cost trades before 

finalizing requirements and committing to full scale development. If confirmed, I 

will review the new decision point with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics. 

Question. Does having a new decision point between Milestone A and Milestone 

B risk creating a new bureaucratic hurdle in the acquisition process that will slow 

the process? 

Answer. I believe it is important that major cost and performance trades have 

been completed and we have appropriately reduced risk before committing to full 

scale development. If confirmed, I will review the new decision point with the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics to ensure it does not 

unnecessarily add bureaucracy and slow the acquisition process. 

Question. Recently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) issued 

guidance which ‘‘encourages Program Managers, Program Executive Officers and 

Component Acquisition Executives, in coordination with the requirements sponsor, 

to officially request requirements relief, through the appropriate requirements validation authority, where Key Performance Parameters appear out of line with an appropriate cost-benefit analysis.’’ 

Do you agree with this reform? 

Answer. Yes. It is important to ensure that major cost and performance trades 

are made in order to control costs of our weapon systems. 

Question. Do you support the JROC’s review of the analysis of alternatives prior 

to Milestone A as was called for in the Government Accountability Office’s June 

2011 report titled DOD Weapon Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During 

Requirements Reviews? 

Answer. I am not familiar with this report, but if confirmed, I will review it and 

consider the recommendation. 

ROLE OF SERVICE SECRETARIES AND CHIEFS IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

Question. Some have suggested that the Service Secretaries and Chiefs should be 

given a different or expanded role in the acquisition of major systems. Others have 

expressed concern that such a change would reverse efforts in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to reduce the layers between the Under Secretary and the program 

managers, and ensure that there was a dynamic tension between those who defined 

requirements (Service Chiefs) and those who filled the requirements (Service Acquisition Executives). 

What do you believe is the appropriate role for Service Chiefs in the acquisition 

of major systems? 

Answer. Service Chiefs must play a major role in acquisition through their deep 

involvement in the requirements, manpower, and budget processes. I believe that 

the Service Chiefs profoundly affect the acquisition process through the way they 

and their organizations generate, prioritize, and review requirements, program 

budgets, manage workforce, and interact with the Acquisition Enterprise. 

218 

Question. Do you believe there is value in having greater participation of the Service Secretaries and Chiefs involved in the acquisition process? 

Answer. I believe that the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries must play a role 

in the acquisition process since they ensure the requirements development process, 

the manpower process, and the budget processes are properly managed and integrated with the acquisition process. If confirmed, I intend to work with the Service 

Chiefs and Service Secretaries to ensure effective interactions between the requirements, budgeting, staffing, and acquisition systems. 

CONTRACTING FOR SERVICES

Question. Over the last decade, DOD’s spending on contract services has more 

than doubled. As a result, the Department now spends more for the purchase of 

services than it does for products (including major weapon systems). When he was 

USD(AT&L), former Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter testified that ‘‘the 

low-hanging fruit really is [in contract services]. There’s a lot of money. There has 

been a very, very high rate of growth over the last decade, in services. They have 

grown faster than everything else . . . . So, there’s a lot we can do. I think great savings can be had there, across the Services’ spend. It’s essential that we look there, 

because that’s half the money.’’ 

Do you believe that the cuts made to contract services have fully addressed the 

issues of waste and inefficiency in this area, or are further reductions possible? 

Answer. While the Department has made progress, I believe more can be done. 

With the current fiscal realities facing the Department, we need to look for efficiencies in our service contracts. The Department needs to strengthen oversight of 

the requirements for services contracts, improve both competition and small business utilization, and strengthen the professionalism of those outside the acquisition 

workforce that are principally engaged in buying services. If confirmed, I will work 

with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics and 

the Military Departments to improve the processes and procedures to manage contracted services. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to control the Department’s spending on contract services? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current efforts in the Department to improve our visibility into, and accountability for, contracted services and focus on improving our insight into the appropriate utilization, cost effectiveness, and alignment of contracted services in support of the Department’s mission. If confirmed, I 

will also support additional steps to ensure the Department’s acquisition of services 

is more efficient and effective. 

CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more 

reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively 

by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in 

areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many 

cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and 

task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees. 

In your view, is DOD still too reliant on contractors to support the basic functions 

of the Department? 

Answer. The Department uses a Total Force approach to manage its workload. 

Contractors are an important element of the Total Force and provide flexibility and 

technical competence. 

However, we must be careful to ensure work is appropriately assigned to military 

personnel (Active/Reserve), civilian employees, and contract support. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department continues efforts to implement 

a Total Force strategy that aligns functions and work to military, civilian, and contract support in a cost effective and balanced manner consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, laws, and regulations. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to reduce the 

Department’s reliance on contractors to perform critical functions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the acquisition and personnel communities 

to review our current use of contractor support and reduce such use where appropriate. 

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Question. DOD has requested another Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

round. 

219 

Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why? 

Answer. With declining budgets and shrinking force structure, I believe the Department’s supporting infrastructure must be examined; both for alignment with 

strategic needs, and opportunities to reduce unneeded capacity. BRAC provides a 

fair and comprehensive way to do that. 

Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round resulted in 

major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far less money than originally estimated. What is your understanding of why such cost growth and lower realized savings have occurred? 

Answer. I did not participate in the BRAC 2005 process. However, it is my understanding that the 2005 BRAC round was not designed specifically to save money. 

A good portion of the recommendations were focused on transformation, jointness, 

and relocating forces from overseas to the United States. These recommendations 

increased the costs of that BRAC round. 

Question. How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a future BRAC 

round? 

Given the Department’s limited resources, I expect that a future BRAC round 

would be similar to the 1993/1995 rounds in which DOD cut excess capacity and 

achieved a relatively quick payback. That should be the focus of a future round 

should Congress provide that authority. 

STRATEGIC REVIEWS

Question. What is your understanding and evaluation of DOD’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting for each of the following 

strategic reviews? 

Answer. The processes for these reviews are important tools to help the Department’s senior leaders provide strategic guidance across the Department in keeping 

with defense objectives in the broader National Security Strategy. They help the 

Military Department and other Components prioritize efforts and resources to 

achieve the Department’s objectives effectively and efficiently in light of the changing security and fiscal environment. 

I have been involved directly and indirectly in many of these reviews at different 

points throughout my career. The Secretary of Defense determines how best to oversee these review processes. I have seen various approaches used over the years— 

each differs based on strategic changes, timing, and leadership preferences. However, each Defense review should be based on candid deliberations and advice from 

across the military and civilian leadership, supported by rigorous data and analysis. 

This analytical rigor and intense engagement are critical for the Department and 

the country’s national security. 

Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (section 118 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

Answer. The QDR articulates the Nation’s defense strategy in support of the 

President’s national security strategy. Specifically, title 10 U.S.C. section 118, requires the Department to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget 

plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States 

with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United 

States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. In my experience, 

effective QDRs include a wide range of stakeholders and help to ensure the defense 

strategy guides U.S. military force structure, plans, and programs. 

Question. The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

Answer. The Chairman prepares the National Military Strategy as a means to delineate how the armed services support the National Defense Strategy, and to convey the military’s views on strategic priorities and associated risks. 

Question. Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, U.S.C.); 

Answer. In my previous role as Under Secretary of the Navy, I participated in 

the Department’s continuous review process for global defense posture. I have witnessed how this process is informed by the strategy and the Department’s operational needs. The annual report to Congress encapsulates the Department’s current 

overseas defense posture and the collaborative process by which the Department 

makes posture decisions. 

Question. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b of title 10, 

U.S.C.). 

Answer. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) describes how the 

Department intends to align organizational responsibilities and military capabilities 

to carry out assigned missions. Specifically, title 10 U.S.C., section 118b, requires 

the Department to complete a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions 

of the Armed Forces and the core competencies and capabilities of the Department 

220 

to perform and support such roles and missions. In the past, conclusions reached 

during the QDR significantly influenced the Department’s assessment of its military 

roles and missions. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to change 

title 10, U.S.C., that would update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to 

the Department and to Congress? 

Answer. The QDR and associated reviews serve a useful function for the Department by helping make sure that at least every 4 years the Department deliberately 

reassesses and, if necessary, adjusts the Nation’s defense strategy, defense capabilities, and force structure in line with national security interests, the future security 

environment, and available resources. If confirmed, I look forward to working with 

Members of Congress to help make the specific requirements and information the 

Department provides in these reviews as relevant and useful as possible. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve 

DOD’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decisionmaking relative to each review above? 

Answer. From previous experience, I find that the following factors contribute to 

successful strategic reviews: 

• The Secretary or Deputy Secretary provide clear initial guidance and 

maintain ‘‘hands-on’’ oversight of the review from start to finish. 

• All relevant DOD stakeholders are a part of the formal review and decisionmaking fora. These stakeholders generally include senior leaders within 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, military and civilian 

leadership from the Military Department and Services and the combatant 

commands. 

• Working groups and review groups are co-led by the offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, allowing for the most 

relevant expertise and involvement in the issue areas being examined. 

• The working groups’ deliberations and findings are transparent and vetted with the key stakeholders. 

If confirmed, I would recommend that insights gained from previous reviews, 

along the lines of those outlined above, be applied to additional reviews that the Department undertakes. 

Question. The law requires the QDR to identify the budget plan that would be 

required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low to moderate level of risk, 

and any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current Future 

Years Defense Program) required to achieve such a level of risk. The law also requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with 

and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s QDR analysis 

and decisionmaking processes to address these two requirements? 

Answer. The QDR assessment should be strategy-driven and resource-informed to 

determine the best mix of capabilities and investment portfolios for the Department 

to pursue in these complex and uncertain times. However, the Department should 

not be so constrained by this approach as to overlook gaps and risks in resource 

allocation or changes to the strategy. 

Question. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value in a defense 

strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the current budget request or 

fiscal environment? 

Answer. No. One of the first rules of strategy is that all resources are scarce. An 

effective defense strategy should take a comprehensive view of the future security 

environment to assess and prepare the Department prudently for a range of missions and associated risks to U.S. national interests. By definition, a strategy seeks 

to identify ways to meet policy goals, and allocate projected resources and means 

in response to perceived risks. As such, the QDR process ensures a broad review 

of the trends, threats, challenges, and opportunities that shape that environment. 

Although this assessment is strategy-driven, particularly in this fiscal environment, 

the defense strategy should also be resource-informed to ensure the Department sufficiently prioritizes its efforts and addresses trade-offs in the needed capabilities, activities, and posture of the future force. 

IRAQ

Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to 

Iraq? 

Answer. I have not been given a thorough update on developments in Iraq. However, I believe it is imperative that the United States maintain a long-term security 

221 

partnership with Iraq as part of a broader enduring commitment to regional peace 

and security. The United States has invested and sacrificed heavily in Iraq. Iraq’s 

strategic location, oil production capacity, and work to counter violent extremism 

make Iraq an important regional partner. As such, the United States has a strategic 

interest in ensuring that Iraq remains stable, sovereign, and secure. If confirmed, 

I will work to strengthen the Department’s relationship with Iraq, by maintaining 

consultation on security issues, continuing to develop Iraq’s military capabilities 

through foreign military sales (FMS), and deepening Iraq’s integration into the region. 

Question. What do you see as the major areas, if any, of common security interest 

between the United States and Iraq? 

Answer. I see areas of mutual strategic interest in partnership with a sovereign, 

stable, and democratic Iraq in several areas, including: countering Iran’s aggression 

and pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, mitigating destabilizing effects on the region from violence in Syria, cooperating with regional allies and partners to reduce 

the capacity of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), maintaining stable 

production of petroleum exports, and actively participating in regional multilateral 

exercises. 

Question. In what areas, if any, do you see U.S. and Iraqi security interests diverging? 

Answer. Both Iraq and the United States have an interest in fighting terrorism, 

securing borders, combating undesirable external influence, and routing extremist 

militias to ensure the peace and security of Iraq and the stability of the Middle East 

region. The United States has an interest in Iraq remaining a close partner, and 

although our approaches may sometimes differ, our interests tend to be aligned. 

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S.-Iraq security 

relationship over the coming years? 

Answer. The greatest challenge facing the U.S.-Iraq security relationship is the 

successful transition to a more traditional security cooperation relationship—with a 

robust bilateral and multilateral training and exercise program—despite the complicated history we share, persistent sectarian violence, and tensions over Iranian 

support to Syria and proxy forces in the region. If confirmed, I will support efforts 

to work with the Iraqis to make sure that we maintain and expand our bilateral 

security relationship and will seek to bolster the U.S.-Iraq defense partnership on 

a wide array of security matters. 

Question. Iraq faces a resurgent violent extremist threat that has sought to exploit popular discontent with the current Maliki Government, particularly within 

Sunni communities in western Iraq. 

What role, if any, should the United States play in assisting the Government of 

Iraq in confronting the threat of violent extremism? 

Answer. Iraq is the lead in providing for its own security, but the United States 

plays an important role in providing Iraq with security assistance to counter violent 

extremism. Information sharing, non-operational training and advice to the Iraqi 

Counterterrorism Services, and provision of key defense systems through the foreign 

military sales program play an important role in improving the capability of the 

Iraqi military in its campaign against extremists. 

Question. In your view, what conditions, if any, should the United States place 

on the provision of equipment or assistance to the Government of Iraq in its fight 

against violent extremism? 

Answer. I believe we already have sufficient conditions in place. All countries receiving defense equipment and assistance through the foreign military sales program are required to abide by stringent end-use monitoring (EUM) protocols that 

govern the use and application of military equipment. I understand that the United 

States holds Iraq to the same EUM standards of accountability and proper use of 

equipment as with other U.S. defense partners, and the Department makes it clear 

that cooperation is contingent on the proper use of these systems. 

AFGHANISTAN

Question. In your view, has the military campaign in Afghanistan been successful 

in achieving its objectives? 

Answer. Although I have not received a full briefing on the current situation in 

Afghanistan, I believe the campaign has made significant progress. Coalition and 

Afghan partners were successful against the insurgency’s summer offensive for the 

second consecutive year. The progress made by ISAF and the ANSF over the past 

3 years has put the Government of Afghanistan in control of all of Afghanistan’s 

major cities and 34 provincial capitals, and has driven the insurgency into the countryside. I understand that the Department continues to pursue counterterrorism obVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00229 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
222 

jectives. Afghanistan continues to face many challenges, but has made positive 

strides. 

Question. What is your assessment of the performance of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in assuming the lead for security throughout Afghanistan? 

Answer. I understand that Afghan security forces are now providing security for 

their own people, fighting their own battles, and holding their own against the 

Taliban. This is a fundamental shift in the course of the conflict. The ANSF now 

conduct the vast majority of operations in Afghanistan. However, ANSF capabilities 

are not yet fully self-sustainable, and they require continued support to make lasting progress. 

Question. Do you support the retention of a limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. I understand that the United States and coalition partners are on track 

to bring the ISAF mission to a close by the end of 2014 and transition to a new, 

post-2014 NATO train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission. Beyond the TAA mission, 

I understand that the United States also plans to conduct a narrowly focused 

counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda and its affiliates. 

As the President has made clear, however, the United States must secure an 

agreement that protects U.S. Forces and must have an invitation from the Afghan 

Government in order to remain in Afghanistan. 

My view is that the United States is, and should remain, committed to a longterm relationship with Afghanistan. The United States’ fundamental goal in Afghanistan remains to defeat al Qaeda and disrupt other extremists who present a 

serious threat to the United States, its overseas interests, and its allies and partners. 

Question. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to conclude a Bilateral 

Security Agreement that ensures legal protections for such residual U.S. Forces 

after 2014, should the United States withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan? 

Answer. The President has made clear that the United States must have an invitation from the Afghan Government and must secure an agreement that protects 

U.S. personnel. 

It is my understanding that the current Status of Forces Agreement between the 

United States and Afghanistan does not have an expiration date. However, further 

consultation would be necessary if the United States were to rely on it after 2014. 

My understanding is that the administration’s position continues to be that if we 

cannot conclude a BSA promptly, we will initiate planning for a post-2014 future 

with no U.S. or NATO forces in Afghanistan. It continues to be up to the Afghans 

to determine what is in their interests. 

That is not a future I will seek, and it is not in Afghanistan’s interests. However, 

the further this slips into 2014 without a signed agreement, the more likely this 

outcome becomes. 

Question. On Thursday, January 27, 2014, the Karzai Government announced it 

will release 37 Bagram detainees whom the United States has classified as ‘‘ . . . legitimate threats to security’’. 

How will you ensure that detainees held in Afghanistan which are thought to be 

threats to our security will continue to be held by the Afghan Government? 

Answer. I understand that the Department is working through the mechanisms 

established by the Detention-related Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 

Afghanistan to resolve the matter. The MOU provides a process for the United 

States to object to releases that it deems inappropriate. Ultimately, however, the decision to release detainees is with the Government of Afghanistan. 

Question. The current end strength of the ANSF is around 350,000 personnel. At 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Chicago in May 2012, 

coalition participants discussed a proposal to reduce the future size of the ANSF to 

around 230,000, with an annual cost of $4.1 billion. 

Do you agree that any future reductions in the ANSF from the 352,000 troop level 

should be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time the reductions 

would occur? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the ANSF force structure is regularly evaluated to ensure the ANSF is right-sized based on operational and security conditions. 

If confirmed, I would review any plans for the final size and structure of the ANSF, 

including an appropriate force reduction. 

Question. Would you support reinvesting a portion of the savings from the drawdown of U.S. Forces into sustaining the Afghanistan security forces at an end 

strength at or near their current level of 350,000 if necessary to maintain security 

in Afghanistan? 

223 

Answer. If confirmed, I would review the recommendations of the military commanders on the ground regarding the force structure and requisite funding of the 

Afghan National Security Forces. 

Question. What do you see as the United States’ long-term strategic interests in 

Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. My view is that the United States should remain committed to a longterm relationship with Afghanistan. The United States’ fundamental goal in Afghanistan remains to defeat al Qaeda and disrupt other extremists who present a 

serious threat to the United States, its overseas interests, and its allies and partners. As the President said in the January 2014 State of the Union address, after 

2014, the United States will support a unified Afghanistan as it takes responsibility 

for its own future. If the Afghan Government signs the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States, a small force of U.S. personnel could remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to carry out two narrow missions: training and assisting Afghan forces, and counterterrorism operations to pursue any remnants of al 

Qaeda. 

PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between the United 

States and Pakistan? 

Answer. My understanding is that since Pakistan reopened the Ground Lines of 

Communication to Afghanistan, the defense relationship with Pakistan has improved significantly. The United States has refocused the bilateral defense relationship on shared security interests, including promoting peace and reconciliation in 

Afghanistan, finishing the job of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda 

and its affiliates, and supporting Pakistan’s fight against the militant and terrorist 

networks that threaten both the United States and Pakistan. However, if confirmed, 

I would ensure that the Department continues to engage on issues where there is 

discord, particularly the need for stronger and more effective action against insurgent groups—especially the Haqqani Network—that threaten U.S. personnel and 

their Afghan counterparts. 

Question. Do you see opportunities for expanded U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on security issues? If so, how would you prioritize these areas of cooperation? 

Answer. I believe the United States should continue to shape the defense relationship by taking a pragmatic approach, focused on cooperation in areas of shared interests, such as the fight against al Qaeda and other militant and terrorist networks. Doing so would involve supporting Pakistan military efforts to counter the 

threat of militant and insurgent groups along the border with Afghanistan. It may 

also mean working with Pakistan to develop longer-term solutions to Pakistan’s militant challenge. 

If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department engages with Pakistan where 

strategic interests diverge, such as the direction of the Pakistani nuclear program 

and support for proxy militant organizations. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s efforts to combat the threat of 

international terrorism? 

Answer. Pakistan continues to make a major contribution to the fight against terrorism. I understand that thousands of Pakistani troops are engaged in counterinsurgency operations along the border with Afghanistan. The enormous casualties 

Pakistan has suffered in the fight against terrorism demonstrate Pakistan’s strong 

commitment. 

However, I believe Pakistan also needs to counter militant and terrorist groups 

operating within its territory that do not directly threaten the Pakistani state, especially the Haqqani Network. These networks pose a direct threat to U.S. personnel, 

threaten regional security, endanger the prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan, 

and undermine Pakistan’s own stability. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe Pakistan should take to 

address the threat posed by violent extremist groups such as the Haqqani Network 

and the Taliban Quetta Shura that currently use their safe haven in Pakistan to 

launch cross-border attacks on U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces? 

Answer. I believe Pakistan needs to curtail the ability of these violent extremist 

groups to plan and execute attacks against U.S. service men and women, coalition 

forces, and Afghan National Security Forces. Pakistan should take additional steps 

to target these groups with military and law enforcement assets, improve its efforts 

to interdict improvised explosive device precursor materials, and prevent these 

groups from moving freely throughout the country and across the Afghan border. 

At the same time, Pakistan needs to continue to support reconciliation efforts to promote a political settlement that bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. 

224 

Question. What conditions, if any, should the United States place on its security 

assistance to Pakistan? 

Answer. It is difficult to make a comprehensive statement about the impact of 

conditions on security assistance to Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan do 

work together on areas of common interest, but it is important to be cautious about 

explicit conditions on assistance to encourage or require Pakistani cooperation. Any 

prospective conditions on U.S. assistance should be carefully examined to ensure 

they advance U.S. strategic interests. 

Question. In your view, what impact will the conclusion of the International Security Assistance Force mission at the end of 2014 have on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship? 

Answer. Following the conclusion of the ISAF mission at the end of 2014, the 

United States and Pakistan will still need to work to promote peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, cooperate in the fight to defeat al Qaeda, its affiliates, and 

other militant groups, and improve regional security. U.S. Force reductions in Afghanistan will amplify the importance of Pakistani support for these efforts. It is, 

therefore, critical that the United States sustain its defense relationship with Pakistan, through 2014 and beyond. 

CHINA

Question. From your perspective, what effect is China’s expanding economy and 

growing military having on the region at-large and how is that growth influencing 

the U.S. security posture in Asia and the Pacific? 

Answer. China’s rapid economic growth is welcomed by many neighboring states 

as a driving force of economic dynamism and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. 

At the same time, the scale and character of China’s military growth is increasingly 

becoming a source of concern. China’s annual defense budget is growing faster than 

its economy—with average annual increases in defense spending topping 10 percent 

over the past decade. In certain respects, China’s growing military capabilities create opportunities to partner and cooperate where our interests and those of China 

converge. However, China’s rapid rise and the relative lack of transparency surrounding its intentions are increasingly perceived as threatening in the region, especially as its modernization efforts emphasize advanced anti-access and area denial 

(A2/AD) capabilities. I understand the Department has been making investments focused on countering A2/AD environments around the world, including in the AsiaPacific region. If confirmed, I would evaluate the impact of these developments— 

as well as the impact of other security trends—on requirements for the U.S. defense 

posture in the region. 

Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China’s military modernization 

program? 

Answer. As I understand it, China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to 

fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery, and to 

counter third party intervention. China’s near-term focus appears to be preparing 

for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and deterring or denying effective 

third party intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. China is also devoting increasing 

attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China’s immediate periphery. This broader focus includes military missions such as humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief, military medicine, peacekeeping, and counter-piracy. 

Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic 

strike capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is improving 

other strategic capabilities, such as in space, counter-space, and computer network 

operations. 

Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to China’s military modernization program? 

Answer. I believe the scope and pace of China’s military modernization and China’s relative lack of transparency with respect to its military plans and programs 

require that the United States closely monitor the evolution of China’s armed forces. 

It is my understanding that the President’s strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region seeks, in part, to ensure that the United States remains the preeminent 

military power in the Asia-Pacific region so that we can continue to help preserve 

peace and prosperity. I believe the U.S. response to China’s military modernization 

should be comprehensive and encompass changes to U.S. Force posture in the region, the strengthening of Alliances and partnerships, the maintenance of global 

presence and access for U.S. Forces, and the modernization of key capabilities in 

such areas as countering anti-access and area denial capabilities. 

225 

Question. U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue has been strained over the past 

several years and efforts to establish and maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by China’s propensity for not responding to requests for 

military engagements, although there are signs that China has been more inclined 

to engage in the past 2 years. 

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military 

relations and what would be your intention, if confirmed, regarding these relations? 

Answer. I understand that the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship has 

experienced positive momentum over the past year. If confirmed, I would look for 

ways to strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship consistent with 

U.S. interests and values, in pursuit of sustained, substantive dialogue; concrete, 

practical cooperation; and enhanced risk reduction measures to manage our differences responsibly. At the same time, I would seek to ensure that we balance 

these exchanges with continued, robust interactions with allies and partners across 

the region. 

Question. What is your view of the relative importance of sustained military-tomilitary relations with China? 

Answer. I believe there is value in sustained and substantive military dialogue 

with China as a way to improve mutual understanding and reduce the risk of 

miscommunication and miscalculation. I believe we should continue to use military 

engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment 

to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play 

a constructive role in the region, to discuss the peacetime interaction of our respective military forces with a view to minimizing the risk of accidents, and to urge 

China to partner with the United States and our allies and partners in addressing 

common security challenges. 

Question. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why? 

Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can 

only truly move the relationship forward if China is equally committed to open and 

regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would support deepening and enhancing our military-to-military relationship with China. I would also continue to encourage China 

to act responsibly, both regionally and globally. 

NORTH KOREA

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean 

peninsula? 

Answer. Nearly a year has passed since the last period of heightened tension on 

the Korean Peninsula, but North Korea continues to be a serious concern for the 

United States and our allies and partners in the region. 

North Korea’s December 2012 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test 

were highly provocative acts that undermined regional stability, violated North Korea’s obligations under numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions, and contravened its commitments under the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the 

Six-Party Talks. 

My understanding is that Kim Jong Un remains in full control and is consolidating his power. There is a strong possibility of more North Korean provocations, 

as Kim Jong Un continues to consolidate his power and Pyongyang attempts to coerce us back into negotiations on its own terms. 

If confirmed, I would continue to monitor the situation closely and work with our 

allies and partners to maintain peace and stability in the region. 

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and 

its allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of 

those capabilities? 

Answer. North Korea’s missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its proliferation activities, continue to pose a direct and serious threat 

to U.S. Forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region as well as our regional allies and 

partners. Although these programs are largely untested at longer ranges, they could 

pose a direct threat to U.S. territory. 

If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department draws upon the full range of 

our capabilities to protect against, and, if necessary, to respond to, these threats. 

Question. In your view are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure 

that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran, 

and others? 

Answer. I understand that DOD, with its interagency partners, has taken several 

steps to prevent North Korea’s proliferation of weapons-related technology. These 

steps include strengthening proliferation control regimes, advancing international 

226 

nonproliferation norms, and promoting cooperation with partners to interdict vessels 

and aircraft suspected of transporting items of proliferation concern. Despite these 

efforts, I believe North Korea will continue to attempt weapons-related shipments 

via new and increasingly complex proliferation networks. If confirmed, I would work 

to enhance DOD’s countering WMD, partner capacity-building programs and the Department’s ability to discover and disrupt these illicit networks. 

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

Question. What is your view on whether or not the United States should join the 

Law of the Sea convention? 

Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. I believe that 

accession to the Convention would demonstrate a U.S. commitment to upholding the 

established legal order that codifies the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and 

airspace, including those that are critical to the global mobility of U.S. military 

forces. 

Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention help or 

hinder the United States’ security posture in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Answer. I believe that becoming a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would 

enhance the U.S. security posture around the globe, including in the Asia-Pacific region, in several ways. First, it would enable the United States to reinforce all of the 

rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea codified in the Convention, including those that 

are critical to the global mobility of U.S. Forces. A significant portion of the world’s 

oceans are located in the Asia-Pacific region, and the ability for U.S. Forces to respond to situations depends upon the freedom of the seas. Second, it would help the 

United States promote a common, rules-based approach among other nations to resolve their territorial and maritime disputes peacefully, including those in the AsiaPacific region. Third, it would reassure some nations that have expressed concerns 

about the legal basis of cooperative security efforts that the United States supports, 

such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS

Question. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department’s CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence 

on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, 

GAO found that DOD ‘‘does not have an effective performance measurement system 

to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.’’ This is the second such finding relating to DOD CN in the last decade. 

What is your assessment of the DOD CN program? 

Answer. I am not familiar with all aspects of the DOD CN program. However, 

I know that the CN program should provide policy guidance and fiscal resources to 

perform this important mission, and it has been successful in identifying networks 

and preventing illicit drugs from entering this country. I understand the Department concurred in the 2010 GAO study that cited a need to improve performance 

measurement, and that DOD continues to work closely with the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy to refine these processes. If confirmed, I would ensure that the 

CN program continues to take concrete steps to improve its evaluation system. 

Question. In your view, should DOD continue to play a role in attempting to stem 

the flow of illegal narcotics? 

Answer. Yes. In my view, DOD should continue to play a role in detecting and 

monitoring drug trafficking. Because of its links to terrorism and other forms of 

transnational organized crime, drug trafficking has become a major national security challenge. The Department’s efforts to build the counternarcotics capacity of 

partner nation security forces have helped them prevent and deter global trafficking 

of illegal narcotics. 

Question. In your view, should DOD continue to fund the National Guard 

Counterdrug Program for Youth Intervention and local law enforcement education 

programs that may be duplicative of the efforts of other agencies, using CN funds? 

Answer. I am aware that, in light of the fiscal environment, the National Guard 

has had to limit its Counterdrug youth outreach program in recent years. If confirmed, I would work with the National Guard Bureau to assess CN programs and 

to ensure they remain effective and efficient. 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY (BPC)

Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the 

227 

global train and equip authority (section 1206) and the Global Security Contingency 

Fund. 

In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities 

of partner nations? 

Answer. My understanding is that these temporary DOD authorities are intended 

to address emerging threats, and as such the Department’s primary objective should 

be to develop near-term capacity for partners to take effective actions against these 

threats. From a strategic perspective, the Department’s objective should be to help 

partner countries develop effective and legitimate defense and security institutions 

that can provide for their countries’ internal security. Doing so reduces the burden 

on U.S. Forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promotes interoperability between U.S. Forces and allied and partner forces. If confirmed, it would be my aim to ensure that DOD security assistance programs will 

fulfill defined strategic requirements and close vitally important capability gaps. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their operations. 

Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of Special Operations Forces can 

and should be maintained in light of current fiscal challenges? 

Answer. The United States has grown Special Operations Forces substantially 

since 2001—doubling the size of the force and tripling the budget. As U.S. Forces 

draw down in Afghanistan, where Special Operations Forces have been heavily committed, the Department has an opportunity to rebalance the force to align it better 

with our overall strategy and declining resources. If confirmed, I would work with 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM to understand more fully the issues associated with developing, employing, and resourcing 

our Special Operations Forces. 

Question. Special Operations Forces heavily rely on enabling capabilities provided 

by the general purpose forces to be successful in their missions. 

In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities 

can be maintained within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities will 

remain available to Special Operations Forces when needed? 

Answer. It is my experience that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) receive excellent support from the Services. As the Department reshapes and resizes overall 

force structure, it needs to ensure proper balance, including the right density of enabling capabilities such as intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, 

and medical support that are essential to both SOF and General Purpose Forces. 

If confirmed, I would work closely with our Service Chiefs and the Commander, 

SOCOM, to ensure the Department has the right balance across the entire force. 

Question. Do you believe Special Operations Forces should develop additional organic enabling capabilities in addition or in place of those currently provided by the 

general purpose forces? 

Answer. I believe organic enablers assigned to SOCOM should be purposely designed for ‘‘SOF-specific’’ requirements. Service-common capabilities should fill the 

rest of SOF’s enabler requirements. This arrangement allows the Department to 

focus its Special Operations funding on SOF-specific requirements and avoids duplication with the Services. 

Question. The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has 

sought more control over the deployment and utilization of Special Operations 

Forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense modified policy guidance for the combatant commands earlier this year that gave SOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic combatant commanders and Special Operations Forces assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of 

SOCOM is also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move 

Special Operations Forces between geographic combatant commands. 

Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can 

be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic combatant commanders, or raising concerns 

with the State Department. 

Answer. It’s appropriate always to look for ways to manage the force more efficiently and effectively, and in this time of transition and declining resources this 

is increasingly important. At the same time, I believe the Department should maintain a proper degree of oversight and control of force deployments, as it does with 

conventional forces. I understand the Department will continue to rely on our geographic combatant commanders to oversee activities in their respective areas of reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00235 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
228 

sponsibility, similar to how they oversee Service-led activities overseas. If confirmed, 

I would work closely with interagency colleagues to ensure deployments of Special 

Operations Forces are fully coordinated and synchronized with the geographic combatant commanders and the Chiefs of Mission and Chiefs of Station in the affected 

countries. 

Question. Do you believe SOCOM is appropriately resourced to adequately support 

the Theater Special Operations Commands and Special Operations Forces assigned 

to them? 

Answer. I have not been briefed on any gap between SOCOM requests and available resources. I believe SOCOM is appropriately resourced to support the forces assigned to them. I understand a recent change gave SOCOM increased responsibility 

for the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), which also receive funding 

and support from the Geographic Combatant Commands through their respective 

Service support activities. If confirmed, I would ensure the division of responsibility 

for TSOC resourcing is properly divided between SOCOM and the Services. 

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), 

as amended, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and 

equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism. 

What is your assessment of this authority? 

Answer. Section 1208 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to combat 

terrorism in a wide range of operational environments—often where Special Operations Forces are operating under austere conditions and require specialized support 

from indigenous forces or persons. Although I have not been briefed on the particulars of these activities, I understand that combatant commanders and chiefs of mission place a high value on this program, and if confirmed, I would make it a priority 

to gain a deeper understanding of the costs, benefits, and risks associated with activities conducted under section 1208 authority. 

DOD’S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program was historically focused primarily on eliminating Cold War era WMD in the states of the former Soviet Union and Russia. The bilateral agreement with Russia has now ended. 

What are the principal issues remaining to be addressed in this program with the 

former Soviet states? 

Answer. I believe the principal issue that the CTR program needs to address in 

the former Soviet States is the threat posed by WMD terrorism. It is my understanding that the CTR Program has made significant progress to reduce the dangerous legacy of the Cold War-era WMD. In addition, I understand there is important work that could be done to assist partners within the former Soviet States to 

achieve the biosecurity measures referenced in the newly released Global Health Security Agenda. 

Question. What are the principal issues with this program in the Middle East and 

North Africa? 

Answer. I believe that reducing the threat from WMD should be the principal 

driver for the program in the Middle East and North Africa. One great example of 

this work that I am aware of is the Libyan Government’s recent announcement that 

it had completed destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile with the help from 

the U.S. Government through the CTR Program and from the German Government. 

Question. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, including DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department? 

Answer. My understanding is that the CTR Program and other non-proliferation 

programs executed by Federal agencies are coordinated well through the National 

Security Council staff. If confirmed, one of my priorities would be to ensure that all 

of the Department’s activities in this area are well-coordinated with interagency 

partners. 

Question. As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond the states 

of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation and threat reduction 

goals should the DOD establish? 

Answer. My understanding is that the President has highlighted nuclear and biological terrorism as key threats, and that the CTR Program strongly supports these 

priorities with particular emphasis on biological threats. I agree with these priorities and, if confirmed, I would work to make countering these threats a DOD priority. I understand that in the near term, one of the high-priority efforts of the CTR 

229 

Program is the destruction of the Syrian Chemical weapons and production materiel. 

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has been no decision to field a 

prompt global strike capability as the effort is early in the technology and testing 

phase. 

In your view, is there a role for a conventional prompt global strike capability in 

addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in the near future? 

Answer. Yes, I believe there is a role. Prompt global strike weapons can provide 

a means for striking high value, time sensitive and defended targets from ranges 

beyond the capabilities of existing weapons or in situations where other forces are 

unavailable. The DOD technology development program is designed to determine 

whether the Department can achieve that desired capability at an affordable cost. 

Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would you expect 

to pursue if confirmed? 

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review the status of current technology 

efforts that support this capability. If confirmed, I will monitor progress, and evaluate costs and options for implementation. 

Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence capabilities 

would be needed to support a prompt global strike capability? 

Answer. Discussion of intelligence capabilities and their limitations is classified. 

If confirmed, I will seek to understand and identify what improvement in intelligence capabilities would be needed in the context of a prompt global strike capability. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim 

of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for 

the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and 

Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued safety, 

security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest challenges 

with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile? 

Answer. I believe the greatest challenge for an aging stockpile in today’s fiscal environment is maintaining a balanced program to ensure that the current stockpile 

can be maintained and the infrastructure modernized, and that the science and 

technology program that underpins the program is adequate to meet current and 

future tasks. It is my understanding that the most recent stockpile assessment reports from our Nation’s Weapons Laboratory Directors and the Commander of 

STRATCOM indicate that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. However, the 

average age of U.S. nuclear weapons is 27 years, and the nuclear weapons complex 

includes facilities that date back to the Manhattan project. As the stockpile continues to age, efforts to sustain and certify the deterrent through warhead surveillance activities will become even more challenging. 

I understand that DOD and the Department of Energy have made significant investments in the nuclear complex since the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I would continue to work with Congress and the Department of Energy to 

update and execute a long-term modernization strategy that will continue to ensure 

the safety, reliability, security and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile. 

Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile 

as safe, secure, and reliable, would you recommend the resumption of underground 

nuclear testing? 

Answer. My understanding is that the administration’s investments in the nuclear enterprise, including the Department of Energy’s Stockpile Stewardship Program, continue to provide us confidence in the nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, I will 

look into this issue and take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that our nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. 

Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President’s plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a 

critical national security priority? 

Answer. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile is a critical national security priority. If confirmed, I would advocate for the required funding to 

do so. The section 1043 report, which I understand has superseded the section 1251 

230 

report, describes the administration’s plan for sustainment and modernization of nuclear deterrent capability, including how the plan will be funded. It is my understanding that DOD works closely with the Department of Energy, and other relevant agencies, to prioritize modernization efforts and align them with funding realities. If confirmed, I would continue that cooperation. 

Question. Can DOD afford the plan set out in the report? 

Answer. Modernizing the nuclear weapons complex is imperative to our Nation’s 

security, and, if confirmed, I would work to ensure adequate funding for this critical 

national security priority. The current plan includes extending the life of nuclear 

weapons and investing in weapons infrastructure through refurbishment of existing 

facilities and construction of new facilities. I understand that DOD and the National 

Nuclear Security Administration are funding the B61 gravity bomb, the W76 warhead for Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and the W88 warhead for Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. In the near future, cruise missile warheads and 

ICBM warheads must also be refurbished. The Nation’s nuclear weapons complex 

also requires investment in new plutonium and uranium processing facilities to 

guarantee that critical nuclear components are available for warhead modernization 

programs. Even in a constrained budget environment, DOD and the Department of 

Energy, acting through the Nuclear Weapons Council, must work to ensure a safe, 

secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. 

Question. Do you support the nuclear employment strategy released in June of 

2013? 

Answer. Yes, based on what I’ve seen in unclassified forms, I support the President’s new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security 

environment. If confirmed, I would make sure that DOD takes the steps necessary 

to implement this policy. Consistent with the President’s new guidance, I would support maintaining a credible deterrent, capable of convincing potential adversaries 

that the adverse consequences of attacking the United States or our allies and partners far outweigh any potential benefit they may seek to gain through an attack. 

Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it would 

be prudent to consider reductions below New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(START) limits for the deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons? If so, what are the 

potential risks and benefits associated with further reductions? 

Answer. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concludes: ‘‘The United States will retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent with our need to deter adversaries, reassure our allies, and hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.’’ The 

President has stated his willingness to next reduce U.S. nuclear forces by up to onethird over New START treaty limits. I believe such reductions below the New 

START treaty limits should only be done on a mutually negotiated basis, subject 

to the trajectory of other potential threats. 

Question. If confirmed will you commit to participating in exercises involved with 

the nuclear command, communications, and control system in facilities and platforms outside the Pentagon? 

Answer. Yes. 

TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will face over the next 

several years is the set of programs to modernize our tactical aviation forces with 

fifth generation tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology, to include the 

JSF. 

Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the requirements 

for and timing of these programs? 

Answer. I believe the Department needs to transition to a fifth generation capability. We need the F–35 capability to address advanced threats world-wide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare environments of the future. If confirmed, 

I will review the Departments tactical aviation modernization programs. 

Question. What is your view on the affordability of these programs? 

Answer. I believe affordability is critical to these programs, as well as with all 

of our acquisition programs and services. If confirmed, this is an area I will be reviewing closely to assess these programs in the context of the overall DOD program, 

and make appropriate adjustments in consultation with the Secretary and other Department leadership. 

Question. Even if all of the current aircraft modernization programs execute as 

planned, the average age of the tactical, strategic, and tanker fleet will increase. 

Aging aircraft require ever-increasing maintenance, but even with these increasing 

maintenance costs, readiness levels continue to decline. 

231 

Can both the maintenance of the legacy force and the modernization efforts be affordable at anywhere near the expected budget levels? 

Answer. Given expected budget levels, balancing the costs of maintaining an 

aging aircraft fleet while recapitalizing and modernizing that fleet is an area I 

would examine closely, if confirmed. I expect risk-informed tradeoffs to be necessary. 

The Department will have to continue to assess where trades are required to meet 

those readiness and modernization needs. 

Question. Some critics believe that there is still too much service parochial duplication in procuring new systems. 

Do you agree with these critics? 

Answer. I believe that the Department has improved in this area, but it is an area 

that requires continued vigilance and oversight to ensure the Department is not 

wasting scarce resources on duplicative systems. Service investments should be complementary to benefit the entire department 

Question. What steps will you take as Deputy Secretary to reduce such duplication? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure Service investments are complementary, and 

that any duplication I find is reduced appropriately. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the Department should 

take in the future? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will investigate what levels of readiness exist and any reasons why readiness does not match investments in maintenance. I will then determine what additional actions to take. 

UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Question. Congress has established a goal that by 2015, one-third of the aircraft 

in the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet and one-third of operational ground 

combat vehicles will be unmanned. 

Do you support this goal? 

Answer. I support the goal of fielding unmanned systems with greater capability 

for the future, especially as our National Defense Strategy shifts to one focused on 

the Pacific Region and more sophisticated operating environments than what we 

have experienced over the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Question. What is your assessment of DOD’s ability to achieve this goal? 

Answer. Based on what I know, I think the 2015 goal is overly optimistic. If confirmed, I will assess the ability of DOD to achieve this goal. 

Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve this 

goal? 

Answer. The Department should continue to focus on research and development 

efforts related to UAS and ground robotics technology, as well as on the development of concepts of operations and requirements for unmanned systems. This is 

vital to realizing increased unmanned capabilities that are properly aligned with 

evolving warfighter needs, at affordable cost. At the same time, if confirmed I will 

ensure the Department remains focused on being responsive in fielding urgently 

needed capabilities to meet the needs of today’s warfighter. 

SHIPBUILDING BUDGET

Question. With about half of the Navy’s construction and development dollars 

being needed to build nuclear submarines, the Navy’s commitment to building new 

submarines could crowd out funding needed to modernize the surface fleet. 

In your view, will the level of funding in the shipbuilding budget and certain highcost programs force the Department to make requirement decisions in a constrained 

budget environment that may not be in the best interest for our national security? 

Answer. There are multiple options to make the shipbuilding budget support our 

national security including new procurements, modernizing legacy systems and security cooperation with other navies. It will take a balanced approach to sustain a 

maritime force structure adequate for national defense with acceptable risk. If confirmed, I will assess the shipbuilding budgets and programs and the potential consequences to operational capabilities over time, to include the industrial base. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take to address this concern and ensure adequate funding for the ballistic missile submarine 

replacement program? 

Answer. I believe the strategic deterrence value of the Ohio Replacement Program 

remains valid. If confirmed, I will evaluate the need for, and level of, funding. I understand the Navy is working to manage the affordability of the Ohio replacement 

by managing requirements and leveraging advantages of the Virginia submarine 

program. 

232 

Question. Do you believe that certain high cost ‘‘national assets’’ should be funded 

outside the services’ budgets where they do not have to compete with other critical 

weapon systems modernization needs of the Services? 

Answer. At this time, I do not believe that moving programs outside of the Service 

budgets will protect programs or reduce pressure on the Department’s topline. If 

confirmed, I will work with Congress to properly fund prioritized programs within 

the overall defense budget. 

CYBER SECURITY

Question. Deputy Secretary Lynn and Deputy Secretary Carter were heavily involved in developing the DOD cyber strategy. 

If confirmed will you also play a major role in DOD cyber issues? 

Answer. In 2013, for the second year in a row, Director of National Intelligence 

James Clapper named cyber as a top-tier threat to the Nation. If confirmed, I would 

invest significant time and attention to cybersecurity and to DOD’s ability to operate effectively in cyberspace. I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense and 

others to make certain that DOD can accomplish its three principal cyber missions: 

to defend the Nation from strategic cyber-attack; conduct effective cyber operations 

in support of combatant commanders, when directed; and defend DOD networks. 

TEST AND EVALUATION

Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the desire 

to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to perform adequate testing? 

Answer. Testing is needed to validate system performance, and I believe it is a 

necessary part of the acquisition process. The optimal balance of cycle time and testing is likely unique to each system, and, if confirmed, I would seek to examine opportunities to achieve this goal. 

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we should procure 

weapon systems and equipment that has not been demonstrated through test and 

evaluation to be operationally effective, suitable, and survivable? 

Answer. Systems should demonstrate their effectiveness, suitability and survivability through operational testing prior to a full rate production decision. In specific 

cases, based on the nature and seriousness of the deficiencies found in testing, it 

may be acceptable to continue production while the deficiencies are corrected. There 

can be circumstances when it might also be necessary to field a system prior to 

operational testing in order to address an urgent need in a critical capability, especially in those circumstances when the system is better than anything already in 

the field. Even then, operational evaluation should still be done at the earliest opportunity to assess the system’s capabilities and limitations and identify any deficiencies that might need to be corrected. 

FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

Question. In the past, the QDR and the Department’s leaders have endorsed the 

statutory goal of investing 3 percent of the Department’s budget into science and 

technology programs. 

Do you support that investment goal? 

Answer. Yes. I recognize the critical importance of a robust science and technology 

program that can develop and deliver near-term capabilities and maintain long-term 

options for the Department. As we consider the Department’s future budget situation, every part of the budget must be assessed to identify the appropriate level of 

investment consistent with the Departments’ needs and long-term strategy. 

Question. How will you assess whether the science and technology investment 

portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs of the Department? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary, the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs, the Services, and others to establish guidelines for investment priorities. Based on these priorities, I would work through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to assess the adequacy of the current science and technology investment portfolio and to identify any changes required in the planned program to address the Department’s priorities. 

Congress established the position of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

to serve as an independent voice on matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with 

Congress which allows him to preserve his independence. 

Question. What is your view on the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide oversight of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will rely on the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to provide both me and the Secretary independent and objective evaluations of 

233 

system key performance parameters and their effectiveness and suitability for the 

Department’s systems. This function is critical to advancing our acquisition priorities and ensuring the effective stewardship of our resources. I will meet regularly 

with the Director to review the scope, content, and findings of the operational and 

live-fire testing being conducted by the Department. 

Question. Do you support the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s ability 

to speak freely and independently with Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the 

February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you implement them? 

Answer. Yes, I support the conclusions of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The policy priorities laid out in the BMDR are still valid, and, if confirmed, I would continue U.S. efforts already underway to implement them. 

Question. Do you agree that operationally effective and cost-effective ballistic missile defenses are essential for both Homeland defense and regional defense and security? 

Answer. Yes, even in these days of tight budgets, it is important that we invest 

in effective, affordable missile defense systems. If confirmed, I would support the 

U.S. commitment, described in the 2010 BMDR, to deploying capabilities that have 

been proven through extensive testing and assessment and that are affordable over 

the long term. 

Question. The two most recent attempted intercept flight tests of the Groundbased Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets, one in December 2010, using a Capability Enhancement-2 (CE–2) kill vehicle, and one in July 

2013, using the older CE–1 kill vehicle. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) has inducted that MDA’s highest priority is correcting the problems that 

caused these flight test failures, and that such corrections need to be demonstrated 

through successful intercept flight testing. 

Do you agree that it is essential to demonstrate through successful and operationally realistic intercept flight testing that the problems that caused these flight test 

failures have been corrected, and that the GMD system will work as intended, with 

both the CE–1 and CE–2 kill vehicles? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. 

Question. On March 15, 2013, Secretary Hagel announced plans to improve our 

Homeland ballistic missile defense capability to stay ahead of ballistic missile 

threats from North Korea and Iran, including the deployment of 14 additional 

Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) at Fort Greely, AK, by 2017. Secretary Hagel stated that, prior to deploying these 14 additional GBIs, there would need to be confidence that the system would work as intended, through successful testing of the 

GMD system with the CE–2 kill vehicle. 

Do you agree with Secretary Hagel’s ‘‘fly before you buy’’ approach that the GMD 

system needs to demonstrate successful operationally realistic intercept flight test 

results before we deploy any additional GBIs? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. 

Question. In a recent report, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation said 

that the GMD flight test failures had raised questions about the robustness of the 

EKV design and recommended that the Department consider redesigning the EKV 

to be more robust. The Department is already planning a re-designed EKV, and 

Congress supported the funding requested for fiscal year 2014 to develop Common 

Kill Vehicle Technology. 

Do you agree there is a need to improve the GMD system, including through development and testing of a re-designed EKV and improvements to sensor and discrimination capabilities, to increase the reliability and performance of the system 

against evolving homeland missile threats from North Korea and Iran? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. 

Question. DOD has successfully completed deployment of Phase 1 of the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense and is proceeding toward 

planned deployment of Phases 2 and 3 in 2015 and 2018, respectively, to protect 

all of NATO European territory against Iranian missiles. 

Do you support the EPAA and other similar United States regional missile defense efforts and, if confirmed, will you work to implement them? 

Answer. Yes. Our regional missile defenses are an important element of our deterrence and defense strategies, and provide an essential capability for defending U.S. 

Forces and presence abroad, and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I would conVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00241 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
234 

tinue to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach as well as other regional 

missile defense efforts. 

READINESS FUNDING

Question. After almost a decade of combat operations, each of the military Services faces a rising bill for maintenance and repair. The Army has stated that reset 

funding will be needed for at least 2 to 3 years beyond the end of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The Marine Corps leadership has acknowledged that a $10 

billion bill awaits at the end of combat operations, but has requested only $250 million for reset this year. The Navy has identified a 1-year backlog of deferred ship 

and aircraft depot maintenance. The Air Force has requested funding for only 84 

percent of needed aircraft repairs this year. 

What level of priority do you place on reset and reconstitution funding for the 

Military Services? 

Answer. Reset and reconstitution are important to the Services as they transition 

from a counterinsurgency-focused force to a force ready and capable of operating 

across a full range of operations across the globe. Reset activities are funded out 

of the OCO budget. The Department needs these funds, and I understand that OCO 

funding, or some similar funding mechanism, will need to continue for several years. 

Some equipment can be repaired and some will have to be replaced if required for 

future contingencies. Reset and reconstitution requirements must be carefully managed to ensure these funds contribute to future readiness. If confirmed, I will work 

to ensure this happens. 

Other maintenance needs are funded out of the base budget. Given the magnitude 

of sequestration reductions and despite some relief as a result of the BBA of 2013, 

the Military Services will have to make tough choices to balance their budgets to 

maintain the All-Volunteer Force, maintain readiness, and sustain infrastructure 

and modernization investments in equipment while continuing to give priority support to troops deployed in combat. If confirmed, I will make every effort to ensure 

adequate funding for these initiatives, consistent with the budget limitations that 

Congress places on the Department. 

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address maintenance backlogs and ensure that the military departments request adequate funding for reset, 

reconstitution, and other maintenance requirements? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to monitor readiness reporting and work 

with the service secretaries and other components to ensure DOD is prepared to 

achieve the National Security Strategy goals. 

PROTECTION AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

Question. DOD has fallen victim to numerous internal threats, leading both to 

physical attacks and loss of life, and the theft and exposure of huge amounts of sensitive and classified information. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 included legislation mandating reforms of the personnel security system and integration of that reformed system with other elements of a coordinated insider threat program. Prior 

NDAAs mandated comprehensive insider threat protection programs coordinated 

with cybersecurity systems. The President issued a memorandum in late 2012 directing all departments and agencies to build and maintain an insider threat analytic capability that is integrated across many different domains and functions, including personnel security, personnel records, counterintelligence, law enforcement, 

information assurance, and computer network auditing. These requirements present 

a daunting information technology acquisition and integration challenge. 

What type of management structure, resources, and authorities do you believe is 

necessary to succeed in this endeavor? 

Answer. I believe the Department must take a very deliberative approach to understanding and evaluating potential threats posed by insiders while simultaneously 

ensuring that privacy and civil liberties are preserved. As I understand it, DOD is 

working both internally and with OMB, OPM, and other agencies to develop better 

approaches to guard against insider threats. I believe this challenge, and the associated challenges of information technology acquisition and integration, require the 

sustained attention of the Department’s leadership. If I am confirmed, I will utilize 

the tools and procedures available to me as the Department’s Chief Management 

Officer to ensure that the Department meets these critical challenges 

ANNUAL INCREASE IN RATES OF BASIC PAY BELOW THE EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX

Question. The Department requested an across-the-board pay raise for 2014 for 

military personnel of 1 percent, versus a 1.8 percent rise in the Employment Cost 

Index (ECI) benchmark, and has indicated that in order to restrain the growth of 

235 

personnel costs, similar below-ECI pay raises may be necessary over the next several years. 

What is your assessment of the impact on recruiting and retention of pay raises 

below the increase in ECI in 2015 through 2018? 

Answer. From my time as Under Secretary of the Navy, I know our military compensation package is and must remain highly competitive in order to recruit and 

retain the high quality men and women who make up our Nation’s military. 

I understand that even under the Department’s plan to slow the growth of military compensation, military members continue to receive a robust package of pay 

and benefits that compares favorably with private-sector compensation. Thus, I do 

not assess the below-ECI level pay raise as materially impacting our recruiting or 

retention efforts. 

If confirmed, I will monitor this issue and remain vigilant to ensure our military 

pay levels remain appropriate and ensure the Department remains good stewards 

of the funds provided by Congress and the American taxpayers. 

RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN THE ARMED FORCES

Question. In your view, do DOD policies concerning religious accommodation in 

the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who 

have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. Yes. From my previous experience as a Marine Corps Officer and Under 

Secretary of the Navy, I believe the Department is fully committed to the free exercise of religion. 

Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and discipline? 

Answer. Yes. That is my understanding of the current law and policy. 

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers 

offered by chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper 

balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious 

beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no 

religious beliefs? 

Answer. Yes. I have had numerous opportunities during my decades of service in 

the Department to observe firsthand how chaplains strike this balance by considering their audience and the tenets of their faith before addressing groups in formal 

and informal settings. 

Question. DOD Instruction 1300.17, ‘‘Accommodation of Religious Practices Within 

the Military Services’’ provides that servicemembers submitting requests for waiver 

of religious practices will comply with the policy, practice or duty from which they 

are requesting accommodation, including refraining from unauthorized grooming 

and appearance practices unless and until the request is approved. 

In your view, does the requirement to comply with the policy from which the servicemember is seeking a waiver unless and until it is approved interfere with the 

accommodation of religious faith of a person, such as a male of the Sikh faith whose 

faith requires an unshorn beard, if that servicemember must comply with grooming 

standards that require that he shave his beard pending a determination of the waiver? 

Answer. Servicemembers accept the standards of service upon entry into the military. 

My understanding is the Department has recently updated its policy in this area 

to provide more latitude for members in favor of accommodation which can be approved on a case-by-case basis as long as those waivers do not affect mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline, health and safety. 

If confirmed, I look forward to receiving an update on the Department’s revised 

policy. 

Question. Section 774 of title 10, U.S.C., authorizes members of the Armed Forces 

to wear items of religious apparel, such as the Jewish yarmulke, while wearing their 

uniform so long as the items are neat and conservative and do not interfere with 

the performance of military duties. 

Does DOD policy presumptively allow the wear of religious apparel or do 

servicemembers have to request approval in every instance, even for the wear of apparel that is neat and conservative and that does not interfere with the performance 

of military duties? 

Answer. My understanding is that servicemembers must comply with the uniform 

policies of their individual Service. 

236 

Question. Do you believe that requests to waive grooming and appearance standards and to wear of items of religious apparel are more appropriately addressed 

prior to the member’s entry into military service? 

Answer. My understanding of the Department policy is that it does allow members to request waivers at any time during their service. 

Question. Under what circumstances would you consider it appropriate to grant 

waivers for grooming and appearance standards and for wear of religious apparel 

for all members of a specific faith group? 

Answer. Given my concern for the safety and well-being of our personnel and the 

often dangerous and austere conditions in which they operate, I cannot envision a 

set of circumstances that would make for a blanket waiver from military standards 

advisable. I believe the best approach is a case-by-case examination for each servicemember and duty station or service specialty. 

Question. Under what circumstances would you consider it appropriate to grant 

waivers for grooming and appearance standards and for wear of religious apparel 

for a member of a faith group that could remain in place regardless of new assignment, transfer of duty stations, or other significant change in circumstances, including deployment? 

Answer. Given my concern for the safety and well-being of our personnel and the 

often dangerous and austere conditions in which they operate, I cannot envision a 

set of circumstances that would make a blanket waiver from military standards for 

an entire career advisable. I believe the best approach is a case-by-case examination 

for each servicemember and duty station. 

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role in assisting the Department 

to develop policy for religious accommodation for the following: 

The Armed Forces Chaplains Board? 

Answer. To inform and advise Department policies. 

Question. Ecclesiastical Endorsing Agents? 

Answer. To provide advice on specific religious practices. 

Question. Civil organizations? 

Answer. I understand the Department often receives information from various private organizations and this information helps inform us regarding the views of the 

public. 

Question. Section 533 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112–239) protects 

rights of conscience of members of the Armed Forces and chaplains of such members, and prohibits, so far as possible, use of such beliefs as the basis of any adverse 

personnel action, discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some religious denominations have sincerely held beliefs in 

opposition to same-sex marriage. 

In your view, may a member of the armed forces who has a sincerely held belief 

in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse personnel action or similar 

other adverse action, if he or she shares those personal views on the subject in an 

official capacity? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has a longstanding practice 

of generally not supporting the expression of personal views in one’s official capacity 

because of the likelihood of confusion between the two. 

Question. Can he or she be subject to adverse personnel action if they express personal views on same sex marriage in their personal capacity? 

Answer. My understanding is the Department does not inhibit the rights of members to talk about their beliefs, as long as such speech is free of compulsion or coercion and does not encroach upon the dignity and respect of others who do not hold 

the same moral or religious views. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. On December 20, 2013, the President commended the Pentagon leadership for moving ahead with a broad range of initiatives to address sexual assault 

in the military, including reforms to the military justice system, improving and expanding prevention programs, and enhancing support for victims. The President directed the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to continue their 

efforts and to report back to him by December 1, 2014, with a full-scale review of 

their progress. 

What is the Department’s plan for complying with the President’s directive? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is working collaboratively 

with the White House to ensure the report reflects its progress toward satisfying 

the President’s goal of detailing major improvements in the prevention and response 

to sexual assault, demonstrates the Department’s efforts and leadership on the 

issue, and shows clear measures of progress—both quantitative and qualitative. 

237 

Question. If confirmed, do you expect to participate in the progress review directed 

by the President? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will actively, and vigorously, participate in and support this review process. 

Question. If confirmed, what will be your role in the Department’s effort to prevent and respond to sexual assault in the military? 

Answer. The Secretary has made it very clear that eliminating sexual assault 

from the armed forces is a priority. I share his commitment. Sexual assault is a 

crime and since it erodes the trust and cohesion that is central to our values and 

our operational mission effectiveness, it has no place in our Nation’s military. 

If confirmed, I intend to be an active participant in the Secretary’s comprehensive 

efforts to prevent this crime from occurring, and if it does occur, ensuring we protect 

victims’ privacy, provide responsive care, professionally investigate these crimes, 

and hold offenders appropriately accountable. 

The Department must sustain its focus and current level of emphasis on this 

issue and continue fielding solutions that inspire victim confidence. If confirmed, I 

will support these efforts wholeheartedly. 

Question. What is your view of the role of the chain of command in addressing 

sexual assault in the military? 

Answer. I support the Department’s position on the importance of retaining the 

Chain of Command as an integral part of an effective response to sexual assault. 

Commanders make countless important decisions every day, both in and out of 

combat that impact the lives and careers of servicemembers and their families. They 

are accountable for mission accomplishment as well as the health, welfare, and 

readiness of those under their command. Having a defined role in the administration of justice helps commanders carry out these critical responsibilities. 

END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

Question. What is your understanding of the Army and Marine Corps’ ability to 

meet their end strength reduction goals without forcing out soldiers and marines 

who want an opportunity to compete for career service and retirement? 

Answer. I understand that the Army will continue to use lowered accessions and 

natural voluntary attrition as the primary levers to reduce end strength. Involuntary measures, however, are necessary to achieve lowered end strength goals. The 

Army has taken a proactive and transparent approach to communicating the drawdown to the force. The Army is committed to a fair board process and will work to 

ensure an equitable process for transitioning soldiers and families by affording them 

the maximum amount of time to transition while connecting them with opportunities for continued service in the Reserve component, civilian employment, education, 

and healthcare prior to separation. 

Similarly, I understand the Marine Corps is maximizing voluntary incentives to 

meet its end-strength goals. The Commandant of the Marine Corps provided testimony in November that he intended to work with Congress to ‘‘map out a resource 

strategy that protects our global interests as a nation, keeps faith with our 

servicemembers, and provides the greatest value to the American people.’’ The 

NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 increased the allowable rate of drawdown for the Marine Corps to 7,500 per year. 

If confirmed, I will be committed to achieving the highest quality force within our 

allocated end strength. 

Question. What programs are in place to ensure that separating and retiring 

servicemembers are as prepared as they can be as they enter a struggling economy? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department’s current Transition Assistance Program (TAP) provides information and training to ensure servicemembers 

leaving military service are prepared for their next step—whether pursuing additional education, finding a job in the public or private sector, or starting their own 

business. 

Question. What impact, if any, will the additional budget authority for fiscal years 

2014 and 2015 provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act have on the end strengths 

of the Services? 

Answer. If the Budget Control Act’s sequestration-level cuts remain the law of the 

land, not only would they force deep reductions in force structure, they would also 

starve the Department of funds for readiness and maintaining our technological 

edge. I understand that Budget Control Act spending caps remain in place for fiscal 

year 2016 and beyond and there is significant lead-time involved in adjusting military end strength levels. This may inhibit the Military Services from using any of 

the additional fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 budget authority provided by 

the Bipartisan Budget Act for this purpose. 

238 

Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping 

tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past 2 years? 

Answer. Based on my experience as the Under Secretary of the Navy, I believe 

the Department has been granted the necessary force shaping tools to meet the 

drawdown in its current plan. 

However, continued budget reductions may make it necessary to review the size 

of all components of the Total Force—the Active and Reserve components, DOD civilians and contractors. 

If confirmed, I am committed to studying this issue in detail. 

RECRUITING STANDARDS

Question. Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents unique challenges. 

What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces? 

Answer. I believe our qualification standards are appropriate with respect to aptitude, medical fitness, and adaptability. Today, our measures of quality are at some 

of the highest rates over the history of the All-Volunteer Force. 

In my experience, the All-Volunteer Force continues to perform exceptionally well. 

Over the past 12 years of protracted conflict, the military has proven its ability to 

accomplish the mission when tasked. These standards have helped to ensure we 

have the strongest and most respected military in the world. 

Question. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of eligible enlistees 

without sacrificing quality? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the Military Departments to make certain our 

policies are not overly restrictive and allow us to recruit a diverse force drawn from 

the best and the brightest of our youth. 

Question. In your view, are there any enlistment requirements or standards that 

are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful military service? 

Answer. I am not aware that the Department’s military enlistment standards are 

overly restrictive. The Services employ medical fitness, adaptability, and aptitude 

standards that correlate to the physical, disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive 

demands needed to succeed in the Armed Forces. We continually assess and modify 

our policies based on empirical data or changes in law. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Department in January rescinded the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has given the Military Services until January 

1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception 

to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. 

The services are working now to develop gender-free physical and mental standards 

for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards. 

If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. The Services and Special Operations Command are conducting the review and validation of their occupational standards. 

If confirmed, along with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, I will monitor their progress toward integration of female servicemembers into previously closed positions, in accordance with each of their implementation plans. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed I will ensure I will monitor the progress of the Military 

Departments in terms of reviewing and validating their occupational standards to 

ensure the standards are current, definitively tied to an operational requirement, 

and gender-neutral. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you take to ensure that such 

decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. Yes, it is in the best interest of the Department to allow both men and 

women who meet the validated standards for military positions and units to compete for them on the merits. 

If confirmed, I will ensure I monitor the progress of the Military Departments. 

239 

RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. The President’s budget request for the Department’s Unified Medical Program has grown from $19 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $49.4 billion in fiscal year 

2014. In recent years, the Department has attempted to address this growth 

through fee increases for military retirees, while also attempting to identify and implement other means to ensure the viability of the military health system in the 

future. 

Do you agree with the health care efficiencies proposed by the Department over 

the past few years? 

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to keeping faith with our troops and will 

continue to review military health care and be transparent about any proposed 

changes. Efficiencies that preserve care and resources should be our first move. 

Given today’s budget environment, we must continue to look for savings opportunities, and given the dramatic cost increases, this should include military health care. 

Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, 

do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health 

care? 

Answer. I understand the Department included proposals in the fiscal year 2014 

President’s budget that would slow the growth of healthcare costs while preserving 

and enhancing the quality and range of health care. If confirmed, I will continue 

this comprehensive review of all initiatives that would help control the costs of military health care. 

Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs 

on future DOD plans? 

Answer. As I understand the situation, health care consumes nearly 10 percent 

of the Department’s budget and could grow considerably over the next decade taking 

an ever larger bite of our ability to invest in our people or in enhanced warfighting 

capability. I realize the healthcare benefit is a key component of retention for our 

men and women so I will work closely with the healthcare leadership in DOD to 

find reasonable and responsible ways to stem this growth without breaking faith 

with our troops and their families. 

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service and the Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, 

successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis 

over the past several years, many challenges remain. 

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the Services 

to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured 

servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. The Walter Reed revelations in 2007 were a sobering moment for the Department. I believe we have made significant progress in how we support our recovering servicemembers. However, there is still more to learn, and more to be done. 

As the military continues to draw down forces in Afghanistan and moves to a new 

readiness posture, the focus will be to ensure current practices are maintained and 

updated to prevent us having to relearn the lessons of the last decade. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department’s healthcare professionals to better understand both the visible and invisible wounds of war, and continue to support advancements in how we support servicemembers and their families through treatment, recovery, rehabilitation, and possibly transition out of service. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, 

and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will be a proactive participant in making certain the necessary resources are in place to properly take care of our recovering wounded, ill, 

and injured servicemembers and their families. I am particularly interested in understanding the research initiatives we have in place to evaluate the effects of PTSD 

and TBI, making certain we are addressing these signature injuries of our most recent conflicts in a meaningful way. 

Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that the 

Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs achieve the administration’s objectives 

in DOD and VA collaboration? 

Answer. I understand and support the Department’s commitment to continually 

improve DOD–VA collaboration and ensure our support to servicemembers and vetVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00247 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
240 

erans. Secretary Hagel has made it clear that he intends to strengthen efforts with 

Secretary Shinseki to accelerate improvements to our interoperable systems and 

processes. I understand the Department has cooperated with VA and assisted in reducing VA’s disability claims backlog from nearly 611,000 to 400,000 during the 

course of 2013 and the hope is it will continue to be reduced in 2014. If confirmed, 

I will support efforts to improve cooperation on joint initiatives such as the electronic health record, care coordination, medical care and transition issues. I look forward to working with the veterans community as well in identifying ways of reducing our claims backlog and outreach. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue to be of great 

concern to the committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to help prevent 

suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all 

servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. Suicide is influenced by many factors: stressed relationships, mental 

health, substance misuse, legal and financial issues, exposure to trauma, social isolation, and many other influences from the broader social, cultural, economic, and 

physical environments. 

Suicide is a serious problem that causes immeasurable pain, suffering, and loss 

to individuals, families, survivors, military formations, and to military communities. 

The health and resilience of the force, our military members, and our Family 

members increase our combat effectiveness, and our overall readiness. 

I know the Department has placed a significant amount of emphasis on implementing a wide variety of resilience programs in place to help our servicemembers. 

Suicide prevention requires our best efforts, and the attention of leaders at all levels. Thus, if confirmed, I look forward to learning more about these efforts and it 

would be my intent to become engaged in, and supportive of, these important programs. 

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life 

programs for military families, such as family support, childcare, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially 

as DOD’s budget declines. 

How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment and retention 

and quality of life programs and your own top priorities for the Armed Forces? 

Answer. Quality of life programs improve the well-being and resilience of our 

servicemembers and military families and enhance the Department’s ability to recruit an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). We cannot sustain the quality and readiness of 

today’s AVF without also supporting their family adequately. It is part of an overall 

holistic approach to both readiness and personnel compensation. 

Taking care of our servicemembers and their families is one of the Department’s 

top priorities. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize those quality of life programs 

that effectively meet our servicemembers’ needs and that of their families. 

Question. If confirmed, what military quality of life programs would you consider 

a priority, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to sustain them? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to sustain key quality of life 

programs that support mission and family readiness. The benefits of core programs 

such as family support, child and youth programs, spouse employment and education, and Morale, Welfare and Recreation programs are invaluable to the wellbeing and readiness of military families and deserve the support of the Department 

and Congress. 

I will strive to enhance cooperative relationships with advocacy groups to leverage 

resources that optimize support for the military community. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Servicemembers and their families in both the Active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go 

with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for 

servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that 

241 

family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light 

of current fiscal constraints? 

Answer. I believe the Department has a responsibility to help prepare families to 

face the challenges inherent with military service and deployments. Focusing on the 

social, financial, educational, and psychological well-being of military families will 

help to build and sustain resilient families. 

If confirmed, I will prioritize sustainment of family resilience programs in the current fiscally constrained environment, while continuing to review and adapt them 

to improve efficiency and to maximize support from non-government sources. 

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global 

rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end strength? 

Answer. Family readiness services including health care, non-medical counseling, 

education, and employment support must be available to families wherever they reside. Innovative solutions, such as web-based delivery systems, allow the Department to be more flexible and responsive to the diverse needs of the population. 

The Department should continue to engage with Federal agencies, as well as local 

governments, businesses, and non-profit stakeholders to address the myriad aspects 

of military life, and work together to provide the necessary resources. 

If confirmed, I will consider these impacts on our military families to ensure their 

needs are met. 

MEDICAL MARIJUANA

Question. What is your assessment on the need for legitimate scientific study of 

the efficacy of medical marijuana in alleviating the symptoms of post-traumatic 

stress disorder experienced by servicemembers and veterans? 

Answer. This is not something I have studied in detail. I would look to our medical leadership for an assessment. I understand that the Federal Government’s position is that marijuana does not have a valid medical purpose, but some research 

efforts have been undertaken. 

HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING

Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human capital plan that specifically identifies 

gaps in the Department’s civilian workforce and strategies for addressing those 

gaps. DOD has not yet produced a strategic human capital plan that meets the requirements of these provisions. 

Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies gaps in the 

workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key step toward ensuring 

that the Department has the skills and capabilities needed to meet future challenges? 

Answer. I believe this type of plan, and the workforce skill assessments required 

to develop it, would be of significant assistance to the Department’s efforts relative 

to acquiring developing, and retaining the workforce needed to meet current and future mission challenges. 

Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements of section 115b 

regarding the requirement for a strategic human capital plan? 

Answer. I will, if confirmed, ensure that the Department strives to meet the 

human capital plan under section 115b and assess the need for any changes. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies with these requirements? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will continue to work toward ensuring the Department fully complies with statutory strategic workforce planning requirements. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, 

regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. I believe the proper treatment of detainees is of paramount importance to ensuring the Department has principled, credible, and sustainable detention policies and procedures. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. Yes. The Department must ensure that it holds its personnel to the highest standards of treatment while detaining individuals in the context of armed conVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00249 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
242 

flict. Gaining intelligence from captured enemy forces is paramount to the war effort, and it must be done in a manner consistent with our values. Early in his first 

term, President Obama established the Army Field Manual on Interrogation as the 

‘‘standard’’ for all U.S. Government agencies to adhere to. It is my understanding 

that this has been strictly adhered to throughout all DOD agencies, Services, and 

commands. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and 

plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and 

tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 

and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues to implement policies that are consistent with its current humane treatment standards. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes, without reservation. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of Defense? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I am committed to provide information relating to my 

position and the performance of the Department. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes, and I look forward to working with the committee and staff on advancing the Nation’s security. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

STRATEGIC DISPERSAL

1. Senator NELSON. Mr. Work, since 2005, congressional and military leadership 

have reaffirmed the importance of dispersing the Atlantic Fleet in two ports. In February 2005, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Clark, stated that it 

was his view that, ‘‘over-centralization of the [carrier] port structure is not a good 

strategic move . . . the Navy should have two carrier-capable homeports on each 

coast.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘ . . . it is my belief that it would be a serious strategic 

mistake to have all of those key assets of our Navy tied up in one port.’’ Despite 

current fiscal constraints, both the current CNO, Admiral Greenert, and the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary Mabus, have affirmed their commitment to accomplishing strategic dispersal of the east coast fleet. 

The principle of strategic dispersal is decades old. What is your understanding of 

the principle of strategic dispersal and what are your thoughts regarding the priority of accomplishing strategic dispersal on the east coast? 

Mr. WORK. It is my understanding that the Navy remains committed to the concept of strategic dispersal. Strategic dispersal ensures that the fleet’s ships and aircraft, their crews, supporting maintenance, training-critical infrastructure, and the 

public/private skilled labor force required to keep these assets running, are located 

at different locations in the continental United States, Hawaii and Alaska, U.S. territories, and overseas to the greatest degree possible consistent with available resources. I supported the general idea of strategic dispersal as Under Secretary of 

the Navy, and continue to do so. 

It is my understanding that the Navy’s goal remains to strategically disperse its 

east coast fleet to the maximum extent practical. At this point, there are two major 

surface fleet concentration areas on the east coast, including the Hampton Roads 

243 

area of Virginia and Mayport, FL. Submarine bases are likewise distributed on the 

east coast in Groton, CT and King’s Bay, GA. At this point in time, however, all 

east coast carriers and support infrastructure are consolidated within a 15 nautical 

mile radius in the Hampton Roads area. The Navy remains committed to strategic 

dispersal of east coast carriers, and I believe the Navy would still like to homeport 

a carrier in Mayport in the future. Due to fiscal constraints, the Navy has been 

forced to defer the investment required to homeport a carrier in Mayport at this 

time. 

If confirmed, I will continue to monitor Navy plans for strategic dispersal, particularly with regard to the east coast carrier fleet. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

CYBER SECURITY

2. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Work, the National Commission on the Structure of 

the Air Force recently released their findings, which highlighted the importance of 

the National Guard and Reserve in the U.S. cyber mission. Specifically, it noted that 

the Guard and Reserve were uniquely positioned, because of their part-time status, 

to attract and retain the best and the brightest in the cyber field. I have long-agreed 

with this assessment, and introduced the Cyber Warrior Act which would establish 

National Guard cyber teams in each State to leverage this talent pool. In addition 

to the Air Force Commission review, I know that DOD is also looking at the role 

of the Reserve component in U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). If confirmed, do 

I have your commitment to look at the role of the Reserve component beyond 

CYBERCOM? 

Mr. WORK. I agree that the National Guard and Reserves provide the Joint Force 

with a wide array of talents in cyber and a variety of other important joint capability areas. As such, if confirmed, I commit to looking at the role of the Reserve 

component in supporting CYBERCOM. Although not fully briefed on the initiative, 

I understand the Department is currently conducting a mission analysis looking at 

this very subject in response to section 933 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014. If confirmed, I look forward to working across the 

Department to ensure that the mission analysis is both rigorous and thorough, and 

meets congressional timelines. 

3. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Work, I want to be helpful to DOD in recruiting the 

best talent and acquiring the best tools for our cyber mission. In your opinion, what 

can Congress do to assist DOD in this effort? 

Mr. WORK. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014’s requirement for CYBERCOM to 

build infrastructure to conduct military-specific operations was a critical step for 

equipping the cyber mission force with the tools necessary to fulfill its missions. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure that cyber capabilities 

for CYBERCOM, the Military Departments, and the Services are appropriately 

resourced and efficiently managed. 

As part of this effort, I would monitor Departmental efforts to recruit and retain 

highly-qualified personnel in our officer, enlisted, and civilian cyber workforces. 

However, I understand there are challenges to organizing and equipping the total 

cyberspace workforce. For example, although the Services have plans to retain their 

most talented uniformed cyberspace operators, I have been told that the recruitment 

and retention of our civilian cyberspace workers is lagging. One way to tackle this 

problem is to encourage more students to enter Science, Technology, Engineering, 

and Mathematical (STEM) fields, and to incentivize some of them to pursue a career 

in the DOD cyber workforce cyber career. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

with Congress and the acquisition community within DOD to advance STEM education and recruit highly skilled personnel from less technical educational backgrounds as well. 

4. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Work, what do you believe DOD needs in order to remain on the cutting edge of cyber defense? 

Mr. WORK. The quality of our people—Active, Reserve, civilian, and contractors— 

is what sets the U.S. military apart from all others. This is especially true in the 

realm of cyber warfare. To remain on the cutting edge of cyber defense, DOD needs 

to continue to invest in an elite, highly trained military and civilian workforce to 

carry out its missions of defending the Nation against strategic cyberattack, supporting combatant commands, and defending DOD networks. In addition to investing in quality people, DOD needs to continue investing in the tools, technical infraVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00251 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
244 

structure, and intelligence capabilities necessary for conducting effective cyberspace 

operations. 

In my view, DOD must also build information systems that are more difficult to 

attack and easier to defend. Over the coming years, DOD is planning to invest in 

the Joint Information Environment, an information system composed of consolidated 

data centers, enterprise services, and a single security architecture. In achieving 

those goals, the Joint Information Environment should make it easier for DOD to 

see threats, prevent intrusions, and improve network defense operations. 

Finally, cyber is a true national and international team sport. DOD needs to 

maintain strong partnerships with other government agencies, with the private sector, and with international allies and partners to defend the United States and its 

interests against cyberattacks. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress 

to ensure DOD’s cyber capabilities remain unequalled in the world. 

5. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Work, in your advance policy questions you were 

asked about ways to increase the pool of eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality. I think this is an especially important question as it pertains to our cyber workforce. If confirmed, will you look at some of the requirements for emerging missions, 

such as cyber, to determine if there are alternative requirements that we might consider in order to truly attract the best and the brightest? 

Mr. WORK. Success in cyberspace will rely on our people—just as it does in other 

domains. The Services have a long history of excellence in recruitment, and I am 

confident that they will attract the best and brightest enlisted personnel to this 

growing career field. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to ensure that they 

can recruit and retain highly skilled cyber personnel who remain competitive, in 

both rank and position, with military personnel in other career specialties. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT

6. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Work, would you please share with me information 

about all the cases in which a convening authority did not follow the legal advice 

of his or her staff judge advocate or Article 32 investigating officer about whether 

to prefer charges for sexual assault, rape, or sodomy, or attempts, conspiracies, or 

solicitations, to commit these crimes? 

Mr. WORK. Sexual assault is a major problem in our military that must be aggressively addressed. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you, Secretary Hagel, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Services, and all Members of 

Congress to improve the Department’s ability to determine the scope of the sexual 

assault issue, to increase awareness and improve DOD policies so that victims feel 

confident reporting incidents, and to hold accountable those that perpetrate these 

crimes. 

Based on a preliminary review of recent cases across the Services in 2012, sexual 

assault-related charges were referred to court-martial in every case in which a staff 

judge advocate recommended that the case go forward. At this time, however, I do 

not have any information about instances in which a convening authority disagreed 

with the recommendations of an Article 32 investigating officer, or in which a convening officer decided to refer charges after a staff judge advocate or Article 32 investigating officer recommended against doing so. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MEDICAL RECORD SYSTEM

7. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Work, DOD was charged with modernizing its 

health record infrastructure almost 7 years ago. To date, over $1 billion has been 

spent in the effort. Although many Secretaries have directed the action, DOD is still 

using the legacy Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application. The improvements made to date seem to be superficial and overly expensive. The health 

records are still not interoperable with the current Veterans Affairs (VA) system. 

System modernization cost estimates are said to be $28 billion. What will you do 

to ensure that DOD will modernize its health record system quickly? 

Mr. WORK. Providing high-quality healthcare for current servicemembers and 

their dependents, and facilitating high-quality healthcare for our veterans are 

among our Nation’s and DOD’s highest priorities. I fully support Secretary Hagel’s 

decision to pursue a competitive acquisition strategy for a new DOD electronic 

health record that is compatible with VA electronic health records. I also support 

245 

Secretary Hagel’s decision to assign acquisition oversight of the program to Under 

Secretary Kendall. 

I am not aware of the combined amount that both Departments (DOD and VA) 

have spent to date on the effort to improve health record infrastructure. If confirmed, I will support efforts to improve cooperation on joint initiatives with the VA, 

such as electronic health records, with two distinct goals: (1) Modernize the software 

supporting our clinicians; and (2) ensure health data interoperability among VA, 

DOD, and the private sector. The Department’s commitment to achieving these 

goals in the most efficient and effective way possible is demonstrated by the ongoing 

personal engagement of Secretary Hagel. I also plan to be personally engaged and 

ensure this priority program remains on track. 

8. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Work, is DOD currently reviewing any system modernization methods that could occur at significantly lower cost (such as adopting VA 

records infrastructure)? 

Mr. WORK. DOD is pursuing a competitive acquisition strategy for electronic 

health records that will consider commercial alternatives that may offer reduced 

cost, reduced schedule and technical risk, as well as access to increased capability 

and capacity by leveraging ongoing advances in the commercial marketplace. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION CUTS

9. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Work, the Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA) reduced 

the impact of sequestration by $22 billion in fiscal year 2014 and $9 billion in fiscal 

year 2015. With this additional funding as a result of this agreement, how will DOD 

prioritize readiness funding levels for these fiscal years—by program or capacity, 

and what will the readiness impacts be for fiscal year 2016, should sequestration 

remain a reality? 

Mr. WORK. I have not had the opportunity to review the President’s budget for 

2015. However, Secretary Hagel has said the BBA enabled the Department to mitigate the most serious cuts in readiness and modernization accounts in both fiscal 

year 2014 and fiscal year 2015. Nevertheless, some challenges remain at the fiscal 

year 2015 budget levels. As Secretary Hagel announced on 24 February, after careful deliberation, the administration has proposed a $26 billion investment ‘‘bridge’’ 

in fiscal year 2015. As I understand it, approximately 40 percent of this added investment would be devoted to readiness; 40 percent would be devoted to modernization; 2 percent would be devoted to infrastructure; and the remainder for other 

pressing needs. 

As for fiscal year 2016 and out, Secretary Hagel has stated for the record that 

full sequestration level funding generates unacceptable levels of risk to our national 

security. The administration’s budget proposal includes an additional $115 billion 

across the remainder of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). This $141 billion total increase to the current budget caps ($26 billion in fiscal year 2015, and 

an additional $115 billion across the FYDP) will help to preserve force readiness as 

DOD shifts from a wartime footing to a more sustainable peacetime posture. 

I cannot tell you at this point exactly how DOD is planning to prioritize its readiness funding. However, if confirmed I will do my best to ensure that resources are 

prioritized to support the readiness requirements for our warfighters worldwide. I 

lived through the ‘‘hollow force’’ of the late 1970s, and have no desire to do so again. 

If confirmed, I will do everything humanly possible to make sure we retain a force 

ready to respond to any contingency. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION CUTS

10. Senator KAINE. Mr. Work, the Budget Control Act (BCA) originally placed 

DOD under reduced discretionary spending caps that have since been adjusted by 

the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) and the BBA. These across-the-board cuts 

have had significant negative implications for readiness, operational capacity, and 

our military personnel and their families. Fortunately, the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2015 aims to ease the strain on DOD by $26 billion in 2015 

and $115 billion over the next 5 years. Considering the adjustments that have been 

made with respect to ATRA and BBA, and with the proposed cap adjustments in 

246 

the President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request, how much of the original sequestration cuts is DOD proposing to absorb? 

Mr. WORK. As you indicate, after careful deliberation, the administration has pro- posed an additional $26 billion defense investment ‘‘bridge’’ on top of the BBA fiscal 

year 2015 caps, and an additional $115 billion in defense spending above BCA levels 

across the remainder of the FYDP. How much DOD will absorb of sequestration depends on future congressional action. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

SEQUESTRATION

11. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, I believe we can all agree that sequestration has 

had a devastating impact on our Nation’s military readiness. However, I also believe 

many are under the mistaken impression the Ryan/Murray agreement solved this 

problem. It did not. It helped, but DOD is still subject to $76.96 billion in sequester 

cuts in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015. Even with the small relief in fiscal 

year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, do you think we can execute the current Defense 

Strategic Guidance? If you believe we can execute the strategy but with greater risk, 

can you explain what you mean by risk? To me, risk equals lives, the lives of our 

men and women in uniform. 

Mr. WORK. As Under Secretary for the Navy, I participated in the Strategic Review that followed the passage of the 2011 Budget Control Act. This review sought 

to balance strategic ends, ways and means with the $487 billion reduction in 

planned defense spending over a 10-year period. I believe the results of that review, 

as outlined in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance that followed, maintained an excellent balance between strategic aims and expected resources. 

I left the Department of the Navy in March 2013, just as DOD was coming to 

grips with the impact of an additional $500 billion in cuts necessitated by sequestration. I am aware that the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) ordered by Secretary Hagel, and the subsequent fiscal year 2015 budget review, 

looked closely at ways to accommodate potential reductions. Based on Secretary 

Hagel’s recommendations, the President proposes to budget at the cap level in fiscal 

year 2015 but at levels that exceed the caps by a total of $115 billion for the years 

fiscal year 2016 through 2019. The President also proposes, and Secretary Hagel 

supports, a government-wide initiative to add some funding in fiscal year 2015. 

I have not yet seen or been able to analyze the defense strategy in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which, as I understand, will update the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Nor have I seen the Chairman’s Risk Assessment associated with the QDR. However, if confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the Department of Defense (DOD) identifies and clearly communicates with Congress the risks 

and strategic choices associated with resourcing the strategy. 

ALTERNATIVES TO THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

12. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, you are currently the Chief Executive Officer of 

the Center for New American Security (CNAS). CNAS recently participated in a 

joint think-tank exercise which offered alternatives to the QDR and proposals for 

the fiscal year 2015 defense budget. Though the author was another CNAS analyst, 

CNAS’s recommendations appear to draw upon work you had previously conducted. 

For example, in a May 29, 2013, briefing, you proposed a smaller Army, smaller tactical air forces, a smaller Navy, an expeditionary-focused Marine Corps, while retaining a special operations force and air and sea mobility forces, which are comparable in size to current levels. In addition, you proposed to invest in technologies 

such as electromagnetic rail guns, unmanned systems, cyber, and directed energy 

weapons. I must say, this sounds much like the 2001 all over again. Specifically, 

Secretary Rumsfeld’s Transformation Initiative advocated for smaller forces using 

new technologies. Therefore, are these positions incorporated in the fiscal year 2015 

defense budget? 

Mr. WORK. As Secretary Hagel stated at his press conference on February 24, 

2014, the Department’s fiscal year 2015 budget supports the joint force’s ability to 

defend the United States against all strategic threats, build security globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression, and remain prepared to win decisively against any adversary should deterrence fail. Although I am not aware of the 

details of the fiscal year 2015 budget proposal, the broad outlines highlighted in the 

Secretary’s speech seem consistent not only with the approach I advocated in my 

247 

CNAS work, but also with the requirements of U.S. Forces in this dynamic security 

environment. It seems to me that DOD has chosen to take selective reductions in 

end strength and force structure in order to sustain investments in readiness and 

modernization. As a result, although the joint force will be smaller, it will become 

more modern and more ready to confront a broad range of future defense challenges. 

I think this is the right overall approach. 

13. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, would it not be more prudent to reduce the size 

of our forces after we have developed the technologies you envision? 

Mr. WORK. I believe the Department must begin to act now to ensure that it can 

rebalance the force for the future. This will require difficult tradeoffs between nearterm capacities and future capabilities that Secretary Hagel has been discussing 

since the Strategic Choices and Management Review. 

Given reduced resources, in practical terms this means that if we want a force 

that is ready while it continues to modernize, it will likely be necessary to scale 

back force structure. Only by reducing some parts of the force now will we have the 

resources necessary to develop the systems and capabilities that the future force will 

need to confront a broad range of challenges. From what I understand, the fiscal 

year 2015 President’s budget submission follows this general approach. 

14. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, over the last 50 years, time and again we have 

seen assumptions regarding our national security proven wrong. Given today’s current security environment, can we afford to bet it all on a smaller force? 

Mr. WORK. Some degree of uncertainty is unavoidable in defense planning, as we 

must always make choices in the present that will limit some future options. The 

challenge is to strive for a force that is well-trained, well-led, well-equipped, ready 

to adapt to unforeseen circumstances, and with the will to win, despite the odds or 

level of adversity. Such a force depends first and foremost on the quality of the people, not on technology or force structure—that is why the U.S. Armed Forces stand 

apart from all others. 

Said another way, continuing to invest in a robust joint force with diverse capabilities and a broad set of missions is one means of hedging against uncertainty. 

But equally, if not more important, is ensuring that the U.S. Armed Forces continue 

to attract the Nation’s most capable, adaptable, and dedicated professionals. Maintaining force structure per se does not ensure that we will retain a capable force. 

Indeed, were the Department to retain more forces than it could afford to keep 

trained, ready, and well-equipped, it would risk undermining the quality and readiness of its force and, hence, its adaptability. 

If confirmed, I intend to work tirelessly with other Department leaders to continually weigh the risks of fielding too small a force against those associated with holding onto force structure at the cost of underfunding training, readiness, and modernization. 

NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE STRATEGY

15. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, a new QDR should be published soon. This is a 

critical document which sets DOD’s strategies and priorities. Recently, DOD conducted a Strategic Choices Management Review, commonly called the Skimmer. The 

Skimmer explored different military capabilities based upon various funding scenarios. Both of you have watched the Skimmer process closely and Ms. Wormuth 

you have worked on the QDR itself. Many are concerned that in an effort to seek 

defense cuts, the new QDR will expose the United States to risks which recently 

would have been unthinkable. Therefore, will the QDR articulate where we are 

going to be taking additional risks? 

Mr. WORK. I did not participate in the development of the 2014 QDR nor have 

I been briefed on it. However, the QDR statute requires an assessment of risk, and 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to submit his own assessment 

of the review, including his assessment of risk and a description of the capabilities 

needed to address such risk. If confirmed, I will closely review both the QDR report 

and the Chairman’s risk assessment to understand the levels of risk assumed in our 

strategy, and how it seeks to reduce, hedge against, or mitigate them. 

That said, based on his recent speech, Secretary Hagel has said that under the 

PB15 proposals, the military can protect the United States and fulfill the President’s defense strategy—but with some increased levels of risk. His speech provides 

more detail on those risks. 

248 

16. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, will the defense cuts cause major changes to our 

National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy? 

Mr. WORK. It is my understanding that the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy are under development. I have not been briefed on either 

of them and therefore do not know their current status. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the National Military 

Strategy and with interagency counterparts on the National Security Strategy. 

17. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, how can you tell when a strategy has gone from 

being budget-informed to being budget-driven? 

Mr. WORK. A budget-informed strategy begins by defining one’s objectives; assessing threats, challenges, and opportunities impinging upon those objectives; and then 

determining how best to harness available resources in the pursuit of them. A budget-driven strategy is not really a strategy at all but rather an exercise through 

which the force is developed to fit a given funding level. The former approach has 

several advantages because it enables decisionmakers to set priorities, make tradeoffs, and adjust investments in ways appropriate to the demands of the security environment and the strategy. Such an approach also helps one to understand more 

clearly the risks associated with the choices one has made. Budget-informed strategy and planning cannot eliminate risks but offer a proven means of making best 

use of the resources available. Such an approach is especially important in times 

of diminished resources. 

18. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, how are our risks affected when you change from 

being budget-informed to being budget-driven? 

Mr. WORK. In a budget-informed approach, risk is identified by comparing what 

the force can or cannot do in terms of national security objectives. Risk is characterized in terms of the ability (or inability) of military forces to conduct all missions 

called for by the defense strategy. That ability can be defined in terms of the expected time and/or costs associated with conducting required missions. It can also 

define the level of risk associated with executing the mission successfully (high, 

moderate, or low). 

A budget-driven approach simply identifies what the force can do, making risks 

more difficult to identify, mitigate, or manage. It is also more likely to miss opportunities to pursue innovative mixes of investments and approaches to accomplish desired objectives. 

ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

19. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, included in last year’s Senate version of the NDAA 

was a provision to create a new position, the Under Secretary of Defense for Management, which would replace the existing DOD Deputy Chief Management Officer 

(DCMO) and combine them with the DOD’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) functions. The purpose was to empower the modernization effort of DOD’s business/back 

office functions. However, many believe such duties should rest/have rested with the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. Do you believe we should create an Under Secretary 

for Management which combines the DCMO and CIO functions? 

Mr. WORK. I have not yet had the opportunity to study the recommendation you 

refer to, or understand its intent. I therefore am not comfortable offering an opinion 

at this time. In the most general sense, however, I agree more attention on the 

DOD’s business/back office functions is required-especially in this time of scarce defense resources. I believe reducing overhead and becoming more efficient should be 

top priorities for all senior DOD managers. If confirmed, I plan to aggressively pursue this belief. The Secretary took important steps last December to strengthen the 

Office of the DCMO, which I support. I believe that we should allow these reforms 

to be implemented and mature before we decide to establish a sixth Under Secretary 

of Defense. 

20. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, what will be the role of the DCMO if you are confirmed? 

Mr. WORK. It is too early for me to answer this question definitively. If confirmed, 

I must first assess the progress made on Secretary Hagel’s most recent headquarters review, as well as the capability of the DCMO organization. I would likely 

first focus the DCMO on strengthening, streamlining and cutting the costs of those 

business activities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and in the Defense agencies. These organizations include about 45 separate organizations with 

about 110,000 civilian, military, and contract employees. They currently account for 

249 

approximately $84 billion of annual defense appropriations ($34 billion on Defense 

Health Program alone). It is these organizations that make up what Secretary referred to last November as the ‘‘world’s largest back office.’’ 

Because the scope, scale and complexity of these 45 agencies currently exceeds 

what can reasonably be expected to be overseen by the Department’s five Under 

Secretaries, my sense is that their business operations are ‘‘under-governed.’’ If confirmed, I would focus the DCMO on assessing the defense agencies’ business operations in direct support of the Under Secretaries, so as to strengthen their authority 

to provide direction and control over the related policy matters of those entities. By 

taking steps to strengthen the management of the OSD staff and defense agencies, 

as well as the rest of the Department, through an empowered DCMO function, I 

would aim to help Secretary Hagel deliver a higher level of service to the military 

departments at lower cost to the American taxpayer. 

COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

21. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, Congress established the Military Compensation 

and Retirement Modernization Commission to review military compensation and retirement systems and to make recommendations to modernize those systems. The 

Commission will report its recommendations in February 2015. Do you believe the 

administration should propose fragmented changes to personnel compensation and 

benefits before the Commission makes public its recommendations in 2015? 

Mr. WORK. Based on my time as Under Secretary of the Navy, I believe the Department has ample analyses and information to request changes in some forms of 

military compensation. I also believe the Department must strive to find the proper 

balance between competitive pay and benefits and sustaining a force equipped with 

the latest technology and ready to meet current and future challenges. If confirmed, 

I would work with Secretary Hagel, the administration, and Congress to find that 

balance. 

Due to the complexity of the military retirement system, however, I agree that 

changes in this area should not be fragmented. They should only be considered and 

evaluated in the context of a holistic, top-to-bottom review of the system, such as 

the one being conducted by the Commission. 

22. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, how would development of a piecemeal package 

of retirement benefits and compensation reforms get us to an optimal solution for 

controlling DOD’s sky-rocketing personnel costs? 

Mr. WORK. Finding the appropriate balance between providing the men and 

women who serve our great nation a competitive package of pay and benefits while 

also providing them the best possible training and equipment is a monumental challenge in the current fiscal environment. Based on my experience as Under Secretary 

of the Navy, I can readily see how adjusting some military personnel compensation 

costs now would allow the Department to achieve the balance it seeks, and that our 

men and women deserve. 

However, due to the complexity of the military retirement system, I believe 

changes should not be made in this area until the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission completes its work and any recommendations 

it might make can be reviewed and evaluated by the President, the Department, 

and Congress. 

23. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, Congress and the President have both promised 

our men and women in uniform that they would be grandfathered from any changes 

in the military retirement system. Do you support grandfathering those currently 

retired and those serving from any proposed changes? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, I do. I believe that any retirement changes should be grandfathered; to do otherwise would break faith with our members. 

24. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, do you feel that current servicemembers should 

also be grandfathered for all changes to proposed military benefits? Why or why 

not? 

Mr. WORK. If confirmed, I will remain committed to ensuring that any proposed 

changes keep faith with those who are serving today and with those who have 

served in the past. That said, I will also remain committed to ensuring that the Department finds the proper balance to maintain force structure, readiness, and modernization capabilities while adequately compensating personnel. These will require 

hard choices in all parts of the defense program, including military benefits. 

250 

MISSILE DEFENSE

25. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, do you agree there is a need to improve the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system against evolving Homeland missile 

threats from North Korea and Iran? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, based on my understanding of the evolving threat, I think we 

need to improve the GMD system. If confirmed, I would look at the options and 

make recommendations to Secretary Hagel. 

26. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, would you support funding for the development 

of a redesigned kill vehicle for the ground-based interceptor and improvements to 

sensor and discrimination capabilities? 

Mr. WORK. Yes. 

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

27. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, last month during a visit to Wyoming, Secretary 

Hagel said, ‘‘it’s clear that we have some work to do on [nuclear] modernization.’’ 

Secretary Hagel also said ‘‘we’re going to invest in the modernization we need to 

keep the deterrent stronger than it’s ever been, and you have my commitment to 

that.’’ If confirmed, would we have your commitment to modernize our nuclear 

triad? 

Mr. WORK. Yes. Our nuclear forces make vital contributions to the national security of the United States and our allies and partners. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the report on the President’s June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy 

make clear the President’s commitment to maintain the nuclear Triad and a safe, 

secure, and effective nuclear stockpile and infrastructure. 

Accordingly, if confirmed, I will vigorously support the President’s and the Secretary’s commitment to modernize U.S. nuclear forces, the nuclear stockpile, and its 

associated infrastructure. 

28. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, your predecessor, Dr. Ashton Carter, observed 

that nuclear weapons are ‘‘not a big swinger in our budget’’. Were you aware that, 

according to recently released Congressional Budget Office (CBO) figures, total DOD 

and Department of Energy (DOE) funding for nuclear forces accounts for only 4 percent of national defense spending in 2014? 

Mr. WORK. I am aware of the CBO Report and the figures reported. 

29. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, do you consider this to be a reasonable and necessary investment in U.S. national security? 

Mr. WORK. Yes. Based on my experience, I believe the planned investment in our 

nuclear forces is both reasonable and necessary. Our nuclear forces deter strategic 

attack on the United States, provide extended deterrence to our allies and partners, 

and contribute to strategic stability writ large. If confirmed, I will maintain the Department’s focus on, and prioritization of, this vital component of our national security. 

INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

30. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, two recent reports on cheating suggest a disturbing problem with integrity in the Armed Forces. The Navy reported on February 

4 that 30 senior sailors serving as instructors cheated on written exams at the Navy 

Nuclear Power School. This follows a recent Air Force incident in which 92 airmen 

at Malmstrom Air Force Base were implicated in a cheating incident involving intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) readiness examinations. Both incidents are 

under investigation. But they follow recent reports of senior officers and officials 

who behaved as if ethics rules didn’t apply to them or who mistook toxic leadership 

for effective leadership. I view the recent failures of junior personnel as a failure 

of leadership. Do you agree and if so, why? 

Mr. WORK. At this time, I am not privy to anything more than newspaper reports 

about these troubling incidents. It would therefore be premature and inappropriate 

for me to attribute the underlying justification or causation of these incidents. 

What I can say unequivocally is that integrity, personal courage and accountability are the hallmarks of the U.S. military, and must be reinforced-particularly 

when it comes to our strategic forces. Senior leaders, both civilian and military, 

must model and reinforce the highest standards of behavior. If confirmed, I will promote a work environment that exemplifies these ideals. 

251 

31. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, if you are confirmed, what would be your role in 

restoring integrity and accountability? 

Mr. WORK. If confirmed, I will work to implement Secretary Hagel’s efforts to foster a culture of ethical values-based decisionmaking and stewardship among senior 

DOD leaders and their staffs. I will also work with General Martin Dempsey, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to implement his general and flag officer professional character initiatives, which are aimed at maintaining the integrity of the 

military profession and preserving the public trust. 

TOTAL FORCE

32. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Work, as we enter a time of end strength drawdowns, 

we must consider the total force structure and how to best use our servicemembers 

in the Active, Reserve, and Guard components. How do you envision the composition 

of the total force as we begin troop drawdowns and wind down from the wartime 

efforts? 

Mr. WORK. I support our Total Force policy and, if confirmed, would welcome the 

opportunity to evaluate how we can best meet our security requirements using the 

Active, Reserve, and Guard components. When determining the composition of the 

Total Force, the Department looks at the expected demands and seeks a solution 

that will meet our national strategic goals, account for the strengths of each of the 

components, and fit within the budget topline. 

If I am confirmed, and as the Department steps down from its war footing, I will 

work to ensure the Department considers and implements force shifts and 

drawdowns, and adopts the Total Force composition and capacity best suited for our 

strategy and available resources. Considerations of risk, readiness and responsiveness across the full range of military operations, which involves supporting the 

homeland, quickly responding to contingencies, and providing global presence, will 

be incorporated in these deliberations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE

33. Senator WICKER. Mr. Work, combined with diplomacy and sanctions, the credible threat of military force has been a key component of the U.S. strategy to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. President Obama has repeatedly said 

‘‘all options are on the table’’ to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and 

America ‘‘will do what is necessary to prevent Iran from getting the world’s worst 

weapons’’. As diplomacy moves forward with Iran, a process I hope succeeds, I believe it is crucial that Iran understand both that additional sanctions will be forthcoming if an agreement is not reached and that we remain committed to using military force if all else fails to stop their nuclear weapons ambition. Will it remain U.S. 

policy that all options, including military force, remain on the table to prevent Iran 

from developing a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. WORK. The President has been very clear on this issue-the United States is 

determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and all options remain 

on the table to achieve this objective. These options include tough-minded diplomacy 

and economic sanctions and pressure, reinforced and complemented by credible military capabilities and options. If confirmed, I will fully and faithfully support this 

policy. 

34. Senator WICKER. Mr. Work, if confirmed, will you ensure that our forces will 

always be prepared to disrupt a potential Iranian nuclear breakout? 

Mr. WORK. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department continues to 

provide the President with all the options he might need to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL

35. Senator WICKER. Mr. Work, a central hallmark of the U.S.-Israel defense relationship has been the close cooperation between the countries. In the past few years, 

this cooperation has grown immensely in breadth and depth. As the region continues to be unstable, Israel has remained a constant ally and friend. What is your 

view of the importance of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship? 

Mr. WORK. I believe the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable, and that the defense relationship between the United States and Israel has 

252 

never been stronger. This relationship is based not only on mutual security interests, but on common values. 

I therefore strongly support the President’s and Secretary Hagel’s proven commitment to Israel’s security. This includes providing Israel with the most Foreign Military Financing in history, working tirelessly to maintain Israel’s qualitative military 

edge by authorizing the sale of advanced technology to Israel, and supporting 

Israel’s active missile defense efforts, including funding programs such as Iron 

Dome. 

With such significant change in the region, DOD must continue to forge an ever 

closer relationship with Israel. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that the 

strategic relationship between our two countries becomes stronger, and that our 

military-to-military cooperation remains robust. 

36. Senator WICKER. Mr. Work, do you intend to continue to engage and strengthen the cooperation between the United States and Israel? 

Mr. WORK. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to support the President’s and Secretary 

Hagel’s efforts to make the defense relationship between the United States and 

Israel the strongest it has ever been. Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that the 

security cooperation between our two countries is ‘‘unprecedented.’’ I believe that no 

U.S. administration has done as much for Israel’s security. 

Under the leadership of Secretary Hagel, DOD has strengthened the U.S.-Israeli 

defense relationship significantly by providing $3.1 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and by releasing some of the most advanced U.S. military capabilities—like the F–35 and V–22 aircraft. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure that 

DOD continues to expand this defense cooperation with Israel across the board and 

that our military-to-military ties are stronger than ever. 

ISRAEL’S QUALITATIVE MILITARY EDGE

37. Senator WICKER. Mr. Work, it is U.S. policy to maintain and enhance Israel’s 

qualitative military edge (QME)—effectively, Israel’s ability to defend itself, by 

itself, and against any threat or potential combination of threats. Given the growing 

instability among Israel’s neighbors and the region overall, this U.S. commitment 

is of upmost importance. How would you help to enhance Israel’s QME as Secretary 

Hagel has pledged? 

Mr. WORK. Secretary Hagel has said, ‘‘Our commitment to Israel’s security is ironclad and unyielding.’’ To me, this commitment means ensuring that Israel has what 

it needs to defend itself—anytime and anywhere. Currently, the United States is 

providing $3.1 billion in FMF, which is the most FMF that the United States has 

ever provided to any country in history. This funding commitment directly supports 

Israel’s security, as it allows Israel to purchase the sophisticated defense equipment 

it needs to protect itself, to deter aggressors, and to maintain its qualitative military 

edge. If confirmed, I will work to ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge, and that 

Israel always has access to the most advanced military capabilities possible. 

38. Senator WICKER. Mr. Work, if confirmed, will you make ensuring Israel’s QME 

is maintained a constant priority? 

Mr. WORK. If confirmed, I will work not only to preserve, but to ensure Israel’s 

qualitative military edge remains a constant priority. I fully support Secretary 

Hagel’s statement from his visit to Israel in April 2013, where he said that DOD 

is ‘‘committed to providing whatever support is necessary for Israel to maintain military superiority over any state or coalition of states and non-state actors.’’ This includes not only providing Israel with the most Foreign Military Financing in history, but ensuring that Israel has access to the most advanced military technologies 

available, including the F–35 and the V–22. 

39. Senator WICKER. Mr. Work, will you ensure our military cooperation and arms 

sales to the region are always weighed against their impact on Israel’s QME? 

Mr. WORK. I believe that ensuring that Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) 

is maintained is the cornerstone of the U.S. security assurance to Israel. Israel must 

have the ability to defeat any adversary—anytime, anywhere. 

As you well know, the United States’ commitment to Israel’s qualitative military 

edge is not just based on shared values and interests, but is U.S. law. This law provides that any proposed sale or export of defense articles or services to the Middle 

East will include a determination that the sale or export will not adversely affect 

Israel’s QME. If confirmed, I will work diligently to ensure that DOD upholds its 

253 

obligations under the law, and that we continue to support Israel’s qualitative military edge. 

40. Senator WICKER. Mr. Work, what steps should the United States undertake 

to mitigate the impact of unfolding Middle East events on Israel’s QME? 

Mr. WORK. I believe the bond between the United States and Israel is unshakable, 

and I fully support Secretary Hagel’s efforts to ensure that Israel’s qualitative military edge is maintained in the midst of the uncertainty and instability that has 

plagued the Middle East in recent years. Maintaining Israel’s qualitative military 

edge includes ensuring that Israel has access to the most advanced military technology possible. Last year, Secretary Hagel announced that the United States would 

make available to Israel a package of advanced military capabilities, including the 

V–22, advanced fighter aircraft radars, and anti-radiation missiles. This significant 

decision underscores the United States and DOD’s support for Israel’s security. If 

confirmed, I will work with our policy community and all members of the defense 

enterprise to ensure that Israel continues to have access to advanced technologies, 

and that military-to-military cooperation between the United States and Israel continues to expand and strengthen in the future. 

41. Senator WICKER. Mr. Work, when we sell arms to the Middle East, there are 

often commitments and guarantees made by the purchasers that are meant to limit 

the potential threat to U.S. interests in the region. If confirmed, will you ensure 

these commitments are closely monitored and promptly advise Congress of any violations? 

Mr. WORK. It is my understanding that when DOD sells arms to any overseas customers, the United States includes provisos to protect U.S. national security interests. These include technology security measures such as end-use monitoring requirements, equipment security, and end-use assurances where required in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. Compliance 

with these provisions is necessary to preclude inadvertent use beyond their intended 

defensive purpose. If confirmed, I will work to ensure these provisos are closely 

monitored and that any violations are identified and reported to Congress in strict 

accordance with the law. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTEE

CIVILIAN FURLOUGHS

42. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Work, can you assure me that, if you are confirmed, you 

will do everything in your power to avoid furloughs of civilians at our public shipyards and depots? 

Mr. WORK. The furlough of any civilian workers should be an absolute last resort. 

Our civilian and contracting workforce are important to the success of the defense 

of the Nation. The impact of a furlough ripples throughout the entire organization 

and directly impacts the morale and welfare of our dedicated civilian employees. 

Furloughs also degrade the readiness of our military, which depend on public 

shipyards and depots to maintain their ships, aircraft, and equipment. If confirmed, 

I will do my best to ensure that we will consider furloughs only if every reasonable 

alternative has been exhausted or no alternative exists. For example, if there is another lapse in appropriations, the Department could have no alternative but to furlough civilians. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DEB FISCHER

SECTION 8128: ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

SILOS

43. Senator FISCHER. Mr. Work, section 8128 of the fiscal year 2014 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act (H.R. 3547, Public Law 113–76) expressed congressional opposition to any environmental study relating to the silos of Minuteman III ICBMs. Specifically, it states: ‘‘None of the funds available to DOD shall be used to conduct any 

environmental impact analysis related to Minuteman III silos that contain a missile 

as of the date of the enactment of this act.’’ Please state DOD’s interpretation of 

this section. 

Mr. WORK. As I understand it, section 8128 of the Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2014 states that no funds shall be used to conduct any environmental impact 

analysis related to Minuteman III silos currently containing a missile. I also underVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00261 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
254 

stand that section 8136 of the fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, referencing section 1056 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 appears to authorize the 

Department to conduct an environmental assessment (but not an environmental impact statement), provided the Department meets certain reporting requirements. I 

believe that the Department has not yet reached a final decision on how best to interpret these provisions. 

If confirmed, I would certainly look into this issue. 

44. Senator FISCHER. Mr. Work, what interactions has DOD had with other Federal agencies or parties outside of the Federal Government to prepare for conducting 

any environmental studies on the ICBM silos? 

Mr. WORK. I am unaware of any DOD interactions with other agencies or nongovernmental organizations regarding environmental studies of ICBM silos. 

45. Senator FISCHER. Mr. Work, does DOD believe the decisions with respect to 

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) force structure depend on the results of an environmental study of ICBM silos? 

Mr. WORK. As I understand it, the President must evaluate options to adjust our 

force structure in order to implement the New START treaty. The Department’s role 

should be to develop options and recommendations for the President; and to preserve the decision space necessary for the administration to make its final force 

structure decision. 

There are different options under consideration to bring the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers within New START treaty limits. Keeping some 

number of ICBM silos warm or converting or eliminating some submarine-launched 

ballistic missile (SLBM) tubes is one possible option. Eliminating some number of 

ICBM silos while keeping SLBM tubes available is another possible option. An environmental assessment would help ensure that the Department is able to fulfill its 

responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROY BLUNT

ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES

46. Senator BLUNT. Mr. Work, you have previously discussed the importance of 

electronic warfare capabilities and the necessity of dominating the electromagnetic 

(EM) spectrum in any warfighting scenario. Your comments at the nomination hearing this week echoed the position of the CNO as it pertains to the same topic. It 

appears to me that stealth doesn’t necessarily control the EM spectrum, but more 

appropriately neutralizes limited portions of it. I am interested in the manned airborne electronic attack (AEA) full spectrum coverage and how it operates in the future. Would you please discuss the current role that the EA–18G Growler plays in 

controlling the EM spectrum for the Navy and the joint warfighter? I believe that 

it plays the most critical role in enabling mission effectiveness in contested environments. 

Mr. WORK. EA–18G Growlers bring the fundamental attributes of range, speed, 

persistence, and flexibility to regions of the globe where AEA capability is required 

to support the Joint force, whether operating from aircraft carriers or land bases. 

There is no other Joint or Navy program that offers the broad AEA capability afforded by the EA–18G aircraft. EA–18G’s have the ability to passively monitor the 

EM spectrum to provide targeting information. With legacy jamming pods or Next 

Generation Jammers, the EA–18G provides precise control of a broad range of the 

EM spectrum to create virtual tactical sanctuaries from which joint warfighters can 

execute offensive missions while providing the Joint Force with defensive capabilities. 

47. Senator BLUNT. Mr. Work, in your time with the Navy, or in your capacity 

at CNAS, have you seen or performed any analyses that address the benefit of this 

capability in the form of additional Growlers on the carrier air wing? 

Mr. WORK. Yes, I am aware of studies that have been conducted and are ongoing 

that address options for additional Growlers in the carrier air wing. However, I have 

not been briefed on the status of these studies inside DOD. If confirmed, I would 

ask to be briefed to understand the full range of options considered. 

48. Senator BLUNT. Mr. Work, aside from budget constraints, do you feel that additional Growlers could enhance operational effectiveness in the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment for not only the Navy, but also the entire Joint Force? 

255 

Mr. WORK. Electromagnetic warfare is a core competency and primary mission of 

the Joint force. The growing character of A2/AD capabilities possessed by potential 

future adversaries could create a highly contested environment requiring precise 

control of the magnetic spectrum. The Growler is the only DOD AEA tactical aircraft in the joint force inventory. The Growler with legacy jamming pods or Next 

Generation Jammers is the only flexible joint system that creates the necessary 

sanctuaries for our fourth and fifth generation aircraft to execute offensive and defensive tasks. If confirmed, I would work to obtain the highest level of electromagnetic warfare capabilities and capacities consistent with budget resources. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AND TACTICAL AVIATION DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

49. Senator BLUNT. Mr. Work, the Navy variant of the Joint Strike Fighter program—the F–35C—has an initial operational capability objective of late 2018 or 

early 2019. Last year, Secretary Kendall testified that the program made progress 

last year, but that there are remaining challenges with software, the new helmet, 

and the landing hook, in particular. I am concerned that before some of these challenges are overcome, DOD proposes shutting down the only risk mitigation to the 

program—the F/A–18 manufacturing line. I strongly disagree with the premature 

closure of the F/A–18 line. Would you please tell me how you will evaluate the risk 

still inherent in the F–35C development program and how delays might affect the 

tactical aviation inventory? 

Mr. WORK. I left government service nearly a year ago, so I do not have the most 

up-to-date information on the F–35 program. However, I understand the program 

is generally tracking with the schedule established following the 2010 program rebaselining, though challenges remain. I understand the F–35C, carrier variant, recently completed developmental testing of the re-designed arresting hook system 

with positive results. The initial at sea testing period aboard the aircraft carrier is 

scheduled for later this year. 

If confirmed, I will work with Under Secretary Kendall to ensure the F–35 program is closely monitored, that risks are carefully assessed, and issues are brought 

to resolution. I will also ensure the Department continues to carefully monitor and 

manage the strike fighter inventory to meet current and future operational requirements. 

50. Senator BLUNT. Mr. Work, do you have any concerns about the tactical aviation defense industrial base if there is a single tactical aviation provider with the 

F–35? 

Mr. WORK. Yes. Budget cuts are decreasing production and R&D for many Defense systems. In the tactical aircraft industrial base, I am concerned about maintaining engineering design capabilities for the future. To address this, I understand 

the Department has initiated a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency-led Air 

Dominance Initiative with extensive participation from both the Navy and the Air 

Force, partnered with major tactical aviation industry suppliers. This team is exploring concepts for the next generation of air dominance and undertaking prototyping efforts based on the results of concept exploration. 

I also know about and support DOD efforts to promote competition and innovation 

in aeronautics more broadly with investments in enabling technologies and programs, including the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike 

aircraft. 

[The nomination reference of Hon. Robert O. Work follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

February 10, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Robert O. Work, of Virginia, to be Deputy Secretary of Defense, vice Ashton B. 

Carter, resigned. 

256 

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Robert O. Work, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ROBERT O. WORK

Education: 

University of Illinois 

• 1970–1974 • BS Biology 

University of Southern California • 1978–1980 • MS Systems Management 

Naval Postgraduate School 

• 1988–1990 • MS Systems Technology 

John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) 

• 1993 • Masters in International Public Policy (MIPP) 

Employment record: 

Center for New American Security 

• Chief Executive Officer • April 2013–Present 

Department of the Navy 

• Under Secretary of the Navy • May 2009–March 2013 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

• Vice President for Strategic Studies • January 2007–May 2009 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

• Senior Fellow • April 2002–December 2006 

George Washington University 

• Adjunct Professor • May 2003–May 2009 

U.S. Marine Corps 

• Various Officer assignments • May 1974–2001 

Honors and awards: 

Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award, 2013 

Legion of Merit, 2001, 1998 

Meritorious Service Medal, 1996, 1992, 1988 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal, 1994 

Marine Corps Achievement Medal, 1985, 1980 

Ancient Order of St. Barbara for Conspicuous Service to Marine Field Artillery, 

1995 

1st Marine Brigade Nominee for the annual Leftwich Award, which recognizes the 

best small unit leader in the Marine Corps, 1983 

Distinguished Speaker Award, U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, 

1981 

Distinguished Honor Graduate (1 of 53), U.S. Army Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK, 

1975 

Honor Graduate (2 of 242), Marine Officer’s Basic School, Quantico, VA, 1975 

Distinguished Marine Graduate, Naval Reserve Officers Training Course, University of Illinois, 1974 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

257 

The form executed by Hon. Robert O. Work in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Robert Orton Work. 

Robert O. Work. 

Bob Work. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

3. Date of nomination: 

February 10, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

January 17, 1953; Charlotte, NC. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Cassandra Faye Baugher. 

Married Name: Cassandra B. Work. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Kendyl Taylor Work, 23. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

University of Illinois, 5/1970–8/1974; BS Biology, 8/8/1974. 

University of Southern California, 1/1978–1/1980; MS Systems Management, 1/31/ 

1980. 

Naval Postgraduate School, 6/1988–9/1990; MS Systems Technology, 9/27/1990. 

John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), 8/1992–5/1993, 

Masters in International Public Policy (MIPP), 5/26/1994. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Chief Executive Officer, Center for a New American Security, 1152 15th St., NW, 

Suite 950, Washington, DC, April 2013–present. 

Under Secretary of the Navy, Department of the Navy, 1000 Navy Pentagon, 

Washington, DC, May 2009–March 2013. 

Vice President for Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1776 K St., NW, Washington, DC, January 2007–May 2009. 

Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1730 Rhode Island Ave., Washington, DC, April 2002–December 2006 

258 

Adjunct Professor, George Washington University, Washington, DC, January 

2003–May 2009 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Member, President-elect Obama’s Defense Transition Team, November–December, 

2008. 

Member, 2006 QDR Red Team for the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

As Senior Fellow and VP for Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, provided consultative analysis for the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

Chief Executive Officer, Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, 

April 2013–present. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Member, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) 

Member, U.S. Naval Institute 

Member, Navy League 

Member, Marine Corps Association 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. $1,500 to Obama Victory Fund, 9/19/2012 

$500 to Obama Victory Fund, 9/29/2012 

$500 to Obama for America, 9/29/2012 

$100 to Obama for America, 10/26/2012 

-$100 from Obama for America 11/15/2012 

$100 to Democratic National Committee, October 2013 (2x$50) 

$117 to Democratic National Committee, November 2013 (2x$50; 1x$17) 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Scholarships: 

• Naval Reserve Officer Training Course, 4-year scholarship, University of 

Illinois, 1970–1974 

Honorary Society Memberships: 

• National Honor Society 

Military Awards: 

• Legion of Merit, 2001,1998 

• Meritorious Service Medal, 1996,1992,1988 

• Defense Meritorious Service Medal, 1994 

• Marine Corps Achievement Medal, 1985,1980 

Recognitions: 

• Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award, 2013 

• Ancient Order of St. Barbara for Conspicuous Service to Marine Field Artillery, 1995 

• 1st Marine Brigade Nominee for the annual Leftwich Award, which recognizes the best small unit leader in the Marine Corps, 1983 

• Distinguished Speaker Award, U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare 

School, 1981 

• Distinguished Honor Graduate (1 of 53), U.S. Army Artillery School, Fort 

Sill, OK, 1975 

• Honor Graduate (2 of 242), Marine Officer’s Basic School, Quantico, VA, 

1975 

259 

• Distinguished Marine Graduate, Naval Reserve Officers Training Course, 

Univ. of Illinois, 1974 

• Presidential Classroom for Young Americans, 1970 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Published Writings: 

• The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002) 

• Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge, with Andrew 

Krepinevich and Barry Watts (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, 2003) 

• Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship (Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004) 

• ‘‘Small Combat Ships and the Future of the Navy,’’ Issues in Science and 

Technology,’’ Fall 2004 

• To Take and Keep the Lead: A Naval Fleet Platform Architecture for Enduring Maritime Supremacy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, 2005) 

• ‘‘DDX,’’ Written Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 

Projection Forces Subcommittee Hearing on DD(X), July 19, 2005 

• Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow (Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2006) 

• The 313-Ship Fleet and Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan,’’ Written Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Projection Forces Subcommittee Hearing on the Affordability of the Navy’s 313-Ship Navy and 

the Executability of the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, March 30, 2006 

• ‘‘ ‘Economics’ and Established Maritime Powers: Implications of the New 

Maritime Strategy,’’ William B. Ruger Chair Workshop Report No. 2, U.S. 

Naval War College, 2006 

• ‘‘On Seabasing,’’ Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the 

Twenty-First Century (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College Newport 

Paper 26, February 2006) 

• Know When to Hold ‘Em, Know When to Fold ’Em: A New Transformation Plan for the Navy’s Surface Battle Line (Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007) 

• ‘‘Numbers and Capabilities: Building a Navy for the 21st Century,’’ in Of 

Men and Material: the Crisis in Military Resources, Gary J. Schmidt and 

Thomas Donnelly, ed, (Washington, DC: the AEI Press, 2007) 

• A New U.S. Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era, 

with Andrew Krepinevich (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007) 

• ‘‘The Global Era of National Policy and the Pan-Oceanic National Fleet,’’ 

William B. Ruger Chair Workshop Report No. 3, U.S. Naval War College, 

2007 

• Range, Endurance, Stealth, and Networking: The Case for a CarrierBased Unmanned Air Combat System, with Thomas P. Ehrhard, Ph.D. 

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008) 

• ‘‘A Cooperative Strategic for 21st Century Seapower: an Assessment,’’ 

with Jan van Tol, CSBA Backgrounder, March 26, 2008 

• ‘‘The Global Era of National Policy and the Pan-Oceanic National Fleet,’’ 

Orbis, Fall 2008 

• The Challenges to U.S. National Security, with Andrew Krepinevich and 

Robert. Martinage (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments, 2008) 

• The U.S. Navy: Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet (Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009) 

• ‘‘The Coming Naval Century,’’ Proceedings, May 2012 • 20YY: War in the Robotics Age with Shawn Brimley (Washington, DC: 

The Center for a New American Security, 2014) 

Forthcoming: 

• The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why, Newport Paper 

No. 43, (Newport, RI: Naval War College) 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

I have given many speeches over the past 5 years. I typically speak without notes, 

although I often use PowerPoint to guide me. I have attached a CD with several 

260 

examples. Below is a short list of speeches or public remarks that I made as the 

Under Secretary of the Navy and as the Chief Executive Officer of the Center for 

New American Security. 

23 July 2013 - Senate Budget Committee testimony 

12 June 2013 - Center for New American Security (CNAS) annual conference 

29 May 2013 - CNAS ‘‘Strategic Choices’’ out-brief 

17 May 2013 - EAST: Joint warfighting symposium 

26 October 2012 - Navy Flag Leadership Conference 

25 October 2012 - Navy SES Leadership Town Hall 

22 October 2012 - Navy Leadership Forum 

26 September 2012 - Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Leadership Summit 

12 July 2012 - John Hopkins APL Integrated Air—Missile Defense Symposium 

12 June 2012 - Current Strategy Forum (Naval War College) 

5 June 2012 - Navy Opportunity Forum 

21 May 2012 - CATO Institute—Speech on Fleet Design 

10 May 2012 - Navy Postgraduate School—State of the Navy 

30 April 2012 - Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

11 April 2012 - Army War College 

15 February 2012 - Expeditionary Operations Symposium 

12 January 2012 - Surface Navy Association Annual Conference 

10 January 2012 - Naval War College 

15 December 2011 - Navy Flag Officers/SES seminar 

13 December 2011 - Center for Naval Analysis—Air/Sea Battle Seminar 

28 October 2011 - Navy Flag Officers/SES seminar 

26 October 2010 - AIE Counter Anti-Access/Area-Denial Symposium 

9 June 2010 - Armed Forces Communications/Electronics Association 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

ROBERT O. WORK. 

This 10th day of February, 2014. 

[The nomination of Hon. Robert O. Work was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on March 26, 2014, with the recVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00268 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
261 

ommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on April 30, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Michael J. McCord by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. Currently, I do not see the need for modifications. I believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms have been and are effective and continue to serve us well. 

If confirmed, I will continue to assess any need to recommend changes to the act. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I do not believe any modifications are presently required. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and each of the following? 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the principal assistant 

and advisor to the Secretary on fiscal and budgetary matters. If confirmed, I will 

continue to support the Secretary in any aspect of the responsibilities of the Comptroller that the Secretary may prescribe. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. My relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense will be based on 

the role as described above. During my time as the Department’s Deputy Comptroller, the Comptroller and I have worked closely with the Deputy Secretary on 

budget and management issues and I would expect that will continue. If confirmed, 

I would support the Deputy Secretary in any matter within the purview of the 

Comptroller that the Deputy Secretary may prescribe. 

Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Under Secretaries, 

to carry out the policies and guidance of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. My relationship with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and other senior officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would be similar to that described above in relation to the other Under Secretaries of Defense. In most cases 

I would expect to deal with the Assistant Secretaries through the Under Secretaries 

to whom they report. In those cases where the Assistant Secretary reports directly 

to the Secretary, as is the case with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, I would expect to continue the excellent direct working relationships 

that both I and the incumbent Comptroller have had. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both directly and frequently through their Director for 

Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment on any matter pertaining to resourcing 

our forces and military operations and financial management. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Secretaries of the 

Military Departments on a wide range of resource allocation, budget execution, and 

other financial management issues. I will ensure that they are aware of the President’s and the Secretary of Defense’s policies and priorities and assist them in imVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00269 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
262 

plementing Departmental policies and programs as they may relate to their specific 

Services. 

Question. The heads of the defense agencies. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the heads of the defense 

agencies in any matter pertaining to resources and financial management. I will ensure that they are aware of the President’s and the Secretary of Defense’s policies 

and priorities and assist them in implementing Departmental policies and programs 

as they may relate to the specific agency. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The Department’s Comptroller and I work very closely with the Assistant 

Secretaries for Financial Management of the military departments in the development and execution of budgetary matters, fiscal policy, and initiatives of the President and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with 

the Assistant Secretaries in contributing to the successful development and implementation of effective DOD policies and programs and management of the defense 

budget. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) works closely 

with the Department’s Office of the General Counsel on a daily basis. I will, if confirmed, continue to consult and coordinate with the General Counsel on all legal 

matters, and specifically, matters related to fiscal and budgetary issues that may 

have legal implications. 

Question. The Inspector General. 

Answer. If confirmed, I consider it my responsibility to support the DOD Inspector 

General (DODIG) in carrying out his or her duties as set forth in the Inspector General Act. 

Question. The Director, Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to coordinate and work closely with the Director for Cost, Assessment and Program Evaluation in meeting his or her duties 

and in providing advice, assessments, and options to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary. I will continue to work with the Director to ensure that a robust and successful program/budget review is conducted and that our programs are aligned with and 

managed in accordance with their guidance. 

Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work to improve the management of the 

Department’s complex operations and organization. In particular, I will work with 

the Deputy Chief Management Officer on monitoring the Department’s progress on 

implementing efficiency measures directed by the President, the Secretary, and Congress, and on improving the systems that provide management information, particularly financial management information, and the development of appropriate 

metrics in those areas. 

Question. The Director, Office of Management and Budget. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the near near-daily interaction with the Office of Management and Budget on the preparation and execution of the Department’s budgets, and the advancement of both the administration’s and the Department’s management priorities. 

Question. The Comptroller General. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to review the recommendations of the Comptroller General and the Government Accountability Office regarding DOD financial 

matters and, as required, support actions to improve the Department’s processes. 

DUTIES OF THE COMPTROLLER

Question. The duties of the Comptroller of DOD are set forth in section 135 of 

title 10, U.S.C., and in DOD Directive 5118.3. Among the duties prescribed in statute are advising and assisting the Secretary of Defense in supervising and directing 

the preparation of budget estimates of DOD, establishing and supervising DOD accounting policies, and supervising the expenditure of DOD funds. 

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that Secretary Hagel will 

prescribe for you? 

Answer. To provide the Secretary and Deputy Secretary expert and timely advice 

on all issues related to the budgetary and financial management of the Department. 

To ensure that the men and women serving within the Department for their Nation, to include the members of our Armed Forces, our Federal civilian employees 

and the contractors that support them, especially those engaged in overseas contingency operations, have the resources they need to meet national security objectives. 

263 

To ensure that funds are obligated and expended in accordance with laws and regulations that govern such funds and to exercise the fiduciary responsibilities vested 

in us by the American taxpayers to provide the best possible value for their tax dollars. 

To be responsible for and accurately manage funds that have been authorized and 

appropriated to the Department by Congress. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform the duties of the Comptroller? 

Answer. I believe that my experience as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller) for the past 5 years demonstrates my qualification for this 

position. I am intimately familiar with the budgetary and financial issues that pertain to the Department. 

Including my 5 years as the Department’s Deputy Comptroller, I have over 29 

years of experience in defense budget and financial management analysis. This includes: 

The 21 years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee overseeing the DOD budget and providing expert analysis 

on issues such as funding overseas contingency operations, the fiscal impact 

of legislation, reprogramming of funds to meet emerging needs, questions 

of fiscal law and financial management, the analysis of alternative courses 

of action with respect to specific programs, and knowledge of the Federal 

budget process. 

Two years at the Congressional Budget Office analyzing military pay and 

benefits, including military retirement, and force structure costs. 

Service on the staff of the House Budget Committee working topline 

funding issues pertaining to both defense and veterans issues, which enhances my understanding of benefit issues and the areas of interaction between the two Departments, as well as the analysis of the cost of contingency operations and the overall Federal budget process. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform these duties? 

Answer. Although I have been with the Department over the past 5 years as the 

Principal Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the vast breadth of the Department’s programs and policies require me to constantly enhance my expertise as they 

relate to the Department’s budget and financial management issues. 

Question. Do you expect Secretary Hagel to make any changes in the duties of 

the Comptroller as set out in DOD Directive 5118.3? 

Answer. There are several initiatives Secretary Hagel is implementing to reduce 

size and increase the efficiency of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I believe 

it is possible roles and responsibilities within DOD may be modified once these initiatives are fully implemented, but at this time I do not anticipate any significant 

change in the duties of the Comptroller or our office or Defense agencies. 

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Question. DOD Directive 5118.3 designates the Comptroller as the Chief Financial 

Officer of DOD. 

Does Secretary Hagel intend to continue to designate you, if confirmed as the 

Comptroller, as the Chief Financial Officer of DOD? 

Answer. I have no information that Secretary Hagel would do otherwise if I am 

confirmed. 

Question. If so, what would be your major responsibilities as Chief Financial Officer? 

Answer. As specified by DOD Directive 5118.03 dated April 20, 2012, the Chief 

Financial Officer shall: 

Oversee all financial management activities relating to the programs and 

operations of DOD; 

Oversee the development and maintenance of integrated DOD accounting 

and financial management systems, including financial reporting and management controls, which comply with law; 

Direct, manage, and provide policy guidance and oversight of DOD financial management personnel, activities, and operations; 

Monitor the financial execution of the DOD budget for actual obligations, 

expenditures, and costs incurred; 

Review, the fees, royalties, rents, and other charges imposed by DOD for 

services and things of value it provides and make recommendations on revising those charges to reflect costs incurred by it in providing those services and things of value. 

264 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer? 

Answer. The Comptroller’s major and recurring challenge is to prepare and manage defense budgets and work with Congress to provide the Department the necessary resources to accomplish our national security objectives. Although the Department is transitioning from a wartime posture, it does so in an uncertain strategic environment. The Department will continue to require substantial resources 

to maintain the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces, and to carry out a broad 

range of missions at the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense on 

behalf of the Nation. 

Providing our operational commanders with the resources and flexibility they 

need to carry out their directed missions. As the world security situation continues 

to grow in complexity and move at increasing speeds, I am concerned that our current executive and legislative processes may not be agile enough to keep pace. I intend to work with the defense committees to seek the additional flexibility I believe 

we need to ensure that we can meet our Nation’s security needs in the 21st century, 

while respecting and preserving appropriate oversight on behalf of the taxpayers. 

Continuing to improve our financial management and the financial information 

available to DOD managers, providing them with the information they need to help 

identify areas where they can help make defense spending as efficient as possible. 

Maintaining a trained and capable financial management workforce in the face 

of significant challenges in recruiting, retaining, and training a skilled workforce in 

the face of the sequestration, hiring freezes, furloughs, and pay freezes the Federal 

workforce has experienced over the last several years. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with other senior officials in DOD, our 

Comptroller staff, the Military Departments and Defense agencies, the Office of 

Management and Budget, and Congress to develop policies to meet these challenges. 

I will also provide my commitment, leadership, and support to our staff in the immediate office of the Comptroller, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and 

the Defense Contract Audit Agency in meeting these priorities. 

I will ensure that we maintain our progress on the centerpiece of our financial 

management improvement efforts, which is achieving auditable financial statements. 

An important part of our efforts to maintain or enhance the quality of our financial management workforce will be to continue the strong start we have made in 

implementing the course-based certification program for Defense financial managers 

that was authorized by Congress in the fiscal year 2012 defense authorization bill. 

AUTHORIZATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. Do you believe that an authorization pursuant to section 114 of title 10, 

U.S.C., is necessary before funds for operation and maintenance, procurement, research and development, and military construction may be made available for obligation by DOD? 

Answer. The Department is committed to work with the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees to resolve any matter relating to the authorization or appropriation of the Department’s activities. If confirmed, I will continue to respect the 

prerogatives of the Department’s oversight committees, and will work closely with 

the committees to achieve a consensus necessary to meet our defense needs. 

CONTRACTING FOR SERVICES

Question. Over the last decade, DOD’s spending on contract services has more 

than doubled. As a result, the Department now spends more for the purchase of 

services than it does for products (including major weapon systems). When he was 

USD(AT&L), former-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter testified that ‘‘the 

low-hanging fruit really is [in contract services]. There’s a lot of money. There has 

been a very, very high rate of growth over the last decade, in services. They have 

grown faster than everything else. . . . So, there’s a lot we can do. I think great savings can be had there, across the Services’ spend. It’s essential that we look there, 

because that’s half the money.’’ 

Do you believe that the cuts made to contract services have fully addressed the 

issues of waste and inefficiency in this area, or are further reductions possible? 

Answer. The funding reductions the Department has already made in contract 

services are a good start. These reductions are the result of several initiatives undertaken across the Department. We have gained efficiencies by improving requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00272 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
265 

ments definition, negotiating lower labor and overhead rates, increasing competition, improving our purchasing processes, and by aggressively reviewing services 

contracts. Further reductions are possible as we reduce the military force structure 

and continue to implement process and system improvements to actively manage 

contracted services. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to control the Department’s spending on contract services? 

Answer. I support the efforts we are taking to improve our visibility into, and accountability for, contracted services. This improved data will help ensure appropriate utilization, cost effectiveness, and alignment to mission for contracted services and provide the information we need to target specific areas for improvement. 

We face the prospect of a prolonged period of constrained resources that will force 

us to continue to get the most bang for the buck in this area, among others. 

CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. The positions of Chief Management Officer of DOD and Deputy Chief 

Management Officer of DOD were established by section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. In accordance with section 904, the 

purpose of these new positions is to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness 

of the business operations of DOD and to achieve an integrated management system 

for business support areas within DOD. 

Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and 

transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of DOD’s business systems? 

Answer. Yes. The Department’s Business Enterprise Architecture and the Enterprise Transition Plan are key elements in the successful modernization and integration of our business systems. They are critical in ensuring an interoperable business 

systems environment that effectively supports our business operations. 

Question. Do you believe that the Department needs senior leadership from a 

Chief Management Officer and a Deputy Chief Management Officer to cut across 

stovepipes and ensure the implementation of a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture for its business systems? 

Answer. Yes. The Chief Management Officer and the Office of the Deputy Chief 

Management Officer play a vital and significant role within the Department. Responsible for looking holistically at the Department’s business operations, they are 

able to bring a cross-functional, end-to-end perspective to the management of the 

Department’s business operations. 

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in working with the Chief 

Management Officer and the Deputy Chief Management Officer to improve the business operations of DOD? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Chief Management 

Officer and Deputy Chief Management Officer, and the Under Secretaries of the 

Military Departments, in ensuring unified, standardized and integrated business 

processes and systems. Additionally, I will work closely with the Deputy Chief Management Officer as the co-chair of the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 

Governance Board to ensure we meet our financial improvement goals. 

Question. What responsibilities, if any, that may have formerly been performed 

by the Comptroller do you believe have been, will be, or should be reassigned to the 

Chief Management Officer or the Deputy Chief Management Officer of DOD? 

Answer. During my time as the Department’s Deputy Comptroller, the Department’s first Deputy Chief Management Officer was confirmed. Our office worked 

with hers to reconcile and clarify our responsibilities and we updated our governing 

directives to that effect fairly recently. Therefore I do not believe that any further 

changes are required, but if confirmed, I will assess the roles and responsibilities 

of the Office of the Comptroller and make recommendations for any changes required. 

AUDIT READINESS

Question. Former Secretary Panetta stated: ‘‘While we have reasonable controls 

over much of our budgetary information, it is unacceptable to me that the Department of Defense cannot produce a financial statement that passes all financial audit 

standards. That will change. I have directed that this requirement be put in place 

as soon as possible. America deserves nothing less.’’ 

What is your understanding of the efforts and progress that have been made in 

DOD toward the goal of being able to produce a clean audit? 

Answer. DOD is making real progress toward a clean audit. The large trust funds 

for retiree benefits and the revolving funds for several Defense Agencies have reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00273 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
266 

ceived positive audit results. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers earned a clean 

audit opinion, as did the U.S. Marine Corps’ Schedule of Budgetary Activity. 

There is, however, a substantial amount of work still to do, including efforts to 

address some of the most challenging problems. Under the leadership of our Comptroller, Robert Hale, the Department implemented a new strategy to achieve a clean 

audit that focuses improvement efforts on the financial information most used to 

manage, and that strategy is yielding very positive results throughout DOD. We expect most of the Department to undergo a financial audit of the Schedule of Budgetary Activity in fiscal year 2015. If confirmed, I will pursue appropriate actions to 

ensure continued progress toward meeting clean audit goals. 

Question. Do you believe the Department will meet the statutory goal and achieve 

an auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources by the end of fiscal year 2014 or 

are additional steps necessary? If so, what are those steps? 

Answer. The Department is making steady progress toward achieving a clean 

audit opinion. We intend to validate our audit readiness for budgetary accounts by 

the end of fiscal year 2014. Using the Marine Corps model, this will allow us to 

begin an audit of the Schedule of Budgetary Activities during fiscal year 2015. This 

represents a crucial step towards an auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources. 

While it is too soon to know for sure, I expect most budget statements to be audit 

ready. For those elements that are not ready, appropriate actions will be taken to 

achieve this state at the earliest possible opportunity. If confirmed, I will ensure 

that we clearly communicate our status in our regular status reports and staff briefings. 

Question. Do you believe the Department will meet the statutory goal and achieve 

an auditable financial statement by the end of fiscal year 2017 or are additional 

steps needed? If so, what are those steps? 

Answer. I believe that we have made significant progress and, if confirmed, I will 

continue the current approach that has supported this progress. We are committed 

to achieving audit readiness for all aspects of our business by the end of fiscal year 

2017, supporting an audit of all required financial statements during fiscal year 

2018 as described in this year’s defense authorization bill. I believe that we are on 

track to meet this commitment, and if confirmed, I will ensure that we sustain this 

effort. While much work remains, we have a clear understanding of the breadth of 

work that is required. 

Question. Do you believe the Department meets the statutory goal ‘‘to ensure a 

full audit is performed on the financial statements of DOD . . . ’’ for fiscal year 2018 

and that audit will be completed by September 30, 2018, or are additional steps 

needed? If so what are those steps? 

Answer. We are committed to performing a full scope financial audit of the entire 

Department in fiscal year 2018. Based on experience within DOD as well as in nondefense agencies, this initial full scope audit will likely continue well into fiscal year 

2019. 

Question. Do you believe the Department will meet the statutory goal to submit 

to Congress the results of the audit to be completed by September 30, 2018, or are 

additional steps needed? If so, what are those steps? 

Answer. The results from our initial fiscal year 2018 full-scope audit will be submitted by the DOD Inspector General when audit work is completed in fiscal year 

2019. While I am hopeful those results will be positive, experience of other Federal 

agencies as well as our own experience in auditing the Marine Corps and other entities, is that achieving an unqualified opinion the first year under audit is rare. 

Question. Do you believe in order to meet the statutory goal to conduct a full audit 

that the Department will have to place a monetary value on all of its property? 

Answer. Yes. Under current Government audit standards, the Department will 

need to value all of its property that is above the appropriate capitalization thresholds. Depending on the type of property, this information may not always be useful. 

Current accounting standards allow us some flexibility to minimize the cost of valuing property, particularly when this information is not used. 

Question. Do you believe that the Department can achieve a clean audit opinion 

through better accounting and auditing, or is the systematic improvement of the Department’s business systems and processes a perquisite? 

Answer. Strengthening the Department’s business systems and processes has 

been and is essential to achieving audit readiness. This includes timely and accurate 

accounting. The business operations of the Department are complex, often decentralized and not necessarily set up to support audit standards. We have found that we 

can achieve audit readiness by emphasizing controls in our existing systems, but 

sustaining audit readiness and supporting cost effective audits will require us to 

continue to improve and modernize our business systems and processes so that they 

can be relied upon by financial auditors. 

267 

Question. When do you believe the Department can achieve a clean audit? 

Answer. We expect most of the Department’s components to be prepared to undergo an audit of the Schedule of Budgetary Activity during fiscal year 2015. Using the 

Marine Corps experience and considering relative size, we anticipate clean audits 

for these smaller audits within several years. Building on this foundation, I believe 

the entire Department should be ready to undergo a full scope financial audit beginning in fiscal year 2018. Experience of other Federal agencies as well as our own 

experience in auditing the Marine Corps and other entities, is that achieving a clean 

opinion can take several years. 

THE FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT AND AUDIT READINESS PLAN

Question. The Department’s Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) 

plan is organized into five waves that focus on audit readiness of the Statement of 

Budgetary Resources (SBR) (waves 1 and 2), the existence and completeness of assets (wave 3), and a full financial statement audit (waves 4 and 5). 

Answer. To provide clarification, the Department’s FIAR plan is organized into 

four waves that focus on audit readiness of Appropriations Received and the SBR 

(waves 1 and 2, respectively), the existence and completeness of mission-critical assets (wave 3), and a full financial statement audit (wave 4). 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure the implementation of specific detailed plans for achieving a full audit through waves 4 and 

5? 

Answer. The Department is very close to completing the required work on the 

first 2 waves and is on track to complete Wave 3 (Existence and Completeness of 

property) by June 2016. Because of our intense focus on audit readiness of budgetary accounts, we have just provided the initial guidance for developing detailed 

plans for Wave 4—full financial statement audit. If confirmed I will ensure that 

these plans are completed and executed across the Department. Our progress on the 

auditability of our budgetary execution will provide the transaction-based foundation for full statement audits. 

Question. What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the Military Department Chief Management Officers (CMOs) in implementing the FIAR 

plan through their individual financial improvement plans (FIP)? 

Answer. One of the key roles the Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, 

as CMOs, play in their organizations is integrating and coordinating efforts between 

the functional communities (e.g., Logistics or Personnel) to improve their business 

operations. This is particularly true when it comes to financial improvement. The 

Military Department CMOs ensure that all parts of the organization recognize their 

vital role in achieving audit readiness, since most financial transactions originate 

as the result of business events in the functional communities’ operations, and work 

together to implement their FIPs. Additionally, the Military Department DCMOs sit 

on the FIAR Governance Board to help the Department maintain effective governance of the audit readiness process. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe are needed to clarify those roles and 

responsibilities? 

Answer. I believe that the role of the Military Department CMOs is clear. As the 

Under Secretaries of their organizations, they have the authority and responsibility 

necessary to ensure progress in implementing their FIPs and hold their functional 

communities, including the financial management community, accountable. 

Question. Do you believe that performance measurement and monitoring mechanisms need to be improved? 

Answer. Our current ability to link financial information to other measures of performance is not as robust as it should be. As part of our business systems modernization effort, we are improving our capability in this area. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to sustain the commitment of 

the Department’s top leadership to the long-term goal of transforming the Department’s financial management? 

Answer. Secretary Hagel has made improving financial information and audit 

readiness a Department-wide, all-hands responsibility, and if confirmed, I will do 

everything I can to support his leadership on this issue. I believe DOD leaders understand that audit success supports mission success and have embraced the need 

to transform financial management. We have made great progress in helping those 

outside the financial community understand how stronger controls will also improve 

the quality of their financial information and enhance their decision-making ability. 

I think we have made substantial progress in all aspects of financial management 

to include sustaining a professional work force through a strong certification program. 

268 

Question. Do you think that having the Deputy Secretary of Defense ‘‘dual-hatted’’ 

as the CMO is consistent with the prioritization and sustained day-to-day focus 

needed for the success of the Department’s financial improvement efforts? 

Answer. Yes. Dual-hatting the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the CMO is a critical component in ensuring that the Department’s financial improvement efforts are 

both sustained over time and given the priority needed to be successful. The seniority and cross-cutting nature of the position of CMO/Deputy Secretary of Defense ensures that financial improvement issues can be elevated to a position with the authority necessary to drive change across all components within the Defense enterprise. 

INCREMENTAL FUNDING VS. FULL FUNDING

Question. Do you believe DOD should continue to adhere to the longstanding practice of fully funding the purchases of major capital assets, including ships and aircraft, in the year the decision to purchase the asset is made, or do you believe incremental funding of such purchases is justified in some cases? 

Answer. I agree with the longstanding Office of Management and Budget policy 

on fully funding end items in 1 fiscal year. However, there are circumstances where 

incremental funding of large assets, such as nuclear aircraft carriers and complex 

military construction facilities, which often take several fiscal years to complete, can 

be appropriate. In these limited situations, and with proper management oversight, 

incremental funding would not lead to inefficient delivery of the item being financed 

over 2 or more fiscal years. Such decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis 

after careful analysis. 

Question. If you believe a change in policy is warranted, please explain how you 

believe such changes would benefit the Department and the taxpayer. 

Answer. Currently, I do not see the need for a change in policy, or a need for new 

legislation. The use of incremental funding for Procurement and Military Construction projects should be limited, and justified case-by-case. 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 INVESTMENT FUND

Question. It has been reported that the Department’s fiscal year 2015 budget request will include an outline of how it would spend an additional $26 billion above 

the fiscal year 2015 discretionary limit set in the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA). The 

reports describe the additional $26 billion as an ‘‘investment fund’’. 

How was this wedge of additional spending created? That is, was the wedge created after the fiscal year 2015 program was drafted or was the fiscal year 2015 program drafted at a higher level and then program budgets reduced so the Department’s budget would conform to the discretionary cap in the BBA? 

Answer. I cannot discuss the specifics of the fiscal year 2015 budget request at 

this time. The administration will release the budget on March 4, 2014. The Department has sought to prepare a budget that meets the President’s strategic national 

security guidance within the fiscal year 2015 discretionary spending limits in the 

BBA. Given the uncertainty of the fiscal climate difficult choices will have to be 

made. 

Question. How does the wedge differ from the Secretary of Defense-screened compilation of the Services ‘‘Unfunded Priority Lists’’ of prior years? 

Answer. As noted above, I cannot provide details on the fiscal year 2015 budget 

request at this time. 

BUDGETING BEYOND FISCAL YEAR 2015

Question. It has been reported that DOD budget projections in the out-years (beyond fiscal year 2015) may exceed the Budget Control Act (BCA) caps currently in 

law. 

What are the principal risks and possible consequences facing the Department in 

basing its fiscal year 2015 program on the assumption that out-year budgets will 

exceed the current out-year BCA caps? 

Answer. I cannot comment on the fiscal year 2015 budget request at this time. 

The Department is very concerned about our ability to execute the Defense Strategy 

if constrained to budgets at the BCA cap levels over the long term, so there is a 

risk associated with reducing our forces and capabilities down to that level. There 

is a different kind of risk in building a program that more fully supports our strategy but requires additional resources, should those additional resources not be provided. 

269 

SEQUESTER AND READINESS

Question. The fiscal year 2013 sequester reduced DOD’s funding by $37 billion. 

The Services were directed to minimize fiscal year 2013 sequester impacts on readiness. What steps did the Department take to protect readiness? 

Answer. The Department did what it could to protect readiness, and sought to 

protect training and other key readiness enablers to the extent we could given the 

discretion we have in our operations and maintenance accounts. However, given the 

across-the-board formulaic nature of sequestration and the sheer mathematical imperative to cut $37 billion in less than a full fiscal year, we were not able to completely protect readiness. The primary step we took to protect readiness was to 

shield our operations in and in support of Afghanistan from sequestration to the 

maximum extent possible by shifting those burdens to the rest of the force where 

possible. 

The fiscal year 2013 sequester resulted in significant reductions to training 

events, including fewer rotations through the National Training Center, significant 

reductions in flying hours, and decreases in Navy operations. The Department made 

sure to support our deployed forces and ensured our next-to-deploy units were ready 

to go. Due to increased costs being experienced in Afghanistan, the Department had 

to reprogram significant funds, with the strong support of our defense committees, 

to ensure support to the deployed troops was adequately funded. 

Sequestration resulted in substantial reductions in both facility and equipment 

maintenance activities. Hiring freezes and travel limitations were imposed. Most 

troubling to us was the necessity to furlough a large portion of our civilian work 

force, which could have long-term as well as short-term impacts on our readiness 

and capability. 

The Department accommodated the sequestration funding limitations in part by 

deferring some requirements from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2014. Our hope is 

the funding made available in the fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act 

will enable a gradual recovery from the readiness degradation experienced in fiscal 

year 2013. 

Question. Within the operation and maintenance accounts, what steps were taken 

to protect operating accounts and activities? 

Answer. Given the formulaic nature of sequestration, there is very little the Department could do to protect any of the accounts. In the operating accounts, priority 

was given to supporting deployed forces, treating wounded warriors, and sustaining 

family support programs. Beyond those activities, reductions in virtually all other 

operating account-funded activities such as peacetime training, facilities maintenance, depot maintenance, and base operations had to be implemented in order to 

accommodate the sequestration funding reductions. 

Question. The Ryan/Murray Bipartisan Budget-Conference Agreement reduced the 

impact of sequester on Defense by $22 billion in fiscal year 2014 and $9 billion in 

fiscal year 2015. As a result, the Department remains subject over $30 billion in 

cuts in fiscal year 2014 and $45 billion in cuts in fiscal year 2015. Under these constraints, how does the Department intend to continue to take steps to protect readiness? 

Answer. The additional $22 billion above the Budget Control Act cap level of funding provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2014 does provide an opportunity to begin a limited recovery from the readiness problems in fiscal 

year 2013. While our fiscal year 2014 budget was not built to recover from a sequester we did not anticipate in fiscal year 2013, the services and other components will 

use that topline relief provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act to recover readiness 

where possible. However, readiness is a function of time and available trained personnel and other factors beyond funding, so there will still be continued challenges 

to achieve the level of training required to improve readiness. Priority will continue 

to be given to supporting deployed forces and taking care of our wounded warriors. 

The Department will also continue the implementation of efficiencies where possible to reduce support costs. The Department appreciates the additional funding 

that was provided and will seek to maintain readiness at the highest possible level. 

Question. Does the Department intend to protect readiness in its base budget request or does it intend to request readiness resources through an additional ‘‘investment fund’’ request that lies outside of the prescribed BCA caps? 

Answer. The Department seeks to fund our essential readiness activities in our 

base budget. Because there are so many activities that enable readiness directly or 

indirectly, not all of which can be fully funded given constrained resources, it will 

probably always be possible to enhance readiness through additional investments if 

additional resources can be provided. 

270 

STRATEGIC REVIEWS

Question. What is your understanding and evaluation of the DOD’s processes for 

strategic assessment, analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting for each of the following strategic reviews? 

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (section 118 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

Answer. The QDR is required by law and asks the Department to take a longterm look at the Defense Strategy and related issues. It is important that the Department periodically conduct an intensive review and assessment of the future national security environment and highlight the required priorities. The QDR is an important tool to inform the critical decisions that need to be made concerning future 

resource levels. 

Question. The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

Answer. Section 153 directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist 

the President and Secretary of Defense in assessing the strategic and military risks 

in executing missions under the National Military Strategy (NMS). It is extremely 

important for the civilian leadership of the Department to get the best military advice possible on the military force’s ability meet the goals and objectives addressed 

in our strategy. 

Question. Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, U.S.C.); 

Answer. The Global Defense Posture Review provides an analysis and recommendations concerning the current global defense posture strategy and the status 

of key overseas posture realignments. The current Asia-Pacific pivot has engendered 

an intensive look at the changes needed to realign our global posture to the new 

priorities. My view is that this review, led primarily by the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides a disciplined 

way to focus reviews of this nature and can be used to inform future resource decisions. 

Question. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) (section 118b of 

title 10, U.S.C.). 

Answer. The QRM is required by law and the next one is due in 2016. The Department is in a very dynamic situation. As we complete the mission in Afghanistan 

and adjust to the current fiscal climate, I think it will be important to assess future 

roles and missions. The QRM provides an opportunity to assess the impact of the 

ongoing changes and what they mean for the roles and missions of all the Services. 

That said, as Comptroller I would not expect to be directly involved in this review. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to change 

title 10, U.S.C., that would update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to 

the Department and to Congress? 

Answer. We are in a period of enormous strategic uncertainty and fiscal pressure. 

We should use all the tools available to inform the difficult decisions that will need 

to be made over the next few years. The Department’s leadership appreciates the 

need to conduct robust reviews to inform our decisions. I do not think any statutory 

changes are needed at this time to assist us in these efforts. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve 

DOD’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decisionmaking relative to each review above? 

Answer. Given the dynamic world security situation and our constrained and uncertain funding situation, DOD needs to periodically re-evaluate our plans, our program, and our budgets to meet our evolving challenges. Because we have to carry 

out so many essential missions for the Nation and have so many stakeholders, it 

is a complex and difficult process to revise our strategy, plans, and resource decisions. We will need a combination of all the above reviews, and more, to arrive at 

informed decisions going forward. If confirmed, I will work with all the Defense communities to ensure we make fact-based decisions in an inclusive, participatory manner. 

Question. The law requires the QDR to identify the budget plan that would be 

required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, 

and any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current Future 

Years Defense Program) required to achieve such a level of risk. The law also requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with 

and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s QDR analysis 

and decisionmaking processes to address these two requirements? 

Answer. The QDR should do an assessment of all the factors impacting the national security strategy and outline a program that allows us to best meet our mulVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00278 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
271 

tiple goals with acceptable risk. I will provide my resource-informed advice and 

counsel in the development of the QDR. 

Question. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value in a defense 

strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the current budget request or 

fiscal environment? 

Answer. The Defense Department must be mindful of fiscal realities. It would not 

be useful to develop a national military strategy that is unaffordable. Like any other 

enterprise, the Department must be realistic in its assessment of available resources. 

FUNDING FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN FISCAL YEAR 2014

Question. The fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $160 bil- lion for base operation and maintenance (O&M) funding which was $15 billion below 

the request. The Act funded slightly more than $9 billion of the base O&M request 

with OCO appropriations. In total, net of all changes, the act provided $68 billion 

for OCO O&M which was $6 billion above the request. 

Did the realignment of funding comport with OMB criteria for what constitutes 

an OCO item? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act did fund readinessrelated activities in the Overseas Contingency Operations budget. The Department 

will use this funding to begin the recovery from the readiness reductions experienced in fiscal year 2013. I am not aware of an OMB assessment of this act for compliance with existing criteria. 

Question. Did the realignment of funds from base to OCO distort actual base requirements? 

Answer. The realignment of funds will make it more difficult to make year-to-year comparisons. The need to reduce funding by approximately $30 billion below our fiscal year 2014 request level due to the BCA caps, as amended by the BBA, and the 

uncertainty and late enactment of those changes, constituted the major difference 

between our request and final enacted appropriations. 

FUTURE FUNDING FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Question. With the end of a U.S. military role in Iraq, and the forthcoming end 

to U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, when do you anticipate it will it be possible to end the requirement for a separate budget request for overseas contingency 

operations? 

Answer. The future of our separate overseas contingency operations (OCO) budget 

can and should be examined once the timing and circumstances of our enduring 

presence in Afghanistan becomes clear. Sufficient funding needs to be provided until 

all forces have redeployed from the theater and the retrograde of the equipment is 

complete. The Department has also emphasized that it will take at least 2–3 years 

subsequent to the end of major combat operations to repair and replace the equipment degraded, damaged, or destroyed as a result of combat operations. The OCO 

budgets have gone down significantly in recent years, but we must be cautious not 

to end funding prematurely before the mission is complete in all its phases. 

PHASING OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

Question. In some cases, the Department has proposed phasing, as opposed to incrementing, some large military construction projects over multiple fiscal years even 

when each distinct phase does not satisfy the overall requirement of the Department. For example, the Army has proposed construction of a Command and Control 

Facility at Fort Shafter, HI, over five distinct phases. It has been shown that phasing large military construction projects, rather than requesting a single authorization for the complete facility and then seeking incremental authorization of appropriations over multiple fiscal years, can result cost growth of 10 percent or more 

if all phases are executed independently. 

Do you believe phasing, as opposed to incrementing, large military construction 

projects is appropriate? If so, when? 

Answer. It is the administration’s policy that military construction projects should 

normally be fully funded. I am supportive of the policy. Phasing requires that each 

phase of a large military construction effort be a complete and usable segment of 

the facility. When those segments have different time sensitivities, phasing can help 

the Department to better balance competing critical requirements by not tying up 

limited budgetary resources ahead of the actual need for a segment. For example, 

in the case of the Command and Control Facility at Fort Shafter, HI, the military 

construction effort replaces over 10 separate World War II facilities, which are dispersed across the installation. The personnel occupying those dispersed, aging faciliVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00279 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
272 

ties will move into the newly constructed segments as they are completed, while 

continuing operations. 

Question. Do you believe phasing of large military construction projects can be 

justified even when it results in cost growth for the complete facility? If so, how? 

Answer. The phasing of a military construction effort allows more flexibility to respond to any changes to the requirement over time, provides more flexibility to future administrations to address their priorities, and provides more opportunity for 

oversight by the Department and the congressional committees. That said, our policy is to fully fund our construction projects unless there is a compelling reason to 

do otherwise. 

While the full funding of military construction projects is the administration’s policy, as previously noted, there is an exception process to also allow for incremental 

funding of projects that have a very high cost and demonstrated major national security impact. Sometimes, incrementally funding a project can be a better fit for 

very large, complex military construction efforts or when the project is time sensitive, as incrementally funded projects are not subject to new start prohibitions 

under a continuing resolution and can continue with little or no disruption. For example, the Department is incrementally funding a very large and complex hospital 

replacement project at Landstuhl, Germany. 

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Question. DOD has requested another Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

round. 

Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why? 

Answer. Yes. It has been nearly a decade since the last base closure round in 

2005, and much has changed in that time. Furthermore, the funding caps in the 

Budget Control Act of 2011 mean the Department faces a period of constrained resources through at least 2021. Decreasing budgets mean force structure reductions 

are needed, which is a primary reason why we must eliminate excess infrastructure 

to avoid wasting resources maintaining unnecessary facilities—resources that that 

could be much better spent on readiness and modernization. 

Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round resulted in 

major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far less money than originally estimated. 

Answer. The 2005 BRAC round was an anomaly—the only round conducted while 

our force structure was growing. It focused on transformation, jointness, and relocating forces from overseas to the United States. Additionally, during the implementation phase, Congress added extra requirements to medical facilities that added to 

the program cost. 

Question. What is your understanding of why such cost growth and lower realized 

savings have occurred? 

Answer. There were two types of BRAC in 2005: a ‘‘transformation’’ BRAC that 

had implementation costs of $29 billion and resulted in a small portion of the savings, and an ‘‘efficiency’’ BRAC that cost $6 billion and had an annual payback of 

$3 billion, accounting for most of the $4 billion total recurring savings from that 

round. The movement of Army brigades from Europe to the United States in that 

round is an example of a transformation move that had substantial costs. 

Question. How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a future BRAC 

round? 

Answer. Our intent is to conduct a future BRAC round similar to the 1993 or 

1995 rounds in which DOD cut excess capacity and achieved a relatively quick payback. 

REPEAL OF COLA REDUCTION FOR CERTAIN MILITARY PENSIONS

Question. The Bipartisan Budget Act included a provision that reduces the costof-living adjustment (COLA) made annually to military retired pay to 1 percent 

below the annual rise in the Consumer Price Index for working-age military retirees. The Consolidated Appropriations Act amended that provision to exclude disability retirees and their survivors. Deputy Secretary Fox and Admiral Winnefeld 

testified that the Services will save $500 million per year in their discretionary 

budgets owing to reduced contributions to the Military Retirement Fund as a result 

of this change. 

Will the Services realize any of these savings in 2014? 

Answer. No. The actuarial valuation and determination processes detailed in 

chapter 74 of title 10 U.S.C., do not allow for adjustments to the normal cost contribution accrual percentages after the start of a fiscal year. Therefore, since the Bipartisan Budget Act was not enacted prior to the start of fiscal year 2014, the earVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00280 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
273 

liest adjustments to the Department’s normal cost contribution accrual rates can be 

made is at the beginning of fiscal year 2015. 

Question. If Congress were to repeal the COLA reduction for working age military 

retirees but desire to retain the discretionary budget savings the reduction affords, 

would the security caps under the Budget Control Act have to be raised by $500 

million per year? 

Answer. If Congress repealed the COLA reduction for working age military retirees, the Department would have to fund an additional $500 million contribution to 

the Military Retirement Fund. These funds would have to come from other DOD 

programs to remain within the BBA cap unless Congress provided relief from that 

cap. 

Question. Would repealing the COLA reduction affect the additional budget authority provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act to the Department for fiscal years 

2014 and 2015? 

Answer. If the COLA reduction were simply repealed, the BBA caps would be unaffected. However, the Department would lose the accrual savings described above 

and thus have fewer resources available to devote to other needs within the BBA 

caps. 

RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. The President’s budget request for the Department’s Unified Medical 

Program has grown from $19 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $49.4 billion in fiscal year 

2014. In recent years, the Department has attempted to address this growth 

through fee increases for military retirees, while also attempting to identify and implement other means to ensure the viability of the military health system in the 

future. 

What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future 

DOD plans? 

Answer. Health care consumes nearly 10 percent of the Department’s budget and 

could grow considerably over the next decade, putting even more pressure on our 

ability to invest in enhanced warfighting capability. I realize the healthcare benefit 

is a key component of retention for our men and women, so I will continue to work 

closely with other senior military and civilian leaders in the Department to find reasonable and responsible ways to stem this growth. 

Question. What additional cost saving measures has the Department considered 

other than raising enrollment fees and pharmacy co-pays? 

Answer. Controlling health care costs is a priority for the Department. A continual emphasis is placed on achieving savings and efficiencies within the operational environment of the Military Health System. This has been a success story, 

with roughly $3 billion in savings per year achieved through programs like Federal 

Ceiling Pricing (a discount drug program), implementing the Outpatient Prospective 

Payment system (a transition to more favorable Medicare rates for private hospitals), medical supply chain optimization and standardization, and increased efforts 

to detect fraud, waste, and abuse from fraudulent providers and institutions. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

274 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN

HEFTY BANK FEES FOR SERVICEMEMBERS

1. Senator MANCHIN. Mr. McCord, the Wall Street Journal published an article 

on January 15, 2014, that described hefty bank fees for servicemembers. My office 

has been in contact with the Office of Financial Management and Comptroller and 

I am familiar with the 2011 investigation report. Are you familiar with the news 

article’s claim and the Army financial investigation report? 

Mr. MCCORD. Yes. I am aware of the Wall Street Journal article and the reference 

to the Army’s review. 

2. Senator MANCHIN. Mr. McCord, do you agree with the Wall Street Journal’s 

claim? 

Mr. MCCORD. I’m concerned about any allegations that our servicemembers are 

being unfairly treated, and we are reviewing this issue. I would prefer to have the 

benefit of that additional review before reaching final conclusions on this matter. 

3. Senator MANCHIN. Mr. McCord, would the Department of Defense (DOD) be 

willing to work with civilian financial regulatory agencies to create banking products that are tailored for servicemembers and to help them avoid unnecessary fees 

and charges? 

Mr. MCCORD. The Department takes seriously any practice, including financial 

products or services, that take unfair advantage of our servicemembers and their 

families. While DOD does not have the expertise to create new military-unique 

banking products, it does make sense, as you suggest, for the Department to work 

with other entities, such as financial institutions and bank regulators, who may 

have that expertise to seek improvements to financial products, services, or regulations, in addition to making sure our personnel are educated about existing policies, 

fees, services, and regulations. 

4. Senator MANCHIN. Mr. McCord, what additional measures would you suggest 

to reduce these large numbers of unnecessary bank fees that servicemembers are 

disproportionately incurring? 

Mr. MCCORD. The commercial financial institutions operating on DOD installations must abide by applicable Federal and State banking laws for commercial banking activities. Any additional measures related to fees, disclosure policies, or commercial banking activities should come from these Federal and State authorities. 

There is also an element of personal responsibility that must be reinforced. To ensure our servicemembers and their families have access to financial management 

education, the Services’ Family Support/Community Centers provide financial counseling, as well as conduct workshops on subjects such as money management, budgeting, consumer awareness, home buying, investment strategies, predatory lending, 

and savings. In addition, financial institutions on military installations are required 

to provide financial education to any servicemember, even if they are not a customer. The Department should assess whether our financial education programs are 

addressing this particular problem adequately so that our servicemembers can be 

as well educated as possible on how to recognize and avoid such fees. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICES

5. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. McCord, you said during your nomination hearing 

that as the client, it is the Army that is looking at a proposal to change its requirements from the Defense Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS) as part of an effort to restructure the Army’s financial enterprise. As Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller), part of your responsibility will be to oversee DOD’s financial policy, 

financial management systems, and business modernization efforts. Can you please 

clarify for me who has oversight over this current proposal and over DFAS’s role, 

responsibilities, and functions? 

Mr. MCCORD. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) has oversight of the 

DFAS. However, in this case, the Army is undertaking a review of the work that 

DFAS performs for it, as part of a broader review of Army business practices. As 

the customer, the Army reimburses DFAS for the work that is accomplished at 

DFAS’s location in Rome, NY. 

275 

Although I am aware that the Army is reviewing its business practices to seek 

efficiencies, as stated during the hearing, I am unaware of any Army decisions at 

this time that would reduce the workload that is conducted by DFAS in Rome, NY. 

6. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. McCord, this plan could severely impact the civilian 

employees currently working at DFAS sites like the one in Rome, NY, who ensure 

the centralization, professionalism, and efficiency of DOD accounting. I believe 

DFAS is a logical focal point to ensure that DOD has independent accountants developing standardized, auditable records. What is your vision for DFAS’s role and 

functions? 

Mr. MCCORD. DFAS does and will continue to play an important role to standardize, consolidate, and improve accounting and financial functions throughout the 

DOD. The goal is to reduce the cost of the Department’s finance and accounting operations while strengthening its financial management. If confirmed, I will continue 

to seek opportunities to strengthen the roles and functions of DFAS and ensure its 

operations are efficient and effective. Any changes to operations at any of the DFAS 

sites should be designed to meet mission requirements in the most efficient and effective way, from a corporate DOD perspective. 

7. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. McCord, I am concerned that I had to hear about the 

impact to my State through back channels. Do I have your assurance that my office 

will be kept apprised of all future actions relating to changes in the DFAS mission 

and force structure? 

Mr. MCCORD. If confirmed, I will keep you and your staff apprised of any changes 

with respect to DFAS mission and force structure. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION CUTS

8. Senator HIRONO. Mr. McCord, the Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA) reduced 

the impact of sequestration by $22 billion in fiscal year 2014 and $9 billion in fiscal 

year 2015. With this additional funding as a result of this agreement, how will DOD 

prioritize readiness funding levels for these fiscal years—by program or capacity, 

and what will the readiness impacts be for fiscal year 2016, should sequestration 

remain a reality? 

Mr. MCCORD. While readiness concerns remain, the President’s budget offers a deliberate and responsible approach that puts us on a path to restore readiness, while 

maintaining a force large enough to fulfill our defense strategy, though with some 

risk for some missions. If sequestration funding levels should remain in place in 

2016 and out, we will have to make some very difficult decisions. This will most 

likely result in a smaller force that will be less ready, less modern, and less capable. 

Were we to go back down to sequestration funding levels in fiscal year 2016, we 

would also waste much of the effort and resources we will devote in fiscal year 2014 

and 2015 to recovering from the readiness problems resulting from the fiscal year 

2013 sequester. 

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY AND RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT

9. Senator HIRONO. Mr. McCord, as alternative energy research continues, there 

appear to be opportunities for reducing our reliance on petroleum. What is DOD’s 

fiscal strategy for investment priorities in operational energy improvements and in 

particular, ones that impact Hawaii? 

Mr. MCCORD. The President’s 2014 budget included $2.6 billion for operational energy initiatives, 88 percent of which was to reduce the demand for energy in military operations, and 12 percent of which was to increase the supply of energy for 

operations. These initiatives include new and ongoing investments in energy efficiency, propulsion improvements, energy storage, new materials, unmanned systems, and alternative energy sources, such as high-efficiency solar and waste-to-energy. The goal of these efforts is to ensure that our Armed Forces have the energy 

they require to meet our 21st century defense challenges. These investments are 

primarily meant to increase military capabilities and effectiveness. While I cannot 

predict the precise extent to which they will benefit the broader energy security 

challenges we face as a Nation, these technologies hold promise for potential crossover applications in our civilian economy, including in Hawaii. 

276 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION CUTS

10. Senator KAINE. Mr. McCord, the Budget Control Act (BCA) originally placed 

DOD under reduced discretionary spending caps that have since been adjusted by 

the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) and the BBA. These across-the-board cuts 

have had significant negative implications for readiness, operational capacity, and 

our military personnel and their families. Fortunately, the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2015 aims to ease the strain on DOD by $26 billion in 2015 

and $115 billion over the next 5 years. Considering the adjustments that have been 

made with respect to ATRA and BBA, and with the proposed cap adjustments in 

the President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request, how much of the original sequestration cuts is DOD proposing to absorb? 

Mr. MCCORD. The sequestration level reductions required by the BCA of 2011 between fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2019 were nearly $400 billion compared to 

the President’s budget for fiscal year 2013. The changes to the original BCA which 

were enacted by Congress for fiscal year 2013, 2014, and 2015 increased the Department’s budget above the original sequestration levels by approximately $50 billion. 

The Department’s President’s budget fiscal year 2015 would provide an additional 

$115 billion above sequestration levels for fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2019. 

While the relief provided in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 is helpful in supporting 

readiness and some procurement accounts, if nothing is done to eliminate sequestration in fiscal year 2016 and beyond, the Department could still see up to 80 percent 

of the original BCA sequestration level reductions. This will directly impact the current and future readiness of our Armed Forces. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

AUDIT

11. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, currently, there is an argument in DOD over 

whether to include valuations of property as part of the audit which is required to 

be completed in fiscal year 2018. Though establishing the value of a company’s property is critical in the private sector, the benefit of ascertaining the value of property 

owned by DOD has much less significance. For example, what is gained by establishing the value of a destroyer? In addition, the amount of work to establish the 

value of each piece of DOD’s equipment is a herculean enterprise sure to require 

vast numbers of auditors and could delay the timely completion of the audit. What 

is gained by DOD establishing the value of all of its property? 

Mr. MCCORD. In order to achieve a clean opinion, DOD must adhere to Federal 

financial accounting standards, which require that capital property be fairly valued. 

The current standards mandate that Federal agencies report property and equipment assets at full acquisition cost. The Department has recently published equipment valuation guidance, which provides various options for valuing our assets and 

costs associated with this effort. We will meet with each of our components to determine which options work best within their standard business processes. The Department is committed to meet its audit goals, including verifying the existence, completeness, location, and status of all equipment assets, which will provide assurance 

of physical control of assets, stewardship, and the information that is most meaningful to the management and our stakeholders, while also doing this in a cost-effective 

way. 

12. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, why do we need to know the monetary value 

of each ship, truck, and aircraft in the inventory? 

Mr. MCCORD. In most cases, we do not need to know the value of this kind of 

equipment to perform our mission. However, we do need to know depreciated value 

and remaining useful life of an asset as we make decisions such as disposition for 

equipment in theater. Additionally, to ensure that we are auditable and meet Federal accounting standards, our current plan is to first compute values on our newer, 

high value assets using actual costs or the estimating methodologies that are now 

permitted. Older assets will be valued if deemed necessary. The current value of the 

Department’s property plant and equipment represents more than 71 percent of the 

property, plant, and equipment values reported for the entire Federal Government. 

To omit the Department’s equipment values would therefore impact the Federal 

Government’s overall consolidated annual financial statements, as well. 

277 

13. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, will that enable DOD to make better business 

decisions or enhance our support of the warfighter? 

Mr. MCCORD. Verifying the existence, completeness, location, and status of our 

property and equipment in support of the upcoming financial audit is expected to 

provide valuable information to help inform decisions on priorities for refurbishment, replacement, or obsolescence of that property and equipment. The valuation 

of this property, which is harder than verifying existence and completeness, is less 

useful to us, but is required by current accounting standards. Modifications to current accounting standards to address the concerns you raise would require a dialogue and consensus among the Department, Congress, the Office of Management 

and Budget, the Government Accountability Office, and the Federal Accounting 

Standards Advisory Board. 

14. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, won’t we have to employ vast number of auditors to make these valuation determinations? 

Mr. MCCORD. The Department is studying the cost of making and auditing property and equipment values. Auditors will verify not only the estimated value, but 

also the existence of our property, whether we have inventoried and reported all of 

our equipment and property, and whether we own or have the right to use that 

property. Valuation is only one element in the audit of property, plant and equipment. I agree that the valuation aspect of auditability will require a significant investment of time and resources, not just by auditors, but by many people across the 

Department, to include the logistics community. However, I recognize the importance of this information in reaching full auditability as required by law. If confirmed, I will work the committee and other interested parties to meet the requirements as they stand, and to discuss whether modifications to those requirements 

would be cost-effective and better serve the interests of the taxpayer and the Federal Government. 

15. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, when Congress has concerns about DOD meeting the statutory goals of audit readiness, should we not devote more of our resources to achieving the core of the requirement? 

Mr. MCCORD. The Department currently devotes considerable resources to audit 

readiness, focusing first and foremost on our core requirements of our budget statements and then existence and completeness of assets. It will require significant additional resources in the coming years to fully meet our goals. We are committed 

to achieving full auditability, but given the Department’s constrained resources, I 

share the concern that the resources we will have to devote to the valuation effort 

could be considerable and will come at the expense of other DOD needs. I am particularly concerned about our ability to meet all the Department’s needs, including 

this one, should we return to the sequestration-level funding caps again in fiscal 

year 2016. 

TRICARE FEES

16. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, for many years, the military associations and 

veterans’ service organizations vigorously opposed TRICARE fee increases, but in 

the NDAAs for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013, Congress authorized increases to 

TRICARE enrollment fees and pharmacy co-pays based on annual military retired 

pay cost-of-living adjustments. In this current budget environment, will more 

TRICARE fee increases alone sustain the great health benefit that military retirees 

and their families have today? 

Mr. MCCORD. Given the significant fiscal pressures the Department faces over a 

sustained period, as exemplified by the restrictions of the BCA of 2011, no single 

policy or savings proposal will generate the kind of savings we need. However, increases in co-pays for pharmaceuticals and implementing an enrollment fee for new 

TRICARE-for-Life beneficiaries would go a long way in helping to sustain the great 

health benefits that military retirees and their families have today while freeing up 

funds badly needed for training and maintenance. In the past, Congress has permitted small increases in the TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for working age retirees and some adjustments to retail and mail order pharmacy co-pays, but more 

needs to be done. 

17. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, I believe Congress, DOD, and beneficiaries—all 

of us—must share the responsibility for helping to control health care costs. What 

can DOD and its beneficiaries do, either separately or together, to help control the 

rapid growth in DOD’s health care costs? 

278 

Mr. MCCORD. I agree, this is an area where the Department’s leadership, Congress, our beneficiaries and providers, including our private sector partners, all need 

to work together. In the fiscal year 2015 budget, DOD proposes replacing the current three TRICARE plans with a consolidated TRICARE Health Plan starting in 

2016 for about 3.3 million retirees under age 65 and about 2.1 million Active-Duty 

family members, while implementing new military treatment facility (MTF) fees and 

other fee increases. The proposed TRICARE reforms include higher copays designed 

to ensure that the quality of health care is not compromised, while allowing the Department to sustain an efficient and cost effective health care system. 

The Department remains committed to ensuring any proposed changes keep faith 

with those who are serving, but this means more than just maximizing their benefits at the expense of everything else. 

We all have a solemn responsibility as well to make sure our people are trained 

and equipped to do the missions we send them to do on behalf of the Nation. 

18. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, in the President’s budget request last year, 

DOD proposed increases in TRICARE fees and co-pays again, but Congress didn’t 

authorize those increases. In a few weeks, I imagine that DOD will send over more 

TRICARE proposals with the President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request. If Congress doesn’t agree with the administration’s TRICARE proposals in the fiscal year 

2015 budget request, what is your plan to make up the resulting large budget deficit 

resulting from the savings you assumed in the Defense Health Program budget? 

Mr. MCCORD. To adequately fund readiness and modernization under constrained 

budgets, we have to slow the growth in military compensation. Our budget balances 

the need to protect our national security with the need to be realistic about the resources we can expect. If Congress chooses not to support our TRICARE proposals, 

our readiness and modernization accounts will be significantly affected, and ultimately we will probably need to further reduce the size of our force to keep whatever force we can afford trained and ready. 

19. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, if you have to move operation and maintenance 

(O&M) funds from the Services’ budgets to the Defense Health Program O&M account to pay for incurred health care costs, how will that impact the readiness of 

the force? 

Mr. MCCORD. Increases in health care spending will largely come at the expense 

of readiness spending, which would be detrimental to the Department’s ability to 

carry out its missions. 

20. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McCord, if confirmed as Comptroller, what role would 

you have in implementing necessary oversight measures for the responsible use of 

Government resources? 

Mr. MCCORD. If confirmed, I expect to have a significant role in reviewing, implementing, and as required, recommending changes to policies and procedures to ensure the responsible use of Government resources. I will work closely with the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Under Secretaries of the military departments, 

and other senior leaders to support the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in carrying 

out the Department’s missions efficiently and effectively and in accordance with 

laws and regulations that govern the use of the Department’s funds. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

A–10 COST SAVINGS

21. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McCord, based on your current position as Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), as well as the position for which 

you are nominated—Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)—could you please 

clarify the number Secretary Hagel cited on February 24 ($3.5 billion) for potential 

A–10 savings? 

Mr. MCCORD. The savings from retirement of the A–10 fleet by fiscal year 2019 

is approximately $3.7 billion. The response to question 88 provides additional detail 

on how those savings are achieved. If the cost avoidance to replace wings for 100 

aircraft ($500 million) is factored in, the total savings would be approximately $4.2 

billion over the Future Years Defense Program. 

22. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McCord, how will the Air Force specifically achieve that 

$3.5 billion in savings? Please provide an annual breakdown by Program, Project, 

and Activity (PPA). 

279 

Mr. MCCORD. The below table provides the breakdown for the $3.7 billion savings 

specified in the response to question #21. 


225ful1.eps
280 

23. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McCord, for any A–10 related funds that the Air Force 

claims as savings, please provide a detailed explanation of how the Air Force (not 

just the A–10 program) will no longer incur the expense. For example, for savings 

related to contract personnel or organic depot maintenance costs, can you confirm 

that the cost associated with that workload will not be transferred to other Air 

Force activities but represents sustaining activities that can actually be terminated? 

Mr. MCCORD. It is my understanding that the costs associated with that workload 

would be eliminated, and represent a savings to the Air Force. Depot maintenance 

requirements are determined based upon individual weapon system needs. As aircraft are retired they will no longer require depot activities, such as engine overhauls, aircraft heavy maintenance, and spare parts. As a result, the cost of the activities associated with that workload would not be incurred. 

24. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McCord, for A–10 personnel costs associated with Air 

Force personnel (organic depot maintenance), can you confirm that those personnel 

will no longer be employed with the Air Force as a result of losing this specific 

workload, and will not simply be transferred to other Air Force activities? 

Mr. MCCORD. Although the Air Force would be better suited to provide specific 

details, I understand that the overall size of the depot workforce is expected to decrease when the A–10 is retired. Given the fiscal pressures the Department faces 

due to the BCA of 2011, any savings that can be realized, whether in manpower, 

operating costs, or modernization costs, will generally be applied to meeting these 

constrained toplines. Although some employees who support or maintain the A–10 

may seek retraining or reassignment to other Air Forces systems, while others may 

retire or leave Federal service, I do not think it is possible to know enough about 

the portability of the skill sets of all such employees in a way that would allow a 

comprehensive answer to this question. 

25. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McCord, please provide a comprehensive list of which 

contracts would be terminated. In other words, for the $3.5 billion number please 

differentiate between actual savings to the overall Air Force budget, and simply 

moving expenses to other Air Force accounts. 

Mr. MCCORD. The $3.5 billion of potential savings Secretary Hagel referenced is 

associated with operating and support (O&S) funding for the A–10 as set out in the 

response to question #22. As was previously mentioned in other responses, these potential savings to the A–10 program can be broken down into the following cost elements: Military Personnel ($1.47 billion), Flying Hours ($1.51 billion), and Weapon 

System Sustainment (WSS) ($0.70 billion). The total of these elements sum to $3.68 

billion in O&S savings across the Future Years Defense Program from divestiture 

of a 283-aircraft fleet. 

Because there are no contracts associated with the Personnel and Flying Hours 

elements, this response will address the contracts associated with the WSS element. 

These contracts are funded with the O&M appropriation and are usually 1-year efforts, with follow-on option years that may be exercised at the government’s discretion. It is my understanding that as the Air Force executes its A–10 divestiture 

plan, it will take appropriate contracting actions. In some cases, the Air Force may 

decide not to exercise future options on existing contracts. In instances where ongoing contracted work is underway, the Air Force may reduce the scope of those contracts. Finally, in instances where the Air Force was planning to award new contracts, such contracts may no longer be required. 

Although the Air Force is better suited to address all the specific items that fall 

within this element, I am aware of the following information: 

Full Mission Trainer (<$27 million/year): The current contract runs to fiscal year 

2016 and can be scaled back to required work; the follow-on contract will also be 

scalable with base plus option years; 

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Depot Support (5 year/$40 million cap, the Air Forces 

only pays for work required): The current contract runs out 30 Sep 2014 with a 6- 

month extension option. A new contract has gone out for proposals that will only 

carry cost if PACAF A–10s require depot maintenance; 

Sustaining engineering contracts: These are scalable efforts to monitor fleet 

health and maintain fleet safety of flight; these provide support to meet Operational 

Safety Suitability and Effectiveness mandatory requirements; 

Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) - Legacy (value varies by 

year); 

ASIP - Modernization (value varies by year); 

Reliability Center Maintenance Contract (value varies by year). 

The Air Force is best suited to provide additional details if required. 

281 

26. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McCord, please provide a revised number for the potential A–10 divestment that reflects what the Air Force—not just A–10 PPAs—would 

no longer expend. 

Mr. MCCORD. Please refer to the response to question #22. 

[The nomination reference of Hon. Michael J. McCord follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 30, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Michael J. McCord, of Ohio, to be Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), vice 

Robert F. Hale. 

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Michael J. McCord, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MICHAEL JOHN MCCORD

Education: 

The Ohio State University 

• September 1977–June 1981 

• Bachelor of Art in Economics with honors in Liberal Arts 

The University of Pennsylvania 

• September 1981–May 1984 

• Master of Arts in Public Policy 

Employment Record: 

Department of Defense 

• Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

• January 2009–Present 

U.S. Senate 

• Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services 

• March 2004–January 2009 

U.S. House of Representatives 

• Budget Analyst, Committee on the Budget 

• January 2003–February 2004 

U.S. Senate 

• Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services 

• January 1987–January 2003 

Congressional Budget Office 

• Assistant Analyst 

• December 1984–January 1987 

Honors and awards: 

Federal Civilian Awards 

• Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service (Bronze 

Palm), February 2013 

• Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, October 

2011 

Academic Awards 

• National Merit Scholarship, The Ohio State University, 1977–1981 

• Member, Phi Beta Kappa, The Ohio State University, 1981 

Fellowships 

• Stennis Congressional Staff Fellow, 110th Congress, The Stennis Center 

for Public Service Leadership, 2007–2008 

282 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Hon. Michael J. McCord in connection with 

his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Michael John McCord. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 

3. Date of nomination: 

January 30, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

January 23, 1959; Marion, OH. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Donna Miller Rostant. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Alejandra E. McCord, 28 (child). 

Meredith J. McCord, 26 (child). 

Joseph F. Slade IV, 27 (step-child). 

Andrew T. Slade, 25 (step-child). 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

River Valley High School, Marion, OH, Fall 1972–Spring 1977, high school degree 

received May 1977. 

The Ohio State University, September 1977–June 1981, Bachelor of Art in Economics with honors in the liberal arts, June 1981. 

The University of Pennsylvania, September 1981–May 1984, Master of Arts in 

Public Policy, May 1984. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

January 2009–present, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), U.S. Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington DC. 

March 2004–January 2009, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate, Washington DC (also January 1987–January 2003). 

283 

January 2003–February 2004, Budget Analyst, Committee on the Budget, U.S. 

House of Representatives, Washington DC. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Department of Defense, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), January 2009–present. 

U.S. Senate, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services, March 

2004–January 2009. 

U.S. House of Representatives, Budget Analyst, Committee on the Budget, January 2003–February 2004. 

U.S. Senate, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services, January 

1987–January 2003. 

Congressional Budget Office, Assistant Analyst, December 1984–January 1987. 

President-Elect’s Transition Team, Department of Defense Agency Review Team, 

The Pentagon, Washington DC, November–December 2008 (on detail from the Senate Armed Services Committee staff). 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Unitarian Universalists for Social Justice, Washington DC. Board Member. 

Member, American Society of Military Comptrollers, Alexandria, VA. 

Member, Reston Runners, Reston VA. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

My cumulative 2009–2013 contributions to any entity of $100 or more are: 

• Obama for America Presidential campaign, $1,075 

• Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, $965 

• Democratic National Committee, $705 

• Fairfax County (VA) Democratic Committee, $635 

• Democratic Party of Virginia, $570 

• Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, $540 

• Virginia Inaugural Ball 2013, $500 

• McAuliffe for Governor (VA), $450 

• Kaine for Senate (VA), $450 

• Friends of Mark Warner, $200 

• Ohio Democratic Party, $200 

• Deeds for Governor (VA), $120 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

• National Merit Scholarship, The Ohio State University, 1977–1981 

• Member, Phi Beta Kappa, The Ohio State University, 1981 

• Stennis Congressional Staff Fellow, 110th Congress, The Stennis Center 

for Public Service Leadership, 2007–2008 

• Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, October 

2011 

• Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service (Bronze 

Palm), February 2013 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

284 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

Congressional Testimony: 

• Written testimony to the House Small Business Committee regarding the 

potential impact of sequestration on small business, September 20, 2012. 

• Written testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 

Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, 

hearing on termination of the C–17 aircraft, July 13, 2010. 

Speeches and Presentations: 

I have given several speeches during the last 5 years. A list of all speeches is provided. Copies of three representative speeches are provided, and additional speeches 

can be made available upon request. 

• Public Contracting Institute, Washington, DC, April 18, 2013. Roundtable 

discussion was on the record but I had no prepared remarks. 

• AGA Conference, San Diego, CA, July 30, 2012 

• ASMC Regional PDI, Washington DC, March 22, 2012 

• Credit Suisse conference, New York, NY, November 30, 2011 

• AGA/ASMC Regional PDI Conference, Honolulu, HI, August 17, 2011 

(two presentations) 

• ASMC National PDI, Minneapolis, MN, June 2, 2011 

• AICPA, Washington, DC, August 16, 2010 

• Credit Suisse conference, Arlington VA, June 10, 2010 

• ASMC National PDI, Orlando FL, June 4, 2010 

• DOD Managers Internal Controls Programs conference, Washington, DC, 

November 24, 2011 

• Remarks on DOD Budget and Financial Management Priorities to the Association of Government Accountants/American Society of Military Comptrollers Professional Development Institute Conference, Honolulu, HI, October 14, 2009. (previously provided for 2010 confirmation) . 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes, 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes, 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

285 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

MICHAEL J. MCCORD. 

This 10th day of February, 2014. 

[The nomination of Hon. Michael J. McCord was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on March 26, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on June 12, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Christine E. Wormuth by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I believe there is no need to modify the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time. The Act was a very significant piece of legislation that, over 

the course of more than two decades, has led to dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Based on my experience since 2009, there is not a 

need for changes in the near term. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. Please see my response above. 

DUTIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Question. Section 134 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) shall assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written 

policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans, and in reviewing such plans. Additionally, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have responsibility for supervising 

and directing activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) relating to export controls. Further, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the USD(P) is responsible for overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities 

of DOD for combating terrorism. 

Department of Defense Directive 5111.1 reiterates these duties and specifically 

notes that the USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary 

of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation 

of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD 

policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the USD(P) under current regulations and practices? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would perform the duties set forth in title 10 and the Department of Defense Directive. The USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant 

and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy as well as the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. Specifically, the USD(P) directly supports the Secretary of Defense in the 

interagency process, dealings with foreign counterparts, developing strategy and 

planning guidance for the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 

(PPBE) process, providing policy oversight of current operations, and guiding the development and review of contingency plans. He or she is the Secretary’s principal 

policy advisor on the use of the U.S. military and its adaptation for future missions. 

286 

Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the USD(P) in 

combating terrorism, in particular as differentiated from those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict? 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) functions under the authority, direction, and control 

of the USD(P) in combating terrorism. More broadly, the ASD(SO/LIC) is defined 

in title 10 as the principal civilian advise to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties and functions do 

you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will discuss with Secretary Hagel how the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy organization and I can best support him, including whether there are any duties and functions he would prescribe beyond those set 

forth in section 134(b) of title 10, and the Department of Defense Directive for 

USD(P). At this time, I have not identified any such additional duties and functions. 

Relationships 

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the USD(P) and 

each of the following? 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and 

defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve 

national security objectives. The USD(P) provides policy support to the Secretary in 

interagency fora (such as National Security Council deliberations), in engagement 

with international interlocutors, and in the PPBE processes inside the Department, 

including the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Nuclear Posture Review, and 

annual program and budget reviews. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Under Secretary for Policy provides similar support to the Deputy 

Secretary as described above. 

Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the other Under Secretaries of Defense to achieve the Secretary’s objectives. This includes providing policy 

input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility. In 

addition, the Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the Under Secretary for 

Intelligence and other intelligence officials to ensure that policy formulation and 

execution are well informed and supported by intelligence. 

Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy (PDUSD(P)) is the principal assistant to the USD(P) and is responsible for assisting the USD(P) in carrying 

out all responsibilities, fulfilling functions, managing relationships, and exercising 

authorities provided for in law to the USD(P). The PDUSD(P) advises on and supports the USD(P) in regard to all responsibilities in providing advice to the Secretary of Defense in interagency fora (such as National Security Council deliberations), engagement with international interlocutors, and in the PPBE processes inside the Department, including the QDR and annual program and budget reviews. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The USD(P) exercises authority, direction, and control over the 

PDUSD(P), and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs, Asian and Pacific Affairs (APSA), Global Strategic Affairs, Special Operations 

and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), and Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs (HD/ASA). This team works together to provide the Secretary with advice 

and recommendations on the full range of policy issues under consideration in the 

Department and provides policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary’s guidance 

and decisions are implemented properly. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The USD(P) works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues, including defense strategy and policy development, force planning, and other areas in which the Military Departments are critical stakeholders. 

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council, the Chairman has a unique and critical 

military role. The USD(P) works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to 

support the efforts of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, and to ensure that military advice is taken into 

account in an appropriate manner. 

Question. The Service Chiefs. 

287 

Answer. The USD(P) works closely with the Service Chiefs on a broad range of 

issues, including defense strategy and policy development, force planning, and other 

areas in which the Military Departments and Services are critical stakeholders. 

Question. The Commanders of the Regional and Functional Combatant Commands. 

Answer. The USD(P) works closely with the regional and functional combatant 

commanders to support the efforts of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of regional and functional strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations. 

Question. The Director of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The USD(P) works closely, through the Chairman and Vice Chairman, 

with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is a member of the Joint Chiefs, and has a specific responsibility to provide information on 

the non-Federalized National Guard. 

Question. The General Counsel of DOD. 

Answer. The USD(P) works closely with the General Counsel on all policy issues 

that involve a legal dimension. In practice, this means significant and regular coordination on a broad range of issues. 

Question. The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 

Answer. The USD(P) exercises authority, direction, and control over the Director 

of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Policy organization works 

closely with DSCA to provide the Secretary with advice and recommendations on 

the full range of security cooperation issues facing the Department. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. Since joining the administration in March 2009, I have served in three 

senior defense-related positions that have enabled me to work on a very broad array 

of challenges facing DOD, and to understand how to work effectively in the interagency process to address difficult national security policy issues. As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs, I had the opportunity to work on a wide range of homeland security, Homeland defense, and defense support of civil authorities issues. In that role, I managed 

a staff of more than 300 people and worked closely with the National Security Council staff, as well as the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice and other 

key Federal departments and agencies. Then, as Special Assistant to the President 

and Senior Director for Defense Policy at the National Security Council, I had the 

opportunity to work on many of the most challenging defense policy issues in recent 

years, from helping to formulate the Defense Strategic Guidance to addressing a 

range of regional security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. For 

the last year and one-half, I have served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Strategy, Plans, and Forces. In this capacity, I have collaborated closely with the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Department Secretaries, and Combatant Commanders 

on issues including strategy development, the global force management process, contingency planning, force structure analysis and development, and regional posture. 

I have frequently represented OSD Policy in the annual PPBE process on behalf of 

the USD(P). In each of these three positions, I have had the opportunity to work 

directly with the current and two previous Secretaries of Defense. 

Prior to joining the administration, I focused professionally on defense and security policy issues both in and out of government for many years. As a Senior Fellow 

at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for 5 years, I worked 

on a host of national security issues, and was privileged during that time to serve 

as the Executive Director for the Independent Commission on Iraqi Security Forces, 

also known as the ‘‘Jones Commission.’’ Before coming to CSIS, I was a senior manager in a small defense consulting firm for almost 3 years, which gave me valuable 

insight into defense industry concerns and provided me an opportunity to hone my 

management skills. 

I also believe that my early years as a Presidential Management Intern and career civilian action officer in OSD Policy are an important part of what will enable 

me to be effective as Under Secretary, if I am confirmed. I grew up professionally 

in OSD Policy. I have seen how it works, in good times and in bad, from the ground 

up. I care deeply about the talented people who work there, and the important work 

we do to provide the Secretary and the President with the best possible policy advice 

on matters of national security. Drawing on that deep knowledge and commitment 

288 

to the organization, if confirmed, I would work with the Policy staff to ensure we 

serve the Secretary as effectively as possible. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the USD(P)? 

Answer. If confirmed as USD(P), I would expect to confront a large number of 

very significant and difficult policy issues. Among the most important in the near 

term will be working with other U.S. departments and agencies to transition security responsibility effectively in Afghanistan and prevent that country from once 

again becoming a safe haven for groups like al Qaeda. Looking ahead, I think that 

we will continue to face a changing and increasingly complex security environment. 

I believe it will be essential to continue to demonstrate our strong commitment to 

our partners in the Middle East, while working to advance U.S. interests in the context of the sweeping changes that are unfolding in that region, and in North Africa. 

If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize defending the homeland and seek to ensure we effectively address emerging threats like cyber and the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I would work closely 

with the rest of the Department and other U.S. departments and agencies to continue our efforts to defeat al Qaeda, counter the threat of violent extremism across 

the globe, and protect the United States and our vital interests from an attack. Addressing each of these challenges, and many others, will be made more difficult in 

the context of the significant fiscal pressures and uncertainty the Department is facing. If confirmed as Under Secretary, a major challenge I anticipate will be working 

to ensure that the Department allocates its more limited resources in ways that 

align to the needs of our defense strategy, and in ways that enable us to prepare 

as effectively as possible for future challenges and opportunities. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary and the senior 

leadership of the Department, as well as interagency colleagues to develop and oversee implementation of effective strategies, policies, and plans that address these 

challenges. I would also work closely with Congress, U.S. allies and partners, and, 

where appropriate, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector. In working to address difficult policy issues, I would anticipate drawing on the deliberations 

of the QDR, gaining insights from the upcoming National Defense Panel report and 

other outside organizations and commissions, and using the range of annual planning and programming processes within the Department to generate potential policy 

solutions. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the USD(P)? 

Answer. At the outset of the QDR process, Secretary Hagel outlined a number of 

priorities that guide his thinking in how to lead the Department. If confirmed, I 

would seek to ensure the Policy organization is focused on how we contribute to 

making progress in those areas, particularly those with significant policy implications. The forthcoming QDR report will outline our approach to some of those priorities, including re-evaluating our force planning and sizing construct, ensuring we 

avoid a long-term readiness challenge, and protecting investment in critical military 

capabilities most needed to implement our defense strategy. A key priority for me, 

if confirmed, would be to ensure that the Department executes our defense strategy 

through a disciplined and rigorous process that effectively matches resources to 

strategy. 

If confirmed, I also would make it a priority to continue and deepen the Department’s efforts to implement the President’s guidance to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 

region. Since the publication of the Defense Strategic Guidance in January 2012, the 

Department’s senior leadership has made implementation of the rebalance a priority. If confirmed, I would work closely with other components of the Department, 

and with my interagency colleagues, to develop additional creative approaches to 

implement the military component of the rebalance, and continue to ensure that the 

rebalance is prioritized in the resource allocation process. 

Secretary Hagel recently approved, as part of his efforts to streamline the Department further, a reorganization of the Policy organization. I support this reorganization, and if confirmed as Under Secretary, I will make it a priority to ensure that 

we successfully implement the reorganization plan. Ultimately, the strength of the 

Policy organization is its workforce, so I would continue to invest in developing, recruiting, and retaining a dynamic workforce. If confirmed, I would make it a priority 

to ensure that we make this transition in an effective, transparent, and well-orgaVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00296 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
289 

nized way that enables us to continue to provide excellent advice to the Secretary, 

and function as a strong, effective part of the overall OSD. 

If confirmed as Under Secretary, I also would make it a priority to set aside time, 

both personally and at the organizational level, to think strategically about over-thehorizon challenges and opportunities the United States may face in the future. It 

can be very challenging in government to find time to address emergent, long-term 

issues, but having worked in a think tank for a lengthy period, I am convinced that 

decisionmakers benefit when we are able to ‘‘give the future a seat at the table.’’ 

If confirmed, I would push myself and the Policy organization to devote sufficient 

time to strategic thinking and planning, even as we work to address more immediate threats and opportunities. 

REORGANIZATION OF OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY

Question. The Secretary of Defense has announced a plan to reorganize the Office 

of the USD(P). The reorganization has begun and is expected to be completed by 

2015. 

What is your understanding of the major changes planned for the organization 

that you have been nominated to lead, and what do you believe will be the primary 

benefits of the reorganization plan? 

Answer. By 2015, the Policy reorganization will eliminate seven senior leader positions, including a DUSD, the Policy Chief of Staff, four DASDs, and a USD(P) senior advisor. The changes should increase efficiency by aligning similar functions and 

reducing the total number of offices overall. The reductions also ensure that Policy 

will be in compliance with pending DOD headquarters budget reductions and the 

requirement to eliminate the DUSD position itself. 

Question. How do you plan to ensure that the reorganization leads to improvements and efficiencies in the formulation and execution of policy within the Department? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the PDUSD(P) and Assistant Secretaries 

to ensure that synergies created by the reorganization lead to development of more 

comprehensive and cohesive policy options. For example, defending the Nation from 

cyber attacks is an important element of protecting the U.S. Homeland. By placing 

responsibility for development of cyber policy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

for Homeland Defense, that Assistant Secretary will be better able to leverage the 

tools in the Cyber Policy office to ensure the homeland is defended against cyber 

threats. Implementation of the reorganization will also enable the Policy organization to recognize some efficiencies in terms of reducing and streamlining front office 

staffs due to the consolidation of a number of offices. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s rationale for combining 

the functional experts in Cyber and Space under one Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense? 

Answer. The reality of modern telecommunications is that there’s a strong nexus 

between policy issues related to cyber and space. During its comprehensive reorganization review, Policy recognized that the two offices worked together frequently 

and that improved synergy could be achieved by unifying the office under a single 

leader. Programs in both offices have matured significantly over the last few years, 

allowing the efficiency of single office management. 

Question. How do you intend, if confirmed, to achieve unity of effort within the 

Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) accounting community given its 

fragmented command and control and budgetary processes? 

Answer. As the committee is aware, the POW/MIA accounting community has 

been the subject of several organizational studies over the past 18 months. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) completed a study in 2013, and it is my understanding that the Department is implementing recommendations from the GAO report. 

Additionally, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is reviewing DOD’s organizational structure in this area. If confirmed, I would consider 

the results of these reviews, and seek the views of family and veterans’ groups to 

determine how we can better achieve unity of effort. 

AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY

Question. What are our key strategic objectives in Afghanistan and in your view 

are we on track to achieve those objectives? 

Answer. I understand that Coalition and Afghan Forces are meeting campaign objectives. The Afghan Government is able to exert control over all of Afghanistan’s 

major cities and provincial capitals. Afghan forces have assumed the lead for security and, with the Coalition, have successfully countered the insurgency’s efforts in 

290 

the 2012 and 2013 summer fighting seasons. I understand that we continue to make 

progress in our counterterrorism efforts. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the U.S. 

strategy in Afghanistan? 

Answer. I believe the U.S. strategy is succeeding and would recommend that we 

follow through on our commitments made in Chicago and Tokyo. Our core goal in 

Afghanistan remains disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and preventing its return to Afghanistan. To achieve this, we should maintain our commitment to Afghanistan after 2014 and continue to transition security responsibility to 

the Afghans. 

Question. What do you see as the United States’ long-term strategic interests in 

Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. The United States has made a commitment to an enduring partnership 

with Afghanistan, and it will continue to be in the U.S. interest to work towards 

defeating al Qaeda and disrupting other extremists who present a serious threat to 

the U.S. Homeland, allies, partners, and interests. We have also pledged at Chicago 

and Tokyo to support the Government of Afghanistan’s development as it takes responsibility for its own future. 

Question. Do you support the retention of a limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. I support a long-term partnership with Afghanistan, including a limited 

U.S. presence after 2014 to support the two missions the President discussed in the 

State of the Union address—a narrowly focused counterterrorism mission against al 

Qaeda and its affiliates; and a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led 

train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission to support the Afghan forces. To accomplish 

these missions, we must conclude an agreement with the Afghan government in 

order to remain in Afghanistan and to secure privileges and protections for our 

forces. 

Question. If so, what in your view should be the size, mission, and duration of 

such a residual U.S. military force? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would engage our military commanders to assess the appropriate size, mission, and duration of such a residual force. 

Question. In your view, what would be the consequences for Afghanistan’s security 

and stability if the United States were to reduce its post-2014 military presence in 

Afghanistan to a ‘‘normal’’ Office of Defense Cooperation under chief of mission authority? 

Answer. At this time, I am unable to assess the impact of reducing our presence 

to an Office of Defense Cooperation. My understanding is that the Afghans are leading the majority of security operations, but that they require additional support and 

assistance at ministerial levels. 

Question. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to conclude a Bilateral 

Security Agreement that ensures legal protections for such a residual U.S. military 

force, should the United States withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support a U.S. military presence in Afghanistan if 

our forces have the requisite legal protections that a status of forces agreement, 

such as the Bilateral Security Agreement, would provide. 

Question. What is your understanding, as a legal matter, of when the current 

agreements that provide legal protections for the U.S. military between the Afghan 

Government and the U.S. Government expire? If a residual U.S. military force were 

to remain in 2015, would it have the same legal protections as the current U.S. military force does now even without the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement? 

Answer. I understand that the current bilateral Status of Forces Agreement with 

Afghanistan does not have an expiration date. The President has made clear that 

for the United States to remain in Afghanistan post-2014, it must be at the request 

of the Afghan government and under a Bilateral Security Agreement concluded with 

Afghanistan. 

AFGHANISTAN TRANSITION

Question. Do you support the transition of full responsibility for the security of 

Afghanistan to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by 2014? 

Answer. Yes. My understanding is that the ANSF has shown over the last year 

that it is up to the task of providing security across Afghanistan. The ANSF is now 

conducting virtually all operations independently and has prevented the insurgents 

from making any significant gains. I realize that the ANSF will require continued 

international assistance to sustain these gains, and, if confirmed, I would support 

such efforts in line with whatever decision the President makes about our post-2014 

force level, mission, and resourcing. 

291 

Question. In your view, what are the main challenges to the success of such a 

transition? 

Answer. In my view, the main challenge will be ensuring that the ANSF has adequate financial resources to sustain the gains they have made. This will require continued international assistance; if confirmed, I would support such efforts in line 

with whatever decision the President makes about our post-2014 force level, mission, and resourcing. Another challenge is that the Afghans now have limited combat enabler support from the coalition, so we will have to monitor closely how this 

affects their readiness and morale when the fighting becomes more intense later 

this year. 

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional 

and effective ANSF? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Afghan military and police forces have a 

competent cadre of officers and leaders, but the rapid growth in the size of the 

ANSF over the last few years has created a requirement to produce even more leaders—a task that cannot be accomplished quickly. The international assistance effort 

has expanded the institutional training base for all levels of ANSF leaders. If confirmed, I would support continuing this focus, consistent with the President’s decision about our post-2014 force level and mission. 

Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the 

ANSF, including after 2014? 

Answer. My understanding is that building this capacity at the ministerial and 

institutional level will be the focus of the NATO-led train/advise/assist mission. One 

of the main challenges I see will be ensuring that the Afghans have the right leaders in place and that we have the right advisors with the right skillsets in place. 

Another challenge I foresee is ensuring the ANSF has the financial resources needed to sustain a force structure that is adequate to maintain the security gains it 

has made over the past year while continuing to develop their ability to improve 

their functional skills, such as in the areas of resource management, contracting, 

and logistics. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with our Afghan and coalition partners 

to ensure we are working toward the same objectives. The key will be to ensure the 

focus is on building Afghan capacity—not doing tasks for them. If confirmed, I 

would reinforce this focus and ensure DOD contributions are aligned with this approach. 

Question. What do you see as the main challenges to sustaining the ANSF beyond 

2014, and if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. The ANSF is leading nearly all security missions in Afghanistan. I understand the main challenges to sustaining the ANSF beyond 2014 are ensuring 

that those forces have the training and equipment necessary to plan for and carry 

out their missions. This entails financial and personnel support for the NATO-led 

TAA mission at the ministerial and institutional levels to enable the planning, contracting, and logistics functions needed to sustain the ANSF forces. It also means 

engaging regularly with the U.S. civilian leadership to gauge progress in the Afghan 

missions. 

Question. Do you agree that any future reductions from the current ANSF troop 

level should be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time the reductions would occur? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would participate in what I understand to be a biannual 

DOD review of the appropriate size of the ANSF, which considers operational and 

security issues, among other factors. 

U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between the United 

States and Pakistan? 

Answer. The bilateral relationship with Pakistan continues to improve through cooperation to defeat al Qaeda, promote peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, and 

support Pakistan’s fight against militant and terrorist networks. There is still room 

for progress, however. If confirmed, I would focus on strengthening areas of common 

interest and continue engagement where we disagree, especially to spur greater action against the Haqqani Terrorist Network and other terrorist groups that operate 

on Pakistani soil. 

292 

Question. Do you see opportunities for expanded U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on security issues? If so, how would you prioritize these areas of cooperation? 

Answer. I believe we should continue to focus our defense relationship with Pakistan on areas of mutual interest; specifically, the fight against al Qaeda and other 

terrorist networks. This will involve supporting Pakistan’s military efforts to 

counter the threat of militant and insurgent groups along the border with Afghanistan. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s efforts to combat the threat of 

international terrorism? 

Answer. Pakistan plays a major role in the fight against terrorism, as demonstrated by the large number of forces Pakistan has deployed in counterinsurgency 

operations. Pakistan also has suffered significant military and civilian casualties 

combating terrorism in their country, which underscores the breadth of Pakistan’s 

commitment to the fight against terrorism. 

Question. What conditions, if any, should the United States place on its security 

assistance to Pakistan? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to assess the level of our assistance, the return on that investment, and whether there is value in attaching conditions. 

Question. What impact do you believe the end of coalition combat operations in 

Afghanistan will have on: (1) U.S.-Pakistan relations after 2014; and (2) U.S. strategic interests in the South Asia region? 

Answer. Militants and terrorist groups may attempt to exploit perceived security 

gaps as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) play an increased role in maintaining security after International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat operations end. Despite the drawdown, the United States will continue to have a strategic interest in promoting stability and countering the threat of terrorist groups in 

South Asia. As the coalition footprint decreases, the importance of cooperating with 

Pakistan and other partners to promote our strategic interests in the region will increase. 

THE HAQQANI NETWORK

Question. The Haqqani Network, which has been linked to a number of deadly attacks on Afghan, U.S., and other coalition forces in Afghanistan, operates from safe 

havens in Pakistan. 

In your view, should additional steps be taken to track and counter the illicit financial activities of the Haqqani Network, and if so, what role—if any—should DOD 

play? 

Answer. The Haqqani Network continues to pose a threat to U.S., coalition, and 

Afghan personnel, threaten regional security, and undermine Pakistan’s stability. I 

understand that DOD and the broader U.S. Government are taking steps to counter 

this network. The Department of State’s designation of the group as a global terrorist network and the Department of Treasury’s move on February 6, 2014, to 

freeze the assets of three suspected militants linked to the network are steps in the 

right direction. If confirmed, I would support DOD and other agencies’ efforts to 

counter the Haqqani Network. 

IRAQ

Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to 

Iraq? 

Answer. I believe we have a key interest in making sure Iraq remains stable and 

secure. If confirmed, I would work to deepen the strategic partnership to make sure 

we continue collaboration on security challenges and work to deepen Iraq’s military 

capabilities to repel the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and further integrate Iraq with regional partners. 

Question. What in your view are the major areas, if any, for security cooperation 

between the United States and Iraq? 

Answer. I believe we share many security interests with Iraq. We have cooperated 

and need to continue to cooperate in areas such as countering threats from Iran and 

terrorist organizations, including ISIL. We also have similar interests in making 

sure the region is peaceful and secure, including stemming instability emanating 

from the violence in Syria. 

Question. In what areas, if any, do you see U.S. and Iraqi security interests diverging? 

Answer. I don’t see the United States and Iraq having divergent security interests. Both the United States and Iraq are working to ensure that Iraq remains stable, sovereign, and secure; is able to protect its borders from external aggression; 

and develops capabilities to fight terrorism and extremism inside its borders. 

293 

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S.-Iraq security 

relationship over the coming years? 

Answer. Despite numerous security problems in the region, if I am confirmed, I 

would work to help Iraq integrate into the region, ensure it has the resources it requires to counter violent extremism, and move our relationship with Iraq to a more 

traditional security partnership like ones we have with other global and regional allies and partners. 

Question. In your view, what steps, if any, should the United States take to engage with Iraq to promote greater security and stability across the Middle East region? 

Answer. I believe by maintaining and increasing robust foreign military sales, information sharing, and additional training and exercises, the United States will help 

Iraq remain stable and secure and promote broader stability across the region. 

Question. Iraq faces a resurgent violent extremist threat that seeks to exploit popular discontentment with the current Maliki Government, particularly within Sunni 

communities in western Iraq. 

What role, if any, should the United States play in assisting the Government of 

Iraq in confronting the threat of violent extremism? 

Answer. Despite the many challenges the Iraqis are facing, they are demonstrating to us that they are in the lead for their security, but are also asking the 

United States for help in the form of training and expedited weapons deliveries. I 

believe that with these tools, coupled with information sharing and non-operational 

training for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorism Services, we can assist the Iraqis in deepening their capabilities and dealing 

with violent extremists across Iraq. 

Question. In your view, what conditions, if any, should the United States place 

on the provision of equipment or assistance to the Government of Iraq in its fight 

against violent extremism? 

Answer. I believe that we should follow the end-use monitoring protocols that are 

already in place for all countries that we sell weapons to, including Iraq. The United 

States has made clear to Iraq that U.S. assistance is dependent on the Iraqis adhering to proper use of U.S.-origin systems. If confirmed, I would ensure that appropriate end-use monitoring is part of the discussion on negotiations for U.S. security 

assistance. 

Question. What steps can be taken to ensure that the Maliki Government uses 

any equipment, training or advice provided by the United States to fight extremists 

and not to suppress the political opposition from the Sunni minority in Anbar? 

Answer. In addition to the end-use monitoring protocols, I believe that deep and 

sustained U.S. diplomatic engagement to encourage the Government of Iraq to integrate all Iraqi citizens more fully into the political process offers the only way to 

achieve a lasting and durable peace and stability. We have seen vigorous engagement from officials across the U.S. Government as the security situation in Iraq has 

worsened and, if confirmed, on behalf of the Department I would continue to communicate the message that Iraq will be secure and free from extremists when all 

the people of Iraq are given a voice. 

Question. The death toll in Iraq has risen to levels not seen since 2007–2008. The 

deteriorating security conditions in Iraq have been blamed on the growth of extremists in Syria and on Prime Minister Maliki’s inability or unwillingness to address 

Sunni concerns. 

What is your view on the cause of the increased violence? 

Answer. The spillover of instability from Syria has clearly affected Iraq’s security 

and aggravated Iraqi sectarian tensions. The Government of Iraq has taken notable 

steps to address these twin challenges. First, Iraqi Security Forces have deployed 

to western Iraq and are working with local governmental and tribal authorities to 

dislodge and expel terrorist elements that have taken refuge in the undergoverned 

spaces of Anbar. Second, the Iraqi Government announced plans to better integrate 

Sunni tribal forces more effectively into the national military and has publicly affirmed its intent to proceed with national elections in April despite the violence. 

IRAN

Question. What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed by 

Iran? 

Answer. In my view, some of the policies and activities of the Islamic Republic 

of Iran constitute a significant and direct threat to our regional allies and partners, 

to some of our core interests in the region, and to broader international norms. This 

is most evident in Iran’s pursuit of capabilities that, if left uncontested, would enable it to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. Iran also has the largest invenVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00301 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
294 

tory of ballistic missiles in the region, and some of these missiles are inherently capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Last, Iran is the most active statesponsor of terrorism in the world. 

Question. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to Iran? 

Answer. I believe that the comprehensive approach of tough-minded diplomacy 

and unrelenting pressure has sharpened considerably the strategic choices for Iran. 

This policy has mobilized and unified the international community against the Iranian regime, resulting in Iran’s unprecedented regional and global isolation. It has 

inflicted a heavy economic toll on Iran through a comprehensive set of smart and 

robust sanctions. It has sent a powerful message that unless Iran changes course, 

all options are on the table. Ultimately, the U.S. policy forced Iran to the negotiating table and to agree to the Joint Plan of Action. I believe that sustained application of our policy gives us the best chance of reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal 

with Iran, while holding Iran accountable for a range of destabilizing activities in 

the region and its dismal human rights record. 

Question. In your opinion, what impact, if any, do ongoing P5+1 negotiations with 

Iran on Iran’s nuclear program have on our ability to counter Iranian ambitions in 

Syria and Iran’s support of international terrorism? 

Answer. In my opinion, the ongoing P5+1 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program 

do not limit our ability or weaken our resolve to counter Iranian ambitions in Syria 

and Iran’s support of international terrorism. I believe that we should not and will 

not relax our efforts to hold Iran accountable for its support of terrorism, interference across the region, and human rights violations. 

Question. In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing U.S. presence 

in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran? 

Answer. I believe that a substantial reduction of our military presence in the Middle East at this time could have a significant, adverse impact on the effectiveness 

of our policy vis-a-vis Iran and our credibility with our partners in the region. 

Therefore, if confirmed, I would support the Department’s position, as stated by Secretary Hagel in Manama last December, that DOD will continue to maintain a 

strong military posture in the Gulf region. 

Question. In your view, what role should DOD play in countering Iran’s support 

of international terrorism? 

Answer. In my view, the Department has an important role to play in supporting 

broader U.S. Government efforts to counter Iran’s support for international terrorism. If confirmed, I would work with interagency and international partners to 

continue holding Iran accountable for a range of destabilizing activities in the region 

and elsewhere as necessary. 

Question. In your view, is there a trust deficit with Saudi Arabia and our other 

Gulf partners based in part on negotiations with Iran? 

Answer. I believe that the United States and our partners in the region share the 

same assessment of the threat and policy objective vis-a-vis Iran’s nuclear pursuits. 

Although there may be occasional tactical differences, our extensive bilateral relations and especially our strong defense relationships serve to reassure our partners 

of our commitment to regional security and to building their capacity to deal with 

common threats, including those posed by Iran. This includes not just a strong U.S. 

military presence, which itself is clear evidence of continued U.S. commitment, but 

a robust schedule of combined exercises, routine key leader engagement, and a significant foreign military sales program. If confirmed, I would work to maintain and 

build on those strong relationships. 

ISRAEL

Question. With regard to our relationship with Israel, President Obama has stated: ‘‘Our military and intelligence cooperation has never been closer. Our joint exercises and training have never been more robust. Despite a tough budget environment, our security assistance has increased every year. We are investing in new capabilities. We’re providing Israel with more advanced technology—the type of products and systems that only go to our closest friends and allies. Make no mistake: 

we will do what it takes to preserve Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge—because 

Israel must always have the ability to defend itself, by itself, against any threat.’’ 

Do you agree with President Obama’s position and views with regard to the U.S. 

security relationship with Israel? 

Answer. Yes, I agree with the President’s views, which Secretary Hagel has reaffirmed on several occasions. Under the leadership of Secretary Hagel, the Department has worked diligently to strengthen the U.S.-Israeli relationship, which includes the largest amount of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) in history and the 

approval to release advanced military capabilities, including the F–35 and the V– 

295 

22 aircraft, to Israel. If confirmed, I would work to continue DOD’s substantial cooperation with Israel and maintain the strength of our security relationship. 

POST-ARAB UPRISING MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

Question. The past few years have brought great change to the Middle East and 

North Africa. These changes may require adjustments to our military-to-military engagement efforts throughout the region. 

What is your understanding of U.S. military-to-military engagement in the 

MiddleEast and North Africa (e.g. Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries in 

the region), and what changes—if any—would you advocate for in light of the Arab 

Uprising? 

Answer. DOD’s military-to-military and defense civilian relations with our partners in the Middle East and North Africa constitute a variety of tailored programs 

and efforts. Our military engagement includes working with key partners’ defense 

ministries and militaries, having a forward presence to enable operations and deter 

threats, building partner capacity to meet common challenges, and being prepared 

for future contingencies. These programs are matched to partners’ perspectives, capabilities, and needs, and play a critical role in advancing U.S. strategic interests, 

which include: securing and protecting Israel, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, defeating extremists, countering terrorist organizations, ensuring the 

free flow of commerce, and supporting operations in Afghanistan. 

During this time of continuing change and uncertainty in the region, it is imperative that the Department sustains and improves military-to-military and defense civilian relations, while continuing to evaluate and recalibrate the nature and substance of each of our relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S. values 

and advance U.S. vital national interests. 

EGYPT

Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in Egypt? 

Answer. I am troubled by the government’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, opposition groups, and journalists. I know that the Department has repeatedly 

voiced concerns about the crackdown to the Government of Egypt and urged that 

the interim government protect the rights provided in the new constitution. 

I am also concerned with the recent increase in violence perpetrated by Sinaibased terrorist organizations. I understand that the Department has continued to 

provide maintenance support for platforms that support CT operations, and that the 

Secretary has personally offered our assistance. If confirmed, I would continue the 

Department’s work to support Egypt’s efforts to combat terrorist threats. 

Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egypt security relationship? 

Answer. The U.S.-Egypt relationship is one of our most significant and enduring 

security relationships in the Middle East. Egypt is an important regional actor, and 

for more than 30 years our relationship has served to further our countries’ joint 

security interests. Our security relationship with Egypt helps us facilitate expedited 

U.S. military access to the Suez Canal and critical overflight privileges, ensure the 

security of Israel, cooperate on counterterrorism efforts, and maintain the security 

of our embassy and consulate. Supporting Egypt’s transition while encouraging a 

non-violent, transparent, and inclusive process ensures our security relationship is 

maintained and our interests protected. 

Question. What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with respect to regional 

stability? 

Answer. Egypt remains an important partner for regional security. Egypt’s upholding of the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel, the security support that it provides 

to military and commercial ships transiting the Suez Canal, and its efforts to combat terrorist elements in the Sinai all advance critical regional security objectives. 

In addition, Egypt’s work to prevent illicit trafficking across its shared borders with 

Libya, Sudan, and Israel demonstrate its commitment to promoting stability in the 

region. 

Question. In your view, should the U.S. Government continue to provide defense 

articles and services purchased by the Egyptian military using U.S. FMF funds? 

Answer. Our FMF funds have been an important part of our overall relationship 

with Egypt for more than 30 years. I understand the Department’s position to be 

that we want to maintain our security assistance relationship with Egypt, and if 

confirmed I would continue the Department’s efforts, working with other U.S. departments and agencies, to exercise the authorities granted in the fiscal year 2014 

omnibus appropriations act to continue providing assistance to Egypt. 

296 

Question. If current Defense Minister Field Marshal el-Sisi were elected president 

of Egypt based on free and fair elections, what impact do you believe that might 

have on our military relationship with Egypt? 

Answer. Egypt is an important partner of the United States and is critical to stability and security in the region, but Egypt’s path forward is for the Egyptians to 

decide. The military and security aspect of the U.S.-Egypt relationship remains important to the United States and for our interests in the region, but the overall relationship is far broader than military assistance. 

Regardless of who Egypt’s president is, our shared interests in upholding the 

Camp David Peace Accords, counterterrorism and Sinai security, maritime security, 

and border security will remain, and I understand that the Department will continue to work with Egypt to advance those interests. 

SYRIA

Question. The civil war in Syria continues and President Assad’s commitment to 

continuing his regime’s ongoing operations appear unwavering despite international 

condemnation. To date, the United States has limited its support to opposition 

forces to non-lethal assistance to forces on the ground, as well as technical assistance to elements of the opposition working to build a cohesive political entity. 

In your view, what is the proper role on the U.S. military in this conflict? 

Answer. A political solution to the Syria conflict would be the best outcome. DOD 

continues to be involved in interagency discussions that explore potential military 

roles, to support the important U.S. national interest in stopping atrocities in Syria. 

The U.S. military stands ready to support these goals, as determined by the President. 

Question. In your view, should the United States provide support to opposition 

groups on the ground in Syria, including lethal support? 

Answer. Yes, the United States should provide assistance to the moderate Syrian 

opposition. In fact, in addition to diplomatic support, the U.S. Government is providing nonlethal support—nearly $260 million—to the Syrian Opposition Coalition 

(SOC) and the Supreme Military Council (SMC). 

DOD also has been supporting the State Department in this endeavor. Since April 

2013, DOD has delivered additional assistance directly to the SMC as well as the 

SOC in the form of meals ready-to-eat and medical supplies. 

The provision of lethal assistance by DOD to the opposition would be a serious 

undertaking and would require a change in U.S. policy. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working closely through the U.S. interagency process to address such difficult policy questions. 

Question. In your view, would the removal of the Assad regime be a strategic defeat of Iran in the region? 

Answer. I believe the removal of the Assad regime would be a setback for Iran’s 

destabilizing efforts in the region. The extent of that setback, however, would depend on what follows the downfall of Assad’s regime. 

As the President has said, there can only be a political resolution to the conflict 

in Syria. That is why the administration is focused on a negotiated transition that 

does not include Bashar al-Assad. 

Question. National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen said ‘‘As the 

conflict in Syria rages on, we are concerned about the flow of fighters to the country 

and the likelihood that they will pose a threat when they return from Syria to their 

home countries,’’ and that dealing with this threat ‘‘will be the primary focus of our 

counterterrorism efforts in 2014.’’ 

If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for a counterterrorism strategy to blunt the rising tide of extremists in Syria? 

Answer. Any counterterrorism strategy will need to involve active engagement 

with partner nations and allies, who have legitimate concerns about the growing extremist problem emanating from Syria. We must approach this issue regionally in 

order to combat these groups effectively, since this terrorist activity is not limited 

to Syria alone. Further, the Department must work closely with our interagency 

partners to develop options reflecting a whole-of-government approach to addressing 

the terrorist threat and disrupting terrorist efforts to attack the U.S. Homeland, our 

allies and partners, and our interests abroad. 

Question. After the United States threatened the use of military force in response 

to Syria’s use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians in August 2013, Syria 

agreed to an international plan to eliminate its chemical weapons program by the 

end of June 2014. Although Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention and 

has eliminated its capacity to mix and fill chemical agents and munitions, it has 

297 

failed to meet recent deadlines to transport its chemical agents and precursors to 

Latakia for removal and destruction. 

Given Syria’s apparent unwillingness to meet all its internationally mandated 

deadlines, what are your views on the prospects for eliminating Syria’s chemical 

weapons program by June 30, 2014? 

Answer. I understand that the international community is poised to complete destruction of Syria’s chemical materials once Syria fulfills its obligations. The United 

States is engaging bilaterally and multilaterally with key international partners to 

increase pressure on the Syrian Government in order to achieve complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe DOD could take as part 

of the international effort to ensure the successful elimination of Syria’s chemical 

weapons program in 2014? 

Answer. I understand the Department is playing a critical role in the international effort. If confirmed, I would continue the robust coordination within DOD, 

other U.S. departments and agencies, and with international partners necessary to 

ensure successful completion of our mission. 

GULF SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. The administration has been working with Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) governments to enhance regional cooperation and security against ballistic 

missile threats, particularly from Iran. 

What is your view of the potential for missile defense cooperation within the GCC 

to enhance regional security, and how do you see this potential cooperation fitting 

into the United States missile defense and security efforts in the Middle East? 

Answer. I understand that our efforts concerning missile defense cooperation with 

our Gulf partners are progressing. The plans that many GCC states have developed, 

including acquisition of advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities and participation in ballistic missile defense training and exercises, put us on a path to building 

stronger bilateral security partnerships, which could in turn provide a solid foundation for future progress in the multilateral arena. 

Question. What role do you see for the sale to the United Arab Emirates of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile defense systems, 

and similar sales to other GCC partners, in regional security against Iranian missile 

threats? 

Answer. I understand that the United States is working with a number of GCC 

States regarding regional missile defense initiatives, including supporting their consideration of ballistic missile defense capabilities through the Foreign Military Sales 

program. As a result, many GCC partners are becoming increasingly interested, and 

active, in acquiring and fielding substantial ballistic missile defense capabilities. 

When complemented by the deployment of U.S. capabilities, these systems could 

make a significant contribution to deterrence of, and defense against, the Iranian 

ballistic missile threat. 

Question. To your knowledge, have there been any requests by the GCC to purchase military equipment or services as a bloc, as Secretary Hagel announced in December 2013? 

Answer. No, to my knowledge the GCC has not yet initiated any Foreign Military 

Sales requests following the recent Presidential Determination. 

Question. Given the relative wealth of GCC states and their ability to buy complete systems independently (e.g., UAE’s purchase of THAAD), what dynamics do 

you believe could lead to purchasing military capabilities as a GCC bloc? 

Answer. I believe that a GCC decision to purchase military capabilities as a bloc 

would largely be a function of a shared view that the deployment of a collective capability would enhance the national, sovereign defenses of member states. 

Question. Do you believe that, after the rotation of an aircraft carrier presence 

from the Gulf, the U.S. military should take any steps to reassure our GCC partners 

of U.S. willingness and capability to defend against the threat of Iranian aggression? 

Answer. The United States has deep and enduring interests in the Middle East 

and maintains a robust regional military posture able to deter aggression and respond to potential security contingencies. This is a message that Secretary Hagel 

firmly delivered in his public remarks during the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain in 

December, and a theme he has repeatedly conveyed in consultations with our GCC 

partners. 

298 

REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS AND RESPONSE

Question. Iran and North Korea each have hundreds of short- and medium-range 

ballistic missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command areas of responsibility (AORs). The 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of February 2010 stated that the United 

States intends to pursue regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches to ballistic 

missile defense against such missile threats in various regions. 

Do you believe that such regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches will provide our regional combatant commanders with the missile defense capabilities needed to defend our forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in the region? 

Answer. Yes. I believe our tailored missile defense approaches will contribute to 

the defense of our forward-deployed forces and our allies and partners. If confirmed, 

I would work to ensure that U.S. missile defenses are tailored to address the threat 

to each region using the capabilities that are most suited for deployment. 

Question. What role do you see for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system with 

Standard Missile-3 interceptors in U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs? 

Answer. Ships equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense weapons system 

are a good example of the mobile systems that allow for the tailored defense of key 

regions and the capacity to surge missile defenses to a particular region in a crisis. 

Question. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs, what role 

do you see for other nations to contribute to regional missile defense capabilities? 

Answer. The missile defense contributions from our allies and partners help to 

strengthen regional deterrence and defense by increasing defense cooperation ties 

with the United States while making themselves and our forward deployed forces 

less vulnerable to coercion and ballistic missile attack. If confirmed, I would encourage even closer cooperation with allies and partners in this area. 

LIBYA

Question. What role do you envision the United States playing in helping Libya 

build capable security institutions? 

Answer. Libya remains a country in a difficult democratic transition. I understand 

that building Libyan security capacity is a priority for DOD, and I would support 

this effort if confirmed. In response to a request from Libyan Prime Minister Zeidan, 

the United States will train a 5,000–8,000-member general purpose force (GPF), 

which will be a foundational element of Libya’s future security. The United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey are also committed to training Libyan GPF personnel, and 

we are working with them closely to ensure our efforts are coordinated. To underwrite the development of, and to sustain, this force, DOD also contributes to international efforts to provide defense advisor and defense institution reform programs 

to help the Libyan Ministry of Defense develop the capabilities necessary to manage 

the country’s security forces. 

Question. What is your assessment of the risks associated with the paramilitary 

forces that continue to have control of large swaths of Libya? 

Answer. It is my assessment that paramilitary forces disrupt Libya’s democratic 

transition and undermine the basic peace and stability of the state. 

Question. In your view, what role, if any, should DOD play in assisting the Libyans with addressing the threat to stability posed by paramilitary forces? 

Answer. I understand that the United States is committed to working with the 

Libyan Government as it addresses the risks paramilitary forces pose to Libyan stability, and DOD plays an important role in those efforts. In addition to the GPF program, I understand DOD provides training and equipment to increase Libya’s border security and counterterrorism capacity. The Department also contributed to 

weapons abatement efforts and defense institution reform programs. 

Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges to the Libyan Government in building capable and sustainable security institutions? 

Answer. Libya was left without a deep bench of experienced technocrats and civil 

servants, and its ability to administer governing institutions is nascent. This poses 

challenges to Libya’s capacity to absorb and coordinate international assistance efforts. For this reason, the administration is focused on ensuring that the United 

States and our international partners coordinate among ourselves to provide Libya 

with the assistance it needs. 

Question. In what ways can the United States be most effective in assisting the 

Libyan Government in building capable and sustainable security institutions? 

Answer. To complement our GPF, border-security, and counterterrorism training, 

DOD seeks to assist the Libyan Ministry of Defense with institution-building programs to facilitate the recruiting, retention, and integration of trained personnel 

299 

into the Libyan military. In my view, a capable Libyan Ministry of Defense is essential to the consolidation of Libya’s security capacity. 

Question. What security assistance programs do you consider most vital to providing security assistance to Libya and to help Libya build its security capacity? 

Answer. Once implemented, I understand that the Libyan-funded General Purpose Force training will be our largest effort to help build Libya’s security capacity. 

With Congress’s support, we funded programs to develop counterterrorism forces as 

well as a border security company in Libya. I understand that DOD’s defense advisor and defense institution reform programs also benefit Libyan Ministry of Defense 

development. 

Question. In your opinion, how important is the Global Security Contingency Fund 

to U.S. security assistance efforts in Libya? 

Answer. I understand that the United States has the strategic goals of supporting 

Libyan Government efforts to develop a basic capability to secure its own borders 

and maintain stability in the face of internal and regional challenges, and to create 

the space for a peaceful, successful democratic transition. By developing Libyan special operations and border security capacity, the Global Security Contingency Fund 

could play a critical role in advancing these objectives. 

AFRICA-RELATED SECURITY MATTERS

Question. The new DOD strategic guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’’ announced by President Obama on January 5, 

2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which DOD will prepare. The primary emphasis of the strategy relates to 

the Middle East and Asia. The strategy makes little reference to Africa and its myriad security challenges. 

In light of the emphasis on areas outside of the African continent, if confirmed, 

how would you draw attention to the myriad security challenges confronting African 

nations? 

Answer. We must protect U.S. lives and interests from al Qaeda and its affiliates 

and those who intend to do us harm. Building the capability of African security 

forces, defense institutions, and regional organizations to combat transnational 

threats will continue to be a cornerstone of our defense efforts in Africa. As part 

of these efforts, if confirmed, I would support ongoing programs and policies that 

instill in African militaries a commitment to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of law, abide international human rights norms, and support international peacekeeping operations. Over the long run, it will be Africans who will 

best be able to address African security challenges, and DOD will be positioned to 

advance U.S. security interests most effectively through focused security engagement with our African partners. 

Question. In the last few years, there has been a growth of terrorist networks, capabilities, and operations in North and East Africa, including groups that reportedly 

intend to target Western nations, including the United States. Some have characterized the U.S. counterterrorism effort in North and East Africa as an ‘‘economy of 

force’’ effort. 

Do you agree with that characterization of the U.S. counterterrorism effort in 

North and East Africa? 

Answer. The growing terrorist threats in Northwest and East Africa present a 

complex security challenge to U.S. security interests. The vast under-governed areas 

in North and East Africa have contributed to a permissive environment for extremist networks. Working closely with international and regional partners, I understand that DOD focuses its efforts on disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda, its affiliates, and adherents. U.S. support of France’s operations in Mali and support of 

United Nations peacekeeping forces have resulted in significant progress in addressing the terrorist threat in the Sahel. Our support to the African Union Mission in 

Somalia (AMISOM) has been critical to reducing al-Shabaab’s freedom of movement 

in south and central Somalia. 

Question. In your view, should these U.S. counterterrorism efforts be expanded, 

contracted, or remain the same? 

Answer. In my view, U.S. counterterrorism efforts should align with the threat 

to the United States, our allies and partners, and our interests. If confirmed, I 

would support counterterrorism efforts to disrupt and over time defeat violent extremist organizations that pose a direct threat to U.S. and allied interests, and 

threaten regional security. 

300 

U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and 

efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord’s 

Resistance Army (LRA)—including Joseph Kony—continue to operate and commit 

atrocities against civilian populations. Some observers have identified operational 

concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find 

an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered 

in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from 

the Defense and Intelligence Community continues to be inadequate; (3) limitations 

continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of 

direct support they can provide; and (4) logistics and operational enablers for U.S. 

forces. 

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass (OOC)? 

Answer. The mission of U.S. OOC forces is to enhance African capacity to end the 

threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). It is my understanding that U.S. 

military advisors are working with these forces to strengthen information-sharing 

and synchronization, enhance their operational planning, and increase the effectiveness of African security forces. If confirmed, I would support the current U.S. policy 

of pursuing a comprehensive, multi-faceted strategy to help the governments and 

people of this region in their efforts to end the threat posed by the LRA and to address the impacts of the LRA’s atrocities. 

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate level of priority to be accorded 

to efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army? 

Answer. OOC balances the operational needs of our African partners with our desire to ensure those partners remain in the lead as they confront their security challenges, and contributes to a whole-of-government effort to support local resistance 

to and eventual defeat of the LRA. I understand that this approach has yielded dividends. Since 2012, there have been more than 100 defections from the LRA, including LRA fighters, with many citing U.S.-supported defections messaging as influential in their decisions to defect. In December 2013, 19 individuals defected from the 

LRA, the largest LRA defection since 2008. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to review the four concerns outlined above 

and report back to the committee? 

Answer. Yes. 

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND NATO

Question. In your view, how important to U.S. national security interests is the 

NATO and the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our Alliance partners? 

Answer. Europe is and remains the United States’ partner of first resort. The 

transatlantic community has never been more closely aligned in confronting the 

challenges of a complex, dangerous, and fast-changing world. The breadth and depth 

of our cooperation are remarkable. For example, in Libya, NATO allies came together with Arab and other partners to prevent a catastrophe and to support the 

Libyan people. In Afghanistan, with nearly 40,000 allied and partner personnel 

alongside our own, we built and sustained NATO’s largest-ever overseas deployment. As President Obama has said, ‘‘Europe remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the world,’’ and NATO is ‘‘the most capable Alliance in history’’. 

Question. If the United States were to have to take military action against Iran 

in the future, do you believe that could occur without strategic basing in Europe, 

and if so how difficult would that be? 

Answer. I cannot address the basing requirements for specific operations in an 

unclassified setting. I understand that, traditionally, U.S. basing in or transit 

through Europe has been essential to a broad range of contingency plans and global 

operations. For example, European bases provided critical support to Operation 

Desert Shield in Iraq and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in the 1990s, and more 

recently to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Unified Protector in Libya. 

Question. Do you believe that any moderate to major military operation (e.g. Operation Odyssey Dawn, Operation Unified Protector) that the United States might undertake in Africa or the Middle East is likely to involve U.S. forces from Europe 

and/or with Europe? 

Answer. Yes, I expect that U.S. forces and facilities in Europe would likely be involved in any moderate or major military operation the United States might undertake in Africa or the Middle East. Additionally, as recent and ongoing operations 

in the Middle East and Africa show, I expect that a moderate to major military operation in Africa or the Middle East would include European allies and partners. 

301 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to strengthen that transatlantic relationship, if confirmed? 

Answer. The strength of the transatlantic relationship has always been based on 

shared values of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law enshrined in the 

North Atlantic Treaty. However, shared security interests and U.S. leadership are 

the glue that binds the Alliance. Making the transatlantic relationship stronger requires sustained U.S. support and leadership of the Alliance, a re-dedication on the 

part of the next generation of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to the founding 

principles and values of the Alliance, and sharing the responsibility among allies for 

supporting the Alliance so that future leaders continue to believe that investments 

in the Alliance are in their national interest. If confirmed, I would work to ensure 

U.S. support for these principles. 

Question. As the United States pursues a pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, do 

you believe there should be a reduction in the U.S. security commitment to Europe? 

Answer. No. Even as we add focus on the Asia-Pacific, we must sustain our commitments to Europe. Europe is home to many of our most committed and capable 

allies and partners, many of whom who have sacrificed—and continue to sacrifice— 

alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. In fact, economic austerity, the transnational nature of today’s threats, and the rise of other centers of 

power in a multipolar world, make a strong transatlantic alliance all the more important to retaining our influence and defending our common interests. 

Question. As the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan 

nears completion, do you foresee a need for NATO to re-evaluate its purpose, missions and objectives going forward? 

Answer. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has continually re-evaluated its 

purpose, missions, and objectives. The end of the International Security Assistance 

Force mission in Afghanistan should be no different. The purpose of the Alliance as 

stated in the 2010 Strategic Concept is still valid, but the end of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of this year provides an opportunity for the Alliance to reassess the balance between various missions and to review objectives. I 

understand that NATO’s transition in Afghanistan will provide an opportunity to 

reinvest in areas that received less focus during the ISAF operation, and allies will 

face the challenge of maintaining the level of interoperability that we achieved after 

years of operating together in Afghanistan. 

Question. Do you believe NATO should reduce the number of U.S. non-strategic 

nuclear weapons based in Europe at this time? If so why and, if not, what conditions 

could lead to such a reduction? 

Answer. The President stated in Berlin last June that we will work with our 

NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical weapons in Europe. The 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) reflects the consensus position of NATO members, and it commits NATO to remaining a nuclear 

Alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. The DDPR concluded that the ‘‘Alliance’s 

nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and 

defence posture.’’ The DDPR also notes, however, that, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned 

to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the 

greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the EuroAtlantic area. 

Question. What is your assessment of the participation of NATO partners other 

than the U.S. in the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) program and 

other NATO missile defense efforts? 

Answer. It is my understanding that our allies contribute to NATO missile defense through common funding to the command and control network, hosting U.S. 

missile defense assets in the region, and contributing their own missile defense capabilities. If confirmed, I would work to ensure robust Allied participation in NATO 

missile defense. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for maintaining the unprecedented level of interoperability between the U.S. and NATO 

partners after the draw down in Afghanistan? 

Answer. NATO political leaders recognize that as ISAF ends, Alliance forces will 

need to maintain the interoperability we have developed during the last 20 years 

of continuous deployments. I understand that those leaders tasked NATO’s military 

planners to work on several training-related Summit deliverables, including an updated Education, Training, Exercise, and Evaluation Policy; a new NATO Training 

Concept looking at the 2015 to 2020 timeframe; and a new Major Exercise Program 

for 2016 and onwards. If confirmed, I would recommend following through on the 

work already undertaken by our NATO military planners. 

302 

Question. Two Brigade Combat Teams have been inactivated in Europe. What is 

your understanding of the status of a rotational brigade designed to provide regular 

training with NATO forces to help maintain engagement and interoperability? 

Answer. I understand that DOD will continue to allocate a U.S. Brigade Combat 

Team to the Response Forces Pool of the NATO Response Force (NRF). We have 

also requested funding to support the deployment of a U.S.-based battalion to Europe twice per year for up to 2 months at a time, so that our U.S.-based Army units 

can exercise with the NRF and train with allies and partners in the same way that 

units stationed in Europe do. The U.S. European Command has already developed 

a plan to integrate the rotational battalion into several U.S. Army Europe-led multinational exercises, as well as several NATO-led exercises. 

RUSSIA

Question. What in your view are the major security issues in the U.S.-Russian relationship? 

Answer. There are a number of areas where the United States and Russia can 

and do cooperate in order to build common ground and increase shared security. 

These include, but are not limited to, strategic arms reductions, counterterrorism 

and counter-extremism, Afghanistan, preventing proliferation of dangerous technologies, military relations, and dissuading Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed nation. 

In the last 4 years, we have achieved significant results by cooperating in areas 

of mutual interest, and produced real benefits for the American and Russian people. 

We negotiated, ratified , and are successfully implementing the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START); supported the conclusion of Russia’s WTO negotiations; 

adopted tough multilateral sanctions on Iran and North Korea to prevent them from 

pursuing nuclear weapons programs; and worked together on stabilizing Afghanistan. 

Right now we have differences on a number of important issues—including Georgia’s security and territorial integrity, NATO’s role in European security, missile defense in Europe, and conventional arms control in Europe. If confirmed, I would continue to engage the Russian government to try to find common ground, and when 

appropriate, to speak out about our concerns. I would also continue to work with 

Russia in areas where our interests overlap because it is in the long-term strategic 

interests of the United States and our allies and partners to do so. 

Question. Where do you see U.S. and Russian security interests aligning and 

where are they diverging? 

Answer. Although points of friction exist in many areas of our relationship, the 

United States and Russia should be able to cooperate effectively in the many areas 

in which we share common interests, communicate effectively in areas where we 

have competing interests, and negotiate reasonably in areas where we have overlapping interests. 

Among the most important areas where the United States and Russia have common interests is in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We have had significant cooperation with Russia on Iran. 

The Russians supported U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed 

international sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Similarly, 

Russia is a key player in reversing North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and 

shares common interests in this regard. As a third key example, Russia shares our 

concerns, and those of the international community, regarding what it views as the 

potential for regional instability should the conflict in Syria remain unresolved and 

should Syria retain its chemical weapons program. The United States and Russia 

have agreed on a framework to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program. This 

framework represents an important step toward degrading the Assad regime’s ability to use chemical weapons. Finally, the United States and Russia share strong interests in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, as reflected in the New START 

treaty and in prior arms control treaties. 

Question. In your view what policy steps should DOD take to improve relations 

with Russia? For instance, would you support increased military to military relations and exchanges with Russia? 

Answer. DOD has been a proponent and a beneficiary of the ‘‘reset’’ with Russia. 

I understand that DOD is constantly looking for ways to improve military-to-military relations by ensuring that our cooperation with Russia serves U.S. and Russian 

interests and contributes to greater security in the Euro-Atlantic space. Over time, 

cooperation on a wide range of issues may help to build a foundation for more concrete and substantive cooperation with Russia. 

303 

Question. Would you support any joint development or other programs with Russia? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would be interested in supporting joint programs that 

would benefit the United States. I understand that DOD recently proposed a project 

with Russia on Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) through the U.S.- 

Russia Defense Relations Working Group. If confirmed, I would support moving forward on CIED issues in both bilateral security cooperation and defense technology 

cooperation. 

Question. Would you support joint U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense as 

a way to send a signal to Iran against Iran’s developing long-range missiles or having nuclear weapons? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense 

because it could improve the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, thereby improving our capability to protect the United States, our forces overseas, and 

our allies. Missile defense cooperation with Russia could strengthen capabilities 

across Europe to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles. 

Question. Do you support efforts mandated by the New START Treaty Resolution 

of Ratification to seek reductions in the stockpiles of Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If so, what steps would you recommend for pursuing such reductions, 

if confirmed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that our focus for the next stage of 

arms control consist of bilateral negotiated efforts to increase transparency and pursue further reductions that could potentially include all nuclear weapons—deployed 

and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic—while ensuring that we maintain our 

commitments to stability with other nuclear powers, deterrence of potential adversaries, and assurance of our allies and partners. 

Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in responding to Russian attempts 

to exert influence over other countries on its border, including Ukraine, Georgia, 

and the Baltic countries? 

Answer. I believe that stable democracies on Russia’s borders contribute not only 

to Europe’s security, but to Russia’s as well. In that vein, if confirmed, I would 

stand by DOD’s commitment to continue building partner capacity and establishing 

robust security cooperation programs with our partners throughout Europe and Eurasia. 

Question. In your view, does Russia want Iran to have a nuclear weapon? 

Answer. In my view, I do not believe Russia seeks a nuclear armed Iran. Russia 

is an active participant in the P5+1 dialogue. Russia also supported UNSCR 1929, 

which imposed international sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs. I hope that we will continue to find ways to cooperate with Russia in dissuading Iran from a nuclear weapons path. 

Question. After the Sochi Olympics are over, do you expect any change in Russia’s 

pursuit of its interests in the international environment? 

Answer. Russia has consistently pursued what it perceives as its national interests, and I believe that it will continue to do so after the Sochi Olympics. 

Question. In your view, what additional risk does the presence of Russian 

Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad pose to NATO allies and military facilities in Europe? 

Answer. President Putin recently dismissed reports that his country has deployed 

missiles in its Kaliningrad region. That said, any potential deployment of state-ofthe-art missiles near the Alliance’s eastern borders is destabilizing to the region, is 

cause for concern, and would underscore the need for regular communications between Russian and NATO military leaders. 

CHINA

Question. China’s defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for 

about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected 

for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over 

about that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing 

have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit access and freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of 

transparency, stoke growing concerns about China’s intentions in the region. 

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China? 

Answer. The U.S.-China relationship is characterized by elements of both cooperation and competition. In November 2013, National Security Advisor Ambassador 

304 

Susan Rice stated that the United States seeks to manage inevitable competition 

while forging deeper cooperation on issues where our interests converge—in Asia 

and beyond. The United States continues to seek to manage those areas where we 

may have differences and pursue opportunities to engage where there is mutual 

benefit. 

Question. To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United 

States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in 

which China develops? 

Answer. The policies and actions of the United States and other actors can and 

do influence the direction of China’s development. By that same token, U.S. policy 

and actions, or the policies and actions of any country or group of countries, cannot 

alone determine China’s future. The choices of China’s leaders play the central role 

in charting China’s future. However, no country has done more to assist, facilitate, 

and encourage China’s national development and integration into the international 

system than the United States. More fundamentally, the United States can also 

help to shape the environment in which China makes its strategic choices, and in 

so doing, encourage China to ‘‘do the right thing’’. 

Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China’s steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program? 

Answer. China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military modernization 

program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces. Taiwan contingencies 

remain the principal focus of much of this modernization, which seeks to enable 

China to fight and win high-intensity regional military operations of short duration. 

One can also see growing indications that China’s expanding regional and global influence is prompting it to develop capabilities for missions that go beyond China’s 

immediate territorial concerns. 

Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to this Chinese 

military growth and modernization? 

Answer. The United States has been and should remain the foremost military 

power in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States must continue to monitor developments in China’s military modernization and continue encouraging China to be 

more transparent about its military and security affairs. This lack of transparency 

breeds suspicion and the potential for misperception of intentions. The U.S. response to China’s military modernization should be flexible and supported by two 

efforts: first, the continued evolution of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region 

and the maintenance of our global presence and access, including through the 

strengthening of our alliances and partnerships; and second, the transformation of 

our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial challenges. 

Question. What effect is China’s military growth having on other countries in the 

region? 

Answer. China’s rapid rise and the relative lack of transparency surrounding its 

intentions are increasingly creating uncertainty in the region. Other countries in the 

region are closely watching the growth of China’s military, and how its military 

acts. Tensions between China and its neighbors in the East and South China Seas 

have increased, spurring regional actors to modernize their forces. 

Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have contributed to a 

greater focus on regional forums where issues may be addressed multilaterally and 

the need to adhere to international law and norms can be amplified. Such security 

concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have also led to stronger demand 

signals from regional countries and the United States as a security partner of 

choice. 

China’s annual defense budget is growing faster than its economy—with average 

annual increases in defense spending topping 10 percent over the past decade. In 

certain respects, China’s growing military capabilities create opportunities to partner and cooperate where U.S. interests, regional states’ interests, and China’s interests converge. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-tomilitary relations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would look for ways to strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship. I understand that the U.S.-China military-to-military 

relationship has experienced positive momentum over the past year. Our approach 

should continue to pursue this positive development, consistent with U.S. interests 

and values, in pursuit of sustained, substantive dialogue; concrete, practical cooperation; and enhanced risk reduction measures to manage our differences responsibly. At the same time, I would seek to ensure that we balance these exchanges 

with continued, robust interactions with allies and partners across the region. 

305 

Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the 

quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and 

why? 

Answer. Military exchanges are an important mechanism to build trust and mutual understanding, reducing the risk for miscalculation. I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly move the relationship forward if China is equally committed to open and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I 

would continue to encourage China to act responsibly, both regionally and globally. 

I would also support deepening and enhancing our military-to-military relationship 

with China. 

By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty 

in various domains, including maritime, air and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in particular is China’s increased aggressiveness 

in asserting its excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea. 

Question. What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea? 

Answer. The United States is a Pacific nation that has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, the maintenance of peace 

and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law in the 

South China Sea. The United States should sustain its presence in the South China 

Sea and uphold its commitments to its allies and partners in order to maintain 

peace and stability in the region. I believe all parties should resolve their disputes 

through peaceful means and in accordance with customary international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force. 

Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in 

that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation? 

Answer. Although the United States does not take a position on the territorial 

and maritime disputes, I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain a visible presence and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the East 

and South China Seas in accordance with customary international law. The U.S. 

Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability 

across the globe, including in the Asia-Pacific region. 

If confirmed, I would work with our military commanders to evaluate the appropriate level of naval activities in the region to maintain peace and stability as well 

as unimpeded access for lawful commerce and economic development. 

Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There 

are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber espionage and warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space 

in the event of a potential conflict situation. 

If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber 

space and prepared to defend itself against a cyber attack? 

Answer. The protection of U.S. military networks from cyber attack is one of 

DOD’s core missions. If confirmed, I would continue to support DOD’s ongoing efforts to develop new capabilities to defend military networks, support the development of our cyber workforce, and develop partnerships with other government agencies, the private sector, and our allies and international partners to strengthen our 

collective defenses. DOD must also continue to ensure that we are able to conduct 

operations in degraded information environments. 

Question. In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy 

one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China 

has continued its active pursuit of ballistic missile and anti-satellite technology. 

What is your view of China’s purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities? 

Answer. In my view, this test was a troubling incident. It was yet another element of China’s comprehensive, long-term military modernization effort to develop 

and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. 

Question. What do you see as the long-term implications of such developments for 

the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space? 

Answer. The United States should seek ways to protect our interests in space; 

space systems are vital to our national security and our economy. I believe we need 

to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded environment by increasing the resilience of national security systems against threats to space-based 

architectures and developing space control capabilities. If confirmed, I would continue to pursue partnerships with commercial suppliers, collaboration with international partners, and changes in our own architectures and operational tactics that 

306 

can improve the resiliency of our systems and strengthen strategic stability in 

space. 

NORTH KOREA

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean 

peninsula? 

Answer. I believe that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula is serious 

and deserves our constant vigilance. North Korea has demonstrated—through its 

December 2012 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test—that it has the capabilities and the will to undermine regional stability in pursuit of its national interests. 

North Korea’s provocative behavior, large conventional military, pursuit of ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs, and proliferation activities 

continue to be serious concerns for the United States and our allies and partners 

in the region. Kim Jong Un’s unpredictability adds to our concerns. 

If confirmed, I would ensure that our military deterrence of North Korean aggression continues to support our diplomatic efforts to end North Korea’s nuclear and 

missile programs. 

Question. What is your understanding of the threats posed to the United States 

and our allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities? 

Answer. North Korea’s ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

capabilities, and its proliferation of these capabilities, pose a serious threat to U.S. 

forces in the region as well as to our regional allies and partners. Although largely 

untested at longer ranges, these capabilities could pose a direct threat to U.S. territory. If confirmed, I would do my best to ensure that DOD uses its full range of 

resources and capabilities to defend against these threats. 

Question. What concerns you most about North Korea and, if confirmed, what 

would you do to address those concerns? 

Answer. Although under Kim Jong Un the North Korean regime has demonstrated unpredictability, my understanding is that Kim Jong Un remains in full 

control and is consolidating his power. We must remain vigilant against North Korean provocations given Kim Jong Un’s continuing efforts to consolidate power, 

North Korea’s tactic of escalating tension to draw parties to the negotiating table, 

and the onset of the spring military training cycle. If confirmed, I would work to 

ensure the Department is prepared for any potential provocations by North Korea. 

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the U.S.-South Korean security relationship? 

Answer. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is a linchpin of peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region. The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are making 

shared investments in the security of the Korean Peninsula to enhance our combined ability to deter North Korean aggression. Our security relationship represents 

part of a comprehensive, strategic Alliance and plays an important role in contributing to stability not only on the Peninsula but also throughout Northeast Asia and 

globally. 

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve this security relationship? 

Answer. My understanding is that DOD and the ROK are focused on developing 

the strategies, interoperable capabilities, and processes needed to deter and, if necessary, respond to North Korean provocations. If confirmed, I would support a continued emphasis on these areas. 

The United States and the ROK continue to work closely to realign U.S. forces 

on the Peninsula and to assess the conditions for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK. 

If confirmed, I would also prioritize supporting the ROK as it plays a greater role 

in regional and global security befitting its economic status and influence. I would 

work diligently to maintain strong, cooperative relationships with my ROK and 

interagency counterparts to ensure that we all work together to strengthen the Alliance. 

Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now planned for December 

2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place as planned? 

Answer. The United States and the ROK remain committed to the transfer of 

wartime operational control on the timeline identified in the Strategic Alliance 2015 

(SA2015) plan. Wartime OPCON transition has always been conditions-based, and, 

307 

if confirmed, I would support the continued assessment and review of the security 

situation on the Korean Peninsula in the context of implementing SA2015. 

Question. Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should 

remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed 

in Korea be available for regional or global deployments? 

Answer. I believe it is essential that the United States remains committed to the 

combined defense of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with our mutual defense 

treaty obligations. U.S. force posture on the Peninsula contributes to the stability 

of the Northeast Asia region. Our ROK allies are a linchpin for peace and stability 

on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region, and we expect that they 

will remain so into the foreseeable future. 

Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and 

how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean 

Peninsula? 

Answer. I understand that both of these plans are based on the security benefits 

of being outside the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery. By being outside the range of North Korean artillery, U.S. forces gain operational advantages 

regarding force protection, survivability, and consolidation of personnel and equipment. There are also other potential benefits of the force repositioning, including efficiencies, reduced costs, and contribution to the political sustainability of our forward presence on the Korean Peninsula. 

Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an 

attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. Armed Forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in 

response to an attack on South Korea? 

Answer. It is my understanding that under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, 

when the political independence or security of the ROK or the United States are 

threatened by an external armed attack, the United States and the ROK will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack. Patterns of North Korean rhetoric and provocations necessitate that the two sides continue to consult 

closely so that Alliance responses are effective. 

Question. Does the new Counter-Provocation Plan affect U.S. obligations in the 

event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea? 

Answer. My understanding is that the new Counter-Provocation Plan is a ROKled, U.S.-supported contingency plan developed by mutual understanding between 

the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both countries after a November 2010 

North Korean artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. The plan improves the Alliance 

readiness posture to allow for a strong and decisive combined South Korean and 

U.S. response to North Korean provocations and threats. 

Question. How has the new Counter-Provocation Plan changed the consultation 

process between the ROK military and USFK after a provocation by North Korea? 

Answer. The Counter-Provocation Plan includes procedures for consultation and 

ensures a well-coordinated combined action in response to North Korean provocations and threats. I understand that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the ROK military closely consult to ensure the proper response and control escalation. 

Question. Does the ROK military have the obligation to consult with USFK before 

it engages in a response to a provocation by North Korea? 

Answer. The ROK military has the inherent right of self-defense to respond to a 

provocation by North Korea. However, USFK and the ROK military closely consult 

on a daily basis to deter North Korea and maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. 

JAPAN

Question. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship? 

Answer. The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship is very strong and remains the cornerstone of our security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan relationship has underwritten the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region for more 

than a half century. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity 

in the region. The Joint Statement following the October 3, 2013, Security Consultative Committee meeting in Tokyo captures our full range of cooperative activities, 

which I would fully support, if confirmed. 

Question. How does Japan’s relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly 

China, North Korea and South Korea influence the U.S.-Japan relationship? 

Answer. We encourage a healthy and open trilateral relationship among Japan, 

the ROK, and the United States, to facilitate better relations between our two closest allies in northeast Asia. A strong trilateral relationship is an important element 

308 

of deterrence against North Korean challenges. We also continue to encourage both 

China and Japan to increase the level of communication between the two sides in 

order to reduce the possibility of mistakes or miscalculation in contested areas. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more 

active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international 

security arena? 

Answer. We welcome any steps Japan chooses to take that will enable it to play 

a larger role in the Alliance, and to increase its contributions to regional and global 

security. In my view, the steps Japan is considering represent a natural evolution 

in policy that reflects its stature on the global stage. 

Question. What is your view of the U.S.-Japanese joint development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of 

cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense? 

Answer. Japan is one of our most significant ballistic missile defense partners. 

Our cooperation on development of the SM–3 Block IIA and Japan’s commitment 

of more than $1 billion to the program serve as excellent examples of that partnership. Japan also hosts the U.S. Navy SEVENTH fleet, which includes multiple ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis ships; is licensed to co-produce the PATRIOT 

PAC–3 missile; and hosts a U.S. AN/TPY–2 missile defense radar with plans to host 

a second such radar by the end of 2014. 

Question. The current plan is for the closure of the Marine Corps Air Station on 

Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp 

Schwab on Okinawa. While the Governor of Okinawa has signed the landfill permit 

to allow construction of the FRF to go forward, local opposition and a long construction timeline make the completion of the FRF uncertain. 

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the 

Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa? 

Answer. In short, DOD is optimistic about the prospect for successful construction. 

In December of last year, the Governor of Okinawa signed the land reclamation, 

or landfill, permit. This had been a significant political hurdle. This year, DOD expects to work closely with Japan on concrete steps to move forward with the landfill 

and the eventual construction of airfield facilities at the current Marine Corps 

Camp Schwab. Many of the necessary relocations within Camp Schwab required for 

the landfill are already underway, and we have every confidence that Japan will 

continue to make progress on this very significant forces realignment effort. 

Question. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan 

to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? 

Why or why not? 

Answer. I understand that a revision to the Guam International Agreement 

signed last year by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State with their Government of Japan counterparts reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to provide $3.1 billion (in fiscal year 2012 U.S. dollars) in cash toward the construction of Marine 

Corps facilities on Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands 

(CNMI). For Japan, this unprecedented commitment of funds for U.S. military facilities on U.S. territory makes perfect sense, preserving a strong U.S. military presence in the region while simultaneously reducing the pressure associated with the 

U.S. presence in Okinawa. It is also consistent with our policy to have a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force presence in 

the region. 

The Japanese funds will not only assist in the construction of operational and administrative facilities for the U.S. Marines, but also contribute to the construction 

of training areas in Guam and the CNMI to ensure the operational readiness of our 

regional forces. I understand that we will also support opportunities for Japan to 

train at these facilities. 

Question. How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least $3.6 billion, 

serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa 

relations in particular? 

Answer. Since at least 1996, the United States and Japan have shared the view 

that there is a need to relocate the existing Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, 

around which a significant population had grown over the years. Since 1999, we 

identified a replacement site in the vicinity of Camp Schwab near the village of 

Henoko. This was confirmed most recently in the October 2013 2+2 meeting Joint 

Statement. 

I understand that the Department is confident that once this facility is completed 

and operational, the resulting benefit to the areas of Okinawa south of Kadena Air 

Base, where the vast majority of the Okinawa population resides, will be apparent 

309 

to all. At the same time, this facility will allow the Marine Forces on Okinawa to 

maintain their operational readiness and be able to respond quickly as the regional 

emergency force. The Marine Corps will be able to continue to train as they fight, 

as a combined arms team. 

Question. Is Japan carrying a fair share of the burden of the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan under the current Special Measures Agreement? 

Answer. My understanding is that Japan is meeting its obligations as negotiated 

under the 2011 Special Measures Agreement. If confirmed, I would monitor implementation to ensure that Japan continues to do its part to sustain the U.S. presence. 

INDIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations? 

Answer. In my view, the United States and India have built a strong strategic 

partnership, in which defense cooperation plays a major role, and the Secretary is 

strongly committed to this partnership. Over the past decade in particular, we have 

built a bilateral defense relationship that includes a robust number of military exercises, a strong track record on defense trade, and increasingly close consultations 

on regional security issues. As India continues its military modernization efforts, we 

look to India to be a net provider of security in the region, and a partner on issues 

ranging from maritime security to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) 

to broader regional stability. 

Question. How has the recent diplomatic crisis regarding the Indian diplomat who 

was arrested for failing to pay her domestic servant the minimum wage affected the 

U.S.-India security relationship? 

Answer. This was an unfortunate incident, but it does not change the important 

bilateral defense agenda we are pursuing with India. I understand that we are putting this incident behind us and moving forward. 

Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship? 

Answer. If confirmed, there are several key priorities with India that I would pursue. First, I would continue to build on the significant progress we have made in 

our military-to-military relationship, working to increase the scope and complexity 

of exercises, encouraging exchanges, and continuing to prioritize senior-level engagements. We should continue to consult closely on issues affecting broader regional 

stability and look to expand in other areas of cooperation. For example, I would continue the work over the past several years on maritime security and HA/DR, and 

I would continue to work toward increasingly sophisticated defense trade and technology, among other areas. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and 

Pakistan? 

Answer. Long-term stability in South Asia will depend upon progress in the IndiaPakistan relationship, and I was encouraged by the meeting last year between 

Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Sharif on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly. DOD hopes to see more similar high-level engagements, and a greater degree of trust built up between India and Pakistan to ease longstanding tensions, particularly along the line of control. In the meantime, we continue to build 

our own bilateral relationships with both countries and to urge them to be transparent with each other on their activities in the region. 

Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan 

and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Central and South Asian stability will require India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to achieve some level of sustained, mutual cooperation and trust, as well 

as productive relationships between Afghanistan and all of its neighbors, including 

those in Central Asia. We also need to recognize the need for separate bilateral relationships in the region, including the strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan, which is not, in my view, directed at any other country nor is it a threat 

to Pakistan. If confirmed, I would encourage all parties to be transparent with each 

other regarding their activities and relationships in the region. 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-tomilitary relations? 

Answer. We have a very strong U.S.-Philippine defense partnership and a strong 

alliance. We have made progress in several key areas and continue to work with 

310 

the Armed Forces of the Philippines as they pursue long-term military modernization and to increase cooperation on shared security challenges. 

Question. What do you believe the U.S. goals should be in the Republic of the 

Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support ongoing efforts to build Philippine capacity 

with respect to internal security, military modernization, and a role as a positive 

contributor to regional and global security challenges, such as counterterrorism and 

maritime security; and I would continue to support the negotiations now underway 

to enhance our defense cooperation and facilitate an increased rotational presence 

of U.S. forces in the Philippines. 

Question. Do you believe Operation Damayan was a successful disaster relief effort? What were the lessons learned from the operation? What are the needed areas 

of improvement for U.S. disaster relief operations and joint task force operations in 

this area? 

Answer. Operation Damayan was a very successful disaster relief effort, which 

saw a rapid international response and closed cooperation within the U.S. Government and between the U.S. Government, the Government of the Philippines, and 

other responders. The process of examining and incorporating lessons learned is ongoing, and if confirmed I would work to ensure we build on this experience to keep 

improving our own disaster response capabilities and those of our partners. 

Question. Do you anticipate a reduced or increased U.S. military footprint or 

change in mission for U.S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to midterm? 

Answer. The United States and the Government of the Philippines are discussing 

ways to facilitate an enhanced rotational presence in the Philippines. I do not want 

to prejudge the outcome of those discussions. With regard to operations in the 

Southern Philippines, if confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to assess the 

requirements for the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines mission as security improves in that region. 

Question. In your opinion, how important is the Global Security Contingency Fund 

to U.S. security assistance efforts in the Philippines? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the employment of the Global Security Contingency Fund as an important mechanism to help build partner capacity in the 

Philippines, particularly in the areas of maritime security and maritime domain 

awareness. This will help us support the Philippines’ efforts to bolster important capabilities in these key areas. 

INDONESIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations 

with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus? 

Answer. As the U.S.-Indonesia defense relationship continues to expand, we view 

Indonesia as a regional leader and a strong defense partner. Bilateral defense cooperation focuses on enhancing the Indonesian military’s (TNI) capability to conduct 

the external missions of maritime security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. Bilateral defense trade is becoming an important part of our relationship as well. 

With respect to the Kopassus military unit, we see Indonesian progress on human 

rights issues and continue to work with Indonesia to improve human rights and accountability. 

Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If 

so, under what conditions? Why? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would favor increased U.S.-Indonesia military-to-military 

engagement to build on the progress in our defense relationship over the last decade. I would also advocate for continued DOD support to Indonesian defense reform 

efforts, including continued progress towards prevention of, and accountability for, 

human rights violations. 

Question. What is your understanding of the factors that informed the decision 

to re-engage with Kopassus members? 

Answer. I understand that in recent years we have seen a great deal of progress 

with respect to human rights and accountability. I believe that then-Secretary 

Gates’ decision to resume limited engagement in 2010 was a recognition of this 

progress and a way to encourage continued improvement. Since then, I believe we 

have seen gradual improvement and, if confirmed, I would work to support Indonesia’s continued progress. 

Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its Armed Forces, adhering to human rights standards, 

311 

improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses? 

Answer. I believe that Indonesia has made significant progress in institutionalizing respect for human rights and in ensuring accountability when abuses do occur. 

If confirmed, I would continue to maintain an open dialogue between DOD and Congress on how best to keep this trend moving in the right direction, and, would support continued emphasis on necessary further reforms in our military engagement 

with Indonesia. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights 

and accountability in the Indonesian military? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Indonesian leadership on 

this important issue through increased engagement with senior Ministry of Defense 

officials, personnel exchanges, and support for professional military education. We 

would also continue to encourage positive actions taken by the Indonesian Government when violations do occur, including: suspensions and removals of military officials accused and convicted of abuses, and cooperation with the prosecution of accused military members. 

COLOMBIA

Question. Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian Government to make significant gains against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other 

paramilitary forces in Colombia, as well as enabled the government to secure many 

previously ungoverned areas. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided 

more than $7 billion to support Colombia’s efforts to counter the threat of 

transnational criminal organizations and various terrorist groups. 

What are your views regarding the current situation in Colombia focusing upon: 

(1) the current military and political situation in Colombia; (2) the ability of the Colombian military to control its territory; and (3) ongoing DOD programs? 

Answer. It is clear to me that as one of our strongest defense partners in the region, Colombia has taken tremendous steps, with important U.S. support, to improve its own internal stability and citizen security. Colombia has dramatically improved its security throughout the country against several threats, including insurgents (such as the FARC), paramilitaries, criminal bands, and drug trafficking organizations. However, Colombia’s efforts against such groups are not finished, nor is 

stability in Colombia assured. Colombia’s Ministry of Defense, with U.S. support, 

continues to apply pressure on organizations like the FARC, while also working to 

address citizen security and external defense issues. 

We also see Colombia as an increasingly capable and willing partner in addressing common security challenges and contributing to efforts to improve stability more 

widely in the Western Hemisphere. While providing training and engagement on its 

own to many countries in the Hemisphere, Colombia has also partnered with us directly in Central America, an area of common security interest. We are confident 

that Colombia will continue to grow as a stable, interoperable partner in supporting 

security in the region. 

Question. In your view, is the Colombian Government capable of sustaining the 

last decade’s gains during this economic downturn and the scheduled decline in U.S. 

security assistance? 

Answer. Yes, Colombia is capable of maintaining its gains, if it continues to build 

on the strengthened institutional, operational, and technical capacity that it has developed, with U.S. support, over the past decade. DOD is working closely with Colombia to prioritize and streamline our mutual security cooperation programs, understanding that resources are declining, while also acknowledging that certain U.S. 

support, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), will remain 

critical to Colombia’s success for the foreseeable future. Colombia has been a good 

partner in acknowledging the new realities of more limited resources, and DOD remains committed to working with our Colombian partners to address their emerging 

needs while sustaining their hard-won security gains. 

Question. In light of budget conditions, do you believe continued U.S. security assistance to Colombia at the current levels is sustainable? 

Answer. Security assistance to Colombia has been slowly decreasing, and given 

budget realities across the U.S. Government, it will likely continue to decrease in 

the future. We have made hard decisions about where to focus our cooperation with 

Colombia, and also identified some areas where continued U.S. support remains 

critical into the foreseeable future (institutional reform efforts, for example). Although we acknowledge that fewer resources are available for security assistance in 

Colombia, we will stand by Colombia as it continues to move toward improved staVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00319 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
312 

bility and a greater strategic partnership with the United States, and this type of 

commitment will continue to require U.S. resources. 

Question. In your view, what are the remaining U.S. supported programs that will 

need to be continued to ‘‘lock in’’ the progress that has been made? 

Answer. I believe that the United States should continue to support programs 

that strengthen Colombian defense institutions, providing them the capacity to plan, 

forecast, and sustain their enhanced abilities. The United States should also continue to provide support to programs that provide the Colombian Government the 

technical and tactical edge, including critical capabilities it needs to defeat internal 

threats and guarantee stability over the long term. 

CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

Question. During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in 2011, General 

Douglas Fraser—the Commander of U.S. Southern Command—and Admiral 

Winnefeld—the former Commander of U.S. Northern Command—discussed the increasingly dangerous region between Colombia and Mexico, and the devastating impact transnational criminal organizations are having on the people and security in 

this region. The United States has increased its assistance in this region, but—to 

date—DOD has had only a small role. 

What is your assessment of the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations in this region? 

Answer. I understand that the level of threat posed by Transnational Criminal 

Organizations (TCOs) to the Governments of Mexico and in Central America varies. 

While the Government of Mexico continues to deal significant blows to TCOs, Honduras and other Central American governments struggle. The governments in Central America continue to build nascent democratic institutions, but are often susceptible to the corrupting influences of TCOs. DOD believes that the Governments of 

Mexico and in Central America will continue to require varying levels of support 

to address the TCO threat. Although Mexico is a more mature partner and has developed better capabilities to face TCOs, Central American Governments lack the 

means to confront the challenge successfully. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of DOD’s current activities 

in Mexico and Central America? 

Answer. I understand that the Department conducts security assistance and security cooperation programs to advance the capacity of Mexico and Central American 

countries to maintain host nation security, and to advance regional and hemispheric 

defense cooperation and coordination. To support Mexican and Central American efforts against TCOs, DOD security assistance and security cooperation activities 

focus on professionalization and capacity building of regional Armed Forces. Within 

Central America, much of DOD’s efforts are focused on maritime capacities to help 

curb illicit trafficking and training programs emphasizing respect for human rights 

and being responsive to civil authority. Although these efforts are important, and 

have significantly improved the capacity of our partners to meet the TCO threat, 

defense cooperation alone will not be sufficient to defeat the TCOs. 

CUBA

Question. What is your view of the need to review and, potentially, revise U.S. 

policies regarding Cuba? 

Answer. DOD stands in support of the overall U.S. Government policy towards 

Cuba. When the administration periodically reviews our Cuba foreign policy, DOD 

has the opportunity to contribute to the interagency process. Current policy is that 

the United States is open to forging a new relationship with Cuba when the Cuban 

people enjoy fundamental human rights and the ability to determine their own political future freely. The policy also emphasizes targeted bilateral engagement that advances U.S. national interests and the enactment of measures that help reduce the 

dependence of Cuban citizens on the state. 

Question. What is your opinion about the need for, and the pros and cons of, military-to-military contact with Cuba? 

Answer. The Department views military-to-military engagements as a valuable 

tool for building confidence. I understand that we currently conduct limited military-to-military engagement, including at monthly fence line talks at the Guantanamo Naval Base, which focus on ensuring there are no misunderstandings on either side of the fence. 

Question. In your view, is Cuba currently supporting or sponsoring international 

terrorism? 

Answer. Cuba remains designated by the Secretary of State as a State Sponsor 

of Terrorism. I am not aware that the Cuban Government has provided weapons 

313 

or paramilitary training to terrorist groups in recent years. However, if confirmed, 

I would work with the Department of State on all State Sponsorship of Terrorism 

designations, and advise the Secretary of Defense on the Department’s appropriate 

response to complement those designations. 

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? If so, please explain why? 

Answer. I strongly support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. I believe that accession to the Convention would show a U.S. strategic commitment to 

upholding the established legal order that codifies the rights, freedoms, and uses of 

the sea and airspace, including those that are critical to the global mobility of U.S. 

military forces. 

Question. From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages 

and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS? 

Answer. I see many advantages to being a Party to the Convention. The primary 

national security advantage of U.S. accession would be strengthening U.S. credibility to promote the robust set of rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea reflected 

in the Convention. These rights are vital to the mobility of U.S. military forces 

around the world. As a non-Party, we are impeded in our ability to encourage other 

states to respect the rules of law contained in the Convention. 

I do not see any disadvantages to the United States joining the Law of the Sea 

Convention. If confirmed, I would work with Members of the Senate to address any 

concerns that may be raised. 

Question. What is your understanding of the principal arguments against ratifying UNCLOS, and what is your response to those arguments? 

Answer. One of the arguments I have heard Convention opponents make is that 

U.S. accession may erode U.S. sovereignty. I believe that U.S. accession to the Convention would strengthen U.S. sovereignty and sovereign rights. The Convention 

recognizes that a State Party may claim 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, may 

establish an exclusive economic zone, and may assert resource-related sovereign 

rights on its extended continental shelf. Other nations may question whether they 

are obligated to respect a U.S. assertion of these coastal State rights as a non-Party 

to the Convention. 

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 

2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., stated that the United 

States ‘‘is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military 

staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I 

should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.’’ 

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute additional 

military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. 

peacekeeping operations? 

Answer. Successful U.N. peacekeeping operations are in the national security interest of the United States, as they generally cost less than U.S. operations, reduce 

the burden on U.S. forces, and in many cases directly advance U.S. security interests. In principle, I support additional contributions of U.S. military personnel to 

key staff officer positions that provide an opportunity to add significant value to 

mission effectiveness, and where the mission is a strategic priority for the Department and the United States. 

Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the 

DOD request for forces system could be more responsive to requests for personnel 

support from multilateral peacekeeping missions, like the U.N.? 

Answer. We should explore more effective ways to contribute U.S. personnel in 

support of the United Nations and overcome barriers to U.S. military personnel 

serving in U.N. headquarters. If confirmed, I would support seeking ways where the 

Department could identify desired positions and turnover dates, and work to fill 

those positions. 

MASS ATROCITIES PREVENTION

Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in 

August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10. 

What is DOD’s role in addressing atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have 

for preventing or responding to atrocities? 

314 

Answer. DOD is a member of the Atrocities Prevention Board, which has 

strengthened our efforts and given us more tools with which to work. DOD plays 

an important role in early warning and providing support to enable international 

partners to prevent mass atrocities. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that 

the Department contributes to U.S. efforts to prevent mass atrocities. 

AUTHORITY FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE/LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Question. On September 18, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use 

of Military Force (AUMF) (Public Law 107–40), which provides that ‘‘the President 

is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations 

or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 

United States by such nations, organizations or persons.’’ This AUMF remains in 

effect and provides the legal authority for certain U.S. military actions. 

What is your understanding of the role of the USD(P) in interpreting the AUMF 

and in the application of the AUMF to military activities? 

Answer. The AUMF is the domestic legal basis for use of force against al Qaeda 

and associated forces. If confirmed as the USD(P), my role would be to advise the 

Secretary of Defense on the policy dimensions of proposed operations, working closely with interagency colleagues, to ensure our operations and activities are aligned 

to our policy and strategy objectives. 

Question. In your view, does DOD have the legal authorities it needs to conduct 

military operations against entities responsible for September 11 and against those 

who plan further attacks against the United States? 

Answer. Yes, I believe the 2001 AUMF is appropriate for such military operations. 

Question. In your view, do existing authorities provide the U.S. military the flexibility it needs to respond to new and emerging terrorism threats? 

Answer. Yes. The President’s authority as Commander in Chief provides sufficient 

flexibility to respond to emerging terrorism threats posed by organizations not covered by the 2001 AUMF. If confirmed, I would provide my best advice to the Secretary and Congress to ensure we’re doing everything we can to protect our Nation 

from terrorist attacks. 

Question. Without the AUMF, would the U.S. military have the authority to use 

force, including deadly force against members of al Qaeda and associated forces? If 

so, under what circumstances? 

Answer. Yes. The President’s authority as Commander in Chief empowers him to 

order military operations necessary to protect an important national interest, subject to Constitutional and statutory limitations on the scope and duration of military 

operations the President may order without the express authorization of Congress. 

Question. What is the impact of the President’s Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on the application of the AUMF with respect to counterterrorism operations? 

Answer. The President’s Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism provides rigorous 

processes for reviewing and approving counterterrorism direct action operations. 

The President’s Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism is not limited to operations 

conducted solely under authority of the 2001 AUMF. If confirmed, I intend to ensure 

we remain committed to conducting counterterrorism operations lawfully, and in accordance with this policy. 

Question. In your view, would it be appropriate for the United States to use military force against terrorist groups that have not engaged in hostilities directly 

against the United States, but merely shown an intent to do so? If so, under what 

circumstances? 

Answer. The decisions to use military force are made based on careful, fact-intensive assessments to identify the individuals and groups that pose a threat to the 

United States. The most important policy consideration is the protection of U.S. 

lives. 

UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Question. Over the last 4 years, the administration has worked to establish a 

framework that governs our use of force against terrorists—insisting upon clear 

guidelines, oversight, and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy 

Guidance the President signed on May 22, 2013. As a part of that effort, the President has indicated a preference that the U.S. military should carry out the use of 

force in active warzones, and beyond. 

What are your views on whether DOD should assume greater responsibility for 

lethal strikes by remotely-piloted aircraft (drones)? 

315 

Answer. I believe that DOD is the part of Government where expertise in the use 

of force abroad should reside. Our best efforts come when we are working in concert 

with our interagency partners to collect intelligence, collaborate with the host nation, and synchronize our actions. If confirmed, I would remain committed to ensuring DOD is capable and ready to fulfill its under the President’s Policy Guidance. 

Question. What benefits or risks to national security would be implicated if the 

Department were to take the lead role in operating unmanned systems? 

Answer. The application of force abroad in a disciplined and accountable manner 

is a core strength of DOD. I understand that countering terrorist threats must be 

a collaborative effort that involves experts from across our Government, and if confirmed as USD(P), I would join my counterparts to ensure we are executing counterterrorism operations in a manner that takes advantage of current capabilities and 

provides a solid foundation to protect our Nation from terrorist attack. 

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Question. One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and 

civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The 

USD(P) is specifically directed to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such plans. 

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the 

formulation of strategy and contingency planning? 

Answer. The role of the civilian leadership is not only statutorily mandated, but 

is critical to translating broad national security policies and principles into a defense strategy and strategic priorities that ultimately drive military planning and 

resource allocation. Civilian and military perspectives are both important to successful defense planning. The Civilian leadership plays the principal role in providing 

policy guidance to shape military planning and then has the responsibility to review 

that planning to ensure it fits within the policy guidelines outlined. The role of military leaders and planners is to provide their best military advice on how to achieve 

objectives within the parameters outlined by the President and Secretary of Defense. 

The USD(P) is responsible for developing the guidance issued by the Secretary for 

the preparation of contingency plans and for reviewing DOD plans to ensure that 

they support strategic objectives. The USD(P) is also uniquely responsible for facilitating interagency coordination on contingency planning efforts, as necessary. 

Question. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning? 

Answer. Yes, I believe that the current level of civilian oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning is appropriate. If confirmed, I would sustain the 

strong and healthy dialogue that is already ongoing between civilian and military 

leaders. 

Question. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning? 

Answer. Based on my experience, I believe that current oversight processes work 

well. Active and forthright dialogue between the Secretary, the senior civilian leadership, and the senior military leadership is essential for effective oversight of strategy and planning. Although all parties may not agree on a specific issue, in my experience we currently have a very healthy dialogue on strategy and planning issues. 

If confirmed, I would be committed to reflecting civilian and military perspectives 

in my recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to provide him the best possible 

advice in fulfilling his statutory responsibilities and meeting the intent of Goldwater-Nichols. 

STRATEGIC REVIEWS

Question. What is your understanding and evaluation of the DOD’s processes for 

strategic assessment, analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting for each of the following strategic reviews? 

The QDR (section 118 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, U.S.C.); 

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b of title 10, 

U.S.C.). 

Answer. These strategic reviews are important opportunities for substantive dialogue with Congress, and to provide guidance to the entire defense enterprise. Senior DOD leaders use these reviews to guide the Department in meeting the defense 

objectives described in the broader National Security Strategy. They are valuable 

316 

processes for managing and guiding the defense enterprise. These documents set 

priorities across the Military Departments and Services, combatant commands, and 

components and are especially useful as the Department seeks to achieve its objectives more effectively and efficiently in light of the changing security and fiscal environment. The end products are also used to inform a variety of other audiences, including the U.S. public and the international community. 

I have been involved in several of these reviews throughout my career and have 

seen a wide variety of review processes. Each review is different based on strategic 

circumstances, timing, and preferences of the senior defense leadership at the time. 

The Secretary of Defense determines how best to oversee these review processes. 

Candid deliberations, significant collaboration, and analytic rigor are important 

hallmarks of each of these reviews. 

The QDR (title 10 U.S.C., section 118) requires the Department to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program 

for the next 20 years. The QDR is designed to articulate a defense strategy in support of the President’s National Security Strategy. Based on my experience, effective 

QDRs involve a wide range of stakeholders and ensure the defense strategy sets priorities for U.S. military force structure, plans, and programs. The Department has 

strengthened its dialogue on QDRs with both interagency and international partners in recent years, which has been beneficial. 

As directed in title 10 U.S.C., section 153, the National Military Strategy is prepared by the Chairman as a means to convey the military’s views on strategic priorities and associated risks. 

The Department employs a continuous review process to determine the best mix 

of continental United States and overseas-based forces, and reports annually to Congress on the status of these assessments in the Global Defense Posture Review. This 

report, authored primarily by the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides a comprehensive review of DOD’s 

overseas posture, new initiatives, defense agreements, and negotiations; the report 

also plays an important role in supporting future resource decisions. 

Title 10 U.S.C., section 118b, requires the Department to complete a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions of the Armed Forces and the core competencies and capabilities of the Department to perform and support such roles and 

missions. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) describes how the Department will align organizational responsibilities and military capabilities to carry 

out its missions. The QDR should have a strong influence on the Department’s assessment of its military roles and missions. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to change 

title 10, U.S.C., that would update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to 

the Department and to Congress? 

Answer. These reviews serve a useful function for the Department. They provide 

deliberate processes for DOD to reexamine and, if necessary, adjust the defense 

strategy and the capabilities, capacity, and posture of the Armed Forces. The security environment and resources available for the Defense Department are not static, 

and periodic reviews are useful ways to ensure the Department refreshes, as required, the strategic approach it takes to defend the Nation. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Members of Congress to ensure these reviews are relevant, 

timely, and valuable to both defense leaders and the U.S. Congress. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve 

DOD’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decisionmaking relative to each review above? 

Answer. First, I note that from my experience, successful strategic reviews feature 

the following: 

• Strong participation from the senior defense leadership, including the 

Secretary, throughout the process. 

• Transparent and inclusive processes and decision fora. Civilian and military leadership from each DOD component is essential, including: the OSD, 

the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and Services, and the combatant 

commands. 

• A structured process that is co-led by the OSD and the Joint Staff, which 

allows the appropriate subject matter expertise to be brought into the discussion. Such a structure allows analysis to be vetted with the key experts 

and stakeholders before being presented to the Department’s senior leaders. 

317 

Strategic reviews also require robust analytical efforts to assess the sufficiency 

and proficiency of current, programmed, and projected forces. This is important to 

ensure that the appropriate information, data, and analysis are available for each 

QDR so that key questions can be formulated and informed decisions made. If confirmed, I would seek to apply insights gained from previous reviews to ensure future 

reviews are efficient and effective. 

Question. The law requires the QDR to identify the budget plan that would be 

required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, 

and any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current Future 

Years Defense Program) required to achieve such a level of risk. The law also requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with 

and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s QDR analysis 

and decisionmaking processes to address these two requirements? 

Answer. In my view, the Department’s QDR process is strategy-driven and resource-informed. This is appropriate and ensures that the QDR usefully sets priorities for the Department. A strategy-driven approach allows the Department to take 

a comprehensive view of the strategic environment and identify the full range of 

missions that the Department would need to undertake to meet potential challenges 

to U.S. national interests. A resource-informed process motivates the Department to 

pursue innovation and reach difficult decisions in determining the best mix of investments in capabilities, capacity, and readiness to execute the strategy. 

If, in the process of shaping the overall defense program, the Department’s leaders were to determine that available resources were not sufficient to execute a defense strategy necessary to achieve the larger national security objectives set forth 

by the President, it would be incumbent upon them to say so. 

Question. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value in a defense 

strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the current budget request or 

fiscal environment? 

Answer. A defense strategy completely unconstrained by fiscal realities would not 

be very useful, in my view. An effective defense strategy should examine the future 

security environment to assess and prepare the Department for the range of missions needed to meet potential challenges to U.S. national interests. Although the 

QDR is strategy-driven, the defense strategy should also be resource-informed, particularly in this fiscal environment, because a defense strategy is effective only if 

it is executable. Because it is not possible to eliminate all risk from the Nation’s 

security, devising a resource-unconstrained strategy and accompanying force structure is not practical, given that it is impossible to eliminate risk completely in such 

a complex strategic environment. 

A resource-informed process ensures that the Department sets priorities among 

its investments and activities—a central function of an effective strategy—and considers risks explicitly. 

Question. In your view, what would be the indications that the line between a 

budget-informed strategy and a budget-driven strategy has been crossed? 

Answer. A budget-driven strategy defines ends, ways, and means based on available resources. A budget-driven strategy would contain little to no risk because, by 

definition, the strategy is designed to do only what can be done with available resources, regardless of what might be needed in terms of advancing national interests. A budget-informed strategy first considers national interests and objectives, 

then assesses how to achieve those objectives given the strategic environment, and 

then develops specific ways and means to try to meet desired ends, informed by the 

likely available resource levels. A budget-informed strategy would explicitly consider 

risks to the strategy that may result from the reality that resource levels are finite. 

A strategy that failed to describe any inherent risks would be an indication, in my 

view, that the line between a budget-informed and a budget-driven strategy has 

been crossed. 

GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE

Question. As the Defense Department continues its assessment of projected budget cuts on its end strength, force structure, and other programs, it must also consider the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the permanent stationing of military forces in countries around the world. Based on a series of reports by GAO, evidence indicates that the Department is challenged in its ability to comprehensively 

and reliably estimate the cost of our global defense posture. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the cost and benefits of the U.S. 

global defense posture and the stationing of U.S. military forces overseas? 

318 

Answer. The financial cost of overseas stationing must be balanced against U.S. 

national interests and national security imperatives. DOD’s global defense posture 

enables military operations overseas and is a visible expression of U.S. national security interests and priorities abroad. In many cases, our posture is essential to 

interoperability with partners and encourages other nations to work alongside with 

us to address common interests. As with any defense investment, global defense posture decisions should be strategy-driven and carefully examine risk and trade-offs. 

Question. In light of the force structure reductions associated with the Department’s planned end strength cuts, and potentially even deeper future end strength 

cuts, if confirmed, how would you propose to allocate those reductions between 

forces based within the United States and forces stationed outside the United 

States? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would allocate available forces consistent with our defense 

strategy, selectively tailoring U.S. defense presence overseas to advance and protect 

our interests most effectively. Any force allocation, whether permanent or 

rotationally deployed, would need to contribute measurably to a strategic priority, 

such as protecting the homeland, sustaining defense contributions to the Asia-Pacific rebalance, maintaining U.S. assurances of security in the Middle East, sustaining NATO Article V commitments, and retaining the ability to engage actively 

in building partnerships globally. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD methodology 

and assumptions used to evaluate the relative cost of overseas posture compared to 

stationing forces in the United States? 

Answer. Although forward stationing can, in many cases, meet the required presence for a specific mission with less total force structure—a consideration in an austere budgetary environment—there are also significant costs associated with forward stationing that merit careful review. When considering the relative costs and 

benefits of overseas stationing, the Department employs a rigorous process to evaluate the ‘‘business case’’ of each forward stationing decision, taking into consideration 

our national strategy, U.S. costs, host nation contributions, and political-military 

and operational considerations. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take or changes would you recommend, if any, to DOD’s methodology and assumptions in determining the cost of 

overseas force posture compared to forces stationed in the United States? 

Answer. At this time, in my view, the Department’s methodology and assumptions 

for determining overseas force posture are appropriate and useful, given the complexity of the issues, and assist in our posture decisionmaking processes. 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the 

global train and equip authority (section 1206), targeted authorities in Yemen and 

East Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund. 

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations? 

Answer. The Department’s principal capacity-building objective should be to develop partner nation forces and their supporting defense and security institutions 

so that they can provide for their own internal security, and, when necessary, take 

effective action against those that pose an external threat. 

Question. What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to the 

strategic direction, oversight, and management of the Department’s programs for 

building partner capacity (BPC) to ensure that these programs are executed consistent with our national security goals and objectives? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD capacity-building programs fulfill 

defined strategic requirements, close important capability gaps, and adhere to the 

Department’s strategic guidance. As part of the Policy reorganization, we are creating a new DASD for Security Cooperation, which will help us ensure even better 

alignment between the BPC programs and our larger defense strategy. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies in efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces? 

Answer. Building the capacity of foreign security forces can best be achieved when 

the expertise and resources of the entire U.S. Government are brought together in 

a synchronized and coordinated manner. If confirmed, I would seek strong relationships with DOD’s interagency partners, in particular the State Department, to support and inform our combined efforts. 

319 

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its associated forces to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests 

more broadly? 

Answer. Al Qaeda’s intent and capability to attack the United States varies by 

affiliate, but striking the homeland is a common theme in al Qaeda’s propaganda 

and planning. We take these threats seriously and, if confirmed, I would work to 

ensure the Department remains capable and ready to take appropriate action to 

counter them. 

Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated 

groups in each of the geographic combatant commands? Of these threats, what do 

you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities? 

Answer. Al Qaeda’s core has been relatively isolated by pressure from the United 

States. However, core al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents in the AfghanistanPakistan region are a persistent and serious threat and remain a priority. New 

groups of geographically dispersed, diverse, and loosely affiliated extremists have 

also emerged, which pose localized threats to U.S. personnel overseas. 

Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has the intent and the 

capability to conduct attacks against the United States, and is among our highest 

counterterrorism priorities. The Department collaborates extensively with Yemeni 

forces to capture or kill key AQAP leadership and operatives, and our programs to 

train, advise, and equip Yemeni forces are critical to long-term efforts against 

AQAP. 

In the Levant, thousands of foreign fighters are traveling to support the Syrian 

insurgency against the Assad regime. Al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria are becoming a growing regional threat and a potential threat to the U.S. Homeland. If confirmed, I would support improving coordination and information sharing on foreign 

extremist flows from Syria, and would continue working with Jordan and Israel to 

support their stability. 

In Africa, Somalia-based al-Shabaab is a threat to U.S. and Western interests in 

the Horn of Africa, and potentially to the homeland through its links to al Qaeda 

and Somali diaspora communities. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated the capability to 

stage complex, high-profile attacks against Western targets outside Somalia and to 

harm U.S. citizens abroad. 

Algeria-based al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its regionally based 

associates threaten U.S. persons and interests in North and West Africa. These 

threats have flourished from instability in Libya and Mali, leading to hostage situations and high-profile attacks in Mali and Niger. However, my understanding is that 

there is no current, credible evidence that AQIM is a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s role in the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism? 

Answer. The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-departmental, multi-national 

effort guided by the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. DOD supports this 

strategy principally by building the capacity of partner security forces, collecting intelligence, conducting information operations, and, when appropriate, conducting operations to capture or kill terrorists who pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. 

persons. 

Question. Are you aware of any nexus between non-state actors and criminal networks? 

Answer. It is my understanding that there is a strong nexus between illicit nonstate actors and criminal networks worldwide. I am aware of a few examples that 

pose threats to our national security interests and to those of our allies and partners. The Taliban continues to finance their insurgency activities through regional 

trade in illicit drugs. Additionally, the transnational drug cartels in Mexico rely on 

global criminal networks to sell their product and expand into new markets, and 

pirates off the coast of Somalia depend on land-based illicit networks to finance 

their operations. 

Question. Given your current knowledge of DOD’s programs, do you believe resources are aligned in a manner consistent with these counterterrorism priorities? 

Answer. Yes. I believe the Department’s counterterrorism resources are currently 

aligned consistent with the priorities outlined in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. If confirmed, I would continue working with the Secretary, the Joint 

Staff, the Combatant Commands, and interagency partners to ensure that alignment of the Department’s resources evolves with the nature—and geography—of the 

threat. 

320 

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent legislation, 

authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to 

regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military 

operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism. 

What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority? 

Answer. Section 1208 remains critical to our counterterrorism efforts across a 

wide range of operational environments. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to 

gain a deeper understanding of the costs, benefits, and risks associated with activities conducted under section 1208 authority. 

Question. The fiscal year 2014 appropriations bill makes a number of changes to 

the prohibitions and vetting process required for training and equipping foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights. 

What is your understanding of the impact of these changes on the 1208 program? 

Answer. I fully support ensuring that foreign security forces who have committed 

gross violations of human rights are prohibited from receiving U.S. training or 

equipment. If confirmed, I would ensure that Congress is fully informed of any required changes to our programs as a result of this provision in the DOD Appropriations Act, 2014. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends 

more than $1.0 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department’s role in U.S. counterdrug 

efforts is to employ knowledge, skills, and capabilities to confront a range of national security threats associated with drug trafficking and related forms of 

transnational crime. As the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial 

and maritime drug traffic bound for the United States, DOD has provided critical 

counterdrug support to State, local, Federal, and foreign law enforcement partners 

to combat the flow of illicit drugs into our country. DOD counterdrug efforts support 

the National Security Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s CN authorities? 

Answer. In my experience, the Department’s counternarcotics authorities are important tools to confront the threat of narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and 

transnational organized crime that increasingly pose a threat to our national security interests. Under its CN authorities, the Department serves as the lead U.S. 

Government agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug 

traffic bound for the United States, supporting State, local, tribal, Federal, and 

international law enforcement partners’ activities to stem the flow of illicit drugs 

into the United States. The CN authorities also provide for the National Guard’s 

counterdrug activities in 50 States and 3 Territories and support the theater campaign plans of all 6 geographic combatant commands. 

Question. Should the Department continue to play a role in countering illegal narcotics trafficking? 

Answer. Yes. The global flow of illicit narcotics and other contraband commodities 

provides resources that finance transnational terrorism and insurgencies and that 

undermine legitimate government institutions, foster corruption, and distort legitimate economic activity. The Department’s CN programs focus on building the capacity of our foreign partners to confront these issues, serving to prevent and deter conflicts that could require a much more costly U.S. military intervention in the future. 

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have 

called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow 

of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking. 

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter-threat finance activities? 

Answer. I believe it is essential to engage all U.S. government tools to track and 

halt the illicit flow of money and to fight our adversaries’ ability to access and use 

global financial networks. While DOD is not the lead U.S. Agency for CounterThreat Finance (CTF), the Department works with and supports other departments, 

agencies, and partner nations through a unique set of capabilities, including longterm planning, network analysis, and intelligence analysis. 

321 

Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities? 

Answer. I believe DOD should continue to support U.S. Government departments, 

agencies, and partner nations with CTF assistance, within existing DOD resources. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department remains fully engaged in the 

interagency process on counter threat finance and is postured to provide additional 

support if necessary. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact 

on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. DOD is by no means the U.S. Government’s law enforcement 

agency, but it does bring unique enabling capabilities to our Nation’s Federal law 

enforcement agencies. 

What role, if any, should the Department play in combatting transnational criminal organizations? 

Answer. The President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime 

(TOC) declares TOC a threat to national security. Although DOD does not serve as 

the lead U.S. Government agency for TOC, it has provided and can provide unique, 

important support to U.S. efforts. These DOD-specific capabilities primarily include 

military intelligence support and counter-threat finance support to U.S. law enforcement. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. The USD(P) is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). 

In your view, what are the significant issues that the NWC should take up in the 

coming years? 

Answer. The significant issues facing the NWC in the coming years involve the 

need to sustain and modernize our weapons and our infrastructure in a time of limited budgets. Key decisions will have to be made on the scope and sequencing of 

both weapon and facility modernization. Additionally, in the wake of recent incidents involving personnel in our nuclear forces, I believe the NWC should examine 

any relevant implications of the Secretary’s ongoing internal and external reviews 

of the nuclear enterprise. 

Question. If confirmed would you commit to active personal participation in Nuclear Weapons Council matters? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would commit to active personal participation in 

NWC matters. I have participated in Council meetings previously and would welcome the opportunity to do so again. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX MODERNIZATION

Question. Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010 (Public Law 111–84) required a report (the ‘‘1251 report’’) on plans for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and strategic delivery systems. Prior to the 

Budget Control Act of 2011, the 1251 report that accompanied the New START treaty set forth a robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and the 

triad of nuclear delivery vehicles. 

Do you support the modernization plan set forth in the 1251 report? 

Answer. I do support the modernization plan set forth in the report by the administration. 

Question. Do you agree that modernizing the nuclear triad and replacing critical 

infrastructure, such as the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

(CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y–12, should 

be national security priorities that should be addressed in a timely manner? 

Answer. I agree that modernizing both the nuclear Triad and the critical infrastructure should be priorities that are addressed in a timely manner. DOD has reviewed how best to replace critical nuclear infrastructure like the UPF, and has 

identified a more cost-effective way forward. If confirmed, I would support efforts 

to modernize both the weapons and facilities in a cost effective manner. 

DOD’S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. Do you think the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is well 

coordinated among the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction 

efforts, e.g., DOD, the State Department, and the Department of Energy? 

Answer. My understanding is that the CTR Program and other threat reduction 

programs executed by Federal agencies are effectively coordinated by the National 

322 

Security Council staff. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the CTR program’s 

activities continue to be well-coordinated within the Department and with interagency and international partners. 

Question. The CTR program has been expanded to geographic areas outside the 

former Soviet Union, for example including Syrian chemical weapons destruction. 

What in your view are the key proliferation concerns that CTR should address 

outside the former Soviet Union? Please explain. 

Answer. In my view, the key proliferation concerns the CTR Program should address outside the FSU are preventing the proliferation of WMD technology, materials, and expertise, as well as delivery systems. The President has highlighted nuclear and biological materials proliferation as key threats, and if confirmed, I would 

ensure that the CTR Program strongly supports efforts to reduce these threats. 

Question. Which countries outside the former Soviet Union should be the focus of 

this expansion of the CTR program? 

Answer. The threat of WMD proliferation is a global concern. I understand that 

the CTR Program uses a threat-based approach to identify potential partners to 

allow for flexibility in responding to rapidly evolving situations. If confirmed, I 

would continue to use a threat-based approach as a principal driver of future CTR 

activities. 

Question. CTR has completed its scheduled work with Russia. 

What in your view is the next step, if any, in the U.S.-Russia CTR program? 

Answer. I understand that although the CTR Program has concluded most of its 

work with Russia, there are still important nuclear security activities underway 

with Russia as part of the CTR Program, which now will occur under a new bilateral framework agreement (Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the 

Russian Federation) and a related bilateral Protocol. I also understand that Russia 

is interested in cooperating with the United States and other nations to address the 

threat posed by WMD terrorism. If confirmed, I would work with members of Congress to ensure current efforts are completed and would explore additional cooperative opportunities with Russia to reduce the threat posed by WMD. 

ILLICIT ARMS TRAFFICKING

Question. What is your understanding of the problem of illicit arms trafficking 

and the role of the United States to deal with the problem? 

Answer. Illicit arms trafficking, unfortunately, continues to be a pervasive, worldwide problem. Because it has a robust arms export control system, the United 

States can help partner countries, through dialogue, to develop best practices and 

methods of controlling the transfer of arms. 

Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, does the lack of national controls 

and enforcement on arms flows contribute to the illicit trafficking problem, and 

could efforts to respond to illicit trafficking be improved if other countries adopted 

and enforced national regulations on arms import, export, and transit similar to 

those of the United States? 

Answer. Where illicit arms trafficking is widespread, partner countries should indeed seek to improve their export, import, and transit controls for the transfer of 

arms. It is important for other countries to advance these controls, to a standard 

closer to that of the United States, so the international community can make significant progress in combatting this problem. 

Question. Do you think the arms trade treaty would enhance U.S. national security interests? 

Answer. Yes. My understanding is that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) would help 

establish higher standards for the international transfer of arms. This would help 

in preventing them from reaching the illicit market. The treaty would also establish 

international norms so that countries can better regulate, on a national basis, the 

transfer of arms and thus prevent them from getting into the hands of terrorists 

or other criminals. In this regard, the ATT would enhance U.S. national security 

interests. 

ARMS CONTROL

Question. What role do you see for arms control as a means of improving U.S. national security? 

Answer. Arms control can contribute to U.S. national security by providing predictability, stabilizing the strategic or military balance between the United States 

and other nations at lower levels of weapons, constraining arms competition, and 

reducing the number of weapons other States possess. Such agreements, and their 

attendant verification provisions, make the United States safer, more secure, and 

323 

provide mutual transparency and predictability regarding military forces that builds 

confidence and assists in force modernization planning. 

Question. What are your views on the possible next steps to address nuclear 

weapons issues between the United States and Russia? 

Answer. The New START treaty strengthens strategic stability with Russia at reduced nuclear force levels and limits the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads. After a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces, the President concluded 

that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and partners 

and maintain a strong and credible nuclear deterrent while safely pursuing up to 

a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons below the limits established in 

the New START treaty. The administration is seeking to pursue such reductions 

through negotiations with the Russian Federation. To date, Russia has shown little 

interest in pursuing such negotiations, though discussions can and should continue. 

Question. What conditions, if any, do you believe need to be met to further reduce 

strategic and non-strategic nuclear stockpiles through arms control? 

Answer. The United States has publicly and privately conveyed to Russia its desire to seek additional negotiated reductions. However, Russia has so far shown no 

interest in negotiating further reductions. The administration will continue to engage with Russia in appropriate bilateral and multi-lateral venues to gauge interest 

in pursuing opportunities for arms control relating to both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear stockpiles. 

Question. What might be the risks and benefits of pursuing reductions below New 

START force levels? 

Answer. Further nuclear reductions would reduce the number of weapons that can 

be targeted against the United States, promote our nuclear non-proliferation objectives, and support strategic stability and predictability at lower numbers of nuclear 

weapons. Such a posture, if supported by modernization programs to maintain the 

effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear forces and by close consultation and strategic cooperation with allies and partner nations in Europe and Northeast Asia, 

poses few if any risks as the United States will have a sufficient stockpile to deter 

and/or respond to 21st century threats. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the 

February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you implement them? 

Answer. Yes, I support the conclusions of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. If confirmed, I would continue ongoing U.S. implementation efforts. 

Question. Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy 

operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat? 

Answer. Yes, it is important that we invest in effective, affordable missile defense 

systems that counter credible threats. 

Question. Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess 

operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to 

deploying such systems? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. Realistic testing is an essential element on the path to deployment. 

Question. The two most recent attempted intercept flight tests of the Groundbased Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets, one in December 2010, using a Capability Enhancement-2 (CE–2) kill vehicle, and one in July 

2013, using the older CE–1 kill vehicle. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) has indicated that MDA’s highest priority is correcting the problems that 

caused these flight test failures, and that such corrections need to be demonstrated 

through successful intercept flight testing. 

Do you agree that it is essential to demonstrate through successful and operationally realistic intercept flight testing that the problems that caused these flight test 

failures have been corrected, and that the GMD system will work as intended, with 

both the CE–1 and CE–2 kill vehicles? 

Answer. Yes, I fully support rigorous and realistic testing as an essential element 

to improving the reliability of the GMD system. 

Question. On March 15, 2013, Secretary Hagel announced plans to improve our 

Homeland ballistic missile defense capability to stay ahead of ballistic missile 

threats from North Korea and Iran, including the deployment of 14 additional 

Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) at Fort Greely, AK, by 2017. Secretary Hagel 

stated that, prior to deploying these 14 additional GBIs, there would need to be conVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00331 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
324 

fidence that the system would work as intended, through successful testing of the 

GMD system with the CE–2 kill vehicle. 

Do you agree with Secretary Hagel’s ‘‘fly-before-you-buy’’ approach that the GMD 

system needs to demonstrate successful operationally realistic intercept flight test 

results before we deploy any additional GBIs? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. ‘‘Fly-before-you-buy’’ is a fiscally responsible approach that 

will ensure the best use of defense funds. 

Question. In a recent report, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation said 

that the GMD flight test failures had raised questions about the robustness of the 

EKV design and recommended that the Department consider redesigning the EKV 

to be more robust. The Department is already planning a redesigned EKV, and Congress supported the funding requested for fiscal year 2014 to develop Common Kill 

Vehicle Technology. 

Do you agree there is a need to improve the GMD system, including through development and testing of a redesigned EKV and improvements to sensor and discrimination capabilities, to increase the reliability and performance of the system 

against evolving homeland missile threats from North Korea and Iran? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. GMD improvements will increase the reliability and performance of the system against evolving missile threats to the Homeland from 

North Korea and Iran. 

Question. DOD has successfully completed deployment of Phase 1 of the EPAA to 

missile defense and is proceeding toward planned deployment of Phases 2 and 3 in 

2015 and 2018, respectively, to protect all of NATO European territory against Iranian missiles. 

Do you support the EPAA and other similar United States regional missile defense efforts and, if confirmed, will you work to implement them? 

Answer. Yes. Our regional missile defenses provide an essential capability for defending U.S. forces abroad, and our allies and partners. If confirmed I would continue to support the EPAA as well as other regional missile defense efforts. 

SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the USD(P) should play in the establishment of a national security space policy? 

Answer. The role of the USD(P) is to oversee implementation of existing national 

security space policy in coordination with other departments and agencies and with 

Congress. The USD(P) also oversees development of new policy when circumstances 

warrant. If I am confirmed, I look forward to working with my Departmental and 

interagency colleagues, and the members of this committee, on implementing our existing national security space policies and on continually assessing developments in 

the international security environment that could affect our national security interests in space. 

Question. Do you support the policy of having an operationally responsive space 

(ORS) capability as a means to lower the cost and time for the development of national security space payloads? 

Answer. I support the objectives of ORS to meet warfighter requirements at a 

lower cost and in a more timely way. DOD remains committed to achieving those 

goals. To that end, DOD is working to ensure that resilience, survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness are considered in all future space programs. 

Question. The launch of the ORS–1 satellite demonstrated that giving combatant 

commanders such as CENTCOM the ability to control a small operationally responsive satellite can be successful. 

Would you support extending this capability to other COCOMs through the development of additional small tactically responsive satellites? 

Answer. DOD is committed to satisfying validated and prioritized combatant commander requirements to the extent that resources allow. ORS–1 was an appropriate 

solution to the urgent need to support U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) with increased intelligence during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, given 

the options available. As we move forward, we need to exhibit flexibility and look 

to both government solutions and increasingly capable and available commercial options for meeting urgent warfighter requirements. 

Question. Space systems, like other military systems, rely on the availability of 

sufficient frequency spectrum. However, frequency spectrum is becoming scarce, and 

its sale has been used as a source of revenue for the government. 

If confirmed, how will you work with the Services, the Joint Staff and other elements of DOD to ensure that the Department’s frequency spectrum requirements 

are accounted for in interagency discussions about potential spectrum auctions? 

325 

Answer. DOD’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) has the lead responsibility for 

DOD interests regarding spectrum requirements, including representing DOD in 

interagency discussions about spectrum auctions. If confirmed as the USD(P), I 

would ensure continued close cooperation between OSD Policy and the CIO organization, as well as with the Services and Joint Staff, to address the interests of all 

DOD and non-DOD spectrum users. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their operations. 

Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of Special Operations Forces can 

and should be maintained in light of current fiscal challenges? 

Answer. Since 2001, the United States has doubled the size of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and tripled its budget. As forces withdraw from Afghanistan, we have opportunities to redistribute Special Operations Forces (SOF) to engage with partner nations, build capabilities, and remain vigilant for future threats. 

If confirmed, I would work closely with my interagency counterparts to develop options for the best use of these capabilities and, with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM, to examine this issue further. 

Question. Special Operations Forces heavily rely on enabling capabilities provided 

by the general purpose forces to be successful in their missions. 

Answer. In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities will remain available to Special Operations Forces when needed? 

I believe that, as the Department reshapes overall force structure, it will ensure 

that the excellent intelligence, medical, communications, and other support provided 

by the Services to both SOF and the general purpose forces continue. If confirmed, 

I would work closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Service 

Chiefs, the ASD(SO/LIC), and the Commander, SOCOM to ensure the Department 

achieves the appropriate balance. 

Question. Do you believe Special Operations Forces should develop additional organic enabling capabilities in addition or in place of those currently provided by the 

general purpose forces? 

Answer. I believe SOF’s enabling requirements can likely be met by both internally reexamining the SOF force structure for ‘‘SOF-particular’’ requirements, and 

by establishing common Service capabilities to fill the remaining SOF enabler requirements. This arrangement allows for more focused application of SOF-specific 

funds and avoids duplication of capabilities with those of the Services. 

Question. The Commander of SOCOM has sought more control over the deployment and utilization of Special Operations Forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense modified policy guidance for the combatant commands earlier this year that 

gave SOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic 

combatant commanders and Special Operations Forces assigned to them. It has 

been reported that the Commander of SOCOM is also seeking new authorities that 

would allow him to more rapidly move Special Operations Forces between geographic combatant commands. 

Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can 

be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic combatant commanders, or raising concerns 

with the State Department. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense continues to rely on the geographic combatant 

commanders to oversee all military activities in their respective areas of responsibility, including deployments of SOF personnel resourced by SOCOM. If confirmed, 

I would work closely with interagency colleagues to ensure deployments of SOF are 

fully coordinated and synchronized with the geographic combatant commanders, 

interagency partners, and the relevant Chiefs of Mission. 

Question. Do you believe SOCOM is appropriately resourced to adequately support 

the Theater Special Operations Commands and Special Operations Forces assigned 

to them? 

Answer. Yes, I believe we have the right resources in place today. If confirmed, 

I would work with the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM to understand 

more fully future requirements to support the Theater Special Operations Commands and Special Operations Forces assigned to them. 

326 

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors (PSC) who may continue to operate in an area of combat 

operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign 

policy objectives? 

Answer. I am aware that over the years and based on lessons learned, DOD has 

published formal policy and procedures for the use of PSCs as both a department 

instruction and as part of the Code of Federal Regulations (title 32 CFR 159). The 

Department has also contributed to the development and publication of U.S. national standards from the American National Standards Institute for PSCs. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to continue to ensure that PSCs act in a responsible manner. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, 

regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. The humane treatment of detainees is fundamental to the Department’s detention operations in armed conflict. If confirmed, I would ensure that all 

our policies continue to be consistent with all applicable law, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. Yes. It is vital to the war effort for the Department to continue gaining 

intelligence from captured enemy forces, in a manner consistent with our values. 

The Department must hold its personnel to the highest treatment standards for detention in armed conflict. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and 

plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and 

tactical questioning comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and 

the Army Field Manual on Interrogations? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would ensure that all of the Department’s policies 

and plans continue to be implemented consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations. 

Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be 

based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the 

risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact 

on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, 

should they be captured in future conflicts? 

Answer. Yes. I believe that the manner in which the Department treats detainees 

in the current conflict reflects our character and sets the standards by which we 

should expect our own personnel to be treated in future conflicts. 

TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES

Question. The fiscal year 2014 appropriations bill makes a number of changes to 

the prohibitions and vetting process required for training and equipping foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights. 

What is your assessment of these changes and their possible effect on the Department’s ability to provide needed training, especially in countries such as Mexico, Afghanistan, and Myanmar? 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense and I strongly support both the letter and spirit 

of the Leahy law. As I understand it, OSD Policy, the Office of the General Counsel, 

the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands are working closely with the State 

Department to assess the impact of the changes to the Leahy law in the fiscal year 

2014 DOD Appropriations Act. 

Question. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the changes to the law? 

Answer. Overall, I fully support the Leahy law and human rights vetting. As with 

any changes in law, if confirmed, I would ensure that we work to develop clear implementation guidance for our commanders. I do not have any specific concerns at 

this point. 

327 

Question. Would it be beneficial to have an exception to the prohibitions on training and providing assistance to allow the Department to provide limited training on 

human rights, rule of law, the English language, and the law of armed conflict? 

Answer. It is my understanding that, at this point, the Department is not recommending any changes to the Leahy law. 

PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION ACCOUNTING COMMUNITY

Question. In the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed that 

the POW/MIA accounting community be resourced sufficiently to realize significant 

increases in identifications, with the goal of 200 per year by 2015. Despite increasing resources, the Department continues to identify less than half that number annually. Last year, GAO found that the Department’s response to that accountingfor goal has revealed and brought to the fore: ‘‘longstanding disputes [within the 

community] that have not been addressed by top-level leaders, and have been exacerbated by the accounting community’s fragmented organizational structure. . . . 

Leadership from the USD(P) and Pacific Command have been unable to resolve disputes between community members in areas such as roles and responsibilities and 

developing a community-wide plan to meet the statutory accounting-for goal. Further, the accounting community is fragmented in that the community members belong to diverse parent organizations under several different chains of command. 

With accounting community organizations reporting under different lines of authority, no single entity has overarching responsibility for community-wide personnel 

and other resources.’’ 

What is your reaction to this finding? 

Answer. I support GAO’s findings, and understand that the Department began 

implementing these recommendations in 2013. If confirmed, I would continue implementation of GAO’s remaining recommendations. 

Question. What is your view of the organization, management, and budget structure of the POW/MIA community? 

Answer. I support the recent findings of the GAO’s review of the accounting community. The accounting community suffers from a fragmented organizational structure. The community is currently the subject of reviews by CAPE and the DOD IG, 

and should I be confirmed, I would be committed to making the community more 

efficient and effective. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes would you propose to address these organizational, management, and budgetary issues that appear to be hampering the recovery mission of the POW/MIA community? 

Answer. The accounting community suffers from a fragmented organizational 

structure, and command and control functions should be streamlined as much as 

possible. If confirmed, I would be committed to reforms to make it more efficient 

and effective, including examining all options and recommendations for streamlining 

the community. 

Question. The committee has historically maintained that recovery operations in 

North Korea are a humanitarian effort, and should not be tied to the larger political 

and strategic issues surrounding North Korea. Since its inception in 1996 until its 

suspension in 2005, this program was seen by both parties as humanitarian in nature. The program is very important to the families of these missing servicemembers. 

What is the status of resumption of recovery operations in North Korea? 

Answer. In October 2011, the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic 

of North Korea (DPRK) agreed to resume joint remains recovery operations in the 

DPRK. As I understand it, in March 2012, the United States suspended operations 

because the DPRK took actions that violated the arrangement to recover remains. 

I am committed to achieving the fullest possible accounting for all our missing, including the more than 7,900 U.S. servicemen from the Korean War of which we estimate that 5,300 are missing in the DPRK. 

Question. Does the Department intend to wait until political and strategic issues 

are resolved before approaching North Korea? 

Answer. Engagement with the DPRK on remains recovery issues is a nationallevel issue. As I understand it, the United States will engage with the DPRK when 

conditions permit. 

MINERVA INITIATIVE

Question. The Minerva Initiative is a DOD-sponsored, university-based social 

science research initiative established in 2008 focusing on areas of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy. The goal of the Minerva Initiative is to improve DOD’s basic understanding of the social, cultural, behavioral, and political 

328 

forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the United States 

for better awareness for Phase 0 operations. OSD Policy and the ASD (Research & 

Engineering) co-lead this initiative. Since its inception, examples of research funded 

by the Minerva Initiative include insights into China’s technology and innovation 

sector and counter narratives to help countering violent extremism. The Initiative 

has also established research and teaching chairs at the professional military education colleges. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Minerva Initiative? 

Answer. Over the past 6 years, the Minerva Initiative has been a useful vehicle 

for enabling DOD to encourage and invigorate basic social science research in the 

academic community that supports better understanding of emerging national security issues. As a result of Minerva-funded research, the Department has strengthened its ability to draw on relevant and critical research in the social sciences and 

improved its understanding of emerging features in the global security environment. 

These insights have informed the development of the Department’s defense strategy 

and policy. 

Question. If confirmed as USD(P), what guidance, if any, would you provide to the 

Minerva Initiative, including incorporating the results from the research produced 

thus far and utilizing the expertise affiliated with this initiative? 

Answer. The Minerva Initiative is a unique channel in that it enables Defense Department personnel to draw on the deep body of relevant knowledge that resides 

in academia. Most importantly, it facilitates a productive dialogue between decisionmakers and academic experts that shapes the direction of future academic research. 

If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that as the Department shapes the Minerva 

Initiative in the future, it strengthens this dialogue so that academic research sponsored by the Initiative is fully informed by policy priorities. 

Question. What are your thoughts on the usefulness of the Conflict Records Research Center at the National Defense University and how can it support the Minerva Initiative? 

Answer. The Conflict Records Research Center performs a useful function, facilitating academic research by providing access to primary source materials captured 

in past conflicts and helps us learn the lessons of past wars. This support to academic research is very much aligned with the Minerva Initiative’s mission to encourage social science research in support of national security. 

The passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 has 

authorized funding for the CRRC to become independent from government for the 

first time. I understand the Department is working with the Joint Staff, NDU, and 

other interested parties to find a mechanism to facilitate that transition. 

As directed by the legislation, the Department will report back to Congress on 

that effort later this year. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the 

USD(P)? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

329 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

SEQUESTRATION

1. Senator INHOFE. Ms. Wormuth, I believe we can all agree that sequestration 

has had a devastating impact on our Nation’s military readiness. However, I also 

believe many are under the mistaken impression the Ryan/Murray agreement 

solved this problem. It did not. It helped, but the Department of Defense (DOD) is 

still subject to $76.96 billion in sequester cuts in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 

2015. Even with the small relief in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, do you 

think we can execute the current Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG)? If you believe 

we can execute the strategy but with greater risk, can you explain what you mean 

by risk? To me, risk equals lives, the lives of our men and women in uniform. 

Ms. WORMUTH. The Bipartisan Budget Act did provide the Department modest relief from the impact of sequestration in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, but 

your observation is correct in that it still reduced the Department’s budget relative 

to the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request. Using the 2012 DSG as our starting point, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) updates the defense strategy in light of the evolving security and fiscal environments. The 2014 QDR will 

make clear that, at the President’s budget level in fiscal year 2015, we could execute 

the defense strategy, although there would be increased risk in some mission areas. 

We would continue to experience gaps in training and maintenance over the near 

term. U.S. Forces would remain actively engaged in building partner capacity, but 

our engagement would be even more tailored and selective. Over the long term, we 

would face the risk of uncertainty that is inherent in the dynamic and shifting nature of the security environment. We would have less margin of error to address 

unforeseen events, and we would face some risk as others develop more advanced 

capabilities and weapons systems. Returning to sequestration level cuts would significantly increase these and other risks. 

NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE STRATEGY

2. Senator INHOFE. Ms. Wormuth, a new QDR should be published soon. This is 

a critical document which sets DOD’s strategies and priorities. Recently, DOD conducted a Strategic Choices Management Review, commonly called the Skimmer. The 

Skimmer explored different military capabilities based upon various funding scenarios. Both of you have watched the Skimmer process closely and Ms. Wormuth 

you have worked on the QDR itself. Many are concerned that in an effort to seek 

defense cuts, the new QDR will expose the United States to risks which recently 

would have been unthinkable. Therefore, will the QDR articulate where we are 

going to be taking additional risks? 

Ms. WORMUTH. The 2014 QDR does address the risks associated with the updated 

defense strategy and the future force, as envisaged in the President’s fiscal year 

2015 budget submission. It also describes the risks that the Department would face 

should sequester-level cuts be re-imposed in fiscal year 2016, if proposed reforms are 

not accepted, or if budget uncertainty continues. At the President’s budget level, we 

would be able to execute the strategy with increased risk in some mission areas; 

we would still be able to meet the requirements of the force planning construct, including the ability to defeat or deny any adversary. If sequestration continues, DOD 

would be unable to adjust the size and shape of the force in the more balanced way 

envisioned in the President’s budget submission. As a result, readiness would be reduced, modernization would be slowed, and reductions in capacity and capability 

would challenge our ability to respond to strategic surprise. The 2014 QDR report 

will describe in detail the implications and risks of sequestration to the Department’s ability to implement the updated defense strategy fully. 

3. Senator INHOFE. Ms. Wormuth, will the defense cuts cause major changes to 

our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy? 

Ms. WORMUTH. The 2014 QDR will articulate that at the President’s budget level, 

the Department can continue to implement the updated defense strategy, which incorporates the priorities of the 2012 DSG, with increased risk in some mission 

areas. If sequestration level cuts are reinstated in fiscal year 2016 or beyond, the 

Department’s ability to implement the defense strategy fully would be at significant 

risk. The 2014 QDR takes into account the fact that the National Security Strategy 

is being updated. Because the National Security Strategy has yet to be finalized, 

I cannot comment on that document in any detail. As I understand it, the Chairman 

is considering options for developing an updated National Military Strategy this 

year given changes to the updated defense strategy, the budget environment, and 

330 

readiness. The updated defense strategy in the 2014 QDR will be the starting point 

for the Chairman, but I would defer to him to answer specific questions about the 

content of a new National Military Strategy. 

4. Senator INHOFE. Ms. Wormuth, how can you tell when a strategy has gone from 

being budget-informed to being budget-driven? 

Ms. WORMUTH. A budget-informed strategy would first consider national interests 

and objectives, then assess how to achieve those objectives given the strategic environment. Next, it would develop specific ways and means to meet desired ends, informed by the likely available resource levels. A budget-informed strategy explicitly 

considers risks to the strategy that may result from the reality that resource levels 

are finite. A strategy that failed to describe any inherent risks would be an indication, in my view, that the line between a budget-informed and a budget-driven strategy has been crossed. A budget-driven strategy defines ends, ways, and means based 

on available resources. By definition, a budget-driven strategy would describe little 

to no risk, because this kind of strategy is designed to do only what can be done 

with available resources, regardless of what might be needed to protect and advance 

national interests. 

5. Senator INHOFE. Ms. Wormuth, how are our risks affected when you change 

from being budget-informed to being budget-driven? 

Ms. WORMUTH. A budget-informed approach characterizes risk in terms of the 

ability of the force to accomplish the missions that are necessary to support the defense strategy. The 2014 QDR will describe the risks we as a nation would face 

should sequestration be re-imposed in fiscal year 2016 and beyond or if proposed 

reforms are not accepted. A budget-driven approach will almost always result in 

greater strategy risks than a budget-informed approach because it does not focus 

on interests, threats to those interests, and trade-offs among investment choices. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DEB FISCHER

SECTION 8128: ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

SILOS

6. Senator FISCHER. Ms. Wormuth, section 8128 of the Fiscal Year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3547, Public Law 113–76) expressed congressional 

opposition to any environmental study relating to the silos of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Specifically, it states: ‘‘None of the funds available to DOD shall be used to conduct any environmental impact analysis related to 

Minuteman III silos that contain a missile as of the date of the enactment of this 

act.’’ Please state DOD’s interpretation of this section. 

Ms. WORMUTH. I understand that DOD has not yet developed a final position on 

the application and interaction of the relevant provisions, including sections 8136 

and 8128 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act. 

7. Senator FISCHER. Ms. Wormuth, what interactions has DOD had with other 

Federal agencies or parties outside of the Federal Government to prepare for conducting any environmental studies on the ICBM silos? 

Ms. WORMUTH. I am not aware that DOD, or the U.S. Air Force, has met with 

any other Federal departments or agencies or parties outside the U.S. Government 

with respect to conducting environmental studies for the elimination of ICBM silos. 

8. Senator FISCHER. Ms. Wormuth, does DOD believe the decisions with respect 

to New START treaty force structure depend on the results of an environmental 

study of ICBM silos? 

Ms. WORMUTH. An environmental assessment that deals with ICBM silos that 

currently contain Minuteman III missiles is important to determining the best path 

forward to achieving New START treaty compliance, whether compliance is to be 

achieved through dismantlement of some missile silos or through keeping a certain 

number of such silos ‘‘warm’’. 

[The nomination reference of Ms. Christine E. Wormuth follows:] 

331 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 30, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Christine E. Wormuth, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

vice James N. Miller, Jr., resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Ms. Christine E. Wormuth, which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH

Education: 

University of Maryland, School of Public Affairs 

• September 1992–August 1995 

• Masters of Public Policy 

Williams College 

• August 1987–May 1991 

• Bachelor of Arts cum laude in political science and fine arts 

Employment Record: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Pentagon 

• Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces 

• August 2012–present 

National Security Staff, The White House 

• Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Defense 

• December 2010–August 2012 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Pentagon 

• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and Americas’ Security Affairs 

• March 2009–December 2010 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC 

• Senior Fellow, International Security Program 

• December 2004–March 2009 

DFI International, Washington, DC 

• Principal, DFI Government Services 

• April 2002–December 2004 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Department of Defense, Pentagon 

• Country Director for France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg 

• September 2001–March 2002 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, Pentagon 

• Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for Programs and Legislation 

• March 2000–June 2001 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, 

Department of Defense, Pentagon 

• Senior Assistant for Strategy Development 

• January 1998–February 2000 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Pentagon 

• Presidential Management Intern 

• January 1996–December 1997 

The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC 

• Senior Research Assistant 

• January 1995–December 1995 

332 

Alliance for International and Educational and Cultural Exchange, Washington, 

DC 

• Policy Analyst 

• April 1994–January 1995 

House Foreign Affairs Europe/Middle East Subcommittee 

• Professional Staff, Women’s Research and Education Institute Fellow 

• July 1993–April 1994 

Honors and awards: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service, 2000 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Ms. Christine E. Wormuth in connection 

with her nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Christine Elizabeth Wormuth. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

3. Date of nomination: 

January 30, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

April 19, 1969; La Jolla, CA. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Andrew Rabe Kuepper. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Madeleine Wilson Heinemann, 12. 

Rachel Wilkens Heinemann, 12. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Williams College, 1987–1991, Bachelor of Arts, Political Science and Fine Art 

(1991). 

333 

University of Maryland, College Park, 1992–1995, Masters degree, public policy, 

(1995). 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Pentagon. 

• Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces • August 2012–present 

National Security Staff, The White House 

• Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Defense 

• December 2010–August 2012 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Pentagon 

• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and Americas’ Security Affairs 

• March 2009–December 2010 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC 

• Senior Fellow, International Security Program • December 2004–March 2009 

DFI International, Washington, DC 

• Principal, DFI Government Services 

• April 2002–December 2004 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Private consultant to Department of Homeland Security 2007–2008 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

None currently. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

2012, $750, Obama for America ($250, $500 contributions) 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Exceptional Civilian Service Award, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2000. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Attachment A - Published Writings 

• February 20, 2009, ‘‘The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces.’’ CSIS. 

• January 2009, ‘‘Merging the HSC and NSC: Stronger Together.’’ Homeland Security Affairs 5, issue 1. 

• January 1, 2009, ‘‘The Next Catastrophe: Ready or Not?’’ The Washington 

Quarterly - Winter 2009 Journal. CSIS. 

• December 9, 2008, ‘‘Transitioning Defense Organizational Initiatives: An 

Assessment of Key 2001–2008 Defense Reforms.’’ CSIS. 

• June 6, 2008, ‘‘Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (Or 

Not)?’ Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase Four Report.’’ CSIS. 

• February 1, 2008, The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 

Final Report. CSIS. 

334 

• 2007, ‘‘Is a Goldwater-Nichols Act Needed for Homeland Security?’’ 

Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in 

the New Century. U.S. Army War College. 

• 2007, ‘‘Transformation of the Reserve Component: Opportunity for Real 

Change.’’ Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century. U.S. Army War College. 

• November 14, 2007, ‘‘The Realities of ‘‘Getting Out of Iraq’’ in Global 

Forecast: the Top Security Challenges of 2008.’’ CSIS. 

• October 2007, ‘‘Total Force Policy: The Sequel.’’ The Future of the Citizen 

Soldier. Conference Proceedings.’’ The Cantigny Foundation and the Virginia Military Institute. 

• Summer 2007, ‘‘Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq.’’ 

The Jones Commission. 

• March 2007, ‘‘Rethinking the National Guard and Homeland Defense.’’ 

CSIS. 

• July 12, 2006, ‘‘The Future of the National Guard and Reserves.’’ CSIS. • July 1, 2006, ‘‘Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III.’’ CSIS. • July 28, 2005. ‘‘Elevating and Strengthening Homeland Security Policy’’ 

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II. CSIS. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

Please see Attachment B for copies of written statements provided as congressional testimony in 2008 and 2009. 

Other than congressional testimony, I have not made any ‘‘formal speeches’’ of 

which I have copies since 2008. As a Senior Fellow at CSIS, I spoke at many conferences and on panels, etc. Typically I would speak extemporaneously from an outline or bullet points. 

Since joining the Obama administration in March 2009, I have also made a number of presentations at conferences and other professional gatherings, but again, I 

generally do not give formal speeches. 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

Please see Attachment C for a list of events at which I’ve spoken in the last several years. 

Attachment C - Speaking Engagements 

• November 30, 2010, International Symposium on Societal Resilience. 

• May 24, 2010, Smart Security 2010 Conference. ‘‘Technology - Leading 

the Way toward a Secure Future.’’ 

• February 25, 2010, Women in Defense Symposium. 

• November 19, 2009, Panel member at CSIS conference session on ‘‘The 

Evolving Role of the National Guard and the Services’ Reserves in Homeland Defense and Civil Support.’’ 

• September 21, 2009, Domestic Operations Essential Requirements Conference. 

• March 2008, Moderator of a panel at a CSIS Conference on ‘‘The Role of 

DOD, the Guard and the Reserves in the Homeland’’ 

• January 24, 2008, Moderator of a panel at a CSIS Event on ‘‘GoldwaterNichols: A Critical Look.’’ 

• April 27, 2007, Naval Reserve Association Conference. ‘‘Increased utilization of the Guard and Reserve and the concerns regarding the operational 

Guard and Reserve.’’ 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

335 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH. 

This 10th day of March, 2014. 

[The nomination of Ms. Christine E. Wormuth was reported to 

the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 26, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on June 19, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Brian P. McKeon by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. Not at this time. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. N/A. 

DUTIES OF THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Question. Section 134a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

(USD(P)) in the performance of his duties. Department of Defense Directive 5111.3 

emphasizes that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy advises and assists the USD(P), particularly on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and 

the integration of Department of Defense (DOD) plans and policy with overall national security objectives. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P)) under current regulations and 

practices? 

Answer. Section 137a of title 10, U.S.C., governs the position for which I have 

been nominated. It provides that the Principal Deputy ‘‘shall be the first assistant 

to an Under Secretary of Defense and shall assist such Under Secretary in the performance of the duties of the position of such Under Secretary and shall act for, and 

336 

exercise the powers of, such Under Secretary when such Under Secretary is absent 

or disabled.’’ DOD Directive 5111.03 (January 8, 2009) provides a broad statement 

that the Principal Deputy ‘‘advise[s] and assist[s]’’ the Under Secretary for Policy 

‘‘with all responsibilities in providing advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense.’’ 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) would prescribe for you? 

Answer. Unless and until I am confirmed, I will not know the specific set of issues 

that will be assigned to me by the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Policy. 

If confirmed, it is likely that Ms. Wormuth and I will divide responsibilities so that 

each of us has a lead role on certain issues for Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) Policy. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What do you see as the relationship between the PDUSD(P) and each 

of the following? 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), as the 

USD(P)’s principal assistant, the PDUSD(P) serves as a staff assistant and advisor 

to the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national 

security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and 

plans to achieve national security objectives. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The PDUSD(P) provides support to the Deputy Secretary similar to that 

provided to the Secretary, as described above. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. The PDUSD(P) is the principal assistant to the USD(P) and is responsible for assisting the USD(P) in carrying out all responsibilities, fulfilling functions, 

managing relationships, and exercising authorities provided for in law to the 

USD(P). The PDUSD(P) advises and supports the USD(P) with all responsibilities 

in providing advice to the Secretary of Defense in interagency fora (such as National 

Security Council system deliberations), engagement with international interlocutors, 

and in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution processes inside the 

Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and annual program and budget reviews. 

Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the 

PDUSD(P) works closely with the other Under Secretaries of Defense and their Deputies to achieve the Secretary’s objectives. This includes providing policy input, as 

appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the 

PDUSD(P) works closely with Assistant Secretaries of Defense across the Department to achieve the Secretary’s objectives. This includes providing policy input, as 

appropriate, to each of them in their respective AORs. As the USD(P)’s principal assistant, within the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, the PDUSD(P) provides 

oversight of Assistant Secretaries on issues and at times as directed by the USD(P). 

The Policy team works together to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of policy issues under consideration in 

the Department and provides policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary’s guidance and decisions are implemented properly. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The PDUSD(P) works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues, including strategy development, force planning, 

and other areas in which the Military Departments are critical stakeholders. 

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council, the Chairman has a unique and critical 

military role. The PDUSD(P) works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman 

to support the efforts of the USD(P), the Secretary, and the Deputy Secretary, and 

to help ensure that military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner 

across a broad range of issues relating to strategy, force development, force employment, and other matters. 

Question. The Service Chiefs. 

Answer. The PDUSD(P) works closely with the Service Chiefs in support of the 

USD(P) on a broad range of issues, including defense strategy and policy developVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00344 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
337 

ment, force planning, and other areas in which the Military Departments and Services are critical stakeholders. 

Question. The Commanders of the Regional and Functional Combatant Commands. 

Answer. The PDUSD(P) also works closely with the combatant commanders to 

support the efforts of the USD(P), the Secretary, and Deputy Secretary, particularly 

in the areas of strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations. 

Question. The Director of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely, 

through the Chairman and Vice Chairman, with the members of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is a member of the Joint Chiefs, 

and has a specific responsibility to provide information on the non-Federalized National Guard. 

Question. The General Counsel of DOD. 

Answer. The PDUSD(P) works closely with the General Counsel on all policy 

issues that involve a legal dimension. Doing so requires significant and regular coordination on a broad range of issues. 

Question. The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration. 

Answer. The PDUSD(P) works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrator 

of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in support of the USD(P)’s oversight of strategy for nuclear weapons and forces, as well as USD(P)’s role on the 

Nuclear Weapons Council. The PDUSD(P) also works with the Administrator and 

Deputy Administrator to coordinate policies and programs to reduce nuclear threats. 

Question. The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 

Answer. The PDUSD(P) supports the USD(P) in exercising authority, direction, 

and control over the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). 

The Policy organization works closely with DSCA to provide the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of security cooperation issues facing the 

Department. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I have worked on national security issues for Congress and the executive 

branch for most of the past 25 years. Consequently, I have gained experience and 

knowledge on a very broad range of regional and functional issues. This experience 

has also given me a deep understanding about how policy is developed and advanced in the two political branches. 

For the last 16 years, I have also been assigned management responsibilities. In 

my current position, I supervise a staff of approximately 370 people and have served 

as the de facto chief operating officer for 2 National Security Advisors, managing 

the budget, administration, and personnel, as well overseeing the Executive Secretariat and the White House Situation Room. I believe I have demonstrated an ability to manage people and processes. 

Through my long service in the Senate and in the White House, I have developed 

strong personal and professional relationships with many senior officials currently 

serving in DOD, as well as in the White House, the Department of State, and the 

Intelligence Community. These relationships will help me in the performance of my 

duties, should I be confirmed. 

My experiences as Deputy National Security Advisor to the Vice President and 

in my current position have given me first-hand experience in diplomacy and policymaking at the highest levels of the executive branch. 

Finally, my long experience working in the Senate would enable me, if confirmed, 

to help the Department in its frequent interactions with Congress. Having spent so 

much of my professional career working in Congress, I have deep respect for its role 

in national security policy and am committed to ensuring a regular dialogue between the Department and Congress. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the PDUSD(P)? 

Answer. Section 137a of title 10, U.S.C., provides only a general statement of the 

duties of the position for which I have been nominated. It provides that the ‘‘Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense shall be the first assistant to [the] Under 

Secretary of Defense and shall assist such Under Secretary in the performance of 

the duties of the position of such Under Secretary and shall act for, and exercise 

338 

the powers of, such Under Secretary when such Under Secretary is absent or disabled.’’ Until and if I am confirmed, I will not know the specific set of issues that 

will be assigned to me by the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Policy. If I am 

confirmed, it is likely that the USD(P) and I would divide responsibilities so that 

each of us has a lead role on certain issues for OSD Policy. 

As a general matter, I recognize that the women and men of OSD Policy have 

been through a difficult period in the last year, with furloughs resulting from sequestration, followed by the government shutdown in October. Among other things, 

I intend to focus on our human capital to ensure that OSD Policy can continue to 

recruit and retain strong talent. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. See response above. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you recommend be established 

in terms of issues which must be addressed by the PDUSD(P)? 

Answer. See response above. 

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What are our key strategic objectives in Afghanistan and, in your view, 

are we on track to achieve those objectives? 

Answer. I understand we continue to make progress in our pursuit of the remnants of core al Qaeda. Additionally, our Afghan partners are proving effective in 

their combat operations, which supports our security objectives in Afghanistan. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the U.S. 

strategy in Afghanistan? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the current U.S. strategy to defeat of core 

al Qaeda, to include preventing its reconstitution in the region. 

Question. What do you see as the United States’ long-term strategic interests in 

Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. The U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan include the defeat of core al 

Qaeda in the region as well as the realization of a stable Afghan Government that 

can provide security to its people. 

Question. Do you support the retention of a limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. A post-2014 U.S. military presence can help Afghanistan by continuing 

a focused counterterrorism mission against core al Qaeda and by being part of a 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led mission to train, assist, and advise 

the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As the President has stated, however, 

the Afghan Government must conclude the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) in 

order for U.S. troops to remain in Afghanistan. 

Question. If so, what in your view should be the size, mission, and duration of 

such a residual U.S. military force? 

Answer. The President has stated that if a BSA is signed, a small U.S. force could 

remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to carry out two narrow missions: training 

and assisting Afghan forces, and counterterrorism operations to pursue any remnants of core al Qaeda. If confirmed, I will support DOD’s work to develop options 

and a recommendation on the appropriate force size. 

Question. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to conclude a BSA that 

ensures legal protections for such a residual U.S. military force, should the United 

States withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan? 

Answer. The President will make that decision at the appropriate time. In the 

meantime, I understand that the United States is prepared to sign the BSA. The 

longer it takes the Afghan Government to conclude the BSA, the greater the risk 

for higher costs and constrained options for the United States and coalition partners. 

AFGHANISTAN TRANSITION

Question. Do you support the transition of full responsibility for the security of 

Afghanistan to the ANSF by 2014? 

Answer. Yes. I understand that the ANSF now has the lead for virtually all operations, conducts these operations independently, and over the last year has proven 

itself to be up to the task. The ANSF has prevented insurgents from making any 

significant gains. 

Question. In your view, what are the main challenges to the success of such a 

transition? 

339 

Answer. I believe the main challenge will be ensuring that the ANSF has the necessary financial support to preserve the progress achieved so far. This will require 

a continued U.S. commitment as well as assistance from allies and partners. 

Question. What do you see as the major challenges of transitioning away from a 

DOD-lead for programs currently in Afghanistan to a civilian-led effort in Afghanistan? 

Answer. There are many missions that DOD led during the counterinsurgency 

campaign (e.g., rule of law development) that will transition to civilian agencies 

post-2014. If confirmed, I would work with U.S. departments and agencies—particularly the Department of State—the international community and the Afghan Government to ensure that we are positioned to protect our strategic interests in Afghanistan with appropriate assistance, consistent with the President’s decision on 

the post-2014 military mission. 

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional 

and effective ANSF? 

Answer. I am informed that current ANSF officers and leaders are very competent, but more are needed. The ANSF has grown rapidly over the last few years, 

but developing a larger leadership cadre takes time and sustained effort. 

Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the 

ANSF, including after 2014? 

Answer. My understanding is that capacity at the ministerial and institutional 

level is one of the main challenges facing the ANSF. Having advisors with the right 

skill sets in place will be critical in mitigating this challenge. Sustaining financial 

resources and ensuring the ANSF continue to build capacity to execute funding will 

also be critical in maintaining security gains made over the past 3 years. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would closely consult and coordinate with Afghan leaders, 

NATO allies, and other partners to ensure we are working together on shared priorities. We must also ensure we are promoting professionalism and self-sufficiency 

within the Afghan forces. 

Question. What do you see as the main challenges to sustaining the ANSF beyond 

2014, and if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. My view is that we need to ensure that the Afghan forces continue to 

receive the necessary international support and assistance, as well as the training 

and equipment, to plan and conduct missions independently. If confirmed, I would 

recommend that we continue to focus on improving the Afghans’ ability to conduct 

planning, contracting, and logistics functions at the ministerial levels. 

Question. Do you agree that any future reductions from the current ANSF troop 

level should be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time the reductions would occur? 

Answer. It is difficult to contemplate or foresee the size or structure of the ANSF 

over an indefinite time period. I agree that, for the remainder of the Obama administration, the size of the ANSF should be governed primarily by security conditions. 

U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between the United 

States and Pakistan? 

Answer. The relationship has improved since 2012, and the recent visit of Prime 

Minister Sharif to Washington was an indicator of that improvement. I attribute the 

improvement to both countries’ decision to refocus the relationship on areas of mutual interest. This includes promoting peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, 

eliminating core al Qaeda, and aiding Pakistan in its fight against militants that 

target the United States, Pakistan, and other nations. The relationship still faces 

significant challenges, but it is in a stronger position than it was. If confirmed, I 

would engage my Pakistani counterparts on common interests, as well as in areas 

where we have disagreement. 

Question. Do you see opportunities for expanded U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on security issues? If so, how would you prioritize these areas of cooperation? 

Answer. I believe we should continue to take a practical approach to the security 

relationship with Pakistan. We should focus on areas where our strategic interests 

overlap, while engaging in areas where they do not. In their joint statement issued 

last October, President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif agreed that no country’s 

340 

territory should be used to destabilize its neighbors. This presents an opportunity 

for strengthened cooperation on counterterrorism. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s efforts to combat the threat of 

international terrorism? 

Answer. Pakistan has suffered significant military and civilian casualties in the 

fight against terrorism and deployed large numbers of forces in counterinsurgency 

operations along the Afghan border. These actions attest to the extent of Pakistan’s 

commitment to the fight against terrorism. At the same time, we have longstanding 

concerns that we regularly discuss with the Pakistan government about the use of 

its territory by terrorist or extremist organizations that threaten U.S. interests and 

the security of Pakistan’s neighbors. 

Question. What conditions, if any, should the United States place on its security 

assistance to Pakistan? 

Answer. The provisions of U.S. law and regulations governing the transfer of governing U.S. security assistance to foreign governments, including those found on the 

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111–73), provide appropriate 

conditionality. 

THE HAQQANI NETWORK

Question. The Haqqani Network, which has been linked to a number of deadly attacks on Afghan, U.S., and other coalition forces in Afghanistan, operates from safe 

havens in Pakistan. 

In your view, should additional steps be taken to track and counter the illicit financial activities of the Haqqani Network, and if so, what role—if any—should DOD 

play? 

Answer. I understand that the U.S. Government is taking action against the 

Haqqani Network through DOD action in Afghanistan and Treasury’s decision on 

February 6, 2014, to freeze the assets of three suspected militants. If confirmed, I 

would work across the U.S. Government, and with international partners and organizations, to counter the Haqqani Network. 

IRAQ

Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to 

Iraq? 

Answer. The United States has a strategic interest in helping Iraq build a sovereign, stable, self-reliant country with a representative government that can be a 

partner in the region and not a safe haven for terrorists. We are working to develop 

a strong, long-term strategic partnership in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Strategic 

Framework Agreement. Strengthening our partnership with Iraq will help us to advance significant interests, including counterterrorism cooperation against threats to 

our national security and that of the region, economic growth and the stabilization 

of global energy markets, and the development of democracy. 

Question. What in your view are the major areas, if any, for security cooperation 

between the United States and Iraq? 

Answer. We share key interests with the Iraqis in the security realm, including 

reducing the threat from violent extremists such as the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant, containing the spread of extremism from Syria, and countering threats 

from Iran. 

Question. In what areas, if any, do you see U.S. and Iraqi security interests diverging? 

Answer. The United States and Iraq have similar security interests. We both have 

an interest in fighting terrorism and ensuring that Iraq is stable and free from external influences. We also both have an interest in maintaining stability and security in the Middle East. 

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S.-Iraq security 

relationship over the coming years? 

Answer. Today’s Iraq is still recovering from decades of dictatorship and years of 

conflict and international isolation. To continue on a path of progress, it needs an 

inclusive government so that all people of Iraq feel they have a voice in their government. As the President said during the visit to Washington of Prime Minister 

Maliki last November, the United States stands ready to deepen its security cooperation and to honor the sacrifice of the U.S. Armed Forces by ensuring a strong, 

prosperous, inclusive, and democratic Iraq. 

Question. In your view, what steps, if any, should the United States take to engage with Iraq to promote greater security and stability across the Middle East region? 

341 

Answer. The United States has encouraged Iraq and its neighbors to act to reintegrate Iraq into the region after years of isolation. Progress has been made over 

the last year in resolving longstanding disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, but more 

needs to be done. One important way to support this integration is by encouraging 

Iraq to take part in regional dialogues as well as military exercises as demonstrated 

by Iraq’s participation in the Eager Lion exercise held in Jordan last summer. If 

confirmed, I would work with partners in the region to assist Iraq in becoming more 

integrated in the regional framework and to participate in additional trainings and 

exercises. 

Question. Iraq faces a resurgent violent extremist threat that seeks to exploit popular discontentment with the current Maliki Government, particularly within Sunni 

communities in western Iraq. 

What role, if any, should the United States play in assisting the Government of 

Iraq in confronting the threat of violent extremism? 

Answer. Although the Government of Iraq is responsible for providing its own security, we can assist in a variety of ways to help the Iraqis increase their capabilities and capacity to meet current threats. It is my understanding that the Department, in concert with interagency partners, is already using a variety of key security assistance and cooperation tools to build the capacity of Iraqi Security Forces. 

If confirmed, I would support information sharing, non-operational training for the 

Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Services, and 

continued sales of key defense articles to the Government of Iraq. 

Question. In your view, what conditions, if any, should the United States place 

on the provision of equipment or assistance to the Government of Iraq in its fight 

against violent extremism? 

Answer. The Foreign Military Sales program provides what I believe are stringent 

measures to monitor the Government of Iraq on the use of military equipment and 

assistance, consistent with U.S. laws. These are the same conditions imposed on 

other countries that have and receive U.S. defense articles. Prime Minister Maliki 

also pledged, in a recent letter to Chairman Menendez, that U.S. equipment would 

not be used against innocent civilians. The United States has made clear to Iraq 

that it will be held accountable for complying with end-use monitoring protocols, 

and that U.S. assistance is dependent on the Iraqis adhering to proper use of the 

systems we sell to them. 

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND NATO

Question. In your view, how important to U.S. national security interests is NATO 

and the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our Alliance partners? 

Answer. NATO and our transatlantic relationships remain very important, as 

U.S. security and engagement in Europe are closely intertwined. Europe is home to 

some of the United States’ most stalwart allies and partners, who have fought and 

continue to fight and sacrifice alongside U.S. forces. Europe is our principal partner 

in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The United States has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity 

in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to strengthen that transatlantic relationship, if confirmed? 

Answer. The transatlantic relationship is as strong as ever, but we should not 

take Alliance cohesion and solidarity for granted. The commitment of allies to a 

strong NATO must be manifested in a willingness to invest in the future of the Alliance by pooling resources and sharing risk to develop the capabilities needed to fulfill future missions. If confirmed, I would encourage allies to make those investments. 

Question. As the United States pursues a pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, do 

you believe there should be a reduction in the U.S. security commitment to Europe? 

Answer. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region does not imply a shift of attention from Europe. Far from it. Europe remains our principal partner in seeking global and economic security. Moreover, we continue to have security obligations to our 

NATO allies pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty. A peaceful and prosperous AsiaPacific is in the interests of both Europe and the United States. 

Question. As the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan 

nears completion, do you foresee a need for NATO to re-evaluate its purpose, missions and objectives going forward? 

Answer. Like any organization, NATO should periodically examine its purpose, 

missions, and objectives. The successful completion of NATO’s largest and most 

challenging operation represents a turning point for the Alliance. As allies sustained 

regular troop rotations to Afghanistan, defense investment in new capabilities and 

342 

the readiness of some forces for other potential missions declined. The purpose of 

the Alliance continues to be deterrence and defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. However, as NATO completes the International Security Assistance 

Force mission in Afghanistan, some of its operational objectives will likely be replaced by objectives related to training and readiness, with more emphasis on live 

exercises to maintain interoperability. 

LIBYA

Question. What role do you envision the United States playing in helping Libya 

build capable security institutions? 

Answer. The administration has made building Libyan security a priority. It is 

my understanding that DOD will train a 5,000–8,000-member general purpose force 

(GPF) with the basic skills needed to protect government institutions and maintain 

order. I believe that DOD plans to complement its training efforts with defense advisor and defense institution reform programs to build the institutional capacity of the 

Libyan Ministry of Defense. Importantly, DOD is coordinating security-capacitybuilding efforts with our partners in the United Kingdom, Italy, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and ensuring that our programs complement the U.N. Support Mission in 

Libya and other international activities to support Libya’s security sector development efforts. 

Question. What is your assessment of the risks associated with the paramilitary 

forces that continue to have control of large swaths of Libya? 

Answer. Paramilitary forces present significant risk to the Libyan Government 

and the Libyan people. Building a government security force that is respected by 

Libya’s people will be essential to Libya’s future. 

Question. In your view, what role, if any, should DOD play in assisting the Libyans with addressing the threat to stability posed by paramilitary forces? 

Answer. I believe that DOD’s GPF training and related efforts are intended to 

help Libya develop the security foundation necessary to protect government institutions and maintain order. DOD’s border security and counterterrorism training and 

equipping programs are also aimed at building the Government of Libya’s capacity 

to address its security challenges. 

Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges to the Libyan government in building capable and sustainable security institutions? 

Answer. Qaddafi left Libya with deep deficits in government capacity. As a generation of Libyans deprived of self-government takes on the challenges and responsibilities of renewing Libya’s security sector, the United States will support their 

capacity- and capability-development goals through practical training and advice. If 

confirmed, I would support these efforts. 

Question. In what ways can the United States be most effective in assisting the 

Libyan government in building capable and sustainable security institutions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to advance the U.S. effort to couple our 

training and equipping efforts with institution-building programs to facilitate the 

Libyan Ministry of Defense’s ability to recruit, sustain, and retain trained GPF personnel. 

AFRICA-RELATED SECURITY MATTERS

Question. The new DOD strategic guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’’ announced by President Obama on January 5, 

2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which DOD will prepare. The primary emphasis of the strategy relates to 

the Middle East and Asia. The strategy makes little reference to Africa and its myriad security challenges. 

In light of the emphasis on areas outside of the African continent, if confirmed, 

how would you draw attention to the myriad security challenges confronting African 

nations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department’s continued focus on disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda and its affiliates in the region while building the 

capacity of African security forces, defense institutions, and regional organizations 

to combat transnational threats and participate in peace operations. As part of these 

efforts, if confirmed, I would support the Department’s efforts to instill within African militaries a commitment to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of 

law and human rights, and support international peacekeeping operations. 

U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and 

efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord’s 

343 

Resistance Army (LRA)—including Joseph Kony—continue to operate and commit 

atrocities against civilian populations. Some observers have identified operational 

concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find 

an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered 

in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from 

the Defense and Intelligence Community continues to be inadequate; (3) limitations 

continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of 

direct support they can provide; and (4) logistics and operational enablers for U.S. 

forces. 

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass (OOC)? 

Answer. OOC is one component of a wider U.S. strategy to counter the LRA. This 

strategy has four pillars: increasing the protection of civilians; apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and senior commanders from the battlefield; promoting the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; 

and increasing humanitarian access and providing continued relief to affected communities. Under OOC, U.S. Special Operations Forces seek to enhance the capacity 

of local forces to end the threat posed by the LRA. I understand that U.S. military 

advisors work with African forces to strengthen information-sharing and synchronization, enhance operational planning, and increase overall operational effectiveness. 

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate level of priority to be accorded 

to efforts to counter the LRA? 

Answer. I understand that, as with all of the Department’s efforts in Africa, OOC 

is a low-cost, small-footprint effort that leverages the capabilities of our African 

partners. This approach has yielded significant results to date. Two of the top five 

LRA leaders have been removed from the battlefield, and recent reports suggest 

that the Ugandan military also removed a third leader, Okot Odhiambo. Since OOC 

was launched, civilian deaths attributed to the LRA have decreased by 75 percent, 

and LRA abductions are down by 50 percent. Such statistics indicate that the current level of effort is making progress against the LRA while keeping our African 

partners appropriately in the lead. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to review the four concerns outlined above 

and report back to the committee? 

Answer. Yes. 

RUSSIA

Question. What in your view are the major security issues in the U.S.-Russian relationship? 

Answer. There are a number of areas where the United States and Russia cooperate, including strategic arms reductions, counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, preventing 

proliferation of dangerous technologies, military relations, and dissuading Iran from 

becoming a nuclear-armed nation. If confirmed, I would continue to engage Russian 

counterparts to try and find common ground and new areas of cooperation, such as 

the work we have done together to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons. 

Question. Where do you see U.S. and Russian security interests aligning and 

where are they diverging? 

Answer. Although there are points of friction in many areas of our relationship, 

the United States and Russia have worked together effectively on issues such as the 

removal of the Syrian chemical weapons program, countering the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction, and Afghanistan. If confirmed, I would work with Russia to make progress on such areas where we share common interests and communicate effectively where we disagree. 

Question. In your view what policy steps should DOD take to improve relations 

with Russia? For instance, would you support increased military to military relations and exchanges with Russia? 

Answer. My general view is that military-to-military exchanges are useful to increase channels of communication and mutual understanding. It is my understanding that DOD has a robust military-to-military work plan scheduled for this 

calendar year, with more than 60 events and a variety of quality activities such as 

military exercises, senior leader visits, and conferences. If confirmed, I would support our military-to-military cooperation agenda and support increasing our engagement for the benefit of both sides. 

Question. Would you support any joint development or other programs with Russia? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support joint development programs that would 

benefit the United States. 

344 

Question. Would you support joint U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense as 

a way to send a signal to Iran against Iran’s developing long-range missiles or having nuclear weapons? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense. U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense would signal to 

Iran that its development of missiles and pursuit of nuclear capabilities are reducing rather than enhancing Iranian security. 

Question. Do you support efforts mandated by the New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START) Resolution of Ratification to seek reductions in the stockpiles of 

Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If so, what steps would you recommend for pursuing such reductions, 

if confirmed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that our focus for the next stage of 

arms control consist of bilateral efforts to increase transparency and pursue further 

reductions that would include all nuclear weapons—deployed and non-deployed, 

strategic and non-strategic. Consultation with allies and partners will be essential 

to ensure that extended deterrence and assurance remain strong. 

Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in responding to Russian attempts 

to exert influence over other countries on its border, including Ukraine, Georgia, 

and the Baltic countries? 

Answer. DOD’s role and potential response would depend on the particular situation and whether it involved a military dimension. For example, in the current crisis 

in Ukraine, DOD officials have urged their counterparts in Ukraine to stay out of 

the political struggle. The United States, of course, has a treaty alliance with each 

of the Baltic States. It seeks to maintain strong partnerships with other countries 

in the region, including Ukraine and Georgia. 

Question. In your view, does Russia want Iran to have a nuclear weapon? 

Answer. No. Russia is a partner in the P5+1 process, which is working toward 

a long-term, comprehensive solution to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

IRAN

Question. What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed by 

Iran? 

Answer. If left uncontested, some of the policies and activities of the Iranian regime constitute a significant threat to the security of the United States and that 

of many U.S. friends and partners. This trend is particularly concerning with regard 

to Iran’s advancement of its ballistic missile program. Iran’s inventory of ballistic 

missiles, which is the largest in the region, is therefore a source of tremendous concern. Iran is the most active state-sponsor of terrorism in the world, with a proven 

track record of meddling in the internal affairs of countries in the region. 

Question. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to Iran? 

Answer. The Obama administration’s dual-track approach of combining smart diplomacy with economic and military pressure has resulted in a considerable sharpening of Iran’s strategic choices. This policy has unified and mobilized the international community against Iran, resulting in Iran’s regional and global isolation. 

It has imposed tremendous economic costs on Iran through robust and comprehensive sanctions. By keeping all options on the table, it has sent a powerful message 

to Iran that unless it changes course, its policies risk making it less, not more, secure. Ultimately, it is this comprehensive and focused policy that forced Iran to the 

negotiating table, where it agreed to the Joint Plan of Action. The sustained application of this policy, I believe, gives us the best chance of reaching a comprehensive 

nuclear deal with Iran. Meanwhile, I believe we should continue to hold Iran accountable for a host of destabilizing activities in the region and its deplorable 

human rights record. 

Question. In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing U.S. presence 

in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran? 

Answer. In my view, a significant reduction in our military presence in the Middle 

East during negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program would negatively impact the effectiveness of our policy in relation to Iran and our credibility with regional partners. If confirmed, I would support the position of DOD to maintain a 

strong military posture in the Gulf region, made clear by Secretary Hagel in December at the Manama Dialogue. 

Question. In your view, what role should DOD play in countering Iran’s support 

of international terrorism? 

345 

Answer. It is my view that DOD has a significant role to play in countering Iran’s 

support for international terrorism through DOD’s support to broader U.S. Government efforts. If confirmed, I would continue to work with interagency and international partners to ensure that Iran is held accountable for the full scope of its 

destabilizing activities in the region and beyond, as necessary. 

ISRAEL

Question. With regard to our relationship with Israel, President Obama has stated: ‘‘Our military and intelligence cooperation has never been closer. Our joint exercises and training have never been more robust. Despite a tough budget environment, our security assistance has increased every year. We are investing in new capabilities. We’re providing Israel with more advanced technology—the type of products and systems that only go to our closest friends and allies. Make no mistake: 

we will do what it takes to preserve Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge—because 

Israel must always have the ability to defend itself, by itself, against any threat.’’ 

Do you agree with President Obama’s position and views with regard to the U.S. 

security relationship with Israel? 

Answer. Yes. Under the leadership of Secretary Hagel, the Department has 

worked to strengthen further this already historically strong U.S.-Israeli defense relationship. Key components include significant Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 

and the approval to release advanced military capabilities to Israel, like the F–35 

and the V–22 aircraft. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD’s already deep cooperation with Israel is continued and I would work to sustain our strong security 

relationship. 

POST-ARAB UPRISING MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

Question. The past few years have brought great change to the Middle East and 

North Africa. These changes may require adjustments to our military-to-military engagement efforts throughout the region. 

What is your understanding of U.S. military-to-military engagement in the Middle 

East and North Africa (e.g. Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries in the region), and what changes—if any—would you advocate for in light of the Arab Uprising? 

Answer. My understanding is that DOD cooperation with Middle East and North 

African partners is specifically tailored to partners’ strategic interests and tactical 

needs while advancing U.S. strategic interests. In my view, during this time of continuing change and uncertainty in the region, DOD should sustain and improve 

military-to-military and defense civilian relations, while continuing to evaluate and 

re-calibrate the nature and substance of each of our engagements to ensure that 

they are consistent with U.S. values and advance U.S. national interests. 

I also would stress the critical importance of reassuring partners that we will remain engaged in the region and committed to our joint strategic interests. 

SYRIA

Question. The civil war in Syria continues and President Assad’s commitment to 

continuing his regime’s ongoing operations appears unwavering despite international condemnation. To date, the United States has limited its support to opposition forces to non-lethal assistance to forces on the ground, as well as technical assistance to elements of the opposition working to build a cohesive political entity. 

In your view, what is the proper role on the U.S. military in this conflict? 

Answer. The President has been very clear that he will direct the use of military 

force when necessary to protect the United States and in furtherance of U.S. national security interests. In the case of Syria, the President has been clear that 

there is no military solution to the conflict. The Department continues to be involved in interagency discussions that examine possible military roles to support 

U.S. policy goals in Syria. If confirmed, I look forward to advising the Secretary and 

working with interagency partners on this matter. 

Question. In your view, should the United States provide support to opposition 

groups on the ground in Syria, including lethal support? 

Answer. The United States should provide, and has been providing, a range of assistance to moderate elements of the Syrian opposition, both civilian and armed. 

This assistance is critical to building opposition capacity to meet essential needs, 

strengthen the effectiveness of the armed opposition on the ground, and counter the 

growing influence of extremist groups. We are providing nearly $260 million in nonlethal support to the Syrian civilian opposition, including the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), local activists, and the Supreme Military Council (SMC). This assistance includes the provision of equipment (e.g., ambulances, food, computers, commuVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00353 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
346 

nications equipment, and generators), small grants to local councils and Syrian nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and associations on the ground, and support for 

media. 

It is my understanding that since April 2013, DOD has delivered additional assistance directly to the SMC as well as the SOC. To date, DOD has provided more 

than 480,000 meals ready to eat and 18 tons of medical supplies, as well as communications gear and vehicles. We seek to be responsive to the needs of the armed opposition and ensure that our assistance serves the military purposes of the SMC. 

We have provided this support in consultation with the SMC. We continue to provide our support in consultation with and cooperation with other countries in the 

region, in an effort to build the effectiveness of the armed opposition. 

We are constantly looking at what options are available to help resolve the crisis 

in Syria. We are focused on ways to help end the conflict, alleviate the suffering 

of the Syrian people, and mitigate the growing threat from extremists. If confirmed, 

I would continue OSD’s efforts, in partnership with the Joint Staff, to examine the 

risks and opportunities related to the provision of lethal assistance to the moderate 

opposition and other military options for Syria to support the administration’s decisionmaking on this question. 

Question. In your view, would the removal of the Assad regime be a strategic defeat of Iran in the region? 

Answer. Yes. Iran has an interest in the outcome of the conflict in Syria, and has 

invested resources in seeking to ensure that the Assad regime stays in power. 

Therefore, removal of the Assad regime would be a loss for Iran. 

Question. After the United States threatened the use of military force in response 

to Syria’s use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians in August 2013, Syria 

agreed to an international plan to eliminate its chemical weapons program by the 

end of June 2014. Although Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention and 

has eliminated its capacity to mix and fill chemical agents and munitions, it has 

failed to meet recent deadlines to transport its chemical agents and precursors to 

Latakia for removal and destruction. 

Given Syria’s apparent unwillingness to meet all its internationally mandated 

deadlines, what are your views on the prospects for eliminating Syria’s chemical 

weapons program by June 30, 2014? 

Answer. The U.S. Government and international community are concerned about 

Syria’s lack of progress in meeting its obligations, and further delays will make 

meeting the June 30 deadline more challenging. We are working with key international partners to increase pressure on the Syria to fulfill its obligations in accordance with the agreed timeline. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe DOD could take as part 

of the international effort to ensure the successful elimination of Syria’s chemical 

weapons program in 2014? 

Answer. I understand that the Department is contributing capabilities critical to 

eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons, and is postured to fulfill its role in the international effort as soon as Syria fulfills its obligations to remove the chemical materials from Syrian territory. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the 

policy, operational, and technical communities, as well as with key international 

partners, to ensure the successful elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. 

EGYPT

Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in Egypt? 

Answer. I know that the Department is concerned with the recent upswing in terrorist violence in the Sinai and around Cairo, and I understand that Secretary 

Hagel has personally offered assistance to help Egypt respond to and prevent future 

attacks. Despite the hold on delivery of some weapons systems, the Department continues to provide maintenance support for Apache helicopters used in counterterrorism operations. If confirmed, I would continue to support Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts. 

The Egyptian Government’s detainment and arrest of journalists, opposition 

group members, and the Muslim Brotherhood are also a significant concern. I understand that the Department has continued to encourage the interim government 

to uphold the new constitution’s rights and has raised U.S. concerns about this 

crackdown. 

Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egypt security relationship? 

Answer. The U.S. security relationship with Egypt provides us with important 

over-flight routes and facilitates Suez Canal transit access, helps us to ensure 

Israel’s security, allows us to cooperate on combatting terrorist threats, and helps 

to maintain the security of our embassy and consulate. Egypt is an important reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00354 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
347 

gional actor, and our security relationship with Egypt helps us protect our interests 

in the region. 

Question. What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with respect to regional 

stability? 

Answer. Egypt has historically played an important role in promoting regional 

stability. By continuing to fulfill its obligations under its Peace Treaty with Israel, 

increasing its counterterrorism operations in the Sinai, providing security for both 

military and private vessels transiting the Suez Canal, and efforts to prevent illicit 

trafficking across its shared borders with Libya, Sudan, and Israel, Egypt makes 

significant contributions to regional security. 

Question. In your view, should the U.S. Government continue to provide defense 

articles and services purchased by the Egyptian military using U.S. FMF funds? 

Answer. FMF remains an important element of the U.S.-Egypt relationship. At 

the same time, we have serious concerns about the Egyptian government’s actions, 

as described in my response to question 69, above. The delivery of some weapons 

systems remains on hold. In addition, the fiscal year 2014 appropriations law restricts the use of fiscal year 2014 FMF for Egypt unless certain certifications are 

made by the Secretary of State. If confirmed, I would support the Department’s efforts to work with the Department of State on making the required assessments, 

and implementing these authorities. 

GULF SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. The administration has been working with Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) governments to enhance regional cooperation and security against ballistic 

missile threats, particularly from Iran. 

What is your view of the potential for missile defense cooperation within the GCC 

to enhance regional security, and how do you see this potential cooperation fitting 

into the U.S. missile defense and security efforts in the Middle East? 

Answer. It is my understanding that U.S. missile defense cooperation with GCC 

nations, including their acquisition of advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities, 

is increasing. Such cooperation on defensive systems is beneficial to those countries 

as well to the United States and the region. 

Question. What role do you see for the sale to the United Arab Emirates of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile defense systems, 

and similar sales to other GCC partners, in regional security against Iranian missile 

threats? 

Answer. It is my understanding that a number of GCC countries are considering 

acquiring ballistic missile defense capabilities. These systems would play an important role in countering Iranian missile threats. 

REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS AND RESPONSE

Question. Iran and North Korea each has hundreds of short- and medium-range 

ballistic missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command AOR. The Ballistic Missile Defense 

Review (BMDR) report of February 2010 stated that the United States intends to 

pursue regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches to ballistic missile defense 

against such missile threats in various regions. 

Do you believe that such regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches will provide our regional combatant commanders with the missile defense capabilities needed to defend our forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in the region? 

Answer. Yes. I believe that continuing to deploy U.S. and allied and partner missile defenses appropriate to each region can make a significant contribution to defending our deployed forces and our allies and partners from ballistic missiles. 

Question. What role do you see for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system with 

Standard Missile-3 interceptors in U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs? 

Answer. My understanding is that Aegis destroyers and cruisers with SM–3 interceptors are important capabilities that are in great demand for defending against 

ballistic missile threats in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 

Question. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs, what role 

do you see for other nations to contribute to regional missile defense capabilities? 

Answer. Given the large number of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles 

that can threaten NATO, the Middle East, and East Asia, the missile defense capabilities of allies and partners in those regions are important both for their own defense and as a complement to U.S. ballistic missile defense capabilities. 

348 

CHINA

Question. China’s defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for 

about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected 

for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over 

about that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing 

have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China’s intentions in the region. 

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China? 

Answer. The relationship is both cooperative and competitive. Our policy is to 

manage the areas of competition while seeking to expand our cooperation in areas 

where our interests align, both in Asia and globally. 

Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China’s steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program? 

Answer. As is set forth in an annual report to Congress on this subject, China 

is undertaking a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improving the capacity of its Armed Forces to fight and win high-intensity 

regional military operations of short duration (i.e., a Taiwan contingency). In addition, there are indications that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing capabilities beyond those required to address China’s immediate territorial concerns. 

Question. How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth 

and modernization? 

Answer. I believe that the U.S. response to China’s military modernization should 

be flexible and supported by the continued evolution of our force posture in the AsiaPacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization 

of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial capabilities, and the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships. The United States 

should continue to monitor developments in China’s military modernization program 

while encouraging China to be more transparent about its military and security affairs. The United States has been and should remain the preeminent military power 

in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-tomilitary relations? 

Answer. The trajectory of the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship is positive. If confirmed, I would look for ways to build on this positive momentum consistent with U.S. interests and values, always balancing increased engagement with 

China against increased engagement with allies and partners across the region. 

Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the 

quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and 

why? 

Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable. These exchanges require that China be as committed as the United States is to sustained 

and substantive exchanges. If confirmed, I would support increasing military-tomilitary engagement with China while encouraging China to act responsibly, both 

regionally and globally. 

Question. By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air, and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in particular is China’s increased aggressiveness in asserting its excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea. 

What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime disputes in the 

South China Sea? 

Answer. Freedom of navigation and overflight, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect 

for international law are key national security interests of the United States in the 

South China Sea. U.S. policy is that all parties should resolve their disputes 

through peaceful means and in accordance with international law, without resorting 

to the threat or use of force. 

Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in 

that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation? 

Answer. I believe it is critical for the U.S. Navy to maintain a visible presence 

and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight in the East and South China 

Seas, in accordance with international law. 

Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There 

are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and 

349 

would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event 

of a potential conflict situation. 

If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber 

space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack? 

Answer. The protection of U.S. military networks from cyber attack is one of 

DOD’s core missions, and if confirmed, I would work with DOD components and 

other departments and agencies throughout the U.S. Government to ensure a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from China, but from others as well. 

If confirmed, I would continue to support DOD’s efforts to develop its cyber capabilities and cyber workforce, which are two of the most important enablers for defending DOD’s networks. We must also work closely with the private sector and international partners to strengthen our overall cybersecurity and collective defense. 

NORTH KOREA

Question. What do you see as the implications for regional security and stability 

of North Korea’s continued refusal to curb its provocative behavior? 

Answer. The security situation on the Korean Peninsula is serious and requires 

constant vigilance. North Korea’s December 2012 missile launch and February 2013 

nuclear test demonstrate that it has the capabilities and the will to undermine regional stability. 

North Korea’s provocative behavior, large conventional military, pursuit of ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and proliferation 

activities continue to be serious concerns for the United States and our allies and 

partners in the region. The murky nature of the North Korean regime and the unpredictability of its leader, Kim Jong Un, add to our concerns. 

If confirmed, I would ensure that our military deterrence of North Korean aggression continues to support our diplomatic efforts to end North Korea’s nuclear and 

missile programs. 

Question. What is your understanding of the threats posed to the United States 

and our allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities? 

Answer. My understanding is that North Korea’s missile programs are largely untested at longer ranges. However, they are a direct threat to U.S. forces in the AsiaPacific and to our allies and partners in the region. Combined with North Korean 

proliferation activities, they pose a direct threat to U.S. territory. I take this threat 

very seriously, and if confirmed, I would ensure that DOD is prepared to defend 

against it. 

Question. What concerns you most about North Korea and, if confirmed, what 

would you do to address those concerns? 

Answer. My top concerns regarding North Korea are the unpredictability of North 

Korea’s leadership, its capabilities described in response to the previous question, 

its longstanding practice of provocations designed to draw parties to the negotiating 

table, and the upcoming spring military training cycle. If confirmed, I would work 

with our South Korean allies to ensure that we have the capabilities necessary to 

address the full range of possible North Korean aggression, including ballistic missile and WMD threats. 

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the U.S.-South Korean security relationship? 

Answer. The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is very strong. Together we 

are making investments necessary to deter North Korean aggression and ensure security on the Korean peninsula. The President plans to visit the Republic of Korea 

in April, at which time he will reaffirm the strength of our partnership. 

Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now planned for December 

2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place as planned? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the continued assessment and review of the 

security situation on the Korean Peninsula in implementing Strategic Alliance 2015 

(SA2015), of which the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) is a part. 

OPCON transition has always been conditions-based. If confirmed, I will continue 

to support this approach. 

Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation 

Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on 

the Korean Peninsula? 

Answer. I am not familiar with the specifics of these plans and would need to be 

briefed on them before providing an assessment. 

350 

Question. There have been a number of North Korean attacks against South 

Korea in the last few years including the sinking of the South Korea Navy ship 

Cheonan, the artillery attack on the South Korean island, as well as the 2013 cyber 

attack against television stations and banks. South Korea has been adamant that 

it will respond ‘‘firmly’’ to the next such provocation. 

What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on 

South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. 

Armed Forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to 

an attack on South Korea? 

Answer. These obligations are set forth in the U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, specifically Articles II and III. 

Question. Are you confident that the recent Counter-Provocation Plan provides a 

sufficient framework to de-escalate tensions on the peninsula if there are future attacks? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Counter-Provocation Plan includes procedures for consultation and ensures a well-coordinated combined action in response 

to North Korean provocations and threats. It is also my understanding that U.S. 

Forces Korea and the ROK military closely consult to ensure the proper response 

and control escalation, and if confirmed, I would work to ensure those close consultations continue. 

JAPAN

Question. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship? 

Answer. The U.S.-Japan security relationship is very strong. It enables virtually 

all U.S. military activity in the Western Pacific, allowing peace, stability, and prosperity to flourish in the region for more than a half century. The President will visit 

Japan in April, at which time he will reaffirm the strength of our partnership. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more 

active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international 

security arena? 

Answer. I support any steps that Japan chooses to take to increase its contributions to the Alliance and to regional and global security. I believe the changes Japan 

is currently contemplating are a logical reflection of Japan’s role in the world. 

Question. The current plan is for the closure of the Marine Corps Air Station on 

Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp 

Schwab on Okinawa. While the Governor of Okinawa has signed the landfill permit 

to allow construction of the FRF to go forward, local opposition and a long construction timeline make the completion of the FRF uncertain. 

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the FRF 

at Camp Schwab on Okinawa? 

Answer. I believe that Japan took a significant step towards enabling the construction of the FRF last December with the signing of the landfill permit by the 

Governor of Okinawa. This concrete step forward will lead to the construction of airfield facilities at the current Marine Corps Camp Schwab. It is my understanding 

that many of the necessary relocations within Camp Schwab required for the landfill are already underway. By working closely with Japan, we have every confidence 

that this very significant forces realignment effort will be successfully completed. 

Question. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan 

to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? 

Why or why not? 

Answer. Current cost sharing arrangements for relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam are both equitable and appropriate. Japan has made an unprecedented commitment to provide $3.1 billion to fund U.S. military facilities on U.S. 

territory. This contribution helps us achieve our common goals of maintaining a 

strong U.S. military presence in the region while creating a U.S. military presence 

on Okinawa that is politically sustainable over the long term. 

Question. How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least $3.6 billion, 

serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa 

relations in particular? 

Answer. My understanding is that since at least 1996, the United States and 

Japan have been in agreement on the need to relocate the existing Marine Corps 

Air Station at Futenma, around which a significant population had grown over the 

years. Since 1999, we have identified a site in the vicinity of Camp Schwab near 

the village of Henoko. This was confirmed most recently in the October 2013 2+2 

Meeting Joint Statement. I believe that once this facility is completed and operVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00358 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
351 

ational, the resulting benefit to the areas of Okinawa south of Kadena Air Base, 

where the vast majority of the Okinawa population resides, will be apparent to all. 

Question. Is Japan carrying a fair share of the burden of the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan under the current Special Measures Agreement? 

Answer. My understanding is that Japan is meeting its obligations under the 

2011 Special Measures Agreement (SMA). If confirmed, I will ensure that Japan 

continues to meet its obligations under the current and future SMAs. 

INDIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-India security relations? 

Answer. I see the United States and India as committed to a long-term strategic 

partnership, based on common values, interests, and shared challenges. President 

Obama has referred to this relationship as one of the defining partnerships of the 

21st century. The defense relationship is a vital and growing component of that relationship. My understanding is that defense cooperation has increased rapidly over 

the last decade since the signing of the 2005 New Framework Agreement on defense 

cooperation, and now includes a strong slate of high-level dialogues, personnel exchanges, exercises, and defense trade. 

Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize a number of lines of effort 

with India currently underway. I would work to build upon current military-to-military engagement, including exercises, which remain the most visible part of the defense relationship. I would focus on accelerating defense trade, seeking out new joint 

ventures, and pursuing opportunities for technology transfer, co-production, and codevelopment of defense systems under the aegis of the defense trade and technology 

initiative approved by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh in 2013. In addition, if confirmed, I would seek to further cooperation in such areas as maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response and counterterrorism. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and 

Pakistan? 

Answer. The relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by historic distrust. In recent years, the two governments have undertaken efforts to improve the 

relationship, with limited success. The U.S. Government is committed to constructive and durable relationships with both India and Pakistan. If confirmed, I would 

continue to encourage further confidence-building measures and senior-level engagements between India and Pakistan, and would encourage both countries to be transparent with each other on their activities in the region. 

Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan 

and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The distrust between India and Pakistan does not promote regional stability, and that is also the case in Afghanistan. The United States believes that the 

bilateral relationship between India and Afghanistan is not a threat to Pakistan, 

nor is it directed against any other country in the region. It is vital for Afghanistan 

to develop constructive relationships with all countries in the region to achieve longterm regional stability. I support the administration’s view that we should continue 

to encourage all regional actors to be transparent with each other with respect to 

their bilateral relationships and cooperative activities. 

Question. What effect, if any, do you anticipate that India’s successful test launch 

of the Agni V rocket on April 19, 2012, will have on India-U.S. relations? 

Answer. In the 2 years since that test, we have not seen a major impact on U.S.- 

India relations. 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-to-military relations, including efforts to increase the number of rotational U.S. forces operating 

from the Philippines? 

Answer. My understanding is that DOD is in the process of modernizing the U.S.- 

Philippines alliance to position our two countries more effectively to address 21st 

century security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. DOD supports the Armed 

Forces of the Philippines’ long-term modernization. I understand that DOD is also 

currently negotiating a new agreement to further enhance our defense cooperation 

and enable an increased rotational presence of U.S. forces. 

Question. Do you believe Operation Damayan was a successful disaster relief effort? What were the lessons learned from the operation? What are the needed areas 

352 

of improvement for U.S. disaster relief operations and joint task force operations in 

this area? 

Answer. The U.S. whole-of-government response to Super Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda was highly successful. In close cooperation with Philippine authorities, the 

United States was able to move responders and supplies rapidly into the affected 

area. I was pleased to see such close cooperation between DOD, the Department of 

State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Philippine authorities, and all of 

the other international and nongovernmental partners that came to the aid of those 

affected by this tragedy. I believe that the U.S. Government and international community are still discussing lessons learned, and I agree that it will be important to 

incorporate them into future disaster relief training, exercises, and preparedness. I 

would work to do so, if confirmed. 

Question. Do you anticipate a reduced or increased U.S. military footprint or 

change in mission for U.S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to midterm? 

Answer. My understanding is that there are two primary considerations that will 

determine future U.S. military missions and footprint in the Philippines. First, discussions between the United States and the Philippines on enhanced rotational 

presence of U.S. forces are ongoing. I cannot predict the outcome of those discussions. Second, I understand that DOD continues to assess requirements for the current counterterrorism mission in the southern Philippines as security in that region 

improves. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging on both of these issues as we 

chart the future of the alliance. 

INDONESIA

Question. What is the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus? 

Answer. My understanding is that DOD considers Indonesia to be a strong defense partner and that the U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relationship continues to improve after the years of restrictions ended in 2005. In my view, increased military-to-military engagement supports our ability to foster the continued 

reform and professionalization of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Current defense cooperation is focused on maritime security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Bilateral defense trade is also growing. 

With respect to Kopassus, I agree with the July 2010 decision by then-Secretary 

Gates to begin limited engagement. If confirmed, I would work with Congress to ensure that we help Indonesia continue to make progress on reform, human rights, 

and accountability issues. 

Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If 

so, under what conditions? Why? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military engagement 

with Indonesia. My understanding is that we have a strong bilateral defense relationship as well as many shared regional security interests, including maritime security, counterterrorism, and cooperation within regional architectures. Indonesia is 

a key regional leader, including within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 

and will be an important partner in increasing multilateral defense cooperation in 

the region. I support continuing and building on our engagement consistent with required human rights vetting, and we will continue to encourage further defense reform efforts. 

COLOMBIA

Question. Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian government to make significant gains against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other 

paramilitary forces in Colombia, as well as enabled the government to secure many 

previously ungoverned areas. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided 

more than $7 billion to support Colombia’s efforts to counter the threat of 

transnational criminal organizations and various terrorist groups. 

What are your views regarding the current situation in Colombia focusing upon: 

(1) the current military and political situation in Colombia; (2) the ability of the Colombian military to control its territory; and (3) ongoing DOD programs? 

Answer. Since the start of Plan Colombia, the Government of Colombia has made 

enormous strides, with substantial U.S. support, to improve its internal stability 

and citizen security. It has dramatically improved its capacity to secure the country 

against several threats, including insurgents (such as the FARC), paramilitaries, illegally armed groups, and drug trafficking organizations. Colombia’s Ministry of Defense, with U.S. support, continues to apply pressure on organizations like the 

FARC, while also working to address citizen security and external defense issues. 

353 

Colombia has made progress in asserting better governmental control of its territory and maintaining consistent pressure on the FARC, and continues to work to 

consolidate those gains. If confirmed, I would support the Department’s efforts to 

encourage Colombia to maintain pressure on the FARC and other threats to internal 

stability. 

I understand that DOD’s security cooperation programs with Colombia have focused on training, equipping, and mentoring Colombians and also provide support 

to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs. Colombia has also 

partnered with the United States in Central America, an area of common security 

interest. I am confident that Colombia will continue to grow as a stable, interoperable partner in supporting security in the region, and if confirmed, I look forward 

to working with my Colombian counterparts to this end. 

Question. In your view, is the Colombian Government capable of sustaining the 

last decade’s gains during this economic downturn and the scheduled decline in U.S. 

security assistance? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In light of budget conditions, do you believe continued U.S. security assistance to Colombia at the current levels is sustainable? 

Answer. Given Colombia’s substantial progress, described above in response to 

question 110, security assistance to Colombia has been on a downward glide path. 

Given budget realities, this trend will likely continue. I understand that the Department has made difficult decisions about where to focus our cooperation with Colombia, and has also highlighted some areas where continued U.S. support remains critical, such as institutional reform efforts. 

Question. In your view, what are the remaining U.S. supported programs that will 

need to be continued to ‘‘lock in’’ the progress that has been made? 

Answer. It has been several years since I have been briefed on the details of our 

assistance programs in Colombia, so I would want to Reserve judgment on this 

question until and if I am confirmed. Colombia’s long-term stability and response 

to transnational interests is in our direct interest. As a general matter, well-designed and well-implemented programs that restore security, provide social services, 

promote justice and human rights, and encourage legitimate economic development 

in areas formerly under guerrilla and terrorist control are essential to helping Colombia secure the progress that has been made. 

CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

Question. During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in 2011, General 

Douglas Fraser—the Commander of U.S. Southern Command—and Admiral 

Winnefeld—the former Commander of U.S. Northern Command—discussed the increasingly dangerous region between Colombia and Mexico, and the devastating impact transnational criminal organizations are having on the people and security in 

this region. The United States has increased its assistance in this region, but—to 

date—DOD has had only a small role. 

What is your assessment of the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations in this region? 

Answer. In the region between Colombia and Mexico, the Central American Governments continue to struggle against the threat described in the question. Several 

Central American countries have nascent governmental institutions, making them 

susceptible to the corrupting influences of transnational criminal organizations. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of DOD’s current activities 

in Mexico and Central America? 

Answer. My understanding is that DOD’s Mexico and Central America programs 

support host nation security efforts, as well as regional and hemispheric defense cooperation and coordination. DOD activities focus on professionalization, respect for 

human rights, and developing sustainable capabilities with regional Armed Forces. 

Within Central America, DOD’s efforts are focused on building maritime capacity 

to curb illicit trafficking. 

Additionally, DOD has the lead responsibility for the detection and monitoring of 

maritime and air illicit narcotic smuggling flow to Central and North America and 

manages those efforts through the Joint Interagency Task Force South, a component 

of U.S. Southern Command. 

CUBA

Question. What is your view of the need to review and, potentially, revise U.S. 

policies regarding Cuba? 

Answer. The President’s policy is to promote positive change in Cuba and the ability of the Cuban people freely to determine their future. The President’s policy 

354 

changes have allowed separated Cuban families to reunite and given Cuban citizens 

greater access to resources and information that allow them to establish greater 

independence from the state. We are open to a more constructive relationship with 

Cuba, consistent with our national interests, but that will be difficult to achieve 

while Cuba continues to hold in jail U.S. citizen Alan Gross and continues to detain, 

harass, and abuse its citizens for exercising their fundamental freedoms. Consistent 

with current policy, I support targeted bilateral engagements that advance U.S. national interests and the enactment of measures that help reduce the dependence of 

Cuban citizens on the state. 

Question. What is your opinion about the need for, and the pros and cons of, military-to-military contact with Cuba? 

Answer. I understand that the U.S. military currently conducts regular militaryto-military fence line talks at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay with representatives of the Cuban Frontier Brigade in order to prevent misunderstandings on either 

side. The U.S. military also conducts an annual disaster-relief exercise with the 

Cuban military at Guantanamo Bay. I look forward to learning more about these 

engagements, if confirmed. 

Question. In your view, is Cuba currently supporting or sponsoring international 

terrorism? 

Answer. As designated by the Secretary of State, Cuba remains on the list of 

State Sponsors of Terrorism. 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Question. In the past few years, the Defense Department has requested and Congress has approved a number of temporary authorities to build the capacity of partner nations or provide security assistance. These include the ‘‘section 1206’’ global 

train and equip authority, targeted authorities to build capacity in Yemen and East 

Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund. 

In your view, what are the strategic objectives and priorities for the Department’s 

programs for building the capacity of partner nations? 

Answer. In my view, the Department’s capacity building programs aim to develop 

partners’ defense and security institutions, and enable them to provide for their own 

security and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. Doing so reduces the burden on U.S. forces to respond to security threats outside the United States, and develops a group of partner countries that can effectively participate in coalition-based operations. 

Question. What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to the 

strategic direction, oversight, and management of the Department’s programs for 

building partner capacity to ensure that these programs are executed consistent 

with U.S. national security goals and objectives? 

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to review the Department’s partner 

capacity building programs in detail. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD assistance programs are appropriately managed and assessed for strategic effectiveness, 

are coordinated with interagency efforts, and adhere to the Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Question. What is your assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of the 

Department’s programs for building partner capacity in achieving U.S. national security goals and objectives? 

Answer. I have not been involved in the implementation of the Department’s partner capacity building programs, but I understand the Department has undertaken 

in-depth assessments of their effectiveness. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing the Department’s close collaboration with the Department of State and Congress on these programs. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies, in efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces? 

Answer. DOD is an important member of the interagency group that considers, 

executes, and evaluates the U.S. Government approach to building partner capacity. 

If confirmed, I would seek to maintain strong relationships with DOD’s interagency 

partners, to ensure the Department’s efforts to strengthen foreign security forces 

fully contribute to regional foreign policy objectives. 

AUTHORITY FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE/LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Question. On September 18, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use 

of Military Force (Public Law 107–40), which provides that ‘‘the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 

or persons he determines planned authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist atVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00362 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
355 

tacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 

United States by such nations, organizations or persons.’’ This AUMF remains in 

effect and provides the legal authority for certain U.S. military actions. 

What is your understanding of the role of the USD(P) in interpreting the AUMF 

and in the application of the AUMF to military activities? 

Answer. My understanding is that the USD(P) is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on policy-related matters regarding the application of the AUMF 

to military activities. 

Question. In your view, does DOD have the legal authorities it needs to conduct 

military operations against entities responsible for September 11 and against those 

who plan further attacks against the United States? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In your view, do existing authorities provide the U.S. military the flexibility it needs to respond to new and emerging terrorism threats? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Without the AUMF, would the U.S. military have the authority to use 

force, including deadly force against members of al Qaeda and associated forces? If 

so, under what circumstances? 

Answer. I believe that the President may, in certain circumstances, direct the use 

of military force without the express authorization of Congress, but I would defer 

to the General Counsel on the more detailed analysis of the circumstances under 

which he could do so. 

Question. What is the impact of the President’s Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on the application of the AUMF with respect to counterterrorism operations? 

Answer. As far as I am aware, the Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism had no impact on the Department’s application of the AUMF with respect 

to counterterrorism operations. 

Question. In your view, would it be appropriate for the United States to use military force against terrorist groups that have not engaged in hostilities directly 

against the United States, but merely shown an intent to do so? If so, under what 

circumstances? 

Answer. My understanding is that any decision to use such force against a terrorist group showing an intent to engage in hostilities directly against the United 

States would be fully informed by analysis from the Intelligence Community; policy 

deliberation, and appropriate legal review. 

UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Question. Over the last 4 years, the administration has worked to establish a 

framework that governs our use of force against terrorists—insisting upon clear 

guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy 

Guidance the President signed on May 22, 2013. As a part of that effort, the President has indicated a preference that the U.S. military should carry out the use of 

force in active warzones, and beyond. 

What are your views on whether DOD should assume greater responsibility for 

lethal strikes by remotely-piloted aircraft (drones)? 

Answer. I support the view that the U.S. military is the part of government that 

should be responsible for using force against terrorist threats abroad. 

Question. What benefits or risks to national security would be implicated if the 

Department were to take the lead role in operating unmanned systems? 

Answer. I believe that close cooperation between DOD and its interagency partners can address risks to our security, while providing the benefits of improved 

transparency with Congress and the public and greater efficiency across our Government. 

STRATEGY FORMULATION AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Question. One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and 

civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. DOD Directive 5111.3 specifically assigns a major role to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for those important matters. 

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the 

formulation of strategy and contingency planning? 

Answer. In my opinion, defense strategy and contingency plans must be anchored 

in national security principles established by the President. Civilian leaders play an 

important role in providing necessary guidance to shape military planning, and then 

have a role reviewing that planning. Working within the parameters outlined by the 

356 

President and Secretary of Defense, military leaders provide their best military advice on how to achieve objectives. 

Question. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy and contingency planning? 

Answer. Having not served previously in DOD, I am not in a position to evaluate 

the level of civilian oversight of strategy and contingency planning. If confirmed, I 

intend to play an active role in supporting the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) 

as they establish the strategic direction for the Defense Department and fulfill their 

statutory responsibilities. 

Question. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy and contingency planning? 

Answer. In my experience working with both civilian and military leaders of DOD, 

I believe it is important to have open discussions on both what we ask the military 

to achieve and the proposed military approaches to key security challenges. If confirmed, I intend to support the Secretary and Under Secretary fully in fostering 

such discussions. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

Question. The DOD strategic guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’’ announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, 

sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions 

for which the DOD will prepare. 

Do you agree with the defense priorities set out in that guidance? What changes, 

if any, would you recommend to those defense priorities? 

Answer. Yes. Any changes to this guidance should be reviewed in light of an 

evolving future security environment, as well as the realities of the changing fiscal 

environment. 

Question. The DOD strategic guidance includes a new emphasis on U.S. security 

interests and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, the Department is 

taking steps to shape U.S. forces relative to the air and maritime demands of the 

Far East and deemphasizing readiness for prolonged or large-scale stability operations. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the new strategic guidance’s shift 

of emphasis to the Asia-Pacific and away from large-scale stability operations, and 

the implications of this shift for shaping U.S. force structure? 

Answer. The United States has strong and longstanding ties with countries in the 

Asia-Pacific region, where the United States has supported security and stability 

with our military presence and partnerships. The rebalance reflects an understanding of the growing importance of Asia to the world economy and our own security and prosperity. In terms of force structure changes to support the rebalance, 

I understand that DOD is building resiliency in its regional operating bases, enhancing capacity for long-range strike, and making investments in cyber and space 

capabilities. DOD also continues to invest in advanced capabilities for undersea operations and fifth-generation fighter aircraft. 

I understand that U.S. ground forces will retain sufficient capacity to undertake 

limited counterinsurgency and stability operations, if required. DOD is also ensuring that it has the ability to mobilize and regenerate forces if a larger-scale stability 

operation becomes necessary in the future. Finally, the institutional elements of the 

ground forces are seeking to retain and refine the lessons learned and specialized 

capabilities that have been developed over the past 10 years in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its associated forces to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests 

more broadly? 

Answer. Al Qaeda and its associated forces continue to pose a persistent threat 

to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly. 

Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated 

groups in each of the geographic combatant commands? Of these threats, what do 

you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities? 

Answer. I believe the highest counterterrorism priorities remain in the 

CENTCOM AOR. Core al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan remain a persistent and serious threat. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

has proven its capability to initiate attacks against the United States, and is the 

most lethal al Qaeda affiliate. Al Qaeda’s continued persistence in Iraq and Syria 

raises regional concerns. 

357 

In the U.S. Africa Command AOR, al-Shabaab remains a threat to U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa, and has staged high-profile attacks against 

Western targets in the region. My understanding is that there is no current, credible evidence that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a direct threat to the U.S. 

Homeland. AQIM and its associates do, however, threaten U.S. persons and interests abroad, as well as those of our European allies. 

In the remaining geographic combatant command AORs, I understand that the 

threat from al Qaeda is less pronounced. If confirmed, I would work with the Intelligence Community, the Department’s interagency partners, and our foreign partners to disrupt and dismantle any emerging threats from al Qaeda in the regions. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s role in the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism? 

Answer. DOD supports the President’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism 

principally by building partner capacity and, when appropriate, capturing or killing 

terrorists who pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons. 

Question. Are you aware of any nexus between non-state actors and criminal networks? 

Answer. Yes, it is my understanding that a strong nexus exists between illicit 

non-state actors and global criminal networks. In locations such as Colombia, Peru, 

Afghanistan, and the Sahel, there is plenty of evidence of instability fostered and 

funded by the convergence of criminal networks and terrorist organizations. These 

relationships pose threats to the national security of the United States and to our 

allies and partners. 

Question. Given your current knowledge of DOD’s programs, do you believe resources are aligned in a manner consistent with these counterterrorism priorities? 

Answer. I understand the Department has appropriately aligned its counterterrorism resources with the priorities outlined in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. If confirmed, I look forward to working on this issue in greater detail and 

ensuring we remain agile in our ability to address emerging threats. 

MASS ATROCITIES PREVENTION

Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in 

August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10. 

Among interagency partners, what is DOD’s role in addressing atrocity threats, 

and what tools does DOD have for preventing or responding to atrocities? 

Answer. As President Obama noted in April 2012, preventing and responding to 

atrocities is a core national security interest of the United States. I understand that 

the Department has played an active role in the efforts of the Atrocities Prevention 

Board and has worked to strengthen support to emerging atrocity situations. If confirmed, I would continue these efforts and ensure that the Department plays an active role in supporting the Atrocities Prevention Board. 

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent legislation, 

authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to 

regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military 

operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism. 

What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority? 

Answer. Although I understand that DOD section 1208 programs are widely supported by both interagency partners in the field and our foreign partners, I would 

make it a priority—if confirmed—to ensure that the Department has objective measures for assessing the program’s strategic effectiveness. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends 

more than $1.0 billion to support U.S. CN operations, build the capacity of certain 

foreign governments around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program? 

Answer. DOD is assigned the mission of lead U.S. agency for the detection and 

monitoring aerial and maritime drug traffic bound for the United States. It is my 

understanding that DOD provides militarily unique capabilities to support law enforcement organizations, both foreign and domestic, in their efforts to combat illicit 

drug trafficking. The revenues generated by illicit narcotics trafficking provide support for terrorists, insurgents, and other criminal groups that threaten U.S. national 

358 

security interests. The Department’s counternarcotics program serves as a cost-effective way to protect these interests. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s CN authorities? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department’s CN authorities allow DOD 

to provide critical enablers to law enforcement and partner nations’ security forces 

to confront the threat posed by illicit narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. The use 

of these authorities often provides ancillary benefits to law enforcement efforts in 

other areas including addressing other forms of transnational organized crime. As 

the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug traffic 

bound for the United States, the Department also has authority to assist our State, 

local, tribal, Federal, and international law enforcement partners. DOD CN authorities also support our geographic combatant commanders’ CN programs, covering regions in Central and South America as well as Afghanistan. CN authorities also 

allow for the provision of CN programs and activities through the National Guard 

Counterdrug Programs of 50 States and 3 Territories. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working with Congress to preserve these authorities. 

Question. Should the United States reassess ongoing efforts to combat the trafficking of illegal narcotics in the Western Hemisphere given the increasing concerns 

of many of the Nations in the Hemisphere about the lack of results from the decades 

old war on drugs? 

Answer. In my view, DOD has played a key role in supporting U.S. and partner 

nation counternarcotics efforts that have made progress against cocaine use and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere. According to the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy, DOD counternarcotics efforts helped reduce the amount of cocaine reaching the United States, which has contributed to declines in cocaine overdose deaths, positive workplace drug tests, retail drug purity, and cocaine seizures 

in the United States. Nevertheless, continued high levels of cocaine, heroin, and 

methamphetamine trafficking, and the growing threat of synthetic drugs, continue 

to present a difficult challenge, and there is room for improvement. If confirmed, 

I would work to find better ways to disrupt the production and trafficking of illegal 

drugs, which in turn can contribute to reduced stability in affected countries. 

TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES

Question. The fiscal year 2014 defense appropriations act makes a number of 

changes to the prohibitions and vetting process required for training, equipping, or 

providing other assistance to foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights. 

What is your assessment of these changes and their possible effect on the Department’s ability to provide needed training, equipment, or other assistance, especially 

in countries such as Mexico, Afghanistan, and Myanmar? 

Answer. I strongly support the Leahy law, and I am aware that the Secretary of 

Defense, and the Secretary of State strongly support it also. If confirmed, I would 

review the impact of fiscal year 2014 changes to the Leahy law on DOD activities. 

Question. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the changes to the law? 

Answer. I do not have any concerns at this point with the changes to the Leahy 

law made in the fiscal year 2014 act. 

Question. Would it be beneficial to have an exception to the prohibitions on training and providing assistance to allow the Department to provide limited training on 

human rights, rule of law, the English language, and the law of armed conflict? 

Answer. I am not aware that the administration is recommending any changes 

to the Leahy law. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact 

on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. Last July, President Obama released the first National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. DOD is not a law enforcement agency, but it does bring unique enabling capabilities to our Nation’s Federal law enforcement agencies. 

What role, if any, should DOD play in combatting transnational criminal organizations? 

Answer. The President stated in his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 

Crime that transnational organized crime is a threat to our national security. I 

agree with the Strategy’s call for the U.S. Government to build, balance, and integrate the tools of national power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats. DOD has a supporting role to play in this effort. Although DOD does 

not, and should not, serve as the lead U.S. Government agency for transnational orVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00366 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
359 

ganized crime, it is my view that DOD should continue to provide unique support 

to U.S. law enforcement and foreign partners in our common efforts against 

transnational organized crime. 

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is 

currently pending in the Senate. 

What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS? 

Answer. I support U.S. accession the Law of the Sea Convention. The United 

States has a significant interest in promoting a rules-based international order, including the international law of the sea. Dating back to the Nixon administration, 

the United States played a substantial role in drafting and negotiating the Law of 

the Sea Convention and its 1994 Implementing Agreement. The Convention effectively preserves our interests as both a coastal nation and a maritime nation. 

Question. From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages 

and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS? 

Answer. The Convention advances the interests of the United States as a global 

maritime power. Specifically, the Convention codifies the rights, freedoms, and uses 

of the sea, including rights of innocent passage in the territorial sea, transit passage 

in straits used for international navigation, archipelagic sea lanes passage, and the 

traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight beyond the territorial seas of any 

coastal State. I am unaware of any disadvantages of the United States joining the 

Convention. 

Question. What is your understanding of the principal arguments against ratifying UNCLOS, and what is your response to those arguments? 

Answer. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee twice approved the Convention 

during the last decade, in 2004 and in 2007. The arguments against the Convention, 

and the responses to those arguments, are fully developed in the reports of the committee. I agree with the arguments set forth by the majority of members who twice 

approved the Convention, which are reflected in those reports, specifically S. Exec. 

Rept. 108–10 (2004) and S. Exec. Rept. 110–9 (2007). 

CYBERSPACE

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) in the development of policy and strategy 

for military operations in cyberspace and in exercising oversight of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and the National Security Agency? 

Answer. My understanding is that the OUSD(P) plays an important role in providing senior-level civilian oversight of CYBERCOM, working closely with U.S. Strategic Command and CYBERCOM on cyberspace strategy and policy, contingency 

planning, and policy oversight of cyberspace operations. In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, OUSD(P) will work closely 

with the Secretary’s principal cyber advisor. Finally, OUSD(P) works closely with 

and supports the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in its role 

overseeing NSA. 

Question. In the cyberspace domain, for each of the mission areas of cyber network defense, cyber network exploitation, and cyber network attack, what is your 

understanding of the relationship between the OUSD(P) and each of the following: 

the Chief Information Officer; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence? 

Answer. My understanding is that, to defend DOD networks, the OUSD(P) and 

the Chief Information Officer frequently work together to support initiatives such 

as the Joint Information Environment that improve the resiliency of DOD networks. 

OUSD(P) also works closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (OUSD(AT&L)), in particular through the 

Cyber Investment Board, which addresses resource allocation issues across the 

cyber mission areas. OUSD(P) has a strong relationship with the Office of the Under 

Secretary for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) because of the nexus between intelligence and 

cyber operations, which also support activities across the cyber mission areas. 

Question. What is your assessment of the maturity and adequacy of policy and 

doctrine governing defensive, offensive, and intelligence-gathering operations in 

cyberspace, both within DOD and the interagency? What gaps or deficiencies remain, in your view? 

Answer. My understanding is that DOD continues to refine doctrine, policies, and 

organizational relationships to enable CYBERCOM to execute its missions in cyberspace. In particular, CYBERCOM continues to refine its concepts of operations and 

employment, command and control structure, and training and readiness standards. 

360 

These efforts represent a significant maturation of the policy and doctrine that govern cyberspace operations. DOD also supports the newly released framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve the defenses of critical infrastructure upon 

which the Department depends. 

Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate roles and responsibilities 

of DOD, vis-a-vis other government agencies (such as the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Intelligence Community, and the Justice Department) and the private 

sector in preparing for, and the conduct of, the defense of government and critical 

infrastructure networks in cyberspace? 

Answer. DOD is responsible for defending the Nation against attacks in all domains, including cyberspace. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, DOD conducts cyberspace operations to enable military operations, to operate 

and defend military systems, and to secure DOD critical infrastructure. If and when 

directed, DOD provides support to State and local governments and to the private 

sector. Departments and agencies across the Federal Government coordinate with 

the private sector to develop cybersecurity solutions and to mitigate risks and 

vulnerabilities. 

It is my understanding that DHS has the primary responsibility for coordinating 

domestic cyber incident prevention, protection, mitigation, and recovery. In addition, 

DHS is responsible for securing unclassified Federal civilian networks and systems. 

DOD and the Department of Justice (DoJ) provide technical support to DHS as it 

carries out these missions. DoJ investigates, attributes, disrupts, and prosecutes 

cybercrimes outside of military jurisdiction. The Intelligence Community provides 

cyber threat information to agencies of the U.S. Government as they carry out their 

missions. 

ILLICIT ARMS TRAFFICKING

Question. What is your understanding of the problem of illicit arms trafficking 

and the role of the United States to deal with the problem? 

Answer. The trafficking of illicit arms is a serious, worldwide problem. Because 

of the United States’ experience in this area and our strong and well-developed 

arms export control system, we can be a leader in engaging partner countries on 

ways to combat illicit arms trafficking more effectively. 

Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, does the lack of national controls 

and enforcement on arms flows contribute to the illicit trafficking problem, and 

could efforts to respond to illicit trafficking be improved if other countries adopted 

and enforced national regulations on arms import, export, and transit similar to 

those of the United States? 

Answer. Where illicit trafficking is pervasive, partner countries should improve 

their arms transfer processes. If confirmed, I would encourage other countries to improve the standards of their controls, to make them closer to those of the United 

States, so that the international trafficking of illicit arms would become much more 

difficult. 

Question. Do you think the arms trade treaty would enhance U.S. national security interests? 

Answer. Yes. The Arms Trade Treaty would help to establish higher international 

standards for the transfer of arms that are based on the standards that apply in 

the United States, thus making it much more difficult for terrorists or other illicit 

actors to obtain them. It is in the interest of U.S. national security to have fewer 

weapons in the hands of illicit actors. 

ARMS CONTROL

Question. What role do you see for arms control as a means of improving U.S. national security? 

Answer. Arms control can contribute to U.S. national security by providing predictability and stabilizing the strategic or military balance between the United 

States and other nations at lower levels of weapons, including strategic nuclear 

forces. I believe such agreements, and their attendant verification provisions, make 

the United States safer and more secure, as they provide mutual transparency and 

predictability regarding military forces. 

Question. What are your views on the possible next steps to address nuclear 

weapons issues between the United States and Russia? 

Answer. The President determined after a review of our nuclear strategy that we 

can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible nuclear deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third 

reduction in deployed nuclear weapons below the limits established in the New 

361 

START treaty. The administration is seeking to pursue such reductions through negotiations with the Russian Federation. The United States has made clear our interest in seeking reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. 

Question. What conditions, if any, do you believe need to be met to further reduce 

strategic and tactical nuclear stockpiles through arms control? 

Answer. We require a willing partner, but to date, Russia has not shown interest 

in pursuing such discussions. The administration will continue to engage with Russia to gauge interest in pursuing opportunities for arms control relating to both 

strategic and non-strategic nuclear stockpiles. 

Question. What might be the risks and benefits of pursuing reductions below New 

START force levels? 

Answer. Further reductions in the nuclear forces of Russia and the United States 

offer a number of benefits, including reducing the number of nuclear weapons that 

can be targeted against the United States and promoting our nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Reducing nuclear forces also benefits the United States by permitting us to maintain strategic stability and predictability at lower force levels. Such 

a posture, supported by modernization programs to maintain the credibility of our 

deterrent force, will provide the United States sufficient forces to deter or respond 

to 21st century threats. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the 

first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, 

the BMDR, as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as 

a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. It also stated the 

policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of longrange missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against 

future uncertainties. 

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the BMDR? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally sustainable? 

Answer. Yes, we have an obligation to invest in effective, affordable missile defense systems. If confirmed, I would continue to implement DOD’s commitment to 

deploying capabilities that have been proven through testing and assessment and 

that are affordable over the long term. 

Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted 

the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. 

This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging 

threats from Iranian missiles, increasing in capability with each of its four phases. 

Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against 

potential future long-range missiles from Iran that could reach the United States, 

thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability. 

Do you support the PAA to Missile Defense in Europe and, if confirmed, will you 

implement it? 

Answer. Yes, I support the European Phased Adaptive Approach and the plans 

for it that Secretary Hagel announced on March 15, 2013. If confirmed, I would continue to implement those plans. 

Question. Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy 

operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess 

operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to 

deploying such systems? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with 

Russia on missile defense, including the possibility of sharing radar and early warning data. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit 

U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities. 

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United 

States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from Iran, and could 

362 

send a powerful signal to Iran that could help persuade Iran not to pursue longrange missiles or nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Yes. U.S./NATO cooperation with Russia on missile defense has the potential to improve our mutual security against the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons and would send a strong signal to Iran of our common 

resolve. 

Question. Do you agree that, notwithstanding Russian concerns, the United States 

is committed to the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defense 

systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, 

needed to meet our security needs? 

Answer. Yes. I believe that the proliferation of ballistic missiles is a real and 

growing threat to the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I would work to improve our missile defense forces to meet our 

national security needs. 

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE POLICY

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the PDUSD(P) should play in the establishment of a national security space policy? 

Answer. The role of the PDUSD(P) is to support the USD(P) in carrying out the 

responsibilities of overseeing implementation of existing national security space policy in coordination with other agencies and with Congress. The Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary also supports the Under Secretary in carrying out responsibilities 

for overseeing development of new policy when circumstances warrant. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have mandated 

significant growth in our Special Operations Forces (SOF) and enablers that directly 

support their operations. 

Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of SOF can and should be maintained in light of current fiscal challenges? 

Answer. I understand that SOF are a highly-efficient and effective capability that 

the Department intends to preserve. If confirmed, I would work with the Service 

Chiefs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM) to ensure the SOF community is appropriately sized to meet the full 

range of missions assigned globally. 

Question. Special Operations Forces heavily rely on enabling capabilities provided 

by the GPFs to be successful in their missions. 

In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities 

can be maintained within the GPFs and that such capabilities will remain available 

to Special Operations Forces when needed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Service Chiefs, the ASD(SO/ 

LIC), and the Commander, SOCOM to ensure the Department is appropriately 

structured and resourced to make enablers available to both SOF and the GPFs. 

Question. Do you believe Special Operations Forces should develop additional organic enabling capabilities in addition or in place of those currently provided by the 

GPFs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, 

SOCOM to examine this issue. 

Question. The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has 

sought more control over the deployment and utilization of Special Operations 

Forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense modified policy guidance for the combatant commands earlier this year that gave SOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic combatant commanders and Special Operations Forces assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of 

SOCOM is also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move 

Special Operations Forces between geographic combatant commands. 

Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can 

be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic combatant commanders, or raising concerns 

with the State Department. 

Answer. I understand that SOCOM resources deployments of SOF personnel to 

the geographic combatant commands, but that the geographic combatant commanders continue to exercise operational control over those deployed forces. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Department of State and other relevant interagency partners to understand the contours of this issue more fully. 

363 

Question. Do you believe SOCOM is appropriately resourced to adequately support 

the Theater Special Operations Commands and Special Operations Forces assigned 

to them? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, 

SOCOM, to understand more fully the resourcing issues associated with the Theater 

Special Operations Commands and their assigned forces. 

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, GPFs, and 

other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in 

the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. 

However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature. 

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative 

interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere? 

Answer. The lessons learned on interagency efforts over the past decade have led 

to well-informed, transparent, constant communication and collaboration at multiple 

levels. If confirmed, I would work to ensure we continue operating under a common 

strategic framework and build long-lasting, multi-departmental relationships with 

our interagency partners. 

Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved? 

Answer. I strongly support a whole-of-government approach to counterinsurgency 

and counterterrorism operations. If confirmed, I would work to maintain and expand 

the capacities and institutions that have supported successful, collaborative interagency efforts over the course of the past decade. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in encouraging greater interagency collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, GPFs, and other U.S. 

Government departments and agencies? 

Answer. I believe that interagency collaboration is the most important contributing factor to many SOF achievements. If confirmed, I would work with the 

ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM, to help them oversee, maintain, and 

build upon the important relationships developed over the past decade. 

MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 

2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that 

the United States ‘‘is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including 

more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.’’ 

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute additional 

military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. 

peacekeeping operations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support additional contributions of U.S. military 

personnel to staff officer positions, provided that they are positions that would add 

significant value to the mission, and that the mission is a strategic priority for the 

United States. 

Support for international peacekeeping remains an important security objective 

for the U.S. Government, and the United States has a stake in the success of U.N. 

peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practical, the United States should 

continue to provide military personnel for U.N. peacekeeping operations, especially 

for key staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the mission. 

If confirmed, I would carefully evaluate any proposals to contribute military or civilian personnel to a U.N. peacekeeping operation, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other military commitments we 

have around the globe, and the estimated cost of U.S. involvement. 

Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional 

military personnel to U.N. operations? 

Answer. Contributing additional military personnel to U.N. missions can provide 

the opportunity to shape U.N. missions and enhance mission success. Successful 

U.N. peacekeeping operations are in the core national security interest of the United 

States, as they generally are cost effective, reduce the burden on U.S. forces, and 

in many cases directly advance U.S. security interests. Additionally, the Department 

gains real-time information and insights on emerging threats and crises from places 

where there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence. We must be mindful, however, 

of the additional demands these assignments could impose on the Department. 

364 

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, 

regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and 

plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and 

tactical questioning comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and 

the Army Field Manual on Interrogations? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be 

based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the 

risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact 

on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, 

should they be captured in future conflicts? 

Answer. Yes. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the 

PDUSD(P)? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

SEQUESTRATION

1. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McKeon, I believe we can all agree that sequestration has 

had a devastating impact on our Nation’s military readiness. However, I also believe 

many are under the mistaken impression the Ryan/Murray agreement solved this 

problem. It did not. It helped, but DOD is still subject to $76.96 billion in sequester 

cuts in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015. Even with the small relief in fiscal 

year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, do you think we can execute the current Defense 

Strategic Guidance? If you believe we can execute the strategy but with greater risk, 

can you explain what you mean by risk? To me, risk equals lives, the lives of our 

men and women in uniform. 

Mr. MCKEON. I am not yet in a position to evaluate the Department’s updated 

defense strategy in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). However, if confirmed for this position, I will focus on ensuring the Department can fulfill our defense strategy, based on the means provided, and identify clearly the risks we are 

not able to mitigate for our country and for our servicemembers. 

365 

NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE STRATEGY

2. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McKeon, a new QDR should be published soon. This is 

a critical document which sets DOD’s strategies and priorities. Recently, DOD conducted a Strategic Choices Management Review, commonly called the Skimmer. The 

Skimmer explored different military capabilities based upon various funding scenarios. Both of you have watched the Skimmer process closely and Ms. Wormuth 

you have worked on the QDR itself. Many are concerned that in an effort to seek 

defense cuts, the new QDR will expose the United States to risks which recently 

would have been unthinkable. Therefore, will the QDR articulate where we are 

going to be taking additional risks? 

Mr. MCKEON. Although I have not reviewed the 2014 QDR, I understand that it 

articulates risk to some missions at various defense funding levels. These include 

the President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request, as well as the risk if sequestrationlevel funding returns, proposed reforms are rejected, and budget uncertainty continues. 

3. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McKeon, will the defense cuts cause major changes to our 

National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working closely with the 

White House as the National Security Council Staff updates the National Security 

Strategy. This close coordination will ensure that the National Security Strategy, 

the 2014 QDR, and the President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request will be consistent 

and mutually reinforcing. I am currently unfamiliar with the state of development 

of the National Military Strategy. 

4. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McKeon, how can you tell when a strategy has gone from 

being budget-informed to being budget-driven? 

Mr. MCKEON. A strategy goes from being budget-informed to budget-driven when 

it sets investment priorities without a logical connection to how these investments 

support the Department’s primary missions or U.S. national security interests. 

Strategies should be informed by the budget to ensure realistic expectations on what 

the Armed Forces can achieve. Strategies should not be driven by the budget because doing so risks developing a future force that is not aligned with the President’s expectations of what the Armed Forces should be prepared to do. 

5. Senator INHOFE. Mr. McKeon, how are our risks affected when you change from 

being budget-informed to being budget-driven? 

Mr. MCKEON. In a budget-informed approach, risk can be defined in terms of the 

ability of military forces to conduct the missions called for by the defense strategy. 

In a budget-driven approach, risk is more difficult to assess or reduce because the 

methodology does not allow for the development of different approaches to meet the 

objectives of the strategy. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

POTENTIAL RUSSIAN TREATY VIOLATION

6. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, in Berlin last year, President Obama gave a 

speech calling for further cuts to our nuclear deterrent. He stated that we need to 

work with Russia on new arms control agreements that go below the New Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) levels. What role did you play in the drafting of 

this speech? 

Mr. MCKEON. As I testified on February 25, I may have reviewed some of the 

drafts of the speech, and may have offered comments to the speechwriter. 

7. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, did the President call for these cuts and for 

working with Russia while he knew Russia was violating a major arms control 

agreement? Wasn’t this disingenuous on the White House’s part? 

Mr. MCKEON. Based on your questions during the public hearing, I believe you 

are referring to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. As I testified, 

and indicated in my letter of February 24, the administration is concerned about 

Russian activity that raises concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty; a formal compliance review is ongoing but has not yet been completed. 

8. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, in December 2012, the administration threatened to veto the NDAA because of section 1035(c) of that Act. Specifically, this provision stated that the United States could not reduce its nuclear deterrent until the 

366 

President certified that Russia was in compliance with its Arms Control Treaty obligations. Were you on the National Security Staff at the time? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes. 

9. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, in light of the New York Times story on the INF 

Treaty, is it fair to say that the President issued that veto threat because he could 

not certify that Russia was complying with its treaty obligations? 

Mr. MCKEON. The administration released two Statements of Administration Policy (SAP) in connection with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 

Fiscal Year 2013. The first was issued on May 15, 2012, in connection with H.R. 

4310; the second one was issued on November 29, 2012, in connection with S. 3254. 

The former expressed strong objections to sections 1053–1059, because they ‘‘would 

impinge on the President’s ability to implement the New START treaty and to set 

U.S. nuclear weapons policy.’’ The latter does indicate that the President’s senior 

advisers would recommend the President veto the bill in its current form but there 

is no mention in the SAP of provisions relating to Russia or arms control treaty obligations. 

The President signed the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 in January 2013 (Public 

Law 112–239). section 1035, as modified by section 801(a) of the American Taxpayer 

Relief Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–240), adds a new section 495 to title 10, United 

States Code. On January 3, 2013, in signing the NDAA, the President issued a signing statement which said—— 

Section 1035, which adds a new section 495(c) to title 10, is deeply problematic, as it would impede the fulfillment of future U.S. obligations agreed 

to in the New START treaty and hinder the executive’s ability to determine 

an appropriate nuclear force structure. I am therefore pleased that Congress has included a provision to adequately amend this provision in H.R. 

8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which I will be signing into 

law today. 

I believe the concern expressed at the time by the administration about this provision related to the fact that the administration was unable to certify Russian compliance with certain treaties, including the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 

and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and, as expressed in the President’s statement, that the executive branch could not accept constraints on the President’s ability to set U.S. nuclear policy. 

10. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, were you aware that in October 2012, the 

chairmen of the House Armed Services and House Intelligence Committees had 

written to the President with their concerns about Russia’s violation of the INF 

Treaty? 

Mr. MCKEON. I was likely aware of it at the time the letter was received in the 

White House. 

11. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, you were a central staff member behind the 

administration’s push to ratify the New START treaty in 2010. You recalled, I assumed, the letter the President wrote to Senators on December 20th of that year 

stating: ‘‘I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment for the longterm, in addition to this 1-year increase. That is my commitment to Congress—that 

my administration will pursue these programs and capability for as long as I am 

President.’’ Can you assure us that the National Security Staff, under Ms. Sherwood 

Randall, is not undertaking any reviews of how to walk away from that commitment 

for the sake of the President’s nuclear disarmament legacy? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes, the President stands behind the commitment made in the letter. The administration remains fully committed to the investments required to ensure that our nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure, and effective. 

12. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, do you agree that the United States has an obligation to keep our allies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 

fully and timely informed on matters that impact their national security, such as 

a violation of the INF Treaty? 

Mr. MCKEON. The United States has obligations to our NATO allies under the 

North Atlantic Treaty. Included in the treaty is a commitment in Article 3 that the 

parties will ‘‘separately and jointly maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack’’. Accordingly, we regularly inform and consult 

with our allies about matters affecting their security and the security of the Alliance. 

367 

13. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, in 2012, NATO undertook a Deterrence and 

Defense Posture Review, which included a full examination of their nuclear posture. 

Did the United States have important information on the INF Treaty which we did 

not share with NATO? 

Mr. MCKEON. The United States keeps our NATO allies informed about matters 

that affect their national security and the security of the Alliance, including treaty 

compliance issues. Throughout the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) 

process, the United States consulted closely with our NATO allies about the overall 

security environment and the capabilities we and our allies require to meet the 

challenges we face, and we continue to do so. 

14. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, would you please explain why we wouldn’t inform our Article V mutual defense and security allies of a violation, which is a 

threat to their security more than ours, especially during their consideration of a 

review focusing on deterrence and defense? 

Mr. MCKEON. Throughout the DDPR process, the United States consulted closely 

with our NATO allies about the overall security environment and the capabilities 

we and our allies require to meet the challenges we face, and we continue to do so. 

As noted previously, a compliance review regarding Russian compliance with the 

INF Treaty is ongoing. 

15. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, on January 30th, a New York Times article described a previously undisclosed Russian violation of the INF Treaty. When State 

Department spokeswoman Ms. Jen Psaki was asked about the facts of the New York 

Times report, she stated: ‘‘I don’t have anything to refute.’’ We take this to mean 

that the facts of the article are accurate. Do you have anything to refute? 

Mr. MCKEON. As I stated in the February 25 hearing, and in my letter to you 

of February 24, we have concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. 

As I cannot comment on the details of these concerns in an unclassified form, I refer 

you to my letter of February 24 for additional information. 

16. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, the Senate received a classified briefing in late 

2010, prior to its vote on the New START treaty, regarding a potential arms control 

issue with Russia. What role did you play in organizing that briefing? 

Mr. MCKEON. I recall two classified briefings in September 2010 related to a potential arms control issue with Russia. 

One occurred on or about September 15, 2010, for the senior staff of the Senate 

leadership and the national security committees. I understand that this briefing was 

conducted by officials from the Intelligence Community (IC). I do not recall having 

any role in organizing it. 

The second occurred on September 29, 2010, when the Director of National Intelligence briefed an all-Senators session on the National Intelligence Estimate on the 

IC’s ability to monitor the New START treaty. I included an excerpt of Director 

Clapper’s statement in my letter of February 24. As part of the administration’s efforts to ensure that all Senators were briefed on the treaty and relevant issues, I 

believe that I worked with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 

as well as the Departments of State and Defense to arrange for this briefing to occur 

prior to the adjournment of that session of the Senate, in response to a request from 

the Senate leadership staff. 

17. Senator WICKER. Mr. McKeon, can you assure me that all possible issues and 

facts, of which Ms. Jen Psaki had nothing to refute, were fully briefed to the Senate 

as it was considering the New START treaty? 

Mr. MCKEON. I believe that the Senate had access to, or was provided, a range 

of unclassified and classified information about the New START treaty, about Russian compliance with treaties in force at the time, and about Russian activities relevant to the New START treaty. I understand that on February 27, 2014, the Director of National Intelligence testified in closed session before your committee regarding what had been shared with the Senate while the New START treaty was being 

considered, and will be providing additional classified information about information 

made available to Congress in 2010 and in the years prior. 

368 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

18. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, in Berlin last summer, President Obama gave 

a speech calling for further cuts to our nuclear deterrent. Did the President call for 

these cuts and for working with Russia while knowing Russia was potentially violating the INF? 

Mr. MCKEON. On June 19, 2013, the President gave a speech in Berlin on a range 

of issues. Among other things, he announced the results of a review of our nuclear 

employment guidance, stating that he had determined that we can ‘‘ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third’’. He 

further expressed an intention to seek ‘‘negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond 

Cold War nuclear postures’’. 

Prior to June 2013, the administration had submitted reports to Congress in unclassified and classified form setting forth information about Russian compliance 

with all arms control obligations, including those contained in the INF Treaty. 

RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA

19. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, I am interested in your responses to the advance policy questions related to Russia. You were asked, ‘‘What in your view are 

the major security issues in the U.S.-Russia relationship?’’ In your response, you 

proceeded to list several areas in which you believe we have cooperated well with 

the Russians including strategic arms reductions. You did not mention any specific 

challenges in the relationship with Russia. In the next question you were asked, 

‘‘Where do you see U.S. and Russian security interests aligning and where are they 

diverging?’’ In your response to this question you mentioned working with the Russians on the removal of Syrian chemical weapons as evidence of good collaboration. 

You mentioned areas of friction but did not mention any specifics. What is your assessment of the U.S. relationship with Russia? 

Mr. MCKEON. The bilateral relationship with Russia is marked by pragmatic cooperation where our interests converge and one of disagreement where they do not. 

The United States has worked closely with Russia in the P5+1 (permanent five 

members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) in connection with that 

group’s efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. We have cooperated with Russia when we can in the United Nations Security Council, where it is 

a permanent member. At the same time, we have made clear our concerns about 

a number of issues, such as the current Russian military activities in Crimea. We 

have expressed our strong concern about this violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and 

territorial integrity, which we firmly believe is destabilizing. We have criticized in 

public and in private Russia’s decision to allow Edward Snowden to remain in Russia. As noted above and in my testimony, we have made clear to Russia our concerns about its compliance with certain treaties, including questions concerning its 

obligations under the INF Treaty. We also strongly criticized Russia’s clampdown 

on civil society and its intimidation of the political opposition. 

20. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, do you believe the President’s reset policy with 

Russia has failed? 

Mr. MCKEON. I do not believe that the ‘‘reset’’ policy failed. In President Obama’s 

first term, the ‘‘reset’’ policy yielded several important results, including the negotiation and ratification of the New START treaty, the expanded use of the Northern 

Distribution Network for the transport of supplies needed by the U.S. Armed Forces 

fighting in Afghanistan, the cancellation of the sale of the S–300 air defense system 

by Russia to Iran, Russian cooperation in the imposition of new sanctions against 

Iran and North Korea, Russian cooperation in the P5+1 in that group’s effort to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and Russia’s entry into the World Trade 

Organization. These achievements have helped to enhance global security and economic prosperity. At the same time, the administration has expressed its concerns 

about several issues, particularly Russia’s increasingly authoritarian stance at home 

and its aggressive behavior towards its neighbors. 

21. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, where are the U.S. and Russian security interests diverging? 

Mr. MCKEON. The administration has a serious disagreement with Russia on the 

right of all countries—including those in Russia’s neighborhood—to exercise their 

rights fully as sovereign States and in accordance with the democratic will of their 

369 

people. We reject Russia’s use of economic and military threats against its neighbors 

to try to influence decisionmaking of independent States. We likewise reject Russia’s 

continued decision to base military forces in Moldova and Georgia against the will 

of their governments, and its deployment of military forces on Ukrainian territory 

to which the Government of Ukraine has not consented, and which is a clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. We also criticize the politically motivated trade restrictions Russia has imposed on its neighbors and other 

States, including the United States. 

TREATY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION

22. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, in your answers to the advance policy questions, you reiterate the administration’s interest in pursuing, ‘‘a one-third reduction 

in deployed nuclear weapons below the limits established in the New START treaty’’. Can you assure us that any cuts of this nature will adhere to the Biden-Helms 

standard and will only be done with the advice and consent of the Senate treaty 

ratification process? 

Mr. MCKEON. The President said in his Berlin speech that he intends to seek negotiated reductions in strategic weapons with Russia. Should conditions in the future become conducive to negotiating such an agreement with Russia, I fully expect 

that it would be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, 

as has been the case with all other strategic arms reduction treaties in the last several decades, with the exception of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement 

(SALT I). 

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

23. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, I understand that you were a central staff 

member supporting the administration’s push to ratify the New START treaty in 

2010. You may be aware of the letter the President wrote to Senators on December 

20, 2010, stating: ‘‘I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment for 

the long-term, in addition to this 1-year increase. That is my commitment to Congress—that my administration will pursue these programs and capability for as long 

as I am President.’’ Can you assure us the National Security Staff, under Ms. Sherwood Randall, is not undertaking any reviews of how to walk away from that commitment for the sake of the President’s nuclear disarmament legacy? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes, the President stands behind the commitment made in the letter. The administration remains fully committed to the investments required to ensure that our nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure, and effective. 

KEEPING OUR ALLIES INFORMED

24. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, do you agree that the United States has an obligation to keep our NATO allies informed in a full and timely manner regarding 

matters that impact their national security, such as a potential violation of the INF 

Treaty? 

Mr. MCKEON. The United States has obligations to our NATO allies under the 

North Atlantic Treaty. Included in the treaty is a commitment in Article 3 that the 

parties will ‘‘separately and jointly maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack’’. Accordingly, we regularly inform and consult 

with our allies about matters affecting their security and the security of the Alliance. 

25. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, in 2012, NATO undertook a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR), which included a full examination of their nuclear 

posture. Did the United States have important information on the INF Treaty which 

we did not share with NATO? 

Mr. MCKEON. The United States keeps our NATO allies informed about matters 

that affect their national security and the security of the Alliance, including treaty 

compliance issues. Throughout the DDPR process, we consulted closely with our 

NATO allies about the overall security environment and the capabilities we and our 

allies require to meet the challenges we face, and we continue to do so. 

26. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, would you please explain why we wouldn’t inform our Article V mutual defense and security allies of a violation, which is a 

threat to their security more than ours, especially during their consideration of a 

review focusing on deterrence and defense? 

370 

Mr. MCKEON. Throughout the DDPR process, we consulted closely with our NATO 

allies about the overall security environment and the capabilities we and our allies 

require to meet the challenges we face, and we continue to do so. As noted previously, a compliance review regarding Russian compliance with the INF Treaty is 

ongoing. 

27. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. McKeon, if Russia is not in compliance with this treaty 

1 year from now, in your current position or in the position for which you are nominated, do you believe the United States should continue to comply with the INF 

Treaty? 

Mr. MCKEON. I refer you to my response to this question in my letter of February 

24. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DEB FISCHER

SECTION 8128: ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

SILOS

28. Senator FISCHER. Mr. McKeon, section 8128 of the Fiscal Year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3547, Public Law 113–76) expressed congressional 

opposition to any environmental study relating to the silos of Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). Specifically, it states: ‘‘None of the funds 

available to DOD shall be used to conduct any environmental impact analysis related to Minuteman III silos that contain a missile as of the date of the enactment 

of this act.’’ Please state DOD’s interpretation of this section. 

Mr. MCKEON. I understand the Department was interested in conducting an Environmental Assessment in order to help inform the decision of what force structure 

is best for U.S. national security. I also understand that the provisions in both the 

Fiscal Year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act and the NDAA for Fiscal Year 

2014 are currently under review by the DOD General Counsel, and that there is 

no final position on whether the Department will proceed with the Environmental 

Assessment this fiscal year. 

29. Senator FISCHER. Mr. McKeon, what interactions has DOD had with other 

Federal agencies or parties outside of the Federal Government to prepare for conducting any environmental studies on the ICBM silos? 

Mr. MCKEON. I am unaware of discussions with other Federal agencies or outside 

entities about preparations to conduct environmental studies on ICBM silos. 

30. Senator FISCHER. Mr. McKeon, does DOD believe the decisions with respect 

to New START treaty force structure depend on the results of an environmental 

study of ICBM silos? 

Mr. MCKEON. An Environmental Assessment would help to inform the decision 

that the President must make on a nuclear force structure that meets New START 

treaty requirements. 

[The nomination reference of Mr. Brian P. McKeon follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 30, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Brian P. McKeon of New York, to be a Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, vice Kathleen H. Hicks, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Brian P. McKeon, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

371 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF BRIAN P. MCKEON

Education: 

University of Notre Dame 

• Attended 1981–1985 • B.A. awarded, May 1985 

Georgetown University Law Center 

• Attended 1991–1995 • J.D. awarded, May 1995 

Employment Record: 

March 2012 to present: Deputy Assistant to the President, Executive Secretary of 

the National Security Council, and Chief of Staff for the National Security Staff, the 

White House. 

January 2009 to March 2012: Deputy National Security Adviser, Office of the Vice 

President, Executive Office of the President. 

January 1997 to January 2009: Democratic Chief Counsel, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, U.S. Senate. In 2007–2008, also served as Deputy Staff Director, and during the fall of 2008 also served as Acting Staff Director. 

September 1996 to November 1996: full-time volunteer, foreign policy office, Clinton-Gore 1996 campaign. 

August 1995 to August 1996: Law clerk to U.S. District Judge Robert G. Doumar, 

Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. 

July 1988 to June 1995: Legislative Assistant for Foreign Policy and Defense, Office of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senate. 

February 1988 to June 1988: researcher, Community of the Peace People, Belfast, 

Northern Ireland. 

October 1985 to February 1988: Legislative Correspondent, Office of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senate. 

June 1985 to September 1985: Intern, Washington Office on Latin America. 

Honors and awards: 

Academic Awards 

• Cum Laude graduate of Georgetown University Law Center • Associate Editor, Georgetown Law Journal 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Mr. Brian P. McKeon in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

372 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Brian Patrick McKeon. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

3. Date of nomination: 

January 30, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

February 11, 1964; Auburn, NY. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Lizabeth Tankersley. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

None. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Auburn High School (NY), 1977–1981; high school diploma awarded June 21, 

1981. 

University of Notre Dame, 1981–1985; B.A. awarded May 19, 1985. 

Georgetown University Law Center, 1991–1995; J.D. awarded May 29, 1995. 

I took Spanish language courses at the USDA Graduate School in the mid-1980s. 

I do not recall the precise dates but it was for either one or two semesters. No degree awarded. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

March 2012 to present: Deputy Assistant to the President, Executive Secretary of 

the National Security Council, and Chief of Staff for the National Security Staff, the 

White House. 

January 2009 to March 2012: Deputy National Security Adviser, Office of the Vice 

President, Executive Office of the President. 

January 1997 to January 2009: Democratic Chief Counsel, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, U.S. Senate. In 2007–2008, also served as Deputy Staff Director, and during the fall of 2008 also served as Acting Staff Director. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

November 2008 to January 2009: member of Obama/Biden transition team, Department of State. 

August 1995 to August 1996: Law clerk to U.S. District Judge Robert G. Doumar, 

Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. 

July 1988 to June 1995: Legislative Assistant for Foreign Policy and Defense, Office of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senate. 

October 1985 to February 1988: Legislative Correspondent, Office of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senate. 

Summer 1984: employed by Auburn (NY) Water Department. 

June 1983 to August 1983: Intern, Office of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 

U.S. Senate. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Admitted to practice law in the District of Columbia (active status) and Maryland 

(inactive status). 

Member of Notre Dame Monogram Club 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

373 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 2011–2012: $1,010 to Obama for America 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Awarded New York State Regents Scholarship, April 1981 

Auburn High School Achievement Award, June 1981 

Kellogg Institute for International Studies (Notre Dame), awarded human rights 

internship, 1985 

Georgetown University Law Center, graduated cum laude. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

‘‘Need for Reform of Life Sentence Review Process,’’ oped, The Independent (UK), 

July 8, 1988. 

Letter to the Editor, Ms. Magazine, November 1989 (letter was in response to an 

article about an NGO in Northern Ireland for which I had volunteered). 

‘‘Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme 

Court and Courts of Appeals 1991–1992.’’ Georgetown Law Journal (81 Georgetown 

L.J. 853, 1356–70) (April–May 1993) (as a member of the Law Journal, I updated 

the chapter on Prosecutorial Misconduct). 

‘‘A New START in Prague,’’ blog post on White House web site, April 8, 2010. 

‘‘The New START Treaty Sent to the Senate,’’ blog post on White House web site, 

May 13, 2010. 

While a student at the University of Notre Dame, I had a regular oped column 

in the student newspaper, The Observer, during much of my senior year. I also 

wrote a guest column or two prior to becoming a regular columnist for the paper. 

Titles of articles that I have found are as follows: 

‘‘Notre Dame Election System Needs Change,’’ February 27, 1984. 

‘‘Improve Social Life Through Coed Dorms,’’ September 18, 1984. 

‘‘The Significance of the Next President,’’ October 2, 1984. 

‘‘College Football’s Motto: Anything for the Money’’ (1984/precise date uncertain but likely October). 

‘‘Reagan’s Foreign Policy is Nothing to Applaud,’’ November 7, 1984. 

‘‘United States Should Obey World Court Ruling,’’ December 11, 1984. 

Today’s Concern Seems to be Making the Most’’ January 22, 1985. 

‘‘Freshman, Year Program Needs Some Changes,’’ February 5, 1985. 

‘‘Napoleon Duarte Faces a Very Rocky Road,’’ February 19, 1985. 

‘‘Does Rice Serve the Best Interests of Campus?,’’ March 5, 1985. 

‘‘Are the Democrats Doomed to Suffer Defeats?,’’ April 12, 1985. 

‘‘U.S. Affluence Cannot Hide World Poverty,’’ May 17, 1985. 

While working as a volunteer for the Community of the Peace People, a cross-community nongovernmental organization in Belfast Northern Ireland, in the spring of 

1988, I wrote two articles that appeared in their monthly newsletter. Their titles 

and dates: 

‘‘Deja-Vu,’’ April 1988 (related to the political situation at the time in 

Northern Ireland) 

‘‘The Way of the Cross,’’ May 1988 (reporting on a march on Good Friday 

of that year by members of the organization that traversed both Catholic 

and Protestant neighborhoods in Belfast). 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

Speech to Phi Kappa Phi (honors society) spring awards luncheon, U.S. Military 

Academy (April 21, 2011) 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

374 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

BRIAN P. MCKEON. 

This 10th day of February, 2014. 

[The nomination of Mr. Brian P. McKeon was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on April 8, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 28, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. David B. Shear by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications? 

Answer. I do not believe that modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions are necessary at this time. However, if confirmed, I would consider this question as it relates to my area of responsibility as I perform my duties as Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (ASD(APSA)). 

DUTIES

Question. Department of Defense Directive 5111.17 assigns the responsibilities, 

functions, relationships and authorities of the ASD(APSA). The directive establishes 

ASD(APSA) as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

(USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on various matters relating to the Asian and 

Pacific regions, their governments, and defense establishments. 

375 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD(APSA)? Will 

they differ in any way from those described in DOD Directive 5111.17? 

Answer. As I understand it, the ASD(APSA) is the primary advisor to the USD(P) 

and the Secretary of Defense on defense matters related to the Asia and Pacific region. The ASD(APSA) is responsible for developing regional security and defense 

strategy; formulating and coordinating regional defense policies in support of the 

Secretary’s objectives; overseeing operational execution of the Secretary’s approved 

policies for the region; and fostering bilateral and multilateral security relationships 

in the region. This position is the focal point for Asia policy within the Department 

of Defense (DOD) for DOD components, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and 

the U.S. Central Command. The ASD(APSA) also represents the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in interagency policy deliberations and defense-related 

international negotiations in the Asia and Pacific region. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I have worked closely and effectively with the Military Services and DOD 

components in the Asia and Pacific throughout my career. 

As a political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, I worked with U.S. forces to 

strengthen our alliance while adjusting our presence in Japan. As the Deputy Director of the Office of Korean Affairs, I coordinated U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance issues with the Joint Staff, and most recently, as Ambassador to Vietnam, I 

helped build a new partnership that includes a growing military-to-military component. Assignments as a Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuala Lumpur and as Ambassador to Vietnam have allowed me to hone my skills as a leader and manager of 

large groups of people in a constrained fiscal environment. Finally, as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the State Department, I worked closely with DOD and interagency partners to develop national 

policy for the Asia-Pacific region. 

I believe that my background and experience demonstrate that close coordination 

between the diplomatic and military arms of government is essential for a successful 

security policy. If confirmed, I look forward to serving my country in a new capacity 

by representing the OSD and carrying forward our national security objectives in 

the region. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with: 

The Secretary of Defense 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense 

The Under Secretaries 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command 

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command 

Other Combatant Commanders 

The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs 

The Regional and Functional Assistant Secretaries 

Commander, U.S. Forces Korea 

Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan/Commander, International Security 

Assistance Force 

Director of the National Guard Bureau 

Answer. If confirmed, I would report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the USD(P). I would also work closely with the Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to develop and maintain 

close working relationships with Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries across 

the Department, the General Counsel of DOD, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the commanders of the combatant commands, particularly U.S. Central Command, PACOM, and U.S. Special Operations Command and, as appropriate, with the Commanders of U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Afghanistan on 

policy and strategy issues involving Korea and Afghanistan. 

If confirmed, I would also work closely with and coordinate with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within the Office of the USD(P). Many policy challenges 

in the Asia-Pacific region involve resources and expertise that are distributed across 

the regional and functional portfolios of OSD. Examples of this coordination include 

working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

on the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan; the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on 

376 

counterterrorism; and the Director of the National Guard Bureau on disaster relief 

efforts. 

CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

ASD(APSA)? 

Answer. I believe that the most significant challenge is managing a changing and 

dynamic security environment in one of the most critical parts of the world. The 

President has rightly acknowledged the importance of Asia to U.S. prosperity and 

security interests. 

Toward that end, the major challenges the next ASD(APSA) will face include: 

managing an effective drawdown in Afghanistan; continuing to work with partners 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat the threat of al Qaeda; continuing to monitor closely the evolving North Korean threat; continuing to work with China to encourage greater transparency about how it will use its growing military capabilities; 

negotiating the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international law; and ensuring that the countries in the region adhere to key norms and 

principles that benefit all nations. 

Meeting these challenges requires continued implementation of the rebalance to 

the Asia-Pacific region as well as modernizing and enhancing U.S. regional security 

Alliances and partnerships to address both traditional and non-traditional threats. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. I believe that the administration and DOD have sound strategies in place 

for dealing with the challenges that the ASD(APSA) will face, particularly through 

the continued implementation of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. 

If confirmed, I would work closely with others in the Department, interagency 

partners, Congress, and our international allies and partners to understand more 

fully ways to address these challenges more effectively. This would include, among 

other things, analysis of current strategies and assessments, involvement in ongoing 

policy reviews, and continued senior-level engagement with allies and partners in 

the region. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating closely with Congress on the 

range of challenges and opportunities in the region. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the ASD(APSA)? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would be carefully evaluating the current strategies to determine if a reordering of priorities, applicable to ASD(APSA), is in order. That said, 

the key priorities to focus on would include ensuring the successful drawdown and 

transition of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to a train-advise-assist role and continuing 

to make progress against al Qaeda and its affiliates with our partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan; continuing implementation of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 

region—modernizing existing Alliances, enhancing our relationships with emerging 

regional frameworks and partners, working on a constructive relationship with 

China, advancing key norms and principles—to address shared regional challenges; 

and ensuring that the U.S. military is postured to protect and advance U.S. interests. 

ENGAGEMENT POLICY

Question. One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been 

military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint combined exchange training exercises, combatant 

commander exercises, humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are 

used to achieve this goal. 

If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S. military-to-military engagement? If not, why not? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support continued U.S. military-to-military engagement with nations in Asia. Throughout my career, including during my recent time 

serving as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, I have seen firsthand the importance of 

DOD engagement with the militaries of our allies and partners in the region. I also 

believe the current and emerging security environment presents important opportunities to build productive relationships with many countries with whom our past 

military-to-military engagements have been limited or entirely absent. U.S. military 

engagement helps professionalize and improve standards of conduct and capabilities 

of partner nation militaries, and is vital to advancing U.S. national security interests in the region. 

Question. Do you believe that these activities contribute to U.S. national security? 

377 

Answer. Yes, I do believe that these important activities directly contribute to 

U.S. national security. 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided a number of authorities 

to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and 

equip authority (‘‘section 1206’’) and the Global Security Contingency Fund. 

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific region? 

Answer. My understanding is that these temporary DOD authorities are intended 

to address emerging threats. That being the case, I believe that our strategic objective should be to help our partners develop effective and legitimate defense and security institutions. If our partners each can provide for their own country’s security, 

this will help reduce the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promote interoperability between U.S. forces and allied 

and partner forces. If confirmed, my goal would be to ensure that DOD building 

partner capacity programs can fulfill defined strategic requirements and address vitally important capability gaps and ensure that these objectives are directly in line 

with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Question. In a resource-constrained fiscal environment, how would you prioritize 

the types of programs or activities that should receive support under these security 

assistance authorities? 

Answer. In a resource-constrained fiscal environment, I believe it would be important to continue to improve military-to-military and defense-civilian relations, while 

continuing to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and substance of our relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S. values and advance U.S. national interests. 

If confirmed, it would be my aim to ensure our assistance programs supporting 

partner nations can fulfill defined strategic requirements and close important capability gaps; these objectives are directly in line with the 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis other civilian 

departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft 

power (civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance)? 

Answer. As I experienced firsthand during my time as an Ambassador in Southeast Asia, building the capacity of foreign security forces is a shared responsibility 

within the executive branch, particularly between the Departments of State and Defense. Close collaboration between the Departments is a key characteristic of the 

Section 1206 authority, and one of its greatest strengths. I believe the Global Security Contingency Fund epitomizes this shared responsibility and provides an opportunity for the Departments of State and Defense to establish a new business model 

for interagency planning of security sector assistance. 

FORCE POSTURE IN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Question. Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are planned 

over the next several years, including movement of marines from Okinawa to Guam 

and the relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea. There are also plans to increase presence in southern parts of the Asia-Pacific, including in Australia and 

Singapore, and to develop comprehensive engagement strategies with a number of 

other countries in the region. These initiatives will likely compete with other global 

commitments for increasingly constrained funding. 

In your opinion, what should be the national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific? 

Answer. I believe that U.S. national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region, 

as outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy and 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance, include protecting U.S. territory, citizens, and allies and partners; deterring aggression and maintaining regional stability; maintaining free and open access 

to the maritime, air, and space domains; deterring and defeating violent extremism; 

and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated 

materials. 

Question. In your view, what strategic criteria, should guide the posture of U.S. 

military forces in that region to best address those priorities at acceptable risk? 

Answer. It is my understanding that DOD’s strategic criteria include the development of a defense posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, 

and politically sustainable. The continuing U.S. Marine Corps rotations in Australia 

and the Littoral Combat Ship rotations in Singapore are examples of initiatives that 

support a more geographically disbursed posture in the Asia-Pacific region. IncreasVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00385 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
378 

ing the resiliency of U.S. forces in the region will require long-term investments in 

key capabilities. Reducing the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa will result 

in a more politically sustainable force posture in Japan. 

Question. How, if at all, do the methods of forward basing, rotational forces, and 

agreements with allies for training and logistics activities support our national security priorities throughout the region? 

Answer. As I saw firsthand during my time as Ambassador to Vietnam, bilateral 

and multilateral defense engagements with allies and partners in the region 

strengthen these relationships and support broader regional objectives. Pursuing 

agreements (e.g., such as access arrangements) can increase the ability of U.S. 

forces to operate out of strategic locations and support the U.S. commitment to longterm engagement in the region. These forward operating forces engage in regular 

training events and exercises with allies, such as Japan and Korea, and contribute 

to regional stability and security. 

Question. In your view, is the right mix of these forward presence methods necessary to achieve an affordable theater posture at acceptable levels of risk? If so, 

how would you propose broadly assessing each method relative to its cost and benefit? 

Answer. Yes, I believe it is important to evaluate the best way to leverage DOD’s 

forward presence in the region and balance the demands on the force globally. I understand that DOD has established processes for deciding how U.S. forces are assigned and allocated globally, based on strategic priorities outlined in the guidance 

documents. Commander, PACOM, also develops regional plans that prioritize the 

type and frequency of military engagements with allies and partners in the region. 

Question. How important is a forward basing strategy to the ability of PACOM 

to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency plans? 

Answer. I believe that forward-stationing U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region is 

vitally important to our national security interests, as it increases contingency responsiveness; deters adversaries and assures allies and partners; and contributes to 

security cooperation activities as well as day-to-day joint training events and exercises. In the event of a crisis, these forces can provide Commander, PACOM additional response options due to their proximity in the region. 

Question. What do you see as the implications, if any, of the force posture changes 

in Korea, Japan, and Guam on the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in 

general? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and 

other locations in the Pacific improve U.S. security in the region? How does the 

planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security? 

Answer. It is my understanding that ongoing force posture changes will serve to 

strengthen U.S. presence in the region in line with the key principles of being geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. For instance, the reduction of the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa supports all 

three of these principles, most notably by developing a long-term U.S. posture in 

Japan that both sides agree is politically viable. In the Republic of Korea, U.S. 

forces will continue to work closely with the South Korean military to maintain a 

robust presence and provide unique capabilities to sustain security and stability on 

the Peninsula. 

Question. What is your understanding of the plans for the U.S. military presence 

in Australia and how, in your view, does the presence advance U.S. security interests? 

Answer. In 2011, President Obama and then-Prime Minister Gillard announced 

two force posture initiatives designed to expand the cooperation between the U.S. 

Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps with the Australian Defence Force. In the first 

initiative, DOD would rotate up to a 2,500 Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 

through Australia, and I understand that DOD has concluded two company-sized rotations of approximately 250 marines each at Darwin. It is my understanding that 

in April 2014, DOD will increase the rotation to approximately 1,100 marines. 

The second initiative decided upon by the United States and Australia was for 

greater access for U.S. military aircraft to the Royal Australian Air Force facilities 

in northern Australia. These posture initiatives strengthen the Alliance and increase opportunities for U.S. forces to engage throughout the region. I support a 

more distributed presence in Southeast Asia that will better prepare the United 

States for the types of missions its forces are likely to face in the future, including 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). 

Question. In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region? Do you foresee a requirement to increase or to decrease those funding levels in the coming years? 

379 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with others in DOD to assess the levels of 

investment and engagement that is required and sustainable to achieve U.S. strategic interests in the region. As the United States continues to execute defense initiatives, including developing advanced capabilities with direct applicability in the 

region, continued investment will be critical to demonstrating the U.S. commitment 

to the strategy. 

CHINA

Question. China is viewed by some in the United States as an emerging adversary 

that poses a potential threat to security in the region, and by others as a constructive international partner that should be welcomed and integrated into the international economic and political community. Others yet believe we are at a crossroads somewhere between those two scenarios. 

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China? 

Answer. As the President said when hosting President Xi Jinping last summer, 

the United States welcomes the continuing peaceful rise of China as a world power 

and that, in fact, it is in the U.S. interest that China continues on the path of success, because we believe that a peaceful and stable and prosperous China is not only 

good for the Chinese people but also good for the world and for the United States. 

I would describe the U.S. relationship with China as having elements of cooperation 

and competition. The United States continues to pursue opportunities to engage 

where there is mutual benefit, while constructively managing those areas where we 

may have differences. Moreover, I believe that getting this relationship right will 

be critical to the future of U.S. national security as well as international security 

for decades to come. 

Question. To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United 

States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in 

which the U.S. relationship with China develops? 

Answer. I believe that U.S. policies and actions can influence the direction of China’s development. The United States has done more than any other country to assist, facilitate, and encourage China’s national development and integration into the 

international system. However, U.S. policy and actions alone will not determine China’s future, which will ultimately be based upon the choices that China’s leaders 

make. I do think that there are opportunities for the United States to help shape 

the environment in which China makes its strategic choices and, in so doing, encourage China to adhere to international norms and standards of behavior in the 

region and globally. 

Question. What do you see as the impact of current global economic challenges 

on stability and security in China specifically, and in the Asia-Pacific region generally? 

Answer. The full impact of the global economic crisis on stability and security in 

China and in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly will continue to play out over 

time. I believe that those who manage defense and security issues must be attentive 

to the connections between security and economic issues. If confirmed, I would actively work with colleagues in economic and diplomatic fields, both to guard against 

negative outcomes and also to seek positive ways forward where they may exist. 

Question. China’s defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for 

about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected 

for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over 

about that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing 

have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China’s intentions in the region. 

What do you believe are the objectives of China’s steady increase in defense 

spending and its overall military modernization program? 

Answer. As documented in DOD’s annual Reports to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, China appears to be 

conducting a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program which is focused on enabling the People’s Liberation Army to fight and win high-intensity, but 

short duration, military operations in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan appears to be 

the driver of much of China’s military modernization, but China’s leaders, under the 

rubric of the ‘‘New Historic Missions,’’ have tasked the military to also be prepared 

for missions and contingencies beyond China’s periphery. If confirmed, I will continue to press for greater transparency from China in its military and security affairs. 

380 

Question. How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth 

and modernization? 

Answer. I believe that the United States should continue to monitor China’s military modernization program while encouraging China to increase transparency in 

the military and security domains. The U.S. response to China’s military modernization should be flexible and supported by our sustained presence in the Asia-Pacific 

region, through continued evolution of our force posture; maintenance of our global 

presence and access; modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial; and strengthening of our alliances and partnerships. The United States has been and should remain the preeminent military 

power in the Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, ensuring that DOD maintains an effective and flexible approach to China’s military growth and modernization will be 

one of my top priorities. 

Question. What do you believe are the Chinese political-military goals in the AsiaPacific region? Globally? 

Answer. In my view, the overriding objectives of China’s leaders appear to be the 

following: ensuring the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party; continuing 

China’s economic development; maintaining the country’s domestic political stability; defending China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and securing 

China’s status as a great power. Within this context, preventing any moves by Taiwan toward de jure independence remains a key part of China’s strategy. Within 

each of these dimensions there lies a mix of important challenges and opportunities 

for the United States that will continue to deserve priority attention. 

Question. What effect is China’s military growth having on other countries in the 

region? 

Answer. The scale and character of China’s military modernization program are 

increasingly becoming a source of concern. Other countries in the region are closely 

watching the growth of China’s military, and how its military acts. China’s annual 

defense budget is growing faster than its economy—with average annual increases 

in defense spending topping 10 percent over the past decade. In certain respects, 

China’s growing military capabilities create opportunities to partner and cooperate 

where U.S. interests, regional states’ interests, and China’s interests converge. 

However, China’s rapid rise and the relative lack of transparency surrounding its 

intentions creates uncertainty, especially as maritime tensions between China and 

its neighbors in the East and South China Seas increase. Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have contributed to a greater focus on regional forums, where issues may be addressed multilaterally and the need to adhere to international law and norms can be amplified. Such security concerns have also led to 

stronger demand signals from regional countries to the United States as a security 

partner of choice. 

Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship between China 

and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on either side? 

Answer. Since Taiwan President Ma took office in 2008, Taiwan has made considerable progress to reduce tension across the Taiwan Strait. In February of this year, 

representatives from Taipei and Beijing held their first official talks in mainland 

China since 1949. The meeting marked a symbolic development in the continued 

easing of cross-strait tensions. I believe the United States consistent policies, based 

on the three joint U.S.-China Communique ́s and the Taiwan Relations Act—which 

include making available to Taiwan ‘‘such defense articles and services in such 

quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability’’—have provided the security and confidence necessary for an easing 

of cross-Strait tensions. 

Question. How do China’s efforts to establish a strategic presence in the Indian 

Ocean by securing and maintaining access to various seaports in South and Southeast Asian countries affect its political-military posture and influence in the region? 

Answer. China looks to South and Southeast Asia as an area of strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to resources, trade, and investment. 

With regard to South and Southeast Asian seaports, the important question is how 

China intends to use its presence. The United States retains strong relationships 

in South and Southeast Asia, and we do not view each of our respective activities 

in those areas in zero-sum terms. 

Question. What are your views of China’s deployment of warships to counter piracy in the western Indian Ocean and how does this deployment contribute to China’s ability to project power? 

Answer. Generally speaking, I see China’s participation in counter-piracy operations as a positive development: it contributes to addressing a global security challenge; demonstrates China’s ability to use its military in a positive, constructive, 

and responsible manner; and increases opportunities for contact between our navies. 

381 

To your second question, from this experience China could begin to develop capabilities to enhance its ability to sustain a deployed force over an extended period of 

time. 

Question. What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China’s nuclear 

power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 

region? 

Answer. The administration has reiterated that preventing the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, along with related technologies 

and materials, is a key goal for the United States. I believe that DOD should continue to work with interagency partners and through existing processes to ensure 

that any proliferation concerns relating to China, including its nuclear power industry, are expressed to the Chinese Government clearly, consistently, and directly in 

appropriate forums, and should similarly support the development of appropriate 

interagency responses in the event that China takes steps that do contribute to nuclear proliferation. 

Question. Our military-to-military relations with the Chinese military can be 

characterized as modest at best and the Chinese approach to these relations can be 

accurately described as ‘‘on again, off again’’. 

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military 

relations? 

Answer. The U.S.-China military-to-military relationship appears to have experienced modest improvements in recent years, highlighted by a series of senior-level 

visits and exchanges, and cooperative activities such as counter-piracy exercises. If 

confirmed, I would look for ways to strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military 

relationship consistent with U.S. interests and values—and within the context of 

our overarching strategy in the Asia-Pacific region—to improve our ability to cooperate with China while managing our differences. 

Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the 

quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and 

why? 

Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be an important mechanism to improve mutual understanding, enhance communications, and reduce the 

risk of miscalculation between the United States and China. If confirmed, I would 

look for ways to strengthen our program of defense contacts and exchanges with 

China, consistent with our interests and with relevant laws, to explore areas of cooperation, encourage China to act responsibly in world affairs, and to manage our 

differences constructively. 

Question. What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections and criticism from China? 

Answer. U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the United States will make available to Taiwan such 

defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Act also provides that the 

President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. That 

policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 years 

and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 

I believe our arms sales have been carried out in a responsible manner. 

Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China’s possible reaction 

to such sales be considered by the United States when making decisions about the 

provision of defense articles and services to Taiwan? 

Answer. We should continue U.S. policy under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with ‘‘such defense articles and services in such quantities as may be 

necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability’’ without 

considering China’s potential reaction. 

Question. By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and space. There are numerous 

examples of this assertiveness, including China’s increased aggressiveness in asserting its maritime claims in the South China Sea and the recent declaration of its 

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). 

What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime dispute in the 

South China Sea? 

Answer. The United States is a Pacific nation that has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, the maintenance of peace 

and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law in the 

South China Sea. 

382 

I agree with the assessments of the Departments of State and Defense that the 

United States should not take a position on the competing territorial claims over 

land features in the South China Sea. I also believe all parties should resolve their 

disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with customary international 

law, without resorting to the threat or use of force. The United States should sustain its presence in the South China Sea and uphold its commitments to its allies 

and partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. 

Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in 

that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation? 

Answer. The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies 

peace and stability across the globe, including in the East and South China Seas. 

Although the United States does not take a position on the territorial and maritime 

disputes, I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain a visible presence 

and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the South China Sea 

in accordance with customary international law. 

If confirmed, I would work with our military commanders to evaluate the appropriate level of naval activities in the South China Sea to maintain regional peace 

and stability as well as unimpeded access for lawful commerce and economic development. 

Question. What should the United States do to help prevent dangerous encounters 

in the South China Sea? 

Answer. To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I believe that the 

United States should use its position in several regional organizations, including the 

East Asia Summit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional 

Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, to facilitate initiatives and 

confidence-building measures that will help generate momentum for claimant states 

to reach agreement on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. 

Question. How should the United States view China’s recent declaration of an 

ADIZ zone that includes the area over the Senkaku Islands and does the declaration 

increase the risk for instability in the region? 

Answer. As Secretary Hagel has made clear, the United States does not recognize 

and does not accept China’s ADIZ. The announcement was provocative and raised 

tensions. If confirmed, I would support the DOD position that China’s announced 

ADIZ will not change how the United States conducts military operations in the region. 

Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There 

are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and 

would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event 

of a potential conflict situation. 

What is your understanding of China’s efforts to develop and deploy cyber warfare 

capabilities? 

Answer. I understand that in recent years, numerous computer systems around 

the world, including some owned by the U.S. Government, have been the target of 

intrusions, some of which appear to have originated within China. Increasingly, U.S. 

businesses are calling attention to sophisticated, targeted theft of confidential business information and proprietary technologies through cyber intrusions emanating 

from China on an unprecedented scale. The international community cannot tolerate 

such activity from any country. Government-sponsored cyber-enabled theft for commercial gain is outside the bounds of acceptable international behavior. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected 

in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack? 

Answer. The United States, like many other nations, has been the target of innumerable malicious activities via cyberspace. I understand that numerous steps have 

been taken to increase network defense and monitoring capabilities. If confirmed, 

I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic 

Affairs, the current lead for cyber policy, to take action to protect our economy and 

national security against cyber-threats so that we are better able to protect our networks, critical infrastructure, and value private and public sector property. 

Question. Since 2009, DOD has been funding, under the Minerva Initiative, academic research focusing on the evolving relationship between technology and national security in China. The goal of this research is to create a better understanding of China’s dynamic science, technology and innovation enterprise and its 

impact on its military. 

Are you aware of this research and in your view, should DOD continue to fund 

activities like this to increase the breadth and depth of its understanding of the Chinese military-industrial enterprise? 

383 

Answer. I am aware of this research, and believe that DOD would benefit from 

similar investments in the future. China’s military growth concerns us, and we are 

paying particular attention to Chinese investments in technology development as 

well as what they are fielding. We must do more than watch and analyze actions. 

To help understand future developments, it is also important to understand what 

is shaping those investments. As I understand it, Minerva Initiative research efforts 

in China help DOD understand the social, cultural, and historical factors that define 

China’s strategic priorities in science and technology, drive its approaches to international engagement, and shape state-internal balances of power between political, 

military, and industrial forces. 

Question. In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy 

one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China 

has continued its active pursuit of ballistic missile and anti-satellite technology. 

What is your view of China’s purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities? 

Answer. In my view, this test was just one element of China’s military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for 

anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. 

Question. What do you see as the long-term implications of such developments for 

the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space? 

Answer. The question highlights the importance to U.S. national security and 

strategic stability of increasing the resilience of national security systems against 

threats to space-based architectures and developing space control capabilities. If 

confirmed, I would continue to pursue partnerships with commercial suppliers, collaboration with international partners, and changes in our own architectures and 

operational tactics that can improve the resiliency of our systems and strengthen 

strategic stability in space. I would also work closely with Congress in implementing 

Presidential and DOD guidance that directs DOD to retain counter space capabilities to address the growing space capabilities of potential adversaries, including 

anti-satellite capabilities. 

Question. What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space and 

the international agreements and efforts to prevent space weaponization? 

Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, 

and that all nations should act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, 

misperceptions, and mistrust. 

Space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners. I support our longstanding national policies of affirming the right of all nations to use 

outer space for peaceful purposes, the right of free passage through space, and the 

right to protect our forces and our Nation from those that would use space for hostile purposes. 

TAIWAN

Question. Much of the recent discourse regarding Taiwan has involved the state 

of Taiwan’s defensive military capabilities and the U.S. commitment to do what is 

‘‘necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability’’ as required by the Taiwan Relations Act. In particular, much of the debate about how 

best to enhance Taiwan’s current defensive capabilities has revolved around fighter 

aircraft and what air defense capabilities are most prudent and appropriate under 

the circumstances. 

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-Taiwan security relations? 

Answer. I believe that U.S.-Taiwan security relations have never been stronger. 

DOD works closely with Taiwan to ensure it maintains the defensive capabilities 

to deter and, if necessary, resist coercion from China. Since 2010, the United States 

has made available to Taiwan defense equipment and services of more than $12.5 

billion. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to maintain its self-defense capability. 

Question. What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S. military assistance 

to Taiwan? 

Answer. Our priority should be to assist Taiwan in implementing an asymmetric 

and innovative defense strategy to deter aggression from China. Taiwan’s military 

must develop a defense force that can challenge a larger adversary and undermine 

China’s ability to coerce Taiwan. 

Question. What is your opinion of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)? Enacted 30 

years ago this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current 

state of affairs in the region? If so, how? 

384 

Answer. In my view, the Taiwan Relations Act has helped maintain peace and 

stability in Northeast Asia for 35 years, and it continues to serve the United States 

well. Consistent with the act, the United States will continue to make available to 

Taiwan such defense articles and services necessary to maintain its self-defense capability, and at the same time maintain the capacity of the United States to resist 

any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or 

the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. 

Question. Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, do 

you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities? 

If not, what is the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more appropriately in 

its military? 

Answer. I believe that Taiwan should increase its defense budget to 3 percent of 

its gross domestic product (GDP) and use these funds to implement an innovative 

defense strategy and adequately man, train, and equip its military, particularly as 

it transitions to an All-Volunteer Force. Low defense expenditures send the wrong 

message to China; and, it sends the wrong signal to the U.S. Congress and the U.S. 

public, who could be asked to come to Taiwan’s defense in the future. 

Question. What military capabilities do you believe would be most effective in improving Taiwan’s self-defense capability over the next 5 to 10 years? 

Answer. Taiwan should implement a defense strategy with asymmetric capabilities that undermine the offensive capabilities by potential adversaries. To be effective, Taiwan’s military needs to be resilient, which can be accomplished through increasing mobility, redundancy, camouflage, concealment, deception, decoys, hardening, and joint operations. 

Question. What do you believe should be appropriate criteria for the consideration 

of potential United States sales of military aircraft to Taiwan? 

Answer. I understand that DOD is mindful of Taiwan’s air defense needs and remains committed to supporting Taiwan Air Force’s efforts to address the challenge 

posed by China’s growing quantity and quality of fighter aircraft. If confirmed, I 

would continue to work closely with Taiwan counterparts to address Taiwan’s air 

defense capabilities to ensure it is able to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea still represents one of the greatest near-term challenges 

to security and stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean peninsula remains a top U.S. priority. 

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and of the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade North Korea to comply with 

international mandates regarding its ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programs? 

Answer. The security situation on the Korean Peninsula remains serious and warrants our constant vigilance. North Korea’s December 2012 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test demonstrate that the country has both the capabilities and 

the will to undermine regional stability in pursuit of its national interests. 

Although a year has passed since the last cycle of provocation, North Korea’s provocative behavior, large conventional military, pursuit of ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and proliferation activities continue to be 

serious concerns for the United States and our allies and partners in the region. 

Also, the murky nature of the North Korean regime and the unpredictability of the 

young leader Kim Jong Un add to our concerns. 

If confirmed, I would support the longstanding U.S. effort to ensure that North 

Korea meets its international obligations. If confirmed, I would ensure that our military deterrence of North Korean aggression continues to support our diplomatic efforts to end North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. 

Question. What is your understanding of the threat posed to the United States 

and our allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, and the possible export of those capabilities? 

Answer. As documented in the DOD Report to Congress on Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea’s 

continued pursuit of ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, and its proliferation of 

these capabilities to others, poses a serious threat to U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific 

region as well as our regional allies and partners. Moreover, these capabilities, although largely untested at longer ranges, could also pose a direct threat to U.S. territory. 

If confirmed, I would do my best to ensure that DOD uses the full range of our 

resources and capabilities to defend against these threats. 

385 

Question. How has the new government of Kim Jong Un changed the Department’s risk assessments of North Korea? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would actively review DOD’s risk assessments of North 

Korea to ensure that we are prepared for all contingencies. This being said, my 

sense is that the Kim Jong Un regime has demonstrated some unpredictability, particularly with the purge and execution of Jang Song-thaek. We must remain vigilant 

against North Korean provocations given Kim Jong Un’s continuing efforts to consolidate power, North Korea’s tactic of escalating tension to draw parties to the negotiating table, and the onset of the spring military training cycle. 

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. The longstanding alliance between the United States and the Republic 

of Korea (ROK) has been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This relationship, while strong, is undergoing substantial changes in terms of command 

and control and force laydown over the next several years. 

What is your understanding of the current status of the U.S. security relationship 

with South Korea? 

Answer. My sense is that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is very strong and is a linchpin 

of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States and the ROK 

are making shared investments in the security of the Korean Peninsula in order to 

enhance our combined ability to deter North Korean aggression. At the same time, 

our security relationship represents one part of a comprehensive, strategic Alliance 

and plays an important role in contributing to stability not only on the Peninsula 

but also throughout Northeast Asia and globally. 

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the 

U.S.-South Korean security relationship? 

Answer. The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea stands as a linchpin for 

peace and stability in the Northeast Asia and, increasingly, in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. I understand that DOD and the Republic of Korea Ministry of 

National Defense have been focused in recent years on improving the ability of the 

alliance to deter and if necessary, respond to, North Korean aggression or provocation, including by enhancing combined planning, increasing interoperability, 

strengthening capabilities for missile defense, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and realigning our forces on the Korean 

Peninsula. If confirmed, I would work to continue to make progress in these areas, 

as well as our combined efforts to assess and prepare the alliance for the transition 

of wartime operational control to the Republic of Korea. 

Question. Do you believe South Korea is providing sufficient financial contributions to U.S. Forces Korea under the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) 

and the recently negotiated SMA for future years? 

Answer. Based on the press reports I have seen, the recently negotiated SMA provides for a tangible increase in the ROK’s support to offset the costs associated with 

stationing U.S. forces on the Peninsula and also promotes a more stable stationing 

environment by improving various aspects of the cost-sharing programs. It is critical 

that the ROK shares in the investments the Alliance makes to defend South Korea, 

and my impression is that the SMA sends an important signal in that regard. Additionally, the support provided through the SMA represents only one aspect of the 

ROK’s investment in the Alliance and, if confirmed, I would work hard to advocate 

for continued shared investments in the combined defense. 

Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, planned for December 2015, 

and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place by the end of 2015? 

Answer. I understand that the United States and the ROK remain committed to 

the transfer of wartime operational control on the timeline identified in the Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA2015) plan. Wartime operational control and transition have 

always been conditions-based. If confirmed, I would support the continued assessment and review of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula in the context 

of implementing SA2015. 

Question. How do we ensure that we continue to protect our vital regional interests, while continuing meaningful progress toward the transfer of command and 

control to the Republic of Korea and the relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula? 

Answer. As Secretary Hagel and ROK Minister of Defense Kim noted at the last 

Security Consultative Meeting on October 2, 2013, the transition of wartime operational control should sustain and enhance the Alliance’s combined defense posture 

and capabilities. Also at that meeting, I understand that Secretary Hagel reaffirmed 

the continuing U.S. commitment to provide specific capabilities until the ROK obVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00393 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
386 

tains full self-defense capabilities. Similarly, Minister Kim reaffirmed that the ROK 

is committed to developing or acquiring the critical military capabilities necessary 

to assume the lead of the combined defense. I support all of these positions. 

Question. Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should 

remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed 

in Korea be available for regional or global deployments? 

Answer. U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula play a critical role in deterring conflict and supporting the defense of the Republic of Korea consistent with 

U.S. treaty obligations, and I believe that this should remain our principal focus. 

At the same time, the U.S. military forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula—as 

well as the armed forces of the Republic of Korea—have played important roles both 

regionally and globally in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and, I believe, they 

should be available to continue to do so in future. 

Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation 

Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on 

the Korean Peninsula? 

Answer. Both of these plans are predicated on the security benefits of being outside the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery. By being outside the 

range of North Korean artillery, U.S. forces gain operational advantages regarding 

force protection, survivability, and consolidation of personnel and equipment. If confirmed, I would look into potential costs savings to be found in this consolidation 

of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula that include efficiencies, reduced costs, and 

contribution to the political sustainability of our forward presence on the Korean Peninsula. 

Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an 

attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe U.S. Armed Forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea? 

Answer. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, when the political independence or security of the Republic of Korea or the United States is threatened by an 

external armed attack, both of our countries will maintain and develop appropriate 

measures to deter and defeat armed attack. Patterns of North Korean rhetoric and 

provocations necessitate that the two sides continue to consult closely so that Alliance responses are effective. 

Question. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report established 

a policy and program priority for defending against near-term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased Adaptive Approach to regional missile 

defense, including to defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats. 

Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile 

defense in the Asia-Pacific region to defend against North Korean regional ballistic 

missile threats? 

Answer. Yes. Development of our regional missile defenses is an important element of our deterrence and defense strategies as it provides essential capabilities 

for defending U.S. forces abroad as well as our allies and partners. 

JAPAN

Question. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship? 

Answer. I understand that U.S.-Japan security relationship is very strong and remains the cornerstone of our security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.- 

Japan relationship has underwritten the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region for more than a half century. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy 

and prosperity in the region. The Joint Statement that followed the October 3, 2013, 

Security Consultative Committee meeting in Tokyo captures our full range of cooperative activities, which I fully support. 

Question. How does Japan’s relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly 

China, North Korea and South Korea influence the U.S.-Japan relationship? 

Answer. I understand that DOD encourages, to the fullest extent possible, a 

healthy and open trilateral relationship between Japan, the Republic of Korea, and 

the United States, in order to facilitate better relations with our two closest allies 

in Northeast Asia. A strong trilateral relationship is an important element of deterrence against North Korean challenges. We also continue to encourage both China 

and Japan to increase the level of communication between the two sides in order 

to reduce the possibility of mistakes or miscalculation in contested areas. 

387 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more 

active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international 

security arena? 

Answer. As described in the October 3, 2013 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee in Tokyo, the United States would welcome any steps that 

Japan chooses to take that will enable it to play a larger role in the Alliance, and 

to increase its contributions to regional and global security. If confirmed, I would 

work with my Japanese counterparts to identify ways in which Japan could partner 

with the United States and others in contributing to peace and stability, including 

by examining the potential future roles, missions, and capabilities needed to meet 

the challenges of the 21st century. 

Question. What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint development of 

the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense? 

Answer. I understand that Japan is one of the United States’ closest ballistic missile defense partners. The significance of this partnership is reflected in the U.S.- 

Japan cooperation on development of the SM–3 Block IIA to which Japan has already committed over $1 billion, Japan’s hosting of one ballistic missile defense 

radar and plans to host a second by the end of 2014, Japan’s co-production of the 

PATRIOT PAC–3 missile, as well as hosting a number of the U.S. Navy’s ballistic 

missile defense-capable Aegis ships. This cooperation is significant in enhancing the 

ability of the United States to defense of the Homeland, U.S. forces deployed forward, and U.S. allies and partners from regional missile threats. 

Question. The current plan is for the closure of the Marine Corps Air Station on 

Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp 

Schwab on Okinawa. While the Governor of Okinawa has signed the landfill permit 

to allow construction of the FRF to go forward, local opposition and a long construction timeline make the completion of the FRF uncertain. 

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the FRF 

at Camp Schwab on Okinawa? 

Answer. In short, I am encouraged by the prospects for successful construction. 

Following the approval by the Governor of Okinawa [Nakaima] on December 27, 

2013, we are continuing to work closely with Japan to implement our realignment 

plans, including the construction of the FRF. As I understand it, for the FRF, the 

plan is simple—once it is fully operationally capable, we can leave Marine Corps Air 

Station (MCAS) Futenma and begin the process for return. The Government of 

Japan is motivated to move quickly on this project, and we will work hand-in-glove 

to see it though. Until that time, my understanding is that we will continue to work 

with Japan on sustaining MCAS Futenma so that it supports our operational needs. 

Question. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan 

to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? 

Why or why not? 

Answer. A revision to the Guam International Agreement signed last year by the 

Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State with their Government of Japan counterparts reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to provide $3.1 billion (in fiscal year 2012 

U.S. dollars) in cash toward the construction of Marine Corps facilities on Guam 

and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). I believe that this 

level of support is appropriate as it helps to ensure a strong U.S. military presence 

in the region while improving the political sustainability of the U.S. presence in 

Okinawa. 

The Japanese funds will not only assist in the construction of operational and administrative facilities for the U.S. Marines, but also contribute to the construction 

of training areas in Guam and the CNMI to ensure the operational readiness of our 

regional forces. If confirmed, I would also support opportunities for Japan to train 

at these facilities. 

Question. How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of approximately $3 to 

$4 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular? 

Answer. Since at least 1996, the United States and Japan have shared the view 

that there is a need to relocate the existing Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, 

around which a significant population has grown over the years. Since 1999, we 

identified a replacement site in the vicinity of Camp Schwab. This was confirmed 

most recently in the Joint Statement issued by the October 3, 2013 Security Consultative Committee meeting in Tokyo. 

388 

I understand that once this facility is completed and operational, there will be 

substantial benefits to the areas of Okinawa south of Kadena Air Base, where the 

vast majority of the Okinawa population resides. At the same time, this facility will 

allow the Marine forces on Okinawa to maintain their operational readiness and be 

able to respond quickly as the regional emergency force. The marines will be able 

to continue to train as they fight, as a combined arms team. 

Question. Is Japan carrying a fair share of the burden of the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan under the current Special Measures Agreement? 

Answer. My understanding is that Japan is meeting its obligations as negotiated 

under the 2011 Special Measures Agreement. If confirmed, I would monitor implementation to ensure that Japan continues to do its part to sustain the U.S. presence. 

AFGHANISTAN

Question. If confirmed, what would your role be with respect to U.S. activities in 

Afghanistan? 

Answer. As the ASD(APSA), I would be the principal advisor to the USD(P) and 

the Secretary of Defense on security strategy and policy related to Afghanistan, including defense relations with the Government of Afghanistan and coalition partners. I would also be responsible for the oversight of security cooperation programs 

in Afghanistan. 

Question. What are the key objectives of the campaign in Afghanistan and in your 

view are we on track to successfully achieve those objectives? 

Answer. I have not received a full briefing on the current status of the U.S. efforts 

in Afghanistan, but understand that the Coalition and Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are meeting campaign objectives. The Government of Afghanistan is in control of all of Afghanistan’s major cities and provincial capitals. The Coalition and the ANSF successfully blunted the insurgency’s 2012 and 2013 summer 

offensive, and I understand we continue to make progress on our counterterrorism 

objectives. 

Question. What is your assessment of the performance of the ANSF in assuming 

the lead for security throughout Afghanistan? 

Answer. I understand that Afghan security forces conduct the vast majority of operations unilaterally, and are in the lead for security across their country. I understand they performed well in the 2013 fighting season and held ground against the 

Taliban. This is a fundamental shift in the conflict. I am mindful that the ANSF 

has made progress but they are not yet fully self-sustainable, and they require continued support. 

Question. Do you support the transition of full responsibility for the security of 

Afghanistan from coalition forces to the ANSF by the end of 2014? 

Answer. Yes. The only sustainable and long-term solution to the security challenge facing Afghanistan is an ANSF that is capable of providing security for a legitimate Afghan Government. ISAF and the ANSF have been working towards this 

goal for years, and I believe that they will succeed. 

Question. Do you support the retention of a limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. The President has described two missions for post-2014 Afghanistan; a 

narrowly focused counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda and its affiliates; and 

a NATO-led train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission to support the ANSF. The President has also made it clear that the United States must conclude an agreement with 

Afghanistan in order to remain in Afghanistan; this agreement would secure the 

necessary privileges and protections for our forces. I support the U.S. commitment 

to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan, as outlined by the Strategic Partnership Agreement concluded in May 2012. 

Question. If so, what in your view should be the size, mission, objectives, and duration of such residual U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. Any post-2014 forces should be tailored to support the counterterrorism 

mission and the train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission described by the President. 

As the President outlined in his State of the Union Address, a small U.S. force could 

remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to train and assist Afghan forces, as well 

as conduct counterterrorism operations, if the Afghan Government signs the bilateral security agreement that has been negotiated. 

The exact size and duration of that commitment remain at the discretion of our 

national leaders. 

Question. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to conclude a Bilateral 

Security Agreement that ensures legal protections for such residual U.S. forces, 

should the United States withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan? 

389 

Answer. My understanding is that the administration continues to seek to conclude the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) promptly. 

As the President outlined in his State of the Union Address, a small U.S. force 

could remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to train and assist Afghan forces, 

as well as conduct counterterrorism operations, if the Afghan Government signs the 

BSA that has been negotiated. 

The President will make the decision regarding the post-2014 U.S. force presence. 

My understanding is that he continues to weigh options, with input from military 

officials, the Intelligence Community, diplomats, and development experts. 

The longer it takes to conclude the BSA, options for a post-2014 force presence 

become more costly and may become more narrow for the United States and our 

NATO partners. 

The United States is prepared to sign the agreement and to support the long-term 

security and stability of Afghanistan though a continuing partnership. 

Question. In your view, what would be the consequences for Afghanistan’s security 

and stability if the United States were to reduce its post-2014 military presence in 

Afghanistan to a ‘‘normal’’ Office of Defense Cooperation under chief of mission authority? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with DOD and State Department counterparts 

to understand what we could accomplish through an Office of Defense Cooperation. 

Question. What is your understanding, as a legal matter, of when the current 

agreements that provide legal protections for the U.S. military between the Afghan 

Government and the U.S. Government expire? If a residual U.S. military force were 

to remain in 2015, would it have the same legal protections as the current U.S. military force does now even without the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the current Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan does not expire. However, the President 

has made clear that for a small U.S. force to remain in Afghanistan after 2014, the 

United States must have an invitation from the Afghan Government. 

If the Afghan Government signs the security agreement that has been negotiated, 

the President could decide that a small U.S. force would remain in Afghanistan to 

train and assist Afghan forces and conduct counterterrorism operations. 

Question. The current end strength of the ANSF is around 350,000 personnel. At 

the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, coalition participants discussed a proposal to reduce the future size of the ANSF to around 230,000, with an annual cost 

of $4.1 billion. 

Do you agree that any future reductions in the ANSF from the 352,000 troop level 

should be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time the reductions 

would occur? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department conducts a review every 6 

months to evaluate the size of the ANSF. The Department considers both the operational and security conditions to ensure that the ANSF force level is appropriate 

for the environment. If confirmed, I would participate in this review process and any 

decision concerning the final size and structure of the ANSF, including force reduction. 

Question. Would you support reinvesting a portion of the savings from the drawdown of U.S. forces into sustaining the Afghanistan security forces at an end 

strength at or near their current level of 350,000 if necessary to maintain security 

in Afghanistan? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would discuss these issues with our military commanders 

to develop recommendations for the Secretary. 

Question. What would be your priorities for building the capabilities of the ANSF 

after 2014? 

Answer. If confirmed, my priorities for building the capabilities of the ANSF after 

2014 would depend on the President’s decision on a U.S. force presence and mission, 

as well as on the level of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund resourcing. Depending 

on these variables, priorities could include ministerial institutional development, 

ministerial logistics and sustainment capacity, and moving Afghanistan to traditional security assistance. 

Question. What do you see as the United States’ long-term strategic interests in 

Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. The United States has committed to a long-term partnership with Afghanistan. Beyond the primary goal of defeating al Qaeda and disrupting other extremists who present a serious threat to the United States, overseas interests, and 

allies and partners, the United States has pledged to support the development and 

stability of the Government of Afghanistan as it takes responsibility for its own future. Once the Afghan Government signs the BSA, a contingent of U.S. personnel 

390 

could remain in Afghanistan with our NATO allies to conduct two specified missions: training and assisting Afghan forces, and counterterrorism operations. 

PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between the United 

States and Pakistan? 

Answer. Since Pakistan reopened the Ground Lines of Communication to Afghanistan in July 2012, the bilateral relationship has improved significantly, although 

there is still room for improvement. If confirmed, I would support focusing the defense relationship on defeating al Qaeda, promoting peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, and supporting Pakistan’s fight against militant and terrorist networks 

that threaten both the United States and Pakistan. Although there is room for improvement in the relationship, it is stronger today than it has been in recent years. 

However, Pakistan must take greater action to combat militant groups operating 

from its territory—like the Haqqani Network—who do not openly target the Pakistani state. These militant groups undermine regional stability and threaten U.S. 

and coalition personnel. 

Question. Do you see opportunities for expanded U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on security issues? If so, how would you prioritize these areas of cooperation? 

Answer. We should continue to work with Pakistan to promote regional security 

and counter the threat of al Qaeda. If confirmed, I would work to maintain cooperation in areas where our strategic interests align, while pressing Pakistan to take 

more direct action against all terrorist groups operating in its country. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s efforts to combat the threat of 

international terrorism? 

Answer. Pakistan has invested its military in fighting terrorism and has suffered 

enormous military and civilian casualties. The Pakistan military has deployed more 

than 140,000 personnel to the western border to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) 

and counterterrorism (CT) operations. If confirmed, I would engage Pakistani defense officials to expand their COIN and CT efforts to target militant groups operating in Pakistan more directly. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe Pakistan should take to 

address the threat posed by violent extremist groups such as the Haqqani Network 

and the Taliban Quetta Shura that currently use their safe haven in Pakistan to 

launch cross-border attacks on U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces? 

Answer. I believe that Pakistan must prevent these terrorist networks from planning and executing attacks against U.S. and Afghan targets. This should involve a 

stronger effort to target militant groups and prevent them from acquiring the necessary material to execute attacks. Pakistan also needs to restrict more effectively 

these groups’ ability to move across the border and throughout the region. 

Question. What conditions, if any, should the United States place on its security 

assistance to Pakistan? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work the Department of State and other interagency partners to assess the level of our assistance to Pakistan, the return on that 

investment, and whether there is value in attaching conditions. 

Question. What impact do you believe the end of coalition combat operations in 

Afghanistan will have on: (1) U.S.-Pakistan relations after 2014; and (2) U.S. strategic interests in the South Asia region? After 2014, assuming safe havens for international terrorists in Afghanistan don’t grow, will Pakistan’s relative importance to 

U.S. interests eclipse that of Afghanistan due to the presence of nuclear weapons 

in Pakistan? 

Answer. I do not believe that the end of the International Security Assistance 

Force’s (ISAF) combat operations in Afghanistan is a signal of U.S. disengagement 

from South Asia or a weakening of the bilateral relationship with either Afghanistan or Pakistan. In fact, U.S. engagement with both countries will remain important to support regional stability and secure our interests in the region. Vibrant defense relationships across South Asia will deter international terrorists from using 

South Asia as a safe haven to strike the U.S. Homeland or attempting to acquire 

a nuclear weapon. 

BURMA

Question. There has been a lot of discussion recently about increasing military to 

military engagements between the U.S. and Burmese military, which has a long history of human rights abuses. 

What is the strategic importance of Burma to PACOM and how does it fit within 

PACOM’s overall Southeast Asia strategy? 

391 

Answer. Burma’s openness after decades of self-imposed isolation—its size, its 

strategic location between South and Southeast Asia as well as India and China, 

and its wealth of natural resources—has the potential to alter the geopolitics of the 

region. A strong, prosperous, and ideally democratic Burma could become a major 

player within ASEAN and in the region. Additionally, a successful transition to democracy could serve as a powerful model for many other countries around the world 

struggling to become more responsive to its people and a testament to U.S. willingness to assist with such transitions. 

More immediately, Burma is the current chair of ASEAN, one of the cornerstones 

of U.S. engagement in the region. As ASEAN chair, Burma sets the ASEAN agenda 

for the year—including on such issues as the South China Sea—and is the host for 

all its meetings. It is my understanding that DOD is seeking to craft limited and 

calibrated reengagement with the Burmese military in support of reforms. 

Question. How would you characterize current military to military engagement 

with Burma and how do you assess its effectiveness? 

Answer. I would characterize engagement with the Burmese military as crucial 

to the overall success of the ongoing reform movement in Burma. The military remains a key constituency in Burma, and without military support, the reform movement and transition to democracy will likely falter. I understand that the current 

limited military-to-military engagement is designed to incentivize support for reforms and improve the military’s ability to institute greater respect for human 

rights, adhere to international standards of behavior, and submit to civilian control. 

I believe DOD should move forward with the calibrated and conditional engagement 

and continue to be clear-eyed about the Burmese military’s poor human rights 

record and history of dominating Burmese politics and the economy. 

In terms of effectiveness, I believe that the institutional changes the U.S. Government is seeking to promote in Burma will take time to implement and will thus require some patience. However, I agree with the current policy approach that makes 

any expansion of bilateral defense engagement contingent upon further progress by 

Burma on democratization, improving its human rights record, national reconciliation, and ending its military trade with North Korea. 

VIETNAM

Question. What are the greatest challenges for greater engagement with Vietnam? 

Answer. Vietnam’s human rights record remains a major concern and, as U.S. 

Ambassador, I have supported the current policy of withholding lethal assistance 

until we see further progress in this area. Meanwhile, Vietnamese leaders will continue to attempt to balance its relationships with the United States and with China. 

We should continue to respect this reality and the pace of engagement with which 

Vietnam is comfortable. 

We have come a long way in building a bilateral relationship based on mutual 

trust, respect, and understanding. I am confident that our two countries will continue to find ways to deepen engagement and promote our mutual interest in peace 

and stability in the region. 

Question. What is the strategic importance of Vietnam to PACOM and how does 

it fit within PACOM’s overall Southeast Asia strategy? 

Answer. As Ambassador, I have seen first-hand what an important role Vietnam 

plays in South East Asia, and have been pleased to support our strengthened bilateral security relationship. It’s been an honor to serve as Ambassador during a time 

in which we have expanded defense relations. Vietnam occupies a geo-strategically 

crucial location along the South China Sea and its busy sea lanes. As a South China 

Sea claimant, it is also a key player in one of the world’s most sensitive and important political issues. Its large population and dynamic economy make it a growing 

economic force in the region. 

Vietnam often acts as one of ASEAN’s most strategic thinkers on regional geopolitics. It founded the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) forum 

in 2010, has developed new Experts Working Groups under ADMM+, and has been 

keen to develop ASEAN as a leading multilateral institution in many other ways. 

INDIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations? 

Answer. The United States is investing in a long-term relationship with India— 

what the President has called one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century— 

and our bilateral defense relations play a key role in advancing this strategic partnership. I know that the Secretary of Defense is committed to continuing to build 

a relationship where close cooperation with India is normal, expected, and routine 

392 

in areas such as joint military exercises, defense trade, as well as co-production and 

co-development of defense articles. If confirmed, I would work to support this commitment and to build upon the progress made by former Deputy Secretary Carter 

in taking our already strong defense relationship to the next level. 

Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to strengthen our military-to-military cooperation, work together on broader regional stability, and expand cooperation in 

areas such as maritime security, HA/DR, defense trade, collaborative science and 

technology, and co-production and co-development of defense articles. 

Question. What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if any, of the civil 

nuclear cooperation agreement with India? 

Answer. It is my understanding that DOD does not have direct equities in the 

civil nuclear agreement. That said, it shows us that big leaps forward are often possible with India—which extends to security cooperation. Of note, the 2005/2006 defense cooperation agreement that set the course for the bilateral defense relationship was signed the same year as the civil nuclear agreement, and the past decade 

has seen an incredible increase in military-to-military engagement, senior-level 

interactions, and defense trade. 

Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between India and China 

and how does that relationship impact the security and stability of the region? 

Answer. As with the United States, China’s military modernization presents both 

challenges and opportunities for India. The relationship between these two rising 

powers—both engaged in serious military modernization efforts—has broad influence on greater regional security. We are pleased to see high-level visits over the 

last year as well as increased economic and commercial engagement, and we will 

continue our engagement with both countries to encourage positive contributions to 

Asian stability and security. 

Question. What do you believe the United States should do to assist the Indian 

Government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events in India? 

Answer. The United States and India have a shared interest in working together 

on counter-terrorism. Current U.S. counterterrorism efforts with India are led predominantly by the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security, 

with support from DOD. If confirmed, I would continue support for these initiatives. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and 

Pakistan? 

Answer. The United States does not view the security situation in South Asia as 

a ‘‘zero sum’’ game between India and Pakistan, and we value our relationship with 

each country. We believe that peaceful cooperation between India and Pakistan benefits the entire region, and are hopeful that the two countries can focus on confidence-building measures that help resolve tensions peacefully. 

Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan 

and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Regional security cannot be achieved in isolation, and we believe that Afghanistan must build positive relationships with all of its neighbors. India and Afghanistan have their own bilateral relationship; we do not view this partnership as 

any kind of threat to Pakistan, and we have continued to encourage India to be 

transparent with Pakistan on this relationship. As for lasting security in Afghanistan, if confirmed, I would encourage Indian leadership to provide continued support 

to Afghanistan through trade and investment, reconstruction, and assistance to the 

Afghan Security Forces. 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-tomilitary relations? 

Answer. U.S.-Philippine Alliance relations are strong. In recent years, both countries have worked to hone bilateral defense activities to improve cooperation on mutual security challenges and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ long-term 

military modernization. 

Question. What do you believe the U.S. goals should be in the Republic of the 

Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals? 

Answer. With respect to security-related issues, I believe we should cooperate 

with the Government of the Philippines to ensure that the Philippines is secure internally; has a modern, professional, and externally focused military; and is an active contributor to addressing mutual security challenges in the region and globally. 

393 

Question. What is your assessment of recent U.S. military efforts in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance being provided to the Philippine 

military in its fight against insurgent groups? 

Answer. For more than a decade, DOD has cooperated closely with the Armed 

Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to strengthen its counterterrorism capabilities in the 

southern Philippines. I think that the ongoing effort to transition responsibility for 

internal security to the Philippine National Police is a testament to the impressive 

security gains made by the AFP and enabled by U.S. military support. I understand 

that DOD continues to assess the requirements for the counterterrorism mission in 

the southern Philippines as security in that region improves. 

Question. Has Super Typhoon Haiyan affected U.S. plans to increase partner capacity in the Philippines, especially with regard to maritime awareness? 

Answer. Bolstering Philippine maritime domain awareness capabilities is an important goal, which predates the storm; however, I understand that identifying lessons learned from the typhoon response could be valuable and incorporated into future Alliance activities. 

Question. What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat or law enforcement in 

the Republic of the Philippines? 

Answer. Philippine security forces are already capably responding to internal security threats and reducing instability in that country. Through security cooperation 

and assistance, DOD aims to bolster the capabilities of Philippine forces. 

Question. In your opinion, how important is the Global Security Contingency Fund 

to U.S. security assistance efforts in the Philippines? 

Answer. The Global Security Contingency Fund is an important tool in our capacity-building efforts, which will help to reinforce Government of the Philippines successes in the south and strengthen that country’s maritime security and maritime 

domain awareness capabilities. 

INDONESIA

Question. Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim country in 

the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and 

expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where possible. 

What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia? 

Answer. U.S.-Indonesia military-to-military relations are very strong and focused 

around the four focus areas of HA/DR, peacekeeping operations (PKO), military reform, and extensive security assistance or cooperation engagements. This growing 

relationship is apparent in the increased complexity within exercises and the recent 

Foreign Military Sales cases between the United States and Indonesia. 

Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism? 

Answer. It is my understanding that Indonesia has taken steps to improve its 

ability to respond to indigenous terrorist activities according to the rule of law and 

has been concentrating its institutional efforts on an active campaign to counter violent extremism. 

Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If 

so, under what conditions? Why? 

Answer. We encourage increased military-to-military contacts as the U.S.-Indonesia relationship continues to strengthen. Our interactions have grown in complexity and frequency over the last decade, and we look forward to building on this 

momentum. This enhancement is contingent to Indonesia’s continued progress in 

the area of preventing human rights violations and appropriately addressing violations when they occur. 

Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, 

improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses? 

Answer. I commend Indonesia for the strides it has made to institutionalize respect for human rights and accountability for abuses. 

It is my understanding that, over the last few years, the U.S.-Indonesia militaryto-military relationship has continued to deepen and expand. Support from the U.S. 

Congress is critical for ensuring that we can continue to deepen our cooperation 

with a key regional actor. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on 

the next steps. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights 

and accountability in the Indonesian military? 

394 

Answer. We would continue to enhance our institutional linkages with the Indonesian Ministry of Defense through increased engagement, subject matter exchanges, and professional military education. We would also continue to emphasize 

recent progress in addressing human rights violations, including: suspending from 

active duty military officials credibly accused of human-rights abuses; removing 

from military service any member convicted of such abuses; and cooperating with 

the prosecution of accused military members. 

CENTRAL ASIA

Question. What in your view are the U.S. strategic interests in the Central Asian 

region? 

Answer. As long as the United States has forces in Afghanistan or is supporting 

the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), it is in the U.S. strategic interests 

that we maintain alternative supply lines through Central Asia so that we do not 

remain dependent solely on supply lines through Pakistan. 

It is important that we continue to support the independence and territorial integrity of these nations, and ensure that they are capable of defending their own territory against extremists and narco-traffickers. 

Beyond that, it is in our strategic interest to help ensure that these nations develop defense institutions similar to our own and with which we can work together 

to address future security challenges. 

Question. What opportunities, if any, do you see for expanding security cooperation with the countries of Central Asia? 

Answer. I understand that the countries of Central Asia are interested in modernizing their militaries and learning from U.S. counterinsurgency experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is in the interest of the United States to assist them in this 

effort, within the limitations of increasingly tight budgets. 

Question. What is your assessment of the New Silk Road Initiative? Do you believe that increased economic integration among the Central Asian countries contributes to improved security and stability in the region? 

Answer. I understand that the DOD’s Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and 

Local Procurement initiatives have helped to develop habits of trade and transit 

within Central Asia and Afghanistan. Increased economic integration of the Central 

and South Asian region could enhance stability, and the State Department’s New 

Silk Road Initiative has the potential to build on these habits and promote greater 

economic integration within the region. 

COMBATTING TERRORISM

Question. The administration’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights 

the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda’s core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment 

efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups ‘‘that continue to emerge 

from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia’’. 

If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to counter terrorism? 

Answer. I understand there is still a great need to maintain focus on pressuring 

al Qaeda’s core while building foreign partnerships and capacity to strengthen our 

resilience against this threat. If confirmed, I would work closely with the countries 

in Asia to build enduring partnerships and capabilities, eliminate safe havens, and 

degrade links between al Qaeda and its affiliates and followers. 

Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated 

groups in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Answer. There has been significant success in the last few years in the fight 

against al Qaeda, but al Qaeda continues to pose a persistent and evolving threat 

to the United States. Al Qaeda is still adapting to losses in its command structure, 

utilizing its safe havens for attack planning, communicating guidance to its operational cells in the region, soliciting logistical and financial support, and providing 

training and indoctrination to new recruits. 

Question. Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal networks in the 

Asia-Pacific? 

Answer. During my time as a U.S. Ambassador in Southeast Asia, it was clear 

that the nexus between illicit non-state actors and criminal networks is strong. It 

can be found throughout the globe. Terrorist organizations are using criminal networks, including narcotics trafficking and arms smuggling, as pathways to move 

people and resources across the region. Criminal networks can provide financial 

support to terrorists, insurgents, and other adversaries, and contribute to global inVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00402 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
395 

stability by undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption, 

and distorting legitimate economic activity, including in the Asia-Pacific region. 

In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and Indonesia, U.S. engagement with these partner nations has helped combat violent extremist ideology and 

activities. The integration of operations by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building, development, and information support operations has dramatically 

reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate. 

Question. What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat 

the threat of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists? 

Answer. Our partners in Southeast Asia have successfully maintained pressure on 

the region’s most lethal terrorist organizations, but the region still remains fertile 

ground for local terrorists who share al Qaeda’s ideology and motivations. I support 

efforts to continue to build the capacity of governments that demonstrate their commitment against al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents. If confirmed, I would 

work with others in the Department, other U.S. departments and agencies, Congress, and partners in the region to continue to make progress on this issue. 

Question. Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the fight 

against terrorism in that region and what should the United States do to enhance 

relations with those countries? 

Answer. Consistent with the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the United 

States has developed a robust network of bilateral counterterrorism relationships 

with key countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, 

Thailand, and Australia. It is my understanding that Indonesia and the Philippines 

continue to be top priorities for counterterrorism capacity-building assistance. I support continued efforts to work closely to enhance relationships with the Governments of Indonesia and the Philippines through continued policy dialogues, security 

cooperation, and support to action-oriented regional frameworks that address CT 

issues. 

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent legislation, 

authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to 

regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military 

operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism. 

What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority? 

Answer. My understanding is that section 1208 provides the Secretary of Defense 

with the authority to combat terrorism in a wide range of operational environments 

where U.S. Special Operations Forces are often operating under austere conditions 

and require specialized support from indigenous forces. Although I have not been 

briefed on the particulars of these activities, from my time as a U.S. Ambassador, 

I am aware that combatant commanders and Chiefs of Mission place a high value 

on this program. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign 

governments in Asia and around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related 

matters. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program? 

Answer. From my time in Asia, I am aware that the DOD’s role in U.S. counternarcotic efforts is to employ militarily unique knowledge, skills, and capabilities to 

confront the range of national security threats associated with drug trafficking and 

related forms of transnational crime. I believe that DOD’s CN programs are a costeffective tool to build the capacity of our partners and allies’ security forces but also 

serve to deter broader conflicts that could require more costly military involvement. 

Given the networked nature of threats we face today, it is evident that the expertise, authorities, and skill of our law enforcement partners are essential enablers 

in efforts to achieve national security objectives. 

Question. What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics industry in Asia? 

Answer. From my time as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, I am aware that AsiaPacific criminal enterprise activities, including drug-trafficking, are organized on a 

business model of networked criminal service providers. There are a number of drug 

trafficking organizations that see the Asia-Pacific region as a lucrative market for 

the illicit products and attempt to buy influence and subvert governmental institutions. In addition to trafficking drugs, these organizations exploit their global netVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00403 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
396 

work to traffic precursor chemicals globally. This can create instability, put civilian 

populations at risk, and undermine democratic processes. 

Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering—either directly or by, 

through, and with our Asian partners—the illegal narcotics industry in Asia? 

Answer. I believe that DOD plays a critical role in countering the illegal narcotics 

industry in Asia. I understand that the Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF– 

W) is PACOM’s executive agent for countering narcotics, and works by, with, and 

through the U.S. embassy country teams to identify our Asian partners’ needs incountry. JIATF–W works with foreign and domestic law enforcement partners to 

provide training and support. Capacity-building efforts are the hallmark of JIATF– 

W engagement with Asian partners and contribute to a whole-of-government effort 

to hinder the growth of transnational criminal organizations, thereby reducing the 

risk to the U.S. Homeland. I believe DOD should continue efforts to address the 

threats posed by narcotics and narcotics trafficking in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Question. On an annual basis, DOD spends approximately $400 million building 

the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to counter the illegal narcotics trade. 

Despite this sizable annual investment, Afghanistan remains the ‘‘well-spring of the 

global opium trade, accounting for 93 percent of all opium poppy cultivation’’ according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC has also 

found that about 80 percent of the drugs derived from Afghan opium poppies are 

smuggled out by transnational organized criminal groups through the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan; the rest flow through Central Asia. 

What is your assessment of DOD’s CN program in Afghanistan? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the CN programs in Afghanistan developed 

an Afghan capacity to conduct CN investigations and interdiction operations with 

little U.S. support. This capacity was developed by building vetted Afghan CN police 

units and the Special Mission Wing. Afghan border units were trained and equipped 

to interdict drug trafficking and other illicit goods crossing the Afghan border and 

at Afghan ports of entry, including airports. Prosecutions of drug traffickers in Afghanistan have put narco-traffickers supporting the insurgency in jail and removed 

them from the battle space. The narcotics trade has been a key resource for the insurgency. CN efforts have been able to reduce that resource flow. 

DOD has also established CN capacity-building programs in Pakistan and Central 

Asia to interdict drugs and networks trafficking Afghan-origin narcotics. A regional 

approach is required to ensure a greater impact on transnational criminal organizations and to disrupt the narcotics flow. 

Question. Do you think the DOD CN program in Afghanistan has been successful 

to date? 

Answer. My understanding is that DOD’s CN programs in Afghanistan have been 

successful. DOD, in coordination with the Departments of State and Justice, has 

been able to build the CN capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. These 

forces are now capable of planning and executing law enforcement CN operations 

with minimal help from the United States, and Afghan-only CN operations are occurring more frequently and with greater success. If confirmed, I would work with 

others in the DOD and in other departments and agencies to assess whether we 

should provide continued support to these forces post-2014 to ensure they remain 

capable in the future. 

LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea? If so, why? 

Answer. I believe accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea would send a clear signal that the United States remains 

committed to advancing rule of law, in the world’s oceans. The United States is at 

the forefront of promoting rule of law and under the Convention the United States 

would have the legal foundation for navigational rights needed to project power, respond to crises, reassure our allies and partners, sustain deployed forces, and secure 

sea and air lines of communication. Supporting the Convention would further sustain our economic prosperity and trade worldwide. 

Question. Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 

benefit the U.S. military’s mission in the Asia-Pacific region? If so, how? 

Answer. It is my belief that U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention 

would be of great benefit to the U.S. military’s mission in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Accession would enhance the United States’ exercise of the Convention’s freedom of 

navigation and overflight rights. Accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea 

Convention would also support combined operations with Asia-Pacific partners and 

the Proliferation Security Initiative, strengthen the U.S. position in discussions with 

397 

China, substantiate undisputed title to our extended continental shelf area, and further establish the United States as a leader in future developments in the law of 

the sea. Additionally, accession would further add to U.S. credibility in a myriad of 

Asia-focused multilateral venues where Law of the Sea issues are debated. 

PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION ACCOUNTING EFFORTS

Question. Recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam war continues to be a high priority. 

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) recovery efforts in the PACOM area of responsibility? 

Answer. As I can personally attest to from my time as the U.S. Ambassador to 

Vietnam, POW/MIA recovery is a whole-of-government effort. If confirmed, I would 

work closely with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, the State Department, and PACOM to provide the utmost support. 

FOREIGN LANGUAGE POLICY

Question. In 2005, DOD approved the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to improve the Department’s foreign language capability and regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working toward implementing that 

roadmap. 

How many Mandarin and/or Cantonese speakers does DOD have in intelligence 

analyst positions? 

Answer. Unfortunately, I have not yet examined this issue in detail. If confirmed, 

I look forward to working with Congress and the Office of the Under Secretary for 

Personnel and Readiness to assess DOD requirements for capabilities in foreign languages and regional areas of expertise. 

Question. Is this number sufficient to ensure good intelligence assessments for use 

by the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs? 

Answer. See previous answer. 

Question. In your view, how should the United States expand the foreign language 

skills of civilian and military personnel in order to improve the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by, the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs? 

Answer. See previous answer. 

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. A number of officials in DOD and the intelligence community (IC) have 

called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow 

of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking. 

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter-threat finance (CTF) activities? 

Answer. Our Nation’s adversaries require access to financial networks to conduct 

their operations. To counter these activities, U.S. Government departments and 

agencies must cooperate together, using their respective capabilities, to trace and 

stop the flow of money to our adversaries, and to interdict adversaries’ funding 

sources in non-kinetic ways. Although DOD is not the lead U.S. agency for conducting CTF actions, DOD does have unique capabilities that can assist other U.S. 

departments and agencies and partner nations in accomplishing the CTF mission. 

I believe that DOD should continue to support U.S. law enforcement agencies, the 

Department of the Treasury, the Intelligence Community, and others with these 

unique DOD capabilities, which include planning, intelligence analysis and tools, 

and the integration of intelligence into operations. 

Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting CTF activities? 

Answer. I believe DOD should continue to support U.S. Government efforts and 

international partners with CTF assistance, within existing DOD resources, while 

ensuring that DOD CTF support reflects U.S. defense priorities. Through this support, DOD can enhance the U.S. Government’s ability to target our adversaries successfully through financial and law enforcement actions. 

Question. The Haqqani Network in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region poses 

a major threat to the security of U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan, 

both by conducting direct attacks on those forces and by providing sanctuary to 

other militant extremists. 

In your view, should additional steps be taken to track and counter the financial 

activities of the Haqqani Network, and if so, what role, if any, should DOD play? 

Answer. The Haqqani Network poses a grave threat to U.S. persons and to U.S. 

interests. This threat requires a whole-of-government response. I believe that DOD 

398 

should continue to provide support in order to assist U.S. Government efforts to target the financial activities of terrorist networks such as the Haqqani Network. 

Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact 

on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. 

Do you think expanding CTF activities in the Asia-Pacific region would be beneficial? If so, what role, if any, should DOD play in those activities? 

Answer. I believe that CTF cooperation with allies and partners in Asia and the 

Pacific benefits our Nations’ security. If we are to succeed in stopping transnational 

criminal organizations, we must pursue transnational cooperation. If confirmed, I 

would recommend that DOD continue to provide support, within available authorities and resources, to other departments and agencies and to foreign partners, so 

that we can strengthen our collective capabilities to interdict the flow of financial 

resources to Asia-Pacific region transnational criminal organizations. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the 

ASD(APSA)? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS

1. Senator HIRONO. Ambassador Shear, as the next Assistant Security for Asian 

and Pacific Security Affairs, you will oversee the Asia-Pacific Center for Security 

Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, HI. Would you share both your short-term and longterm visions for the Center, and what role it can play in the administration’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific? 

Ambassador SHEAR. Regional partners hold the APCSS in very high regard, and, 

if confirmed, I look forward to assessing additional ways in which the APCSS can 

play a greater role in the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. The APCSS is a valuable tool for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, and exchange of 

ideas focused on security issues in the region. It provides a unique venue for discussions and engagement with partners in the region. If confirmed, I would work with 

my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy as well as U.S. Pacific 

Command to identify opportunities to enhance partnerships and strategic thinking 

in the region. 

JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS

2. Senator HIRONO. Ambassador Shear, as you are well aware, relations between 

our treaty allies, Japan and South Korea, remain strained. Please provide an assessment of the situation between the two countries and your thoughts on how the 

United States can better foster bilateral cooperation between the two countries and 

trilateral cooperation to address regional threats. 

Ambassador SHEAR. Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, two of 

our closest treaty allies, remain strained. The United States has made a concerted 

399 

effort to promote dialogue and cooperation between Japan and the Republic of 

Korea. I understand that the Department of Defense (DOD) has encouraged, to the 

fullest extent possible, a healthy and open trilateral relationship among Japan, the 

Republic of Korea, and the United States in order to insulate defense cooperation 

from larger political issues in the bilateral Japan-Republic of Korea relationship. I 

believe that a strong trilateral relationship can be an important deterrent against 

regional threats such as those posed by North Korea. If confirmed, I would work 

to ensure that trilateral security cooperation with Japan and the Republic of Korea 

remains a priority for DOD. 

TAIWAN

3. Senator HIRONO. Ambassador Shear, under President Ma Ying-Jeou, Taiwan 

continues its historic steps toward closer cross-strait ties. What implications do you 

see for the U.S. relations with both sides, considering our commitments under the 

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)? 

Ambassador SHEAR. I believe that closer ties between the People’s Republic of 

China and Taiwan are a positive development and contribute to a reduction in 

cross-Strait tensions. In this respect, I believe that U.S. policy, based on the three 

joint U.S.-China Communique ́s and the TRA, which includes making available to 

Taiwan ‘‘such defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary 

to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,’’ has enabled Taiwan to enter into cross-Strait dialogue with confidence and in the absence of coercion. If confirmed, I would continue to support this policy. 

CHINA

4. Senator HIRONO. Ambassador Shear, Admiral Locklear of the U.S. Pacific Command has mentioned a desire to have a direct line of communication with his counterparts in China. What are your thoughts on such a system and what steps would 

be needed to create it? 

Ambassador SHEAR. I support open lines of communication between our two defense establishments. As I understand it, the Secretary of Defense has a direct line 

of communication with his Chinese counterpart through the Defense Telephone 

Link. I believe that this system may be used by Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, 

to facilitate direct communications with his counterpart as well, and I would look 

into this if confirmed. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

REBALANCE TO ASIA-PACIFIC

5. Senator INHOFE. Ambassador Shear, thank you for your service as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam. From your time in the region, you can evaluate the rebalance to 

the Asia-Pacific called for in the Defense Strategic Guidance. A rebalance toward 

the Asia-Pacific would seem to signal an increase in presence and resources. But 

despite the rhetoric due to resource constraints, if there is a minimal increase in 

presence or a perceived U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, what do you 

think the impact will be on our Asia-Pacific allies and partners? 

Ambassador SHEAR. Despite resource constraints over the past year, the United 

States—including DOD—has prioritized efforts such as modernizing our alliances 

and partnerships, increasing partner capabilities to respond to common challenges 

such as humanitarian disasters, and strengthening multilateral cooperation—which 

all demonstrate the United States’ enduring commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. 

Should resources be further constrained, it would likely require the administration to adjust the timing or intensity of specific activities; however, I believe that 

the United States will continue to prioritize resources and efforts that will affect the 

Asia-Pacific region. 

6. Senator INHOFE. Ambassador Shear, I think that if we don’t follow through on 

the rhetoric of a rebalance, that we will cause significant damage to our regional 

security relationships. Like the Middle East where we have left a leadership vacuum, our friends won’t trust us and our enemies won’t fear us. The Defense Strategic 

Guidance says ‘‘the growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions . . . ’’ Do you think that China’s unilateral declaration of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) covering the airspace of Japan, 

400 

South Korea, and Taiwan, has given us greater clarity on China’s strategic intentions? 

Ambassador SHEAR. China’s announcement of an ADIZ was provocative and 

raised tensions in one of the world’s most geopolitically sensitive areas, and it suggests that China is willing to risk friction with its neighbors—and with the United 

States—to advance its regional policy goals. As Secretary Hagel has made clear, the 

United States does not recognize and does not accept China’s ADIZ. If confirmed, 

I would support the DOD position that China’s announced ADIZ will not change 

how the United States conducts military operations in the region. 

7. Senator INHOFE. Ambassador Shear, what strategy do you suggest to counter 

those aggressive intentions? A slow and weak response by the United States to Chinese bullying in the East and South China Seas decreases confidence in U.S. commitment to the security of our partners and allies in a region which is supposed to 

be seeing more, not less, U.S. attention. The lack of a strategy supported by inadequate resources will further erode U.S. leadership and influence in an important 

region of the world. 

Ambassador SHEAR. The U.S. response to provocative actions by any country, including China, should be firm and grounded in the principles of support for international law; open access by all to the global maritime domains; free and open commerce; and peaceful resolution of disputes. To achieve this, the United States should 

continue to evolve our force posture in the region, maintain a robust regional and 

global presence and access, modernize our own capabilities, and strengthen alliances 

and partnerships, while also promoting the expectation that disputes are resolved 

diplomatically without aggression, coercion, or retribution. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

8. Senator CHAMBLISS. Ambassador Shear, this year marks the 35th anniversary 

of the TRA. The TRA forms the basis of U.S. policy towards Taiwan and affirms 

the U.S. commitment to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability. This has successfully ensured peace in the Taiwan Strait and contributed to stability in the U.S. Pacific Command. With the People’s Republic of China’s continued military advances 

and the U.S. Air Force’s anticipated decision to defund the combat avionics programmed extension suite (CAPES) program—which upgrades Taiwan’s F–16 fleet 

with advanced avionics—how do you plan to continue to implement the security 

partnership the United States has with Taiwan? 

Ambassador SHEAR. The TRA has helped maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia for more than 35 years, and it continues to serve the United States well. 

If confirmed, I would continue our policies, based on the three joint U.S.-China 

Communique ́s and the TRA, which includes making available to Taiwan ‘‘such defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan 

to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.’’ In this regard, I would look to explore ways in which the United States could support Taiwan’s ambitions to adopt 

asymmetric and innovative concepts and capabilities as part of its defense strategy. 

With respect to the CAPES program, if confirmed, I would look into the matter to 

determine what, if any, effects there could be on our commitments under the TRA 

and seek ways to mitigate them, if necessary. 

REBALANCE TO THE PACIFIC

9. Senator CHAMBLISS. Ambassador Shear, in November 2011, then-Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton gave an address titled ‘‘America’s Pacific Century’’ and stated 

that the United States has ‘‘a strong relationship with Taiwan, an important security and economic partner’’. How will you build on the existing foundation and further enhance our important relationship with Taiwan as we rebalance to the Pacific 

and look to bolster regional alliances? 

Ambassador SHEAR. In my view, the best way to build on the existing foundation 

and further enhance our important relationship with Taiwan is to maintain consistency with our longstanding policy based on the three joint U.S.-China Communique ́s 

and the TRA, which provides that the United States will make available to Taiwan 

‘‘such defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable 

Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.’’ That policy has contributed 

to peace and stability in the region for more than 35 years and is consistent with 

the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner 

401 

acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. If confirmed, I would 

work to ensure that the United States continues to assist Taiwan, consistent with 

the TRA. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

10. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Ambassador Shear, this year marks the 35th anniversary of the TRA. The TRA forms the basis of U.S. policy towards Taiwan and affirms the U.S. commitment to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability. This policy 

has successfully ensured peace in the region and contributed to the stability and 

prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. With the People’s Republic of China’s arms 

buildup and naval modernization shifting the cross-strait military balance in its 

favor as well as the U.S. Air Force planning to defund the CAPES program—which 

serves to upgrade Taiwan’s F–16 fleet with advanced avionics—how do you and the 

administration plan to continue to implement the security commitment the United 

States has to Taiwan under this framework? 

Ambassador SHEAR. The TRA has helped maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia for more than 35 years, and it continues to serve the United States well. 

If confirmed, I would continue our policies, based on the three joint U.S.-China 

Communique ́s and the TRA, which includes making available to Taiwan ‘‘such defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan 

to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.’’ In this regard, and consistent with 

the provisions of the TRA and our unique relationship with Taiwan, I would look 

for ways to support Taiwan’s ability to maintain an effective deterrence and adopt 

asymmetric and innovative concepts and capabilities as part of its defense strategy. 

With respect to the CAPES program, if confirmed, I would look into the matter to 

determine what, if any, effects there could be on our commitments under the TRA 

and seek ways to mitigate them, if necessary. 

[The nomination reference of Hon. David B. Shear follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 7, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

David B. Shear, of New York, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Mark 

William Lippert, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Hon. David B. Shear, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DAVID B. SHEAR

Education: 

Earlham College 

• September 1971–June 1975 (Estimated) 

• Bachelor’s Degree 

Waseda University 

• July 1973–June 1974 (Estimated) 

Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 

• September 1980–June 1982 (Estimated) 

• Master’s Degree 

Johns Hopkins Nanjing Center 

• January 1987–June 1987 (Estimated) 

Georgetown University 

• July 1998–June 1999 

402 

Employment record: 

U.S. Department of State 

• Foreign Service Officer • January 1982–Present 

Institute of International Education 

• Administrative Assistant • February 1980–September 1980 

American Institute in Taiwan 

• Contract Visa Clerk • June 1979–December 1979 

American National Red Cross 

• Flood Relief Volunteer • February 1977–June 1977 

Jiyu Foreign Language Center, Tokyo 

• English Teacher • August 1975–December 1976 

Honors and awards: 

State Department Superior Honor Award (individual), May 2001 

State Department Superior Honor Award (individual), February 1997 

Superior Honor Award (group). January 2001 

Defense Civilian Meritorious Service Award, October 1995 

State Department Superior Honor Award (group), November 1989 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Hon. David B. Shear in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

David Bruce Shear. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia/Pacific. 

3. Date of nomination: 

Janaury 7, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

403 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

May 25, 1954; Cobleskill, NY. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Barbara Chai Shear (Maiden name: Barbara Chai). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Jennifer Shear, age: 26. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Georgetown University, Rusk Fellow, 1998–1999 no degree 

Nanjing University, student, 1987, no degree 

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1980–1982, M.A. degree 

National Taiwan University, Chinese language student, 1978–1979, no degree 

Cornell University, Chinese language student, 1977–1978, no degree 

Waseda University (Tokyo), Japanese language student, 1973–1974, no degree 

Earlham College, 1971–1975, B.A. degree 

Clayton A. Bouton Jr.-Sr. High School, Voorheesville, NY, 1967–1971 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Joined Department of State in August 1982. 

Last 10 years: 

August 2011–Present: U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam 

March 2011–April 2011: Vietnamese Language Training 

May 2009–February 2011: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East 

Asia-Pacific Bureau, Department of State 

August 2008–May 2009: Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, East Asia-Pacific Bureau, Department of State 

August 2005–July 2008: Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Kuala 

Lumpur 

August 2001–July 2005: Political Minister, U.S. Embassy Tokyo 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

July 1999–July 2001: Deputy Director, Office of Korean Affairs, Department of 

State, July 1997–July 1998: Special Assistant to Under Secretary for Political Affairs Tom Pickering 

August 1994–July 1997: Political/Military Unit Chief, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo 

July 1992–August 1994: Political/Military Officer, Office of Japanese Affairs 

July 1990–June 1992: Deputy Director, Office of East Asian Regional Affairs 

August 1989–April 1990: Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo 

June 1987–July 1989: Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Beijing 

August 1986–January 1987: Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Taipei, Taiwan 

July 1984–July 1986: Desk Officer, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State 

February 1983–July 1984: Vice Consul, U.S. Consulate, Sapporo, Japan 

November 1982–January 1983: Trainee, U.S. Mission to the United Nations 

August 1982–November 1982: Trainee, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC 

June 1979–December 1979: Contract Employee, Consular Section, American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Member, American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

404 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. $200 to the campaign for President Obama, 2012. 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

State Department Superior Honor Award (individual), May 2001 

State Department Superior Honor Award (individual), February 1997 

Superior Honor Award (group), January 2001 

Defense Civilian Meritorious Service Award, October 1995 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

I have given several speeches during the last 5 years. Three representative 

speeches are provided, and additional speeches can be made available upon request. 

I also have a record of written and oral testimony before Congressional oversight 

committees all of which are included in the Congressional Record. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any. actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

DAVID B. SHEAR. 

This 15th day of January, 2014. 

[The nomination of Hon. David B. Shear was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 26, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 17, 2014.] 

405 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Eric Rosenbach by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I do not see a need to amend any provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act. Since its adoption in 1986, Goldwater-Nichols has met its intended goals of improving civilian oversight of the Department of Defense (DOD) and creating a joint 

environment among the Services. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. Currently, I do not believe that modification to the Goldwater-Nichols Act 

is required. 

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. DOD Directive 5111.13 of January 16, 2009 states that the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs 

(ASD(HD&ASA)), ‘‘under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), serves as the principal civilian advisor to the 

Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on homeland defense activities, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), and Western Hemisphere security matters.’’ It further elaborates that the ASD(HD&ASA) shall provide overall supervision of homeland defense activities of DOD which include ‘‘Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP); domestic antiterrorism; the Defense Continuity Program; other homeland defense-related activities; and alignment of homeland defense policies and programs with DOD policies for counterterrorism and counternarcotics.’’ 

The Secretary of Defense has announced a plan to reorganize the Office of the 

USD(P), under which the ASD for Homeland Defense is located. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) 

for Homeland Defense position to which you have been nominated, and do they differ from those described in DOD Directive 5111.13? 

Answer. My understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland Defense is consistent with those described in DOD Directive 5111.13, as well as other applicable DOD directives, with the exception of the 

duties and functions for Western Hemisphere security policy, which has been transferred within the Office of the USD(P) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)). In the future, the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense will assume some of the duties and functions currently assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs 

(ASD(GSA)), including the duties and functions for cyberspace, space, and countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policies. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. My professional background includes nearly 20 years of experience working on national security issues in the military, private sector, academia, and Federal 

Government. I believe that both my substantive expertise and leadership experience 

provide me with the background necessary to serve successfully, if confirmed, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 

My substantive background includes extensive practical and academic work in intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and cyber policy. As the commander 

of an Army intelligence unit, I gained invaluable experience about military and intelligence operations. I gained a deep understanding of U.S. counterterrorism and 

homeland security efforts as a professional staff member on the Senate Intelligence 

Committee. At the Harvard Kennedy School, I taught classes on national security 

policy and authored a book focusing on counterterrorism. Over the last 21⁄2 years 

at the Pentagon, I gained a deep understanding of the cybersecurity challenges facing the Nation. 

406 

I believe that I also have the strong leadership and management skills necessary 

to serve effectively as Assistant Secretary. As a senior executive at a large international telecommunications firm, for example, I managed complex projects across 

fifteen nations. Later, I served as the Executive Director of a large center at the 

Kennedy School, where I was responsible for managing all aspects of the center’s 

operations. Prior to my work in the Pentagon, I was a senior executive at an international consulting firm working with Fortune 500 executives. 

Question. What additional actions do you believe you need to take, if any, to prepare yourself to fulfill these duties? 

Answer. If confirmed, I am prepared to undertake fully the duties and functional 

areas within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and anticipate working with the congressional defense committees to fulfill my responsibilities under title 10. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What do you see as the relationship between the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland Defense and each of the following: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense serves as the principal civilian advisor 

to the Secretary of Defense on homeland defense activities and Defense Support of 

Civil Authorities. In the future, I understand that this responsibility will expand to 

serving as the principal civilian advisor on DOD cyber, space, and countering WMD 

policy. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense provides support to the Deputy Secretary similar to that provided to the Secretary, as described 

above. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense functions 

under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P) and provides the USD(P) 

with advice and support on homeland defense policy formulation, interagency deliberations, engagement with interagency interlocutors, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes and strategic reviews within the 

Department. In the future, the ASD’s role will be expanded to include DOD cyber, 

space, and countering WMD policy matters. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

Answer. Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works closely with the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to achieve the Secretary of Defense’s objectives, 

particularly the defense of the United States from attack upon its homeland. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works closely 

with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low-Intensity 

Conflict to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense with advice and recommendations on policy issues regarding combating terrorism within the United 

States and homeland defense policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary’s guidance and decisions are implemented. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works closely 

with the ASD(ISA) to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense with advice 

and recommendations on issues regarding emerging threats to the United States 

and homeland defense policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary’s guidance and 

decisions are implemented. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the civilian 

officials of the Military Departments in charge of Reserve Affairs. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works closely 

with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and civilian officials of 

the Military Departments in charge of Reserve Affairs in the areas of DOD policy 

regarding the development, readiness, and employment of National Guard and other 

Reserve component forces within the United States, as well as homeland defense 

policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary of Defense’s guidance and decisions are 

implemented properly. 

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Directors of the Army 

and Air National Guard. 

407 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works closely 

with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Directors of the Army and 

Air National Guard, on the roles, capabilities, and readiness of the National Guard 

to support the homeland defense and civil support priorities and objectives of the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Answer. Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works closely with—and provides advice 

on homeland defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, DOD cyber, space, and 

countering WMD policy to—the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to 

achieve the Secretary of Defense’s objectives in defense of the United States. 

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Joint Staff. 

Answer. As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council, the Chairman of the Joint Staff (CJCS) has a unique and critical military role. If confirmed 

as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, I would work closely 

with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to support the efforts of the Secretary and 

Deputy Secretary, and to ensure that their military advice is taken into account in 

an appropriate manner. 

Question. The Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the 

North American Aerospace Defense Command. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works closely 

with the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and 

NORTHCOM to support the efforts of the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and USD(P), 

particularly in the areas of homeland defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations. 

Question. The Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works closely 

with the Commander of PACOM to support the efforts of the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and USD(P), particularly in the areas of homeland defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations. 

At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works with the Commander of PACOM 

on a broad range of issues that affect strategy and policy for countering the proliferation of WMD, as well as for the space and cyberspace domains. 

Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). 

Answer. At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works with the Commander 

of STRATCOM on a broad range of issues that affect strategy and policy for countering the proliferation of WMD, as well as for the space and cyberspace domains. 

Question. The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). 

Answer. At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works with the Commander 

of CYBERCOM on a broad range of issues that affect the Department’s activities 

in cyberspace. As I understand it, once duties that are currently performed by the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (OASD(GSA)) become part 

of the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense would provide senior-level 

civilian oversight of CYBERCOM. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to ensure that the relationship with CYBERCOM remains close and would facilitate coordination as the Department’s role in the cyber domain evolves. 

Question. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, works closely with the Director of the DTRA, particularly regarding 

efforts in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat reduction and defense, counter-proliferation, and emergency response support and training. This 

close coordination is necessary to ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense is able to provide policy oversight and guidance to the DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which is implemented by DTRA. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense works closely 

with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) on DOD’s chemical, biological, and nuclear defense proVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00415 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
408 

grams as they relate to homeland defense, antiterrorism/force protection, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 

Question. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (and my current office) has a close working relationship with the DHS due to the complementary responsibilities of homeland defense and homeland security missions and the 

need for a close, habituated, and well-exercised relationship for the rapid execution 

of Secretary of Defense-approved defense support of civil authorities missions as requested by the DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 

Question. The State Governors. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense serves as the 

principal DOD representative to State Governors on policy matters pertaining to 

homeland defense activities, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and DOD security 

matters, including but not limited to: defense domestic consequence management; 

activities commonly referred to as mission assurance (Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, Defense Continuity Program, Defense Crisis Management); the alignment of homeland defense activities with counterterrorism and counternarcotics policy and programs; and DOD cyberspace activities, space policy, and WMD counterproliferation. 

In 2010, the Secretary of Defense designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense as the Executive Director of the Council of Governors. If confirmed, I would, as Executive Director, be responsible for coordinating the activities 

of the Council. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the ASD 

for Homeland Defense? 

Answer. If confirmed, my primary challenge and top priority would be to continue 

and improve the outstanding efforts DOD has devoted to protecting the homeland 

from a major terrorist attack. I would be particularly focused on preventing an attack using a weapon of mass destruction and on planning and preparing for the response to catastrophic incidents in the United States, including WMD. 

One of the most pressing challenges that I would immediately face, if confirmed, 

once duties of OASD(GSA) are transferred to the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland Defense, would be managing the Department’s efforts to 

help eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons. 

I believe that DOD has a crucial role in planning for complex catastrophic incidents; thus, I would devote extensive attention to the Department’s preparations for 

catastrophes like Super Storm Sandy. 

If confirmed, I would also devote special attention to the challenge of building the 

cyberspace workforce, growing DOD’s operational capabilities, and continuing to rationalize the complex funding streams that support cyberspace initiatives. 

Question. If you are confirmed, what priorities and plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would maintain support for the key issues I outlined 

above by actively addressing them in key DOD and interagency processes, including 

the PPBE processes, strategic reviews inside the Department, and the Interagency 

Policy Committee (IPC) process. 

Once duties that currently reside in OASD(GSA) become part of the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, I would address 

challenges in cyberspace initially by streamlining senior-level oversight of workforce, 

capabilities, and funding issues to improve efficiency throughout the Department for 

how the cyber force is organized, trained, and resourced. 

I am committed to continuing my close working relationships with partners across 

DOD, with other departments and agencies throughout the executive branch, and 

with Congress, to address whatever issues and concerns arise to implement the new 

policies and strategies. 

Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the responsibilities of the ASD for Homeland Defense? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would initially focus my efforts on the changes that will 

be made to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

as a result of the reorganization of the Office of the USD(P) that Secretary Hagel 

announced last December. There are many synergies that will occur as a result of 

this reorganization and, if confirmed, I would ensure that we maximize the collective talents of the staff in the new Homeland Defense organization. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems? 

409 

Answer. If confirmed, and upon implementation of the reorganization of the Office 

of the USD(P), I would work with each Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(DASD) under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to identify 

the synergies between the homeland defense issues and cyberspace, space, and 

WMD policy issues and establish a unified vision for the organization. 

COMBATING TERRORISM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. Section 902 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2003, which established the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense, also transferred the responsibility for the ‘‘overall direction and 

supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of 

resources for the activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism’’ 

to the USD(P). 

Please specify what combating terrorism activities will be under the jurisdiction 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, particularly domestic 

antiterrorism activities. 

Answer. It is my understanding that the specific counterterrorism activities that 

reside under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense include providing critical staff support to the Secretary of Defense regarding support requested 

by the Attorney General, or as directed by the President of the United States to 

combat domestic terrorism. Also, as I understand it, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense advises the Secretary of Defense on all domestic consequence management matters. 

Question. What DOD official or officials will be responsible for DOD combating 

terrorism activities not under the jurisdiction of the ASD for Homeland Defense? 

Answer. The USD(P) has the overall lead for DOD combating terrorism policy 

oversight. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) and the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to achieve the Secretary of Defense’s 

objectives and proper alignment of DOD combating terrorism activities. 

The geographic combatant commanders have tactical control (TACON) for Force 

Protection of all DOD personnel within their areas of responsibility, with the exception of DOD personnel for whom the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions have security 

responsibility. If confirmed, I would work closely with both the Combatant Commanders and the Department of State to ensure that all DOD personnel serving 

overseas, including those at U.S. missions and embassies, have appropriate anti-terrorism protection. 

Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the Department’s efforts are 

focused and well-coordinated in this critical area of Homeland defense? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence to achieve the Secretary of Defense’s objectives in this critical area of Homeland defense. 

I would also use DOD’s Mission Assurance Coordination Board, which the ASD 

for Homeland Defense leads, to ensure that the Department’s efforts are focused 

and coordinated on antiterrorism and force protection issues. DOD’s Mission Assurance Senior Steering Group integrates mission-related security issues of mutual interest with other executive committees and efforts within the Department. 

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY

Question. DOD is responsible for Homeland defense, and the DHS is responsible 

for Homeland security. 

Please describe your understanding of the differences between the two different 

missions. 

Answer. DOD is responsible for the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other 

threats as directed by the President. The Department’s missions are executed to 

deter, defend against, and defeat those who threaten the United States. 

DHS leads the Nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover 

from, and mitigate against the risk of terrorist acts, natural disasters, and other 

natural and manmade disasters. DHS also secures the Nation’s borders, ports, and 

airports; and ensures that the Federal Government works with States, localities, 

and the private sector as a partner in prevention, mitigation, and response. 

As necessary, and consistent with the law, DOD provides support to DHS in the 

execution of its missions. 

410 

Question. Do you agree that DOD should not be responsible for Homeland security, but may serve in a supporting role to assist civilian Federal agencies, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense? 

Answer. Yes. In enacting the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress assigned 

responsibility to DHS for preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from, terrorist attacks within the United States. 

As necessary, and consistent with the law, DOD provides support to DHS in the 

execution of its missions. 

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question. The establishment of the DHS was one of the U.S. Government’s largest 

cabinet-level reorganizations in the last 50 years. Despite this reorganization, DOD 

will continue to play an important role in providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities for Federal response to certain domestic incidents, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 

Please describe your understanding of the relationship between DOD and DHS, 

particularly with respect to Defense Support of Civil Authorities and cyber security. 

Answer. DOD has a strong, mutually supporting relationship with DHS that 

dates back to its inception. As I understand it, the preponderance of requests for 

assistance that the Department receives comes from one of DHS’s operational components. Since the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense was created in 2003, FEMA has submitted to DOD more requests for assistance than all other sources combined. The Secret Service, Customs and Border Protection, and the Coast Guard have also made multiple requests each year. 

In the area of cyber security, DOD provides personnel, equipment, and facilities 

in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration in strategic planning for the 

Nation’s cybersecurity, mutual support for cybersecurity capabilities development, 

and synchronization of current operational cybersecurity mission activities. The formal Memorandum of Agreement between the Departments focuses national cybersecurity efforts to increase the overall capacity and capability of both DHS’s homeland 

security and DOD’s national defense missions, while providing integral protection 

for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. 

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the direction and coordination of DOD activities with DHS and its component elements? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would build on the strong professional relationships that 

have been developed between the Departments. I would represent DOD in seniorlevel discussions with colleagues from DHS and its operational components. I understand that key areas of collaboration and coordination include working with the U.S. 

Coast Guard on maritime domain awareness, Customs and Border Protection on 

support to border security, the Secret Service on Presidential and dignitary protection, and DHS’s Office of Cyber Security and Communications on national cyber policy. 

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Question. The ASD for Homeland Defense has primary responsibility for Defense 

Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), particularly support to the DHS and its components, for response to natural and manmade disasters in the United States. 

Please describe your general understanding of the roles and responsibilities of 

DOD in providing DSCA, and the roles and responsibilities of other Federal agencies 

in responding to domestic disasters. 

Answer. Defense Support of Civil Authorities is one of the primary missions of 

the Department as articulated in the latest National Defense Strategy, ‘‘Sustaining 

U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’’ dated January 2012. 

When directed by the President or approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Department has robust capabilities and capacity that can be used to support civilian 

authorities at the Federal, State, and local levels. 

For domestic emergencies and disasters, FEMA has statutory responsibility to coordinate the Federal support to State, tribal, and local authorities. When requested 

by FEMA, or when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the vast capabilities of the Department can be used to supplement FEMA support to local, tribal, 

State, and other Federal departments and agencies. 

Question. Under current law, when DOD provides Defense Support to Civil Authorities, what are the responsibilities of other Federal agencies for paying for or 

reimbursing the Department for such support? 

Answer. During an emergency or disaster, when the Department is asked to support FEMA under the terms of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and EmerVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00418 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
411 

gency Assistance Act, the Department is reimbursed by FEMA for civilian overtime, 

temporary duty expenses, and the operational and maintenance costs of providing 

the support. DOD is not reimbursed for the pay and allowances of personnel providing the support. 

Under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, when the Department 

provides temporary support to the Secret Service that is directly related to the protection of the President or Vice President, the support is provided on a non-reimbursable basis. When support is provided to the Secret Service for other protected 

persons, DOD is reimbursed for its expenses. 

When we support other Federal departments and agencies under the Economy Act 

(title 31, U.S.C., section 1535), DOD is reimbursed for all of our support costs, including the pay and allowances of the personnel providing the support. 

DEFENSE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

Question. The ASD for Homeland Defense is responsible for overseeing DOD efforts and programs to protect defense critical infrastructure in the United States. 

If confirmed, what plans, approaches, and priorities would you have for ensuring 

that the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program is functioning properly? 

Answer. I am familiar with the importance of the DCIP and worked closely with 

this program while leading the Cyber Policy office. If confirmed, one of my priorities 

would be to integrate this program further with other risk management programs 

across the Department to ensure DOD’s ability to execute missions. I would review 

such plans, approaches, and priorities, and make recommendations to the USD(P) 

to ensure that adequate measures are taken for the protection of defense critical infrastructure in an all-hazards environment to ensure mission execution. 

INSTALLATION SECURITY

Question. The security of U.S. military installations—both at home and abroad— 

has been a longstanding priority for the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

If confirmed, what would be your priorities for ensuring an adequate level of security for military installations in the United States? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the effectiveness of DOD 

antiterrorism and protection policies in detecting, deterring, and responding to 

threats directed at DOD installations, facilities, and personnel, including their families. I would also work to ensure that adequate resources are provided to execute 

these policies and that DOD is working closely with its Federal, State, local, and 

tribal partners in establishing a mutually supportive protective posture inside and 

outside DOD installations and facilities. 

Although the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the principal staff assistant for physical security, if confirmed, I would support an antiterrorism approach to physical security, focused on risk mitigation, which defends in-depth using 

technology and manpower to reduce risk and mitigate potential threats. In addition, 

I would encourage DOD components to share access control information and continuously vet individuals against U.S. criminal and terrorist databases. Moreover, 

I would help to ensure that antiterrorism policy is consistent with DOD physical security and installation emergency management policy, as part of the overall DOD 

Mission Assurance effort. 

DEFENSE CONTINUITY AND MISSION ASSURANCE

Question. The ASD for Homeland Defense has primary responsibility for the Defense Continuity Program and for DOD Mission Assurance in the United States. 

What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the ASD for Homeland Defense with respect to the Defense Continuity Program and Mission Assurance? 

Answer. It is imperative that the Department has the ability to provide senior 

leaders a clear understanding of risks to mission accomplishment and that we possess the tools and processes needed to develop effective options to reduce associated 

risks. Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance provide this important capability 

to ensure resiliency and readiness. 

Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland Defense has two major responsibilities for the Defense 

Continuity Program. The first is to develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation 

of Defense continuity policy (which includes activities supporting continuity of operations, continuity of government, and enduring constitutional government). The second is to develop and oversee a comprehensive continuity program, including continuity plans to support the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and their senior and 

412 

supporting staffs, and the DOD components in coordination with the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for accomplishing these important missions? 

Answer. If confirmed, one of my mission assurance priorities would be to review 

how DOD prioritizes risk mitigation efforts to eliminate unnecessary redundancies, 

achieve closer integration of key activities, and more effectively inform the 

resourcing of existing programs and future investments related to mission assurance. 

If confirmed, one of my Defense Continuity Program priorities would be to continue modernization of selected DOD continuity capabilities to improve readiness 

and resilience while incorporating operational efficiencies. 

CBRN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISE

Question. Among the specialized capabilities that the Defense Department can 

provide to civil authorities are the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) consequence management response forces. These comprise a mix of National Guard and Active component forces and units, both large and small. 

Please describe your understanding of the composition and role of the DOD CBRN 

consequence management enterprise, the circumstances under which they could be 

used, and the role of National Guard capabilities in responding to both state and 

Federal CBRN incidents. 

Answer. The consequence management enterprise is composed of approximately 

18,500 Active and Reserve component forces on alert to support civilian authorities 

in rapidly responding to mitigate the consequences of a domestic CBRN incident 

(e.g., nuclear plant, chemical facility, or biological attack). 

Consequence management enterprise capabilities reside in the Active components 

and Reserve components, including National Guard forces under State command 

and control (some of which are DOD-funded). Maintaining capabilities in the National Guard better enables a rapid response in support of local and State responders. 

Each State and territory hosts at least one National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team, and there are larger, regionally positioned National 

Guard forces, including CBRN Enhanced Force Packages and Homeland Response 

Forces, all prepared to provide immediate response capabilities, including casualty 

search and extraction, medical triage, and decontamination. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your role with regard to the oversight, 

training, certification, coordination, and employment of the Defense Department’s 

CBRN consequence management response forces? 

Answer. As I understand it, elements of the CBRN force participate in ambitious 

training, standardization, and evaluation programs. If confirmed, I would work 

closely with NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau to ensure that DOD’s 

consequence management forces maintain their full operational capability. 

CYBER SECURITY

Question. You are currently the DASD for Cyber Policy, and have experience 

working with the DHS and other Federal agencies that have domestic cyber security 

responsibilities. The planned reorganization of the Office of the USD(P) envisions 

the ASD for Homeland Defense having primary responsibility for DOD cyber security policy. 

What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the DOD for cyber 

security, and how do they compare to the roles and responsibilities of the DHS? 

Answer. Ensuring the Nation’s cybersecurity is a shared responsibility across the 

U.S. Government. DHS is the lead Federal department responsible for national protection against, mitigation of, and recovery from domestic cybersecurity incidents, 

for which both DOJ and DOD provide support. DHS is further responsible for the 

security of unclassified Federal civilian systems. DOJ is responsible for the investigation, attribution, disruption, and prosecution of cyber crimes outside of military 

jurisdiction. All three Departments share cybersecurity information with each other, 

and each coordinates with public, private, and international partners. 

DOD is responsible for defending the Nation from attack in all domains, including 

cyberspace. As such, DOD plans, coordinates, and conducts cyberspace operations to 

operate and defend DOD critical infrastructure and military systems. When directed, DOD can conduct cyberspace operations to defend the Nation and defend and 

enable military actions in all domains. Upon request, DOD may also assist in providing Federal support to the private sector and State and local governments. 

413 

Question. Given that cyber threats can be inherently global in nature, and that 

cyber security is not a mission limited to the Homeland, how do you view the relationship of cyber security to homeland defense? 

Answer. Homeland defense includes the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, 

domestic population, and defense critical infrastructure against external threats and 

aggression, or against other threats as directed by the President. DOD is responsible for homeland defense. As with threats to the United States, our allies and 

partners, and our interests in other domains, DOD has the mission to defend the 

Nation in cyberspace. Because many cybersecurity threats allow would-be adversaries to attack the Nation from overseas, I believe cybersecurity is a key part of 

homeland defense. Of course, the Department must continue to work with other 

Federal departments and agencies, the private sector, and international partners to 

ensure the Department can carry out its assigned missions in cyberspace as well 

as in other domains. 

SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE CYBER MISSION

Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 requires the Secretary of Defense to appoint a Senate-confirmed official from the Office of the USD(P) to act as the principal cyber advisor to the Secretary. This official must be responsible for overall supervision of cyber activities, including policy and operational considerations, resources, personnel, and acquisition and technology. This official also must assemble 

a small cross-functional team to integrate cyber expertise across the Department to 

enable sound decisions while leaving execution of decisions to existing organizations 

and officials. 

The description of the duties of the office to which you have been nominated provided to the committee does not mention these responsibilities and authorities. 

Has the position to which you have been nominated been designated as the principal cyber advisor to the Secretary? If not, which position has been so designated? 

Answer. At this time, the Secretary has not formally designated his principal 

cyber advisor. However, along with many colleagues throughout the Department, I 

am involved in deliberations that have studied how best to implement this legislation. Once the reorganization of the Office of the USD(P) is complete, the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will be responsible for cyber policy matters. 

Question. How does DOD intend to implement the NDAA legislation? As the incumbent Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cyber in USD(P), have you taken any actions to begin implementation? 

Answer. Yes, as Deputy Assistant Secretary, I have initiated a Department-wide 

process to develop options for implementation of the legislation, but the Secretary 

has not yet made any formal decisions. The opportunity provided by this legislation 

to streamline oversight of cyber policy within DOD is crucial, so we want to ensure 

implementation reflects long-term goals for the Department in cyberspace, as well 

as short-term needs for effective organization and management. We remain mindful 

of the guidance from the committee contained in the Joint Explanatory Statement 

that accompanied the legislation. 

INFRASTRUCTURE FOR U.S. CYBER COMMAND

Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 requires the Secretary of Defense to 

provide CYBERCOM with infrastructure to enable CYBERCOM to independently 

access global networks to conduct military operations. Congress intends for 

CYBERCOM to have infrastructure for conducting operations that has attributes 

that are different from those of the intelligence community, including the ability to 

scale rapidly, to be disposable, and to cause minimal impacts on our capabilities if 

discovered by adversaries. 

What are your views on this requirement? 

Answer. I believe that it is essential for CYBERCOM to have infrastructure that 

allows it to accomplish military operations that are unique and distinguishable from 

the Intelligence Community. Over the past several months, the Department made 

significant strides in developing plans for diverse, highly-scalable, easily deployable, 

and disposable platforms, available on demand for the Cyber Mission Force to carry 

out its missions. 

Question. What is the Department’s plan for complying with the legislation? 

Answer. DOD has already made significant progress toward achieving this 2014 

NDAA requirement. In October 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked 

CYBERCOM to create a strategy for determining the right mix and number of diverse platforms specifically for use by the Cyber Mission Force. These platforms will 

provide diversity from the intelligence platform, are able to scale quickly to address 

414 

specific requirements, and, because they do not need to be overly sophisticated, can 

be inexpensive to build and deploy. 

Question. Do you believe DOD can implement the legislative direction in an effective and affordable manner? 

Answer. Yes. DOD has already taken large strides toward achieving this 2014 

NDAA requirement. 

Question. Do you believe this can be implemented in a way that is not redundant 

or duplicative of existing infrastructure? 

Answer. It is fiscally prudent for DOD to leverage all existing capabilities, which 

is why CYBERCOM is working with the National Security Agency (NSA) to ensure 

there are not duplicative efforts. To ensure the intelligence community can execute 

its missions free of fear from being exposed by military actions, a CYBERCOM-dedicated infrastructure on demand is not only reasonable, it is mission critical. 

CYBERCOM is creating a unified architecture plan to ensure there are not redundant efforts, find ways to leverage previous investments, and ensure the Cyber Mission Force has the infrastructure it needs to carry out its missions. In my current 

position, I would be happy to provide additional detail about anything related to the 

‘‘diverse platform’’ plan in a classified setting at a later time. 

DEVELOPMENT OF CYBER OFFICER CORPS

Question. In a forthcoming article, the J3 of CYBERCOM, Major General Brett 

Williams, argues that: ‘‘We have a pressing need to develop cyberspace operators 

who are credible and effective in the J3 and J5, within both the Joint Staff (JS) and 

the Combatant Commands (CCMD). Just for emphasis, that is the J3 and J5, not 

just the J2 and J6; and at all of the CCMDs, not just CYBERCOM . . . Joint staffs 

consist of what we typically think of as operators, members of the combat arms who 

are educated, trained and experienced in operations. Cyberspace expertise usually 

comes from people with intelligence, communications, or cryptology backgrounds; career fields typically categorized as support forces. If we are going to treat operations 

in cyberspace like operations in the other domains, the services must commit to 

unique career fields for cyberspace . . . Cyberspace, like the other domains, requires 

officers who are developed across their careers in a way that positions them to lead 

at senior levels in both command and staff. Cyberspace officers should spend their 

first 10 years becoming tactically proficient in all aspects of cyberspace operations, 

complete service and joint military education, serve on joint staffs, command in 

their area of operational specialty and do all of the other things necessary to 

produce general and flag officers whose native domain is cyberspace.’’ 

What are your views about whether cyber officer career development should be 

distinct from both intelligence and communications officer development? 

Answer. I believe, just like in other areas of combat arms, DOD needs to develop 

its enlisted, officer, and civilian force from a wide variety of career fields, including 

but not limited to the intelligence and communications communities. 

Question. Is it advisable to develop cyberspace officers as we do other combat 

arms or line officers? Why or why not? 

Answer. Yes. I believe cyber officers, as well as our enlisted forces and civilians 

should have well-defined career paths focused on operations. Over the past 18 

months, the Services have invested extensive attention toward growing our force, 

and developed plans to recruit and retain our most highly-skilled enlisted and officer forces in the cyberspace operations workforce. Just as we do for other unique 

military career fields including pilots, cyberspace operators should receive certain 

incentives to remain in the field. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Services for cyberspace operations military and civilian forces to be competitive, in both 

rank and position, with those whose operational focuses have been the other domains. 

ALIGNMENT OF MILITARY CYBER OPERATIONS WITH CYBER INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Question. For the most part, the military service cyber organizations have been 

formed from the service cryptologic elements, and in general cyber warfare operations have been regarded as an extension of signal intelligence operations. More 

recently, however, there is a growing perception that military cyber operations, and 

the tools and techniques employed in them, should be different from those employed 

in intelligence operations in cyberspace. 

Do you think that, as CYBERCOM matures and as cyber military art develops, 

military cyber operations and cyber intelligence operations will diverge? 

Answer. Because the type of targets for military operations may be different than 

those targets for intelligence operations, I am inclined to think that these operations 

415 

are likely to diverge in the future. However, a small subset of targets may remain 

common, such as foreign cyber adversaries. 

Question. In the long term, what are the pros and cons of treating the services’ 

cyber organizations and the service cryptologic elements as distinct entities? 

Answer. Both communities play vital roles within the Services. An important benefit of the distinction is that cyber organizations will tend to have a more explicit 

focus on warfighting, while cryptologic elements are likely to focus more on their 

core intelligence-related competencies. However, one drawback of over-emphasizing 

this distinction would be to neglect the important nexus between warfighting and 

intelligence in the conduct of cyber operations. If confirmed, I would be sure to continue assessing the cyber force model in light of this distinction as that model 

evolves. 

Question. Would you expect that military cyber operations personnel assigned to 

CYBERCOM units will continue to be funded mainly in the intelligence budget and 

compete with intelligence priorities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will likely conduct an assessment to determine the optimal methods to ensure appropriate funding for CYBERCOM personnel. 

RANGE SUPPORT FOR CYBER COMMAND

Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to ensure that there are adequate range capabilities for training 

and exercising offensive cyber forces in operations that are very different from cyber 

intelligence operations. The committee understands that the community responsible 

for planning and managing cyber range capabilities has developed a plan for acquiring the range capabilities that CYBERCOM requires, but has not programmed funding to implement the plan. 

From your position as DASD for Cyber Policy, how do you expect the Department 

will implement the NDAA legislation? 

Answer. The Department is working to establish the DOD Enterprise Cyber 

Range Environment (DECRE) governance body to oversee Cyber Range issues. 

DECRE is currently working on establishing a persistent test and training environment intended to meet the demand of the Cyber Mission Force teams that are being 

fielded by providing on demand environments for training in both offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. The Department is also conducting an assessment to 

determine if we have the required cyber range capacity and capability to support 

Cyber Mission Force training. This assessment is expected to be completed by October 2014. 

Question. What is your understanding of CYBERCOM’s range requirements for 

individual and unit training, and exercises, and the capabilities and capacity of the 

joint cyber range infrastructure to satisfy those requirements? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the persistent test and training environment 

is being developed based on requirements from CYBERCOM’s Exercise CYBER 

FLAG, and represents our current best estimate of what cyber range capabilities are 

needed to train the Cyber Mission Force teams. Additionally, we are assessing the 

capacity needed to train all of the cyber forces as they are formed and will include 

requirements for large-scale exercises such as Cyber Flag, as well as National Mission Force Headquarters and Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber training, certification, 

and exercises. 

INFORMATION ASSURANCE

Question. The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 

Technologies recommended that the Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) of the 

NSA be separated from NSA and subordinated to the cyber policy component of the 

DOD. The Senate version of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision 

that would transfer supervision of the IAD from the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence (USD(I)) to the Chief Information Officer (CIO). The committee’s rationale for this transfer is that the IAD conducts cyber protection-related duties, which 

fall under the responsibility of the CIO, not the USD(I). 

As the position to which you have been nominated is presumed to become the 

principal cyber advisor to the Secretary of Defense, what are your views on the pros 

and cons of these proposals? 

Answer. I support the President’s decision to maintain the IAD within NSA, as 

the synergy between information assurance and the signals intelligence missions 

should be maintained. Altering civilian relationships for oversight of the information 

assurance mission might risk creating divergent chains of oversight that are not 

synchronized with operational chains of command. However, it is undeniable that 

the CIO has a critical role to play as well. The interaction between CIO, USD(I), 

416 

and IAD is an important one, and it must be closely monitored to ensure that the 

current oversight structure is functioning effectively. 

DUAL HATTING OF DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND THE

COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND

Question. The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 

Technologies recommended that the positions of Director of the NSA and the Commander of CYBERCOM be separated and that the President appoint a civilian to 

be Director of NSA. The President decided against separating these two positions 

at this time. According to press reports, the President based his decision, in part, 

on his perception that CYBERCOM was not yet mature enough to stand on its own 

without a very strong institutional connection to NSA. 

Do you support the President’s decision? 

Answer. I support the President’s decision against separating these two positions 

at this time. 

Question. If CYBERCOM remains too dependent on NSA for their leadership to 

be bifurcated, does it follow that CYBERCOM is not mature enough to become a 

full unified command? 

Answer. When CYBERCOM was established in 2009, the dual-hat arrangement 

allowed for the unification of leadership for organizations responsible for defending 

the Nation in cyberspace and for signals intelligence. We continue to do extensive 

analysis of whether CYBERCOM should remain a subunified command under 

STRATCOM or be unified to a full combatant command. We will continue to remain 

in close consultation with Congress if the Department believes the current arrangement should change to ensure CYBERCOM remains operationally effective. Regardless of CYBERCOM’s potential status as a command in the future, if confirmed I 

will work with my colleagues throughout the Department to ensure CYBERCOM 

has the resources it needs to continue to mature. 

Question. To the extent that military operations in cyberspace should evolve to be 

different and distinct from intelligence collection in cyberspace, is it possible that 

NSA’s strong influence over CYBERCOM’s development could hinder as well as support the proper maturation of the Command? What are your views on this issue? 

Answer. In the coming years, I expect the Department will continue to closely assess CYBERCOM’s maturation and its ability to execute its missions. This includes 

ensuring that CYBERCOM has control over those assets its needs to be successful. 

Given NSA’s status as a combat support agency, I anticipate NSA will continue to 

be supportive of CYBERCOM’s maturation. If confirmed, I will look forward to 

working with colleagues across the Department to ensure CYBERCOM has the support it needs. 

Question. As NSA is a combat support defense agency subject to the authority, 

direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and NSA is subordinate to the 

Secretary of Defense in his capacity as the President’s executive agent for signals 

intelligence under Executive Order 12333, is there any reason to expect that NSA’s 

support for CYBERCOM and the other combatant commands would be questionable 

if the dual-hat arrangement were terminated? 

Answer. I am confident that NSA will continue to provide mission-critical support 

to CYBERCOM and other combatant commands, regardless of the status of the 

dual-hat arrangement. 

SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANT COMMANDS

Question. The Secretary of Defense has ordered the military services and 

CYBERCOM to quickly develop operational military cyber teams to support the missions of defending the Nation against cyber attacks, supporting the war plans of the 

geographic and functional combatant commands, and defending DOD networks 

against attacks. The mission teams that will support the combatant commanders ultimately will be under the operational control of those commanders. The committee 

understands that, to date, the combatant commands have not committed to creating 

cyber component commands to direct the operations of those units. 

In your opinion, can the combatant commanders properly direct the operations of 

assigned cyber mission teams without a component command element? 

Answer. As the Department builds out the Cyber Mission Force and its teams, 

we will continue to evaluate and evolve command and control to ensure cyber capabilities are integrated and responsive to the combatant command operations. 

Question. Have cyber operations been integrated into the operations plans of the 

combatant commands? 

417 

Answer. Yes, cyber capabilities are being integrated into planning the same as 

other capabilities from the physical domains. This is an area, however, in which the 

Department must continue to make steady progress. 

Question. How would you assess the progress of the Department in developing 

cyber capabilities for the use of these command cyber teams to support the specific 

needs of the combatant commands? 

Answer. Equipping the Cyber Mission Force teams is a work in progress. In addition to presenting trained personnel for the Cyber Mission Force, the Services are 

responsible for presenting real capability for the force. The Combat Mission Teams 

(CMTs), in particular, have unique requirements for full-spectrum military capabilities and the Services must continue to invest in capabilities to achieve cyber effects 

against DOD priority targets. 

Question. What priority has been assigned to the development of capabilities for 

national versus command cyber mission teams? 

Answer. Though the Cyber Mission Force build is still in its infancy, today, we 

have National Mission Teams (NMTs) and CMTs with fully trained personnel and 

equipped with sufficient technical capabilities needed to conduct their missions particularly against threats in the PACOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility, 

based on the threat. The NMTs and CMTs have very different missions and therefore require very different sets of capabilities. As the force build continues, the Department will continue to develop capabilities for the NMTs, the CMTs, as well as 

the Cyber Protection Teams, since defending our networks is our top priority. 

Question. Who would you say is responsible for developing cyber capabilities to 

support joint task forces and lower echelons? 

Answer. Just as they man, train and equip for the combatant commanders in 

other domains, the Services will continue to be responsible for equipping 

CYBERCOM and the Combatant Commanders with cyber capabilities to conduct 

their missions. 

Question. Is it your view that CYBERCOM forces would control all cyber operations regardless of target type and battlefield situation, including where cyber and 

traditional electronic warfare are intertwined? 

Answer. I expect that control and employment of cyber operations will be in accordance with a model that will enable effective control and synchronization of 

cyberspace operations while balancing regional and global priorities. In regional situations where a combatant command is in the lead, CYBERCOM will provide direct 

support to ensure its cyber capabilities mesh with the supported command’s operations. In a global situation, STRATCOM will be the supported command and, as 

STRATCOM’s operational lead for cyber, CYBERCOM will direct the operations of 

regional units to ensure they are in synch with global priorities. 

DEVELOPMENT OF CYBER CAPABILITIES

Question. CYBERCOM has depended heavily to date on NSA for technology, 

equipment, capabilities, concepts of operations, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Are you satisfied that DOD is organized and resourced to provide a broad base 

of innovation and capability development in the cyber domain that includes the military service’s research and development organizations, defense agencies such as the 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the private sector? 

Answer. While the Department has made much progress, more work certainly remains to ensure that DOD is organized and resourced to provide military-specific 

capabilities for the Cyber Mission Force. Combined, the Services and their dedicated 

research and development labs, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, federally-funded research and development centers, the defense industrial base, and the 

private sector all contribute greatly to providing real, viable cyber capability to the 

DOD. As the build of the Cyber Mission Force continues, CYBERCOM will continue 

to leverage the expertise of these organizations to build diverse capability to enable 

full-spectrum military operations. 

In October 2013, the Department made a series of decisions to enforce a process 

to ensure there is no redundancy of effort, and that several DOD entities can use 

the same capability multiple times when possible to get more return on investment. 

CYBER PERSONNEL

Question. The Military Services have already provided thousands of servicemembers to man cyber mission units assigned to CYBERCOM. These personnel are 

going through training provided by the NSA. CYBERCOM, working with the Services, NSA, and others, has developed position descriptions, roles, and skills, and 

418 

training programs. Over the next couple of years, the Services will be identifying 

thousands more positions for additional units before the current force goals are met. 

What direction has DOD given to the military services regarding the quality and 

existing skill levels of the personnel they shall provide for the cyber mission forces? 

Answer. The Services have some personnel with existing cyber skills. The Department is working to determine and grant, as appropriate, training equivalencies for 

these qualified personnel assigned to the cyber mission forces. For future personnel, 

the Services are applying screening criteria to ensure those entering training programs have the skills and aptitude to succeed. The Services are employing recruiting and retention mechanisms to facilitate the build plan for the cyber mission 

forces, including those specifically meeting CYBERCOM’s needs. 

Question. So far, does it appear that there is a satisfactory match between the 

skills and aptitudes of the personnel provided by the services and the training programs developed by CYBERCOM? 

Answer. This has been a priority for DOD’s senior leadership, and the subject of 

recent senior-level decision forums over the past year. As a result of guidance from 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense, each Service provided assessments of their ability 

to meet CYBERCOM training requirements, and the Joint Staff has been closely 

tracking progress across the range of readiness categories, including training. There 

has been significant progress by each Service in meeting the training goals, but because this is a multi-year effort, we don’t expect to see full maturation across the 

Cyber Mission Force until fiscal year 2016. 

Question. What direction has been given to the services regarding recruiting goals 

and priorities for individuals with skills and aptitudes relevant to the needs of 

CYBERCOM? 

Answer. As a result of recent senior DOD decision management processes, each 

Service was given direction to prioritize the establishment of personnel management 

mechanisms to identify, recruit, retain, and provide incentivized career advancement paths for both military and civilian personnel with the type of high-end, advanced operational skills that CYBERCOM has identified within the Cyber Mission 

Force. There has been steady progress by each Service toward meeting this guidance, and this issue continues to be followed closely in monthly reporting by 

CYBERCOM to the Joint Staff. One of the more significant challenges in implementing the guidance has been in the civilian workforce, where DOD is looking at 

options that may require the assistance of Congress. 

Question. Has the Department considered delegating personnel authorities to 

CYBERCOM that are similar to those that are exercised by U.S. Special Operations 

Command to ensure that the Services manage the careers of their servicemembers 

with cyber skills appropriately? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with Congress, the Military Departments, and 

the Services to examine where the potential delegation of personnel authorities 

might be appropriate for consideration to maximize CYBERCOM’s mission effectiveness as it evolves. 

RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

Question. NORTHCOM was established in October 2002 with the mission of conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the 

United States, its territories, and interests within the Command’s assigned area of 

responsibility; and, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to provide 

military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management operations. 

If confirmed, how do you anticipate you would coordinate roles and responsibilities with the Commander of NORTHCOM? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with the Commander of 

NORTHCOM to support the efforts of the Secretary of Defense on the broad array 

of issues touching on homeland defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, theater strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations. 

Question. How do you anticipate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and the Commander of NORTHCOM will coordinate with other 

Federal and State entities in planning for response to catastrophic events that 

might require Defense Department support? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Commander of 

NORTHCOM to ensure that DOD support to Federal and State entities in response 

to catastrophic events, if required, is provided in a timely and coordinated fashion. 

It is my understanding that this begins with DOD positioning itself to support civil 

authorities during disaster response activities by building its own resilience against 

cascading failures of critical infrastructure. Moreover, this effort continues, through 

419 

the Secretary’s complex catastrophe initiative, to ensure that the Department is able 

to provide its civil support capabilities from all components in support of civil authorities, making defense support of civil authorities faster and more effective when 

delivering life-saving and life-sustaining requirements. 

PARTNERSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE STATES

Question. DOD has an important partnership with the National Guard because 

it has both Federal and State responsibilities. The Department has worked with the 

Council of Governors to establish procedures to ensure unity of effort between military forces operating in Federal and state status, including the creation of ‘‘dualstatus commanders.’’ 

Please summarize your understanding of how this unity of effort is maintained 

through the dual status commander arrangement, so that the authorities of the 

President and Secretary of Defense are preserved for Federal military forces, and 

the authorities of Governors are preserved for National Guard Forces acting in a 

State capacity. 

Answer. As I understand it, a signed memorandum of agreement between a Governor and the Secretary of Defense provides the terms, responsibilities, and procedures for the use of a dual-status commander, including the procedures for preserving the separate and mutually exclusive Federal and State chains of command. 

These procedures are tested in annual exercises and used in real-world operations 

such as the response to Super Storm Sandy in 2012. 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

Question. The ASD for Homeland Defense has policy responsibility for the participation of National Guard units or personnel in Homeland defense activities, when 

the Secretary of Defense determines that such participation is necessary and appropriate. 

What role do you believe the National Guard and Reserves should have in Homeland defense, and how does their role relate to the role of the Active component? 

Answer. I believe that Homeland defense is viewed as a Total Force Mission. The 

role of the National Guard and non-National Guard Reserve Forces is to integrate 

with Active component forces seamlessly to accomplish U.S. objectives. National 

Guard and non-National Guard Reserve units are organized, trained, and equipped 

to succeed in accomplishing assigned missions. 

Question. What role do you believe the National Guard and Reserves should have 

in providing civil support assistance to other Federal agencies, and how does their 

role relate to the role of the Active component? 

Answer. Civil Support—or ‘‘Defense Support of Civil Authorities’’ as DOD terms 

it—is a Total Force responsibility. All of the appropriate resources of the Department, including those of the various Defense Agencies, are integrated in support of 

other Federal departments and agencies for specific missions. With the recent authority provided in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, non-National Guard Reserve 

Forces may now be activated to provide assistance to respond to Federal requests 

during responses to major disasters and emergencies. 

USE OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE PERSONNEL FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE/POSSE

COMITATUS

Question. What is your understanding of the legal issues and authority associated 

with using National Guard and Reserve personnel in security roles within the 

United States? 

Answer. Under the authority of State Governors, in State Active Duty status or 

duty status under title 32, the National Guard is not subject to the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. However, when ordered to Active Duty, National 

Guard and non-National Guard Reserve Forces are subject to the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act and DOD policy. 

The National Guard, as a State militia, under the command and control of respective Governors and Adjutants Generals, may be used for any security role authorized under State law. When the Reserve components (including the National Guard) 

are mobilized under title 10, and placed under Federal command and control, they 

are subject to the same restrictions as other Federal military forces. 

Question. In your opinion, does the Posse Comitatus Act (title 18 U.S.C. § 1385) 

or chapter 18 of title 10, U.S.C. (which regulates the use of the Armed Forces in 

support of civilian law enforcement and related activities) require amendment to 

deal with the present homeland security situation? 

Answer. No. I believe that current laws and policies governing DOD’s role in support to civilian law enforcement-related activities are sufficient. 

420 

Question. Under what circumstances do you believe that it is appropriate for DOD 

to provide assistance to law enforcement authorities in response to a domestic terrorist event? What about a non-terrorist event? 

Answer. As I understand it (under title 18, U.S.C., section 831), the U.S. Attorney 

General may request that the Secretary of Defense provide emergency assistance if 

an emergency situation exists in which civilian law enforcement personnel are not 

capable of enforcing the law to address certain types of threats involving nuclear 

materials, such as potential use of a nuclear or radiological weapon. This could be 

for either a domestic terrorist event or a non-terrorist event. 

The Department does provide non-direct support to civilian law enforcement on 

a routine basis. As an example, DOD provides subject matter experts in the area 

of explosive ordnance disposal to detect and, if necessary, render safe an improvised 

explosive device that is of military origin. Further, DOD can provide logistics and 

training assistance to civilian law enforcement authorities. 

In response to a domestic terrorist event, I believe it is appropriate to provide 

DOD assistance to law enforcement authorities under existing authorities when requested by the U.S. Attorney General or directed by the President of the United 

States. 

For non-terrorist events, DOD does provide assistance to law enforcement authorities, consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act and other restrictions, to save human 

lives, mitigate human suffering, and prevent wide-spread property damage. 

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in making such determinations and making such assistance available? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would be the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary 

of Defense under the USD(P) on all matters related to Defense Support of Civilian 

Authorities. I expect that this would include support to civilian law enforcement 

agencies by DOD where appropriate. If confirmed, I would work with others in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and heads of the DOD components and activities to facilitate informed decision-making by the Secretary of Defense. 

POLICY TO COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Question. The plan to reorganize the Office of the USD(P) envisions the ASD for 

Homeland Defense having primary policy and oversight responsibility for countering 

WMD, meaning nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. This would be a new responsibility for the ASD for Homeland Defense. 

Please describe your understanding of the programs and activities to counter 

WMD for which the ASD for Homeland Defense would have policy responsibility. 

Answer. I understand that, in the future, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense will be responsible for developing strategies and policies, and 

overseeing the execution of approved policies and programs, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; WMD and missile-related proliferation; and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program activities. 

Question. What do you believe are the principal challenges in countering WMD 

and, if confirmed, what would be your priorities for DOD policy for countering 

WMD? 

Answer. Preventing the proliferation or use of WMD by either state or terrorist 

actors is our principal challenge. The ability to respond to and mitigate WMD attacks remains essential, but our homeland, citizens, and interests are best protected 

by ensuring that these threats never fully materialize. I believe that by reducing 

incentives to proliferation, increasing the barriers to acquisition and use, and denying the effects of current and emerging WMD threats we can better protect our citizens and interests at home and abroad. If confirmed, I would prioritize DOD’s efforts in these areas. 

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the creation of policy 

for, and oversight of, Defense Department programs to counter WMD, and how 

would you ensure effective policy coordination of the various DOD actors and programs to counter WMD? 

Answer. If confirmed, my office would play a lead role in developing policies to 

prevent and counter WMD threats to our interests and citizens at home and abroad. 

This includes guiding Defense Department efforts to protect and defend our forces 

from such threats, bolstering the capabilities of allies and partners to deal with 

these challenges, ensuring appropriate support to civil authorities should these 

weapons threaten us at home, and developing the strategies, plans, and capabilities 

for DOD to prevent and mitigate these risks overseas. Countering WMD is a wholeof-government effort, and, if confirmed, I expect to partner with DOD, interagency, 

421 

and international partners to ensure that appropriate policy and oversight are in 

place to reduce these threats and protect our interests. 

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. If confirmed, what will your role be in implementing and overseeing the 

CTR Program? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the role currently performed by the ASD 

for Global Security Affairs as that responsibility migrates to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. I would provide policy guidance to 

the director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for implementing the CTR Program and continue to coordinate with the ASD(NCB) on program implementation 

issues. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the CTR 

program, including changes in legislative authorities, programs, or funding? 

Answer. My understanding is that the DOD CTR Program has had, for the most 

part, the authorities, programs, and funding needed to address emerging WMD 

threats appropriately. Most of the DOD CTR legislation has existed for about 20 

years, and therefore, if confirmed, I would work with interagency partners and Congress to review the existing legislation to see if it requires updating. 

Question. How do you envision the evolution of the program as it transitions away 

from Russia to countries outside the former Soviet Union? 

Answer. WMD threats are global, and I envision that the CTR Program will continue to evolve to meet those threats. I understand that the CTR Program is focused 

on countering WMD terrorism threats. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that 

CTR is well-positioned to continue to address those threats while also responding 

to unique challenges such as those posed by chemical weapons stockpiles in Libya 

and Syria, in cooperation with U.S. Government and international partners. 

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Question. One of the issue areas that will be placed under the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland Defense is the Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

of the Defense Department. 

What do you believe are the principal challenges in chemical and biological defense, and what would be your priorities for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program? 

Answer. As part of the Department’s overall effort to counter WMD, the Office of 

the ASD/NCB manages the Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program. I understand that the ASD for Homeland Defense would be responsible for development 

of policies to guide the program and would work to ensure close coordination between our offices. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that, given the constrained 

fiscal environment, the Department prioritizes capabilities that counter operationally significant risks, taking into consideration potential contributions from other 

partners in the U.S. Government or the international community. 

Question. Do you believe the Chemical and Biological Defense Program should be 

closely coordinated with related efforts of the Defense Department’s CTR program 

focused on reducing biological threats? 

Answer. The President has highlighted the importance of countering biological 

threats, and my understanding is that both the CBD and CTR Programs strongly 

support this priority. I agree with these priorities, and if confirmed, would work to 

ensure awareness of and close coordination between the two Programs. 

Question. Do you believe the Chemical and Biological Defense Program should be 

coordinated closely with the Department of Health and Human Services in their respective development of medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, and 

radiological hazards? 

Answer. Yes, I believe that close coordination of the Department and HHS medical countermeasure efforts is required. I understand that both Departments are 

currently working together to ensure respective medical countermeasure efforts are 

transparent and mutually supportive, and if confirmed, I would continue this close 

coordination. 

CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION

Question. DOD Directive 5160.05E states the DOD policy that ‘‘the Department 

of Defense shall be in full compliance’’ with the Chemical Weapons Convention 

(CWC) and the Biological Warfare Convention (BWC). In 2006, the Department announced that the United States would not meet even the extended deadline of April 

2012 for destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile, as required under the CWC, 

and the United States does not expect to complete destruction until after 2020. 

422 

Do you agree that DOD and the U.S. Government should be in full compliance 

with the terms and obligations of the CWC and the BWC, including the deadline 

for destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile under the CWC? 

Answer. I understand that in 2006 the United States informed the Organization 

for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that it did not expect to meet the 

2012 CWC deadline for complete destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. 

Since then, the United States has continued to follow a policy of transparency about 

the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program and has stressed U.S. efforts to 

complete chemical weapons destruction as safely and quickly as practicable. If confirmed, I would continue to support a policy of transparency and would support continued efforts to destroy the remainder of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile as 

safely and quickly as practicable. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the Department takes steps 

needed to minimize the time to complete destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons 

stockpile, without sacrificing safety or security, and that the Department requests 

the resources necessary to complete destruction as close to the deadline as practicable? 

Answer. The Office of the USD(AT&L) and the Department of the Army continue 

to focus significant senior leadership attention on completing destruction of the U.S. 

chemical weapons stockpile as safely and quickly and practicable. If confirmed, I 

would work closely with these offices to ensure continued focus on meeting this objective. 

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

Question. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an international effort to 

identify and interdict WMD and related materials. 

If confirmed, would you recommend that the PSI program continue and, if so, do 

you believe that it should be modified in any way? 

Answer. I support the PSI and, if confirmed, would work to implement President 

Obama’s call to make PSI a more durable effort. PSI has led the way in building 

international consensus on the importance of countering proliferation-related shipments. I believe that PSI sends a strong deterrent message to proliferators, 

strengthens nonproliferation engagement with partners, and builds partner capacity 

to interdict illicit WMD-related shipments. 

DEFENSE SPACE POLICY

Question. The plan to reorganize the Office of the USD(P) envisions the ASD for 

Homeland Defense having primary responsibility for DOD Space policy. This would 

be a new responsibility for the ASD for Homeland Defense. 

Please describe your understanding of the space policy responsibilities intended 

for the ASD for Homeland Defense, and how those responsibilities would relate to 

cyber security policy responsibilities. 

Answer. As I understand it, under the plan to reorganize the Office of the 

USD(P), the Space Policy functions will be overseen by a DASD responsible for 

Space and Cyberspace, who will report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense. In my previous experience as the DASD for Cyber Policy, I 

worked closely with the DASD for Space Policy and we reported to the same Assistant Secretary, so the reorganization would maintain the close alignment between 

these two offices. These days, cyber and space policy face similar challenges. If confirmed, I would continue the close collaboration between these two critical areas. I 

would also participate actively in the development and oversight of space policy and 

strategy for the Department, in the DOD space-related decisionmaking processes, 

and in the DOD PPBE processes to ensure space system architectures support our 

national security objectives effectively. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for DOD policy for space, 

and how would you ensure effective execution of DOD space policy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would place priority on U.S. space control capability and 

on increasing national security space resiliency against growing threats to spacebased architectures. Both Presidential and DOD guidance directs the Department 

to retain counter-space capabilities to address the growing space capabilities of potential adversaries, including anti-satellite capabilities. Through partnerships with 

commercial suppliers, collaboration with international partners, and changes in our 

own architectures and operational tactics, we can improve the resiliency of our systems and strengthen strategic stability in space. 

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in establishing architectures for 

various space systems, such as those for communications and overhead persistent 

infrared? 

423 

Answer. If confirmed, I would participate actively in the development of space architectures and the PPBE processes of the Department to ensure space system architectures support our national security objectives effectively, including our National Security Space Strategy. 

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in developing a space protection 

strategy, and working with STRATCOM to implement that strategy, such as improving space situational awareness? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander, STRATCOM, to 

ensure appropriate and effective strategies are in place to increase our space situational awareness and to ensure that critical space capabilities are resilient and redundant, in order to maintain the advantages provided by these capabilities. I believe that continually improving space situational awareness underpins our ability 

to operate safely in the increasingly congested and contested space environment and 

enables the protection of our space assets. In addition, if confirmed, I would look 

to partner with the Space Security and Defense Program and the efforts they have 

been undertaking to develop a space protection strategy. 

Question. Over the course of the last several years there has been discussion 

about establishing international space rules of the road to deal with, mitigate, and 

reduce the generation of space debris. 

What are your views on establishing space rules of the road? 

Answer. Establishing non-legally binding norms for the responsible, peaceful, and 

safe use of space and preservation of the space environment is an important issue 

for all space-faring nations. Pragmatic guidelines, or rules of the road, could help 

avoid collisions and other debris-generating events, reduce radiofrequency interference, and strengthen safety, stability, sustainability, transparency, and security 

in the space domain. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that development of international norms strengthens safety and sustainability in space, consistent with U.S. 

national security interests. 

SPACE POSTURE REVIEW

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in overseeing and implementing 

the policies, strategies, and priorities established in the Space Posture Review? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the USD(P) and the Secretary as they continue to implement the President’s 2010 National Space Policy and the National Security Space Strategy, which included the Space Posture Review. I would help to 

develop and oversee implementation of DOD’s space-related policies, and oversee implementation of strategy and plans related to space forces, systems, and activities 

in close coordination with other DOD officials, including by serving on the Defense 

Space Council. 

TERRORIST THREAT TO THE HOMELAND

Question. In your view, what is the extent of the current threat to the Homeland 

of terrorist extremists both from outside the United States and from within the 

United States? 

Answer. Based on my understanding of intelligence community judgments, there 

is no question that al Qaeda, its associates, affiliates, and adherents continue to 

maintain the intent to strike the United States, posing a persistent threat to the 

homeland. A relatively new phenomenon is the growth of homegrown violent extremists (HVE) who are motivated by al Qaeda ideology to conduct attacks in the 

homeland. The intelligence community assesses judges that the number one target 

of HVEs is DOD installations and facilities. Al Qaeda, its associates, affiliates, and 

adherents continue to produce English-language propaganda that inspires and encourages violent attacks, highlighting al Qaeda’s de-centralized nature since there 

is no direct command and control over the plotting or conduct of this type of attack. 

Question. How would you broadly characterize that threat—low, medium, or high? 

Answer. I would characterize the threat as persistent. There are threat streams 

that at the time of receiving them run the range of threat from low to high. Al 

Qaeda, its associates, affiliates, and adherents publicly express and maintain the intent to attack the homeland, and they are constantly seeking the best capability to 

do so. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Intelligence Community to help to prevent an attack against the United States. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information in a timely 

manner. 

424 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would appear before the congressional defense committees or other appropriate committees on matters under the purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would appear and provide information to this committee, or its designated membership, on matters under the purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I agree to provide information to this committee and 

its staff on matters under the purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would provide documents subject to appropriate and 

necessary security protection. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN

MODULAR AIRBORNE FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM

1. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Rosenbach, I’m told by the North Carolina National Guard 

that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Integration 

and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, with the consent of the acting Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, has been trying for several years to 

change the authority under which the mission is conducted from its historic title 32 

of the U.S. Code, to title 10 of the U.S. Code. 

I asked the North Carolina National Guard about this. They tell me the mission 

as it has operated since its beginnings is not broken and does not require a fix. Further, they tell me title 32 affords them flexibility to quickly respond to a fire emergency, provides the maximum amount of benefits for their servicemembers and that 

all of the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) State National Guard 

commands—North Carolina, Wyoming, and California—along with the National 

Guard Bureau and even the U.S. Air Force, oppose this move and said as much following a study of the issue last year. If confirmed, would you continue to push this 

agenda over the objections of the States, the National Guard Bureau, and the others 

who have studied the issue? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. I am not very familiar with this issue, but, if confirmed, I would 

examine it fully with the States, the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Air Force and 

Air Force Reserve, and others who have studied the issue. Further, I would work 

to ensure that MAFFS units have the maximum flexibility when responding to 

wildfires and saving U.S. lives and property. I can assure you that DOD support 

to wildland firefighting efforts would be one of my top priorities. 

2. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Rosenbach, please tell me how this proposal improves 

America’s ability to fight wildfires or save American lives and property. 

Mr. ROSENBACH. Please see answer #1 above. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

CYBER SECURITY

3. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rosenbach, you currently serve as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, giving you a unique perspective on the 

cyber debate. What do you think are our two most important cyber needs for the 

next 5 years? 

425 

Mr. ROSENBACH. In my opinion, there are three cyber needs for the next 5 years 

that are most important to address: (1) for organizations across the U.S. Government and the private sector to invest in information systems that are more resilient, 

more difficult to attack, and easier to defend; (2) for the United States and its allies 

and partners to counter the proliferation of destructive malware; and (3) for Congress to pass legislation that will enhance information sharing between the U.S. 

Government and the private sector, among companies within the private sector, and 

between the private sector and the Government. 

On the first point, U.S. companies and Government organizations have underprioritized cybersecurity and network resilience in their business plans and investments. This leaves the Nation at risk. Although the trend has begun to change, over 

the next 5 years companies and organizations across the country, including the Department of Defense (DOD), need to increase their cybersecurity and resiliency investments significantly to mitigate the risk of intrusion and to recover from an operational disruption if a successful attack occurs. 

On the second point, there is little international understanding regarding how to 

counter the proliferation of malware. Given the easily transferable nature of malicious computer code, I am concerned that destructive malware can easily be sold to 

dangerous actors. Working with our allies and partners, the United States should 

explore methods for keeping cyber weapons out of the wrong hands. Congress and 

the executive branch have both recognized this as an issue, and it is something that 

I am very focused on addressing. 

On the last point, in the event of a cyber attack, the U.S. Government and the 

private sector must share situational awareness of the threat, and must be able to 

share information about the incident as quickly as possible. Threats in cyberspace 

emerge and spread rapidly, so more needs to be done to help companies and the 

government share information about specific threats in a timely manner. 

4. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rosenbach, if confirmed, how will you incorporate 

cyber forces, especially in the National Guard, into our Homeland defense strategy? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. The Department is currently undertaking a mission analysis to 

identify appropriate roles and missions for the National Guard and Reserve components in supporting DOD’s cyber missions. In the Active component, we are developing National Mission Teams whose sole focus will be defending the U.S. Homeland from catastrophic cyber attacks. In addition, DOD, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, the Council of Governors, and the States, is developing an action plan for developing deeper ties to improve cybersecurity. I am confident that through these processes, as well as through U.S. Cyber Command’s 

Cyber Guard exercises, the Department will develop a path to integrate cyber forces 

into our Homeland defense strategy. 

5. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rosenbach, in your advance policy questions you said 

if confirmed, you would ‘‘devote special attention to the challenge of building the 

cyberspace workforce . . . ’’ In your opinion, what are the challenges of building the 

cyberspace workforce? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. I believe that a primary challenge to building the cyberspace 

workforce is retaining highly-skilled personnel. Last fall, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense tasked the Military Departments and Services to create a plan to retain 

their most highly-skilled enlisted and officer forces. Each Service accounted for ways 

to incentivize these highly skilled individuals not only to stay in the Service, but 

to stay specifically in a cyber-focused career field. However, I believe this will continue to be an area to improve upon as the Department continues to build the Cyber 

Mission Force. If confirmed, I would work with the Military Departments and Services and other organizations throughout DOD to ensure that we recruit and retain 

a world-class civilian cyberspace workforce just as we recruit and retain well-qualified military personnel. 

6. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rosenbach, what can Congress do to assist with building that workforce? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. As we continue to grow our cyberspace cadre within the Department, if confirmed, I would work with Congress and the Military Departments and 

Services to identify any unique requirements that would warrant establishing alternative mechanisms, or that call for need special authorities, for attracting, recruiting, retaining, and sustaining a world-class cyberspace workforce. 

7. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rosenbach, at some point in the future, the position 

you have been nominated for will include civilian oversight of U.S. Cyber Command 

426 

(CYBERCOM). How do you envision your role in this relationship with 

CYBERCOM? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. If confirmed, I see my role as supporting the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in executing their statutory authorities for civilian oversight of CYBERCOM. In practical terms, I would engage in daily 

interaction with other Department offices, the Joint Staff, and CYBER’s leadership 

to continue development of the Cyber Mission Force and associated capabilities, to 

mature processes and procedures for cyber operations, and to integrate cyber into 

joint operations across the Department. If confirmed, and if the Secretary of Defense 

designates the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as the Principal Cyber Advisor, I would also develop the cross-functional team called for in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 to support the Principal 

Cyber Advisor in streamlining oversight of cyber and to ensure we move forward 

in an integrated and organized fashion to support CYBERCOM’s missions. 

[The nomination reference of Mr. Eric Rosenbach follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 7, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Eric Rosenbach of Pennsylvania, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice 

Paul N. Stockton, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Eric Rosenbach, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ERIC B. ROSENBACH

Education: 

Davidson College 

• 1991–1995 • Bachelor of Arts 

Harvard Kennedy School 

• 2002–2004 • Masters Public Policy 

Georgetown University Law School 

• 2004–2007 

• Juris Doctorate 

Employment record: 

Fulbright Foundation, Sofia, Bulgaria 

• Fulbright Scholar 

• 08/1995–08/1996 

U.S. Army, Germany/Bosnia/Kosovo 

• Intelligence Officer 

• 09/1996–11/2000 

World Online/Tiscali Telecom, Frankfurt, Germany 

• Chief Information Security Officer 

• 11/2000–1/2002 

Booz Allen Hamilton, Washington, DC 

• Associate Consultant 

• 02/2002–02/2005 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC 

• Professional Staff Member 

• 02/2005–08/2007 

Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for International Affairs, Cambridge, MA 

• Executive Director 

427 

• 08/2007–06/2010 

Markle Foundation, Washington, DC 

• Managing Director for National Security 

• 06/2010–05/2011 

Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA 

• Adjunct Lecturer 

• 09/2008–06/2011 

Good Harbor Consulting, Washington, DC 

• Principal 

• 05/2011–09/2011 

Department of Defense, Washington, DC 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy 

• 09/2011–Present 

Honors and awards: 

Military awards: 

• Meritorious Service Medal, 2000. A military award presented to members 

of the U.S. Armed Forces who distinguished themselves by outstanding 

meritorious achievement or service to the United States. 

• The Knowlton Award, 1999. The Knowlton Award recognizes individuals 

who have contributed significantly to the promotion of Army Military Intelligence in ways that stand out in the eyes of the recipients, their superiors, 

subordinates, and peers. These individuals must also demonstrate the highest standards of integrity and moral character, display an outstanding degree of professional competence, and serve the MI Corps with distinction. 

• Distinguished Military Graduate, 1995. Presented to the most outstanding graduate of the Davidson College ROTC program. 

Federal civilian awards: N/A. 

Academic awards: 

• Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Advisor of the Year, 2009. Presented 

each year to the faculty member selected by Kennedy School students as 

the best advisor. 

• Fulbright Scholar, 1995–1996. The Fulbright U.S. Scholar Program sends 

distinguished American scholars to approximately 125 countries, where 

they lecture and/or conduct research in a wide variety of academic fields. 

Other awards: N/A. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Mr. Eric Rosenbach in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

428 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Eric Brien Rosenbach. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 

3. Date of nomination: 

January 7, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

September 23, 1972; Colorado Springs, CO. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Cristina Alexandra Lopez-Casero. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Sophia Marie Rosenbach, 6. 

Maximillian Francisco Rosenbach, 3. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Davidson College, 8/1991–6/1995, BA granted 6/1995. 

Harvard Kennedy School, 9/2002–6/2004, MPP granted 6/2004. 

Georgetown University Law Center, 9/2004–12/2007, JD granted 6/2008. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, Department of Defense, 

Washington, DC, 9/2011–present. 

Principal, Good Harbor Consulting, Washington, DC, 5/2011–9/2011. 

Adjunct Lecturer, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, 9/2008–6/2011. 

Managing Director for National Security, Markle Foundation, Washington, DC, 6/ 

2010–5/2011. 

Executive Director, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for International Affairs, 8/2007–6/2010. 

Professional Staff, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, 2/ 

2005–8/2007. 

Associate Consultant, Booz Allen Hamilton, Washington, DC, 1/2002–2/2005. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

During my time at the Harvard Kennedy School I provided analysis for the Joint 

Staff Pakistan-Afghan Coordination Cell and the Director of National Intelligence. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Maryland Bar Association. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

$100 - Juliette Kayyem for Governor of Massachusetts, 12/2013. 

429 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Fulbright Scholar, 1995–1996. The Fulbright U.S. Scholar Program sends distinguished American scholars to approximately 125 countries, where they lecture and/ 

or conduct research in a wide variety of academic fields. 

The Knowlton Award, 1999. The Knowlton Award recognizes individuals who 

have contributed significantly to the promotion of Army Military Intelligence in 

ways that stand out in the eyes of the recipients, their superiors, subordinates, and 

peers. These individuals must also demonstrate the highest standards of integrity 

and moral character, display an outstanding degree of professional competence, and 

serve the MI Corps with distinction. 

Meritorious Service Medal, 2000. A military award presented to members of the 

U.S. Armed Forces who distinguished themselves by outstanding meritorious 

achievement or service to the United States. 

Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Advisor of the Year, 2009. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Books: 

‘‘Find, Fix, Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns That Killed Bin Laden 

and Devastated Al Qaeda’’ Public Affairs Books, 2011. 

‘‘Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence’’ Westview Press, 2009. 

‘‘Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community’’ Harvard Kennedy School, 2009. 

‘‘Trials By Fire: Counterterrorism and the Law’’ Harvard University, 2009. 

‘‘Defeating the Jihadists’’ Century Foundation Press, 2004. 

Chapters: 

‘‘Securing Cyberspace: A New Domain for National Security’’ Aspen Institute 

Press. 2011. 

‘‘The New Find-Fix-Finish Doctrine’’ Joint Force Quarterly. 2011. 

‘‘The Incisive Fight: Recommendations for Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence’’ American Academy of Political Science. Volume 618, 2008. 

Op-Eds: 

‘‘Afghan Security for Afghanistan’’ The Huffington Post: September 5, 2009. 

‘‘Pakistan Smart to Hit Taliban’’ Boston Globe: February 21, 2010. 

‘‘What Maliki’s Power Means for U.S.’’ The Boston Globe: July 24, 2009. 

‘‘China’s Cyber Warriors’’ Baltimore Sun; July 18, 2008. 

‘‘Real Intelligence Men Don’t Cry’’ Washington Post: May 28, 2008. 

‘‘Rethinking U.S. Foreign Policy’’ Globe and Mail: December 7, 2007. 

‘‘President Bush Reciting Bin Laden’s Script’’ The Huffington Post: November 2, 

2007. 

‘‘After success in Bosnia, why failure in Iraq? Arrogance in the Pentagon’’ International Herald Tribune: September 4, 2004. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

Event: Andreessen Horowitz, Software Eats DC, Technologies that will Change 

Government; Date: Thursday, May 9, 2013; 12:00–12:30; Topic/Description: Over the 

Horizon Challenges for Cybersecurity 

Event: Georgetown International Engagement on Cyber; Date: April 10, 2013; 

Georgetown University; Topic/Description: Current International Cyber Affairs: Conflict or Consensus? 

Event: AFCEA Cybersecurity Symposium 2013; Date: February 22, 2013; 09:00– 

09:35; Topic/Description: Combating the Proliferation of Destructive Malware 

Event: FEDcyber.com Cyber Security Summit; Date: Nov 15, 2012, 08:10–09:00; 

Topic/Description: Addressing Cyber Workforce Challenges for a New Domain of 

Conflict 

Event: SINET Workshop; Date: Thursday, October 25, 2012; 11:10–12:00; Topic/ 

Description: ‘‘DOD, DHS, and the Private Sector: Defining Roles and Responsibilities and Improving Information Sharing’’. 

Event: Keynote at Minerva Project Conference; Date: September 13, 2012, 11:15– 

12:00; Topic/Description: ‘‘Theories of Power and Deterrence’’. 

Event: Panelist Discussion at RSA Conference; Date: February 2012; Topic/Description: The Roles and Responsibilities of Government in Cybersecurity. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

430 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

ERIC ROSENBACH. 

This 17th day of January, 2014. 

[The nomination of Mr. Eric Rosenbach was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 26, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 18, 2014.] 

(431) 

NOMINATIONS OF GEN. PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, 

FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF 

GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. 

TRANSPORTATION COMMAND; AND VADM 

MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL 

AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY 

AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICES/COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND 

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Udall, 

Manchin, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, 

Chambliss, Wicker, Ayotte, Graham, Vitter, Lee, and Cruz. 

Other Senator present: Senator Kirk. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets today to consider the nomination of General Paul Selva to 

be Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM); Admiral Michael Rogers to be Commander, U.S. 

Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), Director of the National Security 

Agency (NSA), and Director of the Central Security Service. 

We welcome our nominees. We thank you for your many years 

of service and for your willingness to continue to serve in positions 

of great responsibility, and of course we thank your families, who 

give up so much to enable you to serve. 

TRANSCOM, which encompasses the Air Force’s Mobility Command, the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, the Army’s Surface 

Deployment and Distribution Command, is the linchpin of our strategic mobility. TRANSCOM has played a crucial role in supplying 

our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has also taken the lead 

in bringing troops and equipment home from Afghanistan. 

We’d be interested in the nominee’s views on how long we can 

wait for a bilateral security agreement to be signed by President 

Karzai or his successor and still meet the December 31, 2014, deadline for removing all of our people and equipment from Afghanistan 

432 

in the event—and I emphasize—in the event we end up without an 

agreement. 

Like other elements of the Department of Defense (DOD), 

TRANSCOM suffers from constant threats from cyber intrusions. 

Because of the command’s reliance on the commercial sector to supplement its transportation capacity, it must be sensitive not only 

to the vulnerability of its own computer systems, but also to the 

vulnerability of the private companies that it relies on to mobilize, 

transport, and resupply our troops. 

Our committee will soon release a report on cyber intrusions affecting TRANSCOM contractors and the extent to which information about such intrusion reaches TRANSCOM and other key entities within DOD. That’s an issue which touches both of the nominees’ prospective commands. We welcome your thoughts on dealing 

with this ongoing problem. 

Last month, we heard testimony from General Alexander, the 

current CYBERCOM Commander, regarding a number of pressing 

issues currently facing the command. We look forward to hearing 

Admiral Rogers’ views on many of the same issues, including the 

qualifications of the personnel that the Military Services are making available for their new cyber units, the tools and data sources 

these forces will have to work with, the ability of the Military Services to manage the careers of their growing cadre of cyber specialists, and the steps that should be taken to ensure that the Reserve 

components are effectively integrated into the cyber mission. 

The committee will also be interested in Admiral Rogers’ views 

on the collection of bulk telephone call records, the collection of the 

contents of Internet communications, and other NSA programs that 

have raised public concerns about threats to privacy and to civil 

liberties. For example, Admiral, we would like to know your reaction to the recent statement of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 

Oversight Board with respect to the section 215 telephone call 

record program that they have not, and this is the board saying 

this, that they have not, ‘‘identified a single instance involving a 

threat to the United States in which the program made a concrete 

difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation.’’ 

We’d be interested in knowing what steps, Admiral, you would 

take if confirmed to assess the continuing value of this program 

and to weigh that value against its potential impact on privacy and 

civil liberties. Do you support the President’s recent directive to 

modify the program so that bulk records are no longer held by the 

Government, while ensuring that these records can be accessed 

when necessary? What is your view on the threshold or standard 

that the Government should be required to meet to search through 

such data? Admiral Rogers will play a key role in providing advice 

on these and other issues. 

Thanks again to both of our nominees for being here today, for 

your service to the Nation over many, many years, and your willingness to continue that service. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Two weeks ago I expressed to General Alexander my support for 

the progress under way at CYBERCOM to normalize cyber planning and capabilities. Despite these critical strides, the lack of a 

433 

cyber-deterrence policy and the failure to establish meaningful 

norms that punish bad behavior have left us more vulnerable to 

continued cyber aggression. In particular, I’m deeply concerned 

about the two well-publicized events by Iran that involved an enduring campaign of cyber-attacks on U.S. banks and the financial 

sector and another involving the exploitation of a critical Navy network. 

The administration’s failure to acknowledge or establish penalties for these actions emboldens countries like North Korea, Russia, China, and places American infrastructure such as the power 

grid or Wall Street at greater risk. The President’s going to have 

to get serious and develop a meaningful cyber deterrence policy. 

General Selva, TRANSCOM provides the lifeline for every other 

combatant command by enabling them to execute a wide array of 

missions from combat operations to humanitarian relief, from 

training exercises to supporting coalition partners. I’m interested 

in your assessment of the readiness of TRANSCOM and its components, including the viability of the commercial sector to support 

TRANSCOM missions. I’m also interested in your assessment of 

TRANSCOM’s ability to meet U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 

and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) requirements. 

General Fraser testified last year that the number of cyber-attacks against TRANSCOM had doubled from 45,000 in 2011 to 

nearly 100,000 in 2012. The committee has been investigating 

these incidents and it appears that there are a number of factors 

that should be addressed to ensure that TRANSCOM has the information necessary from its many contractors to defend its networks 

and protect mission-critical data. 

I look forward to hearing from our nominees on how they intend 

to work together to ensure that these issues are corrected and 

TRANSCOM’s classified and unclassified networks are secured. It’s 

something that not many people know about, but I don’t draw a 

distinction between a cyber-attack and a military attack in places. 

We’ll have a chance to talk about that during the questioning. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

We’re delighted to have Senator Kirk with us this morning to introduce one of our nominees. It’s great to have you with this committee and to call on you now for your introduction. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK KIRK, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Senator KIRK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I’m 

here to introduce Mike Rogers to the committee. I have known 

Mike Rogers for almost 40 years. We were in the same home room 

in high school together. I had the honor to work for Mike as a reservist when he was the head of intel for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

I would say that you cannot pick a better guy, an officer who has 

a stronger work ethic or detail orientation, than Mike. I wanted to 

say that being a Republican, I have not supported a lot of the 

nominees of the President. I would say that this is the best American you could have picked for this job. 

That would conclude my statement. 

434 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much for that wonderful introduction. 

The first question we’re going to ask Admiral Rogers is what did 

he know about you in home room. He’s going to tell us some secrets 

that you have now unleashed on yourself, I think. 

Thank you for being with us, Senator Kirk. 

All right. We’ll call on, I think in order of their being listed, General Selva. Of course, Senator Kirk, you’re free to stay or leave because we know you have a tough schedule. General Selva. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

General SELVA. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, distinguished 

members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it’s a great 

honor to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to be 

the Commander of U.S. Transportation Command. First I want to 

thank the members of this committee for their steadfast support of 

the airmen in Air Mobility Command, who throughout the last decade have literally moved mountains to support our soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, and marines in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s because of your 

continued support that they’ve been able to provide the global 

reach that’s so important to this great Nation. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and other relevant committees to navigate the challenges of leading the men 

and women of TRANSCOM. 

I’m proud today to introduce you to my wife Ricky, who’s seated 

right behind me, who has served with me and by my side for our 

34 years of marriage, since our graduation as classmates from the 

U.S. Air Force Academy. She served in uniform for 9 years and 

gives generously of her time now to support the amazing airmen 

and their families that are part of Air Mobility Command. She is 

the love of my life and, apart from my mother, is one of the very 

few people that can give me the unabashed feedback I need when 

I step away from centerline. 

It’s also a privilege to be here today with a friend and colleague, 

Admiral Mike Rogers, with whom I have served on the Joint Staff, 

and I can think of no better person to serve in the capacity for 

which he has been nominated. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, and marines of TRANSCOM, Active, Guard, Reserve, and 

their civilian counterparts, as well as the vast network of commercial partners that provide the distribution and logistics networks 

that make our Nation successful. 

I appreciate the trust and confidence that the President, Secretary of Defense, and General Dempsey have put in me in considering me for this position. I’m grateful for the opportunity to be before you here today and I look forward to your questions. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, thank you so much. Again, I’m glad 

you introduced your family. I should have indicated that you’re 

both welcome to introduce family and anyone else who’s here to 

support you. We’re delighted you did that. 

Admiral. 

435 

STATEMENT OF VADM MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; CHIEF, 

CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICES; AND COMMANDER, U.S. 

CYBER COMMAND 

Admiral ROGERS. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored and humbled that 

the President has nominated me for duty as Commander, U.S. 

Cyber Command, and designated me as the next Director of the 

National Security Agency. I also thank Secretary of Defense Hagel 

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey for 

their confidence in my ability to assume these significant duties. 

I’m joined today by my wife, Dana. One evening 30 years ago, in 

fact here in Washington, DC, she took a chance on a then-young 

Lieutenant Junior Grade Rogers, which just goes to show that truly 

great things can happen to a sailor on liberty. I want to very publicly thank her for her love and support, both for the past nearly 

29 years of marriage and for her service to the Nation and, perhaps 

most importantly, her willingness to take on an even greater set 

of challenges if I am confirmed. 

I have always believed that the life we lead in uniform is even 

more difficult for our spouses and our families than it is on us, and 

I am blessed to have a great partner in Dana. 

Not with us today are our two sons, Justin, a serving naval officer currently on sea duty, which on a day like today sure sounds 

like a great place to be, and Patrick, a very hard-working college 

student. 

I’m also honored to be here today alongside General Paul Selva, 

who, as he has indicated, we have had the pleasure of working together before and I can attest to his significant abilities firsthand. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the members 

of this committee in addressing the significant cyber challenges facing our Nation today and into the future. We face a growing array 

of cyber threats from foreign intelligence services, terrorists, criminal groups, and hacktivists, who are increasing their capability to 

steal, manipulate, or destroy information and networks in a manner that risks compromising our personal and national security. 

They do so via a manmade environment that is constantly evolving 

and through the use of techniques and capabilities that are continually changing. 

This is hard work and it requires change, something seldom easy 

either for individuals or for organizations. If confirmed as the Commander, CYBERCOM, my priority will be to generate the capabilities and capacities needed to operate in this dynamic environment 

and to provide senior decision makers and my fellow operational 

commanders with a full range of options within the cyber arena. 

I will partner aggressively with others in doing so, particularly 

with our allies and partners, those in the private and academic sectors, within DOD and agencies and organizations across the U.S. 

Government as well as Congress. 

I am also mindful that CYBERCOM and the NSA are two different organizations, each having its own identity, authorities, and 

oversight mechanisms, while executing often related and linked 

mission sets. Each has the potential to make the other stronger in 

436 

executing those missions and I will work to ensure each is appropriately focused. When there is differing opinion between them, I 

will make the call as the commander, always mindful that the mission of each is to deliver better mission outcomes. 

I will also be ever mindful that we must do all of this in a manner which protects the civil liberties and privacy of our citizens. I 

will ensure strict adherence to policy, law, and the oversight mechanisms in place. I will be an active partner in implementing the 

changes directed by the President with respect to aspects of the 

NSA mission, and my intent is to be as transparent as possible in 

doing so and in the broader execution of my duties if confirmed. 

To the men and women of the NSA and CYBERCOM, I thank 

you for your commitment to the security of our Nation and for your 

professionalism. I believe in you and in the missions you execute 

in defending the security of the Nation and its citizens. I am honored to even be considered for duty as your leader and, if confirmed, I look forward to joining the team. 

I also want to thank General Keith Alexander for his almost 40 

years of commissioned service to this Nation. He has laid a solid 

foundation at CYBERCOM and the NSA for those who come behind him. He has made a huge contribution in this mission set and 

I thank him and Debby for all that they have given the Nation. 

Finally, let me conclude by thanking those men and women, far 

too numerous to name individually, who have given me the love 

and support in my life to live the dream I have had since I was 

literally a young boy of being a serving naval officer. From those 

who shaped me in my youth to those who have led, mentored, guided, taught, or in some instances flat-out just kicked me in the tail 

in my time in uniform when I needed it most, I thank them. I fully 

realize that I am in no small part here today because of the efforts 

of so many others in my life. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you and I 

look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, thank you so much. 

We have standard questions that we ask of our nominees and 

here they are: Have you both adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Admiral ROGERS. I have. 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in 

power? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

Admiral ROGERS. No, sir. 

General SELVA. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you make sure your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

437 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and 

briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 

for their testimony or briefings? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this committee? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely 

manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you both. 

Let’s try 7 minutes for our first round of questions. 

General, let me start with you. I asked this in my opening statement, asked you to consider this question: How long can the negotiations on a bilateral security agreement continue before 

TRANSCOM will be at risk of being able to get all of our cargo out 

of Afghanistan if there is no bilateral security agreement and we 

have to leave Afghanistan completely by the end of the year? 

General SELVA. Senator, my understanding from consulting with 

the TRANSCOM staff on that question is that through the early 

fall we still have sufficient capacity in the variety of networks that 

we’re using to redeploy cargo from Afghanistan to be able to make 

the decision at that point. To be able to give you a specific date, 

I’d have to consult with General Lloyd Austin down at CENTCOM, 

and if confirmed we’ll be happy to do so and come back to you with 

a more definitive answer. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

The next question for you, General, has to do with the intrusions, 

the cyber intrusions, and whether or not they affect DOD information. Is it not important that TRANSCOM know of cyber intrusions 

that can pose a risk to operations even if they don’t immediately 

affect DOD data? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. As you’re aware, the network that we 

use inside TRANSCOM consists significantly of our relationship 

with commercial transportation and logistics providers. Roughly 90 

percent of the information in my current position as Air Mobility 

Command, and I suspect inside TRANSCOM as well, travels across 

unclassified networks. Being able to maintain the security of those 

networks through appropriate mechanisms inside those commercial 

companies is critical to our success. 

We have an obligation to be able to assure the validity and veracity of the information that we pass on those networks. As a result, 

one of the initiatives that’s been taken is to include in all of our 

commercial contracts a stipulation that commercial providers provide us with information on any intrusions into their networks. 

438 

I’m not aware of the details of the report that you spoke about, 

but I look forward to working with your staff on being able to work 

those details if confirmed. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Admiral, in January the President ordered a transition to end 

the section 215 telephone metadata collection program as it currently exists, to, ‘‘preserve the capabilities that we need,’’ but without the Government collecting and holding the data on call detail 

records. Let me ask you this, what in your view are the essential 

capabilities that need to be preserved in transitioning the program 

as the President directed? What are those essential capabilities? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, there’s a process ongoing to work through 

that. I’m not part of that process, but one of my thoughts in particular would be the idea of speed, the ability to query the data, 

to work with the new mechanisms that we will put in place, and 

to do so in a timely manner to generate information and insight in 

a way that enables us to act in a timely manner. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, do you agree that the Government itself 

does not need to hold all the metadata records in order to determine whether terrorist suspects overseas are communicating with 

persons located in the United States? In other words, is it possible 

that a third party could be designated to hold the data on the one 

hand and then have the service providers keep the data on the 

other hand? 

Admiral ROGERS. I believe, sir, with the right construct we can 

make that work. 

Chairman LEVIN. You could have a third party other than the 

service providers, or would it be limited to the service providers 

holding that data? 

Admiral ROGERS. Again, I think those are options all under consideration. I believe we could make either scenario work, whether 

the service providers did it or a third party did it. There are definitely some challenges we’ll need to work through, but I’m confident in our ability to do so. 

Chairman LEVIN. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the 

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and the President’s 

Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology 

characterized the section 215 program as useful but not critical. 

The Oversight Board said that, ‘‘We have not identified a single instance involving a threat to the United States in which the program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation.’’ 

First of all, do you have an assessment of the utility of the program, and how that utility compares to the level of concern that 

the American people have about its perceived impact on privacy? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, first, as the nominee I’m not in a position 

to really yet be able to comment on the value of 215. But if confirmed I certainly intend to be able to do so. I believe one of the 

most important functions of the Director of the NSA is to be able 

to articulate just that, what is the value of our efforts, so that we 

can make well-informed and smart decisions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 

there has been an instance involving a threat to the United States 

439 

in which the 215 program made a concrete difference? Do you have 

an opinion going in on that subject? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, nothing specific. I have not had a chance 

to sit down and particularly review the events, although if my 

memory is correct General Alexander has testified before this committee last month, as you indicated, in which he outlined a number 

of instances in which he thought 215 generated value. 

Chairman LEVIN. This is also for you, Admiral. Do you think 

DOD is doing enough to provide capabilities for our defensive cyber 

units by exploiting commercial technology? 

Admiral ROGERS. I will use my own experience right now as the 

Navy component, if you will, to CYBERCOM, where we have a continual outreach to the broader commercial and industry sectors in 

an attempt to identify just what technologies are available that we 

could use in the missions. There is an aggressive effort to do so. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you both. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We’ve expressed many times our concern about Iran and the 

threat that they pose to us and that our intelligence, unclassified 

intelligence, as far back as 2007 indicated that they would have a 

capability of a weapon and a delivery system by 2015. Then it was 

even more forcefully expressed in a report that was unclassified by 

our intelligence in 2010 reaffirming their suspicions earlier. 

I’ve been concerned about that for a long period of time. I’m concerned that we have a President that somehow thinks that there 

is an opportunity to get them to join the global community and reform their ways. A recent Wall Street Journal article suggested 

that the Iranians were able to successfully infiltrate the critical 

Navy computer network. The February 17 article raises serious 

questions, suggesting Iran was able to access the bloodstream of 

the Navy network. Now, I’m going to quote from that report: 

‘‘Iran’s infiltration of a Navy computer network was far more extensive than previously thought. It took the Navy about 4 months 

to finally purge the hackers from its biggest unclassified computer 

network.’’ 

Now, if that’s true, the geopolitical consequences of such an attack should really be profound. However, it remains unclear what, 

if anything, this administration would do in response to such behavior. Would a similar penetration by the Iranians’ warplanes into 

American air space be treated with such ambivalence? I would 

hope not. 

Admiral Rogers, your current job as Commander of the Fleet 

Cyber Command means that you are the one responsible for defending Navy networks. This happened on your watch, correct? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, it did. 

Senator INHOFE. What are the consequences of Iranian action in 

cyber space? 

Admiral ROGERS. First, sir, as a matter of policy and for operational security reasons we have never categorized who exactly, 

publicly, penetrated the network. I would be glad to discuss this 

with you in a classified session. 

440 

Senator INHOFE. No, this has been discussed in an unclassified 

session for quite some time, that we’re talking about Iran in this 

case. So go ahead. 

Admiral ROGERS. I’m sorry, sir. Not to my knowledge. I apologize. 

Specifically, a segment of our global unclassified network was 

compromised. An opponent was able to gain access to the system. 

In response to that, I generated an operational requirement not 

just to push them out of the network, but I wanted to use this opportunity to do a much more foundational review of the entire network, to use this as an opportunity to drive change within my own 

Service. 

Senator INHOFE. What is the administration doing now in response to this attack? 

Admiral ROGERS. I’m sorry, I apologize, but I’m not in a position 

to comment. 

Senator INHOFE. In my opening statement I quoted General Fraser. He testified last year that the number of cyber-attacks on 

TRANSCOM had doubled from 45,000 in 2011 to nearly 100,000 in 

2012. Now, that’s not very good, is it? Does that concern you, and 

to what level, General Selva? 

General SELVA. Senator, in my current position as Air Mobility 

Command Commander I’m aware of those statistics. We’ve taken 

pretty aggressive action to secure our networks. As I discussed before, the nature of our network that ties us to commercial providers 

of transportation requires us to have access to the information from 

their networks as well, and we have been working diligently with 

those contractors and commercial providers to secure those networks. 

The number of attacks doesn’t actually equate to the number of 

actual intrusions and data exfiltrated, but to the number of probes 

and attempts to get into the network. If confirmed for the position 

of TRANSCOM Commander, I’ll continue to work that issue hard 

with Admiral Rogers’ team at CYBERCOM as well as with our 

24th Air Force team, which is the designated unit that essentially 

provides the external security for our networks. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. When we had a hearing on February 

27—General Alexander and I have become good friends over the 

years and we’ve had a chance to have a lot of conversations, personal conversations—he was asked when a cyber-attack is actually 

an act of war and to explain what sort of actions an adversary 

might take in crossing that threshold. He answered that he believes that if an attack destroys military or government networks 

or impacts our ability to operate, you have crossed that line. 

Admiral Rogers, do you agree with his characterization? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would agree. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you agree that they’ve crossed that line? 

Admiral ROGERS. I’m sorry? The ‘‘they’’? 

Senator INHOFE. They have crossed that line in the actions that 

they have taken? 

Admiral ROGERS. What ‘‘they’’ you’re referring to, sir? 

Senator INHOFE. I’m talking about, when General Alexander was 

asked when a cyber-attack does cross that line and become an act 

of war, and he said that, impacts our ability to operate, you have 

441 

crossed that line. Do you agree with that characterization and do 

you believe that we’ve crossed that line? 

Admiral ROGERS. No, I do not believe we have crossed that line. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you agree with the statement that was made 

by General Selva that the number of attacks, cyber attacks against 

TRANSCOM, doubling from 45,000 in 2011 to nearly 100,000 in 

2012 doesn’t properly express our deterrent against these attacks? 

Does this concern you, that we have doubled in that period of time 

in the number of cyber-attacks on us? 

Admiral ROGERS. I apologize. Is your question to the General or 

myself, sir? 

Senator INHOFE. The question is for you. I’m saying that General 

Fraser testified that the number of cyber-attacks on TRANSCOM, 

or let’s say cyber-attacks period, has increased from 45,000 to 

100,000 in a period of a year. Isn’t that concerning? Doesn’t that 

mean that perhaps we’re not doing the job we should be doing? 

Admiral ROGERS. It is concerning. I think it’s reflective of the 

level of investment that the Department is making in this cyber 

mission set. Even as we face challenging budget times, cyber remains one of the areas in which the Department remains committed to actual growth in capability. 

Senator INHOFE. My only concern here is that, first of all, I believe a lot of the things that I’ve gotten from the unclassified media 

and classified media, that Iran is very active in this area. I’ve been 

concerned about their capabilities and I’ve expressed that concern, 

and it appears to me that a statement such as we have from the 

administration, ‘‘If Iran seizes this opportunity and chooses to join 

the global community, then we can chip away at the distrust that 

exists.’’ I just think that we need to be talking about the fact that 

we have an enemy out there, and he’s demonstrated that very 

clearly. 

A few years ago nobody knew what a cyber attack was. But I 

think we all understand now it can be just as critical, just as damaging to our country, as an attack with weapons on this country. 

I think you all agree with that, don’t you? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your distinguished 

service to our Nation. 

Admiral Rogers, I want to turn to you and your written testimony and advance policy responses. In those, I noted that you stated if the Government could continue to access phone records 

through phone service provider repositories that could serve as a 

viable alternative to the current bulk phone records collection program. I was glad to read that. 

You also wrote that the business records 215 program, ‘‘grew out 

of a desire to address a gap identified after September 11,’’ since 

one of the hijackers, Khalid Al-Midhar, made a phone call from San 

Diego to a known al Qaeda safe house in Yemen. You noted that 

the NSA saw that call, but it could not see the call was coming 

from an individual already in the United States. 

442 

I’m concerned by the implication that somehow the section 215 

program could have prevented September 11 and I want to set the 

record straight from my point of view. As the 9/11 Commission 

pointed out, the Central Intelligence Agency knew about AlMidhar, but did not tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So the 

argument that business records data could have been the key to 

identifying Al-Midhar doesn’t stand up in my view. 

Also, I don’t know why the NSA couldn’t have gained the authorization on an individualized basis to determine whether this Yemeni number was in contact with anyone in the United States, and 

I don’t see why a bulk collection authority would have been necessary. 

As I’m sure you’ll agree, the Constitution is not an impediment 

to our security; it’s the source of our security. We can end bulk collection and focus on terrorists and spies without infringing on the 

constitutional rights of law-abiding Americans. Last year the President acknowledged what I’ve been saying: The status quo must 

change. I look forward to working with you to make those changes. 

If I might, in looking ahead I want to turn to the 702 program 

and ask a policy question about the authorities under section 702. 

It’s written into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 

The committee asked your understanding of the legal rationale for 

the NSA to search through data acquired under section 702 using 

U.S. person identifiers without probable cause. You replied that the 

NSA court-approved procedures only permit searches of this lawfully acquired data using U.S. person identifiers for valid foreign 

intelligence purposes and under the oversight of the Justice Department and the Director of National Intelligence. 

The statute’s written to anticipate the incidental collection of 

American communications in the course of collecting the communications of foreigners reasonably believed to be located overseas. 

But the focus of that collection is clearly intended to be foreigners’ 

communications, not Americans’. 

But declassified court documents show that in 2011 the NSA 

sought and obtained the authority to go through communications 

collected under section 702 and conduct warrantless searches for 

the communications of specific Americans. My question is simple: 

Have any of those searches ever been conducted? 

Admiral ROGERS. I apologize, sir, that I’m not in a position to be 

able to answer that as the nominee. But—— 

Senator UDALL. Yes? 

Admiral ROGERS. But if you would like me to come back to you 

in the future, if confirmed, to be able to specifically address that 

question, I would be glad to do so, sir. 

Senator UDALL. Let me follow up on that. You may recall that 

Director Clapper was asked this question at a hearing earlier this 

year. He didn’t believe that an open forum was the appropriate setting in which to discuss these issues. The problem that I have, Senator Wyden’s had, and others is that we’ve tried various ways to 

get an unclassified answer, simple answer, a yes or no to the question. We want to have an answer because it relates, the answer 

does, to Americans’ privacy. 

Can you commit to answering the question before the committee 

votes on your nomination? 

443 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, I believe that one of my challenges as the 

Director, if confirmed, is how do we engage the American people 

and by extension their representatives in a dialogue in which they 

have a level of comfort as to what we are doing and why. It is no 

insignificant challenge for those of us with an intelligence background, to be honest. But I believe that one of the take-aways from 

the situation over the last few months has been as an intelligence 

professional, as a senior intelligence leader, I have to be capable of 

communicating in a way that highlights what we are doing and 

why to the greatest extent possible. 

Perhaps the compromise is, if it comes to the how we do things 

and the specifics, those are best addressed perhaps in classified 

sessions, but that one of my challenges is I have to be able to speak 

in broad terms in a way that most people can understand. I look 

forward to that challenge. 

Senator UDALL. I’m going to continue asking that question, and 

I also look forward to working with you to rebuild the confidence, 

as you pointed out, that the public has in the very vital mission 

that you have. 

If I might, let’s turn to cyber for the last half of my time. Before 

I ask a specific question—and I don’t want to steal Senator 

McCain’s thunder, although that’s impossible, to steal Senator 

McCain’s thunder. I think he has a very creative idea in setting up 

a special committee on cyber security, so that we could cut through 

some of the jurisdictional tensions that exist. 

In a more specific context, you noted in your comments that we 

have to really work to develop and train a significant number of 

highly capable cyber personnel to meet the Nation’s needs. There’s 

no doubt if we’re going to achieve dominance that we have to have 

those personnel. We’ve done it in the physical world and in the kinetic world, and we can do it in cyber space. Do you believe we’re 

doing enough to cultivate cyber professionals in the early stages of 

their career? 

The Air Force Academy, which is located in my State, has given 

cadets the opportunity to fly small aircraft in their college years. 

They enter pilot training then already familiar with the fundamentals and the feel of flying an airplane or a helicopter. I’m afraid 

we’re not giving that same level of attention to cyber training programs. Should we be investing in more hands-on real world training opportunities at our academies for the next generation of cyber 

warriors? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. As a naval officer, currently as the 

Navy component commander, I have worked with our own Naval 

Academy on doing just that. In fact, right now the requirement at 

the Naval Academy is there is a baseline cyber course requirement 

for every midshipman to graduate from the Naval Academy now. 

That’s a new requirement laid down within the last couple of years. 

Senator UDALL. I look forward to working with you in that area 

as well, because we will achieve dominance, but we have to make 

those investments upfront. I think you and I violently agree. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you again, both of you, for your willingness to serve in these important positions. 

Thank you. 

444 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses for their outstanding service. Just to follow 

up, Admiral Rogers, General Alexander when I asked, he said because of the overlapping jurisdictions of many committees of Congress that he thought that a select committee to investigate this 

entire issue, which covers a wide spectrum, would be a good idea. 

Do you have a view? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, steps which would try to bring together 

those focused—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I would ask if you have a view on whether we 

should have a select committee or not, Admiral. I’m not used to obfuscation here, okay? Let’s not start out that way. Would you or 

would you not agree that a select committee would be a good idea? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General, are you on track to remove all the necessary equipment 

and armaments from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 that you are 

tasked to do? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. You are confident? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. You’re on track right now? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Admiral, I want to bring up this issue again of the Iranian hack 

of Navy computers. According to a Wall Street Journal article, the 

Iranian hack of the Navy’s largest unclassified computer network 

reportedly took more than 4 months to resolve, raising concern 

among some lawmakers about security gaps exposed by the attack. 

The paper reported that the hackers were able to remain in the 

network until this past November. That contradicts what officials 

told the Journal when the attack was first publicly reported this 

past September. At that time, officials told the paper that the intruders had been removed. ‘‘ ‘It was a real big deal,’ a senior U.S. 

official told the Journal. ‘It was a significant penetration. It showed 

a weakness in the system.’ ’’ 

Can you help out the committee on that whole scenario here? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. It was a significant penetration, which 

is one of the reasons why over the last few months multiple updates to staffers on this committee, because one of the things I 

wanted to do was, how do we learn from this, how do we work hard 

to make sure it doesn’t happen again. As a result, I directed a rather comprehensive operational response to that. That response was 

much broader than just be able to come back and say they’re not 

there anymore. I wanted to use this as an opportunity to try to 

drive change. We put a much more comprehensive, much longer 

term effort in place than if I had just said, I want to immediately 

remove them. I wanted to do more than that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Was the damage done in your view, significant? 

General SELVA. I’m not sure that I would agree with significant, 

but it is of concern, because in this case they did not opt to engage 

445 

in any destructive behavior. My concern from the beginning was, 

what if they had decided that was their intent? 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. 

Admiral, we have a real problem here, at least from the standpoint of those of us who feel that our ability to monitor the behavior of possible attackers of the United States of America is vital. 

Mr. Snowden has done some really significant damage. There were 

polls in the January Quinnipiac Survey, 57 percent of Americans 

branded Mr. Snowden as a whistleblower, and 34 percent called 

him a traitor. 

A Fox News poll taken the same month found 68 percent of 

Americans were glad to know about the NSA programs Snowden 

revealed, while CBS’ survey found those disapproving of Snowden’s 

conduct outnumbered those approving 54 to 31. Still, it’s a very significant number of Americans that view Mr. Snowden as a whistleblower and a significant portion of Americans as a patriot and approve of his conduct. 

What do you think we need to do to counter that impression the 

American people have, when I’m sure that you and I are in total 

agreement that this individual violated a solemn oath that he 

made not to reveal this information and has damaged our ability 

to defend this Nation? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, I would agree with your assessment. 

I think in general there’s a couple things here. The first is this idea 

of transparency, as Senator Udall mentioned, this idea that we 

have to have a dialogue that talks about what are we doing and 

the why. 

In addition, we have to ensure strict accountability on the part 

of the NSA. We have to make sure that we do in fact follow those 

processes appropriately, and when we make a mistake, if we fail 

to meet those requirements, that we’re very upfront about how and 

the why. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have any thoughts about the allegations 

that the FISA courts are just a rubber stamp for the administration? 

Admiral ROGERS. I don’t believe that to be the case. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that they are exercising sufficient oversight? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you appreciate the fact that we have, at 

least with a large number of Americans and people around the 

world, a significant problem with the public relations aspect of the 

work that you and your organization will be doing? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, which is why, for example, while my 

personal opinion is that the FISA structure has worked well, I am 

open to the idea that, with the view of instilling greater confidence, 

we should look at a range of potential options to improve that 

transparency. 

Senator MCCAIN. If I had a recommendation for you it would be 

as much as possible, given the aspects of national security, that 

you give some speeches in various venues where you could explain 

better to the American people exactly what you’re doing, perhaps 

not exactly what you’re doing, but why you’re doing it, and these 

446 

threats, including this one that hacked into the Navy on your 

watch, which I doubt if hardly any Americans are aware of. 

I don’t think Americans are aware of the extent of the penetration that is not only accomplished, but being attempted, by our adversaries and potential adversaries around the world. Do you 

agree? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, I think you’re correct. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your service to our Nation in the past and 

for what you’re going to be doing in the future in very demanding 

and critical jobs. Thank you to your families as well. 

Admiral, the White House recently announced the creation of a 

voluntary framework to establish a cyber-security guide for organizations involved in running the Nation’s critical infrastructure. 

This effort and framework standardizes the cyber security defensive measures to assist in identifying, protecting, detecting, responding to, and recovering from potential intrusions. 

How effective do you think that this voluntary framework will be 

in protecting us from cyber-attack, and what additional measures 

should the Senate or the NSA take? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, I think it’s a step in the right direction, but 

I do believe that in the end some form of legislation which addresses both the requirement and need to share information, as well as 

trying to address the issue of setting standards for critical infrastructure for the Nation, in the long run is probably the right answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working along with a host of 

other people who would be a party to that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I agree with you very, very strongly that 

legislation will be necessary. There have been efforts to achieve it, 

bipartisan efforts, I should emphasize, and some of them have been 

opposed by representatives of the business community on the 

ground that either there’s no need for it, there’s no urgency, or 

other reasons that I think are specious. 

I thank you for your offer of cooperation and I look forward to 

working with you. How urgent do you think it is that we have this 

kind of legislation? 

Admiral ROGERS. The sooner the better. It’s only a matter of 

time, I believe, before we start to see more destructive activity and 

that perhaps is the greatest concern of all to me. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are there areas of our private defense industrial base or even financial, utilities, and so forth that you regard as most vulnerable? 

Admiral ROGERS. There’s certainly core infrastructure that’s critical for us as a Nation. In an unclassified forum I’d be leery of providing specific insights as to where do I think the greatest vulnerability is, but I would be glad to discuss that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. If the chairman at some point does have 

a briefing in another setting, a more classified setting, that may be 

an area that I’d like to explore with you. Thank you. 

Let me shift to the role of the National Guard in cyber security. 

The CYBERCOM Commander, General Alexander, frequently 

447 

talked about the critical value of the National Guard as a resource 

and the role that it could play in expanding our military cyber warfare and defense capabilities. Do you agree with him and how 

would you define the value that the National Guard can bring to 

this effort? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, I do agree. At the present, the Department as a matter of fact is in the process of doing the analysis 

right now to address that very question. If confirmed, I’ll be a part 

of that process and I intend to dig deeper into it, because one of 

my take-aways after 30 months right now as the naval commander, 

if you will, for General Alexander in the cyber mission set is that 

in the end this is about how do you build an integrated team that 

harnesses the power and the expertise of every element of that 

team. 

While the U.S. Navy does not have a Guard structure, the Reserve structure we use has been very effective for us. I have 

worked hard to try to apply it in my current duty. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Frequently those members of the Naval 

Reserve or of the Army National Guard or the Air Force National 

Guard bring capabilities, training, education, skills that are very 

valuable. 

Admiral ROGERS. Oh, yes, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Turning to another area, if I may, the use 

of contractors. Following up on the very important questions asked 

by my colleague Senator McCain, just to state the obvious, here 

was a contractor who was entrusted with responsibilities that 

never should have been, and I think many of us are concerned by 

the scope and scale of the use of private contractors even to screen 

and evaluate other contractors. 

Are you concerned? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, I share your concern. If confirmed, this 

is an area that I think I need to ask some hard questions. Why are 

we where we are today? What led us to this, and are we comfortable with the position we find ourselves in with respect to the 

role of contractors? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are there obvious defects that you can see 

right away that need to be corrected? 

Admiral ROGERS. Nothing comes to mind immediately, although 

to be honest in my current duties this has not been the same issue 

on the Navy side that I have seen it on the joint side, as it were. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you think that concern is shared widely in the Intelligence Community? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would believe so. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Selva, if I can ask you a question, 

the chairman began by asking some questions about how quickly 

we need to make determinations about our presence in Afghanistan. What’s your assessment now about how flexible we are in determining our timeframe there in drawing down and withdrawing 

the equipment and personpower that we have? 

General SELVA. Senator, today I’d say we have the greatest flexibility that we’ve had in the past several months. But as each day 

passes, as you’re probably aware, our options decrease. There is a 

limit to the capacity of the networks to bring that equipment and 

those personnel out. I will commit to consulting with General AusVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00455 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
448 

tin for his assessment and for General Dunford’s assessment in 

ISAF of the specific limits of those networks. In TRANSCOM, our 

obligation is to make sure that the transportation layer and the 

distribution layer of those networks is prepared for whatever capacity comes at us. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

My time has expired. I thank you both for your very helpful answers and again for your service. I look forward to working with 

you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, to both of you, thank you for your service and your 

commitment to freedom. We appreciate the great job you do. 

I just want to make a comment for the record first, Admiral Rogers, with regard to some comments that Senator Udall made. I 

don’t want to leave a false impression with the American people 

here that if we had had 702 and 215 in place in 2001 there is a 

strong probability that we would have been able to determine that 

a major attack was going to occur, and there’s the probability that 

we would have picked up on conversation between Al-Midhar and 

those in Yemen with whom he was planning the attack. 

Knowing that he was in country versus knowing that he was in 

communication with terrorists planning an attack are two different 

things. We didn’t have 215, we didn’t have 702. We knew that a 

phone call came to the United States. We did not know it went to 

San Diego. 

It’s pretty clear that if we had had more definitive information 

that we would have gleaned from these programs, that there is 

strong probability within the Intelligence Community that we 

might have picked up on that. I won’t ask you to make a comment 

on it, but I want to make sure the record really reflects the actual 

facts on the ground relative to Al-Midhar. 

Now, Admiral Rogers, you and I discussed something that Senator McCain mentioned a little earlier, and that is with respect to 

trying to communicate these programs to the American people. It’s 

going to be very difficult. He mentioned doing speeches and whatnot. I think you and I agree that that’s part of it. 

But I’d like for you to elaborate a little bit more on really what 

you think we can do to show more transparency and to let the 

American people understand how these programs work. 

Admiral ROGERS. As I said, I think we can be a little more communicative with why we’re doing this, what led us to these kinds 

of decisions. I also think it’s important that dialogue needs to be 

much broader than just the Director of the NSA, regardless whoever that individual is. There’s a lot more aspects of this discussion 

than just the intelligence piece. 

In the end, this fundamentally boils down to an assessment of 

risk, both in terms of our security as a Nation as well as our rights 

as individuals. We value both and we have to come up with a way 

to enable us to ensure that both sides of that risk coin are addressed. But we should never forget that there’s a threat out there 

that aims to do us harm, that does not have the best interests of 

449 

this Nation in mind, and wants to defeat what this Nation represents. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. You’re exactly right. It’s truly unfortunate 

that General Alexander was put out there on a limb by himself by 

the administration to seek to explain these programs. While he did 

a very good job of it, had the President with the bully pulpit been 

out there with him I think we would have already had a better understanding on the part of the American people of, number one, the 

misrepresentation of the facts regarding what information is collected on individuals, what’s done with that information, and how 

very difficult it is to be able to access personal information on any 

single American. It simply is extremely difficult and requires the 

same process virtually that you would have to go through if you 

were a U.S. Attorney seeking to get information on an individual 

American. 

The FISA court is not a rubber stamp. All you have to do is look 

at the makeup of the court, as well as look at the decisions, now 

which some of them are going to be made public, and I think that’s 

a good idea, as long as we don’t reveal sources and methods. 

The fact that the administration did not give General Alexander 

the kind of support they should is really pretty disturbing on my 

part, and as I mentioned to you yesterday, I have expressed this 

to the administration. I hope they will give you more support in explaining these programs than they have given to General Alexander, and I have confidence that maybe they will. 

Let’s talk for a minute about information sharing. We’ve been 

working on a cyber bill for years now. We’re getting very close to 

an agreement within the Senate Intelligence Committee between 

the chairman and myself on a cyber bill that is much needed. One 

of the key provisions and the last remaining obstacle we have is 

the immunity provision or the liability protection provision. Would 

you talk for a minute about your opinion regarding how necessary 

liability protection is to companies who will share privileged and 

personal information if we’re truly going to have a program that 

works relative to cyber? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. I’m not a lawyer, but my sense is it’s 

a critical element in any legislation. I believe to be successful we 

ultimately have to provide the corporate partners that we would 

share information with some level of liability protection. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Do you think that firms will participate in 

the sharing of information if they are not granted pretty much 

blanket liability protection? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would think they’d be much less inclined to 

do without it. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, thank you. General, thank you, and your families. 

The chairman mentioned an article in the New York Times 

today. I thought one of the interesting quotes was where they said, 

why would somebody want to be the head of CYBERCOM now? It 

reminded me very much of the movie Apollo 13 where they said: 

450 

This might be one of the worst things that could ever happen to 

us. They looked and they said: ‘‘Well, this could be the best.’’ 

This could be the most amazing time, and we have more challenges maybe than ever before. We are giving you the football and 

expecting big things from both of you on this. 

I wanted to ask you, General. In regards to what we have seen 

in Ukraine and the dealings we’ve had with Russia before, are you 

making alternate plans in terms of TRANSCOM as to the work we 

do with Russia? Are you gaming out worst case scenarios as to how 

we proceed in the future? 

General SELVA. Sir, not yet being in the seat at TRANSCOM, I’d 

have to say if confirmed that is a priority. I do know as the air 

component to TRANSCOM and working directly with the 

TRANSCOM director of operations that we have been building alternative plans. The Northern Distribution Network, part of which 

flows through Russia, consists of five different options for how we 

move cargo in and out of Afghanistan. We’ll have to look at using 

other options than the overflight or transit through Russia should 

the conduct in Ukraine continue. 

Senator DONNELLY. I would recommend we get working on that 

right away, in light of what we have seen going forward these days. 

Admiral, when you look at what happened with Mr. Snowden, I 

know we have done reviews. Have you continued to look and ask 

what-if about this or about that in regards to where we are now, 

our operations now, to make sure we are not going to face this 

again internally? 

Admiral ROGERS. As the nominee I haven’t done that for 

CYBERCOM or the NSA, sir. 

Senator DONNELLY. Have you thought that through? 

Admiral ROGERS. If confirmed, yes, sir, I do believe we need to 

ask ourselves, so given this compromise, what would be the indicators that would highlight to us, that in fact would point out that 

now we’ve been compromised, now we’re seeing changes in behavior, and how are we going to have to change that to stay ahead of 

the threats that face us as a Nation. 

Senator DONNELLY. I would suggest that one of the first things 

you do is sit down and determine where did we go off the highway? 

How do we fix it? How do we square it away? 

One of the areas of interest to me is contractors. You’re not in 

the position yet, but why is it that we have contractors in those positions, as opposed to perhaps military personnel or other Government personnel who are expert in those areas? Is it a lack of individuals who can fill those positions? 

Admiral ROGERS. I can’t speak to the specifics of Mr. Snowden, 

the function he was fulfilling, as to why that was chosen to become 

a contractor vice Government, if you will. But I think it is reflective 

of a trend over the last decade or so where, as we looked at the 

size of Government, as we looked at the size of our workforce, some 

decisions were made that perhaps some of these functions could be 

executed on a contractor basis vice using permanent Government 

employees. 

I have always believed as a commander that what you should use 

contractors for are for those functions that are either so specialized 

that you don’t have the capability or skill resident within the GovVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00458 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
451 

ernment workforce, whether that be uniformed or civilians, or it is 

prohibitively expensive to try to achieve that capability, but that 

what we consider to be core operational functions, those need to be 

Government. 

Senator DONNELLY. In regards to Mr. Snowden’s area, will there 

be a review through all of these contractor areas as to what is core 

to what we need to do and when we regard and review expense? 

The next question is what is the expense of what we’re dealing 

with now, with the situations that have been created by Mr. 

Snowden’s conduct? 

Admiral ROGERS. I apologize, but I don’t know the answer to 

that. 

Senator DONNELLY. No, I understand. I’m just trying to lay out, 

here are some things as we move forward that we look at. 

Mr. Snowden also remarked recently: The U.S. Government has 

no idea what I have and will not know what I have, and they’ll find 

out as it goes on, in effect, not his exact words. But when we look 

at Ukraine one of the concerns that has to come up is how much 

of Mr. Putin’s actions were based on knowledge that may have 

been given to him by Mr. Snowden. 

How good a handle do we have at this point on what Mr. 

Snowden has and what he does not have? 

Admiral ROGERS. We have an in-depth analytic effort ongoing 

within the Department to determine that and ask that question. I 

haven’t been party to that review, although I’ve seen some of the 

initial work, which has highlighted where the data he took exactly 

where it came from. We’ve tried to identify exactly what the implications are of what he took. That operation is ongoing and will take 

some period of time to finish. 

Senator DONNELLY. In another area, it would be remiss of me not 

to ask you about supply chain integrity. It’s something of concern 

to me, counterfeit parts, and this would be for both. How are we 

going to partner with industry? How are we going to work together 

with our intelligence officials and others to secure the integrity of 

the supply chain of what we have? We see counterfeit parts in missiles, in planes. It is an extraordinarily dangerous situation, and I 

was wondering what your plans are as we move forward to try to 

get this squared away. 

General SELVA. Senator, our obligation in TRANSCOM is to 

work as the distribution process owner under the unified command 

plan. Part of that obligation is to work directly with the Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA) on the issue of supply chain management 

and integrity of the supply chain. It’s out of the lane that I’ve been 

in for the last year and a half as the commander of Air Mobility 

Command. It is one of the areas that I have committed to spend 

time with with Admiral Hernitchek, to get at the details of the supply chain integrity process. 

It’s more than just the data. It is in fact the ability of counterfeiters to bring to that market parts that appear to be genuine, but 

in fact aren’t. It’s a physical issue as well as a data security issue. 

It goes right to the heart of our industrial capacity and the ownership of the intellectual rights and being able to produce the products that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines use in battle. 

452 

Senator DONNELLY. I would ask you to make that a priority, because we are one counterfeit part away from disaster on a constant 

basis. 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you very much. Thank you both for 

your service and to your families. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Donnelly. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank both of you for your service to our country, and 

to your families as well for their support and sacrifices. 

General Selva, with regard to DOD’s air refueling capability, how 

important is it to our military capabilities and our national security? 

General SELVA. Senator, the capacity of Air Mobility Command 

to operate at TRANSCOM’s behest and provide refueling around 

the world is critical to being able to move our forces to the places 

they need to be when they need to be there. The Air Force, as 

you’ve probably heard over months and years, talks about global 

vigilance, global reach, and global power. Tankers are what make 

us global. 

Senator AYOTTE. I’m really pleased the 157th Air Refueling Wing 

at Pease, the New Hampshire Air National Guard Base, has been 

chosen as the top Air National Guard unit to receive the new tankers, the KC–46A. I want you to know we had a very positive public 

hearing for the basing of the KC–46A last week in New Hampshire. 

I wanted to ask you, in your role as Commander, Air Mobility 

Command, what’s your assessment of the 157th Air Refueling Wing 

at Pease? How have they performed and how important is the 

Guard in all of its capabilities as we go forward? 

General SELVA. Senator, the 157th has a pretty storied heritage 

in the tanker world, and they’re a high performing organization. 

They’re one of the units to which we’ve appended an Active Duty 

associate unit and the unit is performing quite well. The base and 

the unit exist in an area of fairly high demand for tanker services 

and as a result their performance speaks for itself. They’re a great 

unit and we look forward to being able to base the KC–46A Pegasus at Pease, subject to the outcome of the environmental impact 

statement. 

Senator AYOTTE. Fantastic. I think you’re going to get a very 

positive outcome. The whole community is really excited and very 

supportive of having the new tanker there, and I look forward to 

working with you on that. It’s incredibly important to our national 

security. 

I noted Senator Donnelly asked you about the issue of the Northern Distribution Network with regard to our retrograde from Afghanistan. In light of what’s happening in the Ukraine, the President, many of us, are pushing for further economic sanctions, other 

types of sanctions against Russia for their invasion of Crimea. 

If the Russians were to take retaliatory action as a result of that 

to shut down the Northern Distribution Network with regard to the 

transit operations on those roads, what impact would that have to 

453 

us and how would we address it? Because I think it’s something 

we have to understand and be prepared to address. 

General SELVA. Yes, ma’am. If the Russians were to take action 

to constrain our access to the Russian segments of the Northern 

Distribution Network, we have other options to move that cargo in 

and out of Afghanistan. The singular item that moves across that 

network that would concern me at this point is the subsistence cargoes in the form of food and non-combat articles. I’m told about 20 

percent of the subsistence cargoes move through that network. 

We’d have to use another option to get it in. We do have several 

options in the Northern Distribution Network that do not include 

transitting Russia. 

Senator AYOTTE. If for some reason, which obviously I would 

hope that they wouldn’t take that type of action, but we’d be prepared to use other options if we had to and could do so? 

General SELVA. Yes, Senator, we would. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Admiral Rogers, thank you for taking on at a very challenging 

time this important position. Last week it was reported in the 

press that Russia is using cyber-attacks against the Ukrainian telecommunications system to block the Ukrainian leadership from accessing the country’s phone network. To what extent do you believe 

Russia is conducting cyber-attacks against the Ukraine, and what 

could the United States do to help the Ukraine better defend itself 

against attacks from Russia? 

Admiral ROGERS. Ma’am, in an open, unclassified forum, I’m not 

prepared to comment on the specifics of nation state behavior. 

Clearly, cyber will be an element of almost any crisis we’re going 

to see in the future. It has been in the past. I believe we see it 

today in the Ukraine. We’ve seen it in Syria, Georgia. It increasingly is becoming a norm. 

As we work to partner with others to develop norms of behavior 

and expectations for what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, 

examples like this highlight to us I think what is not acceptable. 

As we work with the Ukrainians and other nations to attempt to 

figure out what’s the best way to address them, whether the 

Ukrainians ask for specific technical assistance, I think we’d have 

to work through everything on a case by case basis. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do you believe we should help our allies in situations like this if they are receiving cyber-attacks, and working 

with them to combat these attacks? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator AYOTTE. I think that’s very important, particularly with 

what’s happening in the Ukraine right now, that we are active in 

this area in countering any type of actions by the Russians, cyberattacks or otherwise. 

I wanted to ask you about DOD’s vulnerability overall to a cyberattack. In January 2013, the Defense Science Board issued a task 

force report titled ‘‘Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced 

Cyber Threat’’. The report concluded that, ‘‘The United States cannot be confident that our critical information technology systems 

will work under attack from a sophisticated and well-resourced opponent utilizing cyber capabilities in combination with all of their 

military and intelligence capabilities.’’ 

454 

In other words, we’re not confident that many of our military 

systems would work if we were attacked by a high-end peer-to-peer 

adversary. 

Do you share that assessment and how can we make sure that 

DOD is more resilient to cyber-attacks? 

Admiral ROGERS. I certainly share that concern, which is one 

reason why I believe creating a defensible architecture has to be 

one of the most important things we do. The reality is the network 

structure of today reflects a different time and a different place. I 

have experienced that firsthand in my current duties in the Navy 

as the operational commander for the Navy’s networks. I have 

watched that challenge across the entire Department. 

That’s why the Joint Information Environment (JIE) I think is 

so critical to the future for us. We have to get to a defensible architecture. 

Senator AYOTTE. We have to work with you on that. 

Finally, there’s been a lot of discussion about Edward Snowden 

here today. Do you believe that the disclosures that he made have 

potentially put at risk the lives of Americans and our allies, or at 

greater risk, because he has released this type of classified information? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes is the answer to that? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. I think that people need to understand that, 

that he has put potentially at risk American lives and the lives of 

our allies. That is very, very important for people to understand in 

terms of what we are addressing and what we’re dealing with and 

how we characterize his behavior. 

Thank you both. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Senator. 

General Selva, it’s good to see you again. If I was in an airplane 

out of gas over the North Atlantic, I’d call the guys from Bangor. 

Forget about those guys from Pease. [Laughter.] 

Senator AYOTTE. I don’t think so. [Laughter.] 

Senator KING. The 101st could take care of you quite adequately. 

As you look across the broad range of commercial assets, military 

assets, that TRANSCOM employs across the globe, what do you 

feel are the greatest risks and vulnerabilities to TRANSCOM today 

to execute its responsibilities? How about the vulnerability of commercial carriers to events like cyber intrusions? Going into this 

new job, what’s going to keep you awake at night? 

General SELVA. Senator, I think there’s probably two things that 

worry me the most over the coming couple of years. The first is 

once we have completed whatever retrograde operation happens in 

Afghanistan, whether we have a residual force or no force remaining behind, the demand signal for lift, surface and air, will diminish significantly. We’ve already seen in the last year nearly a 50 

percent reduction in the requirement for sustainment cargoes into 

and out of Afghanistan, combat articles as well as just regular 

sustainment. 

455 

That has an implication for our organic fleets, sealift, airlift, as 

well as surface, and for our commercial partners whose networks 

we access to make that entire distribution network work. That decline in requirements, a return to a more stable environment, if 

you will, actually has some negative readiness implications across 

the enterprise. We’re studying those in all of the organic and commercial sectors of the market to try and understand those implications. They have significant impacts on the commercial cargo carriers, both sealift and airlift, who have been such an integral part 

of that network into and out of Afghanistan. 

Senator KING. What percentage of TRANSCOM’s assets are organic versus commercial at this moment? 

General SELVA. That’s a difficult number to quantify, but I’ll take 

a stab at it. Roughly 40 percent of our capacity is organic in the 

air environment and about 50 percent, if we access all of the available assets through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), would be 

brought to us by our commercial partners. I don’t have the specific 

statistics. 

Senator KING. As the demands of Afghanistan diminish, is there 

an industrial base issue here in terms of the commercial carriers? 

Are they going to go away? Are they going to be able to find other 

business? Is there a risk of not having the capacity when we need 

it? 

General SELVA. There are two dynamics at play, Senator, in that 

environment. One is the health of the airline industry as a whole, 

both commercial cargo carriers and commercial passenger carriers, 

and two segments within that, that industry, the charter carriers 

and the scheduled carriers. 

The decline in the demand signal on those commercial carriers 

will change the economics of that industrial segment. The second 

thing that’s changing is the very nature of commercial charter 

cargo across all of the global economy. With the introduction of 

large aircraft with large cargo bays below the passenger decks, we 

now see commercial passenger carriers reentering the charter cargo 

market. That has changed the dynamic of our CRAF partners and 

we have to understand the impacts of that change in the economy 

on their capacity to be with us in crisis. 

Senator KING. That’s an issue that we’re just going to have to 

watch as it evolves? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. To be fair, right now we have an ongoing study. We’re about a year into working with our commercial 

partners to understand the economic dynamics of what’s changing 

in the cargo and passenger markets. We are right now in about a 

3-month period of receiving their comments on the work we’ve 

done. We owe this committee a report in mid-June, if I understand 

correctly, on the outcome of that discussion. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Admiral Rogers, I’m going to ask a question that I don’t think 

you’re prepared to answer, but I may ask it again in a year. I’ve 

been in a number of hearings both in the Intelligence Committee 

and in this committee on cyber issues, CYBERCOM and the NSA. 

How can you possibly do both of these jobs? 

Admiral ROGERS. There is no doubt it’s a challenge, and I’ll be 

in a much better position, as you indicate, if confirmed, to look 

456 

back and say how hard has it been and what have been the challenges. But I just believe that where we are right now, many of the 

missions and functions are so intertwined and related that to not 

do it this way would create real concern. Right now, in my current 

duties in the Navy I work for General Alexander both as 

CYBERCOM and as NSA leader, and so I have experienced these 

same challenges firsthand within my own service. 

Senator KING. But you understand how over the past year both 

jobs have grown in responsibility. You have to be a spokesman, you 

have to manage. I just think it’s something that we’re going to really have to think about along with the administration going forward. I understand the desire to have it in one person, but, boy, 

I would think running the NSA itself is more than a full-time job. 

Admiral ROGERS. We’ll be busy, sir. 

Senator KING. One of the major issues that we’ve been discussing 

again for the past year and a half, actually for the past, I don’t 

know, years before I was here, is the necessity of some kind of 

cyber legislation that allows better coordination between the private sector and the Government. How do you assess the importance 

of that kind of legislation coming out of this Congress? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, I believe that legislation is a key for our 

future. We have to change the current dynamic. 

Senator KING. I certainly hope people are listening around here, 

because ever since I’ve been here everybody’s been saying that, but 

it doesn’t seem to change. My father used to say if you drove 

straight at the Pentagon it kept getting further and further away. 

I feel like that’s where we are with this legislation. Everybody’s 

talking about it. I certainly hope you’ll work with us to try to develop that legislation in the multiple committees that have jurisdiction. 

I believe one of our greatest vulnerabilities is to cyber-attack. I 

think the next Pearl Harbor is going to be cyber. The problem is 

we’re more vulnerable than many other places. It’s an asymmetrical disadvantage because we’re so advanced in terms of our 

linked-up, networked society. How do we prevent that or what are 

the tools and are we where we should be? I certainly don’t want 

to have a hearing or a set of hearings here about why we were 

asleep at the switch. 

Admiral ROGERS. I think clearly we’re not where we want to be. 

We’re generating capability, we’re generating capacity, and those 

are all positive steps in the right direction. But in the end I believe 

we have to get to some idea of deterrence within the cyber arena. 

Senator KING. I think you’re absolutely right about that, and we 

have the whole strategy of deterrence on the nuclear side and I 

think we have to develop a strategy of deterrence on the cyber side, 

that if somebody comes into our networks they’re going to have 

some serious problems with their networks. 

Thank you, Admiral. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator King. 

Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to both of you for joining us today and for your service 

to our country. Admiral Rogers, I thank you in particular for visVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00464 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
457 

iting with me in my office. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss 

those important issues. 

There does have to be a balance struck between achieving our 

national security goals and protecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights of American citizens. Ultimately, I agree with my friend 

Senator Udall that, properly understood, these two things are the 

same thing. Our security lies in our constitutional protections and 

so we can’t overlook constitutional protections in the interest of national security without compromising a good deal of what is embodied in our national security interests. 

In our well-intended efforts to recover and move forward past 

September 11, 2001, we have at times tried to strike a balance in 

a way that I find troubling. As I’ve stated before, I have some pretty deep-seated concerns with some of the things that have been revealed in recent months to the public, things that previously were 

known only to Members of Congress and to other people with the 

right security clearance within the Government. 

I worry about the NSA’s surveillance and metadata collection 

programs and the risks that such programs could pose to the constitutionally protected rights of American citizens. The Fourth 

Amendment stands to safeguard those rights, and even if one assumes for purposes of this discussion that currently the only people 

employed at the NSA are people with only our best interests at 

heart, we still run a risk, even if that assumption is made, that at 

some point in the future, whether it’s a week from now, a month 

from now, a year from now, 10 or 20 years from now, unless we 

have the right safeguards in place those powers will be abused. 

They will be abused with respect to American citizens. 

Particularly given the fact that the NSA’s mission is related to 

foreign intelligence-gathering, we need to make sure that we protect American citizens in their constitutionally protected rights. 

Admiral Rogers, if confirmed to this position how would you work 

to protect the constitutionally protected rights of American citizens 

while doing your job? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. I would attempt to be as transparent 

as possible with the broader Nation about what we’re doing and 

why. I would try to ensure a sense of accountability in what the 

NSA does. The Nation places a great deal of trust in this organization. It has an incredibly important mission. It’s a mission that involves a tension in our society, given the fact that the fundamental 

rights of the individual are so foundational to our very concept of 

the Nation. 

I welcome a dialogue on this topic. I think it’s important for us 

as a Nation. I look forward to being part of that dialogue. As you 

and I have previously discussed, I am committed to trying to be a 

good partner in that effort. 

Senator LEE. I understand that a certain level of confidentiality 

must almost unavoidably surround many of the NSA programs that 

might be of concern to the American people, to ensure the effectiveness and to keep our enemy actors from working around our systems. But the public has developed a certain distrust of many of 

those programs. 

In discussing this concept with Senator McCain a few minutes 

ago, you mentioned that there might be a range of options availVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00465 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
458 

able to us. Can you describe what some of those options might look 

like in balancing the need for confidentiality on the one hand, in 

order to protect our programs, and the need for transparency on 

the other? 

Admiral ROGERS. I’d be looking at what are the mechanisms we 

use to assess the value portion of this and how can we do this potentially in a more public way. I haven’t fully formed my own 

thoughts in this regard, but I think it’s something that’s incredibly 

important and I think is very specific to the duties as the Director 

of the NSA, if confirmed, the ability to be able to lead an honest 

and open dialogue about just what is the value of these efforts as 

we try to move forward. 

As I said, I’m not on the job yet. I need to get much smarter, but 

I’m committed to doing so. 

Senator LEE. The President’s directed that the Government start 

to transition out of having the Government itself hold onto the bulk 

metadata collected pursuant to section 215 of the Patriot Act. Can 

you give me an update on how that process is going and how it 

might unfold? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, as the nominee I haven’t been part of that 

process, so I’m not in a position to give you a sense for how it’s unfolding. I know it is ongoing. The President set a deadline of the 

28th of March, indicating he wanted feedback on how the best way 

to move forward was. The issue that’s among the many that’s important to me as we move forward is this, and we try to figure out 

the best way, is how do we address the idea of speed, the ability 

to query the data in a way that both protects the rights of the individual, but also enables us to get answers in a quick, reasonable 

time period. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. 

President Obama stated in a speech in January the following. He 

said: ‘‘I’ve directed the Attorney General to work with the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Court so that during this transition period the database can be queried only after a judicial finding or in 

case of a true emergency.’’ 

What do you think might constitute a ‘‘true emergency’’ in this 

context? 

Admiral ROGERS. Potential loss of life, hostage, criminal kind of 

scenarios. 

Senator LEE. I assume that in those scenarios there would have 

to be a time component, an urgency component for that to qualify. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, I would think so. 

Senator LEE. Not a mere inconvenience to the Government personnel involved, but some practical reason that would make it impossible, rather than just inconvenient, to go to the FISA court. Is 

that your understanding? 

Admiral ROGERS. Inconvenience is clearly not the standard that’s 

intended. 

Senator LEE. I see my time has expired. Thank you very much, 

Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lee. 

Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

459 

I want to thank both of you and congratulate you on your nominations. I’ve read your resumes, quite impressive. Thank you for 

the service to our great country. 

I also want to acknowledge the passing on Sunday, March 9, 

2014, of one of your fellow Air Force officers, one of your fellow 

comrades, if you will, at the Air Force Academy, in the passing of 

Major General Stewart. We’re very sorry for that, and a loss for all 

of us. 

If I can, General Selva, to start with, the equipment in Iraq, 

where did it go, the equipment that we should have taken out? 

How much did we leave behind? Where did it go? What have we 

done with it? 

That leads right into what we’re going to do in Afghanistan. I’m 

hearing that we’re going to leave so much stuff behind. The State 

of West Virginia is kind of watching its p’s and q’s and its pennies, 

nickels, and dimes. How does that fare? 

General SELVA. Sir, I’m not in a position to comment on what we 

left behind in Iraq. 

Senator MANCHIN. Is that because of security? 

General SELVA. No, sir. I wasn’t party to those decisions. 

Senator MANCHIN. Could you get some information on that? 

General SELVA. I could try to find out for you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The majority of equipment in Iraq was transported back to the United States or 

to Afghanistan based on military operational and training requirements. The Department of Defense (DOD) transferred equipment and property to the Government 

of Iraq (GoI) under a number of authorities to build up the security forces of Iraq. 

Specifically, DOD transferred $319.7 million (fair market value) worth of foreign excess personal property (FEPP) to the GoI under the authority of title 40 U.S.C. 

§ 704. Examples of these items are installation and base life support equipment 

(e.g., commercial vehicles, power generators, living containers, security barriers, and 

air conditioners). DOD achieved an estimated cost avoidance in excess of $605 million by not transporting these items back to the U.S. Additionally, DOD transferred 

over 24,000 pieces of ‘‘excess’’ equipment under the authority of title 22 U.S.C. 

§ 2321j (grant transfers of Excess Defense Articles) to the GoI. Examples of this 

equipment are helmets, older version weapons (M16), body armor, tools, and commercial vehicles. DOD also transferred 1,305 pieces of ‘‘non-excess’’ equipment to the 

GoI under the authority of § 1234 of Public Law 111–84. Examples of this equipment 

are High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, 40 ton trailers, maintenance 

trucks, and airfield support equipment. 

Finally, DOD transferred 759 items valued at approximately $10.8 million to 20 

different U.S. State and Local organizations through the National Association of 

State Agencies for Surplus Property. Examples of this equipment are: non-tactical 

vehicles, light sets, generators, dozers, bobcats, and forklifts. The equipment is provided on an ‘‘as-is, where-is’’ basis to the States, with the States funding all packaging and transportation costs. Items not claimed by any organization were disposed 

of in Iraq. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, sir. 

General SELVA. I will let you know that in the current discussions we’re having with ISAF on what we might leave behind in 

Afghanistan, one of the key issues that we have to address is the 

residual value of the equipment and whether or not the cost of lifting it out of Afghanistan is worth that investment. We have to do 

that, essentially a business case. 

Senator MANCHIN. Do we have any buyers in that part of the 

world for it or are we just going to give it away? 

460 

General SELVA. Sir, in some cases the equipment will be disposed 

of through foreign military sales. In others it will be through 

grants. But I don’t have the specifics. 

Senator MANCHIN. If you could do that, I’d appreciate it. 

General SELVA. If confirmed, I will get with the DLA team and 

get you that information. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Equipment that is required to meet future military operational and training requirements is being transported back to the United States. Equipment that is excess 

to the Department of Defense (DOD) requirements is offered to the Government of 

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and other eligible countries under various authorities. As of March 30, 2014, DOD has transferred $91 million (fair market value) worth of foreign excess personal property to the GIRoA under the authority of title 40 U.S.C. § 704. Examples of these items are installation and base life 

support equipment (e.g., commercial vehicles, power generators, living containers, 

security barriers, and air conditioners). DOD achieved an estimated cost avoidance 

in excess of $1.1 billion by not transporting these items back to the United States. 

As with the equipment in Iraq, excess military equipment is made available to 

GIRoA and other eligible countries on an ‘‘as-is, where-is’’ basis under the authority 

of title 22 U.S.C. § 2321j (grant transfers of Excess Defense Articles) or title 22 

U.S.C. § 2751 (Foreign Military Sales). Non-excess military equipment may be transferred to GIRoA under the authority of § 1222 of Public Law 112–239. DOD is providing lists of excess equipment to the National Association of State Agencies for 

Surplus Property (NASASP) for potential transfer to U.S. State and local organizations on an ‘‘as-is, where-is’’ basis. To date, no equipment has been requested by 

NASASP due to the high transportation costs. 

Commercial equipment that has no trade security controls may be sold to local 

Afghan vendors beginning in April 2014. Finally, equipment with trade security controls that is not disposed of in any of the methods above will be demilitarized and 

disposed of in Afghanistan. 

Senator MANCHIN. Admiral Rogers, if you can, give me an overview of the cyber-attacks from Russia, and especially with the 

Ukraine situation we have right now that we’re dealing with, and 

how that escalates to concerns and maybe more activity into the 

former Soviet Union countries, such as Kazakhstan and some of 

the others that are very much concerned, and even Poland, at 

what’s going on. Are you seeing an uptick in those type of cyberattacks there? 

Admiral ROGERS. We clearly see that there’s an ongoing cyber 

element to the challenges in the Ukraine at the moment. In terms 

of specifics, I would respectfully ask that this is something that 

would perhaps be best shared in a classified setting. 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. I was just wanting to see, I would assume there has been. If you can do that, I’d appreciate it, sir. 

Also, my State of West Virginia has gone through a water crisis, 

if you will, because of a spill. I’ve said this before. If anyone wanted 

to know the effects it has on the population and the concerns and 

the hysteria—and we had no loss of life, no one seriously ill—what 

a cyber-attack would do to the confidence of the people, we’re a perfect example, if you would come down and work with us and help 

us on that. 

But with that being said, our most vulnerability I see is in our 

water, our food, and our grid system. Since a lot of this is privately 

owned or corporately owned, are you interacting and how much are 

you interacting with those concerned to beef up the security? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, it’s clearly not in my current duties, but if 

confirmed that would be an aspect of the mission. Absent legislation, we’re attempting to do that on a voluntarily-in partnership 

461 

basis. Those partnerships in some areas are working very well, in 

others clearly not as mature as we would like. 

Senator MANCHIN. Maybe you can even elaborate more. I know 

that Senator King had mentioned you probably wouldn’t be able to 

answer it today, you could a year from now. Tell us what all has 

been thrown into the mix, if you will, of what you’re expected and 

how you can bring everything together with the demands and the 

growth, I think is what we’re concerned about, and if we should 

still stay under one umbrella? I think right now we’re going down 

that direction. But how much more has been thrown at you? 

Admiral ROGERS. Clearly, it’s a demanding set of duties. I’d also 

highlight the Director of NSA and the Commander of CYBERCOM 

does not operate alone by themselves. There’s a strong team in 

place. I’ve had the honor of working with that team on both the 

CYBERCOM side and the NSA side for the last 21⁄2 years in my 

current duties. They’re a real strength for the team. 

Senator MANCHIN. It’s amazing to me—and I don’t see this in 

West Virginia at all—they’re trying to lift Snowden up to any type 

of hero. He is basically a traitor in our eyes and what he’s done 

to our country. 

But with that being said, there had to be a frustration level to 

where he felt, he felt that that was the direction for him to go, because there was no outlet. Are you able to in your new position 

looking at how you can work, because you’re going to have contractors involved and it looks like you’re going to have more contractors—are they able to come and have their concerns and do you 

have any type of an outlet there that would work with them, so 

that we don’t continue to go down this road? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, there are avenues both within the 

NSA chain of command, there are avenues both with an inspector 

general structure, both within NSA and CYBERCOM as agencies. 

Senator MANCHIN. Did Snowden ever take those avenues and try 

to air his concerns? 

Admiral ROGERS. I don’t know, but I’m sure in the ongoing investigation as we review the particulars of the Snowden case that’ll 

be one of the questions of high interest. 

Senator MANCHIN. Yes, because basically he just went down the 

sabotage route. You’ve said before some of the things he’s done and 

has continued to do is irreparable. 

Admiral ROGERS. I’m not sure I said irreparable, but I believe it 

has significant risk, damage, and consequences for us. 

Senator MANCHIN. Would you look at him as a traitor? 

Admiral ROGERS. I don’t know that I would use the word traitor, 

but I certainly do not consider him to be a hero. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Manchin. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both for your service and I look forward to working with you in the future. I have every confidence 

that you’ll be confirmed, and these will be difficult, but I think very 

rewarding, jobs. 

General, on the transportation side, what effect will sequestration have on the ability of Air Transportation Command to meet 

our defense needs over the next 8 years? 

462 

General SELVA. Senator, I think there’s two significant impacts 

sequestration will have. The first will be as an industrially funded 

organization, where our users that use transportation services pay 

out of their operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts for those 

services, the decrease in the availability of those funds is likely to 

cause a decrease in that demand signal. The corollary to that is 

that will force then our organic capacity, the training and seasoning of the people that do that work, whether it’s Military Sealift 

Command or Air Mobility Command, to spend more of their O&M 

dollars to achieve that training they could as a byproduct of moving 

transportation requirements around the world. There is a bit of a 

two-sided coin there on the impact of sequestration on the readiness of those fleets. 

Senator GRAHAM. In simpler terms, would it be really damaging? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. From an Air Mobility Command point of view, 

which you are very familiar with, how has our air fleet been affected by the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) over the last 10 

years? 

General SELVA. Senator, we’ve had a fairly high OPTEMPO, particularly in our airlift and air refueling fleets. The fleets are holding up pretty well. We do a continuous assessment of the structures in our large airlift aircraft. But the OPTEMPO is showing 

its—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it fair to say that when we accepted each 

plane into the fleet—the operational tempo has been really unprecedented since World War II probably, and that when it comes time 

to evaluate our future needs, we’re flying the wings off of these 

planes basically? I know they’re structurally sound, but I want the 

committee to understand that no one envisioned this level of operational tempo before September 11, and we’re going to have to 

make accommodations for it. 

Admiral, are we at war? 

Admiral ROGERS. I wouldn’t use the word war, but there is no 

doubt we are in a conflict. 

Senator GRAHAM. If it’s not a war what is it? 

Admiral ROGERS. War has a very—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it a disagreement? 

Admiral ROGERS. I apologize, Senator. I didn’t understand the 

question. 

Senator GRAHAM. I said, are we at war? You said, no, I think it’s 

something else, conflict. How could you say we’re not at war? 

Admiral ROGERS. War has a very specific legal definition and I 

don’t believe we’ve met that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe that we’re at war with al Qaeda 

and their affiliates? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. Senator, if I could, I apologize. I assumed you were talking in the cyber arena. Please accept my 

apologies. 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. My bad, my bad. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, there is no doubt—— 

Senator GRAHAM. No, I got you. You don’t want to go down the 

road. I got you, no. 

463 

But we are at war in terms of radical Islam being the enemy of 

the Nation? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. The NSA program is designed to protect us 

against an enemy who is hell-bent on attacking our Nation at home 

and throughout the world, do you agree with that? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it likely that there are fifth column movements already in the United States, embedded in our country, sympathetic to the enemy? 

Admiral ROGERS. We’ve seen those kinds of actions by people in 

the United States sympathetic to that previously. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe if we had had the NSA capabilities in effect in September 2001 that we have today there’s a high 

likelihood that we would have intercepted the attack on September 

11? 

Admiral ROGERS. The potential certainly would have been much 

greater. 

Senator GRAHAM. As we reform the program, will you keep in the 

forefront of your thinking not to take us back to pre-September 11 

capabilities? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. When it comes to monitoring content of an 

American citizen on a phone, the NSA program is very restrictive 

in that regard; is that a true statement? 

Admiral ROGERS. Very restrictive, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. The threat we face is very real. Major Hassan, 

are you familiar with that gentleman? 

Admiral ROGERS. At Fort Hood, I believe, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. How could he, a major in the U.S. Army, communicate on the Internet with Anwar Awlaki, a leader of al Qaeda 

in Yemen, an American citizen, and we not understand that or not 

find out about, detect that? Do you know? 

Admiral ROGERS. No, sir, other than to say in general I believe 

he took advantage of the protections afforded to our citizens. 

Senator GRAHAM. Could you do me a favor and evaluate how we 

missed Major Hassan? Because I believe in privacy and transparency, but I believe that any system that’s going to protect America from an attack has to be able to pick up a communication from 

a major in the U.S. Army with one of the leading terrorists in the 

world. If we can’t do that, something’s wrong. Would you please go 

back, evaluate how we missed Major Hassan? If we need to change 

the law to catch future Major Hassans, I would like to help you in 

that endeavor. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Many factors contributed to the outcome of the 2009 Fort Hood incident and I’m 

not in a position to identify the specific or primary ones. This has been the subject 

of extensive study by the Department of Defense Independent Review Panel and by 

the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee and I refer you 

to the reports that detail their respective investigations into the Fort Hood shooting 

and recommendations to prevent future incidents. Both reports are authoritative 

and comprehensive. 

Senator GRAHAM. The Boston attack. Is it fair to say that our 

ability to pick, intercept communications, identify the perpetrators 

464 

fairly quickly, gave us some lead time about anything they may 

have been planning in New York? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. When it comes to being at war with radical 

Islam, do you consider the Homeland one of their chief targets? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. If they could attack any place in the world, the 

top priority would probably be here at home? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, when it comes to reforming this program, 

how much can we talk about how the program works before we destroy its ability to protect us? 

Admiral ROGERS. There’s clearly always an element there that 

we don’t want to divulge sources and methods. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you say that the discussions about how 

this program works and the details probably have already helped 

the enemy in terms of being able to adapt? 

Admiral ROGERS. It’s given them greater insights into what we 

do and how we do it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it fair to say that the enemy, when they 

communicate, uses commercial networks like the rest of us? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. The only way we’ll be able to detect what 

they’re up to is to be able to access these commercial networks in 

a reasonable fashion? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that the only way to 

deter them is to prevent them from attacking us, because killing 

them is not a deterrent? They welcome death. The best way to protect us against radical Islam is to find out what they’re up to and 

hit them or stop them before they hit us? Is that the world in 

which we live in? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

gentlemen and your families, for your devoted service to the Nation. 

Let me begin with General Selva. General, one of the important 

components to TRANSCOM is the CRAF. Your agency is studying 

the relationships and what we do now, as we reset after significant 

extensions in Afghanistan and Iraq and around the globe. Can you 

give us an idea, a preliminary idea at least, of what we have to do 

to ensure the CRAF program continues to support our wartime 

needs, and any highlights of the study that are ready for prime 

time? 

General SELVA. Senator, inside the relationship with the CRAF 

we have 28 separate carriers that provide cargo and passenger 

services, each with their own business plan, each with their own 

motivation for how they run their businesses. Part of the study was 

to get at the eachs of how the industry runs and get at the broad 

macroeconomics of how the industry is going to evolve over time. 

465 

We’ve put those two big pieces together. We’re now working with 

the senior executives in those individual carriers to come to some 

agreement on what a contract mechanism might look like to 

incentivize their volunteer service in the CRAF. As you may be 

aware, the policy that governs how we manage, National Airlift 

Policy, was last updated in 1987. This study is the first major effort 

post-Desert Storm to get at what the economics of the industry look 

like and how they affect our relationship with the CRAF. 

I fully expect, based on my interaction with senior executives 

from many of the airlines, that their volunteerism will continue. 

The question is how do we make it a meaningful business incentive 

for them to do that. 

Senator REED. Do you anticipate any legislative requirements 

that you would have that would help you achieve a more efficient 

outcome for the Government? 

General SELVA. Senator, based on the preliminary work we’ve 

done in the study and our interaction with the carriers, I don’t believe any legislative changes are required to the National Airlift 

Policy to make us successful. 

Senator REED. But if they do, you will inform us? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Admiral Rogers, congratulations. I don’t know if that’s in order 

or not, but congratulations. 

Admiral ROGERS. Thank you. 

Senator REED. You have two huge responsibilities, CYBERCOM, 

which is a DOD function, and the NSA. In your organization are 

you going to have, or are you contemplating having, principal deputies that would essentially focus exclusively on one or the other? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. Each organization has its own deputy 

and a complete operational organization. 

Senator REED. There are no changes at this time in those deputies? 

Admiral ROGERS. I believe you may see the CYBERCOM deputy 

changing in the course of the next few months. But that’s again 

part of the normal rotation. 

Senator REED. Part of the anticipated rotation, et cetera. There’ll 

be the overlap, et cetera. 

Let me change gears slightly. We’ve all recognized the growing 

importance of cyber in every capacity, and I think the lessons of 

history suggest that the more we practice the better we are when 

the game starts. To my mind, I don’t think we’ve had the kind of 

coordinated exercises between CYBERCOM, the NSA, the Department of Homeland Security, every other agency, which basically 

would confirm what we believe and maybe give us some surprises 

about what we don’t know. Is that your impression, too? 

Admiral ROGERS. I think we’ve done a good job of exercising 

within the Department. As we bring more capability, more capacity, on line, I think the next major evolution for us is how do we 

exercise more broadly across the U.S. Government in applying 

those capabilities. 

Senator REED. Then also there’s the issue of not only across the 

U.S. Government, but also reaching out to utilities, both financial 

utilities and public utilities. Is that something where again you 

466 

would need either funding or authorization or encouragement from 

Congress? 

Admiral ROGERS. At this stage of the game, I don’t know. But I 

do make the commitment that if I am confirmed I will assess that, 

and if I believe that money or authorities or support from the legislative side is required I will approach you. 

Senator REED. I would encourage you to do that, because again 

I think there are so many different moving parts in these issues 

that you’re addressing, not just in terms of operational, but privacy, constitutional, policy, commercial enterprises versus Government enterprises, not-for-profits, that I think this exercise would be 

hugely important. This is probably not the most precise analogy, 

but when we saw war beginning in 1939 and 1940 we learned a 

lot in the Louisiana maneuvers. In fact, we discovered some very 

capable leadership down there that was in the junior ranks and 

vaulted over some others very quickly when the war started. 

I don’t sense we’ve actually done that in the scale that we talked 

about. I would urge you to look very quickly and get back to us 

very quickly in terms of what we have to do to assist you. 

Again, I think both of you gentlemen bring extraordinary dedication and service, and not just yourselves personally but your families. Also, I think you bring appreciation that all of what we do ultimately is about the young men and women who wear the uniform, that really are in harm’s way. For what you do for them, I 

thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to both of our witnesses today. Let me try to be brief. 

General Selva, I want to talk about moving C–130Js from 

Keesler Air Force Base. But let me say that DOD wants to do another base realignment and closure (BRAC) round, and often we 

hear Defense officials say it’s not going to be like the 2005 BRAC 

round. They say: Our days of spending lots of money just moving 

things around that won’t result in financial savings, those days are 

over. Yet with the Air Force plans to shut down the 815th Airlift 

Squadron and their Active Duty partners, the 345th Airlift Squadron, and move the squadron of C–130J aircraft away from Keesler 

Air Force Base, it seems to me the reasons have never been fully 

explained. 

The official announcement came yesterday. I have a news report 

from WLOX of Biloxi, MS, which says Keesler Air Force Base will 

lose 10 aircraft from the 403rd Wing under proposed defense cuts 

presented to Congress on Monday. The Air Force Reserve Command plans to transfer the 10 C–130J aircraft to the newly reactivated—newly reactivated—913th Airlift Group in Little Rock. 

First, I’m willing to work with the Air Force in making overall 

savings. Every Senator is going to defend our own bases. But if this 

is going to help the greater good, count me in to be your teammate 

here. 

But first these aircraft were going to go to Dobbins in Georgia. 

The Air Force abandoned that, and then they were going to send 

them to Pope Field to the 44th Airlift Wing in North Carolina. Now 

that wing’s going to be deactivated, and we’re newly reactivating 

467 

an airlift group at Little Rock and sending these C–130Js from 

Keesler to Little Rock Air Force Base, to this newly reactivated 

group. 

The taxpayers have spent millions of dollars to provide Keesler 

Air Force Base with state of the art modern hangars and facilities. 

As a matter of fact, Keesler has enough space to house two squadrons. Yet the Air Force continues to propose to spend millions of 

dollars to move these aircraft away. 

I just want you to help us understand at the committee level the 

reason for this. Of course, the move would also cause serious disruptions to the unit’s personnel and their families, and that happens every time there’s a move. I just want to ask you three direct 

questions, General: 

How much will this move cost? 

General SELVA. Senator, my understanding is that the move 

itself is cost-neutral to Little Rock. The savings are on the order 

of 600 manpower billets across the Air Force Reserve specifically 

as the Reserves looked at this decision, which equates to about 

$100 million across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for 

savings. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Is there going to be any military construction (MILCON) needed at Little Rock to accomplish this 

move? 

General SELVA. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator WICKER. Now, I want you to supply me a statement then 

on the record, not to your knowledge. I want you to be able to look 

us in the eye on this committee, General, and assure us that not 

$1 of MILCON is going to be needed to accomplish this move. 

General SELVA. Sir, I’ll look into the costs of the move from the 

specifics of what might be required at Little Rock that wouldn’t either be required at Pope or any other location where we would base 

that unit. 

Senator WICKER. It is your testimony that moving these 10 aircraft from a base where there’s already modern hangars and facilities to a new base is actually going to save enough money to offset 

the cost of making this move? 

General SELVA. Senator, based on the consultations I’ve had with 

the Air Force Reserve Command in their making this decision and 

recommending it to the Air Force, my understanding is that they 

will save upwards of 600 manpower billets and that will save us 

$100 million across the FYDP, and that it’s a reasonable thing to 

do. 

Senator WICKER. I want you to get back to us with the specific 

numbers there. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Proposed C–130 fleet reductions in the fiscal year 2015 President’s budget, including deactivation of Air Force Reserve Command’s 440th Airlift Wing at Pope Army 

Air Field and Air Force Reserve Command’s consolidation at Little Rock Air Force 

Base from 15 C–130Hs to 10 C–130Js, combined with the existing infrastructure at 

Little Rock Air Force Base results in no additional MILCON needed to integrate Air 

Force Reserve Command’s 10 C–130J aircraft at Little Rock Air Force Base. 

Senator WICKER. Let me just follow up on Senator Manchin’s 

question about equipment being left in Afghanistan. I think your 

468 

testimony was that you really weren’t in a position to comment 

about equipment left in Iraq, is that correct? 

General SELVA. Sir, I’m not in a position to testify about the details of the equipment left in Iraq because I wasn’t in that decision 

process. 

Senator WICKER. Okay, but you are going to get back with the 

committee and with Senator Manchin on some follow-up answers 

regarding equipment being left in Afghanistan, is that correct? 

General SELVA. Senator, the decisions on equipment left in Afghanistan will be up to General Austin in CENTCOM and General 

Dunford in ISAF, as well as our DOD leadership. The comment I 

made to Senator Manchin was there is some equipment that would 

normally be left in Afghanistan as a result of the value of the 

equipment, the residual value of the equipment, being less than the 

transportation costs in having to bring it home. 

Senator WICKER. Are you going to be able to get back to the committee about the factors there or do you suggest that Senator 

Manchin and I look elsewhere? 

General SELVA. Sir, I would have to consult with General Austin 

and General Dunford—— 

Senator WICKER. It’s a question for another command? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. But it goes without saying—number one, 

we’re going to leave friends there. Hopefully we’re going to leave 

a follow-on force. 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Hopefully, we’re going to try to continue to be 

successful in Afghanistan. There are some forces that are going to 

need this equipment. 

Second, there would be a cost to the taxpayers of transporting 

some of this equipment back that’s not going to be necessary for 

us to be successful in the long haul, and it would make no sense 

to spend the money to bring it back if it’s going to cost more. Would 

that be a fair statement? 

General SELVA. That’s correct, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. Good luck to both of you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Let me interrupt just for one second. The first vote has now 

begun. I believe it’s the first of four that are scheduled. After Senator Vitter, I think that Senator Kaine is coming back, and if there 

are no other Senators I’m then going to ask Senator Kaine, who is 

coming back I understand, to close off, unless Senator Inhofe has 

a different plan. Thank you. 

Senator Vitter. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our 

witnesses for all of your service and for being here. 

Admiral Rogers, do you think that CYBERCOM has the necessary supporting policies and authorities and relationships and 

the will to act? Are all of those in place, and if you would supplement any of those what additional authorities or policies would you 

like to see? 

Admiral ROGERS. In general, my immediate answer would be yes. 

I think as I’ve already indicated, that the things I think we need 

to continue to work on are this idea of deterrence, this idea of deVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00476 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
469 

veloping norms within the cyber arena. That’s going to be much 

broader than just CYBERCOM, but clearly CYBERCOM I believe 

is part of that dialogue. 

Senator VITTER. But within CYBERCOM, do you have the authorities and the policies you need to do all of that effectively? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

If I could, and if I am confirmed and my experience leads me to 

believe otherwise in actually executing the mission, I will come 

back. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. In your statement you said, ‘‘The level of 

expertise required to conduct potentially damaging operations has 

steadily lowered, enabling less capable actors to achieve some level 

of effect.’’ How does this impact our allies and foreign partners and 

our ability to work with them? 

Admiral ROGERS. I think it increases the level of risk for all of 

us, for all of our partners. 

Senator VITTER. Is it in particular a problem when we have allies 

and partners with less capable defenses than we do, and how do 

you handle that? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, and I think one of the ways we handle 

that is through strong, broad partnerships. We have a strong dialogue in the cyber arena now with many of our allies and partners. 

We need to continue to build on that. 

Senator VITTER. I know the Pentagon, for instance, wants more 

NATO members to have more access to unmanned aircraft. Are 

there particular issues or threats or vulnerabilities related to that, 

given these advanced opportunities for our enemies to have an effect? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, there clearly is a risk there. 

Senator VITTER. How do we mitigate and hedge against that 

risk? 

Admiral ROGERS. I think we ask ourselves what can we do to try 

to mitigate that risk, whether it’s changes to the physical systems 

on those aircraft themselves, whether it’s asking ourselves what 

kind of tactics, techniques, and procedures are we doing that can 

help maximize our attempts to mitigate that risk. 

Senator VITTER. Are those risks ever such that, with regard to 

particular systems, we would change our mind in terms of a transfer to an ally? 

Admiral ROGERS. Clearly it would be on a case-by-case basis. 

None that I’m currently aware of. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. Last week the press reported that Russia 

had used cyber-attacks against Ukrainian telecommunications, to 

hamper Ukrainian leadership’s ability to access that. Do you agree 

that Russia has very sophisticated cyber capabilities, and if they 

use them that could impart considerable damage to Ukraine’s critical infrastructure? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir, I would agree with both of those statements. 

Senator VITTER. I want to move to Guard and Reserve, Admiral 

Rogers. A lot of us are interested in better integrating and using, 

leveraging, Guard and Reserve capabilities. Clearly it’s a long-term 

trend that the Guard and Reserve are much more in the middle of 

any effort, any fight we have. What specifically is CYBERCOM 

470 

doing to ensure that the Guard and Reserve components are being 

fully utilized and maximized? 

Admiral ROGERS. First, CYBERCOM is part of that broader departmental discussion, that review that’s ongoing right now, that 

is scheduled to be finished by July, that’s designed to take a look 

at the mission analysis associated with asking ourselves just what 

kind of Reserve capability in the cyber arena do we need, how do 

we bring it to bear, how do we structure the Reserve component 

to maximize its effectiveness and its part in this mission. 

In addition, CYBERCOM currently has an ongoing series of exercises designed to exercise with Guard units in the cyber arena. 

CYBERCOM also has an ongoing dialogue and is part of a broader 

dialogue with governors and the adjutant generals as we work our 

way forward to figure out what’s the best way to maximize that capability, and we have to maximize that capability. 

Senator VITTER. I would underscore and encourage that with regard to CYBERCOM in particular. As I hope you know, there’s particular language in the last defense authorization bill requiring 

maximization of that with regard to the Guard and Reserve. I 

would really commend that to your focus and attention. 

A final question. I think some of your comments have gone to the 

fact that appropriate leadership needs to make the case more fully 

and publicly and persuasively for the use of important authorities 

that do exist and lay that out in layman’s terms, if you will, why 

it’s important. In that spirit, can you talk to a capability that has 

been fairly hotly debated, which is the use of geographic information regarding cellphones? 

Admiral ROGERS. To be honest, sir, it’s not an issue I have yet 

delved deeply into. It’s one of those things I need to get specificly 

smarter on to be prepared to discuss very publicly. I think that’s 

an important part of that public discussion. 

Senator VITTER. If you could look at that and maybe supplement 

the record in writing with regard to your thoughts on that, I would 

appreciate it. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I appreciate that there has been some concern raised about whether the National 

Security Agency (NSA) would seek to obtain Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) 

under section 215 of the Patriot Act. CSLI provides identifying information for the 

cell tower used initially to place or receive the call. While CSLI identifies the tower, 

it does not reveal the precise location of the mobile device used to place or receive 

the call. As detailed in several declassified court orders by the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court (FISC), NSA is not authorized to obtain CSLI as part of the section 215 Telephony Metadata Program. Accordingly, should NSA seek to obtain 

CSLI under section 215 at a future point in time it would need to obtain the approval of the FISC. It is important to note, however, that CSLI is potentially useful 

intelligence information in many other contexts, such as counterterrorism investigations and in support of U.S. military and intelligence operations abroad. For example, it could well be that knowing the general location where a terrorist was located 

or where an individual in contact with a terrorist was located when a call was made 

would be a key piece of information to those responsible for protecting the Homeland. 

Senator VITTER. That’s all I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Vitter. 

Senator Kaine, when you’re done, we’re in the middle of a vote 

now—you have voted on this one, have you? 

471 

Senator KAINE. I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you could then turn it over to whoever is 

here next in line, I’d appreciate it. 

Senator KAINE. I will. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to the witnesses for your service and for your testimony 

today. My questions will be primarily for Admiral Rogers. 

I have a little bit of an unorthodox view of some of these challenges about NSA programs. Many of my colleagues talk about 

these programs as if the solution to controversies is fixing the programs themselves, and I actually think the bigger challenge is 

many of these programs are being carried out pursuant to a vaguely defined war or conflict. 

Admiral Rogers, twice during your testimony today I think your 

testimony has at the vague notion of what we are, in fact, in. You 

indicated that you thought Edward Snowden’s revelations were 

wrong and that they cost American lives, but you hesitated about 

whether to use the word traitor to describe Edward Snowden. 

When you were asked by Senator Graham whether we were at war, 

you said we’re in a hostility or disagreement. But then there was 

a misunderstanding in terms of what he was asking. You thought 

he was asking about a cyber-war in particular; you understood that 

we’re in a war on terror. 

My concern is we are carrying out a whole series of military actions and intelligence programs that are being done pursuant to an 

authorization for use of military force that was done on September 

14, 2001, that has no temporal limitation, that has no geographic 

limitation, and that has been defined by both the Bush and Obama 

administrations to extend to taking action not only against those 

who planned the September 11 attack, but against associated 

forces. That language does not appear in the authorization, but it 

has been the administrations’, both administrations’, decision about 

what that authorization means. 

We are currently in a war, but the war does not have a geographic limitation. It does not have any kind of a temporal limitation. It doesn’t have an expiration date. This committee held a 

hearing on the authorization for use of military force in May. I 

asked Obama administration witnesses when does this war end, 

and they said: We’re not sure; it could be 25 or 30 years. 

I asked Obama administration witnesses: If someone who is born 

in 2020 and when they’re 15 years old in 2035 joins an organization that is associated with al Qaeda that only popped up then, 

that has no designs against the United States, does the authorization allow us to take military action against that individual or that 

group? The answer was yes. 

There is no reform that we’re going to be able to make to any 

of these NSA programs that I think will answer the questions of 

our citizens or civilians if our intelligence-gathering operation is 

done in a significant way pursuant to an open-ended military authorization. The questions that you received about the dual-hatted 

nature of your job—you’re part of a military command that is executing an authorization that has no limitation whatsoever for all 

practical purposes, and you’re also in an NSA position where you’re 

gathering intelligence. 

472 

I feel like the challenge about limiting these NSA programs or 

trying to find the right balance between fighting terrorism, stopping evil, and protecting citizens’ rights—we can do anything we 

want within the four corners of the programs. If we do not as a 

Congress revisit the 2001 authorization and try to put some sense 

of definition and scope to it—open-ended, it could be a war for another 25 or 30 years—we’ll continue to have witnesses, sharp witnesses who are very talented, who will come before us and will 

have difficulty describing exactly what we’re in the middle of because the primary job of Congress is to give some definition at the 

front end in terms of what the mission is. It’s the military and the 

Commander in Chief that have to execute the mission. 

But Congress has given no definition of what it is we are doing 

at this point, and we will always have controversies in my opinion 

going forward. 

Now, Admiral Rogers, in your advance policy questions you were 

asked about what constitutes use of force in cyber space in relation 

to the War Powers Act, the exercise of the right of self-defense 

under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, and also the triggering 

of collective defense obligations. I’d like if you could just elaborate 

a little bit on that answer today, use of force in cyber space and 

how in your view that triggers either the war powers or other obligations that the United States has. 

Admiral ROGERS. I’d be first to admit, I apologize, of the 120 

questions I was asked, I don’t remember word for word the specifics. Please, accept my apologies. 

Senator KAINE. Yes, indeed. What are unique challenges in defining ‘‘war’’ in cyber space, what war is, what hostilities are, what 

military action is? 

Admiral ROGERS. Clearly, from a policy perspective we are still 

trying to work our way through those issues. The tenets I think 

that are applicable here are the fact that, whatever we do within 

the cyber arena, international law will pertain; that if we find ourselves getting to a point where we believe that cyber is taking us 

down an armed conflict scenario, that the rules and the law of 

armed conflict will pertain every bit as much in this domain as it 

does in any other. 

I don’t think cyber is inherently different in that regard. I think 

those sets of procedures, those sets of policies and law, as a Nation 

have stood us in good stead. I think they represent a good point 

of departure for us. 

Senator KAINE. The phrase you used I think is an interesting 

one: If we believe that cyber activity is taking us down the path 

to armed conflict, then international law would apply. Would it be 

your view then that pure cyber war—somebody wipes out our grid 

and then we think about taking activity to respond—is that not 

war? It could have huge effect on human life. It could have huge 

effect on the economies of the two nations. Is that not war unless 

it then leads to armed conflict? 

Admiral ROGERS. No, certainly I believe that an offensive, destructive act that has significant impact for us, I believe now we’re 

starting to get on the boundaries of is that an act of war. Now, everything varies on a case by case basis and I’m always concerned 

about broad general statements. 

473 

Senator KAINE. Right. It is just that question. We do have some 

important definitional work to do. The absence of a cyber-bill 

makes this all harder for all of us. 

Let’s switch topics. Yesterday I visited Northern Virginia Community College and was fortunate to be there at a time where 

there was a meeting of the DC-based organization CyberWatch, 

which was set up a number of years ago to help colleges, community colleges, and the private sector, coordinate what they think are 

the skills that our cyber professionals need. It’s a work force organization. 

I was interested that someone from DOD is not commonly 

around that table and I might want to follow up separately to suggest that that would be a good avenue for participation. 

There has been testimony—General Alexander was here last 

week—on the need for 133 cyber mission teams managed by 6,000 

highly trained personnel by 2016. As the leader of CYBERCOM, 

what will be your approach on these recruiting and training issues? 

Because, first, the need is intense; and second, the competition 

from the private sector is also very intense for people with this 

skill set. What will your approach be to staffing out this important 

mission? 

Admiral ROGERS. First, each of the Services continues to pay particular attention to this in their responsibilities to man, train, and 

equip the cyber force. As the Navy individual right now, to be honest, on the uniformed side our experience has exceeded our expectations. We have been able to recruit quality individuals and retain 

them. It’s something I, in my current duties, continue to pay close 

attention to: What are the indicators that would suggest that potentially that is changing? 

In some ways, the civilian side I think represents an even potentially greater challenge. I think we need to look at incentives, 

whether that be pay, whether that be the ability to focus these individuals in particular areas for extended periods of time, in ways 

that traditionally we don’t do now. I think we’ll need to look at all 

of that. 

Senator KAINE. When you say the civilian side, you mean to do 

the work of CYBERCOM it takes a real balance of Service branch 

personnel, but also DOD civilians. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator KAINE. There has to be a good mixture. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator KAINE [presiding]. My time is up and all who are here 

for first rounds of questions are done. Is there a second round of 

questions? Ranking Member Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. If you’d like to go ahead 

and continue, you could. I know that Senator Cruz is coming back, 

although you were involved, starting to talk about something that 

I unsuccessfully was trying to get at during my time, and that is 

this threat. I just fail to see that there’s a major difference between 

someone who is attacking us, depending on what kind of weapon 

they’re using, and this weapon of cyber attack. 

Let me ask you, Admiral Rogers, do you believe we’re deterring 

or dissuading our adversaries in cyber space and out? Do you think 

we’re deterring them? 

474 

Admiral ROGERS. Not to the extent we need to, sir, no. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you know what cyber deterrence looks like? 

Admiral ROGERS. No, sir. We’re still working our way—— 

Senator INHOFE. That’s the problem. There’s not a lot of the public out there that is aware of the significance of what’s going on. 

When I talk to people out there about what Iran’s capabilities are, 

what they’re going to be next year. We talk about a weapon, we 

talk about a delivery system, they understand that, but not cyber 

attack. I look at this and I just think that the Senator from Virginia was really onto something. A war is a war, and I think we’re 

going to have to elevate the threat that we’re talking about in this 

committee and you’ll be dealing with, both of you are going to be 

dealing with, to the level of a military threat, because I think most 

people are not really aware of that. 

General Selva, DOD uses rail primarily for large training exercises and deployments. It also depends on the rail industry to be 

ready to meet DOD’s surge requirements. What is your assessment 

of the rail industry to support DOD’s requirements? 

General SELVA. Senator, I’m not in a position as the Air Mobility 

Command Commander to give you a definitive answer other than 

to say that, having consulted with TRANSCOM, the recent work 

that’s been done to look at the number of available rail cars and 

the status of the rail infrastructure in the Nation is in the hands 

of the TRANSCOM Evaluation and Assessments Division. I’ll be 

happy to take a look into that data once I have an opportunity to 

do that if confirmed. But it’s so far out of the area of my expertise 

right now, it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to give you a definitive 

comment. 

Senator INHOFE. Admiral Rogers, I mentioned earlier that I have 

gotten to know the outgoing man in charge, General Alexander, 

quite well, and I’ve had a chance to talk to him some time ago, 

early on. I think he’s really done an excellent job and he has informed me that you have the type of background that is going to 

be able to do the same thing. I would just hope that we could work 

together in getting this, raising this in the eyes and the views of 

the public so that people understand how real the threat is out 

there. I look forward to working with you. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Ranking Member Inhofe. 

Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

General, Admiral, thank you both for being here. Thank you both 

for your long and distinguished service to our Nation. 

Admiral, I’d like to talk some about the NSA’s policies. I have 

long expressed concerns about the NSA’s policies on really two 

fronts: one, an overbroad intrusion into the privacy rights of lawabiding citizens; and two, a pattern of not focusing sufficiently on 

bad actors and not collecting the information, the intelligence needed to prevent terrorist acts. It seems to me the focus overall of our 

intelligence and defense community and law enforcement community is directed far too much at law-abiding citizens and far too little at individualized bad actors. I’d like to ask you questions on 

both fronts. 

Starting out with the citizenry at large: As you’re aware, President Obama’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 

475 

Technology has said that the bulk metadata collected by the NSA 

should be held by a third party, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties 

Oversight Board has recommended ending bulk metadata collection 

altogether. Do you agree with either of these proposals? 

Admiral ROGERS. In terms of pulling the data from the NSA, yes, 

I believe that there is a standard that we can work toward that 

would enable us to do that while still meeting the requirements of 

generating the intelligence we need and ensuring the protection of 

U.S. citizens. 

Sir, would you mind repeating the second portion? 

Senator CRUZ. The second portion was that the Privacy and Civil 

Liberties Oversight Board recommended ending bulk metadata collection altogether, and I was asking if you agree with that recommendation. 

Admiral ROGERS. No, sir, I would not. I believe we can still do 

this in a way that ensure the protection of our citizens while also 

providing us insights that generate value. 

Senator CRUZ. But you believe that the information should not 

be held by the U.S. Government, is that correct? 

Admiral ROGERS. I support the President’s decision to shift that 

from the NSA. 

Senator CRUZ. If confirmed, what would be a timetable for implementing that reform? 

Admiral ROGERS. To be honest, sir, I don’t know. I’m just not 

smart enough yet about the particulars. It’ll be driven by the solution that we come up with. That dialogue is ongoing right now. I 

haven’t been a part of that as a nominee. 

Senator CRUZ. Will you commit, if confirmed, to working with 

members of this committee to implement it expeditiously? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator CRUZ. I want to ask more generally. The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of law-abiding Americans. What is your 

view of the appropriate limitations on the ability of the Government to search through phone or email communications of lawabiding citizens not accused or under suspicion of any wrongdoing? 

Admiral ROGERS. I believe such searches should not be done 

without a corresponding legal framework for their execution. 

Senator CRUZ. Does that framework in your judgment require individualized suspicion? 

Admiral ROGERS. I think it varies by the specifics of the threat 

that we’re talking about, which is one reason why the metadata approach I think was taken to try to address that, to deal with no 

content, no names, no geographic locations, to try to strike that 

balance, if you will. 

Senator CRUZ. Would you agree that for the Government to intercept content from telephones or emails requires under the Fourth 

Amendment individualized suspicion and some form of judicial 

oversight? 

Admiral ROGERS. I don’t know that I would make a blanket 

statement. Again, sir, I apologize; I am not a lawyer and you’re 

asking me about the specifics of the law and it’s just not an area 

of my expertise. 

Senator CRUZ. I would ask after this hearing if you would follow 

up and answer that question in writing, and you can certainly conVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00483 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
476 

sult with counsel. But the relevance of the Fourth Amendment in 

terms of how you would implement the policies at the NSA I think 

is a question of great interest to a great many citizens, and the 

Government collecting metadata or even more so the content of 

communications between law-abiding citizens is an issue that the 

Constitution I believe speaks very directly to. I would appreciate 

your expanded answer in writing after this hearing. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Admiral ROGERS. It is certainly the case that Americans are protected by the 

Fourth Amendment from unreasonable searches and I am fully committed to protecting this and all other rights of Americans. As to the requirements of the Fourth 

Amendment for the Government to intercept content from telephone calls or emails, 

I understand that this legal doctrine is the subject of numerous Supreme Court decisions and that those requirements would depend on the particular facts and circumstances of a given situation. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 

absent limited exceptions such as an emergency, the National Security Agency may 

not target any unconsenting U.S. person anywhere in the world under circumstances in which the U.S. person would enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy without an individualized determination of probable cause by a Federal judge 

that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. 

Senator CRUZ. I’d like to shift to the other side, to the concern 

that I have that we are devoting far too many resources looking at 

law-abiding citizens and far too few resources looking at the bad 

guys. With regard, for example, to the Boston bombing, the 

Tsarnaev brothers, we had been notified by Russia that in their 

judgment they were having communications and may be radical Islamic terrorists. The elder Tsarnaev brother posted and advertised 

his desire for jihad on YouTube, not exactly a secure, hidden communication, but publicly for the world to see. 

Yet, even though we knew this individual or had reason to know 

this individual was a radical Islamic terrorist, and even though he 

was publicly proclaiming his desire for jihad, we failed to prevent 

that tragic bombing in Boston. I’d like to ask you, why do you think 

that was and what can we do to correct it so we don’t fail to prevent the next Boston bombing? 

Admiral ROGERS. The reality is, sir, I don’t know the specifics of 

the Boston bombing. It’s not an element of my current duties and 

it’s not something I have express direct knowledge of. I think to 

comment knowingly I would need that kind of knowledge. 

Senator CRUZ. A second example deals with Major Nidal Hassan 

and the Fort Hood murders. In that instance, Hassan had traded 

some 18 emails with radical Islamic cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a 

known terrorist leader who was a spiritual adviser of the September 11 bombers. This is not some extraneous person. This is 

someone known to be a serious threat to this country, and a major 

in the military is communicating repeatedly by email with him. 

Despite all of our surveillance capabilities, we failed to prevent 

that horrific terrorist attack at Fort Hood that claimed the lives of 

14 innocents. In your judgment, why was that? What could we 

have done better to prevent that? 

Admiral ROGERS. To be honest, I answered that question to Senator Graham. 

Senator CRUZ. Let me suggest more broadly on both of these that 

it would be a far better allocation of resources in the NSA and in 

our efforts to prevent terrorism generally if much more resources 

were directed to targeting those who we have reason to know are 

477 

dangerous, we have reason to know are or may be radical Islamic 

terrorists, and less resources were devoted and less energy was devoted to broader interception and surveillance of the law-abiding 

citizenry. 

It has struck me for some time that the priorities have been 

backwards and we ought to be targeting the bad guys and protecting innocents from terrorist attacks and at the same time respecting the constitutional rights of every American. 

Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, General. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Senator Cruz. 

Senator Inhofe, any additional questions for a second round of 

questioning? 

Senator INHOFE. No. 

Senator KAINE. Seeing none, I thank the witnesses for your appearance today and for your patience as we were going back and 

forth to vote. We appreciate your service and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Paul J. Selva, USAF, by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I believe Goldwater-Nichols has transformed the Department of Defense 

(DOD) for the better and it has led to an unprecedented level of cooperation and 

understanding between the Services. Over the last 28 years, DOD and the military 

have fully embraced joint, interdependent operations. Having the opportunity to 

serve in multiple joint tours and now as Commander of Air Mobility Command, I 

have seen first-hand how we continue to improve our joint capabilities, ultimately 

producing a more effective means to grow the officers who are capable of leading 

our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines as a joint force. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I have no suggestions for altering Goldwater-Nichols at present, but I do 

recognize the need to continuously review and improve the framework in which 

DOD operates. If confirmed, I will work with Congress, the Secretary of Defense and 

other senior leaders of our military to ensure Goldwater-Nichols continues to meet 

the needs of our Armed Forces and champion any changes to the legislation that 

might become necessary. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)? 

Answer. The mission of the Commander, TRANSCOM is to provide air, land and 

sea transportation for DOD, in peace, crisis, and war. TRANSCOM relies on three 

Component Commands—Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command 

(MSC), and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC)— 

to accomplish this mission. The Commander has been assigned numerous responsibilities in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to include the Distribution Process 

Owner (DPO) mission to improve the worldwide DOD distribution system; DOD single manager for global patient movement; Global Distribution Synchronizer (GDS) 

478 

mission for synchronizing Phase 0 distribution operations; and facilitating the rapid 

establishment of joint force headquarters for combatant commanders through its 

subordinate command, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. The TRANSCOM 

Team utilizes a blend of Active and Reserve Forces, civilian employees, and commercial industry partners to meet the command mission in support of a full range of 

military operations. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. Throughout my military career, I have had the opportunity to be in positions that have prepared me, if confirmed, to perform the duties as the Commander 

of TRANSCOM. 

As the Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, I had the opportunity to 

serve as an advisor to the Secretary of State and senior State Department leaders. 

In that capacity I worked directly with senior diplomats strengthening our relationship with allies, partners and friends, and building partnerships with foreign governments and international and non-governmental organizations. 

As a previous Director of Operations in TRANSCOM, I directed and synchronized 

the Defense Transportation System with national distribution processes to meet national security objectives. During my tenure I was responsible for day-to-day operations of the transportation and logistics networks that supported our forces engaged in combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan and supported humanitarian relief 

and disaster response operations at home and abroad. 

Finally, in my current capacity as Commander, Air Mobility Command, the Air 

Component of TRANSCOM, I command over 130,000 airmen from across our Air 

Force, Active, Reserve, and Air National Guard who provide worldwide cargo and 

passenger delivery, aerial refueling, special air mission and aeromedical evacuation. 

This includes the crucial role of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to victims of natural disasters both at home and around the world. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, TRANSCOM? 

Answer. As a previous Director of Operations for TRANSCOM and as the current 

commander of one of TRANSCOM’s Service components, I am aware of the command’s global responsibilities. If confirmed, I will personally engage with all of 

TRANSCOM’s component commands, DOD agencies, and commercial partners to ensure I fully understand the scope of the issues they face in order to execute this 

critical duty. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command 

runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, 

however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command to the following offices: 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has full power and authority to act for 

the Secretary of Defense when serving as his designated representative in the Secretary’s absence. As such, the Commander TRANSCOM will report to and through 

the Deputy Secretary when serving in that capacity. The Deputy Secretary also 

serves as the Chief Management Officer of DOD to optimize the business environment across the Defense enterprise. TRANSCOM supports such optimization to improve our support to the other combatant commands, at best value to the Nation. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with 

DOD components, including combatant commands, which have collateral or related 

functions. In practice, this coordination and exchange is normally routed through 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, as the DPO, the TRANSCOM 

commander receives oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics in his role as the Defense Logistics Executive via the Defense Logistics Board. If confirmed as a combatant commander, I will act accordingly. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal military advisor 

to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and 

Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor, and is not, according to 

the law, in the chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each combatant commander. The President normally directs communicaVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00486 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
479 

tions between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders 

via the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved 

and allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the combatant commanders, especially on 

operational requirements. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary 

of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I would be personally accountable. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. Although the Vice Chairman does not fall within the combatant command chain of command, he is delegated full power and authority to act for the 

Chairman in the Chairman’s absence. If confirmed as a combatant commander, I 

will keep the Chairman informed, but if the Vice Chairman is representing the 

Chairman I will keep him informed as I would the Chairman. 

Question. The Director of the Joint Staff. 

Answer. The Director of the Joint Staff assists the Chairman in managing the 

Joint Staff. The Director of the Joint Staff does not fall within the combatant commander’s chain of command. However, he enables important decisions to be made 

as the combatant commander’s staff interacts with the Joint Staff. The Director is 

also a key interface with Office of the Secretary of Defense principles and interagency leadership, and can assist combatant commanders working issues below the 

Chairman’s level. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. Each Service Secretary is responsible for equipping, training, maintaining, and administering forces in the Secretary’s Service. Close coordination with 

each Service Secretary is required to ensure that there is no infringement upon the 

lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services. 

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure preparedness of his assigned 

forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs and their respective Reserve components. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service 

Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. The experience and judgment the Service Chiefs provide is an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed, as Commander, TRANSCOM, I will pursue an open dialogue 

with the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Question. The other combatant commanders. 

Answer. Each combatant commander is assigned specific responsibilities in the 

Unified Command Plan. Given the complexity of today’s security environment, it is 

essential that all the combatant commanders work together to execute U.S. national 

security policy. If confirmed, I will maintain open dialogue with the other combatant 

commanders to foster trust and build mutual support. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, TRANSCOM? 

Answer. TRANSCOM currently has the capability to meet all surge requirements, 

however, long-term budget uncertainty may erode this key, asymmetric military and 

logistics advantage. TRANSCOM is focused on providing logistics and transportation 

solutions and increasing efficiencies for all its customers but if the future budgets 

are not addressed, its readiness, particularly the readiness of commercial partners, 

could be negatively impacted. Maintaining the readiness of our organic lift and sustaining the readiness of our commercial partners in an uncertain budget environment will present significant challenges to our ability to respond to crisis or conflict. 

The talent and skill of the men and women that make up TRANSCOM and its 

component commands is the foundation of the command’s success. I take very seriously the challenge and responsibility as a commander to be the champion for their 

readiness and to keep the entire team prepared to respond to the needs of the Nation. If confirmed, I would take an active role in preserving and enhancing the quality and expertise of TRANSCOM’s personnel resources and will actively address the 

demand to maintain the readiness of the transportation and distribution networks 

to respond to crisis or conflict. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my fellow combatant commanders to assess 

risks and develop mitigation strategies to ensure we can meet steady state and 

surge requirements. I will work to improve TRANSCOM’s global, end-to-end ability 

to deliver to the point of need in the most cost-effective way possible—projecting 

American influence and power when and where our national interests dictate. To 

480 

do this, I will work with TRANSCOM’s commercial partners and the interagency to 

continue to build and maintain capacity and continue TRANSCOM’s efforts around 

the world to secure diplomatic and physical accesses to ground and airspace infrastructure for logistics. I will also leverage ongoing multi-modal efforts to optimize 

our operations to support the warfighter while improving the performance and efficiency of the joint deployment and distribution enterprise. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish? 

Answer. If confirmed, my main priorities will be to support the warfighter and 

preserve readiness to meet national objectives. Always mindful of our obligation to 

make the most of our existing resources, I will continue process improvement and 

enterprise synchronization efforts through relationships within the Department, 

across the U.S. Government, and with commercial and international partners. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Commander, TRANSCOM? 

Answer. In a resource constrained environment, the most significant area I would 

focus on would be improving the coordination and synchronization of the entire 

Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise—a vast network of organizations 

both in and out of DOD that relies heavily on commercial partnerships with industry. TRANSCOM has made great strides in improving the economies and efficiencies 

toward this end, and if confirmed, I will continue this work by aligning enterprise 

responsibilities commensurate with assigned authorities and available resources; 

improving our ability to rapidly build strategic distribution networks; and, institutionalizing best practices and lessons learned during more than a decade of war. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work early to deepen strategic and personal relationships with fellow combatant commanders, TRANSCOM’s components, commercial 

and international partners, interagency leaders and with Members of Congress. We 

will be challenged with difficult decisions in the near future; however, we must balance costs and benefits, matching our actions to available resources in the near term 

and adapting our efforts for greater economies and efficiencies in the long term. 

EXPERIENCE IN MANAGING LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

Question. You have served as the Commander of the Air Mobility Command. 

What steps do you believe you need to take to achieve a more complete understating of the logistics operations of the other component commands of the 

TRANSCOM? 

Answer. Fortunately, as a previous Director of Operations for TRANSCOM and 

as the current commander of one of TRANSCOM’s Service components, I have an 

in-depth knowledge of the missions, roles and responsibilities of all facets of the 

TRANSCOM team. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to offer continued engagement with the component commanders, DOD agencies, and commercial partners to 

increase my understanding of the issues they face in order to better execute 

TRANSCOM’s critical worldwide mission. 

DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OWNER

Question. In September 2003, following a review of logistics operations, the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, TRANSCOM, as the Distribution 

Process Owner (DPO). As the DPO, TRANSCOM was tasked to improve the overall 

efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities—deployment, 

sustainment, and redeployment support during peace and war. 

What is your understanding of TRANSCOM’s responsibilities as the DPO? 

Answer. TRANSCOM, in partnership with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), 

General Services Agency, the Services, and combatant commanders others, is responsible for constantly working to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the 

DOD Distribution Network. Working with all the network stakeholders, 

TRANSCOM must work carefully to optimize the effectiveness and efficiency of the 

entire military supply chain, from factory to end user. 

Question. What is your assessment of the progress has TRANSCOM made in improving the distribution process? 

Answer. In the last few years our DPO Strategic Opportunities team has focused 

on a number of cost avoidance initiatives on both the surface and air side. Through 

these efforts, we have successfully reduced the amount of containers moving globally 

through both better utilization and a decrease in the amount of less efficient 20 foot 

containers used. We applied similar utilization principles to aircraft movements to 

reduce the overall amount of air lift. Along the same lines, we expanded use of continental United States multi-modal hubs to maximize cheaper surface movements. 

481 

Finally, we have developed methods to better manage aircraft fuel usage/purchase 

which is the single largest expense in aircraft operations. 

Question. Do you believe that the current system needs any changes to enhance 

the ability of TRANSCOM to execute the responsibilities of the DPO? 

Answer. I believe TRANSCOM has the necessary authorities to execute the Unified Command Plan designated responsibility of the DPO. If confirmed, I will continue the work underway in TRANSCOM’s execution of the DOD Global Campaign 

Plan for Distribution. TRANSCOM is in its first cycle of this recently approved plan 

which will identify distribution issues, assess their risks, prioritize these issues and 

finally pursue issue resolutions. The plan has a built-in annual update to ensure 

it is still enhancing the Global Distribution Network. The plan sets the stage for 

successful execution of TRANSCOM’s DPO role. 

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Question. According to DOD, the requirement for organic strategic airlift needed 

to support wartime requirements has fallen to a level of 275 aircraft. 

Do you agree with the plan to reduce the number of strategic airlift to a level of 

275 aircraft? 

Answer. Yes. The Mobility Capability Assessment (MCA) and the Mobility Requirements Capability Study concluded that in general the mobility capabilities support the strategic objectives in the 2012 National Defense Strategy. While certain 

scenarios presented some mobility challenges, none precluded achievement of U.S. 

objectives with accepted timelines and risk. 

Question. What is your view of the requirements in peacetime for such organic 

airlift aircraft? 

Answer. In peacetime, the organic airlift force flies to maintain readiness to meet 

its wartime mission. The organic strategic airlift fleet is able to provide 80–90 aircraft per day to meet the DOD’s airlift needs. 

Question. Do you believe that the Air Force could, at reasonable costs and within 

reasonable timeframes, reactivate some portion of the fleet of C–5 aircraft if we discover that 275 strategic airlift aircraft is not sufficient to meet our peacetime and 

wartime needs? 

Answer. Yes. C–5s not retained in service have been placed in the Aerospace 

Maintenance and Regeneration Center at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona, 

where they can be returned to service if needed. 

Question. If we decide that 275 strategic airlift aircraft is insufficient to meet our 

requirements, should we consider buying more C–17 aircraft? 

Answer. The purchase of additional C–17s could be one of several alternatives to 

consider in an Analysis of Alternatives. This option will be increasingly expensive 

after the production line is shut down. 

NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

Question. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) has been important in delivering equipment and supplies to Afghanistan, in part to reduce the U.S. reliance on 

supply routes through Pakistan. Yet significant portions of the NDN go through certain countries, particularly in Central Asia, that have extremely poor track records 

on human rights and corruption. 

What do you see as the major challenges to continued use of the NDN to deliver 

supplies to Afghanistan or withdraw equipment from Afghanistan as we draw down 

forces there? 

Answer. Sustainment and retrograde cargo volumes have greatly reduced with the 

reduction of troops in Afghanistan and the increased use of both military and commercial multi-modal operations. Should events in Ukraine strain relationships between the United States and Russia and countries strongly influenced by Russia, 

access to routes north of the Black Sea both for surface and over-flight movement 

could be limited. Additional concerns include border crossing and convoy security 

within the country of Afghanistan which could affect surface movement in and out 

of the country; if the security situation deteriorates, surface access may become very 

limited. 

The NDN accessed through the Mediterranean and the Caspian remain open and 

reliable as the countries involved are deeply interested in maintaining routes which 

will help them build the ‘‘New Silk Road’’ initiative. 

Question. To what extent, if any, should concerns about the human rights and corruption records of authoritarian regimes, particularly in Central Asia, be taken into 

account in using access to supply routes along the NDN? 

Answer. The DOD agencies, Department of State (DOS), and geographic combatant commands coordinate closely to develop and maintain NDN routes to ensure an 

482 

efficient and effective means of moving warfighter cargo into and out of Afghanistan. Human rights violations as determined by the DOS, and corruption records, 

should be considered for participation on the NDN. 

STRATEGIC SEALIFT

Question. Strategic sealift has always played a significant role in providing support to our forces overseas. Typically, we have seen strategic sealift delivering 95 

percent of the equipment transported to overseas contingencies. 

An important component of our strategic sealift surge capability is the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). Many of the ships in the RRF are well beyond economic service 

life and may need to be replaced in the near future. 

What plans do you believe would be appropriate for modernizing the RRF? 

Answer. The capacity provided by the RRF is critical to TRANSCOM’s ability to 

meet its wartime requirements. In the past, the fleet capacity was increased by 

using authorities to purchase vessels. The capacity was then maintained using selective Extended Service Life (ESL) programs on vessels where it was appropriate. 

For the future, we will explore all options to find a recapitalization strategy that 

is cost effective and minimizes the cost of ownership of the fleet for the long term, 

to include purchase and ESL where it makes sense. 

Question. What will the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommend for 

both airlift and sealift requirements? 

Answer. The QDR recommended combat coded inventory (i.e. PMAI) force structure for Air Force in fiscal year 2019 is 211 strategic airlift aircraft (39 C–5, 172 

C–17) and 300 tactical aircraft (C–130). The sealift requirements were not defined 

as main elements in the Navy fiscal year 2019 force structure. If confirmed, I will 

work with the Navy, U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), and MSC to ensure 

we have adequate organic and commercial sealift capacity in the future. Moreover, 

I would reiterate the criticality of organic and commercial mobility capability and 

capacity, including robust sealift and aerial refueling, which remain the foundation 

of our Nation’s ability to project power. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the National Defense 

Sealift Fund (NDSF) to facilitate resourcing sealift? 

Answer. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, Navy transferred NDSF funding to other 

appropriations, preserving the readiness of TRANSCOM’s Surge Sealift assets. 

TRANSCOM supports Navy’s effort to be auditable in accordance with Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness standards. 

Question. What would be the impact to strategic sealift if the NDSF were closed 

out and sealift funded out of through other Navy appropriations? 

Answer. It is my understanding that this change is an internal Navy funding realignment. Appropriated funds will be used by the Navy for our strategic sealift requirements. TRANSCOM will still have full visibility over these funds. 

Question. If you believe the NDSF has worked well, what is your assessment of 

the potential benefits that could be achieved by establishing a similar or combined 

airlift-sealift mobility fund to provide resources for both sealift and airlift and promote cost effective tradeoffs? 

Answer. TRANSCOM’s Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) was established to achieve land, sea and air cost effective tradeoffs while maintaining readiness. If confirmed I would explore options to improve transportation tradeoffs as 

well as afford better alternatives for readiness. 

Question. Are there any initiatives that you would pursue, if confirmed, to modernize or sustain our strategic sealift capability? 

Answer. TRANSCOM is currently examining various cost effective options to 

maintain our organic sealift capacity. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Navy, 

the Maritime Administration and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to implement a cost effective and timely recapitalization strategy to ensure critical vessel 

capacity is not lost in the organic fleets. 

MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAM

Question. Through programs like the Maritime Security Program (MSP), the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement 

(VTA) administered by the Maritime Administration, DOD has maintained access 

to U.S. commercial capabilities and transportation networks while ensuring the continued viability of both the U.S.-flag fleet and the pool of citizen mariners who man 

those vessels. 

What is your view of the importance of these Maritime Administration programs? 

Answer. The MSP, VISA, and VTA are critical to TRANSCOM’s ability to meet 

the needs of the warfighter and the Nation. For more than a decade of operations 

483 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, our commercial sealift partners have provided the vast majority of sealift for DOD. The vessel capacity, intermodal transportation networks 

and the U.S. Citizen Merchant Marine are key components to TRANSCOM and its 

global mission. 

Question. What changes in these programs, if any, do you believe are appropriate 

and would make them more effective or more efficient in supporting DOD transportation requirements? 

Answer. The ability of these programs to meet DOD needs is directly tied to the 

health of the U.S.-flag international fleet, which has been declining in size for some 

time. Additionally, as force drawdowns continue in Afghanistan, so will the deployment and sustainment cargoes which have become a valuable piece of our commercial partners’ business. In recognition of these dynamics, Congress tasked the Maritime Administration with the development of a National Maritime Strategy to ensure the health of the fleet and the U.S. Merchant Marine. TRANSCOM is coordinating closely with MARAD to ensure these vital commercial programs remain effective in supporting DOD well into the future. 

CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

Question. The Air Force has in the past, and may very well in the future, rely 

heavily on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to supplement its organic airlift. The 

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 requires the Secretary of Defense to provide an assessment of the requirement to maintain industrial base for CRAF carriers and ability of CRAF carriers to support the goals of 

the National Airlift Policy. 

What is your assessment of CRAF’s ability to meet requirements to transport any 

equipment, materials, or commodities for the use of U.S. military operations and respond to a humanitarian disaster? 

Answer. We rely on our commercial partners as an integral part of providing global air lift assets to support military operations and in response to humanitarian disasters. In addition to our organic capability, commercial carriers that participate in 

CRAF provide the augmentation capability that allows us to say ‘‘Yes’’ to any call 

our Nation makes of us. The combined capability of military and commercial lift 

gives us the ability to transport equipment, materials, or commodities the 

warfighter will need to execute their mission to any point on the globe. To ensure 

the strength of our CRAF partnership and the program’s continued viability, 

TRANSCOM conducts biannual Executive Working Group (EWG) conferences to 

bring together Chief Executive Officers, Presidents, and other representatives of the 

commercial airline industry to discuss vital issues affecting the program. The CRAF 

EWG will continue to meet on a regular basis to discuss future changes as we strive 

to maintain the readiness of the program to support our Nation. If confirmed, I will 

continue to work with our CRAF partners to ensure the business relationships remain solid and the contracts continue to support DOD requirements. 

Question. Do the changes in the commercial airline industry, characterized by 

bankruptcies and a move toward smaller and shorter-range aircraft, impact the future viability of the CRAF system? 

Answer. The commercial airline industry is dynamic and always has been. We 

have been able to adapt to carrier’s fleet planning and benefited by having a commercial augmentation capability ready to answer the call when needed. It is accurate there are fewer carriers in the CRAF program now than 15+ years ago. I have, 

however, met with several airline executives over the past 18 months, and to the 

person, they have all said they will support the DOD and CRAF program because 

it is the right thing to do for our Nation. It is also accurate to say as we drawdown 

forces from Afghanistan, there will be excess capacity in the commercial sector that 

we expect to go away as carriers right size their fleets to meet the new business 

environment. Through AMC sponsored research, conducted as part of an extensive 

ongoing CRAF study, we are confident the CRAF program will remain viable and 

able to meet operational plans in the future. 

Question. Do you think it is important to maintain an adequate industrial base 

for CRAF carriers? 

Answer. CRAF has been a healthy program for over 60 years. It is a capability 

that no other nation can replicate and ensures we can meet national requirements 

that our organic assets alone cannot provide in times of crisis or conflict. It is critical we maintain both an organic airlift capability and commercial augmentation capability that is ‘‘ready’’ to answer the call when the next crisis arises. Striking a 

balance of airlift opportunities in this fiscally constrained environment is one of the 

biggest challenges we face going forward. If confirmed, I will work with all concerned to define a minimum business level for our commercial partners that will enVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00491 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
484 

sure we maintain readiness, not only for the carriers, but also for the Defense 

Transportation System. 

Question. How much should we be relying on CRAF to meet our peacetime and 

wartime airlift requirements? 

Answer. The CRAF program is a critical component in this nation’s ability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment in times of crisis and peace. Because of the capability our commercial partners bring to the fight, we can deploy forces more rapidly 

and more efficiently than any other nation in the world. In peacetime, this workload 

changes from year-to-year due to dynamic customer requirements. Our forecast requirements are expected to be much lower starting in fiscal year 2016 compared to 

the past 13 years, which will impact both military and commercial capacity. We will 

continue to strive for the balance between military and commercial capacity. 

Question. What changes, if any, do you think need to be made to CRAF—authorities, requirements, composition? 

Answer. AMC, in coordination with TRANSCOM, chartered a study of the CRAF 

program to look at these specific issues. Throughout the study we engaged industry 

experts for their advice on where the airline industry is headed and what to expect. 

The study team provided recommendations to senior leadership and industry executives. We are in the process of analyzing carrier feedback and revising the appropriate recommendations for senior leaders’ decision. The results of this study are expected to be complete no later than June of this year, and I have committed to report the results of that study to interested Members of Congress at that time. 

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. What is your view of the QDR process? Was TRANSCOM asked to provide inputs to the QDR prior to it being finalized? 

Answer. I view the QDR process as vital to the future success of DOD to prevail 

in current operations, deter our enemies, and ensure success in any future conflicts. 

It is essential for all the combatant commands and Services to meet, discuss strategic and current issues, and come to agreement on the direction ahead for DOD 

for defense of our Nation. 

TRANSCOM was an active participant in the 2014 QDR process to include discussions on DOD strategy, implications of budget reductions, and Force Posture. In addition, TRANSCOM coordinated with Air Force leadership in the development of the 

tactical and strategic airlift requirements. As previously mentioned, the sealift requirements were not defined as main elements in the Navy fiscal year 2019 force 

structure. 

READINESS

Question. Why did TRANSCOM recently downgrade its overall readiness assessment? 

Answer. It’s my understanding that TRANSCOM’s overall readiness assessment 

has been the same for more than 3 years and the current overall assessment is consistent with that trend. While current readiness levels are assessed as sufficient for 

operations, projected readiness levels are of concern and must also take into account 

the long-term effects of sequestration and funding reductions. TRANSCOM’s readiness is dependent upon the long-term health of strategic airlift, surge sealift and 

other enabling capabilities that face significant challenges in times of budget uncertainty. Modernization, recapitalization, and balanced use of both organic and commercial lift are necessary to maintain agreements and readiness levels across the 

transportation and logistics enterprise. 

Also, because TRANSCOM must communicate over the unclassified networks with 

many private-sector entities in the transportation and shipping industry, protecting 

command and control systems from attack is a huge challenge to readiness. If I am 

confirmed, I will continue to advocate for improved security standards, incident reporting, and cyber defense capabilities across TRANSCOM’s mission responsibilities. 

TRANSCOM RISKS

Question. What is your assessment of TRANSCOM’s critical risks and key issues 

based on sequestration budget funding level? 

Answer. The reduced customer workload will drive impacts to organic and commercial capabilities that will likely be required in the future with potential readiness impacts on the organic and commercial transportation and logistics networks 

we rely on. Budgetary uncertainty makes it difficult to posture and plan for our customer’s future transportation and logistics workload demand, as well as ensure all 

readiness and mobility capability aspects (people, infrastructure, assets) of our mission are preserved. The value of TRANSCOM being funded through a working capVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00492 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
485 

ital fund (TWCF) is that the command can focus on long-term requirements and not 

make near-term suboptimal decisions. 

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS AND SECURITY

Question. Transportation Command must communicate over the unclassified 

Internet with many private-sector entities that are central to DOD’s force generation and deployment operations—in the transportation and shipping industries in 

particular. Much of the rest of the critical communications and operations of the Defense Department can be conducted over the classified DOD internet service, which 

is not connected to the public Internet and is therefore much more protected against 

eavesdropping, espionage, and/or disruption by computer network attacks. 

What do you believe are the critical needs of TRANSCOM for cyber security? 

Answer. TRANSCOM moves vast amounts of information between military and 

commercial partners in its role as the distribution process owner for the Department. Command and control systems must get the right information to the right 

people at the right time, while protecting it from adversaries. If confirmed, I will 

continue the work to protect the command’s information equities by working with 

our agency and commercial partners to further define roles, responsibilities, relationships and authorities for cyber security and to build trust and enhance information sharing. 

Question. What plans do you have for addressing these critical needs? 

Answer. TRANSCOM will need to continue addressing cyber issues on multiple 

fronts. Keeping command and control systems secure and protecting them from attack is a huge challenge. TRANSCOM has led the way in developing cyber language 

in its contracts to address security standards and incident reporting which, if confirmed, I will continue to push. In addition, I will continue the migration of component command and control systems inside the TRANSCOM security perimeter 

which will provide better situational awareness to my cyber security teams. I will 

also continue to collaborate with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and our Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) partners to incorporate a solid command 

and control infrastructure that improves the accuracy and timeliness of cyber defense information providing synchronization of cyber operations across 

TRANSCOM’s mission threats. 

Question. How important is it that TRANSCOM be aware of cyber intrusions by 

advanced persistent threat (APT) actors into the networks of airlines, shippers, and 

other defense contractors that enable TRANSCOM operations? 

Answer. Commercial partners provide volume, velocity and efficiency that make 

TRANSCOM’s mission possible. Vulnerabilities within any organization’s infrastructure, including cyber vulnerabilities, are a risk for all mission partners. 

TRANSCOM data that resides on our commercial partners’ networks, if compromised by an APT, is a potential cyber security issue that, at minimum, provides 

insight into TRANSCOM operations. It is critical that we have awareness of these 

intrusions so that we can mitigate their operational impacts in the other domains. 

Question. Are you concerned about the level of reporting of cyber events by command contractors or other U.S. Government agencies to TRANSCOM? 

Answer. The level of reporting continues to be a concern. TRANSCOM has overcome some of these challenges with its cyber contract language and partnering efforts. The next step is to work with our commercial partners to develop a measurable standard of compliance. 

Question. When TRANSCOM becomes aware of an APT intrusion into an operationally critical contractor, what steps should the command take to determine 

whether operational plans should be adjusted to mitigate the risk of the intrusion 

affecting military operations? 

Answer. The level of reporting continues to be a concern. TRANSCOM has overcome some of these challenges with its cyber contract language and partnering efforts. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders, government, military, and commercial partners to define the steps necessary to adjust to cyber attacks, including 

APT intrusions. 

Question. Is DOD taking adequate steps to address your special needs? 

Answer. It is my understanding that TRANSCOM works very closely with DOD 

to share information on cyber security, intelligence and logistics operations to assess 

overall impact of cyber intrusions to the command’s mission. Due to the high volume 

of the command’s workload conducted on unclassified systems, the Department’s use 

of cross-cutting teams including CYBERCOM, DISA, and various intelligence agencies is necessary to protect mission critical information. 

486 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Question. TRANSCOM’s budget includes funding for a research and development 

activity designed to allow for examination and improvement of the entire supply 

chain as part of TRANSCOM’s role as Distribution Process Owner. 

What are the major gaps in capability related to TRANSCOM’s mission that need 

to be addressed through research and development efforts? 

Answer. Research and Development (R&D) investments will play an essential role 

in addressing a variety of challenges and capability gaps to ensure TRANSCOM’s 

ability to accomplish its mission in an ever-increasing contested cyberspace and 

Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. New technologies may allow 

TRANSCOM to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of distribution operations 

and lower the operating costs for our Nation’s joint logistics enterprise. If confirmed, 

I will champion TRANSCOM’s R&D investment priorities to address these challenges and capability gaps while improving our effectiveness and efficiency by exploring and further developing technologies in the areas of End-to-End Visibility, 

Command and Control/Optimization/Modeling and Simulation, Cyber, and Global 

Access. 

Question. What unique processes and technologies do you feel TRANSCOM needs 

to develop through its own program and investments? 

Answer. As the DOD’s Distribution Process Owner and Global Distribution Synchronizer, TRANSCOM must continue the business process management work 

begun under the Agile Transportation for the 21st Century program. Distribution 

processes should be designed, documented and/or refined in three distinct areas (e.g. 

Requirements Management, Network Design, and Capacity Management). In addition, TRANSCOM continues to enhance warfighter support with a range of technologies with particular emphasis on addressing A2/AD challenges. If confirmed, I 

will pursue and support innovative solutions which improve efficiency, effectiveness, 

and maintain organic readiness to support the Nation’s global missions. 

Question. How will you work with other research and development organizations 

to ensure that TRANSCOM’s current and future capability gaps are addressed? 

Answer. TRANSCOM annually engages combatant commands, Services, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, DLA, the Joint Staff, other Government agencies, and academia S&T communities for updates and validation of joint deployment and distribution technology gaps and focus areas which guides our Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) investments. Nearly 75 percent of our RDT&E 

projects are collaboratively funded which greatly increases the transition of efficiency-gaining, life-saving, and cost-reducing capabilities to the warfighter. If confirmed, I will continue to partner with these organizations to identify, validate and 

recommend RDT&E projects that address validated capability gaps. 

TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES

Question. Serving the needs of the combatant commanders both in the near term 

and in the future is one of the key goals of the Department’s science and technology 

(S&T) executives, who list outreach to commanders as an activity of continued focus. 

What do you see as the most challenging technological needs or capability gaps 

facing TRANSCOM in its mission to provide air, land, and sea transportation to 

DOD? 

Answer. Primary concern will be developing and exploiting emerging technologies 

that improve the Department’s ability to provide timely and precise delivery of 

sustainment to our warfighters as well as humanitarian aid and relief anywhere, 

in moment’s notice, and in a fiscally responsible manner. Additionally, we need to 

explore information security and assurance as well as new cyber technologies to ensure greater efficiency and mission accomplishment. Furthermore, reducing dependency on fossil fuels will also remain a major focus area for TRANSCOM. 

Question. What would you do, if confirmed, to make your technology requirements 

known to the department’s S&T community to ensure the availability of needed 

equipment and capabilities in the long term? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work through appropriate S&T community forums including Joint Interagency Field Experimentations, Defense Innovation Marketplace, 

technology symposiums, and collaborative interservice/agency partnerships to preserve our 90 percent transition rate of proven technologies. 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. TRANSCOM has been active in the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) process. 

487 

What are your views on the JCTD process as a means to spiral emerging technologies into use to confront changing threats and to meet warfighter needs? 

Answer. The Department’s JCTD program is an extremely effective tool that combatant commands leverage to rapidly develop and insert emerging technologies to 

address warfighter needs and capability gaps. In contributing to TRANSCOM’s successful JCTD track record, if confirmed, I will strongly advocate for innovative technologies which enhance warfighter support and success. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the effectiveness of 

technology transition efforts within your command and in cooperation with other 

Services and defense agencies? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to apply the Command’s RDT&E investments, in partnership with other combatant commands, Services, Defense Agencies, 

academia, and industry to advance our Nation’s war fighting capabilities. I will 

work with stakeholders in leveraging the Department’s many programs (JCTD, Coalition Warfare Program, Joint Test & Evaluation, Small Business Innovative Research, etc.) to rapidly develop, field, and transition mature technologies that address near term needs and identified gaps. Specifically, I will partner with our 

stakeholders to vet projects, gain buy-in, and avoid duplication. Finally, I will ensure that all projects develop a viable transition strategy and emphasize rapid fielding from day one. 

DEPLOYMENT CHALLENGES

Question. Multiple studies by TRANSCOM and the Army, and direct experience 

in Afghanistan and elsewhere, demonstrate that the airlift strategy and airlift platforms developed for the Cold War confrontation in Central Europe are not ideal to 

support operations in third-world regions. Unlike Europe, most of the world has few 

airfields with long runways, and there are fewer still that have parking space for 

more than a couple of cargo aircraft to unload at one time. This ‘‘Maximum-onGround’’ (MOG) metric is the critical measure of throughput capacity at airfields. 

The few airfields with MOG greater than 2 are scarce and are located within major 

urban areas, usually far from where ground forces would be employed. Traditional 

fixed-wing airlifters—even flexible ones like the C–17—cannot be effectively employed in large numbers to deploy and support ground forces in these regions because of these infrastructure limitations. 

Previous analyses have indicated that alternatives to traditional fixed-wing transports, such as heavy-lift airships and heavy vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) 

rotorcraft, scored very high compare to current programs. These alternatives could 

deploy more forces faster, save lots of fuel, and increase sustainment. Because they 

deliver troops and supplies directly to the point of need, they could reduce the number of trucks on the road that are vulnerable to IEDs, as well as the length of supply lines. In other words, they would also reduce the vulnerability of our supply 

lines and save lives. 

What is your view of these analyses? 

Answer. My understanding is the Joint Future Theater Lift Technology Study 

(JFTL TS) was completed on 20 February 2013. The intent of the JFTL TS was to 

evaluate options to supplement the C–17, C–130, and C–27 capabilities to deliver 

medium weight combat vehicles into very austere environments. The JFTL TS assessed the overall value and cost of a variety of fixed wing aircraft, hybrid airships 

and tilt-rotor platforms as to how they might perform in emerging, future intra-theater airlift missions. The JFTL TS was comprehensive and provided insight to the 

cost effectiveness and risk of multiple technology options. 

Question. We understand that the Army favors a heavy lift, second generation tilt 

rotor that would provide VTOL capabilities. 

Answer. I understand that in the view of the JFTL TS, the Tilt Rotor (TR) technology alternative is the most operationally effective technology alternative because 

it is not restrained to fixed airfields; is capable of taking off and landing at more 

opportune landing sites (i.e., austere, short, unimproved landing areas), and is not 

limited by traditional Maximum on Ground (MOG) concepts. I believe it is reasonable to continue to examine these conclusions in the context of maturing CONOPs 

and anticipated schemes of maneuvers. It is also important to understand the maturity of the technologies that are necessary to develop heavy VTOL capabilities. If 

confirmed, I will assure that TRANSCOM will continue to monitor development of 

all emerging VTOL capabilities. 

Question. Do you support development of such a platform? 

Answer. Development of heavy lift Tilt Rotor or Hybrid Airship platforms will require careful consideration of our current and future warfighting needs, the planned 

fiscal environment, and our ability to mature both the technologies and operational 

488 

concepts to make these delivery options operationally viable. While these platforms 

may fill future capability gaps of emerging warfighting concepts, they both would 

require significant investment to develop and field. At this time, a hybrid airship 

configured for heavy cargo, equivalent to legacy lift platforms, does not exist. I believe the DOD should support technology development which may lead to a commercially produced hybrid airship capability in the future. 

Question. In natural disasters, the airfields and roads and bridges that are required to fly in and distribute relief forces and supplies are frequently destroyed. 

Fixed-wing transports that need functioning airfields are not much use, but vertical 

lift aircraft or airships have the potential for continuing effective operations. 

Do you believe that the TRANSCOM analyses have adequately factored disaster 

relief into their assessments? 

Answer. Yes, the MCA included a number of disaster relief scenarios and found 

that ‘‘PB13 mobility forces do not materially constrain the U.S. objectives associated 

with conducting simultaneous operations in different theaters, and have sufficient 

capabilities to concurrently support a heightened defense posture in and around the 

United States or support U.S. civil authorities in response to a large-scale attack 

or natural disaster. 

Question. How would you assess TRANSCOM’s ability to respond to domestic disaster relief? 

Answer. Based on the results of the MCA and TRANSCOM’s ongoing planning 

with U.S. Northern Command, the Command, in partnership with the National 

Guard and local authorities, can effectively respond to and support domestic disaster relief efforts as needed. 

DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY SYSTEM

Question. For over 10 years, TRANSCOM and its subordinate command, Surface 

Deployment and Distribution Command, have been working to improve the process 

of moving servicemembers’ household goods and gaining the support of the transportation provider industry for needed changes. Implementation of the new system— 

Defense Personal Property System (DPPS)—uses a ‘‘best value’’ approach to contracting with movers that focuses on quality of performance, web-based scheduling 

and tracking of shipments, servicemember involvement throughout the moving process, and a claims system that provides full replacement value for damaged household goods. Successful implementation of this system depends on replacement of the 

legacy Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) with 

the web-based DPPS. 

What do you view as the most significant challenges that remain in continuing 

to implement DPPS? 

Answer. TRANSCOM is currently incorporating the remaining functionality for 

Non-Temporary Storage, Intra-Country Moves, and Direct Procurement Method into 

DPPS while modernizing the architecture to enhance overall system performance 

and the user experience. TRANSCOM recently re-competed a development and 

sustainment contract, which was awarded 9 Oct 2013. One of the most significant 

challenges that remain is ensuring capability development maintains schedule to 

enable the sunset of the legacy TOPS in fiscal year 2018. 

Question. What is your assessment of the performance of DPPS in achieving the 

requirement for full replacement value for damaged or missing household goods 

claims? 

Answer. Full replacement value is implemented across the Services for all modes 

of shipments in support of the Defense Personal Property Program. It is my understanding that the existing claims module is scheduled for redesign and will be deployed in fiscal year 2016 to improve the user experience. If confirmed, I will ensure 

improvements such as this continue. 

Question. What is your understanding under DPPS of the percentage of valid personal claims for damage or loss of household goods that is currently paid for by 

DOD and the percentage that is paid for by the movers who caused the damage? 

Answer. In 2013 less than 9 percent of submitted claims were transferred to the 

Military Claims Offices (MCOs). The MCOs are normally able to recover approximately 80–90 percent of what they pay out from the Transportation Service Provider (TSP). My understanding is TSPs settle most claims directly with the servicemember. 

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the response rate on customer satisfaction surveys as a method for identifying best and worst performers? 

Answer. Customer Satisfaction Survey response rates have risen to 40 percent. 

With 553,000 personal property moves in 2013, the survey response rates continue 

to be statistically significant. Survey response rates are the cornerstone for ensuring 

489 

that quality transportation service providers are participating in the program, and 

opportunities for struggling performers are minimized or eliminated. If confirmed, 

I will continue to work closely with the Service Headquarters to increase the survey 

response rates. 

Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring that DPPS is fully 

funded and implemented and will you make every effort to ensure this program is 

successful in meeting its goals? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will leverage DPPS to continue to improve our business 

processes for household goods and services. OSD, Joint Staff, and the Services have 

committed to fully fund the DPPS program development and sustainment between 

fiscal year 2014–2018. I will work to ensure the DPPS program successfully meets 

the Services’ goals to fully support servicemembers’ personal property moves. 

SPACE AVAILABLE TRAVEL POLICIES

Question. DOD, in consultation with TRANSCOM, submitted a report to Congress 

on Space Available Travel for Certain Disabled Veterans and Gray-Area Retirees in 

December 2007. The report concluded that increases in space available eligibility 

would significantly impact DOD’s ability to accomplish effectively the airlift mission 

and negatively affect support to active duty military space available travelers. Additionally, the report concluded that adding to the eligibility pool would increase support costs and displace the current policy that mandates that space-available travel 

not incur additional costs to dod. 

Do you consider the conclusions and recommendations of the December 2007 report to still be valid? 

Answer. I believe the conclusions and recommendations of the December 2007 report remain valid. Also, I believe DOD’s concern with any expansion to the SpaceAvailable program was also reiterated in the GAO review as directed by section 362 

of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. DOD data showed the five most used air terminals had limited seats available with the three most traveled destinations from each 

terminal were near capacity. An expansion to the current pool of eligible travelers 

limits the ability to support the primary objective of the space available program 

which is to enhance the morale and welfare of our Active-Duty Force. 

Question. What are the constraints in today’s operational environment of expanding the categories of individuals eligible for space available travel? 

Answer. I believe the conclusions and recommendations of the December 2007 report remain valid. Also, I believe DOD’s concern with any expansion to the space 

available program was also reiterated in the GAO review as directed by section 362 

of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. We will work closely with DOD as the Secretary 

of Defense reviews space available policy in accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2013. 

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have regarding changes to the 

existing policies controlling space available travel eligibility? 

Answer. In today’s operational environment, DOD has limited ability to support 

continued expansion of the space available program. We will work closely with DOD 

as the Secretary of Defense reviews space available policy in accordance with the 

NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, TRANSCOM? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

490 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

1. Senator NELSON. General Selva, in your response to the advance policy questions, you stated, ‘‘In peacetime, the [airlift] workload changes from year-to-year due 

to dynamic customer requirements. Our forecast requirements are expected to be 

much lower starting in fiscal year 2016 compared to the past 13 years, which will 

impact both military and commercial capacity.’’ Based on the lowered requirement 

for airlift, can the Transportation Working Capital Fund accounts adequately support both crew readiness requirements and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program? 

General SELVA. Over the last 13 years of supporting Overseas Contingency Operation requirements U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has been able to 

maintain organic crew readiness while also supporting the CRAF. However, the current and future workload projections are significantly decreased due to the Afghanistan drawdown and Services’ constrained transportation budgets. When 

TRANSCOM reaches a point where it can no longer reduce capacity supplied to 

match lower workload due to Service readiness requirements, the Transportation 

Working Capital Fund will realize a loss and our component command readiness 

will be impacted as no revenue is generated. Working Capital Fund policy dictates 

these losses become the responsibility of the Services and/or recouped by increased 

future rates. 

We have efforts underway regarding the CRAF to support the lower business levels. First, we have provided CRAF subscribers with business projections, which will 

help them size their fleets to meet their own requirements. Second, we are working 

to establish a minimum level of business to support commercial readiness and business. This will help support not only the CRAF subscribers, but also our military 

aerial ports to ensure they maintain readiness and familiarization with utilizing 

commercial aircraft. 

2. Senator NELSON. General Selva, are the training needs of our current airlift 

fleet negatively affecting CRAF carriers? 

General SELVA. Ensuring the readiness of the CRAF while maintaining an organic 

fleet capable of meeting all DOD requirements is a priority for us and it requires 

the right balance of workload between the military and commercial segments. 

Achieving that balance for the future requires a careful analysis of commercial and 

military readiness requirements, capabilities required for all levels of response, and 

an understanding of economic factors affecting the industry’s ability to meet DOD 

requirements. We are working through that analysis now. 

Recognizing the need to maintain a viable CRAF and the likelihood of both declining budgets and workload post-Afghanistan, our comprehensive review of the CRAF 

program is focused on the objective of developing recommended changes to assure 

the program’s viability in the future and the readiness of participating carriers. We 

recognize the need for CRAF carriers to have business within the defense transportation system to maintain their readiness to support DOD. 

We also need to continue to season Active Duty and Air Reserve component airman and maintain a ready organic airlift capability. Air Mobility Command is working to balance this requirement, as well as certain combatant commander requirements that dictate use of organic assets with the need to maintain a ready commercial augmentation capability. 

3. Senator NELSON. General Selva, what are your plans to ensure the future viability of the CRAF program? 

General SELVA. In the midst of declining business, TRANSCOM has made significant efforts to bolster relations with the commercial airline industry through military and industry joint venues. The CRAF Executive Working Group, National Defense Transportation Association, and the Military Aviation Advisory Committee are 

491 

examples of venues which work to develop solutions and exchange ideas to effectively ensure the future viability of the CRAF program. 

We have listened to industry concerns and have pursued multiple avenues to 

maximize business opportunities, not only by pursuing CRAF preferences in policy, 

but adjusting operating procedures and guidance to maximize workload to our U.S. 

flag carriers. Additionally, we have been proactive and transparent in giving our industry partners the most accurate projected requirements during this drawdown period so commercial carriers can posture themselves appropriately. In addition to 

these efforts, we conducted a comprehensive review of the CRAF program with an 

objective of developing recommended changes to assure the program’s viability in 

the future. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III 

EQUIPMENT LEFT BEHIND IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

4. Senator MANCHIN. General Selva, I am very concerned about the amount of 

equipment that the United States will be forced to leave in Afghanistan. I understand that the United States will not be able to recover a substantial amount of 

military equipment from Afghanistan. What is your assessment of the amount of 

equipment the United States will be forced to leave in Afghanistan? 

General SELVA. The Services have made decisions on some of their equipment 

that will be returning to the United States and TRANSCOM will transport it when 

and where needed. The Services are still deciding on disposition of equipment that 

may be destroyed in place or declared excess and offered to other countries as Excess Defense Articles. 

5. Senator MANCHIN. General Selva, what is the value of this equipment and what 

will be the associated costs with removing and destroying the sensitive components 

among this arsenal? 

General SELVA. The Services are in the best position to provide an overall cost 

analysis of equipment in theater. TRANSCOM assists the Services with calculating 

the transportation cost and readily supports equipment movement once the Services 

determine what is to be moved out of theater. 

6. Senator MANCHIN. General Selva, is there an existing plan to recoup these 

losses, perhaps through Foreign Military Sales (FMS)? 

General SELVA. The Services are in the best position to provide an answer on 

their equipment replacement plans. Defense Security Cooperation Agency is in the 

best position to provide an answer on any possible recoupment of funds through 

FMS sales to offset equipment losses. 

7. Senator MANCHIN. General Selva, does this compare to the amount and value 

of equipment that the United States failed to retrograde from Iraq? 

General SELVA. The Services are in the best position to provide an answer on the 

amount of equipment that was not retrograded from Iraq. TRANSCOM assisted in 

transporting equipment from Iraq once disposition decisions were made. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

CYBER ATTACKS ON U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

8. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Selva, this committee is currently reviewing a report on cyber attacks on TRANSCOM dating from fiscal year 2011. I am highly concerned about this information in light of the fact that TRANSCOM will be instrumental as we leave Afghanistan. If confirmed, how do you intend to handle this 

issue? 

General SELVA. We have migrated the critical Transportation Component Command systems behind the TRANSCOM security boundary and exercise command 

and control over the defenses of those systems. These efforts align with the Department’s Joint Information Environment initiative, as we are implementing a security 

architecture that fits within DOD’s security architecture, led by the DOD CIO and 

the Defense Information System Agency (DISA). We expect to achieve significant efficiencies by leveraging common enterprise services and improving our cyber security posture. 

492 

9. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Selva, from your perspective, what can we do to 

improve cyber defenses as they relate to contractors? 

General SELVA. TRANSCOM actively engages with our commercial partners on 

cyber security; we have led multiple commercial partner outreach programs and 

highly encourage them to join the Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security/Info Assurance program. Of the 80 current TRANSCOM commercial partners that we encouraged to participate in the Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security/Information 

Assurance Program, only 7 are full participants. Three additional companies have 

requested further information and are considering joining. In addition we have developed cyber security contract language for both our commercial carriers and information technology (IT) support contracts that require notification in the event of an 

actual intrusion that impacts TRANSCOM mission data. In these cases we work 

with our commercial partners and through law enforcement and contracting channels to mitigate the threat to mission and improve cyber defenses. We have recently 

streamlined some of that language changing reporting requirements from reporting 

intrusions affecting DOD data to reporting intrusions on any systems in which DOD 

data resides or transits. We also welcome the opportunity to help validate security 

controls with our commercial partners through voluntary exercises that will 

strengthen dialogue and a shared understanding of the threat to the TRANSCOM 

mission. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

NETWORK VULNERABILITY

10. Senator INHOFE. General Selva, TRANSCOM has been subject to a growing 

number of cyber attacks. TRANSCOM’s reliance on unique contracts—such as the 

CRAF program where U.S. civil air carriers agree to augment organic military airlift during a crisis in exchange for access to peacetime defense business—creates 

unique challenges. In a contingency, TRANSCOM’s ability to move troops or supplies could be hindered if a vendor’s network were compromised. Today there appears to be little sharing of threat and network vulnerability information. Do you 

share these concerns? 

General SELVA. TRANSCOM has always shared this concern which is why we 

work to make substantial progress in organizing and resourcing our TRANSCOM 

cyber defense efforts. We stood up our Joint Cyber Center on our Fusion Center operations floor to ensure our cyber defense efforts are aligned with our transportation 

mission. CYBERCOM has provided a Cyber Support Element that gives us reach 

back into their capabilities, and Air Force Cyber Command has provided a Cyber 

Protection Team that has just reached Initial Operational Capability, with another 

on the way. In addition to these DOD cyber defense capabilities, our Joint Cyber 

Center has established relationships with law enforcement and other federal and 

state agencies to buttress our cyberspace defenses. There are opportunities for improvement of information sharing between the special investigations units within 

the Department and their counterparts within the Department of Justice. Both can 

benefit from understanding the TRANSCOM mission context and our current vendor list so they can address TRANSCOM national security equities in the course of 

their ongoing operations. 

11. Senator INHOFE. General Selva, what other unique cybersecurity challenges do 

you believe we should be aware of? 

General SELVA. The primary challenge continues to be protection of mission data 

residing in or transiting the information systems of our commercial partners, which 

lie outside of DOD and TRANSCOM visibility, control, or authorities. Historically, 

TRANSCOM has encountered threat actors penetrating our military and commercial 

partner networks to gain access to our mission data which could disclose DOD operations, disrupt command and control of logistics movements, and have the potential 

to deny or degrade operations. The fact that we do utilize commercial partners 

across the enterprise means that some of our data resides on information systems 

that exist in the commercial business community. These systems provide volume, 

velocity, and efficiency for our TRANSCOM mission. To mitigate vulnerabilities, we 

are actively engaged with our commercial partners on cyber security both in our 

contracts and in our relationships with these companies. We also work with our 

interagency partners to provide context to the execution of their authorities and ongoing activities because cyber defense is a team effort where one organization’s 

vulnerabilities are potential vulnerabilities for all. 

493 

12. Senator INHOFE. General Selva, what steps are TRANSCOM and CYBERCOM 

taking to address these vulnerabilities? 

General SELVA. TRANSCOM is integrating critical systems operated by our service components behind a common security boundary with common technology and 

policies and enhanced situational awareness for TRANSCOM and component network defenders. In addition, TRANSCOM is including the new Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Clause, ‘‘Safeguarding of Unclassified Controlled Technical Information’’ in all of our new non-transportation contracts, while retaining the Cyber 

Security language we previously developed in our transportation contracts. We are 

continuing to build relationships with our commercial partners and law enforcement 

to increase collaboration and incorporate contract language based on industry best 

practices. Additionally, I am gaining operational control of cyber protection teams 

to augment our organic network defense forces. This will enable a better protective 

posture across the TRANSCOM enterprise. We are fully engaged with CYBERCOM 

and Defense Information Systems Agency to work through command and control of 

these assigned forces. The command is satisfied with our efforts to date and will 

continue to leverage opportunities to improve as they present themselves. 

13. Senator INHOFE. General Selva, can TRANSCOM and DOD enact a policy 

change that can make the fixes that you envision? 

General SELVA. DOD is working with its U.S. Government counterparts to enact 

policy and process changes that will enable coordinated employment of existing law 

enforcement and military authorities and capabilities, as appropriate. TRANSCOM 

continues to focus on improving information sharing between our network defenders 

and our commercial partners in the private sector to the greatest extent feasible in 

the current environment. 

14. Senator INHOFE. General Selva, do you feel that TRANSCOM and DOD need 

more legislative authority to fix this persistent threat brought about by the current 

cyber intrusion problem? 

General SELVA. The President has the necessary authority to order military action 

to defend our nation against all attacks including those in the cyber domain. The 

President can delegate authorities to the Secretary of Defense in order to use the 

Department’s operational capabilities to defend against such an attack so additional 

legislative authority for DOD is not necessary. However, TRANSCOM and its industry partners serve to highlight that with so much of the critical infrastructure 

owned and operated by private industry, the government has limited visibility and 

thus is often unaware of the malicious activity targeting our critical infrastructure. 

These blind spots prevent the Government from being positioned to either help the 

critical infrastructure to defend itself or to defend the nation from an attack. The 

contract language in place at TRANSCOM, relationships we are building to enhance 

mission context with other agencies, and aligning our cyber defense resources are 

the ways in which we are addressing this issue. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

AFGHANISTAN EQUIPMENT RETROGRADE

15. Senator MCCAIN. General Selva, in your testimony, you agreed that 

TRANSCOM was ‘‘on track to remove all the necessary equipment and armaments 

from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.’’ How much U.S. military equipment do you 

assume will be left in Afghanistan? Please provide your answer as a percentage of 

total equipment currently in theater, as a dollar amount, or by some other meaningfully quantitative measure. 

General SELVA. TRANSCOM provides common-user strategic lift on a global basis 

to our supported geographic combatant commands (GCCs). While we determine strategic sea, air, and surface lift feasibility to meet the transportation needs of the 

GCCs, we are not involved in determining equipment levels they require to execute 

missions in their Areas of Operation. In the case of Operation Enduring Freedom 

drawdown and the post-2014 enduring mission in Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), in coordination with the Military Services, will determine how 

much U.S. military equipment will be required to execute their assigned missions. 

As a supporting command in this effort, TRANSCOM is postured to generate the 

required strategic lift capacity to meet the Commander International Security Assistance Force drawdown timelines, and will continue to rely on our ground forces 

to identify and generate cargo for strategic lift to meet CENTCOM requirements. 

National level decisions associated with an approved and signed Bi-lateral Security 

494 

Agreement will heavily influence the final mission set required for CENTCOM operations in Afghanistan. 

16. Senator MCCAIN. General Selva, to the best of your knowledge, what will be 

the disposition of any equipment left in Afghanistan after the departure of U.S. 

forces? 

General SELVA. CENTCOM, in coordination with the Military Services, will determine the disposition of U.S. military equipment in Afghanistan after the departure 

of U.S. forces. Final disposition of this equipment will be influenced by national 

level decisions associated with an approved and signed Bilateral Security Agreement, which will significantly impact the equipment-set required to execute any enduring U.S. and coalition mission in Afghanistan. CENTCOM will determine final 

disposition based on operational requirements and transportation cost-benefit analysis in coordination with Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. If strategic transportation is required, TRANSCOM is postured to fully support retrograde/redeployment of U.S. military equipment from Afghanistan, as well as Foreign 

Military Sales movements and Excess Defense Articles transfers when authorized 

and approved at appropriate DOD and congressional levels. 

17. Senator MCCAIN. General Selva, please list the commands or agencies that 

provide guidance to TRANSCOM regarding retrograde of military equipment. In 

other words, do the combatant commander, the component commanders, the Services, or some combination of these have authority to decide what equipment is 

retrograded from Afghanistan? 

General SELVA. TRANSCOM provides common-user strategic lift on a global basis 

to our supported geographic combatant commands (GCCs), based on transportation 

requirements that have been validated for movement by the GCC-in this case 

CENTCOM. While TRANSCOM determines strategic sea, air, and surface lift feasibility to meet the transportation needs of CENTCOM, we are not involved in determining which equipment will or will not be retrograded from Afghanistan. 

CENTCOM, in coordination with the Military Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff, will determine which U.S. military equipment will remain in 

Afghanistan for any enduring mission post-2014. As the strategic transportation 

provider, TRANSCOM is postured to generate the required strategic lift capacity to 

meet the Commander International Security Assistance Force drawdown timelines. 

We also continually present transportation feasibility and costing data to all stakeholders for their consideration when making final decisions on retrograde equipment 

disposition and transportation. 

18. Senator MCCAIN. General Selva, you noted in testimony that five routes are 

used to get equipment and personnel in and out of country and that you are developing courses of action to bypass Russia. What is the status of the alternative logistics plan? 

General SELVA. TRANSCOM has a flexible strategic network consisting of various 

lines of communication both in and out of Afghanistan. With multiple air and surface routes available, bypassing Russia for transit will have no significant impact 

on overall theater operations. If access to Russian air or surface routes becomes unavailable, we will route cargo to an alternate route with little to no affect on inbound or outbound flow. 

19. Senator MCCAIN. General Selva, what assumptions with regard to the socalled southern route through Pakistan and northern routes through Russia are included in your assessment that TRANSCOM will have all necessary equipment out 

of Afghanistan by the end of 2014? 

General SELVA. Currently, TRANSCOM moves less than 10 percent of retrograde 

cargo from Afghanistan via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) through Russia, all of which can be diverted to other routes if required. 

The Pakistan ground lines of communication (PAKGLOC) has achieved great velocity, but has also experienced challenges resulting in limited cargo flow in the 

past. Although the PAKGLOC is the preferred method of moving retrograde due to 

speed and cost, TRANSCOM is prepared to shift cargo to multi-modal and air direct 

operations as required. Albeit challenging with reduced ground line of communication access, TRANSCOM has the capacity to retrograde all necessary equipment 

from Afghanistan utilizing alternate transportation modes and routes provided the 

cargo is properly identified for strategic lift and prepared for movement in a timely 

manner. 

495 

20. Senator MCCAIN. General Selva, what would the impact be on TRANSCOM’s 

equipment retrograde estimates if the northern ground road and rail routes were 

closed? 

General SELVA. TRANSCOM supports warfighter and service priorities by providing a scalable transportation network that maximizes strategic flexibility and reduces operational risk across a variety of routes and modes, both into and out of 

Afghanistan. We continue to execute a variety of movement options utilizing both 

air and ground routes across the Northern Distribution Network, but historically 

these routes have accounted for a very low percentage of overall cargo. Loss of any 

strategic option increases risk, but ultimately TRANSCOM would be minimally affected by closure of the northern ground road and rail routes. 

21. Senator MCCAIN. General Selva, what would the impact be on TRANSCOM’s 

equipment retrograde estimates if the southern route was closed? 

General SELVA. TRANSCOM works with its strategic partners to maintain an effective and flexible transportation network that includes air, ground and multimodal 

routes with organic and commercial capabilities. This robust structure minimizes reliance on any one nation, values fair and open competition, is reconfigurable and 

scalable, facilitating economic development and diplomatic engagement. The southern surface route (the Pakistan ground lines of communication) provides a low cost, 

potentially high volume option for retrograde operations, but ongoing issues (e.g. religious holidays, floods, political strife, and security concerns) have historically affected the volume of cargo and velocity of the route. TRANSCOM has successfully 

routed retrograde and redeploy cargo away from the PAKGLOC in the past with little to no affect on the strategic transportation network. 

22. Senator MCCAIN. General Selva, you indicated during testimony that a business case would be applied to determine whether or not military equipment should 

be retrograded, disposed of via FMS, or given to allied or partner nations as grants. 

Do you have an accurate accounting of all U.S. military equipment in Afghanistan? 

General SELVA. The Services are in the best position to provide an answer on 

their remaining equipment levels in Afghanistan. TRANSCOM will assist in transporting that equipment once disposition decisions are made. 

23. Senator MCCAIN. General Selva, who makes the final disposition decision to 

lift, sell, or grant? 

General SELVA. The Services are responsible for disposition decisions for their 

equipment. TRANSCOM then transports the equipment as needed. If U.S. defense 

articles are declared excess they can be made available for sale through the Foreign 

Military Sales program under the statutes of section 21 of the Arms Export Control 

Act or for grant transfer to eligible countries under the provisions of section 516 of 

the Foreign Assistance Act. The ultimate responsibility for determining if an item 

should be identified as excess rests with the Service having cognizance over the 

item. 

When a country submits a request (via grant or sale) for excess defense articles 

(EDA), the Service evaluates and endorses the country request and submits it for 

review and staffing via Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) through the 

State Department, Commerce Department, and Office of the Secretary of DefensePolicy regional offices. If approved, DSCA prepares any required Congressional Notification. At the end of Congressional Notification, DSCA authorizes the Service to 

offer/transfer the EDA. Each fiscal year, the State Department Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs, Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers in coordination 

with DSCA identifies the countries eligible for grant EDA to Congress. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT

24. Senator AYOTTE. General Selva, in your responses to the advance policy questions, you state that you support the plan to reduce the number of strategic airlift 

aircraft to a level of 275 aircraft. Yet, you acknowledge that certain scenarios presented some mobility challenges. Please describe what kind of scenario would 

present a challenge if our strategic airlift fleet drops to that level. 

General SELVA. A force of 275 strategic airlift aircraft will support the national 

military strategy with acceptable risk. A force of 275 aircraft will be challenged to 

support the strategy in a situation where we are unable to produce sufficient functional aircraft operated by fully qualified crews. This could happen if crews have inVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00503 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
496 

sufficient flying hours to maintain qualifications or the aircraft are not maintained 

at adequate readiness levels. 

25. Senator AYOTTE. General Selva, in your responses, you state that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended a force structure for the Air Force in 

fiscal year 2019 of 211 strategic airlift aircraft, 39 C–5s and 172 C–17s. If 275 strategic airlift aircraft presents challenges to TRANSCOM, what kind of challenges 

would 211 present? 

General SELVA. The force of 39 C-5s and 172 C-17s referenced in the QDR 2014 

reflect U.S. Air Force ‘‘combat coded’’ inventory; that is aircraft assigned to units 

for the performance of their wartime missions. That force becomes 275 total aircraft 

inventory (TAI) if backup aircraft inventory (BAI) and primary training aircraft inventory (PTAI) are included. 

26. Senator AYOTTE. General Selva, would 211 strategic airlift aircraft be sufficient to support one and a half major combat operations? 

General SELVA. The force of 211 strategic airlift aircraft (39 C–5s and 172 C–17s) 

referenced in the QDR 2014 reflects U.S. Air Force ‘‘combat coded’’ inventory; that 

is aircraft assigned to units for the performance of their wartime missions. That 

force of 211 ‘‘combat coded’’ inventory becomes 275 TAI if BAI and PTAI are included. A force of 275 strategic airlift aircraft will support the national military 

strategy with moderate risk. 

27. Senator AYOTTE. General Selva, if our number of strategic airlift aircraft declines to 211, and a major combat operation were to begin, what kinds of delays 

might we confront in deploying Army ground units to a contingency in Korea, for 

example? 

General SELVA. Based on TRANSCOM’s analysis, we would expect any delays to 

be minor, but acceptable. Although the number of ‘‘combat coded’’ aircraft will decrease to 211 (with 24 additional aircraft assigned to BAI), the total size of the strategic airlift fleet remains at 275 (223 C–17s and 52 C 5Ms) TAI. During major combat operations, these additional 24 BAI aircraft are still available for contingency 

missions, but once added back to the fleet, would operate at a lower crew ratio, inducing manageable risk to force closure during sustained combat operations. 

28. Senator AYOTTE. General Selva, would the delay in airlift be longer than is

required to activate and train National Guard units? 

General SELVA. No, the bulk of Army units moved at the onset of major crises 

are from the Active Component. However, those early deploying Army Reserve component units (U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard), as with the other Services’ 

Reserve component units, are currently programmed to be ready to meet their 

planned early availability dates. Reserve component units requiring formal training 

or more lengthy activation processes prior to deploying are not generally associated 

with this early deployment period. 

[The nomination reference of Gen. Paul J. Selva, USAF, follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

February 6, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Air Force to the grade 

indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 

10, U.S.C., section 601: 

To be General. 

Gen. Paul J. Selva, USAF, 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Paul J. Selva, USAF, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

497 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN. PAUL J. SELVA, USAF 

General Paul J. Selva is Commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott Air 

Force Base, IL. Air Mobility Command’s mission is to provide rapid, global mobility 

and sustainment for America’s Armed Forces. The command also plays a crucial role 

in providing humanitarian support at home and around the world. The men and 

women of AMC—Active Duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and civilians—provide airlift, aerial refueling, special air mission and aeromedical evacuation. 

General Selva graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1980, and completed 

undergraduate pilot training at Reese Air Force Base, TX. He has held numerous 

staff positions and has commanded at the squadron, group, wing and headquarters 

levels. Prior to his current assignment General Selva was the Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI. 

General Selva is a command pilot with more than 3,100 hours in the C–5, C–17A, 

C–141B, KC–10, KC–135A, and T–37. 

Education: 

1980 - Bachelor of Science degree in aeronautical engineering, U.S. Air Force 

Academy, Colorado Springs, CO. 

1983 - Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), AL. 

1984 - Master of Science degree in management and human relations, Abilene 

Christian University, Abilene, TX. 

1992 - Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, 

AL. 

1992 - Master of Science degree in political science, Auburn University, Montgomery, AL. 

1996 - National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group, 

Rosslyn, VA. 

Assignments: 

From To Assignment 

June 1980 ............ July 1981 .......... Student, undergraduate pilot training, Reese AFB, TX. 

July 1981 ............. December 1984 Co-pilot and aircraft commander, 917th Air Refueling Squadron, Dyess AFB, TX. 

January 1984 ....... December 1988 Co-pilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot, and flight commander, 32nd Air Refueling Squadron, Barksdale AFB, LA. 

January 1989 ....... July 1991 .......... Company grade adviser to Commander, Strategic Air Command, later, manager of 

offensive aircraft systems and executive officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans 

and Resources, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, NE. 

August 1991 ........ July 1992 .......... Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL. 

July 1992 ............. June 1994 ......... Instructor pilot and flight commander, 9th Air Refueling Squadron, later, Commander, 722nd Operations Support Squadron, March AFB, CA. 

June 1994 ............ June 1995 ......... Commander, 9th Air Refueling Squadron, later, Deputy Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, CA. 

July 1995 ............. June 1996 ......... National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group, Rosslyn, VA. 

July 1996 ............. August 1998 ..... Assistant to the Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 

the Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

August 1998 ........ July 2000 .......... Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, CA. 

July 2000 ............. June 2002 ......... Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord AFB, WA. 

June 2002 ............ June 2003 ......... Vice Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, IL. 

June 2003 ............ November 2004 Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, IL. 

December 2004 ... August 2006 ..... Director of Operations, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, IL. 

August 2006 ........ June 2007 ......... Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and 

Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. 

June 2007 ............ October 2008 .... Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and 

Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and Director, Air Force QDR, Office of the 

Vice Chief of Staff, Washington, DC. 

October 2008 ....... October 2011 .... Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC. 

October 2011 ....... November 2012 Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Joint-Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI. 

November 2012 ... Present .............. Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, IL. 

Summary of joint assignments: 

From To Assignment 

September 1996 .. August 1998 ..... Assistant to the Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 

the Pentagon, Washington, DC, as a lieutenant colonel. 

498 

From To Assignment 

November 2004 ... July 2006 .......... Director of Operations and Logistics, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, IL, 

as a brigadier general. 

October 2008 ....... October 2011 .... Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, as a lieutenant general. 

Flight information: 

Rating: Command pilot 

Hours flown: More than 3,100 

Aircraft flown: C–5, C–17A, C–141B, KC–10, KC–135A, and T–37 

Major awards and decorations: 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Commendation Medal 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award 

Combat Readiness Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two bronze stars 

Southwest Asia Service Medal with bronze star 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

Armed Forces Service Medal 

Effective dates of promotion: 

Second Lieutenant, May 28, 1980 

First Lieutenant, May 28, 1982 

Captain, May 28, 1984 

Major, January 1, 1990 

Lieutenant Colonel, March 1, 1994 

Colonel, September 1, 1998 

Brigadier General, January 1, 2004 

Major General, June 2, 2007 

Lieutenant General, October 8, 2008 

General, November 29, 2012 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Gen. Paul J. Selva, USAF, in connection with 

his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

499 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Paul J. Selva. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, U.S. Transportation Command. 

3. Date of nomination: 

February 6, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

September 27, 1958; Biloxi, MS 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Ricki S. Selva (Maiden Name: Smith). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

None. 

8 Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Air Force Association - Member. 

Airlift Tanker Association - Member. 

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

None. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

PAUL J. SELVA, GENERAL, USAF. 

This 5th day of November, 2014. 

500 

[The nomination of Gen. Paul J. Selva, USAF, was reported to 

the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 26, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on April 8, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to VADM Michael S. Rogers, 

USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has 

been remarkable. All the warfighting benefits we enjoy from fighting as a joint force 

in air, land, sea—we are extending to cyberspace. In addition, it has improved civilian oversight of the Department of Defense (DOD) and fostered our military success 

over the last generation. Today U.S. military forces are more interoperable than 

ever before, and they set a standard for other militaries to attain. I see no need to 

modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I do not believe modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act are currently 

needed. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command? 

Answer. The Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) is responsible for 

executing the cyberspace missions specified in section 18.d.(3) of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) as delegated by the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) to secure our Nation’s freedom of action in cyberspace and to help 

mitigate risks to our national security resulting from America’s growing dependence 

on cyberspace. Subject to such delegation and in coordination with mission partners, 

specific missions include: directing Department of Defense Information Networks 

(DODIN) operations, securing and defending the DODIN; maintaining freedom of 

maneuver in cyberspace; executing full-spectrum military cyberspace operations; 

providing shared situational awareness of cyberspace operations, including indications and warning; integrating and synchronizing of cyberspace operations with 

combatant commands and other appropriate U.S. Government agencies tasked with 

defending our Nation’s interests in cyberspace; provide support to civil authorities 

and international partners. All these efforts support DOD’s overall missions in 

cyberspace of defending the Nation against cyber attacks, supporting the combatant 

commands, and defending DOD networks. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I am humbled and deeply honored that the President has nominated me 

to be the 2nd Commander of CYBERCOM and the 17th Director of the National Security Agency (NSA). Over the past 3 decades, I have served in a wide variety of 

Joint and Navy positions that have prepared me well for the challenges ahead if 

confirmed by the U.S. Senate. 

First, I have more than 32 years in the profession of arms, serving in various command, staff, and intelligence positions afloat and ashore. I have been the director 

for Intelligence for both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Pacific Command, special 

assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanded at multiple 

levels. I have over 27 years of dedicated experience in the SIGINT arena as an InVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00508 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
501 

formation Warfare Officer and have held significant responsibilities in the cyber 

arena for much of the past 12 years. 

In particular, my experiences and knowledge gained over the last 21⁄2 years while 

serving as Commander of both Fleet Cyber Command and Tenth Fleet have done 

much to prepare me for the challenges of this new complex warfighting domain that 

is cyberspace. I should note that my responsibilities there include the command of 

the U.S. Navy’s cryptologic capabilities, and so I have seen firsthand the relationship between cryptology and cybersecurity, and the importance of partnerships with 

interagency capabilities, with our allies, and with industry to strengthen the defense 

of our collective networks. My service at Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet afforded 

me direct experience, particularly in the realm of deliberate and crisis action planning, to ensure the effective execution of cyberspace responsibilities as directed by 

the Secretary of Defense through the Commander, STRATCOM. 

Finally, my academic background has also helped prepare me for the challenges 

of high-level command, national security decisionmaking, and international engagement. I hold a Master of Science in National Security Strategy and am a graduate 

of both the National War College and the Naval War College. I was also a Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI fellow. 

Question. Does the Commander of CYBERCOM have command of or exercise 

operational control of the Defense Information Systems Agency’s (DISA) and Military Services’ communications networks? 

Answer. If confirmed as Commander, CYBERCOM, I will be responsible for directing the operation and defense of DOD’s information networks as specified in the 

UCP and as delegated by Commander, STRATCOM. The DISA provides, operates, 

and assures command and control, information sharing capabilities, and a globally 

accessible enterprise information infrastructure in direct support to national leaders, joint warfighters, and other mission and coalition partners across the full spectrum of operations. As a Combat Support Agency, DISA maintains a close working 

relationship with CYBERCOM, providing expertise on the networks, communications and computing infrastructure that it operates. I will not exercise command or 

operational control over DISA communications networks. 

Question. As a career intelligence officer, what qualifications do you have to command these networks? 

Answer. As noted in my biography, much of my career has involved not only intelligence duties but the command, administration, use, and employment of information networks and the data they carry, process, and store to protect and guard our 

Nation. Over the course of my services, I have witnessed and helped further the revolution in information technology that has helped make our military second-to-none 

in its ability to communicate and control forces while providing decisionmakers with 

unprecedented situational awareness. I have also devoted a great deal of my service 

to understanding and mitigating the vulnerabilities that our dependence on information networks can create for our military and our Nation. In my current duties 

as Commander, Fleet Cyber Command I exercise operational control over Navy’s 

networks and have done so for 30 months. 

Question. What qualifications do you have to command military forces and military operations? 

Answer. As noted above, I have exercised command previously at both junior and 

senior levels. I currently command Fleet Cyber Command and Tenth Fleet, a global 

team of nearly 15,000 men and women. Their operating environment is dynamic, 

and demanding; Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet has literally been ‘‘in action’’ 

against capable and determined adversaries seeking access to our networks since 

the day I assumed command in 2011. The planning and operations we have conducted to protect our networks and provide the Navy and our military and government freedom of maneuver in cyberspace have been complex. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, CYBERCOM? 

Answer. Any individual can learn more to enhance his or her expertise and abilities, and I have found that truth amply applies to me in understanding the very 

complex and rapidly evolving domain that is cyberspace. If confirmed, I shall meet 

with the combatant commanders to ascertain how CYBERCOM can better support 

their missions. Additionally, I would engage with key officials and personnel within 

the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government, leaders throughout 

the Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and senior allied officials to hear their ideas about how we can work 

together to identify, assess, and mitigate the cyber threats we all face. 

502 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command 

runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of 

command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, CYBERCOM, to the following officials: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Pursuant to title 10, U.S.C., section 164, and subject to the direction of 

the President, the Commander, STRATCOM performs duties under the authority, 

direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and is directly responsible to the 

Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to 

the command. As a sub-unified command under the authority, direction, and control 

of the Commander, STRATCOM, CYBERCOM is responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the Commander, STRATCOM. If confirmed, I will work closely with 

the Secretary in coordination with Commander, STRATCOM. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 132, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense performs such duties and exercises powers prescribed by the Secretary of 

Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will act for and exercise the powers of 

the Secretary of Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is vacant. If 

confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary, in coordination with Commander, STRATCOM. 

Question. The Director of National Intelligence. 

Answer. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 established 

the Director of National Intelligence to act as the head of the Intelligence Community, principal advisor to the President and the National Security Council on intelligence matters pertaining to national security, and to oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. Pursuant to title 50, U.S.C., section 

403, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President, the Director 

of National Intelligence coordinates national intelligence priorities and facilitates information sharing across the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with the Commander, STRATCOM and through the Secretary of Defense to 

coordinate and exchange information with the Director of National Intelligence as 

needed to ensure unified effort and synergy within the Intelligence Community in 

matters of national security. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of 

Defense regarding matters related to their respective functional areas. Within these 

areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities, the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. If confirmed, 

I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with Commander, STRATCOM, on all policy issues that affect CYBERCOM 

operations. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of 

Defense regarding matters related to their respective functional areas. Within these 

areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions and, in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. If confirmed, 

I shall work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with Commander, STRATCOM, on matters in the area of CYBERCOM’s assigned responsibilities. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of 

Defense regarding matters related to their respective functional areas. Within these 

areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions and, in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. If confirmed, 

I shall work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with Commander, STRATCOM, on matters in 

the area of CYBERCOM’s assigned responsibilities. 

503 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense executes responsibilities including overall supervision of the homeland defense and defense 

support of civil authorities activities of the DOD while serving under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Any relationship the Commander, CYBERCOM requires with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security would exist 

with and through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. If confirmed, I shall 

work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in concert with 

Commander, STRATCOM; Commander, U.S. Northern Command; and Commander, 

U.S. Pacific Command, on related national security issues. 

Question. The Chief Information Officer. 

Answer. Under the authority of Department of Defense Directive 5144.02 and consistent with titles 10, 40, and 44, U.S.C., the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) 

is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense on information resources management and position, navigation, and timing matters. The DOD CIO is tasked with improving the combat power 

of the Department—as well as its security and efficiency—by ensuring that the Department treats information as a strategic asset and that innovative information capabilities are available throughout all areas of DOD supporting war fighting, business, and intelligence missions. The DOD CIO is the Department’s primary authority for the policy and oversight of information resources management, to include 

matters related to information technology, network defense, and network operations, 

and it also exercises authority, direction, and control over the Director, DISA. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Chief Information Officer through 

the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and Commander, STRATCOM, on 

matters in the area of CYBERCOM’s assigned responsibilities. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, National 

Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Title 10, U.S.C., section 163 allows communication between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the combatant 

commanders to flow through the Chairman. By custom and tradition, and as instructed by the UCP, if confirmed, I would normally communicate with the Chairman in coordination with the Commander, STRATCOM. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 165, subject to the authority, direction, 

and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The authority exercised by a sub-unified combatant commander over Service 

components is clear but requires coordination with each Secretary to ensure there 

is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities which a Secretary alone may 

discharge. If confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive relationship with each of the Secretaries of the Military Departments in partnership with 

Commander, STRATCOM. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services. 

Answer. The Service Chiefs are charged to provide organized, trained, and 

equipped forces to be employed by combatant commanders in accomplishing their 

assigned missions. Additionally, these officers serve as members of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and as such have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. Individually 

and collectively, the Service Chiefs are a tremendous source of experience and judgment. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs. 

Question. The combatant commanders and, specifically, the Commanders of 

STRATCOM and U.S. Northern Command. 

Answer. CYBERCOM is a subordinate unified command under STRATCOM. The 

Commander, CYBERCOM, has both supported and supporting relationships with 

other combatant commanders, largely identified within the UCP, the Joint Strategic 

Capabilities Plan, execute orders, and operation orders. In general, the Commander, 

CYBERCOM, is the supported commander for planning, leading, and conducting 

DOD defensive cyber and global network operations and, in general, is a supporting 

commander for offensive missions. Specific relationships with Commander, U.S. 

Northern Command will be delineated by the President or the Secretary of Defense 

in execute and/or operation orders. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the 

combatant commanders to broaden and enhance the level and range of these relationships. 

Question. The Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency. 

Answer. The DISA is a DOD Combat Support Agency that provides, operates, and 

assures command and control, information sharing capabilities, and a globally accessible enterprise information infrastructure in direct support to national leaders, 

504 

joint warfighters, and other mission and coalition partners across the full spectrum 

of operations. Commander, CYBERCOM must maintain a close relationship with 

the Director, DISA to coordinate and represent requirements in this mission area, 

in order to accomplish STRATCOM-delegated UCP missions. If confirmed, I shall 

work closely with the Director of DISA on matters of shared interest and importance. 

OVERSIGHT

Question. The resourcing, planning, programming and budgeting, and oversight 

for CYBERCOM’s missions is fragmented within the Defense Department, the executive branch as a whole, and within Congress. Section 932 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 requires the Secretary of Defense 

to appoint a Senate-confirmed official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to act as the principal cyber advisor to the Secretary. 

What is your view of this legislation? Do you believe that it will improve oversight, planning, and resource allocation for the cyber mission within DOD? 

Answer. I believe this legislation provides an opportunity to streamline cyber policy analysis and oversight within DOD, and its implementation will support DOD’s 

long-term goals in cyberspace. Cyber is a complex issue that touches many parts of 

the Department and one single point of contact within the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense will reduce duplicative efforts and keep all offices that work on cyber 

issues in sync. 

Question. What changes to the legislation, if any, would you recommend? 

Answer. I do not recommend any changes at this time. If confirmed, I can assure 

you that I will work closely with the principal cyber advisor selected by the Secretary of Defense. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Commander, CYBERCOM? 

Answer. I believe the major challenge that will confront the next Commander, 

CYBERCOM, will be dealing with the changing threat in cyberspace. Adversaries 

today seek persistent presences on military, government, and private networks for 

purposes such as exploitation and potentially disruption. We as a military and a nation are not well positioned to deal with such threats. These intruders have to be 

located, blocked, and extracted, sometimes over long periods of time. We have seen 

the extent of the resources required to wage such campaigns, the planning and intelligence that are essential to their success, and the degree of collaboration and 

synchronization required across the government and industry (and with our allies 

and international partners). We in DOD are creating capabilities that can adapt to 

these uses and others, but we have some key capability gaps in dealing with increasingly capable threats. Our legacy information architecture, for instance, is not 

optimized for defense in its current form, and our communications systems are vulnerable. U.S. military forces currently lack the training and the readiness to confront advanced threats in cyberspace. Finally, our commanders do not always know 

when they are accepting risk from cyber vulnerabilities, and cannot gain reliable situational awareness, neither globally nor in U.S. military systems. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to continue CYBERCOM’s current course of building 

cyber capabilities to be employed by senior decisionmakers and combatant commanders. In accordance with the DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, 

CYBERCOM with its mission partners and allies has been helping the DOD to 

build: 

1. A defensible architecture; 

2. Trained and ready cyber forces; 

3. Global situational awareness and a common operating picture; 

4. Authorities that enable action; 

5. Doctrine and concepts for operating in cyberspace. 

I would plan to assess these current priorities, which are DOD-wide, with an eye 

to shifting emphases across them as necessary and appropriate, and as computer 

and communication technologies continue to evolve. 

Question. What are your priorities for the CYBERCOM? 

Answer. CYBERCOM is helping to accomplish something that our military has 

never done before. With the Services, allies, and a host of partners, it is putting in 

place foundational systems and processes for organizing, training, equipping, and 

operating military cyber capabilities to meet cyber threats. CYBERCOM and the 

505 

Services are building a world class, professional, and highly capable force in readiness to conduct full spectrum cyberspace operations. Its Cyber Mission Force (CMF) 

is already engaged in operations and accomplishing high-value missions. It is no 

longer an idea on a set of briefing slides; its personnel are flesh-and-blood soldiers, 

marines, sailors, airmen, and coastguardsmen, arranged in military units. That 

progress is transforming potential capability into a reliable source of options for our 

decisionmakers to employ in defending our Nation. Future progress in doing so, of 

course, will depend on our ability to field sufficient trained, certified, and ready 

forces with the right tools and networks to fulfill the growing cyber requirements 

of national leaders and joint military commanders. If confirmed, my highest priority 

will be continuing and expanding this progress toward making CYBERCOM capable 

of protecting our Nation’s freedom of maneuver in cyberspace. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL PROSPECTS FOR DEFENDING AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS

Question. The ease with which nation-states, terrorists, and criminals, are able to 

penetrate corporations and government organizations to steal information suggests 

that the prospects for cyberdefense, using current techniques at least, are poor. 

Nonetheless, CYBERCOM has been assigned the mission of defending the Homeland, which at least implies that a defensive mission is practical and achievable. It 

may be possible to build resilience into critical infrastructure to recover from an attack, through back-up systems and redundant control systems that are less automated or electronically connected, but the Government so far has not emphasized 

resilience over defense for our most critical infrastructure. 

On a sustained basis in a conflict with a very capable nation-state, should we expect CYBERCOM to be able to prevent cyber attacks from reaching their targets 

or causing great damage? 

Answer. The United States possesses superior military might across all 

warfighting domains, cyberspace included. In truth, however, there has been no 

large scale cyber conflict yet in history, and the state of strategy and execution of 

cyber warfare is evolving as we speak. Our decision to collocate key intelligence operations and cyberspace capability serves as a force multiplier, if properly authorized and supported by policy, resources, and willpower. Our force construct is such 

that it provides the United States the flexibility to engage, both offensively and defensively, in specific areas of hostility or on a transnational basis. We are building 

or further developing our international partnerships and relationships for mutual 

support and recognition of norms of behavior. We know there are other nation-states 

who have equal or near-equal capability to ours; we have to be sure that we have 

the capabilities, processes, authorities, and, where appropriate, delegation and preapprovals in place to prevent and respond to malicious activity. In a conflict where 

risk to our systems, information, and critical infrastructure was in play, that the 

United States would need to optimize our ability to see, block, and maneuver 

against attackers in a streamlined and efficient fashion. We still have significant 

work to do to build out our forces and capabilities. However, given the circumstances, yes, I believe it is realistic to expect that U.S. CYBERCOM could effectively engage the adversary to prevent attacks and severe damage. 

Question. Is it reasonable to expect the private sector nonetheless to build defenses to prevent serious impacts on critical infrastructure? 

Answer. Yes. I believe that mission assurance and the protection of our critical 

infrastructure is an inherent obligation of all, not just DOD, DHS, DOJ/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and our Government. In many cases, mission assurance 

relies on the provision, management, or facilitation of critical infrastructure lies in 

the private sector. Defensive measures could include not just automated capabilities 

to prevent or respond, but also adherence to proper standards of network security, 

administration, sharing of threat and vulnerability information, and compliance. 

These are as critical to protection of infrastructure as is military or cyber might. 

In almost any scenario, collaboration and information sharing across private and 

public, governmental and non-governmental organizations will be a key to successful 

outcomes. 

Question. In your view, could such cyber attacks be prevented through the development of offensive capabilities and the principles of deterrence? 

Answer. Yes, the development of both offensive and defensive capabilities can 

serve to deter an adversary from cyber attack. Strong capabilities can deter an attack by preventing an adversary from achieving his objectives and demonstrating 

the ability to impose costs on the adversary. 

Question. Should we expect CYBERCOM to be able to prevent the more limited 

attacks that could be expected from powers with lesser cyber capabilities, such as 

North Korea and Iran? 

506 

Answer. Adversarial activities over recent years have shown that the level of expertise required to conduct potentially damaging operations has steadily lowered, 

enabling less capable actors to achieve some level of effect. Although we continue 

to build and develop our forces and capabilities, I believe that CYBERCOM has the 

capability to prevent such attacks, yes, whether from a capable or less capable adversary, given the order and provided that the supporting policies, authorities, relationships, and will to act are in place. 

Question. In your view, can cyber warfare capabilities provide an asymmetric advantage for such rogue nations, providing them the potential to strike the American 

people and economy? 

Answer. Yes. Regardless of the target—assuming that the adversary has somehow 

developed the access—the physics of the cyberspace domain and the technology supporting it make it easier for an adversary to hide or obfuscate his capability, attack 

vector, and location, and deliver an effect on his target either singularly or repeatedly within milliseconds. If he or she has subverted any number of proxies from 

which to operate, that further multiplies the advantage enjoyed. When the victim 

is placed in a reactive posture by processes which constrain the ability to respond, 

the advantage is multiplied. Internal defensive measures can mitigate that advantage to an extent, of course. 

Question. If so, how should we demonstrate or clarify our retaliatory capability 

as a means of contributing to deterrence? Should the U.S. Government be more 

forthcoming about the nature of cyber warfare, and the balance between offensive 

and defensive capabilities? 

Answer. I believe the recent disclosures of a large portion of our intelligence and 

military operational history may provide us with opportunity to engage both the 

American public and our international partners in discussion of the balance of offense and defense, the nature of cyber warfare, norms of accepted and unacceptable 

behavior in cyberspace, and so forth. 

SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Question. CYBERCOM has a mission to support civil authorities, such as DHS 

and law enforcement agencies, to help defend government networks and critical infrastructure networks owned and operated by the private sector. 

Please describe the ways that CYBERCOM should assist civil authorities and the 

capability of CYBERCOM to provide that assistance. 

Answer. I believe that a request for support to civil authorities for cyber related 

assistance normally occur as a response to a request for assistance from DHS to 

DOD, and in close coordination with the Commanders of STRATCOM and 

NORTHCOM. That support could be technical assistance in a number of different 

ways, such as recommendations for improved network configurations, information 

assurance measures, or specific defensive response actions. Other technical assistance could be in the form of mitigation options, forensics, or data analysis. 

Question. U.S. Northern Command was established to serve as the focal point for 

DOD support to civil authorities. 

Will cybersecurity support to civil authorities be provided through U.S. Northern 

Command, as a supported command, or otherwise? If not, why not? 

Answer. Depending on the nature of the national emergency or crisis, and the requirement for cybersecurity support, the Secretary of Defense would determine 

which combatant commander would be supported and supporting and CYBERCOM 

would comply with that determination. In any scenario with respect to cyber security support to civil authorities, a close collaborative relationship between U.S. 

Northern Command and CYBERCOM will be key. 

USE OF FORCE IN CYBERSPACE

Question. Does the Defense Department have a definition for what constitutes use 

of force in cyberspace, and will that definition be the same for our activities in 

cyberspace and those of other nations? 

Answer. DOD has a set of criteria that it uses to assess cyberspace events. As 

individual events may vary greatly from each other, each event will be assessed on 

a case-by-case basis. While the criteria we use to assess events are classified for 

operational security purposes, generally speaking, DOD analyzes whether the proximate consequences of a cyberspace event are similar to those produced by kinetic 

weapons. 

As a matter of law, DOD believes that what constitutes a use of force in cyberspace is the same for all nations, and that our activities in cyberspace would be governed by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter the same way that other nations would 

be. With that said, there is no international consensus on the precise definition of 

507 

a use of force, in or out of cyberspace. Thus, it is likely that other nations will assert 

and apply different definitions and thresholds for what constitutes a use a force in 

cyberspace, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. 

Question. Has the Defense Department, or the administration as a whole, determined what constitutes use of force in cyberspace in relation to the War Powers Act, 

the exercise of the right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter, and the triggering 

of collective defense obligations? 

Answer. It is up to the President to determine when, based upon the circumstances of any event, including a cyberspace event, and the contemplated response that the President intends to proceed with, what consultations and reports 

are necessary to Congress, consistent with the War Powers Act. 

The United States would evaluate its individual self-defense rights, as well as the 

self-defense rights of other nations, consistent with international law and Article 51 

of the U.N. Charter. This analysis would assess whether an illegal use of force had 

occurred, and whether a State’s inherent right of self-defense was triggered. If the 

United States held a collective defense obligation to the state that was subject to 

the illegal use of force, then the United States would evaluate its obligations consistent with its treaty obligations, keeping in mind that the U.N. Charter recognizes 

a state’s inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. After all, collective 

self-defense obligations apply when another state is threatened or subject to a use 

of force in the cyber domain just as they would in other warfighting domains. 

Question. Could CYBERCOM employ offensive cyber weapons against computers 

located abroad that have been determined to be sources of an attack on the United 

States or U.S. deployed forces if we do not know who is behind the attack (i.e., a 

foreign government or non-state actors)? Without confident ‘‘attribution,’’ under 

international law, would the Defense Department have the authority to ‘‘fire back’’ 

without first asking the host government to deal with the attack? 

Answer. International law does not require that a nation know who is responsible 

for conducting an armed attack before using capabilities to defend themselves from 

that attack. With that said, from both an operational and policy perspective, it is 

difficult to develop an effective response without a degree of confidence in attribution. Likely, we would take mitigating actions, which we felt were necessary and 

proportionate, to defend the Nation from such an attack. I’d note that in such an 

event, CYBERCOM would be employing cyber capabilities defensively, in the context of self-defense. 

POLICIES GOVERNING ACCESS TO SENSITIVE TARGETS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

AND TARGETING

Question. Traditionally, espionage has not been regarded as a use of force or an 

act of war. However, in cyberspace operations, experts agree that gaining access to 

a target for intelligence collection is tantamount to gaining the ability to attack that 

target. If a penetration were detected, the victim may not know whether the purpose of the activity would be limited to espionage only, or would also constitute 

preparation for an attack. 

Are there classes of foreign targets that the U.S. Government considers should be 

‘‘off-limits’’ from penetration through cyberspace? 

Answer. My view is that the U.S. Government should only conduct cyberspace operations against carefully selected foreign targets that are critical to addressing explicitly stated intelligence and military requirements, as approved by national policymakers and the national command authority. 

Question. Would or should such targets be immune to penetration by the United 

States in peacetime even for intelligence collection? Should there be a review process outside of DOD for such potential targets? 

Answer. Intelligence collection is conducted in response to specific needs expressed 

by policymakers and military commanders for information. Those needs are vetted 

through a formal requirements process managed by the Director of National Intelligence that includes a review of sensitive policy equities. 

Question. How does the NSA currently consider these issues when making decisions about targeting for intelligence collection? 

Answer. NSA conducts intelligence collection operations in response to specific requirements that are vetted through a formal process managed by the Director of National Intelligence. That process includes an interagency review of sensitive policy 

equities. 

Question. What role do the White House and the interagency coordination process 

play in this decision process? 

Answer. The White House and the interagency community are directly involved 

in approving foreign intelligence requirements and determining what targets are apVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00515 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
508 

propriate for cyberspace and other Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations. All 

cyberspace operations conducted by NSA and CYBERCOM are governed by the policy constraints set by the White House and the interagency coordination process. 

President Obama recently announced improvements to this process in Presidential 

Policy Directive PPD–28. 

NSA and CYBERCOM (under its delegated intelligence authorities) conduct intelligence collection operations in response to specific requirements that are vetted 

through a formal process managed by the Director of National Intelligence. That 

process includes an interagency review of sensitive policy equities. 

Question. Do you see a need for a change in the decisionmaking process? 

Answer. I believe that the recent improvements to the policy review process described in PPD–28 should be sufficient to ensure that all U.S. Government and privacy interests are considered prior to engaging in cyberspace operations. I have no 

specific recommendations for additional changes at this time. 

AUTHORITIES OF COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND

Question. Offensive cyber warfare weapons or operations could have devastating 

effects, depending on the target of the attack and the method used, that could be 

comparable to those caused by weapons of mass destruction. 

Under what circumstances, if any, would you as Commander, CYBERCOM, have 

the authority to use offensive cyber weapons without prior approval by the President? 

Answer. Under current policy, Commander, CYBERCOM, would not use cyber capabilities for offensive purposes without prior approval by the President. 

Question. Are CYBERCOM forces the only forces permitted to conduct offensive 

military cyber operations? 

Answer. The President or Secretary of Defense could authorize any combatant 

command to direct assigned cyber forces to conduct military cyberspace operations. 

At present, we are building a CMF, which will be able to conduct these operations 

under the command and control of whichever combatant command to which they are 

assigned. 

Question. Are there official rules barring non-CYBERCOM forces from, for example, causing cyber effects against battlefield weapons systems, as an extension of 

traditional electronic warfare capabilities? 

Answer. As far as I am aware, there are none. 

Question. Are there clear distinctions between cyber warfare and electronic warfare? 

Answer. While there are clear distinctions between electronic warfare and cyber 

warfare, there may also be avenues to achieve greater operational synergy between 

these two missions and to examine the policy implications of their synchronized use 

in warfare. 

LAWS OF WAR

Question. Has DOD determined how the laws of armed conflict (including the 

principles of military necessity in choosing targets, proportionality with respect to 

collateral damage and unintended consequences, and distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants) apply to cyber warfare, with respect to both nationstates and non-state entities (terrorists, criminals), and both when the source of an 

attack is known and unknown? 

Answer. Per DOD guidance, all military operations must be in compliance with 

the laws of armed conflict—this includes cyber operations. The law of war principles 

of military necessity, proportionality and distinction will apply when conducting 

cyber operations. 

Question. If not, when will the Department produce authoritative positions on 

these issues? 

Answer. N/A. 

EQUITIES

Question. There have been many instances in history where military and political 

leaders had to struggle with the choice of acting on intelligence information to save 

lives or forestall an enemy success, but at the cost of the enemy learning that their 

classified information or capabilities had been compromised. These choices are referred to as ‘‘balancing equities’’ or ‘‘gain-loss’’ calculations. 

Who is in charge of the equities/gain-loss process for cyberspace within the military? 

Answer. There is a clear framework established to adjudicate the equities/gainloss and is part of both crisis and deliberate planning efforts on the part of the comVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00516 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
509 

batant commanders. The risk-loss equation in DOD is made after comprehensive 

consultation with the Intelligence Community and the impacted commander. 

CYBERCOM is the lead for DOD cyberspace deconfliction and is directly involved 

in cases of disagreement as part of the processes directed in key interagency documents. If the interagency disagreement is not resolved at this level, the issue goes 

to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, NSC Deputies, and 

later to the President where the issue is resolved. 

Question. If these decisions rest with the Commander of CYBERCOM, how will 

the combatant commands, the military Services, and other defense agencies be persuaded that their interests will be fairly balanced with those of NSA? 

Answer. PPD–20 allows for representation from other agencies, giving each a 

voice in the process. When gain-loss issues arise, all parties have the responsibility 

to comprehensively state the issues and impacts with these discussions beginning 

at the action officer level. Formal disagreements unresolved after CYBERCOM review follow a clear path to department and national decisionmakers, to include the 

President if need be. 

Question. Since NSA personnel are filling a large number of key positions within 

CYBERCOM, how can you be confident that equity issues make it to senior levels 

in CYBERCOM, and are fully and fairly examined? 

Answer. The value of NSA’s contribution to the CYBERCOM mission in terms of 

manpower and mission support is vitally important; however, I believe that the military and civilian personnel in the current CYBERCOM workforce contains a broad 

mix of experience and background from across the defense, intelligence, operations 

and law enforcement communities. Within the intelligence directorate for example, 

the Defense Intelligence Agency is the primary provider of personnel, with a senior 

executive from that agency holding the deputy director position. Staffing the leadership from a wide range of sources is a strength that has resulted in a more diverse 

level of input into the equities process than ever before. All issues requiring senior 

leadership attention are fully and fairly vetted through a rigorous system of boards 

and working groups, made up of representation from across our diverse leadership 

cadre. 

Question. How are equities/gain-loss decisions made for the Nation as a whole? 

How will the interests of the vulnerable private sector, critical infrastructure, and 

civil agencies be weighed in the selection of targets for intelligence collection and 

attack? 

Answer. The Tri-lateral Memorandum of Agreement contains a deconfliction 

mechanism involving DOD, DOJ, the Intelligence Community and agencies outlined 

in, and reinforced by PPD–20. Disagreements are handled similar to those internal 

to DOD; the issue is forwarded from the Seniors involved to the Deputies then on 

to the Principals Committee with the final stop being the President in cases where 

equities/gain-loss are ultimately resolved. 

Question. As a foreign intelligence agency, NSA has a mission to find 

vulnerabilities in the networks of our adversaries. However, the NSA’s Information 

Assurance Directorate is responsible for securing national security systems and 

CYBERCOM has the responsibility of defending DOD networks and the Nation. 

How do you believe these responsibilities should be balanced? 

Answer. The basis for handling discovered vulnerabilities must be the national interests of the United States. Understanding particular vulnerabilities, and how they 

may impact our national interests, requires deep understanding of the technology, 

the risks a vulnerability can pose, options for mitigating these risks, and the potential for foreign intelligence if the vulnerability remains open. But the balance must 

be tipped toward mitigating any serious risks posed to the U.S. and allied networks. 

NSA has always employed this principle in the adjudication of vulnerability findings, and if confirmed, I intend to sustain the emphasis on risk mitigation and defense. 

Question. What are the policies and processes that apply to the discovery and disclosure of so-called ‘‘0-day’’ vulnerabilities in software? 

Answer. Within NSA, there is a mature and efficient equities resolution process 

for handling ‘‘0-day’’ vulnerabilities discovered in any commercial product or system 

(not just software) utilized by the United States and its allies. The basis for it is 

documented in formal NSA policy, which includes the adjudication process. The policy and process ensure that all vulnerabilities discovered by NSA in the conduct of 

its lawful missions are documented, subject to full analysis, and acted upon promptly. 

NSA is now working with the White House to put into place an interagency process for adjudication of 0-day vulnerabilities. If confirmed, I will support this process. 

Question. What is the impact of not disclosing these vulnerabilities? What is the 

impact of disclosing them? 

510 

Answer. When NSA discloses a vulnerability discovery to a vendor, the goal is to 

achieve the most efficient and comprehensive mitigation of the risk. Upon disclosure, vendors usually fix the vulnerability, and issue an update or patch. The risk 

is mitigated only when users actually install the patch. Since adversaries frequently 

study industry patches to learn about underlying vulnerabilities that will remain in 

unpatched systems, NSA disclosure of a vulnerability may temporarily increase the 

risk to U.S. systems, until the appropriate patches are installed. 

When NSA decides to withhold a vulnerability for purposes of foreign intelligence, 

then the process of mitigating risks to U.S. and allied systems is more complex. 

NSA will attempt to find other ways to mitigate the risks to national security systems and other U.S. systems, working with stakeholders like CYBERCOM, DISA, 

DHS, and others, or by issuing guidance which mitigates the risk. If confirmed, I 

intend to strengthen collaboration with other Government stakeholders, under the 

auspices of the planned interagency process. 

Question. What is the impact of not disclosing these vulnerabilities? What is the 

impact of disclosing them? 

Answer. NSA currently follows its equity resolution process, as required under 

NSA policy. Technical experts document the vulnerability in full classified detail, options to mitigate the vulnerability, and a proposal for how to disclose it. The default 

is to disclose vulnerabilities in products and systems used by the United States and 

its allies. The information assurance and intelligence elements of NSA jointly participate in this process. 

DETERRENCE AND ESCALATION CONTROL

Question. Does the U.S. Government have a cyber warfare deterrence strategy or 

doctrine? 

Answer. Deterrence in cyberspace is achieved through the totality of U.S. actions, 

including the United States overall defense posture and the resilience of our networks and systems. As the President stated in his International Strategy for Cyberspace, the United States reserves the right to defend itself against cyberattacks. 

Whenever possible, the United States will exhaust all options prior to military force, 

and will always act in accordance with U.S. values and in a manner consistent with 

the Constitution and international law. This administration has articulated these 

policies consistently since the International Strategy for Cyberspace was published 

in 2011. The establishment of CYBERCOM is an element of a deterrence strategy, 

but more work and planning will be required to evolve a solid national strategy. 

Cyber warfare is a complex and evolving discipline, and the subject of deterrence 

is drawing increasing attention at all levels of government and the Interagency, and 

in our discussions with our international partners. If confirmed, I will work with 

DOD, DHS, DOJ/FBI and others as we work to establish the relationships and engagement necessary to build such a strategy and policy. 

Question. Would you agree that promulgating such a doctrine requires at least 

some broad statements of capabilities and intentions regarding the use of offensive 

cyber capabilities, both to influence potential adversaries and to reassure allies? 

Answer. Classic deterrence theory is based on the concepts of threat and cost; either there is a fear of reprisal, or a belief that an attack is too hard or too expensive. Cyber warfare is still evolving and much work remains to establish agreed 

upon norms of behavior, thresholds for action, and other dynamics. A broad understanding of cyber capability, both defensive and offensive, along with an understanding of thresholds and intentions would seem to be logical elements of a deterrence strategy, both for our allies and our adversaries and as they are in other 

warfighting domains. I believe we’ll see much discussion of the structure and implementation of our cyber deterrence strategy from DOD and Intelligence Community 

experts, along with Interagency engagement. 

Question. How do you reconcile the utility of speaking more openly and candidly 

about cyber warfare capabilities in the interest of promoting greater public knowledge and the development of deterrence doctrine with the continued need to classify 

U.S. cyber capabilities? 

Answer. I believe that as we communicate more with the public, the understanding that the United States will defend and deter in cyberspace, in accordance 

with law and international agreement, is more important than understanding the 

intricacies of the capabilities it will use to do so. I believe the public will understand 

that we do not want to telegraph our strategy for action to the adversary. As cyberspace matures as a warfighting domain, I believe our classification policies will also 

evolve to support growing domestic and international partnerships and relationships. Regardless, we will adhere with all classification policies and practices dictated by Executive order. 

511 

Question. Most experts believe that the attacker has a substantial advantage over 

the defender in cyber warfare. It is also widely believed that striking first against 

an adversary’s networks offers an advantage if the adversary’s command and control 

networks can be degraded, and because the attacker can take steps to protect itself 

from a retaliatory attack. These considerations suggest that cyber warfare is currently ‘‘unstable’’ from the perspective of classic deterrence theory and escalation 

control. 

What are your views of these dynamics? 

Answer. There is no doubt that the dynamics of offense and defense in cyberspace 

are complex, simply due to the physics of the engagement space. Automated capabilities, human response cycles, and many other factors make them even more so. 

These considerations are discussed and debated by experts across the whole of government, industry, and academia on a near-constant basis. The science and the philosophy are evolving. Just as it took time for doctrine, strategy, and concepts of deterrence and escalation to evolve in the other warfighting domains, so it is with 

cyber warfare. I believe we are making progress. 

IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. DEPENDENCE ON CYBER NETWORKS

Question. Many experts assert that the United States is the most vulnerable country in the world to cyber attack because we are the most networked nation and the 

one that has most fully exploited computer networks for business, government, and 

military functions. 

How could the Department compensate for U.S. dependence on vulnerable cyber 

networks in developing effective deterrent strategies? 

Answer. We have effective deterrent strategies in place in the other warfighting 

domains, in the form of our demonstrated military might and capability. Cyber deterrence should evolve in the same way; demonstrated capability to defend, respond, 

or be able to attack when necessary is a key to deterrence. Our dependence on our 

networks can be compensated for by having a strong, viable defense in the form of 

both traditional military strength and cyber capability. We have the ability to respond proportionately and discriminately in both kinetic and non-kinetic modes 

when we can meet attribution requirements. 

We need, however, to move from what is currently a reactive posture, to a 

proactive one. We are integrating and synchronizing our military operations and 

supporting intelligence capabilities for optimal detection, analysis, assessment, and 

response to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities on a near real-time basis. The concepts we are maturing in the form of multi-layered approaches and scalability, in 

coordination with DHS and others, are expandable to the rest of our Government 

and critical infrastructure. 

Our networks are inherent to our way of life; their vulnerability is the key concern. A strong and deterrent defense, along with robust, resilient networks, will alleviate that vulnerability. 

Question. Given our vulnerabilities, is it in our interest to avoid engaging in certain kinds of offensive cyber warfare—so that we do not set precedents by example 

for others to follow? 

Answer. Any decision to engage in offensive cyber operations must reflect careful 

consideration and due diligence of the range of potential impacts, including adversary responses and the impact upon norms and precedents in cyberspace. Even as 

we must be prepared to undertake offensive cyber operations, these are important 

considerations in the decision to undertake such operations. 

THE CHALLENGE OF ATTRIBUTION

Question. An essential feature of military, intelligence, and criminal or malicious 

activities in cyberspace is the ease with which the origin and the identity of those 

responsible for an attack can be concealed—the problem of ‘‘attribution’’. 

Can deterrence be an effective strategy in the absence of reliable attribution? 

Answer. Yes, I believe there can be effective levels of deterrence despite the challenges of attribution. Attribution has improved, but is still not timely in many circumstances. We must employ several approaches to this challenge. A healthy, engaged partnership with the Intelligence Community is vital to continued improvement in attribution. Second, is development of defensive options which do not require full attribution to meet the requirements of law and international agreement. 

Cyber presence, being forward deployed in cyberspace, and garnering the indications 

and warnings of our most likely adversaries can help (as we do with our forces dedicated to Defend the Nation). We must ensure we leverage the newest technology to 

identify our attackers before and during an attack—not just after. Last, and perhaps 

most important, we need to make our networks and supporting architectures robust, 

512 

resilient, and defensible by establishing and encouraging adherence to cybersecurity 

and information assurance standards. This last is a national problem across all of 

our networks, and is one which we should actively work to resolve. 

There are other actions that need to be taken, too, in order to advance our defensive capability and support a deterrent posture. These include partnerships with nation-states who share common goals and expectations for behavior in cyberspace. 

From these partnerships, we can build normative standards, thresholds for action, 

and evidential frameworks on which to base response. We also need to improve our 

relationships with private and industrial sector partners through information sharing regarding threat and vulnerabilities. 

I believe the United States may be considered an easier mark because our own 

processes and criteria for response lead the adversary to believe, rightly or wrongly, 

that we do not have the will to respond in a timely or proportionate manner, even 

when attribution is available. This is within our capacity to fix. 

The bottom-line is that we have much we can do to increase our posture to prevent attacks, mitigate them to at least a reasonable extent, or deter them outright, 

without full attribution. 

Question. Can the attribution problem be solved without comprehensive information sharing among the private sector and with the government? 

Answer. I believe that the difficulty of attribution is compounded without a close 

relationship with the private sector, and full information sharing to the degree that 

policy and law allow. Most of our national information systems and networks ride 

on or are composed of infrastructure that is privately owned; we need their engagement to build attribution capability. 

SYSTEMS ACQUISITION

Question. Combatant commands by design play a limited role in the acquisition 

process. However, the Commander of CYBERCOM is dual-hatted as the Director of 

the NSA, which is a large enterprise with substantial resources for developing, procuring, and supporting new equipment, systems, and capabilities. In addition, the 

Commander exercises operational control of DISA networks, and DISA is also an 

agency that acquires systems and capabilities. 

Is there a precedent for a combatant commander to exercise this degree of direct 

control over acquisition organizations, aside from Special Operations Command, 

which Congress expressly provided with acquisition authority? 

Answer. If confirmed as the Commander, CYBERCOM, I will rely upon the acquisition authority of other organizations, (e.g., the Services and Defense Agencies) to 

equip the cyber forces to satisfy validated operational requirements and comply with 

DOD policy and capability development guidance. This is the same process used by 

the other combatant and sub-unified commands, with the exception of U.S. Special 

Operations Command. 

Question. What measures have been taken to ensure that Commanders of 

CYBERCOM do not circumvent the requirements process and the established acquisition process by directing subordinates at NSA or DISA to directly address needs 

perceived by CYBERCOM without the rigor required by the DOD requirements and 

acquisition processes? 

Answer. CYBERCOM, NSA, and DISA are all separate organizations with their 

own, ability to acquire personnel and equipment, processes and staffs. Due to the 

separate nature of these three organizations, the oversight, accountability chains, 

and the ability to audit will ensure I follow the CYBERCOM requirements process 

and the Director of NSA follows the established NSA acquisition process. As mentioned earlier, CYBERCOM will operate under the same authorities and oversight 

as other combatant commands and sub-unified commands. 

Specifically regarding rigor, CYBERCOM adheres to all laws and policies regarding acquisition and if confirmed, I will ensure DOD requirements and acquisition 

processes will continue to be followed. 

Specifically, I understand the Department directed CYBERCOM to establish the 

DOD Cyber Operational Capabilities Board (COCB) to better integrate military 

cyber capabilities requirements into cyber capability development. The COCB is in 

its infancy and the draft Charter is still being staffed, but it will be fully alignment 

with the Department’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to 

ensure future cyberspace capability development supports the Combatant Commands. 

It is important to note that although CYBERCOM, as a sub-unified command, 

does not have its own acquisition authority, it has the management controls necessary to ensure Command activities for funding capability developments satisfy 

validated operational requirements and comply with DOD policy and capability deVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00520 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
513 

velopment guidance. While CYBERCOM does not have the acquisition authority to 

designate a Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the Command makes investment 

decisions that result in starting, continuing, suspending, or terminating its investments in cyberspace capability developments. These decisions are made in concert 

with executing MDAs and reflect the Command’s focus on funding only those capability developments that will deliver required operational cyberspace capabilities 

within the timeframes needed. As discussed previously, CYBERCOM will rely upon 

the acquisition authority of other organizations, e.g., the Services and Defense Agencies. 

Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 required the Secretary of Defense to 

establish a strategy for streamlining the acquisition and oversight process for cyber 

warfare capabilities, which resulted, among other things, in the establishment of the 

Cyber Investment Management Board (CIMB). 

Three years after the passage of this legislation, how would you characterize 

DOD’s progress in establishing an agile acquisition process to provide capabilities 

for CYBERCOM? 

Answer. The CIMB was established in 2012 and has been meeting on a quarterly 

basis. The CIMB is chartered to provide strategic guidance and recommendations 

to support integration and synchronization of cyber capabilities across science and 

technology requirements, acquisitions, development, test and evaluation, and 

sustainment to ensure that cyber warfare investments are efficiently planned, executed, and coordinated across the Department. The CIMB continues to mature and 

is working to demonstrate a streamlined acquisition and oversight process for cyber 

warfare capabilities. Currently, they have identified pilot programs to demonstrate 

the proof of principle for rapid acquisition of cyber capabilities. 

MILITARY SERVICE ROLES IN U.S. CYBER COMMAND

Question. Each of the Military Services is producing cyber operations units for assignment to CYBERCOM to defend the Nation, support the other combatant commands, and to defend DOD networks. 

Are these Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force units geographically organized and assigned, or is there also specialization among the Military Services by 

mission or type of target? 

Answer. Service provided CMF Teams are both geographically aligned and specialized depending upon their assigned mission area. 

The Cyber National Mission Force is comprised of National Mission Teams, National Support Teams, and National Cyber Protection Teams. They are assigned to 

the ‘‘Defend the Nation’’ in cyberspace mission area and, if directed, defend our critical infrastructure and key resources against nation state and non-state actors. 

The Combat Mission Forces are comprised of Combat Mission Teams and Combat 

Support Teams. They are assigned to the ‘‘Provide Support to Combatant Commands’’ mission area. Combat Mission Forces are geographically and functionally 

aligned under one of four Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ–C) in direct support of geographic and functional combatant commands. They are aligned as follows: 

• JFHQ–C Washington supports U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. 

Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command 

• JFHQ–C Georgia supports U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Northern Command 

• JFHQ–C Texas supports U.S. European Command, STRATCOM, and 

U.S. Transportation Command 

The Combat Protection Forces are comprised of Service, DISA, and Combatant 

Command Cyber Protection Teams. They are assigned to the ‘‘Secure, Operate, and 

Defend the Department of Defense Information Networks’’ mission area. These 

teams are specialized to prepare and protect key cyber terrain to provide mission 

assurance. 

Question. Would, for example, Army units be assigned to operate against naval 

or air targets, and vice versa? 

Answer. Yes, targets developed for fires and effects delivered in and through 

cyberspace do not necessarily correspond with traditional Service domains much as 

an Air Force unit may be tasked to attack a naval vessel. The cyberspace domain 

often intersects with multiple elements of a single target. A Target System Analysis 

that yields multiple aimpoints provides a commander flexibility on how best to prosecute the target with the least risk. These options may require an Army unit to operate against naval or air targets and vice versa. Ultimately, the Joint Force Commander will determine how best to engage a target with the cyber mission forces 

at his/her disposal. 

514 

Question. Will each geographic combatant command have a mix of units from each 

Military Service? 

Answer. Each geographic combatant command is supported by a Joint Force 

Headquarters-Cyber with personnel from all Services, and with the exception of U.S. 

Africa Command, all GCCs have a combination of Service established CMF teams 

aligned. Currently, all U.S. Africa Command CMFs are U.S. Army provisioned. 

Question. Will geographic combatant commanders be permitted to execute cyber 

operations under their own authorities? 

Answer. Geographic combatant commanders already have authority to direct and 

execute certain Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) within their own networks. 

These actions consist of internal defensive measures to prepare and protect mission 

critical networks. In the event of hostilities or contingency operations, combatant 

commanders would be permitted to execute full spectrum cyber operations as approved by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense. 

FOCUS ON INTELLIGENCE GATHERING VERSUS FOCUS ON WARFIGHTING

Question. The NSA, as an intelligence agency, appropriately places the highest 

importance on remaining undetected, and accordingly invests in high-end—and 

therefore expensive and hard-to-develop—technical tools and tradecraft, following a 

deliberate methodology for developing and maintaining capability. CYBERCOM, as 

a military combatant command, has very different interests and objectives. For example, it must have the capability to act rapidly, it may need tools and processes 

that do not require computer scientists to operate them, and it may need to act in 

a fashion that makes it clear that the operation is an attack by the United States. 

Do you believe that you could direct CYBERCOM wartime operations effectively 

if CYBERCOM were only able to use the NSA infrastructure to support those operations? 

Answer. It depends. We must ensure we have the tools and infrastructure needed 

to accomplish our mission whenever necessary. CYBERCOM should leverage the 

NSA platform where appropriate and cost-effective, while developing additional infrastructure to accomplish military operations that are unique and distinguishable 

from the Intelligence Community. 

Question. How scalable are NSA infrastructure, personnel, and tools for supporting combat operations in cyberspace? 

Answer. NSA’s infrastructure and tools could be scaled to support combat operations in cyberspace. To most effectively manage risks across military and intelligence operations in cyberspace, CYBERCOM and the Services need to leverage 

NSA expertise to build cyberspace capabilities for combat operations which could include additional tools and infrastructure that are unique and distinguishable from 

the Intelligence Community. 

Question. On what schedule should CYBERCOM develop the capability to take offensive actions that do not require hiding the fact that the operations are being conducted by U.S. forces? 

Answer. As the Services field CMFs in accordance with Joint Staff guidance, capability development should occur concurrently to ensure the CMF have the requisite 

facilities, platform, equipment, and tools needed to accomplish their assigned mission. In many cases, Cyber forces, to be operationally effective, would need to retain 

the capability to operate in a manner which conceals the detailed specifics of U.S. 

military capabilities. If we were to operate ‘‘in the clear,’’ we may expose our 

tradecraft, tools, and infrastructure. If we do that, our enemy can deny us our capability and, in some cases, replicate it and use it against us. 

Question. Section 932 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 requires the Secretary 

of Defense to provide CYBERCOM with infrastructure to enable CYBERCOM to 

independently access global networks to conduct military operations. 

What are your views on this requirement? 

Answer. There is no doubt that collocating CYBERCOM with NSA, and dualhatting the Commander and Director, allows for efficient use of available platform 

capabilities and technical expertise. I do believe; however, that CYBERCOM needs 

additional infrastructure to accomplish military operations that are unique and distinguishable from the Intelligence Community. The Department has made significant progress recently in identifying and planning for development of alternative, 

diverse, scalable, deployable, and disposable platforms that can be available on demand to the CMF for mission accomplishment. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s plan for complying 

with the legislation? 

Answer. My understanding is that CYBERCOM has already been tasked by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense and has made measurable progress in laying out a 

515 

strategy for identifying the numbers and mix of alternative platforms required to 

meet operational requirements, both for steady state and contingency purposes. 

These platforms will give the CMF the diversity and scalability needed to address 

the threat, apart from the intelligence platform. Additionally, since they do not require the breadth and sophistication of the existing platform, they should be less 

expensive to build and deploy. 

Question. Do you believe DOD can implement the legislative direction in an effective and affordable manner? 

Answer. Yes, there has been a significant amount of effort expended by the Department toward meeting this requirement. 

DEVELOPMENT OF CYBER OFFICER CORPS

Question. In a forthcoming article, the J–3 of CYBERCOM, Major General Brett 

Williams, argues that: ‘‘We have a pressing need to develop cyberspace operators 

who are credible and effective in the J–3 and J–5, within both the Joint Staff (JS) 

and the combatant commands (CCMD). Just for emphasis, that is the J–3 and J– 

5, not just the J–2 and J–6; and at all of the CCMDs, not just CYBERCOM . . . Joint 

staffs consist of what we typically think of as operators, members of the combat 

arms who are educated, trained and experienced in operations. Cyberspace expertise 

usually comes from people with intelligence, communications or cryptology backgrounds; career fields typically categorized as support forces. If we are going to treat 

operations in cyberspace like operations in the other domains, the Services must 

commit to unique career fields for cyberspace . . . Cyberspace, like the other domains, 

requires officers who are developed across their careers in a way that positions them 

to lead at senior levels in both command and staff. Cyberspace officers should spend 

their first 10 years becoming tactically proficient in all aspects of cyberspace operations, complete service and joint military education, serve on joint staffs, command 

in their area of operational specialty and do all of the other things necessary to 

produce general and flag officers whose native domain is cyberspace.’’ 

What are your views about whether cyber officer career development should be 

distinct from both intelligence and communications officer development? 

Answer. Specialized expertise in our officer ranks is critical to mission accomplishment. At the same time, a shared understanding across the team is essential. The 

way we have deliberately approached this in the Navy has been the establishment 

of Cyber Warrant Officers and Cyber Warfare Engineers. These individuals are purposefully selected to join our ranks from either our enlisted force, the Intelligence 

Community, academia, or industry. We then train and employ them to leverage 

their specialized expertise. They serve side by side with Officers from varied career 

fields, but primarily intelligence and communications specialists although combat 

arms officers could be trained as cyber officers as well. I believe all officers should 

have an appreciation for cyberspace operations. Intelligence and communication officers must have a clear understanding of the same, and we have a responsibility to 

develop specialized expertise in a core of cyber officers. 

Question. Is it advisable to develop cyberspace officers as we do other combat 

arms or line officers? Why or why not? 

Answer. I am a strong proponent of diversity across the team and quick to recognize all have a responsibility to both understand and contribute in this mission 

area. We must find a way to simultaneously ensure combat arms and line officers 

are better prepared to contribute, and cyberspace officers are able to enjoy a long, 

meaningful career with upward mobility. A meaningful career should allow them to 

fully develop as specialized experts, mentor those around them, and truly influence 

how we ought to train and fight in this mission space. I am especially interested 

in the merit of how a visible commitment to valuing cyberspace officers in our ranks 

will affect recruitment and retention. I believe that many of today’s youth who are 

uniquely prepared to contribute (e.g. formally educated or self-developed technical 

expertise) do not feel there is a place for them in our uniformed services. We must 

find a way to strengthen the message of opportunity and I believe part of the answer is to do our part to ensure cyberspace officers are viewed as equals in the eyes 

of line and combat arms officers; not enablers, but equals. Equals with capabilities 

no less valued than those delivered by professional aviators, special operators, infantry, or surface warfare. 

ALIGNMENT OF MILITARY CYBER OPERATIONS WITH CYBER INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Question. Do you think that, as CYBERCOM matures and as cyber military art 

develops, military cyber operations and cyber intelligence operations should be distinct operations? 

516 

Answer. Intelligence is a joint function integral to all military operations. Intelligence operations are conducted in cyberspace to inform military operations in all 

domains, including cyberspace. 

Question. In the long term, what are the pros and cons of treating the Services’ 

cyber organizations and the service cryptologic elements as distinct entities? 

Answer. Just as there is a dynamic partnership between CYBERCOM and NSA, 

and the disciplines of military cyber operations and cyber intelligence operations are 

interwoven, there is a similar relationship and advantage to be had in the partnerships between the service cryptologic and cyber organizations. They provide key capability to their Services as independent focal points for warfighting and intelligence, but together provide the additive cyber capability for each Service. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the cyber force model as it develops in view of this 

synergism. 

Question. Do you think that military cyber operations personnel assigned to 

CYBERCOM units should, in the long term, continue to be funded mainly in the 

intelligence budget and competing with intelligence priorities? 

Answer. In view of our current fiscal environment and challenges, if confirmed, 

I would examine and assess all CYBERCOM funding streams and processes, including personnel. 

RANGE SUPPORT FOR U.S. CYBER COMMAND

Question. Section 932 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 requires the Secretary 

of Defense to ensure that there are adequate range capabilities for training and exercising offensive cyber forces in operations that are very different from cyber intelligence operations. 

What is your understanding of CYBERCOM’s range requirements for individual 

and unit training, and exercises, and the capabilities and capacity of the joint cyber 

range infrastructure to satisfy those requirements? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the persistent training and test environment 

is being developed based on requirements from CYBERCOM’s exercise continuum 

of Cyber Knight, Cyber Guard, and Cyber Flag. This continuum is designed to train 

and/or certify CMF teams. Unfortunately, these exercises are executed using not 

only ad hoc range support, but also ad hoc facilities. Though the lack of a range 

continues to be a limiting factor, so does the lack of a physical infrastructure. 

Though the main effort in building the teams is individual training and qualification 

right now, collective training and certification will quickly make the lack of efficient 

range even more glaring than it is today. Our cyber forces need a persistent training 

environment they can depend on every day of the week to train. We must continually train against a high end adversary and not only in CJCS level exercises. The 

key to success here is training. A persistent range is a must have if we want to 

build a professional cyber force. 

Question. What is your view of the NDAA legislation? 

Answer. The Department continues to fully realize the potential of the DOD Enterprise Cyber Range Environment (DECRE) governance body to oversee Cyber 

Range issues. The main effort of DECRE is the establishment of a persistent test 

and training environment that will effectively meet the growing demand of the CMF 

teams. It is essential that we provide these teams, which are quickly reaching IOC 

and FOC in greater numbers, by providing on-demand environments for training in 

both offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. It is my understanding that the 

Department is on pace to deliver an assessment of the required cyber range capacity 

and capability to support CMF training by October 2014. 

INFORMATION ASSURANCE

Question. The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 

Technologies recommended that the Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) of the 

NSA be separated from NSA and subordinated to the cyber policy component of 

DOD. The Senate version of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision 

that would transfer supervision of the IAD from the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence (USD(I)) to the Chief Information Officer (CIO). The committee’s rationale for this transfer was that the IAD conducts cyber protection-related duties, 

which fall under the responsibility of the CIO, not the USD(I). 

What do you see as the pros and cons of these proposals? 

Answer. I support the President’s decision for the IAD to remain part of NSA. 

NSA has developed (and continues to develop) an extremely deep cadre of computer 

scientists, mathematicians, software engineers, etc. whose skills are translatable 

across the breadth of the Information Assurance (IA) and SIGINT missions. IAD 

and the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) operate in a common trade space, the 

517 

global telecommunications network. NSA offensive and defensive missions have a 

proven track record of success at working together to counter the cyber threat. Code 

making and code breaking are two sides of the same coin. Breaking them apart will 

have significant consequences to the U.S. Government’s ability to develop secure 

communications based on the understanding of how those communications might be 

attacked. 

NSA has developed an infrastructure that supports both Information Assurance 

and SIGINT missions. Creating a separate agency that would need to develop and 

build its own infrastructure and expertise would be extremely inefficient and costly 

in a time of constrained resources. IAD guidance and technology helps secure the 

NSA enterprise. The work IAD performs benefits the security of the Nation and the 

world. Current Media Leaks have unfortunately caused degradation in our trust relationships with industry. If confirmed, I am committed to restore the trust and will 

deepen the partnerships with the DOD CIO and the USD(I) to demonstrate oversight procedures and processes function appropriately. 

DUAL HATTING OF DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND THE

COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND

Question. The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 

Technologies recommended that the positions of Director of NSA and the Commander of CYBERCOM be separated and that the President appoint a civilian to 

be Director of NSA. The President decided against separating these two positions 

at this time. According to press reports, the President based his decision, in part, 

on his perception that CYBERCOM was not yet mature enough to stand on its own 

without a very strong institutional connection to NSA. 

If CYBERCOM remains too dependent on NSA for their leadership to be bifurcated, does it follow that CYBERCOM is not mature enough to become a full unified 

command? 

Answer. My focus on sub-unified or unified will rest on what allows CYBERCOM 

to achieve the most effective cyber force—one that is best postured to defend the 

Nation and our national interests. 

The decision by Secretary of Defense to redesignate the position of Director, NSA 

as both Commander, CYBERCOM and Director, NSA enabled DOD to leverage the 

similarities and overlaps between the capabilities needed for the conduct of NSA’s 

core missions—SIGINT and IA—and those of CYBERCOM to provide for the defense and secure operation of DOD networks; and, upon order by appropriate authority, to operate in cyberspace to defend the Nation. The strength of this arrangement as the most effective approach to accomplishing both organizations’ missions 

was re-affirmed with the President’s December 2013 decision to retain the dual-hat 

position. 

Question. To the extent that military operations in cyberspace should evolve to be 

different and distinct from intelligence collection in cyberspace, is it possible that 

NSA’s strong influence over CYBERCOM’s development could hinder, as well as 

support, the proper maturation of the Command? What are your views on this 

issue? 

Answer. I will ensure NSA, as a combat support agency, continues to support 

CYBERCOM’s ability to execute its mission as well as its maturation. For example, 

there is a high correlation between the knowledge, tools, and techniques necessary 

for meeting military objectives and those for enabling intelligence collection. This 

correlation allows economy of scale in tool and technique development. In addition, 

I will ensure that CYBERCOM has control over the assets it needs and I will work 

within DOD to ensure CYBERCOM has the support it needs to be successful. As 

the dual-hatted Director/Commander, I will empower the Deputy Director, NSA and 

Deputy Commander, CYBERCOM to focus on running their respective organization 

with mission equities in mind, while I maintain accountability with insight into both 

missions and direct collaboration when necessary. 

Question. As NSA is a combat support defense agency subject to the authority, 

direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and NSA is subordinate to the 

Secretary of Defense in his capacity as the President’s executive agent for SIGINT 

under Executive Order 12333, is there any reason to expect that NSA’s support for 

CYBERCOM and the other combatant commands would be questionable if the dualhat arrangement were ended? 

Answer. NSA has a long history of supporting combatant commands with SIGINT 

and IA products and services, well before CYBERCOM was established. I will ensure NSA provides mission critical support to all combatant commands, with or 

without the dual-hat arrangement. 

518 

U.S. CYBER COMMAND AS A SUB-UNIFIED COMMAND

Question. The UCP establishes CYBERCOM as a sub-unified command reporting 

to STRATCOM. We understand that the administration considered modifying the 

UCP to establish CYBERCOM as a full combatant command. 

What are the best arguments for and against taking such action now? 

Answer. I understand that there was discussion at the CJCS and Service Chiefs’ 

level in 2012 to establish CYBERCOM as a full unified command, and that discussion of this option has continued. 

I don’t believe there are any major impediments to elevating CYBERCOM to full 

unified command status, with the exception of adding approximately 112 personnel 

to our headquarters manning (currently 912) required to accomplish administrative 

functions that would accompany unified command status, such as workforce recruitment, Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE); and Global Force 

Management. In addition, there are formal processes that would have to be executed, including revision to the current UCP language, but cyberspace operations 

comprise both a warfighting and enabling discipline and domain in and of itself. 

CYBERCOM is working incredibly hard every day to develop its forces, processes, 

and capability, so perhaps the best argument against elevating the command is the 

need to focus energies in these areas. 

The argument for full unified command status is probably best stated in terms 

of the threat. Cyber attacks may occur with little warning, and more than likely 

will allow only minutes to seconds to mount a defensive action seeking to prevent 

or deflect potentially significant harm to U.S. critical infrastructure. Existing department processes and procedures for seeking authorities to act in response to such 

emergency actions are limited to unified combatant commanders. If confirmed, as 

the Commander of CYBERCOM, as a sub-unified combatant commander I would be 

required to coordinate and communicate through Commander, STRATCOM, to seek 

Secretary of Defense or even Presidential approval to defend the Nation in cyberspace. In a response cycle of seconds to minutes, this could come with a severe cost 

and could even obviate any meaningful action. As required in the current Standing 

Rules of Engagement, as a combatant commander, I would have the requisite authorities to directly engage with the Secretary of Defense or President of the United 

States as necessary to defend the Nation. 

There are some inherent inefficiencies in not elevating, also, in the form of redundant processes and timeliness. Elevation to full unified status would improve resource advocacy, allocation and execution by improving input to Department processes and eliminating competition in prioritization. Additionally, alignment of responsibility, authority, situational awareness, and capability under a single commander would improve cyberspace operations and planning. 

Question. What authorities for operating in cyberspace that are allocated to 

STRATCOM have been pre-delegated to CYBERCOM? 

Answer. CYBERCOM has been delegated by Commander, STRATCOM, the responsibility to conduct specified cyberspace missions as detailed in section 18(d)(3) 

of the UCP. The specific missions delegated include: directing DODIN operations, 

securing and defending the DODIN; maintaining freedom of maneuver in cyberspace; executing full-spectrum military cyberspace operations; providing shared situational awareness of cyberspace operations, including indications and warning; integrating and synchronizing of cyberspace operations with combatant commands and 

other appropriate U.S. Government agencies tasked with defending the Nation’s interests in cyberspace; provide support to civil authorities and international partners. 

SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANT COMMANDS

Question. The Secretary of Defense has ordered the Military Services and 

CYBERCOM to develop operational military cyber teams to support the missions of 

defending the Nation against cyber attacks, supporting the war plans of the geographic and functional combatant commands, and defending DOD networks against 

attacks. The mission teams that will support the combatant commanders ultimately 

will be under the operational control of those commanders. The committee understands that, to date, the combatant commands have not committed to creating cyber 

component commands to direct the operations of those units. 

In your opinion, can the combatant commanders properly direct the operations of 

assigned cyber mission teams without a component command element? 

Answer. Geographic combatant commanders already have the authority to direct 

and execute certain DCO within their own networks. These actions consist of DCO 

internal defensive measures (DCO–IDM) to prepare and protect mission critical networks. The current Joint Staff C2 model provides an interim construct to direct 

DCO–IDM through a Joint Cyber Center/Cyber Support Element. Combatant comVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00526 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
519 

manders direct full-spectrum Cyberspace operations (ISR, OPE, Attack and Defend) 

through a Joint Cyberspace Component Command to ensure actions are synchronized and integrated throughout all warfighting domains. A JFCCC also provides for accountability through legal oversight and compliance—a requirement for 

Cyberspace Operations. Until a JFCCC is established, a Joint Force Headquarters 

directly supports combatant command planning, execution, and oversight. 

Question. Four years after the creation of CYBERCOM, to what extent have cyber 

operations been integrated into the operations plans of the combatant commands? 

Answer. My understanding is that progress has been made in integrating cyberspace capabilities into the operations plans of the combatant commands. Although 

much work remains, CYBERCOM has been successful in this effort by coordinating 

and cooperating with the combatant commands directly, by integrating cyberspace 

capabilities when the plans are undergoing Department-wide review, and also by 

drafting cyberspace support plans that supplement the higher level combatant command plans. 

Additionally, CYBERCOM is building 27 CMF teams assigned to the combatant 

commands to achieve exactly this kind of capability. 

Question. How would you assess the progress of the Department in developing 

cyber capabilities for the use of the command cyber teams to support the specific 

needs of the combatant commands? 

Answer. The Services have made progress developing capabilities to equip their 

CMF teams. At the Department’s direction, CYBERCOM has established, and now 

chairs, the DOD Cyber Operational Capabilities Board (COCB) which will integrate 

military cyber capability development into existing requirements processes. 

In accordance with Department direction, CYBERCOM has also begun implementing changes to the Cyber Capabilities Registry (CCR). The CCR is now populated and accessible, providing military planners a compendium of available cyberspace capabilities for use in support of mission requirements. Ultimately, the CCR 

will become an informative source for all DOD cyberspace capabilities. 

CYBERCOM recognized that we needed to make progress faster in developing the 

tools our warfighters need in cyberspace. As such we stood up a J9 inside the command and staffed it with the best and most qualified military and NSA personnel 

(lead by a NSA senior and U.S. Army Colonel both with Ph.Ds) to work with the 

Services, industry, academia, the IC and our DOD labs to bring new ideas and tools 

to our cyber forces in the shortest time possible. This effort is starting to bear fruit 

delivering cyber tools our warfighters are already training with and integrating in 

tactical training exercise. 

While the Department has made progress in this area, there is still much work 

to be done to ensure we develop joint, interoperable cyberspace capabilities to equip 

the CMFs as they become operational. 

Question. What priority has been assigned to the development of capabilities for 

national versus command cyber mission teams? 

Answer. The prioritization of capability development for national and combatant 

command CMFs flows directly from CYBERCOM’s three mission areas: (1) defend 

the Nation; (2) secure, operate, and defend DOD information networks (DODIN); 

and (3) provide support to combatant commands. CYBERCOM’s highest priority is 

to defend the Nation. This is done in parallel with activities dedicated to securing 

the DODIN and supporting combatant commands. We are building out a robust 

cyber force over the next 3 years. While we rightfully have first focused on the DTN 

mission, we have simultaneously begun the buildout and IOC of our Combatant 

Command CMTs and CPTs. All of these mission areas are resourced in a balanced 

way in accordance with a continuous threat assessment and fiscal limitations. 

Question. Who would you say is responsible for developing cyber capabilities to 

support joint task forces and lower echelons? 

Answer. The Services are responsible for developing capabilities to equip their 

forces. That said, CYBERCOM plays a role coordinating operational and technical 

requirements to ensure interoperability for CMFs and compatibility with mission infrastructures. The DOD Cyber Operational Capabilities Board (COCB) provides a 

venue for much of the coordination to standardize military cyber capability development and leverage existing programs to avoid duplication of effort across the DOD. 

In its unique position, CYBERCOM can and should form a community of operational 

and technical subject matter experts from across DOD and the IC to inform policy 

and resourcing decisions. 

520 

DEVELOPMENT OF CYBER CAPABILITIES

Question. CYBERCOM has depended heavily to date on NSA for technology, 

equipment, capabilities, concepts of operations, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Are you satisfied that DOD is organized and resourced to provide a broad base 

of innovation and capability development in the cyber domain that includes the 

Military Service’s research and development organizations, Defense agencies such as 

the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the private sector? 

Answer. While the Department has made much progress, more work certainly remains to ensure that DOD is organized and resourced to provide military-specific 

cyber capabilities. However, I believe the Department is moving in the right direction through a series of decisions to prevent redundancy and to ensure cyber innovation in both the public and private sectors can be leveraged. One of these decisions 

was to establish the aforementioned COCB to identify and track dependencies 

among capability requirements and to validate and prioritize all cyberspace capability requirements. 

CYBERCOM’s Advanced Capabilities Directorate, J–9 has existing relationships 

with the Services and their dedicated research and development labs, DARPA, federally-funded research and development centers, the defense industrial base, the 

private sector, and other entities, allowing CYBERCOM to leverage their expertise 

to provide and build diverse capability to enable full-spectrum military operations. 

As a member of the COCB, the J–9 also helps enforce a process to ensure there is 

no redundancy of effort, and that several DOD entities can use the same capability 

multiple times when possible to get more return on investment. 

DELEGATION OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES

Question. How important will it be for CYBERCOM personnel to be able to operate with SIGINT authorities that are not necessarily tied to NSA personnel who 

may be working temporarily for CYBERCOM? 

Answer. The ability of CYBERCOM personnel to operate under delegated SIGINT 

authorities and leverage the national cryptologic platform is a critical capability, enabling the command to fully execute its cyberspace mission in an informed, timely, 

and coordinated manner. SIGINT information remains vital to support cyber operations. Effective ‘‘net-speed’’ operations as conducted by an expanded U.S. CMF require ready access to the technical streams of information that SIGINT provides. 

Providing SIGINT information at the lowest possible level in a distributed force environment makes the delegation effort especially important. Time delay increases 

the potential for mission failure. It is important to note that under delegated 

SIGINT authorities, CYBERCOM personnel adhere to the same uniform techniques, 

training and standards, as well as intelligence oversight and compliance programs, 

as those who work for the NSA. We will not sacrifice our legal and security obligations to accomplish these goals. 

JOINT INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Question. The DISA advertises the Joint Information Environment (JIE) programs 

as delivering: 

‘‘. . . the largest restructuring of information technology (IT) management 

in the history of the DOD. The end state is a secure, joint information environment comprised of shared IT infrastructure, enterprise services, and a 

single security architecture. JIE will enable DOD to achieve full-spectrum 

superiority, improve mission effectiveness, increase security, and realize IT 

efficiencies.’’ 

To realize this potential, the CYBERCOM will have to operate within the JIE. 

Has CYBERCOM developed plans for integrating its warfighting operations into 

the JIE? 

Answer. In the JIE Management Construct (approved at the TANK), CYBERCOM 

is responsible for identifying requirements and concepts of operation which enable 

and align with the Command and Control (C2) and defense of the DODIN. JIE is 

a framework for which standards are being designed and built to meet these specified operational requirements. 

Question. Will the JIE systems architecture support a full range of potential 

CYBERCOM warfighting operations? 

Answer. The JIE systems architecture supports the full range of operations ‘of’ 

and ‘on’ the DODIN. The JIE will shift focus from protection of Military Servicespecific networks, systems, and applications to securing data and its uses; a paradigm shift from the traditional net-centric to a data-centric environment. Key secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00528 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
521 

rity features that will be employed under the JIE framework include: an enterprisewide Single Security Architecture (SSA), a secure Out-of-Band Management network; standardized identity and access management; and the integration of thin-client and cloud-based (virtualization) technologies. 

JIE changes the way the Department delivers IT capabilities in the largest, most 

complex operational environment in the world. Common services and capability will 

provide users information at the point of need from any networked device and from 

the enterprise level for all users. The ultimate beneficiary of the JIE will be the 

commander in the field and forces at the tactical edge. JIE will allow better integration of information technologies, operations, and cyber security at a tempo that supports today’s fast-paced operational conditions. The operational capabilities delivered through the JIE will enable commanders to blend the art of command with the 

science of control, enabling JF 2020 to address emerging military challenges 

through the flexible integration of warfighting functions as required. 

JIE will afford organizations responsible for operating and defending this complex 

environment end-to-end visibility and situational awareness for security from strategic to tactical as well as down to the desktop. It will eliminate the barriers which 

prevent information sharing and consolidate computing power and storage capabilities while enabling support for low-bandwidth/disadvantaged users. 

Question. Should DOD approach the JIE as more of a ‘‘weapons system’’ than a 

pure IT system in order to support the range of CYBERCOM’s warfighting plans? 

Answer. JIE is not a system, but is a framework of standards which the DOD 

Services and Agencies are using to procure, operate, and defend the DODIN. JIE 

is focused on helping the DOD achieve full spectrum superiority, improved mission 

operational effectiveness and increased security while realizing IT efficiencies. The 

JIE focuses on creation of a secured joint environment, comprised of a shared Information Technology infrastructure that will deliver common services from the enterprise, bound and secured by a single security architecture. The environment will be 

operated in accordance with responsibilities and authorities identified in the UCP 

based on common, enforceable standards and specifications, as well as common tactics, techniques, and procedures. The primary objective of creating the JIE is to provide DOD and mission partners secure access to Department IT capabilities at the 

point of need; i.e., home, work or deployed; by creating a Joint Enterprise Information Environment that encapsulates computing power; common enterprise services 

and mission applications; and access to data anywhere in the enterprise with the 

ability to extend the same capabilities in the deployed environment. However, once 

we build the underlying architecture(s) within the JIE framework, we need to look 

at them as a weapons system: measure its readiness, garner mission assurance, 

produce trained and ready operators, et cetera. 

SECURITY OF NAVY NETWORKS

Question. The Wall Street Journal last September reported that Iran had compromised the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), an unclassified but important 

and pervasive internal communications network. The Navy has made an award for 

the successor to NMCI, called the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN). 

The winning contractor is the same company that bought the original contractor for 

NMCI. 

Is the NMCI properly architected and constructed against external cyber attacks? 

If not, why not? 

Answer. Yes, NMCI is properly architected and constructed against external cyber 

attacks. Since its inception the NMCI architecture has evolved to respond to the 

threat environment. The threat environment has clearly changed and cyber security 

improvements have been made to NMCI over the years. The Navy and DOD defense 

in depth cyber security architecture, when combined with NMCI security layers, 

provide appropriate protection. As with all networks, the NMCI security architecture continues to mature as technology and threats evolve. Based upon operations 

over the last 8 months and in collaboration with NSA, USCC, and DISA, I have 

identified additional network hardening and cyber security requirements for current 

and future Navy Networks that are currently being planned and programmed for 

implementation. 

Question. Is the NGEN architecture more secure than NMCI, and if so, in what 

respects? 

Answer. Yes, NGEN benefits from lessons learned and technological advances but 

is designed on the same solid security principles used to develop NMCI. Its increased security will be the byproduct of three important factors: increased Navy 

Command and Control (C2) of a network the Navy ‘‘bought back’’ as a result of the 

transition from a contractor-owned/contractor-operated model to a governmentVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00529 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
522 

owned/contractor-operated model; an increase in the Navy’s ability to make and implement critical decisions about the selection of enterprise services under a more 

agile and innovative contract; and a firm commitment to align those services with 

the higher level JIE and Intelligence Community (IC) Information Technology Enterprise. The NGEN contract also allows us to add, modify, and delete services in 

addition to lowering overall operating costs through competition. 

Question. Is the NGEN program fully aligned with the security architecture of the 

JIE initiative? If not, why not? 

Answer. Yes, NGEN is designed and architected to current security standards and 

will leverage Technical Refresh and additional security funding to align to the JIE 

SSA as it becomes better defined, documented, and tested. Navy is participating actively in DOD’s drive to define the SSA and the other components that will come 

together to form JIE. It has been playing a particularly active and important role 

in defining how the emerging SSA and related components will apply to JIE Increment II, which will properly secure U.S. and multinational information flows under 

the transformational Mission Partner Environment. As the definitions take shape, 

Navy will take decisive action to bring NGEN into alignment with JIE’s SSA. 

Question. What steps and how much time and investment will it take to align 

NGEN with JIE? 

Answer. The Navy supports the concept of JIE and is working in coordination 

with the other Services, DISA, COCOMs, and OSD to fully develop this concept into 

a joint enterprise capability. By continuing such engagement, Navy will develop better insights regarding the time and money required to bring its NGEN into alignment with these higher-level architectures. At present, we are of the belief that our 

agile and innovative contracts and the investments we’ve already programmed 

across the Future Years Defense Program within NGEN and our other IT infrastructure and network programs (e.g., Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise 

Services (CANES) and OCONUS Navy Enterprise Network (ONE–Net)) constitutes 

a sufficient response to the challenge at hand. As the standards for JIE mature, 

Navy will be able to provide cost and schedule estimates using NGEN as our path 

to meet JIE standards. 

CYBER PERSONNEL

Question. What is your understanding of the direction DOD has given to the Military Services regarding the quality and existing skill levels of the personnel they 

will provide for the CMFs? 

Answer. On behalf of the DOD (IAW CJCSI 3500.01G), CYBERCOM establishes 

CMFs joint standards for individual and collective training. These standards are 

contained in three foundational documents; the Joint Cyberspace Training and Certification Standard (JCT&CS), the Individual Training Pipelines, and the Training 

and Readiness Manual (T&R Manual). The JCT&CS identifies the unique Knowledge Skills and Abilities (KSAs) for each work role on the CMF Teams. The individual training pipelines outline an optimal path to achieving the required KSAs to 

satisfy the JCT&CS requirements. The T&R Manual provides the tasks, conditions 

and standards required to demonstrate individual and collective proficiency. 

Question. So far, does it appear that there is a satisfactory match between the 

skills and aptitudes of the personnel provided by the Services and the training programs developed by CYBERCOM? 

Answer. The CMF build out, when complete, will include over 6,100 personnel organized across 133 teams in the CMFs. As we build this force, work roles have 

unique training requirements and we must continue to create sustainable, repeatable training programs to meet this demand. Over the past 18 months, we’ve come 

a long way working out training pipeline bottlenecks. Additionally, over the next 21⁄2

years of the CMF build, the Services must continue for the Services to incorporate 

CYBERCOM training requirements into their training programs, and ensure their 

workforce meets the CMF standards. 

If confirmed, one of my first priorities will be to work closely with NSA and the 

Services to expand existing training classes, identify training equivalencies, and establish alternate training venues. I think we should also look collectively at increasing the time on station requirements to retain trained and fully qualified personnel 

until sufficient training programs are in place. 

Question. What direction has been given to the Services regarding recruiting goals 

and priorities for individuals with skills and aptitudes relevant to the needs of 

CYBERCOM? 

Answer. Senior DOD leadership directed the Services to establish management 

processes that identify, recruit, retain and provide incentivized career advancement 

paths for military and civilian personnel. This allows the high-end advanced skills 

523 

that CYBERCOM has identified to work in the CMF. Progress is being made by 

each Service and the issue is monitored closely in monthly reporting by 

CYBERCOM to the Joint Staff. DOD is addressing one of the more significant challenges by looking at options pertaining to the civilian workforce that would establish 

a flexible and responsive workforce that improves the ability to attract, develop, motivate and retain a high quality Cyber workforce. 

Question. Has the Department considered delegating personnel authorities to 

CYBERCOM that are similar to those that are exercised by U.S. Special Operations 

Command to ensure that the Services manage the careers of their servicemembers 

with cyber skills appropriately? 

Answer. SOCOM’s Article 167 Authorities continue to prove essential to their ability to work with the Services to develop truly Joint capabilities that meet Joint 

Standards. CYBERCOM continues to do a great job facilitating progress without 

such authority, but eventually delegating these authorities could greatly enhance 

their ability to meet the Nation’s needs. 

Question. What would be the pros and cons of providing CYBERCOM such authorities? 

Answer. While there are no real cons in my opinion, the pro for CYBERCOM is 

the same as for SOCOM. This authority would allow CYBERCOM to shape the 

cyber force and ensure cyber training and capabilities are standardized and inherently Joint across the man, train, and equip spectrum. Once trained, these personnel are highly skilled and valuable commodities. They are bona fide high-demand, low-density assets—just as our Special Operations Forces are. 

We are growing a highly-skilled, highly-qualified standardized workforce. 

CYBERCOM, empowered with these types of authorities can more effectively advocate and ensure that we do everything in our power to retain these exceptional 

forces even as our manpower, promotion, and retention systems may be slow to recognize this. 

DESIGNING THE INTERNET FOR BETTER SECURITY

Question. How could the Internet be redesigned to provide greater inherent security? 

Answer. Advancements in technology continually change the architecture of the 

Internet. Cloud computing, for instance, is a significant change in how industry and 

individuals use Internet services. As evidenced by the growth of security conferences, companies and media attention, security is at the forefront of Internet use 

as businesses and government strive to protect intellectual property and citizens desire to protect their privacy. To put it simply, the environment is ripe for significant 

attention to inherent security and government, industry, and academia all have an 

interest in achieving this objective. 

I believe there are options for the Internet to provide greater inherent security. 

Several major providers of Internet services are already implementing increased security in email and purchasing services by using encryption for all transmissions 

from the client to the server. It is possible that the service providers could be given 

more responsibility to protect end clients connected directly to their infrastructures. 

They are in a position to stop attacks targeted at consumers and recognize when 

consumer devices on their networks have been subverted. The inability of end users 

to verify the originator of an email and for hackers to forge email addresses have 

resulted in serious compromises of end user systems. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working with this committee, as well as industry, academia and government leaders, on the advancement of security measures for the Internet. 

Question. Is it practical to consider adopting those modifications? 

Answer. I believe modifications to enhance security on the Internet will evolve 

and strengthen over time. Industry is developing and deploying solutions today to 

maintain the trust of their clients. Events such as recent payment card breaches 

are highlighting the concerns and accelerating solution deployment. These advancements in commercial technologies provide a benefit to all who use them, including 

government. Public-private working groups have and will continue to address hard 

problems and implementable solutions to strengthen security on the Internet. 

Question. What would the impact be on privacy, both pro and con? 

Answer. I believe the Government should strive to implement advanced security 

measures that enhance privacy. Tensions between security and privacy are not new, 

but I believe we cannot accept one without the other. Increased security should help 

protect identities, reduce cyber attacks, and assure the transmission and storage of 

private data; in turn, this enhanced security will ultimately improve individual and 

corporate privacy in the Internet. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this 

524 

committee and industry and Government leaders to protect privacy while making 

the Internet as secure as possible. 

THE SECTION 215 PROGRAM

Question. In January, 2014, the President ordered a transition to end the section 

215 telephone metadata collection program as it currently exists, to ‘‘preserve the 

capabilities we need’’ without the government collecting and holding the data on call 

detail records. 

What are your views on what specific capabilities need to be preserved as the program is transitioned? 

Answer. The program grew out of a desire to address a gap identified after September 11. One of the September 11 hijackers—Khalid al-Mihdhar—made a phone 

call from San Diego to a known al Qaeda safe-house in Yemen. NSA saw that call, 

but it could not see that the call was coming from an individual already in the 

United States. The telephone metadata program under section 215 was designed to 

map the communications of terrorists so we can see who they may be in contact 

with as quickly as possible. It does not involve the content of phone calls or the 

names of the people making the calls. 

I believe that we need to maintain an ability to make queries of phone records 

in a way that is agile and provides results in a timely fashion. Being able to quickly 

review phone connections associated with terrorists to assess whether a network exists is critical. 

Question. From your perspective, what are the pros and cons, and problems, involved in the establishment or designation of a private ‘‘third party’’ to hold the 

data, on the one hand, and the service providers keeping the data, on the other? 

Answer. Both options are technically feasible and, if implemented in a manner 

that addresses mission requirements, could be viable alternatives for the current 

program. I anticipate that either would require significant upfront costs. However, 

if a private ‘‘third party’’ holds the data, I expect it would be at greater expense 

and could introduce other complexities. For example, as the President noted in his 

speech on 17 January 2014, it could require companies to alter their procedures in 

ways that raise new privacy concerns. If the service providers keep the data, I understand that this may require statutory changes for any data retention requirements which may be levied upon them. 

Question. What is your assessment of the impact on the program of the President’s order to have the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court make 

individual Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion (RAS) determinations prior to nonemergency database queries? 

Answer. Before the President’s speech on January 17, 2014, this approval process 

was done internally at NSA and both DOJ and ODNI conducted post-approval reviews of RAS determinations on a quarterly basis. Since 17 January, NSA has been 

working closely with DOJ to establish processes and procedures to obtain RAS approvals from the FISA court. 

Question. The Federal Communications Commission requires service providers to 

keep telephone call detail records for 18 months. The government currently keeps 

the records collected under section 215 for 5 years. Section 215 expires next year. 

If Congress does not renew the provision, the executive branch could continue to access call records under other authorities, but only through the service provider’s repositories. 

Is that a viable alternative? 

Answer. The other authorities, as currently established, do not fully replicate the 

current ability under section 215 to obtain telephony metadata records in a way 

that is agile and timely. However, I believe it’s possible that, if new legal authorities 

were established or existing authorities were modified to enable more flexible acquisition of such records, these could serve as a viable alternative. 

Question. How critical is it in your opinion to have guaranteed access to records 

more than 18 months old from all service providers? 

Answer. Currently, NSA retains the metadata for 5 years, but it is my understanding that NSA has assessed that the 5-year retention period could be reduced 

to a shorter period without significantly decreasing operational utility. In his January speech, the President directed a study of how to restructure the program for the 

longer term. The work of that study, with participants from multiple agencies, is 

now ongoing. While specific options are under development, there is further work 

to be done. 

Question. What concerns do you have, if any, about leaving the metadata records 

with the service providers, and having them produce records responsive to Courtapproved queries? 

525 

Answer. My main concern is whether such an arrangement would produce records 

in a timely fashion. Being able to quickly review phone connections associated with 

terrorists to assess whether a network exists is critical. The ongoing interagency review is looking at ways to address this risk. 

SECTION 215 UTILITY VERSUS PRIVACY CONCERNS

Question. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) and the 

President’s Review Group On Intelligence and Communications Technologies (‘‘Review Group’’) characterized the section 215 program as useful but not critical. The 

PCLOB stated that ‘‘We have not identified a single instance involving a threat to 

the United States in which the program made a concrete difference in the outcome 

of a counterterrorism investigation.’’ 

What is your understanding of the utility of the program, and how that utility 

compares to the level of concern among the American people about its perceived impact on privacy and civil liberties? 

Answer. One of the key vulnerabilities identified after September 11 was the lack 

of a sufficient and timely capacity to detect when a known foreign based terrorist 

threat was in contact with someone inside the homeland. The section 215 program 

was designed to provide that capability by enabling the government to quickly review telephone connections to assess whether a terrorist network exists and the 

President has stated that it is critical the capability that this program was designed 

to meet is preserved. The President has also been clear about expectations that such 

a capability be conducted in a manner that addresses the concerns of the American 

people about the potential impact on privacy and civil liberties. I support the ongoing interagency effort in response to the President’s direction to seek to find an ability for this necessary capability to exist within an acceptable privacy and civil liberties regime. 

Question. The Review Group also stated on multiple occasions that the 215 program, contrary to many public reports, actually only collects ‘‘a small percentage of 

the total telephony metadata held by service providers.’’ 

How do the costs compare for expanding the government’s capacity to ingest all 

telephony call records, on the one hand, versus the cost of enabling comprehensive 

access to needed records through the service providers, on the other? 

Answer. In the summer and fall of 2013, NSA performed some analysis of the relative costs of having the Government collect the data in bulk with the costs of 

searching data retained at the providers. I have not been briefed on the details or 

the results of that analysis, or how it might apply to specific proposals now under 

consideration. If I am confirmed for this position, it will be my responsibility to thoroughly and accurately communicate costs and benefits to those who set policy and 

establish appropriations. Cost will be a factor taken into consideration in the development of options for the President. If confirmed, I will ensure that Congress will 

be informed of the cost of any successor programs. 

REFORM OF THE FISA COURT

Question. The President’s Signals Intelligence Directive (PPD–28) announced in 

January called for Congress to authorize a panel of advocates from outside the government to ‘‘provide an independent voice in significant cases’’ before the FISA 

Court. A similar approach has been recommended by the PCLOB and the President’s Review Group. 

Do you have any concerns about introducing an adversarial element in the proceedings of the FISA Court as the President and others have urged? 

Answer. I concur with the President’s view that responsible actions which will 

help increase the transparency of and confidence in the government’s conduct of extraordinary authorities—like those performed under statutory authority with the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—are an important element of government’s 

relationship with the American people. If the legislative and judicial branches of 

government introduce changes to the FISA court or its proceedings, and if I am confirmed, I will be fully prepared to work with them and alongside others in the executive branch. Whatever approach is considered, I believe must also address the necessary timeliness and operational integrity of national security activities. 

STANDARDS FOR SEARCHING NSA DATABASES USING U.S. PERSONS’ PERSONALLY

IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

Question. NSA collects foreign intelligence information under multiple authorities, 

including Executive Order 12333, traditional individualized FISA Court orders, and 

programs such as section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, and section 215 of the 

Patriot Act. Unlike EO 12333 collection, traditional FISA wiretaps must meet a 

526 

probable cause standard and are very specifically targeted. The section 215 program 

involves bulk collection, but only of non-content metadata, and the bulk data is 

queried under the RAS standard that the target of the query is associated with terrorist groups. Section 702 content collection is based on the ‘‘reasonable belief’’ 

standard that the specific target of the collection is a non-U.S. person located outside the United States. The President’s Review Group On Intelligence and Communications Technologies (‘‘Review Group’’) and the PCLOB have raised issues about 

the standards under which the government can search through data holdings acquired under these authorities using U.S. persons identifiers. 

Is NSA permitted to search data acquired under EO 12333 authorities using U.S. 

persons identifiers without probable cause? 

Answer. Minimization procedures that are reasonably designed to protect the privacy interests of United States persons. The full procedures are classified, but generally prohibit selection of the content of communications of or concerning a U.S. 

person absent probable cause. However, there are exceptions, such as when there 

is a threat to life or when the search is limited to querying information under which 

there is no reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g. metadata). 

Question. If so, what is your understanding of the legal justification? Does the review group’s recommendation, relate to or cover queries of data acquired under EO 

12333? 

Answer. I defer to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for any legal interpretation 

of the procedures approved by the Attorney General. 

Question. Is NSA allowed to search data acquired under traditional FISA individual wiretap orders using U.S. persons identifiers without probable cause? 

Answer. Information acquired by NSA under traditional FISA orders must be 

handled in accordance with the Court-approved minimization procedures, as defined 

by FISA, that are reasonably designed to protect the privacy interests of U.S. persons. NSA’s Court-approved minimization procedures for traditional FISA orders do 

not permit data searches using U.S. person names or identifiers. Any exceptions to 

these procedures would require approval by the Federal Intelligence Surveillance 

Court (FISC). 

Question. If so, what is your understanding of the legal rationale? 

Answer. I defer to the DOJ for any legal interpretation of the procedures approved 

by the FISC for individual FISA wiretap orders. 

Question. What is your understanding of the legal rationale for NSA to search 

through data acquired under section 702 using U.S. persons identifiers without 

probable cause? 

Answer. Information acquired by NSA under section 702 of FISA must be handled 

in strict accordance with minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General 

and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. As required by the 

statute and certifications approving Section 702 acquisitions, such activities must be 

limited to targeting non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the 

United States. NSA’s Court-approved procedures only permit searches of this lawfully acquired data using U.S. person identifiers for valid foreign intelligence purposes and under the oversight of the DOJ and Office of Director of National Intelligence. 

Question. What is your understanding of the legal rationale for searching through 

the ‘‘Corporate Store’’ of metadata acquired under section 215 using U.S. persons 

identifiers for foreign intelligence purposes? 

The section 215 program is specifically authorized by orders issued by the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Court pursuant to relevant statutory requirements. (Note: 

the legality of the program has been reviewed and approved by more than a dozen 

FISC judges on over 35 occasions since 2006.) As further required by statute, the 

program is also governed by minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General and approved by the FISC. Those orders, and the accompanying minimization 

procedures, require that searches of data under the program may only be performed 

when there is a Reasonable Articulable Suspicion that the identifier to be queried 

is associated with a terrorist organization specified in the Court’s order. 

INFORMATION SHARING LEGISLATION FOR CYBERSECURITY

Question. Several proposed cybersecurity bills have been introduced to authorize 

the collection and sharing of information on cybersecurity threats—including 

malware, command and control, exfiltration of data, and other evidence of compromise—between the public and private sectors for the purpose of enabling the private sector and Government to defend themselves, enabling law enforcement agencies to detect criminal activities and identify and prosecute perpetrators, and, in the 

527 

case of nation-states, enabling the Government to attribute attacks and hold aggressors accountable. To date, none of these proposals have been enacted. 

In your view, would it be helpful for Congress to enact more limited legislation 

to enable the private sector to collect and share cyber threat information within the 

private sector, leaving the issue of sharing with the Government for the future? 

Answer. The nature of malicious cyber activity against our Nation’s networks has 

become a matter of such concern that legislation to enable real-time cyber threat 

information sharing is vital to protecting our national and economic security. Incremental steps such as legislation that addresses only private sector sharing would 

have limited effectiveness, because no single public or private entity has all the necessary authorities, resources, or capabilities to respond to or prevent a serious cyber 

attack. Therefore, we must find a way to share the unique insights held by both 

government and the private sector. At the same time, legislation must help construct a trust-based community where two-way, real-time sharing of cyber threat information is done consistent with protections of U.S. person privacy and civil liberties. 

Question. What restrictions would you recommend be imposed on what information could be shared with the Government regarding cyber threats, and the uses to 

which the Government could apply that information? 

Answer. Protecting the security and the privacy of Americans is not a mutually 

exclusive proposition. The information provided to the Government should be limited to that which is necessary for the Government to understand or take action to 

counter a cyber threat and to which all appropriate mechanisms have been applied 

to protect the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. If confirmed, I would expect 

to engage fully in discussions on how to accomplish these objectives. 

Question. What transparency measures and institutional checks would you recommend to increase confidence that allowing the sharing of cyber threat information 

would not lead to abuses of privacy and civil liberties? 

Answer. Transparency can be ensured by establishing procedures for receiving, retaining, using, and disclosing cyber threat information. In turn, compliance with 

these procedures should be subject to independent review and oversight by cleared 

trusted U.S. Government and private sector third parties. Due to the criticality of 

real-time sharing of cyber threat information, we must also leverage technology that 

enables a transparent, policy-based, machine-speed infrastructure that automatically enforces the rules for use and any lawful restrictions on sharing. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, CYBERCOM? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

528 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III 

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

1. Senator MANCHIN. Vice Admiral Rogers, the disclosure of classified and sensitive information by Edward Snowden certainly highlighted serious flaws in the 

National Security Agency’s (NSA) internal security. There are those that would call 

Snowden a whistleblower, but I am curious as to whether he made an attempt to 

address his concerns through existing whistleblower channels in the NSA. What 

were those channels at that time and how have they changed since? 

Admiral ROGERS. The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act 

(ICWPA) and Presidential Policy Directive-19 (PPD–19) describe specific steps to be 

taken to file a complaint. It provides employees and contractors of intelligence agencies with a mechanism for reporting alleged wrongdoing in IC agencies and associated programs to Congress. Congress specifically extended whistleblower protection 

to contractors in 2009 and those protections remain in place today. Mr. Snowden 

did not follow the processes established by the ICWPA or PPD–19 and therefore is 

not a ‘‘whistleblower’’ as that term is defined. 

In the case of Mr. Snowden, he had the option reporting through his chain of command or contacting any Inspector General. There are also Congressional committees 

and mechanisms in place. After extensive investigation, we have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden’s contention that he brought these matters to the attention of anyone. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

RECRUITING TALENT IN U.S. CYBER COMMAND

2. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, the National Commission on the 

Structure of the Air Force recently released their findings, which highlighted the 

importance of the National Guard and Reserve in the U.S. cyber mission. Specifically, it noted that the Guard and Reserve were uniquely positioned, because of 

their part-time status, to attract and retain the best and the brightest in the cyber 

field. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 

2014 has directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to look at the integration of 

the Guard in all its statuses into the cyber workforce. I have long agreed with this 

assessment, and introduced the Cyber Warrior Act which would establish National 

Guard cyber teams in each State to leverage this talent pool. If confirmed, what is 

your vision for the roles of both the Guard and Reserve in U.S. Cyber Command 

(CYBERCOM) and within the distinct Service cyber elements? 

Admiral ROGERS. CYBERCOM envisions the Guard and Reserve will play a vital 

role in our cyber mission by working through the Services for the opportunity to leverage their civilian skill sets, the dual mission of the Guard, and the complementary nature of reservists to address specific needs, fill gaps and provide a surge capability within the Active component. 

3. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, I want to be helpful to DOD in recruiting the best talent and acquiring the best tools for our cyber mission. In your 

opinion, what can Congress do to assist DOD in this effort? 

Admiral ROGERS. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF) construct and the corresponding planning documentation, identifies the size and scope of the CMF, the 

associated knowledge, skills, and abilities required for the various work roles that 

make up the CMF, the schedule for manning the teams, and the work role priorities. Together this information provides the Services with their targeted recruiting 

goals and priorities. 

4. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, what do you believe DOD needs in 

order to remain on the cutting edge of cyber defense? 

Admiral ROGERS. DOD requires trained and ready cyber teams that can take a 

more proactive approach rather than the reactive approach. DOD also requires a 

more defensible, data-centric architecture with cloud-enabled analytics, and a dynamic and reconfigurable network. CYBERCOM requires appropriate authorities to 

defend U.S. national interests in cyberspace. Additionally, policy is required that 

clearly establishes roles and responsibilities across agencies that provide the authority to see and defend systems outside of the DOD Information Systems. 

529 

CYBER DEFENSE

5. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, you are nominated to serve as both 

Commander, CYBERCOM, and Director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service, giving you a unique role and perspective on cyber issues. What do you think are DOD’s 

two most important cyber needs for the next 5 years? 

Admiral ROGERS. Recently, General Alexander described to the House Armed 

Services Committee five key things we need to do without further delay, namely: 

promote a defensible architecture; develop a trained and ready workforce; pass cyber 

legislation that enables two-way, real-time information sharing among and between 

private and public entities; set up a seamless cyber command and control structure 

from the President on down; and, build a common picture to strengthen our Nation’s 

cybersecurity defenses. 

6. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, if confirmed, how will you incorporate cyber forces, especially in the National Guard, into our Homeland defense 

strategy? 

Admiral ROGERS. The CYBERCOM Guard Reserve office is diligently working 

with the National Guard Bureau and U.S. Northern Command to develop a cyberspace strategy framework that incorporates relevant portions of our Homeland defense strategy involving the protection of our Nation’s critical infrastructure and key 

resources. 

7. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, what are your thoughts on the relationship between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD in terms 

of global cybersecurity roles and responsibilities? 

Admiral ROGERS. Global cooperation on cybersecurity is necessary to address the 

threat, build consensus on the norms of responsible conduct in cyberspace, and address ongoing malicious activity. CYBERCOM strongly endorses the U.S. Government’s team approach, leveraging all of our homeland security, law enforcement, 

and military authorities and capabilities, which respectively provide for domestic 

preparedness, criminal deterrence and investigation, and national defense. As such, 

Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS, and DOD each have specific, critical roles and 

responsibilities as part of the Federal whole-of-government effort to counter cyber 

threats. Moreover, all three departments are involved with private and international 

partners within their areas of responsibility, and whether their activities are at 

home or abroad, the departments support one another to address cyber issues. As 

with threats to the United States, our allies, and our interests in other domains, 

DOD has the mission to defend the Nation, to include the protection of national security systems. This responsibility logically extends to all domains, including cyberspace. DHS is responsible for securing unclassified Federal civilian Government networks and working with owners and operators of critical infrastructure to secure 

their networks through risk assessment, mitigation, and incident response capabilities. DOJ is the lead Federal department responsible for the investigation, attribution, disruption, and, and as appropriate, prosecution of cybersecurity incidents. As 

authorized by the President, and consistent with the law, DOD defends, deters, and 

takes decisive action in cyberspace to defend national interests; supports DHS in 

homeland security (i.e., personnel, equipment, and facilities); and supports Federal 

agencies pursuant to the Defense Support of Civil Authorities process. 

8. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, the dynamic nature of the cyber 

threat presents a unique problem in that we typically find ourselves in a perpetual 

game of catch-up, always chasing our adversary. As soon as one system fix is introduced, countless other vulnerabilities, some known, many unknown, become all the 

more magnified. If confirmed, how do you intend to address the continually 

morphing requirements distinct to the cyber threat facing both DOD and the United 

States as a whole? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

9. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, what do you project as the main 

over-the-horizon cyber threat? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

CYBER TRAINING

10. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, I am interested in the training our 

cyber warriors are receiving. What is your understanding of the training capacity 

at the Service academies and in the current pipeline? 

530 

Admiral ROGERS. Each Service Academy educates our future Service and joint 

leaders slightly differently and for good reason. The mission of the Service Academies is to educate our next generation of military leaders and cyber related skills 

are core to every officer regardless of their chosen career. Given the many requirements levied upon midshipmen and cadets, I believe the investment currently being 

made in cyber education to be appropriate. 

11. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, do you see room for improvement

in the training pipeline and at the Service Academies? 

Admiral ROGERS. There is always room for improvement, and each Service Academy is integrating cyber education to meet Service specific needs. Because I am a 

Naval Officer, I am far more aware of how the Naval Academy has embraced cyber 

related education. 100 percent of their graduates will receive at least two semesters 

of technical cyber education with a large percentage of them earning a STEM degree. I believe that is the right path and one that each academy should consider 

implementing. 

12. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, is there a role for Congress to assist in making improvements, such as a need for additional authorities? 

Admiral ROGERS. Providing CYBERCOM with the oversight authorities it needs 

to ensure that it can enforce common, joint architectural components to support 

both CYBERCOM strategic requirements and unique Service specific requirements 

remains critical. I am still investigating the need for additional authorities and 

won’t hesitate to make requests known if we deem them to be necessary. 

RETENTION OF CYBER PERSONNEL

13. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, since cyber is a relatively new

field, it seems like the Services are not having any trouble recruiting talent at this 

point. However, the issue of retention is of concern to me. If confirmed, what would 

you recommend for retention of these servicemembers across the total force? 

Admiral ROGERS. CYBERCOM remains engaged with each of the Services to address current and projected Active Duty requirements as needed. This includes designating servicemember re-enlistment and career field bonuses for cyber career 

fields, along with associated Active Duty service commitments to assist with retention. Additionally, the Command continues to utilize civilian temporarily expanded 

hiring authorities and is in negotiation with the Air Force to expand the current 

internship program to include universities offering cyber-specific expertise. The National Guard and Reserves offer servicemembers the opportunity to continue contributing to the cyber mission in uniform after they have completed Active Duty 

service. We will continue to work with the Services to develop plans to integrate 

the National Guard and Reserves into the cyber domain, including recruitment and 

retention strategies for Reserve component members. 

14. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, do you believe that current retention strategies are useful to the cyber force, or should we be considering different 

strategies? 

Admiral ROGERS. While to date overall retention has not been a concern, strategically, we will continue to work with the services to address assignment policies and 

career management for highly technical/highly trained cyber professionals with the 

desired result to maintain skill currency and utility. Strategies are still being developed/implemented, once implemented, retention rates will be monitored. 

JOINT INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

15. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, in some of my conversations, I have

heard that the Joint Information Environment is a good idea, but there are some 

concerns about the challenges of implementing it effectively. What challenges do you 

see, and if confirmed, what would you do to address concerns about implementation? 

Admiral ROGERS. The Joint Information Environment (JIE) will transform the 

DOD Information Network (DODIN) into a defensible and operationally effective architecture by shifting the focus from protection of individual Military Service-specific 

networks, systems and applications to securing data and its uses. I support the JIE 

approach. Given these challenges, the threat, and the need for efficiency, we must 

move in this direction. I see three key challenges to JIE implementation. First, 

transferring responsibility and authority for network command, control, and security of an organization’s operational network to a third party is a new paradigm that 

531 

will be challenging to overcome. Second, the Department must leverage finite resources to design and implement JIE while continuing to operate and maintain the 

existing DODIN infrastructure. JIE will demand the involvement of some of our 

best technical experts even as we rely on these same people for current operations. 

Additionally, it will need to include the design and implementation of a strong security infrastructure. Third, implementation of the JIE framework is being accomplished without a program of record and corresponding dedicated funding line. This 

intentional, strategic decision introduces a degree of complexity in maintaining 

alignment of the various IT acquisition programs across the Department, but the 

risk appears to be manageable and will allow the Services and combatant commands to retain control of their individual information technology budgets while 

providing capabilities that enable the entire enterprise. We are addressing these 

challenges through a combination of rapid capability implementation and optimization of existing governance constructs. We are leveraging the lessons learned from 

implementing JIE Increment 1 in U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command, streamlining development processes, minimizing the time required of our 

technical experts, and ensuring critical path activities minimize impact on Department components. Additionally, in partnership with the DOD Chief Information Office, we are leveraging established governance forums to apply the collective expertise of the entire JIE team toward solving tough challenges and making informed 

decisions. 

CIVILIAN CYBER RECRUITING AND RETENTION

16. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, during the hearing, you identified

recruitment and retention of civilian cyber personnel as a greater challenge than recruitment and retention of military cyber personnel. What specifically are the challenges and what do you believe is needed to recruit and retain civilian cyber warriors in DOD? 

Admiral ROGERS. We are faced with a couple of recruiting and retention challenges. The recent furlough situation created uncertainty for recruiting prospective 

new hires and retaining our talented cadre workforce. While Federal employment 

has traditionally been seen as a secure career, both NSA and CYBERCOM experienced employee turmoil directly attributed to an absence of appropriations at the 

beginning of fiscal year 2014. Given our close relationship with NSA, many employees experienced the furlough while others did not. This had a negative impact on 

morale and caused employees to search for perceived ‘‘non-furloughed’’ positions to 

mitigate their employment risk. This of course results in skewing the workforce mix, 

and also leads to some critical work roles remaining vacant. We also continue to experience difficulty hiring personnel with the skills we need while competing with industry, academia, and other non-Federal and Federal organizations. We have had 

success using the ‘‘Schedule A Expedited Hiring Authority’’ that was granted 

CYBERCOM over the past 3 years and expires 31 December 2014. However, we continue to have great difficulty competing with outside agencies and companies due 

to the speed at which they can hire and the generally higher level of salary that 

they can offer. 

17. Senator GILLIBRAND. Vice Admiral Rogers, do you see a need for Congress to

grant additional authorities to DOD to recruit and retain civilians? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. In order to address the challenges of recruitment and retention of civilian cyber warriors, CYBERCOM needs additional authorities such as: 

(1) Rank-In-Person: The ability to assess and act on the knowledge, skills and

abilities (KSA) an individual brings to the job, rather than focusing principally

on assessing a position against rigid job classification factors.

(2) Performance Focused Pay: Designed to compensate and reward employees

based on performance, contribution or competencies; enhances ability to compete with the private sector for high quality candidates, including college

graduates.

(3) Market Informed Pay: Pay ranges tied to pay rates for comparable positions

with CYBERCOM’s private/public competitors; grade levels replaced with career levels and varied by occupation; OPM classification standards are aligned

with CYBERCOM career levels.

(4) Extended Probationary Period: Allows the 1 year probationary period to be extended for up to 3 years determined by the type of work.

(5) Training and Development (Critical Skills): Expanded CYBERCOM authority

to provide funding for degree and certificate programs.

532 

In order to stay competitive in the work place and execute the CYBERCOM mission effectively, the Commander, CYBERCOM, needs greater flexibility to recruit, 

hire and retain a highly skilled work force. Under Title 10 excepted authorities, the 

Director, NSA/Chief CSS has that flexibility and is thus able to recruit and retain 

some of the Nation’s most talented technical PhDs, Computer Scientists, Engineering and Physical Scientists and Mathematicians, business and support professionals. 

Commander, CYBERCOM, needs these same authorities to build a similar civilian 

work force. 

In addition, the previous commander in an open hearing identified, ‘‘.with respect 

to personnel, I think we need to come up with a personnel system that puts all of 

our cyber team in one personnel construct, especially for the NSA CYBERCOM 

team.’’ 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

CYBERSECURITY VITAL TO NATIONAL SECURITY

18. Senator HIRONO. Vice Admiral Rogers, cybersecurity plays a vital role in the 

security of our Nation. With $5.1 billion in the fiscal year 2015 budget request, 

there are many opportunities to incorporate, both Active and Reserve cyber units 

to play critical roles in cybersecurity. With cybersecurity and intelligence infrastructure already in place on Oahu and many cyber threats originating in the Pacific region, I believe that the Hawaii National Guard would be an ideal candidate to establish a cyber force. Please share your thoughts on the National Guard’s role in 

the cybersecurity mission at the national level as well as specifically for the State 

of Hawaii? 

Admiral ROGERS. Regarding the role of the National Guard, to include the State 

of Hawaii, in State-specific cyber missions we are looking at two distinct areas of 

concern. One, we continue to work with the Services on how the National Guard 

Forces are employed by CYBERCOM specifically, and integrated with the CMF. Second we are looking to develop a CMF capability that included the National Guard 

and its role in support civil authorities in resiliency, recovery, and aid in investigations. One concept for consideration, subject to appropriate mission analysis, feasibility study, authorities analysis, and requisite DOD approvals, would be to establish cyberspace situational awareness and capabilities for protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) within the States’ utilizing the Reserve Force 

construct. Additionally, we recognize Reserve component civilian experience and certifications are a critical benefit in the quickly evolving cyberspace domain which enhances military based training programs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

NETWORK VULNERABILITY

19. Senator INHOFE. Vice Admiral Rogers, U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM) has been subject to a growing number of cyber attacks. 

TRANSCOM’s reliance on unique contracts—such as the CRAF program where U.S. 

civil air carriers agree to augment organic military airlift during a crisis in exchange for access to peacetime defense business—creates unique challenges. In a 

contingency, TRANSCOM’s ability to move troops or supplies could be hindered if 

a vendor’s network were compromised. Today there appears to be little sharing of 

threat and network vulnerability information. Do you share these concerns? 

Admiral ROGERS. I do share these concerns, and that is why efforts to enable 

asset owners to strengthen these networks and hold them accountable are so important. DOD and NSA have long worked to address these issues through voluntary 

and contractual means including sharing information directly with participating 

companies in the Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity/Information Assurance program. DOD further supports broader industry information sharing efforts by providing threat and vulnerability information through DHS. Executive Order 13636 

continues to advance information sharing, but legislation is still needed to enhance 

information sharing among and between private and public entities, and to protect 

privacy and civil liberties. The end goal is to achieve machine speed cybersecurity 

and to enable coordinated preventative and response options across the U.S. Government and private sector to protect and defend the United States and our interests in cyberspace. 

533 

20. Senator INHOFE. Vice Admiral Rogers, what other unique cybersecurity challenges do you believe we should be aware of? 

Admiral ROGERS. The United States faces adversaries that seek persistent 

presences on military, government, and private networks for purposes such as exploitation and potential disruption and destruction. These adversaries have displayed increasing capacities and sophistication in their capabilities designed to 

steal, manipulate, and destroy U.S. information and hold our critical infrastructure 

on which our military and nation rely at risk. This is a constantly changing environment that requires we generate the capability and agility needed to operate in this 

dynamic environment. In addition to improved information sharing among public 

and private sector entities, we need to establish timely decision-making structures 

and processes to provide senior decision makers and operational commanders with 

a full range of options within the cyber arena. This requires that we partner with 

our allies, the private sector, within DOD, and across the U.S. Government. These 

partnerships can assist us in countering common threats and addressing shared 

vulnerabilities at a larger scale than any one organization can do alone. 

21. Senator INHOFE. Vice Admiral Rogers, what steps are TRANSCOM and 

CYBERCOM taking to address these vulnerabilities? 

Admiral ROGERS. Across DOD, we are creating capabilities that can help mitigate 

these vulnerabilities, but some key capability gaps remain in dealing with highly 

adaptable and increasingly capable threats. Because the architecture must be agile, 

secure, reliable and rapidly deployable, DOD is currently involved in efforts to leverage computing technology that can dramatically increase our ability to safely and 

securely store and access data. In order to create effective cyber teams, we need 

enough trained and ready cyber experts to perform all the responsibilities; therefore, 

CYBERCOM is in the process of assembling a workforce that understands how to 

perform necessary threat management in this domain. We must also have the ability and the confidence to share this common operating picture among government 

organizations, industry partners, and foreign partners as appropriate. We continue 

to work across DOD and with other departments and agencies to enact policy 

changes such as the work under the Executive order that will enhance our ability 

to strengthen our cybersecurity, but cyber legislation is still needed to enhance information sharing among public and private entities and protect privacy and civil 

liberties. 

22. Senator INHOFE. Vice Admiral Rogers, can TRANSCOM and DOD enact a policy change that can make the fixes that you envision? 

Admiral ROGERS. CYBERCOM is collaborating with TRANSCOM and other DOD 

entities to work with private sector partners to improve network security that will 

ensure reliable worldwide logistics operations. In the past year, DOD has extensively re-written cybersecurity policies to incorporate National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards and ensure compatibility across not only the 

department, but the entire Federal Government. These new policies are currently 

being disseminated and enacted across DOD, and promise to significantly alter the 

way DOD evaluates and manages risks across our enterprise. DOD is also working 

with its U.S. Government counterparts to enact policy and process changes that will 

enable the coordinated employment of existing homeland security, law enforcement, 

and military authorities and capabilities, as appropriate. Also, we continue to focus 

on improving information sharing between the private and public to the greatest extent feasible in the current environment, noting that cybersecurity information sharing legislation would do much to enable and enhance two way real time information 

sharing. 

23. Senator INHOFE. Vice Admiral Rogers, do you feel that TRANSCOM and DOD 

need more legislative authority to fix this persistent threat brought about by the 

current cyber intrusion problem? 

Admiral ROGERS. The President has the necessary authority to order military action to defend our Nation against all attacks whether they come from terrorists or 

nation states and in any domain from sea, air, land or cyberspace. Since the President can delegate appropriate authorities to the Secretary of Defense to use the Department’s operational capabilities, including CYBERCOM, to defend the Nation 

from cyber attack, additional legislative authority for DOD or CYBERCOM is not 

necessary. That said, the operations of TRANSCOM and its close industry partnerships serve to highlight that with so much of the critical infrastructure owned and 

operated by the private sector, the government has limited visibility and thus is 

often unaware of the malicious activity targeting our critical infrastructure. These 

blind spots prevent the Government from being positioned to either help the critical 

534 

infrastructure to defend itself or to defend the Nation from an attack, if necessary. 

This can best be overcome through legislation that removes existing barriers and 

disincentives and facilitates two-way real time information sharing between the private sector and the government. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

CYBER DETERRENCE

24. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, when DOD endures a cyber attack, how

would you characterize our ability to determine who conducted the attack? 

Admiral ROGERS. Our ability to determine who conducts cyber attacks depends 

upon several factors including sophistication of the malicious actors, information 

sharing capabilities and policies and available trained manpower. Attribution involves an examination of malicious activity based on technical, behavioral, and personal characteristics. Our ability to determine attribution does not solely rely on the 

mechanical process of geo-location of physical networks or nodes. The possibility always exists the adversary has exploited/hijacked what appears to be the origin and 

is directing the cyber attacks from a remote location, anywhere in the world. We 

employ significant resources and manpower to analyze network and intelligence 

data to determine the true aggressor. Over the past decade, our ability to identify 

malicious cyber actors has improved significantly as we have adopted a federated 

approach in the analysis of data necessary to pinpoint the nexus for a given cyber 

operation. To stay ahead of the adversary, there are currently processes in place to 

share information and analytic insight across DOD and the Intelligence Community. 

In addition, defense contractors and other civilian defense organizations have their 

own sets of information which could lead to the attribution of cyber threat actors 

and their capabilities and intentions. 

25. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, how long does it take to identify the

attacker? 

Admiral ROGERS. Analysis of network traffic is one key element in the attribution 

process. Analysis of malicious network traffic over time provides valuable clues in 

the hunt for a nexus in the case of nefarious activity. Developing ‘‘signatures’’ using 

the aforementioned network analysis techniques, combined with multi-source intelligence information, allows for rapid identification and notification—often within 

minutes. 

The process for identifying top level cyber actors using advanced tools is much 

more complicated. Attribution can take days to months as the forensic review of the 

operation is conducted by multiple organizations within DOD and the Intelligence 

Community. It must be noted, however, that the distributed nature of the Internet 

combined with the blinding pace in the evolution and growth of cyber tools and associated programs makes timely attribution of the most advanced actors particularly 

difficult. 

26. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, how can we improve our attribution capability? 

Admiral ROGERS. Attribution of the individuals and/or organizations responsible 

for malicious cyber activity can run the gamut of difficulty. In order to improve our 

attribution capability it is imperative we employ highly skilled and trained individuals working with advanced and consistently updated technologies across and between Whole of Government. 

Training and recruitment of effective information technology and analysis personnel is critical to building and maintaining an effective cyber force. Our current 

build-up of National Mission Teams and Cyber Protection Teams are a step in the 

right direction. It is also important that we continue to strengthen the cyber ranks 

of existing agencies by hiring the most qualified individuals and providing working 

environments that are competitive with the private sector. 

Substantial investment in research and development of new capabilities by private enterprise, educational institutions, and government agencies is also critical to 

improving our attribution capability. Attribution capability is highly dependent 

upon our mastery and dominance of communication and system technologies. 

Finally, sharing of malicious cyber activity and associated intelligence across Federal agencies is a key part in the process of understanding the cyber adversary. As 

attribution models and frameworks continue to mature and are shared and agreed 

across agencies, each agency’s unique insights and information can be shared and 

organized to deliver more rapid and accurate attribution. 

535 

CYBER THREAT

27. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, what is your greatest concern in regards to CYBERCOM? 

Admiral ROGERS. My greatest concern is dealing with the evolving threat in cyberspace. Our adversaries seek to establish persistent access to military, government, 

and private-sector networks in order to extract sensitive information and, potentially, to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure and key resources. As a military 

and a nation, we are not well positioned to counter such threats. Detecting, containing and expelling capable, persistent intruders can require a commitment of resources and a degree of information sharing and collaboration among government 

and private-sector entities that is often limited by questions of legal authorities, liability and regulatory necessity. 

DOD is improving development of cyber capabilities to detect and respond to the 

evolving threats; however, key gaps remain. Our legacy information architecture, for 

instance, is not optimized for defense in its current form and our capability for 

shared situational awareness across DOD networks are not yet sufficient. We have 

not yet built trained and ready cyberspace forces in the quantity needed to counter 

the full range of threats we face. Finally, existing authorities and legal frameworks 

are not adequate for the public-private threat information sharing and timely responses needed for defense of the Nation in cyberspace. Additional legislation is 

needed to allow greater public-private information sharing while protecting privacy 

and civil liberties. 

28. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, from a DOD perspective, what steps 

do you think are most important to take in the short-term to better protect our 

warfighting capability from cyber attacks? 

Admiral ROGERS. The most important short-term actions to better protect our 

warfighting capability mirror DOD’s enduring priorities to build a defensible architecture, employ trained and ready CMFs, and maintain global situational awareness 

and a common operating picture, but with a slightly different order of emphasis. 

One of my first priorities will be to work closely with NSA and the Services to accelerate the training and deployment of trained and fully qualified personnel to man 

the CMFs. Effectively employing our CMFs and better focusing their secure and defend efforts requires that we continue to identify and prioritize assets that constitute the critical cyber components or cyber dependencies of our warfighting capabilities. Finally, an improved understanding of critical warfighting cyber components 

and cyber dependencies is essential for enhancing our efforts to build and maintain 

global situational awareness in cyberspace. 

CYBERCOM AND U.S. NAVY RESERVES

29. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, the Military Services provide many of 

our Nation’s cyber professionals. What role do you believe the Reserve component— 

including the National Guard—should play in cyber operations? 

Admiral ROGERS. We are engaged with the Services on the proper role of Reserve 

component cyber forces. The ability to identify, leverage, and employ these forces 

can provide a critical enabler for national cyber defense. The Air Force and Army 

are planning to have the Reserve component forces part of their respective CMF 

build. These plans are currently being vetted within each of the respective Services. 

The Reserve component, to include the National Guard, plays an essential role in 

physical defense and public security. The cyber mission provides an opportunity for 

the Services to leverage the dual nature of guardsmen and the complementary nature of reservists to address specific needs, fill gaps and when required, supplement 

the Active Force in a surge capacity. A significant contribution to the national cyber 

defense mission is the ability of guardsmen and reservists to leverage their civilian 

expertise, professional knowledge, and established relationships in order to support 

Federal, State, or local mission tasks as assigned by appropriate authorities. 

30. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, what specific role do you think the U.S. 

Navy Reserves should play in cyber operations? 

Admiral ROGERS. Since 2012, the Navy Reserve (NR) fulfills a significant role in 

Fleet Cyber Command/Commander Tenth Fleet (FCC/C10F) efforts to build and deploy its CMF structure. Reserve personnel are sourced from across all FCC/C10F 

Reserve units, Selected Reserves, and a mix of volunteers from Voluntary Training 

Units, a subset of the Inactive Ready Reserve. The FCC/C10F’s utilization of Navy 

Reserve personnel includes the drafting of CMF team-specific Concepts of Operations, as well as the strategy for development and formalization of a plan for the 

536 

Active component Navy CMF team build, which is currently under review by FCC/ 

C10F. Additionally, Navy Reserve personnel currently augment headquarters functions on both the cyber plans and targeting, and fires efforts. Navy reservists currently support Active component cyber exercises such as Cyber Flag and Cyber 

Guard, and serve as a critical force augmentation by providing immediate, trained, 

and experienced operators. 

CYBERSECURITY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

31. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, under the cybersecurity Executive 

order that President Obama signed in February 2013, the Government was tasked 

with improving the manner in which it shares information with the private sector. 

From a cyber perspective, how would you assess the information flow between the 

U.S. Government and the private sector? 

Admiral ROGERS. In the last few years, and most recently under Executive Order 

13636, the U.S. Government has made important progress in providing information 

to the private sector. Notable examples include the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program for sharing threat and technical information from the Government to 

critical infrastructure sectors, and the release in February 2014 of the Cybersecurity 

Framework. Yet, without two-way sharing between the private sector and the Government, the Government may not have insight to malicious cyber activities within 

privately owned and operated networks in time to enable the private sector to defend itself, or to defend the United States, if necessary. 

32. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, does the Government share enough information with the private sector? 

Admiral ROGERS. No, despite the recent progress, there is room for improvement 

in what cybersecurity information the U.S. Government shares with the private sector, as well as what the private sector shares with the U.S. Government. The U.S. 

Government needs to improve its information sharing policies and processes in a 

manner that is timely, respects privacy and civil liberties, is sensitive to competitive 

advantage concerns, and protects intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, operations, and investigations. 

33. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, if confirmed as Director of the NSA and 

Commander of CYBERCOM, what more would you do to have a better flow of information to private sector companies so they can best protect their systems from cyber 

attacks? 

Admiral ROGERS. As the Commander, CYBERCOM and the Director, NSA/Chief 

CSS, I will partner with DOD, DHS, FBI, and the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence to improve machine-speed cybersecurity information sharing with the 

private sector. To this end, I will continue to support the goals of Executive Order 

13636, namely: provide threat information to DHS, DOD, and other sector-specific 

agencies; assist in expanding the DHS-managed Enhanced Cybersecurity Services 

program to all critical infrastructure sectors; and move expeditiously to implement 

secure sharing of classified cybersecurity information with appropriately cleared private entities. 

34. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, on the flip side, when a defense company endures a cyber attack, is that being shared with DOD? In other words, do 

we really understand the degree to which our defense industrial base is under 

cyber-attack? 

Admiral ROGERS. The Department is adapting its DOD–Defense Industrial Base 

Voluntary Cybersecurity/Information Assurance (DIB CS/IA) Activities program (32 

CFR Part 236) to incorporate mandatory incident reporting requirements under section 941 (NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013) while maintaining the voluntary cyber threat 

information sharing. This amended program will strengthen DOD’s ability to safeguard DOD information on contractor unclassified information systems and provide 

contractors increased incentive to join the voluntary DIB CS/IA program for more 

robust cybersecurity collaboration with DOD. However, all stakeholders in the public and private sectors will remain disadvantaged in understanding the full scope 

of the threat without legislation to enhance information sharing among and between 

private and public entities while protecting privacy and civil liberties and clarifying 

liability and anti-trust issues. 

537 

35. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, countless jobs, investments, and dollars

are being lost from the theft of intellectual property each year due to cyber hacks. 

How can we help our defense industrial base better protect itself? 

Admiral ROGERS. I agree that the theft of intellectual property is a real and growing problem that negatively impacts the technological competitiveness, economic 

health, and national security of the United States. Several initiatives are underway 

to help the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) better protect itself. Cybersecurity information sharing occurs within the voluntary DIB Cybersecurity and Information Assurance (DIB CS/IA) Program and its optional DHS-managed Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) component. In addition, DOD, as the Sector Specific Agency for 

the DIB, works with DHS to implement the National Infrastructure Protection Program sector partnership model and risk management framework. While these partnerships help to improve the security of the DIB, and improve our collective 

strength against the theft of our Nation’s intellectual property, additional steps are 

needed to remove barriers to cybersecurity information sharing and encourage industry to harden its networks. 

INTERAGENCY INFORMATION SHARING

36. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, what role should CYBERCOM play in

coordinating with other agencies such as DHS to make sure the U.S. Government 

has a common picture of the threat and can develop a well-coordinated response? 

Admiral ROGERS. As part of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 

(CNCI), Federal cybersecurity operations centers across the U.S. Government were 

linked to foster improved information sharing and shared situational awareness of 

cyber threats. CYBERCOM’s Joint Operations Center is and should continue to be 

a key member facilitating that linkage across the whole of government, particularly 

when DOD is the designated lead for a cyber-related operation. In those circumstances where another agency has the lead, then CYBERCOM should act in a 

supporting capacity, as needed. 

It is important to note that developing well-coordinated responses to potential 

cyber incidents begins long before an incident comes to light. Ideally, the U.S. Government would have pre-coordinated response options to cyber incidents available 

to respond to the most likely and most dangerous cyber threats. This requires advanced planning, capability development, machine-speed information sharing, 

whole-of-government exercises, and timely and agile decision-making processes that 

allow national leaders to assess and manage risks both during steady state and crisis operations. CYBERCOM is—as part of a broader DOD and U.S. Government effort—well-suited to support the development and exercise of pre-coordinated response options needed to defend the United States and its interests in cyberspace. 

37. Senator AYOTTE. Vice Admiral Rogers, based on your preparation for your

nomination hearing, how would you characterize CYBERCOM’s current relationship 

with DHS? 

Admiral ROGERS. CYBERCOM’s relationship with DHS is good and growing. 

DHS, the lead for national protection, is a key partner to DOD, the lead for national 

defense. Efforts to protect and defend the United States and its interests in cyberspace must go hand-in-hand. As the nature of conflict and competition in cyberspace 

evolves, so, too, must CYBERCOM’s relationship with DHS in order to ensure our 

Nation’s ability to operate, defend, and protect ourselves in the domain. 

CYBERCOM’s relationship with DHS will continue to grow both in importance and 

strength over the coming months and years. I look forward to working with my DHS 

counterparts to this end. 

[The nomination reference of VADM Michael S. Rogers, USN, follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 30, 2014 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

538 

The following named officer for appointment to the U.S. Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under Title 10, 

U.S.C., section 601: 

To be Admiral. 

VADM Michael S. Rogers, USN, 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of VADM Michael S. Rogers, USN, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

RE ́SUME ́ OF SERVICE CAREER OF VADM MICHAEL SCOTT ROGERS, USN 

28 Aug 1981 ......... Ensign 

28 Aug 1983 ......... Lieutenant (junior grade) 

01 Sep 1985 .......... Lieutenant 

01 Sep 1991 .......... Lieutenant Commander 

01 Sep 1997 .......... Commander 

01 Sep 2002 .......... Captain 

02 Nov 2007 .......... Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while serving in billets commensurate with that 

grade 

01 Feb 2008 .......... Rear Admiral (lower half) 

01 Oct 2010 .......... Rear Admiral 

30 Sep 2011 .......... Vice Admiral, Service continuous to date 

Assignments and duties: 

From To

NROTC Unit Auburn University (Asst Admin Officer) ......................................................................... Aug 1981 Sep 1981 

USS Caron (DD 970) (Acting Division Officer) ................................................................................... Sep 1981 Dec 1981 

Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Newport, RI (DUINS) .................................................... Jan 1982 May 1982 

Naval Justice School, Newport, RI (DUINS) ........................................................................................ May 1982 Jun 1982 

USS Caron (DD 970) (Combat Information Center Officer) (Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer) ......... Jun 1982 Jan 1985 

Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command, Washington, DC (Navy Affirmative Action Plan 

Manager) ........................................................................................................................................ Feb 1985 Nov 1986 

Naval Security Group Dept, Naval Comm Station, Spain (Surface/Subsurface Direct Support Officer) (Electronic Warfare Officer) .................................................................................................... Nov 1986 Dec 1989 

Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Assistant Shore and National Cryptologic Systems Officer) ......... Jan 1990 Jan 1993 

Armed Forces Staff College (Student) ................................................................................................ Jan 1993 Apr 1993 

Naval Technical Training Center, Pensacola, FL (Student) ............................................................... May 1993 May 1993 

Commander, Carrier Group Two (Staff Cryptologist) ......................................................................... Jun 1993 May 1995 

Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC (Cryptologic Junior Officer Detailer) ........................... May 1995 May 1997 

Commander, Naval Security Group Command (Executive Assistant) ................................................ May 1997 Jun 1998 

CO, Naval Security Group Activity, Winter Harbor, ME ...................................................................... Jul 1998 Jul 2000 

Commander, Sixth Fleet (Fleet Information Operations and Cryptology Officer) ............................... Jul 2000 Jul 2002 

National War College (Student) .......................................................................................................... Jul 2002 Jun 2003 

Joint Staff (Head, Computer Network Attack/Defense Branch) .......................................................... Jun 2003 Oct 2003 

Joint Staff (Chief, Information Operations Division) .......................................................................... Oct 2003 Feb 2004 

Joint Staff (Executive Assistant, Director for Operations) (J–3) ........................................................ Feb 2004 Aug 2004 

Joint Staff (Executive Assistant, Director, Joint Staff) ....................................................................... Aug 2004 Aug 2005 

Joint Staff (Special Assistant to CJCS/Director, Chairman’s Action Group) ...................................... Aug 2005 Nov 2007 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Director for Intelligence) (J2) ................................................. Dec 2007 Sep 2009 

Joint Staff (Director for Intelligence) (J2) .......................................................................................... Sep 2009 Sep 2011 

Commander, Fleet Cyber Command/Commander, 10th Fleet ............................................................ Sep 2011 To date 

Medals and awards: 

Defense Superior Service Medal with two Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters 

Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars 

Joint Service Commendation Medal 

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Silver Star 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award with three Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters 

Navy Unit Commendation 

Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars 

Navy ‘‘E’’ Ribbon 

539 

Navy Expeditionary Medal with three Bronze Stars 

National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star 

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal 

Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with two Bronze stars 

Overseas Service Ribbon with four Bronze Stars 

Expert Rifle Marksmanship Medal 

Expert Pistol Shot Medal 

Special qualifications: 

BS (Business Administration) Auburn University, 1981 

MS (National Security Strategy) National Defense University, 2003 

Designated Surface Warfare Officer, 1983 

Designated Cryptologic Officer (Information Warfare), 1986 

Designated Joint Qualified Officer, 2006 

Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009 

CAPSTONE 2009–4 13JU 

Pinnacle 2012–1 

Summary of joint duty assignments: 

Assignment Dates Rank 

Joint Staff (Head, Computer Network Attack/Defense Branch) ............................................ Jun 03–Oct 03 CAPT 

Joint Staff (Chief, Information Operations Ops Division) .................................................... Oct 03–Feb 04 CAPT 

Joint Staff (Executive Assistant, Director of Operations, J–3) ............................................. Feb 04–Aug 04 CAPT 

Joint Staff (Executive Assistant, Director, Joint Staff) ......................................................... Aug 04–Aug 05 CAPT 

Joint Staff (Special Assistant to CJCS/Director, Chairman’s Action Group) ........................ Aug 05–Nov 07 CAPT 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Director for Intelligence) (J2) ................................... Dec 07–Sep 09 RDML 

Joint Staff (Director for Intelligence) (J2) ............................................................................ Sep 09–Sep 11 RDML/RADM 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by VADM Michael S. Rogers, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Michael S. Rogers. 

540 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service/Commander, 

U.S. Cyber Command. 

3. Date of nomination: 

January 30, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

October 31, 1959; Chicago, IL. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Dana M. Rogers (Maiden Name: Walck). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Justin, age 25. 

Patrick, age 21. 

8 Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Member, U.S. Naval Institute 

Member, Auburn University Alumni Association 

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

None. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

MICHAEL S. ROGERS. 

This 16th day of January, 2014. 

[The nomination of VADM Michael S. Rogers, USN, was reported 

to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 16, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on March 31, 2014.] 

(541) 

NOMINATIONS OF DR. LAURA J. JUNOR, TO 

BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS; MR. GORDON O. TANNER, TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE AIR FORCE; MS. DEBRA S. WADA, TO 

BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS; 

MS. MIRANDA A.A. BALLENTINE, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

FOR INSTALLATIONS, ENVIRONMENT, AND 

ENERGY; AND DR. MONICA C. REGALBUTO, 

TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF ENERGY 

FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in room 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Nelson, Donnelly, 

Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, Sessions, and Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

The committee meets this morning to consider the nominations 

of Dr. Laura Junor to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Gordon Tanner to be General 

Counsel of the Department of the Air Force; Debra Wada to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; 

Miranda Ballentine to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Installations, Environment, and Energy; and Dr. Monica Regalbuto 

to be Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management. 

We welcome you and your family members this morning. The 

committee always recognizes the tremendous contributions that are 

made by the support of engaged family members that we are all 

so blessed to have. We thank you all for joining us and for joining 

542 

your family members here today. We encourage our nominees, during your opening statements, to introduce family members and others who might be here to support you. 

The positions to which today’s witnesses have been nominated 

are important and challenging assignments. 

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness’ responsibilities include recruitment, retention, pay 

and benefits, health care, readiness, and quality of life for the men 

and women of our Armed Forces. If confirmed for this position, Dr. 

Junor will play a critical role in the Department’s efforts to address 

the difficult issues, ranging from reductions in end-strength, the increasing cost of military health care, sexual assaults in the military, and changes in assignment policies relating to women in the 

Armed Forces, and that is just naming a few. 

The General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force is the 

chief legal officer and chief ethics official in the Air Force. He will 

provide legal advice and guidance to the Secretary of the Air Force, 

as well as legal services throughout the Air Force in a variety of 

disciplines. He will also provide oversight of intelligence and other 

sensitive activities and investigations. 

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs is responsible for the supervision of the manpower and Reserve component affairs of the Army. If confirmed, Ms. Wada will 

face many challenges, among them ensuring that the Army executes end-strength reductions in a way that preserves readiness 

and protects against a hollow force, prevention and response to sexual assaults in the Army, and assignment policies for female soldiers. 

The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy has a diverse portfolio that includes several 

issues directly impacting the readiness of our Air Force. Ms. 

Ballentine will have responsibility for overseeing the construction 

and maintenance of facilities in a time of increased budget austerity, ensuring that the Air Force is maximizing energy efficiency 

and security, and navigating environmental issues relating to installations safety and occupational health. 

I believe that your great success, Ms. Ballentine, has its roots in 

your formative years that you spent in Michigan. I am pleased that 

your parents, who are also Michigan residents, could be with us 

today. We give them a special welcome. My colleagues will forgive 

me for that, I know. 

The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management will oversee the ongoing cleanup at 16 former Cold War-era 

defense production sites spread across 11 States. Upholding the 

Federal Government’s commitment to remediate these sites is of 

critical importance to the States and local communities in which 

they are located. Dr. Regalbuto, if confirmed, will play a central 

role in carrying out that commitment. 

We welcome our nominees here today. We look forward to their 

testimony and, hopefully, their swift confirmation. 

Senator Inhofe? 

543 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say that 

I concur in the comments that you made and the significance of 

each position. I look forward to hearing from each one of you. I just 

hope that you recognize, all five of you, that we are in a situation 

that, certainly in my 20 years in the U.S. Senate and on this committee, I have never seen a more stressed time, in terms of budget 

problems and all of that. 

I am sure you will keep that in mind. I hope that you will. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe. 

Dr. Junor? 

STATEMENT OF LAURA J. JUNOR TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND 

READINESS 

Dr. JUNOR. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, and members of the committee. I am honored to be here before you today, and I appreciate the confidence that President 

Obama has expressed in nominating me to be the Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

I would also like to thank my family, who is with me here today: 

my mother, Phyllis Gladhill; my 17-year-old daughter, Madeline; 

my husband and an incredibly patient man, T.J.; my sister, Ann; 

and my brother-in-law, Michael Santorios; and my friends and coworkers, who are also here today. 

My 7-year-old couldn’t be here. She is training for a musical this 

afternoon, so today is a very big day in our house. 

I also would like to recognize and thank the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and their families, with whom I have the honor 

to serve during my career. Their selfless commitment to our Nation 

and to each other is testament to the strength of our military community and to our Nation. 

It has been a privilege for me to have served the Nation in the 

Department of Defense (DOD) for over 20 years and currently as 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness. 

The Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Readiness is the 

focal point of the Department on all issues and activities related to 

the readiness of America’s Armed Forces. 

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary, my primary responsibility is 

to ensure that our military is effectively manned, trained, and 

equipped for all missions. 

During my career, I have been part of the military buildup in 

support of conflicts in two theaters, and subsequently the drawdown of both. Balancing the need to reduce budgets while maintaining a healthy and ready military is the mission that senior Department leaders must not fail. 

In the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness, that is our commitment to the men and women who put 

themselves in harm’s way. The competition for resources should not 

degrade our ability to respond to conflicts that may threaten the 

safety of our Nation and those who took oaths to defend. 

544 

I believe my experience has prepared me to fill the position of the 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness. 

I am an economist, both by training and practice, and favor an 

analytic approach to most problems. My work has directly influenced policy on a range of topics, including spares and maintenance, aviation, training, contingency sourcing, recruiting and retention, and response options for domestic emergencies. 

Finally, I grew up a military dependent and married a naval officer. In that sense, I am familiar with the scope of issues facing 

military families. 

I am grateful to the members of the committee and to all Members of Congress for their support, the support that they have given 

to our men and women in uniform and their families. 

If confirmed, I pledge to you that I will work diligently on behalf 

of the Nation’s servicemembers, their families and our civilian 

workforce that supports them, along with this committee and Congress. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Tanner? 

STATEMENT OF GORDON O. TANNER TO BE GENERAL 

COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Mr. TANNER. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and 

members of the committee. It is a great honor to be before you as 

the nominee for General Counsel of the Air Force. 

I would also like to thank President Obama, Secretaries Hagel 

and James for the trust they have placed in me. I want to thank 

the staff and members of this committee for the great courtesy they 

have shown during this process. I realize that this is a very busy 

time, and I appreciate the hard work it took to make this hearing 

happen. 

I would also like to thank my family and friends, whose continued support through the years has been essential. In particular, I 

appreciate my mother, husband, and sister being here with me 

today. 

Finally, I want to thank the airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines, 

and their families, with whom I have had the honor to serve during 

my career as an Active Duty and Reserve Judge Advocate as well 

as a member of the civil service. 

My life has been enriched by the opportunity to serve with them. 

I am deeply humbled and honored by this nomination. The most 

fulfilling job that I have had in my career to date was as Principal 

Deputy General Counsel of the Air Force, and I am excited by the 

prospect, if confirmed, of serving as the Air Force General Counsel. 

The challenges facing the Department of the Air Force are many, 

and I look forward to helping Secretary James, Under Secretary 

Fanning, and the rest of the Air Force team as they grapple with 

these challenges. 

But most of all, I am especially happy to be nominated for a position that will allow me to improve the lives of dedicated Air Force 

personnel who work to protect America and, when called upon, put 

themselves in harm’s way for our country. 

545 

I am committed to continuing and enhancing the close and productive working relationship and partnership with the Air Force 

Judge Advocate General and other military lawyers in the Department. I am proud that I had a great relationship with the Air Force 

Judge Advocate leadership during my tenure as Principal Deputy 

General Counsel. Its senior leadership were not merely great colleagues, but close friends. 

I am firmly convinced that the leadership of the Air Force is best 

served when the civilian and military lawyers work together as a 

team to offer the best possible legal advice to our mutual clients. 

Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee in addressing any legal issues that may arise during my 

tenure. I am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Tanner. 

Ms. Wada? 

STATEMENT OF DEBRA S. WADA TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS 

Ms. WADA. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee, I am honored that the President has nominated me for the 

position of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs. It is a privilege to be here today to respond to any 

questions or issues with respect to my nomination. 

I would like to thank President Obama, Secretary of the Army 

John McHugh, Representatives Smith and Davis, as well as Chairmen McKeon and Wilson, for their support of my nomination. 

I would also like to recognize my family and friends for providing 

me their unwavering love and support for me to pursue my 

dreams. I would also be remiss if I did not recognize my colleagues 

who have provided me their wise counsel over the years. 

If confirmed, it would be an honor for me to continue my service 

on the behalf of the soldiers, civilians, contractors, survivors, and 

families. I believe that my 27 years on Capitol Hill, including 14 

years on the House Armed Services Committee, provide me the 

depth of experience and expertise to successfully execute the responsibilities of this position. 

I look forward to continuing my work with this committee and 

Congress to address the personnel challenges the Army is facing 

and will continue to face in the next several years. 

Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Ms. Wada. 

Ms. Ballentine? 

STATEMENT OF MIRANDA A.A. BALLENTINE TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR INSTALLATIONS, ENVIRONMENT, AND ENERGY 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, Senators. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee as nominee for Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy. 

546 

I would like to start by thanking my family: my husband, Roger 

Ballentine, who knows the rigors of Government service all too well 

and, nonetheless, has supported my nomination wholeheartedly; 

my kids, stepdaughter Eliza, who is 10, and daughter, Grace, who 

is 41⁄2, who are always very forgiving of my time. 

Here today also are my parents, Bob and Dina Anderson, who, 

Senator Levin, as you point out, drove from Michigan to support 

me today, and from whom I learned the importance of Government 

service. 

I am grateful to President Obama, Secretary Hagel, Secretary 

James, and Under Secretary Fanning for their support of my nomination. 

Although I have never experienced the gravity of signing on the 

dotted line, committing my very life if necessary to protect my 

country, I do know what it means to be a profoundly grateful citizen of the United States. Since my nomination, I have voraciously 

read the writings of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, trying to put 

my feet in their boots, trying to see through their eyes and the eyes 

of their families. 

Thus, if confirmed, I would consider this role as an opportunity 

to serve those who serve, to serve my President, my country, and, 

most of all, the men and women of the U.S. Air Force. This nomination is also an opportunity for me to honor those in my family 

who have served in the military, my father, my father-in-law, and 

my late grandfather, a World War II vet who served in the Army 

with one of the Air Force’s founding fathers, General Claire Chennault. 

I believe that many of the skills I have built in my private sector 

career transfer well to the job of Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy. Today’s airmen 

depend on installations that operate effectively and efficiently, and 

I understand that the Secretary and the Chief have had to make 

hard choices in this tight fiscal environment to maximize mission 

effectiveness while making every dollar count. 

If confirmed, I understand that I would face multifaceted, difficult decisions with few clear-cut solutions. My time at America’s 

largest company gives me proven experience in leading global 

teams to develop and execute winning strategies for facilities, environment, and energy. 

Coming from a company with over 11,000 facilities in over two 

dozen countries, I bring a history of successfully working with top 

leadership to balance competing priorities, manage limited resources, and drive mission-oriented solutions to complex problems. 

If confirmed, I pledge to make every dollar count in the Air 

Force’s installation management portfolio, handle environmental 

issues with integrity and speed, and help drive energy efficiency 

improvements in DOD’s largest energy bill. 

Thank you for your service and for considering my nomination, 

and I look forward to taking your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Ms. Ballentine. 

Dr. Regalbuto? 

547 

STATEMENT OF MONICA C. REGALBUTO TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 

Dr. REGALBUTO. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee 

for Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM) of the 

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 

I would like to begin my statement by expressing my gratitude 

to the President for his confidence demonstrated by this nomination. I am honored and humbled to be here. Should I be confirmed, 

I will do my best to meet that confidence. 

I would like to thank Secretary Moniz for his support and for his 

leadership of the Department of Energy. 

Professional achievement is seldom an individual effort. I have 

had the privilege of working with a multitude of talented people 

throughout my career as a chemical engineer. There are countless 

family members, friends, mentors, and colleagues who have done so 

much over the years to make this day possible. 

I want to especially thank and recognize my husband, John, for 

always being supportive and patient, and to my adult children, 

Ricky, Carol, and Robby, for their sense of humor as they grew up 

in a hybrid culture, hearing my daily use of science-based 

Spanglish. 

Lastly, I would not be here without the love and support of my 

parents, Horacio and Conchita, for instilling in me great values 

during my childhood, and for my parents-in-law, John and Carole, 

who I consider my second set of parents. 

Mr. Chairman, I began my studies in Mexico, where, through 

great economic sacrifice of my family, I attended private schools, 

which offered a better education. In high school, I discovered an interest and gift in math and science, and started college seeking a 

degree in chemical engineering and computer science at Monterrey 

State. 

At the time, there were very few women in engineering with limited job opportunities. This reality has heavily influenced me. As 

such, I have always supported and led efforts that substantially enhance employment opportunities for women and minorities. 

I met my husband, John, while I was a student and eventually 

married him and moved to the United States and proudly acquired 

my U.S. citizenship. 

After completing my Ph.D. at the University of Notre Dame, I 

joined Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago in 1988. I started 

my career supporting the development of technologies for the treatment of high-level waste at the Department of Energy plutonium 

production sites. 

After developing strong technical skills, I joined BP-Amoco in 

1996, where I enhanced my skills in managing complex projects, 

large projects, and multidisciplinary staff in an industrial setting. 

I returned to Argonne in Chicago in 2001 and became the head 

of the process chemistry department where I worked on new technologies for the treatment of used nuclear fuel. 

In addition, I was a member of the fuel cycle study team of the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. My participation in this 

548 

study not only allowed me to gain experience working with highlevel officials and nongovernmental organizations but brought to 

my attention the need for safe, permanent disposal of all types of 

radioactive waste. 

In 2008, I had the unique opportunity to join the Department of 

Energy Office of Environmental Management, where I served as 

senior project manager supporting their strategic mission in the 

waste processing area. 

I also served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fuel Cycle 

Technologies within the Office of Nuclear Energy. In this position, 

I was responsible for directing the research and development programs involving 10 national laboratories, 32 universities, over 400 

students, and 300 professors. 

The last few years have been an eventful period with respect to 

nuclear energy. I was directly involved in providing and coordinating emergency responses to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 

power plant disaster, focusing on opportunities to mitigate the 

highly contaminated water resulting from emergency cooling of the 

reactors damaged by the earthquake and subsequent tsunami. 

Over the past few decades, I have seen our various nuclear waste 

management programs from a variety of vantage points. As a scientist at Argonne, I have worked on and led efforts to identify technical solutions to difficult waste management issues. In my previous role, I had been responsible for formulating and articulating 

the strategic options to expedite the resolution of our waste management needs. 

I have also experienced the intricacy of nuclear waste management from a perspective of a waste generator and from a waste disposal specialist during my time at DOE. 

Mr. Chairman, the Manhattan Project was a critical component 

of our success in World War II and the Cold War. The communities 

and regions that were home to these sites have made sacrifices for 

our Nation, and their environmental remediation is both a legal 

and moral obligation. 

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the EM program. During my 

time at Argonne and now at the Department of Energy, I have 

watched the environmental management mission complete 91 sites 

and have made significant progress in the remaining 16. 

But great challenges still remain, which require innovative strategies to clean up efforts while ensuring that work is completely 

done safely. 

I believe my background and experience and commitment have 

prepared me to lead the Office of Environmental Management during this particularly critical time. I welcome the opportunity to continue my service to the Nation as Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management. 

If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with this committee and 

others in Congress to continue and ensure that our safe cleanup of 

the environmental legacy remains a priority. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you and your committee today, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Regalbuto. 

549 

I am going to ask all of you the standard questions and then turn 

it over to Senator Inhofe, who has to leave here for a few minutes 

for another commitment. 

These questions, you can all answer at the same time. 

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing 

conflicts of interest? 

Dr. REGALBUTO. Yes. 

Ms. WADA. Yes. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Yes. 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes. 

Mr. TANNER. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties, or undertaken 

any actions, which would appear to presume the outcome of the 

confirmation process? 

Dr. REGALBUTO. No. 

Ms. WADA. No. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. No. 

Dr. JUNOR. No. 

Mr. TANNER. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record, and hearings? 

Dr. REGALBUTO. Yes. 

Ms. WADA. Yes. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Yes. 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes. 

Mr. TANNER. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and 

briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Dr. REGALBUTO. Yes. 

Ms. WADA. Yes. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Yes. 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes. 

Mr. TANNER. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 

for their testimony or briefings? 

Dr. REGALBUTO. Yes. 

Ms. WADA. Yes. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Yes. 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes. 

Mr. TANNER. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Dr. REGALBUTO. Yes. 

Ms. WADA. Yes. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Yes. 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes. 

Mr. TANNER. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including 

copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner 

when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with 

a committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial 

in providing such documents? 

Dr. REGALBUTO. Yes. 

550 

Ms. WADA. Yes. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Yes. 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes. 

Mr. TANNER. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In looking at the five of you, I think the one that arguably would 

have the toughest job is you, Dr. Junor, because of the real problem, the key word there is readiness. There was an article that I 

read last night, I will quote from it. This was in Politico. It said: 

‘‘Authorizers and appropriators have so far mostly ignored the Defense Department’s budget plans in favor of protecting big-ticket 

weapons programs, home district allocations, and troop pay benefits and personnel programs.’’ 

Then, on the other hand, we have heard from all of the Service 

Chiefs, all of them, in uniform plus the Secretaries, that we have 

a real dire situation. I will read you a quote from General 

Dempsey, who is the very top person. He says: ‘‘Our force is so degraded and so unready that it would be immoral to use force.’’ 

We are in a situation now that we have certainly never been in, 

as I said in part of my opening statement. We have a crisis on our 

hands. 

I would ask you, first of all, do you recognize the severity of our 

readiness shortfall at the present time, and do you have any 

thoughts about how you are going to address that, keeping in mind 

this is not your fault? You inherited this mess, but what are you 

going to do? 

Dr. JUNOR. Sir, I am very familiar with it. The conflicts that we 

have been in for more than a decade now have exhausted our capacity. We have so focused, and correctly so, on meeting the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, we have very little residual capacity in full spectrum operations. 

This has been a concern. I have been in this position for 3 years, 

and it has been my daily commitment to understand this problem 

better, to find out not just how it affects the unit, but the pipeline 

processes that generate that manpower. 

Senator INHOFE. I think that that is key there, because when you 

go over there, and you have gone over and everyone up here has 

gone over, those who are on the frontlines, they are ready. It is 

that pipeline that is important. 

Dr. JUNOR. That is exactly right. The readiness of the unit is, in 

effect, a lagging indicator. It is the readiness of the pipelines where 

the real problems lie. 

When I first started as a readiness analyst, it was in the 1990s, 

and I watched how a problem would grow. 

For example, in the Navy, we had a problem with spare parts, 

and that spare parts created a bow wave that it took literally years 

to fix. 

Fast forward now, in my career, I have never seen so many simultaneous readiness problems. 

Senator INHOFE. Exactly. 

Dr. JUNOR. There are negative synergies, and I am at my wits 

end trying to figure out exactly how they will manifest. 

551 

That said, the Department has put everything—we recognize 

where we need investments, and even with our PB15 submission, 

we tried to find and free up the resources to fix the most acute 

problems. That is going to be our plan going forward. 

Over the last almost 13 years now, our servicemembers and their 

families have borne the brunt of the cost of these wars, and they 

deserve as much as a grateful Nation can afford. But we have also 

promised that we would never again send our servicemembers into 

harm’s way, and the current budget environment makes it really 

difficult to balance those two imperatives. 

Senator INHOFE. In fact, I would give another quote of the second 

man down, Admiral Winnefeld. He said there could be a time, for 

the first time in his career, of instances where we will be asked to 

respond to a crisis and we will have to say we cannot. 

I think that is the main thing, that you recognize that and you 

are, certainly, equipped to handle that, and I appreciate that very 

much. 

Dr. JUNOR. Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. Ms. Wada, there has been a lot of discussion as 

to what we are doing with the Reserve component and changing 

around responsibilities between the regular Services and the Reserve component. 

Have you been following that, in our defense authorization bill 

and the discussion that has surrounded that issue? 

Ms. WADA. Yes, sir, I have. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you have any thoughts about it? Are we 

going the right direction, in terms of shifting some of the responsibilities in order to meet the crisis that Dr. Junor is talking about? 

Do you think that we are going in the right direction? 

Ms. WADA. In terms of—— 

Senator INHOFE. In terms of shifting responsibilities to and from 

the Reserve component to the regular? 

Ms. WADA. Sure. Sir, the Secretary of the Army signed onto a 

total force policy. If confirmed, I would be responsible for implementing that policy. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, okay. 

I notice, and I have addressed this to Ms. Ballentine and Dr. 

Regalbuto, in both of your titles, the word ‘‘environment’’ is there. 

I am not real sure how you divide that up? What areas of the environment do each of you have exclusive to the other? 

Dr. REGALBUTO. I work for the Department of Energy, and the 

environmental component for DOE is exclusively for the cleanup of 

the legacy from the weapons production sites. It does not include 

environmental like the Environmental Protection Agency for other 

chemicals. It is exclusively for contaminated former weapons production sites. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Do you have any comment on that, Ms. 

Ballentine? I think I understand from her response what your duties would be. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Yes, sir. My duties would be to oversee and create policy for all environmental laws for the Air Force. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that is fine. 

What I would ask of each of you is to be aware of the thing that 

we are talking about with Dr. Junor, the severity of the situation 

552 

that we are in right now. While there is always a temptation to use 

our resources, our very limited resources, in the military for the environmental agenda, resist that temptation as much as you can, 

and we will be watching and hope we can help you out in that respect, okay? 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. REGALBUTO. We will. Thank you, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Dr. Junor, you have discussed the readiness shortfalls and the 

need to make sure that whenever we send our men and women 

into harm’s way, that they are fully ready even though we may 

have a smaller force, that we are never going to send our forces 

into action unless they are fully ready and equipped. Would you 

agree that should be our goal? 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. One of the ways in which the funding is being 

shifted around a little bit this year, in order to try to reduce the 

pressure on readiness and to try to restore some of the readiness 

and modernization shortfalls created by the Budget Control Act 

and sequestration, which Congress approved, one of the ways that 

we are looking to try to reduce the impact of sequestration—and 

I think it was a terrible way to budget and we ought to get rid of 

it. But in any event, one of the ways we are looking at to reduce 

the impact is to save about $31 billion in the budget request over 

the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) in the area of personnel 

and health care costs. Are you familiar with that budget request? 

Dr. JUNOR. I am. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. If we delay enacting those proposals, it 

will cost the Department $10 billion over the FYDP, if we delay it 

by 1 year. A 2-year delay in agreeing to those requests will cost 

about $15 billion. That, of course, means it will be even harder to 

overcome some of the readiness and modernization shortfalls, 

which you have identified and Senator Inhofe has identified and I 

think all of us have identified. 

Would you agree that we have to slow the growth of personnel 

costs, if we are going to buy back readiness and modernization 

shortfalls? 

Dr. JUNOR. I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Our authorization bill slows some of 

those costs, not all of them, as requested, but at least we did some 

of them. We made an effort. I think we made some progress. 

Now, in terms of sequestration, what would be the impact on the 

Department’s ability to meet the national defense and strategic objectives if sequestration occurs again in fiscal year 2016? 

Dr. JUNOR. It is my understanding that we could not meet the 

defense strategy. 

Chairman LEVIN. Ms. Ballentine, you, for the last 5 years, served 

as Director of Sustainability, Renewable Energy, and Sustainable 

Facilities at Wal-Mart. Can you tell us what your experience is as 

to whether or not there are circumstances which make it very economically sensible for us to invest in energy conservation and alterVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00560 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
553 

native energy sources, and how those views are informed by your 

experience in the private sector? 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Thank you, sir. 

First of all, I would like to say that, if confirmed, I want to give 

my assurance to this committee that I would make every taxpayer 

dollar count in our installation management. 

I do currently work for one of, if not the largest private energy 

consumer in the United States, and we have developed a strategy 

that emphasizes saving money in the energy portfolio as a way to 

contribute to our underlying mission of saving people money so 

they can live better. 

There are really multiple elements to that. Energy conservation 

and energy efficiency, making every BTU [British Thermal Unit] 

count toward the mission, is job number one. 

Renewable energy, we have found at Wal-Mart, can be a reliable, 

viable, and affordable piece of a broader energy puzzle. 

I will tell you that Wal-Mart has more solar rooftops than any 

other company in this country, and every single one of those 

projects meets or beats brown power prices over the course of the 

contract. 

Renewable energy does not work everywhere. It is really a piece 

of a broader puzzle. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Ms. Wada, I think we all deeply believe that servicemembers 

who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from the Army and the Federal Government for support services; for healing and recuperation; rehabilitation; evaluation for return to duty; successful transition from Active Duty; if 

required, continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

Now, despite the enactment of legislation, our Wounded Warriors 

legislation, and renewed emphasis over the past several years, 

there are a lot of challenges that remain. 

First of all, I want to commend the Army for proactively providing the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) with additional 

staff to help the VA process servicemembers through its portion of 

the integrated disability evaluation system more quickly. 

Would you anticipate, if confirmed, continuing such collaboration? 

Ms. WADA. Sir, yes. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Secretary of the Army. 

Chairman LEVIN. In the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, so that is 6 years ago now, Congress 

required the Department of Defense to utilize the VA schedule for 

rating disabilities. Do you know whether the Army is complying 

with that requirement? 

Ms. WADA. Sir, I believe that the Army is complying with that 

requirement, but if confirmed, I will confirm that and respond back 

to the committee. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Let me ask now both Mr. Tanner and you, Ms. Wada, about the 

pilot program that the Air Force initiated to provide victims of sexual assault with their own attorney and to represent them during 

the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. 

554 

This program has now been implemented by all the Military 

Services. 

First, Mr. Tanner, you have been working on sexual assault prevention and response issues in the Air Force for several years. 

Were you involved in the development of the Air Force’s pilot program to provide the special victim’s counsel to victims of sexual assault? 

Mr. TANNER. Yes, sir. If confirmed, I would look forward to continuing to assist the Air Force and advise the Air Force in the further development of its sexual assault program. 

Chairman LEVIN. What is your assessment of that particular 

Special Victims’ Counsel Program? 

Mr. TANNER. My assessment is that it is a very successful program for several reasons, not the least of which is that it provides 

an arm for the commander to care for victims who may be in that 

commander’s unit. 

It is the role of the commander to not only hold certain members 

accountable for sexual assault, but also to care for victims of sexual 

assault within that commander’s unit. 

I believe a special victim’s counsel not only provides a meaningful way for victims to be assisted throughout this process, but also 

healthy feedback to commanders of ways that the commander can 

improve the climate and the service to its members. 

Chairman LEVIN. Ms. Wada, do you have a different view of it 

all, or do you agree with what Mr. Tanner said? 

Ms. WADA. Sir, I understand that the Army has implemented the 

special victim counsel, according to the law. At this point, that is 

the extent of my knowledge as to the success. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Will you find out for us and let us 

know? 

Ms. WADA. Certainly, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Based upon information provided to me by the Army, the Special Victim Counsel 

(SVC) Program appears to be successful and well-received in providing legal representation to victims of sexual assault. The Army’s SVC program has resulted in 

SVCs serving worldwide, including the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility. These services are available to all victims, regardless of whether they file a 

restricted or unrestricted report. I have been informed that the feedback from victims and commanders is that this program is valuable in helping victims make informed decisions as they navigate the administrative, medical, and justice systems 

within the Army. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

I am going to act as though I came first. I am going to call on 

another Democrat, who is next, so it will be Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Ballentine, energy security in the Department of Defense 

and the Air Force are vitally important for our future. As we all 

know, DOD is the biggest user of energy of all of the departments. 

As Assistant Secretary in this area, what initiatives will you pursue to continue sound energy conservation practices and ensure energy security for the future in the Air Force? 

Ms. BALLENTINE. I understand that the Air Force has the largest 

energy bill within the Department of Defense, and that the Department of Defense has the largest energy bill within the U.S. Government. 

555 

Likewise, I happen to come from one of the largest private energy consumers. I think that putting mission first, there are really 

three areas to develop a comprehensive energy strategy that can 

drive down costs in our operations, as well as build some resilience. 

First, fuel efficiency, making every BTU count. If we can accomplish a cargo mission in one sortie instead of two, that is a mission 

win. 

Second and third kind of go together, fuel flexibility and fuel supply assurance. Having airplane engines that can fuel up on all different types of fuels anywhere in the world where they happen to 

be, and with any type of fuel that is available to them builds fuel 

flexibility. 

Assurance of supply in the case of supply disruptions is also an 

important element of a comprehensive energy strategy, and something that we think about quite a lot in the private sector as well. 

If confirmed in this position, one of my first orders of business 

would be to look across the portfolio of activities that have already 

been undertaken both within the Air Force and across the other 

branches, and accelerate those projects that are winning already 

today, saving us money and contributing to efficiency, flexibility, 

and supply assuredness. 

Senator HIRONO. I am particularly intrigued by your fuel flexibility focus. Is the Air Force doing research and development 

(R&D) on alternative, sustainable kinds of fuels? 

Ms. BALLENTINE. I am not currently familiar with the details of 

the R&D portfolio. If confirmed, it is something that I would look 

into. 

I do understand that the engines are currently certified to fly on 

a number of different fuels. 

Senator HIRONO. I think that is very important. 

For Mr. Tanner, Chairman Levin asked you about your sexual 

assault prevention and response program, which I believe you said 

is working well. We want to make sure that the Department of Defense takes very seriously the changes that were in NDAA that addresses the issue of sexual assault. 

Could you tell us where DOD is with regard to implementation 

of the changes that were made in NDAA on this issue? 

Mr. TANNER. Senator, if confirmed, as the Air Force General 

Counsel, I would look forward to guiding the Air Force in its implementation of those changes. My sense is that the Air Force has 

made huge progress in its sexual assault program, but there is 

more to do, including changes in the NDAA. 

I would look forward to working with the sexual assault prevention response team that has now been elevated to a direct report 

to the Vice Chief of Staff, so that it gains direct senior leadership 

interest in working with that team to implement those changes. 

Senator HIRONO. I should have asked that broader question to 

Dr. Junor. What would be your priority in implementing the 

changes that we made in NDAA sexual assault treatment? 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes, Senator. Our number one focus is on victim support, and so making sure that we have enacted and are successful 

in providing victim support and analyzing case data, for example, 

to see if our programs we have implemented are working the way 

they are supposed to. 

556 

I am also greatly interested in prevention, making sure that we 

know what the current climate is and that it is a climate of dignity 

and respect, and a climate where sexual harassment and sexual assault are unlikely to happen in the first place. 

Finally, I’ll be looking for ways to hold both commanders and 

perpetrators accountable for these incidents. 

Senator HIRONO. I think the prevention aspect is one where I 

would really like to see more specific kinds of programs, because 

we know the alcohol is very much involved in these assaults. The 

prevention part of it, the command climate is very critical, so I will 

be probably following up with you on how that is going. 

Ms. Wada, aloha. 

That gives you an indication she is from Hawaii. [Laughter.] 

With the Army facing significant end strength reductions from 

520,000 to 490,000, drawdowns over the next several years, what 

are the most significant challenges as the Army reduces its total 

force? How will this impact future Army recruiting and retention? 

Ms. WADA. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of 

Army to look at the balance between the reduction in force of the 

total force between the Active, National Guard, and Reserve. 

At this time, there is a total force policy that the Secretary has 

laid out, and I think, though, that it would have to be addressed 

further since sequestration still exists. 

Senator HIRONO. I have a question for Dr. Junor. At one point, 

the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs spent $1 billion, 

basically, to have the DOD and VA medical records be much more 

compatible if not the same kind of system. 

Where are we with that? The whole point of that is to make sure 

that, as the Active Duty person transitions to veteran status, that 

this information goes with him or her. With all of the emphasis on 

health care in the VA system, where are we with making those 

records compatible? 

Dr. JUNOR. I believe that electronic health records is under the 

purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at this point. I don’t have the details, but I 

do understand that that is still in development. 

The larger issue, even with the Integrated Disability Evaluation 

System (IDES) and with the service treatment records for folks 

who have already left and claimed disabilities, there is a larger 

issue of information-sharing between DOD, even within the Services within DOD, and then from DOD to VA. There is still a lot of 

work to be done there. 

Improvements have been made. The IDES timeline is shorter 

than it was. It was about 11⁄2 years and now it is down to just a 

little over a year, which is still too long. 

But there is a lot of work to do. This is something that, if confirmed, I would consider a priority. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

My time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono. 

Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this 

opportunity. 

557 

Thank all of you for being willing to serve. You are going to be 

taking office in a time of great national importance, and in a time 

when our budget is very tight. We don’t have the money we have 

had. We are running unacceptable debts. Interest on the debt last year was $220 billion. That is almost 

half the defense budget. 

But in just a few years, we are projected, I think by 2019, to 

have interest on the debt that passes the entire Defense Department budget, and the Congressional Budget Office says that it will 

reach $876 billion in 1 year, interest, in 10 years from today. 

I would just say that we are very anxious and concerned about 

your difficulties in trying to help the Defense Department manage 

effectively. But every department and agency will have to tighten 

its belt. 

In my opinion, the Defense Department, to date, has undertaken 

more cuts than any other department in Government. 

My question, first, would be to all of you. Do you understand the 

financial challenge we face? Will you do your best in managing 

your department to produce the needed capabilities for the Defense 

Department, while reducing costs, wherever possible? 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes, sir. 

Ms. WADA. Yes, sir. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TANNER. Yes, sir. 

Dr. REGALBUTO. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Ms. Ballentine, did you say ‘‘yes’’? 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Good. You are running a private business. I 

know you know there are limits to what you can spend. 

Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, how much I respect Gordon Tanner’s legal ability and skill. He has the background that we need 

for this office. 

I have known him as a private practitioner in Mobile. I know his 

family. He has been in Washington for a number of years now. He 

is the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. From 2012 to 2013, he was the 

Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Air Force and served in 

a variety of positions before that. He retired in March and then has 

been called back now after 27 years of service. He had many years 

in Air Force Reserve. 

He came from an excellent law firm. Got his undergraduate degree at Alabama and his law degree at Vanderbilt. 

Mrs. Tanner, his mother, is here. We lost his father, Mr. Cecil 

Tanner, a great American, last fall. 

Mrs. Tanner, it is so great to see you. 

Among other good qualities they have, they were wonderful 

Methodists, I have to say. 

Mr. Chairman, I think that is the kind of background you look 

for in a position as important as General Counsel for the Air Force. 

I have to get to the floor. I thank you all for your willingness to 

serve, and we are all going to be watching our dollars, aren’t we? 

Thank you so much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. 

558 

Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to all the witnesses for your service. 

Dr. Junor, I have some questions for you about personnel matters. One of my highest priorities as a member of the Armed Services Committee is working with my colleagues and folks at the Pentagon to try to tackle the veterans’ unemployment rate. 

Some work on that is done in the Veterans’ Committee, but I 

tend to believe that a lot of the way we tackle veterans’ unemployment is by what happens when folks are in Active service. In particular, I focused on issues surrounding credentialing of our military members for the skills they attain at the moment they attain 

them, on the theory that, in a Nation where only 1 percent of the 

people serve in the military, if you go into a hiring hall and say 

I was a gunnery sergeant in the Marine Corps, or petty officer, people will thank you for your service, but they won’t necessarily know 

what skills and talents you bring to the table. 

But if you can get a commercial driver’s license or physician’s assistant degree or a welding certificate, if you have an ordnance specialty, that can help you immediately get traction in the civilian 

workforce. 

I want to ask you a little bit about that, because there is a lot 

of effort underway to make that happen, but there are some concerns that I have. 

In your advance policy questions, you mentioned that tuition assistance, the current military tuition assistance program, can be 

used to pay for academic coursework that supports earning a credential or licensure when part of an improved academic degree 

plan. 

My understanding is that tuition assistance benefit is up to 

about $4,500 per fiscal year, if approved. Am I right about that? 

Dr. JUNOR. I am actually not sure, but I can find out for the 

record for you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Tuition assistance is $4,500 per fiscal year. 

Senator KAINE. I think that is more or less the case. 

But one of the things I have discovered in looking at this is this 

issue that you can only access the tuition assistance if it is part of 

approved academic degree plan. 

Let me give you an example. At Fort Lee in Virginia, we train 

all these logistics specialists, in the ordnance school that is there. 

Ordnance school personnel in the Army take machining and ironworking and welding training. 

It takes $300 to pass the American Welding Society welding certificate exam. That is not an improved academic degree, but it is 

an accepted credential at any employer in the United States and 

with some international employers, as well. 

Currently, under the military tuition assistance program, you 

can use $4,500, I believe that number is correct, to take coursework 

at a community college or college, but you can’t use $300 to get a 

Welding Society certification that will enable you to get a job and 

probably earn more money than just about anything you could get 

with a degree from a community college. 

559 

One of the things I really want to work with you all on is the 

notion that certifications, technical certifications, they are not all 

part of academic degree programs. 

Probably the best educational program, in my view, for the 

money in the United States is the shipbuilding apprenticeship program at the Newport News shipyard. These guys build nuclear 

subs and aircraft carriers. There is a 4-year program, which is 2 

years in class and 2 years on the line, where you end up with a 

certificate, but no academic degree. But you can earn a great living 

for the rest of your life. There is a 5-year program where you get 

a community college degree, too. 

But you couldn’t use military tuition assistance benefits for the 

4-year program, even though it is the kind of program that will 

help somebody get a job. 

Can I work with you on this, to try to make sure, because it is 

not just within the Pentagon, but more generally, we give secondclass status to career and technical education in this country, and 

we have done it for very long time. 

I see it in the K–12 world, and I see it in the higher ed world. 

But I am also seeing it within DOD. I would like to work with you 

to try to erase any second-class stigma around career and technical 

education. 

The certification has to be a validated one. We don’t want to give 

tuition assistance benefits for certifications that don’t mean anything. But for things like Culinary Institute of America, most of the 

folks who train at Fort Lee as chefs and cooks are now getting 

training that they can convert into a Culinary Institute of America 

certification. That is not an approved academic degree program, 

but I can assure you, with that certificate, you can get a job just 

about anywhere. 

I would love to work with you on that initiative in your new position. 

Dr. JUNOR. Sir, I would be honored to. Like you, I absolutely 

value tradecraft, and there are so many empty jobs in this country 

for tradesmen that we cannot fill and this would be an excellent 

opportunity for many of our servicemembers. I would absolutely 

love to work with you on this. 

Senator KAINE. Great. This affects veterans’ benefits as well. The 

G.I. Bill, you can use them for colleges. If you wanted to take a 

code academic course and learn to be a computer coder, you can’t 

use the benefits for that. 

Again, I think we have to break down some old notions about 

what is a valid kind of credential. 

The mission should be, if it helps you get a meaningful job faster, 

and it is validated, then it ought to be accessible to military members who want to choose it. I look forward to working with you on 

that. 

I want to ask you a question, Mr. Tanner, about the special victims’ counsel pilot project within the Air Force that is now being 

used more broadly as a result of the NDAA reforms that we have 

done. 

In particular, I am curious about your experience about the 

interaction of the Special Victims’ Counsel Program with the creation, with the support of Congress, of the restricted report that 

560 

can be filed. Generally, someone complaining about crime within a 

military context files a complaint and it is a unrestricted complaint, and that enables an investigation to go forward and a perpetrator to be punished. 

Because of the unique nature of crimes of sexual violence or sexual assault, we created a restricted report where somebody can 

seek help and get assistance they need, without necessarily saying 

they want the investigation to go forward. 

I understood from some testimony earlier from folks associated 

with the Air Force that, at least preliminarily, there is some evidence that if somebody gets a special victims’ counsel who can walk 

them through the process and explain their rights and explain 

what is going to happen, it actually leads many who file restricted 

complaints to decide ‘‘Okay, I am now comfortable enough with the 

process, and I know that I am protected from retaliation, that I am 

able to move from a restricted into an unrestricted complaint,’’ 

which is better in terms of being able to go after a perpetrator, and 

hopefully stop that individual from perpetrating assaults on others. 

This is a number of months ago that there was that discussion. 

Am I generally right about that? What are you seeing about the restricted/unrestricted complaint filings? Is the special victims’ counsel assistance making a different in that? 

Mr. TANNER. Yes, sir. Your recollection is correct. 

I believe there are two factors that are affecting an increase in 

reporting, overall. 

The Air Force in fiscal year 2013 reported a 33 percent increase 

in total reporting, in restricted and unrestricted. The Air Force, I 

understand, believes that that is due to two things. First is the 

Special Victims’ Counsel Program, which was implemented at that 

time, which created greater confidence on the part of the victim in 

the process and protections within the system. Second, I believe the 

Air Force is committed to enhanced training of all of its members, 

including its most senior commanders. 

The fact that more people understand the program and the Air 

Force’s commitment to solving this problem, I believe that has created a climate in which reporting has been increased. Again, in fiscal year 2013, not only did we see a 33 percent increase in overall 

reporting, but we saw a 41 percent increase in unrestricted reporting. 

To your point, some of that was due to those who had previously 

filed restricted reports and converted those to unrestricted, which 

enabled us to then pursue those parties that may be accountable 

for that. But it is also due to increased training. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you very much. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just say that I fully agree with Senator Kaine about this 

technical careers issue in terms of the trades, because we see it in 

New Hampshire. There are a lot of jobs that are open, and it 

makes sense that our veterans can have the opportunity to get this 

training in our military, because we have such a need in our workforce for this, and there are very good paying jobs. I want to thank 

561 

you for raising that issue, and I hope that we do change that, so 

that we can really give veterans the opportunity that really fits our 

workforce as well. It is fantastic. Thank you. 

Mr. Tanner, I wanted to ask you, in the position as General 

Counsel to the Air Force, obviously, your primary responsibility is 

to advise the Air Force and to comply with the laws that Congress 

puts together. 

You would agree, correct? 

Mr. TANNER. Yes, that is correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. There is a law that was passed in the 2014 defense authorization that said that the Department of Defense may 

not retire, prepare to retire, or place in storage A–10 aircraft before 

December 31, 2014. 

Are you familiar with the provision? 

Mr. TANNER. I was not in the General Counsel’s office at the time 

of that enactment. I am generally familiar with it, but have given 

no advice, nor have I studied that provision. 

Senator AYOTTE. If you are confirmed to this position, you will 

have to give advice to comply with all of our laws. This law says 

that the Department of Defense can’t retire, prepare to retire, or 

place in storage, A–10 aircraft, not just by the end of the fiscal 

year, but by the end of the actual calendar year. 

In fact, myself and Senator Chambliss have written Secretary 

James twice, because we keep receiving numerous reports of efforts 

by the Air Force to actually make steps to retire, prepare to retire, 

or place in storage, in our view, the A–10 aircraft before Congress 

has made its decision on what it will do with the A–10. 

It is probably no secret, I am a strong supporter of the A–10. I 

believe it is the best close air support platform. But this is a debate 

that has been happening in Congress. 

We have written Secretary James on January 24 of this year, on 

April 4 of this year, on a variety of issues that have been brought 

to our attention, that we believed were in violation of the law. 

Secretary James has written back to us, and I appreciate that. 

In one instance, at least, she has said, in responding to our concerns, that she would not implement some of the changes that were 

being made through the budget year. 

But as the new potential General Counsel, I would ask you to 

really look at the fact that the law doesn’t just say that. It says 

through the calendar year. 

Now if Congress acts differently, then obviously you will take 

that into account. But will you commit to me to carefully review 

that law and to follow it? 

Mr. TANNER. Yes, ma’am. As General Counsel, it is my job to ensure that the Air Force fully complies with the plain meaning of 

the laws and regulations by which it is bound, and to advise its 

senior leadership on what compliance with those laws really 

means. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. I appreciate it, because I can assure 

you, we will be watching. 

I wanted to also ask you about the special victims’ counsel. We 

have now extended that throughout all the Service branches. You 

said that you have had a good experience in the Air Force, which 

is really what led our committee to extend the special victims’ 

562 

counsel. I was honored to work on that with Senator Murray, as 

well, across the branches. 

Have you had contact with your other counterparts in the other 

branches? Because it is my sense that they are going to be coming 

to the Air Force for advice on how to properly implement this provision. Can you give us some insight on that? 

Mr. TANNER. I have not had any contact with my counterparts 

in the other Services, as I had retired in early spring. But, if confirmed for the position of General Counsel of Air Force, I would 

look forward to working with my colleagues in the other Services 

and share with them the lessons learned from the successful implementation of the Special Victims’ Counsel Program in the Air 

Force. 

Senator AYOTTE. That would be great. I think it would be important because, really, the Air Force has been the leader on this 

issue. Now we are going to be applying this program across the 

branches, so your advice will be needed to help the other branches 

on this, to make sure that every victim of sexual assault has their 

own counsel and has that advocate within the system to ensure 

that their rights are protected within the system, so it is important. 

Mr. TANNER. If I am confirmed, I will look forward to doing that. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Now, I just wanted to say, finally, Ms. Ballentine, as you may 

be aware, Pease Air National Guard Base was selected to be the 

first Air National Guard base to receive the new KC–46A. We are 

very proud of that. 

It is pending a successful outcome of the environmental impact 

study. We had Secretary James up to visit the 157th Air Refueling 

Wing in May and to show her what we are doing at Pease. 

The Air Force issued the environmental impact study for the second main operation of the KC–46 beddown this month. There 

weren’t any significant issues identified. 

I just want to say to you, if confirmed, I look forward to working 

with you to base the KC–46A, the beddown, as the first Air National Guard unit in the country at Pease. 

We look forward to working with you, because I think that the 

new tanker is one of the success stories we have of how important 

it is to replace our Eisenhower-era tankers for the country. 

Our refueling capability really distinguishes us from other military and air forces. A lot of things distinguish us in terms of our 

Air Force compared to the world, but our refueling capability in the 

conflicts that we have been involved in has really stood out. I look 

forward to working with you on that. 

Ms. BALLENTINE. Thank you, Senator. If confirmed, I would look 

forward to working with you as well. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you all. I appreciate it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to all of you for stepping up and serving our country. It 

is very important to all of us. 

Dr. Junor, the most recent Department of Defense suicide report 

found we lost 522 servicemembers to suicide in 2012. You have 

563 

noted that the average Active Duty servicemember gets to see a 

mental health professional about once a year. 

I introduced legislation earlier this year that ensures that this 

average becomes a minimum, not only for Active Duty, but for 

Guard and Reserve. 

I was wondering what your plans are for easing access to quality 

care for members of the Guard and Reserve? 

Dr. JUNOR. Sir, this is a huge priority. The Guard and Reserve 

suicide continues to be a problem. Even last year, when our numbers were slightly better, we still had a downward turn in Guard 

and Reserve. 

The peer support, the homegrown, the State-based peer support 

initiatives, are some that have been very helpful, especially in the 

sense that it is a brotherhood. It is somebody who knows your 

problem, and so it helps reduce the stigma. 

The stigma reduction is another big issue that we are having to 

face. 

Then when it comes to just access to care, I think the Department has increased the number of behavioral health providers, but 

I am still concerned about whether it is enough. 

These are all issues I would like to address, if confirmed. 

Senator DONNELLY. The other question I wanted to ask you is 

how can we increase the role of frontline supervisors, more peerto-peer information? 

As we discussed before, I had met with the Israeli defense forces, 

and they said one of the keys is a bottom-up approach, where more 

of the squad leaders, platoon leaders, get to see that. 

I was wondering about your ideas on the kind of plans we can 

use to have more frontline supervisors’ help in this process. 

Dr. JUNOR. One of our initiatives is going to have to be, and I 

think we are moving in this direction, is going to have to be ensuring that frontline leaders recognize what signs of stress are and 

cultivate a climate that will encourage help-seeking behavior. 

There are probably 180 or so programs, DOD-wide. A fair 

amount of them are trying to provide this type of training. 

Senator DONNELLY. One part of the legislation is that we try to 

figure out what are the best practices of all of those, and that we 

hone in on those, as opposed to just running on 180 willy-nilly. 

Dr. JUNOR. They were all born for the right reasons. 

Senator DONNELLY. Exactly. 

Dr. JUNOR. But you are right. We have to figure out what is 

working, what is not, and hone in on them. 

You are very right, going back to that garrison mindset that we 

had before these complex conflicts, where commanders knew the 

folks under their command, almost like a family relationship, and 

so they knew signs of stress early on and were able to encourage 

that help-seeking behavior. I think that is what we are all looking 

to go back to. 

Times have changed. The millennials are different. But I think 

we are moving in that direction. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. 

Ms. Wada, thank you for being here. I was fortunate enough to 

serve with Ms. Wada over at the House. We worked together, travVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00571 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
564 

eled overseas to see our troops together. I want to thank you for 

your efforts here. 

Having that background, how critical do you think it is to ensure 

transparency and timeliness in your dealings with this committee 

and with Congress? Can we count on you to do that? 

Ms. WADA. Sir, you certainly can. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. Additionally, one of the things that we 

have been blessed with is having military fellows in our office. This 

year we have an Army fellow who is a noncomissioned officer. In 

a town where there are so many officers, it is a refreshing perspective to have. 

We were wondering about the Army’s commitment to trying to 

have a real diverse group of people be part of the fellows program. 

Ms. WADA. Sir, if confirmed, I understand that the Army has initiated a diverse fellowship program, and I would assume that it 

would continue. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. 

One other question for you, and that is, how do we maintain a 

high level of readiness in the Guard as we go through decreasing 

budgets, decreasing deployments? You have this balancing act, and 

how do we keep our Guard sharp and ready at the same time that 

we balance the needs of the Army? 

Ms. WADA. Sir, at this point, I am not sure that I could answer 

that question specifically. If confirmed, I think I would say that I 

would work with the Secretary, obviously, the Secretary of Defense, 

and Congress to make sure we have a balanced approach to our 

Armed Forces, to make sure it is a comprehensive total force. 

Senator DONNELLY. I think you are going to see in this position 

that that is one of the things you will be spending an amazing 

amount of time on, trying to get that right, and trying to make 

sure that we take a forward look at what we are going to need, how 

we are going to implement, how do we use our Guard and Reserves 

after these many, many years. 

We have great confidence in your ability to do that, but I think 

that is going to be a big portion of your time. 

Mr. Tanner, I wanted to ask you about privacy protection for 

servicemembers seeking mental health support. 

One of the concerns that servicemembers have had over the 

years is, if they go seek to talk to somebody, feel like they are having some personal challenges, there has been a real hesitancy to do 

that, thinking, ‘‘I might not be able to get to the next step in the 

rung on promotion. People may look at me a little different.’’ 

You have a unique position that can have an effect on this, so 

I was wondering your views on how we maintain the privacy protection of our servicemembers while still making sure that they are 

willing to talk to us to seek help. 

Mr. TANNER. The Air Force encourages its members who are 

dealing with tough issues, whether they are mental health issues 

or other related issues, to seek counsel and advice from peers, from 

trained professionals, from its leaders. 

If confirmed, I would work very hard with the Air Force leadership to ensure that not only are all current laws fully enforced, and 

that there be training on those laws about privacy protections for 

565 

members and, in some instances, their dependents, but to enhance 

those to encourage that full and free flow of information. 

Senator DONNELLY. The last thing we want to see is somebody 

who is struggling be hesitant to seek help, because they are worried about, ‘‘Will people start to look at me sideways because of 

this?’’ 

My feeling is, if they are struggling and they go seek help, that 

is a positive thing, as opposed to any type of black mark on their 

career. 

Mr. TANNER. Yes, sir. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with you and this committee, if changes were necessary to the 

present law to increase the opportunity for that engagement. 

Senator DONNELLY. Great. 

In conclusion, I want to thank all of you again for stepping up 

to serve your country. 

To all the families, thank you for your family’s sacrifices. This is 

very, very important work you are going to be doing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly. 

We are all set? 

Okay, we thank you all for your testimony, for your willingness 

to serve, for your patriotism, for your family’s support. We thank 

them, including some children who were attempting very hard to 

look interested. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. It is really important, and I hope the kids understand how important it is that they be here, and how grateful 

their mom is for their being here today. 

Now if they are here instead of school, then maybe I will be less 

flattering. But my hunch is they are done with school for the year, 

is that correct? 

Senator DONNELLY. Mr. Chairman, do you have authority to 

write a note, just in case? [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. I think you just gave me authority to write a 

note, just in case. I don’t know if I have it, but I do now. 

Thank you all, and we will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:51 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Laura J. Junor by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I do not see the need for any modifications. I believe that the GoldwaterNichols Act has significantly contributed to the strong framework for today’s joint 

warfighting capabilities. It has considerably improved interservice and joint relationships, promoting greater effectiveness of the military departments and combatant commands. 

566 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. Currently I am unaware of any areas where modifications are needed. 

If I am confirmed, I will continue to assess any further need to legislative modifications. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. For the last 3 years I have served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Readiness. In this capacity, my primary responsibility is to ensure that 

our military is effectively manned, trained, and equipped to safely and effectively 

perform its assigned missions. 

I’ve spent the last 20 years of my career specifically focused on understanding and 

managing military readiness. I’ve been part of the build-up of conflicts in two theaters, and the drawdowns of both. In addition, I gathered experience understanding 

some of the issues facing the Reserve component. I spent several years after Hurricane Katrina supporting the Department of Homeland Security, the National Guard 

Bureau, and the National Guards of several States understanding and effectively articulating the Nation’s preparedness for responding to a homeland crisis. 

I also understand, and have seen empirically that there is no greater readiness 

determinant than the quality of our force. Effectively recruiting and retaining a superior military and civilian workforce is our single most effective hedge against a 

host of negative factors. In that sense, the opportunity to more directly influence 

the policies supporting these men and women will be a natural extension of my efforts to create a ready and resilient force. 

I began my career in readiness as an analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses 

in 1994 and have also served previously as a readiness analyst in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD). I am an economist both by training and practice and 

favor an analytic approach to most problems. This perspective serves me well in providing defendable and reproducible means for solving even the most complex problems. My work has directly influenced policy on a range of topics including spares 

and maintenance, aviation training, contingency sourcing, recruiting and retention, 

and response options for domestic emergencies. 

I was born a military dependent and married a naval officer. In that sense I am 

familiar with the scope of issues facing military families, and am sensitive to the 

unique circumstances, challenges, and sacrifices made as part of the commitment 

to service to our Nation. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)? 

Answer. The Office of the USD(P&R) oversees one of the most complex and diverse portfolios in the Department. We are responsible for servicemember support 

from recruiting, educating, health care, transitioning, and retirement. During this 

Service lifecycle, we educate military children and care for families through child 

care, healthcare, on-base schools, commissaries, and morale, welfare and recreation 

services. Each of these areas will be affected by budget choices and will subsequently affect the lives of our servicemembers. 

The Department is facing a host of challenges, but no matter is more urgent than 

resolving the critical issues of sexual assault, suicide prevention, and the treatment 

of the spectrum of mental/behavioral health disorders—especially those that are a 

product of the wars we’ve been in for the last 13 years. These issues not only matter 

on moral and compassionate grounds, but they threaten our ability to generate resilient, cohesive, and predictably ready units. 

The Department must also prepare for the likelihood of a more competitive labor 

market not just in highly technical fields like space and cyber, but also in high-demand fields like special operations, aviation, and the range of health services. In 

doing so, we must continue to evolve how we manage, compensate, and support our 

workforce so that we can attract, recruit, and retain an exceptionally qualified force. 

The Department is also in the midst of a profound transition from the longest war 

in our Nation’s history. For the last decade, the vast majority of our force generation 

capabilities have been uniquely focused on meeting the intense demand for counterinsurgency and irregular warfare missions, and for that mission, we have been exceptionally prepared. The cost of this sustainment, however, has been our ability to 

maintain the full-spectrum capabilities required for a high-end conflict. It will take 

considerable time and focused investment to regrow these capabilities. This is chalVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00574 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
567 

lenging under any circumstance, but it is especially difficult in a fiscally austere environment. The competition for resources should not degrade our ability to respond 

to conflicts that threaten the safety of our Nation and those who took an oath to 

defend it. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. Acting Under Secretary Wright, Secretary Hagel, and Deputy Secretary 

Work have clearly said that addressing the challenges identified above are among 

their highest priorities. If confirmed, I will support those initiatives. For example, 

I look forward to supporting Secretary Hagel’s and Acting Under Secretary Wright’s 

proactive, individual-focused, and multi-disciplinary approach to supporting victims 

of sexual assault. I also strongly support the Department’s plans to intensify efforts 

to prevent these crimes in the first place. Similarly, I would be proud to support 

ongoing efforts in the area of suicide prevention and providing help for those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Those efforts include getting in front of 

the problem by building resilience and coping skills that target risk factors; furthering our understanding through data and analysis, ensuring front line leaders 

create a climate that encourages members to seek help, and improving access to 

quality care. 

If confirmed, I also look forward to the findings of the Military Compensation and 

Retirement Modernization Commission and supporting a comprehensive approach to 

providing benefits and support to our servicemembers. A comprehensive approach 

would recognize the criticality of providing the training and equipment they need 

to come home as well as reflects the realities of a competitive and evolving labor 

market and the immense sacrifices already paid by those in our ranks. In the course 

of my current responsibilities, I am already deeply committed to evolving our military capabilities from the wars we’ve been in to a broader and less certain set of 

requirements that we will inevitably face—all without forgetting the hard fought 

lessons of our past. If confirmed, I look forward to expanding this work to include 

a deeper understanding of how to protect our most valuable asset: the quality of our 

workforce. 

I understand the power of collaboration, both within and outside the building. I 

have a track record of transparent, inclusive, and cooperative approaches to resolving issues. I intend to continue this practice by working closely with Congress, colleagues in OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, other governmental agencies, and advocacy groups. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 136a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Principal Deputy 

USD(P&R) shall assist the USD(P&R) in the performance of his or her duties. 

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect to be assigned to you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to carry out my responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities, in accordance with the law and consistent with DOD Directive 5124.08, ‘‘Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.’’ Under the direction of the USD(P&R), I would support with all responsibilities in providing staff advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense, including 

but not limited to Total Force management; National Guard and Reserve component 

affairs; health affairs; readiness and training; military and civilian personnel requirements; language; dependents’ education; equal opportunity; morale, welfare, 

and recreation; and quality-of-life matters. 

Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your relationship with the 

following officials: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense to assign me my duties, 

through the USD(P&R), functions, and responsibilities currently mandated by law 

and specified in the Department’s directives for the position of Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect my relationship with the Deputy Secretary 

to be fundamentally the same as that with the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)). 

Answer. If I am confirmed, the ASD(HA) would be my principal advisor for all 

DOD health policies, programs, and force health protection activities. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)). 

Answer. If I am confirmed, the ASD(RA) would be my principal advisor for all Reserve component matters in the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Question. The Department of Defense General Counsel. 

568 

Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate regular communication, coordination of 

actions, and exchange of views with the General Counsel and the attorneys assigned 

to focus on personnel and readiness policy matters. I would expect to seek and follow the advice of the General Counsel on legal, policy, and procedural matters pertaining to the policies promulgated from the USD(P&R). 

Question. The Department of Defense Inspector General. 

Answer. The DOD Inspector General is in charge of promoting integrity, accountability, and improvement of DOD personnel, programs and operations to support the 

Department’s mission and serve the public interest. If confirmed, I will fully assist 

in any investigations or issues that relate to personnel and readiness. 

Question. The Service Secretaries. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would hope to work closely with the Secretaries of the 

military departments on all matters relating to the management, well-being, and 

readiness of military and civilian personnel in the DOD Total Force structure. 

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to the Secretary 

of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving 

non-Federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined by the 

Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I would work through ASD(RA) to ensure effective integration of National Guard capabilities into a cohesive Total Force. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would intend to further strengthen the partnership with 

these officials in carrying out the human resource obligations of the Services for the 

Total Force. 

Question. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force for Personnel, 

the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to partner in effective working relationships with 

these officers to ensure that DOD attracts, motivates, and retains the quality people 

it needs. 

Question. The combatant commanders. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would foster mutually respectful working relationships 

that translate into providing the Total Force capabilities and readiness needed to 

complete combat missions. 

Question. The Joint Staff, particularly the Director for Manpower and Personnel 

(J–1). 

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek a close coordinating relationship and open 

channels of communication with the Joint Staff regarding personnel and readiness 

policy issues. 

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question. Servicemembers and civilians who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service and the Federal Government 

for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return 

to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support 

after retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis over the past several years, many challenges remain. 

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the Services 

to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured 

servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. The Department has made progress by actively working with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to establish joint policy guidance, processes, and 

metrics for coordination. However, there is still more work to do. If confirmed, I will 

ensure we will continue to work toward a seamless transition from recovery to reintegration or transition for our wounded, ill or injured. Additionally, I will continue 

the Department’s collaborative efforts with the VA on compensation and benefits, 

transition assistance and care coordination. If confirmed, I would look forward to 

working with Congress on this critical issue. 

Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based? 

Answer. Our covenant with our wounded warriors and their families is perhaps 

one of the Department’s greatest strengths, and one that we must continue to build 

upon. This commitment must guide our efforts to refine care and case management, 

including how to continue improving all aspects of the process online to reduce complexity and processing times. 

Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected? 

569 

Answer. Going forward we’ll need to figure out how to accommodate the unique 

needs of each Service and be able to scale our support based on the evolving needs 

of our servicemembers. As we reduce our combat operations, we must ensure that 

we do not lose the capabilities and capacity to provide that support. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, 

and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. Caring for and supporting servicemembers and their families will always 

be a top priority for the Department. If confirmed, I will work to execute this core 

mission of the Office of the USD(P&R), continually evaluating our programs and efforts, examining what resourcing and authorities are needed to further that goal. 

Linking efforts with community-based resources continues to be vital to ensure full 

re-integration into civilian life. 

Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at Walter Reed Army 

Medical Center in 2007 pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system. The Integrated DES (IDES) program was established to integrate the DOD and 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability systems to improve and expedite 

processing of servicemembers through the disability evaluation system. While the 

processing times under the IDES were initially encouraging, servicemembers are 

now mired in long VA disability rating and case disposition wait times, and the VA’s 

portion of the system appears to be overloaded. 

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the IDES? 

Answer. DOD continually evaluates IDES to identify and implement process improvements. DOD completed an initial congressional study on the feasibility of a 

Consolidated Disability Evaluation System in 2013. An additional key initiative underway is the development of a joint IT solution to provide new capabilities that will 

support end-to-end IDES case management—tracking, reporting, and electronic case 

file transfer. If confirmed, we will continue to work with VA to ensure system interface requirements are identified and planned for, from conception to deployment. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change? 

Answer. We will continue to work toward a more efficient IDES by engaging senior leadership within OSD and the Services, as well as capitalizing on information 

and recommendations presented to us by the Department of Defense Task Force on 

the Care, Management, and Transition of Recovering Wounded, Ill, and Injured 

Members of the Armed Forces, Government Accountability Office, and Military Department Inspector Generals. Most importantly, if confirmed, I will hear directly 

from the servicemembers themselves going through the IDES process. Where there 

are redundancies or gaps that need to be addressed by changing policy, we will do 

so. We will continue to collaborate with our VA partners to identify necessary 

changes and appropriately address them. 

Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that the 

Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs (VA) achieve the administration’s objectives in DOD and VA collaboration? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the partnership efforts embraced by Acting 

Secretary Wright and her VA counterpart. I will ensure the DOD continues to work 

closely with VA in supporting our men and women in uniform and their families, 

and our Veterans. I will continue the DOD’s engagement with VA to consider a complete range of issues as we seek process improvements and information exchanges, 

and use of key enablers to provide a seamless lifetime experience for our Service 

men and women, and our Veterans. 

VOLUNTARY EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Question. The Department continues to seek ways to improve oversight of its tuition assistance programs, including standardizing eligibility criteria among the 

Services and requiring all schools who accept tuition assistance funding, whether for 

online courses or on-post, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department which will, among other things, subject online schools to Departmental audits. 

What is your assessment of the tuition assistance program in light of the needs 

of the Services and the current budget environment? 

Answer. The Tuition Assistance program is important to DOD because it enables 

off-duty professional and personal academic development of our servicemembers. It 

has the added benefit of facilitating their transition to the civilian workforce when 

they are ready to leave the military. If confirmed, I will continue the work with the 

Services to sustain the appropriate level of resources for this program. 

Question. What is your view of tuition assistance as a transition benefit for 

servicemembers to obtain civilian licenses and credentials? 

570 

Answer. Tuition Assistance (TA) is a very valuable tool in assisting servicemembers to earn civilian licenses and credentials prior to separation from military 

service. TA can be used to pay for academic coursework that supports earning a credential or licensure when part of an approved academic degree plan. Furthermore, 

earning a professional credential or license broadens servicemembers’ occupational 

knowledge and furthers their contribution to the military ‘‘profession of arms’’. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working with the military departments to increase opportunities for servicemembers to use their tuition assistance. 

Question. What is your view of proposed changes to the so-called 90/10 rule that 

would require academic institutions to derive no more than 85 percent of their revenue from Federal sources, including DOD tuition assistance and VA GI Bill funding? 

Answer. I have no objection to the proposal to include title 10 Tuition Assistance 

funds in the Federal portion of the 90/10 calculation. However, it would be appropriate that any statutory changes to the proposed 90/10 rule reside with the Department of Education. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do DOD policies concerning religious accommodation in 

the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who 

have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. In my view, current DOD policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion for all servicemembers. The Department respects and supports, by 

its policy, the rights of servicemembers to their own religious beliefs, including the 

right to hold no beliefs. 

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers 

offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the 

proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her 

religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs? 

Answer. Existing DOD policies provide military chaplains with the guidance to 

allow prayer in accordance with the tenets of their faith, while respecting, in both 

formal and informal settings, the rights of others who may hold different or no religious beliefs. The Chaplaincies of the Military Departments train and equip chaplains with the knowledge and skills to fulfill this responsibility. Specifically, the Department protects, and supports by its policy, the rights of a chaplain to refuse, 

without any adverse action, any duty that is contrary to his or her conscience, moral 

principles or religious beliefs. 

Question. Section 533 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112–239), as amended by section 532 of the NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2014 (P.L. 113–66) protects rights of conscience of members of the Armed 

Forces and chaplains of such members, and prohibits, so far as possible, use of such 

beliefs as the basis of any adverse personnel action, discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some religious denominations have sincerely held beliefs in opposition to same-sex marriage. 

In your view, may a member of the Armed Forces who has a sincerely held belief 

in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse personnel action or similar 

other adverse action, if he or she shares those personal views on the subject in a 

personal capacity? 

Answer. No. Servicemembers are entitled to express their personal views in personal conversations. However, servicemembers speaking in their official capacities 

are expected not to use their positions as a forum to express their personal views, 

especially when dealing with subordinates. 

READINESS RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., gives the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness certain responsibilities for military readiness. Some important issues that affect military readiness, however, such as logistics and materiel 

readiness, have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

What is your assessment of the impacts and challenges to DOD readiness as a 

result of sequestration? 

Answer. The sequester-imposed cuts in fiscal year 2013, coupled with having to 

operate under a 6-month continuing resolution, contributed to degraded readiness 

and hindered our initial readiness recovery plans. In addition, sequestration impacted the DOD’s ability to generate the ready forces necessary to meet the requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00578 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
571 

ments of a rapidly evolving and complex security environment. Although we are 

meeting current operational requirements with well trained and equipped units, this 

is getting more difficult. The brunt of the sequester effects our ability to generate 

forces to meet contingency surge requirements. This is a serious concern. Some of 

these effects will take considerable time and resources to reverse. The Secretary has 

stated for the record that sequestration-level funding limits would yield a force that 

is too small and not ready enough to meet the Nation’s security objectives. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of our Armed Forces 

to execute the National Military Strategy? 

Answer. The investments made in our Armed Forces have helped maintain our 

military’s standing as the most formidable force in the world. We remain able to 

meet the most critical ongoing operational and presence requirements that the Nation asks of us, however this is getting more difficult as we continue to feel the 

after-effects of sequester and more than a decade of war. What is at risk is our ability to generate the surge required for a high-end emergent crisis and this is a serious concern. 

Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges to the current 

readiness of our Armed Forces? 

Answer. The defense strategy outlines three primary pillars—defend the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively when called upon. 

The most significant challenge is that current budget constraints and the aftereffects of sequestration will inhibit the Services’ efforts to regain full-spectrum readiness in order to successfully meet the tenets of the defense strategy. 

The Services made deliberate plans to shift from counterinsurgency-focused operations to address more globalized, full spectrum warfighter requirements, but those 

plans will require time and consistent funding to materialize. A return to Budget 

Control Act levels of funding in fiscal year 2016 and beyond will put readiness recovery at risk. Specifically, training opportunities and equipment condition are our 

primary concerns in preserving readiness across the force. 

Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and relationship to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness in ensuring military readiness, including materiel readiness? 

Answer. One of the responsibilities of the USD(P&R) is to oversee the total readiness of the force. There are many pipelines across the Department that come together to create readiness. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness oversees a critical portion of the readiness pipelines. Total force 

readiness depends on materiel readiness and logistics. We have a strong working 

relationship that I currently enjoy and will absolutely maintain. If confirmed, I will 

continue to build this relationship and thereby build a greater understanding of 

readiness across the Department. 

Question. What are the most critical objectives to improve readiness reporting and 

monitoring of the military forces, and if confirmed, how would you work with the 

Military Departments as well as other OSD offices to achieve them? 

Answer. Although monitoring the status of unit readiness and how that fits into 

overall joint readiness is important, the most critical element of readiness management is the ability to monitor the health of the pipelines that support it. Metrics 

in these areas provide a more complete picture of readiness as well as provide key 

indicators that are essential to forecasting readiness problems. In my current capacity, I have overseen dramatic improvements in the Department’s ability to monitor 

readiness along these lines. 

If confirmed, I will continue my close partnership with the Services, the Joint 

Staff, the combatant commanders, and other OSD partners to systematically monitor these pipelines, articulate the likely operational consequences, and provide mitigation options. 

Question. Do you believe the current system adequately sets and documents 

standards for military readiness and provides for timely, accurate readiness reporting to establish necessary confidence that our regular and Reserve Forces are not 

only ‘‘ready with what’’ but ‘‘ready for what’’? 

Answer. Yes. The Defense Readiness Reporting System directly addresses the 

‘‘ready for what’’ question by focusing on mission capability as expressed by a units’ 

mission essential task list. It assesses the readiness of all organizations throughout 

the Department to perform not only their high end combat mission but also their 

assigned missions such as counterinsurgency or disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. 

Question. What do you believe is the role of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness in advocating for Readiness resources during the DOD 

572 

budget build process. Do you believe that the appropriate level of resources are 

being allocated to readiness accounts? 

Answer. The USD(P&R), as the Department’s lead readiness advocate, provides 

direct input to the budget build process each year. It is our responsibility to monitor 

the Services’ ability to generate ready forces and the combatant commanders’ ability 

to execute assigned priority plans and ongoing operations. In keeping with this responsibility, USD(P&R) must understand and clearly articulate the consequence of 

readiness degradations and what is causing them. The USD(P&R) is also responsible for providing a complete range of mitigation options as part of the Department’s formal program budget review process. This responsibility benefits from constant collaboration with the Joint Staff, the Services, as well as other offices within 

OSD. 

Thanks to congressional action to raise the discretionary caps posed by the Budget 

Control Act of 2011, the 2013 Bipartisan Budget Agreement has afforded the Department the opportunity to restore healthy levels of readiness funding for fiscal 

year 2014 and fiscal year 2015. Overseas Contingency Operations funding in fiscal 

year 2014 also supported the Services’ ability to begin addressing their most acute 

readiness deficiencies. 

The fiscal year 2015 budget proposal reflects the Services’ resolve to slow the 

readiness decline. Specifically, they shifted funding so that they could start climbing 

out of personnel, training, and maintenance backlogs. In doing this, the Services almost universally moved money out of procurement and facilities sustainment accounts. While this strategy is defendable in the near-term, this imbalance across 

resourcing areas is untenable in the long-term. Future budget uncertainty marked 

by the looming return of BCA-level funding is by far our greatest readiness concern. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work tirelessly in promoting a responsible resource 

strategy that allows for viable and sustainable readiness across the Department. 

Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) with respect to the Global Response Force? 

Answer. The USD(P&R) monitors the readiness levels of units across the Services 

and articulates the capacity of the Services to provide forces. USD(P&R) collaborates 

with the Joint Staff to evaluate sourcing solutions, which include the Global Response Force (GRF), in order to balance risk to force generation with risk to mission 

requirements and presents mitigation options to the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the USD(P&R), in its role as the DOD-wide sponsor for joint training and combatant command exercises and engagement, facilitates the exercise of the GRF 

across all echelons of the force. 

MEDICAL MARIJUANA

Question. What is your assessment on the need for legitimate scientific study of 

the efficacy of medical marijuana in alleviating the symptoms of post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD) experienced by servicemembers and veterans? 

Answer. The Department supports only rigorously designed, scientifically sound, 

and lawful research efforts that adequately protect human subjects and align with 

programmatic requirements. A research proposal with the potential to help improve 

the lives of those affected by PTSD and meeting these requirements would be given 

consideration. We note with interest that the Public Health Service has recently approved such a study to provide 50 veterans diagnosed with chronic, treatment-resistant PTSD with marijuana in various potencies. It is awaiting final approval from 

the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. If confirmed, I will review the results 

of that study, if the study is approved. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCHOOLS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

Question. Some have questioned the continuing need for DOD-operated schools for 

military dependent children within the Continental United States (CONUS). 

In light of the administration’s request for additional Base Realignment and Closure authorities and fiscal constraints, should DOD establish or update its criteria 

for the continued operation of DOD schools within CONUS? 

Answer. The Department understands the importance of education and the role 

it plays in the success, stability, readiness, and retention of servicemembers and 

their families. The Department is committed to quality educational opportunities for 

all military children, while balancing cost and exploring all options and alternatives. 

In 2013, the Department initiated a study to consider the need for DOD to own 

and operate DOD Schools within the United States and to evaluate other options. 

The study findings will be provided to the Department in September 2014. 

Question. If so, and if confirmed, how would you approach this task? 

573 

Answer. If confirmed, I will consider the study’s findings in addition to direct feedback from the military community, and advocacy and professional groups, and force 

management projections in determining the best options for providing education 

support for military families. I will do this in consultation with the Military Departments and in collaboration with Congress. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE POLICY

Question. The fiscal year 2013 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual 

Assault in the Military reflects that reports of sexual assault in the military increased by 50 percent from fiscal year 2012 to 5061 reports of sexual assault. 

What is your assessment of this report? 

Answer. We are encouraged that more men and women are coming forward to report a sexual assault, get care and support, and give us an opportunity to hold offenders appropriately accountable. That being said, we have much more to do to prevent this horrible crime. There is evidence supporting the hypothesis that this unprecedented increase is the result of increased confidence victims have in the system. I have not seen evidence that the recent spike in reporting is due to a concurrent increase in crime. 

The survey being conducted by RAND this summer will give us an indication 

what kind of impact we’re having on the prevalence of sexual assault. 

Question. What is your assessment of DOD sexual assault prevention and response program? 

Answer. Senior leader focus has fundamentally improved the Department’s approach in the past 2 years. The Services have implemented a number of programs 

designed to improve victim confidence, including reforms to the military justice system, the creation of dedicated legal support to victims, enhanced access to victim 

advocacy, and increased training and awareness for the entire force. While many of 

the recent changes have been response focused, the best thing we can do is to prevent the crime. To this end, last month Secretary Hagel directed the implementation of an updated Department-wide Sexual Assault Prevention Strategy that was 

developed in collaboration with civilian experts and is intensely focused on shaping 

the environment where servicemembers live and work. 

Sexual assault is a complex problem, with no easy solutions. The Department continues to implement a multi-disciplinary approach, and, if confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring sustained progress, persistence, and innovation as we work to 

eliminate sexual assault from the military. We will continue to work closely with 

Congress to address this problem. The resulting reforms and policy changes are 

going to take time to implement and assess. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. Giving victims reporting options is at the heart of the DOD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program. Restricted and unrestricted reporting was recommended to us in 2004 by a panel of experts, and we implemented 

these options in 2005. Since that time, a quarter of reports made to us each year 

are in the form of restricted reports. While the Department desires an environment 

where all victims feel free to make an unrestricted report, some victims will never 

be comfortable accessing care and support in that way. As a result, restricted reporting was enacted to provide victims a means to heal while respecting their privacy. 

Since 2005, more than 5,000 servicemembers have used the restricted reporting option, underscoring the need for the option as a way to provide critical medical care 

and support to victims. 

Many civilian jurisdictions have adopted similar reporting options. Confidential 

reporting—or in our case restricted reporting—appears to becoming standard practice in this country. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. Commanders and leaders at all levels are key to our professional response to this crime. Victims must know that they will be respected and supported 

throughout the justice process. We believe that some of the increase in reporting 

that occurred last year was because victims heard the messages of our leadership 

and believed that in coming forward they would be provided the full range of timely 

and responsive care, and treated with the sensitivity and privacy they deserve. The 

Department has taken a number of steps in order to educate frontline leaders about 

their responsibilities—not just to victims of sexual assault—but also in creating a 

command climate free of sexual assault. 

574 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help 

they need? 

Answer. We have made a lot of progress in this area, but we are going to have 

to watch closely to make sure the changes we’ve made are working and that no gaps 

in support remain. Nevertheless, we can and should do more. We’ve benefited from 

a number of organizations looking at how we are providing victims with the many 

kinds of help they need—the Government Accountability Office, the Defense Task 

Force on Sexual Assault in the Military, and soon, the Response Systems Panel. We 

have accepted almost every recommendation made to us—and instituted additional 

services and reforms as a result of our own evaluative work—learning from the perspectives of these groups is a very good thing. 

Some of the specific reforms include offering special victims counsel to provide victims with legal representation, providing professionally certified responders, offering 

expedited transfers, ensuring that every case is treated as a medical emergency, updating our sexual assault examination protocols, combatting negative treatment and 

retaliation, and ensuring the availability of anonymous worldwide 24/7 crisis support through Safe Helpline. These are just a few of the services available to victims. 

Victim support is critical part of healing the trauma caused by these incidents. 

It’s also critical in increasing the odds that a victim will be willing and able to meet 

the very intense demands of the criminal justice system (military or civilian). Victims have to believe that we will support them, and then we have to deliver on that 

support. If confirmed, I look forward to working on this issue. Specifically, working 

with Congress and learning from the perspective of groups inside and outside of the 

Department. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Department has taken to prevent 

additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. My view is that the Department is taking a comprehensive, evidence-informed approach to preventing this crime. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries 

of the Military Departments, and the Joint Chiefs have all been working together 

on the 28 initiatives enacted over the past 2 years to improve our approach to sexual assault. We have also welcomed the assistance we’ve received from Congress 

and the 60+ provisions of law enacted that has fundamentally changed how the Department responds to sexual assault. Many of these provisions have focused on enhancing our care for victims and improving our ability to hold offenders appropriately accountable. However, experts tell us that improved response and deterrence are just part of a much larger approach that must include dedicated work of 

prevention. In order to solve a complex problem like sexual assault in an institution 

as large and spread out as the U.S. Armed Forces, we need a comprehensive approach—one that leverages every amount of influence, planning, and persistence the 

Department can muster. Consequently, the Department tasked itself with updating 

its Sexual Assault Prevention Strategy—a Department wide roadmap that reflects 

a wide range of integrated policies and programs to influence behavior, shape the 

environment, and reduce the crime of sexual assault. 

In developing this updated strategy, the Department has been working with the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Justice, State sexual 

assault coalitions, civilian colleges and universities, and other researchers to identify and incorporate the best practices in sexual assault prevention. The updated 

sexual assault prevention strategy is designed to take action at every level of military society to advance a comprehensive prevention approach. Our military leaders 

are at the core of this approach and must work every day to create a healthy command climate in their units; ensure deterrence and accountability for misconduct 

consistent with military values; provide training and empowerment for all personnel 

to intervene in incidents they believe to be at risk for sexual harassment and assault; and mentor their personnel using leadership and role-modeling as a way to 

develop healthy work and personal relationship skills. 

In sum, prevention is a comprehensive, sustained focus on creating an environment that actively deters and interferes with a perpetrator’s attempts to commit a 

crime. We are committed to producing such an environment in the Department. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the 

military departments have in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. Last year, each Service established a Special Victims Capability to improve the investigation and prosecution of allegations of sexual assault, child abuse, 

and serious domestic violence, and to provide specialized support for victims of such 

offenses. The capability consists of investigators, prosecutors, paralegals, victim/witness program professionals who are selected, trained, and certified to respond to 

sexual assault. Through these capabilities, the Services are training and equipping 

575 

professionals to improve and enhance victim care, victim support, and prosecution 

support, and provide a more comprehensive, integrated, and standardized response 

to allegations of these crimes. 

Over the last year, we also dedicated additional resources to continue specialized 

training on trauma-impacted memory and interviewing techniques to ensure military criminal investigators are using research-proven best practices when questioning victims. Also, as of 1 January 2014, each Service now offers victims of sexual 

assault a dedicated attorney to provide representation and consultation throughout 

the military justice process. There are currently 185 trained attorneys in place to 

support victims of each military Service, ensuring victims know their rights and understand the justice system. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. As we have seen in other recent military culture changes, establishing 

appropriate culture starts at the top with commanders and leaders, leading by example and enforcing standards of conduct. Central to our approach is requiring 

leaders at all levels to foster a command climate where sexist behaviors, sexual harassment, and sexual assault are not condoned or ignored; where dignity and respect 

are core values we live by and define how we treat one another; where victims’ reports are treated with the utmost seriousness, their privacy is protected, and they 

are treated with sensitivity; where bystanders are motivated to intervene to prevent 

unsafe behaviors; and where offenders know they will be held appropriately accountable by a strong and effective system of justice. 

Secretary Hagel has recently directed important new initiatives to make the command structure more accountable. These reforms include fielding methods to better 

assess command climate, mandatory forwarding of command climate surveys to the 

next level in the chain of command, and elevating status reports of sexual assault 

allegations to the first general/flag officer in the chain to ensure appropriate response to every case (victim care, investigative actions, unit climate, and actions 

taken). 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. We talk about sending our servicemembers into ‘‘harm’s way’’ a lot and 

the need for servicemembers to follow the orders of their commanders. The crux of 

this concept rests on the principle that every person in a unit has to believe in an 

instinctive and immediate sense that when a commander tells them to do something: (a) that the order is lawful, ethical, moral, and exactly the right thing to do 

for the successful accomplishment of that mission; and (b) the commander places the 

welfare of every person in the command before his/her own. A commander who 

would interfere with the successful investigation or disposition of a crime based on 

his or her own welfare is simply intolerable. Similarly, a commander who allows the 

routine harassment, ridicule, or discrimination of servicemembers trusted in his/her 

care is equally unfit and must be fired from that position. 

Based on this logic, absolving a commander of the responsibility of doing the right 

thing is a big thought. It would suggest a lack of confidence in command. My fear 

is that it will inject doubt where we need that instinctive and immediate faith. I 

strongly prefer that the disposition authority remain in the command structure. 

That said, I also strongly support requiring senior level review of decisions not to 

proceed with prosecution of sexual assault cases. I expect a series of NDAA changes 

over the last few years to help the Department better address allegations of sexual 

assault and help ensure appropriate accountability 

If confirmed, I am committed to increasing victim confidence and ensuring that 

dignity and respect are guaranteed attributes of every organization in this Department. More specifically, I’d look forward to supporting Secretary Hagel’s efforts on 

prevention, including those involving gauging and improving command climate. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the military? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Department’s efforts to prevent the occurrence of sexual assault. But, when crimes do occur, we must have comprehensive, 

effective, accessible, and responsive investigative and victim assistance services 

available. 

I will work to ensure that our program continues to educate all servicemembers, 

frontline commanders and leaders and hold them accountable in establishing a climate of dignity and respect. I will also support our DOD Sexual Assault Prevention 

Strategic Plan and the 28 Secretary of Defense directives to address this crime. The 

Department must sustain our current level of attention, focus, and emphasis 

throughout the entire organization. 

576 

We recognize how difficult this problem is to solve and that it will take a multidisciplinary approach. There have been a lot of beneficial changes to law, policy, and 

processes over the last few years. We should continue to collect and monitor command climate, prevalence, and case data to ensure that the changes we’ve made are 

working as intended and to look for areas we’ve missed. I also support staying tuned 

to the research literature and victims’ groups for exactly the same reason. 

SERVICE ACADEMIES

Question. What do you consider to be the policy and procedural elements that 

must be in place at each of the Service Academies in order to prevent and respond 

appropriately to sexual assaults and sexual harassment and to ensure essential 

oversight? 

Answer. Sexual assault has no place at the Military Service Academies. To advance a cadet and midshipman culture that embraces dignity and respect, Secretary 

Hagel directed each Academy to implement sexual assault and sexual harassment 

prevention and response strategic plans that are aligned with the strategic plans 

of their respective Service. These strategic plans ensure a coordinated effort of instilling our future leaders with the ability to take action when faced with situations 

at risk for sexual assault, sexual harassment, and inappropriate behavior of any 

kind. If confirmed, I will review and assess these efforts, as well as ensure that each 

Academy provides appropriate support for victims of this crime. 

Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Service Academies 

to ensure religious tolerance and respect, and to prevent sexual assaults and sexual 

harassment? 

Answer. In the past few years, the Academies’ leadership has emphasized the 

need for greater respect for the rights of others to their own religious beliefs, including the right to hold no beliefs. 

In January, Secretary Hagel directed a number of initiatives to enhance the Academies’ climates of dignity and respect. If confirmed, I will remain committed to ensuring that the Department trains its future leaders to establish and be committed 

to fostering a climate where sexual assault, sexual harassment, and inappropriate 

behavior and attitudes are not tolerated. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Department, in January 2013, rescinded the policy restricting the 

assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging 

in direct ground combat operations, and gave the Military Services until January 

1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception 

to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. 

The Services are working now to develop gender-free physical and mental standards 

for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards. 

If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor the progress the Services are making toward 

integration of females into previously closed occupations and positions, and will 

work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs as this 

effort progresses. The Department will continue to notify Congress before opening 

additional positions. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Absolutely. Public Law 103–160, section 543, prohibits DOD from changing an occupational performance standard for the purpose of increasing or decreasing the number of women in that occupational career field. The Department is 

aware of, and complying with, this law. We are committed to opening positions and 

occupations when and how it makes sense, while preserving unit readiness, cohesion, and the quality of the All-Volunteer Force. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you take to ensure that such 

decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. Absolutely, they should be based on a scientific determination of the requirements to perform each occupational specialty. If confirmed, I will fulfill the responsibilities of my office by reviewing each request to open positions and evaluate 

such requests for compliance with statutory requirements and impact on the readiness of the All-Volunteer Force. 

Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about assigning women 

to what are currently male-only combat units. 

577 

To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem in the implementation 

of this policy? 

Answer. I expect our commanders to select the best qualified personnel for assignment regardless of gender, and to create a command climate that focuses on mission 

accomplishment while treating each person under their command with dignity and 

respect. Since mid-2012, we have successfully integrated women into formerly maleonly units. We are incorporating this experience as we progress. 

MENTAL HEALTH CARE

Question. Senior military leaders have long recognized the need to reduce the stigma for military personnel and their families and veterans in seeking mental health 

care, yet we continue to hear from servicemembers that the stigma persists. 

If confirmed, what actions will you take to reduce the stigma associated with 

seeking mental health care by military personnel and their families? 

Answer. I am deeply committed to countering the stigma associated with getting 

help for mental and behavioral health concerns. The thought of our servicemembers 

or their dependents creating or suffering from a barrier in receiving care is heartbreaking. Simply put, getting quality care works; these conditions can be treated. 

I look forward to the time where Americans approach mental health with the same 

comfort level that they approach physical health. 

The Department provides a number of self-help initiatives and other resources to 

meet the needs of servicemembers and their families for mental health care and is 

working to address the barriers (real or perceived) that may prevent them from 

seeking help. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department’s efforts designed to reduce the stigma associated with seeking mental health care, encourage 

help-seeking behavior and increase the use of available resources among 

servicemembers and their families. I am also prepared to work across the Services 

to ensure an integrated approach with necessary resources for ongoing mental 

health research, prevention, and evidence-based treatment efforts that will continue 

to allow the Department to provide high-quality, timely mental healthcare services. 

Question. In your view, are DOD’s current mental health resources adequate to 

serve all Active Duty and eligible Reserve component members and their families, 

as well as retirees and their dependents? 

Answer. Absolutely. Since September 11, with the support of Congress, DOD has 

increased the outlays for mental health care by a 12 percent compounded annual 

rate, roughly quadrupling care rendered between the beginning of fiscal year 2002 

to the beginning of fiscal year 2014. On average, each member of the active Duty 

force is seen by a mental health professional one and a half times per year. Care 

is embedded into primary care clinics and fighting units. Mental health providers 

in Military Health System (MHS) Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) have been 

increased by 50 percent, to nearly 10,000. Further, TRICARE network assets have 

been bolstered to better serve reservists, dependents, and retirees. A total of 65,000 

mental health providers are available in the purchased care network. DOD provides 

state of the art substance abuse care, including medical therapies for addiction and 

confidential alcohol abuse treatment, and one of the finest benefits for autism spectrum disorders in the Nation, including care to provide early intervention. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The number of suicides in each of the Services continues to be of great 

concern to the committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to help prevent 

suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all 

servicemembers and their families? 

Answer. Suicide among our men and women in uniform is one of the greatest concerns of our entire leadership across DOD, and one I share closely. In the last few 

years, and under my early direction, the department has taken several steps to address suicide. It has issued new policies, identified key roles and responsibilities for 

prevention and resilience, addressed rate calculations, established new partnerships 

with other Federal agencies, particularly with the Department of Veterans Affairs, 

and collaborations with community organizations, and has led the Nation in suicide 

prevention research. 

If confirmed, I intend to improve data collection that can better inform risk and 

protective factors within our force and their families and ensure that programs are 

evaluated, aligned to a strategy, and show effectiveness. Continued outreach, peer 

support, and resilience skills training are efforts that I will ensure reach all of our 

active and Reserve components and that their families understand what resources 

are available to them as well. The resilience of the force must be equal to the readiVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00585 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
578 

ness of the force and the same successful approaches I have had with ensuring readiness, I will apply to resilience. 

END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

Question. In this year’s budget request and Future Years Defense Program, the 

Department proposes making additional cuts to the Army’s Active and Reserve component end strengths, as well as the Marine Corps’ Active Duty end strength. The 

Department proposes reducing the Army Active component to 450,000 by 2019, and 

further to 420,000 if sequestration continues in fiscal year 2016 and beyond, and 

the Marine Corps to 182,000, or 175,000 if sequester continues. 

In your view, can the Army and the Marine Corps meet national defense objectives at the strength levels proposed without sequestration? What about at the 

strength levels proposed with sequestration? 

Answer. Yes, the Army and Marine Corps can meet national defense objectives 

at the force levels associated with the Department’s proposed fiscal year 2015 budget submission. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review articulates the Department’s 

commitment to transitioning to a smaller but capable and ready force over the next 

5 years. Towards that end, end strength proposed in the President’s Budget for fiscal year 2015, specifically a 440–450K Active Duty Army and 182K Active Duty Marine Corps, allows the Army and Marine Corps to maintain a balanced ready and 

modern force. 

A return to sequestration would force the Army and Marine Corps to further reduce their end-strength numbers to 420K and 175K, respectively. This would undoubtedly jeopardize the Army and Marine Corps’ ability to fully implement the defense strategy. 

Question. If the Army and Marine Corps must reduce their Active component end 

strengths to 420,000 and 175,000, respectively, where does the Department take 

risk with respect to the national defense strategy? 

Answer. If the Army and Marine Corps were compelled to further reduce their 

end strength beyond their existing drawdown plans, there would be additional risk 

in conducting a broad range of military operations worldwide. Specifically, their decreased ability to respond to a major contingency operation could result in extended 

timelines and increased casualties. 

Furthermore, the Army and Marine Corps would be hard-pressed to maintain acceptable deployment-to-dwell rates to meet unrelenting global operational demands. 

This would place added stress on a smaller force and jeopardize our continued 

pledge to take care of our men and women in uniform. 

Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping 

tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past 3 years? 

Answer. Congress has supported the Department with the force shaping tools necessary to meet the drawdown under its current plan. However, as we have progressed through the drawdown, we learned where and how minor changes to the 

existing authorities could make our force shaping both more effective and more efficient. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress to effect these minor 

changes to legislation to meet reduced end strengths. 

The Department remains concerned that continued budget reductions may make 

it necessary to revisit the size of all components of the Total Force—Active Duty 

military, Reserve component military, DOD civilians, and contractors. Consequently, 

future assessment may require us to request additional Congressional authorization 

for force shaping tools. 

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life 

programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD’s budget declines. 

How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment and retention 

and quality of life programs and your own top priorities for the Armed Forces? 

Answer. Our most valuable resource is our people. If I am confirmed, the programs that support our servicemembers and their families will remain one of my 

top priorities. We must care for our people, particularly as our ability to recruit and 

retain the very best servicemembers becomes more challenging. 

If confirmed, what military quality of life programs would you consider a priority, 

and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family 

advocacy groups, and Congress to sustain them? 

Answer. Military quality of life programs comprise a vast range of services that 

support servicemembers and their families in many different ways. Programs such 

579 

as Morale, Welfare and Recreation fitness opportunities and Child and Youth Programs, for example, help minimize stress on the force. These programs should promote a work-life balance and address the unique challenges associated with military 

service, such as deployments, frequent relocations and financial readiness. The Department is working with a host of interagency and non-governmental collaborators, 

as well as Congress, to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs. We 

also have made a deliberate effort to communicate effectively to ensure that families 

know how to access available support when they need it. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work to promote interagency collaboration and 

Service coordination and advance these objectives. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Servicemembers and their families in both the Active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go 

with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for 

servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that 

family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced? 

Answer. We must recognize that every family has unique needs, requiring a flexible and responsive network of services to deliver support at the right time, using 

the most effective methods. Following more than a decade of war and the ongoing 

draw down, we must be ready to continue supporting families. In particular, it is 

important to assist the surge of Active component servicemembers and families 

transitioning from military to civilian life; and for our Reserve component 

servicemembers and families, the focus must remain on reintegration. It is critical 

that servicemembers, their families, and their survivors receive information about 

available support services and resources through communication vehicles they prefer and trust. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program will continue to provide 

support for the Reserve component servicemembers in remote locations. We must 

continue outreach, education, awareness, and engagement strategies to promote 

servicemember and family readiness programs. 

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global 

rebasing, Base Realignments and Closings (BRAC), deployments, and future reductions in end strength? 

Answer. We must be capable of enabling Services, staff, and resources to be 

surged or evolved, as needed, to respond swiftly and effectively to the changing 

needs of servicemembers and their families during peacetime, war, periods of force 

structure change, relocation of military units, base realignment and closure, crisis, 

natural disaster, and other emergency situations. Close collaboration with and between the Services, as well as interagency and non-governmental resources providing family support needs, will ensure that we continue to provide timely support 

while finding the most effective and efficient ways of doing so. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as 

to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation? 

Answer. I consider the needs of geographically dispersed military families, including those who serve in the Reserve component, of equal importance to the needs of 

all other military families. Implementation of quality assurance measures for Reserve component family readiness programs that meets national accreditation standards supports the overall mission of military family readiness. This approach requires constant coordination with the Services and each of the Reserve components 

to ensure that we are responsive and inclusive. Since 2008, the Yellow Ribbon Integration Program has led our support efforts with this population, providing access 

to deployment cycle information, resources, programs, services, and referrals to 

more than 1.3 million servicemembers and their families. The Yellow Ribbon Integration Program eases transitions for servicemembers and families as they move between their military and civilian roles. Our geographically diverse populations are 

also supported by the Joint Family Support Assistance Program which works to 

build capacity to identify and meet evolving needs at the local community level 

where these families live, work, and attend school. To augment and enable that 

local support, Military OneSource provides support to military families, military 

leadership, and military and civilian service providers through delivery of information, referrals, and non-medical counseling. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to sustain family support programs, given current fiscal constraints? 

580 

Answer. Family support programs that are flexible, responsive, and communicate 

and coordinate with interagency and non-governmental family services are critical 

to meet the enduring needs of our servicemembers and their families, whether they 

live on, near, or far from military installations. If confirmed, I will continue to work 

to ensure that resources are used efficiently and effectively to support our families. 

Our collaboration with others who share our interest in the support of military families is key. Working together with the Services, we can find efficiencies and enhance 

the accessibility of support when and where it is needed and at the right level. 

Question. In your view, does the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 

have unique family readiness and support requirements? If so, in your view, are 

those needs adequately being met by each of the Military Services at this time? If 

they are not adequately being addressed, if confirmed, how would you address these 

unique needs? 

Answer. I believe SOCOM families do have unique support requirements. The deployment rates are among the highest in the Department. Even when they are 

home, they have arduous training requirements. Deployment locations tend to be extremely austere and they are far less likely to be able to maintain reliable contact 

with families. We know that suicide rates, divorce rates, and incidents of risky behavior have remained high over the last few years. Aside from being ethical and 

compassionate concerns, these are also increasingly impacting unit readiness. 

P&R components continue to work closely with SOCOM to identify family support 

requirements that are unique to this community, analyze current support provided 

by the Services, and identify and address gaps in family support provided to the 

SOF community. If confirmed, I look forward to expanding my support for this 

issue. 

OFFICE OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FAMILIES WITH SPECIAL NEEDS

Question. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Congress required the establishment 

of an Office of Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs within 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The purpose of this office is to enhance and improve DOD support for military families with 

special needs, whether educational or medical in nature. 

In your view, what should be the priorities of this Office of Community Support 

for Military Families with Special Needs? 

Answer. The Office of Community Support for Military Families with Special 

Needs endeavors to strengthen personnel readiness for military families with special 

needs through the development of comprehensive and uniform policies, oversight of 

programs, identification of gaps in services, and facilitation of access to resources 

that support military families with special needs. The Exceptional Family Member 

Program (EFMP) currently supports military families with special health and/or 

educational needs in three component areas: identification/enrollment, assignment 

coordination to determine the availability of services at a projected location, and 

family support to help families identify and access programs and services. 

If confirmed, I look forward to reaching the Departments goal of enabling military 

families with special needs to have the same level of access to EFMP support, regardless of Service affiliation or location, with a particular emphasis on military 

families stationed at joint or sister Service installations. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, retirees, and their families. 

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining MWR programs, particularly in view 

of the current fiscal environment and, if confirmed, are there any improvements you 

would seek to achieve? 

Answer. Our ability to deliver Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs 

to our military families is impacted by changes in our basing, deployment patterns 

and force structure. With more than 75 percent of military families now living off 

installation, there is an increasing need for partnerships and support from local governments, school systems and businesses to ensure we continue to provide comprehensive, accessible, and affordable recreation programs. To explore improvements 

further, we are conducting a major assessment of MWR programs to ensure they 

are being operated in as efficient and cost-effective manner as possible. If confirmed, 

I will work to ensure that we continue to provide these important services to our 

servicemembers and their families. 

581 

COMMISSARY AND MILITARY EXCHANGE SYSTEMS

Question. Commissary and military exchange systems are significant quality of 

life components for members of the Active and Reserve Forces, retirees, and their 

families. 

What is your view of the need for modernization of business policies and practices 

in the commissary and exchange systems, and what do you view as the most promising avenues for change to achieve modernization goals? 

Answer. Commissary and exchange programs and policies must continue to evolve 

to meet the needs and expectations of our changing force and marketplace. Efforts 

should be aimed at reducing overhead and pursuing new avenues to reach our military families who do not live on military installations. The military resale community must continue to work, individually and collaboratively, to adapt marketing 

and selling practices, invest in technologies, and improve merchandise availability 

to be responsive to the evolving needs of their military customers. They should continue to deliver customer savings, strive to achieve high customer satisfaction ratings, and deliver exchange dividends in support of our MWR programs. 

The Department takes great care to weigh the potential effects of any proposed 

changes on our servicemembers and their families as we consider efficiencies that 

may impact the commissary and exchange benefits. 

Question. What is your view of the proposals by some to consolidate or eliminate 

Commissaries and Exchanges in certain areas where they are underused or duplicative of services readily available at reasonable cost in the community? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would review any proposals aimed at reducing overhead, 

which may include closing underutilized locations or eliminating duplicative services. 

I recognize that commissary and exchange programs are important elements of 

the servicemembers’ compensation package and contribute to the quality of life of 

military personnel and their families. The fiscal realities facing DOD today and in 

the foreseeable future require that we evaluate all options that will maximize the 

effectiveness of our compensation benefits while reducing costs. If confirmed, I will 

proactively engage with the committee if we believe a change in statute is needed 

to operate our military resale system more efficiently and effectively. 

Question. In the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to establish an executive governing body for the 

commissary and exchange systems to ensure the complementary operation of the 

two systems. 

What is your understanding of the purpose and composition of the executive governing body? 

Answer. To fulfill the requirement of the law, the Department established the 

DOD Executive Resale Board as the governing body to provide advice to the 

USD(P&R) regarding the complementary operation of the commissary and exchange 

systems. The Board reviews and advises on cross-functional matters important to 

the military resale system. The Board is invaluable in leading cooperative efforts 

and resolving issues of concern resulting in increased efficiency and effectiveness of 

the overall system. 

The Board is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and 

Force Management, and members include both the senior military officers and civilians who oversee and manage the commissary and exchange systems. 

Question. If confirmed, what would your role be with respect to the governing 

body, and what would your expectations be for its role? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Board continues to meet regularly to review operational areas of interest across the military resale system and continues 

to promote significant efficiencies through cooperative efforts. The Board is crucial 

to balancing competing needs and providing consistent and coordinated input to inform any decisions to be made regarding these important benefits. 

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

Question. Section 1113 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 provides DOD with extensive personnel flexibilities for its civilian employees that are not available to 

other agencies. In particular, section 9902(a) of title 5, U.S.C., as added by section 

1113, directs the Department to establish a new performance management system 

for all of its employees. Section 9902(b) directs the Department to develop a streamlined new hiring system that is designed to better fulfill DOD’s mission needs, 

produce high-quality applicants, and support timely personnel decisions. 

What is your understanding of the current status of the Department’s efforts to 

implement the authority provided by section 1113? 

582 

Answer. I understand the Department’s plans for the performance management 

system, workforce incentives, and hiring flexibilities were informed by recommendations developed by DOD employees, supervisors, and managers representing labor 

and management from across the Department. Our plans were submitted to the 

Armed Services Committees at the end of March 2013. The collaborative labor-management pre-decisional recommendations for the personnel authorities were widely 

adopted by the Department. 

Leaders in the Department continue to make good progress toward the implementation of their decisions on the personnel authorities. Working with our national 

unions, we are developing the new appraisal system, which will be a multi-level rating pattern characterized by a uniform appraisal period for covered employees, and 

the ability to make meaningful distinctions in levels of performance. If confirmed, 

I will continue to support the work that is underway to comply with statute. 

Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement these flexibilities 

in a manner that best meets the needs of the Department and promotes the quality 

of the Department’s civilian workforce? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will make it my priority to implement those flexibilities that would promote the quality of the Department’s civilian workforce to ensure 

accomplishment of the Department’s missions. 

Question. Section 1112 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the Department 

to develop a Defense Civilian Leadership Program to recruit, train, and advance a 

new generation of civilian leaders for the Department. Section 1112 provides the Department with the full range of authorities available for demonstration programs 

under section 4703 of title 5, U.S.C., including the authority to compensate participants on the basis of qualifications, performance, and market conditions. These 

flexibilities are not otherwise available to DOD. 

Do you agree that the Department needs to recruit highly qualified civilian personnel to meet the growing needs of its acquisition, technical, business, and financial communities? 

Answer. Yes, I agree that recruiting highly qualified civilian personnel both in 

mission critical occupations, such as acquisition, human resources, information technology, and financial management, and in leadership positions across the Department is essential to mission success. 

Question. In your view, has the existing civilian hiring process been successful in 

recruiting such personnel and meeting these needs? 

Answer. While I believe the Department currently has a highly talented workforce, I also wholeheartedly support initiatives to further streamline the civilian hiring process. The Department embraces a simplified, transparent hiring system that 

meets the needs of stakeholders, attracts quality candidates, and reduces the time 

to fill a vacancy. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to actively 

engage in pursuing continued improvements in the civilian hiring process. 

Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement the authority provided by section 1112 in a manner that best meets the needs of the Department 

and promotes the quality of the Department’s civilian workforce? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to continue implementing the authority provided by section 1112. The Department recognizes the need for a sound 

leader-development model to attract, retain, and develop civilian leaders to support 

readiness, enhance bench strength, and promote the quality of the Department’s civilian workforce. I will continue implementing the authority provided to ensure a 

successful framework for developing the next generation of innovative leaders to 

meet the Department’s future needs. 

HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING

Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., as added by section 1108 of the NDAA 

for 2010, requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and update in every evennumbered year a strategic human capital plan that specifically identifies gaps in the 

Department’s civilian workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. Section 

115b requires that the plan include chapters specifically addressing the Department’s senior management, functional, and technical workforce and the Department’s acquisition workforce. 

Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies gaps in the 

workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key step toward ensuring 

that the Department has the skills and capabilities needed to meet future challenges? 

Answer. Yes. I believe such planning helps to position the Department to acquire, 

develop, and maintain the workforce it needs to meet current and future mission 

challenges. 

583 

Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements for a strategic 

human capital plan under section 115b? 

Answer. At this time we appreciate the help of past legislation that put the Department on a biennial reporting cycle. We continue to progress on meeting the requirements for a strategic human capital plan under section 115b, and will continue 

to institutionalize our processes and assess the need for any changes as we continue 

in this important endeavor. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies with these requirements? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work toward ensuring the Department fully complies with statutory strategic workforce planning requirements. 

Question. Since the time that the Department’s most recent strategic human capital plan was issued, its civilian workforce plans have been significantly altered by 

the changed budget environment and extensive efficiencies initiatives. 

What role do you believe human capital planning should play in determining 

where reductions in the civilian workforce can be taken with the lowest level of 

risk? 

Answer. Any reductions in the civilian workforce should be informed by the Department’s strategic workforce plan to determine where reductions can be taken 

with the lowest level of risk, with the understanding that short-term exceptions may 

be necessary due to emerging dynamics in this fiscal environment. In the future, 

the forecasts for the Department’s workforce must be based on validated mission requirements and workload, both current and projected, and any reductions in the civilian workforce must be made in the context of the Total Force and directly linked 

to workload so as to not adversely impact overall mission capabilities. 

Question. Would you agree that the strategic human capital plan required by section 115b should be updated to more accurately reflect the Department’s current 

workforce plans and requirements? 

Answer. Yes. The planning process should be updated to be more aligned and integrated with the Department’s programing and budget process, and meet the requirements for a total force mix and competencies assessments. In preparing for fiscal year 2013 through 2018, we conducted a pilot study that examined the total 

force mix based on the workforce requirements and relationships in high risk mission critical occupations. We have launched a tool to collect competency gap information for all mission critical occupations to analyze gaps that will lead to strategies 

for mitigation. These processes will take several planning cycles, and functional 

communities are preparing for further assessment and implementation. 

Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that civilian 

workforce levels are determined on the basis of careful planning and long-term requirements, rather than by arbitrary goals or targets? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize that civilian workforce levels must be 

planned based on long-term strategic planning requirements. Forecasts for the Department’s workforce must be based on validated mission requirements and directly 

linked to workload so as to not adversely impact overall mission capabilities. 

DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WORKFORCE

Question. Section 955 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 required the Secretary 

of Defense to develop a plan to reduce the size of the civilian personnel workforce 

by 5 percent over the next 5 years. The plan developed by the Secretary does not 

meet this objective. Since the time that section 955 was enacted, the Department 

has implemented hiring freezes and furloughs as a result of sequestration. As a result, the DOD civilian personnel workforce is substantially smaller than it was on 

the date of enactment or at the time the plan was submitted. 

Do you agree that DOD’s civilian employee workforce plays a vital role in the 

functioning of the Department? 

Answer. I absolutely agree that civilians are vital to the Department. They help 

provide the critical equipment maintenance, base support, logistics and engineering 

expertise, family programs, and medical care that ensure our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are ready to deploy, world-wide, and answer the call of our commanders in executing the national defense posture. Additionally, we have dedicated 

civilians serving as critical enablers in essential functions such as acquisition, contract management, quality control, auditing, engineering and design, and financial 

management. Moreover, civilians are a key element of our national security strategy, serving as operators in areas such as intelligence, cybersecurity, security assistance, and stability operations. 

584 

Question. Do you agree that if sequestration continues through fiscal year 2014 

and beyond, the Department will need to further reduce the size of its civilian workforce? 

Answer. I believe that if we are faced with further budgetary reductions as a result of sequestration, we will see significant adverse and untenable impacts on all 

areas and programs of the Department, including the civilian workforce. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that any reductions to the civilian workforce are balanced and executed in the context of the Department’s Total Force management 

principles, ensuring the appropriate and most cost effective alignment of work. 

Question. In your view, would it be preferable for the Department to make 

planned, prioritized reductions to its civilian workforce, or to continue with arbitrary reductions based on hiring freezes and workforce attrition? 

Answer. Yes, planned and prioritized reductions to the civilian workforce aligned 

to mission divestiture and a decrease in workload are preferable. Reductions based 

on hiring freezes and workforce attrition may result in unintended consequences 

such as loss of required skills and competencies, unnecessary gaps in mission execution, and inappropriate realignment of workload to other elements of the Department’s Total Force. 

BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Question. DOD employs many contractors whom now play an integral role in the 

performance of functions that were once performed exclusively by government employees, including the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of policies, the development of public relations strategies, and even the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in the 

same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the 

same functions as Federal employees. Contractors continued to be hired as many 

civilian positions remained on a hiring freeze over the past few years. 

Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees and contractor 

employees is in the best interests of the Department? 

Answer. The Department uses a Total Force approach to manage its workload. 

Contractors are an important element of the Total Force and provide flexibility and 

technical competence. However, we must be careful to ensure work is appropriately 

assigned to military personnel (Active/Reserve), civilian employees, or contract support. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department continues its efforts to implement a Total Force strategy that aligns functions and work to military, civilian, and 

contract support in a cost effective and balanced manner, consistent with workload 

requirements, funding availability, laws, and regulations. 

Question. In your view, has the Department become too reliant on contractors to 

perform its basic functions? 

Answer. We must be constantly vigilant in assessing the extent of our reliance 

on contractors and ensuring that we do not have an erosion of critical skills and 

competencies, particularly in our scientific, technology, and engineering communities all of which are critical to maintain operational readiness and superiority. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department continues to implement robust 

workforce review processes that are geared to ensuring the Department is not overly 

reliant on contracted services and is making the most economical workforce alignment decisions. 

Question. Do you believe that the Department should undertake a comprehensive 

reappraisal of ‘‘inherently governmental functions’’ and other critical government 

functions, and how they are performed? 

Answer. No, I do not believe a comprehensive reappraisal is necessary. The Department’s policies are aligned to recent Federal Government-wide policy, which was 

published in 2011 in response to congressional direction. If confirmed, I will ensure 

that the Department meets its statutory obligations to review annually the alignment of workload to ensure that inherently governmental functions are properly 

aligned to the government workforce. Further, I will endeavor to ensure that critical 

functions of the Department are being performed by the appropriate workforce, with 

sufficient oversight and management, and in a manner that meets operational 

needs, while mitigating risk and reducing unnecessary cost. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate officials in the Department to review the contractor and civilian force mix? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with my colleagues across the Department 

to ensure reviews of workforce mix are conducted, as required by statute and the 

Department’s policies. 

585 

Question. Would you agree that the balance between civilian employees and contractor employees in performing departmental functions should be determined by 

the best interests of the Department and not by artificial constraints on the number 

of civilian employees? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to remove any artificial constraints placed 

on the size of the Department’s civilian workforce, so that the Department can hire 

the number of employees most appropriate to accomplish its mission? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work to ensure policies and procedures for workforce shaping are consistent with statutory requirements and that the workforce is 

managed to available budget and workload. 

SERGEANT BOWE BERGDAHL

Question. Following the recent repatriation of Sergeant Bergdahl after 5 years of 

captivity with foreign fighters there have been questions about the circumstances 

under which he became separated from his unit in Afghanistan in 2009. 

If confirmed, what is your understanding of your role as Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, concerning review of the facts 

and circumstances of Sergeant Bergdahl’s capture and his status as a member of 

the U.S. Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, my role would be to provide the Secretary of Defense and 

the Secretary of the Army with appropriate recommendations regarding DOD statutes, regulations, and policies. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015

1. Senator WICKER. Dr. Junor, the fiscal year 2015 President’s budget request 

(PBR) for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) cuts 

the budget by $26.4 million from the fiscal year 2014 baseline of $24.3 million. This 

cut includes a reduction of 385 full-time equivalents (ref: p. 307 of the Department 

of the Army fiscal year 2015 President’s budget submission). As the Joint National 

Committee for Languages and the National Council for Languages and International Studies (JNCL–NCLIS) understand the situation, the manpower reduction 

at DLIFLC is necessitated by an Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

manpower review, which asserts that the stated mission requirement for DLIFLC 

is 2/2/1+ (Listening/Reading/Speaking) on the Interagency Language Roundtable 

Proficiency Scale. Under PBR–721, DLIFLC was tasked with a mission requirement 

of 2+/2+/2, based on a classified inter-Service Language Needs Assessments and a 

needs assessment by the National Security Agency. Meeting the higher language 

proficiency requirements identified in these needs assessments requires implementation of new levels of people, equipment, and funding. 

586 

There is an apparent mismatch between TRADOC’s understanding of requirements for DLIFLC and the requirements assigned DLIFLC by the Intelligence Community (IC). In your role as the Senior Language Authority for the Department of 

Defense (DOD), you have oversight of all DOD policy related to language (ref: DOD 

Directive 5160.41E, Defense Language Program). How will you ensure that valid 

and accurate requirements for both the strategic needs of the IC and the tactical 

needs of the Services are reflected in the DOD guidance for DLIFLC and that DOD 

guidance is funded under current executive agency’s Service-level budgeting processes? 

Dr. JUNOR. Documenting valid and accurate strategic and tactical language requirements and then ensuring that budgeting processes reflect those requirements 

is essential to ensuring the viability of this capability across the Department. Language capability, like so many other critical operational capabilities, is in the midst 

of a transition from the intense focus on the wars we’ve been in to a broader operational spectrum spanning the entire globe. At the same time we are negotiating 

intense budget pressures that make affording the readiness we know we need exceptionally difficult. 

That said, we have a responsibility to first know what our requirements are, second communicate them effectively, and third advocate for those requirements during 

the budget process. Here’s how we intend to meet this responsibility: 

Specific guidelines for capturing language requirements are contained in DOD 

policies and the 2011–2016 DOD Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities, which represents the Services, the combatant 

commands, the Intelligence Community, and other key DOD agencies. One of my 

current focus areas is to ensure that these requirements stay current and are accurately documented so we know how much of what type of language capabilities we 

must create or maintain. 

With these requirements in mind, I review and assess the DLIFLC continuously 

with Army, as the Executive Agent of the DLIFLC, and key DOD stakeholders including other Services and the Intelligence Community. I host an annual program 

review of DLIFLC past, current, and future year budgets, issues, and achievements 

while working closely across the Services to ensure Department-wide language requirements are addressed and resourced. When necessary, we recommend 

resourcing solutions to meet highest priority mission requirements outlined in DOD 

guidance. 

For example, in 2013 I sought and received over-hire authority for the Army to 

increase the teaching staff at DLIFLC to ensure the training mission would not be 

disrupted during Budget Control Act considerations. At the same time, I established 

special working groups to review the end-to-end processes of language training, including requirements identification, Service assignments to DLIFLC, and academic 

instruction. 

In fiscal year 2014, I established an agency-wide working group to review the entire career field of language professionals within the Services, the Intelligence Community, and the Defense agencies. At the heart of this review is improving the processes to better identify Intelligence Community and Service language requirements; 

how the Services and the Executive Agent make assignments to DLIFLC; and the 

utilization and retention of DLIFLC graduates in their career fields in the Defense 

department. Based on these analyses, I will continue to work with all the stakeholders to ensure that DLIFLC is adequately staffed and resourced. 

[The nomination reference of Dr. Laura J. Junor follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

February 27, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Laura J. Junor of Virginia, to be a Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 

vice Jo Ann Rooney, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Dr. Laura J. Junor, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:] 

587 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DR. LAURA J. JUNOR

Education: 

Prince George’s Community College 

• 1984–1986 

Goucher College 

• 1986–1988 

• MA Economics (1988) 

George Mason University 

• 1988–1993 

• MA Economics (1992) 

• PhD Economics (1993) 

Employment Record: 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) 

• June 2011–Present 

Office of the Director, Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation 

• Special Assistant 

• October 2009–June 2011 

Readiness Logic LLC (Self Employed) 

• Consultant 

• August 2007–September 2009 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)/CNA Corporation 

• Analytic Advisor/Interagency Director (IPA) 

• November 2003–July 2007 

CNA Corporation 

• Deputy Team Lead for Readiness 

• July 1994–November 2003 

Tulane University 

• Visiting Assistant Professor in Economics 

• June 1993–July 1994 

Honors and awards: 

• Research Assistant/Teaching Assistant; George Mason University Economics Department 

• Dissertation Fellowship; George Mason University Center for Public 

Choice 

• Department of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Award (Two Awards, 

both awarded in 2011) 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Dr. Laura J. Junor in connection with her 

nomination follows:] 

588 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Laura Jean Junor 

Laura Jean Thompson (maiden name) 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness. 

3. Date of nomination: 

February 27, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

May 26, 1966; Andrews Air Force Base, MD. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Thomas J. Junor III. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Madeline Ann Junor; age: 16. 

Evelyn Larue Junor; age: 7. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

George Mason University, 1988–1993: Ph.D. Economics (1993), MA Economics 

(1992). 

Goucher College, 1986–1988: MA Economics (1988). 

Prince George’s Community College, 1984–1986. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Title Employer Location Dates 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Readiness).

Under Secretary Personnel & 

Readiness 

4000 Defense Pentagon, 

Washington, DC 20301 

06/2011–present 

Special Assistant .................................... Director, Cost Assessment & 

Program Evaluation 

1800 Defense Pentagon, 

Washington, DC 20301 

10/2009–06/2011 

Consultant ............................................... Self (Readiness Logic LLC) 6113 Lemon Thyme Drive, 

Alexandria, VA 22310 

8/2007–9/2009 

IPA/Analytic Advisor ................................ CNA Corporation 4000 Defense Pentagon, 

Washington, DC 20301 

11/2003–7/2007 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

589 

See positions listed in question 9. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

None. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None. 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Research Assistant/Teaching Assistant; George Mason University Economics Department 

Dissertation Fellowship; George Mason University Center for Public Choice 

Two Department of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Awards (both 2011). 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

With Thomas Dyches. ‘‘Lowering the Spigot on the Beer Keg: Strategies for Contingency Sourcing Under Uncertainty’’ In The New Guard and Reserve. Edited by 

John Winkler and Barbara Bicksler, Falcon Books, 2009. 

‘‘The Defense Readiness Reporting System: A New Tool for Force Management,’’ 

Joint Forces Quarterly, 2005. 

With Jessica Oi, ‘‘Understanding Aircraft Readiness: An Empirical Approach’’, 

CNA Corporation, 1997. 

With Jim Jondrow, Peter Francis, and Jessica Oi, ‘‘A New Approach to Modeling 

Ship Readiness’’, CNA Corporation, 1996. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) if confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

590 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

LAURA J. JUNOR. 

This 24th day of March, 2014. 

[The nomination of Dr. Laura J. Junor was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 24, 2014, with the recommendation 

that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed 

by the Senate on July 31, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Gordon O. Tanner by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. At this time I am unaware of any reason to amend the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act. If I am confirmed and I identify areas that I believe merit changes, I will propose those changes through the established process. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. See my prior answer. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Air Force 

General Counsel? 

Answer. The duties and functions of the General Counsel are determined and assigned by the Secretary of the Air Force. The General Counsel provides legal advice 

and guidance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, their 

staffs, and other offices within the Office of the Secretary, as well as to the Chief 

of Staff and the rest of the Air Staff. The General Counsel also provides legal services throughout the entire Department in a variety of disciplines including fiscal 

law, ethics, dispute resolution, contract law, environmental law, international law, 

intellectual property law, real property law, personnel law, labor law, and litigation. 

The General Counsel determines the controlling legal positions of the Department 

of the Air Force. The General Counsel also serves as the Designated Agency Ethics 

Official, the Suspension and Debarring Official for the Department of the Air Force, 

and the Dispute Resolution Specialist and exercises oversight of intelligence and 

other sensitive activities and investigations. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I believe that my education and over 40 years of practice—in both public 

service and private practice—have well prepared me for the challenges of this office. 

I received a Bachelors of Arts degree from the University of Alabama and was commissioned as a Distinguished Graduate through its Air Force ROTC program. I attended the Vanderbilt University School of Law where I received a J.D. degree. 

While in law school I worked for the Tennessee Legislative Council to assist memVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00598 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
591 

bers of the Tennessee Legislature to draft proposed legislation. Upon passing the 

State bar examination, I began 4 years of Active Duty military service as a Judge 

Advocate at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL. At the expiration of my Active Duty commitment, I returned to my hometown and joined the law firm of McDermott, 

Slepian, Windom & Reed and undertook my first assignment in the Air Force Reserve as the Staff Judge Advocate of the 926 Tactical Fighter Group in New Orleans, LA. I remained with the same law firm and its successor, Sirote & Permutt 

for approximately 20 years. Likewise, I remained in the Air Force Reserves and retired as a colonel after 24 years of service. I believe that my experience as both an 

Active Duty and Reserve judge advocate; my 12 years of service in the Air Force 

General Counsel’s office, culminating with 22 months as the Principal Deputy General Counsel; my opportunities to serve as both a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force (Reserve Affairs) and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); as well as my experience in private practice 

at a law firm with national and international clients, have prepared me for the challenging and diverse legal issues that will face the Department of the Air Force. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Air Force General Counsel? 

Answer. I believe I have the necessary legal training, experience and leadership 

abilities to be the General Counsel. This is especially true given my experience as 

the Principal Deputy General Counsel and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Manpower and Reserve Affairs, as well as my career as a Reserve Air Force judge 

advocate. I am also a firm believer, however, that the best lawyers work hard to 

completely understand the operations of their client. If confirmed, I will benefit from 

the extraordinary talent, expertise and experience of the civilian and military lawyers in the Department as I broaden my understanding of the issues the Air Force 

faces every day. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of the Air Force would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate Secretary James will expect me to provide timely, accurate, and candid legal advice and counsel, ensuring compliance with the law 

and the protection of the legal prerogatives of the Department. I expect the duties 

and functions of the office will cover the wide range of legal issues and responsibilities prescribed by the Secretary. I anticipate the Secretary would expect me to 

manage the General Counsel’s Office efficiently and effectively. Additionally, I anticipate the Secretary would expect me to foster an atmosphere of professionalism 

and responsiveness regarding all legal matters and services while working with the 

Office of The Judge Advocate General, the General Counsels of the Department of 

Defense (DOD) and the other military departments, as well as the legal staffs of 

other government agencies. 

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely and collaboratively with the General 

Counsel of the Department of Defense. Although the General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force does not have a direct reporting relationship with the DOD 

General Counsel, the DOD General Counsel is by law (title 10 U.S.C. section 140(b)) 

and by regulation (DOD Directive 5145.01), the chief legal officer of the Department 

of Defense. If confirmed, I anticipate having a close and professional relationship 

with the DOD General Counsel, characterized by continuing consultation, communication, and cooperation on matters of mutual interest, in furtherance of the best 

interests of DOD. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Air 

Force General Counsel? 

Answer. The challenges facing the Department of the Air Force as a whole, as 

well as DOD, will largely determine the challenges that will confront the General 

Counsel of the Air Force. Secretary Hagel has made clear that institutional reform 

will be a priority in the near term, and I expect that to be a priority for the General 

Counsel of the Air Force as well. Secretary Hagel’s concept of institutional reform 

has three components: (1) Reform and reshape our defense enterprise; (2) Direct 

more resources to military capabilities and readiness; and (3) Make organizations 

flatter and more responsive. Secretary James is working on reshaping our defense 

enterprise. Under her leadership the Air Force budget execution and budget submission are shifting more resources to military readiness and modernization. Finally, 

she has made significant efforts to flatten our organization by reducing our manageVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00599 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
592 

ment staff by 20 percent in a single year. Secretary Hagel and Secretary James will 

continue to make these efforts priorities and therefore they will be mine as well. 

Although the current environment makes it difficult to anticipate all specific legal 

questions, I also expect to confront issues relating to operational matters, intelligence, privatization initiatives, military and civilian personnel policies, and compliance with environmental laws. In addressing these challenges, I think it will be 

critically important that the Office of the General Counsel and the Office of The 

Judge Advocate General have a cooperative and professional partnership. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan on working closely with the Secretary, the Chief of 

Staff, The Judge Advocate General, and the talented and dedicated attorneys in the 

Department of the Air Force to candidly evaluate the challenges and to ensure responsive and accurate legal services are provided to meet and address these challenges. In addition, if confirmed, I will work to expertly staff the Air Force legal 

community, in order to guarantee decisionmakers at all levels access to the best 

legal advice possible. 

Question. What do you see as the greatest legal problems facing the Air Force in 

the coming year? 

Answer. In a time of declining budgets, the Air Force is being forced to make hard 

decisions. All of these decisions will require consultation with Congress and a careful reading of the laws passed by Congress. If confirmed, I will ensure the Office 

of the General Counsel facilitates communication with Congress. I will also ensure 

that the Office of the General Counsel provides timely, accurate, and candid legal 

advice, ensuring compliance with the law and protection of the legal prerogatives 

of the Air Force. It is imperative that the Air Force has the legal support necessary 

to build and maintain the very best air, space and cyberspace capabilities possible. 

Question. Does the Air Force Office of the General Counsel have the resources to 

deal with these problems? 

Answer. Yes. The Office of the General Counsel, like the rest of the management 

structure of the Air Force, participated in the Secretary of Defense-directed 20 percent reduction in management resources. While these cuts will present challenges, 

I believe we have adequate resources to provide good legal advice to Air Force senior 

leaders as we work together to resolve significant legal challenges. I also believe 

that there are lessons to be learned from the Office of the Judge Advocate General, 

private law firms and the legal staffs of other Federal agencies that could maintain 

and even improve the existing high quality of service by the Air Force General 

Counsel’s office in this time of reduced manning and resources. 

Question. What broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues which must 

be addressed by the Air Force Office of the General Counsel? 

Answer. I plan to continue the work underway in the Office of the General Counsel to refine a strategic plan. This plan starts by simply stating the mission of this 

organization—to wit: The Office of the General Counsel enables the Air Force to 

achieve its mission through the provision of independent and candid legal advice, 

effective advocacy, and problem-solving. The draft Strategic Plan focuses on four 

areas that will help the Office of the General Counsel achieve its mission: (1) Talent 

Management; (2) Customer Satisfaction; (3) Program Execution; and (4) Knowledge 

Management. If confirmed, I will provide the leadership necessary to refine, approve 

and implement the Office of the General Counsel strategic plan. 

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Question. In carrying out your duties, if you are confirmed, how will you work 

with the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force? 

Answer. Throughout my career of military and civil service, particularly during 

the nearly 15 years of my civil service, I have enjoyed an excellent working relationship with The Judge Advocate General’s Corps that resulted in the delivery of high 

quality legal services to Air Force leadership at all levels. I learned first-hand about 

the unique and vital experiences and expertise that civilian and military lawyers 

bring to the table, and that the final legal advice given to the client benefited greatly from our close working relationship. I was very proud to be a member of the team 

that delivered those services. If confirmed, I will work to maintain a close professional relationship with The Judge Advocate General. Consultation on matters of 

mutual import and interest should characterize that relationship. It is imperative 

that the two offices work well together to provide the highest quality of legal support to the Department of the Air Force. 

Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Department of the Air Force 

allocated between the General Counsel and the Judge Advocate General? 

593 

Answer. My career of military and civil service convinced me that it is critical 

that The Judge Advocate General and the General Counsel work as collaborative 

partners to provide the best possible legal services to our common client. If confirmed, I will make maintaining such a partnership a priority. In recognition of the 

unique expertise and experiences provided by the Office of the General Counsel and 

The Judge Advocate General, both offices provide legal advice to the Secretary of 

the Air Force and other Department officials. In addition, The Judge Advocate General is responsible for the activities of The Judge Advocate General’s Corps and is 

primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice. The law expressly prohibits interference with the ability 

of The Judge Advocate General to give independent legal advice to the Secretary 

of the Air Force. Even in the absence of that statutory requirement, I would welcome the expression of independent views on legal issues by The Judge Advocate 

General. 

Question. How will you ensure that legal opinions of your office will be available 

to Air Force attorneys, including judge advocates? 

Answer. Close professional cooperation between the civilian and uniformed members of the Air Force’s legal community is absolutely essential to ensure appropriate 

legal opinions issued by the Office of the Air Force General Counsel will be available 

to all Air Force attorneys and Judge Advocates, and vice versa. If confirmed, I will 

survey existing avenues for sharing information and consult with The Judge Advocate General on ensuring the thorough and timely dissemination of key advice. 

Question. In response to attempts within the Department of Defense to subordinate legal functions and authorities of the Judge Advocates General to the General 

Counsels of the Department of Defense and the military services, Congress enacted 

legislation prohibiting any officer or employee of the Department of Defense from 

interfering with the ability of the Judge Advocates General of the military services 

and the legal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide independent legal advice to the Chairman, Service Secretaries, and Service Chiefs. Congress also required a study and review by outside experts of the relationships between the legal elements of each of the military departments. 

What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force 

to provide independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force? 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General’s ability to provide independent legal advice 

has been statutorily recognized as essential to the effective delivery of legal services. 

I share that view. Uniformed attorneys bring another perspective and can provide 

insight and advice shaped by years of service throughout the Air Force. 

Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Air Force judge advocates to 

provide independent legal advice to military commanders? 

Answer. Air Force Judge Advocates have a critical responsibility to provide independent legal advice to commanders, given the missions they perform. I think this 

is well stated by The Judge Advocate General’s Corps mission statement, which emphasizes the importance of professional, candid and independent legal advice. 

Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the current relationships between the uniformed judge advocates and General Counsel? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will make sustaining the collegial and effective relationship that currently exists between the General Counsel and The Judge Advocate 

General a top priority, to ensure the effective delivery of legal services to the Department of the Air Force. 

Question. Are legal opinions of the Office of the Air Force General Counsel binding on all Air Force lawyers? 

Answer. Within the areas of responsibility and functions assigned to me by the 

Secretary under title 10 U.S.C. § 8019, the opinions rendered by the General Counsel are equally binding on all members of the Air Force legal team. If confirmed, 

I will endeavor to engage the full breadth of professional expertise and experience 

of Air Force legal professionals, both civilian and judge advocates, to ensure that 

sound professional inputs are considered in the development of opinions provided to 

senior Air Force leadership. During my tenure as the Principal Deputy Air Force 

General Counsel, my practice was to ensure that such opinions were drafted in collaboration with The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) and his staff. I cannot recall 

a single instance during my service as Principal Deputy General Counsel where any 

differences weren’t resolved through discussions between the staffs. If there were to 

be such a disagreement, since the General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General 

both act under the authority of the Secretary, The Judge Advocate General would 

always have the ability to offer independent advice to the Secretary and seek resolution of the disagreement. Any resulting legal opinions would thus be rendered under 

the authority of the Secretary. 

594 

Question. How will you ensure that such legal opinions are available to Air Force 

lawyers? 

Answer. Final opinions are published through a cooperative General Counsel and 

TJAG process. As for proposed opinions, if confirmed, I would ensure close cooperation between General Counsel and TJAG offices to ensure they are available to 

those whose coordination and consultation are appropriate to the subject matter and 

potential impacts of the opinion. 

Question. If confirmed, are there specific categories of Air Force General Counsel 

legal opinions that you expect to reconsider and possibly revise? If so, what categories? 

Answer. At this time I am not aware of any specific categories that require revision. If confirmed as the General Counsel of the Air Force, I will undertake the responsibilities of the office with an open mind. Only after a thorough review and assessment of existing opinions, as well as appropriate consultation, will I consider revision of existing opinions. I believe one of the responsibilities of the General Counsel is to constantly assess opinions rendered in areas of the law and particular 

issues that may need reconsideration and/or revision based on current events and 

legal, regulatory and policy development. 

Question. Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice gives primary jurisdiction over military justice to the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and 

Air Force. 

How do you view your responsibilities in the performance of military justice matters with regard to the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force? 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General has the primary responsibility for providing 

legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the 

administration of military discipline. Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires The Judge Advocate General or senior members of his staff to make 

‘‘frequent inspections in the field’’ in furtherance of his responsibility to supervise 

the administration of military justice. If confirmed as the General Counsel, I will 

consult with The Judge Advocate General on matters of mutual interest or concern 

relating to military justice, recognizing his statutory duties and special expertise in 

this area, and will provide advice to the Secretary of the Air Force as needed. 

ATTORNEY RECRUITING AND RETENTION ISSUES

Question. How do you assess your ability to hire and retain top quality attorneys 

and provide sufficient opportunity for advancement? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work to maintain the Air Force’s ability to recruit 

and retain the highest quality civilian and military attorneys both in the General 

Counsel’s Office and The Judge Advocate General’s Corps. If confirmed, I want to 

make Federal service as a civilian attorney in the Air Force as attractive and professionally rewarding as possible. I will also work with The Judge Advocate General 

to ensure the Air Force has the tools we need to continue to recruit and retain the 

best and most diverse attorneys available to support the mission. 

Question. In your view, does the Department of the Air Force have a sufficient 

number of attorneys to perform its missions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with The Judge Advocate General to 

evaluate the adequacy of the number of attorneys to ensure that there are a sufficient number of attorneys in the Department of the Air Force to accomplish the Air 

Force’s missions. We must ensure that we continue to develop and maintain the 

right balance of legal skill sets and properly develop future leaders needed for our 

full-spectrum legal support that enables Air Force mission success. 

For example, The Judge Advocate General’s Corps has both a significant homestation (military justice, litigation support) and contingency (operations, Rule of 

Law, detention ops) legal support mission. The JAG Corps has averaged 234 deployment requirements per year for the past 12 years. Sustained legal support operations over the past 12 years in every combatant commander AOR translate into 

reduced capacity for the home station mission. In addition, while the Air Force looks 

to reduce overall end strength to meet budgetary constraints, missions continue to 

grow for Air Force legal professionals. For example, the Corps continues to lead the 

Air Force in its efforts to combat sexual assault through the Special Victims Counsel 

program and with a cadre of highly trained sex assault prosecutors. Sustainment 

of those valuable programs, as well as other important missions such as civil litigation and legal advice to commanders at all echelons, requires a steady, reliable, and 

predictable stream of JAG and GC accessions. 

Question. In your view, what incentives to successful recruiting and retention of 

attorneys, if any, need to be implemented or established? 

595 

Answer. If confirmed, in consultation with The Judge Advocate General, I will 

look at this area very carefully and support initiatives that enhance the Air Force’s 

ability to recruit and retain the best legal talent available. 

DETAINEE ISSUES

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in helping the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force address legal issues regarding 

detainees? 

Answer. The legal issues regarding detainees are of critical importance to DOD 

and the Department of the Air Force. These issues need to be handled with great 

care, and with a clear focus on the rule of law. If confirmed, I will work closely with 

the DOD General Counsel in executing the President’s directives. Additionally, in 

consultation with The Judge Advocate General, I will provide advice to the Secretary regarding detainee issues affecting the Air Force, with particular focus on our 

obligation to treat all detainees humanely. 

Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the 

United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be 

subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 

In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the United States? Why 

or why not? 

Answer. Yes, this prohibition is in the best interest of the United States. Prohibiting the cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment of individuals in 

our custody or under our physical control upholds our ideals and obligations, and 

reinforces our moral authority around the world. 

Question. Do you believe that the phrase ‘‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 

or punishment’’ has been adequately and appropriately defined for the purpose of 

this provision? 

Answer. I understand that considerable attention has been given to this issue 

within DOD. If confirmed, I will play an active part in ensuring the Department’s 

implementing directives make clear what conduct is prohibited. 

Question. What role do you believe the General Counsel of the Air Force should 

play in the interpretation of this standard? 

Answer. The appropriate role of the General Counsel is to provide advice to the 

Secretary of the Air Force and her staff on policies that implement this standard. 

If confirmed, I will ensure Air Force implementation is and remains consistent with 

the law. 

Question. What role do you believe the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force 

should play in the interpretation of this standard? 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General provides advice on policies that implement 

this standard. The Judge Advocate General should also continue to train and supervise the judge advocates in the field, who are instrumental in maintaining this 

standard. 

Question. If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant Air Force 

directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. I will. The requirements of section 1403 and Common Article 3 of the 

Geneva Conventions remain essential to maintaining a disciplined Air Force, bound 

by the Rule of Law. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. I do. 

Question. Section 2441 of title 18, U.S.C., as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment. 

In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S. detainees in foreign custody and 

to foreign detainees in U.S. custody? 

Answer. This statute is intended to provide criminal sanctions for specific war 

crimes as provided under international law and also violations of the Uniform Code 

of Military Justice. Even apart from our obligations to prosecute these violations, 

however, the United States also has the obligation to ‘‘take all measures necessary 

for the suppression’’ of all other violations of the Geneva Conventions, even those 

that are not grave breaches, and I believe the Department must continue to hold 

military members accountable for violations of these standards as well. I think that 

596 

this statute, in addition to robust and vigilant training of airmen of our legal obligations, will protect against abusive treatment of foreign detainees in U.S. custody, 

as well as provide proper criminal sanctions against those who do not likewise secure reciprocal protection of U.S. detainees in foreign custody. 

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was enacted in 

2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to persons employed by 

or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States. 

In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of combat operations? 

Answer. I understand that MEJA was intended to address the jurisdictional gap 

in U.S. law regarding criminal sanctions, as applied to civilians employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States, including contractors and 

servicemembers’ dependents. In my opinion, MEJA provides an effective means of 

exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over contractor employees in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and other areas of combat operations who engage in conduct that 

would constitute a felony-level Federal crime in the United States. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will study this issue and assess what changes to MEJA 

may be appropriate, if any. 

Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in developing administration recommendations for changes to MEJA? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to play an active role in the development of any 

proposals to change MEJA. I would also coordinate closely with The Judge Advocate 

General in the development of any such proposals given the complementary and 

sometimes overlapping availability of jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 

Question. Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2007 extended criminal jurisdiction of the military courts under the UCMJ to persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field during time of declared war or a contingency operation, such as our current operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

In your view, does the UCMJ provide appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal 

actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of combat operations? 

Answer. The UCMJ provides commanders the tools necessary to maintain good 

order and discipline and ensure the morale, welfare and safety of all those under 

their jurisdiction during military operations. Because misconduct by contractors can 

undermine good order and discipline, Congress extended UCMJ jurisdiction over 

such individuals in times of declared war or contingency operations. In turn, the 

Secretary of Defense published guidance on the prudent exercise of such jurisdiction. This guidance ensures that the Department of Justice and DOD each play an 

appropriate role in resolving whether, and under which system, jurisdiction might 

be better exercised in each potential case. 

Question. What is your view of the procedures agreed upon by the Department 

of Defense and the Department of Justice to reconcile jurisdictional responsibilities 

under MEJA and the UCMJ? 

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the procedures agreed upon by 

DOD and the Department of Justice to reconcile jurisdictional responsibilities under 

MEJA and the UCMJ. If confirmed, I will, in coordination with The Judge Advocate 

General, assess the effectiveness of the procedures and whether further refinement 

of these procedures is necessary. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to ensure appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees? 

Answer. At present, I am not aware of any specific provisions in need of change. 

It is my understanding, however, that the Secretary of Defense has appointed a 

working group staffed with personnel from each of the Services to undertake a complete review of the UCMJ. If confirmed, I will do all that I can to support this review and offer resources, opinion and counsel as appropriate. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do Department of Defense policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion 

and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on 

those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

597 

Answer. Yes. However, I am aware that there is congressional concern about 

whether or not the Air Force implementation and execution of the Department of 

Defense policies are adequately protecting individual expressions of belief. I am also 

aware that the Air Force is taking these concerns seriously and is currently reviewing its policies. If confirmed, I will study this issue to determine if changes or further changes are necessary under the law. 

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers 

offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the 

proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her 

religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs? 

Answer. Yes. I know from my previous working relationship with leaders of the 

Air Force Chaplain Corps that Air Force chaplains are never compelled to offer 

prayers that are inconsistent with their faith. I further know that they are expected 

to remain sensitive to the needs of, and provide care for, all the Air Force members 

they serve. Military chaplains have always had the prerogative to pray according 

to their endorsing faith group traditions inside or outside of religious services. Chaplains are trained and equipped to consider the setting and audience in preparation 

of prayers outside of religious services. Additionally, they have always had the freedom and protection to decline the opportunity to offer a prayer at a ceremony that 

may conflict with their personal beliefs without fear of discipline or discrimination. 

If I am confirmed, I will consult with the Chief of Chaplains about whether any adjustments are necessary or advisable. 

Question. Section 533 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013 (P.L. 112–239), as amended by section 532 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (P.L. 113–66) protects rights of conscience of members 

of the Armed Forces and chaplains of such members, and prohibits, so far as possible, use of such beliefs as the basis of any adverse personnel action, discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some 

religious denominations have sincerely held beliefs in opposition to same-sex marriage. 

In your view, may a member of the Armed Forces who has a sincerely held belief 

in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse personnel action or similar 

other adverse action, if he or she shares those personal views on the subject in a 

personal capacity? 

Answer. No. A member of the Armed Forces who has a sincerely held belief in 

opposition to same-sex marriage should not be subject to adverse personnel action 

if he or she shares those personal views in a personal capacity, as long as the member’s expression, in his or her personal capacity, is not disruptive to good order and 

discipline, respects the dignity of those with whom he or she may disagree, and is 

not coercive in nature. 

GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER NOMINATIONS

Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated by senior leaders in 

the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to nomination. 

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in the officer promotion system, 

particularly in reviewing general and flag officer nominations? 

Answer. I understand that, for general officer promotions, the Office of the General Counsel reviews the following: 

A. Memoranda of Instruction that govern the conduct of promotion selection 

boards and subsequent promotion selection board reports. 

B. Adverse information that is not in an officer’s official military personnel file 

that may be presented to the promotion selection board. I have been advised 

that this information is reviewed to ensure it is accurate and comports with 

the requirements of title 10 such that the information is ‘‘substantiated, relevant information that could reasonably affect the deliberations of the selection board’’. 

C. Adverse information related to general officers. In general officer cases, the 

standard for adverse information that must be presented to a promotion selection board is ‘‘any credible information of an adverse nature’’. I have been advised that the Office of the General Counsel participates in a detailed screening process in which all credible information related to officers whose records 

will be reviewed by a promotion selection board for promotion to a general officer grade. The process ensures that all adverse information is properly identified for presentation to the promotion selection board. 

598 

D. Adverse information that becomes available after a promotion selection board 

makes its recommendations. I have been advised that the Office of the General 

Counsel provides legal advice to the Secretary of the Air Force so that she may 

determine whether a promotion review board should be convened to consider 

whether to continue to support the promotion of the considered officer or take 

steps to remove the officer from the board report or promotion list. 

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General Counsel of the 

Department of the Air Force in ensuring the legal sufficiency of statutory selection 

board processes? 

Answer. I understand that, prior to approval by the Secretary of the Air Force, 

all Memoranda of Instructions for officer promotion selection boards are reviewed 

by the Office of the General Counsel to ensure the Secretary’s instructions conform 

to statutes and accurately reflect her guidance regarding attributes necessary for 

service in the next grade. All reports of promotion selection boards are reviewed by 

the Office of the General Counsel prior to final action on the report by the Secretary. The General Counsel must determine that the Air Force has met applicable 

statutory standards, DOD direction and Secretary of the Air Force guidelines and 

that individual selection board reports conform to the law. The General Counsel 

must advise the Secretary of the Air Force of any case in which a selection board 

report fails to adhere to the statutory standards, either generally or with regard to 

a particular officer being considered for promotion. In advising the Secretary of the 

Air Force and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs), the General Counsel helps to ensure that Air Force promotion policies properly implement applicable laws and regulations and are fairly applied. 

Question. What is the role, if any, of the General Counsel of the Department of 

the Air Force in reviewing and providing potentially adverse information pertaining 

to a nomination to the Senate Armed Services Committee? 

Answer. It is my understanding that, under current practice within the Department of the Air Force, the General Counsel’s office reviews each selection board report, as well as departmental communications to the committee, the President, and 

the Secretary of Defense concerning nominations, to ensure that the reports and 

communications comply in form and substance with law and regulation. If confirmed, I will ensure that the General Counsel’s office gives special attention to 

cases of nominees with substantiated or potentially adverse information, in order to 

ensure that such information is reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee 

in a timely, accurate, and comprehensible manner. 

MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY AND CASES

Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the General Counsel play in military personnel policy and individual cases, including cases before the Board for Correction of Military Records? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force, the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and other senior Department leaders to ensure that the Department of the Air Force military personnel policies are formulated and applied uniformly, fairly, and in accordance with 

applicable laws and regulations. If confirmed, it will be my duty to take appropriate 

action if I become aware of an individual case in which military personnel policies 

were not fairly and lawfully applied. If confirmed, I will coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), who exercises overall supervision of the Air Force Review Boards Agency, regarding the legal sufficiency of the determinations made by the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records. In addition, I am aware of, and fully respect, the independent role 

that the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records plays in the correction of military records. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The fiscal year 2013 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual 

Assault in the Military reflects that reports of sexual assaults in the Air Force increased by 33 percent from fiscal year 2012 to 1,047 reports of sexual assault. 

What is your assessment of this report? 

Answer. I have been working on sexual assault prevention and response in the 

Air Force for many years now. Victims are now reporting in unprecedented numbers 

and we view that as a positive sign. 

Historically, reports of sexual assault have increased about 5 percent per year 

since 2006. As you note, in fiscal year 2013, reports are up an unprecedented over 

30 percent. Our best assessment is that this increase as consistent with growing 

confidence in our response system. As the Department of Defense and the Air Force 

599 

continue to collect information, I believe we will be able to provide concrete evidence 

to show that the increase reflects growing confidence in Air Force response systems 

that provide victims with supportive services and hold offenders appropriately accountable. I believe the success of the Special Victim’s Counsel program is playing 

a significant role in the growing confidence. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Air Force sexual assault prevention and 

response program? 

Answer. The Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program has dramatically improved over the past 2 years. Now directly aligned under the Air Force 

Vice Chief of Staff reflecting broad Air Force support from the highest levels of leadership, and with the dedication of new resources to address this issue, the program 

is moving forward very quickly. This office is working hard to implement many new 

congressional and Department of Defense initiatives, as well as its own. The Air 

Force is becoming an innovative leader in this area with initiatives that are being 

adopted across the Department of Defense, such as its Special Victim’s Counsel program that provides victims an unprecedented level of service and support. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. Expanded reporting is necessary to provide enhanced care, increase 

awareness and understanding of the issue, and hold perpetrators accountable. Restricted reporting is a valuable option which ensures that victims who are otherwise 

not ready to participate in the investigative process have access to the care they 

desperately need, while at the same time leaving open the possibility to pursue accountability for the offender at a later time. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. The chain of command is critical to making progress to prevent instances 

of sexual assault. Caring, empathetic support by the chain of command is the key 

to building victim confidence and ensuring victims are encouraged to avail themselves of free legal representation, expedited transfers, and professional responders. 

The chain of command also plays a significant role in building airmen’s awareness 

of resources available outside the chain of command. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Air Force resources and 

programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal 

help they need? 

Answer. As victims of one of society’s most underreported crimes continue to come 

forward in increasing numbers, the resources required to continue the necessary 

quality of medical, psychological, and legal help may need to be revisited. If confirmed, I will work with senior Air Force leadership to ensure the Air Force continually monitors the adequacy of the resources dedicated to supporting victims. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Air Force has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response is a full-time, worldwide commitment for the Air Force. Airmen receive both pre- and post-deployment briefings, 

and the Air Force has fully qualified military personnel who are worldwide 

deployable and prepared for constant rotation to contingency areas to ensure awareness of this program and its importance. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Air 

Force has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. The Air Force has increased its emphasis on both training and resources 

dedicated to response to allegations of sexual assault. Congress has been very supportive in dedicating funds for this purpose and the Air Force has been quick to develop courses, curriculum, studies, techniques, and specialized training to hone the 

skills of its investigators and qualify experts who can better support victims and 

hold perpetrators accountable—while at the same time protecting the rights of all 

parties involved. If confirmed, I will continue to work with other Air Force leaders 

to ensure continued availability of adequate training and resources. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. My nearly 30 years of Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian Air Force experience taught me that the chain of command is the catalyst for cultural change in 

the military. In part, this is because of the responsibility and accountability commanders have for all aspects of their commands, with multiple layers of observation 

and higher-level oversight. Commanders are specifically charged with maintaining 

climates of dignity and respect, as well as supporting sexual assault prevention and 

victim-care principles. Air Force regulations now require commanders to be graded 

on their success in this endeavor on their annual performance reports. 

600 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. I do not have sufficient information or expertise to accurately assess the 

potential impact. Because of the importance of the chain of command in all prevention and response efforts, I believe it is critical that the chain of command remain 

significantly involved in holding perpetrators of sexual assault accountable for the 

crimes they commit. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Air Force? 

Answer. Given the importance of this issue to the Nation, its Air Force and all 

its airmen, if confirmed, I will make it my top priority to work with senior leaders 

to explore and implement new initiatives and seek improvements to our current programs and processes. 

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

Question. Section 1034, title 10, U.S.C., prohibits taking retaliatory personnel action against a member of the Armed Forces as reprisal for making a protected communication. By definition, protected communications include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside of the chain of command. 

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that senior military leaders understand the need to protect servicemembers who report misconduct to appropriate 

authorities within or outside the chain of command? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Inspector General and The Judge Advocate General to ensure that military leaders are fully and accurately advised of the 

whistleblower protections accorded by law and regulation, and that they understand 

their legal responsibilities in this important area. In addition, if I become aware of 

any particular cases involving reprisals, I will ensure that they are addressed in accordance with the law. Whistleblower protections for military personnel are essential to the integrity of the Air Force, and merit serious attention by the General 

Counsel. 

REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

Question. Recent budget cuts continue to adversely impact availability of funds for 

Air Force military construction projects. To mitigate, the Air Force has used innovative methods to continue to meet the infrastructure requirements of the warfighter. 

For example, this included working with Oklahoma State officials to lease a former 

automotive plant to accommodate additional work performed by the Oklahoma City 

Air Logistics Complex and the purchase of property contiguous to the base for KC– 

46 depot maintenance. Another initiative is the Enhanced Use Lease project at Hill 

Air Force Base. However, as with any new public/private endeavor, questions have 

arisen as to the projects’ compliance with statutes written long ago and designed 

to regulate other practices. Resolving these questions has greatly slowed the approval process for a number of these projects. 

How might the law and regulations be modified to facilitate approval of innovative 

projects based on their merits rather than delayed to ensure compliance with potentially obsolete legal and administrative requirements? 

Answer. As the committee is aware, I have a good deal of hands-on experience 

in public-private partnerships. Specifically, my work in Privatized Military Housing 

and Enhanced Use Leases, has given me a unique understanding of the opportunities and risks associated with this area of the law. I know that there have been 

varying interpretations of the intent of legislation within the Air Force and the Department of Defense—often resulting in a ‘‘risk averse’’ interpretation of statute. 

This sometimes means that innovative initiatives have been subject to time consuming and costly processes . . . which can result in not pursuing or deferring an 

initiative. If confirmed, my intent is to work with my counterparts across the Air 

Force and the Department of Defense to identify where these situations exist, and 

to help them either clarify Air Force interpretation of statute or request legislative 

change (or support) where needed. Additionally, if confirmed, I will undertake a 

comprehensive review of the laws and regulations in this area to identify areas that 

need modification to enhance the ability of the Air Force to take advantage of public-private partnerships and will work closely with the Army, Navy, and Department 

of Defense to secure their support for legislation to modify, clarify or expand existing authorities in this area. 

601 

SUPPORT TO AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Question. What role, if any, do you think the General Counsel of the Air Force 

should have in reviewing the investigations and recommendations of the Air Force 

Inspector General? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Inspector General, and will provide candid, independent, and objective 

legal advice. As part of my responsibility to review legal and policy issues arising 

from the Air Force intelligence and counterintelligence activities, I will advise the 

Inspector General concerning proper reporting of the Air Force intelligence oversight 

activities. Of course, given the Inspector General’s mandate for independence and 

candor in advising the Secretary as to his investigative findings and recommendations, the Inspector General has final authority over matters within his functional 

purview. 

CIVILIAN ATTORNEYS

Question. Judge advocates in the Armed Forces benefit from an established career 

ladder, substantial training opportunities, and exposure to a broad spectrum of legal 

areas and problems. By contrast, civilian attorneys in the Military Departments normally do not have established career programs and may do the same work for many 

years, with promotion based solely upon longevity and vacancies. 

In your opinion, does the personnel management of civilian attorneys need changing? If so, what do you see as the major problems and what changes would you suggest? 

Answer. Comprehensive and deliberate professional development of career civilian 

attorneys and paralegals is an important building block to ensure the Air Force receives the highest quality legal services. In December 2006, the Air Force General 

Counsel and The Judge Advocate General co-signed an Air Force Civilian Legal Personnel Development Advisory Council Charter that established a program to provide 

policy and guidance regarding: career progression, training, assignments, program 

objectives, general operation requirements, and career management actions proposed or initiated in support of legal civilian force management objectives. I served 

as chair of that Council for 2 years and updated its charter in 2012 to establish and 

define the role of a development team in pursuing the above-mentioned objectives. 

I can assure you that the General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General have 

placed great emphasis on the personnel development of civilian attorneys. The nomination and selection of civilian attorneys to attend Civilian Development Education 

opportunities has quadrupled since these charters were signed. If confirmed, I will 

continue to emphasize the importance of an organized and comprehensive approach 

to the management, training, and development of civilian attorneys. 

CLIENT

Question. In your opinion, who is the client of the General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force? 

Answer. The client of the General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force is 

the Department of the Air Force, acting through its authorized officials. 

ACQUISITION ISSUES

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Air Force 

procurement programs are executed in accordance with the law and DOD acquisition policy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force, the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), and other senior officials to ensure the Department of the Air Force’s acquisition and procurement programs are 

executed in accordance with applicable provisions of law, as well as DOD guidance. 

Participation by Air Force lawyers should start in the earliest stages of program development. They should seek out potential legal issues and, where appropriate, identify lawful alternative courses of action. Air Force attorneys should also be able to 

anticipate emerging issues and provide future-oriented guidance that improves the 

procurement system’s ability to provide warfighters with mission-critical systems at 

prices that are affordable for the taxpayer. 

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that ethics provisions on conflict of interest are followed both by Air Force personnel and by Air 

Force contractors? 

Answer. Ethics training, acquisition ethics training, and fostering a culture of ethics throughout the Air Force are paramount in creating an organizational climate 

that is sensitive to the need of avoiding conflicts of interest and that reacts approVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00609 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
602 

priately when such issues arise. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary 

of the Air Force, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), The Judge 

Advocate General, and other senior officials to promote an organizational climate 

that is sensitive to the need to avoid conflicts of interest and that reacts appropriately when specific issues arise. This also extends to ensuring that Air Force personnel adhere to the letter and spirit of the law relating to post-employment restrictions. Air Force lawyers can make a significant contribution to these endeavors 

through provision of training, early and sustained involvement in the Department’s 

acquisition programs and procurement activities, and continued instructional outreach to industry. 

DETECTING ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Question. Organizational conflicts of interest have become a major concern with 

the growing use of private contractors being tasked to perform key functions that 

the services had formerly performed in-house. This has been seen in cases in which 

highly qualified individuals who expect to be hired as government employees need 

a salary pending completion of the hiring process. 

What do you think the Air Force should do, and what should the General Counsel’s role be, in ensuring that the Air Force identifies organizational conflicts of interests and takes the appropriate steps to avoid or mitigate them? 

Answer. If confirmed to serve as the General Counsel, I will work with Air Force 

senior leadership to educate our personnel to understand the circumstances that can 

lead to an organizational conflict of interest and to identify those circumstances at 

the earliest opportunity. I will help ensure that all circumstances of potential organizational conflicts are promptly addressed in a manner consistent with appropriate 

guidance. Our goals need to include avoidance of conflicting roles that might bias 

a contractor’s judgment and prevention of circumstances that may result in an unfair competitive advantage. 

Question. What is your understanding of steps the Air Force has taken to address 

the problems created by delays in the hiring process under circumstances in which 

the Air Force intends to hire an individual into government service? 

Answer. I understand that Air Force leadership has engaged with the Office of 

Personnel Management, DOD, and associated liaison offices to address factors that 

can delay hiring actions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Air Force leadership to continue this effort to minimize or eliminate delays. 

LEGAL ETHICS

Question. What is your understanding of the action a Department of the Air Force 

attorney or an Air Force Judge Advocate should take if the attorney becomes aware 

of improper activities by a Department of the Air Force official who has sought the 

attorney’s legal advice and the official is unwilling to follow the attorney’s advice? 

Answer. The attorney should immediately bring the matter to the attention of the 

attorney’s supervisor and, if not satisfactorily resolved, to higher-level supervisory 

lawyers or authorities in the chain of supervision or command. 

Question. Do you believe that the present limits on pro bono activities of government attorneys are generally correct as a matter of policy or does the policy need 

to be reviewed? 

Answer. I understand that Government attorneys may participate in pro bono activities on their own time, consistent with statute, regulation, or other rule or guidelines. I also understand that specific guidance applicable to the JAG Corps permits 

pro bono work with supervisory approval so long as the representation does not 

occur on Government time or at its expense, does not interfere with official duties, 

and does not create a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest. 

Although I am not aware of the need to address pro bono activities, if confirmed, 

I would review the current policy with The Judge Advocate General. 

Question. In your view, do the laws, regulations, and guidelines that establish the 

rules of professional responsibility for attorneys in the Department of the Air Force 

provide adequate guidance? 

Answer. I understand that all DOD lawyers are required to be members in good 

standing of a State Bar and are therefore subject to the rules of professional responsibility of their particular jurisdiction. Lawyers engaged in litigation must also comply with the rules of the court in which they appear. All military and civilian lawyers in The Judge Advocate General’s Corps must comply with the specific rules applicable to them. If confirmed, I will review the rules of professional responsibility 

applicable to Air Force lawyers to assess if changes are required. 

603 

ROLE IN THE OFFICER PROMOTION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS

Question. In your view, what is the role of the General Counsel of the Department 

of the Air Force in ensuring the integrity and proper functioning of the officer promotion process? 

Answer. I understand that, under title 10 of the U.S.C., the Secretary of the Air 

Force is responsible for the proper functioning of the Department of the Air Force 

promotion selection process. In addition to the legal review of memoranda of instruction and selection board reports to ensure they comport with statutory standards, 

DOD policy and Secretary of the Air Force guidance, the Air Force General Counsel 

must also ensure the conduct of the board process conforms to all legal requirements. Additionally, the General Counsel must advise the Secretary of the Air Force 

of any case in which a selection board report or selection board process fails to adhere to the statutory standards, either generally or with regard to a particular officer being considered for promotion. In advising the Secretary of the Air Force and 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the General Counsel helps to ensure that Air Force promotion policies properly implement applicable laws and regulations and are fairly applied. 

LITIGATION INVOLVING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Question. In your opinion, what is the relationship between the Department of the 

Air Force and the Department of Justice with respect to litigation involving the Department of Defense? 

Answer. The Department of Justice represents the Department of the Air Force 

in civil litigation. If confirmed, I will work with The Judge Advocate General to ensure the continuation of a collaborative relationship with the Department of Justice 

with respect to litigation involving the Department of the Air Force. 

Question. In your view, does the Department need more independence and resources to conduct its own litigation or to improve upon its current supporting role? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Air Force’s interests in civil litigation 

are effectively protected and defended by the Department of Justice. If confirmed, 

I will work with The Judge Advocate General to ensure that adequate resources are 

available to ensure that the Air Force is able to provide the appropriate level of support to the Department of Justice and protect the Air Force’s interests in civil litigation in which the department is involved. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[The nomination reference of Gordon O. Tanner follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

April 7, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

604 

Gordon O. Tanner, of Alabama, to be General Counsel of the Department of the 

Air Force, vice Charles A. Blanchard, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Gordon O. Tanner, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GORDON O. TANNER

Education: 

Vanderbilt University School of Law 

• Attended September 1970–December 1972 

• J.D. (Doctor of Jurisprudence) granted December 1972 

University of Alabama 

• Attended September 1966–May 1970 

• B.A. (Political Science) Degree granted May 1970 

Employment Record: 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), Department 

of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC, November 2013 to Present 

Principal Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC, February 2012 to November 2013 

Deputy Assistant Secretary (Reserve Affairs), Department of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC, June 2011 to January 2012 

Deputy General Counsel (Environment and Installations), Department of the Air 

Force, Pentagon, Washington DC, February 2008 to June 2011 

Chief Counsel, Housing Division, Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, Department of the Air Force, Brooks City-Base, San Antonio, TX, July 

2000 to February 2008 

Senior Partner, Sirote & Permutt Law Firm, Mobile AL, 1988 to 2000 

Partner, McDermott, Slepian, Windom & Reed Law Firm, Mobile, AL, 1977–2000 

Captain, Judge Advocate, U.S. Air Force, Tyndall AFB FL, June 1973–May 1977 

Honors and awards: 

Legion of Merit 

Outstanding Civilian Career Service Award 

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters 

Air Reserve Forces Policy Council Exceptional Service Award 

Air Force Commendation Medal 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award 

Armed Services Reserve Medal 

Longevity Service Ribbon with one device 

Air Force Training Ribbon 

Donald C. Rasher Award (for outstanding achievement by a Reserve Forces Judge 

Advocate in the field of continuing legal education) 

U.S. Air Force Reserve Judge Advocate of the Year 

Who’s Who In American Law (6th through 30th editions) 

Who’s Who of Emerging Leaders in America 

Outstanding Reserve Judge Advocate-Strategic Air Command 

Outstanding Reserve Judge Advocate-Eighth Air Force 

Who’s Who on the Gulf Coast 

Best Lawyers in America 

Who’s Who Among Students in American Colleges and Universities 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Gordon O. Tanner in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

605 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Gordon Owen Tanner. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

General Counsel, Department of the Air Force. 

3. Date of nomination: 

April 7, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

October 28, 1948; Mobile, AL. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Robert Luis Patlan. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Brooke Tanner Battle, Daughter, (40). 

Lindsey Ford Tanner, Daughter (38). 

Hampton Lovejoy Tanner, Son (33). 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Vanderbilt University School of Law 

• Attended September 1970–December 1972 

• J.D. (Doctor of Jurisprudence) granted December 1972 

University of Alabama 

• Attended September 1966–May 1970 

• B.A. (Political Science) Degree granted May 1970 

Mary G. Montgomery High School 

• Diploma (with honors) granted May 1966 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), Department 

of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC, November 2013 to Present 

Principal Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC, February 2012 to November 2013 

Deputy Assistant Secretary (Reserve Affairs), Department of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC, June 2011 to January 2012 

Deputy General Counsel (Environment and Installations), Department of the Air 

Force, Pentagon, Washington DC, February 2008 to June 2011 

606 

Chief Counsel, Housing Division, Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, Department of the Air Force, Brooks City-Base, San Antonio, TX, July 

2000 to February 2008 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Admitted, District of Columbia Bar 

Admitted, Tennessee Supreme Court 

Admitted, U.S. Court of Military Appeals 

Admitted, Alabama Supreme Court 

Admitted, U.S. Federal District Court (So. Dist. AL) 

Admitted, U.S. Tax Court 

Admitted, U.S. Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) 

Admitted, U.S. Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) 

Admitted, U.S. Supreme Court Bar Reserve Officer Association American Bar Association Alabama State Bar Human Rights Campaign (member) 

Theta Chi social fraternity 

Omicron Delta Kappa (Leadership Honorary Society) 

Jasons (University of Alabama Leadership Society) 

Pi Sigma Alpha (Political Science Honorary Society) 

The University Club of Washington, DC (member) 

Kings Creek Country Club, Rehoboth Beach, Delaware (member) 

Black Tie Club International (member) 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

2012 - $600 - Primary Campaign - Andy Staton for State Senate, Delaware 

2012 - $600 - General Election - Andy Staton for State Senate, Delaware 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Legion of Merit 

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters 

Air Reserve Forces Policy Council Exceptional Service Award 

Air Force Commendation Medal 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award 

Armed Services Reserve Medal 

Longevity Service Ribbon with one device 

Air Force Training Ribbon 

Donald C. Rasher Award (for outstanding achievement by a Reserve Forces Judge 

Advocate in the field of continuing legal education.) 

Who’s Who In American Law (6th through 30th editions) 

Who’s Who of Emerging Leaders in America Outstanding Reserve Judge Advocate-Strategic Air Command Outstanding Reserve Judge Advocate-Eighth Air Force 

Who’s Who on the Gulf Coast Best Lawyers In America 

U.S. Air Force Reserve Judge Advocate of the Year 

Who’s Who Among Students in American Colleges and Universities 

Outstanding Young Men of America 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

607 

Several entries posted on Air Force General Counsel Blog (official site closed) 

a. March 8, 2013, ‘‘ACLU Law Enforcement Initiative’’ 

b. April 4, 2013, ‘‘DADT Dinner at West Point’’ 

c. April 11, 2013, ‘‘Gay Marine on the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)’’ 

d. April 19, 2013, ‘‘Terrorists Have Attacked Seven Marathons Since 1994’’ 

e. May 7, 2013, ‘‘Arctic Ice’’ 

f. May 10, 2013, ‘‘Military Cyber-Operations and the Third Amendment to the 

U.S. Constitution’’ 

g. June 5, 2013, ‘‘Do Hiroshima and Nagasaki Really Matter?’’ 

h. June 17, 2013, ‘‘Is Cuba a Terrorist State?’’ 

i. July 5, 2013, ‘‘The Future Trends in Global Warfare - No Longer in the Future’’ 

j. September 12, 2013, ‘‘Military Suicide Rate Related to Military Life Insurance?’’ 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

GORDON OWEN TANNER. 

This 25th day of April, 2014. 

[The nomination of Gordon O. Tanner was reported to the Senate 

by Chairman Levin on June 24, 2014, with the recommendation 

that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed 

by the Senate on September 16, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Debra S. Wada by Chairman 

Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

608 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act changed Department of Defense and Army 

operations in a positive manner. The Goldwater-Nichols Act’s framework has promoted the effective execution of responsibilities and improved inter-service and joint 

relationships. I do not see the need for modifications at present, but if confirmed 

will be able to better assess whether any changes are required in today’s environment. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I do not believe modifications are needed at this time. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 3016 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Assistant Secretary 

of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs shall have ‘‘as his principal duty the 

overall supervision of manpower and Reserve component affairs of the Department 

of the Army.’’ 

If confirmed, what duties do you expect that the Secretary of the Army will prescribe for you? 

Answer. By statute, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs’ principal duty is the overall supervision of manpower and Reserve 

component affairs. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary will ask me to perform the 

duties assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs set forth in Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders 2012– 

01, which include setting the strategic direction for and ensuring Army policies 

plans and programs for personnel, force structure, manpower management, training, 

military and civilian personnel readiness, Reserve affairs, and Army protection are 

executed consistent with law, regulation, and policy. 

Question. What actions will you take to enhance your ability to perform the duties 

of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. Although my present position has well prepared me to perform these duties, should I be confirmed, I will work to further my knowledge of the Army, its 

organization, its people, and the necessary resources to perform its mission and 

meet future challenges. To accomplish this, I will work with the dedicated military 

and civilian staff, as well as staff throughout the Department, to thoroughly understand the issues the Army currently faces and to best position it for future 

sustainment and transformation. 

Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your relationship with the 

following officials: 

The Secretary of the Army. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will provide timely and accurate advice to the Secretary 

in the areas of manpower and Reserve affairs. My relationship would be close, direct, and supportive. I would effectively communicate the advice and views of the 

Secretariat and Army Staff to him. I would ensure I understood his vision for the 

Army and would oversee the implementation of this vision throughout the Army. 

I understand I would be subject to his authority, direction, and control. 

Question. The Under Secretary of the Army. 

Answer. If I am confirmed, my relationship with the Under Secretary of the Army 

would be close, direct, and supportive. I would communicate the advice and views 

of the Secretariat and Army Staff to the Under Secretary and oversee the implementation of his decisions falling within my area of responsibility. Because the Under 

Secretary is the Chief Management Officer of the Department of the Army, I would 

particularly work closely with the Under Secretary of the Army with respect to his 

duties in the areas of human capital management and other ‘‘business operations’’ 

under my purview. 

Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Army. 

609 

Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army set strategic direction for and have 

principal responsibility for overall supervision of functions within their purview. 

They lead the development of Army strategic guidance and plans and recommend 

priorities for programming decisions and budget execution to the Secretary of the 

Army. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with each of them and work cooperatively in addressing any matter falling 

under their areas of responsibility. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Army. 

Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal and ethics officer of the Department of the Army. The General Counsel’s duties include providing both legal and 

policy advice to officials of the Department of the Army, to include determining the 

position of the Army on any legal question or procedure. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the General Counsel. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Army. 

Answer. The Inspector General of the Army is charged with inquiring into and 

reporting on the discipline, efficiency, readiness, morale, training, ethical conduct, 

and economy of the Army. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close and 

professional relationship with the Inspector General of the Army. 

Question. The Chief of Legislative Liaison of the Department of the Army. 

Answer. The Chief of Legislative Liaison is responsible for all legislative affairs 

for the Department of the Army, to include developing, coordinating, and supervising policies and programs related to the Army’s relations with Congress. If I am 

confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with 

the Chief of Legislative Liaison. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense 

for Total Force Management as it relates to readiness, National Guard and Reserve 

component affairs, health affairs, training, and personnel requirements and management. These responsibilities include the issuance of guidance to the Military Departments. If confirmed, I will develop a close and professional relationship with the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I will continuously communicate and coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness on matters of mutual interest, articulating the views of the Department 

of the Army. I will ensure that the Department of the Army is administered in accordance with guidance and direction from the Department of Defense. 

Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness. 

Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and, 

from time to time, performs responsibilities that require the issuance of guidance 

to the Military Departments. If confirmed, I will continuously communicate and coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on matters of mutual interest and in furtherance of the best interest of the Army and the 

Department of Defense. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the senior military officer of the Army. He is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Army in the performance of his duties, which include 

the effective and efficient functioning of Army organizations and commands in performing their statutory missions. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chief 

of Staff to supervise the implementation of the Secretary’s decisions. 

Question. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel. 

Answer. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1, is the principal military advisor to the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. He develops 

and executes Army strategy, policy, plans, and programs in the areas of manpower, 

human resources, and personnel readiness issues. I will develop a close and professional relationship with the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1, if I am confirmed. I expect 

that, if confirmed, we will work together closely and communicate openly and frequently as we perform our prescribed duties. 

Question. The Surgeon General of the Army. 

Answer. The Surgeon General is the principal advisor to the Secretary of the 

Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army for the medical aspects of manning, training, 

and equipping the Army. She develops and executes Army strategy, policy and plans 

related to health affairs. Given this role, if I am confirmed, I intend to work closely 

with her to ensure an effective and efficient military health service system and a 

medically ready force. One of my focus areas for collaboration would be ensuring 

quality health care for Wounded Warriors. 

610 

Question. The Chief, National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is the principal advisor to the 

Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters 

involving non-Federalized National Guard forces. The Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau also is the principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of 

Staff of the Army on matters related to the National Guard. If confirmed, I will communicate with him openly to strengthen the Army by utilizing the talents and skills 

available in the Reserve components. 

Question. The Director of the Army National Guard. 

Answer. The Director of the Army National Guard supports the Chief, National 

Guard Bureau in his role as the principal advisor on National Guard matters to the 

Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. If confirmed, I will develop a close, professional relationship with him and seek his input on all matters 

of policy and procedure impacting Army National Guard soldiers. 

Question. The Chief, Army Reserve. 

Answer. The Chief, Army Reserve, is the principal military advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army on all U.S. Army Reserve 

matters. If I am confirmed, I will develop a close, professional relationship with him 

and seek his input on supervision of Reserve matters across all aspects of Army 

business. 

Question. Soldiers and their families. 

Answer. Those men and women who answer the call to duty and service are our 

Nation’s most valuable national security assets. If confirmed, I will work to ensure 

soldiers are fully trained and ready when called upon and to work diligently to care 

for soldiers and their families across the total Army and ensure their quality of life 

is commensurate with their service. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe that my political policy background and experiences have prepared me for the extraordinary opportunity to serve as and execute 

the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). 

It is with great honor and pleasure that I currently serve as a professional staff 

member for the House Armed Services Committee. In my position, it is my responsibility to ensure the passage, defeat, or modification of any legislation that supports 

the interest and goals of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives with respect 

to the Department of Defense. Part of that responsibility is to also ensure that such 

goals and interests support the Department, and are in the best interests of the Nation’s national security and servicemembers and their families. In my 15 years with 

the committee, I have had the tremendous opportunity to work with and for some 

extraordinary members on key legislative actions, such as the repeal of ‘‘don’t ask, 

don’t tell,’’ the military’s health care program known as TRICARE, and on recruitment and compensation for our servicemembers. 

Prior to joining the committee, it was my distinct honor and privilege to serve as 

a legislative assistant to Senator Daniel Akaka. During my 13 years with him, I was 

responsible for defense, veterans’ affairs, and small business issues. From the onset 

of my career, I have been passionate about and dedicated to ensuring this Nation’s 

extraordinary servicemembers (Active component, Reserve, and National Guard) receive the support, resources, and recognition they so richly deserve. It is a source 

of great personal satisfaction and pride to know that my actions may have helped, 

in some small way, improve their lives. 

In 2008, I received the National Military Families Association’s Support of Military Families Award and the National Guard Association of the United States’ Patrick Henry Award. In 2007, the Military Coalition, a consortium of veterans groups, 

presented me the Freedom Award. In 2005, I was privileged to be recognized by the 

Military Officers Association of America, along with my colleague Michael Higgins, 

with the Colonel Paul W. Arcari Meritorious Achievement Award for our work on 

pay equity, health care, and the survivor benefit plan. In 2004, the Enlisted Association of the U.S. National Guard presented me the Militia Award in recognition of 

my actions to improve their pay and benefits. While I have been deeply grateful to 

be recognized for my work on behalf of our Nation’s servicemembers and their families, I never cease to be humbled and amazed by the men and women serving our 

Nation and the strength of their family members. 

If confirmed as the next Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, I pledge to use my 28 years of experiences and policy making skills 

to effectively and efficiently perform the duties of this position. I vow to be as comVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00618 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
611 

mitted and dedicated in serving the Department of the Army as our soldiers have 

been in serving our Nation. It would be a distinct honor to become an official member of the Army family. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. In my view, the fundamental challenge facing the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is manning the entire force, which 

equates to balancing military readiness with the requirements of drawdown. Manning the force with the right mix of manpower in terms of qualified military and 

civilian personnel, with the requisite contractor support, in the current fiscal environment will be a critical challenge. The Army must continue to recruit, train, and 

retain the very best; this is critical to the success of our Total Force. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would begin to address these challenges by ensuring full 

engagement and integration across all organizations that have a role in the process. 

This would include the entire Army Enterprise, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate, Congress. My efforts would focus on ensuring we articulate requirements, allocate resources, and develop executable policies and programs that are measurable and manageable within the Total Army. I would build 

upon the accomplishments of the leaders before me and join my other civilian and 

military counterparts to further refine successful future strategies. 

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from the Army and the Federal Government for support 

services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis 

over the past several years, many challenges remain. 

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Army to improve 

the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured soldiers and their 

families? 

Answer. I have been advised that the Army has made great strides by implementing and continuously improving three programs: the Warrior Care and Transition Program, the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, and the Soldier for Life 

program. All three programs are designed to address the care and transition of 

wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Army 

continues to support these vital programs for Wounded Warriors and their families. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Army’s support for wounded soldiers, and to monitor 

their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, 

the Chief of Staff of the Army, the leadership of the Warrior Transition Command, 

and the rest of the Army to ensure that we maintain and enhance the world class 

support the Army provides to each wounded, ill, and injured soldier. The Nation and 

the Army owe our soldiers no less. 

Question. The Army has proactively provided the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA) with additional staff to help process servicemembers through its portion of the 

Integrated Disability Evaluation System more quickly. 

If confirmed, would you anticipate continuing such collaboration with the VA in 

order to expedite processing of soldiers through the Integrated Disability Evaluation 

System? 

Answer. I believe sustained communications between the Army and the VA are 

integral to improve processing of soldiers through the Integrated Disability Evaluation System. I understand the Army has established a number of mechanisms to 

improve and sustain collaboration with the Veterans Administration at multiple 

steps in the disability evaluation system process. If I am confirmed, I will ensure 

the Army maintains soldiers at the DRAS until the end of the fiscal year when the 

VA believes it will meet joint DOD/VA timeliness standards for case processing. 

OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. As the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs you would have significant responsibilities with regard to officer management 

policies, the promotion system, and recommending officers for nomination to positions of authority and responsibility. 

612 

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you make to the officer management 

system? 

Answer. I understand that the Army has a robust officer personnel management 

system that is designed to develop officers throughout their careers. If confirmed, 

I would pursue enhancements to these policies that would further allow the Army 

to leverage the unique talents of its officers against emerging mission and unit requirements. 

Question. Do you believe the current Army procedures and practices for reviewing 

the records of officers pending nomination by the President are sufficient to ensure 

the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Defense, and the President can make 

informed decisions? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Army’s processes and policies to identify 

eligibility and suitability for appointment or re-appointment as officers are sound 

and provide sufficient information for these decisions. If confirmed, I would fully 

support current efforts to enhance personnel suitability screening, ensuring rapid 

information vetting associated with nominations for appointments to higher positions of leadership, trust and responsibility. 

Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and reasonable for 

the officers involved? 

Answer. I am informed that the Army’s current procedures for vetting personal 

and professional information protect both individual officer rights and the interests 

of the Army to advance only those officers who have clearly demonstrated their 

character, competence, and commitment to the Nation’s values. If confirmed, I 

would support these vetting processes and for any changes proposed, ensure that 

the due process rights of individual officers are protected. 

GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER NOMINATIONS

Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated by senior leaders in 

the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to nomination. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in the officer promotion system, particularly in reviewing general officer nominations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I have been told that I will review all O–6 and below promotion lists. With regard to general officer nominations, I will have the opportunity 

to review every U.S. Army Reserve promotion nomination and all Army National 

Guard Federal Recognition nominations prior to the Secretary of the Army making 

a decision. 

Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the Services to timely document credible information of an adverse nature for evaluation by promotion selection boards and military and civilian leaders? 

Answer. I understand that all officers are screened for potential adverse information prior to being considered for promotion to any general officer grade. If credible 

adverse information exists, it is reviewed by the promotion board. If an officer with 

adverse information is then selected for promotion, the adverse information is 

shown to the military and civilian leadership prior to making a determination on 

whether to recommend the officer for promotion. I understand that this process continues until the officer is promoted. If confirmed, I will continue full support to this 

process. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that only the best qualified officers are nominated for promotion to general and flag officer rank? 

Answer. It is my understanding that selections for promotion to general officer are 

determined by a promotion selection board convened by the Secretary of the Army. 

The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army devote considerable 

time and thought to ensuring that these selection boards select the best qualified 

officers. The Chief reviews and the Secretary approves board membership and the 

written guidance provided to the board. The written guidance is specifically designed to ensure the best officers are selected to meet the senior leadership needs 

of the Army and DOD. If confirmed, I believe my role as the Assistant Secretary 

of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs would be to ensure that the promotion and personnel utilization system that serve as the foundation for those ultimately selected provide for the developmental needs and progression potential for 

officers with multiple skills and from diverse backgrounds. 

TECHNICAL TRAINING OF GENERAL OFFICERS

Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of Army general officers have advanced training and degrees in scientific and technical disciplines? 

613 

Answer. While I believe the Army is able to meet current senior officer requirements in the scientific and technical disciplines, I was advised that the Army’s military and civilian leadership has directed a review of these requirements and is 

awaiting recommendations on providing opportunities/programs directed at ensuring 

the Army continues to meet these requirements in the years ahead. If confirmed, 

I will support the implementation of any recommendations approved by the Secretary of the Army. 

Question. Are the career paths for officers with technical skills appropriate to ensure that the Army can execute complex acquisition programs, adapt to a rapidly 

changing technological threat environment, and make informed investment decisions on DOD and Army resources? If not, what will you do to address this deficiency? 

Answer. I have been informed that the career paths are appropriate. The goal is 

to develop an officer corps with the right mix of skills and experiences to provide 

a capacity of acquisition excellence to the Army. Developmental assignments expose 

an acquisition officer to a full spectrum of experiences within a primary Acquisition 

Career Field allowing an acquisition officer to develop acquisition skills and become 

technically proficient. 

As I understand the process, the Army provides career development opportunities, 

such as Advanced Civil Schooling and Training with Industry programs, to ensure 

the best and brightest candidates continue to rise to new levels educationally, functionally, and technically. I was told that nearly all of the Army Acquisition Officers 

in the grade of lieutenant colonel and above have advanced degrees. 

END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

Question. In this year’s budget request and Future Years Defense Program, the 

Department proposes making additional cuts to the Army’s Active and Reserve component end strengths. The Department proposes reducing the Army Active component to 450,000 by 2019, and further to 420,000 if sequestration continues in fiscal 

year 2016 and beyond. 

In your view, can the Army meet national defense objectives at the strength levels 

proposed without sequestration? What about at the strength levels proposed with 

sequestration? 

Answer. I understand that Army leaders have testified that the Army can meet 

its national defense objectives with an end-strength of 450,000 with significant risk, 

provided the Army is funded to allow appropriate balance in modernization, procurement, readiness, and manpower accounts. Although the Bipartisan Budget Act 

partially mitigates impacts from sequestration in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 

2015, I understand Army leaders have testified that the implementation of sequestration in fiscal year 2016 and beyond would result in an Army unable to meet the 

Defense Strategic Guidance. 

If confirmed, I will focus on how I can best help to ensure the Army is as ready 

and able as it can be, within fiscal constraints, to accomplish its mission. 

Question. If the Army must reduce its Active component end strength to 420,000, 

where does the Department take risk with respect to the national defense strategy? 

Answer. I am aware that both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff 

of the Army have testified that reduction to 420,000 in the Active component would 

leave the Army without the appropriate depth and capacity to successfully meet the 

Defense Strategic Guidance. If confirmed, I will do all possible to make the Army 

as capable as possible, and I will work with other senior leaders to ensure that Congress fully understands the consequences of an end strength reduction to such a 

level. 

Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping 

tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past 3 years? 

Answer. I believe Congress has given the Army the authorities necessary to accomplish its present drawdown. If confirmed, I will continually assess our processes 

and results to ensure the Army reduces end strength in a smart, measured way and 

identifies any additional legislative changes needed in a timely manner. 

Question. In your view, should the number of general officers in the Army be reduced commensurate with the drawdown of total Army end strength? 

Answer. I understand that the Army is already decreasing the number of general 

officers serving internal to the Army from 230 to 219 by March 2016 to meet policy 

directives from the Secretary of Defense’s General Officer (GO) efficiency review. If 

units led by GOs are part of the end strength reductions, a commensurate reduction 

in the number of GOs seems logical. If confirmed, I will ensure future GO reductions are based on the needs of the Army considering the nature of responsibilities 

associated with any specific position. 

614 

ARMY FORCE GENERATION MODEL

Question. The Army relies on a force generation model (ARFORGEN) in which 

units are manned, equipped, and trained to appropriate readiness levels over time 

as they cycle through ‘‘reset and train,’’ ‘‘ready,’’ and ‘‘available for deployment’’ force 

pools. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the manpower and personnel management requirements of the Army’s force generation methodology? 

Answer. I was advised that the current ARFORGEN model has produced the 

readiness required for persistent conflict over the past 8 years by providing a continuous supply of units available for deployment from across the Total Army. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army reviews the results of this process and considers 

whether modifications to, or replacement of, ARFORGEN is necessary to meet future requirements. 

Question. In your view, what are the greatest manpower and personnel management challenges, if any, in implementing ARFORGEN? 

Answer. I believe that the fundamental personnel challenge in implementing 

ARFORGEN is assigning the right soldier to the right place at the right time. Future challenges to implementing ARFORGEN include meeting the manpower and 

readiness requirements of the Army during an end strength reduction and during 

an era of greater unpredictability. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army continues 

to provide sufficient ready forces to accomplish all assigned missions. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions or changes would you propose, if any, to the 

design, implementation, or management of ARFORGEN? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure ARFORGEN sustains unit readiness. 

The Army must meet steady-state requirements, while maintaining readiness to 

meet the Defense Strategic Planning Guidance: defeating an adversary in one theater while simultaneously denying an adversary victory in another. A sustained 

readiness for a greater proportion of the Army is our goal. Readiness is especially 

important as the Army faces the prospect of reducing in size beyond the currently 

approved fiscal year 2015 levels. Regardless of its final form, I believe ARFORGEN 

must support the Army Total Force and provide sufficient and ready structure to 

meet Joint Force requirements. 

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

Question. The Department of Defense established a policy in 2005 mandating the 

discharge of officers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) who are beyond their 

military service obligations (MSO) unless the officer positively elects to remain in 

the IRR. Meanwhile, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has 

found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war has been 

problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning is a failed concept. 

What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Army force management 

planning? 

Answer. The Individual Ready Reserve has provided essential, trained manpower 

that has supported all three components of the Army in times of war. IRR soldiers 

have also recently been used as Individual Mobilization Augmentees to support 

operational and Army headquarters. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army thoroughly 

examines the proper role of the IRR in Army force management planning. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making to the Army’s 

IRR recall policy? 

Answer. I understand that the entire Reserve component has been and remains 

critical to the Army’s mission accomplishment. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army 

thoroughly examines the proper role of the IRR in Total Force planning. Careful 

consideration of all sources of manpower is critical in the present environment of 

declining end strength and reduced resources. 

Question. What are your views about policies affecting continued service by officer 

and enlisted personnel in the Reserve components who have fulfilled their MSO? 

Answer. In my view, retaining quality soldiers should always be one of the Army’s 

top priorities. As the Army draws down over the next several years, it is more important than ever to retain the training and experience of the best soldiers somewhere in the Total Force. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army carefully considers 

and effectively manages all sources of manpower given the present environment of 

declining end strength and reduced resources. 

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in place for 

members in the IRR receiving orders to Active Duty to request a delay or exemption 

for that activation, including the procedures in place for appealing the Army’s decision on that request? 

615 

Answer. I am informed there is system for soldiers to request relief from orders 

based on personal circumstances and a system to appeal decisions. If confirmed, I 

will do my utmost to ensure this process works efficiently and fairly. 

Question. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-Volunteer 

Force? 

Answer. Careful consideration of all sources of manpower is critical in the present 

environment of declining end strength and reduced resources. I understand that the 

entire Reserve component has been and remains critical to the Army’s mission accomplishment. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army thoroughly examines the proper 

role of the IRR for current and future mission requirements. 

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major personnel lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) which you 

would seek to address if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. I realize that over last 12 years, the Army has faced both operational and 

readiness challenges resulting from two simultaneous conflicts. When manning the 

force, I understand the Army has learned valuable lessons on Active component/Reserve component integration, employing and managing the Inactive Ready Reserve, 

and managing large-scale wartime manning programs such as Stop Loss. To support 

these operations, the Army developed systems over time that improved and maintained readiness during high OPTEMPO periods, such as the ARFORGEN cycle. If 

confirmed, I would support this and other efforts to ensure that the hard lessons 

learned from the past 12 years of conflict are captured in Army doctrine and not 

forgotten. 

NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND READINESS

Question. Legislative proposals introduced in recent years and recommendations 

of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves have proposed numerous 

changes to the roles and responsibilities of the National Guard and Reserves. Several of the proposed changes have been implemented, and numerous others are 

under consideration. 

How do you assess the changes in the role and authorities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau? 

Answer. I recognize that the changes that Congress authorized in the 2008 and 

2012 National Defense Authorization Acts, the roles and authorities of the Chief, 

National Guard Bureau have indeed changed significantly. I believe that the National Guard Bureau is working hard to reorganize the staff to better support the 

Chief, National Guard Bureau, in his roles as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with 

Army senior leaders; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Army National Guard to ensure that the National Guard remains a full partner in the Total 

Force. 

Question. How do you assess the changes in the roles and mission of the Army 

National Guard? 

Answer. I know that the Army leaders have repeatedly stated that the goal of the 

Army is to sustain the Army National Guard and Army Reserve as an operational 

reserve in their capacity as part of the Total Army Force. If confirmed, I will ensure 

that any end strength reductions to the Reserve component will not compromise its 

current record high levels of readiness and modernization. 

Question. In your view, do the current Army processes for planning, programming, 

and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the Army National Guard? 

What is the appropriate role of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the 

Director of the Army National Guard in this regard? 

Answer. I have been informed that Army National Guard requirements are sufficiently addressed during the Total Army Program Objective Memorandum process. 

Title 10, U.S.C., provides the authority for the Secretary of the Army to manage the 

Reserve component, to include responsibility for funding, manning and force structure decisions. The Director of the Army National Guard participates at the highest 

levels and advises the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army on 

Army National Guard priorities and requirements and provide assessments of the 

capabilities and risks associated with Army National Guard allocated funding as a 

part of the Total Army strategy. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau advises 

the Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense on National Guard issues based on the 

616 

input from the Director of the Army National Guard. I believe these roles are appropriate for the Army’s processes. 

Question. In your view, what should be the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s 

role in the assignment of Directors and Deputy Directors of the Army and Air National Guard? 

Answer. In my view, the Chief, National Guard Bureau should play an important 

role in the selection of the Director and Deputy Director of the Army National 

Guard. The Secretary of the Army convenes an advisory board to provide recommendations regarding the officer to be nominated as the Director of the Army 

National Guard, and if possible, the Chief, National Guard Bureau should serve as 

a member of that board or otherwise make recommendations on the officers to be 

nominated. If confirmed, I will support this process to ensure the Army has the best 

qualified officers nominated for these important positions. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continue to be of great 

concern to the committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs 

and policies for the Department of the Army to prevent suicides and increase the 

resiliency of soldiers and their families? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on providing clear guidance and policy, while 

championing the Army’s efforts under the Ready and Resilient Campaign to ensure 

that the Army identifies, resources, and sustains the right complement of training 

and services to build the personal resilience and foster unit and personal readiness 

of soldiers and their families. It is my understanding that the Ready and Resilient 

Campaign employs a holistic approach to strengthening the inherent resilience 

skills, abilities, and capabilities of soldiers and family members. Additionally, the 

strategy strives to influence bystanders to become interveners standing ready to 

help others in need of assistance to get the resources they need to overcome life’s 

challenges. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Soldiers and their families in both the Active and Reserve components 

have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational 

deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for soldiers and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal constraints? 

Answer. I am aware that for more than a decade, the Army has continuously 

asked its soldiers to be apart from their families during long deployments and to 

cope with the challenges of a high operational tempo. In order for soldiers to serve 

so selflessly and be effective under these conditions, they must have peace of mind 

that their families are well cared for at all times. I understand that family readiness 

is the state of being prepared to effectively navigate the challenges of daily living 

in the unique context of military service—this is the essence of what is most important for the Army to deliver. 

I have been advised that the Army has invested in a wide array of family programs in support of family readiness. Initiatives such as the Exceptional Family 

Member Program (which considers family members with special needs during the 

assignments process), Child Development Centers (which provide soldiers with affordable, quality day care), and the Financial Readiness Program (which offers soldiers financial counseling) are just a few examples of the ways the Army is committed to helping its soldiers and families. If confirmed, I will work diligently to 

support these important programs. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for soldiers and their families, especially in light of deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, retirees, and families. 

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Army MWR programs, particularly 

in view of the current fiscal environment and, if confirmed, are there any improvements you would seek to achieve? 

Answer. I understand the MWR income stream could be impacted by the current 

austere fiscal climate. If confirmed, I will monitor MWR programs and work to proVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00624 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
617 

tect them to the greatest extent feasible, and I will work to ensure that available 

resources are applied to sustaining existing programs and services. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The fiscal year 2013 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual 

Assault in the Military reflects that reports of sexual assaults in the Army increased 

by 51 percent from fiscal year 2012 to 2,149 reports of sexual assault. 

What is your assessment of this report? 

Answer. I have been advised that the Army views the increase in reporting in fiscal year 2013 as an indication of a growing level of confidence in the Army’s response system and as a sign that victims have increased trust in their chain of command and in the Army’s commitment to treat and care for them. An indicator of 

the growing trust is the increase of sexual assault reports between fiscal year 2012 

and fiscal year 2013 that were from incidents occurring prior to military service or 

involve allegations in which more than a year elapsed between the incident and the 

report. I share the Army’s view that there is still more to do in order to eliminate 

sexual assaults. If confirmed, I intend to provide my full support in helping the 

Army achieve this goal. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s sexual assault prevention and 

response program? 

Answer. I understand that the Army has made substantial progress in addressing 

the issue of sexual assault. Through the combined efforts of military and civilian 

leaders at all echelons, I am informed that the Army has implemented an unprecedented number of program and policy initiatives—more than 30 since January 

2013—to address this insider threat. These initiatives are enhancing the reporting, 

investigation and prosecution of sexual assault offenses, increasing the accountability of leaders at all levels—officer, enlisted, and civilian—in fostering a cultural 

change that will lead to a positive command climate. 

If confirmed, I will lead and support the Army’s commitment to a holistic approach to effectively change culture, prevent sexual assault and harassment in the 

ranks, support and advocate for victims, and prosecute offenders to the fullest extent of the law. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. I believe the Army’s system for receiving and processing reports of sexual 

assault, including both restricted and unrestricted reports, is effective. I am informed that since implementing the ‘‘restricted’’ reporting option (which does not 

initiate a law enforcement investigation) in 2004, the number of total reports has 

continued to increase. Although the Army prefers for reports to be ‘‘unrestricted’’ so 

that it may hold perpetrators accountable, by giving victims control over triggering 

the investigation, the restricted option allows victims time to understand the process, seek the counseling and care they need, and to consult with an attorney if they 

wish. I understand the conversion of restricted reports to unrestricted is continuing 

to increase, which I believe is evidence of the success of numerous initiatives and 

is an indication that victims are gaining more trust in the system. If confirmed, I 

will ensure that the Army continues to improve upon its response system and continues to enhance victim support. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. In my view, the commander, his/her subordinate commanders, and staff 

members are charged with the ultimate responsibility of caring for soldiers in their 

charge and ensuring the needs of victims are met. As such, the chain of command 

must play a vital role in providing compassionate care and support to victims. I understand that the Army is working hard to foster a climate in which victims trust 

their chain of command to support them if and when sexual offenses occur. The 

commander-driven change in unit culture as well as compassionate, comprehensive 

support of victims is critical to assuage victims’ fears. I also believe that the Army 

must hold accountable commanders who fail to do their duty in this regard. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Army resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help 

they need? 

Answer. I believe the Army is dedicated to providing soldiers who are the victims 

of sexual assault with extensive medical, psychological, and legal support services. 

I have been informed that sexual assault victims are offered the services of a Sexual 

Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) and a Victim Advocate (VA). When a victim 

of sexual assault presents at any Military Treatment Facility in the Army, his or 

her medical needs are managed by a Sexual Assault Clinical Provider and his or 

618 

her behavioral health care is provided by the Sexual Assault Behavioral Health Provider. 

On the legal support side, I understand that the Special Victims Counsel Program 

is adequately staffed and resourced to provide victims with the counsel that they 

require. Special Victims Counsel provide the full range of legal assistance services 

to victims. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional 

sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. I fully understand that both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of 

Staff of the Army have listed the prevention of sexual assault as their top priority 

and are putting actions against those words. As a result, leaders at every echelon 

and in every location are committed to preventing sexual assaults and caring for 

victims, and the Army is working diligently to ensure that all soldiers share these 

commitments. I believe that in order to eliminate the crime of sexual assault, the 

Army must change the culture of the force, which includes eliminating the stigma 

associated with reporting these crimes, regardless of whether the reporting soldier 

is a victim or a bystander. If confirmed, I will be committed to helping the Army 

drive this cultural change, and will continuously look for innovative ways to combat 

this difficult problem. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources Army 

has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. I have been advised that the Army has sufficient training and resources 

in place to properly investigate sexual assault allegations and prosecute military offenders. Recognizing the critical importance of this issue, if confirmed, I will closely 

monitor all aspects of the current efforts to prevent sexual assaults, increase reporting, care for victims, and the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. I believe that the chain of command, beginning with senior leaders, is 

responsible for ensuring that our military culture does not tolerate sexual assault. 

Commanders are responsible for everything their command does or fails to do, 

which includes training soldiers on how to prevent sexual assault and holding all 

leaders accountable for creating a culture that does not tolerate sexual assault. I 

am told the Army has recently published policies on Command Climate Assessments 

and Assessing Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers on Fostering Climates of 

Dignity and Respect as tools to enable commanders and leaders to assess and affect 

the culture within their units. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. I have been advised that requiring a judge advocate outside the chain 

of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted 

would in effect create a parallel justice system for sexual assault cases. This risks 

generating confusion and inefficiencies in the military justice system and may undermine the Army’s efforts to change the military culture in which sexual assaults 

have occurred. If confirmed, I will make every effort to ensure that any changes to 

the military justice system are implemented in a manner that continues the trust 

and confidence commanders, soldiers, and victims currently have in our administration of military justice. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will be an ardent supporter of the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program, and will work with the Secretary 

of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 and the 

other Headquarters, Department of the Army elements and commanders to ensure 

that eliminating sexual assault remains a top priority throughout the Army. I will 

also work to strengthen the faith of the American public and Congress in the Army’s 

prevention and response efforts with regard to sexual assault and sexual harassment. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do Department of Defense policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion 

and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on 

those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. I believe the Army and the Department of Defense take very seriously 

the Constitutional freedom expressed in the First Amendment for the Free Exercise 

619 

of Religion on the part of all citizens, including members in military service. Commanders, leaders, and chaplains work to ensure those protections are afforded to all 

of our soldiers and families and Department of Army civilians, and that the varied 

religious practices of soldiers are accommodated, including those with no religious 

beliefs. 

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers 

offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the 

proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her 

religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs? 

Answer. Yes. The Army’s well-trained Chaplain Corps provides religious support 

to the Army. That support is provided on the basis of the Soldier’s Free Exercise 

rights. Chaplains provide prayers on many occasions in both private and public settings. Chaplains are never required to pray outside of their individual convictions, 

beliefs, or religious tradition, or the tenets of the religious organization that provides their endorsement to the Department of Defense and the Department of the 

Army. I understand that there are no Army policies that either promote or restrict 

prayers, either in manner or content. 

Question. Section 533 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013 (P.L. 112–239), as amended by section 532 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (P.L. 113–66) protects rights of conscience of members 

of the Armed Forces and chaplains of such members, and prohibits, so far as possible, use of such beliefs as the basis of any adverse personnel action, discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some 

religious denominations have sincerely held beliefs in opposition to same-sex marriage. 

In your view, may a member of the Armed Forces who has a sincerely held belief 

in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse personnel action or similar 

other adverse action, if he or she shares those personal views on the subject in a 

personal capacity? 

Answer. It is my understanding that current policies regarding servicemembers’ 

individual expression and free exercise of religion have not changed since the repeal 

of the Defense of Marriage Act. If soldiers wish to express their personal views 

about this issue in an open forum and caveat those as such, then that is purely 

within their right to do so. I further understand that soldiers may be subject to disciplinary or administrative action only if they advocate racial, gender, or ethnic hatred or intolerance; if they advocate, create, or engage in illegal discrimination based 

on race, color, gender, religion, or national origin; or if they advocate the use of or 

use force, violence, or unlawful means to deprive individuals of their rights under 

the U.S. Constitution. These rights are fundamental, and if confirmed, I will ensure 

that all Army policies incorporate and protect these rights. 

OFFICER ACCESSIONS

Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relative distribution from the 

sources of commission to meet the Army’s officer accessions requirements and sustain the viability of the Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the 

Officer Candidate School? 

Answer. In my view, there is no single distribution that is appropriate for all circumstances for the Total Army. It is my understanding that each source of commission brings to the force a slightly different strength in terms of academic background, diversity, military cultural indoctrination, and prior military experience. In 

order to reflect our society’s range of talents and strengths and to meet fluid national defense missions and priorities, the Army must periodically adjust the proportion of accessions between all sources of commission. I understand this framework 

is likely to remain consistent as long as the Nation’s needs do not change significantly. However, if confirmed, I will continuously monitor the relative distribution 

of officers from these commissioning sources. 

Question. As Army end strength goes down potentially to numbers as low as 

420,000 in the regular Army, 315,000 in the Army National Guard, and 185,000 in 

the Army Reserve, if confirmed, how would you evaluate and make adjustments, if 

any, to the relative distribution among sources of commission to meet lower officer 

accession requirements? 

Answer. Should commissioning requirements decrease significantly, I understand 

that the Reserve Officer Training Corps would be the primary lever for adjusting 

the Army Officer Accessions. In this regard, I have been told the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) could reduce accessions only slightly without losing the cost effectiveness of their infrastructure, and the Officer Candidate School has already been reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00627 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
620 

duced to a minimum sustainment level to accommodate current budget considerations. 

U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY

Question. What is your assessment of the policies and procedures at the USMA 

to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual assaults and sexual harassment and 

to ensure essential oversight? 

Answer. In my assessment, the USMA at West Point possesses effective policies 

and procedures to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual harassment and sexual assaults and to ensure essential oversight. 

USMA has aligned its Sexual Harassment and Assault Response Program along 

the five lines of effort identified by the Department of Defense as well as the Department of the Army including prevention, advocacy, investigation, accountability, 

and assessment. Only through this holistic approach, coupled with committed leaders, will the culture change. Leading and supporting this culture change will be one 

of my top priorities, if confirmed. 

Question. What is your assessment of the policies and procedures at the U.S. Military Academy to ensure religious tolerance and respect? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the USMA has policies and procedures in 

place that effectively ensure religious tolerance and respect and support cadets, faculty, and staff in their personal faith choices. I fully support this Constitutional 

right and appreciate its importance to the Nation and the Army. If confirmed, I will 

take all necessary steps to ensure the policies of the Army continue to ensure religious tolerance for all faiths. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Department in January 2013, rescinded the policy restricting the 

assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging 

in direct ground combat operations, and gave the Military Services until January 

1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception 

to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. 

The Services are working now to develop gender-free physical and mental standards 

for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards. 

If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. If confirmed as the ASA(M&RA), my role would be to provide oversight 

of the process by reviewing and recommending approval and disapproval of actions 

regarding the assignment of women to newly opened positions and occupations. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes. I understand the Army is scientifically evaluating closed combat 

arms occupations to determine physical performance requirements to ensure the 

best qualified soldiers have the opportunity to serve in any position for which they 

are qualified regardless of gender. If confirmed, I will focus on implementing a Total 

Army Policy that ensures future force capability and readiness by maximizing every 

soldier’s potential, performance and contribution to a ready and modern Army. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you take to ensure that such 

decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. Yes, I believe success in the Army based solely on ability, qualifications 

and performance is consistent with Army values and enhances military readiness. 

That is why the Army is committed to scientifically evaluating the requirements of 

the job in order to select and train soldiers, regardless of gender, who can meet the 

requirements of their military occupational specialty. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to ensure the Army maximizes every soldier’s potential. 

Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about assigning women 

to what are currently male-only combat units. 

To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem in the implementation 

of this policy? 

Answer. As I understand it, the Army is currently developing plans for successfully integrating women into all male units. I am told that in some units with newly 

opened positions, the Army has assigned more senior female soldiers prior to assigning junior female soldiers and has conducted training for these units. By removing 

barriers to serve and succeed in the Army, the Army is enhancing military readiness and ensuring that success is based solely on ability, qualifications, and performance. 

621 

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department of Defense on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department’s foreign language capabilities, to include revision of policy 

and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel. 

Answer. Despite this increased emphasis since 2005, the Department appears to 

have made only modest progress in implementing that transformation. A 2010 GAO 

report indicated that DOD’s efforts to meet the language requirements ‘‘had yielded 

some results but had not closed the persistent gaps in foreign language-proficient 

staff and reflected, in part, a lack of a comprehensive, strategic approach.’’ 

Question. In your view, what should be the priorities of the Federal Government 

to expanding the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel and improving coordination of foreign language programs and activities among the Federal 

agencies? 

Answer. I believe that efficiency across all government agencies and departments 

is valuable, especially in this financially difficult time. If confirmed, I will ensure 

the Army, as the Executive Agent for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, continues to provide foreign language training to all government personnel who require it while simultaneously meeting Army and Department of Defense requirements. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Army contributes to implementing a comprehensive, strategic approach to closing the gaps in 

foreign language proficiency? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army, as the Executive Agent for the 

Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, continues to work closely 

with the other members of the Department of Defense to provide required training 

opportunities. I will also work closely with the Army Senior Language Authority in 

my role as oversight of Army Language programs to assure that there is a continued 

focus on providing necessary training in foreign language and culture to soldiers 

and civilians. Additionally, I will assure the Army is involved in Department of Defense working groups designed to review and assess the training, assignment and 

utilization of professional linguists. 

Question. The GAO report also stated that, ‘‘On the basis of their operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, ground commanders have expressed the importance of language and culture skills for general purpose forces in counterinsurgency 

and stability operations, stressing, for example, that language training is as important as marksmanship.’’ 

Is there any evidence the institutional Army is giving languages and cultural 

skills the same high priority as marksmanships in its career development efforts? 

If more needs to be done, what steps would you propose to take to achieve higher 

levels of importance for language and cultural training? 

Answer. It is my understanding that since 2010, the Army has made language 

and culture training a requirement for all soldiers deploying to Afghanistan. Additionally, I understand the Army is concluding a review of the career path for professional linguists, and is reviewing language required positions across the total force. 

If confirmed I will ensure that the Army will meet the established goals for language professionals, while providing necessary training in language and culture for 

those who are deploying to foreign countries. 

LEGISLATIVE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

Question. Each year, the Services assign mid-career officers to the offices of Members of Congress under the Legislative Fellows Program. Upon completion of their 

legislative fellowships, officers are required to be assigned to follow-on positions in 

their Services in which they effectively use the experience and knowledge they 

gained during their fellowships. 

What is your assessment of the process for the recruitment, selection, preparation, 

and assignment to Members of Army officers in the Legislative Fellows program? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the recruitment, selection, preparation, and 

final assignment of Army Congressional Fellows to Member of Congress offices is 

designed to provide the best Army officers, senior noncommissioned officers, and Department of the Army civilians to support both Chambers of Congress with mature 

and combat experienced (regarding the soldiers) fellows. This is an important program, and if confirmed, I will ensure that the program continues to meet the needs 

of the Army. 

622 

Question. What is your assessment of the value of the Legislative Fellows program to the Army and the utilization of officers who have served as legislative fellows? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Army leader development model is premised on the three pillars of training, education and experience. The Legislative Fellows program, in particular, provides an invaluable opportunity to develop officers, 

senior noncommissioned officers and Department of the Army Civilians with a 

unique skill set and critical understanding of the legislative branch. After 1 year 

as an Army Fellow in a Member of Congress office, a 2-year utilization follows with 

duty in the following agencies: OCLL (Hill Divisions/Pentagon Offices), Budget Liaison, Army Reserve and National Guard Legislative Liaison offices here in the National Capitol Region. 

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of 

senior executives. 

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields? 

Answer. I believe the Army must ensure that all senior executives have a diverse 

portfolio of experiences and strong skills to lead and operate effectively in achieving 

Army’s mission and organizational goals. I understand that Army has instituted an 

enterprise approach to senior executive management through establishment of an 

annual Talent and Succession Management process. This process is designed to optimally align executive positions with the most critical Army imperatives and priorities, to include acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical 

fields. In the end, the Army’s senior executive workforce must be capable of 

partnering with senior military leaders to lead the Army during these challenging 

times. If confirmed, I will endeavor to enhance policies to ensure the Army attracts, 

retains, and develops the best senior executives for all positions. 

BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Question. The Army employs many contractors whom now play an integral role 

in the performance of functions that were once performed exclusively by government 

employees, including the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of policies, the development of public relations strategies, and even the 

collection and analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in 

the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of 

the same functions as Federal employees. Contractors continued to be hired as 

many civilian positions remained on a hiring freeze over the past few years. 

Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees and contractor 

employees is in the best interests of the Army? 

Answer. I believe achieving a ‘‘balance’’ between civilian and contractor employees 

is in the best interest of the Army. Achieving balance will be an ongoing process 

subject to emerging defense requirements, rather than something that is achieved 

on specific date. In my view, the Army must consider the most appropriate and effective source of labor for functions on a case-by-case basis informed by mission requirements, rather than the implementation of specific manpower quotas. 

Question. In your view, has the Army become too reliant on contractors to perform 

its basic functions? 

Answer. In my view, it is critical that the Army use the most appropriate and 

effective source of labor for individual functions, while also carefully scrutinizing the 

process to ensure that no inherently governmental functions are outsourced. Functions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in order to determine which type 

of manpower to use. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army, the 

Under Secretary and other Army leaders to assess the extent of the Army’s reliance 

on contractors and ensure compliance with law and policy. 

Question. Do you believe that the Army should undertake a comprehensive reappraisal of ‘‘inherently governmental functions’’ and other critical government functions, and how they are performed? 

Answer. I understand that the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act 

and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), as well as the Total Force Management statutes of title 10, govern the proper sourcing of labor. Ensuring that the 

Army complies with the FAIR Act and the FAR is an ongoing process. I believe that 

the Army must continue to analyze its functions to guarantee an appropriate workforce mix, while ensuring that inherently governmental functions are not 

623 

outsourced. If confirmed, I will monitor and scrutinize this area and assess whether 

any reappraisal is necessary. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate officials in the Army 

to review the contractor and civilian force mix? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with other appropriate officials in the Army to 

review the contractor and civilian force mix. Pursuant to title 10, U.S.C., section 

129a, I will also work closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness, Comptroller, and Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to ensure 

that the Army continues to operate in a manner consistent with Department of Defense guidance. 

Question. Would you agree that the balance between civilian employees and contractor employees in performing Army functions should be determined by the best 

interests of the Army and not by artificial constraints on the number of civilian employees? 

Answer. Yes. In all instances, the Army must execute its missions to the best of 

its abilities within the available resources in order to best serve our soldiers and 

the Nation. A key component in Army’s overall effectiveness lies in ensuring Army 

functions are performed with the most appropriate source of labor available. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to remove any artificial constraints placed 

on the size of the Army’s civilian workforce, so that the Army can hire the number 

of employees most appropriate to accomplish its mission? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will meet assigned missions within available funding and 

using the most appropriate source of labor as required by title 10, U.S.C. sections 

129 and 129a. If confirmed, I would support all efforts to ensure compliance with 

the law and to remove inappropriate constraints on the size of the Army civilian 

workforce. 

SERGEANT BOWE BERGDAHL

Question. Following the recent repatriation of Sergeant Bergdahl after 5 years of 

captivity with foreign fighters there have been questions about the circumstances 

under which he became separated from his unit in Afghanistan in 2009. 

If confirmed, what is your understanding of your role as Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, concerning review of the facts and circumstances of Sergeant Bergdahl’s capture and his status as a member of the U.S. 

Army? 

Answer. I am aware of the recent reports concerning the repatriation of Sergeant 

Bergdahl and that there are a number of Departmental efforts to clearly establish 

the facts and circumstances related to this matter. If confirmed, I will provide all 

support necessary to the combatant commander, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of the Army to ensure that any decisions in this matter 

are fully informed, well analyzed, and coordinated with all the interested parties. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided in a timely manner to this committee and its staff 

and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

624 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

INVOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS

1. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Wada, under the President’s budget request (PBR), the 

Army is dramatically reducing the size of the force over the Future Years Defense 

Program. In your answer to the advance policy questions, you state that your fundamental challenge, if confirmed, will be ‘‘manning the entire force, which equates to 

balancing military readiness with the requirements of a drawdown.’’ 

According to a report received by the Senate Armed Services Committee, pursuant 

to section 525 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 

2013, I understand that in the second half of calendar year 2013, the Army involuntarily separated six soldiers. These included two sergeants first class and four staff 

sergeants—who had 16 or 17 years of service. Over their time of service, these staff 

sergeants had deployed overseas for contingency operations (presumably Iraq and 

Afghanistan) for an average of 30 months—2 years away from their loved ones, 

serving our country and keeping us safe. 

I understand that the Army is being forced to reduce its end strength and this 

requires difficult decisions you would rather not make. How do you view the use 

of involuntary separations to achieve end strength reduction goals? 

Ms. WADA. Involuntary separations are a last resort, but I understand they may 

be necessary to reduce personnel in a responsible and measured manner. If confirmed, I would ensure the Army uses precision, care, and compassion as it applies 

all the tools and authorities available in achieving the directed end strength without 

jeopardizing the success of combat operations and other critical missions. 

2. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Wada, based on your preparation for this hearing, as the 

Army reduces its end strength this year and next year, how many well-performing 

officers, noncommissioned officers (NCO), and soldiers—who are not eligible for retirement—will be involuntarily separated from the Army? Please provide specific 

numbers. 

Ms. WADA. I am informed that during fiscal year 2014–2015, a total of 140 noncommissioned officers who are not retirement eligible are programmed for involuntary separation from the Army. I am further told that there will be approximately 

another 1,300 captains and approximately 400 majors who will separate as a result 

of separation boards. 

I also understand the Army plans to conduct additional Officer Separation Boards 

in fiscal year 2015, planning to select approximately 1,000 captains for separation. 

There is additional analysis ongoing to determine which year groups should be considered. 

3. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Wada, will you give me your commitment that you will 

do everything in your power to minimize the use of involuntary separations for wellperforming servicemembers, especially those who are not eligible for retirement? 

Ms. WADA. I am committed to doing everything in my power to minimize the use 

of involuntary separations, in the context of the resource constrained environment 

in which the Army is operating. 

[The nomination reference of Debra S. Wada follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

May 5, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Debra S. Wada, of Hawaii, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Army, vice Thomas 

R. Lamont, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Debra S. Wada, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:] 

625 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DEBRA S. WADA

Education: 

Drake University, 1980–1984, B.A. in Economics and Political Science, degree 

granted 1984 

Naval War College, Non-resident Seminar Program, diploma June 1997 

Employment Record: 

House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, 

DC, Professional Staff Member, November 1999–January 2007 and January 2011 to 

present. 

House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, 

DC, Lead Staff Member for Subcommittee on Military Personnel, January 2007– 

March 2010. 

House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, 

DC, Deputy Staff Director, March 2010–December 2010. 

National Park Service, Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs, Washington, DC, Legislative Specialist, January 1999–November 1999. 

Senator Daniel K. Akaka, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, Legislative Assistant, 

April 1990–December 1998. 

Representative Daniel K. Akaka, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 

Legislative Assistant, July 1987–April 1990. 

Chemical Manufacturers Association, Washington, DC, Assistant, January 1986– 

July 1987. 

Honors and awards: 

Naval Reserve Association, Legislative Proponent Award, December 2008 

National Military Families Association, NMFA Support of Military Families 

Award, September 2008 

National Guard Association of the United States, Patrick Henry Award, 2008 

The Military Coalition, Freedom Award, October 2007 

Military Officers Association of America, Colonel Paul W. Acari Meritorious 

Achievement Award, 2005 

Enlisted Association National Guard of the United States, Militia Award, July 

2004 

Federal Asian Pacific American Council, September 1991 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Debra S. Wada in connection with her nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

626 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Debra S. Wada. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). 

3. Date of nomination: 

May 5, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

October 31, 1962; Honolulu, HI. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Single. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

N/A. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

St. Andrew’s Priory, (6th–12th), 1974–1980, high school diploma, degree granted, 

1980. 

Drake University, 1980–1984, B.A. in Economics and Political Science, degree 

granted, 1984. 

Drake University, 1984, Masters in Business Administration, no degree American 

University, August–December 1989, Masters in International Business Management, no degree. 

Naval War College, Non-resident Seminar Program, diploma, June 1997. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Professional Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 1999–2007 and 2011 to present. 

Lead Staff Member for Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 2007–2010. 

Deputy Staff Director, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 2010. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Legislative Affairs Specialist, National Park Service, U.S. Department of Interior, 

January–October 1999. 

Legislative Assistant, Senator Daniel K. Akaka, U.S. Senate, 1990–1999. 

Legislative Assistant, Representative Daniel K. Akaka, U.S. House of Representatives, 1987–1990. 

Intern, State of Hawaii, summer 1981 and 1982. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

N/A. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

• Wolf Trap 

• Kennedy Center 

• National Zoo 

• Smithsonian Institute 

• Congressional Asian Pacific American Staff Association 

• Asian American Pacific Islander Ladies on the Hill 

• Japanese American Citizens League 

• Naval War College 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

N/A. 

627 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

Volunteered for Obama for President Campaigns, and re-election. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

Esther Puakela Kia’aina, Kia’aina for Congress, $250.00 (2012). 

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee $250.00 (2010). 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

• Naval Reserve Association, Legislative Proponent Award, December 2008 

• National Military Families Association, NMFA Support of Military Families Award, September 2008 

• National Guard Association of the United States, Patrick Henry Award, 

2008 

• The Military Coalition, Freedom Award, October 2007 

• Military Officers Association of America, Colonel Paul W. Acari Meritorious Achievement Award, 2005 

• Enlisted Association National Guard of the United States, Militia Award, 

July 2004 

• Federal Asian Pacific American Council, September 1991 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

DEBRA S. WADA

628 

This 23rd day of May, 2014. 

[The nomination of Debra S. Wada was reported to the Senate 

by Chairman Levin on June 24, 2014, with the recommendation 

that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed 

by the Senate on September 17, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Miranda A.A. Ballentine by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I believe the Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms have been very effective, 

and I am not aware of the need for any modifications. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I am not aware of the need for any modifications to Goldwater-Nichols, 

but if confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Air Force and Under Secretary of the Air Force on any proposed changes that pertain to Air Force installations, environment, and energy. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy? 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment 

and Energy (SAF/IE) formulates policy and procedures for effective management of 

the Air Force energy programs, real property, housing and other facilities; environmental protection; and safety and occupational health for both military and civilian 

personnel. This position is also responsible for the timely completion of closures and 

realignments of installations under base closure laws. This position manages the 

strategic basing process. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I bring nearly 2 decades of experience in the private and non-profit sectors. Most recently, I have spent the last 6 years at America’s largest corporation, 

Walmart Stores Inc, which is also the largest private energy user in the United 

States. I lead a global team of 100+ engineers in over 25 countries who manage the 

environmental impact and energy portfolio of 11,000 facilities. I am a trusted advisor to top corporate leaders (Walmart’s version of ‘‘top brass’’), and I bring a proven 

aptitude in developing and implementing energy and environmental strategies, successfully balancing competing priorities between organizational mission, economics 

and community impact. I have a history of successfully collaborating within complex, matrixed, geographically-disperse organizations, as well as developing successful partnerships with outside stakeholder groups. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy? 

Answer. One can always enhance one’s ability to perform at a higher level. If confirmed, the most immediate actions I intend to take to enhance my abilities include: 

- meeting with Members of Congress to ensure their top priorities are 

factored into policies; 

- visiting bases to build a deeper understanding of the state of the Air 

Force’s infrastructure; 

- spending time with airmen and their families, to align the SAF/IE policies 

with our warfighters’ needs; 

629 

- analyzing existing programs and priorities to assess which programs 

ought to be accelerated and where there are areas of challenge or vulnerability; 

- building relationships with the SAF/IE team, as well as other key partners across the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of the Air Force would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect the Secretary of the Air Force to prescribe 

the duties and functions stated above. Additionally, I would expect that the Secretary will request that I rely upon my years of experience to assist her in developing and implementing programs to meet the goals and priorities she has laid out 

for the Department. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would be your professional relationship with: 

Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to carry out the goals and priorities of the Secretary of the Air Force. Additionally, I expect to be the Secretary’s advisor on matters related to installations, environment and energy, and to elevate important 

issues to her in a timely fashion. 

Question. Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary and seek his 

counsel and guidance as I work to support his efforts to carry out the goals and priorities of the Secretary of the Air Force. Additionally, I expect to be the Under Secretary’s advisor on matters related to installations, environment and energy, and to 

elevate important issues to him in a timely fashion. 

Question. Air Force Chief of Staff. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will provide the support that the Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force requires to execute his duties and responsibilities and achieve the Air Force 

mission. I and my staff will partner closely with the Chief and his staff as appropriate on his specific areas of focus. 

Question. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will similarly work closely with the Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force to execute his duties and responsibilities. I and my staff will partner 

closely with the Vice Chief and his staff as appropriate on his specific areas of focus. 

Question. Other Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work as part of the team to ensure that we present 

the best collaborative approach to supporting the goals and priorities of the Secretary of the Air Force. 

Question. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Energy 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Energy to develop and execute the policies and initiatives of 

the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air Force. 

Question. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment to develop and execute the policies and initiatives of 

the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air Force. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and 

Programs. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Operational Energy Plans and Programs to develop and execute the policies and initiatives of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air 

Force. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries of the 

Army and Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment to strengthen the cooperation between the Services. I will work to foster a cordial and productive working relationship with these colleagues, and seek to leverage both knowledge and implementation wherever feasible and viable. 

Question. General Counsel of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel of the Air 

Force to ensure that the programs we execute, and the policies we develop, are consistent with the law. 

Question. Judge Advocate General of the Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Judge Advocate General of the 

Air Force to ensure that the programs we execute with the policies we develop are 

630 

consistent with the areas of law contained within his purview. I would also expect 

to work directly with the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force on areas of mutual interest. 

Question. Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Logistics, Installations and 

Mission Support. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support to identify and implement policies and practices 

that best support the needs of the Department of the Air Force. 

Question. Civil Engineer of the U.S. Air Force. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Air Force Civil Engineer to identify 

and implement policies and practices that best support the needs of the Department 

of the Air Force, our airmen and their families. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that confront the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy? 

Answer. Many significant challenges confront the next Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force (Installations, Environment, and Energy). Chief among them is ensuring 

our installations and infrastructure enables the Air Force’s mission now and in the 

future. Enhancing readiness while controlling cost is a challenge in any environment, and I understand the Air Force had to make difficult choices while building 

this year’s budget request and took risk in installation support. 

With the largest energy bill in DOD, the Air Force will continue to be challenged 

to optimize energy productivity to ensure every dollar counts. 

Environmental and occupational safety and health issues are of top concern for 

our people and installations as well. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with Congress, the Secretary of the 

Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Installations and Environment), as well as other governmental and non-governmental organizations to devise solutions to address these challenges. I intend to 

promptly examine existing policies and procedures to accelerate winning solutions 

and to identify and repair less successful policies. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant problems in the performance of the functions of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy? 

Answer. I am not aware of any significant problems in the performance of the 

functions of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, 

and Energy. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. Again, I am not aware of any significant problems in the performance 

of the functions of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy. If confirmed, I would initiate a review of Air Force programs 

within the SAF/IE portfolio immediately, evaluate the risks and prioritize the most 

pressing problems that will require focused attention. I will collaborate with my 

counterparts in DOD, the Military Services, and within the Air Force where those 

issues overlay or may impact the responsibilities of others and develop a plan to address these issues. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will establish priorities consistent with those of the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air 

Force. In broad terms, I will assist the Secretary of the Air Force in focusing on 

people, making every dollar count, and balancing readiness for today’s fight with 

modernization to meet tomorrow’s challenges. I will lead the Air Force in meeting 

the energy goals laid out for the Department, seek to allocate funding to develop 

the right infrastructure at the right time at the right cost to support the mission 

of the Air Force, our airmen and their families, and work closely with Members of 

Congress, State and local officials, and the public when considering projects and 

processes with environmental impacts. 

631 

Question. Do you have any specific plans to help improve the quality of life for 

Air Force families who are under considerable strain as a result of repeated deployments? 

Answer. I am not in a position at present to develop specific plans with respect 

to improving the quality of life of our airmen and their families. However, I clearly 

recognize the pressures repeated deployments have placed on our Air Force families. 

If confirmed, I will work in concert with the Secretary of the Air Force to identify 

and implement quality of life initiatives that can be influenced by the installations, 

environment, and energy portfolio. Whenever possible, I will seek the insight and 

views of airmen and their families directly. 

The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy has responsibility for, among other things, construction and maintenance of installations, family housing, energy, weapon system energy, and environmental protection. 

Question. In the competition for resources inherent in the Defense Department 

budget process, how do you believe funding for these various responsibilities should 

be balanced? 

Answer. I am not in a position at present to comment on the relative funding priorities of these programs. Although they would certainly compete for the same limited resources, the development of these programs must be done in conjunction with 

each other. All of these programs must work hand-in-hand to further the strategic 

vision and goals of the Secretary of the Air Force. 

My previous professional experience of developing strategies within limited capital 

budgets prepares me well to, if confirmed, execute thoughtful, open, transparent 

processes for budget-allocation decisionmaking. 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Question. What would be your highest priorities, if confirmed, for allocating military construction (MILCON) funding for the Department of the Air Force over the 

next several years? 

Answer. The military construction program priorities should fall in line with overall Air Force priorities. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that those top priorities 

receive appropriate military construction funding. I understand that the Air Force 

MILCON budget bore risk in fiscal year 2015 as the Secretary and Chief were forced 

to make difficult funding decisions. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Air 

Force’s leadership team to thoughtfully, openly, and transparently make decisions 

about capital allocation that best supports the mission. 

BUDGET PRESSURES

Question. In difficult budget times, funding for military construction and facilities 

sustainment is often deferred in favor of other near-term priorities. However, over 

the long-term, underfunding of these accounts increases the number of failed and 

failing facilities, escalates the risk that facilities will fail prematurely, and results 

in higher restoration and replacement costs. 

Do you believe that current funding levels dedicated to military construction and 

facilities sustainment are adequate to support the operational, housing, and quality 

of life requirements of the Air Force? 

Answer. The Air Force, like all the Services, is making difficult investment tradeoffs as budgets decrease. If confirmed, I will review the current and future requirements for infrastructure, to ensure that the Air Force can support its mission requirements and the Secretary of the Air Force’s priorities. 

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENTS

Question. DOD has requested another Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

round. 

Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why? 

Answer. It is my understanding that prior to BRAC 2005, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reported 24 percent in excess capacity for the Air Force. 

BRAC 2005 had little impact in reducing Air Force infrastructure, and since 2005 

there has been significant drawdown in both personnel and number of aircraft, indicating the Air Force likely continues to maintain excess infrastructure. It appears 

another BRAC round would reduce infrastructure and allow the Air Force to concentrate its resources on personnel and mission capabilities. 

Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round resulted in 

major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far less money than originally estimated. 

632 

What is your understanding of why such cost growth and lower realized savings 

have occurred? 

Answer. As I understand BRAC 2005, the key factor that drove the cost of the 

last BRAC round was the willingness of the Department, the BRAC Commission, 

and Congress to accept recommendations that were not designed to save money. 

From my current understanding of BRAC 2005, it appears this round focused on 

both transformation and efficiencies. 

Question. How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a future BRAC 

round? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with DOD to ensure Air Force BRAC recommendations meet Department and congressional guidelines in any future round 

of BRAC if authorized by Congress. 

PHASING OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

Question. In some cases, the Department has proposed phasing, as opposed to incrementing, large military construction projects over multiple fiscal years even when 

each distinct phase does not satisfy the overall requirement of the Department. It 

has been shown that phasing large military construction projects, rather than requesting a single authorization for the complete facility and then seeking incremental authorization of appropriations over multiple fiscal years, can result cost 

growth of 10 percent or more if all phases are executed independently. 

Do you believe phasing, as opposed to incrementing, large military construction 

projects is appropriate? If so, when? 

Answer. I am not currently familiar with difference between phasing and incremental funding of military construction projects. If confirmed I will work to ensure 

that Air Force policy drives sound decisions regarding authorization and appropriation requests for large military construction projects. 

Question. Do you believe phasing of large military construction projects can be 

justified even when it results in cost growth for the complete facility? If so, how? 

Answer. Again, I am not familiar with the specifics of phasing large military construction projects. 

OVERSEAS FACILITIES

Question. Do you believe the Department of the Air Force currently maintains excess infrastructure overseas? If so, how would you seek to address this issue? 

Answer. I am aware a European Infrastructure Consolidation capacity analysis 

was directed by OSD last year, however, I have not been briefed on the Air Force 

or OSD results. I am also aware the report is due to be delivered to Congress this 

summer. 

IN-KIND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Question. The committee released a report on April 15, 2013, titled ‘‘Inquiry into 

U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the U.S. Military Presence Overseas.’’ Among other things, the committee’s inquiry found that in-kind payments 

from Germany, South Korea, and Japan have been used to fund questionable military construction projects. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2014 requires that future military construction projects funded using in-kind payments or in-kind contributions pursuant to bilateral agreements with partner nations be submitted for congressional authorization in the Military Construction Authorization Act. 

If confirmed, how would you ensure that in-kind payments are utilized only for 

identified U.S. priorities to offset costs that the Department of the Air Force would 

otherwise pay with appropriated funds? 

Answer. If confirmed I would work to ensure Air Force payment-in-kind projects 

are selected which support identified U.S. priorities, in accordance with National 

Defense Authorization Act requirements. 

INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in the past have testified 

that the Military Services under-invest in both the maintenance and recapitalization 

of facilities and infrastructure compared to private industry standards. Decades of 

under-investment in DOD installations has led to substantial backlogs of facility 

maintenance activities, created substandard living and working conditions, and 

made it harder to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity. 

633 

If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for restoring and preserving 

the quality of our infrastructure? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the way the Air Force manages its 

facilities and infrastructure and will work with the Secretary of the Air Force and 

the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to make sure our infrastructure supports the 

warfighter. 

ENHANCED USE LEASES

Question. Congress has provided the authority for each of the Service Secretaries 

to lease underutilized non-excess property and to use revenues generated by those 

leases to enhance infrastructure and operating costs on those installations. This socalled ‘‘enhanced use lease’’ (EUL) authority is being used in different ways and for 

different purposes by each of the Military Departments. 

What is your understanding of the EUL authority? 

Answer. My understanding is that the enhanced use lease authority is a valuable 

tool in the Department’s infrastructure management toolbox. My understanding is 

that the Air Force can use this authority to partner with industry and the outside 

community to maximize the value and use of Department property. 

Question. What do you see as the future of the Department of the Air Force’s EUL 

program? 

Answer. I understand that there are several promising EUL opportunities that 

the Department of the Air Force is currently examining. If confirmed, I will seek 

to continue the success of the Air Force’s EUL program. 

Question. What Air Force EUL projects do you see as most viable in the near 

term? 

Answer. Because I am not aware of all the current projects or those projects being 

considered, I could not identify the most viable in the near term. If confirmed, I will 

examine all of our projects more fully before making such an assessment. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the Department of the 

Air Force’s EUL program? 

Answer. Without yet fully evaluating the existing EUL projects, I am not yet in 

a position to state what my priorities would be, if confirmed. I will however, look 

to leverage lessons of both successful Air Force projects and those of other branches. 

If confirmed, I will leverage the EUL program to ensure our warfighters and their 

families have the highest quality environment in which to live and work and that 

the Department’s real estate is put to the highest valued uses. 

Question. If confirmed, would you consider the authority to provide support to energy initiatives? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Air Force is already actively using the 

EUL authority for energy initiatives, specifically renewable energy project development, and I support such an approach. 

Question. The Congressional Budget Office has expressed concern that EUL authority could be used to acquire expensive facilities through long-term leases that 

commit DOD to make payments (rather than receiving payments) over an extended 

period of time. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2011 included a provision designed to ensure that EULs cannot be used to commit 

future years DOD funds for long-term projects that have not received approval 

through the normal budgeting process. 

Do you believe that it would be appropriate to use EUL authority to commit future years DOD funds for long-term projects to acquire facilities that have not received approval through the normal budgeting process? 

Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to study this issue, but if confirmed, 

I certainly will do so. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you address proposals to use EUL authority in 

this manner? 

Answer. Since I have not had an opportunity to study this issue, I do not know 

how I would address such proposals if confirmed, but I would ensure that EULs 

meet legal requirements 

REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

Question. Recent budget cuts continue to adversely impact availability of funds for 

Air Force military construction projects. To mitigate, the Air Force has used innovative methods to continue to meet the infrastructure requirements of the warfighter. 

For example, this included working with Oklahoma State officials to lease a former 

automotive plant to accommodate additional work performed by the Oklahoma City 

Air Energy Complex and the purchase of property contiguous to the base for KC– 

46 depot maintenance. Another initiative is the Enhanced Use Lease project at Hill 

634 

Air Force Base. However, as with any new public/private endeavor, questions have 

arisen as to the projects’ compliance with statutes written long ago and designed 

to regulate other practices. Resolving these questions has greatly slowed the approval process for a number of these projects. 

How might the law and regulations be modified to facilitate approval of innovative 

projects based on their merits rather than delayed to ensure compliance with potentially obsolete legal and administrative requirements? 

Answer. If confirmed, my intent is to identify where these situations exist and 

identify ways to streamline processes or request legislation that enables doing so. 

BASE OPERATING SUPPORT

Question. What is your understanding of the base operating support requirements 

of the Department of the Air Force? 

Answer. My understanding is that Base Operating Support (BOS) requirements 

of the Department of the Air Force are critical to the overall mission readiness. BOS 

funding finances installation activities that support operations, critical training, facilities infrastructure maintenance, public safety, and family programs for both Active and Reserve components. 

Question. In your view, is the Department of the Air Force receiving adequate 

funding for base operating support? 

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review BOS funding in detail, but if 

confirmed, I will closely examine funding levels to ensure the highest quality living 

and working conditions for our airmen and their families. 

How might the Department of the Air Force distribute base operating funds to 

best ensure sound investment of constrained resources? 

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to learning the methods and processes in 

place across the Department to guide investment decisions and distribution of resources. 

FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION, AND MODERNIZATION

Question. What is your understanding of the facilities sustainment, restoration, 

and modernization (FSRM) requirements of the Department of the Air Force? 

Answer. My understanding is that facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization (FSRM) funds maintenance, repairs, and minor modification to facilities 

and infrastructure. 

Question. In your view, is the Department of the Air Force requesting and receiving adequate funding for FSRM? 

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review FSRM funding in detail, but if 

confirmed, I will closely examine funding levels to ensure the highest possible quality living and working conditions for our airmen and their families within resource 

constraints and operational imperatives. 

Question. How might the Department of the Air Force distribute FSRM funds to 

best ensure sound investment of constrained resources? 

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to learning the methods and processes in 

place across the Department to guide investment decisions and distribution of resources. 

FAMILY HOUSING AND PRIVATIZATION

Question. In recent years, DOD and Congress have taken significant steps to improve family housing. The housing privatization program was created as an alternative approach to speed the improvement of military family housing and relieve 

base commanders of the burden of managing family housing. If confirmed for the 

position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and 

Energy you will have a key role in decisions regarding military family housing. 

What are your impressions of the overall quality and sufficiency of Air Force family housing both in the United States and abroad? 

Answer. My understanding is that major improvements have been made to the 

overall quality and sufficiency of family housing, both domestically and overseas. 

Question. What are your views regarding the privatization of family housing? 

Answer. I believe the use of the housing privatization authorities was an important and necessary tool to revitalize a large inventory of inadequate homes. 

Question. What is your view of the structure and general goals of the Department 

of the Air Force’s current housing privatization program? 

Answer. I understand the Air Force met its planned privatization goal at the end 

of fiscal year 2013. If confirmed, I will do all within my power to ensure the continued success of the Air Force housing privatization program. 

635 

Question. Do you believe the housing program should be modified in any way? If 

so, how? 

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the housing program in detail 

to determine if it should be modified in any way, but if confirmed, I will closely examine it to ensure the highest quality living conditions for our servicemembers and 

their families. 

ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION

Question. The Department of the Air Force’s environmental restoration budget remains a significant part of the Air Force’s overall environmental program budget. 

What do you see as the main priorities for clean-up within the Department of the 

Air Force program? 

Answer. I understand the Department of the Air Force’s priorities for clean-up follow priorities established by DOD which are to clean up sites that pose the greatest 

threat to safety, human health, and the environment first. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment to ensure that those priorities are implemented in the Air Force. 

Question. What will you do to ensure that adequate funding is requested and received so that clean-ups under the Installation Restoration Program and under the 

Military Munitions Remediation Program continue apace? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that I fully understand the Air Force cleanup program needs as they relate to DOD priorities previously referenced, and that 

adequate funding requests are prepared and submitted to meet those needs in accordance with those priorities; if confirmed, I will advocate for funding to support 

a program pace commensurate with DOD cleanup performance goals to put cleanup 

remedies in place and cleanup responses complete. 

ENCROACHMENT ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Question. Encroachment by commercial and residential development on military 

installations can negatively impact Air Force operations at military airfields, training ranges, and the development of new facilities. 

What do you see as the main constraints on the Department of the Air Force’s 

ability to use its facilities, including training ranges? 

Answer. I am not aware of any specific constraints on the Department of the Air 

Force’s ability to use its facilities, including training ranges. However, if confirmed, 

I will ensure the Air Force monitors development around Air Force installations, including ranges, and works to actively establish long-term relationships with our 

local communities and participate in the local land use planning process. 

Question. If confirmed, what policies or steps would you take to ensure energy development avoids negatively impacting Air Force missions and, where possible, enhances operations and training? 

Answer. I believe that military operations and energy development are not mutually exclusive. If confirmed, I would work closely with Federal, State, and local governments as well as the energy developers to meet the needs of the Department 

while enabling access to new sources of energy. 

Question. How can the Department of the Air Force address the issues of encroachment around its bases in the United States, particularly with respect to encroachment caused by residential development? 

Answer. I believe the best way to address the issues of incompatible development 

is to actively establish long-term working relationships with our local communities 

and participate in the local land use planning processes. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Air Force’s ability to receive information and plans from potential developers in a timely and effective manner? 

Answer. I am not aware of any specific concerns but, as I stated previously, I believe the best way to address the issues of timeliness of potential development information is to actively establish long-term working relationships with our local communities and participate in the local land use planning processes. 

ENERGY POLICY

Question. If confirmed, what would your responsibilities be for setting and implementing energy policy within the Department? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will oversee implementation of the energy program 

throughout the Air Force. My responsibilities would include working with the Secretary and the Under Secretary of the Air Force, the other Assistant Secretaries, 

and the Air Force Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff to develop overarching energy policy and provide oversight within the Air Force to ensure energy priorities 

and goals are addressed. 

636 

As previously mentioned, with the largest energy bill in DOD, the Air Force will 

continue to be challenged to optimize energy productivity to ensure every dollar 

counts. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of Department of the Air Force funding to meet statutory and regulatory energy conservation goals? 

Answer. I am not in a position at present to comment on the relative Air Force 

funding to meet statutory and regulatory energy conservation goals against overall 

Air Force priorities. If confirmed, I will review the requirements for Air Force energy programs to ensure they are adequate to meet the challenges the Air Force 

faces while enhancing mission effectiveness. 

Question. Do you believe that significant additional funding will be needed in future years to meet such goals? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Air Force leadership and the corporate 

structure programming and budgeting process to ensure adequate funds are available to meet Air Force energy goals. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE LABORATORY AND TEST CENTER RECAPITALIZATION

Question. There has been concern over the adequacy of recapitalization rates of 

the Department’s laboratory facilities and test centers. Historically, Air Force technical centers, laboratories and test centers do not appear to have fared well in the 

internal Air Force competition for limited military construction and facility 

sustainment funds. 

What metrics would you use to assess the amount of investment in the recapitalization of Air Force technical centers, laboratories and test centers to determine its 

adequacy? 

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to assess the amount of investment required, but if confirmed, I will closely examine the issue and work with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to determine the appropriate metrics to 

use. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you work to properly recapitalize the Air 

Force’s technical centers, laboratories and test centers? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work directly with the Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force (Acquisition) to gain a better understanding of the requirement and within 

the Air Force Corporate Structure to ensure they have the necessary information 

to make sound funding decisions. 

SECTION 2808 AUTHORITY

Question. Section 2808 of title 10, U.S.C., allows the Secretary of Defense, in the 

event of a declaration of war or national emergency, to undertake military construction projects supporting the use of Armed Forces with otherwise unobligated military construction funds. 

What is your assessment of this authority? 

Answer. I believe this authority is vital to provide construction projects necessary 

under a national emergency or declaration of war. 

Question. From a policy standpoint, what restrictions do you believe are appropriate for the use of this authority? 

Answer. I am not fully versed in policies regarding this statute. If confirmed, I 

will ensure the Department is executing any projects under this statute in accordance with applicable guidance. 

Question. Do you believe it is appropriate to use this authority outside theaters 

of armed conflict? If so, in what instances? 

Answer. I believe the statute is necessary to allow the department flexibility in 

executing urgent construction projects in the event of a declaration of war or national emergency. I have not had an opportunity to study it in detail and cannot 

provide a specific example today. If confirmed, I will evaluate and ensure the authority is used appropriately. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

637 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[The nomination reference of Miranda A.A. Ballentine follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 30, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Miranda A.A. Ballentine of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant Secretary 

of the Air Force, vice Terry A. Yonkers, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Miranda A.A. Ballentine, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MIRANDA A.A. BALLENTINE

Education: 

Bachelor of Science, Colorado State University (Magna cum Laude) 

• Attended: August 1992–May 1996 

• Degree bestowed: May 1996 

Masters of Business Administration, George Washington University (top 5 percent) 

• Attended: January 2002–December 2003 

• Degree bestowed: May 2004 

Employment Record: 

Walmart Stores, Inc. 

• Director of Sustainability, Renewable Energy & Sustainable Facilities + 

External Stakeholder Engagement 

• January 2008–Present 

David Gardiner & Associates, LLC 

• Vice President of Investor Analysis, Chief Operating Officer, Senior Consultant 

• December 2003–January 2008 

Environment 2004 

• Director of Operations, Assistant Treasurer, and Member of the Board 

• February 2004–January 2005 

Solar Electric Light Fund 

• Operations Director 

• 2001–2004 

Cellular Junction 

• Retail Store Manager 

• 1997–2000 

Honors and awards: 

Academic: 

• Magna cum Laude, CSU, 1996 

638 

• Golden Key Honor Society, 1996 

• George Washington University Distinguished Alumni Award, 2009 

• Awarded Best MBA Paper in Corporate Citizenship by Boston College 

and Net-Impact, 2003 

World Economic Forum class of 2013 Young Global Leaders, selected as one of 200 

leaders (from 5,000 candidates) from over 70 countries 

Walmart professional leadership recognitions: 

• Corporate Affairs Key Leader’s, 2009 

• Leadership Academy, 2011 

• Global Leadership Institute, 2012 

• Walton Institute, 2013 

• Currently ranked in the highest promotable quadrant of Walmart’s talent 

and leadership succession grids 

Current and Former Board Service: 

• (Former) Chair of renewable energy committee of World Economic Forum’s Global Growth Action Alliance (G2A2); 

• Member of WEF’s Global Agenda Council on New Energy Infrastructure; 

• (Former) Chair of The Sustainability Consortium’s External Relations 

Committee; 

• (Former) Net-Impact Corporate Advisory Council. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Miranda A.A. Ballentine in connection with 

her nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Current: Miranda A.A. Ballentine. 

Maiden: Miranda Alice Anderson. 

Prior Married Name: Miranda Anderson Kinney. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy. 

3. Date of nomination: 

January 30, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

639 

5. Date and place of birth: 

December 28, 1973; Petoskey, MI. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Roger Scott Ballentine. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Elizabeth Grose Ballentine, Step-Daughter, age 9. 

Grace Marie Ballentine, Daughter, age 4. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Bachelor of Science, Colorado State University (Magna cum Laude) 

• Attended: August 1992–May 1996 

• Degree bestowed: May 1996 

Masters of Business Administration, George Washington University (top 5 percent) 

• Attended: January 2002–December 2003 

• Degree bestowed: May 2004 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Walmart Stores, Inc. 

• Director of Sustainability, Renewable Energy & Sustainable Facilities + 

External Stakeholder Engagement 

• January 2008–Present 

• Washington, DC and Bentonville, AR 

David Gardiner & Associates, LLC 

• Vice President of Investor Analysis, Chief Operating Officer, Senior Consultant 

• December 2003–January 2008 

• Washington, DC 

Environment 2004 

• Director of Operations, Assistant Treasurer, and Member of the Board 

• February 2004–January 2005 

• Washington, DC 

Solar Electric Light Fund 

• Operations Director 

• 2001–2004 

• Washington, DC 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

Walmart (employer). Director of Sustainability. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

World Economic Forum 

• Member of WEF’s Forum for Young Global Leaders 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

Kathleen McGinty for Governor of PA, 2013, $500. 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

640 

Academic: 

• Magna cum Laude, CSU, 1996 • Golden Key Honor Society, 1996 • George Washington University Distinguished Alumni Award, 2009 • Awarded Best MBA Paper in Corporate Citizenship by Boston College 

and Net-Impact, 2003 

World Economic Forum class of 2013 Young Global Leaders, selected as one of 200 

leaders (from 5,000 candidates) from over 70 countries 

Walmart professional leadership recognitions: 

• Corporate Affairs Key Leader’s, 2009; • Leadership Academy, 2011; • Global Leadership Institute, 2012; • Walton Institute, 2013; • Currently ranked in the highest promotable quadrant of Walmart’s talent 

and leadership succession grids. 

Current and Former Board Service: 

• (Former) Chair of renewable energy committee of World Economic Forum’s Global Growth Action Alliance (G2A2); 

• Member of WEF’s Global Agenda Council on New Energy Infrastructure; • (Former) Chair of The Sustainability Consortium’s External Relations 

Committee; 

• (Former) Net-Impact Corporate Advisory Council. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

2008–present, while at Walmart few publications have been published in my 

name. I have made significant contributions and led copywriting for dozens of 

Walmart publications, but few have been attributed to me. 

• World Economic Forum Blog 2013: The Secret to Affordable Renewable 

Energy, http://forumbloq.org/2012/11 /the-secret-to-affordable-renewableenergy/ 

Academic publications: 

• Corporate Water Policies: The Business Case for Strategic Water Management. 2003 Awarded Best MBA Paper in Corporate Citizenship 2004 by 

Boston College and Net-Impact examined the economic, social and competitive advantages of water management for multinational corporations, with 

focus on risk mitigation, cost control, competitive positioning, and stakeholder and shareholder wealth. 

• The Grand Partnership Experiment: ChevronTexaco/USAID in Angola. 

2003 Analyzed a multi-million dollar public-private alliance, incorporating 

cutting-edge scholarship on multisectoral partnerships to examine this initiative from the perspective of WSSD’s Type II outcomes. 

Solar Electric Dreams. Published in Sustainable Development International, 2002 

Analysis of a Solar Electric Light Fund project in the Xixuau-Xiparina Ecological 

Reserve in Brazil. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

During the last 5 years, I have given several speeches on Walmart’s energy policies, careers in the energy/sustainability fields and other topics related to Walmart 

and my job duties. These speeches have not been reduced to writing, and are presented from PowerPoint slides with notes. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

641 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

MIRANDA A.A. BALLENTINE. 

This 9th day of April, 2014. 

[The nomination of Miranda A.A. Ballentine was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on June 24, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on September 11, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Monica C. Regalbuto by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant 

Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management (EM)? 

Answer. The mission of the Office of Environmental Management is to complete 

the cleanup of the environmental legacy of over five decades of nuclear weapons development and nuclear research efforts sponsored by the Federal Government. As 

the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Management, if confirmed, my paramount 

duty would be to advance this cleanup work while ensuring the safety of workers. 

Additionally, I understand that the Assistant Secretary is responsible for managing Federal staff, Federal budget requests and implementation, overseeing the 

mission units and keeping abreast of technology developments that could stretch 

cleanup dollars farther and shorten the time needed to accomplish the mission. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that Secretary Moniz would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect that Secretary Moniz will continue his focus on 

project management, including the large EM constructions projects. I expect he will 

also ask me to focus on overarching issues such as worker safety, continued efforts 

to improve safety culture throughout the EM complex, and the efficient cleanup of 

waste throughout the system. I also expect that, if confirmed, I will spend significant time working on recovery efforts to reopen the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 

(WIPP). 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What qualifications and experience do you have that would qualify you 

to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management? 

Answer. I have worked on nuclear energy issues for much of my career, starting 

in 1988 when I joined Argonne National Laboratory after completing my Ph.D. at 

the University of Notre Dame. I began my work supporting the development of technologies for the treatment of high-level waste at the Department of Energy plutoVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00649 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
642 

nium production sites. After developing strong technical skills, I joined BP–AMOCO 

in 1996, where I enhanced my skills at managing complex projects, large budgets 

and a multi-disciplinary staff in an industrial setting. I returned to Argonne in 

2001, and became the Head of the Process Chemistry and Engineering Department 

where I worked on new technologies for the treatment of used nuclear fuel and led 

efforts to identify technical solutions to difficult waste management issues 

In addition, I participated in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 3-year 

Fuel Cycle Study Team, published in 2010, which allowed me to gain experience 

working with high level officials and nongovernment organizations, and also brought 

to my attention the need for the safe, permanent disposal of all types of radioactive 

wastes. In 2008, I had the unique opportunity to join the Department of Energy’s 

(DOE) Office of Environmental Management, where I served as a senior program 

manager supporting their strategic mission in the waste processing area. 

In my role as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fuel Cycle Technologies within 

the Office of Nuclear Energy, I was responsible for formulating and articulating 

strategic options to expedite the resolution of waste management issues. 

I have also experienced the intricacies of nuclear waste management from the perspective of a waste generator and from a waste disposal specialist during my time 

at DOE. One of our Nation’s biggest challenges remains to ensure the public that 

the government is able to fulfill its responsibility regarding the timely handling and 

cleanup of the nuclear waste originated from both its defense and civilian programs. 

I believe my background, experience and commitment have prepared me to lead 

the Office of Environmental Management during this particularly critical time and 

I welcome the opportunity to continue my service to the Nation as Assistant Secretary for EM. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with this committee and others 

in Congress to ensure that we continue the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Assistant 

Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management and the Environmental Management program? 

Answer. There is no doubt that the Environmental Management program has its 

share of challenges. While each EM site faces its own unique set of issues, I have 

observed large scale challenges across the complex, including project management 

and the need to execute a critical mission in a time of fiscal constraints. Additionally, a current ongoing challenge is the February 2014 radiological event at WIPP 

and the continuing efforts to determine the cause of the release, remediate the mine 

and, reopen the facility. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will be committed to advancing EM’s cleanup work 

while ensuring the safety of workers and the public, and protection of the environment. If confirmed, I would address the aforementioned challenges, including: 

• Project management: From technology maturity, construction issues to 

cost estimates, building large projects is difficult. Secretary Moniz has recognized this challenge, and during his reorganization of the Department he 

created the position of Under Secretary for Management and Performance 

to, in large part, address project management issues. The Office of Environmental Management was moved from Nuclear Security into the purview of 

Management and Performance, a signal of the Secretary’s commitment to 

addressing these issues. If confirmed, I would work with the Office of the 

Under Secretary for Management and Performance to address matters associated with some of EM’s largest construction projects, including the 

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at Hanford and the Salt Waste 

Processing Facility at Savannah River. 

• Fiscal Constraints: As the Federal Government continues to face fiscal 

constraints there have been significant effects throughout the EM complex. 

DOE must make difficult decisions about prioritizing cleanup work and 

meeting milestones while ensuring worker and public safety. 

• WIPP: As the Nation’s first operating repository, WIPP is a critical asset 

to the Department and our country. It is very important that the recovery 

efforts are done as safely and efficiently as possible while ensuring the safety of the workforce and the public, and protection of the environment. EM 

and the Department must take a close look at the Accident Investigation 

Board reports and other independent investigations for both the fire and radiological release incidents to determine what improvements can be made 

643 

to ensure that WIPP will be reopened and operated safely. If confirmed, I 

expect to be very involved in the WIPP recovery effort and I pledge to work 

closely with you, this committee and the New Mexico delegation on this important issue. 

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. The Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management is responsible 

for cleanup activities occurring at Department of Energy (DOE) sites across the 

country. 

What are your views on the roles and responsibilities of field managers relative 

to those of Environmental Management (EM) headquarters managers? 

Answer. Field managers are responsible for ensuring that the cleanup work is 

done in a safe and effective manner, and in compliance with applicable laws and 

regulations. Headquarters managers are responsible for budget formulation, developing policy, and supporting a system-wide approach to accomplish the overall mission and facilitate and enable the field work. Headquarters managers also provide 

oversight of the field activities to ensure the work is carried out consistent with the 

use of the most cost effective technologies and the Department of Energy and EM 

policies. 

Question. What is your view of EM’s organizational structure? Is there a well-delineated and consistent chain of command and reporting structure from the field 

staff to headquarters staff, from the contractors to DOE officials, and from the Office of Environmental Management to the Secretary of Energy and other DOE officials? 

Answer. I understand the Office of Environmental Management has modified its 

Headquarters organizational structure to place greater emphasis on budget formulation and strategic planning, acquisition and project management, safety, and technical expertise. I also understand that EM’s organizational structure focuses on supporting a system-wide approach to accomplish the overall mission and to facilitate 

and enable field work within three Mission Units: Site Restoration, Tank Waste, 

and Nuclear Material and Waste Management. I believe the organizational structure supports its goals by establishing clear lines of responsibility and accountability 

to improve overall program performance. I also believe that organization and management systems need to be designed in ways that are mutually supportive and 

should provide structure flexibility to address new challenges as they evolve. 

The nature of many of the Department’s operations, the complexity of its mission, 

and its organizational size and structure require a well delineated chain of command to ensure that the program offices and mission support offices in headquarters 

and the field sites work together to identify and meet mission requirements and to 

establish greater accountability for results. It is also critically important that in 

spite of its size, the organization functions in an integrated matter for the benefit 

of the overall system to accomplish the mission. If confirmed, I will continue to 

evaluate how the organization is meeting its goals and adjust if needed. 

Question. Do the field offices have enough autonomy and flexibility to work with 

the contractors at the sites to get the cleanup finished in a safe and efficient manner? 

Answer. I believe sufficient autonomy and flexibility exist within field offices to 

enable Federal staff to work with site contractors effectively in completing cleanup 

activities in an efficient manner. If I am confirmed, I will ensure field office staff 

and headquarters staff have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities 

within this process to maximize the effective use of their capabilities to get the job 

done safely and effectively. 

It is important to me that EM’s sites work throughout the complex to apply lessons learned from one site to another as not every challenge that remains after 25 

years of experience is still one of a kind. For example, while Savannah River’s tank 

waste composition is very different than the tank waste at Hanford, technologies 

that are being used at Savannah River today can and should be explored for use 

at Hanford. If confirmed, I will work to facilitate knowledge and integration of best 

practices and successes across field offices. 

Question. In your opinion, should the field offices have more autonomy than they 

currently have? 

Answer. I do believe that it is important to delegate as much authority as possible 

and appropriate to the field offices and their managers, as they are responsible for 

day-to-day operations. However, the additional authority comes with the responsibility to deliver on performance goals and learn from the experience of and implement best practices from other field offices. Performance is measured by the results 

obtained, the manner in which they are obtained, and return on investment. If conVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00651 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
644 

firmed, I will ensure the EM program aligns authority with performance at each site 

to deliver on its goals and requirements. 

Question. The Environmental Management program has used a variety of contracting methods, including management and operating contracts, cost plus award 

fee contracts, cost plus incentive fee contracts, performance-based, fix-priced contracts, and closure contracts, among others. 

What is your view of the utility and appropriate role of these, or other, contracting methods, and what principles do you believe DOE should follow when entering into EM contracts in the future? 

Answer. I believe to select the best contract type for a particular DOE requirement, EM must take into account the nature of the risks involved with the work 

to be performed, the complexity of the requirement, the general technical capability 

of contractors within the marketplace to perform the work, the work scope needed 

to meet the contract requirements, and DOE’s ability to oversee the work. 

My understanding is that since 2013, EM has used a complex-wide, standardized 

acquisition process that takes into account the nature of EM work, the desire to 

maximize contractor performance on closure/completion contracts by incentivizing 

contractors to complete the remaining cleanup work. I am aware that EM currently 

has over 35 major contracts that are predominately cost type, and 2 Management 

& Operating contracts. 

In December 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued a policy memo that requires use of fixed price contracts whenever feasible and alignment of contract incentives with taxpayer interests. I believe that EM should be driving to get as close 

as possible to a fixed price contracts portfolio. However, it is my understanding that 

the current difficulty of the mission, including cleaning up waste streams that are 

not completely documented, requires EM to use a variety of contract types and even 

hybrids of those types to fairly allocate risk, provide an opportunity for reasonable 

profit rates, cover a wide range of technical difficulty and performance risk and continue to attract contractors. I also recognized that current contracting methods have 

room for improvement and that better characterization of clean up waste streams 

and process technology maturity will facilitate this effort, and as such if confirmed, 

I will support investments in this area. 

MISSION

Question. DOE has offered changing views, over the lifetime of the EM program, 

as to whether the program should focus on cleaning up the sites within its purview 

as of a date certain or whether the program should have an ongoing mission of 

cleaning up all surplus DOE facilities, as the facilities become excess, over time. 

Do you believe there is a point at which the EM program should stop taking surplus buildings, facilities, or waste streams from other components of the DOE into 

the EM program for decommissioning, decontamination, and disposal? 

Answer. I believe EM should continue its decommissioning, decontamination, and 

waste disposal missions of legacy installations. It is the most efficient means for 

DOE to deal with surplus buildings and facilities and waste streams, and during 

the past 25 years, EM has developed and is continuously improving the core capabilities, including expertise, processes, equipment, and facilities, necessary to deactivate and decommission surplus buildings and facilities and treat and disposition 

waste. However, as new facilities come on line the cost of waste disposal and end 

of life decommissioning, decontamination, and disposal must be built into the facility cost structure to minimize the overall future impact to DOE. 

From an organizational perspective, it is more effective to have one organization 

within the Department whose mission is focused on cleanup conduct these activities 

than having the responsibilities spread among several organizations. I believe the 

work in EM enables other crucial DOE missions to continue across the United 

States. By focusing on reducing our cleanup footprint, EM is lowering the overall 

Department cost of security, surveillance, infrastructure, and overhead costs that 

would otherwise continue for years to come. In addition, by building the cost of 

waste disposal and end of life decommissioning, decontamination, and disposal of 

new facilities, EM, and as a result DOE, will become a much more cost effective 

organization as it moves from legacy cleanup to sustainability of the DOE complex. 

Question. If confirmed, what requirements would you place on the other DOE programs before you would take additional buildings, facilities or waste into the EM 

program? 

Answer. I understand that DOE already has policies and procedures in place that 

other DOE programs have to meet in order for EM to accept the transfer of additional buildings and waste streams into the EM program. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure any additional facilities proposed to be added to the EM program 

645 

be clearly identified and segregated from the current baseline, cleanup costs and 

schedules for those facilities be determined, and cleanup of those facilities be 

prioritized according to the principles of the Top-to-Bottom Review. If confirmed, I 

will ensure that acceptance of additional buildings, facilities or waste into the EM 

program will be well-reviewed and that future facilities take into account the cost 

of waste disposal and end of life decommissioning, decontamination, and disposal. 

Question. Do you believe it is an appropriate policy for the EM program to ‘‘go 

out of business’’ at some point and leave the remainder of newly generated waste 

as the responsibility of existing DOE programs? 

Answer. It is the mission of the Office of Environmental Management to complete 

the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from 5 decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. 

EM’s mission will be ongoing for at least the next 35 years. This does not include 

work that is not currently within the EM baseline. As previously discussed, any additions to the EM program of newly non-legacy generated waste will be well-reviewed and the decision made consciously with an emphasis on cost recovery. When 

EM’s mission is complete, our elected officials, regulators and the Department of 

Energy will determine the appropriate path forward for EM. If confirmed, I pledge 

to work with this committee and others in Congress on this issue. 

Question. If not, in your view, how should newly generated wastes be managed 

and which program (EM or the program generating the waste) should budget for 

these activities? 

Answer. These are important issues, not only for the EM program, but for the Department as a whole. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure any additional facilities 

proposed to be added to the EM program be clearly identified and segregated from 

the current baseline, cleanup costs and schedules for those facilities be determined, 

and cleanup of those facilities be prioritized according to the principles of the Topto-Bottom Review. In addition I will work to ensure that future facilities take into 

account the cost of waste disposal and end of life decommissioning, decontamination, 

and disposal. If I am confirmed, I will be happy to work with you on this issue. 

Question. Do you believe that making the program responsible for newly generated waste would incentivize the program to minimize the amount of waste created or, conversely, would it result in the program storing waste, perhaps indefinitely? 

Answer. I believe that these are important issues that, if I am confirmed, would 

require further exploration, analysis and discussion before I could offer an informed 

opinion. I can say, however, that it is my understanding that the Department remains subject to Federal waste management and other environmental laws, as well 

as Departmental directives regarding radioactive wastes, all of which will continue 

to apply, and to govern how waste is stored and managed regardless of which program office has primary responsibility. If I am confirmed, I will be happy to work 

with you on this very important and relevant issue. 

Question. The EM program demonstrated that accelerating cleanup at specific 

sites could result in a more cost effective approach to cleanup over the long term. 

After the Rocky Flats and the Fernald Sites were completed, the accelerated approach was abandoned. 

If confirmed would you look at renewing an accelerated approach for specific sites 

if significant long-term cost savings could be achieved? 

Answer. Based on my understanding of the successes of Rocky Flats, Fernald, and 

Mound, I would be willing to consider this approach, particularly if it accomplishes 

site cleanup in a safe, compliant, and more cost-effective manner. I also understand 

that EM was able to accelerate certain work with funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and accelerate its footprint reduction significantly. However, given the current fiscal constraints, it may be difficult to balance competing 

risk-based priorities across the EM complex. If confirmed, I would certainly look at 

this approach and would be happy to work with you on this issue. 

Question. Do you believe this promise of accelerated cleanup has yet been realized, and if not, why not? 

Answer. The Department of Energy has achieved several successes in its accelerated cleanup efforts, including significant footprint reduction across the EM complex 

during the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. However, given the current 

fiscal constraints and that the bulk of remaining work includes the most difficult 

cleanup challenges, it may be difficult to balance competing risk-based priorities 

across the EM complex. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you on this 

issue. 

646 

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

Question. Do you believe that the EM program has conducted sufficient technology 

development so that a treatment and disposition pathway exists for all identified 

waste streams under the program? 

Answer. As mentioned the most difficult challenges are what remain of EM’s mission. As characterization technologies evolved during the last 25 years, they have 

informed the complexity of the treatment needed for waste stabilization. The mission of the Office of Environmental Management has always been challenging, and 

developing and implementing first-of-a-kind technologies to find further efficiencies 

in cleaning up waste streams and optimizing disposition pathways will always be 

an area in which EM will look to improve its ability and enhance its efforts. In 

short, I do not think that we have done all we can do, and if confirmed, I will work 

to ensure that the Technology Development and Deployment program continues to 

make strides in creating innovating solutions to our challenging nuclear waste 

issues, especially as we address the most difficult waste streams of the mission. 

Question. If any orphan waste streams—those for which there is no identified disposition pathway—exist within the EM program, what technology development or 

other efforts would you undertake, if confirmed, to address them? 

Answer. In my capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fuel Cycle Technologies, I recently led a study that addresses and identifies potential disposal pathways for DOE-managed waste. The report, ‘‘Evaluation of Options for Permanent 

Geologic Disposal of Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste in Support of a Comprehensive National Nuclear Fuel Cycle Strategy,’’ can be found at: http://www.energy.gov/ 

ne/downloads/evaluation-options-permanent-geologic-disposal-spent-nuclearfuel-andhigh-level. There are a few waste categories that require further evaluation, including sodium-based waste within the EM program. 

As you may know, I started my career working on tank waste at Argonne National Laboratory. Our national laboratories provide unique experience in the development of technical solutions that currently don’t exist or are not yet fully mature 

and proven. The Technology Development and Deployment (TDD) program within 

EM enables the development of first-of-a-kind technologies for cleanup efforts of 

unique waste streams. I strongly believe that utilizing the DOE national laboratories and other organizations for TDD activities is crucial to addressing challenging 

waste streams and effectively remediating waste. 

If confirmed, I will actively engage and leverage that expertise in executing EM’s 

cleanup mission. 

Question. What, in your view, are the continuing requirements for developing and 

fielding new technologies, and what are the highest priorities? 

Answer. I began my career working on tank waste at Argonne National Laboratory in 1988. Twenty-six years later, I can tell you that the retrievability, treatment, 

processing, and disposition of tank waste is still the most complicated, challenging, 

and expensive component. As such any effective TDD strategy must target optimization of tank waste treatments. In addition, as mentioned before there are some 

other waste streams that may require future technology development such as sodium-based waste streams, including ‘‘sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel’’ from the 

Fermi lab and the Fast Flux Test Facility at Hanford. 

While focusing on specific targeted areas like tank waste and other unique waste 

streams, subsurface remediation and disposal investigations, an effective TDD strategy can be developed. In addition, a unified systems approach to technology development that incorporates advanced modeling techniques—will facilitate the decision 

making process. Focused Technology development investments can position EM to 

optimize cleanup investments as we face continued constrained budgets. If confirmed, I look forward to using my knowledge of the DOE-managed waste inventory 

and my technical expertise to move the TDD program forward. 

WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING

Question. If confirmed, your duties could involve the review and approval of workforce restructuring plans at sites under the EM program. 

Please describe your general approach and philosophy in reviewing workforce restructuring plans. 

Answer. My general approach and philosophy is to balance being a good steward 

of taxpayer resources with attracting and maintaining the staffing needed to carry 

out our complex and hazardous work. When contract funding is such that the contractor determines it needs to restructure its workforce, I expect the contractors to 

do so in accordance with the terms of their contracts and the laws prohibiting discrimination. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOE provides balanced oversight of the 

647 

contractors’ compliance while encouraging innovative approaches to get the best 

value for taxpayer dollars while minimizing disruption to the contractor workforce. 

Question. Given the nature of their work, cleanup workers are fundamentally in 

a position of ‘‘working themselves out of a job’’. 

How do you believe this particular challenge is best handled from both a corporate 

perspective and as a manager of these workers? 

Answer. This is a significant challenge to the workforce from many perspectives. 

The Department has significant experience in closing down sites, including Rocky 

Flats, Fernald and Mound, and I understand that EM has found that contractors 

have a variety of creative and effective tools to manage this situation. If confirmed, 

I would be happy to work with this committee and other Senators on this important 

issue. 

WASTE INCIDENTAL TO REPROCESSING (WIR)

Question. One of the biggest challenges of DOE’s Environmental Management program is emptying the large tanks of highly radioactive waste that exist at defense 

nuclear sites in South Carolina, Washington, and Idaho. In the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress granted DOE, in consultation with 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the authority to determine that portions 

of this waste are not high level radioactive waste and thus DOE may leave residue 

that meets the requirements of the provision at the bottom of the tanks in South 

Carolina and Idaho after these tanks are otherwise emptied. 

How is DOE using this new authority? 

Answer. I understand that DOE has successfully worked with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and State regulators using the section 3116 authority and 

it will close all of the tanks in Idaho and nearly half the tanks in South Carolina. 

Further, I understand the NRC will be issuing its consultative report soon for the 

remainder of the tanks in South Carolina. DOE will then complete the remainder 

of the regulatory discussions with the State of South Carolina and EPA regarding 

closure of those tanks. I have been told that to date, 7 out of 11 large tanks in Idaho 

have been closed and 4 tanks in South Carolina have been closed, with 2 more 

South Carolina tanks scheduled to be closed in the relatively near term. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about this authority, and I would be happy 

to work with you on this issue. 

Question. If confirmed will you ensure that the NRC has full access to documents 

and information at these sites that the NRC determines is needed to allow them 

to conduct their responsibilities? 

Answer. It is my understanding that all communication between DOE and the 

NRC to date has been public, and if confirmed I will continue that practice. I am 

aware that the NRC has indicated that it has received all requested information in 

a timely and complete manner. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOE continues to 

communicate with the NRC, and to provide all requested documents and information. 

WASTE DISPOSAL

Question. Completion of cleanup at a number of EM sites depends on the timely 

shipment of quantities of transuranic waste to the WIPP in New Mexico for disposal. In some cases, DOE is under regulatory deadlines for completing shipments 

to WIPP. 

What regulatory deadlines does the EM program currently face related to WIPP 

shipments and what is the current progress against those deadlines? 

Answer. I understand the Department is carefully evaluating the impacts of the 

WIPP shutdown to the transuranic (TRU) generator sites, including impacts on commitments with State regulators. Currently, sites are continuing to characterize and 

certify transuranic waste for shipment to WIPP. Impacts to cleanup deadlines will 

depend on the length of the WIPP shutdown. 

It is my understanding that the Department is evaluating specific potential impacts, including the Department’s ability to meet: the removal of all legacy transuranic (TRU) waste from the Idaho National Laboratory by December 31, 2018; and, 

certain milestones for the WIPP certification of legacy and contact-handled TRU located at the Oak Ridge Reservation beginning September 30, 2015. The Department 

announced recently that it would not be able to meet the 3706 Framework Agreement project milestone of June 30, 2014 for the removal of 3706 cubic meters of 

TRU waste from the Los Alamos National Laboratory. If confirmed, I expect to be 

very involved in WIPP issues, including the evaluation of potential impacts to cleanup agreements. 

648 

Question. Are you aware of any issues that jeopardize DOE’s ability to meet these 

deadlines? If so, what is DOE doing to address these issues? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the TRU generator sites are continuing to 

characterize certify transuranic waste for shipment to WIPP. As previously mentioned, the major factor affecting the ability to meet the cleanup milestones will depend on the length of the shutdown of the WIPP facility. The Department is working hard with the Los Alamos National Laboratory and its contractors to reopen 

WIPP in a safe, efficient manner, and if confirmed, I pledge to continue this important work. 

Question. What, if any, additional permits or permit modifications are needed for 

WIPP in order to meet these deadlines? 

Answer. I am not aware that any additional permits or permit modifications are 

necessary at this time. If confirmed, I expect to be very involved in WIPP issues, 

including this one. 

Question. Given the recent fire and then a release of radioactivity at WIPP, if confirmed, will you commit to this committee to review the safety of WIPP, including 

its culture and material requirements in conjunction with new Office of Independent 

Enterprise Assessments to determine what actions, if any should be taken and to 

brief this committee on it in a timely manner? 

Answer. As you may know, the Department created two Accident Investigation 

Boards to investigate the events at WIPP. To date two Accident Investigation Board 

reports have been released. It is my understanding that a third investigation is currently underway into the cause of the February 14 radiologic event. I understand 

that the Office of Independent Enterprise Assessments has already been engaged 

in this issue, and if confirmed, I will make sure they remain engaged. 

Question. If WIPP is severely delayed in re-opening what will you do to meet consent order milestones at various defense sites to move transuranic waste off the 

site? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is carefully evaluating the 

impacts of the WIPP shutdown to the TRU generator sites, including impacts on 

commitments with State regulators. Currently, sites are continuing to characterize 

and certify transuranic waste for shipment to WIPP. Impacts to cleanup deadlines 

will depend on the length of the WIPP shutdown. 

HANFORD WASTE TREATMENT PLANT AND THE OFFICE OF RIVER PROTECTION

Question. The prior Office of Health, Safety, and Security performed numerous 

studies of the safety culture at the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant. Of concern to 

Congress is the recent firings, by contractors of persons who are considered ‘‘whistle 

blowers’’, the most recent being in February 2014. 

If confirmed will you work with the Department Inspector General to review these 

firings and report your findings to Congress? 

Answer. I am aware of the studies completed by the former Office of Health, Safety, and Security, now called the Office of Independent Enterprise Assessment addressing safety culture issues at the Hanford site. 

I understand that the Department has requested that the Inspector General investigate the February 2014 termination of an individual who worked for a subcontractor on the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at Hanford. If confirmed, I would closely study any results of this IG investigation. 

Question. What is your assessment of the construction at the Waste Treatment 

Plant of the: (1) pre-treatment facility, (2) High Level Waste Facility, and (3) Low 

Level Waste Treatment Facility? 

Answer. It is my understanding that due to unresolved technical issues construction at the Pretreatment and High-Level Waste Facilities has been largely stopped. 

As you may know, the technical issues turned out to be much more complex and 

difficult to resolve than originally envisioned and some require full scale testing. I 

understand that the Department is actively working toward resolution of these technical issues, including recently issuing a full scale testing plan for some of the 

toughest technical issues, including those around pulse jet mixing. Regarding the 

Low-Activity Waste Facility, it is my understanding that construction has continued. 

Question. The Department is considering the construction of a Tank Farm Waste 

Characterization and Staging Facility to pre-treat and homogenize waste from the 

Tank Farm before entering pretreatment. 

If you are confirmed, will you commit to brief the committee at earliest possibility 

on your assessment of the cost and feasibility of this facility and the ability to treat 

the low level waste to meet the consent milestones with the State of Washington? 

649 

Answer. If confirmed, I would be happy to brief the committee on this issue at 

the appropriate time. 

Question. Do you support the design build process at the waste treatment plant? 

Answer. It is my understanding that DOE entered into the design-build process 

at the WTP many years ago, and to date the project is approximately 65 percent 

complete overall. It is also my understanding that the Department recently directed 

that all major construction projects are to adhere to the DOE Order 413 process, 

whereby 90 percent of design must be completed to move forward with construction. 

My experience shows that this is a more sustainable approach to large construction 

projects, and if confirmed, I will monitor this important issue. 

Question. Tank AY–102 was discovered last month to have additional leakage, it 

is double walled tank. 

Given constrained budget, what are your views regarding the construction of additional tanks for removal of the waste in this and future leaking tanks vice the construction of the waste treatment plant? 

Answer. The best way to address the risk associated with tank waste is to immobilize its contents as soon as possible. I am very conscious of the constrained fiscal 

situation, and am aware that building additional storage tanks will divert resources 

from the ultimate solution of immobilizing the waste. I am also aware that specific 

situations may require more in depth study. This is a difficult balance, and if confirmed, I expect to be very involved in this issue and would look forward to working 

with this committee and others in Congress on this important issue. 

SALT WASTE PROCESSING FACILITY

Question. The Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) at the Savannah River Site 

has had a series of cost overruns associated with production of processing tanks at 

the facility. 

This facility is critical to removing the high level waste for the underground waste 

storage tanks. What is your assessment of this program? 

Answer. The SWPF is a large, complex, first-of-a-kind radioactive waste treatment 

facility, and I worked on the development of the technology being implemented at 

SWPF while at Argonne National Laboratory. I understand that the construction 

delays and increased project costs were due to the delay in equipment delivery and 

adequate quality of required infrastructure that affected the targeted construction 

completion schedule and the project cost. I also understand that the Department of 

Energy worked with the contractor to develop a project plan which would complete 

construction of SWPF by December 2016, and cap the taxpayer’s liability for completion of the construction. 

I believe there is always room for improvement in project and contract management by using clear and enforceable metrics to monitor performance and mitigate 

cost overruns in construction projects. If I am confirmed, I will ensure contract 

terms and conditions provide additional emphasis on performance and cost control 

and improved construction performance and productivity. 

CONSENT ORDER MILESTONES

Question. As you are aware most if not all the defense cleanup sites are under 

agreements with their host states to achieve well defined milestones. 

If confirmed will you inform this committee in a timely fashion when the Department determines it will miss major consent order milestones? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain open communications with the committee. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

650 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[The nomination reference of Dr. Monica C. Regalbuto follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

March 10, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Monica C. Regalbuto, of Illinois, to be an Assistant Secretary of Energy (Environmental Management), vice Ines R. Triay, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Dr. Monica C. Regalbuto, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DR. MONICA C. REGALBUTO

Dr. Monica C. Regalbuto is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fuel Cycle Technologies in the Office of Nuclear Energy at the Department of Energy (DOE), a position she has held since 2011. She is currently detailed to DOE from Argonne National Laboratory. Prior to this role, Dr. Regalbuto was Senior Program Manager 

for the Office of Waste Processing in the Office of Environmental Management at 

DOE from 2008 to 2010. From 2003 to 2008, Dr. Regalbuto was the head of the 

Process Chemistry and Engineering Department in Argonne’s Chemical Sciences 

and Engineering Division and from 1996 to 2001, she was a Senior Research Engineer at BP Amoco Oil Company. Dr. Regalbuto received a B.S. in Chemical Engineering from the Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey and 

an M.S. and Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering from the University of Notre Dame. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Dr. Monica C. Regalbuto in connection with 

her nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

651 

* Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (Monterrey Nuevo Leon, Mexico) 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Monica Cristina Regalbuto. 

Monica Cristina Gonzalez de Regalbuto. 

Monica Cristina Gonzalez Banos. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management . 

3. Date of nomination: 

March 10, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

July 30, 1961; Monterrey Nuevo Leon, Mexico. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to John Robert Regalbuto. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Jose Ricardo Regalbuto, age 27. 

Maria Carolina Regalbuto, age 24. 

Jose Roberto Regalbuto, age 21. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

University of Notre Dame, IN, 06/1986–05/1988, Ph.D., Ch.E., 05/1988 

University of Notre Dame, IN, 01/1984–05/1986, MS., Ch.E., 05/1986 

ITESM *, 08/1979–05/1983, BS., Ch.E., 06/1983 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Dates Title Name of employer Location 

11/2011–present ... Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fuel Cycle 

Technologies-Intergovernmental Personnel Act agreement.

Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office 

of Nuclear Energy (NE).

Washington, DC 

11/2008–11/2011 Senior Program Manager-Intergovernmental Personnel Act agreement.Department of Energy (DOE) Office 

of Environmental Management 

(EM).

Washington, DC 

01/2009–09/2010 Research Affiliate (no pay) ........................ Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Boston, MA 

04/2009–04/2013 Board Member (no pay) .............................. Illinois High School District 255 ...... Glenview, IL 

01/2001–Present ... Department Head ........................................ Argonne National Laboratory ............ Argonne, IL 

12/1996–01/2001 Research Engineer ...................................... Amoco Oil Company now BP (British 

Petroleum).

Naperville, IL 

09/1988–12/1996 Chemical Engineer ...................................... Argonne National Laboratory ............ Argonne, IL 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

• American Nuclear Society 

• American Institute of Chemical Engineers 

652 

• American Chemical Society 

• Society of Women Engineers 

• Sigma Xi Scientific Research Society 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None. 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

• 2014, U.S. Department of Energy Secretary’s Achievement Award 

• 2011, U.S. Department of Energy Secretary’s Achievement Award 

• 2010, Powerful Hispanics in Energy, Hispanic Engineer & Information 

Technology Magazine 

• 2009, 25 Outstanding Hispanic Women in Business, HispanicBusiness.com 

• 2007, Professional Achievement Award, Hispanic Engineer National 

Achievement Award Corporation (HENAAC) 

• 2007, Jane Oestmann Professional Women’s Achievement Award, American Nuclear Society 

• 2005, Outstanding Engineering Achievement by the Illinois Engineering 

Council 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

See attachment. 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

653 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

MONICA C. REGALBUTO. 

This 9th day of April, 2014. 

[The nomination of Dr. Monica C. Regalbuto was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on June 24, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was returned to the President at the end of the 113th Congress on 

December 17, 2014, under provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules of the Senate.] 

(655) 

NOMINATIONS OF ADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, 

USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE 

OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. 

NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH 

AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND; GEN JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA, FOR 

REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE/ 

COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES, AFGHANISTAN; 

AND LTG JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, TO BE 

GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS COMMAND 

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, 

McCaskill, Udall, Manchin, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Kaine, King, 

Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, and Cruz. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

The committee meets today to consider the nominations of Admiral William Gortney to be Commander, U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM) and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); General John Campbell to be Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan; and Lieutenant General Joseph 

Votel to be Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM). 

Welcome to all of you and to each of you, and we thank you for 

your many, many years of great service to our Nation and for your 

willingness to continue to serve in these positions of huge responsibility. We thank you and your family members. Our senior military 

officers are asked to undertake long hours and immense workloads, 

656 

and we know, as you do, that your success in these roles would not 

be possible without the support of your families. Please feel free to 

introduce those members who are with you today when it comes to 

be your turn. 

All three nominees have impressive records of service and are 

well qualified for the positions to which they have been nominated. 

Admiral Gortney has been the Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces 

Command, including U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command; the 

Director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon; and the Commander of 

U.S. Naval Central Command/U.S. FIFTH Fleet. 

General Campbell has been the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; 

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army; and Commander of the 101st 

Airborne Division in Afghanistan. 

General Votel has been Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command; Deputy Commander of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization; and Chief of Staff of the 

Special Operations Command. 

Our nominees will assume some of the most demanding positions 

in our military. Admiral Gortney’s NORTHCOM responsibilities 

will include defense of the Homeland and supporting civil authorities in case of natural and manmade disasters. Admiral Gortney 

will also be dual-hatted as the Commander of NORAD, our binational command with Canada, which has the mission of providing 

aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for 

North America. 

General Campbell will assume his position in a time of significant transition in Afghanistan. He will be tasked with implementing the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops by the end of the 

year, while simultaneously supporting counterterrorism (CT) operations and sustaining the mission to train, advise, and assist the 

Afghan Security Forces as they continue to assume responsibility 

for their nation’s security. 

The current political uncertainty in Afghanistan stemming from 

the allegations of election fraud threatens to derail significant 

gains made throughout the country. The two presidential candidates in Afghanistan have stated publicly and to me personally 

last Sunday that a comprehensive audit of the election results is 

needed—they both agree on that—and that they will abide by the 

results of such an audit. Regardless whether the candidates can 

agree on the details of the audit process, it is the duty of the Afghan election commissions to move forward to identify and eliminate fraudulent ballots so that they can announce a credible election result. General Campbell, I would appreciate hearing your 

views on the ongoing political events and what impacts they could 

have on the security situation in Afghanistan. 

General Votel will assume the helm of a force that has sustained 

an exceptionally high operational tempo for nearly 13 years of war. 

As we draw down our forces in Afghanistan, we will need to give 

particular attention to the role of special forces and their continued 

ability to carry out the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan. 

General, I will look forward to hearing from you how you will address these challenges while also ensuring that the men and 

women of the special operations community are not shouldering an 

undue burden. 

657 

I want to thank our nominees again for being with us, for your 

great service to our Nation. We look forward to your confirmation. 

I will now call on Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank all three of you for the time that you gave me and the 

rest of us up here at the dais. 

General Campbell, as the Commander, you are going to be 

tasked with overseeing the mission in Afghanistan. Certainly General Dunford has done a great job. It is a serious thing that we are 

dealing with over there. 

The recent presidential elections have been marred by allegations of widespread voter fraud. For example, in the province here, 

they went from 17,000 votes that were cast in the first election. It 

jumped to 170,000 in the runoff. Then, keeping in mind that 

Ghani’s force and influence probably is greater in the rural areas, 

during the last election—this is unprecedented. Everyone up here 

has gone through elections, and we do not remember a time that 

you have a larger percentage of turnout in a rural area than you 

do in an urban area. Yet, it was 30 to 1. You know that is wrong, 

you have voter fraud. 

I am very much concerned about the perception of the people in 

Afghanistan if this is not cleared out. We are going to be really 

pushing hard to get an audit in that case. I have talked to you 

about this, and I am sure you agree with that. 

I am also troubled by the President’s plan to draw down our 

forces based on arbitrary timelines instead of the best advice of 

military commanders and the facts on the ground. The President 

tried the same policy in Iraq in 2011, and I hope we are not 

doomed to make the same mistake again. 

General Votel, contrary to the claims of some that al Qaeda is 

on the run, it is clear they are now operating in more countries and 

control more territory than ever before. Iraq and Syria have become the largest terrorist safe haven in the world and are serving 

as a breeding ground for the next generation of jihadis. It is only 

a matter of time before the thousands of foreigners who traveled 

to join the fight will return back home to places like Africa, battlehardened and ready to perform. 

Admiral Gortney, as Commander of NORTHCOM, you will be accountable for one of the most solemn responsibilities of our Government. That is defending the Homeland. That is what most people 

are concerned with, and that is what has to be the top priority. I 

am concerned and want to hear your views on the growing ballistic 

missile threat from North Korea and Iran and the effectiveness of 

our Homeland missile defense system to protect us against the improving capabilities of our adversaries. North Korea continues to 

develop delivery systems for its nuclear weapons arsenal, and public intelligence reports still assess that Iran could have the means 

to deliver a nuclear weapon by 2015. In fact, our intelligence back 

prior to 2010 said that they would have the ability to produce a 

weapon and a delivery system by 2015. That is on us now. That 

has to be the major concern that we all have at this time. 

658 

I look forward to hearing from the nominees and resolving these 

very difficult problems. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Let me call first on Admiral Gortney. 

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE 

COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, 

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 

Admiral GORTNEY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee. It is a 

distinct honor and privilege to appear before you today. 

I would like to thank the President for nominating me and thank 

Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey for the trust they have 

placed in me. If confirmed, I look forward to serving as the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander of the North 

American Aerospace Defense Command. 

I also thank the Senate Armed Services Committee for their 

work and their support to our servicemembers and their families. 

I am joined this morning by my wife, and with your permission, 

I would like to introduce her. Sherry and I have known each other 

since high school in Orange Park, FL, and this past Saturday we 

celebrated our 34th anniversary. She is active in the education and 

mentoring of Navy spouses who, along with our family, are the 

very stitches that hold the cloth of our Nation together. Her dedication to our family and the sailors and marines is simply remarkable. I would not be here today without her. 

Mr. Chairman, over the last few years, my good friend, General 

Chuck Jacoby, has led the U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD teams 

with distinction. He has set the gold standard for combatant command leadership. If confirmed, I look forward to building upon his 

terrific efforts. 

I would like to make two simple but important points before receiving your questions. 

First, working hand in hand with Congress, there is no greater 

responsibility for a military officer than to defend the Nation that 

we call home. The Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM is charged 

with being our Nation’s last line of defense and providing support 

to Federal, State, and local levels when the American people are 

in their greatest need. I view these missions as a sacred trust and 

that, if confirmed, I will faithfully and passionately execute them. 

Second, cooperation is paramount to the mission of NORTHCOM. 

I have spent a significant part of my career building joint and 

international coalitions to solve the challenging problems that confront us all. These experiences have prepared me for engaging with 

our close friends and neighbors in Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas. Of course, this is a team sport, and therefore, if confirmed, 

I will work closely with the combatant commanders, the Service 

Chiefs, our citizen soldiers in the National Guard and Reserve, the 

Governors of our States, and our teammates at the Department of 

Homeland Security and other inter-agencies. If confirmed, I also 

look forward to working together with the members of this comVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00666 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
659 

mittee to identify and take action on the tasks required to defend 

our Homeland and provide support to civil authorities. 

Thank you again for this opportunity, and thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Inhofe, the members of this committee, 

and the highly talented members of your staff, for the work you all 

do every day to provide our men and women in uniform the things 

they need to do our Nation’s bidding. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Admiral. 

General Campbell? 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE 

COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

FORCE/COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES, AFGHANISTAN 

General CAMPBELL. Thank you, sir. Good morning. Chairman 

Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I appreciate your support and your commitment to our servicemembers, our families, and our veterans, and I am truly honored 

and humbled that the President has nominated me to command 

the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. 

I would also like to thank Secretary of Defense Hagel and Chairman Dempsey for the trust and confidence they have given me in 

supporting my nomination. 

I want to acknowledge General Joe Dunford for the great work 

he has done over the last year and a half and his personal sacrifice 

for our Nation’s efforts in Afghanistan. I also want to thank Joe’s 

wife Ellen who has been a true source of inspiration and support 

of her husband. 

I must acknowledge my wife who could not be here today. She 

is recovering from knee surgery. She is actually up at Walter Reed 

with my daughter, she had surgery yesterday. But I want to thank 

her for her strength and sacrifice throughout our 30 years of marriage, for being a great mom to our two children, and for her tireless advocacy for our military families. I could not be where I am 

today without her, and she has had an immeasurable effect on so 

many of our soldiers and their families. 

Our Nation has been at war in Afghanistan for nearly 13 years. 

This conflict has defined much of my career and I am honored to 

be considered to lead during the next important phase. 

In 2003, I deployed to Afghanistan while I commanded the 1st 

Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division when we only had one brigade in the country. 

I returned to Afghanistan from 2010 to 2011 in command of the 

101st Airborne Division in Regional Command East. In this capacity, I led 30,000 U.S. allied troopers in 14 provinces. I saw firsthand the incredible sacrifice of our soldiers and of our families. Unfortunately, I also had hundreds of heroes that paid the ultimate 

sacrifice under my command. These warriors and all those that 

have deployed to Afghanistan have had an enormous impact by 

bringing hope to the people of that nation and by denying al Qaeda 

660 

their favorite sanctuary. I am absolutely committed to completing 

this mission. 

As we transition to a resolute support mission and draw down 

our forces, there will be many challenges, but I have confidence in 

the strength of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). They 

have held strong, despite significant casualties during the 2013 and 

the current 2014 fighting season. They have succeeded in securing 

the recent election, and I am confident in their ability to remain 

firm through the upcoming political transfer of power. 

I also have faith in the strength of the coalition that has held together over this long conflict. I am committed to working closely 

with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization members. If confirmed, I will proudly lead our service men and women in Afghanistan. 

I thank you again for your steadfast and generous support of our 

men and women of the U.S. military. I look forward to working 

closely with this committee, and if confirmed, I anxiously await arriving in Afghanistan. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. 

General Votel? 

STATEMENT OF LTG JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, TO BE GENERAL 

AND COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

General VOTEL. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today regarding my nomination to be the next Commander 

of U.S. Special Operations Command. I am honored to be included 

on a panel of senior officers with whom I have had a long professional acquaintance and who I deeply respect and admire. 

I am especially pleased that my wife of 34 years, Michele, is able 

to be here with me today. She and the other spouses present represent decades of service caring for our servicemembers and their 

families. Michele has been a constant source of inspiration and 

support to me, and I could not have imagined making this journey 

without her. 

I am deeply honored to be considered by the committee for this 

position. I firmly believe that Special Operations Forces (SOF) perform a vital function within the Department of Defense (DOD), 

supporting our geographic combatant commanders and providing 

our leadership with unique solutions to challenging problems. If 

confirmed for this position, I look forward to working with this 

committee to address the needs and requirements of our SOFs, ensuring that they remain the very best in the world. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Votel. 

Now I will ask the standard questions that we ask of our nominees. 

First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I have. 

General CAMPBELL. I have. 

General VOTEL. I have. 

661 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views even if those views differ from the administration in 

power? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I do. 

General CAMPBELL. I do. 

General VOTEL. I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

Admiral GORTNEY. No, I have not. 

General CAMPBELL. No, I have not. 

General VOTEL. No, I have not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record and hearings? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. 

General VOTEL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and 

briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. 

General VOTEL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 

for their testimony or briefings? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. 

General VOTEL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. 

General VOTEL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including 

copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner 

when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with 

the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. 

General VOTEL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Let us have a 7-minute first round of 

questions, and we can get to a second round here, if necessary. 

Admiral Gortney, let me start with you. We have had a lot of 

failures and a lot of successes in our ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system, and so my question to you is, do you believe 

that it is important to follow a ‘‘fly-before-you-buy’’ approach and 

to conduct operationally realistic testing of the ground-based missile defense system, including the kill vehicle, to provide confidence 

that it will work as intended? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir, I do. I believe in the fly before you 

deploy. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you also agree that our highest priority 

investment at this time is to further improve the capability of the 

662 

GMD system by improving its sensor and discrimination capabilities? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. Given the nature of the mission, it 

is critical that we improve that which we have to make sure the 

kill vehicle is as effective as possible in our ability to discriminate 

the threats that are coming to the Homeland. After that, it is expansion of our capacity in order to do that. I agree with Admiral 

Syring’s third priority, which is to then look at future technologies 

to improve our ability. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Admiral, I understand that the Department of Health and Human Services is now seeking substantially increased DOD support for our housing, temporary housing, 

needs at the southern border because of the influx of the young 

people particularly. I hope that there can be a positive response to 

the request of the Department of Health and Human Services, but 

of course, NORTHCOM needs to have the ability to provide that increased support before it offers it. Do you believe that NORTHCOM 

has the ability to provide the increased support requested by the 

Department of Health and Human Services? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. It is my understanding we have the 

capacity to provide all the help that is required in order to do that. 

Chairman LEVIN. There is a new request. Are you familiar with 

that that just came? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Pardon me, sir? 

Chairman LEVIN. There is a new request from Health and 

Human Services for a significant increase. 

Admiral GORTNEY. I have not heard about the latest increase, 

but currently we are at about 2,600 and so we can go up a bit from 

that. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Campbell, you have given us your assessment of the performance of Afghan National Security Forces 

ongoing and during the fighting season and in securing recent elections. Can you just expand on that a bit? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. Thank you for the question. 

Sir, the last time I was in Afghanistan personally was in April, 

but I have kept in contact with Joe Dunford and the other commanders on the ground, have talked to them about the Afghan Security Forces. Everything I have seen, read, heard, and as I talked 

to some commanders on the ground when I was there in April, the 

Afghan Security Forces have continued to progress in all their capabilities as evidenced by the recent election where actually the coalition forces provided very, very little support and the Afghans 

really took on the security. It brought a sense of pride to them to 

be able to do this, and I think they continue to progress every single day. 

So far, as the new plan will show, we will move off of the tactical 

train, advise, and assist and move up to the corps level. I think 

that shows that the campaign has been working. The difference 

when I left in 2011 to what I saw just this past April was very, 

very significant. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, in your answer to the prehearing 

questions, you said that you support the President’s decision on the 

size of the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan during the next 2 

years. Is that correct? 

663 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I was not in on the decisionmaking, but 

I support the numbers there. I think that shows that we will continue to have a presence in Afghanistan for the next couple years, 

and I think that is very good. 

Chairman LEVIN. You also said that you support the pace of reductions outlined by the President, ‘‘with an understanding that we 

should continue to validate the assumptions and assess the conditions on the ground as the drawdown takes place.’’ Do I understand 

from that that you will recommend changes in the pace of the 

drawdown if you find in your best military judgment that the pace 

should be modified? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, what this committee expects of me and 

what I owe to our soldiers on the ground is my true assessment, 

once I get on the ground, of how the mission is going. I will provide 

that input to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you determine in your best military judgment that the pace should be changed and that the date should be 

changed, you would then make that recommendation? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I would provide my best military advice 

on the pace of the change, the pace of the drawdown. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Even if it differs from the current pace? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, that is what you expect me to do. Absolutely. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, after 2016, the U.S. military presence in 

Afghanistan is planned, at the moment, to be a normal embassybased presence. It has also been reported that the size of the future 

Office of Security Cooperation in Afghanistan could be as large as 

1,000 personnel. 

My question now relates to the plans for post-2016. If at any 

point in your military judgment circumstances change or assumptions underlying the post-2016 plan do not prove valid, will you 

also let those above you in the chain of command know? 

General CAMPBELL. Absolutely, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Votel, there is going to be a consolidation of basing locations inside of Afghanistan, and I want to get 

your view as to how that consolidation is going to impact the ability of assault teams, airborne ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance], to reach remote provinces like Kunar and 

Nuristan where al Qaeda has sought safe haven. 

General VOTEL. Mr. Chairman, we have been closely following 

the basing plans that General Dunford and his staff have made, 

and I assess we have adequate locations at this time to continue 

to do the operations, counterterrorism and partnership operations, 

that we need to continue to apply the pressure against the networks that we are dealing with. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Can you give us your understanding 

of the progress in training the Afghan special operations Kandaks 

and the timeline for achieving their full operational capability? 

General VOTEL. My command has been responsible for training 

a portion of the SOFs, and I assess that we are moving very quickly and effectively to make them capable partners on the battlefield 

not only their ability to execute operations, but more importantly, 

the ability of their leaders to direct operations and to properly suVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00671 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
664 

pervise the execution of those. I think we are making very good 

progress there. 

I have long watched the special operations Kandaks and have 

been hugely impressed by their ability to conduct operations and 

to be with their Afghan countrymen and work very, very closely 

with them. I assess we are on the right path with that, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Campbell, during my opening statement, I made a comment about I could not recall which province it was, and I found 

it was Wardak province that Ashraf Ghani’s vote count went from 

17,000 in April to 170,000 in this runoff, which is absurd. We all 

know that that could not have happened, and certainly the Afghan 

people know that too. I do not think we can find any place where 

the turnout is greater in the rural areas than it is in the urban 

areas. This came out where the strength of Ghani is in the rural 

areas, and it was 3 to 1 over the urban areas. We know that is not 

true. If there are so many of these deficiencies, I am sure that the 

different ethnic groups have the same concern as I do and hopefully as you do. 

We have to push real hard to get an audit, a genuine audit, one 

that has oversight from outside groups. I would ask you, first of all, 

if you think that is a good idea. Second, what would happen if the 

people do not understand and appreciate this as a legitimate election? What would happen in the country in your opinion? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks for the question. 

Sir, this is really the runoff. They had the first election in April, 

and this was a runoff between Abdullah and Ghani. It is absolutely 

critical that the Afghan people and the rest of the world see this 

as a viable, transparent election process. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you think they see that now as viable and 

transparent? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I think both of the candidates have said 

there has been some corruption there and they are working hard 

to come together to find this audit. I think the difference now is 

the number of polling stations whether it is 2,000 or 6,000. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that is good. 

General Votel, you and I talked about U.S. Africa Command 

(AFRICOM), and we remember when the continent of Africa was 

divided in three different commands. It was not workable at all. 

We understand that. Now, the problem is with AFRICOM, they do 

not have their own resources. In my opening statement, I commented that a lot of the people from Africa are sucked up into this 

war that is going on in Afghanistan and elsewhere. They will return as hardened fighters. Does this concern you? Without the resources that you and I talked about, what are you going to do? 

General VOTEL. Senator, thank you. 

It certainly does concern me, as we discussed yesterday. I think 

what we can do, while we continue to prioritize our precious ISR 

resources that are used in a variety of locations, is continue to 

build the relationships on the ground that will allow us to assist 

our partners where we can to provide information, to share inforVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00672 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
665 

mation with them, to better enable them to deal with the challenges of returning fighters to their—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, I think that is right. But you mentioned 

ISR, and General Rodriguez, as you already know, has said that 

they only have the ISR capability to meet 11 percent of the needs 

that they have in the continent. Do you agree with that? Have you 

talked to him? Do you agree with that assessment? 

General VOTEL. I have, Senator. General Rodriguez and I talk 

frequently, and I do agree. We definitely need more ISR. 

Senator INHOFE. Are you prepared to try to come and express 

that so that we can try to get more there? 

General VOTEL. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this 

committee and with AFRICOM to address that. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. That’s good. 

Admiral Gortney, the chairman talked about the GMD program 

and the fact that we need to have more updates and modernization 

and all that, which we have been talking about in this committee 

for a long period of time. We actually put additional funding in 

there for that purpose, but it is not, in my opinion, nearly adequate. In terms of the resources that will be available there, where 

do you think we are now on that program? Do you think that we 

are making sufficient investments in the maintenance and reliability of the GMD system? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. I think the Missile Defense Agency’s 

(MDA) priorities are absolutely correct. Necessary investments into 

the proper maintenance and modernization of the existing groundbased interceptors (GBI) is absolutely the number one requirement. 

The second one, investment after that would be to improve again 

the kill vehicle itself and then improvement to the sensors that 

would allow us to better discriminate the threats that might be 

coming to the Homeland. 

Senator INHOFE. If you go back, as I mentioned to you in my office, to 2008, our funding for the GMD has declined from $2 billion 

then to about half that now. Does that concern you? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir, that does concern me. Once again, 

the first priority should be the necessary investments into the 

maintenance and modernization of the existing facilities that we 

have. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I appreciate that. 

General Campbell, I will get into something that is kind of controversial here. There is a big difference of opinion among the 

members up here, and that is concerning the Mi-17. We have several quotes, and frankly, I have looked into it and I kind of agree 

with the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction that 

said the Afghans lacked the capacity in both the personnel numbers and expertise to operate and maintain the existing and 

planned special mission. If we were to change, what position would 

we be in in terms of our training if we were to drop in new vehicles 

and discard that particular program? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, if we were to change the Mi-17 as the 

primary lift platform for the Afghans, we would be several years, 

I think, behind. They would have to start a whole new training 

program. 

Senator INHOFE. Several years behind. 

666 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. I have a real hard time thinking about something that is there now, they are trained now, and I know it is 

more popular to say, let us go into another group of vehicles and 

not support people that we question. But I think it is very significant that you feel that we could actually be years behind. 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I have talked to General Dunford on the 

ground there. 

Senator INHOFE. He agrees with that? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. The Mi-17 provides the Afghans with the capability to stretch, to get out, to get into the hinterland to go after the insurgents for the Afghans, and it also provides the coalition forces that outer ring of security, so force protection. I know General Dunford is very concerned about the loss of 

the Mi-17 and what it does to not only coalition force protection but 

the ability of the Afghans to get out and conduct all their missions. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate it very much and I am hoping that 

all of the members of this committee have heard you loud and 

clear. I appreciate your honesty. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you and your families for your distinguished 

service to the Nation and to the men and women you lead. 

Admiral Gortney, we are constantly under cyber attack. Today’s 

headline is that the Chinese are hacking into the Office of Personnel Management. NORTHCOM plays a critical role in defending 

the Homeland from any type of attack. Are we doing the exercises 

and the wargaming on a regular basis to assure that you can respond to these threats? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. NORTHCOM’s responsibility is to assure that our systems, our defense systems, are operable to the assurance that we can do the command and control and that the facilities are protected, military facilities are able to defend themselves. We work that closely with the Services to make sure that 

happens. 

Our second responsibility, if confirmed, at NORTHCOM is to respond to the physical responses to a cyber attack to the civilian 

pieces. We exercise that throughout the year under our defense 

support to civil authorities on how well we can respond to that. 

Senator REED. But there is a gap because a lot of the targets 

that would be prime on the list would not be military facilities. 

They would be financial institutions, public utilities, transit systems. Have you coordinated at least a planning level, if not an 

operational level, of how you might defend against these? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Those would be, say, to the power grid, to the 

water, to the rail, all of that. We are responsible for responding to 

the physical consequences of that. That is very similar to the defense support to civil authorities for earthquake, weather, things of 

that nature. Those sort of response capabilities are the same. 

Senator REED. A final question. Who is responsible for the active 

defense of these facilities, or is anybody responsible? 

667 

Admiral GORTNEY. For our civil infrastructure, to be honest, sir, 

Homeland Security has that responsibility. It is my professional 

opinion that we are a little bit behind. We as a Nation are behind 

in our ability to defend that critical infrastructure. 

Senator REED. Do you have a coordination with Homeland Security? Again, if they are the ones responsible, there should be at 

least a joint planning effort, not just in response but in deterrence 

or prevention. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Homeland Security is our closest interagency 

partner in the defense of the Homeland and our responses there. 

But I do not know if we have a formal coordinating, and if confirmed, I will make sure I understand that, sir. 

Senator REED. General Campbell, your experience on the ground 

in Afghanistan is going to be absolutely critical as you go forward. 

There are so many different aspects of the issue, but one I would 

like to just get your opinion upon is the role of Pakistan. They have 

undertaken significant offensive operations in what was formerly 

referred to as the tribal areas in North Waziristan. But they will 

play a key role in anything that happens there. Can you give me 

your impression now of where they are headed and how you might 

work with them? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. 

Sir, you are absolutely right. You cannot talk Afghanistan unless 

you talk about Pakistan as well. It is critical to have that partnership not only with the coalition in Pakistan but, really more important, with the military-to-military between Afghanistan and Pakistan. I can only speak really from my time in 2011. I know that 

coordination and the cooperation continues to get better at the senior levels. At the tactical level right on the border in Regional Command (RC)-East where I was at, the colonels, the brigadier generals, they worked that daily and that continued to progress. We 

had Pakistani liaisons in our talks, and I would visit Pakistan once 

a quarter. I know that General Dunford and the senior leadership 

in Afghanistan today continue to work those relationships, and 

that will be really key not only for the border but also for all the 

counterterrorism reasons. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. 

General Votel, Special Operations Command has been operating 

flat out for more than a decade now, and as we reset our conventional forces you are going to still operate at mach speed. Admiral 

McRaven, in fact, has suggested there might be a fraying on the 

force. What is your impression of the effect of these operations on 

your force in terms of operational capability? 

General VOTEL. Senator, thanks for the question. 

I agree with Admiral McRaven’s assessment. I do think that the 

force, as you said, has been very operationally active for a long period of time. That said, I think we continue to be very, very effective in the operations that we continue to ask to be performed. Key 

to this I think has been Admiral McRaven’s focus on ensuring that 

we do address the pressure on our force and families and provide 

them mechanisms that allow them to continue to serve their country but also take care of the needs that are generated by years of 

combat, of years of service overseas. 

668 

Senator REED. One other aspect of this is that in a rough dichotomy there are covert missions and then there are traditional training missions that special operations performs. In some of those traditional training missions will you shift to conventional forces, or 

is that a way to sort of lessen the pressure from your forces? 

General VOTEL. I think that is an option for us. Senator, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with the Services, particularly the Army who I know is developing regionally aligned forces 

that would be great partners in developing our partners across the 

globe. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Admiral Gortney, if I could, a final question. We have a new theater of operations, the Arctic Ocean, which for anybody my age 

seemed inconceivable, but it is there. How well prepared are we? 

For example, I do not think we have a heavy icebreaker in the 

Navy, and I do not think we have any plans to build one. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. The Arctic is truly a wilderness, and 

in order to operate there, we have to have the ability to communicate, navigate, sustain ourselves, and then have the ability to operate our ships and our aircraft up there. That is going to require 

some significant investments for the Department in order to do 

that. We need to figure out when is the time that we have to put 

all those capabilities in place and POM [program objective memorandum] them appropriately. But we do not have an icebreaker in 

the Navy. The Coast Guard only has one. It requires study. It is 

the President’s priority. It is NORTHCOM. It is a tasked mission 

for NORTHCOM, and so NORTHCOM, and in my current job 

working with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), 

we are working very heavily to figure out those particular 

timelines. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Chairman Levin. 

I thank all of you for your service to the country. We are the finest military in the history of the world in my opinion. It is exceedingly well trained, very well led. I think our modern Army, Navy, 

Air Force, Marine Corps leaders are more engaged with their 

troops, more leading from the front, more in tune to what is happening than ever before. I think we have gone through some very 

tough times to maintain cohesiveness and morale in a way that 

would be difficult to have expected actually considering the deployments that have been imposed on our soldiers. I am real proud of 

them. 

I would thank Senator Levin for his comments and questions, 

General Campbell, to you about your duty, as we understand it in 

this republic, to tell the truth to Congress and to your superiors as 

you see it. History also would indicate I think that leaders on the 

battlefield are ignored at great peril. You are going to have to 

make some recommendations in the months to come concerning reduction in force policies that are going to be challenging. We appreciate your commitment to do that. 

669 

I would ask the other two. Admiral Gortney, would you also answer in the affirmative as General Campbell did to Senator Levin’s 

questions? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Votel? 

General VOTEL. Yes, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. The Mi-17—that is the Russian helicopter. We 

are way down the line now. Maybe it is too late to reverse that decision. The Defense Department made up its mind early, was rock 

solid on it, refused to listen to any other suggestions about it, and 

now we have Russia invading the Crimea. I am personally not very 

pleased with that decision. We talked about it, General Campbell, 

yesterday. But it may be too late to reverse that decision, but that 

is my 2 cents’ worth about that issue. 

General Votel, you were asked about how healthy your force is. 

Is it about 67,000 now in our SOF forces? 

General VOTEL. Senator, that is about right and growing to about 

69,000-plus. 

Senator SESSIONS. We know we are going to be drawing down 

varying different estimations of our total force. Is it your opinion 

that in a restructured force, as a result of budget decisions and 

other decisions, that we ought not to reduce the special operating 

forces below that level and we ought to stay at or about that level, 

more or less? 

General VOTEL. Senator, as we discussed yesterday, I think the 

level that we are going to be at is appropriate for the task that we 

are being asked to perform on behalf of all the geographic and 

other commanders out there that we support. I think staying at the 

level that we are is the right answer. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Admiral Gortney, I understand a recent test in the Pacific of our 

missile defense system was a very successful test involving some 

complexities, and it was still effective. What can you tell us about 

that? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I have limited detail in my capacity right now 

to know it. I do know that it was a successful test. It was one of 

the most complex tests of the total weapons system for it to work 

and that it did work. That gives us better confidence in our ability 

to defend the Homeland. 

Senator SESSIONS. That was a hit-to-kill technology? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that is important. We have had some 

concern about our hit-to-kill technology, and it has been proven in 

the past but we were concerned about it. This successful test, I 

think, is important because it represents a newer and more effective system, I believe. You and I talked about your belief that with 

regard to making a decision to launch, which will be your decision? 

Admiral GORTNEY. That is correct, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. If we have an incoming missile, you would be 

the person to make the decision to launch? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The NORTHCOM commander owns the trigger. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. How do you plan to ensure that that system 

works well, that quick decisions can be made 24 hours a day? You 

670 

gave me an indication yesterday, but I thought it would be good to 

share that. 

Admiral GORTNEY. You test and exercise what is important, sir, 

and you need to test and exercise that entire weapons system, all 

the muscles involved in making that an effective engagement. You 

need to test and exercise it continuously. A key element is the exercising of the command and control of that facility because the shot 

window is so narrow from the detection to when the decision has 

to be made. If you do not exercise everybody in that chain of command routinely, you are not going to be able to make or have the 

confidence that you are going to make that decision in time. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think you are exactly right. We certainly 

have invested a tremendous amount in that system, and we do not 

need to have a glitch in the management of it that would neutralize its value. 

General Campbell, this is going to be such a challenge. Thank 

you for your continued service. I am very pleased that you have extensive knowledge of Afghanistan, and I believe you will be in a position to be most effective. Senator McCain predicted in 2011 openly and directly that if we pulled out so rapidly in Iraq, as we ended 

up doing, that there would be grim consequences. His grim predictions, unfortunately, have been proven true. 

We are going to be watching and remembering the soldiers you 

have led and the soldiers that have been wounded and soldiers who 

have lost their lives in Afghanistan. We have reached a point 

where I believe that country can be successful, but it is fragile. Can 

you give us your best judgment of what the prospects are for establishing a decent government there that is not hostile to the United 

States? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thank you for the question. 

I think the key point is that we will have a continued presence 

in Afghanistan for the next couple of years, and I look forward to 

getting over there and making my own assessment when I get on 

the ground. There are two missions that General Dunford and 

ISAF are working now as they move to the end part of 2014 into 

2015 and that is on the training, advise, and assist at a higher 

level, at the corps and the ministerial level, then of course, a 

counterterrorism mission. I will continue to work hard on those two 

missions. I will give you my best military advice on where we stand 

on that, but I think we have some time to continue to work on 

some of those gaps that General Dunford and the team over there 

has identified that they will continue to work. There has been great 

progress by the Afghan Security Forces, and I look forward to getting on the ground there. 

Senator SESSIONS. Our mission is not to get to zero troops at a 

certain date. Our mission is—and what we have committed to and 

what we have invested in in blood and resources—a successful outcome. I hope that we do not lose sight of that. Thank you. 

General CAMPBELL. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses and your families for your service. 

671 

General Campbell, I am on the Foreign Relations Committee and 

co-chaired a subcommittee meeting on Afghanistan a few months 

ago. General Allen said—and this was kind of a surprising bit of 

testimony, he was one of our witnesses—that he viewed corruption 

as more of an existential threat to the future of Afghanistan than 

terrorism. Terrorism and the Taliban are certainly threats, but he 

viewed corruption as a more significant threat. 

I filed that away in the back of my head, but as I have watched 

what has played out in terms of presidential elections, I found it 

to be an interesting observation. The Taliban threatened to disrupt 

the elections. They made efforts to but they were not able to do it. 

I give credit to the ANSF for doing a good job of protecting the 

physical security of the elections. But the elections have been 

threatened by allegations of corruption of the process by political 

leaders, potentially the outgoing Karzai administration. 

Am I correct in my view that the ANSF did a pretty good job in 

protecting the physical integrity of these elections despite the 

Taliban’s pledge to disrupt them? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. Thank you for the question. 

The Afghan National Security Forces protected all the polling sites, 

and I think just based on the number of incidents that I read 

about—I talked to commanders on the ground—they did an absolutely excellent job. I think their progression from where they were 

and where they continue to go continues to get better. That is a 

great news story but it is really because the great men and women 

of the coalition have continued to be side by side, Shona ba Shona 

with them to help them through the last almost 13 years of doing 

that. It is not by happenstance it has happened. It is because of 

this great work by the men and women, and they continue to work 

that. You are absolutely right, sir. 

Senator KAINE. I think it is important for the members of this 

body, this committee, to recognize that the challenges going forward in Afghanistan are not simply military challenges if the 

ANSF is performing at a level where they can protect the physical 

integrity of the elections, that the elections are still called into 

question because of political corruption. There are other tools that 

we are going to need to explore if we want to make sure that the 

progress that we have been a part of continues. I wish you well in 

that and look forward to working with you in that capacity. 

General Votel, you and I talked a bit the other day. I am also 

concerned, as Senator Reed is, about the force and the fraying of 

the force after the incredible amount of work that has been done 

over the last 13 years. I had a veterans roundtable recently in 

Hampton Roads, VA, where a widow, whose husband was a special 

forces veteran who had committed suicide in March, came and 

talked about the stress on him and on their family. 

If you could just share a little bit more about—you are so familiar with these folks and what the challenges they are under—how 

as the head of this command you intend to deal with those issues 

both for people who are active but then once people separate from 

special forces. I know that you have a continuing commitment to 

them. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Senator. 

672 

Certainly I do think the pressure that has been put on the force 

is not exclusive to our SOF. It has affected all of our forces. 

That said, I do think there are some things that we ask our special operators to do, manners in which they operate, the secrecy 

with which they operate that do not allow them the normal opportunities to talk about things afterwards. I think we do have to address that aspect of it when it comes to our SOFs and families and 

making sure that we provide those appropriate outlets for them. As 

we talked about the other day, the Special Operations Command 

does have the Care Coalition which is designed to take care of our 

members that are wounded physically or otherwise in these situations. I think that is a great way to continue to take care of folks 

while they are in the service and beyond. 

I think continuing to look at veterans organizations outside of 

the military is also a great partnership that we need to have in 

place. I am familiar with some organizations of retired military 

people and just concerned Americans out in the communities who 

are very willing to work with and reach out to our veterans across 

the country to ensure that they and their families are well taken 

care of. 

If confirmed, Senator, I look forward to continuing to strengthen 

those relationships and ensure that our members on Active service 

and beyond Active service continue to get the care that they require. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, General. Let us know the strategies 

that we can also help you in as we pursue that important goal. 

One more comment for you. I want to offer my congratulations 

really. Senator King and I traveled through the Middle East in 

February, and in many of the Nations where we were, we heard 

over and over again about the value of the U.S. Special Forces in 

training special forces in other nations. I imagine in the context of 

the defense budget, the training that our special forces do with 

other nations’ special forces has to be a drop in the bucket. But the 

value of those investments is very significant. We certainly heard 

a tribute to that during our travels. I know that that is an important part of your mission as well. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Senator. I really attribute that to our 

people. They are our most precious and important resource, and 

when we allow them to get out and do their jobs, they always 

amaze us and do fantastic things. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Admiral Gortney, in your oral testimony today and your written 

testimony as well, you talked about the mission of NORTHCOM in 

terms of protecting the Homeland. It is obviously becoming clear, 

just reading the headlines every day, that one of the most important borders in the world for the protection of the American Homeland is the border not between the United States and Mexico but 

the border between Mexico and the Central American neighbors 

whose children are fleeing violence and gangs and trying to come 

to the United States. Talk a little bit about the U.S.-Mexico military relationship and how that relationship can potentially deal 

with some of those border issues on Mexico’s southern border. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. In my current capacity, I am the 

naval component to General Jacoby, and so we work very closely 

673 

with the Mexican Navy. I just had Admiral Soberon in the headquarters just a couple days ago. I would say that the mil-to-mil relationship both with the navy and the army is much better. It is 

strong and it is a growing relationship thanks to the leading edges 

of both Admiral Winnefeld and the great work that General Jacoby 

has had. It is important that it is day to day. It is the same confidence that you just mentioned with the special forces that will 

pay us long-term dividends moving at the pace that they are able 

to go at, doing the things that they find important. I feel that we 

are in a very good direction and a positive trend. 

Senator KAINE. Do they view that border on their south as significantly a challenge as we do? 

Admiral GORTNEY. With my discussions with their leadership, 

they see their border to the south as the bigger issue. That is 

where their threat is coming from causing the disruption in their 

society. They are very focused to the south. That means that the 

relationship between NORTHCOM and U.S. Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM) has to be very strong to ensure there is no seam 

there that can be used against us, that we work together with all 

of the Nations there to counter those shared threats. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your continued great service, and to 

your families, thanks for sharing your husbands with us. We know 

this is a family obligation. We appreciate very much your allowing 

us to have their leadership. 

General Campbell, I will tell you exactly what I told Lloyd Austin as he was preparing to go into Iraq to make sure that we closed 

it down the right way. In my opinion, that was the most dangerous 

command of all the commands in Iraq because, as you pull out, our 

troops become less in number and the situation becomes more dangerous. Obviously, I think you are going to have that same situation, but I think also you are the right person to meet that challenge. We will look forward to your continued leadership in that 

role. 

Something took place over there recently that gives me a little 

bit of concern, and that is the release of about a dozen individuals 

from the prison at Parwan. Ten of those dozen were Pakistanis. I 

understand all of these dozen were returned to their home countries. Can you tell us anything about the release of those detainees, 

why it was decided to release individuals that we know are hard 

core combatant enemies of the United States? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I do not have the exact details on which 

individuals were released. I know that there are third country nationals in Afghanistan that over time we have to return back out 

of Afghanistan. I do not have details on those exact 10. But I know 

that we have been working with all different countries, with the 

State Department, and with the country of Afghanistan to make 

sure that when we do release individuals, that there are mitigating 

effects to make sure they cannot impact the fight again. 

674 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I believe they have 38 non-Afghans still at 

that prison at Parwan, all of which are pretty hard core enemy 

combatants. Have you been briefed on any plans to release the remaining 38? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I know the number 38. I know that there 

is a figure within that 38 that are really determined to be very 

hard core. I do not know the plan on how we will release them, but 

if confirmed, sir, I will make sure that I am tied into that process. 

But that is more than just a military piece. That is a whole-of-government operation that will take place. Sir, I do not have the details on that at this time. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. As you prepare to go to Afghanistan to assume this command, you are obviously going in at a time when we 

are going to have a new president. The political winds are shifting 

somewhat. Can you give us your analysis of the political situation 

now as we prepare to conclude this election and have a new president sworn in? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I can tell you that I think both of the 

candidates, whoever eventually becomes the president, have both 

indicated that they want to continue to have a long-term relationship with the coalition and with the United States in particular. 

That is very encouraging. They understand the importance of how 

important Afghanistan is in that part of the world and the impact 

of showing that they do have a democratic process, political transfer of power, the first time in that country, to make sure that is 

very transparent. 

I think everything I see, sir, is good news and that we are on a 

good road, but we have to get through this 50-meter target and get 

through the election and identify the president and show not only 

the people of Afghanistan but the people of the world that Afghanistan has gotten through this piece and they want to be part of the 

international community here for a stable, secure, and a democratic 

Afghanistan as we go forward. Sir, I am looking forward to getting 

over there, and I think we are on a positive path right now. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. One reason I feel good about your being up 

to the challenge is your statement earlier, and I know this has 

been your commitment to assess the situation on the ground and 

to monitor that as we move along towards the end of 2016 and that 

you are going to give your recommendation, which I think will be 

a real recommendation and honest reflection of your opinion as to 

what we should do with respect to the drawdown. Thank you for 

that commitment. 

General Votel, you and I have had an opportunity to work very 

closely together in your current capacity, and I thank you for your 

leadership. You have done an outstanding job, and I know you are 

going to continue to do that. 

In your new position here with respect to the Special Operations 

Command, I am concerned about ISR and the lack thereof as we 

move forward. It is such an integral part of your command now. 

Having heard from General Rodriguez recently that only 11 percent of his ISR requirements are being met with AFRICOM and he 

is having to depend on other combatant commanders, I know that 

you are going to be facing the same situation. 

675 

We have just gone through the budget of the Department of Defense recently, and one of the requests of the Air Force was to reduce the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (STARS) 

fleet by 40 percent. Do you think that was a wise decision? 

General VOTEL. Senator, thank you for the question. 

I am not sure I know the details of what went into that decision. 

But to your point, I do think there is a vital need to look at our 

ISR posture and ensure that we have the resources, all of the resources starting with our most low-density, high-demand systems, 

all the way down to systems that support our troops on the ground. 

I do think there is a need to constantly look at this, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee and the geographic combatant commanders to address that, particularly as it 

affects our SOFs. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. To you and General Campbell, what portion 

of the 9,800 post-2014 troops that have been announced by the 

President will be made up of special forces operating in the CT 

world in Afghanistan? Also, tell us our goal with respect to CT operations aimed at al Qaeda and al Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan 

between now and the end of 2016 and how you think we are going 

to get there. 

General VOTEL. Senator, I will start here on that. Of the 9,800, 

approximately 2,000 of those are SOFs. Of those 2,000, about half 

of that, just around 980 or so, are anticipated to be forces that 

would be directly supporting the CT effort. The current planning 

that we have done with General Dunford’s staff and with Admiral 

McRaven’s staff and with the other elements forward in Afghanistan I think has allowed us to ensure that we have the right capabilities within that mix to continue to do the operations that we 

need to do for General Dunford and in the future for General 

Campbell as we continue to do that. That will involve continuing 

to do unilateral operations to keep heavy pressure on al Qaeda networks and other networks that are supporting them and importantly will allow us to maintain the relationships with our Afghan 

partners that we have worked for many years and which we are 

seeing now come to full fruition in their ability to get out and conduct operations not only tactically but actually lead and direct operations of their own forces. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Campbell, anything you want to 

add? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I concur with everything that General 

Votel said there. Those are the numbers that I am tracking at this 

point in time and will be able to make recommendations as we 

move forward if we have to adjust those numbers if the mission 

changes. 

On the counterterrorism side, sir, I would only add that as we 

move forward and take a look at past 2014, it is really about Pakistan and their capacity, Afghanistan and their capacity, and then 

our Government and really what we want to get done. I look forward to working with General Votel and all the special operating 

forces. We do know, as we go forward, that train, advise, and assist 

with the counterterrorism mission is a really, really important mission there as well. I look forward to working with General Votel. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

676 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Good morning, gentlemen. It is good to see you 

here. Thank you for your willingness to serve the country in these 

three important commands that await you. 

Admiral Gortney, I wanted to turn to you initially and thank you 

for taking the time to visit with me earlier this week. We talked 

about NORTHCOM and how instrumental it has been in facilitating planning, training, and coordination between DOD and other 

agencies, whether Federal or local or State, in responding to natural disasters. We have had a number of those natural disasters 

in Colorado here over the last few years. We have had floods and 

wildfires. The losses we suffered surely would have been greater if 

not for the work done before, during, and after those disasters by 

NORTHCOM, the National Guard, Active Duty units, and as I alluded to, the Forest Service and many other officials. 

I would like to ask you for your views on these efforts, and I 

would like your assurance that you will continue to make them a 

top priority of the command once you are confirmed. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. I have found in my career that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, Active and Reserve and from 

the Guard, find no greater enjoyment than to help the American 

people in their time of need and to support the civil authorities. I 

think the work that the National Guard and the Active have done 

before your fires and then during the execution and then in preparations for anything that might come in the future is outstanding, 

and I will continue to support that effort. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that assurance. I know we have 

really upgraded the communication that we have seen, and yet 

there is more we can do and I know we are up to the task. 

Let me turn to NORTHCOM more broadly and its mission. What 

do you consider to be the greatest threat to the United States? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The threat to the United States in my current 

capacity and then, if confirmed, at NORTHCOM—I think the 

greatest threat that we have is the cyber threat to our critical infrastructure, to our power grid, to our banking system. That I see 

as the greatest threat. The job of NORTHCOM is to handle the 

physical consequences of that particular threat. 

Senator UDALL. As per your conversation with Senator Reed, I 

think we cannot right now do enough when it comes to cybersecurity. 

Let me turn to General Votel. As you are aware, Congress has 

expressed concern recently with what is seen by many as the lack 

of sufficient justification for budget requests in recent years, especially in light of the significant budget increases for SOF over the 

past decade. What are your views with respect to the congressional 

language requiring SOCOM to provide more detail and meaningful 

information in its budget justification? 

General VOTEL. Senator, I absolutely agree that we should be 

able to defend our requests, and if confirmed, I look forward to 

working with the committee to ensure that they understand what 

the SOF forces require and why we need it. 

Senator UDALL. You would, as a starting point, believe that Congress, in providing its oversight role, ought to have the same level 

677 

of visibility into SOCOM’s funding as is provided by the Services 

more generally? 

General VOTEL. I absolutely believe that they should. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that assurance. 

Gentlemen, let us turn to sequestration, if we could. It looms. 

Many on this committee—I think all of us are very concerned about 

it. It goes back into effect in 2016. Could you give us your perspectives on the effect of sequestration if it were to take effect again? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, I will take that first. In my current capacity as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the effect of 

sequestration was on readiness. The means that it goes about targets the readiness, the operations and maintenance accounts that 

are out there. It impacts today’s readiness, and any impact on today’s readiness impacts tomorrow’s readiness. The forces that we 

are going to fight with tomorrow—most of them we already own. 

When it comes to sequestration, that is our primary concern. If confirmed at NORTHCOM, it is the readiness of those forces to be able 

to defend the Homeland and then respond defense support for civil 

authorities where we have the ready forces to do that. Will they be 

at the proper readiness levels? We work through the components 

in order to ensure to be able to make those decisions to know those 

readiness status. 

Senator UDALL. General Campbell? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thank you for the question. 

In my current job as the Vice Chief, I follow the sequestration 

piece of the budget every single day, sir. If we continue on the path 

and sequestration happens in 2016, as it is right now, it will have 

a great, great impact on all the Services, but I think especially on 

the Army. We have to balance force structure, end strength modernization, and then the readiness. In the near term, we are sacrificing modernization and we are trying to put what we can into the 

readiness and the short-term readiness. For the Army, our biggest 

platform is our people, and we cannot come down fast enough to 

bring out people in our Army to meet the numbers in the sequestration bill as we have. 

I do not think we have done a particularly good job of articulating to the American people the impact of sequestration. In 2013, 

and the impact on readiness—General Odierno briefed one time we 

only had two brigade combat teams ready that he felt comfortable 

with deploying if asked at that particular time. We have since 

worked very hard on the short-term readiness and put any additional monies we have into that short-term readiness but, again, at 

the expense of our modernization accounts as move forward. 

It was in the paper today, sir, it talked about an impact of sequestration, and that was on the drawdown of the forces and particularly of our captains and then of our majors here shortly, but 

recently we had announced 1,100 majors that we have to take out 

of the force from year groups 2006, 2007, and 2008. Some of these 

are men and women that are currently serving in Afghanistan that 

could be company commanders in Afghanistan that we are asking 

that they have to leave the force. That is hard-hitting. We are 

going to see that continue. Those numbers and the impact of just 

those captains and what it means to those families has to bring 

your Army down from 570,000 down to 490,000. We have not even 

678 

started talking about 490,000 down to 450,000 and then potentially 

down to 420,000 if sequestration stays in effect. 

Sequestration will be disastrous, I believe, for your Army. We 

will not be able to do the Defense Strategic Guidance if sequestration continues to go on after 2016, sir. 

Senator UDALL. General Votel? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Senator. 

First of all, I agree with the comments of my colleagues up here 

with regard to readiness and the impact on our ability to support 

the broader plans and requirements that we have. 

I would add two specific things from a SOF standpoint. First of 

all, effects to the general purpose force do affect SOF forces because one of the key lessons we have learned over the last 12 or 

13 years has been that SOF forces are hugely dependent on our 

general purpose forces for a variety of activities that they conduct 

that allow us to do the things that we need. If confirmed, that 

would be something I would really want to look at. 

The second piece would be the impact on our people. We certainly have generated a great amount of experience and leadership 

over the last 10 to 12 years. As we had to reduce forces, I would 

be very concerned about making sure that we do that very, very 

carefully and do not lose the experience that we have developed 

over the last 10 to 12 years. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, gentlemen, for that very sobering 

analysis of sequestration if it were to be put in place again. Thank 

you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. I want to thank the witnesses. 

To follow up, General Campbell, as you and I discussed, we now 

have captains in the U.S. Army who are serving in Afghanistan in 

combat and danger that are now being notified that they are being 

involuntarily separated from the U.S. Army. Is that correct? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, that is correct. 

Senator MCCAIN. That has to hurt morale. Would you agree? 

General CAMPBELL. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Gortney, your area of responsibility 

ends at the Mexican-Guatemalan border. Right? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir, it does. 

Senator MCCAIN. Okay. But is it your information that neither 

the Government of Mexico nor the Government of Guatemala and 

the Government of Mexico at either the Guatemala border or the 

U.S. border are doing anything to stem the flow of illegal immigrants into this country? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I do not have any specifics as to that, but in 

my dealings with their navy, I know they are very concerned about 

that. 

Senator MCCAIN. They are concerned. Are they doing anything to 

stem the flow that you know of or not expediting? 

Admiral GORTNEY. If confirmed, I will get you that answer, sir, 

if confirmed. 

Senator MCCAIN. I think you should know a little more about it 

before you come before this committee. 

I would like to have that answer quickly. 

679 

Because the facts are stubborn things, Admiral Gortney, and 

that is that they are expediting these people across the Guatemalan border and the U.S.-Mexican border. A glance at the evening 

news can tell you that. 

General Votel, we are hearing from inside Syria and from outside 

Syria that the equipment that Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS) was able to get a hold of due to their lightning-like success 

in Iraq is now flowing into Syria. In fact, we have even seen on the 

Internet pictures of the mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) 

vehicles that are now inside Syria fighting on behalf of ISIS. Do 

you have any information about that? 

General VOTEL. Senator, at an unclassified level, I have seen 

some of that reporting that would indicate that it is moving across 

what were the former borders there between Iraq and Syria back 

into Syria. 

Senator MCCAIN. You would agree if, indeed, MRAP vehicles are 

there, that is really a very effective tool if fallen into the hands of 

ISIS people who know how to operate them. They are not that difficult to operate. Would you agree? 

General VOTEL. I would agree with that, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Now we find our Free Syrian Army fighting on 

two fronts, Bashar Assad and his barrel bombs and now ISIS with 

equipment that they captured in Iraq now flowing into Syria, 

which has had, I can assure you—and I do not know what your information is—has had a devastating effect on the morale of the 

Free Syrian Army. Do you have any information about that? 

General VOTEL. Senator, I do not have any specific information 

about that effect. 

Senator MCCAIN. But maybe experience shows that it could have 

that effect? 

General VOTEL. I do think experience would indicate that, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General Campbell, do you know any senior military leader who 

personally recommended the policy of a complete withdrawal by 

January of 2017? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I have not talked to any senior leaders 

that have recommended a complete withdrawal by 2017. 

Senator MCCAIN. I am sure that Senator Graham, who just spent 

his Active Duty tour over in Afghanistan, will pursue this further. 

But is a serious concern not about not only capabilities that the Afghans cannot acquire in the next couple years such as air evacuation, certain logistics capabilities, but one of our big concerns 

should be the total disappearance of CT capabilities? Is that a concern? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, it would absolutely be a concern. We 

have a couple years to continue to work on the gaps and seams 

that the Afghan army and their government has. Aviation, ISR, 

and logistics, as you said, are certainly three of the top things that 

we have to continue to work the Afghan army. The CT piece, as 

we talked earlier, very, very important not only for Pakistan and 

Afghanistan, but for our Nation. 

Senator MCCAIN. In our meetings last week with both candidates 

for president, both of them expressed, one, a desire for a bilateral 

680 

security agreement (BSA), but two, a very deep concern about a 

date certain withdrawal as opposed to conditions-based. Both 

Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani said that they were concerned about even signing the BSA, with their ability to control 

particularly parts of Afghanistan that you are very familiar with, 

Helmand and others. Do you think that that concern on their part 

is legitimate? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I believe whoever becomes president 

would have great concern on what support that any of the coalition 

forces would continue to provide for them. I have not discussed 

with them any sort of timeline, but as I mentioned earlier, I think 

my job and what my senior leadership and what the committee 

would expect of me is to provide continuous updates based on our 

mission and our resources and then my best military advice on 

where we go from that. 

Senator MCCAIN. One would hope that the President of the 

United States would look at the nightmare in Iraq today and the 

ability that we could have had to provide some stability there and 

perhaps reevaluate his decision not for American combat troops but 

for the much needed capabilities of support and counterterrorism 

that we can provide, which they simply do not have. 

My other question to you, do you remain deeply concerned about 

the role that Pakistan plays in all of this with the Haqqani Network and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the 

whole support capabilities for the Taliban/al Qaeda that remain 

there? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. As I said earlier, Afghanistan 

and Pakistan—you cannot separate the two. I am concerned about 

the sanctuary in Pakistan. If confirmed, I will continue to work 

with the Afghan military and the Pakistan military to continue to 

ensure that we can reduce that, but that we have the great milto-mil cooperation between the Afghans and the Pakistanis. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I have to note in passing, General Votel, you used a phrase that 

sort of startled me. I think it was realistic, but I think it is something that we should take note of. You referred to the former border between Syria and Iraq. Unfortunately, I think that is a factual 

assessment. 

General Campbell, this committee made a decision in its markup 

of the National Defense Authorization Act a month or so ago that 

essentially eliminated the Mi-17 support both in terms of purchases of the remaining group of helicopters and also spare parts. 

We got a letter 2 weeks ago from General Dunford that characterized this. The loss of the Mi-17 capability would have a catastrophic effect on the military campaign. He said effective ANSF 

counterterrorism operations are dependent upon the Mi-17 and, 

most chilling, he said any loss of ANSF operational reach would, 

therefore, degrade our force protection. Those are our people that 

he is talking about. 

681 

Would you agree with his assessment that this would be a catastrophic blow to the ability of the ANSF to do their job in Afghanistan? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I would agree with General Dunford’s 

assessment on the Mi-17 and the impact it would have on both the 

Afghan military and their ability to carry out their mission and the 

impact on our own force protection. 

Senator KING. I think it is important that the provision adopted 

by this committee not only would prohibit the buying of the remaining group, but immediately cut off spare parts which would, 

in effect, over a fairly short period of time, ground the entire fleet. 

Is that correct? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, that is correct. I think the estimate I 

have seen is anywhere between 6 months to 12 months. 

Senator KING. They would be grounded? 

General CAMPBELL. They would become combat-ineffective. 

Senator KING. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. 

Admiral Gortney, you are going to be in charge of NORTHCOM 

as we have been discussing. I am concerned about the Arctic. You 

mentioned in answer to your prior questions that we really do not 

have the infrastructure that we need up there. Do you know offhand how many icebreakers the Russians have in operation in the 

Arctic? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I think it is somewhere between five and 

seven, sir. 

Senator KING. We have one 45-year-old Coast Guard icebreaker. 

Is that correct? 

Admiral GORTNEY. That is correct. 

Senator KING. The Navy has no icebreaker capacity in the Arctic? 

Admiral GORTNEY. That is correct. 

Senator KING. A brief question. I believe you indicated in your 

prior submission that you felt it would be important for our country 

to accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty. Could you affirm my understanding of your position? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. It has been a longstanding position 

of the Department of Defense that joining that commission would 

be a good idea to put us on the same footing with the other signatories and not relying on the longstanding traditional law of the sea. 

Senator KING. Does this particularly not take on some level of 

urgency given the opening of the Arctic to commerce, exploitation, 

energy, and all of the other potential areas of conflict? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir, but particularly in the Arctic because 

it would put us on the same footing as the other signatories of the 

Arctic Council. 

Senator KING. General Campbell, there have been a number of 

questions about Afghanistan and our time frame there. As I understand it, there was intelligence that indicated ISIS was building up 

its strength and had designs on moving into Iraq. What we did not 

know was how weak the Iraqi army would be. I would suggest— 

and I hope you agree—that one of your missions is to continually 

assess the readiness and effectiveness of the ANSF because it was 

not ISIS so much as the collapse of the Iraqi army that led to the 

debacle currently unfolding in Iraq. Would you agree? 

682 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I would agree. Today it is an assessment. They do have an assessment process in place to continually 

evaluate the Afghan Security Forces. That will get a little bit 

tougher. As our forces draw down, they will not have that day-today contact with them. But I agree with you there, sir. 

Senator KING. I would like to associate myself with Senator 

McCain’s comments and questions. It strikes me that rather than 

an arbitrary date for leaving Afghanistan, it should be based upon 

conditions on the field. Would you agree with that? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I think any military commander would 

want the flexibility to provide an operational assessment. If that is 

conditions on the ground, then I would agree with that, sir. But I 

owe this committee and I owe my leadership my best military advice based on the mission at hand and the resources I have at that 

time. I do have some time to make that assessment, and in that 

time, I also have time to continue to take a look at the Afghan 

forces and the missions that we have and the resources tied to that 

to continue to upgrade their capability. 

Senator KING. I am not going to ask you to assess the political 

situation in Afghanistan. I think that is unfolding before our eyes 

and is difficult for anyone to assess. But one question. Do you have 

any assessment of the ethnic makeup of the ANSF in terms of 

broad support in the populace? One of the problems we are seeing, 

of course, in Iraq is the exclusion of the Sunnis and the Kurds from 

both the government and most of the defense forces. Is potentially 

the same mistake being made in Afghanistan or not? I do not know 

the answer. I am interested in your view. 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I can get you the composition of the 

ANSF. I do not have that here. My gut tells me it follows probably 

the pattern of the country itself. The great majority of the ANSF 

would be probably 40–45 percent Pashtun, but I can get those for 

you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Please see the attached document. 

683 


710ful1.eps 710ful2.eps
684 

General CAMPBELL. I know that is a grave concern to General 

Dunford and the leadership there to make sure that the ANSF continues to be, for lack of a better word, apolitical and that they continue to have the best interests of the country at hand. I know so 

far, from what I have seen and talked to the leadership there on 

the ground, that is exactly what they are seeing. The leadership is 


710ful3.eps 710ful4.eps
685 

keyed with the ANSF and I know they have made great strides 

with the Afghan leadership there on that. 

Senator KING. I think that is a very important ball to keep our 

eye on because if the government that is left in place is not broadly 

representative of the country, if we have learned anything in the 

last month, it is that that is a crucial element in the stability of 

the country that we leave behind. 

General CAMPBELL. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator KING. General Votel, very quickly. How do we take sufficient advantage of the capabilities that the SOFs have without exhausting them? I see your force as particularly important in the future. General Dempsey in a briefing the other day used the term 

‘‘tailored response’’ to situations. I think he was talking about you 

when he used that term. 

General VOTEL. Yes, Senator. As you and Senator Kaine saw 

when you visited some of our locations, we are able to be very effective with a very light touch. I think what we always have to do is 

look at the situation that we are putting our SOF forces in and ensure that we provide the right capability without overdoing it and 

putting undue pressure on our forces. 

I think part of that is also working with our other Department 

of Defense forces and, where we can, leveraging their capabilities 

as well to ensure that we take advantage of all of the capabilities. 

Senator KING. What appears to be a future of unconventional 

non-state actor forces—your men and women are going to be the 

point of the spear, General Votel. I commend you for taking this 

command and look forward to working with you on it. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator King. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for your willingness to serve and for 

your leadership and for your distinguished service and for all of the 

sacrifices that you and your families have made for the country and 

will continue to make. Thank you. 

I wanted to ask General Campbell. I know that you served in Afghanistan, had at least two or three tours there, in Iraq as well. 

As we look at our situation that is happening in Iraq right now 

with ISIS and obviously the huge security challenges that we have 

there that are very threatening not only to us but to the entire region, what can we learn from having the withdrawal that we had 

in 2011 toward what has happened in Iraq as we look forward to 

our continued engagement in Afghanistan? 

General CAMPBELL. Thank you, ma’am, for the question. 

Two times in Afghanistan: This will be the third—and about a 

19-month tour in Iraq. I think all of the veterans of Iraq would tell 

you, as they watch this unfold, it is very disheartening to see that. 

I am committed in Afghanistan to ensuring that the two missions, the train, advise, assist, and also the CT, that we continue 

to do everything we can with the coalition to continue to improve 

the Afghan capability there so they can stand on their own. I will 

continue to provide my assessments as we go forward. 

We ought to take a look at Iraq and look at the lessons learned 

from there. I think your military, all of our Services—on anything 

686 

we do we critique ourselves. We look very hard at after-action reviews. We always go back and look at the lessons learned. I think 

this is no different. We will take a hard look at this and see what 

we can learn from this and apply that to Afghanistan. If confirmed, 

I am committed to doing that, ma’am. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate it. 

I know you have received a number of questions, taking over the 

command in Afghanistan, about the CT mission. Can you put in 

perspective what the CT mission means to your average American 

in terms of the protection of this country, what we have done in 

Afghanistan and why it is such an important mission? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, ma’am. I think if you just want to boil 

it down to very simplistic—and I probably told you this when you 

were there in 2010, maybe 2011—is that we have not had another 

September 11 attack on the Homeland. We have not had that since 

2011 when we talked as well. We should not take that for granted, 

and that is not by happenstance, and that is because you have 

great men and women from all the Services out there every single 

day working hard. The CT piece of that on a daily basis continues 

to strike after these networks that want to do harm to our country. 

I believe the CT piece, if you want to just boil it down to simplistic 

terms, is it protects the Homeland. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thanks, General. 

I guess I would ask this question of both you and General Votel. 

Thinking about the President on May 27th had made the announcement that by the end of 2016 that the presence we will have 

in Afghanistan will be at the embassy in Kabul, which will be a 

security component. Basically just a normal embassy presence is 

how he described it. In fact, it has been further described by the 

administration that the number of personnel that will be present 

as of January 1, 2017, at the embassy for security there and cooperative efforts will be 1,000 people. 

My question to both of you is as I hear General Votel talk to us 

about the numbers on the CT mission in Afghanistan that we have 

now, that we will plan to have there in 2015—and you also discussed the importance of it, including unilateral operations, CT operations—how do we do that based on a Kabul operation only? How 

do we do that with 1,000 people and which part of that 1,000 people will fulfill this important mission to protect the Homeland? I 

guess the real question is—we just heard your testimony about 

how important this is to protect our country and to have the CT 

mission—what happens after January 2017? 

General CAMPBELL. Ma’am, thank you for the question. I will 

start and let General Votel provide his comments. 

I do not know the number at the end of 2016. I understand and 

acknowledge what you said and the numbers the President said. 

Again, I have not looked at the composition. I know for the next 

2 years, we will continue to improve the capability of the Afghan 

forces. We will continue to work with Pakistan. That is going to be 

a relationship there that will help on the CT piece. We will grow 

some capability there. But as I said earlier, I will need some time 

to get on the ground to give you an assessment of where we will 

be, but I think we have to put in light of that there will be some 

time to improve the capability that is already there. That may or 

687 

may not help us reduce the numbers. I could not talk in terms of 

the exact numbers at the end of 2016 that would be required just 

for the CT mission. I can come back to you as I make that assessment. 

Senator AYOTTE. General Votel, how does the CT mission—just 

having it be Kabul-based with the numbers I just talked to you 

about—obviously, there is a lot you have to do at an embassy. We 

do not even know if any of those individuals would be designated 

for CT. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Senator, for the question. 

First off, as General Campbell said, I think what we have to continue to do is look at the conditions as time progresses here and 

continue to provide our very best military judgment and advice on 

the way forward with that. 

I do think we have some models of where we conduct operations 

in other areas where we do use an embassy-based approach fairly 

effectively to continue to apply pressure against our networks. 

I think maintaining relationships to the degree that we can with 

our Afghan partners in this particular situation here is hugely important to continue to support our CT objectives. I do think we 

have to look at a broader regional approach as well. There are the 

Central Asian states. There is certainly Pakistan and there are 

other people in the region who we have to continue to have relationships with and continue to work with to address our broader 

CT objectives. 

Senator AYOTTE. General Votel, in your view do you think that 

we will be able to accomplish all that we need to accomplish now, 

knowing what you know on the conditions in Afghanistan, with 

solely a Kabul-based approach where 1,000 people are at the embassy and who knows what that number within would be designated to CT? 

General VOTEL. Senator, I do not think I can answer that question accurately for you right now. I think it really depends upon 

the situation as it evolves. That is why I think we have to look at 

the conditions, we have to provide our best advice on what it is 

that we need to sustain, what we need to have in an embassybased approach in order to continue to protect the Homeland and 

accomplish our objectives. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate both of your testimony. What you 

both said makes a lot of sense is that how we could possibly make 

the announcement from the administration of exactly how many 

people are going to be at that embassy and where they are going 

to be, given the importance of the CT mission to protecting our 

country, helping us avoid another attack on our country, when we 

do not even know what the conditions will be at the time is—it is 

really hard to come up with a word for it. But it is certainly not 

a military-based decision based on the announcement of our President. I am glad to hear both of you say that you are going to have 

to hear what the conditions are on the ground. 

I hope that our President will heed the conditions on the ground 

so that we can continue to perform this important mission of protecting our country and ensuring that we have this intelligence 

that has helped us prevent future attacks after September 11 

against this country. 

688 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you and your families for their sacrifice. 

General Votel, Admiral McRaven stated that suicide rates among 

SOFs are hitting record highs. He put in place the Preservation of 

the Force and Family Program to try to help with that. What I 

want to find out is do you plan on continuing that? Do you see it 

as a success? Do you see anything that is more effective or other 

avenues that can help with this? 

General VOTEL. First of all, Senator, thanks for the question. 

I absolutely do continue to apply the same level of effort onto this 

and as more as I can onto this particular problem of suicide with 

our SOF servicemembers and our servicemembers in general. I do 

think we have to continue to look at every potential resource that 

can help us to, one, understand the problem and then identify ways 

that we can deal with this for our servicemembers. The numbers 

are alarming, and I think it is our number one focus with respect 

to preserving the force. 

Senator DONNELLY. One of the things I would also ask you to do 

to take a look at is the things you learn from this program, if you 

see any of it that you say this has been really successful or this 

might be something that is transferable, if you would continue to 

share that with all of the other commands, it would be very, very 

helpful I think. 

General VOTEL. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator DONNELLY. General Campbell, to follow up on Senator 

Levin’s point, it is obviously of a critical nature that you continue 

to give us your unvarnished opinion as you see, going forward, 

where there might be glitches, where there might be problems, 

what the actual numbers need to be. If the plan is not coming together, let us know. General Dunford has been great in saying here 

is where we are on all of our metrics, here is where the problems 

are, here is where they are not. I am sure we can continue to count 

on you for that. 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. 

Senator DONNELLY. Following up on that, one of the things if you 

could—and I know you will—keep an eye on and let us know about 

is one of the distressing things that happened in Iraq is so many 

of the real generals who were trained by you and many others were 

replaced by folks who, through connections or friendship or whatever, wound up in those posts. I think that caused significant damage to the Iraqi army. We want to make sure the same thing does 

not happen in Afghanistan, and if you could continue to let us 

know, as you look at the force, getting better, getting worse, the 

leadership, those kind of things. I know you will keep an eye on 

it and it would be helpful to us because it will also tell us if something is starting to go sideways there. 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. I know that General Dunford 

and the rest of the team there have put into place some programs 

to really look hard at the professionalism of the Afghan officers. 

They have their own academy. They now have a non-commissioned 

officer course that they send folks through. They look at that very 

689 

hard. They understand that one of the main things with any military in the world is the trust and the trust between the military 

and the people, trust between the military and their leadership. I 

know they continue to work that, and I am absolutely committed 

to continue to work that hard, sir. 

Senator DONNELLY. One of the things we have seen recently is— 

and it is somewhat unique in recent times—the Pakistan army has 

just pushed into Miranshah, has moved people out of there. The 

nature of whether they have gone elsewhere or were captured is 

still up for discussion. But it seems that there is a real interest on 

the Pak side to do something in those areas. 

Do you see this as a window we have not had for a while to try 

to create some form of security in that region of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. Anytime that Pakistan will 

continue to work their own operations inside their borders there, 

coordinate those also on the Afghan side, I think it is a win. We 

tried to do that in 2010 and 2011 on a much smaller level. I do 

think this is a great opportunity for the military-to-military engagement between the Afghans and the Pakistanis. They have to 

continue to work that. Sir, I am committed to helping where I can 

on that. 

Senator DONNELLY. In a way, this is the furthest I have seen 

them push in a very long time, and I am hopeful that that can 

make—in terms of ‘‘easy’’ being a general term—your life a little 

bit easier in those regions that if they clean up some of the mess 

on their side, there may be less leaking over to your side. 

General CAMPBELL. Sure, absolutely. The Pakistan army has suffered great casualties themselves in this war on terror here for the 

last—— 

Senator DONNELLY. They have. 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator DONNELLY. In the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 

I am sure you will continue to tell them—we talk about how many 

troops will remain, but if we do not have a SOFA, it completely 

changes the whole discussion. I trust that one of your primary efforts over there will be to continue to tell whoever will be their 

leader how critical this is and that basically everything else, all the 

other efforts kind of line up with this. 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I believe both candidates have expressed 

their desire to sign the BSA and the SOFA to make sure that they 

have continued coalition presence in Afghanistan. They know the 

consequences if they do not do that. Hopefully that will get done 

before I get there, sir, but if not, I will continue to work that hard. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. 

Admiral Gortney, one of the concerns I have when I see what is 

going on with ISIS and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL) and al Nusra Front in that whole region is that there are 

also Americans fighting with them over there, Americans who have 

passports. My fear is if they take a look back to our country and 

they can be people who can be extraordinary weapons against us. 

I am wondering about your efforts in coordinating with Homeland 

Security, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with everybody 

690 

else to try to keep an eye on what is going. Even though it is not 

here in NORTHCOM, it directly affects our Homeland. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, we all share your concern on that one. 

The defense of the Homeland starts at the away game and working 

with our combatant commanders and the interagencies in the away 

game so that we stop it there before it comes to the Homeland, inside the Homeland, Homeland Security, and we are going to have 

to deal with the consequences if we fail in that regard. 

Senator DONNELLY. One last question that I have time for is this, 

we have seen a huge influx of heroin into my home State, into 

other States, much of it coming up across the border. We have seen 

drugs coming in through the Straits of Florida and other areas. We 

have had testimony that there is not near enough equipment, men, 

women, personnel, things needed to try to stop that. 

Would you give us, in a perfect world, your best plan as to how 

to make a change in this area or how to beef up our efforts in this 

area? 

Admiral GORTNEY. It requires a whole-of-government approach 

that includes all of the interagencies, as well as very, very close cooperation between Pacific Command, Northern Command, and 

Southern Command in order to work to close any of those seams 

that are out there between the geographic commanders and seams 

between the commanders and the interagency process, interagency 

partners in order to stem this flow. It has to go to the far reaches. 

You are not just going to be able to stop it at our borders. You have 

to go to the root cause of the problem and try and stem it from 

there, sir. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you very much. I hope you keep an 

eye—and I know you will—on that effort as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Donnelly. 

Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I would like to thank you gentlemen and your families, the Service personnel that you represent for truly dedicating 

your lives to serving the people of this country and keeping us safe. 

Thank you very much. 

General Votel, in your written comments, you speak about the 

greatest threat that ISIL is to the Governments of Syria and Iraq 

and then it threatens to destabilize the entire Levant region and 

their connections are growing throughout north Africa and Europe 

and also Southeast Asia. If this situation on the ground in Iraq 

does not improve significantly, when do they become a threat to the 

United States? Are we there already? 

General VOTEL. Senator, thank you for that question. 

I think they threaten some of our regional interests. They certainly threaten some of our key partners in the region and in Europe right now. I do think as they continue to grow strength, that 

they will ultimately present a threat to the Homeland. As we have 

talked about a little bit earlier, the threat of foreign fighters that 

have gone to Syria and now into Iraq I think poses a very significant problem not only for us but also for our partners that we rely 

on. I think that it is posing a threat to us right now. 

691 

Senator FISCHER. The Admiral spoke about the away game. Do 

we have the eyes on the ground in order to make the assessment 

on what is happening in Iraq and how we are going to address it? 

I know we are looking at all the options that are out there. Are we 

starting to narrow those down? Are we reaching the time of a tipping point already when it may be too late even to take advantage 

of some of those options that are there? 

General VOTEL. Senator, first off, I do not think it is too late to 

do anything right now. As you may be aware, we are just completing the assessment phase here in Iraq, and so we have been 

working with our Iraqi security force partners there both up in 

Kurdistan and down in the Baghdad area and the places that we 

can get to, to ensure that we understand what the situation on the 

ground is, what their capabilities are, and then what options we 

might have to assist them, to address this threat here in the future. 

Senator FISCHER. I heard a comment made recently that perhaps 

we should take the Machiavellian approach and let the militias and 

the terrorists fight each other, just stand back and let our enemies 

fight each other. Are there not risks to that? Did we not do that 

in Syria? 

General VOTEL. In general, I think there are risks to allowing 

things just to try to resolve themselves particularly when there are 

interests that could affect our country. 

Senator FISCHER. Would you think that would be an option the 

United States should look at with regard to Iraq? 

General VOTEL. I think we should look at all options that might 

be available to us, Senator, and how we can address this particular 

problem. 

Senator FISCHER. Would that be your option, would you say, at 

this point? 

General VOTEL. Senator, I think as we kind of complete the assessments here right now, I would certainly want to have discussions with General Austin as part of his assessment on this to ensure that we have had an opportunity to look at everything before 

reaching any conclusion. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. The President has requested $5 billion for the Counterterrorism 

Partnership Fund. What top priorities would you like to see this 

fund accomplish? 

General VOTEL. I think the Counterterrorism Fund can certainly 

help us with some of our partnership activities, and I think it could 

also help us with gaining the additional resources that we might 

need to enable our partners such as ISR, which I think would be 

very helpful in really enabling our partners in a variety of different 

ways. 

Senator FISCHER. How do you see our SOFs evolving, given the 

demand? Senator King touched on that and touched on the pressures that you are looking at. You had mentioned to Senator Ayotte 

about the size of the force that you would look at in different countries, including Afghanistan. Do you see the special ops evolving— 

I guess I will just ask you. How do we see them evolving? 

General VOTEL. I think, first of all, the level of strength that we 

are going to be at is adequate, I think it allows us to meet the reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00699 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
692 

quirements that we have out there right now. I think it is important that we continue to focus on some of the work that has excellently been done by Admiral McRaven in his role, and that is continuing to strengthen our relationship with other SOF and military 

partners out there so that we do have trusted, dependable relationships and partners out there that we can work with and we can 

depend upon to accomplish the broader CT efforts. I do think it is 

important that we continue to have SOF forces forward deployed 

in locations where they can assess, they can understand, and they 

can, most importantly, work with our international partners who 

share our interests. 

Senator FISCHER. I would ask you, General Votel and also General Campbell, if we are going to be conducting CT operations outside of Afghanistan, how effective is that going to be? 

General VOTEL. Senator, just to clarify, conducting operations 

into Afghanistan from locations outside of Afghanistan? 

Senator FISCHER. Yes or throughout the region as well if you 

would lose all your forces within the country. 

General VOTEL. I think that would be very challenging. That 

would be a very challenging approach for us to continue to effectively do that. Certainly there are things that we can certainly look 

at, and we would have to look at all the conditions with that, but 

I think it would be challenging to try to address problems in one 

country from other regions, from other countries. 

Senator FISCHER. Would that be a priority of yours to explain to 

the administration the importance of keeping your forces there? 

General VOTEL. Senator, I think it is one of my primary responsibilities, to always advise on how we best use our precious SOF 

forces in a manner that gives us the most effect. 

Senator FISCHER. General Campbell, your thoughts on that as 

well? 

General CAMPBELL. Ma’am, I would agree with General Votel. As 

I said earlier, I have not taken a look at what that end result 

would be in 2016 on the numbers, but as I said earlier, if you are 

talking about Afghanistan, it involves the relationship and capability of Pakistan, the capability of Afghanistan, and really what 

our Government is trying to do in the CT arena there. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with General Votel to provide those 

assessments as we move forward and the resources that would be 

required to continue to accomplish that mission. 

Senator FISCHER. I appreciate both of you, your comments to 

Senator McCain and also Senator Ayotte on expressing your desire 

to have that flexibility and also to be able to make decisions based 

on what is happening on the ground. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

First for Admiral Gortney. Are smugglers moving through Mexico 

right now with just impunity? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I am sorry, ma’am? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Are the smugglers moving these children 

through Mexico with impunity right now? 

693 

Admiral GORTNEY. I would say the effect of the Mexican Government and their armed forces are not as effective as they could be. 

Whether or not they are trying to interdict them—not trying to 

interdict them, I do not have any specifics on that, but I seriously 

doubt it. They are just not being effective. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think it is important, once you are confirmed, that you get a handle on this because it appears to me— 

all the information is these are cartel-based smugglers. It is the 

same enemy that we have been funding Mexico to fight for as long 

as I have been in the U.S. Senate. At a certain point in time, the 

American people deserve some metrics on how successful the 

money that we have been pouring into Mexico has actually been in 

enabling the Mexican military to do the basics of interdiction. It is 

obvious that buses and trains are moving loaded with thousands of 

children for miles through Mexico. Clearly somebody has decided in 

Mexico they do not give a damn. 

Admiral GORTNEY. I would say that the cartels do control areas 

of Mexico that gives them the freedom of movement to do what you 

are saying. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The border? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. They have the freedom on the border? 

I think that is certainly a priority. If we look at our national security, if we have a neighbor to the south that has decided this is 

acceptable, it means that there is a whole lot of other things they 

think is acceptable that frankly threaten our national security. I 

hope you would make that a priority. 

For General Campbell and for General Votel, I look macro at our 

counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and the pillars of our COIN 

strategy. If you look in Iraq, there was a belief that the pillars— 

if we did the political piece, we did the security piece, and we did 

the economic piece, it would be successful. The political piece did 

not turn out so well, and the economic piece is an abject failure because we spent literally hundreds of billions of dollars building infrastructure and facilities that are in crumbles now, that are inoperable. 

Is there any movement among your level of leadership in the 

military to take another look at the COIN strategy—and by the 

way, I predict we are going to have the same problem in Afghanistan. I have just been highlighting that ridiculous power plant that 

we spent $300 million on. We have the highway. It is almost as if 

we are so good as a military and we are so focused on our mission, 

that we just get blinders on and say we can impose this, we can 

build these highways, we can build these power lines, we can build 

these power plants, we can build these health facilities, we can 

build these schools, we can impact while we are there the functioning capability of a government or of a military. But it appears 

to me that we have put a band aid on a cancer and that it really 

is not something that is being successful. 

Is it time to take another look at the COIN strategy? 

General CAMPBELL. Ma’am, I will take a shot at that. What I 

would tell you is I think that your military continues to take a look 

at all of its doctrine, all of its tactics, techniques, and procedures 

to continue to adapt to that to make sure that we are flexible. They 

694 

are always looking forward to see what that next fight would be. 

We always have to remain cognizant that there are lessons learned 

to continue to grow. 

I think on the COIN piece, though, as you mentioned, this really 

is not just a military piece of it. It is a whole-of-government approach. The military could look at one piece, but we have to bring 

in the entire interagency to continue to learn those lessons and 

then apply those resources to make sure that we can continue to 

sustain that. As we work whatever country that we are working in 

to build capacity in the country, it is a whole-of-government piece, 

not just the military piece. Whatever country that is, the people of 

that country have to want that, and they have to put forth effort 

as well. I think in the end, as evidenced here I think in Iraq, is 

leadership makes a difference, and we have to work with that very 

hard. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is one of the things that happened 

both in Iraq and Afghanistan is the blurring of the lines between 

the interagency. The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 

funds morphed into the infrastructure in Iraq, and then of course 

it moved into major league infrastructure in Afghanistan where 

you—I know the power plant was USAID. But some of the highway 

building—we took that over. The military did. We were doing those 

things. Now we have some of those projects that are going to be 

outside the wire. We are not even going to be able to oversee those 

projects. There is a percentage of the projects that you are going 

to inherit, General Campbell, that we cannot have any oversight 

over because we are not going to be able to get the oversight as 

to where they are with the drawdown that we are embracing. 

I watched and analyzed the mistakes in Iraq, and I think many 

of them are going to come to pass again in Afghanistan. I am wondering if we are going to do the exact same thing again. 

General CAMPBELL. Ma’am, if confirmed and go into Afghanistan, 

I will absolutely take a hard look at that. I spent many months in 

Iraq as well. I do not want to see what is happening in Iraq today 

happen in Afghanistan in the future, and I will work hard at that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. They are less equipped than Iraq was in 

terms of, this is not a country that ever even had a highway department. Iraq was much further along in terms of having some 

kind of central ability to impact government than Afghanistan. 

I admire all of you so much. I am so proud of our military and 

what you are capable of. I stand in awe of your leadership capacity. 

But I think you are being given an impossible task in Afghanistan 

in light of what the reality is in that country in terms of the American taxpayers ever realizing the investment we hoped that we 

would realize from the things we have built in Afghanistan, the 

money we spent on building things for them. 

General Votel? 

General VOTEL. Senator, I would only add I think that is an inherent responsibility for all of us as military commanders to always 

intellectually challenge ourselves about our operating concepts and 

the way we think about the missions that we are giving. I do think 

we have to look at our lessons learned, and that has to inform our 

way forward. 

695 

At my current level of leadership here at the Joint Special Operations Command, I do know that SOCOM is looking very carefully 

at all of these concepts, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, 

and a variety of other things that we think will be important operational concepts for us in the future. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working within my community and within the general purpose 

forces and with this committee to make sure that those concepts 

are well vetted and well understood. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. I really hope that it is a gut-check moment at the War College about COIN and what has worked and 

what has not and why the failures have occurred. 

The one thing you guys are bad at is saying we cannot do this. 

You are given something to do and you just figure out some way 

to do it. I am proud of that, but it works against you in terms of 

acknowledging that maybe there are some things we are trying to 

do that under the circumstances just does not make sense for us 

to try. 

Thank you both. Thank you all three for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thank you, all three of you, for the service to our country 

and your families. 

Are you familiar with the National Justice Center at Parwan, 

General Campbell? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I have been to Parwan and I know of the 

National Justice Center. That came about after I left in 2011, I believe. 

Senator GRAHAM. I would urge you to go visit. It is probably the 

crown jewel of criminal justice in that part of the world, and it is 

a very modern facility, well run. The hope is that in the future, 

when an insurgent is captured, they will not be put in a provincial 

jail if they are really a threat to Afghanistan. They will go to the 

justice center in Parwan where they will be secured and they will 

have well-trained judges dispose of their cases. I would urge you 

to take a visit. I think it is very important in defeating the insurgency. 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I will do that, absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. To defeat the insurgency, they have to believe 

they are going to get killed or captured. Is that fair to say? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, they have to understand that there is 

going to be some sort of repercussions. 

Senator GRAHAM. If they get captured, they are likely to go to 

jail. Without that, it is going to be pretty hard to defeat these guys. 

Do you agree with that? 

General CAMPBELL. I do, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Let us look at Afghanistan as a line of defense for America. Does 

that make sense to you? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, it makes sense that in the past there has 

been sanctuary there that has created the conditions to allow organizations to attack our Homeland. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General Votel? 

696 

General VOTEL. I do agree with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. The forces that attacked our country on September 11—they had safe haven in Afghanistan—the leadership. Is 

that correct? 

General VOTEL. That is correct. 

General CAMPBELL. That is correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. We have had at least one attack generated by 

the Pakistan Taliban that failed in New York. The bomb did not 

go off at Times Square, but apparently the Pakistani Taliban want 

to reach America. Is that still accurate, do you think? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I believe there are many organizations 

that want to do harm to the Homeland, and I do believe that every 

single day the great military and the other services are impacting 

other attempts that nobody here even knows about. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. Many of those organizations reside in the 

Afghan-Pakistan border regions. Is that correct? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I would concur with that assessment. 

Senator GRAHAM. General Votel, is al Qaeda decimated, nonoperational in Pakistan and Afghanistan? 

General VOTEL. I am not sure I can say they are completely nonoperational. I think we have certainly applied a significant amount 

of pressure on them in Afghanistan in the area which we are responsible for, and I think we have limited their ability to do things 

that they would desire to do or to use that as a safe haven. That 

said, I think we have to continue to apply that pressure. 

Senator GRAHAM. If we completely left on the CT front by 2017, 

January 2017, is it possible they could regenerate? 

General VOTEL. I think it is possible, Senator, that they could regenerate if the conditions were not in place for the Afghans to be 

able to continue to provide that pressure themselves. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let us just lay out the plan for the American 

people. By the end of the year—January 2015, how many troops 

are we going to have in Afghanistan? General Campbell? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, by the end of 2014, it is 9,800. The current plan by the end of 2015—the proposal right now is half of 

that, probably 5,500. 

Senator GRAHAM. What percentage of counterterrorism forces 

exist today? How many counterterrorism forces, special forces do 

we have in Afghanistan today? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, General Votel gave the number of about 

900 earlier today. 

General VOTEL. Yes. I think the total number of SOFs of the 

9,800 is approximately 2,000, Senator. Of that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I am talking about today. 

General VOTEL. Today we are roughly 3,000-plus that are focused 

on the counterterrorism. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does that include the enablers? 

General VOTEL. It includes some of our enablers, but of course 

we are very reliant on general purpose forces. 

Senator GRAHAM. Can you get back with me on that? Because we 

were told 7,000 yesterday. 

General VOTEL. I think 7,000 is the total SOF effort that is 

present in country. That includes the efforts we do to train and advise and then a subset of that—— 

697 

Senator GRAHAM. So 7,000 SOF-type forces, including enablers. 

January 2015, you are down, I was told yesterday, 1,800. You say 

2,000. Is that about right? 

General VOTEL. Approximately, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let us fast forward to January 2017. How 

many do we expect to have given the current plan? 

General VOTEL. I do not know that we have the answer to that 

question yet. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let us just look at what we could have. Under 

the current construct, January 2017, we are down to a security cooperation force. Is that true, General Campbell? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, that is the current plan. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. How many security cooperation forces did we 

leave behind in Iraq? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I believe the rough number is probably 

in the neighborhood of 200–250. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let us say it is 1,000 in Afghanistan. What 

will their chief mission be? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, the chief mission, if it follows the example of the Iraq piece, was really an FMS piece, foreign military 

sales. 

Senator GRAHAM. How many counterterrorism forces were involved in the security cooperation team in Iraq? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I do not have that number. 

Senator GRAHAM. How about zero? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I know it was a very low number and 

zero may be it in fact, but I do not have that number, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. This is the plan. The question is do we change 

the plan. Who fills in the delta between where we are at today and 

where we are going in 2017? Rate on a scale of A to F the ability 

of the Pakistani army and the Afghan army to cooperate together 

to provide counterterrorism capabilities to protect our Homeland. 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I have not looked at it in those terms, 

but my gut would tell me that it is not very good. It would be on 

the low end of the scale. 

Senator GRAHAM. I have been told a D by some very prominent 

people. 

General Votel, does that make sense to you? 

General VOTEL. I agree with General Campbell’s comments. 

Senator GRAHAM. If we cannot rely on the Afghans and the Pakistani elements to defend America from a regenerated al Qaeda-type 

force and, if being outside the country is not advisable, it seems to 

me that the line of defense that America enjoys today is going to 

vanish if something does not change. Is that a fair statement, General Campbell? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, following your analogy, it would be a fair 

statement. 

Senator GRAHAM. The question for the committee is do we want 

it to vanish and the consequences to the Nation of it vanishing. 

Finally, General Campbell, if the election process is not resolved 

within the constitutional process and somebody does not accept 

being Robert E. Lee and somebody accepting being Grant, what is 

the likelihood of Afghanistan holding together? 

698 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, if they cannot get through this election 

process to show the Afghan people and the rest of the world that 

they have done this political transfer of power peacefully, then 

right now the coalition forces will not continue to stay there after 

2014. I think it greatly increases the risk for Afghanistan to fracture. 

Senator GRAHAM. I could not agree with you more. 

One final question as to the ethnic makeup of the Afghan Security Forces. About 45 percent are Pashtun, but most of them are 

from the east, very few from the southern region around Kandahar. 

What percentage of the senior military leadership in the Afghan 

Security Forces are Tajik? Is it disproportionately large? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I do not have the exact percentage. I 

would think that it is probably low, but I do not have that number, 

sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think it is actually high. What I fear is if 

there is a failure of the two sides to reconcile the election process, 

the army will fracture along sectarian lines. Do you agree with that 

as being a concern? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, it would be a concern. I think right now 

that the ANSF has been holding strong, and they have become, for 

lack of a better term, apolitical, atribal. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would that be in jeopardy if you do not get an 

election resolved quickly and fairly? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I think if the election does not get resolved, then what will probably happen is that—again, my opinion 

only—they will revert to what they have done for years and years 

and go back to the tribal affiliation. 

Senator GRAHAM. That is my fear too. 

Thank you very much for your service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

General Campbell, how would you describe the level of terrorist 

threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan right now whether from the 

Taliban, from the Haqqani Network, or others? 

General CAMPBELL. The level directed against the United States, 

sir, or the level directed inside of Afghanistan? 

Senator CRUZ. Both. 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I could not put a percentage or high-, 

medium-, low-threat level. What I would tell you is because of the 

great work of the men and women in the SOFs, the general purpose forces, interagency, the threat to the Homeland, because we 

keep the pressure on the networks there, continues to be mitigated. 

As I said earlier, we have not had another September 11-type attack, but that is not because people have not been trying to do 

that. But to give you a percentage on how it is inside there, I have 

not been on the ground since April. I would have to get on the 

ground to give you a better assessment myself. 

Senator CRUZ. If I understand your testimony correctly, it is that 

the threat to the Homeland has been mitigated because of the pressure that we are putting on them currently. If that is right, that 

raises an obvious question, which is we have been advised that in 

699 

2016 the troop level will be reduced to 1,000 troops and in 2017 reduced to nothing. If that plan is carried out, what will be our capability to engage in counterterrorism operations and to keep that 

pressure you described on them to prevent terrorists from carrying 

out a serious threat on the Homeland? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, as General Votel mentioned earlier, we 

would have to take a look at other methods to do that, whether it 

is from outside of the country, other technologies. I think as he 

stated and as I stated earlier, for the next 2 years we will continue 

to work hard at building the capacity of the Afghan forces to have 

a better CT-type force. I know we are doing that now. We will continue to work on that. It also will depend upon what Pakistan does 

and how they continue to evolve over the next 2 years. But if we 

go to zero, as you stated, and we do have a threat at that point 

in time still, then we will have to come up with a different strategy 

to be able to keep and mitigate that threat. 

Senator CRUZ. In your personal judgment, are you concerned 

about our ability to execute effective counterterrorism with a troop 

presence at zero? 

General CAMPBELL. Sir, today again I am not the commander on 

the ground. I am very comfortable with where we are today based 

on everything I know and the great capacity of our special operating forces and the men and women on the ground. If confirmed 

and I get on the ground, CT continues to be one of the missions 

that we have, then I will make sure that this committee and my 

leadership understands the resources I believe that are required to 

carry out that mission. 

Senator CRUZ. Let me ask a couple of questions of Admiral 

Gortney. I want to start out on missile defense. Since June 12, 386 

rockets have been fired at Israel, and the threat facing both the 

United States and our allies is quite real. In last year’s National 

Defense Authorization Act, the Senate required the Department of 

Defense to study missile defense threats from the south such as the 

Gulf of Mexico. Can you discuss the potential threats that may face 

the Homeland from the south and what NORTHCOM has or needs 

in order to deal with this threat? 

Admiral GORTNEY. If confirmed, I am going to have to learn more 

about that particular mission, about the threats. I am not aware 

of the study of a ballistic missile threat from the south, but I have 

been focusing most against the North Korean and the Iranian 

threat. I will have to get back to you on that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM) face potential threats every day from all directions, to include the south. I understand recent NORTHCOM exercises have addressed possible 

asymmetric air, cruise missile, and short/medium range ballistic missile threats 

from the south. NORAD and NORTHCOM are operationalizing a deployable integrated air and missile defense capability to counter these threats by fusing current 

naval, air, and army systems into a full spectrum package. I believe an initial operational capability will be fielded in the near future. It is my understanding that to 

further assure the success of this capability, improvements in persistent surveillance and timely and accurate indications and warnings would be useful to get the 

right forces in the right place at the right time to defend the Homeland. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you. I look forward to continuing that discussion. 

700 

Let us shift then to a different aspect which is border security. 

NORTHCOM helped secure the borders after September 11. In 

your judgment, what additional role could NORTHCOM play given 

the crisis that we are facing on the border right now? 

Admiral GORTNEY. NORTHCOM is currently providing support 

to Borders and Customs who are doing the very best that they possibly can, and we are in support to them. We are currently providing them construction support, surveillance support, linguistic 

support, transportation support, and surveillance. We can continue 

to give as much as the Secretary asks of us in order to beef that 

up, but that is the limit of our authorities at this time. 

Senator CRUZ. Given that over 50,000 unaccompanied children 

have illegally entered the country this year, do you think it is clear 

that international terrorist organizations are fully aware of our 

vulnerabilities along the border? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I would have to assume they are, sir. There 

are seams. We were raised to find your seams and you will find 

your enemy. Whether there is the smuggling of children, whether 

it is smuggling of any kind, whether it is drugs, whether it is 

money, whether it is weapons, those seams can be exploited by terrorists as well. That is why it is important for us to look into those 

seams with our interagency partners. That gives us the surveillance and the ability to detect it, should it be occurring. 

Senator CRUZ. Would you agree that the coyotes and the cartels 

that are smuggling in all of these little boys and little girls—that 

these are hardened, violent criminal organizations? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Absolutely. Yes, sir, and operating in territories that they control that gives them the freedom of movement 

to do what they want to do, to move whatever they want to do. 

They will move whatever they want for money. 

Senator CRUZ. In your judgment, could the equipment returning 

from the CENTCOM theater of operations be potentially utilized by 

NORTHCOM and integrated on the U.S.-Mexico border, specifically 

the tracking and ISR systems? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir, if those authorities are expanded to 

us, I would forward up a request to use as much of the capability 

that we feel is necessary in order to do it. The Department of Defense is providing to law enforcement agency a great deal of surplus equipment that is coming back from Iraq, that has come back 

from Iraq and will come back from Afghanistan. 

Senator CRUZ. The magnitude of the threat on the border, the 

southwest border in particular, continues to grow. In 2011, Border 

Patrol apprehended over 300,000 people unlawfully crossing the 

southwest border. Nearly 50,000 of them were from countries other 

than Mexico. Of those, 255 were aliens from special interest countries. Between 2006 and 2011, nearly 2,000 aliens from special interest countries were apprehended along the southwest border. 

Given those numbers, would you agree that establishing control 

of our border with Mexico has serious implications for national security? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. Given the seams that are there that 

we talked about previously, we want to be able to close up all of 

those seams for the illegal movement of anything, be it terrorists 

or be it immigrants. But I think from the numbers that you deVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00708 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
701 

scribed, you described the magnitude, that it came from the border 

south of Mexico. That is why it is important working with 

SOUTHCOM and our partner nations down there to work on the 

conditions, the long-term conditions, to prevent the flow of their 

people north into our borders, through all the other borders and 

into our borders. That is a long-term commitment that our Nation 

has to make, and if confirmed, working very closely with 

SOUTHCOM, we are there to do everything we can. 

Senator CRUZ. Absolutely. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Generals. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Cruz. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I have one brief question. 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure. Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. I did not get a chance on my first round. I 

wanted to talk to you about the Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU), General Campbell, about detainees. We went into the one 

MOU in March 2012 with the Afghan Government, and then in an 

effort to reduce tensions, we signed another MOU in March 2013. 

It established the Afghan Review Board. That process has resulted 

in the release of hundreds of detainees that we can directly track 

to attacks on our forces. I believe and I believe our Government 

shares my belief that this is a flagrant disregard of the principles 

outlined in the MOU. 

Do you have any ideas as to how we can in the BSA—or maybe 

it is envisioned in the BSA—that we can stop this release of these 

detainees who have attacked our military? 

General CAMPBELL. Ma’am, thank you for the question. 

I have not looked at it in those terms. Certainly if confirmed, I 

will work with the interagency and the authorities that would be 

required to ensure that we can put some controls on that. I think 

every military person on the ground there is concerned with the recidivism rate of detainees that are released and that come back 

into the fight. I think that is something that we have to continue 

to work with the Afghan Government on. Right now, based on the 

authorities, it is their call. We can continue to show them why this 

particular individual and what they have done and provide them 

the evidence that we have of their wrongdoing. But in the end right 

now, that is ultimately their sovereign country and their decision 

to release. We can continue to advise and I will continue to do that 

if confirmed, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know we are in limbo now on the BSA because we are in limbo about who is going to lead the country and 

when we are going to know who is going to lead the country and 

whether or not Karzai’s influence is going to continue to be significant. 

But I would think it would have a dramatic impact on the morale 

if we are capturing those who have killed our most precious resource in this country and then they open the doors a day later and 

let them out. I just want to be on record that I know I share with 

the members of this committee that we want to do anything we can 

to help make sure that that situation does not become the norm. 

General CAMPBELL. Thank you, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

702 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

We thank you for your testimony, for your service. I hope we can 

get to, as we say, mark up your nominations very promptly and 

hopefully can get you through the confirmation process in the Senate very promptly. We will do our very best. You have great support on this committee, deservedly so. You have great support from 

your families, which make it possible for you to serve as you do. 

We thank you. We thank them. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM William E. Gortney, 

USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms 

have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution 

of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. Our Nation’s military has been honed by decades of conflict, with our 

Armed Forces now operating at the highest degree of collaboration and cooperation 

that I have ever seen. I do not see the need for modification to any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. Not applicable 

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)? 

Answer. The duties and functions of the Commander, NORTHCOM, include 

homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation. The Commander is accountable to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and citizens of the United 

States to defend the Nation against external threats and aggression, or other 

threats as directed by the President. In addition, the commander is responsive to 

requests from lead Federal agencies for support during natural or man-made disasters when the capacity of local responders is exceeded. Finally, the commander is 

responsible for forging security relationships with our regional partners: Canada, 

Mexico, and The Bahamas. 

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)? 

Answer. Based on the longstanding partnership of binational cooperation in defense of North America, the responsibilities of the Commander, NORAD, include 

aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. The Commander is accountable to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada 

for these responsibilities. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties? 

Answer. It has been my honor and privilege to dedicate 37-plus years of service 

to our great Nation. I believe the experience I’ve gained in a wide range of joint, 

coalition, and naval assignments has thoroughly prepared me to execute Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM responsibilities, if confirmed. Of note, in my 

current assignment as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command, I am 

General Jacoby’s Naval Component Commander. I work alongside his other component commanders to integrate maritime capabilities into the NORTHCOM mission 

set. Additionally, as Commander, Naval Forces Central Command and Commander, 

703 

U.S. Fifth Fleet, I served as the Naval Component Commander to Commander, U.S. 

Central Command, during the execution and support of missions in Afghanistan and 

Iraq; and I also led the navy element of the Combined Air Operations Center at the 

initiation of combat actions in Iraq. Lastly, my experience as Director of the Joint 

Staff reinforced the value of teamwork and close working relationships with the 

combatant commands, the Services, National Guard Bureau, Federal Reserve 

Forces, and the full spectrum of the interagency community in executing homeland 

defense, civil support, and security cooperation missions. Each of these assignments 

has given me a clear understanding of the value of combined and joint operations, 

particularly in time of crisis. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, NORTHCOM, and 

Commander, NORAD? 

Answer. If confirmed as Commander of NORTHCOM, I will aggressively pursue 

options to further expand my knowledge and experience levels in the Command’s 

mission areas. Understanding that homeland defense is the first priority, I will 

build on NORTHCOM’s decade of experience in developing trusted partnerships 

with domestic and hemispheric partners to defend the Nation in depth. I will ensure 

the Command is ready to support the Nation’s call during natural or man-made disasters through established relationships with Governors and The Adjutants General, as well as leaders of primary Federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. If confirmed as Commander of NORAD, I will build on my 

many years executing aerospace and maritime missions. As tasked in the NORAD 

agreement, the Command will continue to adapt to future shared security threats. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command 

runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of 

command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, NORTHCOM, to the following officials: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The NORTHCOM Commander is responsible to the Secretary of Defense 

for missions assigned in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The Commander of 

NORTHCOM retains title 10 authority under the direct control of the Secretary of 

Defense. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with the Secretary of Defense to ensure 

missions are executed consistent with the Secretary’s intent and direction. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The NORTHCOM Commander coordinates with the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense on major homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation issues. 

The Commander provides timely information on the Command’s mission areas to 

the Deputy Secretary in alignment with the Secretary of Defense’s direction. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. The NORTHCOM Commander coordinates with the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy on strategic policy issues for homeland defense, defense support 

of civil authorities, and theater security cooperation. The Commander communicates 

NORTHCOM priorities in support of the Under Secretary’s role as an advocate for 

the Command’s requirements. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

Answer. The NORTHCOM Commander coordinates with the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence to communicate the Command’s intelligence requirements, 

obtain actionable threat estimates, and receive timely warning of threats against 

the homeland. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 

Answer. The NORTHCOM commander works frequently with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on significant matters 

regarding homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and theater security cooperation, while reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not in the chain 

of command from the NORTHCOM Commander through the Secretary of Defense 

to the President, title 10 directs communications from combatant commanders to 

flow through the Chairman. The Secretary may also delegate certain oversight activities of combatant commanders to the Chairman. If confirmed, I will closely comVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00711 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
704 

municate with the Chairman to enable him to fulfill his role as principal military 

advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The NORTHCOM Commander provides requirements to the Secretaries 

of the Military Departments so that the Commander is able to meet his missions 

of homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and theater security cooperation. The Secretaries resource the combatant command’s requirements by organizing, training, and equipping Active and Reserve component forces. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services. 

Answer. The NORTHCOM Commander communicates with the Service Chiefs and 

their respective Secretaries on the combatant command’s mission requirements. The 

Chiefs provide forces to resource the Command’s requirements in fulfillment of their 

Service responsibility to organize, train, and equip. The Commander also seeks the 

advice and judgment of the Chiefs on matters of mutual interest, including force 

protection within the NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR). 

Question. The other combatant commanders, particularly U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). 

Answer. The NORTHCOM Commander has regular dialogue with other combatant commanders and enjoys the benefits of common support, regular information exchange, and frequent personal interaction. The Commander of NORTHCOM has a 

uniquely close relationship with SOUTHCOM due to issues of mutual interest in the 

hemisphere. The NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM commanders annually testify before this committee together. If confirmed, I will be committed to strengthening existing relationships with all combatant commanders. 

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The NORTHCOM Commander coordinates closely with the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau on matters concerning homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. I believe a trusted relationship and strong teamwork between the Commander of NORTHCOM and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau 

are critical to the continued success of NORTHCOM mission accomplishment. If confirmed, I will be committed to building on an already strong relationship with the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Question. The State Governors and Adjutants General. 

Answer. The NORTHCOM Commander maintains regular dialogue with State 

Governors and The Adjutants General and if confirmed, I will continue to build on 

the strong relationships established by General Jacoby. It is my understanding that 

the Command regularly hosts meetings with The Adjutants General and facilitates 

integration of Department of Defense (DOD) disaster response planning with Statelevel plans, consistent with the National Response Framework. As a Federal participant in the Council of Governors, the NORTHCOM Commander participates in 

twice-yearly council meetings, works to advance its initiatives, and reports progress 

on Command action items. 

Question. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you work with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Homeland Security Council, and other 

Federal agencies, as well as State and local authorities and representatives from the 

private sector? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to expand my relationships with 

senior leaders in DHS, the National Security Council, other Federal agencies, State, 

local, and tribal authorities, and the private sector. I developed a close relationship 

with Secretary Johnson when I served as the Director of the Joint Staff, and if confirmed, I would continue to strengthen this particularly important relationship. I 

view this as essential because NORTHCOM’s missions to defend the Homeland and 

provide support to civil authorities depend on solid, trusted partnerships. Through 

personal interaction, I would work closely with every relevant agency to ensure 

NORTHCOM is fully prepared to defend the homeland. I would do the same to provide defense support of civil authorities to the lead Federal agency, in accordance 

with the National Response Framework and at the direction of the President and/ 

or the Secretary of Defense. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Commander, NORTHCOM? 

Answer. Defense of the Homeland is inextricably linked to efforts in the forward 

regions. While defending forward is the preferred method to secure the Homeland, 

any retraction in forward regions must have a corresponding increase in requisite 

capability and capacity at home to balance global strategic risk. I believe the next 

NORTHCOM Commander is likely to be confronted by disparate threat streams, inVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00712 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
705 

cluding violent extremist organizations intent on attacking the Homeland and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue nations or violent extremists. Additionally, I believe the threats of cyber attack on institutions and critical infrastructure is real. Transnational criminal organizations and their associated global threat 

networks also pose a persistent threat to national security, manifested in violence 

carried out by transnational criminal organizations within Mexico and along the 

southwest border. Lastly, the next NORTHCOM Commander may be called to provide Department of Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in response to complex natural disasters. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will look to strengthen the partnerships built by my predecessors with the other combatant commands and the National Guard, as well as 

interagency, State, local, and international partners for a layered defense of the 

Homeland. I will advocate for resources to defend against these threats and ensure 

the Command’s plans are robust enough to confront evolving threats. I will ensure 

the Command’s exercise program is sufficiently structured to address the full spectrum of threats to the Homeland. 

MISSION OF U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

Question. What is the mission of NORTHCOM? 

Answer. NORTHCOM partners to conduct homeland defense, civil support, and 

security cooperation—particularly in managing the military-to-military relations 

with Canada and Mexico—to defend and secure the United States and its interests. 

The Command also advocates for Arctic capabilities as assigned in the UCP. 

Question. How does NORTHCOM’s mission relate to the mission of DHS? 

Answer. NORTHCOM’s mission is distinct, but related and complementary to the 

mission of DHS. DHS is responsible for preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our borders, enforcing and administering our immigration laws, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, and strengthening national preparedness and readiness. NORTHCOM is responsible for detecting, deterring, and 

preventing external threats to the United States, and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, providing defense support of civil authorities. The 

Command’s mission requires close coordination with DHS to provide whole-of-government approaches to protect and secure the Nation. 

Question. Are there circumstances under which you would anticipate 

NORTHCOM would have the lead Federal role in responding to a domestic terrorist 

incident or disaster consequence management response? Or do believe NORTHCOM 

would operate only in support of other Federal departments and agencies? 

Answer. The President may direct DOD into a lead role in defending the Nation, 

including the event of an armed terrorist attack. Since NORTHCOM is the combatant command responsible for the Homeland, the Command could be designated as 

the supported command. However, typically NORTHCOM would be in support of another Federal agency such as DHS or the Department of Justice in the event of a 

domestic terrorist event. For disaster consequence management, NORTHCOM is always in support of another Federal agency. 

Question. What responsibility, if any, does NORTHCOM have with respect to the 

Defense Critical Infrastructure Program? 

Answer. NORTHCOM is responsible for protecting defense critical infrastructure 

within its AOR necessary to support the projection of forces and capabilities used 

to seize the initiative and conduct decisive operations. To accomplish this task, 

NORTHCOM, in collaboration with its mission partners, identifies and prioritizes 

the physical infrastructure and associated network assets, national and commercial, 

critical to the successful execution of our operational plans. If confirmed, I will be 

responsible for developing mitigation plans for all defense critical assets in the 

NORTHCOM AOR to ensure mission continuity. 

ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORITY

Question. NORTHCOM has been assigned responsibility for force protection and 

antiterrorism within its AOR. 

What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate force protection 

vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges do you anticipate you would 

face within NORTHCOM’s AOR? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess ongoing efforts to improve information sharing, 

both within DOD and with our interagency partners, to detect emerging threats and 

synchronize the collective efforts of the Department to protect the force, our critical 

mission capabilities, and the Nation. Recent shootings on DOD installations and the 

706 

Federal Bureau of Investigation arrest of individuals who had intended to cause us 

harm, continue to remind us of the force protection challenges we face. Our security 

environment is always changing and we must be ready to challenge assumptions, 

think creatively, and meet future threats. 

Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure efficiency in the 

use of funding for force protection and to prevent unnecessary duplication of efforts 

between NORTHCOM, the Military Services, and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we are properly postured to defend the 

Homeland in a fiscally responsible manner. I will work with the Joint Staff, the 

Services, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs to address limited resources and eliminate duplication of effort, 

while sustaining a baseline force protection posture. 

Question. What specific forces, if any, have been assigned to NORTHCOM? 

Answer. The specific forces assigned to NORTHCOM are the headquarters staff 

and the forces from certain subordinate and component commands including U.S. 

Army North, U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command, Marine Forces North, Air 

Forces Northern, Joint Task Force North, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Joint 

Task Force Alaska, and Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region. Recently 

(within the past few months), the Secretary of Defense assigned five tactical-level 

Army brigade and battalion-level Combat Service Support units to NORTHCOM to 

support execution of any short-notice homeland defense or defense support of civil 

authorities missions. 

Question. How has the assignment of forces to NORTHCOM changed since 

NORTHCOM was established on October 1, 2002? 

Answer. Since establishment, the increase in the number of permanently assigned 

forces to NORTHCOM has significantly improved the capability of the Command to 

conduct its highest priority missions. Subordinate Army, Navy, Marine, and Air 

Force Service component command headquarters are focused on homeland defense, 

defense support of civil authorities, and theater security cooperation in the 

NORTHCOM AOR. The other assigned joint task forces I mentioned in the previous 

question provide geographic and functional mission expertise. Each of these headquarters and forces have allowed NORTHCOM to more effectively plan and execute 

missions in defense of the Homeland and in support of the American people in time 

of need. 

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

Question. What is the mission of the NORAD? 

Answer. NORAD conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime 

warning in the defense of North America. Aerospace warning includes the detection, 

validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, through mutual support arrangements with other commands. Aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of the 

airspace of the United States and Canada. Maritime warning consists of processing, 

assessing, and disseminating maritime intelligence and information, and warning or 

advising the Governments of the United States and Canada of maritime threats to, 

or attacks against, North America. 

Question. How has NORAD’s mission evolved since the creation of NORTHCOM? 

Answer. Since NORTHCOM was established in 2002, NORAD’s mission has 

evolved to include a maritime warning mission. This new mission includes dissemination of intelligence and information on maritime threats in the approaches to the 

United States and Canada. NORAD’s traditional aerospace warning mission has always included warning against aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, and this critical 

information is now also used to support NORTHCOM’s operation of the GroundBased Midcourse Defense System. 

Question. How does NORAD’s mission relate to NORTHCOM’s mission? 

Answer. The commands’ missions, though distinct and derived under separate authorities, are interconnected and complementary. The commands share a common 

security environment, have largely integrated staffs, and enjoy close coordination 

with one another. 

Question. How does NORAD’s mission relate to the mission of DHS? 

Answer. NORAD supports the mission of DHS by detecting and deterring threats 

in the aerospace domain. Additionally, in accordance with the National Maritime 

Domain Awareness Plan, NORAD collaborates and shares information with DHS as 

part of a global maritime community of interest, developing a shared understanding 

of the maritime operational environment. 

707 

Question. Do you believe that NORAD should continue to have a combined operations and planning staff, and a consolidated command center, with NORTHCOM? 

Why or why not? 

Answer. While I am not deeply familiar with the staff arrangements or the operation of the consolidated command center, I generally believe integration results in 

greater effectiveness and efficiency. I understand the commands are distinct, yet the 

staffs are fully integrated except for the operations directorates. If confirmed I will 

review the current structures and look for opportunities to improve operational effectiveness. 

Question. What is the relationship of the Commander of NORAD to the Canadian 

component of NORAD, and what role does Canada play in NORAD operations and 

planning? 

Answer. The United States-Canada NORAD Agreement is the gold standard for 

cooperation between nations on common defense. As NORAD is a bi-national command, Commander NORAD is responsible to the senior defense leadership in both 

the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada. Commander 

NORAD exercises operational control over forces provided by both countries to accomplish NORAD’s missions. The Canadian NORAD Region provides command and 

control of forces in Canada that support NORAD’s missions. At the headquarters 

level, representatives from both countries work side-by-side in the planning and execution of NORAD’s missions. 

NORTHCOM JOINT TASK FORCES

Question. Since the establishment of NORTHCOM, several multi-service task 

forces, e. g., Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS), Joint Task Force-North (JTF– 

North), have been placed under its authority. 

What is the current status of the Joint Task Force organizations under 

NORTHCOM in terms of mission, organization, planning, personnel allocation, and 

capability? 

Answer. NORTHCOM has four task forces that operate under NORTHCOM’s authority. These task forces are manned to conduct homeland defense and defense 

support of civil authorities operations, as directed by the President or the Secretary 

of Defense. 

One joint task force, Joint Task Force Civil Support, is aligned under 

NORTHCOM’s Army component command, U.S. Army North. It provides command 

and control of DOD incident management forces responding to chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear events. 

A second task force, Joint Task Force North (JTF–N), was recently realigned from 

U.S. Army North to headquarters NORTHCOM as the command’s countertransnational organized crime lead. Presently, JTF–N leads DOD counterdrug operations in support of law enforcement agencies within the NORTHCOM AOR. Their 

main areas of support at present are the southwest border, Puerto Rico, and The 

Bahamas, based on law enforcement priorities. 

Additionally, NORTHCOM’s Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region is 

postured to provide land-based homeland defense, civil support, and incident management in the National Capital Region. 

NORTHCOM also has Joint Task Force Alaska responsible for homeland defense 

and civil support tasks in their Joint Operations Area. Joint Task Force Alaska provides the Command’s primary subject matter experts for Arctic matters. 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, NORTH

Question. On December 31, 2012, the Secretary of Defense established a Theater 

Special Operations Command to support NORTHCOM, known as Special Operations 

Command North (SOCNORTH). According to the Secretary’s memorandum, 

SOCNORTH’s objective is to ‘‘enhance command and control of Special Operations 

Forces throughout the NORTHCOM AOR’’ as well as ‘‘improve support to interagency counterterrorism operations.’’ 

What is your understanding of current and planned manning, organization, and 

mission of SOCNORTH? 

Answer. I understand SOCNORTH was stood up from existing NORTHCOM manpower and has been augmented by United States Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM) personnel realigned from headquarter SOCOM staff. Current permanent 

manning is less than 50 individuals. I believe the final size of SOCNORTH has not 

been determined, but understand it should top out at just over 100 permanently assigned personnel, with augments and interagency liaisons adding approximately 10– 

20 personnel. 

708 

Question. What is your understanding of the current requirements for Special Operations Forces in the NORTHCOM AOR? 

Answer. Since the establishment of NORTHCOM in 2002, there has been a gap 

in the capability to command and control Special Operations Forces operating in the 

NORTHCOM AOR. The establishment of SOCNORTH has afforded the command 

increased accountability of actions and developed a hub for special operations capabilities for NORTHCOM. SOCNORTH works with allies and partners to expand 

interoperability. 

Question. What is your understanding of how SOCNORTH is to ‘‘improve support 

to interagency counterterrorism operations’’? 

Answer. It is my understanding the establishment of SOCNORTH provides a ‘‘single point of entry’’ for Federal counterterrorism agencies to coordinate on 

NORTHCOM AOR-specific challenges. This synergy is already evident, as improved 

relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Energy, and 

others have been demonstrated through exercise collaboration and various workshops. I believe DOD/interagency collaboration and cooperation are the keys to protecting the Homeland. SOCNORTH, as an integral node of the global SOF network, 

provides NORTHCOM with facilitated access to additional intelligence and information resources. 

COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS

Question. Each year DOD spends several hundred million dollars to counter the 

flow of illegal drugs into the United States, yet the availability of drugs on the 

street has not been significantly reduced, and some countries continue to face internal security challenges in responding to this threat. Some of these funds are executed within the NORTHCOM AOR, and some have questioned the effectiveness 

and focus of our counter-narcotics programs. 

What is your view of the appropriate role of DOD in countering transnational 

drug cartels and gangs? 

Answer. In my view, the current role of DOD in a support role to law enforcement 

is appropriate. DOD largely supports U.S. law enforcement agency (LEA) efforts to 

counter transnational drug cartels and gangs through information sharing, detection 

and monitoring illicit trafficking, and analytical support. In addition, DOD is helping partner countries build capacity to address narcotics trafficking and related 

transnational organized crime within their borders. 

Question. What role does NORTHCOM play in the Defense Department’s overall 

counterdrug mission and organization? 

Answer. NORTHCOM supports the Department’s global counterdrug mission, cooperating closely with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific 

Command (PACOM) through information sharing and situational awareness of 

drug-related threats to national security. NORTHCOM provides DOD support to domestic law enforcement agencies in counternarcotics operations. NORTHCOM also 

works with Mexican military and civil authorities to enhance their capability. 

NORTHCOM partners with Mexico, Canada, and The Bahamas to build capability 

and capacity to fight drug trafficking organizations. 

Question. What is your assessment of the ongoing counter-narcotics operations 

within the NORTHCOM AOR and the geographic seam NORTHCOM shares with 

SOUTHCOM? 

Answer. My understanding is that ongoing counternarcotics operations with interagency and host nation partners in the NORTHCOM AOR are appropriately focused. The geographic border NORTHCOM shares with SOUTHCOM is a key route 

for drugs entering Mexico en route to the United States. I believe that the two commands collaborate closely on this issue and work hand-in-hand with the Nations on 

Mexico’s southern border. If confirmed, I will continue this coordination to ensure 

a seamless effort across the border between the two AORs, to include further 

strengthening the relationships among Joint Interagency Task Force South, 

NORTHCOM’s Intelligence Directorate, and Joint Task Force North. 

Question. How would you recommend that the success of the Department’s counternarcotics programs be measured? 

Answer. One of the primary things I’ve learned in my career is that program success directly correlates with an ability to measure performance against programmatic goals, which for counternarcotics (CN) programs stem from several 

sources, including the National Security Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime are realized in 

NORTHCOM’s Theater Campaign Plan. It is my understanding that performance 

measurement has been a point of emphasis for the Department’s CN program, and 

709 

NORTHCOM already has a clear understanding of what desired outcomes most directly contribute to the national strategy. 

I believe what is most critical here is to continue to develop, collect, and analyze 

operational outputs to better measure the desired outcomes of reducing the flow of 

drugs into the United States and to diminish the national security threat of 

transnational organized crime in our Hemisphere. 

Question. Compared to other missions that you would be responsible for as Commander, NORTHCOM, if confirmed, where would you rank counternarcotics in 

terms of its contribution to our national security and the ability of DOD to make 

a meaningful contribution? 

Answer. I would rank the counternarcotics mission as a critical enabler to the defense of the Homeland, as it supports the development of trust and confidence with 

critical mission partners through combined training opportunities and information 

sharing. In addition, it provides early warning of potential threats through enhanced information and intelligence sharing. I believe it’s critical that we constantly 

evaluate the operational intersects between varying criminal organizations and terror networks to determine threats to national security and prevent attacks in the 

Homeland. 

SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH CANADA AND MEXICO

Question. The NORTHCOM AOR includes the land areas of the United States, 

Canada, and Mexico. The binational NORAD Command ensures close cooperation 

between the United States and Canada on security matters. NORTHCOM has been 

working with the Mexican military on security cooperation related to Mexico’s efforts to counter Transnational Criminal Organizations that are involved in trafficking and causing extraordinary violence. Joint Task Force North (JTF–N) has established itself as a active partner with U.S. law enforcement, mitigating cross border threats posed by trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and humans. 

What is your assessment of the current security relationship between the United 

States and Canada? 

Answer. I believe our security relationship with Canada is exceptional in all facets. The NORAD agreement exemplifies the mutual trust and confidence our Nations have in each other that NORAD forces execute every day. Canada has been 

a vital partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and has played a critical 

role in the International Security Assistance Force’s work in Afghanistan. I understand NORTHCOM enjoys a very strong relationship with its Canadian counterpart, 

Canadian Joint Operations Command. If confirmed, I look forward to advancing and 

strengthening this long-standing partnership. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current security relationship between 

the United States and Mexico? 

Answer. In my view, the security relationship between the United States and 

Mexico has never been stronger. General Jacoby has set the stage for historic 

growth in the levels of cooperation and trust. Just a couple of weeks ago, I hosted 

the Mexican Secretary of the Navy at Norfolk, and I can attest that we can have 

as honest a dialog on security issues as we do with any of our allies. NORTHCOM 

has witnessed an exponential increase by the Mexican military in requests for training, subject matter expert exchanges, and U.S. equipment purchases through Foreign Military Sales. If confirmed, I will continue to capitalize on the personal and 

professional relationships established by my predecessors, and those I established 

as NORTHCOM’s naval component. 

Question. What is your assessment of the security challenges to the United States 

posed by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Mexico? 

Answer. I agree with the President that TCOs ‘‘constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States 

. . . ’’ POTUS Executive Order, July 2011. The more we learn about TCOs in Mexico, 

the more we come to understand that they operate across a broad spectrum of illicit 

activities that goes beyond drugs, to include human smuggling, human trafficking, 

weapons trafficking, illicit financing, coercion and corruption of public officials and 

erosion of the rule of law. Clearly drug demand in the United States fuels their capabilities. Mexico based TCOs have influence that extends into hundreds of U.S. cities. This presents a substantial security challenge. 

Question. What is your assessment of the security situation along the U.S.-Mexico 

border? 

Answer. I would defer to DHS for assessment of the security situation along the 

U.S.-Mexico border. Nonetheless, I understand NORTHCOM monitors threat intelligence to ensure we are prepared for any threat that may seek to exploit border 

vulnerabilities. NORTHCOM is a committed partner in this effort on both sides of 

710 

the border. I believe security on the border is measured in degrees, and the Nation 

should never be satisfied that the border is secure enough. If confirmed, I look forward to working with DHS, our Mexican partners, and others in the interagency 

community and, when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, providing requested military support. 

Question. Would you characterize NORTHCOM’s efforts to protect our southern 

border, specifically JTF–N’s countering of TCOs, as a success? 

Answer. Yes. NORTHCOM and its subordinate command Joint Task Force North 

(JTF–N) bring military-unique capabilities to bear against Transnational Criminal 

Organizations in alignment with the priorities of DHS. JTF–N operations also provide tasked units with valuable and relevant training benefits. 

Question. What is your understanding of NORTHCOM’s support to civil authorities operating along the southern border, including the current DOD support to the 

Department of Health and Human Services in providing temporary housing for unaccompanied immigrant children coming across the border? 

Answer. NORTHCOM supports civil authorities, principally the DHS, when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM partners with 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection and other interagency community partners to 

provide DOD capabilities along the U.S. southern border in accordance with DHS 

priorities. 

DOD has been supporting DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in responding to the unaccompanied children coming across the border. 

Commander, NORTHCOM, is designated as the supported commander for DOD’s efforts to provide temporary housing, transportation, and planning support to the Primary Agencies (DHS and HHS) for assistance in resolving the situation. In my current capacity as NAVNORTH, monitoring current efforts has been part of our daily 

battle rhythm. 

Question. What improvements in border protection capability, if any, would you 

recommend? 

Answer. Since DHS is the lead Federal agency responsible for advocating for border protection capabilities, I would defer this question to DHS. If confirmed, I look 

forward to partnering with DHS to support their efforts on the border, and will look 

to support requests where unique military skills and capabilities can be incorporated into law enforcement partner border operations. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your goals as Commander of NORTHCOM 

for improving security relations with Mexico, and how would you plan to achieve 

them? 

Answer. If confirmed, my primary goal will be to stand with the Mexican military 

to combat mutual security threats, while always fully respecting Mexican sovereignty. Thanks to General Jacoby, NORTHCOM enjoys an unprecedented level of 

dialog with both SEDENA [Secretarı ́a de la Defensa Nacional] and SEMAR 

[Secretarı ́a de Marina] leadership. Using the current authorities granted to 

NORTHCOM, if confirmed, I plan to further cement this relationship. Specific goals 

that I would focus on to improve security relations are enhancing support to Mexico’s strategy to improve security along its southern border with Guatemala and 

Belize, ensuring requested equipment and training are delivered in the most efficient manner possible, and assisting with opportunities to expand Mexico’s regional 

and global posture. 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Question. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) flight within the continental United 

States is severely restricted including portions of the Canadian and Mexican borders. The Federal Aviation Administration is studying how to integrate unmanned 

systems and conventionally piloted aircraft in the same airspace. 

In your view, have airspace restrictions on unmanned aerial systems hindered the 

development and evolution of these aircraft? 

Answer. No. The Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Secretary of Defense, 

and the Services are aggressively pursuing efforts to fully integrate unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System, allowing UAS to be available 

to support NORTHCOM’s missions of homeland defense and defense support of civil 

authorities. The development and evolution of these platforms has been unimpeded. 

Question. Would you recommend opening larger parcels of airspace within the 

continental United States to UAS/UAV overflight? 

Answer. Not at this time. However, the NORTHCOM is currently conducting a 

joint test to validate airspace and flight procedures for UASs to operate safely within National Airspace System. 

711 

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND-STATE RELATIONS

Question. NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to provide Defense 

Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) when directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence management operations. Such military assistance would support Federal assistance to State and local emergency response 

units. 

What is your understanding and assessment of NORTHCOM’s awareness and coordination for the support of the emergency response capabilities and contingency 

plans of the States and territories before a crisis arises? 

Answer. NORTHCOM coordinates with the States mainly through two avenues: 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its FEMA Regional Headquarters and also the National Guard Bureau to individual State National Guard 

Joint Force Headquarters. NORTHCOM also has liaison personnel from various 

Federal agencies that greatly assist in interagency emergency response capability 

awareness efforts. It has been my experience during my tours as Director of the 

Joint Staff and as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command that NORTHCOM has 

leveraged these avenues to develop good relationships with key response partners 

and to gain visibility on their planning and plans. 

Question. In your view, do NORTHCOM’s plans, policies, and programs optimize 

DOD’s consequence management support to civil authorities? 

Answer. It is my observation that NORTHCOM has worked diligently to ensure 

its civil support mission area plans, policies, and programs are appropriately supporting civil authorities. Of note, NORTHCOM has integrated its civil support planning with FEMA’s Regional Planning and has significantly enhanced its relationships with key partners through planning, training, and exercises. As with any endeavor, there are often opportunities for additional improvement, and if confirmed, 

I will work to that end. 

Question. If not, and if confirmed, how would you ensure that NORTHCOM has 

sufficient knowledge of State and inter-State emergency response capabilities, including capabilities of National Guard units, capabilities of title 10 regular and Reserve component forces, and a good working relationship with State emergency response leaders? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to extend my predecessor’s work to develop ‘‘playbooks’’ for foreseeable emergency response situations in the States. Additionally, I 

will look to enhance relationships with defense coordinating officers, State emergency management officials, and the States’ National Guards through the National 

Guard Bureau. Finally, if confirmed, I would continue to advance the Dual Status 

Commander program as the usual and customary command arrangement to achieve 

unity of effort between Federal and State military forces in the event of a domestic 

disaster requiring support from DOD. 

PROCESS FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES REQUESTS AND FUNDING

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the policies and procedures by which States and territories request, employ, and fund Defense Support 

of Civil Authorities (DSCA), including reimbursement of DOD for operations in support of the States? 

Answer. As I understand them, current policies and processes provide for the Governor of an affected State to request Federal assistance from the President via a 

formal Disaster Declaration. This enables a lead Federal agency, usually DHS/ 

FEMA, to request DOD assistance for the affected area or State, and the Secretary 

of Defense will normally direct NORTHCOM to provide the requested capability. In 

such cases, DOD is appropriately reimbursed via the Stafford Act. There are also 

mechanisms, prior to or in the absence of a Presidential Disaster Declaration, for 

providing DOD assistance to local civil authorities under Immediate Response Authority to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage. 

Additionally, DOD may provide assistance under the Economy Act as requested between Federal agencies. 

Question. If confirmed, what policy or procedural changes would you propose, if 

any, for the processes for requesting, employing, and determining funding sources 

for DSCA? 

Answer. I do not see a need in the near future to propose any policy or procedural 

changes with respect to funding sources for defense support of civil authorities. 

FORCE PROVISION FOR NORTHCOM

Question. NORTHCOM has the mission of conducting military operations for 

homeland defense and, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, for 

712 

providing military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management for natural disasters and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) incidents. Yet NORTHCOM has relatively few military forces assigned to 

it on a permanent basis. 

What is your understanding and assessment of how forces are allocated or 

planned to be allocated to NORTHCOM for its full range of mission requirements? 

Answer. Forces and authorities are provided in relevant Joint Staff Execute Orders (EXORDs), which have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. Forces required for these EXORDs are requested in accordance with Global Force Management (GFM) policies and procedures. NORTHCOM then receives trained and ready 

forces necessary to execute these EXORDs for its full range of mission requirements. 

Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that NORTHCOM will have 

sufficient forces available to it, properly trained and equipped, to accomplish its assigned missions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff and the Services to ensure 

NORTHCOM force requirements can be met in support of its UCP-assigned missions. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel, equipment and training readiness of U.S. military forces (Active and Reserve) for homeland defense mission-essential tasks in support of NORTHCOM’s contingency plans, and for its 

DSCA missions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will use the standing Force Allocation Process to identify 

NORTHCOM’s force requirements for assigned missions. In coordination with the 

joint force providers, I will employ the Chairman’s Readiness System to ensure 

NORTHCOM’s mission requirements, capabilities, and shortfalls are properly reflected and assessed in the Defense Readiness Reporting System. 

NORTHCOM–DHS RELATIONSHIP

Question. DHS is still a relatively new Federal agency, and is continuing to improve its ability to meet its homeland security missions. 

As DHS improves and matures its homeland security capabilities, do you expect 

that will reduce the demands on NORTHCOM to provide DSCA, including support 

for crisis response planning? 

Answer. I believe NORTHCOM has an enduring mission to provide DOD capabilities to civil authorities, as an integral component of the National Preparedness System. I expect that the planning for and response to complex natural or manmade 

disasters will remain whole of community efforts. My view is DOD and 

NORTHCOM will continue to have a supporting role in those efforts. 

Question. What do you consider to be the appropriate role for DOD and 

NORTHCOM’s vis-a-vis DHS and State authorities in identifying and validating the 

dual-use equipment and other requirements associated with defense and homeland 

security missions? 

Answer. I defer to the Secretary of Defense on formal dual use equipment policy. 

However, I think the current role is appropriate, wherein NORTHCOM, in coordination with other DOD entities, identifies dual-use equipment needed to support civil 

authorities in natural or man-made disasters. 

Question. By what process should DOD define requirements for the armed services to train and equip forces that NORTHCOM would use to support to civil authorities? 

Answer. The Services are responsible to organize, train, and equip forces for combatant command missions. For DSCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, publishes DSCA orders that capture 

the relevant requirements for Service programs. In addition, the elements of the 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise undergo a 

training and exercise evaluation program that is developed and executed in close coordination among NORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and the Services in 

their title 10 U.S.C. ‘‘train and equip’’ responsibilities. This program ensures the entire enterprise is trained and equipped in a way that ensures a high state of readiness, but which is also standardized and aligned to ensure units are interoperable 

and able to integrate during execution. 

NATIONAL GUARD

Question. There is still debate about the role the National Guard should play in 

homeland security and defense. In an April 21, 2008 letter to the committee concerning the recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote that, ‘‘I 

have some concerns about the Commission’s ideas on enhancing the Defense DepartVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00720 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
713 

ment’s role in the Homeland. While Reserve component civil support requirements 

are important, they should not be of equal importance to DOD combat responsibilities.’’ 

Do you agree with this view of Admiral Mullen? 

Answer. Yes. The principal duty of the Armed Forces is to defend the Nation. 

Civil support is a vital responsibility, but secondary to fighting and winning the 

country’s wars. 

Question. Do you believe that defending the Homeland or civil support should become the National Guard’s primary missions? 

Answer. I believe the National Guard remains a critical component of the Total 

Force and should be oriented to the DOD’s priorities and the three pillars emphasized in the Defense Strategy: homeland defense, building global security, and projecting power and winning decisively. 

Question. What is the current status of the working relationship between 

NORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and individual State National Guard 

headquarters? 

Answer. General Jacoby has forged incredible partnerships between NORTHCOM, 

the National Guard Bureau, and The Adjutants General. If confirmed, I will endeavor to continue this legacy through regular coordination and engagement. 

Question. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for planning and operational purposes would you advocate between NORTHCOM, DHS, the National 

Guard Bureau, Federal, State, and local first responders, and National Guard units 

under State authority? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would enhance existing liaison relationships that 

NORTHCOM currently employs with these organizations and where appropriate, 

build new liaison relationships with key mission partners. In general, I believe liaison officers must be empowered and prepared to build relationships, conduct mutual 

planning, and transition seamlessly to cooperative execution. 

DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL GUARD END STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE AMONG THE

STATES

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the distribution of responsibility and authority for the measurement and analysis of requirements and 

risk, course of action development, recommendation, and decision for the distribution of Army and Air National Guard end strength and force structure among the 

States and territories? 

Answer. If confirmed, my first and foremost responsibility as a combatant commander will be to assess and determine the mission requirements for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. I am very confident the Secretaries 

of the Army and the Air Force, their respective Service Chiefs and the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau will effectively train, equip, and make available the very 

best forces to meet the mission requirements for NORAD and NORTHCOM. 

Question. In your view, does this distribution appropriately assign responsibility 

and authority among national civilian leaders and military staff? Does this distribution of responsibility and authority, and the analysis and decisionmaking process, 

provide an appropriate level of transparency and openness that takes into account 

the risks and requirements of the States and territories? 

Answer. It is my view that we have established the necessary balance within the 

Department to ensure appropriate distribution of responsibilities and authorities between our civilian and military decisionmakers. I am confident our DOD planning 

and budgeting processes afford required transparency and openness, while addressing risk and requirements within the current fiscal environment. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the allocation of responsibility and authority, or the analytical and decisionmaking processes, 

for the distribution of National Guard end strength and force structure among the 

States and territories? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe my role as the NORAD and NORTHCOM commander is to determine required capabilities for homeland defense and defense support to civil authority mission areas. Whether Active Duty, National Guard, or Reserves, I am confident the Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff, along with input 

from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, will establish the proper force structure and end strength to support the vital missions of NORAD and NORTHCOM. 

Question. In your view, is the current allocation of National Guard end strength, 

force structure, capacities and capabilities among the States and territories appropriate to their historical requirements and risks? If not, and if confirmed, what 

changes would you propose to the allocation to best or better deal with the challenges of historical requirements and risk? 

714 

Answer. I believe civilian and military leadership will balance requirements and 

risks within the present fiscal environment in order to ensure we can defend the 

Nation and respond during natural and man-made disasters. If confirmed, my role 

as a combatant commander will be to work with the Services and National Guard 

Bureau to ensure NORAD and NORTHCOM mission requirements are addressed in 

the Total Force planning calculus. 

ARMY AVIATION RESTRUCTURE INITIATIVE

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative and its potential impact on the capability and capacity of DOD 

and the States and territories to deal with domestic emergencies or provide DSCA? 

Answer. I believe this Army initiative attempts to meet budgetary limits, while 

maximizing readiness across the Total Force and improving States’ ability to respond to domestic emergencies and provide support to civil authorities. From my 

perspective, airlift capabilities supporting rescue, evacuation, personnel movement, 

and logistical transport are critical to success when providing defense support of 

civil authorities. Additionally, increasing airlift capabilities, such as Black Hawk 

helicopters, resident in the National Guard, gives Governors and The Adjutants 

General ready access to a capability that should improve States’ capacity to respond 

to natural or manmade disasters. 

Question. One feature of the Aviation Restructure Initiative would transfer all 

Army National Guard AH–64 Apache attack helicopters to the regular army by the 

end of fiscal year 2019. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the relevance and utility of the 

Apache attack helicopter to the aviation requirements needed to support civil authorities for domestic emergencies or crises? In your view, are there any capabilities 

of the Apache helicopter relevant to support for civil authorities that are not or cannot be provided by other aviation platforms in the National Guard? 

Answer. In my view, the Apache attack helicopter has limited value when conducting the defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) mission. In a DSCA role, the 

Apache does not meet the most crucial rotary wing aviation mission needs for airlift 

to support rapid movement of people and supplies. 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

Question. NORTHCOM has two primary missions: Homeland Defense and DSCA, 

including preparation for and response to an incident or attack involving CBRN materials or weapons, in the NORTHCOM AOR. 

If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of ensuring adequate military 

forces, capabilities, and plans to respond to such incidents in support of civil authorities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Joint Staff, Services, National 

Guard Bureau, and The Adjutants General to ensure adequate forces are assigned 

or allocated to this mission and that they are properly trained, resourced, and tested 

by robust exercise programs in order to answer the call, if needed. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities to 

ensure the best possible response force to support civil authorities in the event of 

a CBRN incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication? 

Answer. I understand the organizations designed to respond to a CBRN incident 

are structured to provide a graduated response capable of responding to a range of 

scenarios. Some are Federal forces, while others are National Guard forces typically 

under the control of State governors. Each echeloned element is designed to respond 

under different timelines to build upon and integrate with the others to provide capability to civil authorities. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Joint Staff, Services, National Guard Bureau, and the States to ensure all forces designed to accomplish this mission are 

properly manned, trained, equipped to execute it, and that timelines and command 

and control relationships are appropriate. 

Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the revised DOD Consequence 

Management Response Forces (DCMRF), as currently constituted, to provide a significant capability to support Federal civil authorities in the event of a CBRN incident? 

Answer. The Federal military’s Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) is one element (5,200 personnel) of the larger combined Federal title 10 and State National 

Guard CBRN Response Enterprise (over 18,000 personnel total). The DCRF represents an extremely capable force within that Enterprise. It has the highest density of critical lifesaving capabilities within the Enterprise, consisting of ground 

search and rescue; decontamination; emergency medical triage, treatment and staVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00722 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
715 

bilization; and ground and air medical evacuation. This capability has two force 

packages ready to deploy within 24 hours and 48 hours, respectively, providing the 

Nation with a rapid response and highly trained technical response force. If confirmed, I will report this committee if I determine there are any significant concerns 

with this vital capability. 

Question. How would you ensure the necessary level of coordination and planning 

between the DCMRF and National Guard Homeland Response Forces to ensure an 

adequate response to a CBRN incident? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to sustain NORTHCOM’s close relationship with 

the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and through the NGB, with State National 

Guard Joint Force Headquarters. It is my understanding that these relationships 

are as strong as they have ever been—in large part due to General Jacoby’s leadership. It is through these relationships and through close coordination with our partners that we achieve the alignment of efforts that will synchronize operations during plan execution. 

Question. Do you believe that U.S. military forces providing DSCA in the event 

of CBRN incidents should be under the command of the Commander, NORTHCOM? 

Answer. Yes. I believe Federal military forces conducting defense support of civil 

authorities missions should remain under the command of the Commander, 

NORTHCOM. Federal military forces responding to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident do so in support of the lead Federal agency and at the 

request of State governors. I support the Dual Status Commander arrangement as 

the usual and customary way to command and control Federal military and nonFederalized State National Guard forces to achieve unity of effort amongst forces 

assigned to these distinct chains of command. 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS AND CBRN ENHANCED

RESPONSE FORCE PACKAGE

Question. Do you believe the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams 

(WMD–CST) and CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) are appropriately organized, sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions? 

Answer. Each State has at least one WMD–CST. It is my understanding that they 

are appropriately organized, manned, trained and equipped to accomplish their assigned mission. If confirmed, I will continue the strong partnership with the National Guard Bureau and The Adjutants General to maintain the readiness of 

WMD–CSTs and CERFPs and continue to reassess the mission, and the requirements, based on the existing threats. 

Question. If not, what changes do you believe are needed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the state of the entire CBRN Response Enterprise and seek for opportunities to make improvements as deemed necessary. The 

WMD–CSTs and CERFPs have a no-fail mission and I will support the Services, National Guard Bureau, and The Adjutants General in advocating for them. 

CYBERSECURITY

Question. DOD has issued its cybersecurity strategy. Cyber threats could affect 

both our military and civilian sectors in the United States, public and private. 

What is NORTHCOM’s current role in cybersecurity within its Area of Operations, and how does it relate to the cybersecurity role of DHS? 

Answer. NORTHCOM’s role is to detect, deter, and prevent malicious cyber activity targeting the Command’s assigned missions. This is accomplished through inherent cyberspace capabilities and relationships with mission partners such as U.S. 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM), U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), DHS, National Security Agency, the National Guard, and Canada. 

DHS’s primary cybersecurity role is to coordinate the national protection, prevention, mitigation of, and recovery from cyber incidents, as well as serve as the Federal lead for the protection of critical infrastructure. DHS provides domestic cyber 

threat awareness, which NORTHCOM leverages to enhance understanding and 

mitigate the Command’s operational risk. 

Question. What should be NORTHCOM’s role in cybersecurity operations? 

Answer. My understanding is that NORTHCOM’s current role in cybersecurity is 

appropriate. The overall lead for cyber within DOD is STRATCOM and 

CYBERCOM, which have a global responsibility. By contrast, NORTHCOM has a 

theater focus, ensuring successful operations in a denied or degraded cyberspace environment. 

Question. What is the relationship between NORTHCOM and CYBERCOM? 

716 

Answer. I believe NORTHCOM has a close relationship with CYBERCOM, collaborating on cyber threats, defensive measures, world-wide situational awareness, 

and cyber planning. CYBERCOM provides support to NORTHCOM in executing its 

assigned missions, such as homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. NORTHCOM leverages the cyberspace capabilities of CYBERCOM to achieve 

operational objectives. 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 

(WHINSEC), which replaced the School of the Americas in 2001, has the mission 

of contributing to theater cooperation activities through the education and training 

of students in the Western Hemisphere from Canada to Chile. If confirmed, you will 

be a member of the WHINSEC Board of Visitors. 

What is the relationship between NORTHCOM and WHINSEC? 

Answer. I understand that NORTHCOM interacts with WHINSEC to ensure the 

NORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan is supported through their resident and mobile training team courses. Additionally, it has been a Command priority to have 

both Canadian and Mexican instructors on the staff at WHINSEC and if confirmed, 

I will continue to encourage the participation of our partner nations. 

Question. In your view, does WHINSEC promote the national security interests 

of the United States in the Western Hemisphere? 

Answer. Yes. WHINSEC is an enabler to the NORTHCOM Theater Campaign 

Plan and supports national security interests. WHINSEC provides the next generation of military and civilian leaders in the Western Hemisphere education and training that promotes peace, human rights, and democratic values while providing 

meaningful training and education in the Profession of Arms. 

Question. In your view, how should NORTHCOM participate in command oversight and curriculum development? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the 2008 Nation Defense Authorization Act 

added the Commander of NORTHCOM as a WHINSEC Board of Visitors member. 

NORTHCOM oversight is provided through this annual meeting on academic instruction, resource application, and to ensure WHINSEC remains focused on national security objectives relevant to the Western Hemisphere. If confirmed, I look 

forward to participating in this annual meeting along with the Commander of 

SOUTHCOM and other board members. 

Question. In your view, what more, if anything, does WHINSEC need to do to emphasize human rights in its curriculum? 

Answer. WHINSEC embeds human rights training in all current curriculums. I 

understand that annually, at the Board of Visitors meeting, existing curriculum is 

reviewed and recommendations are taken for action by the Board of Visitors. This 

forum serves to ensure human rights are emphasized throughout WHINSEC’s curriculum. 

Question. If confirmed, will you attend the WHINSEC Board of Visitor’s annual 

meeting? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to attending the Board of Visitor’s meetings. 

INTELLIGENCE SHARING/NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

Question. What is NORTHCOM’s role and involvement in developing intelligence 

assessments regarding terrorist threats? 

Answer. I understand the NORAD and NORTHCOM Intelligence Directorate assesses and apprises the Commander, senior staff, and NORAD Regions and 

NORTHCOM components of all foreign terrorist threats to North America that 

could impact NORAD and NORTHCOM missions or compel a requirement for the 

Commands to respond when directed or required. The accuracy and timeliness of 

these assessments hinge on a small contingent of dedicated terrorism analysts and 

daily intelligence collaboration with the other combatant commands, Defense Intelligence Agency, and national counterterrorism intelligence, and law enforcement 

agencies. 

Question. What intelligence agencies are involved in providing input to 

NORTHCOM’s staff for the development of intelligence assessments? 

Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM is well integrated throughout 

the intelligence and law enforcement communities. I have been informed that our 

terrorism assessments rely heavily on intelligence and perspectives provided by national counterterrorism agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Defense Combatting Terrorism Center. It is normal practice to coordinate asVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00724 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
717 

sessments with these agencies, and command analysts frequently draft and publish 

joint terrorism assessments with these agencies. To facilitate these essential partnerships, each of the key national counterterrorism agencies has assigned a senior 

representative to NORAD and NORTHCOM, and the Intelligence Directorate has 

assigned senior intelligence analysts to work within the NCTC, the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, and with the Canadian Defense Intelligence Staff. 

Question. What is the current relationship between NORTHCOM and the NCTC? 

Answer. It is my understanding that NORAD and NORTHCOM and the NCTC 

have a close and collaborative relationship. The command has two officers embedded 

at NCTC: one in the Directorate of Intelligence and the other in the Directorate of 

Strategic Operational Plans. Additionally, the commands’ Operational Intelligence 

Watch is in continuous contact with the NCTC Operations Center, and the commands’ terrorism analysts are in daily contact with counterparts at NCTC. I understand the commands frequently host NCTC analysts for briefings on threats of mutual concern and also send analysts to support NCTC working groups. All of this 

collaboration ensures command visibility on developing terrorist threats to the aviation sector, Force Protection, or threats with potential weapons of mass destruction 

and consequence management implications. It also ensures that NCTC is cognizant 

of command missions and can facilitate information sharing on topics of mission relevance. 

Question. Does NORTHCOM have representatives located at the NCTC on a daily 

basis? If so, what are their functions and responsibilities? If not, why not? 

Answer. Yes. I understand the NORAD and NORTHCOM Intelligence Directorate 

has a full-time civilian intelligence officer assigned to NCTC Directorate of Intelligence, who produces homeland threat analysis. NORTHCOM also has an active 

duty officer assigned as an operations representative to the Directorate of Strategic 

Operational Planning at the NCTC. Both serve as advocates for NORTHCOM by 

conveying our mission equities and intelligence needs, and provide the command 

visibility to national-level counterterrorism threats and policy issues. 

Question. Do you believe NORTHCOM representatives at NCTC have the access 

to intelligence needed to fully perform their functions? 

Answer. Yes. It is my understanding the NORAD and NORTHCOM representatives at NCTC have the same access to information as NCTC cadre. This includes 

access to terrorism threat information not shared directly with the command or 

other DOD elements. NORTHCOM representatives at NCTC maintain the balance 

between protecting sensitive case work, investigations, and operations information, 

with information sharing and collaboration. 

Question. How do posse comitatus, privacy restrictions, and other laws and regulations concerning the collection of intelligence within the United States, affect the 

way NORTHCOM receives and uses intelligence? 

Answer. From my experience working for NORTHCOM as Commander of Naval 

Forces North, I know first-hand the importance of conducting all intelligence activities in full compliance with intelligence oversight law and policy. If confirmed, I will 

continue to ensure all NORTHCOM intelligence activities are reviewed by intelligence oversight specialists, thereby making certain they are conducted lawfully, 

consistent with all laws and policies. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. One of NORTHCOM’s missions is the defense of the United States 

against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from nations such as North 

Korea and Iran. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review report stated 

as one of its policy priorities: ‘‘Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic conditions.’’ 

Do you agree that it is essential that our deployed ballistic missile defense systems are operationally effective? 

Answer. Yes. In view of evolving threats, the capability to defend the Nation with 

an effective ballistic missile defense system is paramount. Operationally realistic 

testing underpins the confidence we have in this system and is critical to mission 

readiness. 

Question. Do you agree that it is important to conduct operationally realistic flight 

tests to demonstrate the operational capability and reliability of the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) system? 

Answer. Yes. Flight testing is one of the most important, and visible ways of demonstrating the operational capability and reliability of the GMD system to improve 

warfighter confidence and mission readiness of the system. I understand the 

NORTHCOM staff has worked closely with the Missile Defense Agency and 

STRATCOM in the formation of the Integrated Master Test Plan to provide a plan 

718 

for an adequate test cadence. If confirmed, I look forward to being a participant in 

the conversation. 

Question. Do you agree that, if the recent flight test of the GMD system (flight 

test FTG–06b) demonstrates the successful correction of the problems that caused 

previous flight test failures, that the Missile Defense Agency should deploy the additional 14 Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska, as announced by Secretary of Defense Hagel in March 2013? 

Answer. Yes. In all regards, it appears the recent flight test was a success. This 

successful test is an important step in gaining valuable knowledge that will help 

improve the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) as we move forward. The additional 14 Ground-Based Interceptor’s (GBIs) will provide an increased capacity to 

defend our homeland and I support the timely deployment of these interceptors. 

Question. Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the 

GMD system, including the planned re-design of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, 

and continued improvements to sensor and discrimination capabilities? 

Answer. Yes. Modernization and sustainment of the GMD system hedges against 

future threats by ensuring capabilities will be available when needed. Advancing 

missile technologies by rogue adversaries demands continuous improvement in our 

systems. Redesigned Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) and discrimination improvements are two crucial areas where I believe the Ballistic Missile Defense System needs to continue to focus. 

Question. The committee is aware that a recent independent assessment of the 

GMD system indicated that a number of important reliability and maintenance 

functions are not included in the current GMD program of record. Therefore, the 

committee recommended an increase of $30 million in fiscal year 2015 for these efforts. 

Do you agree that additional attention and funding is needed to ensure the reliability of the GMD system? 

Answer. Reliability and maintenance are both factors that improve our overall 

confidence in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. As the system evolves, 

I believe we need to continue to focus on improvements that increase overall confidence and effectiveness of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program. 

CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. NORTHCOM and NORAD have responsibilities for warning and defending the United States against airborne threats, including cruise missiles. 

Relative to cruise missile defense, what do you believe should be the relationship 

between the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) of the 

Joint Staff, on the one hand, and NORTHCOM and NORAD, on the other hand? 

Answer. I believe the JIAMDO and NORAD and NORTHCOM should continue to 

partner on cruise missile defense. If confirmed, I would aim to carry forward the 

great working relationship previous commanders have developed with JIAMDO. 

Question. Relative to the full spectrum of threats to the United States, how would 

you assess the cruise missile threat to the United States and its territories? 

Answer. I assess that a cruise missile attack is possible, though unlikely to occur 

without indications and warnings registering with the Intelligence Community. I believe the cruise missile threat to be low; however, increasing capability and proliferation make the cruise missile problem increasingly more dangerous. If confirmed, I will be committed to development of a robust capability for cruise missile 

defense. 

Question. If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to address this 

threat? 

Answer. I understand NORAD developed a Defense Design for Cruise Missile Defense of the National Capital Region and is currently evaluating emerging technologies to defend against the cruise missile and other air breathing threats. Technologies from the Defense Design are intended to be scalable for expansion across 

North America. If confirmed, I would closely monitor progress on cruise missile defense programs and emphasize the importance of an integrated air and missile defense capability to secure key terrain and critical infrastructure. 

Question. What role do you believe the planned operational exercise of the Joint 

Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) system will 

play in establishing improved capabilities to detect and defend against evolving 

cruise missile threats to the Homeland? 

Answer. I believe JLENS will play an extremely important role in establishing 

improved capabilities. As part of the Operational Exercise, efforts are underway to 

integrate this system into the existing NORAD air defense architecture. This will 

719 

significantly improve the capability to detect, track, and warn, and in the near future engage cruise missiles. 

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE

Question. How has the continental air defense mission changed since the end of 

the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001? 

Answer. In the Cold War era, NORAD was focused primarily on deterring, detecting, and defending against external threats approaching the continent from beyond 

our borders. Since September 11, 2001, NORAD’s focus has evolved to also look at 

potential terrorist attacks originating from both inside and outside the borders of 

the United States and Canada. 

Question. Do you believe that current U.S. continental air defense capabilities are 

adequate to meet national security needs? 

Answer. Yes. Through a network of alert fighters, tanker aircraft, command and 

control platforms, and ground-based air defense systems, NORAD stands watch over 

the Homeland. I understand NORAD continues to evolve and regularly evaluates 

and updates its air defense capabilities in order to outpace threats and ensure the 

air defense of the United States and Canada. 

Question. If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you prioritize to address any identified deficiencies? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess NORAD’s air defense capabilities to confirm 

that they meet national security requirements. At that time, I will work to eliminate 

any identified deficiencies and ensure we maintain continuity of the aerospace 

warning and aerospace control mission. 

MARITIME WARNING AND MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

Question. NORAD has gained the mission of Maritime Warning for North America. How does this mission fit into the larger Maritime Domain Awareness mission, 

and what role do you expect NORAD and NORTHCOM to have in Maritime Domain 

Awareness in the near term? 

Answer. The NORAD Maritime Warning mission relies upon Maritime Domain 

Awareness to develop a comprehensive shared understanding of the maritime operational environment and to issue bi-national warnings of maritime threats or attacks against North America. The Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM coordinates with a global maritime community of interest to expand information sharing 

and Maritime Domain Awareness through agreements, plans development, cooperative training, and acquisition of Maritime Domain Awareness sensors/tools. In my 

current job, I’m also dual-hatted as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command, and support NORTHCOM and NORAD to ensure that we share a very high 

degree of Maritime Domain Awareness. 

ARCTIC REGION MISSION

Question. The 2011 UCP realigned the boundaries of combatant command AORs 

in the Arctic region. NORTHCOM’s AOR now includes the Bering Strait and the 

North Pole. NORTHCOM was also tasked to become DOD’s advocate for Arctic capabilities. 

What is the practical effect of this assignment, and how has it changed 

NORTHCOM planning and operations? 

Answer. The practical effect of the 2011 changes to the UCP is greater emphasis 

on planning for operations in the Arctic. The Arctic is an historic approach to the 

Homeland. It demands unique attention in light of the recent increase in accessibility and human activity in the region. I understand that NORTHCOM has undertaken significant planning and exercise efforts dedicated to a range of safety, security, and defense considerations. If confirmed, I will work to translate these plans 

and the lessons learned from exercises into a realistic, prioritized list of DOD requirements. 

Question. What specific programs, if any, will you put in place if confirmed to 

identify and develop capabilities to protect and defend American sovereignty and interests in the Arctic region? 

Answer. If confirmed, first I would focus on improving our awareness of human 

activity and operations in the region, encompassing a whole-of-government and 

whole-of-community approach. Information on current/pending Arctic activity resides with many U.S. Federal, State, and private sector entities, as well as counterpart organizations in Canada. I believe we need to understand what information is 

available, who has it, how we can get it, and how we can turn it into actionable 

information when needed. Next, I would look to improve communications at the 

high latitudes throughout the year and during severe weather conditions. Finally, 

720 

I would work to identify realistic requirements for defense infrastructure and ways 

to maintain presence. 

Question. By what process will you identify requirements for support from other 

government agencies, such as the Coast Guard, in fulfilling requirements for the 

Arctic region? 

Answer. I understand there is good interagency coordination already underway regarding the Arctic, and if confirmed, I will certainly work to further enhance that 

collaboration and cooperation. General Jacoby and former U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Papp jointly signed an Arctic Capabilities Assessment White 

paper that recommended capability gaps, on which both the DOD and DHS should 

focus. Further, I understand NORTHCOM sponsors a working group that focuses 

on Arctic issues and routinely brings together various Federal and Alaska State 

agencies. 

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

Question. Do you support United States accession to the Law of the Sea Convention? If so, please explain why. 

Answer. Yes. United States accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would 

provide a forum for protecting and advancing U.S. interests, including freedom of 

access and offshore resources. The Convention would support NORTHCOM’s interest in the peaceful opening of the Arctic in a manner that strengthens international 

cooperation. 

Question. Given NORTHCOM’s responsibilities for the Arctic region, do you believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would help the United States 

protect its interests in the Arctic, including against competing claims from foreign 

nations? 

Answer. Yes, for several reasons. At the geostrategic level, I believe we should not 

be the only Arctic nation that is outside the Convention. In addition, all the other 

countries bordering the Arctic Ocean are Parties and have made (or are preparing) 

submissions regarding continental shelves beyond 200 miles to the Convention body. 

We are working on the outer limits of the U.S. shelf, the largest single portion of 

which is in the Arctic, but can only get a formal blessing if we join the Convention. 

Lastly, as Arctic warming enables a wide range of human activity (shipping, oil/gas, 

tourism, fishing), it becomes more important that we put our ocean rights on a treaty footing and have a larger voice in the interpretation/development of rules. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, NORTHCOM, and Commander, NORAD? 

Answer. Yes 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

721 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

WESTERN HEMISPHERE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

1. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Gortney, as a member of the Western Hemisphere 

Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) Board of Visitors, I was pleased to 

read in your advance policy questions about your strong support of their mission 

and your eagerness to further strengthen our cooperation with our partner nations. 

As we continue to focus on strengthening the security capacities of our partners in 

South and Central America, what additional roles can WHINSEC play in that endeavor? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I believe additional roles for WHINSEC and the leaders it influences include the continuing evolution of human rights education, as well as implementation of lessons learned from military/law enforcement operations and outreach with civilian institutions. WHINSEC contributes to the profession of arms of 

partner nations through a curriculum that is grounded in rule of law and human 

rights, ultimately supporting NORTHCOM’s mission where partner nations contribute to the cooperative defense of North America. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

EAST COAST MISSILE DEFENSE

2. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, the current Commander of U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM), General Jacoby, stated: ‘‘The third site, if you built it, 

would give us better weapons access, it’d give us increased inventory and increased 

battle space with regards to a threat coming from the direction of the Middle East.’’ 

Do you agree with General Jacoby? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I agree with his assessment, as well as his comments that conducting the Environmental Impact Studies at all four potential sites puts us in a 

favorable position to make a fielding decision in a timely fashion, should the Department decide to do so. 

3. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, are you aware of section 227 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the requirement for the Director of 

the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to develop a contingency plan for the deployment 

of a Homeland missile defense interceptor site? If yes, please explain your thoughts 

about this contingency plan. 

Admiral GORTNEY. I understand the MDA plans to complete the Environmental 

Impact Studies at all four potential sites by the end of 2015. The data from these 

studies will be used by MDA to inform the contingency plan that will then be presented to Congress. 

4. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, do you commit to working with the MDA 

to develop the contingency plan and coming back and briefing me on it, once you 

are confirmed? 

Admiral GORTNEY. If confirmed, I am committed to working with MDA in all endeavors related to homeland defense. Regarding the contingency plan, I believe that 

we need to wait for completion of the Environmental Impact Studies at the four 

sites and then make an informed decision on which site makes the most sense. 

While this process unfolds, we will continue to watch the threat so that we will be 

in a position to make an informed decision when required. I believe MDA is best 

positioned to brief you on the contingency plan as the Department of Defense (DOD) 

lead for this effort, but if confirmed, should you have any residual questions for 

NORTHCOM, I would be happy to talk to you at your convenience. 

JOINT LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE ELEVATED NETTED SENSOR SYSTEM

5. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) engineering and manufacturing development successfully concluded in December 2013. What capabilities would 

JLENS provide the NORTHCOM commander? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The JLENS (aerostat radar) at Aberdeen Proving Ground will 

provide persistent surveillance and fire control; cueing for defense against cruise 

missile, aircraft, Unmanned Aircraft System, and large caliber rockets; as well as 

wide area surveillance for the Northeast United States. 

722 

6. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, I understand that DOD is deploying a 

JLENS at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG). What are the goals for this deployment? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The goals for this deployment are to surveil, detect, track, 

identify, and provide fire quality tracks to our air defense structure. By taking advantage of JLENS wide area surveillance, the overall objective is to increase decision time available to respond efficiently and accurately for the defense of Washington, DC. 

7. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, what does NORTHCOM expect to learn 

from the deployment at APG? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The operational exercise will demonstrate JLENS integration 

into NORAD’s air defense structure to detect, track and identify potential air 

threats to the greater Washington DC area, as well as new technologies to safely 

employ the current rules of engagement for Operation Noble Eagle. The operational 

exercise objectives include: use JLENS for wide-area surveillance in order to support 

current decisions and intercept timelines; provide precision cue to fighters and 

Ground-Based Air Defense (GBAD) to aid in acquiring and prosecuting tracks of interest; use current Operation Noble Eagle and NORAD rules of engagement and 

timelines; focus on the cruise missile threat to the Homeland; include general aviation, Unmanned Aerial Systems and ultra-lights, as time allows; and, consider surface moving targets in the maritime domain. 

8. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, what are the metrics that will be used to 

evaluate the deployment at APG? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I understand NORAD staff is drafting an assessment plan for 

the JLENS operational exercise, which will document the approach, data, and analysis being used to assess how the system supports the NORAD air defense mission. 

The plan will support the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act requirement to 

provide a report to the congressional defense committees that identifies planned 

data and analysis for the demonstration. This report is due no later than 90 days 

after initiation of the JLENS demonstration and if confirmed, I plan to submit it 

in the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2015. 

9. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, what is the timeline for the deployment at 

APG? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The JLENS consists of two aerostats: a surveillance system 

and a fire control system. The surveillance system is expected to fly in mid-December 2014, followed approximately 6 weeks later by the fire control system. An initial 

operational capability is estimated for late second quarter/early third quarter fiscal 

year 2015. During the 3-year test window, JLENS capabilities will be fully explored 

as part of the NORAD air defense structure. 

10. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, what will be the next step after the deployment at APG? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I understand the next step will be a decision by the Secretary 

of Defense whether to transition JLENS to operational status. The deployment and 

operational exercise will provide the information needed for the Secretary to make 

this determination. 

NATIONAL GUARD

11. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, the National Guard plays an essential role 

in responding to manmade and natural disasters here at home. What is your assessment regarding the role of the National Guard in helping NORTHCOM accomplish 

its Homeland missions? 

Admiral GORTNEY. NORTHCOM’s homeland missions directly align with the first 

of three pillars emphasized in the defense strategy: protect the Homeland. To protect the Homeland, NORTHCOM is prepared to deter and defeat attacks on the 

United States and to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential 

attacks and natural disasters. As a component of the Total Force, the National 

Guard plays an essential role in all aspects of NORTHCOM’s homeland missions. 

Daily, members of the Air National Guard stand ready, or actively fly, missions directly supporting Operation Noble Eagle. For defense support of civil authorities, 

NORTHCOM recognizes and supports the vital role that the National Guard plays 

in the National Response Framework. 

12. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Gortney, will you make it a priority to develop a 

strong relationship with the National Guard, once you are confirmed? 

723 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes. I believe a trusted relationship and strong teamwork between the Commander, NORTHCOM and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau 

are critical to the continued success of NORTHCOM mission accomplishment. If confirmed, I will be committed to building on an already strong relationship with the 

National Guard Bureau. 

[The nomination reference of ADM William E. Gortney, USN, follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

June 23, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under Title 10, 

U.S.C., section 601: 

To be Admiral 

ADM William E. Gortney, 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of ADM William E. Gortney, USN, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR ADM WILLIAM EVANS GORTNEY, USN 

02 Sep 1977 Ensign 

02 Sep 1979 Lieutenant (junior grade) 

01 Oct 1981 Lieutenant 

01 Jul 1987 Lieutenant Commander 

01 Sep 1992 Commander 

01 Dec 1998 Captain 

01 May 2005 Rear Admiral (lower half) 

01 Nov 2007 Rear Admiral 

05 Jul 2008 Vice Admiral 

14 Sep 2012 Admiral, Service continuous to date 

Assignments and duties: 

From To

Training Squadron Six (DUINS) ......................................................................................................... Sep 1977 Dec 1977 

Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL (DUINS) .............................................................. Dec 1977 Jan 1978 

Training Wing One (DUINS) ............................................................................................................... Jan 1978 Jan 1979 

Training Squadron Two Six (Flight Instructor) .................................................................................. Jan 1979 Jun 1980 

Attack Squadron One Seven Four (Ready Replacement Pilot) ......................................................... Jun 1980 Mar 1981 

Attack Squadron Eight Two (Weapons Training Officer) .................................................................. Apr 1981 Mar 1984 

Strike Fighter Squadron One Two Five (Strike Phase Head) ............................................................ Mar 1984 Sep 1987 

Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA (DUINS) ........................................................................ Oct 1987 Nov 1987 

Strike Fighter Squadron Eight Seven (Maintenance Officer) ............................................................ Nov 1987 Jul 1989 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Aide to Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air 

Warfare)(OP–05).

Jul 1989 .. Mar 1991 

Strike Fighter Squadron One Zero Six (DUINS) ................................................................................. Mar 1991 May 1991 

XO, Strike Fighter Squadron One Three Two ..................................................................................... May 1991 Jun 1992 

XO, Strike Fighter Squadron One Five .............................................................................................. Jun 1992 Oct 1993 

CO, Strike Fighter Squadron One Five .............................................................................................. Oct 1993 Jan 1995 

Naval War College, Newport, RI (DUINS) .......................................................................................... Feb 1995 Mar 1996 

CO, Strike Fighter Squadron One Zero Six ........................................................................................ Mar 1996 Jul 1997 

Joint Staff, Washington, DC (Operations Officer)(J3) ....................................................................... Jul 1997 .. Jul 1999 

Strike Fighter Squadron One Zero Six (DUINS) ................................................................................. Jul 1999 .. Oct 1999 

Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, Eskan Village, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (Deputy for Current Operations).Oct 1999 Feb 2000 

724 

From To 

Strike Fighter Squadron One Zero Six (DUINS) ................................................................................. Feb 2000 May 2000 

Commander, Carrier Air Wing Seven (Deputy Commander) ............................................................. May 2000 Jan 2002 

Commander, Carrier Air Wing Seven ................................................................................................ Jan 2002 Feb 2003 

Commander, Fifth Fleet/Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (Chief of Staff) ......... Feb 2003 Aug 2004 

Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (Director for Operations, Plans, Policy, and Training) 

(N3/5/7).

Aug 2004 Jul 2006 

Commander, Carrier Strike Group Ten .............................................................................................. Jul 2006 .. Apr 2008 

Commander, Second Fleet (Special Assistant) ................................................................................. Apr 2008 Jul 2008 

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, Fifth Fleet .......................... Jul 2008 .. Jul 2010 

Director, Joint Staff ........................................................................................................................... Jul 2010 .. Aug 2012 

Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command ......................................................................................... Sep 2012 To Date 

Medals and awards: 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with one Gold Star 

Bronze Star Medal 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster 

Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars 

Air Medal with one Gold Star and numeral 3 

Joint Service Commendation Medal with two Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters 

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal 

Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award with one Bronze Star 

Navy Unit Commendation 

Meritorious Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star 

Navy Expeditionary Medal 

National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star 

Southwest Asia Service Medal with one Bronze Star 

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

Armed Forces Service Medal 

Humanitarian Service Medal 

Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star and two Bronze Stars 

Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon 

NATO Medal 

Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait) 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by ADM William E. Gortney, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

725 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

William E. Gortney. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace 

Defense Command. 

3. Date of nomination: 

June 24, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

September 25, 1955; La Jolla, CA. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Sherry Ann Gortney. 

Sherry Ann Burdeshaw (Maiden Name). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

William Gortney, age 32. 

Stephanie Gortney, age 27. 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the Service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

KAPPA SIGMA - Elon Univeristy, Tailhook Association, Naval Institute. 

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

2013 KAPPA SIGMA Man of the Year. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY. 

726 

This 13th day of May, 2014. 

[The nomination of ADM William E. Gortney, USN, was reported 

to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 22, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN John F. Campbell, USA, 

by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)? 

Answer. The Commander, ISAF (COMISAF) is the senior NATO uniformed officer 

in Afghanistan. He is the in-theatre operational commander exercising operational 

control of all ISAF forces in Afghanistan. COMISAF employs assigned forces, 

through a strategic partnership with Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), to conduct functionally based security force assistance (train, advise, 

assist) to enable credible, capable and increasingly sustainable Afghan Security Institutions and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) that are capable of preventing terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan. 

ISAF is a NATO-directed operation conducted under U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 (2001), which authorizes the establishment of ISAF to assist 

the Afghan Government in maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas 

and to take all necessary measures to fulfill this mandate. Following a U.N. and 

NATO/North Atlantic Council agreement, NATO assumed strategic command of 

ISAF on 11 August 2003 under the authority of UNSCR 1386 and successor 

UNSCRs. Subsequently, UNSCR 1510 (2003) geographically expanded the ISAF 

mandate established in UNSCR 1386 to cover all of Afghanistan. 

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR–A) and how do those duties and functions relate to those of the Commander, NATO ISAF? 

Answer. The Commander of USFOR–A is the senior U.S. officer in Afghanistan 

with duties distinct from his duties as COMISAF. The USFOR–A Commander exercises National Command Element and National Support Element authorities and 

responsibilities for ensuring that U.S. forces have the guidance, equipment, and 

funding they need to conduct their missions. He ensures unity of effort among all 

U.S. forces including those under the ISAF command and those forces not under 

ISAF command, such as those U.S. forces conducting U.S. detention operations and 

U.S. counterterrorism operations. 

COMISAF employs the forces that troop-contributing nations provide to ISAF of 

which the United States remains the largest troop-contributing nation. The Commander, USFOR–A, directs and oversees the United States’ military contributions 

within ISAF while COMISAF duties include ensuring the operations of all troopcontributing nations, including those of U.S. forces, are coordinated. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I have had the opportunity to work very closely on Afghanistan in several 

of my assignments as a general officer to include my current position as the Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army and my previous position as the Deputy Chief of Staff 

G3/5/7, specifically focused on personnel, retrograde, and resourcing our forces. I 

commanded RC-East in 2010–2011 as the Division Command of the 101st Airborne, 

and also deployed my Brigade there in 2003 when in Command of 1st Brigade, 

504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. My command in RCEast in 2010–2011 was during the surge and consisted of a combined force of approximately 30,000 U.S. and allied servicemembers in 14 provinces in Eastern Afghanistan, and shared more the 300 miles of border area with Pakistan. this provided me with critical coalition leadership experience and relationships. We also 

successfully partnered with two Afghan National Army Corps, a large contingent of 

Afghan Police and Afghan Border Police, and routinely worked with the Pakistan 

Army to facilitate complementary operation against insurgents in the border areas. 

727 

Since leaving command in 2011, I have traveled to Afghanistan on multiple occasions and dedicated a great deal of time to self study of the Afghanistan/Pakistan 

region. In my current assignment I frequently represent the Chief of Staff of the 

Army in Tank sessions where our Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy is addressed and 

I contribute to the development of best military advice to the Secretary of Defense 

and the President. I have also interacted extensively with Congress as the Vice 

Chief of Staff and feel I understand the Civil-Military relationship that must exist 

to achieve success. 

Finally, I believe my experience as a deputy Division commander and a General 

Officer in Iraq in 2006 and 2007 was valuable combat leadership experience and enhanced my understanding of the nature of counterinsurgency operations and the associated challenges. All of these experiences, if confirmed, will serve as a foundation 

for my leadership as the ISAF Commander. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, NATO ISAF, and/ 

or Commander, USFOR–A? 

Answer. A professional military officer should never stop listening or learning. If 

confirmed, I will continue to deepen my knowledge of the strategic environment and 

seek input from a wide range of military and civilian experts. If confirmed and before taking command, I will also spend a great deal of time visiting our forces on 

the ground and leaders from across NATO to enhance my understanding of the fight 

and to assist me in refining my personal framing of the problem. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR–A, to the following: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The USFOR–A Commander reports to the CENTCOM Commander, who, 

in turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This reporting relationship is 

prescribed in title 10, U.S.C., section 164(d)(1). COMISAF does not have a formal 

relationship with the Secretary of Defense because COMISAF reports to the NATO 

chain of command through the Commander of Joint Forces Command-Brunssum, 

who reports to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The USFOR–A Commander does not have a formal command relationship with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but coordinates with him 

through the CENTCOM Commander on a regular basis. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National 

Security Council and while he is the Nation’s senior military officer, he is not in 

the chain of command. The USFOR–A Commander sends his advice and opinions 

on military operations to the Chairman through the CENTCOM Commander. 

Question. Commander, U.S. Central Command. 

Answer. The Commander, USFOR–A works very closely with the Commander, 

CENTCOM on all aspects of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. By law, the 

Commander, USFOR–A reports directly to the Commander, CENTCOM. The Commander, CENTCOM exercises authoritative direction and control over all U.S. 

Forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which includes all U.S. Forces in 

Afghanistan. The Commander, CENTCOM provides authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. He has delegated National Command Element and National Support Element authority and responsibilities to the Commander, USFOR–A. 

Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. 

Answer. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is the NATO strategic-level 

commander of all NATO forces, including those assigned to the NATO mission in 

Afghanistan. He provides the Commander of Joint Forces Command-Brunssum 

(JFC–B) with strategic guidance and direction. Joint Forces Command-Brunssum is 

NATO’s operational level command responsible for the mission in Afghanistan. In 

short, SACEUR provides strategic direction and campaign objectives and the Commander of JFC–B directs COMISAF to attain these objectives and perform key military and supporting tasks, as mandated by the North Atlantic Council. 

Question. Commander, ISAF Joint Command. 

Answer. ISAF Joint Command (IJC) is ISAF’s operational-level command and is 

subordinate to HQ ISAF. As such, the commander of IJC, reports to COMISAF. The 

IJC Commander is also dual-hatted as the Deputy Commander of USFOR–A, and 

retains certain U.S. command authorities. IJC was established in November 2009. 

Question. Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. 

728 

Answer. NTM–A oversees training and equipping of Afghan forces across Afghanistan and is subordinate to IJC. NTM–A trains, advises, and assists ANSF training 

in order to support the creation of a capable and enduring force that protects the 

Afghan population and denies safe haven to the insurgency. NTM–A was established in April 2009, merged into the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A) in March 2010, and then reassigned to IJC in 2013. 

Question. Commander, Joint Interagency Task Force Afghanistan. 

Answer. Commander, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Afghanistan 

(CJIATF–A) is a subordinate headquarter to headquarter ISAF. CJIATF–A provides 

operational advice, recommendations, and synchronizes strategic Counter Corruption, Counter Narcotics, Counter Threat Finance, and No Contracting with the 

Enemy activities in order to deny resources to the enemy, enhance transparency and 

accountability within GIRoA, and strengthen the International Community’s confidence in GIRoA. CJIATF–A accomplishes these missions through two sub task 

forces, two mentoring teams, and two partnered interagency units. 

Question. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. 

Answer. The USFOR–A Commander provides operational assistance and advice, 

to include U.S. military views and recommendations, to the U.S. Ambassador. He 

maintains a close working relationship with the Ambassador to ensure that military 

and civilian efforts are synchronized and mutually supporting. This is particularly 

important in the Rule of Law arena where the Department of State has the lead 

for the United States Government. The Commander, Combined Joint-Interagency 

Task Force 435 (who reports directly to the USFOR–A Commander), provides support to the Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement, who reports directly to the U.S. Ambassador. 

Question. U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Answer. The USFOR–A Commander provides operational assistance and advice, 

to include U.S. military views and recommendations, to the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He maintains a close working relationship with 

the Special Representative to ensure that military and civilian efforts are synchronized and mutually supporting. This relationship is particularly important to 

the ongoing security and political transition, as well as re-integration and reconciliation efforts, which will facilitate an inclusive Afghan political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. 

Question. The Secretary General of NATO. 

Answer. The NATO Secretary General chairs the North Atlantic Council, the 

highest political authority in NATO. The North Atlantic Council is responsible for 

the overall decisions and direction of NATO policy and operations and is comprised 

of ambassador-level representatives of all NATO members, including the United 

States. The Council is advised on military matters and the conduct of operations by 

the Military Committee, which is also composed of senior military representatives 

from each member state. The North Atlantic Council, under the Secretary General’s 

leadership, provides overall direction and guidance to the military chain of command. In practical terms, the SACEUR leads all NATO military operations and advises NATO’s Military Committee. Thus, in the case of the ISAF mission, the Secretary General, following consultations and decisions by the North Atlantic Council, 

provides guidance and direction to SACEUR through the Military Committee, and 

the SACEUR communicates those directives and guidance through NATO’s military 

chain of command. COMISAF and the Secretary General confer and consult regularly, including formal updates to the Secretary General and the North Atlantic 

Council on the progress of military operations in Afghanistan. 

Question. NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan. 

Answer. The NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) for Afghanistan is the 

civilian counterpart to COMISAF. As the NATO Secretary General’s direct representative in Afghanistan, the SCR is charged with carrying forward the political 

aspects of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan. Although there is no formal command relationship, the SCR and COMISAF work in close concert and with full 

transparency in accordance with the North Atlantic Council-approved Terms of Reference for the SCR and SACEUR as well as JFC–B’s guidance for COMISAF. In 

short, this cooperative relationship is critical to underwrite NATO’s operational military and political engagement in Afghanistan and can help to improve cooperation 

between ISAF and international civilian agencies in Afghanistan. 

Question. United Nations Special Representative in Afghanistan. 

Answer. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Afghanistan is an important leader in the international community’s efforts in Afghanistan. 

While no command relationship exists between COMISAF and the U.N. SRSG, the 

ISAF mission was authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution to assist the Afghan Government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. SimiVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00736 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
729 

larly, the U.N. SRSG has a mandate to lead the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) supporting the Afghan Government in its efforts to improve critical 

areas, including security, governance, economic development, and regional cooperation, as well as to support the full implementation of mutual commitments made 

on these issues at the London Conference in January 2010 and the subsequent 

Kabul Conference in July 2010. The SACEUR OPLAN states that COMISAF is expected to work in close coordination with both the NATO SCR and the U.N. SRSG. 

These partnerships support efforts to work with the Afghan Government to ensure 

progress towards the goal of a self-sufficient Afghanistan. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. What are the major challenges and problems you foresee, if confirmed 

as the next Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR–A, in the implementation of the mission in Afghanistan? 

Answer. I believe there are three major challenges. Our first challenge is to manage the transition from the ISAF mission and force level to the 2015 Resolute Support mission and force level. The Resolute Support mission posture reduces our footprint to fewer bases in four regions and the Kabul-Bagram area. This will be a significant transition for both the Coalition and the Afghans, as the ANSF takes full 

responsibility for security even as they work to build long-term capability. The second challenge involves the shift of advisory efforts from combat advising to developing the Afghan Security Institutions to sustain a modern army and national police 

force. Our third challenge will be to continue effective counterterrorism operations 

to dismantle, defeat, and disrupt al Qaeda in the region. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges 

and problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Government, NATO, and other 

troop-contributing nations, and our Afghan partners to execute a mutually agreedupon framework for the transition process and capacity-building within the ANSF 

and the broader Afghan system. I will work closely with security ministers and 

other key leaders to help them prioritize requirements and focus on developing Afghan self-sustainability of an effective security force. We will decisively counter insurgent narratives of coalition abandonment through these and other transition actions. 

Question. What is your understanding of U.S. vital interests and strategic objectives in Afghanistan currently and the changes, if any, after 2014? 

Answer. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan aims to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates, contribute to regional and international peace and stability, and enhance the 

ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity. Our mission provides time and space for the ANSF and GIRoA to 

increase capacity and assume full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security by the 

end of 2014. 

Diplomatic efforts continue to complement military efforts. The United States and 

the international community continue to encourage Afghan reconciliation efforts 

with the Taliban as a means to a political solution to the conflict. 

Question. What is your understanding of U.S. strategy to achieve these objectives? 

Answer. The International Security Assistance Force’s primary task is to develop 

the capacity and capability of the ANSF to provide security for Afghanistan. The 

campaign remains a comprehensive counterinsurgency but is now Afghan-led. The 

coalition continues its efforts to deny safe havens for AQ and supports expanding 

GIRoA efforts to disrupt terrorist safe havens. The primary means to achieve this 

is through the development and fielding of a capable, sustainable ANSF. 

SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan and 

the nature, size, and scope of the insurgency? 

Answer. The insurgency is an enduring threat to Afghanistan. However, the 

insurgency’s operational effectiveness has been degraded in some parts of the country so far this year, due in part to improved ANSF performance and growing divisions within the Taliban. As a result, the 2014 summer fighting season violence levels are below historical norms. Most notably, the Taliban failed to derail the Afghan 

Presidential elections, as Afghans voted in record numbers despite Taliban threats 

of violence. However, the insurgents are resilient. They maintain safe havens in Afghanistan and leverage them to train and plot future attacks. Additionally, the presence of numerous insurgent/terrorist groups (e.g., Taliban, Haqqani Network, al 

Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, etc.) allows for the sharing of tactics, techniques and 

procedures. The insurgents also have access to significant internal resources 

730 

through religious taxation, illicit mining, narcotics trade, and other criminal enterprises (kidnapping, human trafficking, etc. . . . ). 

While the insurgency is by no means popular among the Afghan population, it 

continues to attract Afghans to join its ranks through coercion, disenfranchisement, 

or the lack of an alternative means to support their family. Recruitment may decline 

as the ISAF presence decreases and as battle fatigue sets in amongst Taliban rankand-file. Nonetheless, expect the insurgents to attempt to capitalize on any political 

missteps to undermine popular faith in GIRoA. 

Question. What is your assessment of the role and importance of Pakistan to the 

security situation in Afghanistan? In what areas do you think Pakistan could improve to enhance the security situation in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Pakistan is postured to occupy a significant role in the security situation 

in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s first priority is its eastern border with India, but it also 

continues to be concerned over growing Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan 

is and will continue to be a critical partner in the region. The stability of the entire 

region requires cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both nations face 

common threats that attack their civilian populations and threaten their long-term 

development. Both nations must work together to reduce cross border militancy and 

resolve conflicts to enhance the security of each nation and the region as a whole. 

I will continue to work with both nations to support a constructive bilateral relationship to support these two allies and enhance long-term stability throughout the region. 

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2014

Question. In May, President Obama announced that, if the U.S.-Afghan Bilateral 

Security Agreement is concluded, the United States would plan to retain 9,800 U.S. 

servicemembers in Afghanistan, along with our allies and partners. The mission of 

these U.S. forces would be training, advising and assisting Afghan security forces 

and supporting counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda. The President also 

announced that this U.S. troop level would be reduced by approximately half by the 

end of 2015, consolidating forces in Kabul and at the Bagram air base. By the end 

of 2016, U.S. forces would be drawdown to an embassy presence in Kabul, with a 

security assistance component. 

Do you support the President’s decision on the size of the U.S. military presence 

in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. Yes, I support the President’s decision. 

Question. Do you support the pace for the reduction of those forces between the 

end of 2014 and the beginning of 2017? 

Answer. Yes, with an understanding that we should continue to validate the assumptions and assess the conditions on the ground as the drawdown takes place. 

Question. The President said that ‘‘our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul’’ by the end of 2016. 

What is your understanding of what a ‘‘normal embassy presence’’ looks like? 

Answer. A normal embassy presence will consist of a Defense Attache ́ Office and 

a Security Cooperation Office under a Senior Defense Official with a military reporting chain through the CENTCOM. A deliberate and measured transfer of enduring 

security cooperation activities is required to maintain continuity of ANSF development and maintain our relationship with Afghanistan as an enduring counterterrorism partner. Planning for the Security Cooperation Office-Afghanistan is underway at CENTCOM and its size will depend upon factors such as security cooperation objectives, ANSF capabilities, GIRoA requests, security assistance funding 

oversight requirements, and force protection concerns. 

Question. What is your understanding of what a ‘‘normal’’ security relationship 

with Afghanistan will look like? 

Answer. A normal security relationship with Afghanistan will come to resemble 

security cooperation organizations that operate in other parts of the world out of 

U.S. Embassies. The Security Cooperation Office-Afghanistan will contain a security 

force assistance capability tailored to the needs of the ANSF and Afghan Security 

Institutions. Over the long term, I see the United States and Afghanistan establishing an enduring strategic partnership, with many facets in addition to the military, that furthers U.S. strategic objectives in the region. 

Question. What are the major challenges you foresee, if confirmed, in the implementation of the plan announced by the President? 

Answer. I believe there are three major challenges. Our first challenge is to manage the transition from the ISAF mission and force levels to the 2015 Resolute Support mission and force level. The second challenge involves the shift of advisory efforts from combat advising to developing the Afghan Security Institutions to sustain 

731 

a modern army and national police force. Our third challenge will be to continue 

effective counterterrorism operations, both training, advising, and assisting our Afghan partners and through bilateral operations with the Afghans to dismantle, defeat and disrupt al Qaeda in the region. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing those challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with United States, NATO and other troop contributing nations, and the Afghans to ensure we posture the force for Resolute Support. I will continue the effort with NATO and the Services to build a Resolute Support advisory team that will strengthen the Afghan Security Institutions. I will ensure the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan remains effective through the 

transition period. 

Question. You have experience leading combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What are the key lines of effort and key dynamics that will ensure Afghanistan security conditions will be better after 2014 than the circumstances we 

are seeing in Iraq today? 

Answer. Afghanistan and Iraq are two different places, with different cultural and 

security dynamics at play. The key dynamic is the possibility of a stable political 

transition that results in a new Afghan President who is seen as legitimate both 

in the eyes of the Afghan people and of the international community. The Afghan 

people have demonstrated their rejection of the insurgents through their overwhelming participation in the recent elections. The Afghan Security forces have developed a sense of responsibility and accountability for the security of all of the Afghan people. The Afghan people have returned this sentiment with a sense of national pride and ownership of the security forces. The ANSF have proven their combat capability through success in two fighting seasons, two national elections, and 

multiple high profile events. The key line of effort I see after 2014 is ministerial 

level training, advising, and assistance, which will ensure the sustainability of the 

ANSF and institutionalize long-term security for Afghanistan. An effective counterterrorism partnership between Afghanistan and the United States is essential to address our most dangerous adversaries in the region. 

NATO AND PARTNER NATION PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2014

Question. What do you anticipate will be the NATO and other partner force levels 

in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. For 2015, the total NATO contribution will be approximately 12,500 

troops. For military planning and force generation purposes, a two-thirds/one-third 

methodology is expected to apply, where the United States will contribute roughly 

two-thirds (up to 9,800 personnel) and NATO will provide one-third (approximately 

4,500) of the total Resolute Support mission force. 

Question. Will those forces be covered under the Bilateral Security Agreement 

(BSA) or under their own agreements? 

Answer. The BSA covers U.S. forces. The draft NATO-Afghanistan status of forces 

agreement (SOFA) covers all NATO forces, as well as non-NATO operational partners. Non-NATO operational partners include nations such as Australia and New 

Zealand. U.S. forces will be covered under both the BSA and the NATO-Afghanistan 

SOFA. Both agreements stipulate that the sending state, in our case the United 

States, will retain exclusive jurisdiction over their forces. 

Question. What roles and missions do you anticipate for partners and allies after 

2014? 

Answer. In addition to the U.S. mission in southern and eastern Afghanistan, 

other Framework Nations will control three of five areas of responsibility across the 

remainder of the country. Germany will lead the Train Advise Assist Command 

(TAAC) in the North, based out of Mezar e Sharif; Italy will lead the TAAC in the 

west, based out of Herat; and Turkey will command the Central area of operations 

from Kabul. The execution of train, advise, and assist (TAA) will entail the development of the Afghan Security Institution programs and processes, through facilitation and counseling. It will also develop the provision of assistance in administration, planning, and financial management. 

Non-Framework Nations will also contribute to the mission through bilateral initiatives in support of the train, advise, and assist effort; such as the UK-led training 

team at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy in Qargha. Other Troop Contributing Nations will provide individual augmentees across the full spectrum of 

staff functions, having bid for specific appointments through the NATO ‘Flags to 

Posts’ process. These personnel will contribute to the combined minimum target of 

12,000 for the Resolute Support mission. In addition to these roles, partner nations 

will continue to provide training and advising assistance to the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) within the terms of the NATO SOFA authorities. 

732 

BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT

Question. Do you support the conclusion of a bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree that, without the legal protections against prosecution in 

Afghan courts that the Bilateral Security Agreement would provide our troops, the 

United States should withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes, I do. If we are unable to secure adequate status protections for U.S. 

Department of Defense military and civilian personnel, critical operational authorities for U.S. forces, and necessary U.S. access to and use of Afghan facilities, we 

will need to withdraw. 

PROGRESS OF AFGHANISTAN OVER THE PAST DECADE

Question. What is your assessment of Afghanistan’s progress over the past decade 

that our troops have operated in that country? 

Answer. The people of Afghanistan, the Afghan Government, and international 

supporters have contributed to the significant progress within Afghanistan over the 

last decade. Of note, the ANSF has taken full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan and earned the respect of the population, while improved access to education and medical care has increased the quality of life for Afghans. The November 

2013 Loya Jirga’s overwhelming endorsement of the Bilateral Security Agreement 

(BSA) and the high turnout for the April and June 2014 elections were indicative 

of popular support for representative government and a continued international 

partnership and presence. 

PERFORMANCE OF THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. In mid-2013 the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) assumed 

lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan. 

What is your assessment of the performance and capabilities of the ANSF since 

assuming the lead for Afghanistan’s security? 

Answer. The ANSF have more than held their own against the insurgency, sustaining the gains made in the 2013 fighting season. They successfully secured the 

presidential and provincial council elections on April 5, 2014, as well as the runoff elections on June 14, 2014. The ANSF continue to demonstrate that they are a 

competent and confident force, and have embraced their role in securing Afghanistan. The ANSF enjoy the support and confidence of the majority of the Afghan people. While their capabilities have expanded rapidly since 2009, they are not yet selfsustainable. Based on current assessments I have reviewed, four key high-end capability gaps that will remain after the ISAF mission ends on December 31, 2014: 

close air support; intelligence enterprise; special operations; and Afghan security 

ministry capacity. International funding and coalition force assistance will be critical to sustaining the force after 2014 and ensuring that Afghan Security Institutions continue to marginalize the insurgencey by maintaining ANSF’s tactical overmatch. If confirmed, I will focus the forces’ efforts towards these challenges, building 

on the progress that has already been made. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges the ANSF 

face in assuming and maintaining their security responsibilities in the next few 

years? 

Answer. ANSF must adapt to operations without coalition enablers as ISAF forces 

phase out of the battle space over time. Our primary task has changed from leading 

combat operations to providing Security Force Assistance (SFA) to the ANSF. As we 

enter the final stages of the ISAF mandate and prepare to execute Resolute Support, the ANSF have reached an important threshold. Evidence increasingly indicates that over 4 years of investment in combat-oriented mentoring and advising 

has paid off. The ANSF still have room for improvement, but there are capable leaders at every echelon who understand the fundamentals of their profession; despite 

this, many significant challenges remain. 

Gaps and developmental shortfalls exist within the Afghan Security Institution 

(ASI). Capability gaps remain in ANSF aviation, intelligence, and special operations, along with developmental shortfalls in systems maintenance, requirement 

forecasting, and human capital. The ASI lacks the capacity to conduct tasks such 

as planning, programming, multi-year budgeting and execution; logistics; acquisitions; and human resource management. Systemic issues require advisory support 

for sustainment, specifically in Inspector General/Transparency Accountability Oversight and strategic plans and policy. ASI development may slow down without roVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00740 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
733 

bust advisory support during the anticipated period of high personnel turnover associated with the post-election transition of power. 

Critical ANSF capability gaps include: aviation, intelligence and ISR, and special 

operations, Casualty Evacuation and Medical Evacuation (CASEVAC/MEDEVAC), 

engineering (sustainability, bridging), Combined Arms Route Clearance Operations, 

and Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices. 

Additionally, the Afghan Security Institution will need to evaluate their force posture with respect to maintenance of its infrastructure. A significant amount of their 

budget and manpower could be consumed in power generation, facilities maintenance, sustainment and force protection if this issue is not addressed. 

The ANSF will continue to play a crucial role in securing what could be Afghanistan’s first peaceful transition of political power. While the Afghan population spoke 

clearly during the electoral process, the fact is the Taliban led insurgency remains 

a resilient and relevant threat and will continue to threaten a peaceful transition 

of power. 

BUILDING AND SUSTAINING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. The ANSF are near their target end strength level of 352,000, consisting of an Afghan National Army (ANA) of 195,000 and Afghan National Police 

(ANP) of 157,000. 

In your view, do the ANA and ANP have the right size and capabilities to address 

the current security situation on the ground in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes, the ANA and ANP are the right size and are developing the right 

capabilities, with our enabling support, to address the security situation in Afghanistan. Based on current assessments, the ANSF still requires aviation, intelligence, 

and sustainment support beyond this year. We continue to work with the ANSF and 

GIRoA to address these capability gaps. 

Question. What in your view are the greatest challenges to building and sustaining the capabilities of the ANSF over the next 2 years? 

Answer. There are two major challenges the government will face in the next 2 

years that could threaten the sustainability of the ANSF; budgeting and accountability. 

Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution capabilities are seen as the 

greatest challenge to the building and sustaining ASI sustainability over the next 

2 years. Resource Management and Procurement departments across ANSF suffer 

from lack of qualified and experienced leadership and low institutional prioritization 

for planning and budget matters. 

Second, the Afghans are building processes and systems that will ensure a transparent and accountable budget execution process. International community requirements for third party oversight of government processes are central for continued 

International Community (IC) support. Without that support the government risks 

losing IC funds required to build and sustain the capabilities of the ANSF and the 

ASI. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for building the capabilities 

of the ANSF, including the key enablers that the ANSF need to develop and maintain? 

Answer. The size, structure, and posture of the Resolute Support mission is configured towards the development of sustainable Afghan systems focused at the Corp 

level and reaching up to the ministerial and institutional levels. The Resolute Support plan is built around functionally-orientated advising, designed to facilitate the 

horizontal and vertical integration of Eight Essential Functions: 

(1) Plan, Program Budget, and Execute; generate requirements, develop a resource informed budget, and execute a spend plan. 

(2) Develop and implement internal controls to assure Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight. 

(3) Maintain/enhance civilian governance of the ASI, including adherence to the 

rule of law. 

(4) Force Generate: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop a professional 

ANSF. 

(5) Sustain the force through effective facilities management, maintenance, medical, and logistics systems. 

(6) Plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns and operations. 

a. Inter-ministerial and joint coordination, and 

b. Command, control, and employ Ground, Air, and Special Operating Forces. 

(7) Develop and mature sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes. 

(8) Maintain internal and external strategic communications capabilities. 

734 

These functions are interdependent and, taken as a whole, contribute directly to 

Afghan sustainability. They span across all levels of conflict, from the tactical to the 

strategic. The key enabler to this effort is the ongoing provision of quality advisors 

to focus on the delivery of Functionally-Based Security Force Assistance (FB–SFA). 

Through the advisory efforts associated with the Eight Essential Functions we 

will improve the Afghan Security Forces’ capabilities in those areas where we are 

currently providing enabler support: aviation, intelligence, and special operations. 

Question. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Chicago 

in 2012, the ISAF participating countries discussed a model for the future size of 

the ANSF of around 228,000, a reduction of about one third from the current ANSF 

end strength. 

What is your understanding regarding current assumptions for the size of the Afghan security forces during and after the completion of the post-2014 train, advise 

and assist mission? 

Answer. The current authorized ‘‘surge’’ end strength of 352,000 will be maintained at least through the end of 2015. We will continue to coordinate with the 

Afghans and international partners on force planning beyond that point based on 

a review of the anticipated security environment, ANSF performance and capacity, 

and available funding. 

Question. Do you agree that any future reductions in the size of the ANSF post2014 need to be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time those 

reductions would occur? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed, do you agree to conduct a review of the plans for the future ANSF force levels to assess whether the size and capabilities of those forces 

are appropriate to address security conditions in Afghanistan post-2014? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the process of assessing future ANSF force 

levels to determine what size and capabilities are appropriate to address evolving 

security conditions in Afghanistan. As conditions on the ground change we will, in 

partnership with GIRoA, continue to assess the necessary size of the ANSF to ensure the success of the mission and the success of the ANSF post-2014. 

Question. How long after 2014 do you anticipate that the United States and international donors will have to provide significant funding to sustain the ANSF? 

Answer. We helped build an Afghan Security National Force to meet the current 

security environment. We believe that as the security environment continues to improve and the ANSF becomes more efficient, forces can be scoped differently and 

thereby allow GIRoA to meet the cost of the ANSF sooner. However, I expect that 

GIRoA will require significant contributions to support their national security forces 

for a number of years beyond 2014. Although most major equipment purchases and 

facilities construction are all but complete, there are significant sustainment costs 

associated with maintaining the current force structure and capability of the ANSF. 

While I cannot say exactly how long, or at what level, these contributions will be 

required, I can describe what we are doing to address it. 

TRAIN, ADVISE, AND ASSIST MISSION

Question. What is your understanding of the role that U.S. and coalition trainers 

and advisers will play in building the capabilities of the ANSF after 2014? 

Answer. U.S. and coalition personnel will continue to train, advise, and assist the 

Afghan Security Institutions and the ANSF to improve systems, processes and organizations, with the goal of developing a self-sustainable ANSF and decreasing the 

need for U.S. and coalition support. The majority of Afghan systems and processes 

are functional; however, there are friction points and maturity issues within these 

systems. If confirmed, I will conduct further review on these efforts to determine 

possible improvements to the process. 

Question. What is your understanding regarding the percentage of the train, advise, and assist mission force structure that will be for actual trainers and advisors, 

and what percentage will be for other functions, such as force protection, support, 

or command and control? 

Answer. The 12,500 NATO personnel that will constitute the Resolute Support 

mission in January 2015 will be broadly attributed to one of the three campaign 

Lines of Effort: the development of the ANSF and the Afghan Security Institution; 

protection of the force; and posturing of the force. Of the 12,500 personnel, 18 percent will be in a direct train, advise, and assist role, developing the ANSF and the 

Afghan Security Institution. Protection will be provided by 32 percent of the overall 

force. Enablers, or those responsible for posturing the force, will constitute approximately 50 percent of personnel. 

735 

Question. At West Point on 28 June, President Obama said, ‘‘And at the end of 

this year, a new Afghan President will be in office and America’s combat mission 

will be over.’’ 

What is your understanding of what specific lines of effort (e.g. close air support, 

medevac) that would be terminated as a result of the combat mission being over? 

Answer. U.S. forces will continue to have enabler support, including close air support, medevac, and intra theater lift. 

Question. What are the key institutional development areas that must be addressed after 2014 to ensure sustainability of the ANSF? 

Answer. The Afghan Security Institutions, namely the Ministry of Defense and 

the Ministry of Interior, are lacking in two key areas. First, the lack of experience 

with plan, program, budget, and execute processes is holding back their ability to 

sustain security and combat forces within the ANSF. The second key institutional 

development area is Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight. 

POST-2014 COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

Question. What is your understanding of roles and missions for U.S. military personnel engaged in counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. With appropriate authorities and a signed BSA, U.S. military personnel 

will continue a counterterrorism (CT) mission against the remnants of al Qaeda 

after 2014. Additionally, U.S. SOF will continue training, advising and assisting Afghan CT forces to develop their CT capacity. 

INSIDER THREAT

Question. What is your assessment of the measures that have been taken by ISAF 

and Afghan leaders to address the insider threat? 

Answer. The combined efforts of ISAF and the ANSF have stopped numerous insider attacks before they could occur and limited casualties through adherence to 

force protection policies. No single countermeasure can prevent insider attacks; 

therefore, ISAF and the ANSF have introduced a program of countermeasures 

which, when applied collectively, can reduce the threat posed by insider attacks. 

These measures include: strengthened vetting and screening processes for ANSF 

new recruits and those returning from leave; increased numbers and training for 

counterintelligence agents; cultural awareness training for both ISAF and ANSF 

personnel; and enhancing force protection for personnel advising Afghans or in remote areas. Insider attacks by ANSF against ISAF (Green-on-Blue) have declined 

substantially since 2012. This is partly due to the reduction of ISAF personnel in 

contact with ANSF forces and partly due to increased force protection and ISAF 

counterintelligence measures. Insider attacks by ANSF against ANSF (green-ongreen) spiked in 2013. As a direct result of ISAF counterintelligence training of 

ANSF forces, green-on-green attacks in the first 6 months of 2014 have dropped 25 

percent when compared to the same 6 month period in 2013. Positive metrics for 

both green-on-blue and green-on-green insider attacks indicate our force protection 

efforts are working. The joint, integrated ISAF–ANSF approach and the level of the 

Afghan Government’s commitment to reducing this mutual threat are encouraging. 

For example, ISAF and the ANSF have a three-star Insider Threat Action Group; 

they have formed joint casualty assessment teams to study incidents and identify 

lessons; and the ANSF vetting programs have stopped hundreds of insider threats 

before they became attacks by identifying suspected attackers. 

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps, if any, would you recommend to address this threat? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to make countering this threat a top priority. 

There is nothing more important than protecting the force. I intend to maintain the 

complex, layered, security system in place in Afghanistan today which leverages not 

only coalition force protection capabilities but also those of the ANSF and other governmental agencies. I will continuously monitor and assess the nature of insider 

threats and potential vulnerabilities and ensure coalition personnel are properly 

resourced to counter this threat, particularly as ISAF becomes smaller. We are not 

alone in suffering the effects of insider attacks; our Afghan partners have also suffered considerably from this threat. Therefore, I will continue to strengthen and leverage our partnership with the Afghan Government in implementing a comprehensive, combined, and integrated approach by continuing our support for cultural 

awareness and language training for both coalition and ANSF personnel as well as 

strengthening intelligence sharing. 

736 

AFGHAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. According to the most recent quarterly report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (the ‘‘Section 1230’’ report), Afghan Special Operations kandaks now lead 99 percent of all special operations in Afghanistan. The 

report also states ‘‘while they are tactically proficient units, they continued to operate closely with NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan 

(NSOCC–A) partners to conduct missions.’’ 

What is your understanding of the progress in training the Afghan Special Operations kandaks and the timeline for achieving full operational capability of these 

units? 

Answer. NSOCC–A remains focused on the continued development of the Afghan 

Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) to ensure their viability as a long-term counterterrorism force. The SOKs continue to play a crucial role in the security of Afghanistan and have proven their ability to conduct complex special operations with limited coalition enabler support. 

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) School of 

Excellence (SOE) has evolved from a coalition-led effort to an all Afghan-instructed 

training institution which provides an organic force generation capability for the 

SOKs. The Military Intelligence Kandak and General Support Kandak are currently 

at their Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and both will achieve Full Operational 

Capability (FOC) in 2015. Moreover, ANASOC is developing an operations center 

which will reside at ANASOC headquarters and provide a command and control capability for SOK independent operations. 

As ANASOC demonstrates progress in core warfighting skills, the NSOCC–A advisory effort remains focused on the development of Afghan sustainable systems and 

SOK critical capabilities, such as intelligence, fires, sustainment and mobility. 

Through these combined efforts, the SOKs continue to meet development milestones 

and are projected to achieve full operational capability in early 2016. 

Question. What are the most critical enabling capabilities needed by the Afghan 

Special Operations kandaks to ensure successful mission execution post-2014? 

Answer. The most critical enabling capabilities needed by the Afghan Special Operations Kandaks post-2014 are intelligence support and tactical mobility. 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. How do you see the role of U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan evolving as conventional forces continue to draw down post-2014, assuming a 

Bilateral Security Agreement is in place? 

Answer. It is my view that Special Operations Forces (SOF) will continue to play 

a vital role in Afghanistan in a number of ways. SOF will be the only force conducting the TAA mission at the tactical level. NSOCC–A will continue its TAA efforts with ASSF while the Resolute Support (RS) basing will enable tactical TAA, 

and then transition its focus to institutional TAA in later phases of RS. Through 

their advisory efforts, they will enable the ASSF to disrupt insurgent networks, 

maintain ASSF operational tempo, and build capable, self-sustaining Afghan SOF. 

SOF TAA of the ASSF will also help mitigate the operational risk associated with 

a drawdown of conventional forces. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities for 

Special Operations Forces as general purpose forces continue to draw down in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Providing SOF with adequate enabling capabilities is one of my highest 

priorities. Most SOF will be stationed at or near conventional bases. These bases 

will provide all requisite logistic requirements and medical evacuation. As the regional bases are closed or transitioned to the ANSF, SOF will retrograde with conventional forces. ISR requirements for SOF will be also addressed based on the 

operational need. I am confident that the allocated ISR capabilities located in-theater, as well as additional ISR support available from outside the theater will meet 

the SOF requirements. 

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE/VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

Question. The Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs have been called critical to ISAF’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. 

What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what 

has been the response from the Taliban? 

Answer. Per Presidential Directive, the ALP is a force composed of Guardians, recruited from the same local villages where they work, who can readily distinguish 

locals from insurgents. Since the ALP are recruited, vetted, and employed locally, 

737 

the Elders and local populations trust them for protection. The ALP has contributed 

to an increased perception of security by denying insurgent access to the population 

and disrupting insurgent freedom of movement. Public perception polling from December 2013 reflected that the ‘‘ALP’s value to community security are overwhelmingly positive.’’ Furthermore, the same polling found that local Afghans have referred to the ALP as being ‘‘The first enemy of the Taliban.’’ The Taliban remain 

focused on targeting the ALP because they threaten insurgent access to the population and insurgent freedom of movement. 

Question. What is your understanding of the commitment of the Government of 

Afghanistan to continue its support of these programs through 2014 and beyond? 

Answer. The Government of Afghanistan recognizes the value of ALP in providing 

security in rural areas. The ALP served a significant security role during the recent 

national election and subsequent Presidential run-off. The Government of Afghanistan noted the ALP in the 2-year National Police Plan (NPP) and the 5-year National Police Strategy (NPS). Both the NPP and NPS call for keeping the ALP 

through 2017 and then transitioning the ALP into the other Afghan National Police 

pillars in 2018. The best way for the GIRoA to demonstrate commitment to the ALP 

would be for Ministry of the Interior to take full responsibility for the command and 

control, administration, and logistical sustainment of the ALP. 

Question. If these programs continue beyond 2014, what is your understanding of 

the role, if any, that U.S. Special Operations Forces will play in supporting them? 

Answer. After 2014, NSOCC–A will support the ALP Headquarters in Kabul 

through the ALP Special Operations Advisory Group (ALP SOAG). The ALP SOAG 

will continue mentoring the ALP Headquarters Commander and Staff in the areas 

of administration, training, pay, budget, and logistics. Additionally, ALP SOAG will 

conduct command and staff assistance visits to the Provincial Police Headquarters 

where feasible. 

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

Question. The United States has implemented a number of efforts to reduce the 

risk that U.S. contracting practices will be subject to corruption, which helps fuel 

the insurgency and undermines the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. These efforts include the establishment of the Combined Joint Interagency Task ForceShafafiyat (Transparency) to coordinate ISAF anti-corruption activities. 

What is your assessment of ISAF’s anti-corruption efforts and understanding of 

criminal patronage networks, and what additional steps, if any, do you believe 

should be taken to improve those efforts and to ensure adequate oversight of ISAF 

and U.S. contracts is in place? 

Answer. Corruption poses a strategic threat to the long-term stability of Afghanistan as it undermines security, government legitimacy, and prospects for economic 

development. Recognizing that Afghan political will is a necessary component of 

dealing with corruption, I believe ISAF has implemented a number of essential 

steps for addressing this issue. For example, countering corruption and organized 

crime is a specific line of operation in the ISAF campaign. If confirmed, I will reinforce a command climate that takes those responsibilities seriously. 

Question. Section 841 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2012 provided CENTCOM with new tools to avoid contracting with the enemy, as 

requested by the Department of Defense. This authority has been expanded in subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts. 

What is your understanding of the extent to which the new authorities authorized 

in section 841 have been implemented? 

Answer. Section 841 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2012 provided CENTCOM with new tools to avoid contracting with the enemy, as 

requested by the Department of Defense. This authority has been expanded in subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts. Since section 841 does not sunset 

until the end of 2014, the anti-corruption Task Force 2010 has continued to use 841 

authorities in their proposals and has matured its vendor vetting processes to the 

point that it fulfills the requirements that section 841 addresses. Vendor vetting has 

been implemented successfully to prevent contracting with the enemy. 

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in carrying out the authorities provided in section 841? 

Answer. Section 841 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2012 prohibits contracting with the enemy in the CENTCOM theater of operations. 

If confirmed, I will uphold my responsibilities required under section 841, to include 

fulfilling reporting requirements, and will support the efforts of others, up and down 

my chain of command, in the execution of their duties. 

738 

Question. What are any lessons learned from use of this authority both within 

CENTCOM and for other combatant commands? 

Answer. While section 841 has been an effective tool in preventing U.S. monetary 

support to the insurgency, there are two key lessons for other combatant commands 

worth noting. The first lesson is that combatant commands should place strong emphasis on thorough vendor vetting processes which, if implemented properly, preempt fraud and prevent contracting with the enemy. The second lesson has to do 

with the importance of coordination between the COCOM, the intelligence task 

force, and the Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA). Each of these links provides 

vital information on the second- and third-order effects of the program at both the 

operational and strategic levels. 

AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE

Question. In March the Government of Afghanistan announced that it would dissolve the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), the government-established guard 

force for protecting convoys and international reconstruction projects. 

What is your understanding of the impact of the Government of Afghanistan’s decision to dissolve the APPF on the security of our military and civilian personnel 

in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The security of our military and civilians is at the forefront of everything 

we do. Our commanders on the ground, at the tactical and operational levels, constantly analyze their respective operational environments, building in risk mitigation strategies, and aligning their forces to accomplish their missions. 

While the dissolution of the State Owned Enterprise has created points of concern, the impacts to fixed site security have been mitigated as our legal, financial, 

and advisor teams reconcile the processes and our leaders engage the ministries to 

bring them in line with agreed upon acceptable standards. Site security operations 

continue for both ISAF and other coalition developmental projects as these matters 

are worked through with GIRoA. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend for addressing 

any security concerns arising from the dissolution of the APPF? 

Answer. Convoy and site security services will remain a small but important subset of the larger security concerns and anti-corruption efforts we have in Afghanistan. Our Afghan partners are in the lead for the security of their country and our 

efforts should remain focused on the development of Afghan security forces capability. 

DOD-FUNDED COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, drugs from 

Afghanistan account for more than 90 percent of the world’s heroin trade. 

As it relates to the drug trade in Afghanistan, what is your understanding of the 

role of the Commander of ISAF and Commander of USFOR–A respectively in counternarcotics efforts? 

Answer. Under U.S. and NATO authorities, COMISAF/COMUSFOR–A counters 

the drug trade in Afghanistan by strengthening, developing, and enhancing the institutional capabilities of key Afghan ministries, like the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. By working across interagency and International Community lines of effort, 

ISAF/USFOR–A assists GIRoA in preventing the Afghan drug trade from funding 

the insurgency, fuelling corruption, and undermining security, governance, and development. 

Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the Department of Defense have 

within broader U.S. Government counternarcotics efforts beyond the current calendar year? 

Answer. DOD has assets and resources that it can apply to counternarcotic efforts 

that are helpful and supportive. In Afghanistan, CENTCOM is actively engaged in 

mentoring the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan and other specialized Afghan 

counternarcotics units. If confirmed, I will evaluate how USFOR–A might be able 

to contribute to improving counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. 

Question. What is your understanding of the nexus, if any, between the drug 

trade and the various insurgent groups in Afghanistan? Is the nexus, in your view, 

sufficient to conclude that the drug trade is a primary source of funding for the insurgency? 

Answer. The Taliban has been involved in opium and hashish cultivation and trafficking for years in Afghanistan. In many areas of Afghanistan, the insurgency intimidates the farmers to cultivate additional acres. By working and controlling drug 

trafficking organizations and other criminal elements associated with the Afghan 

739 

drug trade, the Taliban has profited greatly. We have also seen the inclusion of 

criminal patronage networks into this narcotics-insurgency nexus. 

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the efforts by the U.S. Government to identify and counter the sources of financing for the insurgency in Afghanistan, including the financial networks of the Haqqanis? 

Answer. Since the fall of 2013, the level of interagency communication and allocation of resources has significantly increased in an effort to combat Haqqani Network 

(HQN) financial mechanisms and revenue streams. However, despite increased 

interagency collaboration, no major financial actions have been completed against 

the HQN since the network was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) 

by the U.S. Department of State in September 2012. 

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to enhance 

U.S. counter threat financing efforts in Afghanistan? 

Answer. To safeguard U.S. interests in Afghanistan, we must maintain and improve our capacity to track and disrupt threat finances originating in Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and from the Persian Gulf states. Future efforts need to be focused on targeting sources of terrorist funding and providing evidence to support criminal indictments and law enforcement prosecutions. 

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES USED FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

Question. Building the security forces of foreign nations has traditionally been a 

Special Operations Forces mission. However, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, general 

purpose forces have been performing this mission for some time. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the preparation and performance 

of Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces operating in Afghanistan in a security force assistance role? 

Answer. In my current position as the VCSA, and in my previous assignment as 

the Army G3, I have been responsible for ensuring Army general purpose forces 

were well prepared for the security force assistance (SFA) mission. In Afghanistan, 

the performance of Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces in a SFA role 

has been outstanding, as evidenced by the ANSF’s development into a confident 

force capable of securing their nation. This progress would not have been possible 

without the training, advising, and assisting efforts of Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces. 

Question. How do you envision the use of general purpose forces in the security 

force assistance role, if at all, as U.S. forces complete the drawdown through 2014 

and as part of the planned residual force for supporting the continued building of 

the capabilities of the Afghan security forces? 

Answer. General purpose forces will continue to TAA their Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) counterparts for the remainder of 2014; however the emphasis 

will shift to improving ANSF organizations, systems and processes. We refer to the 

new mission as functionally based-SFA (FB–SFA), and we have developed eight essential functions to focus our FB–SFA efforts. Specifically, these functions include: 

(1) Plan, program, budget and execute; (2) Assure transparency, accountability and

oversight; (3) Civilian governance of Afghan Security Institutions, including adherence to the rule of law; (4) Force generate; recruit, train, retain, manage and develop a professional ANSF; (5) Sustain the force through facilities management,

maintenance, medical and logistics systems; (6) Plan, resource, and execute effective

security campaigns; (7) Sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes; and (8)

Maintain internal and external STRATCOM capability. By using the eight essential

functions to focus FB–SFA, we will help the ANSF develop and strengthen institutional capabilities and capacity, while vertically integrating systems and processes

from the national to the regional-level for the remainder of 2014 and beyond. To

augment our functional specialists, AF–PAK hands and Foreign Area Officers will

be integrated into task-organized functional advising teams to ensure that our functional expertise can be appropriately transmitted in a way that our Afghan partners

can assimilate. In some specific roles, we will reach back to our professionals in our

civilian DOD force to provide critical expertise for particularly technical processes,

like the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution function.

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN

Question. What restrictions, if any, do you believe should be imposed with respect 

to the assignment of combat-related duties to women in uniform, or the assignment 

of women to combat units? 

740 

Answer. I fully support the efforts of the Military Services to assess all military 

occupational specialties and unit assignment restrictions and look forward to seeing 

their recommendations for policy changes. 

DEPLOYMENT HEALTH

Question. The committee is concerned about the stress on military personnel resulting from deployments and their access to mental health care in theater to deal 

with stress, as well as the prevention and care for traumatic brain injury. 

What is your assessment of the adequacy of health care and mental health capabilities supporting servicemembers in Afghanistan? 

Answer. It is USFOR–A’s mandate to provide a level of health care that is on par 

with the care our servicemembers receive at home, and we are achieving that standard for primary and specialty care regardless of location. In the area of trauma care, 

USFOR–A greatly exceeds that standard; our Joint Theater Trauma System, as well 

as the Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) guidelines for point of injury care, 

are among the best trauma systems in the world. We adhere closely to the ‘golden 

hour’ standard for our MEDEVAC missions, and the speed with which we evacuate 

patients out of Afghanistan, whether after combat injury or for care beyond what 

is available in theater, is exceptional. If confirmed, I will endeavor to maintain this 

high standard. 

U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR–A) provides both in-person and virtual resources to care for our deployed servicemembers with behavioral health concerns. 

We consistently exceed the recommended provider-to-deployed Soldier ratio (Standard is 1/700 and we are currently at 1/531). We continue to utilize video technology 

that allows access to behavioral health specialists for servicemembers even in remote locations. Additionally, the Military Crisis Line headquartered in CONUS provides reach-back to Afghanistan, and affords 24/7 access to counselors via phone and 

computer. USFOR–A maintains vigilance to identify servicemembers at risk both 

before and after deployment through rigorous medical screening and frequent contacts in both formal and informal settings. I am confident that we are meeting the 

mental health needs of our deployed personnel in Afghanistan. 

Question. What is your assessment of suicide prevention programs and resources 

available to support these programs in Afghanistan? 

Answer. USFOR–A maintains a significant effort to develop and deploy suicide 

prevention programs and resources for servicemembers and civilians serving in Afghanistan. These programs are in place and personnel know where to get help. We 

keep our behavioral health assets mobile in order to effectively push services forward where they are needed, and we provide crisis intervention as well as the full 

spectrum of psychiatric services that would be available to servicemembers at risk 

in any environment. Command involvement is critical for the successful employment 

of these programs and the support from commanders has been key to getting the 

word out and reducing any stigma from seeking behavioral health services. Suicide 

prevention is something that I take very seriously, and, if confirmed, it will be a 

high priority for me. 

Question. What is your assessment of the implementation of the Department of 

Defense policy on management of mild traumatic brain injury throughout Afghanistan? 

Answer. USFOR–A is consistently monitoring the comprehensive in-theater evaluation process for mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) and has shown significant 

progress in how we screen for and treat these injuries. The medical treatment system begins at the point of injury with MACE screening for all suspected mTBI 

through unit providers who perform extended evaluations. If necessary, they can 

refer cases to one of two fully staffed 24/7 Concussion Care Centers, one at each 

of our Role III medical facilities. These centers are equipped with CT scans for evaluation and diagnosis and can treat servicemembers for up to 21 days. They are 

staffed by a neurologist as well as occupational therapy support staff to optimize 

rehabilitation and have demonstrated consistently high return to duty rates. mTBIs 

are closely tracked throughout the CJOA–A (Combined/Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan) via the BECIR (Blast Exposure Concussion Incident Report). Additionally, we are investigating and employing technologies such as helmet and vehicle 

sensors to identify potentially concussive events among our servicemembers. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department has developed comprehensive policies and procedures 

to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including 

providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. 

741 

What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults 

in Afghanistan, including assaults by and against U.S. civilian and contractor personnel? 

Answer. Victims of sexual assault need to be protected and receive timely access 

to appropriate treatment and services, regardless of their location. The current policy, education, training, and commander involvement at all levels ensure we’re on 

the right course in eradicating this crime from our force, including all U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, whether military, government civilian, or contractor. If confirmed, I will ensure that if any deployed servicemember, civilian or contractor is 

assaulted, he or she will receive appropriate and responsive support and care. As 

importantly, I will do all I can to prevent incidents of sexual assault. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place 

in Afghanistan to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. The Services recently enhanced their resources for investigating and responding to allegations of sexual assault. Combat zones and other overseas environments present special challenges that require coordination to ensure we are applying those resources effectively and efficiently. If confirmed, I will review our sexual 

assault prevention and response program to ensure it meets the needs of our deployed servicemembers and commanders; that resources are appropriately provided 

so that reports of sexual assault are fully investigated and commanders are fully 

capable of appropriately adjudicating allegations of sexual assault; and I will ensure 

deployed victims have full access to treatment and victim care services. 

Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to 

hold assailants accountable for their acts? 

Answer. While I have served as Vice Chief of Staff, Army commanders have prosecuted the most serious sexual assault cases at a rate more than double that of our 

civilian jurisdictions, including many cases that civilian authorities refused to pursue. If confirmed, I will expect all military leaders to ensure allegations of sexual 

assault are referred for independent law enforcement investigation, to provide appropriate care for the victims, and to ensure that alleged perpetrators are held appropriately accountable. The Department’s policy emphasizes the command’s role in 

an effective response. Special training is provided to commanders, investigators, and 

prosecutors to ensure they are prepared to address incidents of sexual assault. Our 

policies seek to balance victim care with appropriate command action against offenders in order to build victim confidence in assisting investigations. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and programs in Afghanistan to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, 

and legal help they need? 

Answer. Victims of sexual assault need to be protected and receive timely access 

to appropriate treatment and services, regardless of their location. The current policy, education, training, and commander involvement at all levels ensure we’re on 

the right course in eradicating this crime from our force, including all U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, whether military, government civilian, or contractor. Requirements vary across the Services, but currently, all units in Afghanistan are required to provide Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Victim Advocates. The 

Secretary of Defense has directed each service to establish Special Victims Counsel 

(SVC) to provide victims the option of legal advice, representation, and advocacy 

services. If confirmed, I will ensure that if any deployed servicemember, civilian or 

contractor is assaulted, he or she will receive appropriate and responsive support, 

care, and legal assistance. As importantly, I will do all I can to prevent incidents 

of sexual assault. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. Initiatives reinforce the Department’s commitment to eradicating sexual 

assault from our ranks. If confirmed, I will promote a leadership climate that encourages reporting without fear and holds perpetrators appropriately accountable 

for their actions. Whether deployed abroad or at home, commanders and leaders at 

every level must fully understand their authority, responsibilities, and obligations 

to establish positive command climates that safeguard all members within their 

units from predatory behavior. Facilitating this climate is an inextricable part of 

that bond of trust we share with our fellow brothers and sisters in arms. If confirmed, I will ensure commanders have the resources they need to provide care and 

support for victims and fairly adjudicate each case. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred? 

Answer. Combating sexual assault and harassment remains our top priority. The 

commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan developed a Sexual Assault Prevention and 

Response Information Plan that requires leaders to engage Coalition Forces, DOD 

742 

civilians, contractors, and third country nationals about the DOD position on sexual 

harassment and sexual assault. Units conduct focus groups, sensing sessions and 

sexual assault review boards quarterly to foster an environment based on mutual 

respect and trust. The sexual assault review boards are instrumental in demonstrating that leaders will take action in sexual assault cases. We continue to take 

this issue very seriously, and also know how much work remains to be done. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. Removal of the commander’s authority to prosecute sexual assault removes a key mechanism to respond to the needs of soldiers within the command, 

especially the victims. 

The commander’s role in the military justice system is simply essential. The Commander is responsible for good order, discipline, health and morale and welfare of 

the force. The commander needs the ability to take timely and appropriate action, 

locally and visibly, which impacts the overall discipline of the force. Particularly in 

a deployed environment, adding a complex, external approval process for appropriate action will impede the commander’s ability to deal swiftly and fairly with investigated incidents of sexual assault, and consequently impede the commander’s 

ability to protect victims and prevent further assaults. 

Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective? 

Answer. The Department has put considerable effort into the development of policies and procedures designed to address sexual assault and improve reporting. The 

Department faces the same challenges that society faces in dealing with incidents 

of sexual assault—balancing care to victims with offender accountability. The Department’s restricted reporting allows victims who wish to remain anonymous to 

come forward and obtain the medical, legal, and advocacy support they need following an allegation of sexual assault. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess current policies, procedures and programs and to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts 

to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in Afghanistan? 

Answer. If confirmed, as part of my assessment, I will ensure that all commanders in theater evaluate the sexual assault prevention and response capabilities 

for their areas of responsibility. Further, this assessment will solicit feedback from 

those below Commander-level to ensure we create an atmosphere which aims to 

eliminate assault. 

STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the 

United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be 

subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 

If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant Department of Defense directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with 

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that U.S. forces in Afghanistan fully comply with all relevant provisions of Department of Defense directives, regulations, 

policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and that 

they fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 of the Detainee Treatment 

Act of 2005 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Conducting detention operations in the most humane manner possible remains a strategic component of our campaign that directly reflects upon our Nation’s values and the ideals 

we espouse to our Afghan counterparts. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I understand and support the existing standards for 

the treatment of detainees and will adhere to them. All detainees shall be treated 

humanely, and in accordance with U.S. law, the Law of War, and applicable U.S. 

policy. Humane treatment entails the following: no violence, no cruelty, no torture, 

and no humiliating or degrading treatment. Under U.S. law, humane treatment also 

consists of providing detainees with adequate food, drinking water, shelter, clothing, 

medical care, and protection of personal property. I believe these humane treatment 

policies, as practiced at the Detention Facility in Parwan, have adequately protected 

743 

detainees, provided for actionable intelligence, contributed to mission success, and 

enhanced U.S. forces’ reputation in the global community. 

Question. How would you ensure a climate that not only discourages the abuse 

of detainees, but that encourages the reporting of abuse? 

Answer. I believe that engaged and active leadership grounded in the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and DOD Directive 2310.01E 

is required for the secure and humane care, custody and control of detainees. If confirmed, I will ensure these elements remain the cornerstone of U.S. Law of Armed 

Conflict detainee operations. I will also reinforce the obligation to prevent abuse and 

the duty to report abuse as non-negotiable elements in our guard force training and 

ensure all detainees are informed of their rights upon entry into the detention facility, to include their right to report any type of abuse free from retribution. The use 

of medical providers to screen for signs of abuse, and the integration of a robust 

self-assessment program bolstered by external assessments from the International 

Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent further creates an open and transparent 

command climate fused with timely feedback. Finally, if confirmed, I will ensure my 

command team has internalized their professional responsibility to track and investigate any allegations of abuse and take swift action when appropriate. Furthermore, we will continue to assist the Afghan National Army (ANA) in developing 

their detainee abuse reporting systems and sustain the use of U.S. advisors in ANA 

controlled facilities. 

Question. What is your understanding of the agreement between the United 

States and Afghanistan regarding detainees in Afghanistan currently and going forward after 2014? 

Answer. As noted by the President on June 12, 2014, in a letter submitted to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution, U.S. forces have turned over all 

Afghan nationals detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan to Afghan custody pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on March 25, 2013. Under 

this MOU, U.S. forces in Afghanistan transfer any new Afghan captures to Afghan 

custody and control within 96 hours after capture. Additionally, U.S. forces in Afghanistan continue to detain approximately 38 non-Afghan nationals under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) (Public Law 107–40), as informed 

by the law of war. After 2014, U.S. forces will retain the authority to detain both 

Afghan nationals and non-Afghans in accordance with the law of war. 

The BSA would provide context, if it has entered into force, and it includes a prohibition on the maintenance or operations of detention facilities by U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan. It is my understanding that this provision was among the most extensively discussed aspects of the BSA text. Within the context of the entire BSA text, 

this provision was intended to reflect existing U.S. policies and practices with respect to the conduct of military operations in Afghanistan and to preserve the authority of U.S. forces to take necessary action for self-defense and force protection 

purposes, which would include the authority to detain as referenced above. 

Furthermore, U.S. forces will retain the ability to transfer dangerous insurgents 

who they detain to Afghan authorities for further action, such as investigations and 

prosecution. 

PRISONER EXCHANGE FOR SGT. BERGDAHL

Question. What are your views on the prisoner exchange of five Afghan Taliban 

detainees for the release of Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl? 

Answer. Our Nation demonstrated what we have told our people for years: we 

don’t leave a servicemember behind. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this committee and 

other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ISAF 

Commander/Commander, USFOR–A? 

Answer. Yes. 

744 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

CLEARANCE OF UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE AT U.S. TRAINING RANGES IN AFGHANISTAN

1. Senator LEVIN. General Campbell, at the request of the Department of Defense 

(DOD), the committee included in its markup of the Defense Authorization Request 

for Fiscal Year 2015 the authority in section 1229 to use up to $250 million of DOD 

funds over the next 2 fiscal years to clear training ranges used by U.S. Armed 

Forces in Afghanistan of unexploded ordnance. Do you support this proposal and 

will you make this a priority as U.S. forces continue to draw down in Afghanistan? 

General CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, Senator Inhofe, and the 

members of this committee for including section 1229 in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and for the clarifying language contained in the committee’s 

report. I strongly support the 1229 authority as a first step in addressing 

unexploded ordnance (UXO) on U.S. training ranges in Afghanistan. 

I say first step because the authority would provide for the surface clearing of 

UXO, which is of course the most immediate risk to life and safety. However, as 

these training ranges are closed, some land will be transferred back to the Afghan 

people. In areas where intrusive activities, such as construction and farming, frequently occur, sub-surface UXO will continue to pose a risk to civilians. There is 

also the very real potential that the explosive components of UXO can be harvested 

to build IEDs for use against U.S. and coalition forces, Afghan troops, and civilians. 

Expanding the authority to include sub-surface clearing activities would mitigate 

additional risk to our forces and demonstrate our dedication to executing a responsible drawdown. 

Following an initial evaluation of training ranges, U.S. Forces Afghanistan 

(USFOR–A) determined that both surface and subsurface UXO clearance could be 

accomplished within 2 years; however, we would like to complete clearing activities 

as quickly as possible. There is concern that the imposition of a per-year cap will 

unnecessarily limit our ability to execute on an expedited timeline. It is my understanding DOD sent the committee some suggested language that offers a more flexible funding option for these UXO activities. 

Protecting U.S. and coalition forces, as well as the civilian population, is one of 

the highest priorities for USFOR–A. Clearing UXO from U.S. training ranges is one 

more way we can provide for the safety and security of our forces and the Afghan 

people alike. You have my commitment that, if confirmed, I will make clearance of 

UXO a priority. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

AFGHANISTAN

2. Senator SHAHEEN. General Campbell, we have all been struck by the poor performance of the Iraqi Security Forces over the last month, including recent news 

reports citing an unreleased U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) study that indicates the Iraqi Security Forces are so deeply infiltrated by Sunni extremists and 

Shiite personnel trained in Iran that it may be too dangerous for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to provide assistance. How do we impress upon the Afghan civilian leadership the importance of maintaining professional and cohesive security 

forces as we draw down and after we depart? 

General CAMPBELL. I will work closely with the U.S. Embassy and other troop 

contributing nations to make sure this remains a key focus for our engagements 

with the Afghan civilian leadership, both in the President’s office and the Ministry 

of Defense. My understanding is that current efforts on this matter involve emphasizing to Afghan civilian and military leaders the importance of a professional and 

745 

disciplined force which is apolitical and committed first and foremost to the security 

of the country. This includes the concept of civilian control of the military, adherence to rule of law and the implementation of processes, systems, and organizations 

which ensure transparency, accountability, and oversight. 

Most recently, during the political turmoil associated with the run-off election, the 

ANSF leadership has consistently demonstrated their ability to maintain unity 

throughout the force, while maintaining their focus on combat and security operations. Furthermore, recent discussions with senior government officials reveal an 

understanding of the importance of separating the military from politics and a general willingness to achieve the aforementioned objectives. Also encouraging is the 

fact that senior ANSF officials have publically refused to comment on the ongoing 

political process. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

EQUIPMENT RESET FROM AFGHANISTAN

3. Senator AYOTTE. General Campbell, from a readiness standpoint, what is the

danger of not resetting our equipment as it returns from Afghanistan? 

General CAMPBELL. Our equipment has been operating in extreme environmental 

and operational conditions since operations commenced in Afghanistan. Operations 

under these conditions subject equipment to unusual wear patterns and damage due 

to heat, dust and OPTEMPO that must be corrected during a Reset process upon 

return to home station. Past experience has shown that failure to address these conditions using a disciplined maintenance process such as Reset results in continued 

degradation of our most modern and capable equipment, increased maintenance 

burden to maintain readiness and adversely impacts availability to meet future contingency requirements. 

NEVER CONTRACT WITH THE ENEMY

4. Senator AYOTTE. General Campbell, I successfully included the ‘‘No Contracting

with the Enemy’’ legislation in section 841 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 to provide the ability to avoid red tape and expeditiously cut off contracting funds that 

we are flowing to our enemies. I also worked to expand these authorities to all geographic combatant commands in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. General Austin 

has testified that these authorities have been used to save the taxpayers $31 million—preventing these funds from going to our enemies. As we draw down the number of servicemembers in Afghanistan, we may become more reliant in some areas 

on contractors. It is important that money from these contracts and subcontracts not 

be diverted to our enemies and used to kill our troops or our Afghan partners. 

Avoiding this requires an aggressive effort that includes intelligence, contracting, 

and criminal investigation personnel working together to follow the money. This requires command emphasis. Once problematic contracts or subcontracts are identified, section 841 authorities should be used to terminate contracts without delay. 

Once confirmed, do you commit to me that, as Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, you will look at this issue closely, ensure the effort is properly resourced and 

staffed, and encourage your subordinates to look for opportunities to exercise section 

841 authorities? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, I will look at this effort closely and ensure that it is properly resourced and staffed consistent with the requirements of my mission and the 

resources available. 

5. Senator AYOTTE. General Campbell, I am supportive of the work of Task Force

2010 and others in identifying contracts and subcontracts that are benefitting our 

enemies and that need to be expeditiously terminated without paying penalties to 

the very people we are trying to ensure don’t receive our tax dollars. To do that, 

I believe that Task Force 2010 needs to have the investigators, forensic auditors, 

and intelligence personnel in Afghanistan, not just in Qatar or the United States. 

Will you look at ensuring the Task Force 2010 investigators, forensic auditors, and 

intelligence personnel are working in Afghanistan and that they have the command 

support needed to operate effectively? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, I will look at ensuring that all my forces, including any 

counter-contracting with the enemy forces such as TF 2010, are resourced and located to best accomplish the mission, within my force levels and other constraints 

set by my higher headquarters. 

746 

[The nomination reference of GEN John F. Campbell, USA, follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

June 17, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, 

U.S.C., section 601: 

To be General 

GEN John F. Campbell, USA, 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of GEN John F. Campbell, USA, which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA 

Source of commissioned service: USMA. 

Educational degrees: 

U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major 

Golden Gate University - MPA - Public Administration 

Military schools attended: 

Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

U.S. Army War College 

Foreign languages: 

None recorded. 

Promotions: 

Promotions Dates of appointment 

2LT 6 Jun 79 

1LT 21 Feb 81 

CPT 1 Jun 83 

MAJ 1 Oct 90 

LTC 1 Apr 95 

COL 1 Jun 00 

BG 1 Oct 05 

MG 7 Nov 08 

LTG 6 Sep 11 

GEN 8 Mar 13 

Major duty assignments: 

From To Assignment

Mar 13 ..... Present Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC 

Sep 11 ..... Mar 13 Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7, U.S. Army, Washington, DC 

May 11 ..... Aug 11 Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY 

Jun 10 ...... May 11 Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)/Combined Joint Task Force-101, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 

Jul 09 ....... Aug 11 Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY 

Feb 08 ...... Jul 09 ... Deputy Director for Regional Operations, J–3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC 

Jul 05 ....... Feb 08 .. Deputy Commanding General (Maneuver), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX and Deputy Commanding General (Maneuver), Multi-National Division Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq 

Jul 03 ....... Jun 05 .. Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff, Army, U.S. Army, Washington, DC 

May 01 ..... Jun 03 .. Commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC, and Operation Enduring Freedom, 

Afghanistan 

Jul 99 ....... May 01 Operations Officer, Current Operations Directorate, J–3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC 

747 

From To Assignment 

Aug 98 ..... Jun 99 .. Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 

Jun 96 ...... Jun 98 .. Commander, 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, HI 

May 94 ..... May 96 Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, later Chief, Unit Training, G–3 

(Operations), XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC, and Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti 

Jun 92 ...... May 94 G–3 (Training), later S–3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC 

Aug 91 ..... Jun 92 .. Student, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 

Sep 88 ..... Jun 91 .. Assistant Professor of Military Science, later Professor of Military Science, U.S. Army 4th Reserve 

Officers Training Corps Region, University of California, Davis, CA 

Apr 86 ...... Jun 88 .. Commander, B Company, 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, later G–3 (Air), 82d 

Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC 

Apr 84 ...... Mar 86 Battalion S–1 (Adjutant), later Battalion S–5 (Civil Affairs), later Commander, A Detachment, 1st 

Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC 

Nov 83 ..... Apr 84 .. Student, Special Forces Officer Qualification Course, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 

Center, Fort Bragg, NC 

Apr 83 ...... Oct 83 .. Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA 

Jan 80 ...... Dec 82 .. Rifle Platoon Leader, later Weapons Platoon Leader, C Company, later Executive Officer, later Antitank Platoon Leader, Combat Support Company, 3d Battalion, 28th Infantry (Mechanized), 8th 

Infantry Division (Mechanized), U.S. Army Europe, Germany 

Summary of joint assignments: 

Date Grade 

Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)/Combined Joint Task 

Force-101, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.

Jun 10–May 11 Major General 

Deputy Director for Regional Operations, J–3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC .......... Feb 08–Jul 09 Brigadier General 

Operations Officer, Current Operations Directorate, J–3, Joint Staff, Washington, 

DC.

Jul 99–May 01 Lieutenant Colonel/ 

Colonel 

Summary of operational assignments: 

Date Grade 

Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)/Combined Joint Task 

Force-101, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.

Jun 10–May 11 Major General 

Deputy Commanding General (Maneuver), 1st Cavalry Division/Deputy Commanding General (Maneuver), Multi-National Division Baghdad, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.

Aug 06–Dec 07 Brigadier General 

Commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC, and Operation 

Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.

May 01–Jun 03 Colonel 

Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, later Chief, 

Unit Training, G–3 (Operations), XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC, and 

Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti.

May 94–May 96 Major/Lieutenant 

Colonel 

U.S. Decorations and Badges: 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Bronze Star Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Meritorious Service Medal (with six Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Air Medal 

Joint Service Commendation Medal 

Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Army Achievement Medal 

Combat Infantryman Badge 

Combat Action Badge 

Expert Infantryman Badge 

Master Parachutist Badge 

Pathfinder Badge 

Ranger Tab 

Special Forces Tab 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge 

Army Staff Identification Badge 

748 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by GEN John F. Campbell, USA, in connection 

with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

John F. Campbell. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. 

3. Date of nomination: 

June 17, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

11 April 1957; Loring Air Force Base, ME (Limestone, ME). 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Ann Kay Dalton (Maiden name: Ann Dalton). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Jennifer K. Campbell; age 27. 

John F. Campbell, Jr.; age 25. 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Member of: 

(1) AUSA–Association of the U.S. Army (no office held) 

(2) 504 Parachute Infantry Regimental Association (no office held) 

749 

(3) 101st Airborne Division Association (no office held) 

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

None. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

JOHN F. CAMPBELL. 

This 13th day of May, 2014. 

[The nomination of GEN John F. Campbell, USA, was reported 

to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 22, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Joseph L. Votel, USA, by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and subsequent reforms related to Special Operations Forces have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian 

control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the 

Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and 

education and in the execution of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. Perhaps. In my time as Chief of Staff at U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), I saw many examples where we were challenged in our dealings 

with peculiarities of each of the Services on personnel, readiness, and training 

issues. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs to align our processes as much as possible under the current legislation before I would consider seeking a modification to Goldwater-Nichols. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. Whether through changes to policy or legislation, in my view SOCOM 

still needs greater personnel management authority to shape mid- and senior-grade 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) operators to meet SOCOM defined requirements. 

Promotions, selection for command, selection for advanced educational opportunities, 

foreign language testing policy, and foreign language proficiency bonus payment polVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00757 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
750 

icy all differ significantly by Service and are all primarily crafted to support Service 

needs. 

Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders, including 

the Commander, SOCOM, under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate 

and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled? 

Answer. Yes. I have had the pleasure to work very closely with each of our geographic and functional combatant commanders, particularly in the past 3 years, and 

I believe there is tremendous synergy built into the system created by GoldwaterNichols. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. By experience, training and education I have the requisite skills to lead 

this combatant command now and in the future. I have commanded at multiple levels throughout the special operations community including assignments as a Ranger 

Battalion Commander, the Ranger Regiment Commander, as a forward Special Operations Task force Commander in Iraq and Afghanistan and most recently as the 

Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. I’ve also served as Deputy 

Commanding General for the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, and have throughout 

my career as an Infantry Officer maintained close ties to my Service colleagues outside the realm of Special Operations. My joint service as the Chief of Staff at U.S. 

Special Operations Command as well as my experience as both Deputy and Commander at Joint Special Operations Command has prepared me to operate at the 

senior levels of Government. Throughout my service, I have gained valuable experience and built useful relationships with international, interagency, and Intelligence 

Community partners. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command 

runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, 

however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander of SOCOM to the 

following offices: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the SOCOM Commander’s next superior command authority in the chain of command, as your introductory paragraph stated. 

If confirmed, I will look to the Secretary of Defense for the operational authority, 

and the resources, to develop and employ the most well-trained and capable Special 

Operations Forces our Nation can muster to meet the challenges of a highly uncertain global security environment now and in the future. The SOCOM Commander 

owes the Secretary of Defense his best military advice on all aspects of recruiting, 

training, equipping, managing and employing Special Operations Forces in support 

of his, and the President’s, national security objectives. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The SOCOM Commander coordinates activities through the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the senior military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is essential in communicating Special Operations 

Forces capabilities and requirements to the President and Secretary of Defense. Coordination of SOCOM activities ensures that the Chairman remains fully informed 

in support of his responsibilities and for coordination of SOCOM staff and the Joint 

Staff efforts to meet Presidential and Secretary of Defense directed tasks. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the principal staff 

assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy. The 

USD(P) develops, coordinates and oversees the implementation of a wide variety of 

Department policy, including matters related to planning, programming, budgeting, 

and execution of special operations activities. USD(P) also exercises authority, direction, and control over the assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 

Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), who is responsible for overall supervision of 

Special Operations activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD(P) to ensure 

SOCOM activities are closely aligned with Department policies. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) is the principal 

staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00758 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
751 

terintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with USD(I), particularly to ensure the 

intelligence requirements of Special Operations Forces in the field are met. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, USD(AT&L), is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System, including procurement; research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); military construction; 

and nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. If confirmed, I will closely 

coordinate SOCOM acquisition activities with USD(AT&L) to ensure SOCOM procurement efforts are closely aligned with Department procurement processes and 

priorities. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. 

Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the 

USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on Special Operations and low intensity conflict matters. The principal duty of the ASD(SO/LIC) is the overall supervision of 

Special Operations activities within the Department of Defense, including SOCOM. 

As I state in subsequent responses, the SOCOM Commander works closely with 

ASD(SO/LIC) in the execution of his ‘‘Service-like’’ authorities under title 10, U.S.C., 

section 167. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the assistant Secretary, and 

with U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command, 

to ensure the effective employment of Special Operations Forces capability in support of national security objectives in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. I am particularly interested in continuing the enduring relationship with the NATO Special 

Operations Forces Headquarters (NATO SOF HQ), and look forward to working 

with the Assistant Secretary in developing policies in support of NATO SOF HQ. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary, and 

with U.S. Pacific Command, to ensure the effective employment of Special Operations Forces capability in support of national security objectives in the Asian and 

Pacific regions. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary in developing SOCOM’s role in Homeland Defense, and in support of civil authorities, to 

determine the Special Operations support necessary to protect the United States 

and its citizens during domestic emergencies. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the assistant Secretary in 

support of her efforts to develop policy on countering weapons of mass destruction 

and cyber security issues, two areas of abiding interest for Special Operations 

Forces. 

Question. The Service Secretaries. 

Answer. The SOCOM Commander’s authority over the Service components, and 

those forces assigned to him, is clear in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but requires 

close coordination with the Service Secretaries to ensure that SOCOM does not intrude upon each Service Secretary’s legal responsibilities. Close coordination between the SOCOM Commander and each of the Service Secretaries is also essential 

to gaining and maintaining the Services’ support of Special Operations Forces with 

support units from the General Purpose Forces and with service-common materiel. 

Question. The Service Chiefs. 

Answer. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, the 

SOCOM Commander cannot ensure the preparedness of his assigned forces to execute his assigned missions. The Joint Chiefs are also a source of experience and 

judgment that every combatant commander may call upon. If confirmed, I will continue a full and frank dialog with the Service Chiefs. 

Question. The other combatant commanders. 

Answer. Successive SOCOM Commanders have fostered an atmosphere of teamwork and trust in their relationships with the combatant commanders. These relationships have only strengthened over the last 15 years as transregional threats 

have emerged and certainly since SOCOM has been responsible for synchronizing 

planning for global operations against terrorist networks. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the other combatant commanders to achieve our common 

752 

objectives against transnational threats and violent extremist organizations. I will 

be committed to providing the geographic combatant commanders trained and ready 

Special Operations Forces to support national and theater security objectives. 

Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Answer. SOCOM is actively engaged in support of the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC), and has been since it was established after September 11. SOCOM 

also relies upon NCTC estimates and reports in the refinement and synchronization 

of counterterrorist operations, and will continue to assist NCTC to achieve our common objectives against transnational terrorist threats and violent extremist organizations. 

Question. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Answer. SOCOM and its subordinate elements are consumers of Central Intelligence Agency products and analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure that SOCOM continues to develop interoperable capabilities so that, when directed by the President 

or Secretary of Defense, we may work efficiently in close partnership to accomplish 

our assigned missions. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander of SOCOM? 

Answer. Winning the current fight, including Afghanistan and other areas where 

SOF is engaged in conflict and instability is an immediate challenge—SOCOM has 

forces in danger on an almost daily basis. This will continue to be a major challenge 

and one which, if confirmed, I will ensure is adequately resourced with trained and 

ready forces. 

Terrorism remains the most present threat to the security of Americans at home 

and abroad. The growth and expanding influence of transregional threats including 

violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and transnational organized crime remains 

a very challenging threat. VEOs have proven themselves highly resilient and adaptable, and less reliant on nation-state sponsors for funding and safe havens. Our Special Operators will be called upon to protect the Nation from these threats, and to 

build the capacity of partners and allies to deny terrorists and violent extremists 

from the safehavens they need to develop and launch attacks. 

As a force provider for SOF, the SOCOM commander must prepare his forces and 

sustain a high state of readiness for the full range of conflict and contingency scenarios. So we must balance the steady-state requirements to meet current challenges while preparing for an uncertain future. Doing so effectively requires the 

right level of resources, and the right approach to sustaining our force. 

Managing and preserving SOCOM’s Major Force Program-11 funding within the 

current budget and future budget discussions. At the forefront of this discussion is 

the recognition that many of the current expenditures are funded by the overseas 

contingency operations funds. The other part of this challenge includes monitoring 

and understanding the stress the Service Budgets are facing and the impacts it will 

have on their ability to meet present and future SOCOM requirements for forces, 

capabilities and platforms. 

None of this can happen if we do not preserve and protect our Special Operations 

Forces and the families that support them. After nearly 13 years of sustained high 

operational tempo, our people need help with mending their mind, body, and spirit. 

The nation asks much of our Special Operators and their families, and they have 

always delivered. Much more will be asked of them, and, if confirmed, I will seek 

to preserve our most precious asset—our people. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. I will continue to place my priority on the Preservation of the Force and 

Family (POTFF) initiative. With the support of Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Services, I will fully support what Admiral Olsen and Admiral 

McRaven have started. Aggressively, I will reach out to our SOF families and listen 

to their concerns to ensure, between the Services and SOCOM, there are solutions 

available to meet their needs. One of the key causes of stress for our families is the 

unpredictability of training and deployment schedules. To help mitigate this stress 

and provide families with more predictability, I will continue to support the policy 

on Personnel Tempo Tracking and enforce the SOCOM threshold of 250 days at 

home station (head on pillow) in a 24-month period. 

In order to win the current fight, I will place a premium on the organization, 

training, education, and equipping of our Force as we face new and rapidly growing 

challenges. SOF’s readiness also hinges upon our ability to preserve our force and 

care for our families. 

753 

In order to thwart expanding trans-regional threat networks and VEOs, SOCOM 

must outpace the growth of threat networks with friendly networks across cultures. 

In this vein, we must continue to develop our global SOF network. Investing in our 

network allows us to share the burden more appropriately. We must engage, not 

only where problems occur, but also in places critical to our vital national interests 

where no visible threat currently exists. Success in meeting these challenges demands unprecedented levels of trust, confidence, and understanding built through 

persistent engagement. 

To offset resourcing shortages, while maintaining the best trained and educated 

force, we must use technology to meet our immediate and long-term challenges. SOF 

must be internally innovative and take advantage of innovations that could enhance 

our ability to conduct SOF activities. It is critical that our use of new technology 

outpaces our adversaries. In this sense, acquisition speed and agility is paramount. 

Question. What are the most important lessons you have learned during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the special operations community? 

Answer. The most important lesson I have learned is the value of open and transparent relationships and communication with all parties who influence the special 

operations community. Good relationships build trust and understanding and allow 

for better mutual support of all U.S. Government objectives. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the Commander of SOCOM? 

Answer. As the Commander of Joint Special Operations Command and a member 

of the SOCOM and SOF Board of Directors I believe in the Command’s current 

touchstone priorities of preserving the force and families, winning the current fight, 

strengthening the global SOF network, and responsive resourcing/acquisition. These 

have served the Command well and will continue to do so in the future. 

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF SOCOM

Question. The legislation creating SOCOM assigned extraordinary authority to the 

Commander to conduct some of the functions of both a Military Service and a unified combatant command. 

Which civilian officials in the Department of Defense (DOD) exercise civilian oversight of the ‘‘service-like’’ authorities of the Commander, SOCOM? 

Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on 

Special Operations matters. The principal duty of the ASD(SO/LIC) is the overall 

supervision of Special Operations activities within the Department of Defense, including SOCOM. 

SOCOM also coordinates with the USD(P), USD(AT&L), and Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller) on matters within their jurisdiction which touch upon the 

SOCOM Commander’s ‘‘Service-like’’ authorities under title 10, U.S.C., section 167. 

The SOCOM Commander and his staff works closely with USD(P), USD(AT&L), and 

the Comptroller, and their staffs, to ensure SOCOM’s programs are aligned with Department of Defense acquisitions policies and are appropriately funded. 

Question. In your view, what organizational relationship should exist between the 

assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 

(ASD(SO/LIC)) and the Commander, SOCOM? 

Answer. There’s two sides to this—oversight and advocacy. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides oversight on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, to ensure the SOCOM Commander and the activities of the Command are aligned to the Department’s policies, 

directives, and regulatory requirements. At the same time, the ASD(SO/LIC), as the 

Secretary’s principal civilian advisor for Special Operations is an advocate for SOF 

to ensure the views and interests of the SOCOM Commander are represented in the 

formulation of policy and allocation of resources within the Department and with 

Congress. 

Question. What should be the role of the ASD SOLIC in preparation and review 

of Major Force Program 11 and the SOCOM’s Program Objective Memorandum? 

Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) is directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide 

overall supervision of the preparation and justification of Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) programs and budget; review and approve memoranda of agreement governing the SOCOM program, budget, and execution process; approve the U.S. Special Operations Command recommendations concerning which programs the 

SOCOM Commander will execute directly; review the SOCOM Program Objectives 

Memoranda (POM) and budget prior to submission to the Director for Program 

Analysis and Evaluation and the DOD Comptroller, respectively; and present and 

defend the SOF program to Congress, with the advice and assistance of the SOCOM 

754 

Commander. I believe these duties describe the appropriate role for ASD(SO/LIC) 

in oversight and support of SOCOM. 

Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SOLIC) in the research and development and procurement functions of the SOCOM? 

Answer. Working with the SOCOM Commander and the SOCOM Acquisition Executive, the ASD(SO/LIC) advises and coordinates with the USD(AT&L), on acquisition priorities and requirements for special operations-peculiar material and equipment. I do not presently recommend any changes to ASD(SO/LIC)’s role in research 

and development and procurement functions of SOCOM. 

Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the operational 

planning of missions that involve Special Operations Forces, whether the supported 

command is SOCOM, a geographic combatant command, or another department or 

agency of the U.S. Government? 

Answer. Through his broad policy, coordination and oversight roles as the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on Special Operations matters, the ASD(SO/LIC) reviews the procedures and provides policy guidance to the SOCOM Commander on all aspects of Special Operations planning, including contingency planning when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. 

NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS

Question. The Budget Control Act, as amended by the recent Murray-Ryan budget 

agreement, calls for reductions in defense spending in excess of $900 billion. 

How do you believe such budget reductions would impact Special Operations 

Forces? 

Answer. The Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) will alleviate many of the harshest fiscal year 2014 readiness impacts that would have been realized under full sequester, 

but the standing reductions to the Department of Defense will continue to impact 

SOCOM and our enablers. Even with the support of DOD, SOCOM has not gone 

without impact from the BBA. SOCOM has already reduced all non-essential travel 

and training, curtailed replenishment of non-mission critical supplies, and reduced 

period of performance on all non-severable contracts. The potential decreases in 

Service end strength, capabilities, and installation support will also directly affect 

SOF enablers and potentially affect future Special Operations missions. 

The Department of Defense continues to show support for Special Operations by 

allowing the SOCOM portion of the fiscal year 2015 President’s budget request to 

remain approximately level with the fiscal year 2014 President’s budget request in 

both manpower and resources. This allows SOCOM to fully meet the Nation’s most 

critical requirements as highlighted in the fiscal year 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the fiscal year 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), while still 

remaining less than 2 percent of the Department of Defense’s top-line budget. With 

the fiscal year 2015 President’s budget request, SOCOM will be able to limit continental United States (CONUS)-based readiness impacts and fully support global operations and deployments in support of the geographic combatant commands (GCC). 

Continuing to emphasize readiness and focusing on creating competent SOF is imperative to providing a SOF force built to provide a robust range of options for the 

President and the Secretary of Defense. 

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the need to 

maintain pressure on al Qaeda’s core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to 

counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats ‘‘that continue to emerge from beyond 

its core safe haven in South Asia.’’ The President signed new Policy Guidance on 

Counterterrorism (CT) on May 22, 2013, that established a framework governing the 

use of force against terrorists. 

What are the roles and responsibilities of the Commander of SOCOM within the 

Department’s combating terrorism strategy and how would you fulfill such responsibilities if confirmed? 

Answer. The primary role for the Commander of SOCOM is to synchronize DOD 

CT plans and planning efforts. Practical implementation of synchronization occurs 

throughout the development of the DOD Global CT Campaign Plan (CAMPLAN 

7500) and its revisions and in the parallel development of the GCCs’ subordinate 

regional CT plans. Specifically, regional objectives/intermediate military objectives, 

tailored 7500 Lines of Operation (LOO), and planning and assessment tasks are 

agreed upon through the Joint Planning Working Groups which are comprised and 

755 

represented by all GCCs and Functional Combatant Commanders (FCCs) and led 

by Headquarters SOCOM. 

Question. Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and agencies? 

Answer. DOD continues to take appropriate steps to expand relationships between 

the DOD and the Interagency. I want to highlight the superb relationships DOD has 

built with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Interagency over the 

past decade. The strong leadership provided by the DNI and the partnerships built 

with the Intelligence Community has been invaluable for providing coordinated responses to international threat streams as well as defending the Homeland. As future threats become more decentralized these relationships and the timely sharing 

of intelligence will become even more pivotal. The integration of our closest international partners will also prove vital to our ability to disrupt and defeat violent 

extremism on a global scale. While intelligence sharing and release authority has 

improved, we must continue to build on this effort. 

AL QAEDA

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its associated forces to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests 

more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern? 

Answer. Al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents remain the greatest terrorist 

threat to the United States and to its national interests around the world. Al Qaeda 

has adeptly exploited the deteriorating geostrategic environments and has expanded 

its network into every geographic combatant commander’s theater of operations, including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM), Jabhat al-Nusrah in Syria, and al-Shabaab in Somalia. AQAP 

continues to present the greatest terrorist threat to the U.S. Homeland due to their 

proven capabilities, continued threat planning, and ability to recruit operatives. 

The Salafi-jihadist ideology is the common link binding al Qaeda, affiliates, and 

adherents into a transnational brotherhood of believers. The ideology retains its legitimacy within a small portion of the Muslim community because it incorporates 

a potent mix of anti-Western/anti-Zionist fervor, utopianism, and socio-political 

grievances into a common narrative, and provides the religious justification for the 

use of violence in defense of the Muslim nation. Al Qaeda’s Jihad 2020 grand strategy offers an asymmetric approach to remove U.S. and Western influence from Muslim nations through prolonged engagements of attrition designed to exhaust the political will and financial resources of the United States. 

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan is stable yet tenuous. I remain concerned with high profile attacks, particularly those involving very large vehicle born 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as facilitated by the Haqqani Network. Taliban 

senior leaders are committed to regaining power following the drawdown of coalition 

forces and are secure within safe-havens in Pakistan. We expect the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will continue to control major population and economic centers despite the continuance of the Taliban led insurgency. ANSF 

sustainment will be the greatest mid- to long-term challenge. I am also concerned 

with the current political crisis involving voter fraud allegations related to the recent Presidential runoff elections. These allegations could adversely affect the timely, peaceful transfer of power from President Karzai to a successor. A reasonable 

Afghan political response to pervasive election fraud could lessen chances of violence 

and avoid widespread ethnic disenfranchisement. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current effort to combat terrorism and 

insurgency in Afghanistan and what changes, if any, would you recommend to 

strengthen that effort? 

Answer. As General Dunford testified in March of this year, U.S. and Coalition 

forces have placed constant pressure on the terrorist and insurgent networks operating in and around Afghanistan. At the same time, our significant train, advise, 

assist (TAA) efforts to develop capable and credible ANSF will ensure that Afghanistan will be able to maintain its own security long-term and prevent the reemergence of safe havens from which al Qaeda can launch attacks against the United 

States or our allies. We must maintain both of these efforts as long as possible to 

meet U.S. objectives in the region. 

Today, the ANSF are securing Afghanistan with limited to no coalition support. 

They are taking the brunt of attacks but continue to stand strong against the 

756 

enemy. This fighting season will be a test of their strength, but their confidence continues to build with each successful security operation. The ANSF’s increasing capabilities were recently on international display during the successful execution of two 

elections. During the run-off election this June, the ANSF led all aspects of security, 

securing approximately 6,200 polling centers across the country. This was a historic 

accomplishment. 

There is as much reason to be optimistic about the ANSF now as ever, but the 

situation is not decided. There are areas that we must continue to support in order 

to close developmental gaps and shortfalls in the ANSF. In order to ensure ANSF 

longevity, General Dunford has re-oriented coalition efforts from combat advising at 

the unit level to functionally-based security force assistance (SFA). Our advisors are 

now focused on building Afghan ministerial capacity in planning, programming, 

budgeting, and acquisition as well as working to improve integration between the 

different security pillars—army, police, and intelligence—at all levels. In the fielded 

force, the focus is on further developing critical enabling capabilities such as intelligence, aviation and special operations. These are critical efforts for ANSF’s longterm ability to continue the CT and counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. We must continue to provide advisors in support of these efforts for the long-term. 

Question. How do you see the role of U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan evolving as conventional forces continue to draw down and post-2014, assuming 

a Bilateral Security Agreement is in place? 

Answer. In line with COMISAF’s functionally-based SFA, U.S. and coalition SOF 

have adjusted their focus to advising at the ministerial, organizational and institutional level as well as critical enabling capabilities in our Afghan Special Security 

Force (ASSF) partners—these include aviation, logistics, intelligence, and command 

and control. This will be the primary focus into 2015, pending the signature of the 

Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). 

The NATO Special Operations Component Command/Special Operations Joint 

Task Force-Afghanistan (NSOCC–A/SOJTF–A) has five Special Operations Advisory 

Groups (SOAGs) focused on mentoring and advising our ASSF partners at the operational level in order to ensure they have the ability to command, control, maintain 

and sustain their tactical units spread across the country. These special military 

and police units are our most capable partners in the CT fight. In order to ensure 

our ASSF partners continue to take the fight to our enemies, U.S. SOF must be able 

to continue to do some advising at the tactical level post-2014 with select units in 

select locations. This will reinforce ASSF capabilities to address the terrorist networks which are the greatest threat to U.S./Western/GIRoA interests. 

We must show our continued commitment to Afghan security efforts in order to 

maintain the mutually beneficial relationships we need to meet U.S. objectives in 

the region. To do this, SOF will continue to depend on the enabling capabilities and 

footprint provided by conventional forces. 

SYRIA

Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in Syria and its impact on the region? 

Answer. In the past 3 years the Syrian crisis has descended into a sectarian regional conflict pitting the Assad regime, Lebanese Hizballah and Iran against a mosaic of competing Sunni combatants. The proliferation of armed groups and the 

opening up of additional fronts in the region, particularly ISIL’s control of eastern 

Syria and western Iraq allows for the free flow of fighters and arms across the border. Left unchecked this situation will continue to fuel sectarian violence and increase instability and humanitarian concerns beyond Syria’s border, as observed in 

Iraq. 

Question. What is your assessment of Jabhat al Nusra and other like-minded 

groups? 

Answer. Jabhat al-Nusrah, also referred to as al-Nusrah Front (ANF), is al 

Qaeda’s newest affiliate in Syria and has rapidly matured as an effective fighting 

force. ANF is closely connected to multiple Syrian opposition groups and is coordinating operations against the Assad regime. ANF and other extremist groups in 

Syria are attracting record numbers of foreign fighters and the anticipated backflow 

of these fighters will present an enduring counterterrorism challenge as al Qaeda 

seeks to conduct external terrorist attacks. 

Question. In your view, what is the most appropriate role for the U.S. military 

in assisting regional friends and allies respond to the situation in Syria? 

Answer. I believe the U.S. military can help our regional friends and allies respond to the situation in four key areas. First, we can Build Partner Capacity to 

better understand the situation on the ground, share intelligence, conduct IO, and 

757 

enhance border security. We can also develop the network of military-to-military relationships to build a common understanding of the threats and encourage common 

cause. We should continue our efforts to illuminate the foreign fighter threat and 

enable our partners to create action to disrupt foreign fighters and the networks 

that facilitate them. Finally, we could pursue options to provide additional support 

to strengthen the moderate elements of the Syrian opposition, if authorized and directed. 

Question. In your view, what—if any—role should the U.S. military, including 

Special Operations Forces, play with respect to the situation in Syria? 

Answer. In my view the U.S. military should facilitate interagency and international efforts to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters into and out of Syria and Iraq, 

facilitate intelligence fusion with partners, and employ authorized methods and resources to better understand the situation inside Syria. We should also help Build 

Partner Capacity, train and equip vetted opposition units, posture for CT operations, and in concert with DOS conduct a regional IO campaign to reassure our 

allies, reduce the foreign fighter flow, and reduce support to the extremists. 

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by the Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)? 

Answer. ISIL represents the greatest threat to the governments of Iraq and Syria, 

and threatens to destabilize the entire Levant region by fomenting a sectarian war. 

ISIL’s transnational connections are growing throughout North Africa, Europe, and 

Southeast Asia. The majority of the foreign fighters appear attracted to the success 

of ISIL and present a growing threat to global security as veteran fighters return 

to their home countries. 

Question. What is your assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, 

including the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police, and the Counterterrorism Services, to respond to the threat posed by ISIL and other security challenges? 

Answer. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are currently unable to expel ISIL and 

associated opposition groups from areas where they have seized territory and infrastructure. While the ISF is relatively well-equipped there are considerable political 

challenges that are severely impacting the ISF’s strategic direction and operational 

readiness. 

The Iraqi Army faces shortfalls in intelligence, troop mobility, and faces logistics 

problems severely impacting operational maneuver and resupply of munitions. Iraqi 

Counterterrorism Services have been over-used and miscast as conventional military 

forces inhibiting their ability to conduct counterterrorism missions. Iraqi police 

forces have largely capitulated in Sunni dominated regions allowing anti-GOI forces 

to assume control over the northern and western provinces. Compounding these 

problems, the remaining military forces loyal to the government have been withdrawn from border regions and provinces to defend Baghdad. 

Question. What in your view are the main ‘‘lessons learned’’ from Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and Operation New Dawn as they pertain to Special Operations Forces? 

Answer. These operations provided many lessons learned that we have incorporated into our current operations. These lessons include the need for whole-of-government approaches, active and integrated interagency coordination and collaboration, the necessity for culturally attuned forces, and the need for combined operations. It is critical to maintain enduring partnerships, especially with newly formed 

military establishments, once our general purposes forces have redeployed. Special 

Operations Forces are uniquely designed to conduct low visibility, small footprint, 

but high pay-off persistent military-to-military engagement with partner nations. 

These activities contribute to enduring partnerships and enable access and a better 

understanding of the political landscape and overall threat environment in country. 

To maintain these relationships and partnerships funding and authorities are crucial. 

YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen and 

what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that strategy? 

Answer. Yemen is in a strategic location on the Bab El Mandeb strait and is 

struggling with AQAP and internal threats to stability. The United States is Yemen’s strongest supporter and is providing support on many levels to strengthen the 

government and build stability. DOD is a key element of modernizing the Yemeni 

military by providing equipment, training, and mentorship. 

758 

Question. Given the continuing political instability and slow progress of the national dialogue in Yemen, what are your views on the United States continuing to 

provide security training and assistance to Yemeni counterterrorism forces? 

Answer. The political instability and external threats from al Qaeda are the reasons we must continue to provide security training and assistance to Yemen. The 

political and military progress is slow, but the Yemenis continue to move forward. 

If we are willing to continue providing the support that helps the Yemenis move 

towards stability Yemen has the potential to be a small but important victory in 

defeating extremist organizations in the Middle East. 

SOMALIA AND AL SHABAB

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabab? 

Answer. Al Shabaab (AS) is a significant regional threat in East Africa. AS can 

conduct attacks outside of Somalia and has demonstrated this by launching attacks 

against regional neighbors in Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. AS has proven to be a 

significant regional threat to Western interests and is striving to extend its reach 

internationally. 

Question. In your view, does al Shabab pose a threat to the United States and/ 

or western interests outside of its immediate operational area? 

Answer. Yes, the group has demonstrated the capability to stage complex, highprofile attacks against Western targets outside of Somalia and to harm U.S. citizens 

abroad. Since 2008, Al-Shabaab has vowed to attack U.S. interests in Somalia and 

to conduct attacks against the U.S. Homeland. The United States and Europe host 

a large diaspora of Somalis, which AS could recruit, radicalize, and train personnel 

for attacks against the United States or other western interests. 

Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy in Somalia and 

the role of DOD in that strategy? 

Answer. U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to promote political and economic stability, prevent the use of Somalia as a haven for international terrorism, 

and alleviate the humanitarian crisis caused by years of conflict, drought, flooding, 

and poor governance. The United States is committed to helping Somalia’s Government strengthen democratic institutions, improve stability and security, and deliver 

results for the Somali people. It has urged the Somali leadership to continue to consolidate gains by helping local governance structures emerge through community 

dialogue and reconciliation, rapidly providing services, and drafting legislation to facilitate implementation of the provisional constitution. The United States also has 

welcomed the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) success in driving the 

al-Shabaab terrorist organization out of strategically important population centers, 

and has underscored the continued U.S. commitment through DOD to support 

AMISOM and the Somali national forces in their responsibility of extending security 

throughout Somalia. 

Question. Should the United States establish military-to-military relations and 

consider providing assistance to the Somali national military forces? 

Answer. At the right time we certainly should establish a military-to-military relationship with Somalia. We should look first to resume full diplomatic relations, including establishing a full time presence once security conditions are acceptable. 

Concurrently the United States should continue its support to Somali National military forces through AMISOM and the Department of State’s training program. If 

the situation continues to improve, I would welcome working with AFRICOM and 

the Department of State to determine the best course of action for incorporating 

Special Operations Forces into this effort. 

AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by AQIM? 

Answer. AQIM is a threat to Western and U.S. interests throughout North and 

West Africa. AQIM’s objectives include cleansing North Africa of Western influence; 

overthrowing apostate governments to include Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia; and installing fundamentalist regimes that follow strict, Sharia 

law. 

Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United States and/or 

western interests outside of its immediate operational area? What capacity has 

AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions threatening U.S. interests? 

Answer. AQIM poses a low threat to the Homeland, however, it has the intent 

and capacity to carry out attacks against U.S. interests throughout North Africa 

with the greatest threat to U.S. interests being kidnapping for ransom. Although 

AQIM has not specifically targeted U.S. interests, it has kidnapped 20 Europeans 

over the last 10 years, gaining $50 million USD in ransom payments. 

759 

Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent expansion of 

AQIM’s area of operations in northern Mali on the group’s capacities and aims? 

Answer. AQIM made significant gains during the Tuareg rebellion and subsequent coup in northern Mali in March 2012; however, these gains and their capacity 

in northern Mali are being degraded by ongoing French counterterrorism operations 

and U.N. stabilization mission. 

OPERATION OBSERVANT COMPASS AND THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and 

efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord’s 

Resistance Army (LRA)—including Joseph Kony—continue to operate and commit 

atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational 

concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find 

an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered 

in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from 

the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to 

accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the 

level of direct support they can provide. 

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass (OOC)? 

Answer. The objective of OOC, the U.S. military advise and assist mission with 

AU–RTF forces including the UPDF, DRC and South Sudan, is to better enable African militaries of the region to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army, and ultimately 

to dismantle the LRA and eliminate the threat to the civilian populations of the 

Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. The 

LRA has waged violent insurgency in the region since the 1980s, manning its army 

by kidnapping children and forcing them to take up arms against government 

troops. Since October 2011, joint U.S. and Ugandan operations against the LRA 

have significantly marginalized the group’s activities. 

Question. In your view, how can DOD support, particularly SOF support, to OOC 

be more effective in meeting these objectives? 

Answer. DOD can best support OOC by continuing to support U.S. Government 

Strategic Objectives, based on President Obama’s Counter-Lord’s Resistance Army 

(C–LRA) strategy through continued funding and resourcing. To be more effective 

in achieving these objectives, U.S. SOF C–LRA operations should focus on increasing UPDF and regional forces’ capabilities to counter terrorists and insurgents and 

increase their range and capability to reach remote areas where the LRA continue 

to find safe haven and if directed, prepare for a transition of training responsibilities 

from U.S. SOF to U.S. and/or international and regional partner nation conventional 

forces. Information operations including leaflet drops, radio broadcasts and loud 

speaker operations conducted in close coordination with partner nations and regional NGO’s have been extremely effective in influencing LRA members to defect, 

including the recent defection of high level LRA leader Lt Col Opio Sam. These operations have significantly reduced the LRA’s capabilities and should be continued, 

to deplete the LRA’s ranks and reintegrate former LRA members. These activities, 

coupled with conventional and interagency activities, will directly and indirectly 

contribute to increased protection of civilians in the region, neutralizing the threat 

from the LRA, promoting the integration/re-integration of former LRA members, 

and building the international humanitarian relief to affected communities in the 

region. 

Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD’s current level of support to 

this mission? 

Answer. SOCOM supports AFRICOM and SOCAFRICA’s current persistent engagements and Operation Observant Compass mission in Central Africa, and recognizes that DOD actions are an integral part of the overall U.S. Government approach to achieve national objectives. The current level of support has been successful in significantly marginalizing the LRA through persistent Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events engagements and advise, assist and accompany missions with UPDF, DRC and South Sudan forces as they counter the LRA. These engagements with the UPDF have resulted in the enhancement of a UPDF conventional forces, South Sudan Commandos and DRC Forces Regionale d’Intervenion 

(FRI) troops, who have clearly demonstrated increased counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities throughout the region. The pressure applied by U.S.- 

trained forces has resulted in a large number of defections from the LRA, as well 

as effective UPDF actions on named objectives throughout the region. 

760 

PAKISTAN

Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to 

Pakistan? 

Answer. As a declared nuclear-weapons state, Pakistan’s internal stability is of 

paramount strategic interest to the United States. Violence associated with insurgent and political attacks have been trending generally downward since national 

elections in May 2013; however, attacks as of April 2014 are still unacceptably high. 

As the United States draws down in Afghanistan, a more stable Pakistan will contribute to a more peaceful transition in Afghanistan. Regionally, the Central Asian 

States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are 

increasingly important in terms of security and counterterrorism, the flow of narcotics and other drugs (which fuel corruption and violent extremist groups), and the 

flow of hydrocarbons. Save for Turkmenistan, the Central Asian States are members 

of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the SCO)—with focus on regional security, military cooperation, and mutual economic interests. Pakistan is an observer 

nation in the SCO, and a trading partner with all five. How Pakistan interacts with 

the regional powers of India, China, and Russia is of vital strategic interest to the 

United States. How the United States manages bilateral relations with each of these 

three—India in particular—will influence our relationship with Pakistan. 

Question. Does the United States have a strategic interest in enhancing militaryto-military relations with Pakistan? Why or why not? 

Answer. Our primary strategic interest in enhancing military-to-military relations 

with Pakistan lies in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is not 

a signatory in the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (although is a member 

in good standing in the IAEA). As a nation of nearly 200 million, 96 percent-Muslim, and 90 percent of those Sunni, northwest Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan remain susceptible to Taliban (Sunni) influence. In parallel, most of the primary components for calcium ammonium nitrate (fertilizer)-based IEDs have originated in or 

transited through Pakistan over the past 10–12 years. Enhancing military-to-military relations would offer more chance of guiding Pakistan in positive directions 

than not. 

Question. If so, what steps would you recommend, if confirmed, for enhancing the 

military-to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan? 

Answer. Around the core of Special Operations Command’s warrior diplomats is 

a unique world of relationships with partner nation Special Operations and conventional forces, government agencies in intelligence, law enforcement, policy and diplomacy, universities, think tanks, private sector enterprises and non-governmental organizations. Our partner nation liaison officers who travel to the United States to 

work with SOCOM and attend our professional military education programs have 

the opportunity to interact with many of these organizations, and as a result commonly return to their home countries with a greater sense of trust in U.S. capabilities and intentions. Likewise, our Special Operations Liaison Officers return from 

overseas assignments with a deeper appreciation of countries and regions to which 

they are detailed. These exchanges, as well as continuing legacy SOF training missions prove to be of enormous value in breaking down barriers to future communication and understanding. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s cooperation with the United 

States in counterterrorism operations against militant extremist groups located in 

Pakistan? 

Answer. Pakistan has become increasingly cooperative. Pakistan’s central government appears to have changed its stance toward militant extremist groups, specifically the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Haqqani Network, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Within the last few 

weeks, Pakistan’s military (both air and ground forces) conducted successful missions in the federally Administered Tribal Areas region of Pakistan in an effort to 

defeat extremist groups. In addition, Pakistan’s populace has been very supportive 

of its governmental/military efforts, as they have become increasingly frustrated 

with militants targeting civilians, exacerbated by the recent complex attack on Karachi’s airport. 

Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan’s efforts to counter the threat improvised explosive devices, including efforts to attack the network, go after known 

precursors and explosive materials? 

Answer. Pakistan has an extremely complex and volatile climate of political, military and industrial relationships and it is understood that dual-use precursors are 

finding their way into IEDs. While strides have been made to better control production and distribution of materials, more needs to be done to illuminate the networks 

that provide precursors for the lethal devices. This will require building trust and 

761 

identifying the benefits of curbing the shipping of these materials by both militaryto-military and diplomatic means to include, perhaps, offering alternative technologies as mitigation. 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of U.S. assistance provided 

through the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to the military of the 

Republic of the Philippines in its fight against terrorist groups? 

Answer. The short answer is that I believe Operation Enduring FreedomPhillipines (OEF–P), executed through Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF–P), has been a text-book example of the effectiveness of the ‘‘by, 

with, and through’’ strategy. 

The effort has employed the full range of military activities—ranging from Direct 

Action/Kinetic operations to building partner capacity—and utilized numerous capacity building funding authorities. 

In the initial years of OEF–P, USSOF worked at the tactical level, actively patrolling and advising the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in operations against 

ASG and Jemaah Islamiya (JI). After 6 months of FID operations, JTF–510 completed its mission and redeployed while Special Forces Security Assistance modules 

continued with a focus on facilitating connections between elements of the AFP and 

U.S. SOF. JTF–510 was replaced by JSOTF–P, which continued to execute the full 

range of operations to include advise, train, equip, and civil-military support 

through building partner capacity venues. The intent of these operations was to go 

at the heart of the ASG and JI support zones and eliminate their ability to operate 

by improving government legitimacy, separating terrorists from the populace, and 

assisting in CT targeting. This method was sustained for 9 years. As the AFP skills 

progressed, U.S. SOF refocused their efforts on operational planning and higher 

headquarters C2 techniques. Our successes in the Philippines is no doubt based on 

the full range of operations, actions, and activities with both Ministry of Defense 

and Ministry of Interior forces to include direct action, advise/assist, train, equip, 

minor construction, ISR, CASEVAC, CMO, CNT, info ops, and aviation support. 

Our Philippine partners have now progressed to a point where they can maintain 

security and stability with minimal advisory support and international ties to ASG 

and JI have been severed. Within the past year, JSOTF–P elevated their support 

to the institutional training centers of select Philippine National Police (PNP) and 

AFP partner units who can now wage the CT fight on their own. 

Question. Do you expect the necessity for or mission of the JSOTF–P to change 

in the coming years? If so, how? 

Answer. Yes. JSOTF–P will deactivate and the named operation OEF–P will conclude in fiscal year 2015. OEF–P and JSOTF–P will transition because of a change 

in the threat picture, and more importantly, due to the significant enhancement of 

PSF capabilities. Throughout this transition, our ability to maintain a good rapport 

with PSF and internal networks built over the past 11 years has been critical to 

our partnership. 

A smaller number of U.S. military personnel operating as part of a U.S. Pacific 

Command Augmentation Team will continue to improve the abilities of the PSF to 

conduct their CT missions, build PSF capacity through long-term SOF partnership, 

and to partner at critical locations to ensure a level of sustainable competence. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AUTHORITIES

Question. The current Commander of SOCOM has sought and received more control over the deployment and utilization of Special Operations Forces. For example, 

the Secretary of Defense modified policy guidance for the combatant commands that 

gave SOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic 

combatant commanders and Special Operations Forces assigned to them. 

Do you believe the Commander of SOCOM needs additional authorities to optimize the utilization of deployed Special Operations Forces? 

Answer. No, receiving COCOM of Theater Special Operations Commands enables 

resourcing, organizing, and guidance supporting geographic combatant commanders 

while increasing effectiveness of Special Operations Forces assigned to them. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to utilize authorities provided to the 

Commander of SOCOM without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon other authorities provided to the geographic combatant commanders, 

or raising concerns with the State Department. 

Answer. I’ll address each of the three potential conflicts listed above. 

762 

I fully understand and will comply with the military chain-of-command, which 

eliminates conflict with civilian control. 

When Special Operations Forces deploy, OPCON is transferred to the GCC who 

then employs the forces. This clear transfer of control eliminates any conflict with 

the GCCs. 

All of the various events and activities that employ SOF (JCET, CNT, Section 

1208, Section 1207, JCS Exercise) require COM concurrence, thereby eliminating 

any possible conflict with State. 

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent bills, 

authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to 

regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military 

operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism. 

What is your assessment of this authority? 

Answer. Section 1208 is critical to our combating terrorism efforts. It is a force 

multiplier—allowing a small number of U.S. Special Operators to enlist the support 

of regular and irregular forces to facilitate U.S. military operations, particularly to 

access areas where a larger U.S. presence would be counter to our objectives. 1208 

authority is ideally aligned to our defense strategy, which calls for small-footprint, 

distributed operations to counter terrorist threat networks. From a historical perspective, we have achieved tremendous effects across a wide range of operating environments for a fraction of the cost of other programs. Section 1208 authority fills 

a critical gap in our ability to train and equip regular and irregular forces in uncertain environments where terrorists thrive and establish sanctuary. I am extremely 

appreciative of Congress’ continued support for this authority. 

Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)-passed NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2015 (S. 2410) increased the cap for section 1208 operations to $60 million 

from its current level of $50 million 

What is your view of this proposed increase? 

Answer. I am encouraged by the SASC’s effort to increase our authority cap as 

an indicator that we share similar perspectives on section 1208. As we transition 

out of combat operations in Afghanistan and begin to implement the President’s vision of increasing efforts by, with, and through foreign partners to address the expanding threat of terrorism, section 1208 authority will become ever more essential. 

Section 1208 will be in increasing demand by the combatant commanders as they 

seek low-cost, small-footprint, discreet SOF elements to carry out enabled partner 

operations. I also see the need for longevity in the authority—by way of multi-year 

extensions—and incremental increases in the cap to accommodate expanding requirements so that we are able to meet the current demand and posture ourselves 

to respond quickly in the event of emerging crises. 

Question. Are there any other changes that should be made to section 1208 to improve the effectiveness of this authority? 

Answer. I’m continually impressed with the foresight of those in Congress that 

wrote 1208 authority, as it continues after nearly 10 years to provide us with tremendous flexibility in supporting our combating terrorism operations, while affording the Department of Defense and congressional leadership with complete visibility 

on the program through existing notifications and reporting requirements. I believe 

that as long as we adhere to the spirit and letter of the law, with careful management and oversight, this authority will continue to serve us well into the future as 

written. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTIC AUTHORITIES

Question. What is your understanding of the Department of Defense’s counternarcotics authorities? 

Answer. SOF forces conduct counter narco-terrorism (CNT) training missions 

under DOD counternarcotics authorities. Known as section 1004 authority (§ 1004, 

of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991), U.S. SOF CNT missions enable foreign partners 

to develop skills and capabilities to interdict smuggling activities. SOF CNTs address the narco-trafficking and associated transnational criminal organization (TCO) 

threats in regions such as West Africa, Central America, and the Central Asian 

States. These are regions where SOF has a continuous forward presence under CN 

authority. SOCOM helps support the Department’s Counternarcotics and Global 

Threats Strategy through conducting CNTs and other activities. 

Question. In your view, does SOCOM benefit from these authorities and associated funding? 

763 

Answer. Yes. CN authorities and funding enable SOF forces to build partner capacity and enable SOF forward presence in areas threatened by narcotics trafficking. CN authorities and funding also enable the SOF community to perform 

Counter Threat Finance (CTF) analysis of illicit proceeds of the drug trade. 

Question. Would you recommend any changes to the Department of Defense counternarcotics authorities? 

Answer. I believe current DOD counternarcotics authorities are appropriate, and 

have proven to be useful tools to accomplish national security objectives. I would 

note that because the current authorities are tied to counternarcotics, they do not 

currently enable DOD to directly support other U.S. Government efforts to counter 

transnational organized crime that lacks a narcotics or terrorist connection 

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation 

routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production of IEDs, 

narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant national security threats could 

have an outsized impact on confronting these threats. In August 2010, the Department issued a CTF Policy Directive which recognized the CTF discipline as an essential tool in combating criminal networks and terrorist organizations and called 

for the integration of CTF capabilities into future force planning and the continued 

support to interagency partners conducting CTF operations. 

What is your assessment of the value of CTF activities? 

Answer. Identifying and disrupting the enabling means, specifically the resources 

of our adversaries, is a critical line of effort to the National Counterterrorism Strategy and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. CTF directly supports these objectives through highlighting the illicit activities and vulnerabilities 

of threat networks. Additionally, financial data is a powerful tool in understanding 

a network’s capabilities and relationships. In this context, CTF activities provide 

significant value in our efforts to protect the United States and U.S. interests 

abroad. 

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of SOCOM in supporting CTF activities? 

Answer. SOCOM is the DOD lead component for synchronizing transnational 

DOD CTF activities. In this role, SOCOM is well positioned to support interagency 

and partner CTF efforts. Our ability to understand our adversaries and advance 

whole-of-government efforts will remain an important aspect of our enabling role, 

and will shape our ability to operate effectively alongside and in support of our 

interagency partners. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are 

also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats 

that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director 

of National Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ‘‘an 

abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,’’ and stated that 

‘‘rising drug violence and corruption are undermining stability and the rule of law 

in some countries’’ in the Western Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released 

his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging 

Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the 

strategy is ‘‘enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law enforcement.’’ 

What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational 

criminal organizations? 

Answer. The U.S. National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime 

is grounded in the increasing threat transnational criminal organizations pose to 

U.S. and international security and governance. It highlights the threat posed by 

the convergence of transnational organized criminal activities. Therefore, the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime centers on efforts to build, balance, 

and integrate the tools of American power to combat this threat. Depriving threat 

networks of their enabling means must be integrated into current and future operations, including special operations missions. It takes a network to combat this, and 

the approach we must take is a whole-of-government networked approach. The 

Threat Mitigation Working Group led a Strategic Coordination Meeting hosted at 

SOCOM to explore this very topic on May 9, 2014. There is still work to be done 

to synchronize our whole-of-government response to CTOC. 

Question. What is your understanding of the SOCOM’s role within the President’s 

strategy? 

Answer. SOCOM is a partner with interagency efforts to: 

764 

• Enhance intelligence and information sharing; 

• SOCOM’s global perspective can provide unique expertise in defining and 

describing the scope of the threat posed by transnational criminal organizations. 

• Strengthen interdiction, investigations, and prosecutions; 

• Special Operations Forces (SOF) provide unique capabilities in support of 

the Department of Defense’s detect and monitor responsibilities as outlined 

in title 10, U.S.C., section 124. Additionally, an expansion of the DOD rewards for information program to include transnational organized crime, 

would permit SOF to provide additional support in gathering information 

to support arrest or conviction of top transnational criminals. 

• Disrupt drug trafficking and its facilitation of other transnational threats; 

and 

• SOF have a long history in providing support to U.S. Government 

counter-drug activities globally. SOF maintain established relationships 

with counter-drug partners worldwide and execute sustained counter-drug 

capacity development missions. 

• Build international capacity, cooperation, and partnerships 

• SOF have unique qualifications and capabilities to directly interact with 

and enhance international partners’ capacity to address the challenges related to transnational organized crime. 

Question. In your view, should SOCOM play a role in providing support to the 

U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters related to 

transnational organized crime? 

Answer. Yes. Transnational organized crime can destabilize partner nation governments, while also enabling our adversaries. To effectively counter these threats, 

we need to undertake a comprehensive approach that includes mutually supporting 

priorities among DOD, other U.S. Government departments and law enforcement 

agencies, and the Intelligence Community. Furthermore, once the mutually supporting priorities are identified, SOCOM should continue to develop capabilities and 

integrate those capabilities into mission planning in support of whole-of-government 

solutions, including working directly with U.S. Law Enforcement agencies. 

SOCOM ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

Question. SOCOM is unique within the DOD as the only unified command with 

acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only 

uniformed commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive. 

If confirmed, how would you ensure SOCOM requirements are adequately vetted 

and balanced against available resources before moving forward with an acquisition 

program? 

Answer. SOCOM has a robust requirements and programming process that is vetted through the special operations Strategic Planning Process (SPP) and leadership 

from each of the component commands. This disciplined process allows SOCOM to 

align available resources with validated requirements, and to prioritize these requirements within our budget and future year programs. 

Question. In your view, are there ways in which the SOCOM acquisition system 

can be reformed to more expeditiously address emerging requirements? 

Answer. SOCOM prides itself on an acquisition workforce of recognized experts 

and trusted providers, as well as a rapid and focused acquisition system built on 

streamlined processes. Although effective, we continue to look for collaborative opportunities and more innovative ways of doing business with the Services, international partners, and the industrial complex. 

Some recent examples include open collaborative forums between the SOF operators, acquirers, industry and academia, 3D modeling and prototyping, and various 

contracting strategies. 

Question. What role can SOCOM’s development and acquisition activities play in 

broader Service and DOD efforts? 

Answer. SOCOM is a microcosm of the entire Defense Department, and our challenges are very similar to investment requirements among the Services. SOCOM 

also has mature processes to conduct rapid evaluations of technology, systems, and 

concepts of operations, the results of which benefit SOF and are transferrable to the 

rest of the Department. Special Operations Forces Acquirers specialize in the integration of emerging off-the-shelf technologies. 

This integration allows SOCOM to take the best from each Service, as well as industry, and modify or customize the equipment to meet special operations needs and 

765 

rapidly field it to the force. Our success can then be shared with the Services to 

improve their capabilities. 

Some of the SOF technologies that have been transitioned to the Services include 

the M–3 Multipurpose Anti-Armor, Anti-Personnel Weapons System to the U.S. 

Army, the MK48 Machine gun to the U.S. Navy, and the LA–10 Handheld Laser 

Marker to the U.S. Air Force National Guard. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that special operations capabilities 

and requirements are integrated into overall DOD research, development, and acquisition programs? 

Answer. Although SOCOM generates and validates all SOF requirements, these 

requirements are provided to the Joint Staff for inclusion in the Joint Requirements 

Knowledge Management System. In addition, SOCOM has initiated acquisition 

summits with OSD, drawing together SOCOM, USD(AT&L), and the Service Acquisition Executives (SAE) to discuss acquisition issues of common interest. For example, the SAEs regularly synchronize technical and programmatic plans among all investment portfolios, as well as explore initiatives to develop common architectures 

and standards across different future SOF and Service platforms. Additionally, 

OSD(AT&L) has led efforts on behalf of SOF to standardize certification and other 

Service test requirements between Services and SOCOM to gain efficiencies and 

promote common process reciprocity. Continuing that dialogue/exchange will remain 

one of my priorities. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure sufficient resources are dedicated 

to the development of special operations-unique platforms, when required? 

Answer. Ensuring SOF not only has the resources to conduct today’s operations 

but preparing ourselves for the future environment is one of my top priorities. The 

SOCOM SPP allows the Command to take a strategic view of future requirements 

and achieve a balance. Since September 11, the MFP–11 budget has kept pace with 

operations, and the investment funding has allowed SOCOM to support these increased demands and acquire equipment as required. 

Question. If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the effectiveness 

of SOCOM technology development investments and whether SOCOM is investing 

sufficient resources in these efforts? 

Answer. We have created a series of technology roadmaps that assist us in identifying promising solutions to our problems. These roadmaps are schedule-oriented, 

containing both the technology development timelines and the formal acquisition 

program schedules. As such, they have quantifiable metrics (cost, schedule, performance, and technology readiness) embedded in them. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that SOCOM has an acquisition workforce with the skills, qualifications, and experience needed to develop and manage 

its acquisition and research and development programs? 

Answer. The SOCOM Acquisition Executive manages the SOF Acquisition workforce similar to the Service Acquisition Executives. SOF Acquirers are specialists in 

science and technology, acquisition, contracting, and logistics. They are operationally oriented, professionally trained and certified, and experts in the SOF-unique 

processes required to meet the equipping needs of SOF. SOCOM has been recognized as a leader in acquisition workforce development, and has received DOD-level 

awards in this area for the last 3 years. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Question. Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have greater 

influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, 

promotion, compensation, and retention of Special Operations Forces. One proposal 

would modify section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from ‘‘monitoring’’ the promotion, retention, and career progression of special operations officers to ‘‘coordinating’’ with the Services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect Special Operations Forces. 

What is your view of this proposal? 

Answer. In 2010, the Defense Department published DODD 5100.01, Functions of 

the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, which implemented 

SOCOM’s recommendation, specifically citing ‘‘coordinate,’’ vice monitoring as title 

10 states. SOCOM must continue to work with the Services and ASD(SO/LIC) to 

ensure the most effective personnel management policies are codified in all applicable directives. 

SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews mandated significant 

growth in Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their operVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00773 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
766 

ations. However, as a result of the Budget Control Act and Bipartisan Budget 

Agreement, SOCOM will truncate its growth at 69,700 personnel, almost 3,000 

fewer than had been previously planned. 

What is the impact of these cuts to special operations capabilities—particularly 

with regard to organic enabling capabilities like combat support and combat service 

support? 

Answer. The Budget Control Act and Bipartisan Budget Agreement truncated 

SOCOM’s growth by approximately 2,201 personnel. After conducting a detailed 

analysis, it was determined that primarily USASOC’s end strength would be affected (specifically three Ranger companies, an MH–47 company of eight helicopters, 

and one of two ISR Gray Eagle companies cut; and a halt in programmed growth 

of civil affairs capacity), so that cuts to combat support and combat service support 

(CS/CSS) requirements could be minimized. Additionally, while not specifically reduced, NSW and MARSOC did not realize programmed growth. 

Although the cuts were managed to ensure minimal effects on CS/CSS, SOCOM 

will need to define its requirements farther in advance, in order to allow the Services to plan for the employment of habitually aligned units in support of SOF. A 

reduction of our emergent requests and an increase in habitually aligned Service 

Provided Capabilities (SPCs) will go a long way to resolve this problem. We remain 

committed more than ever to working with the Services as part of their Service force 

generation processes and GFM to ensure the necessary SPCs are programmed for, 

trained and ready to deploy with SOF to meet operational requirements. 

STRESS ON THE FORCE AND FAMILIES: FMD POTFF (DR NEFF)

Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have experienced higher suicide rates than those in the general purpose forces and continue to face significant 

numbers of divorces The current Commander of SOCOM has focused significant effort and resources on addressing the stress on special operators and their families 

through the Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) initiative. 

If confirmed, how would you seek to address issues associated with the stress of 

difficult and repeated deployments on special operators and their families? 

Answer. I will continue to place my priority on the POTFF initiative. With the 

support of Congress, the Department of Defense and the Services I will fully support 

what Admiral Olson and Admiral McRaven have started. Aggressively, I will reach 

out to our SOF families and listen to their concerns to ensure, between the Services 

and SOCOM, there are solutions available to meet their needs. One of the key 

causes of stress for our families is the unpredictability of training and deployment 

schedules. To help mitigate this stress and provide families with more predictability, 

I will continue to support the policy on Personnel Tempo Tracking and enforce the 

SOCOM threshold of 250 days at home station (head on pillow) in a 24-month period. 

Question. Do you believe families of special operators face ‘‘special operationsunique’’ challenges when compared to other military families? 

Answer. All military families face challenges associated with supporting their 

servicemember. A combination of high operational tempo (OPTEMPO), exacting 

standards for operational proficiency, and mission sensitivity places unique stressors 

on SOF members and their families. In accordance with President Obama’s strategic 

guidance, this burden will not decrease. I will continue to alleviate the impact of 

these challenges by working closely with the Services and, where gaps are identified, work with Congress to implement programs geared towards meeting SOF requirements. 

SOF members are subject to no-notice recall and immediate deployments without 

clear end dates which adds unpredictability to the families. SOF members routinely 

practice high-risk skills and collective training events with personal injury a persistent career factor and added stress on families. A higher degree of operational 

activity and enemy contact (personally eliminating combatants) brings an increased 

opportunity for traumatic exposure compared with GPF. Many SOF members are 

deployed to remote locations without traditional psychological, medical, or religious 

support. SOF lives within a short-term deployment & training cycle that result in 

little or no reintegration period with families . . . we are always at war. Many SOF 

members work on classified missions which cannot be shared with spouses . . . this 

brings added stress on the relationship. SOF spouses endure a greater percentage 

of parenting duties from high PERSTEMPO. In time the SOF family adapts to the 

high OPTEMPO, and then the SOF member retires or moves to a ‘‘desk job’’, which 

can bring difficulties in adapting back to a ‘‘normal life’’. 

767 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. How successful have the services been in recruiting and retaining the 

special operations personnel that are needed? 

Answer. In today’s operating environment, the demand is much greater for SOF 

operators who speak various languages and are culturally attuned. Service recruitment efforts face many challenges as selection from the pool of eligible U.S. citizens 

and legal permanent residents are limited due to medical, educational, or conduct 

reasons. However, Service recruiting commands, in coordination with SOF component commands continue to be generally successful in recruiting SOF operators. 

Continued support for programs like Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI), has great potential to alleviate some critical strategic language and 

cultural gaps. Your current and continued support of this program is not only appreciated but vital to ensure future SOF success. Looking forward, the Services’ must 

increase recruitment for those candidates who will bring ethnic, business, academic, 

technical and experimental diversity to SOF. Operating in an uncertain global environment requires a broad pool of personnel with deep and diverse global awareness 

and understanding. It is paramount for Services and SOCOM to remain receptive 

and flexible to initiatives which enable the recruitment of these types of individuals. 

Question. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in the SOCOM 

community? 

Answer. Past focus groups identified a primary reason personnel consider leaving 

the force is the lack of predictability for deployments to both named operations and 

to GCC theater security cooperation program missions. Specifically, this is often created by late shifts in deployment schedules and the insertion of new requirements. 

In order to address this challenge, SOCOM recently implemented a Personnel 

Tempo (PERSTEMPO) tracking policy that establishes a 250 days at home station 

(head on pillow) threshold in a 24-month period (730 days) with a 12 months back 

and 12 months forward sliding scale. Any waivers must be personally approved by 

the SOCOM Commander. 

Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the recruiting and 

retention goals of each of the Services’ Special Operations Forces? 

Answer. The Services need increased flexibility to incentivize qualified individuals 

to choose the path to become special operators. We need continued support for programs that are beneficial to SOF and also in maintaining recruiting budgets for the 

Services. Consequently, SOCOM must continue to facilitate comprehensive solutions 

and engagement with our components and the Services to ensure the SOF community is attracting the very best. We must also retain those SOF Operators who demonstrate future potential service to their respective Service. 

Question. What monetary or non-monetary incentives do you believe would be 

most effective in this regard? 

Answer. SOCOM currently has a set of recruiting and retention incentive programs focused on accessing new personnel, keeping both our mid-career SOF personnel as well as maintaining our most senior and experienced SOF personnel: Enlistment Bonus (EB), Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), Critical Skills Retention 

Bonus (CSRB), Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP), Assignment Incentive Pay 

(AIP) and Critical Skills Accession Bonus (CSAB). These programs have been effective in accessing and retaining their target demographic. SOCOM will continue to 

advocate for the SOF Service Components, via OSD and the Joint Staff, with the 

Services in order to maintain these important SOF incentives programs. 

TRAINING CAPABILITY

Question. What capabilities do you consider most important for effective training 

of special operations personnel? 

Answer. Professional Military Education remains an essential element to the development, sustainment, and advancement of SOF. Additionally, language skills and 

cultural knowledge continue to be key to establishing effective relationships with 

foreign forces, organizations and individuals with which SOF will interact. 

Training, such as JCETs, Realistic Military Training (RMT) off Federal property, 

and operational exercises are critical in maintaining SOF core capabilities. JCETs 

fulfill critical language, regional expertise, and cultural training requirements, and 

at the same time they build person-to-person and unit-to-unit relationships, and 

contribute towards persistent engagement with partner nations. RMT provides environments that replicate those encountered in actual operations that may not be 

available in the size or desired level of realism on Federal property. Further, these 

exercises are a great opportunity to enhance interagency relationships. 

Operational exercises rehearse mission essential tasks that are critical across the 

spectrum of conflict. From an aviation perspective, this includes the frequency, volVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00775 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
768 

ume, and quality of training to maintain currency, proficiency, and expertise across 

a variety of tactical skillsets from aircrew primary and advanced flight skills to 

Joint Terminal Attack Controller qualifications to culturally-attuned Combat Aviation Advisors. This consists of, among other things, access to appropriate ranges, 

airspace and the ability to operate off real Federal property to effectively replicate 

operational requirements. SOF is conducting engagements and building partner capacity in several countries with a wide-array of aviation platforms, many of which 

are not in the DOD inventory, which require our forces to continually expand and 

refine their knowledge and expertise of aviation platforms and their capabilities. 

Question. What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance training for 

special operations personnel? 

Answer. SOCOM must continue the reframing of the force from a primarily 

threat-focused approach to a population-centric approach. To achieve U.S. strategic 

objectives, we must continue to posture for and execute an approach based on population-centric engagement. 

The continued use of technology has resulted in tangible tactical benefits to the 

force. For instance, SOCOM’s acquisition of the latest Simulation-Based Training 

devices has provided an alternative or complementary method to conduct SOF training. This training uses virtual environments to augment or replace portions of the 

real environment, reducing risk to the participants and potentially reduce overall 

training costs. The use of these simulations at home stations will reduce the requirement to travel to train thus reducing time away from home and shortening 

training timelines. 

Question. What are the most significant challenges in achieving effective training 

of special operations personnel? 

Answer. Access to and availability of Service training areas and ranges in proximity to SOF home bases continue to be a challenge. While there are excellent joint 

training areas in CONUS, the resources required to access these areas and limited 

range scheduling availability create additional strain on training time, training 

budgets, and PERSTEMPO. Given SOF’s normal OPTEMPO and un-forecasted mission requirements, SOF requires priority over General Purpose Forces at Service 

and joint training installations. 

From a Presentation of the Force perspective, pre-mission and pre-deployment 

training with relevant Service-Provided Capabilities (SPCs) is critical. SOF utilizes 

SPCs to travels to and participate in training at various venues. Coordinating available transportation and training assets with non-prioritized scheduling is difficult 

and creates delays in training and inefficient use of training resources. The lack of 

available CONUS-based fixed and rotary/tilt wing platforms presents a significant 

challenge to train in the spectrum of SOF required capabilities. 

Question. What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. Special Operations Forces 

from training foreign military personnel? 

Answer. SOF conducting training in regional synchronization, intelligence sharing, planning and coordination for counterterrorism related operations are invaluable tools for improving the language and cultural expertise of U.S. Special Operations Forces while providing opportunities to practice skills needed to conduct a variety of missions, including foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and 

counterterrorism. The training of foreign military forces also facilitates more persistent and enduring engagement with partner nation security forces building relationships, trust and interoperability with our global SOF partners. 

Question. To what extent, in your view, is it appropriate for the United States to 

rely upon contractors for training foreign military personnel? What do you see as 

the primary risks and advantages in such contractor training? 

Answer. Training of foreign forces, as a general rule, must be conducted as a part 

of the Department of State title 22 funded Security Assistance or Security Cooperation programs. SOF support to these programs usually does not include the use of 

contracted personnel. The use of contractors in many cases may make sense from 

a cost perspective, as well as relieving military assets from these tasks. The risk 

to SOF in using contracted personnel is the possible disclosure of tactics, techniques, 

and procedures (TTP) which SOF has developed based on our battlefield successes. 

SOF reviews contracts for training to foreign forces to ensure TTPs are protected 

from disclosure. The problem is trying to monitor contracted training that is being 

done by other countries for foreign forces. Frequently, former U.S. Military personnel accept employment with one of 46 foreign companies that conduct SOF training. It is very difficult to monitor disclosure in these cases. Contractors are not a 

SOF substitute. They should only be used in a support role such as logistics and 

administration. Contractors operating separate or leading the training of foreign 

forces may not represent SOF in the best light and cannot represent the U.S. Government. The advantages are they free up SOF from routine logistical and admin 

769 

support functions and allow them to concentrate on operational mission accomplishments. 

DIVERSITY IN SOCOM

Question. How do you define diversity in SOCOM? 

Answer. SOCOM’s definition of diversity includes the traditional categories of minority representation and more. The ability to speak foreign languages, blend into 

foreign environments, and understand the local cultures of our operating regions are 

invaluable skills which creates a broader, operation-specific diversity in SOCOM. 

Question. Do you believe that achieving greater diversity in SOCOM is a priority? 

Answer. Diversity is absolutely a priority for SOCOM and for subordinate SOF 

units. Having people on the team from diverse backgrounds only makes the team 

as a whole stronger. Specifically, diversity is operationally necessary for SOF as 

SOF engagements continue to expand across populations with different cultural nuances. SOF success is impacted by our ability to assess and adapt on multiple 

fronts, and benefit from those that possess a broad range of skills and backgrounds. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that continued 

progress toward diversity goals is achieved without violating reverse discrimination 

principles of law? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my component commanders, Senior DOD 

leadership and the Services to identify future operational requirements and support 

diversity marketing, awareness, and outreach to meet those operational requirements. In addition, senior SOCOM leaders are putting a focus on increasing cultural 

and ethnic diversity. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. What is your assessment of current sexual assault prevention and response policies and procedures in SOCOM? 

Answer. The Military Services have primary responsibility to ensure sexual assault response personnel (Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, Victim Advocates, 

medical and mental health providers, and criminal investigation personnel) are 

well-trained to support victims and investigate and respond to allegations of sexual 

assault. If resources are not readily available where the alleged incident occurred, 

victims are transported to a facility where there is appropriate victim advocate support, medical and psychological care (regardless of Service), and investigative/legal 

support. 

The Joint Staff remains a key partner with the Services and OSD in the campaign 

against sexual assault. Additionally, the Joint Staff works closely with the combatant commands during the development of operational plans and personnel policy 

guidance to ensure the prevention and response to incidents of sexual assault is addressed. 

Prevention of sexual assault is a leadership responsibility. Commanders at all levels must remain committed to eliminating sexual assault within our forces by sustaining robust prevention and response policies; by providing thorough and effective 

training to all assigned service members, by identifying and eliminating barriers to 

reporting; and by ensuring care is available and accessible. 

Question. Do you consider current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective? 

Answer. Yes. For a multitude of reasons, sexual assault has historically been an 

under-reported crime. Restricted reporting has been effective. Although the use of 

restricted, or confidential, reporting doesn’t allow law enforcement to investigate alleged assaults, it does allow a sexual assault victim to confidentially receive medical 

treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigation process. 

Unrestricted reporting supports a sexual assault victim who desires medical treatment and counseling—but also provides for official investigation of his or her allegations by law enforcement with the support of the victim’s chain of command or Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC). 

As our military members’ confidence in the reporting and investigative policies 

and procedures improve as well as the implementation of the victim’s attorney programs (i.e., the Air Force Special Victim’s Counsel) over the past 18 months, I believe and certainly hope that increasing progress is being made in the effort to increase unrestricted reports and victim cooperation during investigations/prosecutions. This will ultimately increase offender accountability. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources 

SOCOM has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. The Services are responsible for training sexual assault response personnel to ensure they are well-trained to investigate and respond to allegations of 

770 

sexual assault. The services have been trying to increase the number of Victim Advocates to support special operators who are deployed to more remote locations. Improved training for investigators is also a priority and this includes investigative resources in deployed areas. As you may imagine, deployed operations and the combat 

environment are very dynamic and investigative resources are often strained by 

other mission requirements. Remoteness of locations, availability of transportation, 

or the level of ongoing operations may complicate access to resources. I believe the 

DOD training network in place now prepares investigators to handle sexual assault 

cases in a caring, responsive, and professional manner. Our ability to respond and 

support victims is critical. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. In January 2013, the Department rescinded the policy restricting the 

assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging 

in direct ground combat operations, and has given the Military Services until January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be 

approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. 

The Services and SOCOM are working now to develop gender-free physical and 

mental standards for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing 

individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those 

standards. 

If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes. Our success requires a highly qualified, talented and motivated special operations force. Our standards are a reflection of the challenges we face every 

day, on and off the battlefield, and are the hallmark of our organization. I view the 

process of developing and validating standards as an opportunity to ensure our 

standards are operationally relevant to current and future special operations. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona 

fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you take to ensure that such 

decisions are made on this basis? 

Answer. Our highest priority and most important responsibility is national security. We must remain uncompromising in this regard when making decisions on assignment of personnel to all positions and occupations. History shows diversity enhances capability and will continue to be an integral part of SOF as we face future 

challenges. The standards validation process will ensure our forces are properly selected and trained to meet the demands for specific occupations and military requirements. 

Question. Do you anticipate SOCOM or its components will need to recommend 

to a parent Service that the Service seek an exception to the policy to keep any of 

its units or occupations all male? 

Answer. The recommendation for exceptions to policy, in coordination with the 

recommendations of the Services, will be informed by the validation of occupational 

standards and SOCOM’s studies of morale, cohesion, and unit readiness. These efforts are ongoing. Without these results, it is premature to anticipate exceptions to 

policy. 

LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

Question. Deployed special operations personnel remain heavily concentrated in 

the Central Command area of operations, including many who have been deployed 

outside of their regional area of expertise. 

Are you concerned that the language and cultural skills among Special Operations 

Forces are being degraded because of repeated deployments outside their regional 

area of expertise? 

Answer. While this remains a concern in the near term, the number of operators 

being deployed outside their regional area of expertise is decreasing and more of our 

language and cultural awareness training has been committed to improving our 

global capabilities. Despite repeated deployments to the Central Command area of 

operations, SOCOM’s gross language capacity and capability are higher than they 

have ever been in the past 10 years. However, we need to finish rebalancing specific 

language densities by operational unit to better serve all geographic combatant commands. Additionally, based on our assessment of the global operational environment, we must maintain our efforts to improve in language capabilities needed to 

develop our foreign partners. 

Question. If so and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to ensure these 

unique skills are adequately maintained? 

771 

Answer. Effectively enabling our foreign partners and allies to address internal 

threats mandates that SOCOM training, mentoring, and coordination efforts are directed at planning, intelligence, and other topics well beyond the simple mechanics 

of teaching rifle marksmanship. This means we must increase our intermediate and 

higher level capacities. To address this, we will continue our partnership with the 

Department and the Services on related issues and increase efforts within the Service SOF components. SOCOM works closely with the Department and the Services 

to optimize and increase diversity recruiting efforts, such as the MAVNI pilot program which brings advanced language and cultural capability into SOF and SOF 

enabler specialties at low or no cost. We also count on the Services for testing capacity and incentive pays. Both are necessary components of our overall language program. 

Rebalancing our language capabilities and continuing to develop the necessary 

higher proficiencies means strengthening our Service SOF language and culture instruction programs, and monitoring them closely to ensure efficiencies without sacrificing critical capabilities. We will also work with the Service SOF components and 

Services to optimize career management that capitalizes on initial training and increases capability through work-related exposure. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on an expanded 

role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, 

including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some 

have advocated significant changes to SOCOM’s title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the 

world. 

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by 

SOCOM, and why? 

Answer. SOCOM and SOF senior leaders are in a constant process of reviewing 

and prioritizing SOF core activities as outlined in DOD Directive 5100.01. This process encapsulates reviewing current directives and capabilities, as well as studying 

the ever-changing global environment in order to provide feedback to re-shape future directives. This process is reported in updates to the Directive and other key 

documents. SOCOM will continue to prepare SOF as directed. 

Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them? 

Answer. SOCOM and SOF senior leaders are in a constant process of reviewing 

and prioritizing SOF core activities as outlined in DOD Directive 5100.01. This process encapsulates reviewing current directives and capabilities, as well as studying 

the ever-changing global environment in order to provide feedback to reshape future 

directives. This process is reported in updates to the Directive and other key documents. SOCOM will continue to prepare SOF as directed. 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the Intelligence 

Community? 

Answer. At the Tactical level intelligence support to SOF operations focuses on 

sustaining the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze intelligence cycle that has been 

tailored to meet the requirements of speed and flexibility associated with SOF operations. At the Operational and Strategic levels intelligence operations carried out 

by special operations personnel focus more on developing and incorporating tailored 

intelligence products to support SOF unique mission sets. SOF intelligence support 

is different than that provided by the rest of the Intelligence Community because 

it provides tailored intelligence analysis supporting Unconventional Warfare planning and operations, uniquely builds detailed diplomatic facility diagrams and models to support SOF NEO or threat based contingency planning, and produces focused 

analytical products in support of SOF persistent engagement activities with ethnic 

groups, tribes, or micro-populations, a mission set that is uniquely SOF in duration 

and focus. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by 

Special Operations Forces are coordinated adequately with other activities carried 

out by those in the Intelligence Community? 

Answer. SOCOM will continue to follow all applicable Intelligence Community directives, will report required sensitive activities to the USD(I), and will maintain 

the robust intelligence oversight processes in place involving our Inspector General, 

Staff Judge Advocate, and our Command Oversight Review Board. I intend to mainVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00779 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
772 

tain and build upon the relationships developed over time with the various Federal 

intelligence and law enforcement agencies represented in our Interagency Task 

Force in Tampa. Additionally, SOCOM will continue to employ and leverage our liaison officers, which we call Special Operations Support Team members, in order to 

coordinate with agencies in the NCR. Interagency collaboration is a significant contributing factor in many of our operational successes. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the authorities and 

agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military personnel to carry out missions 

under the authorities contained in title 50, U.S.C.? 

Answer. Title 50 of the U.S.C., also known as the National Security Act of 1947 

does not specifically grant to the Commander of SOCOM the authority to conduct 

intelligence operations. However, title 50 contains many of the Secretary of Defense’s intelligence statutory authorities which provide the Secretary of Defense a 

basis to direct SOCOM assets to conduct operations or allow him to delegate authority to the Commander of SOCOM. The authorities are either broadly delegated such 

as Defense HUMINT Executor authority, or narrowly tasked through orders such 

as title 10 executive orders. Recognizing the need to fuse the military’s need for tactical and strategic intelligence with the policy need for political and strategic intelligence, title 50 bifurcates the responsibilities for the intelligence function between 

Secretary of Defense and DNI. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IN EMBASSIES

Question. SOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a number of 

priority countries where the United States is not engaged in direct action operations, but rather trying to stop the spread of violent extremism. Their mission is 

to support the priorities of the Ambassador and the geographic combatant commander’s theater campaign plan against terrorist networks. 

If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure the goals of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned closely with those of the Ambassadors 

they are working with? 

Answer. Essential to the success of the efforts you describe is absolute commitment to ensuring the goals of the Ambassador, the GCC and any deployed SOF are 

one in the same, at all times. I completely concur deployed SOF’s mission is to support the priorities of the Ambassador and SOF does nothing without the express approval of the U.S. Ambassador/Chief of Mission to that country. In the case of section 1208 authority, we must gain written concurrence from the U.S. Chief of Mission prior to the application of that authority in support of our operations. 

In certain countries, Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) provide additional coordination. SOLOs are SOCOM-sourced, U.S. SOF-qualified officers, placed 

under Chief of Mission authority as part of the Embassy Team, via an U.S. Ambassador (USAMB)-approved NSDD–38 agreement. These are permanent change of station assignments where the duties and responsibilities of the SOLO are derived 

from the USAMB’s Integrated Country Strategy and consistent with the GCC’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan. There are currently fourteen serving SOLOs (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, El Salvador, France, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, 

Poland, Peru, Turkey, United Kingdom). The program is funded for 40 positions by 

2019 at locations based on GCC-identified requirements and USAMB concurrence 

via the NSDD–38 process. 

Since 2007, the program has been highly successful in developing key SOF partners, preparing for future contingencies, and building mutually beneficial global relationships in support of U.S. Embassy, Geographic Combatant Command and Theater Special Operation Command engagement strategies. With a very small footprint, SOLOs enable U.S. Embassies to provide their host nation Special Operations 

Forces with a more efficient relationship with the U.S. interagency, GCCs, and 

SOCOM on SOF specific issues. Additionally, the existing network of SOLOs facilitates coordination between U.S. SOF leadership and strategic partner nation SOF 

globally. 

Question. In your view, what is the value of these special operations personnel 

to their respective geographic combatant commands and the country teams they are 

supporting? 

Answer. U.S. SOF brings unique capabilities to further U.S. policy, goals, and regional/country objectives. We do this in coordination with our interagency partners 

from across the U.S. Government, ensuring a synchronized whole-of-government approach. As such, U.S. SOF have become an integral part of every GCC TCP. 

773 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. The Government Accountability Office reports that DOD has ‘‘spent 

hundreds of millions of dollars each year’’ to support its information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are in support of operations in Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams from SOCOM also deploy to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of 

the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Further, the geographic combatant commands are increasingly moving into this operational space. 

What are your views on DOD’s military information support operations and influence programs and their integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives? 

Answer. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are a key capability 

that DOD provides in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. SOCOM provides 

MISO forces to geographic combatant commanders in support of specific military objectives within their assigned AORs. Given the breadth and depth of the information 

environment coupled with Violent Extremist Organizations’ unhindered access and 

use of it, we believe DOD must be engaged in this aspect of the fight. 

SOCOM is aware of the varying roles and missions of other U.S. Government 

agencies in the information realm, and through close coordination and focused planning, have been successful in executing mutually supportive operations. MISO activities are closely coordinated with the Department of State and are complementary 

to and supportive of U.S. foreign policy objectives, but do not address U.S. foreign 

policy directly. DOD maintains unique capabilities to reach audiences in denied 

areas and to disseminate information in ways that support not only our military objectives, but contribute to U.S. Government communication and engagement strategies. 

The fiscal constraints of conducting large scale, DOD operations across the globe, 

combined with the rapidly evolving information environment, make small MISO 

teams a vital capability in achieving national security objectives. 

Question. What is the role of DOD versus the Intelligence Community and the 

State Department? 

Answer. DOD MISO teams provide unique capabilities which can support the entire U.S. Government information and influence efforts worldwide. They continue to 

be one of the most deployed SOF capabilities. An important process in developing 

MISO influence messaging is understanding the operational environment and the 

audiences’ perspective. MISO teams maintain awareness of the information environment by identifying current trends in local and regional media reporting, identifying 

hostile messaging, and measuring local populace reaction. DOD works in a concerted effort with the Intelligence Community and the State Department in a wholeof-government approach to achieve national security objectives. 

Question. How do you believe the success of these programs should be measured, 

especially in light of the constrained budget environment? 

Answer. Evaluating the success of MISO programs requires time and access in 

order to collect, process, analyze, and understand the changes in attitudes, perceptions and behavior. The efficient and appropriate evaluation of MISO programs relies on the integration and consideration of assessment early in the planning process 

and throughout the program’s execution. It requires strategic patience in order to 

give influence programs time to show effects. 

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

Question. Civil affairs activities carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces in 

partnership with host nation personnel play an important role in developing infrastructure, supporting good governance and civil societies, and providing humanitarian assistance, including medical and veterinary services to needy populations. 

In your view, does SOCOM have sufficient personnel and resources to conduct the 

range of civil affairs missions required for today’s operations? 

Answer. The demand for civil affairs teams continues to increase, even as they 

are one of the most deployed DOD capabilities. Even with the drawdown in Afghanistan, the GCC and Embassies demand for civil affairs doubles that of our current 

and expected capacity. As highlighted in an earlier response, our civil affairs growth 

programed in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs were halted as a result of the BCA and 

BBA. This has resulted in a prioritization of allocation and assumption of risk to 

support the increasing demands of the GCCs. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs activities by special operations personnel are integrated into larger U.S. Government efforts? 

Answer. SOCOM Civil Affairs activities are deeply integrated into the planning 

and operations conducted within Embassy country teams. We are currently embedVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00781 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
774 

ded in country teams at over 25 embassies across the globe, supporting the Chief 

of Mission in achieving specific effects within their country strategy. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations are adequately coordinated to achieve a maximum impact? 

Answer. The key to achieving maximum impact is a fully integrated and collaborative environment. Maintaining the ability to forward deploy both our CA and 

MISO capabilities, as well as others, in the same location within the TSOC or U.S. 

Embassy is critical to ensuring proper planning, coordination, de-confliction and execution in support of GCC and CoM objectives and strategies. 

CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and Special Operations Forces, particularly with respect to security 

force assistance and building partner military capabilities? 

Answer. Both Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) 

are capable and have supported these missions most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many GPF like SOF have units that are now regionally focused and have a 

thorough understanding of the culture and are able to build relationships with the 

partner nations military. SOF are best utilized in areas which are politically sensitive environments and where a large U.S. presence or a sizeable force is unacceptable to a host country government. While GPF are best suited for delivering GPF 

capabilities to foreign military forces in environments where U.S. presence is acceptable to the host-country government and where large-scale U.S. presence is considered necessary and acceptable by the host-country government. 

Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for Special Operations Forces only? 

Answer. Missions involving the title 10 SOF Core Activities include: Direct Action, 

Special Reconnaissance, and Unconventional Warfare. These missions are highly 

specialized requiring extensive mental and physical training and a high degree of 

risk that the personnel conducting these missions accept. However, other agencies 

in the U.S. Government are also specialized in some of these missions particularly, 

Counterterrorism and Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. SOF 

needs to partner closely with them in the conduct of these operations. Additionally, 

SOF is best suited for politically sensitive environments, where an overt large U.S. 

presence is unacceptable to the host nation’s government, and to denied environments. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

Question. While SOCOM maintains organic enabling capabilities to support short 

duration missions, most special operations missions require enabling capabilities 

provided by the Services to be successful. 

In your view, how should the responsibility for providing enabling capabilities for 

special operations missions be divided between SOCOM and the Services? 

Answer. SOCOM and its components have limited enabling capabilities, especially 

in the Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) organizations in our 

component force structure. This was by design. Our CS/CSS force structure is dedicated to providing direct support to our Special Operations Forces, primarily for 

short duration missions, often in remote austere locations supporting small unit operations distributed over large distances in the battle space. We rely upon the theater combatant commands and their Service components to provide SOF the theater 

level support for persistent SOF enabler requirements. That is precisely why we reiterate the importance of the fifth SOF Truth—‘‘Most Special Operations require 

non-SOF support. When SOCOM was established by title 10, U.S.C., section 167, 

there was never the intent by Congress for SOCOM to fully replicate the enabler 

support provided by the Services and other strategic partners. In joint doctrine, 

common user logistics support was intended as a core responsibility of the Services. 

SOCOM and the Services must work in concert, sharing responsibility for providing CS and CSS enabling capabilities for SOF missions. SOCOM’s responsibility 

is to continue providing end strength for these conventional forces that serve as organic SOF enablers. SOCOM is also responsible to support the GCCs, via the 

TSOCs, in synchronizing demand signals to the Services in order to get these 

enablers for SOF missions. Based on these inputs Services can continue to recruit 

and train these crucial enablers in quantities sufficient to cover requirements for 

SOF and the Services. Because SOF relies on the Services for Combat Service Support, any lack of these enabling capabilities significantly limits SOF’s ability to sustain operations. 

775 

Question. In light of current budget pressures, do you believe SOCOM and the 

Services are maintaining adequate enabling capabilities to support special operations missions? 

Answer. SOCOM is maintaining adequate organic capabilities to provide direct 

support to special operations missions. However, I am concerned that with the significant budget constraints and drawdowns that are being imposed upon the Services in their manpower, equipment, readiness accounts which is degrading the enabling capabilities that they can provide to SOCOM. These degradations of enabler 

capabilities provided to SOCOM by the Services to conduct operations in support of 

the geographic combatant commanders represent high risk to support persistent distributed SOF operations in remote austere locations against increasingly sophisticated enemy networks and terrorist organizations. 

Question. What enabling capabilities are in short supply or at greatest risk with 

current budget constraints? 

Answer. Shortages of enabling capabilities for SOF are often similar to shortages 

in the rest of the deployed force. SOF faces challenges in ISR, C4I, theater-level logistics forces, intra-theater airlift, medical, combat engineering support to GCCs, 

operational contracting support (OCS). SOF manning shortages exist in many of our 

own critical skills and key enablers. 

These manning shortages would be exacerbated by a slowdown or reduction in 

Service provided training due to budget constraints. SOF also relies on Service provided enablers for both initial and currency training (such as fixed wing close air 

support for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers) as well as forward deployed operations (such as Base Operating Support). These types of enablers are essential for 

SOF to perform their global missions with a ready and well trained force. SOCOM 

must continue to work with the Services in assessing future demand and adjusting 

programmed force structure. 

RENDER SAFE PROFICIENCY

Question. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing and especially concerning threat to our Nation. Select special operations units are assigned 

the task of interdicting and rendering-safe weapons of mass destruction should they 

ever fall into the wrong hands. 

If confirmed, how would you ensure render-safe capabilities are adequately maintained by special operations units who may currently be heavily engaged in offensive kill/capture missions against high value targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere? 

Answer. Currently, our capabilities are adequately maintained by special operations units. I will continue to use the current training and exercise programs in 

place. Special operations units participate in the Joint Operational Readiness and 

Training (JORTS) Cycle that incorporates worldwide deployments, individual training, collective training, and joint exercises (and evaluations) year round. 

Question. Do you believe additional render-safe capabilities are needed within 

SOCOM? 

Answer. Yes, but allow me to qualify that answer. As I stated before—our capabilities, training, and exercises are on track. We are abreast of the latest’s threats. 

However we cannot rest. We must stay in front of the evolving threat through our 

research and development (R&D) programs. I am grateful for what we have, but as 

with any program, we are limited by funding. Increased funding for our R&D programs could potentially enhance our current capabilities within SOCOM. 

SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMAND

Question. Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by the President 

or Secretary of Defense, SOCOM may operate as a supported combatant command. 

In your view, under what circumstances should SOCOM conduct operations as a 

supported combatant command? 

Answer. In my opinion, the opportunity for SOCOM to conduct operations as a 

supported combatant command is limited to commitment of the National Mission 

Force. I do not anticipate circumstances where SOCOM would conduct operations 

as a supported combatant command outside of CONUS vice transferring operational 

control of Special Operations Forces to respective GCC commanders for execution. 

Question. In your view, what resource, organization, and force structure changes, 

if any, are required in order for SOCOM to more effectively conduct both supporting 

and supported combatant command responsibilities? 

Answer. As a supporting combatant commander, SOCOM recently received 

COCOM of the TSOCs. This organizational change has allowed SOCOM to better 

support GCC requirements. SOCOM as a Joint Force Provider will continue to orgaVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00783 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
776 

nize, train and equip Special Operations Forces to the highest level in this supporting role. 

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in 

recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature. 

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative 

interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere? 

Answer. The requirement to have an interagency approach is well understood. We 

have learned that combating terrorism requires capabilities and expertise beyond 

those of any single agency. We should continue to integrate the elements of national 

power by leveraging each agency’s core competencies. This requires knowing each 

agency’s culture, method of operation and strength. Another critical lesson is to provide the right number, seniority, and skill sets of personnel from the various agencies. The common denominator is knowledge across the interagency. 

Our ability to rapidly share information and intelligence in order to fully ‘‘see’’ our 

adversaries and subsequently, to take action against them with the most appropriate capabilities within the U.S. Government, is an important lesson learned from 

Afghanistan. 

Additionally, we must ensure that we maintain strong relationships with operational and ministerial leaders following the conclusion of combat operations. Continued TAA efforts aimed at senior leaders across the IA will ensure the progress 

made endures. 

We have learned a great deal over the last decade about the strength of collaboration. The organizational innovation of forming small task forces of subject matter 

experts from across the military, government, and partner nations allowed SOF in 

Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to synchronize efforts with an efficient agility. 

These task forces all follow three simple principles: the practice of flattened, agile 

communications, extensive senior leader involvement across the U.S. Government 

and allies, and the leveraging of information dominance provided by these subject 

matter experts and their systems. These principles are our most important lessons 

learned. 

Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved? 

Answer. The continued exchange of personnel across agencies, departments and 

services to build trust and interoperability before a crisis happens is critical to 

maintaining the cultural of cooperation across the U.S. Government which has 

formed in the war zones over the last decade. We can improve doctrine based on 

lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, continue to emphasize education across all government departments and agencies, continue to work 

toward a flatter, more agile communications enterprise, and extend senior leader involvement across the U.S. Government and allies. It is crucial that the right people 

are in place to achieve effective unity of effort to achieve the desired end state. 

Question. Should these informal and ad hoc arrangements be made more formal 

(i.e. through legislation, DOD Directives or Instructions, etc . . . ) or is their ad hoc 

nature the reason for their success? 

There would be benefit to formalizing some aspects of these arrangements in 

order to prevent the loss of the cooperation that has grown out of necessity in the 

crucible of conflict. We must ensure that our personnel systems and agency/service/ 

department cultures reward, not discourage (either formally or informally), cooperation and the assignments that support it. We should continue to develop a more formal full-time interagency arrangement to achieve greater coordination and integration of diverse policies during an operational deployment. The challenge is to ensure 

that any formalization retains enough flexibility to adjust to the nature of the crisis 

or challenge. 

SOCOM continues to seek ways and means for increasing success in interventions 

through more formal interagency collaboration mechanisms. As part of that effort, 

SOCOM’s Special Operations Support Teams work directly with and in our interagency partners, greatly facilitating intelligence sharing, operations, decision making and keeping lines of communication open. Our Interagency partners in turn 

have sent their LNOs to SOF organizations at the strategic and operational levels. 

We’re on the right track with doctrinal publications such as Joint Pub 3–08, 

‘‘Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization 

Coordination During Joint Operations.’’ Capturing the best practices of these horizontal interagency teams in future editions is critical. 

777 

Question. Interagency collaboration on an operational or tactical level tends to address issues on a country-by-country basis rather than on a regional basis (e.g. 

international terrorists departing Mali for safe havens in Libya). 

How do you believe regional strategies that link efforts in individual countries can 

best be coordinated in the interagency arena? 

Answer. SOCOM maintains persistent engagement and collaboration with individual Country Teams through the TSOCs and through the SOCOM Special Operations Liaison Officers which are placed under Chief of Mission authority as part 

of the Country Team via the NSDD–38. 

In addition, the Department of Defense authorized the establishment of the 

SOCOM Interagency Partnership Program (IAPP) in 2006, which placed liaison 

teams known as Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) within Interagency 

headquarters to provide the strategic linkages necessary to ensure collaboration on 

regional and functional strategies within our partner Agencies and Departments. 

This program continues to allow SOCOM to provide senior experienced SOF personnel to our Interagency partners and provides linkages from the Strategic Level 

in Washington DC, to the Operational Level in conjunction with the TSOCs and 

their relationships with the Country Teams, to the tactical level through the various 

forward commands and Task Forces. The IAPP has been instrumental in flattening 

coordination among our SOSTs, our Interagency partners’ headquarters and regional or functional divisions within those headquarters, and our operational and 

tactical level special operations headquarters and personnel. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, 

regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. Common Article 3, found in each of the four Geneva Conventions 

of 1949, provides a baseline of humanitarian principles that are to be applied in all 

armed conflicts, no matter how they might be described or characterized. I support 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense 2006 memorandum directing U.S. forces to adhere 

to the principles of Common Article 3. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed, would you ensure that Special Operations Forces comply 

with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable 

requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation 

operations? 

Answer. Yes. I fully support these standards and will ensure that our publications 

and training reflect these standards. I will also ensure that operational plans and 

orders, and the execution of those plans and orders, are consistent with these standards. I will hold those who fail to follow the standard accountable for their actions. 

Prompt investigations into allegations of abuse and swift action are keys to ensuring 

strict compliance. 

Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be 

based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the 

risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact 

on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines are treated, should 

they be captured in future conflicts? 

Answer. Humane treatment of detainees is the right thing to do legally, morally, 

and ethically. We should endeavor to treat enemy personnel in our custody in a 

manner that we would want our own U.S. forces to be treated. Reciprocity may be 

interpreted as justification to condone abuse if U.S. detainees are being abused. I 

do not agree that enemy abuse of U.S. detainees dictates like treatment on our part. 

I do believe that if my forces provide humane treatment to those in our custody, 

there is a greater likelihood that our forces in the custody of our enemy may enjoy 

some greater degree of humane treatment as a result. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

778 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander of SOCOM? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

1. Senator SHAHEEN. Lieutenant General Votel, you indicated in your testimony

the possibility of sharing a portion of U.S. Special Operation Command’s (SOCOM) 

traditional training missions with the general purpose forces, which could be a way 

to reduce demand on our Special Operations Forces (SOF). Would you please elaborate on that issue? 

General VOTEL. I believe there are opportunities where SOF and general purpose 

forces (GPF) can work together on an engagement event with a host nation. In some 

select cases, trained and prepared GPF could be used in lieu of SOF for a given 

event to train foreign forces basic skill sets. 

The two primary events that SOF engages with foreign forces are Counter NarcoTerrorism (CNT) events and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events. 

The purpose of CNT events is to focus on building the capacity of a foreign force. 

In these events, it is possible that some of the more basic skill sets (basic marksmanship, explosive ordnance disposal, medical, communications, et cetera) could be 

conducted by or augmented with GPF. A SOF unit augmented with a basic rifle platoon or squad could easily run a medium-size shooting range for partner nation 

training. The potential downside to this scenario is that GPF are not accustomed 

to deploying in the same way as SOF. By this I mean that GPF generally rely on 

base-like infrastructure (billeting, messing, transportation, etc.) being provided by a 

Service or Executive Agent. SOF, on the other hand, normally locally procure all required support. This is not to say that GPF are incapable of living on a minimal 

U.S. footprint, it is just not their normal deployment method. 

The purpose of the JCET is to allow the SOF operators to hone their skills working in another country. Although the host nation usually benefits from the training 

provided by the SOF unit, the real value of the JCET is not necessarily the actual 

Program of Instruction (POI) being taught. 

The SOF unit gains valuable training in language, cultural relationships, movement into and around a foreign country, interaction with an embassy, negotiating 

contracts for logistics support, medical screening, biometrics, remote communications, force protection, and many other skills. Even if GPF are available to augment 

SOF for actually teaching a POI, it is important to retain these training benefits 

for SOF. Additionally, the number of skillsets that are common to both SOF and 

GPF are somewhat limited. For example, SOF train foreign countries on fast-roping, 

small unit tactics, military operations urban terrain, et cetera. Not all GPF units 

train to these skills. There are some common areas such as marksmanship, military 

decisionmaking process, combat casualty care, jumpmaster, static line, engineering, 

demolition, and lifesaving that could be shared between SOF and GPF. 

With the new section 1203 authority, GPF will be able to train foreign forces 

alongside SOF who are training under JCET authorities. 

779 

2. Senator SHAHEEN. Lieutenant General Votel, is there a process in place for 

SOCOM to coordinate with the general purpose forces to reduce duplication and 

maximize efficiency? 

General VOTEL. Yes. The Joint Staff Global Force Management process prevents 

duplicative force sourcing by separating general purpose forces and Special Operations Force requirements submitted by combatant commands. This ensures that 

SOCOM is tasked to support only Special Operations peculiar requirements. Likewise, the Services are not tasked to provide Special Operations peculiar capabilities. 

Regarding maximizing efficiency, SOCOM is currently refining the SOF Operational Requirements Consolidation Process that includes Service representation, 

which provides a forum to explore operational efficiencies. Additionally, SOCOM 

conducts recurring warfighter talks with each of the Services. During these talks, 

the executive-level staffs explore common initiatives and areas to collaborate in 

order to maximize efficiencies. 

3. Senator SHAHEEN. Lieutenant General Votel, will the Army’s Regionally 

Aligned Forces initiative provide additional opportunities for collaboration? 

General VOTEL. Yes. Having regionally aligned forces will result in GPF Army soldiers receiving language and cultural training for the region where they deploy. In 

general, the SOF units will focus on those mission areas they are uniquely trained 

to address while the GPF will focus on their own skills. Augmentation of GPF into 

traditional SOF engagements would naturally result in a better product using a regionally aligned GPF soldier. 

MIDDLE EAST

4. Senator SHAHEEN. Lieutenant General Votel, you mentioned in your testimony 

that there are risks associated with stepping aside and allowing Sunni and Shite 

groups to continue to engage each other in armed conflict, particularly in Iraq and 

Syria. Would you please describe those risks in more detail? 

General VOTEL. First, the conflict between these groups, particularly if it escalates 

or expands, threatens to destabilize the entire region, and with it the economies of 

our allies and partners in the region and their ability to manage the conflict. The 

effects on long-term regional stability cannot be overstated, and conflict that 

deepens to such a degree will undermine the ability of our allies and partners to 

adequately address the pervasiveness of violent extremists and their well-orchestrated efforts to delegitimize their governments. In the interconnected world in 

which we live, this will radiate through our economy and those of our closest trading partners. 

Second, the conflict is attracting large numbers of foreign fighters. The unabated 

infusion of foreigners into particularly Syria and Iraq threatens to expand and escalate the conflict. The character of this conflict is such that it leverages networks of 

associated groups and recruiters and the passions of what is a growing youth bulge 

in the Middle East, most of whose future job prospects is not promising. Many foreign fighters do not fight per se, often serving in supporting roles that translate well 

to fueling growing instability at home upon their return (financial, communication, 

recruiting, et cetera). The foreign fighter networks weave a web over the entire 

globe, potentially bringing the fight and direct national security threats to the many 

nations they touch. 

Finally, the spread of the conflict into Iraq and with it more direct involvement 

by Iran and the potential counter involvement by Persian Gulf states is a reminder 

that the conflict is essentially co-located with much of the world’s supply of petroleum. Any compromise of the ability to ensure the flow of petroleum, which is the 

lifeblood of the global economy, threatens the prosperity of the United States, its 

allies, and trading partners, all of whom, regardless of rivalries, share a common 

interest in stability and economic growth. Among the markets, the mere perception 

that the production or transportation of petroleum is threatened is enough to send 

the price of a barrel sky-high, which will further aggravate instability and empower 

petroleum suppliers like Russia. Even though the United States has reduced its dependency on petroleum from the Persian Gulf, the interconnected nature of the 

world means that the impact of skyrocketing prices would be felt globally and substantially delay any return to a more durable stability in the region and a more robust U.S. economy. 

However, I would be remiss if I did not emphasize that there are risks regardless 

of what we do. Yes, stepping aside puts at risk our allies and partners and very 

real humanitarian concerns. 

780 

However, there is a risk, for example, in taking sides in what is a delicate political situation, one that is rife with miscalculation. While Syria and Iraq may have 

formerly been recognized as ‘‘states,’’ we must acknowledge that each of their ‘‘governments’’ is now a representative of a particular sect, the unabashed support of 

which will be perceived, right or wrong, as taking a side. This, in turn, may very 

well prohibitively strain relationships with our key regional partners like Saudi 

Arabia and potentially upend the balance of U.S. relationships in the Middle East. 

5. Senator SHAHEEN. Lieutenant General Votel, what direct U.S. national interests are at stake? 

General VOTEL. Prime among our national interests is security. Our National Security Strategy retains the goals to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat violent extremists 

around the world, and advance peace and security in the Middle East. While the 

wars in Iraq and Syria do not pose an immediate existential threat to the United 

States, an expanding conflict has the potential to threaten Israel, Jordan, and other 

American allies in the region—including such countries as Bahrain and Kuwait 

where we have a forward presence. Also threatened are countries like Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates where we have on-going 

training agreements. 

We have a vested interest in preserving the global economic system. Iraq’s stability and prosperity are not casually linked to American economic interests. As the 

United States continues to move toward ‘‘energy independence,’’ we are nonetheless 

impacted by global oil prices whether sourced from the Gulf of Mexico, Saudi Arabia 

or Iraq. Two years ago, Iraq was projected to reach in excess of 6 million barrels 

of oil per day by 2017—potentially $5 trillion in revenue by 2035. Significant disruptions of current production would likely impact world energy prices and be felt in 

our own struggling economic recovery. 

As the President and Secretary have stated, our strategic interests are to prevent 

the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or al Qaeda-related groups from attacking 

the Homeland and our national interests in the region, to protect the free flow of 

commerce, and preserving the security and stability of our key partners and allies 

in the region. 

6. Senator SHAHEEN. Lieutenant General Votel, how would it affect our partners

in the region? 

General VOTEL. If the armed conflict in Iraq and Syria continues, it will significantly impact our partners and could destabilize the entire region. First and foremost, our partners could question our reliability, respect, and commitment to their 

security, stability and prosperity as a sovereign nations and key partners. Second, 

if the conflict continues, it will only embolden the actors of concern to expand their 

activity into several of our key partners’ sovereign territory. Our partners are not 

immune to the same social pressures that drove the ‘‘Arab Spring’’. These states 

have been able to buy down risk to date, and while certainly not ‘‘fragile states,’’ 

they are probably best thought of as ‘‘brittle states’’. While apparently stable, they 

lack the inherent resilience to resist an emboldened insurgency, thus potentially 

compelling our involvement. Finally, our partners’ interests may force their direct 

participation in the current conflict. This would significantly expand the scale and 

scope of the conflict, increasing the risks to our national security interests. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

PRESERVATION OF THE FORCE AND FAMILIES

7. Senator CHAMBLISS. Lieutenant General Votel, while the war draws down in

Afghanistan, the SOF mission continues with SOF personnel and their families enduring operational tempos and unpredictability at unprecedented levels. SOCOM established the Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) Task Force to ensure 

its personnel have the resources available to deal with the physical, spiritual, mental, and social stresses associated with their unique service. Of course, that type of 

assistance for the servicemember also assists the family as a whole, but programs 

aimed directly at the families are limited because of legal restrictions on what 

SOCOM can spend money on. What, if anything, is SOCOM doing to expand access 

to programs for the families of SOF personnel, and is additional action required by 

Congress to further said access? 

General VOTEL. SOCOM has taken several steps to improve access and availability of programs to our families. One of the major benefits of implementing the 

POTFF initiative has been the increase in awareness and collaboration SOCOM has 

781 

had with Service and Department family readiness agencies. These relationships 

have helped the command to identify and access existing programs and resources 

for our families. 

Where the command’s requirements cannot be met by existing Service or the Department of Defense (DOD) sponsored programs, there is still a substantial need to 

support our SOF forces and their families within legal authority and funding limitations. SOCOM needs the support of Congress to grant or continue to grant the authorities and funding required to maximize the readiness of our SOF members and 

their families (physical, psychological, and spiritual). SOCOM currently has the authority and funding to conduct family pilot programs through fiscal year 2016 and 

is grateful for this authority, which provides the means to assess our ability to support SOF families and be responsive to their needs. SOCOM strongly urges continued and expanded support in terms of authorities and funding to support SOF members and their families 

The Commander of SOCOM has an explicit responsibility to ensure the readiness 

of the Special Operations Forces. This definition of readiness does not currently include family members outside of the initial pilot program authorized by Congress. 

Given SOCOM’s current statutory authorities, the command is limited in its ability 

to support family members when the need arises. Explicit authority that permits 

the Commander of SOCOM to support assigned families through services and programs funded with MFP–11 resources would benefit the readiness of the SOF community to meet its demands. 

8. Senator CHAMBLISS. Lieutenant General Votel, how would you assess the effectiveness of the POTFF program? 

General VOTEL. Early indications suggest that SOCOM’s POTFF initiatives are 

having a positive impact on the readiness of SOF forces. Over the past year, the 

command saw a 5 percent increase in behavioral health treatment compared to the 

previous year. At the same time, reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress, depression and alcohol abuse declined, while scores on measures of resilience and marital satisfaction improved. The human performance aspect of the program also 

shows evidence of having a positive impact on the health of the special operator and 

the time needed to rehabilitate operators following injury has been reduced. We 

found that Human Performance Program participation is also associated with improved mental well-being. 

As our assessment programs mature, we look forward to sharing our impacts with 

this committee in the future. 

9. Senator CHAMBLISS. Lieutenant General Votel, how are initiatives under this

program integrated with family support programs already provided by the Services? 

General VOTEL. The POTFF team works very closely with their DOD and Service 

counterparts to promote existing programs and, where necessary, to develop activities to meet the special needs of the SOCOM community. Some of these activities 

are being tested under several of the family pilot programs currently being developed under the authority granted in the National Defense Authorization Act 2014, 

section 554. Many of these are supported by DOD in the form of planning and assessment assistance. Where there is the capacity for DOD or the Services to support 

the command, they do so without fail. For instance, this year’s DOD sponsored parent-child camps for members of the SOF community at Fort Campbell, KY, and the 

expanded Military Family Life Consultant program for SOF units throughout the 

enterprise. In all instances, the command’s family programs are coordinated with 

the Services and DOD prior to approval. 

[The nomination reference of LTG Joseph L. Votel, USA, follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

June 16, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under Title 10, 

U.S.C., section 601: 

782 

To be General 

LTG Joseph L. Votel, 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of LTG Joseph L. Votel, USA, which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LTG JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA 

Source of commissioned service: USMA. 

Educational degrees: 

U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Science 

U.S. Army War College - MSST - National Security Studies 

Military schools attended: 

Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

U.S. Army War College 

Foreign languages: 

French. 

Promotions: 

Promotions Dates of appointment 

2LT 28 May 80 

1LT 28 Nov 81 

CPT 1 Feb 84 

MAJ 1 Sep 91 

LTC 1 May 95 

COL 1 May 01 

BG 1 Jan 05 

MG 2 Oct 08 

LTG 10 Jun 11 

Major duty assignments: 

From To Assignment

Jun 11 ...... Present Commander, Joint Special Operations Command/Commander, Joint Special Operations Command 

Forward, U.S. Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, and Operation Enduring Freedom, 

Afghanistan 

Jul 10 ....... Jun 11 .. Chief of Staff, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

Jul 08 ....... Jul 10 ... Deputy Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command. Fort Bragg, NC, and Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, Iraq 

Apr 08 ...... May 08 Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC 

Jan 07 ...... Apr 08 .. Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 82d Airborne Division/Deputy Commanding General 

(Operations), Combined Joint Task Force-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 

Apr 06 ...... Jan 07 .. Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC 

Jan 06 ...... Apr 06 .. Deputy Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC 

Jul 04 ....... Dec 05 .. Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 

U.S. Army, Washington, DC 

Sep 03 ..... Jul 04 ... Deputy Director for Information Operations, and Director, Army Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Task Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7, U.S. Army, Washington, DC 

Jul 01 ....... Aug 03 Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, GA, and Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq 

Jul 00 ....... Jun 01 .. Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 

Aug 98 ..... Jul 00 ... Commander, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield, GA 

Jun 96 ...... Jun 98 .. Commander, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, NY 

Aug 94 ..... Jun 96 .. Staff Officer, Contingency Initiatives Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy and NATO Peace Implementation Force (IFOR), 

Sarajevo 

Jun 91 ...... Jun 94 .. Liaison Officer, later S–3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield, GA 

Aug 90 ..... Jun 91 .. Student, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 

783 

From To Assignment 

Sep 88 ..... Jun 90 .. Plans/Liaison Officer, later S–3 (Plans), 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, GA, and Operation 

Just Cause, Panama 

Jun 85 ...... Sep 88 .. Small Groups Tactics Instructor, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA 

Jan 85 ...... Jun 85 .. Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA 

Oct 80 ...... Nov 84 .. Rifle Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, A Company, later S–1 (Personnel), later Commander, 

A Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh 

Army, Germany 

Summary of joint assignments: 

Date Grade 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL ..... Jul 10–Jul 11 Major General 

Deputy Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, 

NC, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.

Jul 08–Jul 10 Brigadier General/ 

Major General 

Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 82d Airborne Division/Deputy Commanding General (Operations), Combined Joint Task Force-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.

Jan 07–Apr 08 Brigadier General 

Staff Officer, Contingency Initiatives Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of 

Staff, Plans and Policy, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy and 

NATO Peace Implementation Force (IFOR), Sarajevo.

Aug 94–Jun 96 Major/Lieutenant 

Colonel 

Summary of operational assignments: 

Date Grade 

Commander, Joint Special Operations Command/Commander, Joint Special Operations Command Forward, U.S. Special Operations Command, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.

Jun 11–Present Lieutenant General 

Deputy Commanding General, Operations, Joint Special Operations Command, 

Operations Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.

Aug 08–Dec 08 Major General 

Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 82d Airborne Division/Deputy Commanding General (Operations), Combined Joint Task Force-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.

Jan 07–Apr 08 Brigadier General 

Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment, Operation Enduring Freedom ....................... Sep 01–Dec 01 Colonel 

Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq ..................... Mar 03–May 03 Colonel 

U.S. decorations and badges: 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Bronze Star Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Joint Service Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Army Commendation Medal 

Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Combat Infantryman Badge (with Star) 

Expert Infantryman Badge 

Master Parachutist Badge (with two Bronze Stars) 

Ranger Tab 

Army Staff Identification Badge 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by LTG Joseph L. Votel, USA, in connection 

with his nomination follows:] 

784 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Joseph L. Votel. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. 

3. Date of nomination: 

June 16, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

February 14, 1958; Saint Paul, MN. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Michele Marie Votel (Maiden Name: Belair). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Scott Joseph Votel; age 32. 

Nicholas Patrick Votel; age 28. 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

I have held no advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

I have held no positions as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, 

representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business 

enterprise, educational or other institution. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Member of the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) 

Member of the 75th Ranger Regiment Association 

Member of the 82d Airborne Division Association 

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

St. Maurice Medal from the National Infantryman’s Association 

St. Barbara Medal from the Artillery Association 

785 

William G. Knowlton Award from the Military Intelligence Association 

Honorary Medal from the Army Engineer Association 

Honorary Medal from the Ordance Association 

Honorary Medal from the Army Aviation Association 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

I agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

I agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give 

my personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

JOSEPH L. VOTEL. 

This 20th day of December, 2013. 

[The nomination of LTG Joseph L. Votel, USA, was reported to 

the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 22, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2014.] 

(787) 

NOMINATION OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, 

JR., USMC, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE 

GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS. 

THURSDAY, JULY 17, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, 

Hagan, Manchin, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, 

Inhofe, McCain, Chambliss, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, and 

Cruz. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets today to consider the nomination of General Joseph Dunford 

to be the 36th Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Dunford, 

welcome to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you for 

the many years of extraordinary service that you have provided to 

our Nation, also for your willingness to continue to serve. Please 

also extend our thanks to your family, part of whom is here today, 

for their dedication and support, which is so critical, as we all 

know, to your success and the success of all those who serve in important positions and pressured positions for our Nation. Please 

feel free to introduce any family members or other people who are 

with you here today. 

General Dunford has an exemplary record of service, is highly 

qualified for the position to which he has been nominated. He has 

commanded marines from the platoon level to the Marine Expeditionary Force. He has served as the Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps. He is currently the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. 

In Afghanistan, General Dunford has commanded U.S. and coalition forces with great distinction. He is the latest in a line of distinguished commanders in that position. He has overseen the critical 

transition from U.S. and coalition-led combat operations to Afghanled operations throughout Afghanistan. Under General Dunford’s 

leadership, the drawdown of U.S. forces and a shift to a train, adVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00795 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
788 

vise, and assist mission is being carried out with considerable effectiveness. 

General Dunford has demonstrated remarkable skills as both a 

military leader and a diplomat in his interactions with the Afghan 

leadership, which have been essential to keeping the transition in 

Afghanistan on track. 

General Dunford, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, you’re 

going to be tasked with recruiting and retaining a quality force and 

ensuring that force contains the necessary structure and readiness 

levels to meet our Nation’s current challenges and are postured to 

respond to tomorrow’s crises and contingencies. These responsibilities are demanding enough on their own. However, you are also 

going to be asked to assume control at a time of immense fiscal 

challenge, particularly because of sequestration. 

Thank you and your family again for your service to our Nation. 

We look forward to your testimony and your swift confirmation. I 

now recognize Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Dunford, for the great job that you have 

done during arguably one of the most consequential periods of the 

war. With our Afghan partners, we’re making important gains 

against the Taliban, and are solidifying our progress in building 

the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to defend their country. 

Despite this progress, I’m still concerned about the future of Afghanistan. The recent agreement to perform a complete audit of 

the presidential runoff is encouraging. I hope that works out. You 

and I talked about this before. That is just really critical. The Afghan people are going to have to believe the results of this thing. 

Hopefully we can make that happen. 

I remain very troubled by the President’s plan to draw down our 

forces based on arbitrary time lines instead of the advice of our 

commanders and the facts on the ground. The President tried the 

same policy in Iraq in 2011. We can’t afford to repeat that same 

mistake in Afghanistan. 

As Commandant you take command of the Marine Corps as it’s 

being challenged by rising global threats and budgetary crises at 

home. Budget cuts are degrading readiness and forcing a dangerous drop in the end strength. General Amos has said that these 

budget cuts mean that—and this is a quote—‘‘We will have fewer 

forces, arriving less trained, arriving later to the fight. This is a 

formula for more American casualties.’’ I think he’s probably right 

and I will ask you some questions on your agreement on that. 

I’m glad you’re the man at the helm. I appreciate very much your 

being here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

General. 

789 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, FOR 

REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE 

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 

General DUNFORD. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, 

and distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today. I’m truly honored to be nominated as the 36th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). 

Joining me today is my wife Ellyn. I’m fortunate to have her love 

and support. She’s been a great mother to our three children, who 

are now young adults, and she’s also served as a tireless advocate 

for military families. I always refer to her as the most valuable 

player of the Dunford family and she’s certainly earned that title 

during the last 18 months of my deployment to Afghanistan. I’m 

also joined by my niece, Cara. Our sons Joseph, Patrick, and Kathleen, our daughter, are unable to be with us today, but Ellen and 

I are proud of all of them. 

I’d like to begin by thanking the committee for your support of 

our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines now serving in Afghanistan. Due to your leadership, I have no doubt they are the best 

trained and equipped force our Nation has ever sent to war. Their 

performance and the strength of our military families bear testimony to that support. 

I’d also like to recognize the 1,817 Americans who have made the 

ultimate sacrifice in Afghanistan and the nearly 20,000 who have 

been wounded. Each day the men and women of the U.S. Forces 

in Afghanistan work to bring meaning to their sacrifice. 

I know this committee and the American people have high expectations for the U.S. Marine Corps. You expect your Marine Corps 

to serve as the naval expeditionary force in readiness, a force that 

is most ready when the Nation is least ready. You expect your Marine Corps that they be forward deployed and forward engaged, responding to crises and enabling our Nation to respond to contingencies. You expect your Marine Corps to fight and win in any climate and place and under any conditions, and you expect your marines to be physically and mentally tough. You expect your marines 

to demonstrate courage, honor, and commitment. You expect a lot 

of your marines and you should. 

If confirmed as the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, I will 

ensure that marines continue to meet your expectations and the expectations of the American people. I’ll also ensure the well-being of 

our marines, sailors, wounded warriors, and their families. Over 

the past decade-plus of war, they have done all we have asked of 

them and more. It would be a tremendous honor to lead them. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you this 

morning. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General. 

We start with a set of standard questions which we ask of all of 

our nominees. These questions are asked so that this committee 

can exercise our legislative and our oversight responsibilities. Have 

you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts 

of interest? 

General DUNFORD. I have, Mr. Chairman. 

790 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in 

power? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

General DUNFORD. I have not, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record at hearings? 

General DUNFORD. I will, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and 

briefers in response to congressional requests? 

General DUNFORD. I will, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will these witnesses be protected from reprisal 

for their testimony or briefings? 

General DUNFORD. They will. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely 

manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith 

delay or denial in providing such documents? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

We’ll have a 7-minute first round of questions. General, in my 

view, Afghanistan has made remarkable progress over the past 

decade. It has improved the lives of the Afghan people. This includes increases many times over in the number of schools, the 

number of students and teachers, including female students and 

teachers, greater access to health facilities, a leap in Afghan life expectancy, expanded connections to electricity, water, and cellphones, and growing income. 

Can you briefly address the extent of the changes in Afghanistan 

over the past decade that the United States has been involved 

there and give us a sense of the significance of those changes to 

the Afghan people for the future of their country? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. 

Probably the first thing I would say is that I think one of the most 

significant outcomes of our time in Afghanistan has been that 

we’ve put pressure on the terrorist networks, al Qaeda, and prevented another September 11. We’ve also developed capable and 

credible Afghan forces. In 2002, there were no effective Afghan security forces. Today there’s an army and a police force of over 

352,000, as well as another 30,000 Afghan local police, that are capable of providing security to the Afghan people. 

We also have enabled, through those Afghan forces, the Afghan 

people the opportunity to determine their own future with the successful elections of the 5th of April and the 14th of June from a 

security perspective. While we still have some political issues to 

work through for those elections, there’s no question that the AfVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00798 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
791 

ghan Security Forces afforded the Afghan people the opportunity to 

vote. 

We have today over 8 million children in school, 2 million of 

those young girls. In 2001, there were less than a million people 

in school. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned some of the other advances in health care, communications, road networks, and so forth 

that will set the conditions for a secure, stable Afghanistan in the 

future. 

I would say that the most profound thing that exists in Afghanistan today that didn’t exist in 2001 is hope. The Afghan people actually have hope and confidence in the future that didn’t exist 

under the oppression and the tyranny of the Taliban in 2001. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General. 

Is the Afghan army performing well in your judgment? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, they are performing well. 

Since what we described as Milestone 2013 last June, when they 

assumed responsibility across the country, the only unilateral operations that the coalition forces have conducted are for our own security, retrograde, and redeployment operations. 

I would highlight one statistic that is indicative of the Afghans’ 

performance. In 2012, we had over 140,000 coalition forces on the 

ground. That included 100,000 Americans. Today there are 40,000 

coalition forces, of which 30,000 are Americans. In those 2 years, 

the security environment has actually slightly improved since 2012. 

The big difference, of course, is that the Afghan Security Forces 

now are responsible for security. 

I feel very confident about the trajectory that Afghan Security 

Forces are on at this time. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

General, the President has called for drawing down U.S. forces 

to 9,800 by the end of this year, reducing that force by approximately half by the end of 2015, and transitioning to an embassybased military presence by the end of 2016. In your answers to prehearing questions you said that you support the President’s decision on the size of the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan post2014. Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, I do support the numbers of 

forces that will be on the ground in 2015 to both conduct counterterrorism operations and train, advise, and assist. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, also in your answers to prehearing questions you said that you support the pace of reductions outlined by 

the President, ‘‘with an understanding that we should continue to 

validate the assumptions and assess the conditions on the ground 

as the drawdown takes place.’’ Now, is one of your assumptions 

that the full 9,800-personnel force will be available through the entire 2015 fighting season? 

General DUNFORD. It is one of the assumptions I made, yes, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then the reductions under that assumption 

would occur only at the end of next year? 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Can you share with us any other 

major assumptions which you made? 

792 

General DUNFORD. I can, Mr. Chairman. I think the critical assumptions that have to be continually validated as we move forward are: first and foremost, the counterterrorism capability and 

the will of Afghanistan; the nature of the threat. The counterterrorism capacity and the will of Pakistan also needs to be considered. The quality of political transition that we’re in the midst of 

has to be considered, and also the international community’s support, both fiscally as well as troops in support of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) mission. 

I think all of those are variables that would have to be considered when determining the adequacy of our force levels in the future. 

Chairman LEVIN. There’s also an assumption in your answers 

and in your statements that a bilateral security agreement will be 

signed in a timely manner; is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Relative to the size of the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan after 2014, what is your recommendation about the size of that mission, the counterterrorism 

mission? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, of the 9,800 U.S. forces—and 

it’s probably important to highlight that the expectation is that 

there’d be approximately 4,000 NATO forces in addition to those 

9,800. But of the 9,800 U.S. forces, approximately 1,000 would be 

dedicated solely to the counterterrorism mission. But there would 

be a total of 2,000 Special Operations Forces that are there, some 

of those working with the Afghan Special Operations Forces, who 

would also be participating in counterterrorism operations. 

Chairman LEVIN. I want to change the subject slightly to the 

question of the Russian Mi–17 military transport helicopters. You 

recently wrote me, General, regarding a provision in the defense 

authorization bill which this committee marked up that would prohibit any contracts with the Russian corporation that exports the 

Mi–17 military helicopter. 

You indicated that this prohibition could be catastrophic. Can 

you explain why? 

General DUNFORD. I can, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for that 

question. The Afghan Air Force will consist of over 80 Mi–17s. All 

those aircraft have been purchased. The final delivery will be in 

September-October of this year. Those aircraft provide the Afghan 

forces with the operational reach to provide security and stability 

to the Afghan people, as well as to conduct effective counterterrorism operations. 

Thirty of those 80 Mi-17s are for what we call a Special Mission 

Wing, which is the Afghan Special Operations Forces’ capability to 

both conduct counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations. 

Without the operational reach of the Mi-17, the Afghan forces will 

not be successful in providing security and stability in Afghanistan 

and will not be an effective counterterrorism partner. 

One of the second-order effects of that, Mr. Chairman, which is 

why I used the word ‘‘catastrophic,’’ is that it will also have an adverse impact on our force protection in 2015. Among the assumptions that I make in 2015 is the Afghan Security Forces will contribute to the force protection of coalition forces in 2015, and their 

793 

ability to do that would be significantly degraded without the Mi17. 

Chairman LEVIN. It is the spare parts, as I understand it, the 

sustainment that is prohibited by that same language, which is so 

important. 

General DUNFORD. There’s two issues, Mr. Chairman. One of 

them is the ability to have spare parts and to sustain the Mi-17 

fleet. The other is that Rosoboronexport, the Russian company, 

owns the plans and the blueprints, if you will, of the Mi-17. There’s 

also safety of flight issues with subsequent modifications and refurbishment of aircraft that would require our dealing either directly 

with the contractor or the subcontractor, Rosoboronexport. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was going to bring that up. That probably is the most contentious issue on this up here. I agree with the chairman on this. I 

have seen some of the pretty extreme and courageous statements 

made. Whether or not some members up here agree with them is 

a different matter. But the Special Inspector General for Afghan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) on June 13 reported a thing that was titled ‘‘The Afghan Special Mission Wing, DOD Moving Forward 

With This $771 Million Purchase’’; that the Afghans cannot operate 

and cannot maintain the aircraft. 

Is there any way that this could be changed and moderated a little bit so that you could still use the spare parts of existing vehicles 

that are there, that are paid for, that are in existence, and still 

start toward something, another purchase? Have you thought 

about any kind of a combination that might work out where we 

could not lose the value of the helicopters we have, the 88 as I understand that are there, there are trained fighters to fly them, just 

as far as spare parts are concerned? Have you thought about that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we have looked very hard. In fact, 

we’ve done a global search to see if it would be possible to sustain 

the Mi-17 fleet without directly dealing with Rosoboronexport or 

one of its subcontractors. My assessment is that that would not be 

possible. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. I’m quoting now from Tuesday, the 

speech that was made before the Brookings Institute, when General Amos said, ‘‘It breaks our hearts,’’ referring to the fall of the 

Anbar Province in Iraq, which the marines won in 2010. He noted 

that 852 marines were killed and another 8,500 injured in Iraq. I 

believe that they had made the difference. 

I know all the work you did in Afghanistan and I’m sure you’re 

observant as to what happened in Iraq. I mentioned to you when 

you were in my office that I have a young man named Brian Hackler who works for me now, but he actually had two deployments. 

They were in Fallujah. By coincidence, I didn’t know who he was 

at that time, but I was there, as were many of these guys there, 

when they had the fingerprints and all of that. 

I think, looking at it, that arguably could be considered to be the 

most violent, door-to-door, World War II-type of activity. When I 

called up Brian Hackler and told him that we had lost that after 

they had gained it, he talked about the blood, sweat, and tears. 

794 

He’s been called by a lot of people since then. I just look at that 

taking place. 

My concern obviously for bringing this up is that we don’t want 

the same thing to happen in Afghanistan. I know, since you’re a 

marine and you saw the mission that took place there, you agree 

with me. 

What all has been done in your opinion to make sure that we 

don’t have a repeat of that tragedy that took place in Iraq? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Senator. I was one of the thousands 

of marines that did serve in the Anbar Province and feel the same 

way that Brian Hackler does. Senator, I think the biggest difference is we have an opportunity to do a transition in Afghanistan, a proper transition that will allow us to achieve our end 

state. In Iraq we withdrew, with the associated consequences. To 

me, that’s the most significant change. 

We knew when we left Iraq, there was work remaining to be 

done to develop sustainable Iraqi security forces, as well as to ensure that political stability existed in Iraq such that security and 

stability would continue. In Afghanistan, we have a chance to get 

that right, and my argument in fact is for us to do a responsible 

transition from Afghanistan as opposed to a withdrawal. 

Senator INHOFE. That’s good and I appreciate that. I think we 

need to get that on record, because it’s awful hard to explain to 

people how that happened, including the Brian Hacklers around 

who were a part of it. 

There’s been a lot of discussion on the 38 amphibious ships and 

dropping that number down to 33. I have a letter, Mr. Chairman, 

I want to make part of the record right now at this point in the 

record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

795 


717ful1.eps
796 


717ful2.eps
797 

Senator INHOFE. It’s one that you have read and that each member up here has read, from these 20 generals, signing on saying 

that they think it’s absolutely necessary not to deal with that reduction to 33. Any comments you want to make on that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, what I do know is that on a day-today basis the combatant commanders’ requirements for amphibious 

ships greatly exceed the inventory. In fact, I’m a bit dated, but not 

too much, and I think there were close to 50 was the requirement 

on a day-to-day basis. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary 

of the Navy, and the Commandant a few years ago concluded that 

38 was the requirement, and we’re now at the point where we have 

33 in a fiscally constrained environment, but actually 31 in the inventory. 

I would support anything that would allow us to maintain an effective amphibious ship inventory. 

Senator INHOFE. A lot of good points were brought out in that 

letter. Do you agree with the letter? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I have not seen the letter. 

Senator INHOFE. Oh, okay, that’s fine. 

Lastly, on the elections, a lot of us are partly responsible for the 

fact that there is going to be an audit and there’s going to be a real 

effort there to make sure that not just justice is done and the right 

turnout is resulted, but also that the people of Afghanistan will accept this as a fair and honest election. 

Do you have any thoughts—I know you’re going into a different 

job now—on what needs to be done to make sure that that can happen? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator, and I expect to still be there 

throughout the process. 

Senator INHOFE. Sure. 

General DUNFORD. I’m glad to report that we began yesterday to 

gather the ballots in accordance with the agreement that was made 

over the weekend. All 100 percent of the ballots will be brought 

back to Kabul to be audited. There’s significant international community oversight, as well as candidate oversight, in the process of 

counting those ballots. I think that will give both the candidates 

and the Afghan people high confidence that all that can be done 

is being done to eliminate the fraudulent ballots and determine a 

good outcome. 

I think the most encouraging thing—and I know some of the 

members recently spoke to both candidates. The most encouraging 

thing is both candidates are very responsible. They know the consequences of the political transition process and they have agreed 

to accept the outcome of the ballot with certain parameters. Those 

parameters are now in place, and so I’m optimistic that at the end 

of this process some weeks from now there will be a winner and 

a loser and the loser will accept the results of the election, as will 

the Afghan people. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that very much. We all know the 

significance of that election. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

798 

I want to join my colleagues, General, in commending you for 

your extraordinary service to the Marine Corps and to the Nation, 

and to thank your family for serving with you. Knowing you a little 

bit, I think you would first point to the soldiers, marines, sailors, 

airmen, and airwomen who serve as the real force of our success, 

and your predecessors’. But your role has been absolutely critical. 

A year ago I don’t think anyone would have said we’d have two 

relatively peaceful elections in that country, monitored principally 

by the Afghan National Security Forces, not by international personnel. Again, that’s one significant aspect and contribution of your 

individual and personal command. Thank you, sir, for what you’ve 

done. 

Can you talk as we go forward about the decision points and the 

flexibility we have to make adjustments with respect to our presence in Afghanistan, assuming of course that the status of forces 

agreement will be signed and the strategic partnership will be 

signed? 

General DUNFORD. Again, Senator, as we’ve discussed earlier, 

there will be 9,800 U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The plan that we 

have right now would not begin to draw those forces down until the 

end of the fighting season in 2015. The first opportunity to change, 

make adjustments as you describe them would be in the fall of 

2015, where you can effect change in the projected numbers in 

2016. 

Then whatever number you have in 2016, a similar construct 

would probably be in place for 2016, where the numbers that you 

would want to have in 2017 could be determined in the summer 

of 2016 to effect change in the plans for 2017. But it typically will 

run in a post-fighting season pattern over the next couple of years 

in terms of effecting change, which is not to say you couldn’t add 

forces, but this is to make adjustments to the forces on the ground. 

Senator REED. Not only forces on the ground, but facilities that 

may be occupied because of conditions in the country? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that’s absolutely one of the drivers. 

What we have tried to do is make sure that the infrastructure 

doesn’t drive our ability to provide train, advise, and assist in 2015. 

We’ve done some things to maintain a flexible posture in 2015. But 

at the end of the day, infrastructure is absolutely one of the drivers 

to the timeline. 

Senator REED. There’s two principal missions. One is the train, 

equip, and advise the Afghan National Security Forces and the 

other is the counterterrorism operations. You’ll view the force 

structure in terms of both those missions; that’s correct? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. From my perspective 

they’re inextricably linked. 

Senator REED. You’re comfortable with this going forward because of the built-in flexibility and you see no arbitrary constraints 

going forward? The review that will be done at the end of next year 

will be based upon the conditions on the ground, the two missions 

that we outlined, and the facts as the commander, presumably 

General Campbell, sees at that time? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I’m confident that the specific assumptions, the conditions, and the tasks that have to be accomplished, that drove our recommendations for 2015, all that’s availVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00806 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
799 

able to my successor and he’ll have the opportunity to go back in 

2015 and to revalidate those assumptions and to assess the conditions, one of the important conditions of course being the nature of 

the threat to our Nation after 2015. 

Senator REED. Again, invariably parallels are drawn between the 

situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. But in Iraq, in 2008, President 

Bush signed a formal agreement with the Government of Iraq to 

withdraw all forces on a fixed date, the end of 2011. That is not 

going to be the policy in Afghanistan, as you understand it? In fact, 

we would have the flexibility for our own interests to change the 

mix and change the disposition of forces going forward, and that 

is, I would assume, a key difference? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it is a key difference. One of the key 

differences is that, one, the Afghan people want us to be in Afghanistan in overwhelming numbers. I’ve recently spoken to both presidential candidates and I can assure you that both presidential candidates also support a U.S. presence after 2014. 

Senator REED. One of the key factors which you’ve already acknowledged is the role of Pakistan. One of the interesting developments which I think you appreciate very keenly and I wonder how 

much our colleagues in Pakistan do is as we draw down our forces 

and depend less and less on the lines of communication through 

Pakistan our relative leverage goes up. Is that a fair estimate in 

terms of getting their cooperation and getting their help? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it does. I think our footprint in Afghanistan has made us reliant on the ground lines of communication, and I think after 2014 we have an opportunity to reframe our 

relationship with Pakistan. 

Senator REED. Right now they’re conducting operations much 

more aggressively, but probably not as effectively as they would 

even want; is that a fair judgment? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, they are conducting operations in 

North Waziristan, and we’ve certainly wanted them to do that for 

some years. They’ve had some success against the Pakistani 

Taliban and the IMU [Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan] in North 

Waziristan to the best that we can tell, but certainly have not had 

the effect against the Haqqani Network that we want to have seen, 

although it certainly has had a disruptive effect on the Haqqani 

Network in the sense that they have all been forced to move out 

of their sanctuary in the Miranshah area. 

Senator REED. Let me just change quickly, because your new job 

as the Commandant of the Marine Corps touches upon issues of 

budget, potential sequestration effects. I’m sure you’ve thought 

about them, but not I presume in detail. Going forward, can you 

just give us your sense of the readiness challenges you will face 

and other challenges that the Marine Corps faces today? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thank you. I think as I look at the 

future of the Marine Corps, our leadership, the biggest challenge 

we’re going to have is to balance readiness, the crisis response capability that you expect from the U.S. Marine Corps, with the ability to modernize the Marine Corps for tomorrow’s fights, to sustain 

infrastructure, to maintain proper levels of training, and so forth 

for those units at home station. 

800 

Balancing all those in a fiscally constrained environment is going 

to be very difficult. I know that General Amos has prioritized readiness. I also know that he’s been forced to make some decisions 

that create challenges in the future for modernization. I think balancing those things over the next couple of years is going to be difficult. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

With thanks to Senators Chambliss and Wicker, Senator 

McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thanks to Senators Chambliss and Wicker. It 

shows if we live long enough——[Laughter.] 

Thank you, General Dunford. 

Chairman LEVIN. This is an in joke. I have to explain all this. 

Senator MCCAIN. It’s the only appropriate mark of respect that 

I have ever gotten from my two colleagues. Thank you. [Laughter.] 

I thank you, General Dunford, for your outstanding service. 

We’ve had the opportunity of encountering many times over the 

past 12, 13, 14 years and I appreciate your service. 

I really am reluctant to get back into this, but people keep trying 

to say that in 2008 we said we’d have everybody out, that we really 

wanted to stay in Iraq. The fact is that the President of the United 

States—there was never any public statement that the President 

made, the United States made, that said that he wanted to stay 

or have a residual force in Iraq. 

The fact is—and Senator Graham and I were there and know full 

well—that if we had really wanted to we could have kept a residual 

force there. We’re paying a very heavy price for not doing so. We 

were on the ground there when Maliki and Barzani and Alawi 

agreed and, in the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, it cascaded down to 3,500 troops that they wanted to leave 

behind, which was absolutely ridiculous. 

We’ll be fighting this for years to come, but facts are stubborn 

things and we could have left a residual force if we had wanted to 

do so. In fact, today your predecessor said—in the Brookings Institute, General Amos said: ‘‘I have a hard time believing that had we 

been there and worked with the government and worked with the 

parliament and worked with the minister of defense, the minister 

of interior, I don’t think we’d be in the same shape we’re in today.’’ 

Those are just facts. 

General Dunford, did you or any other senior military leader personally recommend the policy of everybody out by 2017 no matter 

what? 

General DUNFORD. No, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. No military, no ranking military officer that 

you know, recommended a hard date for everybody out of Afghanistan; is that right? 

General DUNFORD. None that I know of, Senator. I think we still 

plan to have some presence after 2017. But no one recommended 

zero. 

Senator MCCAIN. Did anybody recommend that we have a conditions-based decision about what kind of residual force we should 

leave behind? 

801 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think you appreciate that every 

military leader would want to have the conditions on the ground 

and the assumptions be revalidated as a transition takes place. 

Senator MCCAIN. Isn’t it true that right now, the way that the 

counterterrorism capability of the Afghans are today, that we cannot abandon that? If you had to make the decision today, with the 

lack of counterterrorism capability the Afghans have, we would 

have to leave that kind of force behind at least for the counterterrorism mission? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there’s no doubt that the Afghan 

forces today would not be capable of conducting the kind of operations we’re conducting to put pressure on the network. 

Senator MCCAIN. Nor right now do you envision them having 

that capability by 2017? 

General DUNFORD. Not if you project the threat that exists today. 

Senator MCCAIN. Including recent rocket attacks on the airport 

in Kabul show that the Taliban is still pretty resilient. 

Isn’t it a fact that as long as the Taliban have basically a sanctuary in Pakistan that this situation will remain extremely complex and dangerous? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, absolutely. The resiliency of the 

Taliban movement is driven by their sanctuary in Pakistan. 

Senator MCCAIN. Is there any doubt in your mind that the announcement of a complete withdrawal by 2017 has had effect on 

the morale of the Afghan army? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think all of us in uniform, to include the Afghans, would have preferred that that be a bit more 

ambiguous. 

Senator MCCAIN. In fact, we were told recently in Kabul by Afghan military officers, they say, ‘‘You are abandoning us.’’ That’s 

what they told me and Senator Graham, and I don’t think they 

would have any reason to tell us otherwise. 

The fact is that we need a conditions-based decision because we 

right now are not confident that the Afghans can take up the complete burden of their own security. 

Very quickly, sequestration. Right now, as I understand it, Marine captains and Army captains who are in the field fighting right 

now as we speak are receiving notices that they’re going to be involuntarily separated from the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Is 

that true? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my understanding is that is what 

the Army has been forced to do as a result of the drawdown. The 

Marine Corps is not doing that at this time with captains that have 

forward deployed. 

Senator MCCAIN. Obviously, that has to have an effect on morale 

of our officer corps. 

General DUNFORD. It does, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. A serious blow, I would think. 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely. Probably more importantly, Senator, than just the officer corps is the message it sends to the 

young soldiers whose company commander is forced to redeploy as 

a result of a reduction in force. 

Senator MCCAIN. Isn’t it true from your time in the military and 

remembering worse times that it takes a long time to restore the 

802 

morale of the military when you take out, involuntarily, some of 

the best and the brightest that we have had. Haven’t we seen that 

movie before in your early part of your career? 

General DUNFORD. I have, Senator. In the late 1970s it took us 

some years, probably into 1983 or 1984, before we recovered from 

the effects of the post-Vietnam drawdown. 

Senator MCCAIN. Would you agree that perhaps one of the greatest responsibilities that Congress and the military has today is to 

review this sequestration and its effects that it is having long-term 

on our ability to defend this Nation? 

General DUNFORD. I would agree with that, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. I look forward to working with my colleagues 

on both sides of the aisle and both sides of this podium, making 

that one of our highest priorities. Otherwise, I think that it is the 

unanimous opinion of every military leader that I have met that 

continued sequestration on the path we’re on could have devastating effects on our ability to defend this Nation. Would you 

agree with that? 

General DUNFORD. I would agree with that, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, the chairman covered the Mi-17 issue, but I just think 

it’s really important to have your unequivocal view that, I think 

the word you used is, it will be catastrophic if we cut off spare 

parts. That would in effect ground the Afghan Air Force; is that 

true? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it is. The reason I used the word catastrophic, which I don’t think is hyperbole, is because the inability 

for the Afghans to have the operational reach represented by the 

Mi-17 will seriously deteriorate their ability to take the fight to the 

enemy. But the more important reason I used the word catastrophic is that their inability to take the fight to the enemy actually will put young Americans in harm’s way in 2015 and beyond. 

Senator KING. Thank you General. 

You’ve discussed this. Looking now at the lessons of Iraq, what 

do we learn from that so that we can avoid that future in Afghanistan? There are those who aren’t as optimistic as the military 

about Afghanistan’s future after our withdrawal. What do we learn 

from Iraq to avoid that fate? 

General DUNFORD. I think the key thing that we have in Afghanistan, we’re in the process of right now, is an effective political 

transition, but also the opportunity to continue to develop the sustainability of Afghan security forces. I’m very confident about the 

Afghan forces’ ability to provide security on a day-to-day basis. I’m 

not confident that if we were to leave at the end of 2014 that those 

forces would be sustainable. 

There are some significant capability gaps that have to be addressed in order for the Afghans to be able to do things that we 

have heretofore been doing for them. There’s still a degree of what 

I describe as capability substitution. Many of those areas are planning, programming, budgeting, execution, things we take for grantVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00810 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
803 

ed, delivery of spare parts, delivery of fuel, pay systems, and those 

kinds of things that the army would need. 

I think the key lesson is that, after all of the sacrifice and all 

the accomplishments over the past 13 years, what we need to do 

is ensure that the transition results in the Afghan forces being sustainable without our presence at some point in the future. 

Senator KING. What’s the ethnic makeup of the Afghan army? 

One of the problems in Iraq appears to be the unequal distribution 

ethnically or sectarian. Is the ethnic, tribal makeup of the Afghanistan security forces representative of the country, so that the security forces will have a broad support within the country? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks for that question. It is an important question. The officer corps in the Afghan army is about 40 

percent Tajik, 40 percent Pashtun. The noncommissioned officer 

(NCO) corps is about the same. The forces are about the same. 

That’s a slight overrepresentation of Tajiks in the sense that the 

Pashtun population represents some 40-plus percentage of the population and about 27 percent of the population is Tajik. 

I would caveat those statistics by telling you that there hasn’t 

been a census in Afghanistan for a long period of time. Those statistics are the best that we have available to us. But in general 

terms we have the foundation of a national army in Afghanistan 

that is in fact representative, not only of the various ethnic groups, 

but representative geographically. 

Senator KING. Is this representation integrated throughout the 

force? In other words, are individual battalions or units balanced 

ethnically? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, they are. They are balanced. There 

is a slight overrepresentation of forces from the northern part of 

the country and the eastern part of the country, slightly less from 

the southern part of the country. But the demographics in each of 

the units represents the Nation as a whole, as opposed to specific 

units being Tajik or Pashtun and so forth. 

The assignment of people inside the Afghan army is not based 

on their geographic area. In fact, all serve away from home. 

Senator KING. We tend to focus around here on problems. That’s 

what we talk about. That’s our job. But my sense is that Secretary 

Kerry and what happened last weekend was a big deal, and the 

avoidance of what could have been a disastrous situation. Could 

you share some thoughts about the importance of the uniform recount and, I understand there’s a kind of a power-sharing agreement or a coalition government agreement of whatever the outcome. This could have been a disaster for us if it had gone the 

wrong way this past week. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks. Last week there was a lot of 

discussion in Afghanistan about one of the candidates establishing 

a parallel government, with the potential for civil war. I would assess that risk as having been significant. I don’t think either one 

of the candidates wanted to do that, but there was certainly a sentiment, a strong sentiment by large numbers of people, that were 

so outraged at the fraud that took place in the election that they 

were willing to take extreme measures. 

I think what happened this weekend was very encouraging in 

that both candidates have agreed to a framework for an audit procVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00811 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
804 

ess that will deliver the cleanest vote possible. But as importantly, 

the candidates agreed on a political track as well as that technical 

track, and that political track will be some power-sharing arrangement so there’s an inclusive government in Afghanistan. They believe that that is most suitable for Afghanistan at this particular 

time. 

While the devil is in the details and much work remains to be 

done, particularly on the political framework, the discussion in Afghanistan now is not about civil war, it’s not about insecurity; it’s 

about a political deal in order to govern effectively in the future. 

I think that’s fairly significant. 

Senator KING. I’ve always felt that God is in the details, but 

that’s a different topic. 

Pakistan. You mentioned Pakistan. You’ve had to deal with Pakistan. Whose side is Pakistan on? Are they trying to suppress these 

terrorist organizations or are they working with them? I find Pakistan a puzzling—I was about to say ally, but I don’t know how to 

characterize them. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, in my time in Afghanistan I’ve met 

generally monthly with our Pakistan counterpart, and also he’s 

now had the opportunity to travel to Afghanistan to meet with both 

me and our counterpart in the Afghan security forces. Numbers of 

hours of discussions. I’m convinced of a couple things, both from 

the intelligence and from my engagements in Pakistan. 

First and foremost, I believe that the Pakistani army recognizes 

that extremism is an existential threat to the state of Pakistan and 

I think they are determined to do something about that threat. 

Less confident that they today have the capability to do all that 

needs to be done to deal with that threat inside of Afghanistan, 

which is why I think you see them focused narrowly on the most 

pressing threats to Pakistan, reflecting an inability to deal more 

broadly with extremism. 

This is one of the reasons I think it’s so important for us to develop an effective relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

and I think the United States can play a unique role in facilitating 

that relationship, because the way we will get after this problem 

is by, one, having a common definition of ‘‘extremism’’ in the region; and number two, then having an agreed-upon framework 

within which both Afghanistan and Pakistan can deal with the 

threat of extremism, as well as the very real political and economic 

challenges that exist between the two states. 

Senator KING. As we draw down in Afghanistan, it’s more important than ever to establish a good, strong working relationship with 

Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, an effective relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is critical to our long-term success in the 

region. 

Senator KING. Thank you, General, and thank you for your extraordinary service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator King. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thanks to you and your family for your continued commitment to America. We’re very thankful that you have been where 

805 

you’ve been coming out of Afghanistan. You’re the next in line of 

a number of great leaders to serve as Commandants. We look forward to your continued service there. 

Taking up where Senator King left off on Pakistan, there is no 

long-term solution in Afghanistan without some sort of cooperation 

out of Pakistan; is that a fair statement? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that’s absolutely a fair statement, 

and one of the critical components of our military campaign is to 

begin to develop effective military-to-military relationships between 

the two countries. I couldn’t agree more. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I want to ask you about the detainees that 

were released recently. I understand 12 non-Afghans were released 

from Parwan. Ten of those were Pakistanis and they were all returned to their home country. I’m concerned because I know the serious nature of the alleged incidents that these prisoners were accused of, and we have 38 more non-Afghans, I understand. Can you 

address why these 12 were released and what’s our long-term policy with Afghanistan regarding non-Afghan prisoners at Parwan? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Senator. I can. First with regard to 

the 10 that were sent to Pakistan, we didn’t release those individuals; we turned them over to Pakistan after the U.S. State Department got assurances from Pakistan that they would be properly 

handled in accordance with the nature of the crimes that they committed. 

We have 38 third-country nationals right now and a similar process takes place, where the State Department deals with the Nation 

from which these individuals come, gains assurances, and then the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense will sign an authorization for them to 

be released after notifying Congress. 

The challenge with this issue, Senator, is that our authority to 

hold these individuals will expire on December 31, 2014. We’re 

working very hard now to ensure that we properly transition these 

individuals to a place where they can be held accountable for, 

again, the acts that they’ve committed. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Do you have confidence that the Afghans are 

going to treat them in the way that they should be treated because 

of the acts they’ve committed? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we’re not planning at this time to 

turn them over to Afghanistan. We plan to turn them over to the 

countries from which they originated. My sense is that if we were 

to turn them over to Afghanistan today I couldn’t guarantee you 

that they would be properly handled. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I want to again take off on something Senator McCain asked you about. We had General Campbell in the 

other day to talk about continuing operations in Afghanistan, and 

with the drawdown to the 9,800 this year, drawing down again 

next year, give me your view as to the long-term situation as you 

understand it right now as we head into the end of 2014, through 

2015 and, more importantly, into 2016? What’s your understanding 

of how this is going to work? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, with regard to developing sustainable Afghan security forces, I think the pace of withdrawal right 

now could result in Afghan forces being sustainable. I’m comfortable that a regional approach to train, advise, and assist in 

806 

2015, where we help mature the institutions, the processes and 

systems that allow the ministerial-level organization to support 

tactical-level organizations, the work that needs to be done can be 

done in 2015. 

I’m also confident that there’s some work that will require a 

longer period of time, but much of that work can be done in Kabul 

inside the ministries. The issue that I really can’t talk to you about 

with any degree of confidence is what the threat to the Homeland 

might be after 2016. That’s certainly an area where I think the assumptions and the conditions that informed our current decision 

would have to be evaluated over time. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. In that respect, if you had to rate the possibility of either al Qaeda or al Qaeda-affiliated operators inside of 

Afghanistan or migrating to Afghanistan as we draw down and resuming training operations, much like we saw before September 

11, what degree would you rate the possibility of that taking place? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can assure you, from what we see 

on a day-to-day basis and from the intelligence, that there are individuals in both Afghanistan and Pakistan who are determined to 

attack the Homeland. They’re determined to replicate acts like September 11. The pressure that we have placed on those networks 

over the past decade is the reason they haven’t been able to execute a September 11. 

I would say that the risk, without continued pressure on those 

networks, of them regenerating and attacking the Homeland would 

be significant. 

General DUNFORD. Is the Haqqani Network still enemy number 

one? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would view al Qaeda as enemy 

number one. Haqqani is certainly the most virulent strain of the 

insurgency in Afghanistan and presents the greatest risk to the 

force because of their emphasis on high-profile attacks. The other 

thing that’s significant about the Haqqani Network is they actually 

provide the network that allows al Qaeda in the region to have 

sanctuary and continue to resource itself. They’re certainly, if not 

the most important group to the sustainability of al Qaeda, they 

are certainly one of the most significant groups that allows al 

Qaeda to sustain itself in the South Asia region. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Talk for a minute about the morale of American soldiers in Afghanistan now? What’s your thought? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I am—and I mean this sincerely—extraordinarily honored to have the opportunity to lead the men and 

women that are in Afghanistan today. Their morale after 13 years 

of war has met or exceeded anybody’s expectations over time. 

They’re focused on what they’re doing. They believe in what they’re 

doing. They trust themselves. They know they’re well trained and 

they’re well equipped and they trust their leadership. 

I would assess the morale of the forces in Afghanistan today and, 

frankly, in the force as a whole as something we can all be very 

proud of. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. The 48th Brigade of the Georgia National 

Guard is charged with basically tearing down Camp Phoenix. I visited them when they got there and they were fired up about the 

807 

job that you had given to them to do that, and I trust they’re doing 

well. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, they are. The job we gave them to 

do is one of the more difficult jobs that needs to be done over this 

next year. It’s a piece of infrastructure, Camp Phoenix, that they’re 

down at, that we want to close. Closing a base is a challenging 

task, but they have taken that on with enthusiasm and they’re 

doing a superb job. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for 

your leadership, General. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, welcome. I also know that your wife has played 

a very big role in your success, so we welcome Ellyn and your 

niece. 

I am the daughter-in-law of a former major general in the Marine Corps Reserve and just know that so many people hold the 

Marine Corps in the highest, highest regard. We thank you for 

doing that. You have some big shoes to fill from Commandant 

Amos, who has certainly led the Marine Corps, I think, with very 

good leadership. 

I did want to talk a little bit more about the Afghan National Security Force. As you wind down your tenure as head of ISAF, 

where you have seen the withdrawing of 20,000 troops in an environment with an unsigned bilateral security agreement and an 

election riddled by fraud that you’ve spoken about, tell me how prepared the Afghanistan National Security Forces are to take over, 

especially in light of what we have seen, the incapability of what’s 

taking place in Iraq? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would, and thanks for that question. I think, rather than just give you my personal assessment, 

maybe I’ll just outline what the Afghan forces have done over the 

past few months, which in my mind is indicative of their current 

capability. First, we had over 300 campaign events involving thousands of people, some as large as 20,000. The Afghan forces secured all of those campaign events. 

There was a Nowruz, or Persian New Year Festival, in the northern part of the country back in March, 100,000 people came. They 

secured that event. There was another event in the country that 

involved people from all over the region to attend, a number of significant threat streams. Those threat streams were disrupted and 

the Afghan forces were able to provide security. 

Probably most significantly, what took place on the 5th of April 

and the 14th of June is indicative of the capabilities of the Afghan 

security forces. On both of those occasions, millions of people, despite being threatened by the Taliban, had the courage to go out 

and vote. That courage was drawn in my assessment from the confidence that the Afghan people and the sense of ownership that the 

Afghan people have for the Afghan security forces. 

While I’m very aware of the challenges that must be addressed 

to have sustainable Afghan forces and the capability gaps that continue to remain, I’m equally confident that the Afghan forces today 

808 

are capable of providing security to the Afghan people. They have 

done that for the past year since they assumed lead responsibility. 

They’re in a tough fight this summer. Our forces when I arrived, 

we had over 100,000 forces on the ground. We have 40,000 right 

now. We’re providing very little support on a day-to-day basis to 

the Afghan security forces. They are yet still able to be successful 

against the enemy. 

Senator HAGAN. Can you talk about the participation of women 

in the Afghani forces? 

General DUNFORD. I can, Senator. It’s not a particularly good 

news story. There’s a goal in the Afghan army and the police forces 

for 10 percent women. We have about 1 percent in both the army 

and the police force right now. There are some bright spots. We 

have the first female police chief in Kabul. We have a couple other 

senior-level officers. Both the Minister of Defense and Minister of 

Interior have taken this on as an area of personal interest, and 

they have a very aggressive recruiting plan. 

Within ISAF, we recently received from Croatia a brigadier general whose singular responsibility will be to assist us with gender 

integration in the Afghan security forces. From a leadership perspective, I think there’s an emphasis by the leadership in Afghanistan to make this better. 

But I wouldn’t for a minute understate, Senator, the very real 

cultural challenges that are going to make the progress for women 

in Afghanistan very slow and very deliberate and, quite frankly, 

contingent upon our continued presence after 2014, as well as some 

of the support that we provide being conditional in order for them 

to make progress in this particular area. 

Senator HAGAN. How many women in the Marine Corps are serving in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I don’t know. That may be something good that I don’t know, because we actually don’t keep track 

of things like that. 

Senator HAGAN. I want to move to the Camp Lejeune water contamination issue. One of my top priorities has been to get help and 

answers for those individuals in the Marine Corps that have been 

affected by this water contamination at Camp Lejeune. As many as 

a million marines, family members, and civilians that were stationed at the base from 1950s until the 1980s were exposed to some 

harmful chemicals that have certainly led to the development of 

cancer and other diseases. 

It’s been a long quest to get answers and we are finally beginning to get results of studies that have shed light on this tragedy. 

I know that you too have served at Camp Lejeune during this time. 

I hope you make this issue a personal priority. When you are confirmed, will you work with Congress to overcome any of these bureaucratic hurdles that we have had in the past—I feel good from 

the Marine Corps’s perspective we’re still working with the Agency 

for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry in some other areas— 

to overcome any of these hurdles that may halt or delay the pursuit of answers for the affected marines and their families? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. We’ll do all we can to be 

transparent with Marine families and, frankly, at the end of the 

day to do the right thing. 

809 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

To tuition assistance. I think that is a powerful program that allows our servicemembers to pursue education in their off time, and 

I think it enhances the professionalism when serving and certainly 

helps to prepare them for the civilian workforce when they transition out. 

Congress has sent a very clear message about the importance of 

this benefit by restoring it in fiscal year 2013 and then by restricting the reprogramming of that in fiscal year 2014. In the Marine 

Corps’ 2015 budget the request originally included a proposal to cut 

this tuition assistance by close to two-thirds and also included a 25 

percent cost share by the individual marine. 

It’s a program that I support and I’ve defended it. I was pleased 

to see that the Marine Corps quickly changed course and then fully 

funded this tuition assistance for fiscal year 2015. 

If confirmed, will you continue to show strong support for the tuition assistance benefit? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I have taken a look at the guidance 

that General Amos provided for the tuition assistance program 

and, if confirmed, the guidance that I would provide would be consistent with what General Amos has provided. 

Senator HAGAN. Because this is a benefit that these men and 

women have really deserved and it has certainly helped from an 

educational standpoint for those individuals and, as I said, when 

they transition out. Thank you. I will look forward to working with 

you on that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

General Dunford, thank you for your testimony and for your 

service. Let me just try to follow up on a few things that have been 

mentioned. 

Senator Inhofe mentioned our amphibious fleet. It’s clear that 

we’re not anywhere near our requirements there. Let me ask specifically about the LPD–17 [landing platform/dock] program. It was 

originally planned for 12 warships. It was reduced to 11 vessels. 

This committee restored that 12th LPD. It’s my understanding that 

the Senate Appropriations Committee has found the funds for that 

12th LPD and that it’s authorized in the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act. 

Do we need that 12th LPD? 

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. What’s your assessment of the risk to the Marine Corps and our troops’ ability to execute objectives around the 

world, and particularly the Asia-Pacific, if we do not get that number right? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we’re both short of the numbers of 

ships required to meet the combatant commanders’ day-to-day requirements, as well as to aggregate marines to conduct an amphibious assault. I believe that that 12th LPD will help mitigate the 

risk, not completely close the gap, but it will help mitigate the risk 

that we have right now in both of those areas. 

Senator WICKER. Would it help you as the next Commandant if 

we would go ahead and get these bills on the President’s desk for 

810 

his signature before the end of the fiscal year? What problems does 

it cause when we let the fiscal year expire and we haven’t given 

you a National Defense Authorization Act and we don’t have our 

Defense Department funded with an actual appropriation bill, but 

rather a continuing resolution? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Senator. I know from my previous 

experience as Assistant Commandant what that frequently requires us to do is break programs. It’s actually a very inefficient 

way to do business if you don’t have a bill passed by the end of 

the fiscal year. 

Senator WICKER. We have reported out of this committee the 

Carl Levin Defense Authorization Act and I know that he would 

like nothing better than to get it on the floor this month. I would 

join my colleagues in that. 

Chairman LEVIN. If I could just correct that, I really wanted to 

get this on the floor last month. 

Senator WICKER. But that was yesterday and yesterday’s gone. 

We need to get it done. I think you and the members of this committee are on the same page. I just implore the leadership of this 

Congress to do whatever’s necessary to get these bills on the President’s desk in a timely manner. 

Let me follow up then on the question of the pace of our drawdown. Right now we have 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, is 

that correct? 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. Another 10,000 from various coalition allies, for 

a total of 40,000? 

General DUNFORD. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. At what pace are we going to get to 9,800? 

What will it look like at the end of this calendar year? 

General DUNFORD. It will be at 9,800 by the end of this calendar 

year, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. It’s going to be a pretty rapid drawdown? 

General DUNFORD. It is, and this is the way it was planned, so 

that we could keep the maximum number of forces on the ground 

throughout the election period, as well as through the fighting season in the summer. But as we discussed a while ago, the infrastructure piece is one of the key drivers, and we’ve been simultaneously working the infrastructure reduction and transition plan 

throughout the last year. I’m not at all concerned about the pace 

of drawdown to get to 9,800. We have a good plan in place and 

we’ll get there. 

Senator WICKER. Are we going to be at 9,800 through most of calendar year 2015? 

General DUNFORD. That is the plan, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. Okay, so November, for example, of 2015? 

General DUNFORD. We will have begun the drawdown by November 2015. 

Senator WICKER. At that point how many of our coalition ally 

troops will be with us there? 

General DUNFORD. We’ll have 4,000, plus or minus, that’ll be 

with us in 2015. As we collapse back to a Kabul-centric approach 

in 2016, I’d expect we’d have at least half of that number in 2016. 

Senator WICKER. We’ll have about 5,000 troops during 2016? 

811 

General DUNFORD. The guidance the President said was we 

would have about half in 2016 and the number 5,500 is out there, 

but the President’s guidance has been about half. 

Senator WICKER. Your testimony before the committee today, 

your best judgment to Congress, is that the numbers that we 

project for 2015 will be adequate to provide security during that 

calendar year; is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that is correct. The numbers in 2015 

are consistent with the recommendation that I made to the President. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. You reserve the right, as I understand it, 

to look at conditions on the ground and change that recommendation as it goes forward beyond calendar year 2015. Is that what I 

understand you to have told me yesterday? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think any commander—and I certainly believe I have this responsibility. Any commander has the 

responsibility to provide the President with best military advice, 

which includes a continual reassessment of the assumptions and 

the conditions that were behind any recommendation that was 

made. 

Senator WICKER. I hope you will. I tell you this, General. I think 

we’re all impressed. We’re impressed with your record, we’re impressed with the answers that you’ve given us. We think the President has the right man here. 

I just have to say, I implore you and I charge you with speaking 

truth to power. If it looks like, as Senator Inhofe said, if it looks 

like we’re not getting it right, as we didn’t get it right in Iraq, I 

hope you will come back to us and tell us we’re not getting it right 

and that something needs to be done. We need to know that. 

We didn’t get the right advice, frankly, we got surprised, in Iraq. 

I have here a news item, which I think I’ll ask to be inserted in 

the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

812 


717ful3.eps
813 


717ful4.eps
814 

Senator WICKER. It’s a statement by General Amos, your predecessor. I’m going to do you the favor of not asking you if you subscribe to his views, because I don’t think that would get us anywhere. But basically, if I could just read a sentence or two: 

‘‘Stepping into an intensifying political debate, the head of the 

Marine Corps said the United States doesn’t have the luxury of isolationism and said Iraq’s deterioration may have been prevented if 

Washington had maintained a larger U.S. presence there. General 

James Amos, who is scheduled to retire this fall, offered strong 

views on both debates. 

‘‘On Iraq, Amos said he believes that the Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria (ISIS) takeover of central Iraq and the growing political 

fissures between Maliki and the country’s embattled Sunni minority may have been avoided if the United States hadn’t completely 

withdrawn from the country in 2011. ‘I have a hard time believing 

that, had we been there and worked with the government and 

worked with the parliament and worked with the minister of defense, the minister of interior, I don’t think we’d be in the same 

shape today,’ Amos said during an event at the Brookings Institute.’’ 

I agree with this distinguished military leader, and it breaks my 

heart, as it breaks the heart of General Amos and other marines 

and other troops, to see what has happened after all of the blood 

and sacrifice and treasure the United States has spent. If we had 

gotten the correct advice and we had been given a more realistic 

something, this disaster could have been avoided. It’s up to people 

like you to help us understand the ways and means to prevent this 

type of disaster from happening in Afghanistan. 

I believe you’re the man to do it. But we look to you to come back 

to us and tell us the truth and give us your best guidance as a military expert on what we need to do to make the situation work in 

Afghanistan. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker, and I 

join you in feeling a level, a very strong level of confidence that 

that’s exactly what General Dunford would do and, as he has testified this morning, has the obligation to do if the assumptions which 

have been made don’t turn out to be correct. I join you in that feeling of necessity that we can count on our top military leaders to 

do just that. I talked to General Dunford about the same thing in 

my office and I thank you for your commentary here today. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, congratulations on the appointment and thank 

you for your service. You have a lot to be proud of in the work that 

you’ve done together with American military and our coalition partners to enhance the capacity of the ANSF. 

I had a hearing recently in the Foreign Relations subcommittee 

that I chair about Afghan civil life post-2014. Your predecessor, 

General Allen, said something that kind of made us all sit back in 

our chairs. After talking about continuing security challenges, General Allen said, but corruption is a bigger threat, existential threat, 

to Afghan society than security challenges are. He wasn’t minimizing security challenges. He was elevating corruption challenges. 

815 

We all were struck by that. But when I’ve watched the playout 

of the elections in Afghanistan, the Taliban threatened them from 

a security standpoint, but, as you pointed out, the ANSF did a superb job in blocking the Taliban from being able to disrupt the elections. The challenge with the elections were allegations of corruption. The corruption threat proved to be more real or to be more 

impactful on this election process than the security challenge. 

I think that is proof of the adage that General Allen made, but 

it’s also proof of the good work that you’ve done, and I applaud you 

for it. 

Questions about your role as Commandant should you be confirmed, and I have confidence you will be. You have to balance a 

lot of tough priorities: security priorities, personnel priorities, and 

budgetary priorities. The needs of today are usually readiness challenges and the needs of tomorrow modernization. Let me ask you 

about both of those. 

What are your greatest concerns regarding readiness today in 

the Marine Corps? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Senator. General Amos has ensured 

that all marines who are deployed in harm’s way, forward deployed, forward engaged, deploy at the highest state of readiness. 

Those forces are absolutely well equipped and well trained. 

Having said that, we’ve paid the cost over the years for making 

sure that those marines that are forward deployed, forward engaged, have the wherewithal to accomplish the mission, and that 

cost has been borne at home station. Today approximately 50 percent of our units at home station are in a degraded state of readiness. That’s largely an equipment readiness issue today as a result 

of the years of war and wear and tear on our equipment. 

Certainly one of the key things would be to ensure that we have 

the resources necessary to reset that equipment that’ll be coming 

out of Afghanistan. As you may know, Senator, we’ve identified a 

minimum of 2 years as the window of time where we continue to 

need Overseas Contingency Operations funding for that very reason, to reset that force and to restore the Marine Corps to be the 

force that you expect it to be, which is not half ready, but completely ready to do whatever the Nation asks it to do. 

Senator KAINE. What are your top priorities on the other side of 

the ledger, for force modernization, as you come into the role of 

Commandant? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think, broadly speaking, the critical 

thing is that you expect us to be a naval expeditionary force in 

readiness. You expect us to be able to come from the sea in a wide 

range of conditions, again in every clime and place. I think today 

there’s a number of areas where we’re going to have to focus to ensure that we do have the amphibious and the expeditionary capabilities necessary to fight tomorrow’s war as well as today. 

I think balancing those requirements for modernization with today’s readiness is going to be a significant challenge, and I know 

you’ll help us with that, Senator. 

Senator KAINE. Indeed, one of the challenges you have in the 

modernization side is acquisition programs. You inherit some acquisition programs, some that are working very successfully, some 

not as successful. What will be your philosophy as Commandant in 

816 

the acquisition area to make sure that the investments in technology and equipment that we make are well spent? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, where I have seen acquisition programs work is where leadership is personally and decisively engaged in the acquisition program. If confirmed, I can assure you, 

particularly on the major defense acquisition programs, that the 

program manager, if not in fact, but certainly in practice, will be 

me. 

Senator KAINE. Talk a little bit about the progress the Marine 

Corps has made in opening up combat-based Military Occupational 

Specialties to women since Secretary Panetta’s announcement in 

early 2013? 

General DUNFORD. It’s clear to me that the Marine Corps understands the direction set by Secretary Panetta, and by January 2016 

we’ll be prepared to make recommendations as to exceptions to policy. I think the approach the Marine Corps has taken now, a deliberate and measured and responsible approach, is exactly the one 

that I would take were I to be confirmed. Certainly, at the end of 

the day you can be sure that the recommendations that I would 

make would be based on the impact to the combat effectiveness of 

the Marine Corps in order to meet the standards that you expect 

the Corps to meet. 

Senator KAINE. Finally, General, just a compliment. Often as I 

travel I’m traveling in a Foreign Relations capacity, not an Armed 

Services capacity, and I interact with the Marine security guard at 

the various embassies we have around the world. That is a critical 

program that has been enhanced in the aftermath of the Accountability Review Board’s (ARB) recommendations following the tragedy in Benghazi. 

But I’ve just been enormously impressed with this program and 

with the Marines’ ability to scale it up to meet the ARB recommendation. I don’t know; it may be one of the few billets in the 

Marine Corps where you get to serve without a commissioned officer telling you what to do. It’s, I think, all NCOs and enlisted personnel. But they do a superb job, and we just need to make sure 

we continue to pay attention to that program, help the Marine 

Corps as it needs budgetary resources to staff it up. 

I just want to tell you that the appreciation of the State Department for the great work the Marine security guard folks does is 

very, very high and I share that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you, General Dunford, for your incredible leadership in Afghanistan. I can’t think of a better man to serve as Commandant. I also want to thank your wife, Ellyn, for everything that 

she’s done for our country and the Marine Corps. 

I wanted to ask you, General, if we follow the course of action 

that’s been announced by the administration in Afghanistan without any changes in the reduction of forces—in other words, 9,800 

to half at the beginning of 2016, to about 1,000 embassy presence 

in the beginning of January 2017—what’s the best case scenario for 

what happens in Afghanistan? Then I would also like you to anVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00824 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
817 

swer: with no changes to the pace withdrawal, what’s the worst 

case scenario, so we can understand what the two possibilities are. 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Senator. The best case scenario for 

the next couple years would be that, first, we have a successful political transition this year. The Afghan forces continue to be successful coming out of the fighting season. They have increased confidence and capability in the fall of 2014. The international community meets their Tokyo and Chicago commitments, so we have the 

resources necessary to sustain the force and to continue the development efforts that are critical to Afghanistan’s future; that the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan improves such that 

they have a cooperative relationship in dealing with extremism; 

and that we minimize the risk of malign actors being involved inside of Afghanistan as they grow and develop. 

The Afghan security forces in the best case scenario would be 

sustainable by 2017, such that a very small presence inside the 

U.S. embassy, in what we describe as a Security Cooperation Office 

that would manage foreign military sales, engagements, and so 

forth, with some amount of ministerial capacity advising as well, 

would be there. 

But in effect, by 2017 we would have addressed those gaps that 

have identified for the Afghan forces, they would be sustainable, 

and again we would have stability as a result of political transition. 

The worst case scenario over the next 2 or 3 years would be, 

first, it starts with the political transition and we don’t have successful political transition. I think that’s a foundational element to 

any success that we’re going to have. 

We also begin to lose international community support over time. 

The Af-Pak relationship doesn’t go in a direction that we want it 

to and both states fall short of where we would want them to be 

in terms of being effective counterterrorism (CT) partners, both 

from a capacity perspective and from a will perspective. 

If we then found ourselves in 2017 without a decisive presence 

in the region and without effective CT partners in the form of Afghanistan and Pakistan and those two nations cooperating with 

each other, I think what you would see in 2017 in a worst case scenario would be the space that al Qaeda would need to grow stronger and to plan and conduct operations against the West, something 

that they haven’t been able to do over the last several years because of a combination of the pressure, largely the pressure that 

our U.S. Government interagency partners and our special operations have placed, but also contributed to by the support that 

we’ve had from Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me follow up on that. With the announcement by the administration, you talked about the 9,800 troops, our 

contribution, in 2015 you’re satisfied with. The administration has 

announced that that would be cut in half in 2016. If that is followed through in terms of cut in half, one of the things you said 

in answer to Senator Chambliss is an important mission that we’ve 

had in Afghanistan is actually ensuring that al Qaeda could not 

replicate September 11, and the way we have done that is keeping 

up pressure, continued pressure, not only on those who would want 

to threaten us in Afghanistan, but for example their counterparts 

in the Haqqani Network in Pakistan. 

818 

If we go down to half at the beginning of 2016—the CT presence 

has been beyond Kabul, correct? 

General DUNFORD. It has, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Absolutely, and it would be in 2015. What happens in the beginning of 2016 if we cut them in half? Where are 

we located? 

General DUNFORD. In 2016, Senator, in accordance with the plan 

right now, we would have fundamentally a Kabul-centric approach. 

The bases that are outside of Kabul would be closed or transferred 

to the Afghan forces or the Afghan Government by 2016. 

Senator AYOTTE. If we do that, that’s pretty soon actually, if you 

think about it. That would be the beginning of 2016 we would go 

to a Kabul-based presence. What does that do overall to our ability 

to keep pressure on those networks on the CT mission, assuming 

something doesn’t dramatically change with regard to those who 

would want to threaten us from Pakistan and Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that would reduce our collections capability, our signals intelligence, our human intelligence, and our 

strike capability. It would be a significant reduction in our overall 

counterterrorism capability. 

Senator AYOTTE. If we have that significant reduction in our 

overall counterterrorism capability beginning in 2016, what does 

that do in terms of threats that we could potentially face to our 

Homeland? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think the equation, you have to 

look at it in the perspective of what is Afghanistan’s CT capacity, 

what’s Afghanistan’s CT capacity and will, and what’s the nature 

of the threat. From my perspective, we would have to be in a position to close the gap between the Pakistani and the Afghan CT capacity and will versus the threat in 2016. 

While I don’t know what the threat will be in 2016, my sense is 

we’ll still need an effective counterterrorism capability based on my 

projection of the threat and based on the growth of Afghan and 

Pakistani CT capacity and will. 

Senator AYOTTE. Just to be clear, an effective CT strategy, unless 

the conditions dramatically change between now and the beginning 

of 2016, really has to be beyond Kabul for us to ensure that we can 

keep that pressure to protect our Homeland; is that true? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, the only way that it will be successful for us to be in Kabul—probably a different way to say it—would 

be if Afghanistan and Pakistan are capable of dealing with the 

threat in 2016. 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me just ask one final question, which is: If 

we think about the presence in Kabul and what’s happening with 

regard to the counterterrorism strategy, what is it that they would 

have to accomplish between now and then? It seems like it would 

be quite a bit. If we wanted to change course, when would we have 

to make that decision, because obviously we have presence outside 

of Kabul and we’re pulling into, if we cut the troops in half in 2016, 

back into Kabul. That takes some time. 

When would you or General Campbell, who will be the new commander on the ground, have to come to us and the administration 

and say, we really shouldn’t pull all back into Kabul, we’re going 

819 

to have to keep a greater presence? What’s our timeframe for that 

so we understand? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I’ll answer that and then go back to 

the first part of your question. The timeframe from my assessment—and again, it’s based on closing of infrastructure—would be 

in the September timeframe, October timeframe of next year, 

would be the latest time when you could actually effect the change, 

because what will happen subsequent to that is you’ll begin to 

draw down the infrastructure, close or transfer those facilities that 

currently house our forces outside of Kabul. About a year from now 

would be when that discussion would probably have to take place. 

With regard to what the Afghans would have to do to be successful in the counterterrorism fight in 2016, there’s really two critical 

gaps that affect their CT capacity. One is their aviation capability 

and then the other is the intelligence enterprise as a whole. While 

those are developing, we still expect that the aviation enterprise 

will still have some capability gaps in 2016, as well as the intel enterprise. Those are longer-term challenges that we’re addressing. 

Senator AYOTTE. I thank you, General. I also would point out, I 

think you’ve said that some of our CT missions we conduct independently because our interests in protecting the Homeland—while 

the Afghans, we have a great partnership with them, ultimately it 

is our interest, and those need to be focused on as well. Their CT 

mission may not be as focused as we would be on that particular 

mission. Would you agree with that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there are operations we conduct in 

the region unilaterally, yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. Thank you also for 

pointing out that it’ll be General Campbell who will be responsible 

for giving us his best military advice next year. Both Senator 

Wicker and I got commitments from General Dunford that he’ll 

make those honest assessments, but it really will be General 

Campbell in terms of Afghanistan—who we got the same assurance 

from, by the way, as we did from General Dunford. But thank you 

for pointing that out. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. One thing I do know is, we know 

that General Campbell hopefully will call on General Dunford for 

his advice. 

Chairman LEVIN. We do. 

Senator AYOTTE. That would be appreciated. Thanks. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you for smoothing over that little omission. 

General Hirono—I mean, Senator Hirono. I made a General out 

of Senator Hirono. [Laughter.] 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, I join my colleagues in thanking you for your 

decades of distinguished service and now taking on this new challenge. I’d like to also take this opportunity to thank the folks at 

Hawaii’s Kaneohe Bay. There are 10,000 marines, 2,000 sailors, 

4,000 family members, 1,400 civilian employees at Marine Corps 

Base Hawaii Kaneohe Bay. I certainly want to give a shout-out to 

them. 

820 

You have been asked a question earlier about the January 1, 

2016, date to provide standards for the occupations within the Marine Corps for which all personnel, including women, will have the 

opportunity to compete. I just wanted to ask you, who in the Marine Corps is the lead person or persons coming up with these 

standards and where are you in this process? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, the lead person who approves those 

standards is General Amos, our Commandant. I know from my previous experience as the Assistant Commandant that he’s been personally and decisively engaged in approving those standards. 

There’s certainly a staff down at Quantico that works this for him. 

Our Training Command is involved, our Combat Development Integration Command is involved, but at the end of the day in our 

Service the Commandant is the one who approves the standards. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

I think you also mentioned during your responses that training 

is very important, of course, to all of our Services, but to the Marine Corps. I understand that the availability of training ranges— 

and we have a big one on the Big Island called Pohakuloa Training 

Area (PTA). Could you share your thoughts on the importance of 

training ranges, especially as we rebalance to the Asia-Pacific? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can, and thanks for that question. 

In two previous assignments, I was involved in what we describe 

broadly as the Pacific laydown. One of the critical elements as we 

reviewed the laydown was to ensure that we had sufficient ranges 

where we can do the kind of combined arms integrated training 

that allows our Marine air-ground task force that are forward deployed to be successful in combat. 

It would not be an overstatement to say that training ranges, the 

opportunity to actually develop the skills of integrating combined 

arms, are inextricably linked to our success on the battlefield. 

Senator HIRONO. We were told that the Marine Corps spends 63 

cents on the dollar to pay for benefits, health care, and other personnel costs. There is a challenge to balance readiness and personnel costs. If confirmed, how would you come up with this balance of personnel costs with readiness while meeting the mission 

requirements of the Marine Corps? What would be the questions 

you would ask to come up with this balance? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, first, I view all the money that we 

spend in the Marine Corps as going towards marines. Some of it 

is in the form of compensation. Some of it is in the form of ensuring 

that they have good equipment. Some is in the form of good training. Some goes to ensuring that the infrastructure that supports 

marines and their families is in good shape and provides the services necessary. 

I think your question is how would I balance it. I would consider 

each of those variables to deliver an effect, and that effect is that 

we would have the force in readiness that you expect your Marine 

Corps to be. 

Senator HIRONO. I think the sense is that 63 cents of every dollar 

going to personnel costs is not necessarily the kind of balance that 

you would want to have in order to make sure that your readiness 

needs are met. 

821 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there’s no question. In fact, our procurement account, to put it in some context, is about 8 percent in 

the current fiscal year environment. Clearly in a perfect world we’d 

have more money going towards modernization and we’d have more 

money going towards infrastructure. Those are the two bill-payers 

right now as we focus on assuring that our marines that are in the 

fight today and forward deployed have good equipment, have good 

training. The bill-payers have been our modernization account as 

well as our infrastructure account. 

Senator HIRONO. My best to you in achieving the balance and 

meeting the needs of the marines. 

I want to turn to our force structure, because there are going to 

be a lot of questions asked about what is the appropriate mix for 

the Active and Reserve units in the Marine Corps. Other Services 

are having to ask those questions themselves. With the challenges 

to personnel drawdowns in the Marine Corps in the future, what 

do you believe will be the best approach to achieve a balanced force 

in both the Active and Reserve components of the Marine Corps? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks for that question. I actually 

believe that over the past decade we’ve validated both the size, the 

organizational construct, as well as the method of employment of 

our Marine Reserve Force. I wouldn’t see any significant changes. 

I do know that the Commandant now has chartered a group to review the capabilities and capacities inside our Marine Forces Reserve to make sure that we’ve properly incorporated the lessons 

learned, to make sure that we have the right mix of forces inside 

the Marine Forces Reserve. 

But we feel pretty comfortable that the overall size of the Marine 

Forces Reserve right now is just about right. 

Senator HIRONO. This committee spent a lot of time on the issue 

of sexual assault in the military. You responded to a series of questions that have been put to you regarding the Marine Corps’s efforts in combating sexual assault in the military and you noted 

that, while you’re satisfied that you’re proceeding ahead, but there 

is much more work to do. 

I wanted to ask you, based on the changes that we’ve made to 

the statutes that apply and the Marine Corps’s own efforts, how 

would you determine the success or the effectiveness of what the 

Marine Corps is doing to, one, prevent sexual assaults and, two, 

when they occur to take appropriate action and prosecute? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Senator. I think the areas where I’m 

encouraged even from the outside looking at the Marine Corps and 

what they’re doing is the changes in the command climate as it 

pertains to sexual assault. Both the surveys that have been conducted have indicated increased trust and confidence in Marine 

Corps in reporting sexual assault, confidence in the chain of command that proper action would be taken. The other statistic that 

is encouraging to me is the numbers of reported sexual assault, 

which, while it’s increased, I think we all recognize that historically 

it has been underreported and so increased reporting over the last 

couple years is a positive step in the right direction. 

But with regard to your question, when will I be satisfied, I’ll be 

satisfied when there’s no sexual assaults. The effect that we’re trying to achieve in establishing the command climate, the effect we’re 

822 

trying to achieve in ensuring that we have bystander training and 

bystander intervention, the effect we’re trying to achieve to ensure 

that all marines are treated with dignity and respect, the results 

that we expect out of all of that and the results we expect from decisive leadership is that we won’t have sexual assaults in the U.S. 

Marine Corps, and I think that’s when we’d be satisfied. 

Senator HIRONO. That’s very commendable. My question had to 

do with, of course, as you go toward that goal of zero sexual assaults how are you going to make sure that that is happening and 

that you will continue to have a commitment to see those changes 

come about? I assume your answer is yes, that you will have a continuing commitment. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I will. I think probably the key piece 

from my perspective is that it’s all about commanders, it’s all about 

leaders, it’s all about standards, and it’s all about holding people 

accountable to those standards. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hirono. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, to you and your family, you’ve done an extraordinary job in Afghanistan and every other assignment that you’ve 

taken on. The President chose wisely to make you the next Commandant of the Marine Corps and I think you will get an overwhelming vote in a bipartisan fashion because you’ve deserved it 

and you’ve earned it. 

To your family, thank you for your service to our country. 

As to Afghanistan: do you agree with me if there is a failure to 

get this election closed out in an acceptable fashion, where somebody acknowledges defeat, and there’s a failure to form a unity government thereafter, no amount of American troops is going to make 

Afghanistan successful? 

General DUNFORD. I agree with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. As a matter of fact, if that doesn’t happen I’d 

be the first one to say to get the hell out of there. To the Afghans, 

in case you’re listening, that’s my view. 

Now, let’s assume for a moment that that can all be accomplished, and I think it will. Two lanes: CT, train, advise, and assist, 

numbers. You’re okay with the numbers in 2015, is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. I am, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. You’re okay with the regional approach being 

in place in 2015? 

General DUNFORD. I am, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s talk about what we lose over time. We 

have about 7,000 Special Forces types in the mix right now on the 

ground today? 

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. By January 2015, it will be 3,000? 

General DUNFORD. Approximately, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. By January 2017, it will be basically zero. 

General DUNFORD. It isn’t determined at this time, Senator. 

823 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, it is. It is determined at this time. The 

President has announced he will go to a security cooperation force 

in 2017, or did I miss—— 

General DUNFORD. No. Roger, Senator. If you’re talking the—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I’m talking about the plan in place. I’m not 

talking about changing the plan. I’m talking about the plan the 

President has adopted. 

General DUNFORD. No, I understand. 

Senator GRAHAM. You agree it will be virtually zero? 

General DUNFORD. Certainly close to that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Now let’s look at the threats we face. Do 

you see by the end of 2016 any reasonable possibility that the al 

Qaeda types—al Qaeda core, al Qaeda-affiliated groups, other 

groups that live and thrive on the Afghan-Pakistan border—will be 

contained in such a fashion as to not represent a threat to the 

Homeland? Is that remotely possible? 

General DUNFORD. I don’t see it at this time, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Your view is that the threat by the end of 2016 

that we face to the Homeland is going to be extinguished—I could 

not agree with you more—but our CT forces will be, unless somebody changes this. Do you agree that’s a high-risk strategy, given 

the likelihood of the threat? 

General DUNFORD. Unless it’s mitigated by Afghan or Pakistan— 

Senator GRAHAM. On paper it’s a high-risk strategy? 

General DUNFORD. From a CT perspective. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. Now let’s talk about the delta to be filled 

in from 7,000 to zero. If you had to grade the Afghan-Pakistan 

working relationship on anything, particularly counterterrorism, 

what grade would you give it? 

General DUNFORD. Today a D. 

Senator GRAHAM. D. The difference between our counterterrorism capability and the Afghans’, how would you rate that difference? 

General DUNFORD. Significant. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. Okay. 

Now let’s talk about the other aspect, train, advise, and assist. 

You were asked to evaluate the plan on paper and you said if everything works out well that by 2017 on the train, advise, and assist lane we might be okay? 

General DUNFORD. It would be possible to develop sustainability 

by that time. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. There’s a lot of assumptions that have 

to be made and met; is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. There are, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Some of these assumptions are pretty enormous, right? 

General DUNFORD. There are significant assumptions. 

Senator GRAHAM. To hit all the gates, would it be akin to kicking 

a 65-yard field goal? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it would be difficult to hit all the 

gates exactly as we’ve outlined. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think it would be kicking a 65-yard field goal 

into the wind. But that’s just my two cents’ worth. 

824 

Now, this is on paper. My statement to the committee is that on 

paper there’s a disaster in the making, to our Homeland and to losing all the gains we’ve fought for inside of Afghanistan, by drawing 

down too quick and not being able to help the Afghans in a reasonable fashion. If it does change, I will be the first to applaud the 

changes. But if it doesn’t change, it is a complete absolute disaster 

in the making. 

As to political reconciliation between the two candidates, are you 

optimistic that this will work out? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I am. 

Senator GRAHAM. Are you optimistic that the Afghan people will 

continue to want us around? 

General DUNFORD. I’m absolutely optimistic about that. 

Senator GRAHAM. There is absolutely no reason for any American 

politician to believe that we’re not welcome to stay in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, both presidential candidates, as well 

as the vast majority of the Afghan people, support the bilateral security agreement and a continued U.S. presence. 

Senator GRAHAM. If al Qaeda is able to regenerate in this region 

and our CT presence goes down to virtually zero, would you expect 

an attack on our Homeland in the next 5 years? 

General DUNFORD. Certainly based on the intent of the enemy, 

I would, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. A lot’s at stake, right? 

General DUNFORD. There is, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, as we go into evaluating our force structure, what have we done to the Marine Corps in your opinion if we 

get back on the road to sequestration? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, as I’ve looked at what sequestration 

does to the U.S. Marine Corps, at a force level of 175,000 it really 

gets to the issues that we’ve talked a little bit about here this 

morning. It’s an inability to balance the need to be ready for today’s crises with the requirement to meet at least a minimum 

threshold of investigation for modernization, infrastructure, and 

other programs that support marines. 

I think you’re really on a path, without overstatement, to use 

General Meyer’s comment from the 1980s, you’re really on a path 

to a hollow force. If you have sequestration and you maintain a 

Corps of 175,000 marines, I don’t think there’s any question about 

that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me that Congress will 

have done more damage to the Marine Corps than any enemy that 

you could face on the battlefield? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there isn’t an enemy that has had 

much success against marines, so I would agree with that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you for your great service. I look forward to seeing you in the future. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you very much for your service. You’ve done extraordinary work. I’ve had the privilege of being with you in Afghanistan and have seen first-hand what you’ve done. 

825 

To your family, the time he spent there helped change the world 

for us. We know you missed him, but we were very grateful to have 

him there with us. 

Sir, as Commander of the Marine Corps, this past year—we are 

so impressed by what you’ve done and you’re going to get an overwhelming vote. As you walk in, in the last year we lost 45 marines 

to suicide. I think this is a critical issue. I hope you do. I was wondering your intention to work with your team to try to make a difference here. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks for that question. I will be 

personally engaged in it, as I was as the Assistant Commandant 

for 2 years. I think it’s fair to say that at the beginning of the war 

our understanding of mental health was rudimentary at best, and 

over the past decade we’ve learned quite a bit. I think one of the 

more encouraging things is the National Intrepid Center of Excellence that’s been established up at Walter Reed to do really some 

great research into both traumatic stress and traumatic brain injury. In terms of mental health, we’ll certainly be engaged in that. 

With regard to suicide, of course, there’s other factors, because 

most of those suicides aren’t related to the combat experience. But 

we’ll do all we can to ensure that we have leadership that recognizes the warning signs of suicide. We’ll make sure that we have 

proper medical care available when those warning signs are identified, that the leadership gets marines to proper help. We’ll continue 

to work at what is in effect a scourge. 

Senator DONNELLY. One of the most disheartening things we saw 

in Iraq was that a lot of the generals who we had worked with, 

helped train, were replaced by, in effect, pals of the people in 

charge. As we look at Afghanistan, we’re trying to learn from the 

lessons that we’ve seen in Iraq. We have Abdullah Abdullah, 

Ashraf Ghani. Obviously, President Karzai still has a great amount 

of influence. 

Obviously we think we have the right generals in place in the Afghan army now. Do you feel confident they can avoid that same 

type of situation, where talent and ability is taken out so they can 

have friends, in effect, come in? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, thanks. Confident, but not complacent, in that particular area. Both candidates have made a commitment to pick the right people in the security ministries. I thought 

one of the more encouraging things that came out of this weekend’s 

discussion is that, of the many areas they talked about in terms 

of the political track and the accommodation they would make, one 

of them was to stabilize the leadership inside the ministry of defense and ministry of interior during the transition. They both recognized the importance. 

I know from Dr. Ghani, he was my counterpart during transition 

last year, and he certainly recognizes the importance of selecting 

the right leadership inside the security ministries. I’ve had enough 

conversations with Dr. Abdullah’s people where I think he recognizes the same. 

It won’t be that we won’t have a patronage network that has an 

effect on appointments inside of Afghanistan. That will be the case 

for some time to come. But what we have today in the form of the 

corps commanders, brigade commanders, and other key leaders and 

826 

also inside the ministry of interior with our police leadership is a 

recognition by senior leadership that, while they may have some 

other factors besides merit that would cause people to be selected 

for senior leadership positions, there has to be a foundation of 

merit for each of the appointments that are being made. 

I’m encouraged by that, but that’s certainly something that the 

next Government of Afghanistan is going to have to continue to 

emphasize and focus on. 

Senator DONNELLY. You had a very specific assignment with Afghanistan, and now as Commandant of the Marine Corps, obviously all over the world. As you look at this, through your experience, where do you see the biggest threat to our country right now, 

the greatest source of potential danger to an attack here and where 

it would be coming from? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think the greatest challenge today 

is the numbers of failed and failing states that provide sanctuary 

for extremists who create a threat to this country. Of course, it’s 

not any longer geographically focused. It’s focused in all those 

areas where the enemy has the space within which to plan and 

conduct operations against the West. I think that’s certainly at this 

point the most critical near-term threat to our security. 

Senator DONNELLY. Have you seen any indication—for instance 

a group like ISIS, they’re involved in Iraq. But is it, from everything you’ve seen, do they still cast an eye toward over here, toward coming after us as well? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think the very change that they 

made to their name indicates the risk that’s greater than Iraq. 

They’ve changed their name to the ‘‘Islamic State’’ and declared a 

caliphate inside of Iraq, which clearly reflects aspirations for operations globally. 

Senator DONNELLY. To go back to Afghanistan for a second, we’ve 

seen Pakistan pushing harder in the tribal areas, trying to go after 

a lot of the Pakistan Taliban. How has the effect of that been on 

Afghanistan? Has it pushed more over into the region that you’ve 

been in charge of or that you’ve been working with the Afghans on? 

Or how do you see that long-term having an effect? 

General DUNFORD. Near-term, Senator, we have seen a large 

number of refugees. The estimates are probably between 70,000 

and 100,000 refugees. We’re also certainly aware of enemy forces 

moving from Pakistan into Afghanistan. We’ve had a disruptive effect on the extremists that were in North Waziristan. There’s a 

positive effect as well as those challenges of the enemy moving to 

Afghanistan. 

I think what remains to be seen and what we’re watching very 

closely is, what will Pakistan do as these groups start to move back 

towards North Waziristan. We have a commitment from our Pakistani counterparts right now that they will not allow groups like 

Haqqani to come back, and they’ve taken visible measures to destroy the infrastructure of Haqqani in Miranshah and North 

Waziristan as a whole. But frankly, that’s something that I think 

is to be determined, and we’re watching that very closely. I think 

it’s going to require that we stay engaged with our Pakistani counterparts to ensure that that does not happen again. 

827 

Senator DONNELLY. One final question is, what do you think will 

be your greatest challenge in inheriting this position as you move 

forward? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think the greatest challenge is 

going to be to continue to provide a ready force of marines to the 

country today and at the same time make the kinds of decisions 

and the kinds of investments that ensure that we have a ready Marine Corps tomorrow. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thanks again. You’ve been an inspiration to 

not only marines, but to our servicemembers all over the country, 

and to us as well. We’re very, very proud of your work. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Donnelly. 

Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you for being here, thank you for your testimony, 

and thank you for your service to our country. 

I’d like to ask you questions about several national security 

threats across the globe, starting with what you and Senator Donnelly were just discussing, which is the situation with ISIS. Right 

now in Iraq, roughly how many Americans are on the ground in 

Iraq, both civilian and military? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I’m not sure how many exactly. I 

think it’s somewhere short of a thousand. 

Senator CRUZ. How would you characterize our ability right now 

to ensure the safety of those Americans? 

General DUNFORD. I’m confident that General Austin, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, who I speak to several 

times a week, has taken proper measures to provide force protection for those forces and in the environment that he’s put them in 

he’s made sure that there’s measures to mitigate the risk to the 

force. Certainly a dangerous combat environment, always a risk. 

But I’m also confident in General Austin’s leadership that he’s done 

all he can to mitigate that risk. 

Senator CRUZ. What about the American civilians who are in 

Iraq? What is our ability to ensure their safety? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, at this time I’m not aware of our capacity to actually provide security for the civilians that are in Iraq, 

unless you’re talking about U.S. Government civilians, in which 

case they’re certainly part of the whole comprehensive force protection plan on the ground for both our diplomatic personnel as well 

as our uniformed personnel. 

If you’re talking about people that are there in a private capacity, then I think our ability to provide security to them on a dayto-day basis is fairly limited. 

Senator CRUZ. To what extent is our ability to maintain security 

both for civilian and military personnel dependent upon the Shia 

militia that are there? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think the security conditions in 

Iraq as a whole are absolutely linked to the political process and 

the viability of the government. That’s, I think, how we get in the 

situation we’re in. It’s a manifestation of a lack of inclusive government and political challenges that spilled over into security. I think 

828 

it shows the inextricable link between stability and security as well 

as viable governance. 

Senator CRUZ. General, I will share with you I am deeply concerned about our ability to protect the Americans who are there, 

particularly as the situation seems to be deteriorating and we find 

ourselves between two implacable foes: ISIS, who are so extreme 

that they were thrown out of al Qaeda, which is a pretty remarkable feat, and who have expressed an open desire to attack and kill 

Americans; and on the other side the Islamic Republic of Iran, who 

likewise are rabidly anti-American and have the same desire. 

What nobody wants to see is a reprise of what we saw in the late 

1970s, another hostage situation of Americans who find themselves 

in an incredibly hostile situation where enemy forces capture 

Americans and hold them hostage. Number one, I would certainly 

urge you and urge your colleagues in the military to continue 

doing—and I know you’re endeavoring to do this—but to continue 

doing everything humanly possible to prevent against such a situation and to do everything we can to mitigate the risks of it spiraling out of control so that American citizens are not caught between two warring factions and trapped in a place from which we 

have no ready exit. 

General DUNFORD. I’ll do that, Senator. 

Senator CRUZ. Let’s shift to a neighboring country which is very 

much involved right now in what’s happening in Iraq, and that is 

Iran. In your military judgment, how significant of a threat would 

you characterize the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapon 

capability? 

General DUNFORD. I think that would be extraordinarily significant, Senator. 

Senator CRUZ. In your judgment, what would happen if Iran 

were to acquire nuclear weapons capability? 

General DUNFORD. I think they would use the leverage of nuclear 

weapons to meet their expansionist objectives and destabilize the 

region. 

Senator CRUZ. If, God forbid, Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons and if, God forbid, they were to make the second decision of 

being willing to use those weapons, based on the radical religious 

extremism that motivates so-called Supreme Leader Khamenei and 

the mullahs in Iran, in your view how much damage could Iran do 

to America or her allies if Iran was willing to use nuclear weapons 

to maximize the damage? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it would be hard for me to envision 

how they may use those or what might happen. But I can say that 

clearly that would be a threat to our vital national interest, which 

is the protection of the Homeland and the people of the United 

States. 

Senator CRUZ. If Iran, say, were able to use a nuclear weapon 

launched from a ship offshore of the United States into the atmosphere to create an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) on the eastern seaboard, what would the impact be to this country? 

General DUNFORD. Any nuclear weapon that would go off in the 

United States would have a horrific effect on people. 

829 

Senator CRUZ. An EMP in particular, how would that impact the 

civilian population if an EMP were detonated in the atmosphere 

above the eastern seaboard? 

General DUNFORD. An EMP would essentially shut down our 

communications network, would be one of the more significant outcomes of EMP. 

Senator CRUZ. Would there be additional impacts in terms of 

transportation, in terms of distribution of food, in terms of distribution of basic means for survival? 

General DUNFORD. All those things, Senator, are impacted by our 

ability to communicate. My expectation is that all of them would 

be adversely affected. 

Senator CRUZ. Let me finally shift to Afghanistan. How significant would you characterize the threat right now of radical Islamic 

terrorism both in Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. We are managing the threat to the Homeland 

now as a result of the pressure that we’re putting on the networks, 

so I believe we are at moderate risk as a result of the extremists 

in the region. But again, that risk is assessed in the context of the 

force that we have on the ground inside of Afghanistan and our efforts with Pakistan. 

Senator CRUZ. The final question on exactly that point: If we proceed with the plan that the President has laid out in 2016 to drop 

our forces to roughly a thousand in and 2017 to drop it to zero, 

what will be our capacity to engage in counterterrorism to limit the 

threat from the radical Islamic terrorists in that region? 

Senator CRUZ. The tools that we’ll have available to deal with or 

to conduct counterterrorism in 2017 in the scenario that you’ve outlined is the will and capacity of Pakistan and the will and capacity 

of Afghanistan. 

Senator CRUZ. We would be dependent on their forces and unable 

on our own to defend ourselves from terrorist threats emanating 

from that region? 

General DUNFORD. Again, Senator, if you’re projecting a threat 

and you’re projecting that we would not have any forces there, then 

we would be dependent on Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Senator CRUZ. That is a deeply troubling scenario. 

Thank you, General. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cruz. 

Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, General. I want to talk a little bit about gender integration. If confirmed, what is your goal with regard to combat integration into the Marine Corps? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I’m aware of the direction that Secretary Panetta put forth in February 2013. Since that time General 

Amos has outlined a deliberate, a responsible, and a measured approach. There’s analysis ongoing right now that would inform any 

recommendations for an exception to the direction that Secretary 

Panetta outlined in February 2013. I’m aware that that recommendation would have to be made by January 2016, and any 

recommendation that I make would be informed by the research 

that’s being done and by the impact on the combat effectiveness of 

the Marine Corps. 

830 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Is the research that you’re referring to the 

review of creating gender-neutral standards that reflect the physical needs of the task? 

General DUNFORD. That is a piece of the research that’s being 

done, Senator. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. If confirmed, do I have your commitment to 

keep my office apprised of how that review is going and what the 

time line for integration is and whether there will be any exceptions? 

General DUNFORD. You do, Senator. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. What phase of implementation is the Marine Corps in now? What is your expected time line? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would have to get back to you. I 

know that we’re prepared to make a recommendation by the deadline of January 2016. I know the Marine Corps has just initiated 

an integrated task force that will in part inform any recommendation for exceptions to policy. I believe we’re on path to make a recommendation by the deadline, but I’m not sure—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I thought the deadline was to actually have 

integration completed by January 2016. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my understanding was that the recommendation was due by January 2016. But I’d ask to take that 

for the record and get back to you. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Okay, that would be helpful. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Please see attached letter. 

831 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Turning to Afghanistan, we’ve seen a few 

difficulties with regard to the Afghanistan presidential election. Do 

you believe that’s going to have an impact in our post-2014 planning, and if so how? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, if we did not have successful political 

transition, an effective political transition, it would have a significant impact on our post-2014 presence. But I would quickly add 

that right now, in the wake of the agreement made over the weekend and where we are in fact, I’m happy to report that we started 

collecting ballots yesterday and our forces are currently supporting 


717ful5.eps
832 

the auditing of all the ballots, that we’re on a path to have effective 

political transition and, frankly, in a positive sense, effective political transition I think will increase the prospects of our success in 

a post-2014 environment. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. What do you think the major challenges 

will be for the next commander of the ISAF? 

General DUNFORD. The major challenges, Senator, will be to address the capability gaps that the Afghan security forces have right 

now. First is what I broadly describe as ministerial capacity. That’s 

the ability for the ministries to do the planning, the programming, 

the budgeting, the acquisition necessary to support tactical-level organizations, so that they have the spare parts and the ammunition 

and the pay and those things that will allow them to be sustainable. 

The second capability gap that exists is in the aviation enterprise, and we still have a couple years to go before we complete the 

aviation enterprise. We have a number of pilots now that have 

been trained, a number of aircraft that have been delivered, but 

the overall enterprise requires additional work. 

The third capability gap is the intelligence enterprise. Much of 

the intelligence that the Afghans have had available to them over 

the last few years has been a result of the coalition providing them 

with that intelligence, and so their organic capability to produce 

and have intelligence drive operations is another capability gap 

area. 

Then the fourth area that I think my successor would have to 

focus on would be their special operations capability, which obviously are inextricably linked as well to that aviation and intelligence capability. 

Those four areas are the areas I think of primary focus for a 

post-2014 presence. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Do you think there’s any lessons we could 

learn from Iraq in terms of our withdrawal there that we could 

apply to Afghanistan? Is there any lessons learned that we should 

be mindful of? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do. I think there’s a significant lesson learned, and that is the need to do a transition to develop sustainable Afghan forces and to oversee the establishment of effective 

governance, as opposed to withdrawal. I think our withdrawal in 

Iraq did not allow us the time to develop sustainable Iraqi forces 

and to provide the environment within which effective governance 

would develop. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Now, in terms of our drawdown in Afghanistan, what do you think the impact will be on the region? Do you 

think it will undermine our ability to do antiterrorism work? Will 

it undermine any other broader security interests? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, in 2015, the force that we have envisioned that will conduct both train, advise, and assist for the Afghans as well as counterterrorism operations, I think actually will 

have a stabilizing effect on the region. Most of the regional actors, 

probably less Iran have encouraged the United States to maintain 

a presence in 2015, and I think the size force that we have in 2015 

will allow us to accomplish those two tasks that I just outlined. But 

833 

they will also contribute to a positive psychology in the region and 

a confidence that Afghanistan will not deteriorate. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. What are your largest concerns in the region right now? 

General DUNFORD. The single biggest concern I have right now 

is probably the sanctuary that al Qaeda has in—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. In Iraq? 

General DUNFORD.—in Pakistan. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Oh, in Pakistan. 

General DUNFORD. When you talk the region writ large—I of 

course, Senator, was focused strictly on Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

But clearly, if you look at the region as a whole you’d have to be 

concerned with what’s going on in Iraq today as well as what’s 

going on in Iran. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. With regard to Pakistan, what would your 

recommendations be? Pakistan has been so difficult to work with. 

They really have been reluctant to do missions we’ve asked them 

to do, to crack down on terrorist networks when we find them. 

They’re very unwilling partners. What would your recommendation 

be to the President on how best to address the terrorism concerns 

in Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I don’t think any of us have an easy 

answer to Pakistan other than continued engagement and engagement based on support that we would provide with regard to specific conditions that have to be met. I do believe that Pakistan recognizes that extremism is an existential threat to Pakistan. I think 

they lack the capacity to deal with that threat completely. I don’t 

personally see any alternative other than continued engagement 

with Pakistan to assist them in dealing with those problems inside 

of Pakistan, as well as to contribute to regional stability. 

I think we’ve seen what we did in the 1990s when we isolated 

Pakistan in the wake of the Pressler amendment, which is the 

other alternative we could take at this particular time, and I don’t 

think the results of our disengagement in the 1990s would cause 

us to want to go back to that. I think continued engagement would 

be what I’d recommend to the President, with a very clear framework within which we would have a partnership. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Just a couple questions for me. In terms of the counterterrorism 

after 2016, you indicated we would be dependent upon Afghanistan 

and Pakistan in that area. Does that answer not assume that none 

of the thousand or so people that we would have at the embassy 

would have a counterterrorism mission? Does it not also assume 

something else, which is that we would not have a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) capability in that area? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity to 

clarify on the 1,000. As I made an effort to say earlier, unsuccessfully, some number of those would be involved in counterterrorism, 

I would assume. But more importantly, those thousand that might 

be envisioned in the embassy in 2017 would also be contributing 

to Afghan security force counterterrorism capacity. One of the key 

tasks after 2017 would be continued development of those key eleVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00841 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
834 

ments of their special operations capability, the aviation and intelligence being two of the more important. 

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of the possibility of CIA capability in 

that area? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know what the CIA 

would envision. We certainly know that unless there was a different laydown of forces in Afghanistan in 2017, they wouldn’t have 

any significant bases in Afghanistan in 2017, I think is the President’s plan right now. 

Chairman LEVIN. But some of the thousand could be assisting 

them in a counterterrorism effort if they so decide? 

General DUNFORD. If we have joint special operations capability 

there, I’d assume, Mr. Chairman, that they’d be operating in a collaborative manner with other elements of the government. 

Chairman LEVIN. That could be part of the thousand as well? 

General DUNFORD. Part of the thousand could be in support of 

the other elements of the U.S. Government, yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. There was a statement Senator McCain heard 

from some Afghan military leaders that they feel abandoned by us. 

That’s not the sense I got from Afghan military leaders. I got the 

sense that, obviously, they’d like us to stay for a much longer period of time, but they are very grateful, number one; and that they 

feel that they have a capability going forward. I sense some sense 

of disappointment, obviously. We’re their brothers in a lot of ways, 

but that they also feel a strong and capable as well. 

How would you describe the Afghan military leaders in terms of 

their feelings towards us? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the announcement some were obviously disappointed that it was not longer. But 

the truth of the matter is that on a day-to-day basis right now the 

Afghan leadership is a lot more focused on the security challenges 

in 2014 and working with us to develop sustainable forces in 2015. 

But it’s not a topic of routine conversation with our Afghan counterparts right now. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’re talking about the military counterparts? 

General DUNFORD. I’m talking about the military counterparts 

specifically, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Yes, Senator King. 

Senator KING. A quick question and an observation, Mr. Chairman. 

The question is: General, how long were you in Afghanistan? 

How long was your assignment? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I’m still there. I’ve been there 18 

months. 

Senator KING. When would you, if confirmed, when would you 

make the transition to Commandant? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think probably sometime this fall. 

Senator KING. Mr. Chairman, this is a thought that’s crossed my 

mind several times during these hearings, but it’s really come into 

focus today. This man is one of the most capable, intelligent, proven successful commanders that I’ve ever worked with or seen. More 

importantly, he has tremendous experience in Afghanistan. Any 

management system that arbitrarily moves somebody out of a job 

835 

after 19 months, given what he knows and experience—and I’m 

sorry to his good wife; don’t worry, I’m going to vote to confirm 

him—that’s nuts. That’s a crazy management system. 

This is one of the most important jobs in our country right now 

and we’re taking a guy who really knows how to do it and has 

learned how to do it and the experience goes away. I just think this 

is something the committee ought to talk about. I understand the 

goal of the military of turning over assignments and not having 

people get stale and those kinds of things. But to get to the level 

that he’s gotten to and with his leadership, I just think it’s a management mistake to arbitrarily say, okay, no matter how well 

you’re doing, no matter what your experience is, we’re going to 

move you on. I just want to make that observation. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. I think that’s intended to be and 

is, obviously, a huge compliment to you, General Dunford. While 

probably your predecessor, we could have said the same for him because he also had that huge experience which we didn’t want to 

lose, nonetheless you came and provided amazing capability and 

competence. Your successor will as well in Afghanistan. We have 

confidence in General Campbell. 

General Amos has been a fabulous Commandant and his successor, who I’m looking at right now, will add another extraordinary chapter to Marine Corps history. 

What you’re raising, Senator, is a fascinating issue. I don’t have 

an easy answer to it other than so far we’ve seen a succession of 

amazing commanders in Afghanistan. I won’t say we’ve lucked out 

because I think the system has produced those. It’s not a matter 

of luck; it’s a matter of real, intense effort to have a system which 

produces great leaders, and we’ve done that. 

It’s sort of ironic, however, to be looking at a general who has 

done an amazing job—and you and I have seen that first-hand— 

in Afghanistan. But on the other hand, I have at least the next set 

both in Afghanistan and as the Commandant. I think this amazing 

capability, competence, loyalty, patriotism to our country will continue. I know your experience in Afghanistan is not going to be lost 

in any event. It’s going to be very much available. 

What Senator King is raising is a very interesting issue, which 

perhaps in other circumstances we would have to say, well, 

whoops, is this really what we want? I think in the current circumstance at least, as Senator King says, he’s going to be voting 

very affirmatively for you, for your confirmation, as I think every 

member of this committee will. The compliment, though, which he 

just paid to you is intended to be exactly that, which I think all 

of us feel about you. What he just said is a huge compliment to you 

and to the Marine Corps, and also to the system which produces 

leaders such as yourself. 

We thank you, your family. We look forward to a confirmation 

which is timely so that General Amos, who deserves a great successor, will have one quickly and General Campbell can take his 

job, his responsibility, over. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

836 

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 

USMC, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms 

have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution 

of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I don’t see a need for modifications at this time. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. N/A. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. Section 5043 in title 10 of U.S.C. clearly prescribes the duties and functions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Commandant, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy, leads the recruiting, 

training, organizing, and equipping of the Marine Corps to support military operations by combatant commanders. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Commandant is responsible for advising the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do 

you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I have served in a variety of key service and joint assignments within 

the Department of Defense that I believe qualify me to perform the duties of Commandant. I have commanded marines from the platoon-level to the Marine Expeditionary Force and currently lead our joint and coalition partners as the Commander 

of both U.S. Forces and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. 

In addition to these leadership assignments, I have served as the Vice Director of 

Operations for the Joint Staff, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to study and seek to better understand the 

full range of issues affecting the Marine Corps and our broader national security. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. The major challenges that will confront the next Commandant of the Marine Corps include supporting marines at war in Afghanistan, ensuring the Marine 

Corps remains ready to immediately respond to any other crisis or contingency, all 

while balancing the need to modernize for tomorrow’s crises and contingencies. It 

will be particularly important that the next Commandant ensure that the Marine 

Corps maintains and continues to develop the expeditionary and amphibious capabilities the Nation requires of its Corps of Marines. This will require making difficult decisions in a period of fiscal austerity. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of 

Naval Operations, and Congress to ensure that the Marine Corps is properly 

resourced to meet both today’s and tomorrow’s challenges. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize the need to maintain high quality, welltrained marines and a high state of readiness. The first priority will be to provide 

837 

those marines in harm’s way with all that they need to fight and win. I will also 

continue to build on the superb foundation established by the current and former 

Commandants in professional military education, junior leader development, wounded warrior programs, and family readiness. I will also prioritize the development 

and fielding of capabilities that will ensure that the Marine Corps remains a relevant, naval, expeditionary force-in-readiness in the context of the 21st Century 

Strategic Landscape. 

ROLE OF THE MARINE CORPS IN COUNTERTERRORISM

Question. What do you see as the Marine Corps’ role in countering the threat of 

international terrorism? 

Answer. The Marine Corps is the Nation’s crisis response force and stands ready 

to counter the full spectrum of threats to national security including international 

terrorism. Our perennially forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), as 

well as our newly-developed Marine Air/Ground Task Forces-Crisis Response 

(MAGTF CR), stand ready to counter terrorist threats and respond to instances of 

terrorist attack. In addition to these formations, the Marine Corps Security Force 

Regiment is a dedicated security and anti-terrorism unit that supports high-value 

naval units and facilities. It maintains specially trained Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Teams (FAST) in a high state of readiness to prevent or respond to terrorist 

threats worldwide. 

The Marine Corps also provides the U.S. Special Operations Command with highly trained Critical Skills Operators from the Marine Corps Special Operations Command that are uniquely capable of supporting the fight against international terrorism. 

Question. What role do you envision for the Marine Corps in homeland security 

and homeland defense? 

Answer. The defense of the Homeland begins on far shores as part of a collaborative interagency defense-in-depth. The primary contribution of the Marine Corps 

is to protect the homeland by being forward deployed and forward engaged to shape 

the environment and respond to crises before the Homeland is threatened. 

When and if directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the Marine Corps 

uses its Active Duty and Reserve Forces to rapidly respond to natural disasters or 

other threats against the homeland 

Question. If confirmed, do you plan any major changes to Marine Corps 

warfighting doctrine? 

Answer. If confirmed, I do not plan any major changes to Marine Corps 

warfighting doctrine. I believe it is fundamentally sound. I do believe we can and 

should make evolutionary changes as we internalize the lessons learned from the 

last decade of crisis and contingency response and as changes occur in the strategic 

landscape. 

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. The United States has been negotiating a Bilateral Security Agreement 

(BSA) with Afghanistan which would provide the framework for some U.S. forces 

remaining in Afghanistan after the end of 2014. President Obama has announced 

that, assuming a BSA is signed, the United States is prepared to retain 9,800 troops 

in Afghanistan after the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission 

ends in December of this year. The President also announced that by the end of 

2015, that U.S. military presence would be reduced by roughly half, and by the end 

of 2016, the United States would draw down its military personnel in Afghanistan 

to a normalized Embassy presence with a security assistance office. 

Do you support the President’s decision on a continuing presence for U.S. forces 

in Afghanistan after 2014? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you support the pace of the drawdown of the U.S. military presence 

in Afghanistan between December 2014 and the end of 2016, as announced by the 

President? 

Answer. Yes, with an understanding that we should continue to validate the assumptions and assess the conditions on the ground as the drawdown takes place. 

Question. Should the Marine Corps be supporting such a sustained deployment of 

forces if we continue a presence in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes. 

838 

MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC), is a 

subordinate component command to the U.S. Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM) established in 2005. 

What is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and growing 

MARSOC, and what do you consider to be the principal issues that you would have 

to address to improve its operations? 

Answer. I believe that MARSOC has become a highly effective and fully integrated part of the Special Operations Command. I have personally observed 

MARSOC’s significant contribution to the campaign in Afghanistan. Also, the feedback I have received from leadership within the special operations community has 

been uniformly positive. Improving MARSOC will require continued emphasis on 

screening, training, personnel assignment policies, equipping, and the integration of 

MARSOC within the special operations community, with the MAGTF, and with 

other conventional forces. 

Question. The Marine Corps has a primary military occupational specialty for enlisted marines trained as special operators allowing these personnel to remain in 

MARSOC for their professional careers. 

Do you believe officers should have a similar opportunity as enlisted marines to 

serve the duration of their military career in MARSOC rather than rotating through 

the command as they do currently? 

Answer. I understand that the Commandant and Commander, SOCOM are in 

agreement that the current model of Marine officer assignment is not optimal. A 

joint Marine Corps-SOCOM assessment is in process to develop a more effective 

model. If confirmed, I will fully support that assessment and work with SOCOM to 

develop the most effective officer assignment policy. 

EFFECTS OF DEPLOYMENTS ON READINESS

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of readiness of the Marine 

Corps? 

Answer. I believe the Marine Corps has demonstrated its readiness over the past 

decade in responding to contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and to a wide range 

of crises across the world. That said, I know our home station readiness has been 

degraded as we have appropriately prioritized the readiness of those Marines who 

are forward deployed. 

Question. In your judgment, are combat operations in Afghanistan adversely affecting the readiness or retention of marines on active duty and in the Reserve component? 

Answer. The Marine Corps has preserved readiness of deploying and next-to-deploying units. This includes units and marines deploying to Afghanistan. I am not 

aware that combat operations in Afghanistan have adversely affected readiness or 

retention. Furthermore, Marine units assigned to Afghanistan have arrived prepared and ready for the mission. 

Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities for maintaining readiness in 

the near term, while modernizing the Corps to ensure readiness in the out years? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize resetting Marine Corps equipment from the 

wear and tear of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and restoring home station 

readiness. While near term readiness will remain the priority, I will work with the 

Secretary of the Navy and Congress to ensure that the Marine Corps is adequately 

resourced to deliver a ready Marine Corps tomorrow. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. What do you consider to be the key to the Marine Corps’ success in recruiting the highest caliber American youth for service and retaining the best personnel for leadership responsibilities? 

Answer. The key to Marine Corps’ recruiting success is the continued focus on 

finding highly qualified young men and women who are seeking the challenge of 

serving their nation. Continued access by recruiters to high schools and colleges not 

only assures the opportunity to engage a diverse and quality market, but also a 

market with the proven mental abilities to serve in technically challenging fields. 

Another key component of our recruiting success is the Marine Corps’ image of 

smart, tough, elite warriors. The time proven intangible benefits of service, pride of 

belonging, leadership, challenges, and discipline are what we offer. Those attributes 

are what allows us to remain America’s Force in Readiness. 

839 

Question. What steps do you feel should be taken to ensure that current operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact the overall readiness, recruiting and retention, and morale of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. Effective recruiting will require that we continue to maintain a high 

quality and properly resourced recruiting force. I also believe sustaining an operational tempo of at least 1:2 will ensure that our readiness, retention, and morale 

remain high. 

Question. What is your assessment of current recruiting standards, particularly 

DOD-wide criteria for tier-one recruits, and their propensity to accurately predict 

minimal attrition and future success in military service? 

Answer. Existing DOD standards enable the Service to find young men and 

women who want to meet the challenge of becoming a U.S. marine. If confirmed, 

I will continue to monitor our recruiting and retention efforts. 

Question. What impact, if any, do you believe the Department’s proposals aimed 

at slowing the growth of personnel and health care costs will have on recruiting and 

retention in the Marine Corps? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully review the compensation reforms and the 

effects on recruiting and retention. 

Question. Do you believe that if Congress does not support these proposals, the 

resultant pressure on training and modernization resources could begin to harm retention? 

Answer. I believe that compensation reforms must be informed by the fundamental requirement to maintain our crisis response and warfighting capabilities. If 

confirmed, I will carefully review the compensation reforms and the effects on training, modernization, and retention if Congress does not support the reforms. 

MILITARY COMPENSATION

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of military compensation? 

Answer. The Marine Corps is meeting our recruiting and retention goals, and the 

current compensation package produces the force we need. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the adequacy of military compensation to ensure we recruit and retain the highest quality Marines. 

Question. What recommendations would you have for controlling the rising cost 

of personnel? 

Answer. Given the fiscal constraints on the Department of Defense, I believe that 

the compensation proposals put forward by the President in the 2015 budget request 

are reasonable measures to slow the growth in military compensation in order to 

strike a balance between personnel costs, training, and modernization that protects 

readiness. 

Question. Do you personally support the administration’s compensation and 

health care proposals? 

Answer. Yes, I support these proposals. They slow the rate of compensation 

growth which is necessary for the Marine Corps to maintain readiness under current budget constraints. This budget achieves the necessary and appropriate balance 

in compensation, training, equipment, and modernization. It sustains the recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel needed to defend our Nation, while 

still providing quality compensation and health care benefits to our servicemembers. 

If confirmed, I will continually assess compensation and health care to ensure that 

we continue to maintain the balance between compensation, training, equipment, 

and modernization. 

Question. As the Marine Corps has the highest percentage of servicemembers who 

leave after their first term, what is your assessment of the adequacy of compensation and benefits available for non-career servicemembers? 

Answer. By design, the Marine Corps is a young Service and purposefully retains 

fewer servicemembers at the first reenlistment decision point than the other Services. Today, we are meeting all of our recruiting and retention goals and the quality 

of the force is extraordinary. Based on that fact, I believe compensation and benefits 

for non-career servicemembers is adequate. 

EDUCATION FOR MARINES

Question. An important feature of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is the ability of careeroriented servicemembers to transfer their earned benefits to spouses and dependents. 

What is your assessment of the effect of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on recruiting and 

retention of marines? 

Answer. I believe that the Post-9/11 GI Bill positively contributes to recruiting 

and retaining high quality marines. 

840 

Question. In your view, what has been the effect of the transferability option on 

retention and career satisfaction of marines? 

Answer. According to Marine Corps surveys, for all non-retirement eligible marines who were required to make a fiscal year 2015 reenlistment decision, 53 percent specifically indicated that the ability to transfer their benefits was an influence 

to stay in the Marine Corps. 

Question. How important do you believe tuition assistance benefits are to young 

marines, and what trends do you see in the Marine Corps’ ability to pay for such 

programs at current levels over the FYDP? 

Answer. Post-secondary education is an important part of individual marines improving their personal and professional development. Encouraging well-qualified 

marines to utilize any and all resources to better themselves via education and 

training is part of the Marine Corps ethos. This leads to better marines and in turn 

better citizens. I understand that the Marine Corps is adequately funded to provide 

tuition assistance benefits to well-qualified marines. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to current eligibility criteria for tuition assistance? 

Answer. I believe the Marine Corps is properly executing the tuition assistance 

program and I have no recommendations to change current eligibility criteria. 

ASSIGNMENT POLICIES FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Department in January 2013, rescinded the policy restricting the 

assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging 

in direct ground combat operations, and gave the military Services until January 

1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception 

to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. 

The Marine Corps continues to develop gender-free physical and mental standards 

for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards. 

If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will be decisively engaged in the development of genderfree standards for all military occupations to ensure that we continue to field the 

most capable Marine Corps possible. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on military requirements? If so, what steps would you take to ensure that such decisions 

are made on this basis? 

Answer. Yes, and all of my recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense, and Congress will be made in that context. 

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE

MARINE CORPS AND COUNSEL FOR THE COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Marine Corps allocated between 

the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant and the Counsel for the Commandant? 

Answer. The Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (SJA 

to CMC) is the senior uniformed legal advisor to the Commandant and Headquarters, Marine Corps staff and agencies. In particular, the SJA to CMC supervises and manages the practice areas of military justice, operational law, civil and 

administrative law, legal assistance, and ethics. 

As detailed in Department of the Navy policy (SECNAVINST 5430.7Q), the General Counsel of the Navy provides the Marine Corps with legal advice in the following areas: acquisition law, business and commercial law, real and personal property law, civilian personnel and labor law, fiscal law, environmental law, intellectual 

property law, ethics, and Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act law. 

Question. Who has responsibility for providing legal advice on military justice 

matters in the Marine Corps? 

Answer. The SJA to CMC is responsible for delivering military justice advice to 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Headquarters Marine Corps. In all other 

commands throughout the Marine Corps, judge advocates, exercising the same independence required by the law, are the only individuals responsible for providing 

legal advice to commanders on military justice matters. 

Question. What is the role, if any, of the Counsel for the Commandant in the duty 

assignments of Marine Corps judge advocates? 

841 

Answer. The Counsel for the Commandant has no formal role in the duty assignments of judge advocates. The assignment of Marine Corps judge advocates remains 

with the Commandant. 

Question. What is your view of the need for the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to provide independent legal advice to the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps? 

Answer. It is essential that the SJA to CMC provide independent legal advice to 

the Commandant. The SJA to CMC’s legal advice is independent because he is not 

subject to evaluation or supervision in the content of his advice from anyone other 

than the Commandant. Fundamental to the duty to provide independent advice is 

the need for that advice to be provided without any form of interference by others. 

Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Marine Corps judge advocates 

to provide independent legal advice to Marine Corps commanders? 

Answer. Like the SJA to CMC, Marine Corps judge advocates at all levels must 

be able to provide—and commanders must receive—independent advice on the exercise of convening authority. Part of what gives Marine Corps judge advocates the 

ability to provide timely and accurate independent advice is their service as unrestricted line officers. The common culture and philosophy, gained through shared 

professional background, experiences and hardships, builds trust, credibility, and 

context between commanders and their judge advocates, improving both the quality 

and independence of that advice. 

GENERAL OFFICERS

Question. At the request of the Secretary of Defense, Congress included a provision in the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 

that designated up to 324 general and flag officer positions as joint duty assignments that are excluded from the limitation on the number of general and flag officers in each Service, and specified the minimum number of officers required to serve 

in these positions for each Service. 

What is your view of the merits of this provision and its impact on the Marine 

Corps? 

Answer. This provision allows expanded assignment opportunities for Marine 

Corps’ general officers and the exemptions provided under section 526 provide increased flexibility for the Marine Corps and the Department to meet steady-state 

and emergent requirements. The ‘‘Joint Pool’’ enables us to satisfy the intent of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 by improving 

unification, cooperation, and coordination between the Services and the combatant 

commanders in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations. 

Question. What impact has the implementation of this provision had on joint officer assignments of Marine Corps general officers? 

Answer. While the number of assignment opportunities has not increased by an 

appreciable number, the strategic approach to joint officer resource management has 

increased the variety of opportunities available. This has improved the quality of 

officers in the joint community. This ensures the development of well-rounded, more 

effective senior officers, which benefits the Department of Defense and Marine 

Corps. 

Question. In your view, does the Marine Corps have statutory authority for a sufficient number of general officers to meet mission requirements of the Corps and 

joint requirements? 

Answer. Yes, the numbers currently authorized are adequate for our current and 

future obligations and aligned with our future force structure plans. 

Question. The results of recent promotion selection boards for brigadier general 

have shown that a number of best qualified officers have not completed all requirements (i.e., joint professional military education, or joint tours of duty) before consideration by selection boards. 

What factors do you consider most important in the difficulty experienced by field 

grade Marine Corps officers in satisfying joint requirements for promotion? 

Answer. With the establishment a few years ago of the experience path to attain 

Joint Qualification, there is little difficulty for our best performing field grade officers to be fully qualified for consideration for selection to brigadier general. 

Question. Do you think that in today’s operational environment that these requirements for promotion to O–7 should be modified? 

Answer. No. 

Question. What steps are being taken to ensure that officers who are competitive 

for promotion to general officer rank are able to fulfill all joint education and experience requirements? 

842 

Answer. Field grade officers are assigned to Joint Duty assignments and to Joint 

Professional Military Education (JPME) II producing schools (War Colleges) based 

on their performance. Our most competitive officers are provided those assignments. 

FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. Marines and their families in both the Active and Reserve components 

have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational 

deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Marine Corps, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are 

addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal constraints? 

Answer. The most important issues are providing timely and accurate communication to our marines and their families while properly resourcing the support functions on our bases and stations. If confirmed, I will ensure the Marine Corps remains committed to providing marines and families with a comprehensive and effective community based support system. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including active duty and Reserve personnel, retirees, and their eligible family members. 

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Marine Corps MWR 

programs, particularly in view of the current fiscal environment and, if confirmed, 

are there any improvements you would seek to achieve? 

Answer. Our greatest challenges are the fiscal realities of sequestration. If confirmed, I will ensure that we sustain priority programs that support the health, welfare, and morale of our marines and families. I will also maintain a dialogue with 

our marines and families to ensure that our MWR programs adapt to meet our highest priority needs. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continue to be of great 

concern to the committee. 

If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs 

and policies for the Marine Corps to prevent suicide and increase the resiliency of 

marines and their families? 

Answer. Suicide prevention is a leadership issue. If confirmed, I am committed 

to continue to set the climate to eradicate the stigma of getting help for this behavioral health issue. Our leaders must be engaged and knowledgeable of resources 

available to address this issue. We must also know our marines and be alert to the 

signs that they need help. The resiliency of our marines and their families will remain a priority. 

WOUNDED WARRIOR REGIMENTS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their service and the Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, 

successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis 

over the past several years, many challenges remain. 

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Marine Corps Wounded Warrior Regiments in facilitating the treatment and management of wounded, ill, and 

injured marines? 

Answer. I am extremely proud of the Marine Corps’ focus on Wounded Warrior 

Care. As Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, I carefully tracked the 

progress of our Wounded Warrior Regiment, and if confirmed, will continue to expect the best care for our wounded, ill, and injured marines. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources you would 

pursue to increase service support for wounded marines, and to monitor their 

progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. If confirmed, caring for our wounded, ill, and injured marines and sailors 

will remain one of my highest priorities. During my time as the Commanding General of I MEF and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, I worked with our 

843 

Wounded Warrior Regiment leadership to ensure services were readily available to 

support our marines. 

If confirmed, I will seek counsel from the Medical Officer of the Marine Corps and 

other medical experts to ensure that we are proactively identifying symptoms, and 

addressing psychological health needs. I view this as a continuing commitment from 

the Marine Corps to its marines. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The fiscal year 2013 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual 

Assault in the Military reflects that reports of sexual assault in the Marine Corps 

increased by 86 percent from fiscal year 2012 to 808 reports of sexual assault in 

fiscal year 2013. 

What is your assessment of this report? 

Answer. The DOD Annual Reports on Sexual Assault provide us with comparative 

snapshots that allow us to measure progress across years. I will carefully assess the 

report and be prepared to provide further input to the committee. 

Question. What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults in the Marine Corps? 

Answer. Sexual assault has no place in our Corps. Sexual assault not only has 

a long-lasting effect on the individual victim, but it also erodes unit readiness and 

command climate. The Commandant has placed particular emphasis on this issue 

and put measures in place to eliminate sexual assault. If confirmed, I will build on 

the current foundation. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Marine Corps sexual assault prevention 

and response (SAPR) program? 

Answer. I see positive progress and indicators that the Marine Corps SAPR Program is going in the right direction. However, I also believe that there is still much 

work to do. We must continue to increase reporting and decrease prevalence. We 

need to emphasize prevention to include focusing on potential offenders, implore all 

marines to be active and responsible bystanders, and integrate the SAPR Program 

with other aspects of behavioral health. Marines must all work together to create 

an environment in which crimes of misconduct are not tolerated in any form. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. Protecting the victim of sexual assault is imperative. Though unrestricted 

reporting provides a bridge to offender accountability, I respect that some victims 

do not want an investigation about these intensely personal details. Restricted reporting is a vital resource for these marines, who may not otherwise come forward 

to access advocacy, medical, mental health, and legal services. I believe that giving 

victims access to the services they need is vital, regardless of how they report the 

crime. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. I believe that the chain of command is invaluable to victims of sexual 

assault. Furthermore, commanding officers are responsible for setting positive command climates that not only help prevent the crime of sexual assault but that also 

provide a safe environment where victims feel confident coming forward to report. 

Without that initial trust and faith in their chain of command, victims may not report. 

The chain of command is absolutely critical in creating a climate that is non-permissive to sexual assault. The chain of command also ensures that victims are in 

a safe and non-retaliatory environment and facilitates access to all supportive services. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy and Marine Corps 

resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need? 

Answer. I understand that the Marine Corps provides and continues to expand 

each of these services, which aims to encourage more victims to participate in the 

military justice process. However, I fully understand that the true measure of the 

effectiveness of these programs is how well they meet the needs of the victim. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Marine Corps has taken to prevent 

additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. I believe the Marine Corps has taken the right steps to combat sexual 

assaults within its ranks, however much work remains. I am committed to confronting this crime. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the 

Navy and Marine Corps to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

844 

Answer. I am encouraged by the progress the Marine Corps has made in many 

areas of victim response, but the goal must be to further improve these services so 

that more victims stay engaged in the process and, as a result, offenders are held 

accountable. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. I believe the role of the commander is central to sexual assault prevention within the military. The commanding officer of every unit is the centerpiece of 

an effective and professional warfighting organization. They are charged with building and leading their team to withstand the rigors of combat by establishing the 

highest level of trust throughout their unit. 

Commanding officers are responsible for setting and enforcing a command climate 

that is non-permissive to sexual assault, a climate in which the spirit and intent 

of the orders and regulations that govern the conduct of our duties will be upheld. 

There are a number of leadership styles, but the result of any of them must be a 

group of marines and sailors who have absolute trust in their leaders. Trust in the 

commander and fellow marines is the essential element in everything we do. Developing this trust, dedication, and esprit de corps is the responsibility of the commanding officer. They do this by setting standards, training to standards, and enforcing standards. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. Removal of commanders’ convening and disposition authority will adversely affect good order, discipline, and combat effectiveness. The commander is responsible for everything the unit does and fails to do. This responsibility cannot be 

overstated. When a unit enters combat, success is directly dependent on the commander’s ability to enforce his or her orders and standards. The commander’s authority to refer charges to court-martial, especially for the most serious offenses 

such as sexual assault, is essential. 

Judge advocates outside the chain of command do not share the commander’s responsibility for the unit, and have different priorities when determining what action 

to take in a particular case. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Marine Corps? 

Answer. I am encouraged by the progress the Marine Corps’ has made, however 

there is much work to be done. If confirmed, I plan to sustain the momentum and 

progress of Marine Corps’ SAPR efforts, and ensure that all marines are committed 

to preventing this crime. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent legislation concerning sexual assault on the capability of Marine Corps commanders to prosecute 

sexual assault cases, including cases where prosecution is declined by civilian prosecutors? 

Answer. I believe enhancing the commanders’ ability to prosecute sexual assaults 

is a step in the right direction. I am also encouraged by the provisions granting victims of sexual assault the right to participate more fully in judicial proceedings 

against their assailants. I expect that these new rights will make victims of sexual 

assault more willing to participate in sexual assault prosecutions. Greater participation by victims will likely enable Marine Corps’ commanders to refer more cases to 

court-martial because better evidence will support such referrals. 

RECAPITALIZATION

Question. The Marine Corps intends to concurrently recapitalize several of its 

front line systems. The MV–22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and the Joint Strike Fighter are both scheduled to be in production at the same time. 

Do you believe that these production plans are realistic in light of the demands 

on resources imposed by maintaining current readiness? 

Answer. I understand the current production plans are realistic. I believe these 

platforms are vital to support marines on the battlefield. 

Question. Do you believe that these modernization programs will survive unless 

Congress amends the Budget Control Act to eliminate or reduce the effects of sequestration for fiscal year 2016 and beyond? 

Answer. I understand that sequestration will increase risk across all Marine 

Corps’ modernization efforts. 

Question. Is it your understanding that MV–22 readiness rates in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the U.S. have achieved desired levels? 

845 

Answer. In my current assignment I have been incredibly pleased with the performance of the MV–22. They have demonstrated readiness levels sufficient for combat missions in Afghanistan. I understand that readiness rates in the United States 

are slightly lower, but sufficient to meet our requirements. 

Question. In your view, will the MV–22 be sustainable over time at an acceptable 

cost? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will seek to continue the trend in reduced operating 

costs. 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES

Question. What are your views regarding the joint development and acquisition 

of Army and Marine Corps equipment? 

Answer. In my experience, the Marine Corps and the Army collaborate whenever 

our mission profiles converge. From a business perspective, collaboration leverages 

significant Army fiscal, manpower, and test resources in the refinement of operational capabilities requirements and the research, development, and acquisition of 

technical solutions to meet those requirements. Long-term benefits include lower average unit costs for both Services. 

Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should have a role in synchronizing Army 

and Marine Corps requirements and service programs? 

Answer. The Army and Marine Corps Board (AMCB) works at every level to make 

sure both Services collaborate on best practices. I believe the AMCB provides sufficient oversight to synchronize requirements and programs. 

Question. What programs would you consider to be candidates for joint program 

development for the Army and Marine Corps? 

Answer. I do not have any recommendations to provide at this time. 

MODERNIZATION OF AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES

Question. The Marine Corps’ current concepts for modernization of its amphibious 

capabilities includes ships, ship to near-shore or shore connectors—such as the 

LCAC—and armored amphibious combat vehicles. Modernization across these systems is complex, technically challenging, and potentially unaffordable given the 

budget environment today and for the foreseeable future. 

What is your assessment of the current capability of amphibious maneuver and 

assault systems in the Navy and Marine Corps? 

Answer. Marine Corps organic amphibious maneuver and assault capability and 

the preponderance of general support infantry mobility is provided by our Assault 

Amphibian Battalions equipped with 40-year old AAV–7A1 Assault Amphibious Vehicles. Without significant additional modifications and enhancements, these vehicles do not provide adequate force protection or lethality and will increasingly suffer 

declining readiness as subcomponents succumb to declining manufacturing sources 

and obsolescence. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize development and acquisition among needed capabilities for sea basing, connectors, and armored amphibious assault and tactical mobility ashore to achieve your vision for a full spectrum force? 

Answer. The development and acquisition of a full spectrum naval expeditionary 

force involves the planning and programming of naval expeditionary capabilities 

across both Navy and Marine Corps planning and programming accounts. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our Navy counterparts in defining the Marine 

Corps’ seabasing requirements. I will personally review the complete portfolio of capability development to ensure we balance our investments to reflect the Marine 

Corps’ role as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness. 

Question. In your view, what is necessary to ensure that modernization of the amphibious force—ships, connectors, and vehicles—is achievable and affordable in the 

near and long term? 

Answer. The key ingredient for achieving an effective and affordable amphibious 

force is the continued close collaboration between the Marine Corps and the Navy. 

I believe that we must continue development, planning, and programming of amphibious force required capabilities to meet assigned war plan tasks, as well as support the training and employment of forward deployed and rotational Amphibious 

Readiness Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units. 

Specifically, to modernize our vehicle capabilities we must pay careful attention 

to capacity requirements and avoid over-investing, while paying particular attention 

to the intended performance and environmental requirements that will drive vehicle 

design. 

846 

Question. In your view, will projected reduction in Marine Corps end strength, if 

implemented, reduce the Navy and Marine Corps’ requirement for LPD–17 class 

ships? At what level of reduced Marine Corps end strength would the Marine Corps 

have insufficient forces to fill up a 12th LPD? 

Answer. The amphibious warfare ship requirement is based on forward presence 

and rotational Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) 

as well as to deploy and employ the Assault Echelons (AEs) of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). The 12th LPD is critical in meeting these requirements. 

I haven’t seen any proposals that would relieve the Marine Corps of either requirement. 

AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT VEHICLE

Question. The Navy/Marine Corps amphibious assault capability today includes a 

large number of self-deploying amphibious assault vehicles (AAV–7) to carry infantry ashore, and a smaller number of small vessels called connectors that can ferry 

other vehicles, such as tanks and artillery, and supplies from ships to shore. 

The Marine Corps has recently changed its plans for development of a next generation armored combat vehicle. Instead of investing in development of a new selfdeploying amphibious assault tracked combat vehicle, the Marine Corps intends to 

reduce technical and fiscal risk by acquiring a wheeled combat vehicle that would 

have to rely on connectors to get from ship to shore or near shore. This would place 

additional demand on connectors that are expensive and consume a lot of space inside amphibious ships. Indeed, the Navy is today not procuring enough amphibious 

shipping to meet existing amphibious assault requirements, much less buying more 

ships to provide additional connecter carrying capacity. 

Unless there is a large increase in the number of connectors procured to carry 

wheeled infantry fighting vehicles ashore, and an increase in the number of ships 

to carry those additional connectors, it would appear that this plan will result in 

a diminished amphibious assault capacity. 

Do you support the Marine Corps’ decision to develop and field a wheeled armored 

vehicle to replace the AAV–7, the current amphibious assault vehicle? 

Answer. I support the decision to develop and field a wheeled armored vehicle as 

an interim step in modernizing our tactical ship to shore mobility. 

Question. Will the Marine Corps decision to forego a self-deploying amphibious assault tractor lead to a diminution of amphibious assault capability? If not, why not? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would not support forgoing an amphibious, self-deploying 

assault capability. I don’t believe the current program reflects that. 

Question. In your view, where does armored amphibious assault fit in the set of 

capabilities required for to field a credible amphibious operations capability? 

Answer. The likelihood of operations in the littorals requires a continued focus on 

the Marine Corps’ responsibility to be organized, trained, and equipped for amphibious operations. I believe that armored amphibious assault capabilities are integral 

to our ability come from the sea. 

Question. Without self-deploying armored amphibious assault vehicles for Marine 

Corps infantry, what advantages would Marine Corps forces have over Army forces 

for conducting amphibious assaults in the future? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the development of armored amphibious assault vehicles. 

AMPHIBIOUS FLEET REQUIREMENTS

Question. In the spring of 2010, Secretary Gates made several public statements 

in which he appeared to question the need for and size of the Navy’s amphibious 

fleet in future defense plans and budgets. 

What is your view of the need for and size of the Navy’s amphibious fleet? 

Answer. The Navy and the Marine Corps have determined that 38 amphibious 

warships is required to support an assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. 

Question. What are the alternatives if the amphibious fleet is allowed to decline 

in size or capabilities? 

Answer. I am not aware of any alternatives that have been developed to mitigate 

the requirement for an amphibious fleet. 

F–35 REQUIREMENTS

Question. The Marine Corps has stated that its F–35 requirement is 420 aircraft. 

The total number of F–35s planned for the Department of the Navy is currently set 

at 680. 

847 

Do you believe that the current plan for 680 aircraft can fully accommodate the 

needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps? 

Answer. Yes. My understanding from a previous assignment as the Assistant 

Commandant is that 680 F–35s meet the Navy and Marine Corps requirement. 

NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT

Question. The DDG–1000 program was initiated to fill the capability gap for naval 

surface fire support. The original requirement for 24 to 32 DDG–1000 ships, each 

with two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems, was reduced to 12 ships, then to 10 ships, 

then to 7 ships, and finally to 3 ships. 

In your view, does the total Navy program, with this significant reduction in the 

number of DDG–1000 destroyers, meet the Marine Corps’ requirement for naval 

surface fire support? 

Answer. With the truncation of the DDG–1000 program a maximum of six 155mm 

Advanced Gun Systems will be available for service in the fleet when all three ships 

are fully operational at the end of the decade which will not support the doctrinal 

capacity requirements of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. 

Question. What other capabilities would you rely upon to help meet naval surface 

fire support requirements? 

Answer. In the absence of adequate naval surface fire support capability and capacity, the Marine Corps will likely rely on aviation delivered fires to mitigate the 

gap. 

JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, such as the 

Joint Tactical Radio System and the Joint Strike Fighter? 

Answer. I support joint development where common capability gaps exist. Working with other Services is, and always has been, a major element of the Marine 

Corps overall Research and Development (R&D) and Procurement strategy. Our limited budgets demand that we adhere rigorously to the well-established Department 

of Defense (DOD) hierarchy of materiel alternatives. If we cannot find a solution to 

our materiel needs in the commercial marketplace, we always look next to take advantage of investments that other Services, DOD components, or our foreign partners are making. This reduces our need to spend R&D dollars on unilateral efforts, 

and it gives all participants involved with joint programs the opportunity to reduce 

unit procurement costs, and ultimately, life-cycle operation and maintenance costs. 

The end result is realized in the form of commonality and affordability across the 

Services making it much easier to share sustainment resources such as training, 

maintenance equipment, and supplies. 

Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the services to conduct more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and unmanned systems? 

Answer. Yes. Encouraging joint development begins with collaboration of requirements during the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process 

and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This is a key element of fostering joint development among the Services. 

Question. If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend implementing more joint program acquisition? 

Answer. Within the Department of Defense, the enforcement mechanisms are already in place through the JROC which plays an important role in harmonizing the 

Services warfighting requirements and ensuring that joint program opportunities 

are fully examined. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commandant of the Marine Corps? 

Answer. Yes. 

848 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

POST-2014 COUNTERTERRORISM AUTHORITIES

1. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, the President has said there will be a

counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan performed by our counterterrorism forces 

after 2014. The ability to conduct military operations such as the ability to take direct action when required, use information operations to shape the battlefield, and 

execute cyber operations is critical to the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations. The authorities must give our military forces the ability to conduct such operations so they match the operational environment in order to be effective. It appears that Afghanistan will be an area of active hostilities in part due to the scope 

and scale of Taliban and al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan after 2014. Do you 

agree? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. Afghanistan will remain a very active area of hostilities, 

at least through 2015. 

2. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what authorities do you believe will be required, suitable for the expected operational environment, to effectively accomplish 

the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan in 2015? 

General DUNFORD. At the unclassified level, I believe that we will continue to 

need authorities that allow our forces to rapidly strike al Qaeda and those who are 

operating with al Qaeda in Afghanistan. We will also need sufficient authorities to 

quickly strike those who threaten our forces in Afghanistan, as well as authorities 

to assist Afghan forces, where we have the capacity to do so and where our assistance is required to avoid an Afghan defeat. 

3. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, if you were given authorities similar to what

is now used in Somalia or Yemen, in your professional military opinion, how severely would that limit the effectiveness of your counterterrorism (CT) mission in 

Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Afghanistan is a unique operational theater, with an al Qaeda 

presence and an active, nationwide insurgency that continues to claim the lives of 

United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Afghan 

servicemembers and civilians. The nature of the mission here, as well as the threat, 

requires operational authorities that are tailored for this operational environment, 

including authorities that facilitate rapid response to threats as they arise. Proper 

authorities are critical for effective CT operations and force protection. 

POST-2014 AFGHANISTAN THREAT

4. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, do you think al Qaeda and the Taliban will

remain a presence and a threat in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region after 2014? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

5. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, do you believe al Qaeda and its affiliates

will reestablish a safe haven in eastern Afghanistan if we withdraw our forces too 

quickly? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS

6. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, on May 27, 2014, President Obama announced there will be 9,800 U.S. troops post-2014 (if the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed), half of that by the end of 2015, hundreds by end of 2016 (like Iraq). 

849 

Post-2014 missions are going to be train, advise, assist, and counterterrorism. The 

President said ‘‘ . . . America’s combat mission will be over by the end of this year.’’ 

What do you think ‘‘end of combat mission’’ means? 

General DUNFORD. After 2014, the United States will not conduct direct combat 

operations against the Taliban. United States and coalition personnel will train, advise, and assist the Afghan Security Institutions and the Afghan National Security 

Forces. However, we will continue to conduct counter-terrorism operations against 

al Qaeda and those who facilitate al Qaeda in order to protect the Homeland. We 

will also conduct operations to protect the force while it is in Afghanistan. 

7. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, will we still do close air support—and if so, 

under what conditions—for U.S. troops, for partner troops, for Afghan troops? 

General DUNFORD. The United States will still conduct close air support to protect 

coalition and U.S. Forces. The decision to support Afghan troops is pending. 

8. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, out of the 9,800 troops at the beginning of 

2015, how many do you expect will be doing force protection and support; and how 

many will actually be training, advising, and assisting? 

General DUNFORD. The exact numbers won’t be known until we complete the 

NATO force generation process in the early fall. Approximately 20 percent of the 

force will be doing train, advise, and assist. The balance of the force will conduct 

counter terrorism, force protection, and support. 

9. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, troop numbers in Afghanistan at the end of 

2016 are supposed to look like troop numbers in Iraq at the end of 2011—‘‘a normal 

embassy presence’’. What do you think that means? 

General DUNFORD. A normal embassy presence will consist of a Defense Attache ́

Office and a Security Cooperation Office under a Senior Defense Official operating 

under the authority of the Chief of Mission with a military reporting chain through 

the U.S. Central Command. 

DETAINEES

10. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what is the plan to deal with the disposition of the approximately 38 non-Afghan national detainees you said in your advance policy questions continue to be detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Most of the remaining non-Afghan detainees will be processed 

for repatriation to their home countries, transferred to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for prosecution, or transferred to another competent 

jurisdiction, subject to the receipt of appropriate security and humane treatment assurances. These repatriations and transfers will be conducted in accordance with 

previously established law and procedures which require State Department receipt 

of written assurances from the receiving country, transfer approval by the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, and congressional notification. 

11. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what happens if we capture additional nonAfghan nationals before the end of 2016, who is responsible for their detention and 

interrogation? 

General DUNFORD. If U.S. forces capture a non-Afghan national in 2015 or 2016, 

I anticipate the captured individual will be turned over within 72 hours to Afghan 

officials for transfer to the Afghan National Security Justice Center in Parwan 

where the individual will be detained and investigated with a view towards prosecution in the Afghan criminal court at the Justice Center in Parwan. I further anticipate the U.S. advisors on the Rule of Law Development Team (who will be working 

at the National Security Justice Center at Parwan) will have ready access to relevant information obtained by the National Directorate of Security through their investigation and any interview of the detainee. 

GEORGIA

12. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, Georgia has been the largest per capita 

and non-NATO troop contributor to the NATO International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) mission, and is committed to support this mission until the end of the 

operations in Afghanistan. Moreover, Georgia is ready to continue engagement in 

the Resolute Support Mission with up to 750 soldiers. What is your assessment of 

the cooperation we enjoy with the country of Georgia in the defense field? 

850 

General DUNFORD. The support NATO and the United States has received from 

the Republic of Georgia throughout the ISAF mission, along with the pledged support to the Resolute Support Mission, has been unparalleled. Georgia continues to 

be one of the most flexible and willing NATO partners and has become a security 

exporter in the truest sense of the word, contributing forces to NATO missions 

wherever needed. As we transition from ISAF to the Resolute Support Mission, 

Georgia will be one of the largest troop-contributing nations. They have proven 

themselves to be stalwart partners to the United States, committing forces to combat operations abroad even when their own homeland came under attack in 2008. 

13. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, I understand that the U.S. Marine Corps

has specifically developed an effective and close cooperative relationship with the 

Georgian Armed Forces. More than 11,000 Georgian soldiers have been trained for 

Afghanistan with support of the U.S. Marine Corps, and have participated in the 

ISAF mission. They have served with bravery and distinction, and 29 have lost their 

lives in the line of duty. Considering the commitment of the Nation of Georgia to 

the United States in Afghanistan, and to common Euro-Atlantic security and shared 

values, how can the United States support this nation to ensure that they have the 

capability to defend themselves against potential aggression, in light of recent 

events in Ukraine? 

General DUNFORD. Our Georgian partners have served with distinction in Afghanistan. I understand that in addition to assisting them in preparation for service in 

ISAF, the United States has committed to assisting them in developing capabilities 

that will assist in their nation’s defense. 

14. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, how do we specifically plan to continue and

enhance our defense cooperation with Georgia to boost their defense capabilities? 

General DUNFORD. I believe this question would be best answered by U.S. European Command. 

READINESS AND END STRENGTH

15. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, the current Commandant of the Marine

Corps, General Amos, has testified that the Marine Corps would have difficulty in 

conducting a single major contingency operation as called for by the National Military Strategy should Marine Corps end strength fall to 175,000. It is projected the 

Marine Corps will have 175,000 marines at the end of this Future Years Defense 

Program. How will this impact the Marine Corps’ ability to meet mission requirements? 

General DUNFORD. The President’s budget supports the 175,000 force at high 

operational risk. At this force level, the Marine Corps will maintain sufficient combat units to meet war plan requirements but places additional stress on the force 

to meet steady state global requirements. Any additional cuts due to sequestration 

in fiscal year 2016 with a 175,000 force would negatively impact the Marine Corps. 

Sequestration cuts on a force already deploying at 1:2 would reduce critical training 

and maintenance resources causing additional risk. 

16. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are your readiness concerns?

General DUNFORD. I believe the Marine Corps has demonstrated its readiness

over the past decade in responding to contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and 

to a wide range of crises across the world. The Marine Corps has preserved readiness of deploying and next-to-deploying units. That said, I know our home station 

readiness has been degraded as we have appropriately prioritized the readiness of 

those marines who are forward deployed. 

I will prioritize resetting Marine Corps equipment from the wear and tear of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and restoring home station readiness. While near 

term readiness will remain the priority, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy 

and Congress to ensure that the Marine Corps is adequately resourced to also deliver a ready Marine Corps tomorrow. 

AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT VEHICLE

17. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, after spending billions of dollars on the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the program was terminated due to technology immaturity and affordability. Its follow-on program, the Amphibious Combat Vehicle 

(ACV) has been recently restructured. Now, the Marine Corps plans to use the Marine Personnel Carrier program requirements to define the first increment of the 

851 

ACV program. Additionally, recent press reports question both the need and effectiveness of amphibious assault. Is it time to rethink the need to conduct amphibious 

assault operations? 

General DUNFORD. Since 1990, the Marine Corps has conducted more than 120 

amphibious operations across the range of military operations. Our Nation should 

always retain the capability to place and sustain forces on a foreign shore in a hostile environment. This is what amphibious assault capability provides. The Marine 

Corps will continue to develop our amphibious assault capability to ensure it remains relevant to our national security requirements in the context of the future 

security environment. 

18. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are your views on the requirement 

for the high water speed ACV? 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps’ requirement for a high water speed ACV 

persists, however, despite the best efforts of our combat and materiel developers, 

supported by academia and industry, the Marine Corps concluded that procurement 

of a high water speed ACV would require too many capability tradeoffs to be an acceptable solution at this time. I intend to continue to pursue the most capable, tactical ship to shore mobility possible. 

19. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what is the operational impact to the Marine Corps if this program is deferred for several years? 

General DUNFORD. Delaying the development of an effective vehicle for ship to 

shore mobility will adversely affect the ability of the Marine Corps to effectively 

support the needs of combatant commanders to conduct amphibious operations. 

20. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, the modernization of the amphibious force 

must include the ships, connectors, and vehicles necessary to conduct amphibious 

operations. I am concerned the Marine Corps’ restructured approach to the ACV 

does not meet the needs of the Marine Corps, specifically, we hear about the ACV 

and we hear about amphibious ships. However, I find the third element, ship-toshore connectors, lacking. Do you believe the Marine Corps has sufficient ship-toshore connectors to meet operational needs of an amphibious assault? 

General DUNFORD. I have been briefed that we currently have sufficient ship-toshore connectors to meet combatant commander requirements for forward presence/ 

rotational Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit deployment schedules, war plans, and independent, single-ship deployments. However, within the 

next 2 to 3 years, we may encounter a significant degree of risk as connector inventories begin to drop below levels necessary to fully meet operational requirements. 

I will personally engage on this issue after assuming my new responsibilities. 

21. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, the Marine Corps recently completed a 

year-long study to assess the technical feasibility and affordability of bringing that 

capability to the force. I understand the Marine Corps has restructured or refined 

the ACV strategy. What concerns do you have regarding the ground vehicle industrial base and its ability to meet the Marine Corps ACV requirements? 

General DUNFORD. Industry has been unable to deliver an optimal ACV at an affordable price. I look forward to addressing this challenge after assuming my new 

duties. 

SPECIAL PURPOSE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

22. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force (MAGTF) construct responds to greater demand for multi-role crisis response forces in several combatant commands under the current security environment. The Marine Corps has stood up one unit and Spain will stand up two more 

to follow later this year. Is the Special Purpose MAGTF indicative that the Marine 

Corps does not have sufficient amphibious ships? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. Land-based Special Purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs) mitigate, but do not replace, amphibious shipping. SPMAGTFs improve the forward deployed Marine force posture and provide more flexibility in employing the Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit within each geographic combatant 

command. SPMAGTFs can mitigate the risk of sending less ready units to major 

contingencies by constituting the lead elements of a surge. 

852 

WOMEN IN COMBAT POSITIONS

23. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, the Marine Corps has a very robust model 

to evaluate and obtain metrics for women in combat. The Marine Corps is taking 

a unique approach to integrating women into combat training. What steps has the 

Marine Corps taken to ensure that women will be placed in a gender-neutral training environment in which they can best succeed? 

General DUNFORD. I know that the Marine Corps understands the direction set 

by the Secretary of Defense and it is taking a deliberate, measured, and responsible 

approach to researching, setting conditions, and integrating female marines into 

ground combat arms military occupational specialties and units. This research will 

allow me to be personally and decisively engaged in the development of gender-free 

standards for all military occupations to ensure that we continue to field the most 

capable Marine Corps possible. 

24. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, will you commit to this committee that 

your recommendation will be based solely on the operational capabilities our Nation 

requires of the Marine Corps, and that you will not tolerate lowering standards if 

that would compromise combat effectiveness? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

AFGHAN MI-17 FLEET

25. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, you indicated during the July 17, 2014, 

nomination hearing that we cannot sustain the Afghan Mi-17 fleet without dealing 

with the Russians. On July 16, 2014, President Obama announced a new round of 

Ukraine-related sanctions on a variety of Russian entities, including a number of 

Russian defense firms. The Russians may retaliate in various ways. If the Russians 

choose to cut the United States off from all parts and other support for these Mi17s, what is the backup plan for making sure the Afghans have a viable fleet of 

helicopters? 

General DUNFORD. Sustainment of the Afghan Mi-17 fleet requires access to Russian helicopter OEM (original equipment manufacturer) spare parts and technical 

design authority. If the Russians restrict U.S. access to OEMs, then ISAF will pursue options that allow Afghan access to Russian OEMs without U.S. involvement. 

There would be a significant operational impact for both U.S. and Afghan forces if 

such a situation occurred, and it is not clear how long it would take to identify alternative mechanisms and put them in place. 

DANGER OF NOT RESETTING EQUIPMENT FROM AFGHANISTAN

26. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, from a readiness standpoint, what is the 

danger of not resetting our equipment as it returns from Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Due to the full support of Congress, I understand the Marine 

Corps is nearly 50 percent complete with the reset of ground combat equipment returned to date from Afghanistan. However, a significant amount of reset work remains to be accomplished. In the absence of funding to repair, recapitalize, and replace remaining ground combat equipment, the Marine Corps would face difficulty 

reconstituting the force. 

Currently, over half of nondeployed units have equipment shortfalls as the Corps 

has prioritized equipping and enabling forward deployed forces. This imbalance of 

readiness across the Marine Corps would be further exacerbated if we did not complete our reset requirements. These nondeployed forces serve as an insurance policy—our bench—providing a timely response to unexpected crises or large-scale contingencies. If those units are not adequately equipped, a delayed response to a contingency or other operational requirement is much more likely. 

READINESS OF NONDEPLOYED MARINE FORCES

27. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what are your leading readiness concerns 

for the Marine Corps? 

General DUNFORD. Based on steady state operations and emerging requirements, 

the Marine Corps has accepted risk to both personnel and equipment readiness of 

our nondeployed units to fully support forces forward deployed. Currently, slightly 

853 

more than 55 percent of our nondeployed units are experiencing degraded readiness 

in their ability to execute core missions principally due to equipment and personnel 

shortfalls necessitated by the effort to ensure that forward deployed units are 

manned and equipped. Such realities portray the imbalance of readiness across the 

Marine Corps. This, however, cannot be our long-term solution to the whole-of-force 

readiness: our nondeployed operating forces serve as an insurance policy, providing 

timely response to unexpected crises or large-scale contingencies. 

28. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, how would you assess the readiness of our

nondeployed Marine Corps forces? 

General DUNFORD. I understand that approximately 55 percent of our nondeployed units are experiencing degraded readiness—principally due to equipment 

and personnel shortfalls created by ensuring forward-deployed units are fully 

manned and equipped. 

29. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, the readiness of our nondeployed forces impacts our strategic depth and overall readiness. How can we improve the readiness 

of our nondeployed Marine Corps forces? 

General DUNFORD. I intend to work closely with the Secretary of the Navy, the 

Secretary of Defense, and Congress to ensure we do everything possible to maximize 

the readiness of our nondeployed forces. 

30. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what impact will sequestration have on our

nondeployed Marine Corps forces—and therefore on our strategic depth? 

General DUNFORD. Full sequestration forces Marine Corps end strength down to 

175,000. This size force accepts great risk when our Nation commits itself to its next 

major theater war. It makes significant reductions in aviation and ground combat 

units—further reducing our available infantry battalions in addition to the current 

reductions in critical combat support capability such as artillery, tanks, and assault 

amphibious vehicles. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT

31. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, how is the Marine Corps doing in the effort

to increase sexual assault prevention, reporting, and assistance for victims? 

General DUNFORD. I see progress and indicators that suggest Marine Corps SAPR 

Program is making a positive impact. However, I also believe that there is still 

much work to do. We must continue to increase reporting and decrease prevalence. 

We need to emphasize prevention to include focusing on potential offenders, demand 

all marines be active and responsible, vice passive bystanders, and integrate the 

SAPR Program with other aspects of behavioral health. 

32. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what impact would removing commanders’

convening and disposition authority have on good order, discipline, and combat effectiveness? 

General DUNFORD. In my experience, every issue of good order and discipline in 

the Marine Corps that has been successfully addressed has featured commanders, 

and the chain of command, as the central facet of the solution. I believe that the 

chain of command is invaluable to victims of sexual assault. Commanding officers 

are responsible for setting positive command climates that not only help prevent the 

crime of sexual assault but that also provide a safe environment where victims feel 

confident coming forward to report. Without that initial trust and faith in the complete commitment and ability of their chain of command, victims may not report. 

The chain of command is the mechanism for creating a climate that is non-permissive to sexual assault, for ensuring victims are in a safe and non-retaliatory environment, and for facilitating access to all supportive services. 

Similarly, the chain of command is the primary and most effective mechanism 

through which I will maintain accountability in our sexual assault prevention efforts. Just as I expect you to hold me accountable, so will I hold my subordinate 

commanders accountable for ensuring that all marines are treated with dignity and 

respect. 

POST-2014 FORCE POSTURE

33. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, any deployed force must be able to accomplish its mission and also protect itself. Is there a point at which the number of U.S. 

854 

troops in Afghanistan gets so small that our forces might not be able to fully protect 

themselves and our diplomatic personnel? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH

34. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, the current Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, General Amos, testified that the Marine Corps would have difficulty conducting a single major operation as called for by the National Military Strategy 

should Marine Corps end strength fall to 175,000. Do you agree with that assessment? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

35. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what specific risks would our Nation confront if we reduce the Marine Corps to 175,000 or below? 

General DUNFORD. In order to prioritize emerging demands in a fiscally constrained environment, the Marine Corps accepted risk in major combat operations 

(MCO) and stability operations. The redesigned Marine Corps made tradeoffs in 

some high end capabilities, like armor and artillery, in order to concentrate on crisis 

response. Reducing force structure would increase risk as the requirements determined by the combatant commands would be unfulfilled, and in the event of a MCO, 

the Marine Corps would be unable to react to crises in other parts of the world. 

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

36. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, will the Afghans need U.S. close air support assistance in 2015 and beyond? If so, what is the specific U.S. plan to provide 

that assistance? 

General DUNFORD. The Department of Defense (DOD) is addressing gaps in Afghan Air Force (AAF) close air support capabilities that the Afghan military leadership has recently identified. DOD is in the process of procuring 12 armed MD-530 

helicopters and arming 5 that are already in the Afghan inventory which should be 

available to participate in operations during the next fighting season. These helicopters will enable the AAF to cover the priority close air support requirements 

within areas that are subject to the majority of the fighting. DOD continues to develop the AAF’s fixed wing close air support capability and in January 2015 will 

begin training AAF pilots at Moody Air Force Base. The first of 20 AAF A-29s will 

arrive in Afghanistan in early 2016 to begin conducting close air support missions. 

We will continue to assess ANSF capabilities and shortfalls as part of the train, advise, and assist mission to determine if additional measures are required. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM

JUSTICE CENTER IN PARWAN

37. Senator GRAHAM. General Dunford, the Justice Center in Parwan provides a 

legitimate means for the Government of Afghanistan to handle current and future 

detainees considered to be national security threats. How important is the Justice 

Center in Parwan to the creation of an effective Rule of Law in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. As a component of the National Security Justice Center, the 

Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP) is critical to effective rule of law in Afghanistan 

for a number of reasons. One is that the JCIP serves as a model for the provincial 

criminal courts. The lessons learned at the JCIP are taught to investigators and 

prosecutors from the provinces by Afghan-led training teams coordinated by Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435. A second reason is that it is 

closely partnered with CJIATF 435 and has been since 2010. CJIATF 435’s staff has 

daily contact with the investigators, lawyers, and judges at the JCIP. This close 

partnership creates a symbiotic relationship through which we can monitor cases 

and track developments, and our Afghan partners can request U.S. assistance when 

necessary. A third reason is the JCIP is free from corruption, a major problem for 

many provincial courts. Additionally, JCIP is physically protected by both U.S. and 

Afghan National Army forces, and closely monitored by CJIATF 435 and Department of State/Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs personnel, therefore it is very difficult for outside influences to affect judicial determinations. I expect the JCIP will continue to enhance rule of law development and 

855 

provide legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people into the Resolute Support mission and beyond. 

38. Senator GRAHAM. General Dunford, what impact did U.S. forces have on its

development? 

General DUNFORD. The Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP) was constructed with 

U.S. funding in 2010, and has been operating continuously since then with U.S. 

funding. DOD and Department of State (DOS)/Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) have shared financial, administrative, and 

logistical responsibilities for the JCIP since early 2011. DOS/INL took the lead for 

funding, logistics, training, and mentorship at the JCIP in late 2013, and will maintain funding for the JCIP through 2014. The bulk of INL’s legal training and 

mentorship roles ended in June 2014. We are working closely with the State Department to identify operations and maintenance funding for the JCIP in 2015. We will 

also continue training and mentoring our Afghan partners at the JCIP through the 

Rule of Law Development Team (15 uniformed personnel), CJIATF 435’s follow-on 

force after its End of Mission in October. 

[The nomination reference of Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 

USMC, follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

June 4, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment to Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance 

and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 5043 and 601: 

To be General 

Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC 

Title: 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan; and Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

Assigned: 

10 Feb 13 

Education/qualifications: 

Saint Michael’s College, BA, 1977 

Georgetown University, MA, 1985 

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, MA, 1992 

The Basic School, 1977 

Amphibious Warfare School, 1985 

Marine Corps Command and Staff College Non-Resident, 1992 

U.S. Army War College, 1999 

CMC Fellowship—Johns Hopkins University, 1992 

Capstone, 2005 

Joint Forces Land Component Commander, 2007 

Pinnacle, 2009 

Senior Executive Equal Employment Opportunity Seminar, 2010 

Infantry Officer 

Date of rank: 

23 Oct 10 

Age: 

58 years 

856 

Date commissioned: 

29 May 77 

MRD: 

1 Jun 17 for Service 

Commands: 

Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force; and Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (LtGen: Sep 09–Oct 10) 

Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division (Col: Jul 04–Jun 05) 

Commanding Officer, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Col: May 01–May 03) 

Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division (LtCol: Mar 

96–Jul 98) 

Joint assignments: 

Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen: Dec 12–Feb 13) 

Vice Director for Operations, J–3, Joint Staff (BGen: Jun 07–Aug 08) 

Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chief, Global and Multilateral Affairs Division, J–5, Joint Staff (Col: Jun 99–May 01) 

Service staff assignments: 

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (Gen: Oct 10–Dec 12) 

Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (LtGen: Aug 08–Aug 09) 

Director, Operations Division (BGen: Aug 05–Jun 07) 

Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division (Col: May 03–Jul 04) 

Executive Officer, 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division (LtCol: Jul 95–Mar 96) 

Senior Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (LtCol: Dec 92–Jul 

95) 

Marine Officer Instructor, College of the Holy Cross (Maj: Aug 89–Jun 91) 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, in connection with his nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

3. Date of nomination: 

June 4, 2014. 

857 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

1955/12/23, Boston, MA. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Ellyn A. Dunford (Maiden Name: Ellyn A. Sartucci). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Joseph F. Dunford III; age 26 

Patrick T. Dunford; age 24 

Kathleen A. Dunford; age 22. 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None. 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Member, Marine Corps Association. 

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

Awarded Colonel Donald Cook Award for Citizenship, from St. Michael’s College, 

VT. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. 

This 4th day of June, 2014. 

[The nomination of Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 22, 2014, with the 

recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2014.] 

(859) 

NOMINATIONS OF MR. ROBERT M. SCHER TO 

BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES; 

MS. ELISSA SLOTKIN TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL 

SECURITY AFFAIRS; MR. DAVID J. BERTEAU 

TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS; 

MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK TO BE GENERAL 

COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 

ARMY; ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, 

FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF 

ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:42 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman), 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, 

McCaskill, Udall, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Wicker, Ayotte, and 

Fischer. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets today to consider the nominations of Robert Scher to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; 

Elissa Slotkin to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; David Berteau to be Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness; Alissa Starzak to 

be General Counsel of the Department of the Army; and Admiral 

Harry Harris, Jr., to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM). 

We welcome our witnesses and their families. We extend our 

gratitude to family members who support our nominees during the 

860 

long hours and the countless demands on their careers in public 

service. 

To our witnesses, during your opening statements, please feel 

free to introduce family members and others who are here to support you today. 

Each of our nominees has a record of public service. Mr. Scher 

has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and 

Southeast Asia, a senior member of the Secretary of State’s policy 

planning staff, and in his current role as both the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Plans and the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. 

Ms. Slotkin, we give you and your parents—you are 

Michiganders—a special welcome here today. You have served in 

positions of distinction throughout your time in Government service, including as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, a senior advisor on Iraq at 

the Department of State, and Director for Iraq on the National Security Council staff. 

Mr. Berteau has held a variety of national security-related positions in Government, academia, and in the private sector. He is 

currently the Senior Vice President and Director of the National 

Security Program on Industry and Resources at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies. Prior to that, he has directed 

the National Security Studies Program at Syracuse University and 

served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Production and Logistics. 

Ms. Starzak is currently the Deputy General Counsel for Legislation at the Department of Defense (DOD). She has also served as 

counsel and a professional staff member on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as Assistant General Counsel at the 

Central Intelligence Agency. 

Admiral Harris has spent 36 years in the Navy and served in 

every geographic combatant command region. He is currently the 

Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He has worked previously as 

the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy 

Chief Naval Officer for Communication Networks, and the Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo. 

There are going to be four votes, as currently planned, at 10:30 

a.m. We are going to work through those votes. If it turns out that 

we cannot complete the hearing for any one or more of our nominees today, we will continue such hearing either later this week or 

next week. 

We look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, of our nominees, and we also again thank their families for their support. 

I turn this over to Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We are getting into the last 2 years of the administration. It’s 

clear, at least in my opinion, that our national security policies 

have been a disaster and the world becomes more dangerous. The 

President is focused on dismantling the military, appeasing our adversaries, abandoning our partners, and refusing to implement a 

new national security strategy. 

861 

That’s kind of interesting. That’s required by law, and I think, 

Mr. Scher, I’ll have some questions for you on that because I think 

it’s very important. We’re supposed to do that every year. It’s been 

4 years now. Instead of taking responsibility and changing the 

course, the President is doubling down on the failed policies and 

blaming the Secretary of Defense. 

Six years in, we still have no strategy in the Middle East and 

no plan to deter Russia, China, Iran, and the Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria (ISIS), and no updated national security strategy. The 

New York Times reported that when Susan Rice was asked why 

there hasn’t been a new national security strategy in 4 years, she 

said, ‘‘If we had put one out in February or April or July, it would 

have been overtaken by events 2 weeks later.’’ I guess what she’s 

saying is you can’t build a strategy that can last more than 2 

weeks. I think perhaps the President should have dealt with her 

instead of Secretary Hagel. 

The problem is, as I see it, the President is relying on his political and his media advisors rather than his military leaders. I 

talked to a lot of the military leaders, as does everyone on this 

panel up here, and I’ve come to the conclusion that they’re not really being listened to, and I think that’s one of our major problems. 

One of the most glaring examples has been the President’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. When asked on August 6th 

whether the United States should provide lethal assistance to 

Ukraine, he said no, but then he added—and this is a quote. Now, 

keep in mind, this is August 6th. He said, ‘‘Now, if you start seeing 

an invasion by Russia, that’s obviously a different set of questions. 

We’re not there yet.’’ That was August. Putin started invading the 

Ukraine 5 months before that, and that’s when he formally annexed Crimea, and that’s 5 months before this. While Obama’s on 

the sidelines, Putin continues to de-recognize Europe. 

I probably shouldn’t have done it. I was on the ballot myself this 

year, but for the whole week prior to our elections over here, I was 

in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, and those areas. They look 

at Ukraine and say it’s not going to stop there. They’re all concerned. They’re all in that same situation. 

It’s clear that Russia, China, Iran, ISIS see weaknesses in the 

President’s rhetoric and it’s not going to deter them from taking 

more aggressive action. It’s not just me who thinks that. I hear 

that constantly all over. 

We’re looking forward to the solutions you might suggest. I do 

think that having five significant nominees all at once during this 

lame duck session is probably not the best way to have done this. 

I’m anxious to get to know all of you better before any final vote 

for confirmation comes around. 

I appreciate it very much, Admiral Harris, the time that you 

spent with me. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

I’ll call first on Mr. Scher for your opening comments. 

862 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. SCHER, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. SCHER. Thank you, Chairman Levin, and Senator Inhofe, 

and all the members of the committee. It’s a privilege to appear before you this morning, and I appreciate the opportunity to answer 

any questions you may have regarding my nomination as Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. 

I’d like to thank President Obama, Secretary Hagel, and Under 

Secretary Wormuth for their support of my nomination. I also owe 

a debt to the many colleagues, mentors, and friends with whom I’ve 

worked over the years and who have always supported me. Most 

of all I’d like to thank my family and friends, without whom I certainly would not be here today. 

I would be remiss if I did not specifically thank my wife, Danielle 

Ewen, and my son, Maxwell. Danielle is taking time off from her 

job today to be here. She is a nationally recognized expert on child 

care and early education, and I’m very proud of her service. Maxwell, a freshman at Moray, decided that he gets to see me talk 

enough and really doesn’t need to be here, so he’d rather go to 

school. Present or not, they provide me with my strength, my moral 

compass, and my motivation to continue to serve this Nation. 

It has been my privilege to be able to serve in DOD as both a 

political appointee and a career civil servant for over 20 years. I 

have lived through or participated in four Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), countless other strategic reviews, and have had the 

privilege to represent our Nation at international meetings 

throughout Asia. In all of these efforts, I have worked with some 

of the finest public servants and military officers we have as a Nation. 

Our public servants are hardworking, patriotic individuals who 

serve this Nation with dedication and honor, but I can never forget 

that what we do in the Pentagon is all about how to better support 

the men and women that make up our Armed Forces, they who 

have volunteered to serve in our Nation’s military and who continue to sacrifice for the freedoms we enjoy here in the United 

States. My allegiance to them is unwavering and, if confirmed, I 

believe it is my most important task to ensure that what we do in 

the Pentagon continues to best support our forces. 

It is because of my past work and my deep respect and admiration for our military that I am so honored to sit here before you 

today. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with you all 

in Congress, with this committee in particular, and with others in 

the executive branch to advance U.S. national security interests in 

what can only be termed an uncertain and dynamic environment. 

My role in this position would be to support the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Secretary, and the Secretary of 

Defense in formulating the strategic guidance for the Department, 

and then working within the Department to make sure that the 

Secretary’s guidance is effectively implemented by the Services and 

the combatant commanders, one of whom I am privileged to be 

here with on this panel, hopefully if confirmed, Harry Harris. 

We must simultaneously be working to address the needs of current operations, planning for potential contingencies, and ensuring 

863 

that we build a military that is capable of responding to the threats 

and opportunities of the future. We do not have the luxury of only 

looking at today’s problems or only looking at the future. We must 

do both. 

In today’s world and with the continued uncertainty over the resources that may be available to the Department, this is a difficult 

task but one that I am committed to getting right. If confirmed, I 

will make every effort to live up to the confidence that has been 

placed in me. 

I am grateful for your consideration and look forward to your 

questions. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Scher. 

Ms. Slotkin? 

STATEMENT OF ELISSA SLOTKIN, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. I am grateful for the confidence that President Obama has 

shown in nominating me, and I thank Secretary Hagel and Under 

Secretary Wormuth personally for their support. 

I also want to thank my family, for I would not be here without 

them. My husband, Colonel David Moore, is here today, having just 

retired after 30 years as an officer in the Army; my step-daughters, 

who are just beginning their careers of service, Christine, who will 

soon be a rural doctor, and Jennifer, a West Point Cadet, who is 

helping to break down gender barriers every day. They are the 

source of my strength, and I thank them for their unending support. 

I’d also like to thank my parents, Curt and Carole Slotkin, in 

from Michigan, who taught me the meaning of hard work and decency, as well as the legion of Slotkins, Singers, Moores, and 

Rosses who have shown unwavering love and understanding. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the position of Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs spans a huge area 

of responsibility. It covers Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the 

Western Hemisphere. America’s national security interests in these 

parts of the world are as profound as they are vast. From ensuring 

the transatlantic alliance and ensuring that it’s prepared to meet 

the challenge of Russian aggressive behavior, to meeting the 

threats in the Middle East and the generational change taking 

place there, to the proliferating extremist groups in Africa, or the 

instability in Central America, I remain convinced that the United 

States must play a central role. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee and 

Congress as a whole to develop the policies, partnerships, and posture the Department needs to address these challenges. 

Mr. Chairman, the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary for 

International Security Affairs is profound and a mission I take extremely seriously. I believe my experience in the Intelligence Community, the Department of State, the National Security staff, and 

DOD have prepared me for the complexities of this account. I have 

benefitted both in the field and in Washington from close civil-miliVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00871 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
864 

tary cooperation, something I believe is critical to countering new 

threats. I have the benefit of learning from exemplary bosses such 

as John Negroponte, Jack Lew, and Miche`le Flournoy, who I believe embody the meaning of committed leadership. If confirmed, I 

hope to live up to their expectations and those of the committee. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will make every effort to live up 

to the confidence placed in me and the excellence demonstrated by 

our men and women in uniform. Thank you for your consideration, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Berteau? 

STATEMENT OF DAVID J. BERTEAU, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS 

Mr. BERTEAU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee. It’s an honor and a privilege for me to appear before you this morning. 

I thank also President Obama for nominating me as the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 

and I’m grateful for the support of Secretary Hagel, Deputy Secretary Wormuth, and Under Secretary Kendall. 

I particularly want to express my gratitude to my family, my 

wife of 41 years, Jane, and my son, Stephen, here with me today, 

behind me. My daughter Celeste is overseas and is unable to be 

here in person this morning, but I suspect she’s following as best 

she can. 

I also owe a tremendous debt to my parents, Marvin and Patsy 

Berteau. Neither one lived to see me here this morning, but they 

instilled in me from an early age a powerful sense of the responsibilities of citizenship in America and of the call to public service 

that flows from those responsibilities, and I owe them gratitude for 

that. 

Mr. Chairman, for most of my professional life I’ve been working 

on and studying and teaching defense and national security, and 

in that time it’s become clear to me that without superior logistics, 

there is little chance of long-term success. The lessons of the wars 

in Afghanistan and Iraq have underscored the importance of logistics not only for the battlefield but also for the capability provided 

by the organic elements of the Military Services, as well as the 

support of a strong industrial base. 

I believe that my background both in and out of Government has 

helped prepare me to help support the men and women in uniform 

as they undertake their varied missions around the world. 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness has been providing support in all of these areas 

for years. If confirmed, I hope to be able to continue and improve 

on that performance. 

I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I thank my 

family for their support and encouragement. If confirmed, I look 

forward to working with this committee and the rest of Congress 

to ensure excellence in logistics and materiel readiness. 

I’m grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

865 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Berteau. 

Ms. Starzak? 

STATEMENT OF ALISSA M. STARZAK, TO BE GENERAL 

COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Ms. STARZAK. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, and members of the committee. I am honored to appear before you today. 

I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to President 

Obama for the confidence shown in me by this nomination, Secretary Hagel, Secretary McHugh, and Under Secretary Brad Carson for their support of my nomination. 

I recognize that I would not be here today except for the family, 

friends, and co-workers who have supported me over the years. I 

want to especially thank my family here with me today: my wonderful, supportive husband, Andrew Ferguson, who is a law professor at the University of the District of Columbia David A. Clark 

School of Law; my parents, Michael and Andrea Starzak, who 

taught me the value of public service; and my sister, Jocelyn 

Starzak, who followed those same values into the non-profit world 

as an attorney for the Special Olympics. 

I also want to thank those, both civilian and military, that I have 

had the privilege of working with during these past few years serving the DOD Office of General Counsel. Their commitment to protecting America and improving the lives of those dedicated men 

and women who serve all of us by putting themselves in harm’s 

way is extraordinary. 

The General Counsel of the Army advises Army leadership on 

the legal implications of the many challenges facing the Army. I believe my background and experience in the Department, Congress, 

and the private sector have well prepared me to serve in this role. 

I am committed to working closely with the Army Judge Advocate leadership and strongly believe in the value of having civilian 

and military lawyers work together to provide the best possible 

legal advice to our clients. 

If confirmed, I will make every effort to live up to the confidence 

that has been placed in me. I am grateful for your consideration, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Ms. Starzak. 

Admiral Harris? 

STATEMENT OF ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE 

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, and 

distinguished committee members, I’m honored to appear before 

you today as the nominee to lead PACOM. 

I want to thank President Obama for nominating me. I also want 

to thank Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, Secretary Mabus, and 

Admiral Greenert. I am deeply humbled by their confidence in me. 

I’m fortunate to be joined today by my wife, Bernie. I simply 

wouldn’t be here without her love and support. Bernie served in 

the Navy herself for 25 years after she graduated from Annapolis 

in 1984. We met in Japan when we were both stationed there. I 

866 

chased her to Hawaii and thank God she agreed to marry me in 

1989. Bernie represents a growing number of military spouses who 

serve our Nation in uniform. 

The All-Volunteer Force is sustained by our families. I’d like to 

thank this committee for your enduring support of our servicemembers and their families, and I would be remiss in not specifically thanking Chairman Levin, who will retire in 2015. Sir, your 

4 decades on this committee have made all the difference. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee as our Nation confronts the complex and compelling challenges in the vibrant Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Our most volatile 

and dangerous threat is North Korea, with its quest for nuclear 

weapons and the means to deliver them intercontinentally. The 

dramatic rise of China’s military, the uncertainty about how it will 

use its growing capabilities, and its provocative actions in the region represent our most enduring challenge. 

As we continue to defend our national interests abroad, our efforts are bolstered by our teammates in the State Department and 

across the Government. Our collective efforts amid the challenges 

I mentioned underscore the importance of America remaining 

strong and engaged in the region. American leadership does matter. 

Since our strategic rebalance was announced 3 years ago, we 

broadened our operations with Japan, deployed marines 

rotationally to Australia, and improved missile defense in cooperation with South Korea. We have also signed an important security 

agreement with the Philippines. 

The rebalance is real, and although we all have concerns about 

the fiscal landscape, I believe that America has the staying power 

to sustain it. 

But there is more work to do, and if confirmed, I will remain 

laser focused on deepening our regional alliances and partnerships 

to increase our combat agility and readiness. I am fortunate to 

have had operational and policy experience, command assignments, 

and educational opportunities that align completely with PACOM’s 

mission. I believe they have prepared me well for the challenges 

ahead. 

If confirmed, I will follow the trails blazed by some truly great 

leaders like Admiral Sam Locklear, Bob Willard, and Tim Keating, 

all of whom mentored me and shaped my understanding of this region. Admiral Locklear’s leadership of PACOM for the last 3 years 

has been of critical importance, and I am proud to have served as 

his Navy component in the Pacific Fleet. 

I look forward to serving alongside the world’s best soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, civilians and their families, as well as 

working with this committee and Congress as a whole to address 

the national security challenges that we have. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee members, leading 

PACOM is a significant responsibility. If confirmed, I pledge to all 

of you that I will devote all of my energy and focus to the job. I 

look forward to your questions. Thank you, sirs. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

Now we have standard questions that we ask of our nominees, 

so I would ask each of you to respond. In order to exercise our reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00874 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
867 

sponsibilities, we have to receive testimony, briefings, and other 

communications of information. First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Mr. SCHER. Yes. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

Mr. SCHER. No. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. No. 

Mr. BERTEAU. No. 

Ms. STARZAK. No. 

Admiral HARRIS. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

Mr. SCHER. Yes. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and 

briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Mr. SCHER. Yes. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 

for their testimony or briefings? 

Mr. SCHER. Yes. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Mr. SCHER. Yes. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including 

copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner 

when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with 

the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Mr. SCHER. Yes. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Yes. 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. 

868 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, just for our uniformed military nominee, 

the question that we ask of our nominees in uniform, so just to 

him, do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views even 

if those views differ from the administration in power? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir, I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now we will have an 8-minute first round, and 

I emphasize first round because we will go to a second round. We 

will work through the four votes at 10:30 a.m., and as I said, if necessary, we will have a continuation of this hearing for one or more 

of these nominees either later this week or next week. 

Mr. Scher, Deputy Secretary Wormuth recently was quoted as 

saying that ‘‘we need a strategic modernization infrastructure 

fund’’ to recapitalize the nuclear forces already in place. Can you 

tell us how that would operate? When would this committee first 

see it in a budget proposal? 

Mr. SCHER. Senator, we have spent a lot of time working to ensure we understand the needs of the defense nuclear enterprise 

and actually are funding it at a rate that we think will make sure 

that we can preserve the modernization of it and fix some of the 

problems that were found in the multiple reviews. 

I do not know the details of the fund of which the Deputy Secretary speaks, but I do know the commitment of the Department 

to maintain the funding, to maintain modernization and to, in fact, 

increase the funding, I think as the Secretary of Defense said, approximately 10 percent over the $15 to $16 billion per year for the 

nuclear enterprise at this moment. I can certainly get back to you 

with details on the specific fund after the hearing. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The internal Nuclear Enterprise Review final report included the following recommendation: 

‘‘The Department of Defense should consider, in conjunction with the National Security Council (NSC) staff, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress, instituting an ‘OCO-like’ fund. The Nuclear Infrastructure Recapitalization 

Fund would be a multiyear appropriation of ‘colorless’ money to rebuild critical nuclear support infrastructure. This fund would allow the Services to concentrate on 

simultaneously repairing current infrastructure and modernizing with new systems.’’ 

The Department is following the review’s recommendation, and is considering 

such a fund in consultation with OMB and the NSC staff. However, more work 

needs to be done to determine what the scope of such a fund would be and how such 

a fund would operate before we can bring such a concept forward for legislative consideration. I do not expect that the administration will be prepared to propose such 

a fund in the fiscal year 2016 budget. Regardless of the future disposition of such 

a fund, the Department is committed to making the investments necessary to sustain the safety, security, and effectiveness of its nuclear enterprise. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Mr. Scher, a second question for you. 

Over the last few years, the Defense Department has been provided 

a number of authorities to build the defense capabilities of our 

partners and friendly nations, and these include the global train 

and equip authority, security assistance funds for a number of specific countries or regions, including Iraq and Afghanistan, the global security contingency fund, and in the bill before us we will have 

funding to train and equip the nongovernment forces, irregular 

forces. 

In your view, is the Department properly organized to ensure coordination and deconfliction of these various security assistance auVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00876 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
869 

thorities? If confirmed, are there steps that you would take to improve on the oversight and the coordination of the Department’s 

authorities? 

Mr. SCHER. Senator, I believe that right now we currently, as a 

department, do a good job of coordinating the various authorities 

that we have been given over the course of the past decade plus, 

as well as do a pretty good job of coordinating with the State Department, realizing that, in fact, building partner capacity is a job 

that is shared between DOD and the Department of State. 

However, I do accept that there are a lot of authorities that continue to come; and, in fact, if confirmed, I assure you I will look 

at this to see if we can do a better job of being sure they are coordinated and deconflicted. In fact, there is an office in the new organization of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities that has been stood up 

that, if confirmed for that position, I will oversee their attempts to 

ensure and their efforts to ensure that we can get greater clarity 

of each of these authorities and how they will be used together. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Ms. Slotkin, media reports have indicated that the administration may be considering support for a Turkish request to create a 

no-fly zone or a buffer zone inside of Syria along the Turkish border. Now, I have long supported this idea, as a number of my colleagues on this committee have. We would very much welcome consideration of this request. 

Can you tell us what is your understanding of the request and 

what is the view of the administration on the Turkish request? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes, Senator. The idea of a safe zone or a no-fly 

zone or a buffer zone is something that the Turks have been talking to us about for a couple of years now. They have raised it off 

and on for at least 2 years that I am aware of, and we are in regular discussion about their proposal. The Vice President was there 

last week. This is something that was discussed. Those talks are 

ongoing. 

We don’t currently think that a no-fly zone fits the bill, but it’s 

something the elements of which we’re looking at very closely to 

see if there is a proposal that advances our combined objectives. 

Chairman LEVIN. What is the problem with the proposal? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I think that at this point we’re still in conversation to understand exactly the elements that they’re talking 

about. Their proposal has changed over time, and the Vice President had extensive conversations, including private conversations, 

about the details so that we understand exactly the elements 

they’re proposing. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know whether the proposal includes the 

use of Turkish troops on the ground inside Syria? Do you know if 

that proposal includes that element? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the proposal involves a full range of air and 

land elements, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would greater access and use of the Turkish 

military installations, particularly at Incirlik, be granted as part of 

the U.S. support for such a zone? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. We’re in regular conversation not just on this proposal but about our counter-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

870 

(ISIL) strategy and how greater access to those bases would provide us additional resources for the counter-ISIL fight. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know whether or not the use of Incirlik 

is part of the Turkish proposal? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I don’t know that specifically, sir. I know that it’s 

very much part of the conversation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Mr. Berteau, in recent years there’s been 

an increase in the number of DOD weapon system platforms that 

are contractor supported, particularly in the Air Force and the 

Navy. What are the most significant areas in which the Department could improve oversight and management to ensure that operating and support costs of a weapons system are reasonable and 

accurate, particularly given the fact that there is an increase in the 

number of platforms that are contractor supported? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Mr. Chairman, a huge percentage of life cycle costs 

of any weapons system is pretty much determined by the time you 

get to what’s known as Milestone B, the engineering and design development stage decision. The costs that are incurred later in cycle 

are largely determined upfront. The single greatest challenge is to 

make a better evaluation at the front end in the design process. 

One of the decisions or implementations, if you will, from the 

Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act was a better job of cost 

estimating and better consideration of cost estimating inside the 

Department. What I don’t know is how much that cost estimation 

improvement has extended into life cycle cost maintenance. 

I think what I would do if confirmed is look most carefully at 

that question. Historically, that’s generally determined through a 

parametric modeling of what it cost you on the previous weapon 

system. While that’s important, it may not be sufficient to be able 

to maintain that. 

The question of what is done under contract logistic support as 

opposed to organic support I think depends on each weapon system 

and the plan that’s put into place at the time, and that has to be 

looked at again as part of the milestone review process in the acquisition. If confirmed, that’s what I would intend to do, and that 

would be part of my responsibility as the Assistant Secretary. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Finally, Ms. Starzak, what is your view of the need for the Judge 

Advocate General to provide independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Army, including independent of the General Counsel? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I believe that is very important. It’s obviously a statutory responsibility of the Judge Advocate General, and 

I support that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask one question of all five of you, and you just answer 

starting with you, Admiral, since I know what your answer is going 

to be. 

We’re all concerned with the sequestration. We’ve been talking 

about that a lot, and prior to that we’ve had other problems with 

the administration in terms of the support of the military. I’ll ask 

each one of you—do you agree that sequestration would significantly increase risk, and that risk is equated to lives? 

871 

Admiral? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I believe that if there is no relief to the 

sequester, it will, in fact, increase risk. It will increase the risk to 

the lives of our service men and women. I believe it will decrease 

the size, the reach, the lethality, and the technological edge that 

we enjoy today over our adversaries and potential adversaries. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. A yes or no answer is fine. [Laughter.] 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I believe that Army leadership and the 

Secretary of Defense has testified about the problems of sequestration for the Army. 

Senator INHOFE. No, no. How do you feel about it? 

Ms. STARZAK. I agree with those views. From a legal standpoint, 

we obviously will look to try to address them. 

Senator INHOFE. Military sequestration would increase risk. Risk 

is lives. Do you agree with that? 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I do agree with that. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. 

Mr. Berteau? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Yes, sir, I agree with that. 

Senator INHOFE. Ms. Slotkin? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCHER. I agree. It risks lives and other issues, but certainly 

lives are part of it. 

Senator INHOFE. I think it’s important for us to understand that 

that’s what we’re talking about. When we get General Odierno and 

others who come in here and they talk about the problems that 

we’re going to have, what that is going to do, the people need to 

equate risk and lives. That’s what we’re talking about here. 

Admiral, you and I have talked in my office about what’s happening, and with the rebalance to the Pacific that’s going to be in 

your responsibility, if this should go through, sequestration, would 

we have enough force structure to carry out that policy that you 

need to be doing and that you want to do? 

Admiral HARRIS. If we get no relief from the sequester, it will affect the strength and the reach of our rebalance to the Pacific, in 

my opinion. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. The other thing I’m going to ask you because nobody seems to talk about this, when Kim Jong-un took office, I thought no one could be worse than his daddy, but nonetheless we’re in a situation right now, and I’d like to know, do you 

think he would be more likely to be aggressive? Let’s just put it 

this way. The carrier gaps that we’re faced with right now and the 

reduced U.S. defense spending, do you think that would make him 

more militarily aggressive? Or how do you think he’d react to that? 

Admiral HARRIS. I’m not sure how he would react to it, Senator, 

but I believe that he is a very opportunistic and very unpredictable 

and a ruthless leader, and I think therefore that if we face continuing carrier gaps or perhaps the loss of a carrier strike or two, 

as our Chief of Naval Operations has testified, if the sequester continues, then I believe he will take advantage of that. 

Senator INHOFE. He is totally unpredictable. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Ms. Slotkin, let me share with you, I was in 

Kiev. Their election was 1 week before our election, and I was 

872 

there during that timeframe. That was an incredible election that 

a lot of people are not aware of, and that is that Poroshenko was 

so supported in that election, as well as was Yatsenyuk, the Prime 

Minister. 

A lot of people are not aware that if a party doesn’t receive 5 percent, then they can’t be in the Parliament. This is the first time 

in—let me make sure I get this right—the first time in 96 years 

that the Communist Party will not have a seat in Parliament. 

That’s an incredible thing that’s going on. We hear the bad news, 

and that’s the good news. 

But when the President, as I said in my opening statement, was 

asked whether the United States should provide lethal assistance 

to Ukraine, he said no but added, ‘‘Now, if you start seeing an invasion by Russia, that’s obviously a different set of questions. We’re 

not there yet.’’ I think we are there yet. Do you agree? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I think that—— 

Senator INHOFE. Do you agree that 5 months before that, when 

they annexed Crimea, that that was an invasion of Ukraine? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I believe it was an illegal occupation and an unlawful annexation of Crimea. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Was it an invasion? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I don’t know the actual definition of invasion. I 

know it was an unlawful occupation. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, I get your answer. If the administration 

asks whether you recommend that Ukraine be provided lethal assistance, will you answer yes or no, and why? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I think, as you may have heard last week, the 

option of providing lethal assistance, lethal defensive assistance, is 

currently being looked at. I support all options being looked at. 

Those—— 

Senator INHOFE. But we’ve been looking at it for quite a while 

now, and it’s lethal assistance. I mean, I was over there and talking to them, and they have come out with incredible support of the 

West and of us in their elections, and they are begging for it. I 

mean, what more looking at it do we need to do? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, again, from the Defense Department perspective, we’ve provided some considerations. Those are being looked at 

now. I think it is important to note that we have provided over 

$116 million worth of security assisting the Ukrainians. I know it’s 

not lethal assistance. 

Senator INHOFE. It’s not—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I understand. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I frankly think that much more important even 

than that is the joint commission we’ve set up with the Ukrainians, 

the 25 visits that our generals have made from U.S. European 

Command to work on the medium- and long-term needs of the 

Ukrainian military to build them into a truly substantial force, 

more than any one piece of equipment, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. The question was if the administration asked 

whether you recommend that Ukraine be provided lethal assistance, knowing what you know now, would it be yes or no? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Again, I believe—— 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that’s fine. 

873 

Mr. Scher, in my opening statement I talked about a couple of 

things that are in the law. One is the QDR. We talk about doing 

that—I think that’s title 10—every 4 years. But also it specifically 

talks about the national security strategy. Now, reading from title 

50 in section 3043, it says, ‘‘The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security 

strategy of the United States.’’ I mean, that’s pretty specific, don’t 

you think? 

Mr. SCHER. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. What are your intentions of doing to see that 

they start following that law? 

Mr. SCHER. If confirmed—— 

Senator INHOFE. It’s been 4 years now. 

Mr. SCHER. If confirmed in this position, I look forward to working with the White House to help them produce a national security 

strategy. I will say—— 

Senator INHOFE. You don’t even work with them. I’d like to have 

a little stronger answer because you’re going to be responsible for 

this area. 

Mr. SCHER. Certainly, Senator, and I will be responsible, if confirmed, for the QDR publication and drafting, which obviously gets 

approved by the Secretary, where we talk about the defense strategy. We make sure that whenever we develop that defense strategy, we do it in consultation with the White House and other interagency players throughout the administration. That is something I 

can assure you I will continue to do. 

Senator INHOFE. Good, good. That’s good. 

I’m out of time now, but I want to get an answer for the record 

on this, Mr. Berteau. It seems on acquisition reform I can remember 28 years ago, the 8 years I spent in the House and then the 

last 20 years in the Senate, we talked about that acquisition reform. We’ve done a lot of talking about it, and every time we come 

up with something, they want more regulations and this type of 

thing. I’m beginning to think that maybe you might be particularly 

suited for this in that you had this in your background but you left 

this area in government in 1993. Is that correct? Now you’re coming back. Does that give you a fresher look at this? For the record, 

if you could give me a report on what you might be able to do differently because of your unique background. Okay? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Yes, sir. I would also refer you to my testimony 

before this committee back on April 30th, which already included 

some of that. 

Senator INHOFE. Good. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Senator Inhofe, you are correct that acquisition reform issues are in my background. My first position in the Pentagon in 1981 as a career civil servant was supporting the acquisition reform efforts known as the Carlucci Initiatives. I served as 

the executive secretary of the Packard Commission in 1985–1986, supporting Dr. 

William Perry’s writing of that commissions acquisition reform recommendations. 

More recently, since becoming a full-time scholar at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, I have testified on the subject three times, twice before the 

House Armed Services Committee and once before this committee: 

• ‘‘Acquisition Improvements for 2015 and Beyond’’ Testimony by David J. 

Berteau before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 30, 2014. 

Panel included Jonathan Etherton and Moshe Schwartz. Committee video 

at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/14–04–30-reform-of-theVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00881 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
874 

defense-acquisition-system. Statement at http://csis.org/files/attachments/ 

ts140430—Berteau.pdf. 

• ‘‘DHS Acquisition Practices: Improving Outcomes for Taxpayers Using 

Defense and Private Sector Lessons Learned.‘‘ Testimony by David J. 

Berteau before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on 

Organization and Management Efficiency, September 19, 2013. Panel included Stan Soloway and Bill Greenwalt. http://csis.org/testimony/dhs-acquisition-practices-improving-outcomes-taxpayers-using-defense-and-privatesector-le 

• ‘‘If These Are Such Good Ideas, Why Are They So Hard To Implement?’’ 

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, April 29, 2009. 

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/congress/ts090430—berteau.pdf 

In addition, I was invited to contribute an essay on acquisition reform to the recently-released report from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs. The report is titled ‘‘Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of 

Views by Leading Experts. It was released October 2, 2014, and may be accessed 

at https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/714067/file/78423/Defense%20Acquisition%20Reform 

%20Where%20Do%20We%20Go%20From%20Here.%20US%20Senate%20Staff%20 

Report.pdf, or through the subcommittee’s web site at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/ 

subcommittees/investigations/media/senators-mccain-and-levin-release-permanentsubcommittee-on-investigations-psi-report-on-defense-acquisition-reform. 

From my work on acquisition issues in the Defense Department, as a contractor, 

and as an academic scholar, my perspective is that Congress and this committee 

could most usefully focus on streamlining and integrating what some have called 

the ‘‘patchwork quilt’’ of statutes that drive regulations on risk reduction, acquisition strategies, and sustainment. The recent draft of the Defense Department Instruction 5000.02 includes approximately 30 pages of such requirements, with many 

different timelines, thresholds, and reporting requirements. Complying with this 

mix of reporting requirements adds time and may even undermine accountability 

by making it more difficult to determine what was decided, when, and by whom. 

As for what I would do differently if confirmed, I would focus on streamlining, by 

working to support current and planned efforts to address this need for streamlining 

by the Defense Department, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 

and Congress. I would also focus on acquisition practices that help meet the needs 

or requirements of deployed forces, as outlined in my previous statements noted 

above. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank 

you, ladies and gentlemen. 

Admiral Harris, just for the record, I think my understanding is 

that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is a subcommand under PACOM? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. It’s a subunified command under 

PACOM. 

Senator REED. You were, in fact, in charge of our military response to the North Koreans? 

Admiral HARRIS. In the USFK hat, but General Scaparrotti is 

also the Combined Forces Command and the United Nations commander for Korea independent of PACOM. 

Senator REED. But you have this complementary relationship, 

and my sense is you’re working very closely together, both individually but also organizationally, so that you have a consistent view 

of the situation in Korea and you feel comfortable going forward 

with that arrangement. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I have a very comfortable relationship 

with General Scaparrotti and with Admiral Locklear in my present 

hat as Pacific Fleet. If confirmed, I will continue that relationship 

with USFK. I believe that PACOM’s primary responsibility is to 

support USFK on the Peninsula in the case of a Korean continVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00882 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
875 

gency, and that translates to all the components, to Pacific Fleet 

as well, that our mission has to be ready to fight tonight. We take 

that seriously in our preparations. 

Senator REED. Can you comment on the cyber activity that may 

be emanating from North Korea? It’s a new dimension, it’s a new 

threat, relatively new, and it would be something I think in your 

command will be increasingly more persistent and troubling as you 

go forward. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I believe that North Korea is seeking 

asymmetric advantages over us and our allies in the Pacific, and 

cyber is just one of those methods by which they’re seeking to get 

that advantage. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. 

Turning to China now, they are increasing their budget militarily. They are increasing their actions in adjacent waters. Their 

strategy seems to be access denial, which raises, particularly for 

PACOM, the issue of how do you structure your fleets to respond 

to that, what weapons systems do you emphasize, particularly as 

the Chinese seem to be deploying more and more long-range precision missile systems that can effectively, very effectively attack 

surface ships. Can you comment on your ideas going forward about 

these issues? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I believe that China’s access area denial strategies are worthy of our taking a hard look at it. In the 

Navy perspective, I believe our fighter aircraft are key to us being 

able to get in there to do the missions that will be assigned by 

PACOM. I think the joint strike fighter is key to that. Our carrier 

strike groups form the heart of that and our submarines, which are 

inherently stealthy, provide a measure of advantage today and into 

the foreseeable future over China and any other adversary in the 

Pacific, sir. 

Senator REED. You would say that, again, the critical ability of 

aircraft to penetrate is going to be important, but the submarines 

provide, at least at this point, the biggest sort of leverage we have 

in the Pacific? 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe today the submarine force is our indisputable leverage over any potential adversary in the Pacific. 

Senator REED. Let me ask you another question and that’s about 

the amphibious capabilities of PACOM. Because of the conflict in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, our marines have been there almost continuously. Now they’re starting to reorient, regroup, and begin to practice amphibious operations. Can you give us your sense right now 

of what our capabilities are for amphibious assault? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. Today we have five amphibious ready 

groups in the Pacific, one forward deployed, the Sasebo in Japan, 

to support the Marine Expeditionary Unit in Okinawa. We have 

four amphibious ready groups in San Diego, and we’ll be building 

a fifth by 2018. We welcome the return of the Marine Corps to its 

amphibious routes, and we’re working very closely, I am working 

very closely with Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Lieutenant General 

Toolan, ensuring that us the Navy, the Pacific Fleet, and the Marine Corps are marching side by side, if you will, in lockstep on the 

need for amphibiosity in our naval services. 

876 

Senator REED. Do you have a plan for increased amphibious 

training exercises in the Pacific going forward? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Slotkin, you just spent a great deal of time in Iraq, 2 years 

as an intelligence officer early in the conflict, and State Department work. Can you talk about the situation, the political situation 

now with Abadi versus the Maliki Government? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Of course. I think the good news is that Prime 

Minister Abadi is saying the right things and starting to do the 

right things on the critical issues of reform and reconciliation in 

Iraq. This is different from what Prime Minister Maliki did, particularly after 2011. In fact, Prime Minister Abadi has been 

deconstructing some of the things that Maliki did during his time. 

We saw, again, he just removed another 20-plus Ministry of Interior officials today for corruption and mismanagement. That’s on 

top of 36 general officers I think about a week ago. He’s identified 

and made a big speech in front of his Parliament yesterday about 

the 50,000 ghost soldiers that were on the books. He’s attacking 

corruption, and he’s attempting to reach out particularly to the 

Sunni community. 

This is a critical piece of any work we do and they do in Iraq 

against ISIL. Again, the countervailing winds in Iraq are strong, 

but he’s doing and saying the right things. 

Senator REED. Our troop presence today, what justification and 

what sort of precedent are we using as we’re building up our 

forces? At the invitation, obviously, of the government, but also to 

protect our own resources? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. Sir, are you referring to the missions that 

they’re performing? 

Senator REED. Not so much the missions, but we have forces 

there, and they are protected by the—let me ask, do we have a Status of Forces agreement in place? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. We currently have an exchange of notes with the 

Government of Iraq that provides us privileges and immunities. 

Senator REED. We feel with this government it’s much more reliable than with the Maliki Government? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. There’s a much wider range of Iraqis who 

have invited us in on an emergency basis to come and help them 

take back part of their country. It’s a wide range of Iraqis that support us and our interactions there. 

Senator REED. Is it your view that without this political progress 

in Iraq, that military efforts would be very difficult to succeed? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the political piece, which is where the 

Iraqis really must lead, is critical, sir, to the success of the mission. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank all of 

you for being here today. I appreciate your willingness to step forward. 

877 

I would like to begin with a discussion on the bilateral security 

assistance as a policy tool. Ms. Slotkin, if I could begin with you, 

please. 

It appears that bilateral security assistance is occupying a greater role as we move forward with U.S. policy. Earlier this year General Dempsey spoke of doubling or even tripling our effort to build 

credible partners around the globe. How do you see this developing 

in the next few years, and do you think there’s a ceiling on how 

much we can accomplish? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Ma’am, thank you for that. I think it’s a critical 

question. We’ve all talked about the complexities of the world’s 

problems, the unpredictability of the world, and there’s nothing 

more important than the capacity and capability of partners in addressing those common threats. We are big believers in security assistance and building partner capacity. It’s a cornerstone of the 

QDR and a cornerstone of almost everything we do around the 

world. 

I don’t know if there’s a ceiling on what it can do because I think 

if the model is Europe, where we have our most capable partners 

working with us, that’s what we’d like to see in every region of the 

world, truly capable partners working with us side by side. 

Senator FISCHER. As we look at the program, though, we all realize it’s an indirect way for the United States to accomplish its policy goals, and we look around the world and we see other countries 

that are more directly involved in many areas such as the Ukraine. 

Do you think there’s a limit to what we can do with the bilateral 

security assistance in areas like that, where maybe we should be 

stepping forward in a more forceful and direct manner? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Again, I think in the places where our allies and 

partners are most capable, you see that as part of deterrence 

against these kinds of destabilizing behaviors. I don’t think there’s 

a ceiling. Whether the United States should get involved, I think 

it’s always critical whether it threatens U.S. national interests directly, and I think in those places where it affects our Homeland, 

U.S. persons and interests abroad, we should act decisively, and I 

think we have. 

Senator FISCHER. You feel our actions in Ukraine are appropriate 

at this time? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think that we are doing quite a bit to support the 

Ukrainians. I know there’s a debate about whether we should be 

doing more, but I think the work in particular that we’re doing 

with advising and training the Ukrainian military is significant, 

and I think that it’s showing effect. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. Scher, do you have anything to add on how you see this assistance developing in the future? 

Mr. SCHER. Thank you, Senator. I believe it’s a very important 

tool that we have to try to advance U.S. interests and take advantage of opportunities and protect ourselves against threats by working closely with countries around the world at different levels, depending on what that country is capable of doing, either helping 

themselves, helping them to help themselves, or helping them so 

that they can help in global priorities. 

It is one tool. It’s an important tool. It is not the only tool. 

878 

Senator FISCHER. Do you see a ceiling on when it should be used 

and when we may possibly have to move on to more direct assistance? 

Mr. SCHER. I think it’s a situation, Senator, that depends on each 

case, that in some cases we will have provided enough. But it’s rare 

that we get to the point, that I have seen, where we have spent 

enough time on building partner capacity. But certainly you have 

to weigh that against the other tools that are appropriate given the 

situation at the time. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Admiral Harris, can you speak to those programs in your area 

of operations on the bilateral security assistance programs? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. We have a lot of bilateral security 

arrangements in the Pacific. We have five, all of our Nation’s five 

treaty allies, bilateral treaty allies are in the Pacific, and we work 

closely with them and our partners and friends. 

I would add to what my colleagues at the table have said in that 

the United States is constrained—and I use ‘‘constrained’’ as a 

positive verb—we’re constrained by law, regulation, and policy in 

what we can do. Other countries are not so constrained, and so 

they are doing things that may be more direct, and I would view 

some of their actions as illegal. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. 

If I could continue with you, Admiral, with nuclear deterrence. 

China is continuing to modernize and also to expand its nuclear 

forces, and your predecessor often talked about the Chinese advancements in the submarine capabilities and the new submarines 

that they’re putting online. 

Are you concerned about the Chinese investments in those nuclear forces? Do you believe that more than reinforces our need to 

modernize our nuclear capabilities? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am, I am concerned, and it reinforces 

my belief that we must continue to modernize our nuclear capabilities. 

Senator FISCHER. Do you see that part as your mission to try to 

get that message out there, that the nuclear deterrence is still, I 

believe, one reason that we have remained safe in this country for 

over 60 years? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. It is my mission as the commander 

of the Pacific Fleet, and if confirmed I will continue to make that 

my mission as PACOM commander. 

Senator FISCHER. I would hope you would be forthright and honest with this committee when you’re questioned in regard to that. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. Slotkin, can you speak to the importance of our deterrent in 

respect to our security commitments that we have? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. Senator, I think that deterrence is a fundamental concept that we think about and work on every day in the 

Department, most recently with the reassurance initiatives that we 

have been partaking with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) alliance, our strongest allies. We have come to Congress 

and asked for additional support for the European Reassurance Initiative so that we can do just that, we can absolutely back up this 

879 

critical deterrent threat against Russian aggressive behavior and 

anyone else who seeks to violate the Article 5 commitments of 

NATO. 

I think it’s a cornerstone of the transatlantic alliance. It’s something we work on every day and we look forward to doing more of 

in light of Russian aggressive behavior. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Fischer. 

Senator Udall? 

Senator UDALL. Good morning to all of you. Let me pick up 

where Senator Fischer just left off and, Mr. Scher, direct a question 

your way. 

In your advance policy questions, you discuss the challenge of 

modernizing our nuclear forces in a cost-effective manner. There 

are a lot of varying estimates of the price involved, the cost involved, but it’s clear we’re going to have to make a significant investment. 

Can you talk about why this is a necessary investment and what 

you think can be done to implement nuclear policy and strategies 

in a cost-effective manner? Because this is a very expensive undertaking. 

Mr. SCHER. Yes, Senator. It is an expensive undertaking. In the 

broad scheme of the DOD budget, it is not a huge percentage. Importantly—and the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary have been 

very clear—this is the number-one priority for them. The nuclear 

enterprise, as we have seen with the reviews that were conducted, 

both the internal and the external review, we clearly see that we 

have underperformed in the nuclear enterprise. It remains safe, secure, and effective. But in order to continue that, we need to make 

sure that we invest in the DOD nuclear enterprise, as well as modernization. 

The Secretary has stated when those reports were rolled out, we spend approximately $15 to $16 billion per year on the nuclear enterprise in DOD, and we are looking to plus that number up in the 

billions, not tens of billions but in the billions, and we’re still making final decisions on the additional money that we put to that. 

But importantly, I would note, it is money that is not coming out 

of future modernization but is coming out from other parts of the 

DOD budget because we recognize the importance of continuing to 

modernize the nuclear enterprise in DOD. 

Senator UDALL. Let me follow up specifically in regards to your 

support for the ‘‘fly-before-you-buy’’ policy for the ground-based 

interceptors. We have in some cases rushed untested systems into 

production, and that’s a costly decision. Can you talk specifically 

about how you’re going to proceed in that context, particularly if 

we can’t deal with the pitfalls that surround sequestration? 

Mr. SCHER. Certainly. First of all, Senator, as I think we were 

asked and I would like to emphasize, sequestration throws all of 

this into question, and it is something the Department feels very 

strongly about broadly. 

In terms of the ‘‘fly-before-you-buy,’’ that is part of our stated policy in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. I, if confirmed, will continue to support that. Certainly we need a robust testing program, 

880 

but we do not want to be testing things that we are not comfortable 

will succeed, although obviously testing means that sometimes 

we’ll fail. But ‘‘fly-before-you-buy’’ is stated policy and, if confirmed, 

I will continue that. 

Senator UDALL. We have an objective through the President’s 

leadership of reducing the total number of deployed nuclear weapons. We’re working on bilateral negotiations with Russia. Can you 

elaborate on why it’s possible to reduce the total number of deployed strategic weapons without jeopardizing our security or 

weakening the deterrent effect of our nuclear enterprise? 

Mr. SCHER. Senator, right now we are looking to get down to the 

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) levels, which we 

look to get to in the early part of 2018. The President has said that 

he believes that we could reduce that further, but he also made 

clear during that, that that was part of a negotiated process with 

the Russians, that we wouldn’t seek to do that without that bilateral work with the Russians. Right now, it’s hard to imagine that 

we are in that situation where we could talk to the Russians about 

that kind of work. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that set of insights. 

Before turning to Ms. Slotkin, I want to acknowledge Ms. 

Starzak. You did great work on the Senate Intelligence Committee. 

I’ve been proud to serve on that committee for 4 years, and I want 

to thank you for your work and for the work you’re going to do in 

the future. You have certainly earned my respect and support for 

your efforts there. 

Ms. STARZAK. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator UDALL. I look forward to working with you when you are 

confirmed, shall we say. 

Ms. Slotkin, you have an enormous portfolio which you’ve come 

to, I think, well prepared to handle. Would you talk a bit about the 

Sahel and the sub-Sahara and what’s happening there and what 

we need to do to have an effective presence? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. The Sahel and, in general, North and West 

Africa are an area where we’re seeing the proliferation of extremist 

groups, some of them small, some of them medium sized, and it’s 

something that we keep a very close eye on, particularly in Mali 

and the countries surrounding Mali. 

I think, first and foremost, we direct our attention in our Intelligence Community on those changing threats. Second of all, we 

work closely with partners in the region, improving our relationships, improving our cooperation so that we can face the common 

threats. They are under most direct threat from these groups. 

Additionally, as you’ve seen in Mali, we work very closely with 

our allies, particularly our European allies, in actually combatting 

the threat. 

DOD is very engaged in supporting a French effort and a United 

Nations (U.N.) effort to try to bring stability back to Mali where 

we had real problems with extremists in the past year-and-a-half. 

Senator UDALL. I believe Senator Fischer and others on the 

panel have already asked you about how we encourage our allies, 

shall we say, to do more. I think the NATO countries are well 

aware of the threats, and we need to see them make a greater investment in their military capabilities. 

881 

Talk about our Arab allies and what it will take for them to realize they cannot continue to play both arsonist and fireman when 

it comes to the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorism 

that follows. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. We have robust relationships with our Arab 

allies, particularly the Gulf states. I think what we’re seeing right 

now in operations in both Iraq and Syria is a real proof of concept 

of the work that we’ve done with the Gulf states in particular to 

build up their capabilities. 

We now have a number of Arab states who are flying combat 

missions over Syria and Iraq. They’re performing targeting. They’re 

performing a number of activities that we do and that they’re doing 

in our stead, and I think that that’s critically important and different than the last time we were engaged in Iraq. I think we’ve 

made some progress on that score. 

I do think that the states of the region see a real threat from 

ISIL and the extremists. They see a real threat from the instability 

emanating out of Syria, and we work very closely with those states 

to try and counter it in their neighborhoods and get them engaged 

to do more, both in Iraq and Syria. 

Senator UDALL. I have a minute left. I know you’re a student of 

history. I know you also have, as Senator Reed pointed out, experience on the ground in Iraq. Could you tell us what historical lessons that you believe we have either ignored or we’ve overemphasized in the past several years, particularly in regards to the Middle East? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. I think that the greatest lesson that I’ve 

learned over the past 11 years in government is that military success must be complemented with political reconciliation and reform, or it certainly isn’t lasting. I think we learned that before we 

decided to surge in Iraq. I think we learned the positive lessons 

during the surge and just after, and I think we saw that demonstrated when Prime Minister Maliki squandered the opportunities that we had provided him. I think that would be, sir, my 

bumper sticker lesson, political reform to complement military success. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that insight. 

Thank you all for your service. 

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. We have how long left on the vote? 

We have 31⁄2 minutes plus 5 for the vote. So if you want to 

start—— 

Senator MANCHIN. I can start very quickly. 

Chairman LEVIN. If there’s nobody here, then just recess, if you 

would, until one of us comes back. 

Senator MANCHIN. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator MANCHIN [presiding]. I’ll start for a few minutes, and 

then we’ll recess. 

First of all, I want to thank all of you and recognize your outstanding service to the Nation. I want to thank you for accepting 

the nomination and thus shoulder the task to help ensure that our 

Nation’s military remains the greatest in the world. 

With that being said, Mr. Scher, if I may, I’ll start with you. 

Having watched this year’s Iraqi security forces fail to stop the inVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00889 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
882 

vasion of ISIS, I remain concerned as we draw down forces in Afghanistan. I want to be clear that I do not support keeping a large 

American force in Afghanistan indefinitely. It seems likely that we 

will need a counter-insurgency force, special forces if you will, there 

for some time. 

How can we prevent Afghanistan ending the way Iraq did, sir? 

Mr. SCHER. Senator, I believe that one of the important things 

is our continued commitment to Afghanistan and working very 

closely with the country and the leadership there. I have great 

faith and confidence in John Campbell, who is the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, and I think he has 

a great vision and working relationship with the Afghanistan leadership, and I expect that he will continue to provide advice and 

counsel to the Department and to the President about what the relationship should be and what military forces and military missions 

should be there for the President to make a final decision. 

I also think that we will benefit from looking at the lessons of 

our engagement in Iraq and hopefully be able to apply them appropriately in Afghanistan. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me ask you about the Afghan security 

forces and securing their own territory, especially given the recent 

voluntary departure of the Kabul police chief. 

Mr. SCHER. Senator, I don’t have a direct view of how capable 

the Afghan security forces are. I know we’ve been working closely 

with them. There are certainly some forces that are quite capable 

and other forces that are probably still engaged in learning. I 

wouldn’t have an assessment but would rely on the assessment of 

General Campbell about how effective they will be as we draw 

down our forces. 

Senator MANCHIN. Concerning Ukraine, what more can be done 

there for us to help Ukraine, other than just the little bit of token 

help that we’re giving right now and the supplies they’ve asked for 

and the type of armament? 

Mr. SCHER. Senator, I think that, as Ms. Slotkin has said, we are 

providing a good amount of support to the Ukrainian forces. This 

is not solely a military condition that we are facing. This has to be 

addressed both by the military and political and diplomatic. There’s 

a range of things from the perspective of DOD that could be 

brought forward, but certainly we’d have to do that in the context 

of the whole-of-government approach. 

Senator MANCHIN. At this time we’re going to go ahead and recess, and I’m going to go vote, and we’ll come right back, and everyone should be back here in a few minutes, okay? Thank you. 

Meeting recessed. [Recess.] 

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. If I can call the hearing back to 

order. Since I’m the only one here and I’m up next, we’ll get started 

until someone else comes. 

Senator NELSON. I’m here. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I know, but they told me I was ahead of you, 

Senator Nelson. [Laughter.] 

They said I could go anyway. 

Senator NELSON. We have another vote coming. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yes. 

883 

Thank you all very much both for your willingness to continue 

to serve our country and also for being here today. 

I would like to start, Admiral Harris, with you, and thank you 

for taking the time to come in and meet with me. I very much appreciate that. 

One of the things that we discussed in our meeting was the potential for Compass Call, which is the military’s only standoff electronic weapons program, to be looked at as potentially coming back 

and providing for important electronic attack aircraft support in 

the Pacific generally. I ask this because this is a program that 

some of our businesses in New Hampshire are very involved in, 

and I just wonder if you could talk a little bit about the potential 

for this system and how it could be used in the Pacific. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. I have used or been associated 

with Compass Call in the past in some of my previous assignments. 

It’s a fantastic platform and there’s nothing like it for what it does. 

If confirmed, I believe that there’s a real need for that electronic 

attack capability in the Pacific. If confirmed, I’ll be asking for all 

that I can get for all the things that are out there in the electronic 

attack arena. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. Anything that we can 

do to support that I certainly am interested in doing. 

I want to follow up next on a question that Senator Inhofe asked 

and that a number of you have referred to around sequestration because obviously it’s something that all of us on the committee are 

also very concerned about, and you all acknowledged the potential 

impact of sequestration. I wonder if you could define how long we 

have to solve this problem before it becomes long-term irreversible, 

or at least has a dramatic impact in the long term before we can 

address reversing the impacts of sequestration. 

Admiral Harris, do you have any sense of how soon it becomes 

an increasing burden? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, it’s already a burden. We were sequestered in 2013, and we’re still coming out of the burden to the maintenance of our ships and aircraft and our training of personnel, 

particularly our pilots. I believe that the sooner we can get the sequester reversed, the better off we are. If we wait until 2016, that 

will just be so much the more that we’ll have to come out of the 

valley that we find ourselves in. If we wait until 2020 or 2021, I 

think it will be too late. I believe by then we’ll be down to maybe 

250 ships. 

China is going to have 350 ships by 2020, and we’re going to be 

down to 250 to 255. I believe that’s dramatic, and that’s globally. 

China is going to have them all there in the Pacific, and we’re 

going to have 250 to 255 to meet all the demands of all the commands and commanders in the whole world. I think the sooner that 

the sequester can be reversed, the better off we will be. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Would anyone else like to add to that? 

Mr. SCHER. Senator, if I could, in addition to supporting everything that Admiral Harris has said, I think the other big piece is 

predictability, the fact that we go year to year not knowing exactly 

what we can plan for. It’s very hard to do long-term strategic planning with short-term budgeting. In addition to sequester and the 

effects we are seeing right now and still trying to climb out of, getVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00891 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
884 

ting some level of predictability and avoiding Continuing Resolutions is very important to the defense budget. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Ms. Slotkin? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I’d just echo those comments as someone who, if 

confirmed, would be responsible for a pretty fractious part of the 

world. The predictability is critical to making sure that we have 

the flexible, agile posture, presence, capabilities that we need to 

handle these threats. I’d just echo what Bob Scher has just said. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Anyone else want to add to that? Mr. Berteau? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Senator, thank you. I think one of the lessons we 

see from history from previous drawdowns is that each year you 

delay adding back, the more it costs. It’s not a one-for-one tradeoff. 

I think that’s part of the calculation that you have to bring into it 

there. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Ms. Starzak, I’m not going to overlook you, but since you’re part 

of the legal system, I’m going to go on to my next question, and 

this is for Ms. Slotkin. 

You talked about lethal weapons as one of the options that was 

being considered in Ukraine. Deputy National Security Advisor 

Tony Blinken also talked about lethal assistance remaining an option that’s under consideration. 

The question that I have for you is under what circumstances 

would the administration consider that option and actually taking 

it off the table and actually providing lethal assistance? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Ma’am, I think that that conversation is going on 

now. Frankly, the failure of Russia to live up to the Minsk agreement, the agreement that they signed and then almost immediately 

started to violate, has just added urgency to the conversation, and 

those considerations are going on right now. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Have you been part of those conversations? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I have, among a number of others in the building 

and throughout the interagency. 

Senator SHAHEEN. It’s still not clear to me what you’re saying 

about what circumstances would suggest that lethal assistance is 

the best course of action. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Ma’am, I think there’s quite a number of factors 

that need to be considered when we think about moving to providing—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yes, like what? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the reaction of the Russians is important, 

what we would do with other states around Russia. I think that 

there are larger policy implications that are being discussed, and 

those are important factors. 

Senator SHAHEEN. One of the comments you made was about 

Prime Minister Abadi and efforts that he was making in Iraq to 

reach out to the Sunnis. What has been the response of Sunnis to 

those efforts? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the response has been mixed. In some cases 

it’s been very positive. He named a Sunni minister of defense who 

is very capable and who spent quite a bit of time out in Anbar 

Province. He’s committed to bringing in members of the tribes out 

885 

in Anbar into the security forces. But I think, as you can imagine, 

some of those tribal elements are concerned. They want to know 

what is truly in it for them, whether the government will follow 

through, because they’ve seen it go a different way in the recent 

past. 

I think he’s saying and doing the right things. The Sunnis are 

starting to get engaged, but they are skeptical. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Are there any other measures that we think 

he could take in the short term or that he has suggested that 

might be helpful in reassuring the Sunnis that he’s serious about 

trying to include them in the government? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. I think actions speak louder than words. He 

has been very public about his intent to bring a large number of 

Sunni fighters into the Iraqi security forces. Given the losses that 

they’ve had in the Iraqi security forces, when he starts bringing 

folks in and actually paying them, putting them on the payroll, 

providing them with uniforms, which he is I think trying very hard 

to do, that to me is going to be something that will demonstrate 

to folks out there that this is someone who is serious—actions more 

than words. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Senator Shaheen and members of the 

committee, and thank you all for your service and willingness to 

continue service in these important positions. 

I’d like to ask some questions about the war against ISIL that’s 

underway right now. Let me read a statement from the President 

from November 5th. ‘‘I’m going to begin engaging Congress over a 

new authorization to use military force against ISIL. With respect 

to the authorized use of military force (AUMF), we’ve already had 

conversations with members of both parties in Congress, and the 

idea is to right-size and update whatever authorization Congress 

provides to suit the current fight rather than the previous fights. 

We now have a different type of enemy. The strategy is different. 

So it makes sense for us to make sure that the authorization from 

Congress reflects what we perceive to be not just our strategy over 

the next 2 or 3 months but our strategy going forward.’’ 

Do any of you disagree with that statement by the President? 

[No response.] 

I’ll take that as a no. 

I assert that there would be some wisdom in Congress debating 

and coming up with an authorization for the war against ISIL 

based upon the magnitude of the operation, the expected operations. Do any of you disagree with that point? [No response.] 

No? 

Do any of you disagree that a debate and a congressional vote 

about the war against ISIL would educate the American public 

about the threat that ISIL poses to the Nation and our allies? [No 

response.] 

None disagree on that point. 

Do any of you disagree that a debate and a congressional vote 

about the war against ISIL would actually offer some support to 

our troops that we’re asking them to fight by suggesting that the 

886 

political leadership of the country is behind their mission? Do any 

of you disagree with that assertion? [No response.] 

Senator KAINE. I have looked to see whether a president has suggested and actually engaged in the initiation of military action and 

said I want to have an authorization from Congress but has not 

sent a proposed authorization to Congress, and I can’t find another 

example of that other than in this circumstance. Do any of you 

know of a circumstance where a president has said to Congress I 

want you to authorize this, but the White House has not offered 

a draft authorization? Are any of you aware of another instance 

prior to this? [No response.] 

No? 

Would you all agree with the assertion that the wording of an 

authorization against ISIL is something that’s not only important 

for a Congress that passes it but it should be of critical importance 

to the administration? Would you agree with that assertion? [No 

response.] 

Would you agree with the assertion that if it’s important to the 

administration what the authorization contains, you’re more likely 

to get what you think is right if you propose your draft version of 

it rather than just if you rely on a fairly dysfunctional bunch of 

Members of Congress of both parties to come up with a version? 

Would you agree that you’d be more likely to get your version if 

you offered a proposal? Does anyone disagree with that assertion? 

[No response.] 

Do any of you know of any reason why the White House has not 

forwarded to Congress a draft authorization for a war against ISIL 

that commenced on August 8th and that is now nearly 4 months 

down the road? Do any of you know of any reason why the White 

House has not forwarded to Congress a draft authorization? [No response.] 

No? 

Admiral Harris, let me ask you a question about an aspect of 

your PACOM responsibility, which is the military-to-military relationship with India. As we’ve discussed, I recently returned with 

Senator McCain from a visit to India, and I was really struck for 

a variety of reasons with real opportunities we have to build a continuous strong relationship with the military in India in a very 

strategic part of the world. Could you offer your thoughts on that? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I believe that India is a key nation in 

the region. I refer to my responsibilities as the Pacific Fleet commander as covering the Indo-Asia Pacific. I use that term intentionally because I believe in the strategic balance that’s offered by 

India. It’s a critical country, and it’s an important country and, I 

believe, an important friend of the United States. I’ll plan to visit 

India in January as the Pacific Fleet commander, and I’ll look forward to that visit. I visited there before in the past, and I look forward to returning there. If confirmed as Pacific commander, my intention is to continue those relationships with my counterparts in 

India. 

Senator KAINE. I think Senator King and I were both surprised 

when we were told in India that India does more joint military exercises with the United States than with any other nation. We 

887 

viewed that as a positive sign, and I’d like to encourage you to continue that and accelerate that trend. 

Admiral HARRIS. It is a positive sign. This past summer, India 

was involved in a trilateral exercise with us and Japan called 

Malabar. They did it in the Western Pacific, which I believe is significant. India sent a ship to RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific Exercise] 

for a Pacific exercise in Hawaii this year, and we welcome their 

presence there, their leaders there, and they have a terrific navy. 

I look forward to continuing my relationships with the navy and 

expanding those relationships with all of the Indian joint forces if 

confirmed as PACOM Commander. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Ms. Starzak, I’m interested in the integration of women into all 

the military occupation specialties (MOS), and especially combat 

MOSs that have previously been closed to women in service. Could 

you offer your perspective about the progress the Army has made 

on this integration of women into combat-related MOSs and what 

you see sort of future developments pertaining to this important 

topic? 

Ms. STARZAK. Absolutely, Senator. Senator, my understanding 

after Secretary Panetta rescinded the 1994 direct combat definition 

of assignment women in January 2013, the Secretary of the Army 

provided a plan on how to move forward. The idea would be to complete the integration of women by January 2016, so that is the 

timeframe that we’re currently looking at. 

It’s been a work in progress, as I understand it. I think we’ve 

looked at opening specific specialties, provided congressional notice 

as things have moved forward, and I think we will continue with 

that process through January 2016. 

Senator KAINE. I hope we might have a status hearing at some 

point on this and have representatives from all the Services. I 

think a lot of good work is being done, and it’s different Service to 

Service for obvious reasons, but I think it’s something that the 

committee would really enjoy hearing about across Service. That’s 

something that I may suggest in the next calendar year. 

I have no further questions, Madam Chairman. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

Mr. Scher, for well over 60 years we’ve had a clearly delineated, 

widely understood strategy with regard to nuclear weapons around 

the world called deterrence, mutually assured destruction. Everybody understood that, and it was based upon an assumption that 

people were at least somewhat rational and that they would not 

want their country to be destroyed. 

Unfortunately, we now seem to be moving into an era where 

there is at least a possibility of non-state actors acquiring nuclear 

weapons who would not necessarily be concerned about their destruction. 

Where do you see us going in terms of a long-term strategic deterrent, if deterrent is the right word, or a long-term strategy for 

dealing with a proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors? 

Mr. SCHER. Senator, the situation you point out is one of the reasons that we spend so much time and effort on nonproliferation efVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00895 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
888 

forts with the Department and the U.S. Government as a whole. 

The scenario you have painted is one that is frightening and also 

one that could be believable. 

Obviously, nuclear weapons continue to have a modest but very 

important role in our overall strategy, but they are a part of the 

overall strategy and a part of what we bring to the table to deter 

adversaries. It is not simply the nuclear weapons. 

I think that, as part of a broad whole, making sure that we have 

all of the capabilities of DOD, the U.S. Government as a whole to 

address the threats from terrorist groups, as well as a clear focus 

and work with other nations on deterring proliferation, that includes being part of the treaty structure, the nonproliferation treaty. That is how we look to approach hoping to stop proliferation 

and then dealing with the proliferants. 

Senator KING. I agree with you that nonproliferation certainly is 

a first line of defense, along with intelligence and other areas. But 

I commend to you the task of developing a strategy because I think 

this is a future that, unfortunately, we may well face. It’s my particular nightmare scenario, because if you have people who don’t 

care about dying, the idea of mutually assured destruction doesn’t 

really have much resonance. I hope that that’s something you’ll follow up on. 

Mr. SCHER. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator KING. Ms. Slotkin, we don’t want the Russians to invade 

Ukraine. Is that correct? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Correct, sir. 

Senator KING. If you want to prevent an invasion, wouldn’t the 

provision of lethal aid to the Ukrainian military be a way to help 

to deter that invasion rather than wait until the invasion occurs 

and then try to fight a rearguard action? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, imposing costs on the Russians for their aggressive behavior is part of the response to the Russians, and hopefully to prevent them doing future activities along the same lines. 

Part of that—there is a military dimension to that, but there’s also 

an economic dimension, there’s also a political dimension. It’s much 

more than just the stuff we can give them. 

Senator KING. I understand that. But you’re being proposed 

here—the title is advisor. As they used to ask on law school questions, the President or the Secretary of Defense walks into your office and says we’re worried that the Russians are going to invade 

Ukraine and the possibility of lethal aid might help prevent that. 

What do you advise? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, in this circumstance, no one piece of equipment 

is going to help the Ukrainians have military parity with the Russians. Unfortunately, there is no singular military solution to the 

problem. 

Senator KING. There may be no one singular piece of equipment, 

but a general reinforcement and strengthening of their capability, 

whether it’s with military hardware, whatever the panoply of 

weapons that they’ve looked for, wouldn’t that make the Russians 

think twice? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes, I think that that’s an important component, 

and that is why we’ve provided over $100 million in security assistVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00896 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
889 

ance; and again, importantly, established this joint commission to 

try and get them to a new place in their military capability. 

Senator KING. Let me move to ISIL. Can they be defeated entirely by air power? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. No, sir. 

Senator KING. It’s going to require troops; is that not correct? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. It will require local forces on the ground who are 

able to clear and hold the territory that we complement with air 

power. 

Senator KING. What’s your assessment of the timing of the local 

forces on the ground, by which I presume you mean principally the 

Iraqi military? When will they be ready to do house-to-house clearing in Mosul? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the situation with the Iraqi military is currently mixed. We sent assessors over in the summer to look at the 

Iraqi military and found that a little over half of the units that we 

looked at were capable of going on the offensive. I think the picture 

is mixed. 

Senator KING. I’m interested in your assessment of how long it 

will take to get to the point where enough of their army is capable 

in order to carry out the second half of the mission. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. First of all, we do have units already going on the 

offensive. They’ve taken back cities, dams, and strategic infrastructure. We do see units already moving out. But I think, sir, if your 

question is when do we really think we’ll be able to destroy ISIL, 

I think this campaign will take years, not months. 

Senator KING. A similar question in Syria. Who are going to be 

the troops in Syria? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Syria is a much more complicated picture, sir. We 

have the Syrian moderate opposition who are a diverse number of 

groups with different levels of capabilities, and we know that they 

are under real pressure. This is why we’ve sent a proposal to Congress for a train and equip program for the Syrian moderate opposition to start to build up those forces on the ground. 

Senator KING. That train and equip program is rather modest 

and will be years in the making. I take it you’re suggesting that 

the campaign in Syria may be also years. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think, unfortunately, the struggles across both 

Iraq and Syria will take years, not months. 

Senator KING. How are we doing in degrading ISIL’s financial capability? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the good news story there, sir, is they were 

gleaning a significant amount of revenue from black market oil 

sales and their control of some key nodes in Iraq on the oil infrastructure, and through air power we have been able to destroy 

some of their heavy equipment, dislodge them from some of those 

key locations, particularly the Baiji Refinery. We’ve seen their revenues, monthly revenues, go down significantly. 

Senator KING. Can we put a number on significantly? Is it 20 

percent, 50 percent, 70 percent? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I don’t have a number for you, sir. I’m happy to 

get back to you with what our current assessment is. 

Senator KING. I would appreciate that. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. 

890 

Senator KING. Because I think that’s a very important part of 

this war. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. Happy to do so. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The U.S. Government estimates Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) earns 

millions of dollars per month through a range of sources, including oil sales, foreign 

donations, ransom payments, extortion, and other criminal activity—but, the average monthly totals have declined significantly. According to the Department of the 

Treasury, ISIL generated approximately $1 million a day through oil and refined 

petroleum product sales until Coalition actions to degrade ISIL’s capabilities in latesummer 2014. The Department of the Treasury now assesses ISIL earns less from 

stolen and smuggled oil sales—now averaging up to a few million dollars per week. 

Coalition airstrikes are impeding ISIL’s freedom of movement and particularly their 

ability to pump, refine, and sell oil, thereby reducing their revenue stream. The U.S. 

Government has also imposed sanctions on anyone who trades in ISIL’s stolen oil 

or refined product. 

Senator KING. Admiral, you talked about China as an enduring 

threat. I’d like to ask you a question, sort of analogizing it to Russia and the Ukraine. China moves against one of its neighbors in 

the South China Sea. What can we as a practical matter do given 

their concentration of force in that region? Similar to what can we 

as a practical matter do about Russia’s annexation of Crimea? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, with regard to China moving against 

some of its neighbors, the potential for that to happen, we have 

treaty obligations with five of the countries in the Pacific, including 

Japan, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia. If China 

were to move against one of those countries, then those treaty obligations would be brought to bear, I believe. 

The best opportunity that we have to preclude China’s expansionist tendencies in Asia is force presence, is to be there when it 

matters and where it matters. 

Senator KING. Similar to what I was talking with Ms. Slotkin 

about, the deterrence of having force in the area. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. Force presence matters, and having 

forces, whether they are in my case today’s naval forces or, if confirmed, the joint force there in the Western Pacific to be ready to 

respond immediately to our friends and allies, especially our allies 

there, matters. It matters on a fundamental level, and that’s the 

value of force presence, and that is why I believe we must continue 

to maintain that presence in the Western Pacific. 

Senator KING. I can’t resist, in closing, pointing out the irony of 

if we were called upon to come to the aid of one of our allies in 

that region against an expansionist China, given our terrible financial condition, we would end up borrowing the money from China 

in order to arm our allies to fight China, but I won’t pursue that. 

Thank you very much, Admiral. 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. 

Senator KING. Thank you all for your service. 

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator 

King. 

Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you and your families for your sacrifice. 

Ms. Slotkin, we recently passed another deadline in the P5+1 

[five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus GerVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00898 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
891 

many] discussions. This is the second time, and I know how important it is to get this right, and what a great benefit it is if we can 

get it right. But I’m starting to become concerned by this pattern, 

and what I’m wondering is with regard to the most recent extension, your views on this and what is the hang-up and what do we 

have to do to get this right now. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. Sir, the negotiations and the extension, they 

still are under the hat of our overall policy, which is to prevent 

Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We still believe negotiations 

are the clearest route to do that right now, but from a Department 

perspective, we underwrite those negotiations with our posture, 

with our capabilities, with our presence in the Gulf, and we continue to provide all options, including contingency planning for 

whatever the President may decide to do. 

We believe the negotiations are the right way forward, but as the 

Department, we stand by with a whole range of options for the 

President. 

Senator DONNELLY. How do these extensions impact our ability 

to manage Iran’s influence with Iraq and with Syria in supporting 

the militias and the Assad regime? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. The P5+1 negotiations are about the nuclear component, but what is separate are Iran’s continuing destabilizing activities in the region, in the Middle East, and in other parts of the 

world. We haven’t taken our eye off that ball. We continue, particularly from the Department’s point of view, to go after the Iranians, 

to look at them very clearly in what they’re doing in their meddling. 

The nuclear negotiations are one area where the State Department has the lead, but there are lots of other things that we remain deeply concerned about with the Iranians’ behavior. 

Senator DONNELLY. Ms. Starzak, one of the issues that has almost burned a hole in my heart, I guess you would say, is the military suicide rate. As counsel for the Army, you have the ability to 

play a prominent role in continuing to bring that rate down. We 

all shoot for zero on that one. I want to know your commitment to 

making sure that happens, that there’s legislation that’s going to 

be coming through in the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), your implementation of it, and that there’s a significant, 

in every way, commitment from the Army, and I know there is, to 

get this to zero. 

Ms. STARZAK. Senator, I am absolutely committed to doing everything I can to help get it to zero, and I share your concern with 

the military suicide problem, particularly the suicide problem in 

the Army, and I will do whatever I can. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. I hope when you see the NDAA come 

through you’ll take a look at that and see the new clauses in there 

and do everything you can to implement it to make it as simple as 

possible for all of our servicemembers. 

Ms. STARZAK. Thank you, Senator. Absolutely. 

Senator DONNELLY. Ms. Slotkin, how closely are you working 

with Syrian tribal leaders and leaders in that country who may 

want to provide help for us? Because one of the things that you 

hear is a lack of human intelligence from Syria, which is extremely 

concerning because how do we know what’s going on on the ground 

892 

if we don’t have friends to talk to us about it? I know we’re working with Sunni tribal leaders, to try to work with them and help 

move it in Iraq. Where are we, if anywhere, with Syrian tribal 

leaders? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Senator, the tribal leaders in Syria, I don’t know 

the specifics of whether we deal with specific tribal leaders. I will 

tell you the good news is many of the tribes in Western Anbar in 

Iraq have families that span the border right there, so strong relationships with tribes on the Iraqi side of the border is particularly 

helpful with managing relationships with members of his family, of 

his tribe, on the other side of the border. 

Senator DONNELLY. Do we have any programs with those Sunni 

tribal leaders in Iraq to find out what they know what’s going on 

in Syria, to find out what they’re doing with their relations in that 

area? Because Syria has been just an extraordinary killing field. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. We are reestablishing many of our contacts with 

tribal leaders out in Western Anbar and, more importantly, we are 

assisting the Government of Iraq in their outreach to the tribal 

leaders. I know that Syria is a topic of regular conversation just 

because ISIL spans the border, the counter-ISIL campaign spans 

the border between Iraq and Syria. I’m not aware of the specifics, 

sir, but I’m happy to take that back. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Department of Defense has engaged in informal discussions with moderate 

elements of the Syrian opposition. The Department, however, does not engage directly with tribal leaders in Syria at this time. In preparation for the Syria trainand-equip program, we are working closely with the Department of State, the intelligence community, and foreign partners to identify local leaders in Syria and candidates for the program. The Department of State has also been working for years 

with local councils and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) within Syria to deliver humanitarian aid and non-lethal assistance. Through these non-lethal assistance programs, Department of State is able to gain a better understanding of the 

current situation within different regions of Syria and identify potentially trustworthy partners willing to pursue local governance. 

In Iraq, while the Department of State leads U.S. Government engagement with 

Sunni leaders, the Department of Defense also engages with tribal leaders on a 

range of security issues. Both Departments are clearly focused on supporting the 

Government of Iraq’s efforts to build Iraqi Government and security forces inclusive 

of all elements of society, including Sunni Arabs. While some tribal leaders have insights on dynamics in the Iraq-Syria border region and eastern Syria, the primary 

focus of our tribal engagement in Iraq is to enhance the institutional relationship 

between local Sunni Arab leaders in Iraq and the Government of Iraq. 

Senator DONNELLY. Another thing I’d like you to take back is the 

amount of resources you have to get the job done there, specifically 

aerial resources, because from all I have seen, there has been an 

incredible shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles and other products 

that are needed to find out what’s going on. Our ability to function 

to the best of our capabilities is dependent on that, and it appears 

to me we are woefully short in that area, and I’d like to know why. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Definitely, sir, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), if that’s what you’re referring to, is an extremely 

high-density asset. 

Senator DONNELLY. Yes. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Every combatant commander, I’m sure—Admiral 

Harris will tell you every COCOM commander wants more ISR. It’s 

in deep competition among the COCOM commanders. I can tell you 

we have thrown significant amounts of ISR at the counter-ISIL 

893 

campaign. I think we are still at 24-hour coverage above Iraq, at 

a minimum. 

But you’re right, there is still competition for this resource. It’s 

invaluable to us, and I hear your concerns. 

Senator DONNELLY. You certainly don’t have 24-hour coverage 

over Syria, do you? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. We do not. 

Senator DONNELLY. I would like to see, if you could provide me, 

your list of priorities, because I’ve been very, very concerned that 

the way we’ve been using them, and with the way priorities were 

lined up, we’re really skewed, which has caused us extraordinary 

damage. I would like to see your ideas as to what should be 

prioritized right now, right now, and what is not. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I’m happy to take that back, sir. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets are some of the most 

in-demand worldwide assets that the Department of Defense manages—and are 

therefore assigned to missions in accordance with U.S. national security interests. 

Changes in ISR coverage are approved by the Secretary of Defense. At present, a 

significant amount of worldwide ISR is focused on the U.S. Central Command area 

of responsibility. The priorities for ISR missions in Iraq and Syria include disrupting terrorist plots against the United States, protecting U.S. persons and U.S. 

Government facilities, and supporting U.S. and coalition forces involved in Operation Inherent Resolve. 

For an in-depth list of the Department’s ISR priorities and allocation, we are 

happy to provide a classified briefing at your convenience. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Berteau, one of the things that we do in Indiana at Naval 

Warfare Center Crane in Southern Indiana, is we do a lot of work 

to detect counterfeit parts, and that’s something that you get one 

part that’s off, it can cause extraordinary damage to planes, to missiles, et cetera. I was wondering your views on counterfeit parts 

and the importance of continuing to make sure that what comes 

through comes through as what we bought for, what we paid for, 

and that we are getting what we were supposed to get. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Senator, this has been an issue of some importance to this committee. In fact, statutory changes were put in 

place. 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. 

Mr. BERTEAU. I have not had the privilege of reviewing the data 

on where DOD stands today in terms of bringing down the incidence of counterfeit parts. I am aware of the role Crane plays. I’ve 

been there a number of times. But it’s one of the issues that I 

would take as a high priority and look into, if confirmed. 

Senator DONNELLY. That would be great, because as the logistics 

guru, we want to make sure that the stuff you’re shipping is the 

right stuff. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Absolutely. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly. 

Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank all of you for being here this morning. 

I’d like to start with Admiral Harris. 

894 

Admiral Harris, the March 14, 2014 U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission Report said that, ‘‘There is growing 

concern among U.S. allies and partners that the United States will 

be unable to follow through on its commitment to the rebalance 

due to declining defense budgets and continuing security challenges 

elsewhere. There is also the perception that the rebalance to the 

Asia Pacific region is a concept and not something that is a priority.’’ 

Admiral Harris, the regional stability in the Asia-Pacific area is 

very important, particularly as there is instability in so many other 

parts of the world, and I know that you said this morning in your 

testimony that the rebalance is real, and you cited some examples 

of decisions and actions that have been taken to reflect that reality. 

From what you have seen, though, how is the rebalance progressing, and what are the future impacts of sequestration in 2016, 

and what have you heard about the rebalance from your counterparts in other countries? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I believe the rebalance is real and 

we’re well into it. From the Navy perspective, our intent is to have 

60 percent of the Navy rebalanced to the Pacific by 2020. We are 

at about 56 or 57 percent right now in terms of ships. We are already at 60 percent in terms of submarines. The Navy, if we continue on the path we’re on, will actually increase in size by 2020 

to about 308 ships from the present 289. This 60 percent would be 

60 percent of a larger number, and I think that’s significant. 

If we are sequestered, if the sequester continues, then that number could be diminished dramatically, as I mentioned before, to as 

low as 250. The number of ships in the Navy that would be in the 

Pacific would be decreased. I think the sequester has an effect on 

that. 

My relationships with my colleagues in uniform in the Pacific are 

strong, and I believe that they welcome the U.S. rebalance, and I 

believe that they are watching what we do very closely. They’re 

watching our commitment to the rebalance, the types of ships, aircraft and submarines that we are putting forward in the Pacific, 

and I’ll be happy to tell you that we are putting our best and our 

newest platforms forward, our Virginia-class submarines, our P8 

Poseidons, EA–18 Growlers, our best aircraft, our best submarines, 

our best carriers are coming forward to the Pacific. But they are 

watching that very closely, as I am, and I think that they will be 

concerned should the sequester continue, just as I will be. 

Senator HIRONO. Admiral, the rebalance is not just about the 

military context but it involves diplomatic, cultural, economic concerns. I do have a very specific question about what sequestration 

could bring and the impact to Hawaii. As the Army’s Supplemental 

Programmatic Environmental Assessment explores the impact of 

reducing some 19,800 Army servicemembers and civilian personnel 

from Fort Shafter and Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, this scenario 

represents a population loss of 70 percent at Schofield Barracks 

and 34 percent at Fort Shafter. 

Can you talk about the impact of these kinds of reductions on the 

capability and readiness of our 25th Infantry Division at Fort 

Shafter in Hawaii? Because I know you’ve talked about forward 

presence and how important that is. 

895 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I view with concern any reduction in 

any of the forces we have in the Pacific, including and especially 

Hawaii, and I’ll review that even more if confirmed as the PACOM 

commander. I have said publicly that I think Hawaii is the key, is 

the gateway to the rebalance, and I think the sequester will affect 

that without a doubt. 

Senator HIRONO. A reduction of 19,800, which is a scenario that 

is reflected, as I said, in the Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment, is a cause of huge concern to not just our national security but, of course, to Hawaii, because it would have a 

significant impact on the economy. But sitting here, though, what 

we’re focusing on is national security and our readiness with regard to this part of the world. 

I just want to make a note for the record of this committee that 

sequestration in 2016 is an issue that we’re going to need to deal 

with in a sensible way. 

You noted in your testimony, and I quote you, ‘‘We should continue to use military engagement with China to demonstrate U.S. 

commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region and to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region, and to 

press China to partner with the United States and our friends in 

the region to address common security challenges.’’ 

Could you elaborate on how you will specifically accomplish, assuming that you are confirmed, a military-to-military engagement 

with China to encourage more collaboration for mutual security 

and/or humanitarian relief concerns? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. I believe that a strong China of 

itself, a strong military in China of itself is not a bad thing, and 

we welcome the rise of a strong China that participates in the 

international arena. I’m concerned, as I mentioned before, about 

the provocations that China has embarked on in the East China 

Sea and the South China Sea. At the same time, I want to acknowledge and applaud China’s efforts in the removal of chemical 

weapons from Syria and the counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of 

Africa/Gulf of Aden region, their work in the search for the Malaysian airliner MH–370, their work in supporting the Philippines 

during the Haiyan Typhoon disaster last year. These are positive 

things. 

But on the other hand, they’re engaged in increasing provocations and tensions in the South China Sea and the East China 

Sea with their neighbors. They have put in place the Air Defense 

Identification Zone, which we believe is illegal. They are working 

counter to regional stability and peace in that area. I view that 

with concern. 

I think it’s important that we continue to have a military-to-military dialogue with China, and I believe that, if confirmed, I will 

pursue that in the joint arena, as I’m doing now in the Navy arena. 

Senator HIRONO. I do recall that when Admiral Locklear testified 

before this committee, he said that one of the areas that he would 

like to improve is a better military-to-military relationship with 

China. At that time, he noted that he has that kind of relationship 

with Russia. That may have changed after Ukraine, but nonetheless we think it’s really important. 

896 

Ms. Slotkin, Jordan is facing many challenges in a region that 

is filled with instability, and I know that they’re taking in many 

refugees as a result of various conflicts, and most recently Syrian 

refugees. What is your assessment of the situation there, and what 

are we doing—we, our country doing—to assist our ally, Jordan? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. We have a robust relationship and an enduring relationship with the Jordanians, military-to-military, Intelligence Community to Intelligence Community, political, economic, 

spans the whole gamut. We have engaged with them for quite some 

time right now about minimizing the instability coming out of 

Syria. 

They are hosting a significant number of refugees, and our close 

military-to-military relationship has resulted in quite a bit of joint 

cooperative work on deterring threats coming out of Syria. They 

are supporting us in our operations in and around the region. We 

are in regular dialogue with them every day, and we are extremely 

concerned, particularly given that they also border Iraq, with their 

border security and have invested significant resources in bulking 

up their border efforts. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hirono. 

We’ll have a 5-minute second round. I expect other colleagues are 

coming back, and there is a vote, I think our final vote. We’re trying to find out if this is our final vote. 

Let me ask a couple of questions of you, Admiral. You’ve testified 

about the problems in the South China Sea, and my question has 

to do with the Convention on the Law of the Sea, as to whether 

or not joining that convention would benefit the U.S. military operations in the Asia Pacific, and how does not being a party disadvantage the United States, if it does. 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I’m a supporter of the Law of the Sea, 

and I believe that U.S. succession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea would be positive and would help me, 

if confirmed, in my responsibilities in the Western Pacific, especially in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea. I believe 

it gives us the moral high ground to be critical of other countries’ 

actions there, and it shows support for the international norms and 

rules. 

Being a member, acceding to the treaty does not mean that we’re 

going to lose any of our rights or freedoms or ability to maneuver. 

But I believe that becoming a member of that treaty would be helpful in the region and would be perceived as positive by our friends 

and allies in the area. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Admiral, as it stands now, during a time of war on the Korean 

Peninsula, the United States would be in operational control of the 

combined U.S. and South Korean forces. That arrangement was 

put in place 60 years ago. Today, South Korea is a prosperous nation with a very capable military, and it should be responsible for 

its own national defense, with our support and the support of others. 

Admiral, I’ve been promised on numerous occasions that there 

would be a transfer of wartime operational control from the United 

897 

States to the Republic of Korea. That commitment has been made 

to me many times over the last decades. While the most recent announcement characterizes this as a delay, it doesn’t appear that 

operational control or OPCON transfer is ever going to happen. I 

hate saying that because I hope it will, and I hope it will soon. 

Nonetheless, I just don’t see it happening, and I see a lot of broken 

commitments. They’re unnecessary, in my judgment, because of the 

capability of the Korean army. Obviously, we would continue to be 

there in a supporting role, but that’s different from having operational control. 

Do you support the transfer of wartime operational control to 

South Korea? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I do support the concept of operational 

control transfer to South Korea when they are ready to take it, and 

I think that’s an important consideration. I would defer to General 

Scaparrotti, of course, because he is there on the Peninsula. I 

would be concerned if they were to take it today. They think 

they’re not ready, and operational control means that they would 

have control of our forces, of U.S. forces in Korea, and I would not 

want that to happen until we are both confident, us and Korea, we 

are both confident that they’re ready to take it, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think they’re always going to say they’re not 

ready because that keeps us there in an operational control capacity, which is their preference apparently. But I think we have to, 

after all these decades, recognize the reality that they have a very 

prosperous nation, they have a capable military, and they should 

be responsible, with our help and support, for their own defense. 

Let’s see. In terms of a first round, in terms of Senator McCain 

and Senator Ayotte, we’re on the first round. I’ve started the second round. 

Senator McCain? 

Oh, I’m sorry. Yes, it goes Senator McCain, then back to Senator 

Manchin to complete the first round. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for 

being on the floor. There was an issue on the floor, and this is what 

we run into when we are having a hearing and floor votes as well. 

It’s very regrettable because we have five nominees, the most I’ve 

ever seen, in a very truncated process here, and you and I have already discussed perhaps the need for additional hearing of these 

witnesses. It just doesn’t work when we have votes on the floor and 

confirmation hearings at the same time because all of us should get 

the benefit of the responses to the questions by our colleagues. 

Ms. Slotkin, in answer to previous questions, you said we are discussing a Turkish proposal. Is that correct? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Elements of a Turkish proposal. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. We don’t have a proposal of our own? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I’m sorry. For the no-fly zone is what you’re referring to? 

Senator MCCAIN. No-fly zone and other aspects of what was described to me by General Allen. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. We have robust conversations going on on—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I’m asking do we have a proposal? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I am not aware of a specific proposal. 

Senator MCCAIN. We don’t have a strategy? 

898 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I don’t think that—that’s not what I’m saying, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Tell me what the strategy is. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Our strategy against ISIL is, first and foremost, to 

defeat that organization across both of our—— 

Senator MCCAIN. That’s an objective. That’s not a strategy. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. So our strategy—I mean, if you’re asking what our 

goals are in Syria—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I’m not asking what the goals are. I’m asking 

what the strategy is. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Our strategy is to defeat ISIL, to—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I just repeated, that’s a goal, that’s not a strategy. I want to know what the strategy is, which entails what we 

deploy, what forces are necessary, what actions need to be taken 

in order to implement or to succeed in the goal that the President 

has articulated of degrading and defeating ISIS. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. On defeating ISIS, we have an air campaign going 

on across both Iraq and Syria. We are looking to improve the capability of the Syrian moderate opposition through a train and equip 

program and ultimately force Assad into a political transition 

where he departs Damascus. 

Senator MCCAIN. Are we bombing any Bashir Assad targets/ 

forces? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. My understanding is the targets at this time are 

ISIL targets. 

Senator MCCAIN. I see, no attacks on—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. ISIL targets—I’m sorry. 

Senator MCCAIN. No attacks on Bashir Assad’s forces while 

Bashir Assad is barrel bombing the free Syrian army. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. My understanding is our targets are ISIL and—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I’m not asking for your understanding. Is it or 

not? I mean, you’re working in the Pentagon. Your title is International Security Affairs. I’m not asking for your understanding. 

I’m asking for the facts. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Our targets are ISIL and other extremist groups, 

including the Khorasan group. 

Senator MCCAIN. But not the free Syrian army. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Bombing the free Syrian army, sir, no. 

Senator MCCAIN. Does that strike you as a bit immoral that we 

would ask thousands of young Syrians to go to Saudi Arabia and 

other places and be trained and equipped and sent back into the 

fight and be barrel bombed by Bashir Assad, and we leave Bashir 

Assad alone? Does that strike you as a little bit immoral, Ms. 

Slotkin? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I think what Bashir Assad is doing is immoral. 

I think he is the magnet for terrorism. 

Senator MCCAIN. Is it not immoral when we don’t try to stop him 

from barrel bombing innocent men, women, and children? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. We are attempting to apply a strategy to force him 

to a political transition, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. By leaving him alone and not hitting him with 

air strikes? That’s bizarre. 

In one of your statements, you cited your work in helping to end 

the war in Iraq as among the most rewarding of your career. ‘‘I 

helped negotiate the U.S.-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement in 

899 

2008, which for the first time established a concrete timetable for 

withdrawal from Iraq which President Obama completed in 2011. 

To see that agreement signed and our troops depart were important emotional events in my life.’’ Is that an accurate quote? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Correct. 

Senator MCCAIN. How is that working out? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I’m extremely disturbed about what ISIL was 

able to do in Iraq. 

Senator MCCAIN. It sort of just happened, like a hurricane or an 

earthquake? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. No, sir. No, sir, it did not just happen. 

Senator MCCAIN. Did you support what most of us argued passionately for, and that was to leave a stabilizing force behind, 

which Ambassador Crocker and Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta all said that we could have gotten? Don’t take my and Joe 

Lieberman’s and Lindsay Graham’s word for it, their word for it, 

that we could have negotiated. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, the administration attempted to negotiate with 

the Iraqi Government, and at the time they thought they could 

handle the threats on their own and they did not invite us in. 

Senator MCCAIN. That’s just patently false, Ms. Slotkin, because 

I was in Baghdad when we talked to Maliki, and they were ready. 

We came back and asked your superiors what is the force that we 

want to leave behind? In the words of Chairman Dempsey, 3,500 

was the number agreed on, which was our final offer. We would not 

tell them the size of the force and what their mission would be. 

Now, those are facts, because we were there on the ground. For you 

to sit there and say that we tried obviously contradicts three of the 

most respected people in America, Ambassador Crocker, Secretary 

Panetta, and Secretary Gates. In all due respect to you, Ms. 

Slotkin, you either don’t know the truth or you are not telling the 

truth to this committee, because we could have left a stabilizing 

force behind. 

Now, if it’s your opinion, then that’s fine. But the facts are not 

that. 

You are glad to see the agreement signed and our troops depart, 

and that was an emotional event in your life. How are your emotions now? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. As I told you, sir, I’m extremely disturbed about 

what ISIL was able to do in that country. 

Senator MCCAIN. So did the surge work? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. The surge worked, and you supported it? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I supported it because I lived it. I went and worked 

at the National Security Council under the Bush administration 

when we decided to surge. 

Senator MCCAIN. Uh-huh. Did it succeed in achieving the goals 

as the President, General Petreus, and Ambassador Crocker defined them at the time? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. It was absolutely the catalyst that turned the 

tide in Iraq. 

Senator MCCAIN. Are you ruling out the involvement of U.S. 

troops in combat roles, as General Dempsey said he thought U.S. 

troops may need to take on a combat role? 

900 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Do I support combat troops, sir? Is that—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Are you ruling out the involvement of U.S. 

troops in combat roles? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. While I’m obviously not the ultimate decisionmaker, sir, I think General Dempsey said that if he feels the need, 

he would recommend that. That is his right. We’d have to look at 

the conditions in the future on the ground. 

Senator MCCAIN. How are the conditions now, Ms. Slotkin? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think that they’re better than they were in the 

early summer, but I think we still have a long way to go. 

Senator MCCAIN. They’re better than they were? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes, when Mosul fell in June. 

Senator MCCAIN. In Kobani and the fact that they’ve taken additional places and they continue to attract thousands of young men 

and a few young women from around the world to their banner, 

and they continue to slaughter innocent men, women and children, 

declaring that enslavement of women is in keeping with Sharia 

law? I guess your view and my view are very different about how 

we’re succeeding. The most powerful air force in the world has still 

been unable to allow the opposition to take Kobani back. 

Do you know why that is, Ms. Slotkin? It’s because we don’t have 

air controllers on the ground. We don’t have people identifying targets. We don’t have the kind of close air support that is necessary 

to win these conflicts. When we give them a week’s warning that 

we’re going to attack them and then strike empty buildings, and 

with the small number of attacks that are carried out, we’re not 

winning, Ms. Slotkin, because we’re not succeeding in rolling back 

the enormous gains that they have made. 

I have lots of additional questions for this witness, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe she is qualified. I believe that she can’t articulate a strategy for the defeat of ISIS, and I will have many additional questions. 

I see my time has expired. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

We’re in the middle of a second round. We’re having the end of 

the first round and the second round going on simultaneously. 

Senator Manchin to complete his first round, and then I believe 

it’s Senator Ayotte. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

To Mr. Berteau, if I may ask, I understand the Defense Logistics 

Agency (DLA) is responsible for the oversight of more than 5.2 million items at a price tag of $35 billion in annual spending for acquisitions. 

Given these rather astounding impressive numbers, how well 

prepared is the DLA to complete a full audit? We’ve been trying to 

get an audit at DOD. How well prepared are you all to do that? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Sir, I have not looked at the finances internally of 

DLA. I’m aware of the reports that they provide publicly and to 

Congress, but I can’t gauge from that how close they are to audit 

readiness. I think that would be a primary interest that I would 

take on immediately if confirmed. 

Senator MANCHIN. Do you accept the audit proposal? We’ve been 

asking for an audit of DOD, agency by agency within the Defense 

Department. 

901 

Mr. BERTEAU. That’s absolutely critical. I’m impressed with the 

progress that appears to have been made there. This is an issue 

that’s been on the docket for 30 years, and elements of DOD are 

now, for the first time, passing audits, and I think that’s an enormous step in the right direction. How close DLA is itself to being 

ready to do that I can’t gauge, but I will certainly take that on. 

Senator MANCHIN. I’ll ask the question of all of you. I’m going 

to go to Admiral Harris. First of all, in your role of the tremendous 

job that you have and that you’re doing, do you believe that we can 

do more with less, or do you believe that sequestering is basically 

without the flexibility? If we gave you the flexibility to sequester, 

and let’s say politically we can’t get through the sequester and get 

over that hump but we were able to give you more latitude as far 

as flexibility, would that help relieve some of the problems you’re 

incurring, or is just the lack of money, period, causing most of your 

problems? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I think any increase in flexibility 

would be helpful. But at the end of the day, the amount we’re talking about can’t be overcome by just shifting money around. 

Senator MANCHIN. Got you. 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe that we should go to a knife fight with 

a gun and not with a butter knife. I think the long-term sequester 

will have that effect on us. 

Senator MANCHIN. You also described basically China’s strategy 

in maritime East Asia and how well we’re doing to support our allies over there? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I believe that China has embarked on 

a maritime sovereignty campaign in East Asia, and I believe that 

we best support our allies and partners and friends out there by 

being there. Forward presence matters, and I believe that— 

Senator MANCHIN. What’s the period of time, do you think? I’m 

so sorry, Admiral, because they gave us such little time here. 

What’s the period of time you think it will take for China to get 

up to a very threatening force, if you will? 

Admiral HARRIS. I think for some regimes, they’re already at a 

threatening level. I believe by 2020, some estimates will have them 

having a navy of 350 ships. The U.S.-China Commission Report 

that Senator Hirono talked about, the 2014 report says that China 

will soon be able to threaten our national security advantages in 

space, our national security satellite program. I view that with significant concern. 

Senator MANCHIN. This is to Ms. Slotkin again, if you will. The 

Iraqi army is reportedly paying salaries to 50,000 soldiers who 

exist only on paper. I think you’ve touched on this, but if you could 

do it again, it just boggles my mind. American taxpayers spent $20 

billion training the Iraqi army. We saw them fold quicker than a 

cheap suit and run. 

With the amount of money that you’re trying to re-surge, if you 

will, to get them up to speed, what are you taking, what steps are 

you taking so this will be prevented, and what have you done on 

these ghost payments and all these millions and millions of dollars? 

Who is receiving that money? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, the good news was it was Prime Minister 

Abadi, in front of his parliament, who made that speech about 

902 

fighting corruption, and he was the one who cited the number of 

50,000 ghost soldiers on his account. The Iraqis are very cash poor 

right now, so he is extremely interested in reaping that money—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Who received the money? Since there were no 

soldiers receiving the pay, who took the graft? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. What I understand is that corrupt military leaders, 

many of whom have been removed from their posts—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Under Maliki? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Under Maliki. 

Senator MANCHIN. So Maliki himself directly? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I don’t know about him himself, but certainly commanders who had those ghost soldiers on their books were simply 

taking their salaries is what I understand. 

Senator MANCHIN. Do you know if there is any action being 

taken against them? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Besides the Prime Minister removed 36 of those 

commanders and another 20-plus today from the Ministry of the 

Interior, and—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Do you know if there are any actions the 

United States Government is taking to get that money back to the 

United States Treasury? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I do not know of any action. 

Senator MANCHIN. Could you check that out for me and let me 

know on that? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Government of Iraq is responsible for its own budget expenditures and Iraqi 

leaders, working from the top down, have the strongest ability to prevent corruption 

among Iraqi Government and security officials. 

The U.S. Government, with the Department of State in the lead, is actively working with the Iraqi Government to support its efforts to curb corruption in its system. 

The Department of State routinely engages Prime Minister Abadi to lead on this 

effort. To this end, Prime Minister Abadi has taken some important steps early in 

his tenure, including relieving from their positions dozens of Ministry of Defense 

and Ministry of Interior officials who were not appropriately executing their responsibilities or accused of corruption. Prime Minister Abadi also gave a public speech 

in front of parliament highlighting the problem of corruption and ghost soldiers and 

pledging to clean up the record-keeping to prevent this problem from happening 

again. 

The U.S. Government is not taking action to retrieve retroactive funds from the 

Government of Iraq. The U.S. Government has not paid salaries for the Iraqi Security Forces since the conclusion of Operation New Dawn in December 2011. Since 

then, salaries have been paid by the Government of Iraq. 

Senator MANCHIN. Also, what are we doing to ensure this 

doesn’t—I can’t believe that we’re sending checks, giving them 

money designated for soldiers that don’t even exist. Who is checking that? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Right now, sir, we are not providing any money for 

salaries, for uniforms, for life support for the Iraqi soldiers. The 

Iraqi Government is providing that. What we’re proposing in our 

Iraq train and equip fund is to provide them some capability training to help them stand up or restand 12 brigades up in the country. 

We’re not suggesting that we pay for salaries, for life support, for 

uniforms, as we did previously. 

Senator MANCHIN. Real quick, if I may, sir, one final thing. 

On the Kurds, where do we stand with the Kurds? Are we getting any equipment to the Kurds to defend themselves? Because 

903 

they’re the only ones who seem willing to fight and die for their 

country. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. The Kurds had a delegation here last week. You 

may have seen them. I think this is actually a good news story. 

The Government of Iraq responded in extremis when the Kurds 

came to them and to us and to everyone in the world asking for 

a surge of weapons that they desperately needed. The Government 

of Iraq was the first to respond. They flew two C–130s of their own 

up there full of equipment; and then, frankly, a huge coalition of 

international partners has come to the aid of the Kurds to provide 

them those weapons because they are very much on the front lines. 

They just had a second tranche of equipment that they requested 

get approved by the Government of Iraq, and it includes things like 

mine resistant ambush protected vehicles and Humvees and antitank weapons, more serious weaponry. 

They are very much on the front lines, but I believe we’re getting 

them equipment that they need. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Manchin. 

Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the Chairman. 

I’m going to give the beginning of my time to Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ms. Slotkin, do you believe that we should be 

providing the Ukrainians with defensive weapons? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, that is something that’s under consideration 

right now. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the witnesses for being here 

and your willingness to serve. 

Admiral Harris, I would like to follow up with you. I know you’ve 

talked about the importance of our attack submarine fleet. What 

currently is our attack submarine fleet meeting the requests of our 

combatant commanders, and also the requests of what we need in 

PACOM? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, right now the combatant commander 

demand for attack submarines, we’re only meeting as a Navy about 

half that demand, about 53 percent in the Pacific. Right now, while 

I can’t go into the specifics of what the demand signal is in this 

hearing, the PACOM commander’s demand signal is being met by 

me as the Pacific Fleet commander at just over 50 percent. 

Senator AYOTTE. Obviously you’ve already talked about the importance of the Virginia-class submarine and continuing to ensure 

that we have production of that submarine at an adequate rate to 

try to meet our concerns in terms of the requests of the combatant 

commanders. 

You and I have talked when we met in the office about the importance of our public shipyards, and one of the things that is very 

important is how we maintain our submarine fleet. I know that you 

have agreed, and I’m very glad and looking forward to hosting you 

at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. We’re very proud of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the work done by the very talented and 

trained workers there. 

In fact, one thing I wanted to highlight is that the Portsmouth 

Naval Shipyard has actually been producing and putting things out 

ahead of schedule, including in April the workers at the Shipyard 

904 

undocked the USS Topeka 20 days ahead of schedule following an 

engineering overhaul. In June, they did the same thing in terms 

of maintenance availability for the USS California and got it back 

in the fleet 14 days ahead of time, as well as in September the 

Shipyard did the same, delivering the USS Springfield back to the 

fleet ahead of schedule and under budget. 

These are the kinds of examples of how do we, in a resource constrained environment, perform to a top level. I look forward to you 

seeing what we’re doing at the shipyard, what the workers are 

doing there to be able to perform ahead of schedule on such an important function of maintaining our attack submarine fleet, and I 

look forward to hosting you and working out a time to do that. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. I look forward to visiting Portsmouth. If confirmed, I’ll do so as soon after I assume the command 

as possible. I think our public shipyards are national treasures. I 

think that schedule is money, and if you can make schedule or beat 

schedule, then you’re making money, and I think that’s important. 

I look forward to visiting Portsmouth. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate your willingness to do that. 

Ms. Slotkin, I wanted to follow up on the question. One of the 

questions I wanted to ask you was, as I understood it, Senator 

Inhofe asked you about what is happening in Ukraine. You answered his question saying you don’t know what the actual definition of an invasion is. 

Do you believe what the Russians have done in Ukraine is an invasion of that country, yes or no? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. ma’am, we consider it an unlawful occupation of 

Crimea in particular and continuing destabilizing activities in 

Eastern Ukraine. 

Senator AYOTTE. So do you believe that’s an invasion? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Again, I don’t believe that—I don’t want to 

misspeak, but I can tell you we believe it’s an unlawful occupation. 

Senator AYOTTE. So General Breedlove in November, who is the 

commander of the U.S. European Command, has said ‘‘We have 

seen columns of Russian equipment, primarily Russian tanks, Russian artillery, Russian air defense systems, and Russian combat 

troops entering Ukraine.’’ 

If, in the United States of America, we saw columns of equipment from another country, tanks, artillery, air defense systems 

and combat troops against the will of our government entering this 

country, would you be prepared to call that an invasion? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. ma’am, again, I think, it sounds like an invasion, 

yes, the way you described it. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. Let’s just call it what it is, because you’re 

being nominated for a very important position, and if we can’t have 

basic conversation about what is an invasion of another country 

and what is not, then it’s going to be very difficult to address the 

challenges we face in the national security context. 

Now that we understand that it is an invasion of another country, on this issue of lethal aid to Ukraine, what will you or will you 

not recommend that we should be providing lethal aid to Ukraine? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. ma’am, I believe, particularly in light of the events 

this fall with the Russian flagrant violation of the Minsk agreeVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00912 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
905 

ment that they had just signed up to, that all options should be on 

the table. 

Senator AYOTTE. One thing that my office has been trying to get 

an answer from is that we have asked the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense to answer a very simple question, and that is, is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency developing a contingency plan 

to provide arms to Ukraine? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. ma’am, again, we’ve made a series of options available, including additional arms. 

Senator AYOTTE. Does that mean that the answer is that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is developing a contingency plan 

to provide arms to Ukraine? So the answer to that would be yes? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. As I’ve said, we’ve provided quite a number of options, including sending additional arms. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to make sure that I can get a specific 

follow-up to what I’ve just asked because that will be key to a contingency plan on the provision of arms. 

One thing, having listened to President Poroshenko come before 

the joint session of Congress, and essentially he’s very appreciative 

of the assistance of the United States of America, but he rightly 

said that they cannot defend against columns of tanks, troops, air 

defense systems coming from Russia with blankets alone, and I 

would hope that we have a country with Ukraine that actually, 

under the Budapest Memorandum, gave up their nuclear weapons. 

We were a signatory to that agreement. Russia has actually repudiated that agreement by its actions in terms of not respecting the 

sovereignty of that country. 

I would hope that we would provide lethal assistance to Ukraine 

because I’m just not sure why any other country would ever give 

up their nuclear weapons again when we won’t give them basic 

arms. don’t you think that is an important consideration for us in 

the bigger picture? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think it’s a consideration, ma’am, of course. But 

I do think, again, no matter what we give the Ukrainians, no one 

piece of equipment is going to make them military competitors to 

the Russians. There is certainly a military dimension to this problem, but there’s not a military solution to the problem. 

Senator AYOTTE. The President of Ukraine came to our Congress 

and asked for lethal assistance. He believes it’s important. They’re 

willing to fight and die for their own sovereignty. They gave up nuclear weapons, and in return for respect for their sovereignty we 

were signatory to that agreement, the Russians were a signatory 

to that agreement. When other countries like Lithuania in the Baltics say they are worried about what Russia’s next steps are, I 

think that to think about the fact that they could be out-matched, 

so we’re just going to let Russia run all over that country when 

they’re willing to defend themselves, I think it’s unconscionable 

that we have not provided this assistance to them, and I would 

hope—you are going to have a very important position—that you 

will provide a leadership position in saying that we really should 

be doing all that we can to allow them to defend themselves. If we 

don’t, I think the consequences are quite grave, not only for 

Ukraine but the surrounding countries in the region. 

I know I’m beyond my time, so I thank the chairman. 

906 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here, and congratulations to you, and 

thank you for your service. 

I want to follow some of the questions about Ukraine that have 

been asked and at the outset say that I share the impatience and 

concern that has been articulated so well by my colleague and 

friend from New Hampshire and others on this panel. I think our 

situation there is increasingly untenable, whatever it’s called—engagement, unlawful occupation. The fact of the matter is, as the 

New York Times reported just recently, Russian ‘‘tanks and other 

military vehicles are pouring over the border from Russia into 

Eastern Ukraine’’. Put aside what’s happened in Crimea, Russian 

aggression has been flagrant, blatant, ongoing, effective in Eastern 

Ukraine, in real time. It’s not history. It’s ongoing right now. 

I believe that the time has come to provide defensive weapons, 

to listen to the Ukrainians, most recently the President of Ukraine, 

President Poroshenko, when he came to us in this Congress and 

asked for those kinds of weapons so that the Ukrainians could defend themselves. 

It’s not that they are seeking to add land. They are defending 

themselves, and I’ve come to that point of view after a great deal 

of thought. I respect the expertise and experience, Ms. Slotkin, that 

you and others in DOD and the Department of State have in this 

area, and I’m not going to put you through the same round of questions. 

But I would ask, when will this decision be made about whether 

to provide these weapons? Because time is not on our side. The 

Russians are continuing to arm the rebels and separatists there, 

and people are dying. Two of the victims of Russian aggression are 

in the Bridgeport, Connecticut Burn Center right now, having lost 

limbs to this struggle. It affects the Ukrainian community in Connecticut and around the country. It’s not just a Ukrainian struggle. 

Ukraine is the testing ground for the United States against this 

kind of blatant, ongoing aggression. 

What is the timeframe? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Senator, those conversations are happening in real 

time. They’re happening now. The ultimate decision is the President’s, and I’m just not privy to the final timeline. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. When do you think we should be making 

a decision? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I would always want decisions as fast as possible. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What do you see as the immediate development there in terms of holding ground, holding land there, by 

the Ukrainian Government? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I’m sorry, Senator, could you repeat that? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What do you see as the developing line of 

events in the future? How soon do you think there will be continuing losses, or do you think there will be a continuing stalemate? What’s your prediction as to what will happen in the next 

very short timeframe? 

907 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Unfortunately, we continue to see Russia’s destabilizing activities, their flagrant violation of the Minsk agreement. 

I, unfortunately, fear that will continue. I don’t see that ebbing 

right now. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. That there will be continuing Russian aggression. But will there be loss of cities, of land? What’s your prognosis? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I hope not, Senator, and I believe the Ukrainian 

military is fortifying itself, and we continue to provide advice and 

counsel to them, along with additional equipment. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. If the President were to decide to increase 

the level of equipment, what would you recommend to him? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, as I’ve said, we’ve provided a range of options. 

I’m not at liberty to provide my private advice that I’ve provided 

up my chain. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me shift topics, although the subject 

is still Russia. As you’re aware, Rosoboronexport has been providing helicopters and Mi-17s to the Afghan Government with 

American taxpayer dollars buying them. I have been at the lead of 

the effort to stop those transactions, and the NDAA has a provision 

relating to those continuing purchases now of components and 

parts to maintain and supply the helicopters that have already 

been delivered. 

I regret that we are in the situation that we have found ourselves. I have opposed those continued deliveries of helicopters, as 

well as the continued sales of parts. They ought to be American 

helicopters, and the purchases certainly should not be from the 

Russian arms agency that continues to fuel aggression in Ukraine. 

I’m asking for your commitment on your confirmation. Will you 

commit to finding alternative means of maintaining and supplying 

parts for the existing inventories of Mi-17 helicopters that we have 

financed, in effect? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I will certainly commit to looking into alternatives, 

sir. I share your frustration. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

That concludes my questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

For a second round, Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Scher, I wanted to follow up with you. In your written response to the committee’s questions, you were asked about nuclear 

weapons reductions, and you said, ‘‘Yes, I believe we should pursue 

further negotiated verifiable reductions in the nuclear forces of the 

United States and Russia, and that would enhance U.S. national 

security.’’ 

You also cited the Nuclear Weapons Guidance announced in 

June 2013, and that would have included the President’s assertion 

that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies 

by safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in our deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the levels established by the New 

START treaty. 

I want to ask you about that because, as I look at your answer 

in the advance policy questions, and citing the President’s desire to 

reduce our nuclear deterrent another third, our strategic weapons, 

908 

I would ask you how does that play when you look at the Russian 

violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the 

INF Treaty, which the White House, in my view, belatedly acknowledged? Because I’ve been pursuing this issue for a while behind the scenes, but obviously that’s a deep concern where they are 

flight testing ground-launched cruise missiles within a range of 500 

to 5,500 kilometers, so a violation of the INF Treaty. We have the 

invasion of Ukraine by the Russians. 

Tell me what you think about the potential reduction of our nuclear strategic stockpile and resources in light of the potential INF 

violations, in light of the invasion of Ukraine. That worries me in 

terms of your view of the role of our nuclear deterrent. 

Mr. SCHER. Senator, I agree with the President’s statements 

when they were made that we could reduce by up to a third if we 

did it in conjunction with the Russians in a negotiated process, 

that we would still be able to achieve our operational aims, as well 

as be safer with fewer nuclear weapons across the world. 

Certainly, however, as you have pointed out, we have to take a 

look at any discussions with Russia in the context of all of the activities that are going on, be it Ukraine, be it the violations of the 

INF Treaty. At this point, we’ve seen no indications that Russia 

has any interest in discussing any of these topics with us, especially not nuclear arms reductions, and as a result I would agree 

with the President that absent that cooperation with Russia, that 

we stay with the New START agreements, which we still see Russia adhering to. 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me ask you this. Do you think that we 

should ever undertake a unilateral reduction without a negotiated 

agreement with Russia? 

Mr. SCHER. I think that we are in a position now where I would 

obviously agree with the President that we could, but that the key 

is a negotiated reduction. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do you believe that it would be important that 

if we were to achieve any reductions, it would be a negotiated reduction? 

Mr. SCHER. I believe that that is a critical part to looking at how 

we could achieve our operational ends. 

Senator AYOTTE. I would hope that if there were ever a move in 

that direction again, that you would also seek congressional approval. I might add, too, that obviously I don’t think we could trust 

negotiating with the Russians right now, so I would hope that the 

administration would never at this point, in light of their behavior, 

think about going down that road. 

I also wanted to follow up one additional question to Admiral 

Harris, and that is on the missing-in-action (MIA) recovery operations in North Korea, Admiral. In October 2011, DOD announced 

an agreement with North Korea that would have allowed U.S. personnel to return to North Korea to resume recovery of remains of 

U.S. servicemembers missing in the Korean War. In your advance 

responses, you said that the arrangement negotiated in 2011 covered for a year is no longer valid, and I understand that given what 

we have seen from the Government of North Korea, and certainly 

that’s really unfortunate when we look at the efforts we want to 

909 

make on behalf of those who are missing in action and their families. 

We have 43 from New Hampshire that have been listed in terms 

of Korea, and we have a solemn obligation to ensure that we never 

leave our servicemembers behind and make every effort to recover 

their remains, and we owe them that. 

Do I have your commitment that you’ll do everything possible, 

obviously consistent with our national security interests, to facilitate recovery operations in North Korea if it ever becomes viable 

again for us to do that with that government? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am, you do. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me continue, then, my second round. 

Ms. Slotkin, the ethnic and religious minority communities in 

Northern Iraq, including the Christians, have suffered horrific attacks by ISIL. They have had to flee violence in mass numbers. 

Several years ago the Government of Iraq issued an order to begin 

establishing the Nineveh Plain Police Force, a security force recruited from those vulnerable communities to provide local protection. U.S. forces in Iraq at the time supported the effort, but the 

Nineveh Force never attained its goal of 5,000 police personnel. 

Does the military assistance plan for Iraq include training and 

equipping local security forces in vulnerable ethnic and religious 

minority communities such as the Yazidis and the Christian communities in Nineveh to empower those communities to defend 

themselves from ISIL? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Senator, we certainly welcome and support representatives of all the groups, particularly the most vulnerable, in 

our training program. It has not yet begun, but there’s no reason 

why representatives from the entire spectrum shouldn’t be in it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that part of the local police force plan, like 

the National Guard which we talk about, so that we have local people defending their own communities? Is it part of our plan specifically that the religious communities be focused on so that they can 

have the power to defend themselves? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. One of the key items of discussion with the 

Iraqis is the National Guard Program, which would indeed allow 

communities to provide for their own local security. It’s an important initiative and would do exactly what you’re talking about, 

allow forces to maintain responsibility for their own safety of their 

families and their communities. 

Chairman LEVIN. That includes an awareness that these very 

vulnerable communities have a need to do exactly that? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Are they included in our plan specifically? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, again, there is no group that is excluded or included right now. It is a—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Which means they’re included? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Absolutely. 

Chairman LEVIN. The question that you were asked about 

Ukraine—and, by the way, I very publicly urged that we provide 

the Government of Ukraine with non-provocative lethal weapons 

that are defensive weapons. When you answered the question that 

910 

you don’t have an answer on defensive weapons, I assume your answer referred to lethal defensive weapons. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. On non-lethal defensive weapons, I presume 

you—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. We’re already providing, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. That you would support? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Of course. 

Chairman LEVIN. As long as I make clear my position, as I have 

repeatedly, I happen to believe it’s long overdue, that non-provocative defensive weapons, even if they are lethal, should be provided. 

I also believe that there is no military solution but that if the 

Ukrainians want to die going down fighting, that they have that 

right to defend themselves, and we should give them what they’re 

asking for, providing it’s not provocative. If it’s defensive weapons, 

that’s different. But there’s no intent or no evidence that Ukraine 

is going to invade Russia. 

The question really comes down to—and I add the word purposefully non-provocative defensive weapons. I don’t know why we can’t 

provide anti-tank weaponry to the Ukrainian Government. I don’t 

understand why we can’t do it. We understand that if Russia decided to move into the Ukraine in massive numbers, that there 

would be no stopping them. Ukrainians understand that, by the 

way, because we made it clear to the Ukrainians that this isn’t 

going to be Hungary all over again, where we’re implying to you 

that we’re going to come militarily to your assistance with boots on 

the ground. They understand that. But they also don’t understand 

why we don’t help them do what they are determined to do, which 

is defend themselves, even if that means they end up in a guerilla 

war against Russia instead of being able to defeat them on a battlefield. 

I know you’re in a position here, and I gather from your answers 

that you’re in the middle of your present job of providing advice to 

the administration, so that puts some constraints on you, I gather, 

as to what your advice is. When you’re asked what your advice 

would be, that is, in essence, asking for what your advice currently 

is in the areas of Ukraine and Iraq and Syria. Is that one of the 

reasons why there’s some constraint in terms of your expressing 

your opinion as to what your advice would be, because you’re currently giving that advice and you’re not able publicly to say what 

your advice is to the administration? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. That’s correct, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think it would have been useful probably for 

you to indicate what those constraints are. I mean, that there are 

constraints. We don’t have to have the exact definition of the constraints, but the fact that there are constraints, it seems to me, if 

it’s not clear to everybody here, which it isn’t, I think that it would 

have been helpful if you had made clear that there are those constraints. There are such constraints? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. There are, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of one of the questions of Senator McCain, this has to do with how much effort was made to 

leave some residual forces in Iraq. The decision was made by President Bush to set a date for the deadline for the removal of all of 

911 

our forces. The issue battled back and forth is whether or not the 

Obama administration made an adequate effort to try to persuade 

Maliki that it’s in everybody’s interest, theirs and ours, that we 

leave some kind of a force there. 

This is what Secretary Gates said in his book. ‘‘In the end, the 

Iraqi leadership did not try to get an agreement through their parliament that would have made possible a continued U.S. military 

presence after December 31.’’ These are Gates’ words: ‘‘Maliki was 

just too fearful of the political consequences. Most Iraqis wanted us 

gone.’’ From Gates’ book, that’s what I get. I have not heard him 

speak otherwise on this subject, or if I have I’ve forgotten what he 

said, but I read his book on this subject, and his book says that 

Maliki would not present an agreement to the parliament. That 

agreement, of course, would be a bilateral security agreement 

which would protect our troops in case of a claim that there was 

a criminal violation by one of our troops. We weren’t about to leave 

it up to an Iraqi system of justice to try our troops. We insisted 

on a bilateral security agreement which would protect our troops, 

which we have with every other country where we have troops, at 

least most other countries where we have troops. 

That, just for the record, is what Gates said in his book, somewhat different from what Senator McCain said is Gates’ position. 

But again, Senator McCain may have information I don’t have 

about something that Secretary Gates may have said in some 

places other than in his book on this subject. 

When you say that relative to Ukraine there’s a series of options 

which have been made available, to whom? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, the Defense Department, the State Department, we all sit in an interagency process. The Defense Department provides recommendations up through the Secretary of Defense and then over to the White House and the rest of the interagency for consideration. That’s what I’m referring to. 

Chairman LEVIN. It goes up the chain, ultimately to the President? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Ultimately the decisions that are made in the 

interagency must go up through the President when it’s on an important decision. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You indicated that something was better in 

Iraq, I believe, than it was last summer. Were you referring to Iraq 

or to Syria or what? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I was saying the security situation in Iraq today 

is at least better than when Mosul originally fell in June in Iraq. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Can you explain what you meant by better? I know you don’t believe it’s good because—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes, I wouldn’t define it as good. 

Chairman LEVIN. But you indicated it was better. I’m just wondering if you would explain your position on that. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. I think since the summer, and certainly since 

we decided to take kinetic action in Iraq and provide air support, 

we’ve seen Iraqis, the Iraqi security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga 

forces and Iraqi tribal forces take back critical areas in Iraq that 

ISIL had captured in the early parts of their offensive in June, in 

particular key infrastructure locations, the Mosul dam, the 

912 

Haditha dam, the Baiji refinery, major towns along the border with 

the Kurdistan regional government. 

I would by no means call it good, sir, but we have been able to 

support the Iraqis as they retake critical areas that were taken in 

the early parts of the summer. 

Chairman LEVIN. I don’t see any of my colleagues here for the 

second round. It’s about quarter to 1 p.m. now. What we will do 

is we will adjourn this hearing, and there will be questions for the 

record. Whether or not there’s a need for an additional hearing for 

one or more of our witnesses, we will leave that question open. 

We obviously hope to move these nominations. It is a lame duck 

session. The timing is very, very difficult, not just for nominations 

but for the Defense bill that is the main responsibility of this committee. Our major responsibility is to get our Defense authorization 

passed. Our second responsibility, obviously, is to deal with nominees as part of the confirmation process. 

We’re going to do the best we can on both fronts, hopefully get 

a Defense authorization bill, a new bill that would be a bipartisan 

bill, a bicameral bill introduced today which would reflect the efforts of our committees, the leadership of our committees, the staff 

on our committees for many, many months, indeed for a whole 

year. I hope we can get that bill passed. 

It will be introduced in a few hours, and I also again hope that 

we can get as many nominees as we can confirmed, but I don’t 

want to raise false hopes on either account. Lame duck sessions are 

named in a weird way, but they also maybe involve much more 

than the usual understanding of lame duck, which means less 

power. It also means a lot less time to get an awful lot of work 

done that in some cases should have been done long ago. 

With that, we thank our witnesses. We thank your families. 

Again, the record will stay open, and we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Robert M. Scher by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been successful in improving 

operational and warfighting effectiveness, and I do not see the need to modify that 

legislation. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I do not think modification is required. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

913 

Answer. At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (ASD/SPC) 

advises the Secretary of Defense on the formulation of national security and defense 

policy, the integration and oversight of the Department of Defense (DOD) policy and 

plans to achieve national security objectives, and strategy and policy on matters relating to nuclear weapons, missile defense, and security cooperation. ASD/SPC also 

provides policy support to the USD(P) and the Secretary in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution processes inside the Department, including the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Nuclear Posture and follow-on reviews, and 

annual program and budget reviews. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The ASD/SPC provides similar support to the Deputy Secretary as described above. 

Question. The Under Secretaries. 

Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Under Secretaries of Defense in support of the Secretary’s objectives. Specifically, the ASD/ 

SPC provides the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with policy input regarding acquisition and programmatic activities, most notably relating to nuclear weapons and missile defense. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The ASD/SPC works collaboratively with other Assistant Secretaries of 

Defense to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary with advice on policy issues under 

consideration in the Department and provide policy oversight to ensure that the 

Secretary’s guidance is implemented. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Chairman 

and Vice Chairman to provide support on matters that affect strategy, force planning and employment, nuclear weapons, and missile defense. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The ASD/SPC provides similar support to the Vice Chairman as described above. 

Question. The Service Secretaries. 

Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Secretaries 

of the Military Departments on a broad range of strategy, policy, and force planning 

issues and other areas in which the Military Departments and Services are critical 

stakeholders. 

Question. The Service Chiefs 

Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Service 

Chiefs on a broad range of strategy, policy, and force planning issues. 

Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. 

Answer. At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the 

ASD/SPC works with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command on a broad range 

of issues that affect strategy and policy for nuclear weapons and missile defense. 

Question. The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. 

Answer. At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the 

ASD/SPC works with the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command in support of strategy development and execution and contingency planning. 

Question. The combatant commanders. 

Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works closely with the Regional and Functional Combatant Commanders, particularly in support of strategy 

development and execution, and steady-state and contingency planning. 

Question. The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 

Answer. The ASD/SPC works collaboratively with the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to provide the USD(P) with advice and recommendations on security cooperation issues to ensure alignment with defense 

strategy. 

Question. The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration. 

Answer. The ASD/SPC works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrators 

of the National Nuclear Security Administration to provide policy support to the 

USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on strategy and policy issues relating to nuclear weapons modernization and related issues. 

DUTIES

Question. The position for which you have been nominated has been substantially 

restructured. 

914 

What is your understanding of the duties that you will be assigned if you are confirmed? 

Answer. My understanding is that the ASD/SPC is primarily responsible for advising and supporting the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on formulation and 

coordination of national security and defense strategy, the forces and contingency 

plans necessary to implement defense strategy, U.S. nuclear weapons and missile 

defense policy, and security cooperation plans and policies. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I have had more than 23 years of experience in a variety of positions as 

a career civil servant in the Departments of Defense and State, as a political appointee in DOD, and as a consultant at Booz Allen Hamilton in many of the areas 

of responsibility assigned to the ASD/SPC. In my current capacity as the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, I serve as the principal advisor to USD(P) 

and the Secretary on all policy matters pertaining to plans and force posture. During my 15-year tenure as a career civil servant in the Departments of Defense and 

State, I helped develop the strategic basis for U.S. Defense strategy, including participating in the oversight of the Bottom-Up Review and the 1997 QDR, and I 

worked extensively on Presidential Decision Directive-56 on conducting complex contingency operations. 

Question. What additional actions do you believe you need to take, if any, to fulfill 

the responsibilities of this position? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on the actions and relationships necessary to 

perform the duties of the ASD/SPC effectively . Nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy will need particular attention and, if confirmed, I would develop the relationships and knowledge needed to provide policy guidance in these critical areas. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities? 

Answer. Crafting strategic guidance, supporting programmatic options, and ensuring planning processes allow DOD to apply resources as efficiently as possible in an 

era of fiscal and strategic uncertainty will be challenging. It also will be a challenge 

to ensure that our efforts to modernize U.S. nuclear forces meet policy and strategy 

requirements in a cost-effective manner. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, it would be my priority to ensure our nuclear forces remain 

safe, secure, and effective and that they are planned, postured, operated, and modernized in accordance with policy guidance. I also would work to publish strategic 

guidance that promulgates clear priorities and risk tradeoffs and infuse this guidance into processes and decisionmaking fora throughout DOD. 

Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of your responsibilities? 

Answer. I am concerned about implementing policies and strategies in a cost-efficient manner. 

Question. If confirmed, what management action and timelines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P) and the ASD/SPC staff to 

establish specific action plans and timelines and to identify and resolve problems 

relating to the ASD/SPC portfolio. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish for the office to 

which you have been nominated? 

Answer. If confirmed, my priorities for SPC would be to create a new fully integrated ASD component and to provide excellent policy support to the USD(P) and 

the Secretary across my portfolio. 

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Question. One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and 

civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities supports the 

USD(P) who is required to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written polVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00922 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
915 

icy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing 

such plans. 

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the 

formulation of strategy and contingency planning? 

Answer. Civilian leadership is critical and a statutory responsibility in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. Civilian oversight takes our U.S. national security policies and establishes strategic ends and baseline assumptions for 

the military. The military uses those strategic ends and assumptions to guide its 

planning. 

Question. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning? 

Answer. In my experience, civilian leadership has the appropriate authorities and 

processes to provide effective oversight of strategy formulation and contingency 

planning. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the capability and capacity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff to provide comprehensive, objective and realistic joint analysis in support of formulating and evaluating 

strategy and operational plans and related force planning? 

Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff maintain sufficient analytic capacity to support strategy and operational plan development, but 

this is an area that requires constant review for the DOD. The Department is reinvigorating aspects of our analysis capability through the Support for Strategic Analysis (SSA) process to represent innovative concepts more effectively and assess their 

impact on the dynamic security environment more fully. Both organizations work 

very closely with the Services and combatant commands to ensure that analysis informing senior DOD leadership decisions on force structure and force planning is 

both objective and realistic. 

Question. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy, contingency, and force planning? 

Answer. I believe our current processes and authorities support civilian control 

and oversight of strategy, contingency, and force planning. Discussions between civilian and military leadership are essential to the civilian oversight process. Existing processes ensure those discussions are taking place. 

Question. Many geographic combatant commands’ contingency and operation 

plans are undergoing DOD review. These reviews are justified for a variety of reasons including geo-strategic change, risk assessments, potential adversary and our 

own capability enhancements, and fiscal realities. 

If confirmed, how would you determine whether the alterations to a contingency 

or operation plan are warranted due to geo-strategic change, risk assessments, potential adversary and our own capability enhancements, and fiscal realities? 

Answer. The plans review process involves many stakeholders and several analytic steps to ensure plans are current, in terms of the geo-political dynamics and 

DOD capabilities, and are viable, resource-informed, and risk appropriate. If confirmed, I would leverage this process to ensure any change to planning is warranted 

and, then, ultimately approved by the Secretary. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities? 

Answer. See my answer above. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. See my answer above. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, 

Plans, and Capabilities? 

Answer. See my answer above. 

STRATEGIC REVIEWS

Question. What is your understanding and evaluation of DOD’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting for each of the following 

strategic reviews? 

The QDR (section 118 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, U.S.C.); 

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b of title 10, 

U.S.C.). 

916 

Answer. Each of these strategic reviews plays an important role in providing guidance to the entire Department of Defense to achieve the objectives outlined in the 

President’s National Security Strategy. These reviews also help the military departments, combatant commands, and DOD components prioritize their efforts and resources collectively to meet the Department’s objectives under changing security and 

fiscal circumstances. The final documents also serve to communicate the Department’s priorities with other audiences, both at home and abroad. 

At various points throughout my career, most recently in my position as Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, I have had the opportunity to participate 

in the preparation and dissemination of these reviews. I have observed various approaches based on defined requirements, including the strategic environment, timing, and leadership preference. That said, I believe each review should be grounded 

in a rigorous analytical approach that incorporates candid feedback and advice from 

both military and civilian leadership. Our Nation’s defense depends on these reviews to ensure the Department makes the best use of its available resources as we 

meet current and future national security challenges. 

The purpose of the QDR is to articulate the Nation’s defense strategy in support 

of the President’s National Security Strategy. Title 10 U.S.C. section 118 tasks the 

Department with conducting a comprehensive examination of the national defense 

strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and 

other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining 

and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense 

program for the next 20 years. In my experience, the most effective QDRs incorporate inputs from a wide range of stakeholders, including interagency partners, 

and work to ensure the defense strategy guides U.S. military force structure, plans, 

and programs. 

The chairman prepares the National Military Strategy as a means to convey the 

military’s views on strategic priorities and associated risks. The National Military 

Strategy, which the chairman submits every 2 years to the respective Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate, is an important review that draws on 

guidance in both the National Security Strategy and the most recent QDR. The National Military Strategy delineates the ‘‘ends, ways, and means’’—in essence, the 

military’s objectives, strategic and operational missions to achieve those objectives, 

and the required capabilities to carry out the military’s missions. It also describes 

the strategic and operational risks associated with accomplishing the military’s 

strategy. 

The Global Defense Posture review describes the operational orientation of the 

Department’s military personnel and facilities, and includes an assessment of 

changes to that posture based on the evolving security environment and strategic 

priorities outlined in other guidance documents, such as the QDR. The USD(P) and 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the primary authors of this strategic 

review document, which offers a comprehensive look at the Department’s posture 

overseas, new initiatives, and defense agreements. It also supports senior leaders 

in the Department to make future resource decisions based on operational needs. 

Title 10 requires the Department to complete a comprehensive assessment of the 

roles and missions of the Armed Forces and the core competencies and capabilities 

of the Department to perform and support such roles and missions, known as the 

Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM). In the QRM, the Department is required to identify the responsible office, agency, activity, or command for providing 

these core competencies and capabilities, and identify any gaps or unnecessary duplication. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to change 

title 10, U.S.C., that would update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to 

the Department and to Congress? 

Answer. These reviews are an important tool for the Department. They offer the 

Department an opportunity to reassess and, if necessary, adjust the Nation’s defense strategy, required capabilities, and force structure in alignment with current 

national security interests, the future security environment, and available resources. 

In a time of fiscal uncertainty, these documents are more essential than ever in ensuring that the Department takes a strategic approach to defending the Nation. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working with Members of Congress to ensure that these 

reviews serve the needs of both Defense leaders and Congress. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve 

DOD’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decisionmaking relative to each review above? 

Answer. Based on my experience, there are many ways to conduct these reviews, 

but I see three broad principles for successful strategic assessments, analyses, and 

reviews. First, senior leaders should provide clear initial guidance on the terms of 

917 

reference for the review. Second, these same leaders should remain involved in the 

execution. Third, the process should be transparent to all relevant Department 

stakeholders, including leaders within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Staff, the military departments, and the combatant commands. 

In addition to and in support of these broad principles, the Department requires 

a robust and ongoing analytical effort. To ensure this, if confirmed, I would 

prioritize engagement with the SSA process, which is designed to inform senior Department leadership deliberations on defense strategy and planning, programming, 

budgeting, and execution system matters. Along with Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) and Joint Staff colleagues, I would actively use wargames to 

seek innovative approaches to address a range of challenges. 

If confirmed, I would recommend that insights from previous reviews, along the 

lines of those described above, be applied to future Department reviews. 

Question. The law requires the QDR to identify the budget plan that would be 

required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, 

and any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current Future 

Years Defense Program) required to achieve such a level of risk. The law also requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with 

and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s QDR analysis 

and decisionmaking processes to address these two requirements? 

Answer. The Department’s QDR process is both strategy-driven and resource-informed. The strategy-driven component ensures the Department considers the full 

range of strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Nation, then identifies the 

defense approach that best secures U.S. national interests. This leads to decisions 

on the best mix of capabilities in which the Department should invest. The reality 

of constrained resources requires the Department to consider investment options 

from a resource-informed point of view to ensure we develop a strategy that is executable. The complex and ever-changing strategic environment requires us to 

prioritize and make difficult choices, and the QDR provides strategic direction for 

doing so. Given the uncertainty about funding levels, the 2014 QDR explicitly considered the implications and risks to the Nation and our defense strategy if sequestration level cuts continued. 

Question. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value in a defense 

strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the current or projected budget 

requests or fiscal environment? 

Answer. In my view, the defense strategy should be strategy-driven and resourceinformed. Assessments of the future security environment and the military missions 

required to support the President’s National Security Strategy should be unconstrained, but the defense strategy is only viable and executable if informed by anticipated levels of resourcing. A resource-unconstrained strategy could inadvertently 

mask risk since investment gaps would be inevitable between the unconstrained approach and which investments were actually funded. A resource-informed approach 

helps ensure coherence between what the Department should achieve, how it expects to achieve it, and the resources available to execute the strategy. 

Question. According to the report of the bipartisan National Defense Panel (NDP), 

‘‘the capabilities and capacities rightly called for in the 2014 QDR . . . clearly exceed 

the budget resources made available to the Department.’’ 

Do you concur with this assessment? Do you believe it will be necessary to repeal 

sequestration in order to make available sufficient resources to execute the QDR 

strategy? 

Answer. The NDP provides an important and valuable tool chartered by Congress 

to review the QDR independently. The Department worked closely with the NDP 

throughout the QDR process. I concur in the NDP’s strong concern that current and 

likely budget constraints are ‘‘dangerous and self-defeating,’’ and significantly impact the Department’s ability to do long-term force planning. I think it is notable 

that the bipartisan NDP supports the capabilities and capacities set forth in the 

QDR as appropriate. I also concur in the NDP’s assessment that sequestration, if 

reinstated, would prevent us from achieving the strategy outlined in the QDR. Our 

defense strategy cannot be executed at sequestration levels without significantly 

higher levels of casualties, attrition of equipment, extended timelines for mission accomplishment, and risk to mission success. If we return to sequestration level cuts 

in fiscal year 2016, we will face significant risks across the board, and would have 

to reassess our defense strategy. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to help solve this pressing problem. 

Question. According to the report of the bipartisan National Defense Panel, ‘‘national defense needs should drive national defense budgets, not the opposite.’’ 

918 

What aspects of a strategy would indicate that a strategy is budget-driven versus 

budget-informed? 

Answer. A budget-driven strategy would define ends, ways, and means based on 

analysis that starts with available resources, and contains little to no risk because, 

by definition, the strategy is designed to do only what can be done with available 

resources, regardless of what might be needed in terms of advancing national interests. A budget-informed strategy considers national interests and objectives, then 

assesses how to achieve those objectives given the strategic environment first, and 

then develops specific ways and means to try to meet desired ends, informed by the 

likely available resource levels. It would explicitly consider risks to the strategy that 

may result from the reality that resource levels are finite, and ensures that the Department sets priorities among its investments and activities—a central function of 

an effective strategy. A successful strategy should be started with an unbounded 

evaluation of the strategic environment, but then would be budget informed to have 

relevance; a defense strategy is effective only if it is executable. For example, the 

defense budget request that was informed by and accompanied the QDR, the President’s Budget 2015 request, is $15 billion higher than Budget Control Act funding 

caps for 2015, demonstrating that the current strategy is not budget driven. 

Question. If sequestration remains in effect, do you believe that our strategy will 

have to be one that is budget-driven? 

Answer. Our strategy should be budget informed, but never budget driven. The 

Department has previously stated that at sequestration levels, it will not be able 

to achieve the strategy outlined in the QDR without unacceptable risk. If sequestration remains in effect, the Department will have to reassess its strategy. A revised 

strategy, like the QDR, should be budget informed if it will serve as a guide to 

prioritize and direct investments, but our strategy should not be a budget exercise. 

A budget-driven strategy, designed to do only what can be done with available resources regardless of what might be needed in terms of advancing national interests, is not the right strategy for our national defense. 

Question. The National Defense Panel also recommended that ‘‘Congress should 

task the Department to do a thorough review to address in detail, without undue 

emphasis on budgetary constraints, how the Department would construct a force 

that meets the force sizing construct.’’ 

Do you agree with the NDPs recommendation that such an assessment would provide the Department of Defense and Congress with a better understanding of our 

Armed Forces requirements? 

Answer. As part of QDR development, the Department develops a force sizing construct that meets future defense requirements. Rigorous analysis is central to this 

process. On this specific point, I do not agree with the NDP’s recommendation. The 

QDR is the product of a strategy-driven and resource-informed process. In conducting the 2014 QDR, the Department assessed the international security environment. This allowed the leadership to identify plausible strategic and operational futures that the United States could face in the near-, mid-, and long-term—with particular attention to threats, challenges, and opportunities. Informed by this assessment, the senior leadership identified the objectives that the Department will likely 

need to be capable of accomplishing in support of U.S. national security interests 

and assessed the sufficiency and proficiency of the Joint Force to meet these demands. The results of these assessments guided development of the Department’s 

force planning construct. 

Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American 

forces should be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased 

campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ 

In the context of the recent and dramatic deterioration of the security environment in both the Middle East and Russia, as well as continuing instability in Asia, 

should the force sizing construct also mandate that American forces be able to defeat two adversaries at the same time, a standard embraced by previous QDRs? 

Answer. U.S. forces are still and will continue to be capable of prevailing in more 

than one conflict at the same time. The 2014 QDR envisioned an uncertain and complex security environment, and directed the Department to size and shape the Joint 

Force so that it would have the flexibility to respond to a wide range of challenges. 

Although the current force-sizing construct is a bit more detailed in how we will 

build forces to prevail in any two conflicts in the unlikely event that they begin at 

the same time, in the end, our forces will prevail. The current force-sizing construct 

allows us to plan and deliver agile, technologically advanced forces of sufficient size 

to defend our Nation and secure our interests globally while preventing America’s 

adversaries from achieving their objectives. 

919 

GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE

Question. As the Defense Department continues its assessment of projected budget cuts on its end strength, force structure, and other programs, it must also consider the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the permanent stationing of military forces in countries around the world. Based on a series of reports by the Government Accountability Office, evidence indicates that the Department is challenged 

in its ability to comprehensively and reliably estimate the cost of our global defense 

posture. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the cost and benefits of the U.S. 

global defense posture and the stationing of U.S. military forces overseas? 

Answer. The U.S. global defense posture is the most tangible expression of our 

interests abroad. To allies, partners, and adversaries alike, our posture demonstrates our ability to respond rapidly to developments that affect our national security. In some ways, it is easy to assess the costs of posturing forces overseas, but 

difficult to assess the benefits. Although difficult to quantify, there is real value in 

our posture, through which we deter aggression, safeguard regional stability, respond in a more timely fashion to contingencies, and facilitate close cooperation with 

our allies and partners. 

Any evaluation of our posture requires the consideration of operational requirements, political-military dynamics, host nation support, effects on the force, and 

costs. The Department employs a continuous review process to determine the appropriate balance between U.S.-based and overseas-stationed forces, taking account of 

the conditions in each region, operational demands, and costs. If confirmed, I would 

work to continue seeking new and innovative ways to posture U.S. forces in ways 

that leverage our strengths and advantages and to assess those costs. 

Question. In light of the force structure reductions associated with the Department’s planned end strength cuts, and potentially even deeper future end strength 

cuts, if confirmed, how would you propose to allocate those reductions between 

forces based within the United States and forces stationed outside the United 

States? 

Answer. Any changes to our forces stationed abroad or within the United States 

must be decided through careful analysis of the operational requirements, politicalmilitary dynamics, host nation support, effects on the force, and costs. Each movement would be handled on an extensively vetted, case-by-case basis, as every military capability has unique characteristics, missions, and limitations that would influence the most beneficial placement. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD methodology 

and assumptions used to evaluate the relative cost of overseas posture compared to 

stationing forces in the United States? 

Answer. The Department employs a continuous review process to determine the 

appropriate balance between U.S.-based and overseas-stationed forces. We look at 

a number of cost factors to evaluate the most efficient and effective stationing of 

U.S. forces, from host nation cost-sharing to rotational costs to base infrastructure 

costs to military construction costs. We combine this analysis with an accounting 

of the conditions in each region, the operational demands on U.S. forces, and the 

benefits of burdensharing with allies and partners who host our forces. If confirmed, 

I would work to ensure cost analysis remains a key decision criterion when evaluating where to station U.S. forces to ensure the most effective force posture. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take or changes would you recommend, if any, to DOD’s methodology and assumptions in determining the cost of 

overseas force posture compared to forces stationed in the United States? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure our cost methodology and assumptions leverage the most advantageous bilateral arrangements possible, and that 

planned expenditures on overseas basing are thoroughly reviewed to ensure investments are executable and efficient. If confirmed, I would continue to emphasize 

high-impact, limited-footprint methods and seek to build capacity among our allies 

and partners to provide for their security. 

Question. On 12 November, the New York Times reported that ‘‘Tanks and other 

military vehicles [are] pouring over the border from Russia into eastern Ukraine’’ 

despite the ceasefire reached in September. 

In the context of Russian aggression in eastern Europe, do you believe that the 

deterrence of further aggression will require the permanent stationing of additional 

U.S. or allied forces in eastern European nations? 

Answer. U.S. European Command (EUCOM), in close concert with our allies and 

partners, is evaluating how we can reassure and deter actors in the region. Going 

forward, adjustments to our European force structure will be considered, but we 

have to be cognizant of the need to balance limited fiscal resources and other global 

920 

demands. In the end, our extensive diplomatic and operational commitments to the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European security, including any 

forces we station on the continent, all contribute to deterring further aggressive 

Russian actions. For example, at this year’s NATO summit in Wales, members resolved to establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. This multinational 

force will stand ready to deploy to NATO’s periphery at a moment’s notice. 

Ultimately, the solution to the Ukraine conflict must be diplomatic in nature. Our 

defense posture plays a key role in the broader diplomatic push by sending a powerful signal to Russia; aggressive Russian actions have no place in a Europe that is 

whole, free, and at peace. 

Question. Do you believe that the deterrent effect of American ground forces will 

be greatest if they are stationed in NATO member states that share a border with 

Ukraine or Russia? 

Answer. Our force posture in EUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) is prepared 

to respond to contingencies across the AOR. Although geography plays a role, we 

plan with the understanding that we can leverage our logistical capabilities to meet 

threats with speed and agility wherever they may come up in the region. 

Question. What is your assessment of which American forces and capabilities have 

the greatest deterrent effect upon Russia and other aggressive actors in the region? 

Answer. It’s difficult to point to a specific capability or force element that’s best 

able to deter aggressive actions such as those by Russia. Rather, our posture aims 

to leverage the contributions of a wide range of forces and capabilities. We can best 

deter aggressive actions by demonstrating a credible capacity to operate in a variety 

of domains. 

Question. The rebalance to the Pacific will increase the percentage of U.S. ships 

in the region from 50 percent to 60 percent of the Navy’s entire fleet. However if 

the fleet size is reduced from about 300 ships to about 250 ships, the number of 

ships forward deployed to the region will remain the same at about 150. 

Does the potential of increasing the percentage of ships in the region, but the 

number of ships in the region remaining the same, lead to challenges regarding the 

expectations of allies, and if so, how would you plan to mitigate such an effect? 

Answer. The Department is on-track to meet its goal of homeporting 60 percent 

of the Navy’s fleet in the Pacific by 2020. Current Navy projections show that the 

fleet size in 2020 will be 308 ships, yielding roughly 170 ships homeported in the 

Pacific. Additionally, the Navy also will increase ship presence in the region to 

about 67 ships, up from an average of 50 today. 

Numbers alone cannot tell the entire story. Of equal importance, if not more importance, is the prioritization of our newest technology to the region. For example, 

the new ships homeported in the Pacific represent the best of America’s new naval 

technology. The addition of Littoral Combat Ships to the fleet enable us to engage 

with regional allies and partners in a range of new training and exercise activities 

that are in high demand. We will be replacing existing cruisers in the region with 

ballistic missile defense-capable destroyers, enhancing our deterrent posture towards the North Korean missile threat. We will also be stationing additional amphibious technology in the Pacific, along with new platforms like the P–8A and the 

F–35C that will provide more capability for missions unique to the Pacific theater. 

If confirmed, I would work with colleagues in the Department of the Navy, the 

U.S. Pacific Command, and with regional allies and partners to ensure that we continue to make progress on these important initiatives, contributing to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the new Assistant Secretariat that I 

would lead will help the Department be more effective in ensuring the proper alignment of strategy and resources as we seek to modernize our alliances while mitigating risk should we face additional resource constraints and improve our security 

cooperation activities. 

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Question. DOD Strategic Guidance established in January 2012 states that, while 

U.S. forces will capture the lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they ‘‘will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.’’ 

In your view, what are some of the key lessons learned from the stability operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. There are many lessons learned from our recent combat experiences, and 

the Services and the Joint Staff have worked hard to ensure that no lessons so painfully learned are lost. In 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed 

an extensive study to identify these enduring lessons. The resulting report identified 

eleven strategic themes that remain relevant for the Department’s current operVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00928 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
921 

ations and future planning. The most notable of these themes for me include understanding the environment, providing a public narrative, integrating special operations forces and general purpose forces, increasing interagency coordination, and 

the importance of host-nation partnering. 

Our efforts abroad over the past decade also highlight the importance of collaborative interagency and coordinated multinational efforts. Training foreign security 

forces and ministries is a whole-of-government approach, and it takes a robust interagency effort to maintain those capacities and institutions that can educate, equip, 

and enable them for future missions. 

Question. What do you believe is the proper role for the DOD in the planning and 

conduct of stability operations in future contingencies? 

Answer. DOD will be an essential part of the planning and conduct of stability 

operations in future contingencies. However, I believe DOD’s stability operations efforts must be in support of a comprehensive interagency and international response. 

We must ensure that all departments and agencies are operating under a common 

national strategic framework in support of achieving sustainable outcomes overseas 

and building long-lasting relationships with our international partners. In most 

cases, the U.S. military’s presence, force protection capabilities, and extensive 

logistical network can provide the backbone for successful stability operations. If 

confirmed, I would continue efforts to ensure that interagency collaboration is as effective as possible for future operations. 

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in overseeing and implementing 

the policies, strategies, and priorities established in the Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR)? 

Answer. The NPR established the key objectives that guide the Department’s 

work on nuclear policy. If confirmed, I would be specifically engaged in almost all 

of the NPR’s objectives in various roles and venues and would ensure that they remain a top priority for the Department of Defense. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

Question. Since the Air Force unknowingly flew nuclear weapons on a B–52 bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana on August 30, 2007, the Air Force has taken a number of significant steps 

to increase its attention, discipline, and expertise on nuclear weapons management. 

If confirmed, what role, if any, will you play in ensuring that nuclear weapons 

are safe, secure and accounted for, and that the Military Services have established 

a high level of attention, discipline, and conduct of operations with respect to nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Secretary Hagel established the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review 

Group (NDERG) to reinforce and ensure senior leader accountability and bring together all the elements of the nuclear force into a coherent enterprise. This group, 

which consists of the leaders responsible for training, funding, fielding, and implementing the nuclear mission, will review the actions we are taking and the progress 

we are making in improving the health of our nuclear forces. If confirmed, I would 

support the office of the USD(P) as it fulfills oversight responsibilities as a member 

of the NDERG. 

Question. The various reviews of the Air Force incident also exposed significant 

gaps in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the attention and expertise to deal with nuclear weapons issues. 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is sufficient attention 

to management of nuclear weapon matters in the Office of the Secretary of Defense? 

Answer. Secretary Hagel said that the nuclear deterrent is ‘‘DOD’s top priority. 

No other capability we have is more important.’’ If confirmed, ensuring our nuclear 

forces are safe, secure, and effective and that they are planned, postured, operated, 

and modernized in accordance with policy guidance would be my top priority. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is sufficient 

technical expertise in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to nuclear 

weapons? 

Answer. Nuclear technical expertise within OSD resides in multiple organizations. 

Many of OSD’s staff positions include experts from the various Department of Energy laboratories, federally funded research and development centers, think tanks, 

and agencies in order to ensure expert analysis supports the OSD decisionmaking 

process. Within OSD Policy, technical expertise for nuclear deterrence resides in the 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy 

(NMD). NMD contains an analytical cell, which has been specifically tasked by 

922 

USD(P) to provide the Secretary of Defense independent technical analyses on a 

range of nuclear issues. If confirmed, I would do everything I can to ensure that 

we retain this unique capability and continue to advocate for technical expertise 

across the Department. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council is intended to be the joint Department 

of Defense-Department of Energy management organization for nuclear weapons 

matters. 

If confirmed, what responsibilities and interaction do you expect to have relative 

to the Nuclear Weapons Council? 

Answer. The USD(P) is a voting member of the NWC. If confirmed, I would support Policy leadership, or represent Policy, on the NWC and in its subordinate bodies. If confirmed, I would ensure Policy continues to play an active role on the NWC 

as we steer the nuclear weapons and infrastructure modernization programs to completion. 

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

Question. The NPR established, among other things, nuclear force structure parameters prior to negotiation of the New START treaty. 

If confirmed, what roles and responsibilities do you expect to have relative to policy development concerning future nuclear force structure and planning? 

Answer. In support of the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, I 

would manage OSD Policy’s role in all nuclear force structure decisions and in nuclear planning, in accordance with the President’s June 2013 Nuclear Employment 

Strategy. 

NEW START TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

Question. The New START treaty entered into force in February 2011, and establishes limits on the deployed and nondeployed strategic nuclear forces of Russia and 

the United States. The treaty allows the parties up to 7 years to comply with the 

numerical limits of the treaty. 

If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in overseeing implementation of the 

New START treaty? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would lead in development and coordination of DOD policies required to implement fully U.S. obligations under the New START treaty. This 

includes supporting DOD components as they plan, program, budget, and allocate 

resources necessary for New START treaty implementation and compliance. Additionally, if confirmed, I would fully support the interagency process of assessing the 

Russian Federation’s compliance with its obligations under the treaty and addressing any compliance or implementation issues. 

MODERNIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTERPRISE

Question. A principal issue in the debate of the New START treaty was ensuring 

that as we draw down the number of deployed nuclear warheads that we modernize 

our nuclear warhead production capability as well as their command and control 

systems and delivery platforms. 

If confirmed what role do you expect to play in modernizing these three areas? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that our efforts to modernize U.S. nuclear 

forces, and their supporting infrastructure and command and control, meet our policy and strategy requirements. We must ensure our current nuclear forces remain 

safe, secure, and effective so that our deterrent remains credible and our force remains combat-capable. I will support efforts to do these things in a cost-effective 

manner. 

Question. Do you support the President’s commitment to modernize or replace the 

triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air launched cruise 

missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and 

SLBM 

Answer. Yes. I agree that retaining all three legs of the triad will best maintain 

strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities. Each leg of the Triad has advantages and characteristics 

that must be maintained, and each leg must be modernized as appropriate. 

Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President’s plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a 

critical national security priority? 

923 

Answer. I agree that maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent 

is a critical national security priority. The DOD works closely with the Department 

of Energy and the administration to prioritize and align modernization efforts with 

funding realities, and, if confirmed, I would continue that cooperation. 

Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort do you believe it would be 

prudent to consider reductions below New START treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Whether further reductions below New START limits would be prudent 

to consider is dependent on a number of contextual factors: whether such reductions 

are negotiated with Russia, the exact nature and extent of the reductions proposed, 

and the impact of such reductions on our ability to implement the President’s deterrence and employment strategies. I can envision prudent reductions that are negotiated, that are properly structured, and that enable us still to meet the President’s 

policy, strategy, and planning guidance. 

I support the President’s goal to reduce global nuclear dangers and to take practical steps toward the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. These 

goals were articulated in the 2010 NPR, which concluded that the United States will 

retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent with its need to deter adversaries, reassure allies, and hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise so 

long as nuclear weapons exist. 

I believe that we should make necessary investments in infrastructure modernization regardless of potential future nuclear weapon reductions. If confirmed, I would 

ensure that the stockpiles of deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads sustain 

the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, including our commitments to extend deterrence to our allies. 

Question. Without the construction of the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production Facility 

(UPF) at Y–12 and the other elements associated with the robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, do you believe reductions to the strategic hedge 

would be prudent? 

Answer. With regard to CMRR and UPF, I understand that the approach to replacing those facilities has been reviewed and that a more cost-effective way forward 

has been identified. If confirmed, I would support efforts to modernize our nuclear 

weapons infrastructure in a cost-effective manner. With regard to the strategic 

hedge, if confirmed, I would ensure any proposed changes remain aligned with the 

vision and objectives as articulated in the NPR and the President’s policy and employment guidance. 

Question. The Congressional Budget Officer has estimated the 10 year cost of 

modernizing the nuclear enterprise at approximately $355 billion, while approximately 5–6 percent of the annual DOD budget, this is still an incredible amount 

of money, with the following 10 years expected to rise further as the construction 

programs for the Ohio replacement submarine get underway. Do you believe we 

should be spending this sum of money and will you work to find cost savings in 

these programs? 

Answer. As the recent Nuclear Enterprise Reviews made clear, modernizing our 

nuclear forces is critically important to our Nation’s security and, if confirmed, I 

would continue to support funding sufficient to meet this critical national security 

requirement. The DOD works closely with the Department of Energy and the administration to prioritize and align modernization efforts with funding realities, and 

I would continue that cooperation as we work toward cost-effective nuclear modernization. 

NUCLEAR POLICY

Question. Do you support the President’s vision for a world without nuclear weapons? 

Answer. Yes, I believe we should continue to seek the peace and security of a 

world without nuclear weapons, and take practical steps toward that long-term objective. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, 

secure, and effective arsenal to deter adversaries and guarantee that defense to U.S. 

allies. 

Question. Do you support the June 2013 nuclear Employment Strategy? 

Answer. Yes, I support the June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy. 

Question. Do you believe the United States should pursue further nuclear weapons reductions? Please explain why or why not. 

Answer. Yes, I believe we should pursue further negotiated, verifiable reductions 

in the nuclear forces of the United States and Russia that would enhance U.S. national security. Further reductions could achieve this in a number of ways. They 

924 

could promote our non-proliferation objectives by demonstrating our commitment to 

meeting our NPT commitments. Such reductions also could enable us to maintain 

strategic stability at lower force levels. Reducing Russian nuclear forces reduces the 

number of nuclear weapons that can be targeted on the United States. Unfortunately, Russia has shown no interest in pursuing further negotiated reductions, and 

such reductions require a willing partner and a conducive strategic environment. 

Question. Do you believe it would be prudent for the United States to pursue unilateral nuclear reductions? Please explain why or why not. 

Answer. As part of the nuclear weapons employment guidance announced in June 

2013, the President concluded that we can ensure the security of the United States 

and our allies and partners while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START treaty. The 

President also announced the U.S. intent to seek negotiated cuts with Russia. Negotiated cuts, and their attendant verification provisions, provide transparency and 

predictability, and they reduce the number of weapons that can be employed against 

the United States. For these reasons, and in light of the current strategic environment, I believe negotiated reductions are more prudent than unilateral reductions 

at this time. 

Question. Do you believe changes to well-established nuclear targeting requirements could negatively impact our ability to: (1) assure our allies; (2) discourage 

other countries from seeking strategic equivalence with the United States in nuclear 

weapons; and (3) hedge against future threats and uncertainties? 

Answer. No, I do not. Our nuclear targeting requirements are highly classified. 

As we do not share them with our allies, these requirements have no effect on the 

extent to which our allies are assured. Similarly, as other countries do not know 

what our targeting requirements are, they cannot be encouraged to seek strategic 

equivalence because of them. Finally, nuclear targeting requirements alone do not 

directly affect our ability to hedge against future threats and uncertainties. Our 

technical and geopolitical hedge strategy does affect our ability to hedge. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the 

first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, 

the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. 

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the BMDR? 

Answer. Yes. The 2010 BMDR provided the broad policy framework shaping the 

administration’s missile defense activities. If confirmed, I would continue U.S. efforts to implement the policies, strategies, and priorities in the BMDR. 

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in implementing these 

policies, strategies, and priorities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would be the lead assistant secretary in OSD Policy for 

missile defense, so I would therefore have a direct role in implementing these policies, strategies, and priorities as they pertain to both homeland defense and regional 

defense. 

‘‘FLY-BEFORE-YOU-BUY’’ APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. The BMDR stated that the Department of Defense would follow a ‘‘flybefore-you-buy’’ approach to new missile defense capabilities, by testing them adequately before deploying them. 

Do you agree with the Defense Department’s ‘‘fly-before-you-buy’’ policy for missile 

defense that ‘‘before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that 

enables an assessment under realistic operational conditions against threat-representative targets’’ to demonstrate that they will be effective and reliable? 

Answer. Yes. We have an obligation to field capabilities that work against the 

threats they are designed to counter. Realistic testing before full-scale acquisition 

is essential to fielding systems the United States can rely on. 

REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS AND RESPONSE

Question. Iran and North Korea each has hundreds of short- and medium-range 

ballistic missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the EUCOM, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. 

Pacific Command AORs. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of February 

2010 stated that the United States intends to pursue regionally tailored phased 

adaptive approaches to ballistic missile defense against such missile threats in various regions. 

925 

Do you believe that such regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches will provide our regional combatant commanders with the missile defense capabilities needed to defend our forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in the region? 

Answer. I understand our current policy is to develop regional approaches to ballistic missile defense in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region that 

are tailored to the deterrence and defense requirements of each region. Because 

these regions vary considerably in the character of the ballistic missile threat, geography, and the defense relationships on which we are able to build cooperative missile defenses, I believe such approaches provide us the best option for managing our 

own high-demand, low-density ballistic missile defense forces and for developing ally 

and partner ballistic missile defense capacity in support of combatant commander 

requirements. 

Question. What role do you see for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system with 

Standard Missile-3 interceptors in U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs? 

Answer. Ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis ships are an excellent example of 

the type of mobility we have built into our current inventory of ballistic missile defense capabilities to help us address the growing demand for regional missile defense systems. These multi-mission ships offer not only the ability to provide surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles, but also a ballistic missile defense capability in the form of the growing Standard Missile-3 family of interceptors. Additionally, the land-based version of the Aegis system we are fielding in Romania and Poland will add substantially to the NATO ballistic missile defense architecture. 

Question. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs, what role 

do you see for other nations to contribute to regional missile defense capabilities? 

Answer. I understand building international cooperation and seeking appropriate 

levels of burden sharing are key tenets of our regional ballistic missile defense policy. I also understand that over time we have developed substantive ballistic missile 

defense relationships with our allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and 

the Asia Pacific, which have led to significant advances in fielding our own capabilities as well as those of our allies and partners. I view continuing these partnerships 

as critical to developing effective security architectures that deter, and if necessary, 

defend against the threat of ballistic missile attack. Accordingly, if confirmed, I 

would promote strong bilateral and multilateral ballistic missile defense cooperation 

in these regions. 

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in any efforts to obtain Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)? 

Answer. Although my position would not have direct responsibility for nuclear 

nonproliferation treaties such as the CTBT, I would support the administration’s efforts to obtain Senate advice and consent to accession to the CTBT. 

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY ACTIVITIES

Question. What is the proper role for DOD in building the security capacity of foreign partners? What, if any, overlap is there with State Department? What steps, 

if any, should DOD take to reduce or eliminate overlap between DOD and State Department capacity building programs? 

Answer. DOD plays a key role in building the tactical and operational capacity 

of foreign military forces within the broader foreign policy lanes established by the 

State Department. DOD also builds capacity at the ministerial and institutional levels through its defense institution-building programs. DOD contributes irreplaceable 

value to this range of capacity-building work by drawing upon the unique subject 

matter expertise and experience of defense civilians and active duty and Reserve 

component personnel. 

The Department’s work at these levels—from the tactical to institutional—should 

be closely coordinated with the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure that the United States pursues a balanced approach 

to broader security sector reform efforts and that partners are able to sustain any 

training and equipment provided. Additionally, implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 23, which calls for whole-of-government security sector planning, 

should help reduce any overlap between DOD and State Department capacity-building programs. 

Question. With regard to security cooperation, what is the appropriate role for the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities and what 

should be the ASD’s responsibilities on security cooperation relative to the combatant commands, the military departments, and others DOD organizations? 

926 

Answer. The ASD/SPC should provide policy guidance to ensure the alignment of 

security cooperation activities and resources with the defense strategy. Once the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) develop plans to implement this guidance, 

the ASD/SPC should review them to ensure they are aligned with the strategy. The 

military departments and Services and other capability providers then allocate adequate resources to accomplish the security cooperation efforts identified in the 

GCCs’ plans. To the extent that there may be shortfalls in DOD resources to execute 

plans, the ASD/SPC may develop recommendations for adjustments in investment 

portfolios. Finally, the Joint Staff serves a critical monitoring and communications 

role, providing assessments of security cooperation requirements and military advice 

on the effectiveness of DOD activities to the ASD/SPC to inform future policy guidance. Question. Over the past decade, Congress has provided DOD with a number of 

authorities to build the capacity of partner nations. 

How would you rate the effectiveness of these investments and what will you do, 

if confirmed, to ensure that these resources provide a return on investment in the 

future? 

Answer. The authorities provided to DOD over the last decade have been critical, 

especially for support of coalition partners. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that 

projects relying on DOD authorities have clear and measurable planned outcomes. 

I also would seek to ensure that authorities evolve to keep pace with the dynamic 

environment in which DOD operates, which is characterized by both rapidly changing threats and fluctuations in partner nation roles and capabilities. 

Further, if confirmed, I would seek to enhance the Department’s ‘‘capability package planning’’—planning that organizes and synchronizes ‘‘train-and-equip’’ efforts 

with related security cooperation activities to account for partners’ institutional, 

sustainment, training, and infrastructure needs. Such efforts will better position 

partners to sustain and properly employ any operational and tactical assistance provided. 

Question. The latest QDR emphasizes security cooperation as a means to mitigate 

risk resulting from DOD’s declining budget. 

In your view, has the Department increased funds for security cooperation, accordingly? Is security cooperation adequately resourced? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2015 budget submission sought to protect resources most 

closely aligned to the three pillars of the defense strategy outlined in the 2014 QDR, 

including building security globally. In order to maximize the impact of our presence 

globally and ensure that security cooperation resources and activities are aligned 

with the defense strategy, the Department recently created a new Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation (SC). The office will develop institutionalized policies and methodologies for prioritizing and evaluating security cooperation activities and resources, mature defense institution-building capabilities 

and strengthen their linkages to the Department’s operational training and equipping efforts, and use security cooperation tools to drive strategic initiatives. 

Question. How effective has security cooperation been as a means of mitigating 

the risks associated with declining DOD budgets, and what challenges, if any, do 

you see with such an approach? 

Answer. The need to strengthen and deepen partnerships is a theme that runs 

throughout the 2014 QDR to address the dynamic security environment, as no country alone can address the globalized challenges we collectively face. With reduced 

force structure and resources, the Department must make greater efforts to coordinate its planning to optimize allies’ and partners’ contributions to their own security 

and to combined activities. I believe there is an opportunity to pursue greater deliberate security cooperation planning with key allies and partners and, if confirmed, 

I would seek to increase such efforts. 

There are some who may be concerned that, when needed, partners may not be 

willing to contribute capabilities to help address shared security concerns. Certainly, 

we should continue to maintain forces sufficient to address most of the threat to our 

interests on our own, should we so choose. However, we have witnessed the benefits 

of partners’ and allies’ cooperation in coalition operations, clearly demonstrating 

their willingness to take action, and their cooperation invariably helps in conducting 

these operations and in most cases reduced the need for some U.S. forces. 

Question. What is your assessment of the sufficiency of existing security assistance authorities to address the evolving nature of global security threats? Given the 

evolving threat environment facing the United States, what new security cooperation missions, if any, might DOD need to take on in the next decade, and what tools 

and authorities might be required to accomplish those missions? 

Answer. Over the past decade, Congress has recognized the need for title 10 authorities to enable military commanders to support allies and partners in addressing 

927 

security threats, largely related to counterterrorism and instability. The Department 

is grateful for these authorities that provide commanders greater flexibility than 

traditional title 22 security assistance authorities to address the capability and capacity shortfalls that they identify among allies and partners to ensure that these 

partners are able to operate alongside or in lieu of U.S. forces. As we face new budget realities, building partners capable of supporting or replacing Title 10 missions 

will take on increasing importance. 

Just as the U.S. Armed Forces are resetting for full-spectrum operations after 

more than a decade of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (CT) operations, the 

Department’s security cooperation efforts also must be reset to address the full spectrum of security challenges. Over the last decade we have emphasized building partners’ capabilities to combat internal or transnational CT threats. Now, our security 

environment demands that we also consider other functional areas where commanders see a need to enable partners to operate with or in lieu of U.S. forces, but 

that have been under-resourced due, in part, to a lack of dedicated tools and authorities. Such areas may include logistics, maritime security and domain awareness, cyber, and defense technology protection/security, among others. If confirmed, 

I would work with Congress to see how we might modify, rationalize, or add to the 

existing authorities in light of these changes in the security environment. 

Question. Given the numerous existing DOD security assistance authorities, what 

is DOD doing to ensure DOD programs are synchronized and applied in a manner 

consistent with strategic requirements? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would 

you recommend? 

Answer. The Department has begun an effort to improve the security cooperation 

governance structure, which began with the establishment of Policy’s new office of 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation. This office is 

undertaking an ambitious series of initiatives to put in place oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure our security cooperation activities and resources are 

aligned to the defense strategy, including the building of an assessment, monitoring, 

and evaluation mechanism across the Department’s security cooperation programs 

to be much more effective in gauging the return on investment of our building partner capacity programs. If confirmed, I would ensure the office’s efforts receive sufficient support and attention from the ASD and other Department leaders to succeed. 

Question. Some of DOD’s work to build our partners’ capacity is at the tactical 

and operational levels. 

What tools do we have in place to ensure that foreign partners possess the institutional capacity to sustain these efforts and operate effectively both to meet their 

own defense needs and in a coalition environment? 

Answer. The Department must ensure that adequate partner nation institutional 

capacity exists to sustain and properly employ the operational and tactical assistance we might provide. To that end, the Department has developed a suite of defense institution-building (DIB) programs to ensure partner nations have the capacity to craft thoughtful defense policies and strategies, create sustainable budgets to 

resource those strategies, provide human resources, and procure equipment and provide logistics support. DIB programs are principally implemented through the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) 

Program, and the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). 

DIB programs are a critical and growing element of a balanced and comprehensive approach to security cooperation. To that end, the Department is developing initiatives to integrate more effectively security cooperation planning, linking the development of tactical and operational capabilities with the governance, direction, 

and oversight mechanisms needed to support those capabilities. 

Question. How does the Department ensure that partners’ militaries operate effectively, accountably, and in accordance with international human rights standards? 

Answer. The Department believes that the ethical and accountable behavior of our 

partner nation security forces is critical to our long-term success. When we engage 

with partner nation militaries, at all levels, DOD emphasizes that respect for 

human rights and the rule of law is a vital component to a successful military. To 

assist partner nation militaries who wish to promote human rights and accountability, DOD has a number of programs that provide training on compliance with 

the law of armed conflict and human rights, developing military justice systems, 

and strengthening civilian control of the military. 

The Department also is committed to compliance with what is commonly referred 

to as the Leahy law and is working closely with the Department of State to 

strengthen our implementation of the law to help ensure accountability for those 

who commit gross violations of human rights. 

928 

Question. The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is a joint DOD/State program designed to leverage the strengths of both Departments to conduct a wide 

array of security cooperation missions. 

Why has it, to date, mostly been used for counterterrorism missions when Congress authorized a much wider mission set? 

Answer. The GSCF projects selected to date represent priorities selected by the 

Departments of State and Defense to provide training and equipment to partner nations that are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. It 

is a State Department-led authority meant to enable partners to address contingencies, and project proposals to enhance the special operations and CT capabilities 

of partner nations have historically competed well in the current security environment. More recently, in light of developments in Ukraine, the Departments of State 

and Defense have submitted a congressional notification for a capacity-building 

project there. Clearly, it has taken time to work out a governance mechanism to 

allow the GSCF—which represents a new model of interagency cooperation—to function as an agile and responsive policy tool; if confirmed, I would work with ASD(SO/ 

LIC), who oversees the authority for the Department, to ensure that it continues 

to mature into a tool that truly enables partners to respond to urgent and emerging 

contingencies that affect U.S. national security objectives. 

Question. The Global Train and Equip Program (or section 1206) has been a DOD 

tool for a number of years with an annual budget of $350 million. 

How would you assess the effectiveness of that program? As the assistant secretary responsible for security cooperation, do you envision any changes to that program? 

Answer. Overall, the section 1206 ‘‘train-and-equip’’ program, overseen by the 

ASD(SO/LIC), has been effective in achieving the limited set of objectives for which 

it was designed: namely, providing tools to partner nations to bolster their nearterm capabilities to address counterterrorism and stabilization priorities. It has 

achieved positive results in this area. 

The effectiveness of the section 1206 authority is best exemplified by the individual program assessments conducted by country teams, combatant command 

staffs, and our own contracted personnel who provide a more detailed analysis of 

six to eight countries annually. In those reports, the section 1206 authority shows 

a positive return on investment in nearly every country in which the United States 

has invested. For the countries where the return is not as great, the assessments 

help to identify where course corrections may be needed. 

That said, it is important to underscore that section 1206 was created with the 

intent of addressing near-term counterterrorism and stabilization priorities, rather 

than to build long-term partner capabilities. In order to maximize the return and 

longevity of our investments, the Department must continue to examine how to use 

section 1206 in conjunction with other authorities to ensure that section 1206 programs transition into sustainable capabilities. If confirmed, I would seek to enhance 

the Department’s ‘‘capability package planning’’—planning that organizes and synchronizes train-and-equip efforts with related security cooperation activities to account for partners’ institutional, sustainment, training, and infrastructure needs. 

Such efforts will better position partners to sustain and properly employ the operational and tactical assistance provided. 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. The Department recently created Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(DASD) for Security Cooperation. 

What is your understanding of this position? 

Answer. The Office of the DASD for Security Cooperation (ODASD(SC)) was established to prioritize Departmental focus on aligning security cooperation resources 

and activities with the defense strategy. Security cooperation activities of the Department, which include Security Force Assistance (SFA), Building Partner Capacity 

(BPC), and Defense Institution Building (DIB), among other activities, play an important role in maintaining U.S. defense relationships and overseas presence, and 

building the capabilities of partner nations to act in coalition with or in lieu of U.S. 

military forces to address U.S. national security objectives. This latter role takes on 

increasing importance as defense budgets decline. ODASD(SC) will ensure that 

these valuable tools are employed to maximize strategic outcomes, continually 

prioritize and assess investments, and build enduring, reciprocal global partnerships. 

Question. What is the relationship between the DASD for Security Cooperation 

and the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency? 

929 

Answer. The DASD for Security Cooperation provides policy guidance on how to 

align security cooperation policies, authorities, resources, and activities in service to 

defense strategic objectives. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency administers 

security cooperation programs, provides procedural guidance to the broader security 

cooperation community on program implementation, and provides policy guidance 

on policies shaping the execution of security cooperation programs. As a result, the 

DASD SC focuses generally on the overarching architecture of DOD policies, processes, plans, and budgets that shape SC programming as a means to achieve defense strategic ends, while DSCA’s role is largely focused on executing current policies and processes to deliver security assistance and security cooperation programs 

to customers most effectively. The two offices will have to work in close collaboration 

to achieve security cooperation outcomes consistent with policy objectives. 

Question. Does the DASD for Security Cooperation have management control of 

the Department’s security cooperation programs? If so, what programs specifically? 

What major programs building capacity programs are not included in this portfolio? 

Answer. The DASD(SC) maintains direct oversight of a select number of security 

cooperation programs, primarily focusing on defense institution building (DIB). 

These programs include the MoDA program, the DIRI, the DIILS, and Regional 

Centers for Security Studies. 

The DASD(SC) also provides policy oversight over a series of programs administered by other, primarily military, components. Examples include, but are not limited to, the National Guard State Partnership Program and the Developing Countries Combined Exchange Program. 

As many of the Department’s capacity-building programs address niche areas, 

such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism, the Department continues to rely on 

the expertise resident in the relevant functional offices to manage these programs. 

The DASD(SC) shapes the security cooperation governance architecture under 

which these programs function, however. Additionally, the DASD(SC) works closely 

with the State Department to support policy oversight of the Department’s implementation of title 22 authorities. 

Question. In you view, what role should the DASD for Security Cooperation play 

with respect to security cooperation programs not directly under the DASD’s management control? 

Answer. In general, ODASD(SC) is tasked with shaping a governance architecture 

to validate, prioritize, integrate, and assess security cooperation programs across the 

Department. Whether or not security cooperation programs are directly under the 

office’s management control, it is critical that they be aligned with defense strategy, 

that they be linked together in ways that are mutually reinforcing, that they be 

evaluated to determine what is working and what is not, and that they obtain the 

greatest possible return on our investment. Shaping and overseeing processes to 

achieve these results is, in my view, the essential role of the ODASD(SC). 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their operations. 

Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of Special Operations Forces can 

and should be maintained in light of current fiscal challenges? 

Answer. Yes. Given the threats we face, the unique military capabilities provided 

by our Special Operations Forces (SOF) will continue to be in high demand for the 

foreseeable future. We will continue to maintain our investment in SOF to preserve 

this strong capability to combat terrorism and confront other unconventional threats 

through direct action, indirect action, and building partner capacity. If confirmed, 

I would work with the ASD(SO/LIC), for SOF, the Service Chiefs, and the Commander, SOCOM, to ensure the SOF community is appropriately sized to meet the 

full range of SOF missions. 

Question. Special Operations Forces heavily rely on enabling capabilities provided 

by the general purpose forces to be successful in their missions. In light of current 

fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained 

within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities will remain available 

to special operations forces when needed? 

Answer. Yes. In an environment of constraining resources and the drawdown of 

our forces in Afghanistan, the Department is reshaping and resizing our overall 

force structure aligned to our national security priorities. The Department will ensure that Special Operations Forces remain sufficiently supported by the general 

purpose forces, which currently provide SOF with intelligence, communications, logistics, and medical support. If confirmed, I would work closely with the ASD (SO/ 

LIC), the Service Chiefs, the Joint Staff, and the Commander, U.S. Special OperVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00937 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
930 

ations Command (SOCOM) to ensure the Department achieves the appropriate balance across the entire force. 

Question. Do you believe Special Operations Forces should develop additional organic enabling capabilities in addition or in place of those currently provided by the 

general purpose forces? 

Answer. Our Special Operations Forces receive excellent support from the Services. Any organic enablers assigned to SOCOM should be purposely designed for 

SOF-specific requirements, while the Services continue to provide SOF’s enabler requirements. I believe this arrangement is most efficient in this fiscal environment 

by allowing SOCOM to use their funding for SOF-specific capabilities and avoid duplication with the Services. 

COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP FUND

Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, will you have in the development and 

implementation of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund? 

Answer. The ASD/SPC would work through the DASD(SC) to issue policy guidance and develop governance processes to ensure security cooperation resources and 

activities are aligned to the defense strategy. Additionally, the ASD/SPC, working 

through the DASD(SFD), is responsible for developing the defense strategy on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and recommending adjustments to the defense program in support of the strategy. Therefore, if confirmed, I expect that my role in 

implementation of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund would be twofold. First, 

the office of the ASD/SPC would provide support to ASD(SO/LIC) in developing coherent, integrated, feasible implementation plans with detailed objectives, and 

would support institutional capacity-building aspects of these plans through defense 

institution-building programs managed by DASD(SC). Second, the office of the ASD/ 

SPC would support ASD(SO/LIC) in teeing up decisions related to investments in 

enabling capabilities and resources for the joint force. 

EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE

Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, will you have in the development and 

implementation of the European Reassurance Initiative? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to institutionalize many of the European Reassurance Initiative’s (ERI) program elements. I would reference changes to the European security environment in future strategy and global force management documents, assist in programming funds in future years’ base budgets, assist in the allocation of forces to participate in exercises, training, and operations, and help secure 

the international agreements necessary to implement the ERI fully. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[The nomination reference of Mr. Robert M. Scher follows:] 

931 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

September 15, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Robert M. Scher, of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Madelyn R. Creedon, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Robert M. Scher, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ROBERT M. SCHER

Education: 

Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs 

• August 1989–June 1991 • Master of International Affairs 

Swarthmore College 

• August 1985–June 1989 

• Bachelor of Arts 

Employment Record: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Plans—Washington, DC 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

• April 2012–Present 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, South and Southeast Asia—Washington, DC 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

• April 2009–April 2012 

Booz Allen Hamilton—McLean VA 

• Associate 

• April 2006–April 2009 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Asia and Pacific Affairs—Washington, DC 

• Chief of Staff to Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

• February 2005–April 2006 

U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning Staff—Washington, DC 

• Member 

• February 2003–February 2005 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Asia and Pacific Affairs—Washington, DC 

• Director for Maritime Southeast Asia 

• February 1999–February 2003 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Strategy—Washington, DC 

• Senior Assistant for Strategy Development 

• July 1993–February 1999 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Presidential Management Intern—Washington, 

DC 

• Various positions 

• August 1991–July 1993 

Honors and awards: 

Exceptional Civilian Service Award—Department of Defense, 2001 

Exceptional Civilian Service Award—Department of Defense, 2006 

Outstanding Public Service Award—Department of Defense, 2001 

DuPont International Scholarship—Columbia University 1990–1991 

Bachelor of Arts Conferred with High Honors—Swarthmore College, 1989 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

932 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Mr. Robert M. Scher in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Robert Mark Scher. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. 

3. Date of nomination: 

September 15, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

March 14, 1967; Baltimore, MD. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Danielle T. Ewen. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Maxwell Lawrence Ewen Scher, 14. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

High School, 1985: Friends School of Baltimore; 1981–1985 

Bachelor of Arts, 1989: Swarthmore College; 1985–1989 

Masters, International Affairs, 1991: Columbia University; 1989–1991 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

2012–Present: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, U.S. Department 

of Defense, 2000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

2009–2012: DeputyAssistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, 

U.S. Department of Defense, 2700 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

2006–2009: Associate, Booz Allen Hamilton, 8283 Greensboro Drive, McLean, VA., 

(New Address: 3811 N Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA) 

2005–2006: Chief of Staff, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, 2700 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

2003–2005: Member, Policy Planning Staff (on detail from DOD). U.S. Department of State, 2201 C St NW, Washington, DC. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

933 

None. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Board Member, Capitol Hill Community Foundation 

Member, U.S. Holocaust Museum 

Member, Kennedy Center 

Member, Cheverly Swim and Racquet Club. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

2014, Tommy Wells for Mayor, DC—$100 

2012, Obama for America—$500 

2012, Obama for America—$375 

2012, Obama Victory Fund—$500 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Exceptional Civilian Service Award: Department of Defense, 2001 

Exceptional Civilian Service Award: Department of Defense, 2006 

Outstanding Public Service Award: Department of Defense, 2001 

DuPont International Scholarship—Columbia University, 1990–1991 

Bachelor of Arts conferred with High Honors—Swarthmore College, 1989 

Scholarship for Voice Study—Swarthmore College, 1986–1987. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

Speech at the New America Foundation, India-U.S. Defense Relationship (http:// 

securitv.newamerica.net/events/2011/building—foundations) 

DOD Press conference on the India report to Congress (http://www.defense.aov/ 

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4917) 

Testimony on Indonesia/Papua (http://democrats.foreianaffairs.house.gov/111/ 

sch092210.pdf) 

Testimony on South China Sea (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG111shrg53Q22/html/CHRG-111shrg53022.htm) 

Testimony on the Palau Compact Agreement (http://www.energy.senate.gov/Public/index.cfm/files/serve?File id=98e52ea9-e63e-4058-d76f-65616fc51375) 

Testimony on the Asia Rebalance (http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/ 

serve?File id=dd4f9af6-8217-4b8a-bffe-c31720f8b719) 

Speech on Maritime Security at the Galle Dialogue, Sri Lanka http:// 

srilanka.usembassy.gov/mobile//sp-14nov11.html 

17. Commitment regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

934 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

ROBERT M. SCHER. 

This 23rd day of October 2014. 

[The nomination of Mr. Robert M. Scher was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on December 9, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on December 16, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Elissa Slotkin by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. No, I do not. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has led to significant improvements, including increased operational effectiveness, greater unity of effort across 

our Armed Forces, and civilian oversight—all of which have strengthened our force. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. None. 

QUALIFICATIONS, PRIORITIES, AND CHALLENGES

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA))? 

Answer. I believe that my experiences over the past 11 years in government—in 

the Intelligence Community, on the National Security Council Staff, at the Department of State and now at the Department of Defense (DOD)—provide me with the 

background to handle the responsibilities of the ASD(ISA). Working both in the field 

and here in Washington, I have worked on U.S. policy in the Middle East, Europe, 

935 

Africa, and most recently the Western Hemisphere—as well as been involved in a 

wide range of international crises that span the entirety of the ISA account. I have 

benefited from close civil-military cooperation to the achievement of U.S. objectives—something that is critically important in meeting new threats. 

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next 

ASD(ISA)? 

Answer. The next ASD(ISA) will need to continue balancing competing demands 

across the five areas within the portfolio—Europe, Russia and Eurasia, Africa, the 

Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere—while providing exemplary support and 

thought leadership to the Secretary of Defense on emerging crises and longer-term 

strategy on defense and security issues. The next ASD(ISA) will also need to manage the International Security Affairs team and ensure it has the tools and resources to conduct the day-to-day affairs of the organization while working within 

real-world budget constraints. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the ASD(ISA)? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DOD pursues a strategic and 

balanced approach as outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Top 

priorities would include strengthening America’s alliances with key partners and allies; ensuring the success and effective transition of the NATO mission in Afghanistan; improving and informing our counter-ISIL campaign and the international coalition that supports it; preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon; combating terrorism; strengthening security and stability across the Middle East; maintaining a strong relationship with Israel; expanding cooperation with our NATO allies and European partners in the face of Russian aggressive behavior; working with 

the states of Africa to meet urgent security challenges and help foster stability; and 

providing DOD support to Colombia and the Central America strategy. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would address these challenges by refining the development and implementation of DOD and interagency strategies, policies, and plans on 

key issues relating to Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. I would continue to work closely with other components of DOD in support 

of the Secretary of Defense, as well as our interagency counterparts, U.S. allies and 

partners, and, where appropriate, the private sector and nongovernmental organizations. I would pay particular attention to shoring up the policies, partnerships, and 

posture needed to meet the complex and often unpredictable challenges of the current security environment to ensure that they are updated as needed to reflect new 

challenges and new opportunities. Under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would work to support the President and Secretary’s guidance to 

shape a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be flexible, agile, ready, and technologically advanced. 

ROLE WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY

Question. The Secretary of Defense has announced a plan to reorganize the Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The reorganization has begun and is 

expected to be completed by 2015. 

What is your understanding of the major changes planned for the organization 

that you have been nominated to lead, and what do you believe will be the primary 

benefits of the reorganization plan? 

Answer. Under the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 

the major change for International Security Affairs has already taken place: the integration of Western Hemisphere Affairs into the International Security Affairs. 

That transition occurred earlier this year, and I worked closely with the Western 

Hemisphere Affairs team, the ASD(ISA), the Under Secretary of Defense, and Policy’s Chief Operating Officer to ensure as smooth a transition as possible. I also 

stood up a Workforce Implementation Team—composed of action officers from both 

the Western Hemisphere office and from offices already in ISA—to identify issues 

the workforce was most concerned with and raise them to management for discussion. 

Question. DOD Directive 5111.07 (11/7/2008) delineates the functions and duties 

of the ASD(ISA). Under this Directive, the ASD(ISA) is the principal advisor to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on 

international security strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest that relate to 

the Nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia), the Middle East, and Africa; their governVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00943 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
936 

ments and defense establishments; and for oversight of security cooperation programs. 

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD(ISA)? 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) is responsible for providing advice and support on defense 

policy and strategy for the Middle East, Europe, Russia, Africa, and, since the 

spring of 2014, the Western Hemisphere to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. Notably absent from the Directive is the responsibility for the Western 

Hemisphere (which was add to the portfolio with the USD(P) reorganization), what 

is the role of the ASD(ISA) with respect to the Western Hemisphere? 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) now provides advice and support on defense policy and 

strategy for the Western Hemisphere to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

and the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. Based on the aforementioned reorganization, what, if any, updates need 

to be made to DOD Directive 5111.07 (11/7/2008)? 

Answer. The DOD Directive will be updated to reflect the reorganization within 

OSD Policy, including the transition of Western Hemisphere Affairs to International 

Security Affairs. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What do you see as the relationship between the ASD(ISA) and each 

of the following? 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on defense and security policy and strategy related to Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. This advice is provided under the guidance of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Similar to the relationship with the Secretary of Defense, the ASD(ISA) 

is responsible for advising the Deputy Secretary of Defense on defense and security 

policy and strategy related to Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. This advice is 

provided under the guidance of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s principal advisor on defense and security policy and strategy related to Europe (including the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. 

Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) is the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy’s principal advisor on defense and security policy and strategy related to Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, 

Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. 

Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) works with the other Under Secretaries of Defense to advance the Secretary’s objectives and policy priorities, under the guidance and direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This includes providing policy 

input to each Under Secretary that relates to Europe (including the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. 

Question. The Joint Staff. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) works very closely with the Joint Staff to advance the Secretary’s objectives and policy priorities, under the guidance and direction of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This includes providing policy input to the 

Joint Staff that relates to Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere, as well as ensuring that military advice from the Joint Staff is sought out and considered in policy development as appropriate. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) works with the Secretaries of the Military Departments 

to advance the Secretary’s objectives and policy priorities, under the guidance and 

direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This includes providing policy 

input as appropriate to the Secretaries of the Military Departments that relates to 

Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, 

Africa, and the Western Hemisphere, and working with the Secretaries of the MiliVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00944 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
937 

tary Departments to help ensure their programs are synchronized with and support 

our policy in those regions. 

Question. The Service Chiefs. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) works with the Service Chiefs to advance the Secretary’s 

objectives and policy priorities, under the guidance and direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This includes providing policy input as appropriate to 

the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs that relates to 

Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, 

Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. 

Question. The Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) works with the commanders of the regional combatant 

commands in connection with activities in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, 

and the Western Hemisphere—U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Africa 

Command (AFRICOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command—to advance the Secretary’s objectives and policy priorities, under the guidance and direction of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs also 

works with the functional combatant commanders—particularly U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Transportation Command—to ensure that crosscutting 

functional efforts are appropriately synched and coordinated with the Secretary’s objectives and policy priorities in the International Security Affairs regions. Particular 

areas of engagement include regional and bilateral strategy and policy, contingency 

planning, and policy oversight of operations. 

Question. The Director of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) works with the Director of the National Guard Bureau 

with regard to the State Partnership Program and related activities in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. 

Question. The Other Functional and Regional Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) works with the other functional and regional Assistant 

Secretaries of Defense within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

to provide policy guidance to advance the Secretary’s objectives and policy priorities, 

and to ensure the regional and functional policy recommendations are coordinated 

and reflect the best advice of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s leadership team. 

Question. The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) works with the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency on the policy guidance for and the implementation of security cooperation activities, including Foreign Military Sales, to ensure these activities support 

the Secretary’s objectives and policy priorities as they are implemented with countries in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. 

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND NATO

Question. In your view, how important to U.S. national security interests is the 

U.S. transatlantic relationship with our European partners? 

Answer. The U.S. transatlantic relationship with European partners has stood the 

test of time through the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the September 11 attack on the United States and ensuing NATO action 

in Afghanistan, and ongoing operations to counter violent extremism and terrorism. 

European allies remain the United States’ principal partners in promoting global security. Not only is Europe home to our most stalwart and capable allies, it provides 

essential access and support that ensures the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to 

respond to global challenges, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. If 

confirmed, I would continue to work to reinforce this critical relationship. 

Question. In your view, what is the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) Alliance in meeting U.S. security interests? 

Answer. NATO is a uniquely important and capable Alliance, through which the 

United States and 27 allies confront together the broad range of diverse and difficult 

threats to our shared security interests. NATO is composed of like-minded allies 

who share our fundamental values of democracy, human rights, and rule of law, and 

it includes the most capable militaries in the world today. Fundamentally, NATO 

provides a standing forum for the consultations that forge consensus for needed actions, including military operations; it coordinates allies’ creation of the interoperable military forces and other capabilities needed for such actions; and it maintains 

a unique multinational command structure to lead those forces in action. NATO also 

has evolved into a global hub for security cooperation, connecting allies with more 

than 40 partner nations who work with us on security challenges worldwide, and 

938 

contributing to the political support and legitimacy accorded to actions by a wider 

international community. 

NATO has played a fundamental role in Afghanistan in leading the ISAF mission 

and is poised to continue in the Resolute Support Mission starting in January 2015. 

Today, NATO allies and partners continue to take significant steps in addressing 

Russia’s actions in eastern Europe, and in forming the core of the coalition against 

ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Other examples, from the Cold War through the Balkans 

to Iraq, Libya, counter-piracy and more, all illustrate NATO’s ability to be a strong 

force-multiplier for helping meet U.S. security interests. 

Question. In your view, what are the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming years, particularly in light of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine? 

Answer. NATO’s enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its 

members, and this includes promoting shared values and aiming to achieve a Europe, including Russia, that is whole, free, and at peace. The Russian Federation’s 

aggressive actions against Ukraine threaten the Alliance’s ability to achieve its strategic political objectives in the coming years. This requires both a united political 

response as well as continued security cooperation between Ukraine and the Alliance. In the coming years, the Alliance will aim to develop and maintain robust, 

mobile, and deployable forces with the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations; to develop the capability to defend its populations and territories against ballistic missile attack; and to develop further capabilities to defend against weapons of mass destruction and cyber-attacks. 

NATO MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. At the NATO Summit in Wales in September, NATO members and 

partner nations reaffirmed their commitment to the post-2014 train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan, known as Operation Resolute Support. 

What do you see as the major challenges for the NATO-led Operation Resolute 

Support mission to build the capacity of the Afghan security forces? 

Answer. The key challenge for the NATO-led Operation Resolute Support mission 

will be ensuring we have the right advisors with the right skills for our capacity 

building efforts, and ensuring we build enough capacity in the Afghan Ministries of 

Defense and Interior to execute the funding being provided to them responsibly and 

transparently. If confirmed, I would work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and interagency colleagues, toward that goal. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the work within DOD and with our partners 

to provide the right advisors. General Campbell and his team are in regular dialogue with the Department on this and we are rotating personnel to the field to 

work in the ministries. If confirmed, I would also work to echo General Campbell’s 

messages to his counterparts about the importance of responsible management of 

donated funds, which are used to pay army and police salaries and other basic 

consumables. President Ghani’s statements on attacking corruption are helpful to 

our efforts to build transparency and accountability with the Ministry of Defense 

and Ministry of Interior—and to keep our allies and partners invested in Afghanistan. 

Question. General Campbell and General Dunford have both indicated that the 

loss of Mi-17 helicopter capability would ‘‘ . . . be catastrophic to the mission and 

would give me cause to reassess the entire campaign.’’ General Campbell and General Dunford also point out that the Mi-17s are key to providing an outer layer of 

force protection to U.S. and coalition forces. 

Do you agree with the statements of General Campbell and General Dunford on 

the critical importance of the Mi-17s to mission success and force protection in Afghanistan, and if so why? 

Answer. Yes. The Afghan Air Force is using the Mi-17s to provide outer ring security for coalition forces. The Afghan Special Mission Wing is using the Mi-17s to 

conduct operations against terrorists and insurgents in otherwise unreachable areas 

of Afghanistan. The Mi-17 provides mobility in difficult terrain and is critical for 

denying enemy sanctuary in these non-permissive areas of the country. It also provides troop transport capability and serves as the primary casualty evacuation platform and as a close air support platforms. It is the centerpiece of the Afghan Air 

Force and the loss of the Mi-17 would be a serious blow to our operations in Afghanistan. 

939 

RUSSIA

Question. What role will you play, if confirmed, in establishing policy with respect 

to the U.S.-Russia security relationship, including in the NATO context? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would play an active role in managing our evolving defense strategy toward Russia, ensuring that the Department is prepared and postured to enforce our Article 5 commitment, reassure our allies with a persistent 

presence in central and eastern Europe for as long as necessary, support our partners so they are better able to secure their borders and provide for their own defense, and deter potential aggressive Russian actions against U.S. interests. 

Question. What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security 

relations? 

Answer. Military-to-military relations between the United States and Russia are 

on hold due to Russia’s illegal occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, as 

well as its continued destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine and failure to uphold the Minsk Agreement. Russia’s behavior is not consistent with a responsible 

global stakeholder contributing to international stability, and we will not seek a cooperative relationship with the Russian military while it violates the sovereignty of 

one of its neighbors. Should Russia change its behavior by fully implementing the 

Minsk Protocol and withdrawing from Crimea, I believe the Department would be 

in a position to review the hold on military-to-military activities. 

That said, the Department is prepared to work with the Russian Ministry of Defense on issues in which it is in our national interest to do so. For instance, the 

United States and Russia have worked together to secure Syria’s declared chemical 

weapons stockpile, have common interests in promoting stability and countering terrorism in Afghanistan, and have a shared interest in avoiding misunderstandings 

or miscalculation concerning our global military presence. 

Question. What do you believe are the main areas of disagreement between the 

United States and Russia and the areas of common interest between the United 

States and Russia in the security sphere? 

Answer. The administration is committed to a Europe that is whole, free, and at 

peace; believes that nations have the right to associate freely with whatever organization it chooses; and does not accept that some nations have a sphere of influence 

or privilege—a vision I would uphold if confirmed. As demonstrated by its actions 

in Ukraine, Russia does not share these views, and is willing to challenge norms 

that have preserved international security for decades in order to assert its own vision. 

However, there are convergent interests between the United States and Russia, 

and opportunities for constructive engagement with Russia continue to exist, particularly regarding nonproliferation, such as the P5+1 negotiations with Iran and 

removing Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile. The United States and Russia also have a shared interest in counterterrorism, counter-piracy, developing the 

Arctic region, and ensuring stability in Afghanistan, and I believe the United States 

should be willing to engage with Russia on areas of mutual interest when it is in 

our national interest to do so. 

Question. On November 2, 2014 the New York Times reported that ‘‘Tanks and 

other military vehicles [are] pouring over the border from Russia into eastern 

Ukraine’’ despite the ceasefire reached in September. 

In the context of Russian aggression in eastern Europe, do you believe that the 

deterrence of further aggression will require the permanent stationing of additional 

U.S. or allied forces in eastern European nations? 

Answer. The Department continues to work with the EUCOM and allies and partners to develop additional reassurance and deterrence measures in the region. Adjusting U.S. force structure in Europe may be one of these measures; however, this 

must be done in the context of balancing other global requirements and managing 

limited fiscal resources. If confirmed, I would continue to support this effort. 

Question. What is your assessment of which American forces and capabilities have 

the greatest deterrent effect upon Russia and other aggressive actors in the region? 

Answer. Effective deterrence relies on the combination of capabilities—but it is 

our will to defend the NATO Alliance from aggression that gives our capabilities 

credibility. Deterring aggressive actors in Europe also requires a strong and unified 

Alliance willing to share the burden for defense, and if confirmed I would continue 

to work with our allies to work toward that goal. 

FORCE POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Question. The Gulf continues to be a turbulent area, made more unstable by the 

malign influence of Iran and the growth of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and 

Syria. 

940 

Do you believe there is a need for the United States to mitigate the effects of a 

reduced aircraft carrier presence in the Gulf region and, if so, how would you propose doing so? 

Answer. The Department maintains a strong military posture in the Gulf region 

with a mix of air, land, and naval forces. We do not rely on any single capability 

to address regional threats. The Department regularly assesses its forward posture, 

including the deployment of aircraft carriers, to address most effectively the challenges faced globally. The Department also maintains our ability to respond quickly 

to a range of worldwide contingencies. Therefore, at the present time I understand 

our military commanders do not see a need to further mitigate the reduced aircraft 

carrier presence in the Gulf. 

IRAQ

Question. The President has announced an increase in the number of U.S. military personnel to be deployed to Iraq to advise and assist Iraqi security forces and 

Kurdish peshmerga in countering the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant (ISIL). 

How would you describe the key U.S. strategic interests and objectives in Iraq? 

Answer. I believe the United States has a strategic interest in a stable, secure, 

and united Iraq led by an inclusive government that has support from all of Iraq’s 

communities. The United States shares many interests with Iraq—including countering ISIL, countering threats from Iran, and ensuring the region is peaceful and 

secure in the long-term. 

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S.-Iraq security 

relationship over the coming years? 

Answer. As we work to support the President’s counter-ISIL strategy, supporting 

the Government of Iraq’s efforts to build an inclusive and effective Iraqi Security 

Force will be a great challenge, and will take time. In order to reconstitute a sustainable, effective, and inclusive security force that can re-take territory and hold 

it in the long-term, the Government of Iraq must do the required reform and reconciliation among major sectarian groups in order to support the security forces. If 

confirmed, I would work with my colleagues toward that end. 

Question. Do you support President’s approach for training and equipping security 

forces in Iraq to counter the ISIL threat? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for efforts to train and equip 

Iraqi security forces to counter the ISIL threat, and if confirmed, what recommendations would you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. As I noted, supporting the Government of Iraq’s efforts to build an inclusive and effective Iraqi Security Force will be challenging, and take time. The Government of Iraq must offer a national program of reform and reconciliation in order 

for Iraqi security forces to succeed. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the 

Department of State and coalition partners on an engagement plan that urges the 

Government of Iraq to match capability development with political reform. 

Question. In your view, what conditions, if any, should the United States place 

on the provision of equipment or assistance to the Government of Iraq in its fight 

against violent extremism? 

Answer. Given the severity of the ISIL threat, the United States should continue 

to exercise its ongoing foreign assistance and security cooperation activities with the 

Government of Iraq, in accordance with applicable legal requirements—and continue to consult with Congress while doing so. 

IRAN

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the military and political threat posed by Iran? 

Answer. The administration’s primary concern is preventing Iran from obtaining 

a nuclear weapon. However Iran’s ballistic missile forces, naval forces, cyber capabilities, and sponsorship of destabilizing activity in the region are also of significant 

concern. Iranian officials’ boasting of their influence in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, as well as Supreme Leader Khamenei’s recent inflammatory comments regarding Israel’s right to existence, are also extremely provocative. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of U.S. policy with respect 

to Iran? 

Answer. Our current priority remains to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear 

weapon and I support the President’s decision to continue pursuit of a diplomatic 

resolution to this issue. Negotiations aside, I subscribe to the view that the United 

States and many other countries hold that Iran needs to become a more responsible 

941 

presence in the region, as well as adhere to international norms, including in the 

area of human rights. 

Question. What are the risks, if any, associated with reducing U.S. presence in 

the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran? 

Answer. The administration has no plans to reduce the U.S. presence in the Middle East, and the President has been clear to both Iran and other countries that 

might consider testing the United States that we will continue to protect our interests globally. The United States’ ability to garner the political will and marshal the 

forces to counter ISIL as quickly as it did serve as evidence that we continue to advance security and stability in the region—and will retain a robust force posture in 

the Middle East to protect our partners and our interests. 

Question. In your view, what role should DOD play in countering Iran’s support 

of international terrorism? 

Answer. In my view, DOD has an important role to play in countering Iran’s support for international terrorism by supporting broader U.S. Government and partner 

nation efforts. We also conduct numerous military exercises in the region that focus 

on mine countermeasures, maritime defense, and integrated air and missile defense 

that prepare us for possible Iranian asymmetric threats. If confirmed, I would continue to work with our interagency and international partners to further these efforts and ensure Iran is held accountable on the full scope of its destabilizing activities in the region and beyond, as necessary. 

SYRIA

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United States policy 

with respect to Syria? 

Answer. The administration seeks a stable Syria that provides freedom and security to its citizens and is at peace with its neighbors. The U.S. focus is on three 

main areas: disrupt, degrade, and destroy ISIL; promote a negotiated political settlement to the Syria conflict; and prevent the Syria crisis from further destabilizing 

neighboring countries. 

The immediate focus is to disrupt, degrade and destroy ISIL. We seek to drive 

ISIL out of Iraq, deny it safe-haven in Syria, and disrupt its ability to project power. 

There is no sustainable solution to the Syria crisis without addressing the current 

ISIL threat. If confirmed, I would work to further the administration’s policy with 

regard to Syria. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United States policy 

with respect to the Assad Regime? 

Answer. As the President has said, Assad has been a magnet for extremism and 

has lost all legitimacy to govern. There must ultimately be a negotiated political settlement in which Assad cedes power in order to restore security and stability to 

Syria. If confirmed, I would work with my interagency partners to further the administration’s policy. 

Question. What role, if any, does ASD(ISA) have within the U.S. Government policy community with respect to Syria? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 

formulating, coordinating, and presenting the Department’s Syria recommendations 

to the rest of the U.S. interagency. I would work closely with my counterparts on 

the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 

Low-Intensity Conflict. I would also work with counterparts across the interagency 

as they develop options that work towards a resolution to the crisis in Syria. This 

includes options for disrupting ISIL, and ways to pressure the Assad regime to negotiate a settlement, bolster the moderate Syrian opposition, alleviate the suffering 

of the Syrian people, and address extremist threats. 

Question. What role, if any, does ASD(ISA) have with respect to the DOD’s proposed program to train the moderate, vetted Syrian Opposition? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would provide advice to DOD and interagency leadership 

on implementing the Department’s proposed program to train and equip the moderate Syrian opposition. 

GULF SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. The administration has been working with Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) governments to enhance regional cooperation and security against ballistic 

missile threats, particularly from Iran. 

What is your view of the potential for missile defense cooperation within the GCC 

to enhance regional security, and how do you see this potential cooperation fitting 

into the U.S. missile defense and security efforts in the Middle East? 

942 

Answer. During the Secretary’s first formal Defense Ministerial with the GCC in 

May, it was clear that a robust and enduring multilateral missile defense architecture would be advantageous to counter the threat posed by Iran. Our partners in 

the region share this view, and DOD sees strong potential for cooperation. I understand, however, that this architecture will take time to build and will require continued support from member states to maintain it over the long term. If confirmed, 

I would work with the Services, the combatant commands, and our partners and allies to build effective deterrence and defense architectures for Europe and the Middle East against ballistic missile threats. 

LIBYA

Question. Following the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli on July 26th, 

there is no longer an active American presence in the country. 

What is your understanding of how the departure of the U.S. presence is impacting our security interests in the country, to include its impact on our ability to collect timely intelligence and engage with Libyan security institutions? 

Answer. I believe the suspension of operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in 

late July has adversely affected our ability to engage with Libyan security institutions, but it was a necessary measure to ensure the safety of U.S. personnel. Unfortunately the fragmentation of the country has caused the United States and our 

partners to place on hold our security assistance programs with Libya, including a 

multinational effort to train a Libyan General Purpose Force. If confirmed, I would 

continue to work with my interagency colleagues to urge all Libyan parties toward 

a political solution and improved governance. 

ISRAEL

Question. With regard to our relationship with Israel, President Obama has stated: ‘‘Our military and intelligence cooperation has never been closer. Our joint exercises and training have never been more robust. Despite a tough budget environment, our security assistance has increased every year. We are investing in new capabilities. We’re providing Israel with more advanced technology—the type of products and systems that only go to our closest friends and allies. Make no mistake: 

we will do what it takes to preserve Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge—because 

Israel must always have the ability to defend itself, by itself, against any threat.’’ 

Do you agree with President Obama’s position and views with regard to the U.S. 

security relationship with Israel? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would work to continue the Department’s substantial 

cooperation with Israel and maintain the strength of our security relationship. 

EGYPT

Question. A stable and secure Egypt is important to maintaining the peace treaty 

between Israel and Egypt and Egypt played an important role in brokering peace 

between Israel and Hamas. 

What is the purpose of the security assistance provided by the United States to 

Egypt? 

Answer. The U.S. relationship with Egypt is significant and enduring. Egypt plays 

a key role in the stability of the Middle East. For more than 30 years, our defense 

relationship has served to further our joint interests. Our security assistance to 

Egypt, and our security relationship with Egypt, facilitates our access to the Suez 

Canal and Egyptian airspace, supports the security of Israel, advances joint counterterrorism efforts, and maintains the security of U.S. personnel in Egypt. 

Question. What, if any, impact would discontinuing or significantly reducing that 

assistance have on the bilateral relationship and regional security? 

Answer. I believe discontinuing U.S. security assistance to Egypt would undercut 

key aspects of our relationship with Egypt, which has been a cornerstone of our security policy in the Middle East since the 1980s. It would reduce U.S.-Egypt cooperation on shared interests—including countering terrorism and access to Egyptian airspace for U.S. military aircraft. 

AFRICA-RELATED SECURITY MATTERS

Question. The new DOD strategic guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’’ announced by President Obama on January 5, 

2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which DOD will prepare. The primary emphasis of the strategy relates to 

the Middle East and Asia. The strategy makes little reference to Africa and its myriad security challenges. 

943 

In light of the emphasis on areas outside of the African continent, if confirmed, 

how would you draw attention to the myriad security challenges confronting African 

nations? 

Answer. The Defense Strategic Guidance and the more recent 2014 QDR both 

make clear that DOD will focus its resources on achieving U.S. objectives in the 

Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions in the years ahead. However, from a mission 

perspective, both documents emphasize the importance of maintaining a strong 

focus on counterterrorism and irregular warfare, particularly with respect to disrupting and defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates (AQAA) wherever they manifest 

as a threat to the United States and partner interests. Given this emphasis, and 

the growing AQAA and potential ISIL presence in Africa, I will ensure African security challenges will continue to receive the focus that they deserve. If confirmed, I 

would support the Department’s ongoing efforts to build the capacity of African security forces, defense institutions, and regional organizations to combat terrorism 

and transnational threats, participate in regional peace operations, and respect 

international human rights norms. 

Question. In the last few years, there has been a growth of terrorist networks, capabilities, and operations in North and East Africa, including groups that reportedly 

intending to target Western nations, including the United States. Some have characterized the U.S. counterterrorism effort in North and East Africa as an ‘‘economy 

of force’’ effort. 

Do you agree with that characterization of the U.S. counterterrorism effort in 

North and East Africa? 

Answer. No. The growing terrorist threats across Africa present a complex challenge to U.S. national security interests; thus, I do not consider it to be an ‘‘economy 

of force’’ region. Africa’s ungoverned spaces have increasingly become safe havens 

for extremists who have been put under increasing pressure in other parts of the 

world. DOD’s approach to disrupting extremist networks in Africa relies on relatively low-cost, small footprint, innovative approaches, often involving partnering 

with regional or international partners. In light of pressure on the Department’s 

overall budget, we focus our efforts on those cases where the most significant U.S. 

interests are at stake, there is political will to address the given security challenge, 

and there is a credible likelihood that our targeted support will result in a decisive 

effect. If confirmed, I would look for ways to build upon the success that we have 

seen to date in places like Mali, where U.S. support to French operations and U.N. 

peacekeeping forces have helped stabilize that country and reduce al Qaeda’s freedom of movement. 

Question. In your view, should these U.S. counterterrorism efforts be expanded, 

contracted, or remain the same? 

Answer. I believe that U.S. counterterrorism efforts should be dynamic and of sufficient scale to address the threats facing the United States, our interests, and those 

of our allies and partners. If confirmed, I would continue to support robust counterterrorism efforts to disrupt and ultimately defeat al Qaeda, ISIL, their affiliates, 

and other violent extremist organizations that pose risk to U.S. and allied interests, 

threaten regional security, and undermine economic growth and opportunity. 

SOMALIA

Question. To date, DOD has had a limited role in Somalia and the Department 

has not established a military-to-military relationship with the newly formed Somali 

National Army. Further, the DOD has not provided any security assistance to the 

Somali National Army. 

What is the appropriate role for DOD with respect to Somalia and what, if any, 

assistance should the DOD provide to the Somali National Army? 

Answer. To date, DOD has had a limited, but focused role in Somalia, which has 

included advice and assistance, training, and logistical support to the African Union 

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Forces as they strive to 

bring stability and peace to Somalia. 

Following the January 2013 recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia 

(FGS) by the United States, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy hosted the 

Somali President in the Pentagon, which was followed by a second visit and meeting 

with the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon in September 2013. Through a deliberate engagement plan, the Department established a military-to-military relationship with the Somali National Armed Forces. This plan has included key engagements with Somali defense leaders, visits by the AFRICOM Commander, the Commander of Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, and other DOD personnel. Moreover, 

in July 2014, the Department installed a Defense Attache ́ to support the Special 

Representative to Somalia, who remains based in Kenya. 

944 

With respect to the Department’s role in Somalia, the United States is in a unique 

position to play an advisory role at a new beginning in the development of Somali’s 

security sector, and if confirmed, I would work to support that effort. 

Question. Are there any restrictions that prevent DOD from providing assistance 

to the Somalia National Army? If so, what restrictions? 

Answer. Yes. Provisions in the fiscal year 2014 Foreign Operations bill currently 

prohibit the United States from providing lethal assistance to Somalia. As a result, 

DOD is unable to provide much-needed military equipment and training to the Somali National Army. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to determine the appropriate approach to this prohibition. 

U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and 

efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord’s 

Resistance Army (LRA)—including Joseph Kony—continue to operate and commit 

atrocities against civilian populations. Some observers have identified operational 

concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find 

an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered 

in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from 

the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; (3) limitations 

continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of 

direct support they can provide; and (4) logistics and operational enablers for U.S. 

forces. 

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass? 

Answer. Under Operation Observant Compass (OOC), U.S. Special Operations 

Forces seek to enhance the capacity of local forces in the African Union Regional 

Task Force to end the threat to regional stability and civilian security posed by the 

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). U.S. military advisors are working with these forces 

to improve their intelligence gathering, fusion, and information-sharing; enable effective logistical support; enhance their staff coordination and operational planning; 

and assist efforts to increase overall operational effectiveness. Because there are no 

purely military solutions to this problem, the U.S. military supports a broader interagency and international effort that involves the U.S. embassies in the affected 

countries, U.S. Agency for International Development’s programs, as well as contributions from nongovernmental organizations. 

If confirmed, I would continue to support the current U.S. policy of pursuing a 

comprehensive, multi-faceted strategy to assist the governments and people of LRAaffected areas to end the threat posed by the LRA and to address the impact of the 

LRA’s atrocities. 

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate level of priority to be accorded 

to efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army? 

Answer. In my view, the level of priority currently accorded to OOC is appropriate 

and appears to have yielded significant results. Three of the top five LRA leaders 

have been removed from the battlefield. There has been a 75 percent decrease in 

the number of people killed by LRA attacks. Since 2012, there have been 240 confirmed defections from the LRA, with 80 occurring between July and September 

2014. Many who have fled the LRA have cited U.S.-supported defections messaging 

as influential in their decision to leave the group. 

Question. If confirmed, will you work to review the four concerns outlined above 

and report back to the committee? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would work with the relevant experts in the Department to ensure that your concerns are reviewed. I would be happy to organize an 

update on current OOC operational efforts at your convenience. 

‘NEW NORMAL’ REQUIREMENTS WITHIN U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

Question. AFRICOM consistently suffers from shortfalls in resourcing—particularly in the areas of force posture, mobility, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—and a lack of persistent access to the continent that impact its ability 

to meet requirements in theater, including crisis response. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the ‘new normal’ requirements in 

AFRICOM’s area of responsibility? 

Answer. The crises in Africa and the complexity of the security environment have 

demonstrated the need for DOD to position forces to respond rapidly on the continent. The Department’s support has focused on two areas: assisting the Department of State in strengthening the security of high-threat, high-risk diplomatic missions in Africa and developing rapid response capabilities to bolster security during 

945 

a crisis as a way to address the challenges presented by the size of Africa and the 

continent’s limited infrastructure. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the impact of and resulting risk associated with AFRICOM’s resourcing shortfalls and persistent access to 

the continent on its ability to meet its ‘new normal’ requirements? 

Answer. I believe the AFRICOM forces will remain resilient in their ability to 

meet new normal requirements and will be augmented as necessary should a crisis 

occur. If confirmed, I would work with colleagues in the Department to support 

those requirements. 

COLOMBIA

Question. Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian Government to make significant gains against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other 

paramilitary forces in Colombia, as well as enabled the government to secure many 

previously ungoverned areas. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided 

more than $7 billion to support Colombia’s efforts to counter the threat of 

transnational criminal organizations and various terrorist groups. 

What are your views regarding the current situation in Colombia focusing upon: 

(1) the current military and political situation in Colombia; (2) the ability of the Colombian military to control its territory; and (3) ongoing DOD programs? 

Answer. I believe the Government of Colombia has made substantial gains in recent years to enhance its internal stability and citizen security. Although stability 

in Colombia is not assured, Colombia has made progress in asserting more effective 

governmental control over its territory through a national consolidation campaign. 

The Department’s security assistance programs are focused on training, equipping, and mentoring Colombians; helping Colombia with defense institutional reform; and providing support to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance programs. Colombia has also been an increasingly capable and willing partner in addressing shared security challenges and has contributed to efforts to improve stability more broadly in the Western Hemisphere, in particular by partnering with us 

in Central America. 

Question. In your view, is the Colombian Government capable of sustaining the 

last decade’s gains during this economic downturn and the scheduled decline in U.S. 

security assistance? 

Answer. Yes. The Department has worked closely with Colombia to institutionalize the strategic, operational and technical capabilities that it has developed 

over the past decade, including through defense institutional reforms. Recognizing 

that continued U.S. assistance and support, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance, will be critical to Colombia’s continued success, the Department is 

working closely with Colombia to streamline our security cooperation programs in 

light of declining resources. If confirmed, I would continue working with our Colombian partners to help them consolidate and sustain their security gains while also 

addressing their emerging needs. 

Question. In light of budget conditions, do you believe continued U.S. security assistance to Colombia at the current levels is sustainable? 

Answer. The Department has made difficult decisions about where to focus resources given the fiscal environment, and has also identified areas where continued 

U.S. support will remain critical for helping Colombia consolidate its security gains. 

Because of the significant progress that Colombia has made in improving its internal stability, security assistance to Colombia has been gradually reduced. Even as 

fewer resources are available for Colombia, if confirmed, I would work with my colleagues to assist this strategic partner as it moves toward improved stability and 

a greater role in exporting security within the region and globally. 

Question. In your view, what are the remaining U.S. supported programs that will 

need to be continued to ‘‘lock in’’ the progress that has been made? 

Answer. Consolidating Colombia’s security gains will require continued U.S. support to programs that strengthen Colombia’s defense institutions. Such programs 

help provide Colombia the capacity to plan, resource, and maintain its enhanced 

abilities. As the FARC persists in conducting attacks on infrastructure and other 

targets, it will be important for the United States to continue to provide support 

to programs that help the Colombian Government maintain the technical and tactical edge that will guarantee stability over the long term. 

CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

Question. While the unaccompanied children crisis is not in the ASD(ISA)’s portfolio, the root causes that drive many of these individuals to seek sanctuary in the 

United States are within the purview of ASD(ISA). 

946 

What are the root causes of insecurity in the region? 

Answer. I believe insecurity stems from a wide range of persistent challenges in 

some countries in Latin America. Difficult economic conditions, widespread poverty 

and inequality, weak and sometimes corrupt government institutions, under-governed spaces, lack of sufficient infrastructure, and widespread crime and violence 

are only some of the significant and often overwhelming factors that contribute to 

insecurity in this region. 

Question. In your view, what role, if any, does DOD have in addressing the root 

causes? 

Answer. DOD has a significant role to play in supporting broader U.S. efforts to 

strengthen government institutions and fight corruption, develop infrastructure, address control of under-governed spaces and help diminish criminal organizations 

and violence. Often in a supporting role, the Department provides unique capabilities and expertise to other lead U.S. agencies, and encourages more capable partners in the region to join in efforts to improve security conditions in the hemisphere. 

Question. What is your assessment of the threats posed by transnational criminal 

organizations in this region? 

Answer. Transnational criminal organizations present a serious threat to the stability of the region, and many of our partners have become unable to control their 

growth and influence. Taking advantage of weak government institutions, endemic 

corruption, large under-governed spaces, and lack of viable economic opportunities 

for many Latin American citizens, criminal organizations have become entrenched 

in places like the Northern Triangle of Central America, further weakening already 

strained governments and citizenry. Dealing in the flow of illegal drugs, human 

smuggling and trafficking, counterfeiting, weapons, and other contraband smuggling 

across U.S. borders, these organizations also challenge the control of our southern 

borders and expose vulnerabilities to the southern approaches to the United States. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of DOD’s ongoing current 

activities in Mexico and Central America? 

Answer. DOD is helping Mexico and the countries of Central America improve 

their capacity to maintain security and advance hemispheric defense coordination, 

and if confirmed, I would continue to pursue those efforts. The Department’s security assistance and security cooperation activities in the region are focused on 

professionalization, including respect for human rights, and capacity building of regional security forces. The Department is also working with partners in Central 

America to facilitate internal defense institutional reform efforts that will help those 

governments plan, resource, and maintain their enhanced capabilities. 

CUBA

Question. What is your view of the need to review and, potentially, revise U.S. 

policies regarding Cuba? 

Answer. I support the President’s current policy with regard to Cuba, which includes targeted bilateral engagements that advance U.S. national interests and the 

enactment of measures that help reduce the dependence of Cuban citizens on the 

state. I support periodic review of the United States’ Cuba policy and DOD’s full 

participation in these interagency reviews. 

Question. What is your opinion about the need for, and the pros and cons of, military-to-military contact with Cuba? 

Answer. U.S. law and policy restrict official engagement with the Cuban Government, including the Cuban military. DOD currently conducts an annual disaster-relief exercise with the Cuban military at Guantanamo Bay, as well as limited military-to-military engagement with Cuba, including monthly fence-line talks at the 

Guantanamo Naval Base, which focus on avoiding misunderstandings across the 

fence line. 

Question. In your view, is Cuba currently supporting or sponsoring international 

terrorism? 

Answer. Cuba is one of the countries designated by the Secretary of State as a 

State Sponsor of Terrorism. This list is reviewed on a recurring basis. 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Question. In the past few years, DOD has requested and Congress has provided 

a number of authorities to build the capacity of partner nations. These include the 

‘‘section 1206’’ global train and equip authority, targeted authorities to build capacity in Yemen and East Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund. 

In your view, what are the strategic objectives and priorities for DOD’s programs 

for building the capacity of partner nations? 

947 

Answer. The defense strategy articulated in the 2014 QDR emphasizes three pillars, including building security globally, as this type of global engagement is fundamental to U.S. leadership and influence. As the Department’s budget declines, security cooperation efforts take on greater importance as a means to mitigate risk. In 

this regard, building the capacity of partners can ease the burden on U.S. forces by 

enabling them to act alongside of, in lieu of, or in support of U.S. forces across the 

globe, as well as to build national and regional security architectures that can prevent potential contingencies from emerging. 

Over the last decade, the Department’s capacity-building efforts, enabled by the 

authorities cited above, have largely focused on counterterrorism and counter-insurgency efforts. However, with reduced force structure and resources, the Department 

also will need to build capacity in other areas that could offset risk to U.S. forces, 

such as logistics and maritime security. 

Question. What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to the 

strategic direction, oversight, and management of DOD’s programs for building partner capacity to ensure that these programs are executed consistent with U.S. national security goals and objectives? 

Answer. Recognizing the need to align the Department’s security cooperation resources and activities the defense strategy, in 2014 the Department established the 

office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation within 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I support this effort and believe the office will help prioritize competing requirements among and between partner countries, within and across combatant commands. I also expect the office to 

work closely with counterparts within the State Department to support implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance, which calls 

for whole-of-government approaches to security sector assistance in support of U.S. 

national security goals and objectives. 

If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

to support further improvements to the security cooperation governance system. 

This includes seeking to complement tactical- and operational-level building partner 

capacity (BPC) efforts with initiatives to support partners’ institutional needs. 

Question. What is your assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of 

DOD’s programs for building partner capacity in achieving U.S. national security 

goals and objectives? 

Answer. Overall, DOD’s BPC programs have contributed to the achievement of 

U.S. national security goals and objectives, particularly with regard to counterterrorism, and regular program assessments have helped contribute to that success. If 

confirmed, I would work closely with security cooperation stakeholders to ensure 

that the Department continues to build on this and other assessment, monitoring, 

and evaluation efforts to ensure outcomes consistent with policy objectives. 

Moreover, although individual BPC programs have demonstrated success, there is 

an opportunity to magnify their impact by linking together security cooperation programs in ways that are mutually reinforcing, so that activities at the tactical, operational, and institutional levels are woven together to create enduring, sustainable 

partner nation capabilities. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies, in efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces? 

Answer. I believe each U.S. Government agency offers unique skills, subject-matter expertise, and experience to contribute to the planning, execution, and evaluation of efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces. Simply put, whole-ofgovernment approaches can bring about outcomes that are larger than the sum of 

their parts. 

In my view, DOD should play a supporting role to other departments and agencies, such as State, Justice, and USAID, in areas such as fostering political reconciliation, building accountable institutions of government, and restoring public infrastructure, so that DOD can focus its efforts on providing a safe and secure environment, while also assisting interagency partners in the building of accountable 

Armed Forces. As DOD continues to develop its approaches to building capacity at 

the ministerial and institutional levels, it should operate collaboratively and transparently with interagency partners to ensure that security sector reform efforts are 

mutually reinforcing. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the 

first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, 

the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. 

948 

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the BMDR? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy 

operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat? 

Answer. Yes, I agree. 

Question. Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess 

operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to 

deploying such systems? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Iran and North Korea each has hundreds of short- and medium-range 

ballistic missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partner nations in the EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM AORs. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of February 2010 stated that the United States 

intends to pursue regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches to ballistic missile 

defense against such missile threats in various regions. 

Do you believe that such regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches are appropriate to provide our regional combatant commanders with the missile defense 

capabilities needed to defend our forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in their areas of responsibility? 

Answer. Yes. Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal presents a significant threat to our 

forward-deployed forces, allies, and partners in the Middle East and Europe. Our 

current policy calls for development of ballistic missile defenses in these regions that 

are tailored to their unique deterrence and defense requirements, giving specific 

consideration to their geography, the character of the ballistic missile threat, and 

the military-to-military relationships on which we are able to build cooperative missile defenses. I believe this approach affords us the best option for developing regional ballistic missile defense architectures in the Middle East and Europe that 

meet the needs of the responsible combatant commanders. 

Question. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs, what role 

do you see for other nations to contribute to regional missile defense capabilities? 

Answer. The United States maintains longstanding security cooperation relationships with allies and partners in Europe and the Middle East. The current U.S. ballistic missile defense policy seeks to leverage such relationships to build and expand 

cooperative missile defense partnerships that lead to appropriate levels of burden 

sharing for defense of common interests. In Europe, we are actively working toward 

deployment of the U.S. contribution to NATO ballistic missile defense and continuing to work with our allies and partners in the region to build their ballistic 

missile defense capacity for their own defense, and in support of the NATO architecture. In the Middle East, we are continuing to grow and strengthen our bilateral 

ballistic missile defense efforts with our partners in the region while also, in the 

case of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, promoting increased levels of multilateral ballistic missile defense cooperation. Given the significant Iranian ballistic missile threat, I believe strong partnerships are the critical foundation upon which we 

will build effective deterrence and defense architectures for Europe and the Middle 

East. If confirmed, I would continue to promote strong bilateral and multilateral 

ballistic missile defense cooperation in these key regions of U.S. interest. 

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda, Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria, and likeminded organizations in the geographical area of responsibility for ASD ISA to the United States, our allies, and our interests? 

Answer. Violent extremists that operate across the geographic area of responsibility of the ASD(ISA) continue to pose a significant threat to the U.S. Homeland, 

to U.S. interests, and to U.S. allies and partners. Al qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant (ISIL), and other likeminded organizations pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons, facilities, partners, and allies. Extremist networks are 

exploiting political unrest and local grievances in parts of the Levant, North Africa 

and East Africa and using modern communications methods and social media to 

spread their ideology and plan operations. DPD conducts a range of operations to 

counter these threats, including direct and indirect action, cooperative efforts with 

allies and partners, and activities to help build the capacity of our key counterterrorism partners around the globe. 

Looking ahead, the large numbers of foreign fighters that have joined the ranks 

of ISIL and other extremist groups in Syria and Iraq will pose a long-term threat 

to the United States and our allies and partners. DOD is therefore working with 

949 

the U.S. interagency and foreign partners to implement appropriate counterterrorism measures to address the threat from attacks inspired or directed by violent 

extremists abroad. 

Question. What is your understanding of and familiarity with DOD’s ongoing effort to combat al Qaeda in the geographical area of responsibility for ASD ISA? 

Answer. I am familiar with DOD’s ongoing efforts to combat al Qaeda in the geographic area of responsibility of the ASD(ISA). DOD is engaged in a campaign to 

address the threat of al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other extremists throughout the 

Middle East and Africa. The Department supports the U.S. Government’s national 

strategy to counter terrorism through a variety of functions, including, but not limited to kinetic strikes, training foreign partners, capacity-building efforts, countermessaging, counter-threat finance, and intelligence collection. 

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its associated forces to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western interests 

more broadly? 

Answer. Although the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains degraded, the network’s affiliates—most notably al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula 

(AQAP)—continue to seek to attack the United States and its interests abroad. 

Strikes against the U.S. Homeland, for instance, remain a common theme in al 

Qaeda’s propaganda, stated aspirations, and planning. We take these threats seriously and, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department remains capable 

and ready to take appropriate action to counter them. 

Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated 

groups in each of the Geographic Combatant Commands? Of these threats, what do 

you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities? 

Answer. I believe the highest counterterrorism priorities remain in the 

CENTCOM area of responsibility. Though degraded by years of counterterrorism 

pressure, core al Qaeda, its affiliates, and adherents in Afghanistan and Pakistan 

remain a persistent and serious threat. 

AQAP has proven its capability to initiate attacks against the United States, remains the most lethal of al Qaeda affiliates, and is among our highest counterterrorism priorities. The Department is working closely with Yemeni forces to capture 

or kill key AQAP leadership and operatives, and our programs to train, advise, and 

equip Yemeni forces are critical to long-term efforts against AQAP. 

In the Middle East and Levant, ISIL, al-Nusrah Front, and other extremist networks pose threats to U.S. interests and persons in the region. We also face a threat 

to the U.S. Homeland by a group of seasoned al Qaeda operatives who traveled to 

Syria and are known as the Khorasan Group. These groups, along with the thousands of foreign fighters they have attracted over the past few years, will remain 

a serious concern and top counterterrorism priority for the United States and our 

international partners. If confirmed, I would support improving coordination and information sharing on foreign extremist flows from Syria, and would continue working with Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Israel to bolster regional stability. 

In the AFRICOM area of responsibility, our top counterterrorism priorities are alShabaab and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Somalia-based al-Shabaab 

poses a threat to U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa. Several years 

of operations by the AMISOM, together with our counterterrorism operations, have 

weakened al-Shabaab and reduced its safe-havens in Somalia. Al-Shabaab remains, 

however, a threat because it has demonstrated a capability to stage complex, highprofile attacks against Western targets outside of Somalia and continues to advance 

similar plots to harm U.S. citizens in the region. 

Algeria-based AQIM and its regional-based associates have flourished from instability in Libya and Mali; however, there is no current, credible evidence that AQIM 

is a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland. 

In the remaining geographic combatant commands, the threat from al Qaeda is 

less pronounced. If confirmed, I would continue working with the intelligence community, interagency colleagues, and foreign partners to disrupt and dismantle any 

emerging threats from al Qaeda in the areas of responsibility of the ASD(ISA). 

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s role in the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism? 

Answer. The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-departmental, multi-national 

effort guided by the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. DOD supports this 

strategy principally by building the capacity of partner security forces, collecting intelligence, conducting information operations, and, when appropriate, conducting operations to capture or kill terrorists who pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. 

persons. 

Question. Are you aware of any nexus between non-state actors and criminal networks? 

950 

Answer. Yes. There is a significant nexus between non-state actors and criminal 

networks worldwide. Non-state actors and criminal networks together pose threats 

to our national security interests and those of foreign allies and partners. For example, the FARC in Colombia have depended on criminal networks for years to conduct 

terrorist operations. Drug cartels in Mexico rely on global criminal networks to distribute their products and expand into new markets. Across Africa, illicit trafficking 

of wildlife and other natural resources facilitated by criminal networks provides 

funding for insurgents, violent extremist organizations, and terrorist organizations. 

Somalia-based pirate groups depend on transnational illicit networks to negotiate 

and secure ransoms to finance their operations. In Afghanistan, the Taliban continues to generate a significant percentage of its revenue through regional trade and 

taxation of illicit drugs, posing a direct threat to U.S. and coalition personnel and 

to our broader interests in the region. 

Question. Given your current knowledge of DOD’s programs, do you believe resources are aligned in a manner consistent with these counterterrorism priorities? 

Answer. Yes. I believe the Department’s counterterrorism resources are currently 

aligned and are consistent with the priorities outlined in the National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism. If confirmed, I would continue working with the Secretary, the 

Joint Staff, combatant commands, and interagency partners to ensure alignment of 

the Department’s resources evolves with the nature—and geography—of the threat. 

USE OF MILITARY FORCES FOR CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Question. Throughout the Western Hemisphere, there is increased use of militaries to conduct policing and public security roles. 

Putting aside issues of corruption and capabilities, what is your assessment of 

this trend? 

Answer. Our Latin American partners, particularly in Central America, have been 

left with few other readily available options, considering the almost complete breakdown of police and justice systems, and are increasingly looking to their militaries 

as a way to address the immediate security challenges. DOD supports the broader 

U.S. Government efforts to strengthen police and justice systems in these countries 

so they need not rely on their militaries. 

Question. In your view, are these permanent shifts or temporary measures taken 

while the capabilities of police forces are improved? 

Answer. I think these are temporary measures. Militaries in some countries have 

been directed to provide breathing space for police forces so that they can address 

significant shortcomings in capabilities. Once the elected civilian leadership in these 

countries has determined the police forces are capable of providing local security, 

these militaries should return to more traditional military roles. 

Question. In your view, what are the benefits and risks of militaries taking on 

more public-security tasks? 

Answer. In times of security crises, militaries can help civil authorities restore 

order, provide government presence and credibility, and aid public security forces 

to develop the capabilities and trust needed to reassume their lead role in maintaining citizen security and public order. However, the longer militaries in some Latin 

America serve in this role, the more likely it is that civil authorities could begin 

to depend on military forces, instead of focusing efforts on improving police forces. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact 

on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. DOD is by no means the U.S. Government’s law enforcement 

agency, but it does bring unique enabling capabilities to our Nation’s Federal law 

enforcement agencies. 

What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational 

criminal organizations? 

Answer. The President’s 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime 

recognizes that transnational organized crime (TOC) has expanded dramatically in 

size, scope, and influence over the past 20 years, and now poses a significant and 

direct threat to national and international security. The strategy organizes a U.S. 

Government approach to counter TOC networks by enhancing information and intelligence sharing of the interagency; strengthening law enforcement interdiction capabilities, investigations, and prosecutions; disrupting drug trafficking networks; and 

building and improving the capacity and cooperation of our foreign partners. The 

primary objective is to lower TOC from a U.S. national security threat to a manageable public safety concern. If confirmed, I would work to support the President’s 

strategy on this issue. 

951 

Question. What role, if any, should the Department play in combatting 

transnational criminal organizations? 

Answer. The President’s 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime 

calls on the U.S. Government to build, balance, and integrate the tools of national 

power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats. DOD provides 

unique capabilities and expertise in support of law enforcement and foreign partners’ broader efforts to include intelligence, counter-threat finance, training, and detection and monitoring. If confirmed, I would work with the Department’s senior 

leadership to ensure that the Department is appropriately organized, resourced, and 

authorized to support U.S. efforts against transnational criminal organizations that 

threaten U.S. national security. 

Question. What role does ASD(ISA) play in combating transnational organized 

crime and in training and equipping partner security forces who have been tasked 

with combating it? 

Answer. The ASD(ISA) works closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and other elements of the Department with counter-drug and counter-transnational organized crime responsibilities. 

If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department’s activities to combat 

transnational organized crime, such as training and equipping of partner nations’ 

security forces, align with broader DOD and U.S. national security objectives. 

ILLICIT ARMS TRAFFICKING

Question. What is your understanding of the problem of illicit arms trafficking 

and the role of the United States to deal with the problem? 

Answer. The arms market is complex and global. Existing regional and national 

arms export control systems do not provide complete, worldwide coverage. This creates gaps that are being exploited by illicit arms dealers. The United States can continue to assist countries by sharing best practices and intelligence to help close 

these gaps. 

Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, does the lack of national controls 

and enforcement on arms flows contribute to the illicit trafficking problem, and 

could efforts to respond to illicit trafficking be improved if other countries adopted 

and enforced national regulations on arms import, export, and transit similar to 

those of the United States? 

Answer. Wherever illicit arms trafficking is widespread, the lack of effective national controls and secure borders contributes significantly to the illegal flow of 

arms. The adoption of national controls by affected countries, similar to those of the 

United States, would likely help to combat this problem. Our active participation 

in international export control regimes and other arms control fora are part of our 

strategy to help address the proliferation of arms and weapons technology. 

Question. Do you think the arms trade treaty would enhance U.S. national security interests? 

Answer. Yes. The arms trade treaty (ATT) that was negotiated in 2013 will serve 

U.S. national security interests. The ATT establishes international obligations for 

State Parties related to the trade of arms, while reaffirming the right of self-defense 

and the legitimacy of arms transfers for security purposes, without undermining existing nonproliferation and export control regimes. These obligations undertaken by 

States Parties will help to regulate the global arms market and prevent weapons 

from reaching the hands of terrorists, insurgents and human rights abusers. 

MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Question. What is your view on whether the United States should contribute additional military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support 

of U.N. peacekeeping operations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would support considering additional contributions of U.S. 

military personnel to staff officer positions. Support for international peacekeeping 

remains a security objective for the U.S. Government, and the United States has 

a stake in the success of U.N. peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United States should continue to provide military personnel for U.N. 

peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can help shape the 

direction and success of the mission. If confirmed, I would carefully evaluate any 

proposals to contribute military or civilian personnel to a U.N. peacekeeping operation, weighing the positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other 

military commitments we have around the globe, and the estimated cost of U.S. involvement. 

Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional 

military personnel to U.N. operations? 

952 

Answer. There are several potential advantages to contributing additional military personnel to U.N. missions including providing the opportunity to shape these 

missions and contribute to their overall success; professional development opportunities for military personnel to serve in a combined, multi-lateral environment; and 

receiving real-time information on emerging threats and crises from places where 

there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence. It also enables increased interaction 

between U.S. military personnel and numerous partner nations’ military personnel, 

with whom we may not normally have the opportunity to serve. 

The potential disadvantage of providing additional military personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a U.S. military force that has 

seen extensive deployments in recent years, and that is still heavily engaged in 

overseas operations. However, I believe the selective placement of modest numbers 

of U.S. military personnel in addition to the personnel currently assigned to U.N. 

operations can have a positive impact on U.N. peacekeeping operations. 

MASS ATROCITIES PREVENTION

Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in 

August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10. 

What is DOD’s role in addressing atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have 

for preventing or responding to atrocities? 

Answer. DOD is a member of the Atrocities Prevention Board, which has 

strengthened the Department’s efforts and provided additional tools to prevent and 

respond to atrocities. DOD plays an important role in early warning and providing 

support to prepare and enable international partners to prevent mass atrocities. 

DOD employs a range of atrocity prevention and response tools, from providing 

human rights training to partner security forces to supplying direct humanitarian 

assistance in active crises. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that the Department contributes to U.S. efforts to prevent mass atrocities, particularly for those regions that will be within the International Security Affairs area of responsibility. 

U.S. MILITARY BASING IN EUROPE

Question. DOD is currently undergoing a European Infrastructure Consolidation 

(EIC) effort. At the same time, the Department has requested additional funds for 

facilities in Europe, including almost $175 million in military construction in fiscal 

year 2015 in support of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). 

What is your understanding and assessment of the EIC and ERI initiatives and 

whether the goals of each can be accomplished in parallel? 

Answer. The EIC and the ERI are separate but complementary U.S. initiatives 

which can be accomplished in parallel. Both initiatives are about increasing U.S. 

military effectiveness in Europe—the EIC through the consolidation of U.S. infrastructure to make U.S. forces more efficient, and the ERI through investments to 

U.S. presence, readiness, and responsiveness in Central and Eastern Europe. The 

EIC will not reduce our military capabilities in Europe, but will shift their location 

within Europe to lower costs, eliminate excesses, and maximize utility. The ERI will 

build on these adjustments by adding even more capability, including through a persistent U.S. air, land, and sea presence. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you define and recommend the use of the key 

U.S. strategic interests for consideration in determining the U.S. military’s force 

structure in Europe over the coming years? 

Answer. I believe force structure in Europe remains vital to U.S. security and that 

of our allies and partners, and U.S. forces and facilities in Europe are likely to continue to be involved in any significant military operation we would undertake in the 

Middle East or Africa. Furthermore, Europe is home to the United States’ primary 

strategic partners and we will continue to rely on those partners and allies to share 

the burden of protecting common interests. In the 2014 QDR, the Department reiterated its commitment to build security abroad and project power decisively to defeat aggression. European force structure—and the relationships and interoperability it enables—is critical to that mission, and if confirmed, I would work to uphold our commitment to European force structure. 

Question. The United States has supported operations in both Africa and the Middle East from our military bases in Europe 

What is your understanding and assessment of the potential impact, if any, on 

our ability to conduct operations in Africa and the Middle East if the United States 

were to lose access to or from bases in Europe? 

Answer. Our partners and allies facilitate U.S. forces’ ability to counter security 

challenges to U.S. interests in Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the 

953 

Middle East in a timely fashion. Base access in Southern Europe, for example, allows U.S. forces to conduct force protection missions, monitor and protect U.S. diplomatic posts, and evacuate U.S. diplomatic personnel and noncombatants in North 

and Central Africa. Losing access to this extensive network of facilities would harm 

our ability to protect U.S. assets and personnel in Europe and further afield. 

Our footprint in Europe also affords U.S. personnel with opportunities to maintain 

relationships and interoperability critical to countering global security threats. For 

example, U.S. facilities in Germany, Italy, and Spain enable U.S. and European 

militaries to plan, train, exercise, and operate together effectively—activities vital 

to forming effective coalitions as we look for ways to cooperate through austere 

times. Coalition efforts like Operation Unified Protector in Libya, ISAF in Afghanistan, and Operation United Assistance in West Africa depend heavily on access to 

bases in Europe. 

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Question. One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and 

civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The 

ASD(ISA) supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy who is required to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such plans. 

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the 

formulation of strategy and contingency planning? 

Answer. If confirmed as the ASD(ISA), I would view my role as providing the strategic context to complement the operational expertise that our combatant commanders apply. Specifically, I believe civilian leadership provides critical depth and 

expertise on regional dynamics, bilateral relationships and priorities, and U.S. regional policies, which help us shape the application of our military power. 

Question. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning? 

Answer. Yes. I believe that the current level of civilian oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning is appropriate. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the capability and capacity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff to provide comprehensive, objective and realistic joint analysis in support of formulating and evaluating 

strategy and operational plans and related force planning? 

Answer. I believe the Department maintains a satisfactory level of analytic capacity to support strategy and operational plan development. My understanding is that 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, working closely with the 

Services and Combatant Commands, have many analytic efforts and venues that 

support the Department’s strategy development and planning oversight. I have benefitted from such analysis in my present role. 

Question. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy, contingency, and force planning? 

Answer. The Department’s civilian leadership is responsible for leading the development of a range of DOD planning efforts, with the support of military leaders. 

Civilian leaders must engage with military colleagues to understand military concepts and evaluate the validity of assumptions, particularly as they relate to political constraints, resource allocation, and strategic priorities. Civilian leaders should 

also ensure guidance continues to evolve as strategic and operational environments 

and objectives shift over time. Among my most important responsibilities, should I 

be confirmed, would be to ensure International Security Affairs informs force planning in a way that helps to define the future security environment and to support 

the President’s policies. 

Question. Many Geographic Combatant Commands’ contingency and operation 

plans are undergoing DOD review. These reviews are justified for a variety of reasons including geo-strategic change, risk assessments, potential adversary and our 

own capability enhancements, and fiscal realities. 

If confirmed, how would you determine whether the alterations to a contingency 

or operation plan are warranted due to geo-strategic change, risk assessments, potential adversary and our own capability enhancements, and fiscal realities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would rely on support from the Intelligence Community 

and the regional and policy expertise resident in International Security Affairs to 

guide and evaluate the combatant commands’ planning efforts. Plans should provide 

viable options to the Secretary and the President that reflect realistic resource assumptions, account for an evolving security environment, and reflect decisions and 

actions that are viable by bringing together senior experts to evaluate and refine 

plans. 

954 

STRATEGIC REVIEWS

Question. What is your understanding and evaluation of DOD’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting for each of the following 

strategic reviews? 

The QDR (section 118 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, U.S.C.); 

Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, U.S.C.); 

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b of title 10, 

U.S.C.). 

The Unified Command Plan (section 161 of title 10, U.S.C.). 

Answer. These strategic review documents and associated review processes offer 

opportunities for meaningful engagement with Members of Congress on the Department’s strategic priorities, in addition to providing essential guidance to the defense 

enterprise. These reviews allow the Department to set priorities across the Services, 

combatant commands, and defense components, in the context of ever-shifting security and fiscal realities. They also communicate the Department’s objectives to external audiences, including the U.S. public and our international partners. 

The QDR articulates the Nation’s defense strategy in support of the national security strategy. According to 10 U.S.C. section 118, the Department must conduct a 

comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, infrastructure, budget, and other elements with the end of articulating the United States’ 

defense strategy over the next 20 years. This strategy serves as a guide for U.S. 

military force structure, plans, and programs and is essential in enabling the Department to meet the current and future security challenges our Nation faces. 

As directed in 10 U.S.C Section 153, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

prepares the National Military Strategy, which focuses on the U.S. military’s strategic priorities. The National Military Strategy articulates the ‘‘ends, ways and 

means’’ in achieving the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy and 

other strategic guidance documents, such as the QDR, as well as describing the 

strategic and operational risks associated with accomplishing the military’s strategy. 

The Global Defense Posture review is an annual report to Congress that is the 

product of a continuous review process to determine the best mix of continental 

U.S.- and overseas-based forces. The report is authored by the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy and the Chairman. The review also supports senior leaders in the 

Department to make resource decisions based on the Department’s operational 

needs. 

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, a report required under section 161 

of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Department to complete a comprehensive assessment 

of the roles and missions of the Armed Forces and the core competencies and capabilities of the Department to perform and support such roles and missions. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to change 

title 10, U.S.C., that would update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to 

the Department and to Congress? 

Answer. These reviews provide opportunities to assess and alter, as necessary, the 

Nation’s defense strategy, required capabilities, and force structure for the Nation’s 

security interests, future security environment, and available resources. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (ASD SPC) to ensure that these reviews serve the needs 

of both the Department’s senior leaders and the U.S. Congress. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve 

DOD’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decisionmaking relative to each review above? 

Answer. I believe that successful strategic reviews include senior leader guidance 

and involvement, collaboration across the Department, and transparent deliberations. 

Strategic reviews require a robust analytical effort to provide a common understanding of future challenges and a common starting point for evaluating the proficiency and sufficiency of different force structures. If confirmed, I would work with 

ASD SPC to recommend that insights from previous reviews, along the lines of 

those described above, be applied to future Department reviews. 

Question. According to the report of the bipartisan NDP, ‘‘the capabilities and capacities rightly called for in the 2014 QDR . . . clearly exceed the budget resources 

made available to the Department.’’ 

Do you concur with this assessment? Do you believe it will be necessary to repeal 

sequestration in order to make available sufficient resources to execute the QDR 

strategy? 

955 

Answer. I concur with the NDP’s concern that current and likely budget constraints are ‘‘dangerous and self-defeating,’’ and significantly impact the Department’s ability to do long-term force planning. I also concur with the NDP’s advocacy 

for the Department’s requested compensation reforms, which provide needed flexibility. A return of the sequester mechanism would break our defense strategy by 

denying DOD the budget level to prioritize its expenditure. This means that, as 

Deputy Secretary Work has said, not only would there be a risk to certain missions, 

but also other missions would be executed on longer timelines and with a greater 

risk to the force. 

Question. According to the report of the bipartisan NDP, ‘‘national defense needs 

should drive national defense budgets, not the opposite.’’ 

What aspects of a strategy would indicate that a strategy is budget-driven versus 

budget-informed? 

Answer. A budget-driven strategy defines ends, ways, and means based on available resources, and contains little to no risk because, by definition, the strategy is 

designed to do only what can be done with available resources. A budget-informed 

strategy considers national interests and objectives, assesses how to achieve those 

objectives given the strategic environment, and develops specific ways and means 

to try to meet desired ends, informed by the likely available resource levels. A successful strategy should be budget-informed to have relevance; a defense strategy is 

effective only if it is executable. 

Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American 

forces should be able to ‘‘defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased 

campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.’’ 

The portfolio of the ASD(ISA) includes some of the most turbulent regions of the 

world. In the context of the recent and dramatic deterioration of the security environment in both the Middle East and Russia, as well as continuing instability in 

Asia, should the force sizing construct also mandate that American forces be able 

to defeat two adversaries at the same time, a standard embraced by previous QDRs? 

Answer. U.S. forces will continue to be able to prevail in more than one conflict 

at a time. The 2014 QDR envisioned an uncertain and complex security environment. Therefore, it directed the Department to size and shape the Joint Force to 

respond to a wide range of challenges. The current force-sizing construct allows us 

to plan and deliver agile, technologically advanced forces of sufficient size to defend 

our Nation and secure our interests globally while preventing America’s adversaries 

from achieving their objectives. 

Question. The law requires the QDR to identify the budget plan that would be 

required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, 

and any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current Future 

Years Defense Program) required to achieve such a level of risk. The law also requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with 

and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s QDR analysis 

and decisionmaking processes to address these two requirements? 

Answer. The Department’s QDR process is both strategy-driven and resource-informed. It determines the best mix of capabilities and investment portfolios for the 

Department to pursue. The Department accounts for both the fiscal climate and the 

strategic environment, and then makes difficult choices—and the QDR provides the 

strategic direction required to do so. This year, the QDR provided a specific assessment of what a return to sequester levels could mean for the risks associated with 

the execution of the Department’s mission. 

Question. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value in a defense 

strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the current or projected budget 

requests or fiscal environment? 

Answer. An effective defense strategy should take a comprehensive view of the future security environment and ensure the Department appropriately prioritizes its 

efforts and addresses trade-offs in the needed capabilities, activities, and posture of 

the future force. If a Defense strategy were characterized by the application of fiscal 

constraints up front, its focus would be on establishing trade-offs within the force 

to meet budget targets, rather than on options for best achieving U.S. objectives. 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), 

which replaced the School of the Americas in 2001, has the mission of contributing 

956 

to theater cooperation activities and capacity building efforts through the education 

and training of students in the Western Hemisphere from Canada to Chile. 

What is your view of WHINSEC and its mandate? 

Answer. The WHINSEC plays an important role as an educational institution focused on promoting democracy and human rights in the Western Hemisphere—and 

by providing professional education and training for military, civilian, and law enforcement personnel from countries throughout the Hemisphere. WHINSEC’s mandate is to foster mutual understanding, transparency, confidence, and cooperation 

among participating nations, and to promote democratic values, respect for human 

rights, and knowledge and understanding of U.S. customs and traditions. 

Question. In your view, does WHINSEC promote the national security interests 

of the United States in the Western Hemisphere? 

Answer. Yes. WHINSEC promotes U.S. national security interests and supports 

strategic objectives of building lasting partnerships that will ensure security, enhance stability, promote respect for human rights, and enable prosperity throughout 

the Americas. 

GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE

Question. As the Defense Department continues its assessment of projected budget cuts on its end strength, force structure, and other programs, it must also consider the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the permanent stationing of military forces in countries around the world. Based on a series of reports by the Government Accountability Office, evidence indicates that the Department is challenged 

in its ability to comprehensively and reliably estimate the cost of our global defense 

posture. 

What is your understanding and assessment of the cost and benefits of the U.S. 

global defense posture and the stationing of U.S. military forces overseas? 

Answer. I believe U.S. global posture is the most visible illustration of U.S. national security interests. It provides our allies and adversaries a measure of American resolve, while deterring aggression from our adversaries. 

In evaluations of U.S. global posture, the Department considers bilateral relationships, operational imperative, force management impact, and fiscal costs. When we 

choose to station forces home, we have to consider basing and facilities cost alongside the rotational costs incurred when those units have to deploy abroad. On the 

other hand, stationing forces overseas embeds additional costs in basing, personnel 

(through allowances such as Cost of Living Allowance and Overseas Housing Allowance), and facilities accounts. 

As the Department seeks a balance between the forces kept at home and those 

stationed abroad, DOD pays close attention to operational demands and regional 

conditions. If confirmed, I would continue to push for innovative methodologies that 

leverage America’s strengths and advantages. 

Question. In light of the force structure reductions associated with the Department’s planned end strength cuts, and potentially even deeper future end strength 

cuts, if confirmed, how would you propose to allocate those reductions between 

forces based within the United States and forces stationed outside the United 

States? 

Answer. Decisions affecting U.S. forces at home or abroad are considered through 

the lens I outlined above. Each decision is unique, but the Department uses a rigorous process that seeks to reassure our allies and partners while deterring our adversaries. If confirmed, I would work with my counterparts to determine the best 

options for military posture given the fiscal environment. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD methodology 

and assumptions used to evaluate the relative cost of overseas posture compared to 

stationing forces in the United States? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the ASD SPC to ensure that the Department considers posture impacts on the achievement of strategic objectives, secures 

the most advantageous cost-sharing arrangements with partners, and ensures that 

cost considerations are appropriately analyzed and considered before resources are 

expended. Finally, I am committed to building the capacity of partners globally, 

which will allow U.S. overseas forces to focus on our core interests. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take or changes would you recommend, if any, to DOD’s methodology and assumptions in determining the cost of 

overseas force posture compared to forces stationed in the United States? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the ASD SPC to ensure that U.S. forward-stationed posture is sized to meet operational requirements and leverages innovative presence paradigms. I would also expect to play a significant role in ensurVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00964 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
957 

ing that bilateral arrangements that support U.S. posture are as cost-effective as 

possible. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Do you support the provisions of section 1403 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 which state that no individual in the custody 

or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or 

physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment? 

Answer. Yes. The prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment reflects American values and is in our country’s best strategic interest. In 

the 21st century, the strength and appeal of our ideas and moral principles will be 

as important as our military might to America’s leadership in the world. We must 

hold to those ideas that make this country great, and continue to inspire the growth 

of freedom and tolerance around the world, if we are to defeat violent extremism. 

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, 

regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 

2006? 

Answer. Yes. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD 

ISA? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

LETHAL ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE

1. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Slotkin, would you agree that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) should be conducting contingency planning to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine in order to minimize the time between a potential policy 

decision and the delivery of lethal assistance to Ukraine? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. If confirmed, I commit to work with DSCA to ensure that it is prepared to provide information, equipment, and/or transportation for any items approved for provision to the Government of Ukraine. In order to provide that information, equipment, and/or transportation as quickly as possible once approved, I 

would work with DSCA to conduct as much research as possible on the pricing and 

958 

availability of all requested items in order to minimize the time between policy decision and delivery of assistance to Ukraine. 

2. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Slotkin, is DSCA developing a contingency plan to provide 

arms to Ukraine? If not, will you recommend or direct the DSCA to do so, if you 

are confirmed? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. No. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) does not 

maintain contingency plans—instead, DSCA provides pricing and availability information on equipment, as Ukrainian requests come in. When policy decisions are 

made to provide either lethal or nonlethal security assistance, DSCA works to provide these items as expeditiously as possible. If confirmed, I commit to continue to 

work closely with DSCA to provide security assistance to the Government of 

Ukraine. I also commit to work with DSCA to conduct as much research as possible 

on pricing and availability on all requested items in order to minimize the time between policy decision and delivery of assistance to Ukraine. 

[The nomination reference of Ms. Elissa Slotkin follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

November 13, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Elissa Slotkin, of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Derek H. Chollet. 

[The biographical sketch of Ms. Elissa Slotkin, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MS. ELISSA SLOTKIN

Education: 

Columbia University 

• 2001–2003 

• Master’s Degree in International Affairs 

Cornell University 

• 1994–1998 

• Bachelor of Science, degree in Rural Sociology 

Employment Record: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• August 2014 to present 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

• Performing the Duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

• July 2013 to August 2014 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• November 2012 to July 2013 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

• Chief of Staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• February 2012 to November 2012 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

• Senior Advisor for Middle East Transition 

• June 2011 to February 2012 

959 

From September 2003 to June 2011, I was an employee at the Central Intelligence Agency—but did frequent rotations around the U.S. Government: 

Department of State 

• Senior Advisor on Iraq 

• July 2009 to May 2011 

National Security Council 

• Director for Iraq 

• August 2007 to July 2009 

Central Intelligence Agency 

• Team Leader 

• September 2006 to August 2007 

Central Intelligence Agency 

• Team Lead for Special Field Assessment Team 

• May to September 2006 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

• Special Assistant to the Director of National Intelligence 

• March 2005 to May 2006 

Central Intelligence Agency 

• Intelligence Briefer to Senior U.S. Officials 

• June 2004 to March 2005 

From September 2003 to June 2011, I was an employee at the Central Intelligence Agency—but did frequent rotations around the U.S. Government: 

Honors and awards: 

Military Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, July 2014 

Cranbrook Kingswood Distinguished Alumni of the Year, June 2014 

Recognition Certificate for 10 years of Federal service, July 2013 

Nine Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Exemplary Performance Awards, March 

2004 to August 2009 

CIA Meritorious Unit Award, May 2006 

War Zone Service Award: April 2005, September 2006, September 2008 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Ms. Elissa Slotkin in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

960 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Elissa blair Slotkin. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. 

3. Date of nomination: 

November 13, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

July 10, 1976; New York, NY. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to David Russell Moore. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Two step-children: 

Christine Ann Moore, 24 years old 

Jennifer Clarice Moore, 21 years old 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Columbia University, 2001–2003, Master’s Degree in International Affairs, May 

2003 

American University of Cairo, Summer 2001, Intensive Arabic Language Certificate (non-degree program) 

Cornell University, 1994–1998, Bachelor of Science, degree in Rural Sociology, 

May 1998 

Cranbrook Kingswood High School, 1990–1994, High School diploma, June 1994 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 

August 2014 to present, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 

Washington, DC 

Performing the Duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, July 2013 to August 2014, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, DC 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 

November 2012 to July 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, DC 

Chief of Staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, February 2012 to November 2012, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Department of Defense, Washington, DC 

Senior Advisor for Middle East Transition, June 2011 to February 2012, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC 

From September 2003 to June 2011, I was an employee at the Central Intelligence Agency—but did frequent rotations around the U.S. Government: 

Senior Advisor on Iraq, July 2009 to May 2011, Department of State, Washington, 

DC 

Director for Iraq, August 2007 to July 2009, National Security Council, Washington, DC 

Team Leader, September 2006 to August 2007, Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, VA 

Team Lead for Special Field Assessment Team, May to September 2006, Central 

Intelligence Agency, Baghdad, Iraq 

Special Assistant to the Director of National Intelligence, March 2005 to May 

2006, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC 

Intelligence Briefer to Senior U.S. Officials, June 2004 to March 2005, Central Intelligence Agency, Baghdad, Iraq 

Political Analyst, September 2003 to June 2004, Central Intelligence Agency, 

Langley, VA 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None. 

961 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

None. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, July 2014 

Cranbrook Kingswood Distinguished Alumni of the Year, June 2014 

Recognition Certificate for 10 years of Federal service, July 2013 

Nine CIA Exemplary Performance Awards, March 2004 to August 2009, 

CIA Meritorious Unit Award, May 2006 

War Zone Service Award: April 2005, September 2006, September 2008 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

Commencement speech for Cranbrook Kingswood High School, June 2014. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) wm those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, ifconfirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

ordenial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

962 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

ELISSA SLOTKIN. 

This 19th day of November, 2014. 

[The nomination of Ms. Elissa Slotkin was returned to the President at the end of the 113th Congress on December 17, 2014, under 

provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules 

of the Senate.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. David J. Berteau by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. Currently I see no specific changes in the act that I would recommend. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. Currently I see no specific changes in the act that I would recommend. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 138a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness is to serve as the principal advisor 

to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on logistics and materiel readiness in the 

Department of Defense (DOD). 

If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense, what would you view as your principal responsibilities to the Secretary and the Under Secretary? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would fulfill the statutory responsibilities of being the 

principal advisor on logistics and materiel readiness issues to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

and serving as the principal logistics official for DOD. In this capacity, my responsibilities would include providing oversight and developing policy for all logistics, 

maintenance, materiel readiness, strategic mobility, and sustainment support programs. 

Question. If confirmed, what other duties do you expect that the Secretary and 

the Under Secretary would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would be ready to respond to changes of mission and leadership direction. Additionally, I would work to provide superior logistics support to 

the warfighter and find new ways to provide the goods and services we offer in a 

more efficient and cost effective manner. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I have spent the past 35 years working in, studying, and teaching about 

national security and DOD. In that time, I have learned first-hand the importance 

of logistics and materiel readiness to the success of every mission. My specific experience includes 12 years of experience in DOD, including 4 years as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics. In that capacity, 

all of the current functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness reported to me, including authority, direction, and control of the 

Defense Logistics Agency. In addition, I have 15 years of experience at senior executive levels in private industry and 12 years of senior analysis of defense matters, 

963 

including logistics, contracting, and sustainment for major defense acquisition systems. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any additional steps that you need to take 

to enhance your expertise to perform these duties? 

Answer. While I believe that my experience described above has prepared me for 

the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 

there are many aspects of current DOD operations and analysis of which I need to 

become more familiar. If confirmed, I would plan to spend sufficient time to become 

more current in my awareness and understanding of current capacities and capabilities across DOD. I would also plan an extensive series of meetings with and visits 

to the practitioners and installations in the field, including maintenance depots, arsenals, and engineering centers involved in sustainment. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would your relationship be with: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense on logistics and materiel readiness issues within the DOD. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on all logistics and materiel readiness issues in DOD. I would also monitor, review, and provide oversight 

of all logistics, maintenance, materiel readiness, and sustainment support programs 

within the Department of Defense, in accordance with applicable DOD policies. In 

addition, I would assist the USD(AT&L) in the performance of his duties in any 

other capacity that he might direct. 

Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would be the same as that described above in relation to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

1Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness so that we can both carry out our statutory obligations 

relating to readiness and other matters related to logistics, including the logistics 

workforce. 

Question. The Director for Logistics (J4), the Joint Staff. 

Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Director for Logistics (J4), the 

Joint Staff, would be based on my role as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

on logistics and materiel readiness in DOD, and on the J4 role as the principal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on logistics and materiel readiness. 

Question. The Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J7), 

the Joint Staff. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J7), the Joint Staff, to 

ensure that DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with J7 

roles and responsibilities advising the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on operational planning and joint force development requirements. 

Question. The Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8), the 

Joint Staff. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8), to ensure DOD logistics 

and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with J8 roles and responsibilities advising the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on force structure and resource requirements. 

Question. Commander, U.S. Transportation Command. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with the Commander, U.S. 

Transportation Command, to ensure seamless support to meet warfighter requirements. 

Question. The Defense Logistics Agency. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would exercise authority, direction, and control over the 

Defense Logistics Agency through its Director. 

Question. The Army Materiel Command. 

964 

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel 

readiness policies are coordinated with the Commanding General’s roles and responsibilities in meeting Army logistics requirements. 

Question. The Naval Sea Systems Command. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with the Commander’s roles and responsibilities in 

meeting Navy logistics requirements. 

Question. The Naval Air Systems Command. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with the Commander’s roles and responsibilities in 

meeting Navy logistics requirements. 

Question. The Marine Corps Systems Command. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel 

readiness policies are coordinated with the Commander’s roles and responsibilities 

in meeting Marine logistics requirements. 

Question. The Air Force Materiel Command. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commander, Air Force Materiel Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with the Commander’s roles and responsibilities in 

meeting Air Force logistics requirements. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate the major challenges to be driven by the 

defense funding shortfalls that will result under the Budget Control Act caps and 

the potential return to ‘‘sequester-level’’ funding in fiscal year 2016. Beyond that 

funding challenge, my additional concerns include: 

(1) Ensure that contingency operations forces and functions are provided with the 

best possible logistics supportunder available resources. 

(2) Ensure sufficient logistics capability to support future contingency or humanitarian operations. 

(3) Strengthen lifecycle management and long-term logistics planning within the 

acquisition process and at each Milestone decision. 

(4) Optimize the DOD supply chain so that it is globally responsive to mission 

needs. 

(5) Ensure that the logistics workforce is trained, experienced, and flexible 

enough to meet further logistics needs. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to focus my actions on ways to: 

(1) Work to identify and illuminate the consequences of failing to alleviate the impact of Budget Control Act caps in fiscal year 2016 and beyond. 

(2) Support and update policies that optimize all elements of the DOD’s logistics 

community, includingthe private sector and effectively support our warfighters 

at the best value to the American taxpayer. 

(3) Work with the military departments, OSD agencies, program offices, and industry to identify and implement long-term lifecycle management considerations throughout the acquisition process. 

DEGRADATION OF EQUIPMENT READINESS DUE TO OPERATIONS TEMPO

Question. The committee has received testimony from senior DOD officials and the 

Military Services citing the effects of operations tempo on the materiel readiness of 

equipment deployed in support of contingency operations. 

What is your understanding of the extent to which many years of combat operations have impacted the service life of major equipment items? 

Answer. My research has shown that, on average, major defense acquisition programs today are 50 percent older than were similar systems at this stage of the 

1990s drawdown in defense spending. This is a major concern, and if confirmed, I 

plan to spend considerable time on this question. I am familiar with public testimony and reports of the impact of high usage of equipment based on an aggressive 

operational tempo (OPTEMPO), coupled with the harsh environments in which 

965 

these systems have been operating. If confirmed, I would plan to examine the data 

regarding the impact of this OPTEMPO on materiel readiness 

Question. If confirmed, what would your approach be to regenerating materiel 

readiness that has been degraded by operations tempo after many years of combat? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to understand the priorities of the Military 

Services in regenerating materiel readiness, work to validate and secure the funding 

to support those priorities, and optimizing the capability of DOD to reset and reuse 

existing systems. 

DRAWDOWN, RESET, AND RECONSTITUTION

Question. The military departments continue to face major challenges in resetting 

and reconstituting their equipment as they complete the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan. The Military Services have repeatedly testified to the committee that 

they anticipate this effort will continue for several years beyond the end of combat 

operations. 

Do you believe that the Army and the Marine Corps have set aside adequate levels of funding in their recent budgets and in future years to meet anticipated reset 

and reconstitution requirements? 

Answer. The DOD budget justification material for fiscal year 2015 base budget 

and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding indicates the need for OCO 

funding for several years to meet reset and reconstitution requirements. Based on 

my research and on what I know now, I anticipate the need for OCO funding to 

continue for several years following completion of contingency operations. If confirmed, I would plan to work with the respective Military Departments to validate 

and obtain the necessary funding. In addition, reset and reconstitution assessments 

should cover all of DOD, as this problem might also extend to some Navy and Air 

Force assets. 

Question. If not, what steps do you believe the Department should take to ensure 

that this effort is successfully completed in a timely manner? 

Answer. If confirmed, and pending the results of the actions outlined in the answer to question 25, I have no additional steps to propose at this time. 

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FUNDING

Question. The committee has received testimony that the Military Services will require OCO funding for multiple years following the end of combat operations in Afghanistan. 

Given the uncertainty of OCO funding availability in future years, what enduring 

maintenance capabilities and activities, if any, would you recommend be transferred 

to base budget requirements? 

Answer. The challenges of reconciling OCO funding with base budgets affects all 

of DOD. This problem is exacerbated by the potential return to ‘‘sequester-level’’ 

funding in fiscal year 2016. Absent relief from the Budget Control Act caps, the 

need for OCO funding is likely to continue for several years following completion 

of contingency operations. If confirmed, and to the extent that Congress restores 

funding through a balanced approach, I would plan to work with the military departments to identify and migrate those enduring maintenance capabilities and activities into base budget requirements. 

Question. What logistics and maintenance activities, if any, would you recommend 

eliminating that have been funded with OCO over the last decade? 

Answer. At this time, I have no recommendations for eliminating activities that 

have been funded with OCO over the last decade. OCO funding levels should support the requirements generated by overseas contingency operations. 

Question. What impact will the eventual end of OCO funding have on the Military 

Services maintenance programs and efforts? 

Answer. Unless Congress acts to restore needed base budget funding through a 

balanced approach, any premature elimination or reduction of OCO will negatively 

impact the Department’s ability to generate readiness to sustain current operations, 

emerging missions, and long-term national defense priorities. 

SEQUESTRATION

Question. While the Bipartisan Budget Agreement Act of 2013 gave temporary relief to some of the negative effects of sequestration, the long-term effects of the 

Budget Control Act of 2011 continue to present significant challenges to the DOD 

in fiscal year 2016. 

If sequestration remains in law, going into fiscal year 2016, what specific capabilities and activities related to logistics and maintenance will be affected? 

966 

Answer. My research showed that sequestration impacts in fiscal year 2013 hit 

harder on spare parts, consumable items, and logistics support than on many other 

areas of the defense budget. I would expect a similar impact from a return to ‘‘sequester-level’’ funding in fiscal year 2016, with a disproportionate impact on the 

Military Services’ operations and maintenance accounts—the primary source of 

readiness funding. Both the purchase of repair parts and the induction of equipment 

into organic and private sector facilities for scheduled and nonscheduled maintenance would be directly affected by reductions in operations and maintenance accounts. 

DEPOT MAINTENANCE STRATEGIC PLANS

Question. The military departments regularly update their depot maintenance 

strategic plans to address the appropriate levels of capital investment in facilities 

and equipment, public-private partnerships, workforce planning and development, 

and the integration of logistics enterprise planning systems. 

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Military Services have updated or revised their depot maintenance strategic plans to address current and future logistics and maintenance requirements? 

Answer. I am aware that the military departments regularly update their depot 

maintenance strategic plans. While I am familiar with the recently released Army 

Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan and the Navy Depot Maintenance Strategic 

Plan, if confirmed, I would plan to evaluate these plans and those of the other Military Services against their current and future logistics and maintenance requirements. 

Question. Do you believe that the steps taken by the Military Services are adequate, or are additional measures needed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to review the steps taken with each Military 

Service and determine their adequacy. 

Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the Military Services 

have assessed the effects of reset on the baseline budgets, competing demands to 

reset equipment to meet unit readiness goals, the preservation of core capabilities, 

and the risk level that organic depot maintenance facilities may be able to accommodate in order to complete reset workload requirements? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to review with the Military Services their reset 

plans, funding requirements, and effects on base budgets, readiness, core capabilities, and risk. 

Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the depots’ plans address the need to manage workload requirements as operations in Afghanistan draw 

down? 

Answer. Recent events have demonstrated the need for flexibility in managing 

workload requirements as operations in Afghanistan draw down. If confirmed, I 

would plan to meet with the Military Services and review their plans and the funding needed to support them. 

Question. Do you believe that the steps taken by the Military Services are adequate, or are additional measures needed? 

Answer. If confirmed, and pending the results of the actions outlined in the answer to question 34, I would plan to examine whether additional measures might 

be needed. 

Question. Congress places great importance on the proper implementation of the 

laws contained in Chapter 146 of Title 10 U.S.C. Please provide your interpretation 

and how you would implement, if confirmed, the following statutes: 10 U.S.C. 2460, 

10 U.S.C. 2464, 10 U.S.C. 2466, and 10 U.S.C. 2476. 

Answer. I have read and fully support these statutes If confirmed, I will work 

with the Military Departments to ensure that the information is available to achieve 

readiness goals while maintaining full compliance with the statutes. 

Question. Do you believe the amounts allocated for the activation of new workloads, including military construction projects, at the covered depots should be included in the calculation to determine the minimum investment of capital budgets 

as required by 10 U.S.C. 2476? 

Answer. I believe the minimum investment should be what is needed to meet future sustainment requirements in the most efficient manner. If confirmed, I would 

plan to examine investments for the activation of new workloads at our depots, shipyards or arsenals that could enhance capabilities and provide benefits to accomplish 

existing workloads. 

Question. Do you believe any of the sections included in Chapter 146 of Title 10 

U.S.C., or any other statute affecting the depots should be modified? If so, why; and 

what is your desired outcome? 

967 

Answer. If confirmed, I have no proposed modifications to any of the sections of 

this statute. 

CONDITION-BASED MAINTENANCE

Question. DOD aviation assets continue to be under high demand and operating 

well beyond their anticipated flying hours. 

What is your understanding of the military services’ plans related to the transmission, storage, and analysis of data important to improving maintenance efforts, 

decreasing maintenance and spare part costs, and increasing readiness? 

Answer. I believe that better use of data is vitally important to improving maintenance efforts, decreasing costs, and increasing readiness If confirmed, I would plan 

to examine the efforts of each of the Military Services to improve the transmission, 

storage, and analysis of such data in support of Condition-Based Maintenance. 

Question. What is your understanding of the results of the condition-based maintenance effort thus far in terms of readiness and costs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to assess the results and work to ensure that 

Condition-Based maintenance supports improvements in the cost of readiness. 

PREPOSITIONED STOCK

Question. As the DOD positions materiel and equipment at locations around the 

world to enable it to quickly field a combat-ready force, it has been reported by the 

GAO that DOD plans to expand the use and reporting of its prepositioned equipment beyond combat operations may include training and joint exercises with neighboring countries, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction activities. The National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 2014 required the DOD to develop 

overarching strategic guidance and a detailed implementation plan to align the service specific prepositioning programs and create a more joint DOD-wide 

prepositioning program to achieve efficiencies and minimize unnecessary duplication, overlap, and fragmentation. 

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Department is working 

with the Military Services to develop an integrated requirement for prepositioned 

stocks that is based on a department-wide strategy? 

Answer. Prepositioned stocks have demonstrated an ability to improve the overall 

logistics capability required to ensure critical mission success. The NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2014 requires the development of strategic guidance and an implementation 

plan. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services, Combatant Commands, and DLA to meet the requirements of the report to Congress. 

Question. What are the logistical and maintenance implications of an expanded 

use of prepositioned stock, particularly in today’s constrained budgetary environment? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to evaluate the impact of prepositioned stocks 

on logistics operations, including the possibility of reducing the overall transportation costs for missions such as joint/combined exercises and Humanitarian Assistance efforts, especially in large geographic areas like the Pacific. 

Question. How would you plan to coordinate service efforts to identify and validate 

the requirements for the expanded use and increase in demand of prepositioned 

stocks? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to review current policy and to ensure that 

the policy provides guidance for validation of expanded use of and demand for 

prepositioned stock as well as reporting the information necessary to track implementation and prioritize funding to meet shortfalls. 

Question. Do you believe that the Military Services have adequately assessed 

which of the many pieces of nonstandard equipment that were purchased to meet 

urgent warfighter needs should be added to the prepositioned stock sets? 

Answer. I believe that the concept of assessing existing equipment for 

prepositioning potential is a good concept. If confirmed, I would review existing policies and the data on such nonstandard equipment. 

Question. What additional reset and sustainment resources will be needed to add 

to these stocks? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to engage in any ongoing review of 

prepositioned stock resource requirements. Nonstandard items could create the need 

for additional support costs, but those could be offset by a reduction in costs for new 

equipment. Pending the outcome of such a review, I am unaware of any additional 

resource needs. 

Question. In your view, have the Military Services identified adequate funding to 

meet its plans to reconstitute its prepositioned stocks around the world? 

968 

My research has shown significant drawdowns of prepositioned stocks to support 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. If confirmed, I would plan to examine whether 

policies enable the Military Service’s prepositioned stock programs to address requirements within budget constraints. 

Question. What steps, if any, would you take if confirmed to address these issues? 

Answer. I believe that prepositioning decisions should be based on strategy, plans, 

and requirements that are consistent with logistics capabilities. If confirmed, I 

would plan to work to ensure that policies on prepositioned equipment provide the 

Military Services with the guidance needed for programming decisions and the data 

to track implementation and shortfalls. 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY FULFILLMENT OF SPARE PARTS ORDERS

Question. In the past, the Air Force Logistics Centers (ALCs) have expressed frustration over DLA’s inability to deliver some parts on time to the ALCs. Even a small 

percentage of spare parts that are not delivered on time can ground an aircraft. 

Some parts can take well over a year to arrive at the ALCs and it appears that DLA 

will often not order parts until the aircraft reaches an ALC. As a result, the Air 

Force is sometimes forced to cannibalize a part off of one aircraft to repair another. 

What is your view of DLA’s track record on delivering parts, particularly to the 

Air Force’s ALCs? 

Answer. I am aware of reports similar to the ones cited above, and it is my understanding that recent reports show progress. If confirmed, I would plan to meet with 

DLA and each of the Military Services (including the Air Force) to review the processes and progress on parts delivery and to support any actions needed to continue 

improvement. 

Question. What changes, if any, do you think are needed to improve DLA’s performance in this regard? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to work to ensure that DLA remains responsive to the Air Force needs as well as to the needs of the other Military Services. 

Question. In the past, there have been multiple reports and investigations conducted by the DOD’s Inspector General and Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) which have identified several instances in which the DLA and Military Services have significantly overpaid for spare parts. 

If confirmed, what will you do to ensure the DOD, Military Services, and other 

defense agencies do not allow contractors to overcharge for spare parts? 

Answer. I have read some of the reports cited above, and I recognize that overcharging for spare parts is a major concern. If confirmed, I would plan to examine 

the guidance, tools, and training currently being used to reduce or eliminate such 

overcharging and to update guidance as needed to improve that guidance. I would 

plan to include in that review the pricing support capability offered by the Defense 

Contract Management Agency. 

Question. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that DOD, Military Services, 

and other defense agencies do not acquire excess inventory of spare parts? 

Answer. I am aware of some of the actions underway within DOD to improve inventory management and to reduce the chance of acquiring excess inventory. I am 

also aware of ongoing work by the GAO with regard to this issue. If confirmed, I 

would plan to review the Department’s strategy to improve inventory management 

as well as the results of audits and investigations. 

Question. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure the Military Services improve 

the reliability of their spare parts forecasts they submit to the DLA? 

Answer. There are a number of existing governance entities, such as the Joint Logistics Board, DLA/Service Days, and the Maintenance and Supply Executive Steering Committees, that are designed in part to help improve forecast reliability. If confirmed, I would plan to use those existing groups as part of the process to examine 

current forecasting. Additionally, I would plan to work with the Military Services 

to incorporate best practices from across DOD and to improve forecasting metrics 

that measure mission support. 

CORROSION PREVENTION AND CONTROL

Question. The GAO has estimated that the Department spends over $22.0 billion 

per year in costs related to corrosion of equipment and infrastructure. While DOD 

has established a central corrosion program management office and has institutionalized corrosion prevention and mitigation as a key component of the Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, efforts 

are frequently underfunded. 

969 

What is your understanding of the challenge to the readiness of the Military Services as a result of corrosion in equipment and materiel and the extent to which the 

Services are coordinating their efforts? 

Answer. Corrosion has been a persistent challenge that every weapon system in 

the DOD has faced, and corrosion has a negative impact on readiness, cost and safety. If confirmed, I would plan to examine current practices and to work with the 

Military Services, Defense Agencies, and commercial entities to pursue the best solutions at the least cost to the Department. 

Question. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with the Director of the 

Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to collaborate and work closely with the Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight in policy and technology development. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the implementation and effectiveness of corrosion prevention and control efforts in programs under your purview 

and, working with other responsible officials, address identified areas of concern? 

Answer. Corrosion needs to be addressed across the entire life cycle of defense 

equipment from conception to disposal. If confirmed, I would plan to work with the 

Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight and existing corrosion prevention control 

mechanisms. In addition, I would plan to address corrosion control and prevention 

as part of the materiel readiness function during design and development of weapon 

systems. 

ASSET TRACKING, IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY, AND RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION

Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 directed the Secretary of Defense to 

complete a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for improving asset 

tracking and in-transit visibility across the DOD. In the past, Congress has also 

supported the DOD’s Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) program in order to improve the visibility and identification of, and access to, equipment and supplies. 

What experience and familiarity do you have with asset tracking, in-transit visibility, and RFID technologies and their implementation? 

Answer. Asset tracking and in-transit visibility initiatives have been evolving 

since my previous experience in DOD logistics. If confirmed, I would plan to support 

the continued use of RFID and other tracking and visibility systems to continue to 

improve the Department’s ability to track assets throughout the logistics supply 

chain. 

Question. In order for RFID technology to be effective, it must be used consistently throughout DOD and the Military Services. One of the problems highlighted 

in ongoing contingency operations is a lack of understanding of RFID technology 

and how to use the devices, particularly in field operations. 

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that standardized training 

on the use of RFID and other tracking technologies is being provided to all necessary military and civilian logistics personnel? 

Answer. Standardized training and usage makes sense. If confirmed, I would plan 

to review current policy and training to ensure consistency and standardization, 

across the logistics community, on RFID and its use. I am aware that DOD just published a document titled ‘‘Automatic Identification Technology (AIT) for DOD Supply 

and Transportation Processes.’’ This document appears to provide a framework and 

baseline standard to guide DOD organizations in synchronizing the joint use of AIT 

media in support of DOD operations, and I would plan to begin my review with 

that. 

DATA VALIDATION FOR DEPOT MAINTENANCE PUBLIC-PRIVATE WORKLOAD DISTRIBUTION

REPORT

Question. Section 2466 of title 10 U.S.C. directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress by April 1 of each year outlining the percent distribution 

of depot-level maintenance and repair workload between the public and private sectors for the preceding fiscal year and the projected distribution for the current and 

ensuing physical years. One of the continuing problems noted in the preparation of 

this report is the validity and accuracy of data submitted by the Services. As a result, the actual percentage of work completed at public depots is less than what is 

reported by the department in some cases. 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure the accuracy of DOD public-private workload distribution reporting? 

Answer. Reporting under title 10, section 2466, the 50–50 law, is covered by DOD 

guidance to the Services for collecting workload distribution data, including specific 

requirements for maintaining supporting documentation and the conduct of internal 

audits. If confirmed, I would plan to work with the Services to improve accurate reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00977 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
970 

porting,ensure compliance and to send Congress the most accurate data available 

on depot maintenance and public-private workload distribution. 

DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY SYSTEM

Question. After many years of costly development, DOD in 2009 implemented the 

Defense Personal Property System (DPS) which is a web-based system for managing 

personal property moves for all DOD personnel. The DPS incorporates numerous 

improvements including contractual awards to movers based on satisfactory performance, not lowest bid; full replacement value as the standard for lost, stolen or 

severely damaged personal property; on-demand web-based move counseling; and 

many other features. An important means of evaluating who the best and worst 

moving contractors are in DPS is satisfaction surveys that should be submitted by 

DOD personnel who have completed permanent change of station moves. 

What is your understanding of the cost-efficiency of the DPS and whether its reliance on web-based systems has produced any savings for the Services? 

Answer. I am aware of the transition to the web-based DPS and its goal of promoting additional competition between shippers in order to drive down costs while 

providing additional benefits to military servicemembers and their families. If confirmed, I would plan to examine current and projected benefits and savings as well 

as the overall performance of the DPS system. 

Question. What is your understanding of the current return rate of satisfaction 

surveys by DPS customers? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to include in the examination cited in my answer to question 59 the return rate of the customer satisfaction surveys. 

Question. If the rate is below 50 percent, to what do you attribute the inability 

to achieve a higher rate of return and do you believe that the current rate of return 

jeopardizes the ability to distinguish good and bad movers? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to include in the examination cited in my answer to question 59 both parts of this question on the return rate of the customer 

satisfaction surveys 

Question. What methods do you think could properly be used to improve the survey return rate? 

Answer. My experience with overseeing surveys is that there are a number of actions that can be taken to improve return rates, including outreach programs, survey design, and improving the ease of survey completion and submission. If confirmed, I would plan to include this question in the examination cited in my response to question 59. 

Question. What is your understanding of actions being taken by U.S. Transportation Command and the Services to improve the performance and utility of DPS? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to include this question in the examination 

cited in my response to question 59. 

Question. Since International Auto Logistics (IAL) took over the shipment of personal vehicles owned by military servicemembers last May, several reports have 

arisen regarding delays in the shipping and tracking of vehicles. 

What is your understanding of the performance of IAL since assuming its 

logistical responsibilities last May? 

Answer. I am aware of reports regarding unacceptable performance in delivering 

servicemembers’ vehicles on time. If confirmed, I would plan to examine contract requirements and contractor performance, including corrective actions and mechanisms to hold the contractor accountable. The ultimate goal is to ensure performance and delivery of servicemembers’ vehicles in a timely and satisfactory manner. 

Question. If confirmed, what improvements would you make, if any, regarding the 

performance of IAL? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to include this question in the examination 

cited in my response to question 64. 

LOGISTICS ROUTES FOR THE SUPPLY AND DRAWDOWN OF FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy and reliability of the current 

logistics routes available for the supply and drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Based on the information available to me, it appears that the current logistics routes are adequate to support both the resupply of remaining forces and the 

ongoing drawdown, with multiple routes to mitigate against a single point of failure. 

If confirmed, I would plan to to make it a high priority to take the actions necessary 

to sustain this adequacy and reliability, particularly with the prospect of changing 

requirements. 

971 

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing the logistics 

challenges associated with the drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to continue to focus on operations in support 

of Afghanistan. This would be a high priority of me and my staff. 

PLANNING FOR CONTRACTOR SUPPORT IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Question. The GAO has previously reported that DOD’s OPLANs often do not include an approved Annex W addressing contract support requirements, contractor 

management plans, contract oversight processes, and manpower requirements to 

execute contractor oversight. Moreover, the GAO has found that the few Annexes 

that do exist merely ‘‘restate broad language from existing operational contract support guidance’’ and fail to identify military capability shortfalls that will require 

contract solutions or ensure that combatant commanders are aware of even the general scope and scale of contract support that will be needed for an operation. 

Do you believe that the current level of military planning for contractor support 

in military operations is adequate and appropriate? 

Answer. My research has shown that planning for and executing contractor support in military operations is a complex and continuously evolving dynamic. Based 

on that research, it is my belief that this will remain a work in progress for the 

foreseeable future. If confirmed, I would plan to examine current DOD processes to 

develop and apply lessons learned. 

Question. What steps, if any, would you take if confirmed to improve military 

planning for contractor support in military operations? 

Answer. This has been an area of focus for me since my service on the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations 

in 2007. If confirmed, I would plan to work across DOD to ensure that guidance and 

doctrine are implemented and that training is sustained for Operational Contingency Support. 

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

Question. Federal agencies including DOD have spent more than $5 billion for private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. Over this 

period, there have been numerous reports of abuses by private security contractors. 

Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should reduce their reliance on 

contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require 

the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to examine DOD reliance on private security 

contractors and DOD roles in supporting such reliance by other Federal agencies. 

I am aware that the Defense Department has implemented several initiatives to 

promote the responsible provision of security services, including those directed by 

Congress such as accountability procedures and development and implementation of 

national standards, and I would plan to include those initiatives in my review. In 

particular, if confirmed, I would plan to work to ensure these security contractors 

are properly regulated and supervised and that their roles carefully limited and defined. 

Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy 

objectives? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to include this issue in the examination cited 

in my response to question 70. In particular, I would plan to work to ensure that 

DOD instructions remain current, clear, aligned with combatant commander guidance and orders, and consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives. 

In addition, if confirmed, I would plan to work to continue to collaborate with the 

State Department and other governmental agencies to ensure consistent policy is 

developed and to promote a common international understanding of responsible use 

and oversight of private security services. 

Question. Section 846 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires DOD to undertake risk assessments and risk mitigation whenever it relies on contractors to perform critical functions in support of overseas contingency operations. 

What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Department fully implements the requirements of section 846? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to include this issue in the examination cited 

in my response to question 70, including a review of current policy regarding planning requirements for situations when contractor personnel and equipment are anticipated to support military operations. I would also plan to work with the Joint 

972 

Staff to ensure that contingency planning includes risk assessment on the intended 

use of private security contractors. It is my belief that these risk assessments should 

be continually reassessed during operations. 

LIFE CYCLE COSTS

Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure that life cycle 

maintenance requirements and sustainment support are considered in the acquisition process for new DOD systems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to work with the Milestone Decision Authority 

and the Military Services to review current Department policy and ensure that guidance addresses life cycle maintenance and sustainment planning and support. I 

would also plan to continue with the efforts already undertaken by the Department 

and look at additional areas such as designing for supportability, Core determination, source of repair, and level of repair analysis as part of my responsibility to review program Life Cycle Sustainment Plans. Early consideration of sustainment 

places additional attention on how design decisions affect the life cycle cost, and I 

would plan to emphasize sustainment planning as part of all major program reviews. I would also plan to work with others in the Department to ensure our arrangements with industry are incentivizing innovation in areas that improve the 

Department’s ability to maintain its weapon systems and reduce Operating and 

Support cost. 

Question. Are you aware of information or concerns that new major weapon systems’ operating and support costs may have exceeded estimates? 

Answer. Rising operating and support costs have always been a concern. I am 

aware of and fully support the operating and support cost actions addressed in section 832 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 and, if confirmed, I would plan to work 

with my counterparts to ensure all appropriate actions are in place to control and 

manage operating and support costs across a system’s life cycle. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure rising operating and 

support costs do not adversely affect the readiness of new equipment and the operational units to which this equipment is issued? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint 

Staff, and Service counterparts to review operating and support cost estimates during acquisition to identify initiatives that can be designed into a system or into the 

sustainment organization. My focus would be on delivering reliable and maintainable weapon systems that operate for longer periods without failure and that, 

when they do fail, can return to service more quickly and affordably. This requires 

supportability attributes be given the same level of attention as other performance 

attributes of our weapon systems. If confirmed, I would plan to work to ensure that 

this area continues to be addressed at major reviews and acquisition decisionsAs 

well as after fielding those systems. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that the DOD will 

have the resources to properly maintain the readiness of this new equipment? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to work with the Joint Staff, Military Services, 

and the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

identify all resource requirements during acquisition to maintain the readiness of 

new equipment. This can partially be accomplished by continuing the existing requirements for sustainment-related Key Performance Parameters and affordability 

goals. I would also plan to work to ensure that weapon system readiness is managed 

at a level consistent with the Department’s fiscal constraints. I would plan to take 

an active role in the Program, Planning, and Budgeting System to ensure that the 

Services readiness accounts are adequate to support our readiness requirements. 

Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 requires DOD alternatives in the acquisition program design trades. 

Do you believe that the fully burdened cost of fuel is an appropriate factor for the 

Department to consider in the evaluation of acquisition alternatives? 

Answer. I do believe that the inclusion of fully burdened cost of fuel in the analysis of alternatives and other comparative studies is appropriate for creating a fair 

comparison of the systems under consideration. 

OPERATIONAL FOOTPRINT

Question. During combat operations in Afghanistan and around the globe, combat 

service support units are constantly at risk when transporting supplies. 

What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in developing strategies to reduce 

the logistical footprint of deployed units operating in hostile environments? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to examine current and future research and 

development efforts focused on reducing the logistical footprint of deployed units. 

973 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

CAPITAL INVESTMENT AT DEPOTS/SHIPYARDS

1. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Berteau, title 10 U.S.C. section 2476 requires—by law— 

the Secretary of each Service to invest in the capital budgets of the depots and shipyards of the Service not less than 6 percent of the average total combined maintenance, repair, and overhaul workload. Is each Service meeting this statutory requirement? Please provide the numbers for each Service for fiscal years 2012, 2013, 

and 2014. Please provide the numbers for each of the four public shipyards for fiscal 

years 2012, 2013, and 2014. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Based on the fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 President’s budgets, with the exception of the Army, each of the military departments have met or 

exceeded the statutory requirement to invest not less than 6 percent of the average 

total combined maintenance, repair, and overhaul workload funded at all the depots 

of that military department. I only have access to publicly reported data, and therefore I do not have the data for the individual shipyards, but the overall shipyard 

and individual Service calculations are provided below. The fiscal years 2012 and 

2013 data are actuals. The fiscal year 2014 data are execution-year estimates as of 

the fiscal year 2015 budget submission. 

If confirmed, I would track performance of the military departments with regard 

to meeting this statutory requirement and would be available to discuss this issue 

further as needed. 

2. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Berteau, if you are confirmed, do you commit to ensuring 

that each of the Services meets the 6 percent statutory requirement? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Yes, I am committed to complying with the statutory requirements. 

[The nomination reference of Mr. David J. Berteau follows:] 


d02ful1.eps
974 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

November 12, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

David J. Berteau, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Alan 

F. Estevez, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. David J. Berteau, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DAVID J. BERTEAU

Education: 

LBJ School of Public Affairs, Univ. of Texas at Austin 

• 1979–1981 • Master of Public Affairs 

Tulane University 

• 1967–1971 • Bachelor of Arts, English 

Employment Record: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

• Senior Vice President, Director National Security Program on Industry 

and Resources 

• March 2008–present 

Clark and Weinstock 

• Director, National Security and Homeland Security • May 2003–February 2008 

Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University 

• Professor of Practice, Director National Security Studies Program • January 2001–May 2003 

Science Applications International Corporation 

• Senior Vice President • September 1993–January 2001 

U.S. Department of Defense 

• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) 

• January 1990–September 1993 

U.S. Department of Defense 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Resource Management and Support) 

• April 1986–December 1989 

U.S. Department of Defense 

• Executive Secretary, President’s Blue Ribbon Commission (Packard Commission) 

• August 1985–April 1986 

U.S. Department of Defense 

• Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

• May 1984–August 1985 

U.S. Department of Defense 

• Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

• January 1983–May 1984 

U.S. Department of Defense 

• Presidential Management Intern, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

• September 1981–January 1983 

Austin Independent School District, Austin TX 

• Teacher 

975 

• December 1978–June 1979 

Transportation Enterprises, Inc., Austin TX 

• Bus Driver 

• January 1976–December 1979 

Avenues Food Coop, Austin, TX 

• Cashier Coordinator 

• September 1975–May 1976 

Franklin Independent School District, Franklin, TX 

• Teacher 

• August 1974–August 1975 

Perry Lumber Company, Hearne, TX 

• Carpenter 

• March 1974–August 1974 

Sevananda Food Coop, Atlanta, GA 

• Manager 

• April 1973–February 1974 

Sunshine Gardens Food Coop, New Orleans, LA 

• Manager 

• May 1972–March 1973 

Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 

• Librarian Assistant 

• September 1971–April 1972 

Honors and awards: 

Distinguished Public Service Award, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 

2014 

Secretary of the Army Exceptional Public Service Medal, 2007 

NASA Outstanding Public Service Award, 2003 

DOD Distinguished Public Service Medal, 1992 

DOD Outstanding Public Service Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster), 1989 

DOD Outstanding Public Service Medal, 1987 

Lyndon B. Johnson Congressional Fellow, 1980–1981 

Tulane University Honors and Scholars Program, 1967–1971 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Mr. David J. Berteau in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

976 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

David John Berteau (1972–1975, nickname ‘‘Dharma’’). 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. 

3. Date of nomination: 

November 12, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

September 26, 1949; Hammond, LA. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Eunice Jane Bordelon. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Stefan Andre Berteau, age 35. 

Celeste Danielle Berteau, age 31. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Ponchatoula, Louisiana, High School; attended Sept. 1963–May 1967; graduated 

with a high school diploma, May 1967. 

Tulane University; attended Sept. 1967–May 1971; graduated with BA in English, 

May 1971. 

The University of Texas at Austin; 54 credit hours of non-degree program courses, 

Aug. 1976–Aug. 1979. Qualified for an elementary school teaching certificate from 

the State of Texas in 1979. 

Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin; 

attended Aug. 1979–Aug. 1981; graduated with a Master’s Degree in Public Affairs, 

Dec. 1981. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Senior Vice President and Director, National Security Program on Industry and 

Resources; Center for Strategic and International Studies; 1616 Rhode Island Ave 

NW, Washington, DC (prior to Sept. 2013, location was 1800 K St NW, Washington, 

DC); March 2008 to present. 

Director of Defense and Homeland Security; Clark and Weinstock (firm’s name 

has since changed to Mercury); 601 13th St NW, Washington, DC (firm’s address 

has since changed to 701 8th St NW, Washington, DC; May 2003 to February 2008. 

Lecturer for National Security Management Course, and occasional Adjunct Professor of Public Administration, Syracuse University; The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University; 200 Eggers Hall, Syracuse University, 

Syracuse, NY (note: this is the location of the school; the classes were taught and 

lectures given in Syracuse, in Washington, DC, and at remote locations as needed); 

June 2003 to present. 

Adjunct Professor; Georgetown University; 3600 N Street, NW, Washington, DC; 

January 2006 to present. 

Adjunct Assistant Professor; Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin; P.O. Box Y, Austin, TX (note: classes were taught in 

Washington, DC); July 2012 to July 2014. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Presidential Management Intern, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 1981–1983. 

Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 1983–1984. 

Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 1984–1985. 

Executive Secretary, President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission), 1985–1986. 

977 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resource Management and Support, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 1986–1989. 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 1990–1993. 

Chair, Defense Conversion Commission, U.S. Department of Defense (simultaneous position with above), 1992–1993. 

Member of Defense Science Board Task Forces and Summer Studies in the period 

1995–1999. 

Member, NASA Advisory Council, 2002–2003. 

Member, Secretary of the Army’s Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 

Management in Expeditionary Operations, for 9 weeks in 2007. 

Unpaid Government Consultant, Washington Headquarters Service, U.S. Department of Defense, for 2 weeks in 2013. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

Senior Vice President and Director, National Security Program on Industry and 

Resources, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC 

Member, Board of Directors, R. Christopher Goodwin and Associates, Frederick, 

MD 

Advisory Board Member, National Security Studies Program, Syracuse University, 

Syracuse, NY 

Consultant, LMI, McLean, VA 

Member, Federal Outreach Advisory Committee, Association of Defense Communities, Washington, DC 

Partner, Bordelon and Berteau LLC, Opelousas, LA 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Fellow, National Academy of Public Administration 

Fellow, Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and the Law, University of Texas at Austin 

Director, Procurement Round Table 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

No offices held or candidacies for any public office. . 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

Registered as a member of the Democratic Party in Montgomery County, MD. No 

offices held or services rendered in the last 5 years. . 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. November 2013: $500 to Michelle Nunn, Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate in 

Georgia September 2014: $500 to Michelle Nunn, Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate in 

Georgia 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Distinguished Public Service Award, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs 

in 2013 

Secretary of the Army Exceptional Public Service Medal in 2007 

NASA Outstanding Public Service Award in 2003 

DOD Distinguished Public Service Medal in 1992 

DOD Outstanding Public Service Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster) in 1989 

DOD Outstanding Public Service Medal in 1987 

Lyndon B. Johnson Congressional Fellow, 1980–1981 

Tulane University Honors and Scholars Scholarship, 1967–1971 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

‘‘The Triumph of Process of Politics: The Base Closure Commissions.’’ By David 

J. Berteau, in Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Congress: Case Studies in 

Legislative Leadership. Edited by Maxmillian Angerholzer III, James Kitfield, 

978 

Christopher P. Lu, and Norman Omstein, Center for the Study of the Presidency 

and Congress, Washington DC, 2014. 

‘‘U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Industrial Base, 2000– 

2013.’’ By David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, Jesse Ellman and Rhys McCormick, 

CSIS, Washington DC, Oct. 15, 2014. http://csis.org/files/publication/140929— 

Ellman—DefenseContractSpend ing2013—Web.pdf. 

Untitled essay by David J. Berteau in Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We 

Go From Here’’ A Compendium of Views by Leading Experts. Staff Report of the 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, October 2, 2014. 

‘‘Update on the Budget.’’ By David Berteau, in ‘‘For Your Situational Awareness, 

Issue 9’’, CSIS, Washington DC, July 29, 2014. http://csis.org/files/publication/ 

140729—FYSA—July—2014—O.pdf. 

‘‘U.S. Department of Homeland Security Contract and Grant Spending and the 

Supporting Industrial Base, 2004–2013.’’ By David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, 

Jesse Ellman, CSIS, Washington DC, June 16, 2014. http://csis.org/files/publication/ 

140529—Ellman—DHSContractGrantSpending’—Web.pdf. 

‘‘Project Brief: Harnessing the Opportunity for Defense Integration in Global 

Value Chains.’’ By David J. Berteau, Scott Miller, Ryan Crotty, Paul Nadeau, CSIS, 

Washington DC, May 14, 2014. http://csis.org/files/publication/140514— 

FederatedDefense—Harnessing—Opportunity—Defense—Integration-Global— 

Value—Chains.pdf. 

‘‘What Exactly is the ‘Budget’? A Short Explanation of the Federal Budget Process.’’ By David Berteau, in ‘‘For Your Situational Awareness, Issue 5’’, CSIS, Washington, DC, March 21. 2014. http://csis.org/files/publication/140321—ISP—newsletter—FYSA—MARCH—2014.pdf. 

‘‘The 2014 QDR and Fiscal Year 2015 Defense Budget: What Are We Watching 

For.’’ By David J. Berteau, Maren Leed, Samuel J. Brannen , Ryan Crotty, Gregory 

Sanders, and Zack Cooper, CSIS, Washington, DC, March 10, 2014. 

‘‘Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2013)’’ By David J. Berteau and Steven L. 

Schooner, (March 3, 2014). West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference 

Briefs, Thomas Reuters, 2014. GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014–XX; 

GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2014–XX. At SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol4/papers.cfm. 

‘‘U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial 

Base, 2000–2012.’’ By David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, Jesse Ellman, and Rhys 

McCormick, CSIS, Washington DC, December 19, 2013. http://csis.org/files/publication/131207—Sanders—DODContractSpending—Web.pdf. 

‘‘How is the Defense Drawdown Affecting Industry?’’ By David Berteau, in ‘‘For 

Your Situational Awareness, Issue 2’’, CSIS, Washington, DC, December 18. 2013. 

http://csis.org/files/publication/131218—FYSADec2013.pdf. 

‘‘How Can We Develop a Sustainable Resource Strategy for Defense?’’ By David 

J. Berteau, in Global Forecast 2014, CSIS, Washington, DC, November 12, 2013. 

http://csis.org/publication/how-can-we-develop-sustainable-resource-strategy-defense. 

‘‘What Does the Budget Deal Mean for Defense?’’ By David J. Berteau and Ryan 

Crotty, CSIS, Washington, DC, October 22, 2013. http://csis.org/publication/criticalquestions-what-does-budget-deal-mean-defense. 

‘‘Structure and Dynamics of the U.S. Federal Services Industrial Base, 2000– 

2012.’’ By David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, and Jesse Ellman, CSIS, Washington 

DC, September 3, 2013. http://csis.org/publication/structure-and-dynamics-us-federal-services-industrial-base-2000–2012. 

‘‘What’s Happening with the Pentagon Budget?’’ By David J. Berteau and Ryan 

Crotty, CSIS, Washington DC, August 19, 2013. http://csis.org/publication/whatshappening-pentagon-budget. 

‘‘The Fiscal Year 2014 Defense Budget: Another Lost Year?’’ By David J. Berteau 

and Ryan Crotty, CSIS, Washington DC, April 10, 2013. http://csis.org/ 

publicationlfy-2014-defense-budget-another-lost-year. 

‘‘Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2012)’’ By David J. Berteau and Steven L 

Schooner, (March 3, 2013). West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference 

Briefs, Thomas Reuters, 2013. GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013–38; 

GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2013–38. At SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract—id=2227093. 

‘‘Europe Defense Trends 2012: Budget, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base.’’ By David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Hermann, Sneha Raghavan, Washington, DC, December 18, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/european-defense-trends-2012#sthash.sUsoQb5a.dpuf. 

‘‘New U.S. Export Trends.’’ David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, and Stephanie Sanok. 

Finmeccanica Magazine No. 26, December 2012, pp. 22–25. 

979 

‘‘U.S. Department of Homeland Security Contract Spending and the Supporting 

Industrial Base, 2004–2011.’’ By David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Jesse Ellman, Priscilla Hermann, and Gregory Sanders, Washington DC, November 13, 2012. http:// 

csis.org/publication/us-department-homeland-security-contract-spending-and-supporting-industrial-base-2004–20. 

‘‘Asian Defense Spending, 2000–2011.’’ By David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, 

Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Hermann, Sneha Raghavan, Washington, DC, October 

2012. http ://csis.org/publication/asian-defense-spending-2000– 

2011#sthash.sZEqZrmF.dpuf. 

‘‘U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial 

Base.’’ By David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Gregory Sanders, Jesse Ellman, and 

David Morrow, Washington, DC, September 28, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/usdepartment-defense-contract-spending-and-supporting-industrialbase#sthash.Alw23xJa.dpuf. 

‘‘U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment.’’ By David J. Berteau, Michael J. Green, Gregory Kiley, and Nicholas 

Szechenyi, Washington, DC, August 15, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/pacom-forceposture-review. 

‘‘Contract Spending by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.’’ By David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Gregory Sanders, Priscilla Hermann, David Morrow, Washington, DC, July 26, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/contract-spending-department-state-and-us-agency-internationaldevelopment#sthash.pDorYPSi.dpuf. 

‘‘A Case Study for Better Buying Power: Information Analysis Centers of the Defense Technical Information Center.’’ By David J. Berteau, Gregory Kiley, Gary 

Powell, Reed Livergood, Washington, DC, June 12, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/ 

case-study-better-buying-power#sthash.OlvauDJF.dpuf 

‘‘U.S. Department of Defense Services Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base, 2000–2011.’’ By David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Gregory Sanders, 

Jesse Ellman, David Morrow, Washington, DC, May 24, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/us-department-defense-services-contract-spending-and-supporting-industrialbase-2000–201. 

‘‘Defense Department Must Prepare for Deeper Budget Cuts’’, By David J. 

Berteau and Clark Murdock. National Defense magazine, May 2012 issue. 

‘‘Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2011 )’’ By David J. Berteau and Steven 

L. Schooner, (March 3, 2012). West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference Briefs, Thomas Reuters, 2012. GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 

2012–12; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2012–13. At SSRN: 

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014385. 

‘‘Super Committee Fallout and the Implications for Defense’’ By David J. Berteau 

and Ryan Crotty, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 

December 2, 2011. http://csis.org/publication/super-committee-fallout-and-implications-defense. 

‘‘Structure and Dynamics of the U.S. Federal Services Industrial Base, 2000– 

2010.’’ By David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, Guy Ben-Ari, Joachim Hofbauer, 

David Morrow, Jesse Ellman. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, November 23, 2011. http://csis.org/publication/structure-and-dynamicsus-federal-services-industrial-base-2000–2010. 

‘‘European Defense Trends: Briefing Update.’’ By David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, 

Joachim Hofbauer, Roy Levy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, July 29, 2011. http://csis.org/files/attachments/110729—european—report.pdf. 

‘‘DHS Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base’’ By David J. 

Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Gregory Sanders, Priscilla Hermann. Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, Washington, DC, July 21, 2011. http://csis.org/publication/dhs-contract-spending-and-supporting-industrial-base. 

‘‘Defense Spending and Deficit Reductions: Funding the Future.’’ By David J. 

Berteau, in Global Forecast 2011, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Washington, DC, June 14, 2011. http://csis.org/publication/defense-spending-and-deficit-reductions-funding-future. 

‘‘DOD Workforce Cost Realism Assessment.’’ By David J. Berteau, Joachim 

Hofbauer, Gregory Kiley, Jesse Ellman, Guy Ben-Ari. Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, Washington, DC, May 17, 2011. http://csis.org/publication/ 

dod-workforce-cost-realism-assessment. 

‘‘Defense Contract Trends: U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and 

the Supporting Industrial Base.’’ By David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Gregory Sanders, Joachim Hofbauer. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington 

DC, May 6, 2011. http://csis.org/publication/defense-contract-trends-O. 

980 

‘‘Industry Toward Security’’ Issue Paper 3 in ‘‘EU–US Security Strategies, Comparative Scenarios and Recommendations.’’ The European Union Pilot Project on 

Transatlantic Methods for Handling Global Challenges in the European Union and 

United States. April 2011. By David J. Berteau and Guy Ben-Ari, et al. 

‘‘Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2010).’’ By David J. Berteau and Steven L 

Schooner, (December 1, 2010). West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference Briefs, Thomas Reuters, 2011. GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 529; 

GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 529. At SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ 

abstract=1772824. 

‘‘European Defense Trends: Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial 

Base.’’ By David J. Berteau, Joachim Hofbauer, Gregory Sanders, Roy Levy, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, November 4, 2010. http:// 

csis.org/publication/european-defense-trends. 

‘‘Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009—A 

Progress Report.’’ By David J. Berteau, Stephanie Sanok, and Joachim Hofbauer, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, May 26, 2010. 

http://csis.org/files/publication/20100528%20WSARA%20Progress%20Report.pdf. 

‘‘The Time Is Right for Export Control Reform.’’ By David J. Berteau and Stephanie Sanok, DIIG Current Issues No. 21, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, DC, May 17, 2010. http://csis.org/publication/diig-currentissues-no-21-time-right-export-control-reform. 

‘‘National Security and the Commercial Space Sector—An Analysis and Evaluation of Options for Improving Commercial Access to Space.’’ By David J. Berteau, 

Gregory Kiley, Guy Ben-Ari, Joshua T. Hartman, Gary Powell, Stephanie Sanok, 

and Brian Green, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 

July 26, 2010. http://csis.org/publication/national-security-and-commercial-space-sector. 

‘‘Fixing the Shortfalls: Defense Budget Trends and Long-Term Impact.’’ By David 

J. Berteau, DIIG Current Issues No. 19, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, DC, December 14, 2009. http://csis.org/publication/diig-currentissues-no-19-fixing-shortfalls-defense-budget-trends-and-long-term-impact. 

‘‘Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2009).’’ By David J. Berteau and Steven L 

Schooner, (December 1, 2009). West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference Briefs, Thomas Reuters, 2010 GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 491; 

GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 491. At SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ 

abstract=1562842. 

‘‘The President’s Government Contracting Review.’’ By David J. Berteau, Current 

Issues No. 8, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 

March 30, 2009. http://csis.org/publication/diig-current-issues-no-8-presidents-government-contracting-review. 

‘‘Structure and Dynamics of the U.S. Federal Professional Services Industrial 

Base, 1995–2007.’’ By David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, and Greg Sanders, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, February 2009. http://csis.org/ 

publication/structure-and-dynamics-us-federal-profesional-services-industrial-base1995–2007. 

Organizing for a Complex World: The Way Ahead. By David J. Berteau, Guy BenAri, and Matthew Zlatnik, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, February 2009. http://csis.org/publication/organizing-complex-world-wayahead. 

‘‘Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2008).’’ By David J. Berteau and Steven L 

Schooner, (December 1, 2008, West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference Briefs, Thomas Reuters, 2009. GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 459; 

GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 459. At SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ 

abstract=1356153. 

‘‘Transitioning Defense Organizational Initiatives—An Assessment of Key 2001– 

2008 Defense Reforms.’’ By David J. Berteau, Kathleen Hicks, Clark Murdock, Nathan Freier, and Christine Wormuth, Sam Brannen, and Eleanore Douglas. Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 2008. http:// 

csis.org/publication/transitioning-defense-organizational-initiatives. 

‘‘Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting.’’ Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, October 31, 2007. http://www.army.mil/docs/Gansler—Commission—Report— 

Final—071031.pdf. 

‘‘Linkages 2007—An Update on Printed Circuit Boards and National Security’’. By 

David J. Berteau, Advancing Microelectronics, May/June 2007, vol. 34 no. 3, pp. 10– 

12. 

‘‘Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: An Annotated Brief. Department of Defense Acquisition and Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System Reform.’’ By 

981 

David J. Berteau, with David Scruggs (principal author) and Clark Murdock (contributing author). Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 

August 2006. 

‘‘Acquisition Initiatives—Phase II.’’ By David J. Berteau, with Gene Porter 

(Project Leader), Gary Christle, Jay Mandelbaum, and Richard Diehl. Institute for 

Defense Analyses, February 2006. 

Linkages: Manufacturing Trends in Electronic Interconnect Technology. National 

Research Council, National Academies Press, December 2005. Available on line at 

http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11515.html. 

‘‘Defense Acquisition Initiatives Review: An Assessment of Extant Initiatives.’’ By 

David J. Berteau, with Gene Porter (Project Leader), Gary Christle, Jay 

Mandelbaum, and Richard Diehl. Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2005. 

CAPITAL LETTERS—a regular column in Government Security News, by David 

J. Berteau. Columns include: 

‘‘Four Things to Remember When Studying the President’s Budget Request’’ March 6, 2006, p. 26. Available on line at http:// 

www.gsnmagazine.com/pdfs/39—Mar—06.pdf. 

‘‘Draft Infrastructure Plan Falls Short on All Counts’’ November 21, 2005, 

p. 23. Available on line at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/pdfs/34—Nov— 

05.pdf 

‘‘Pentagon Historically Reluctant to Share Its Vast Resources’’ Sept. 27, 

2005, p. 1. Available on line at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/sep—05/pentagon—resources.html 

‘‘Does the Pentagon really care about homeland security?’’ June 6, 2005, 

p. 32. Available on line at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/pdfs/24—June— 

05.pdf 

‘‘In Washington, it really does matter what title you hold’’ May 9, 2005, 

p. 35. Available on line at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/pdfs/22—May— 

05.pdf 

‘‘Is the White House’s Homeland Security Council Falling Short?’’ April 4, 

2005, p. 23. Available on line at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/pdfs/20— 

Apr—05.pdf 

‘‘Bush’s Budget: What You See Isn’t What You Get’’ February 21, 2005, 

p. 24. Available on line at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/feb—05—03/capital—letters.html 

‘‘Will Congress and the Pentagon Ever Change?’’ January 24, 2005, p. 24. 

Available on line at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/feb—05/congress—pentagon .html 

‘‘Dear Mr. President . . . (Advice to the next occupant of the White House)’’ 

November 2004, p. 36. Available on line at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/ 

nov—04/capital—letter.html 

‘‘Will Congress Step Up to the Plate on Homeland Security?’’ September 

2004, p. 34. 

‘‘Will We Miss the Next Slam Dunk?’’ July 2004, p. 65. 

‘‘What DoD can teach OHS’’ October 2003, p. 39. 

‘‘Homeland Security Budgeting: Can Confusion Produce Priorities?’’ By David J. 

Berteau, ECMR NewsNetwork, v. 16 no. 2, July 2004. Available on line at http:// 

www.ecaar.org/Newsletter/July2004.pdf 

Commentary ‘‘Post-Cold War Conversion: Gains, Losses, and Hidden Changes in 

the U.S. Economy;’’ by David J. Berteau, in America’s Peace Dividend: Essays on 

The Achievements of the 1990s and the Challenges Ahead, Ann Markusen, 2000. 

‘‘Defense Conversion in IT Service Industries’’ and ‘‘Defense Conversion and Acquisition Reform,’’ by David J. Berteau, in The Defense Industry in the Post-Cold 

War Era, Gerald Sussman and Sean O’Keefe, 1998. 

‘‘The Practitioner’s Comer,’’ LBJ Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 

1994. 

‘‘Waging Peace: A Practical Guide to Base Closures,’’ Public Contract Law Journal, by David J. Berteau, with Benjamin Ginsberg and James King, Vol. 23, No. 2, 

Winter 1994. 

‘‘Defense Conversion: ‘It Ain’t That Simple’ ’’—By David J. Berteau, Defense 

Issues, Vol. 8 No. 22 -April 20, 1993. 

‘‘Defense Conversion: What Does It Really Mean?’’—By David J. Berteau, PHALANX (The Bulletin of Military Operations Research), June 1993 (vol 26, no. 2). 

Adjusting to the Drawdown (Report of the Defense Conversion Commission), 1992. 

The Defense Management Report (sections on organization and personnel), 1989. 

A Formula for Action (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management), 1986. Co-wrote with Paul Stevens, Commission General Counsel. 

982 

Interim Report (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management), 

1986. Co-wrote with Paul Stevens, Commission General Counsel. 

‘‘Your Defense Budget’’ (Department of Defense), 1983 and 1984. 

The Promotion of Exports from Texas (1982, LBJ School), with Sidney Weintraub, 

et al. 

Economic Coercion and Foreign Policy (1981, Westview Press), with Sidney 

Weintraub, et al. 

‘‘Foreign Assembly of U.S. Goods (1981).’’ Master’s degree report. 

‘‘A Compensatory Financing Scheme for the Caribbean (1980–81).’’ unpublished 

study, House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

My work at CSIS entails numerous public speaking engagements. These speeches 

do not normally include formal text but are often accompanied by one or more briefing slides. The list below includes public and semi-public speaking engagements for 

the past 5 years. In some cases, there is a video and/or audio record or a transcript 

of the speaking engagement that is available. To assist the committee in its review, 

where possible, the list includes the link to those video and/or audio records or transcripts. 

Berteau Public Speaking Engagements 2009–2014: 

September 5, 2014, Panelist, ‘‘The Challenges of Complex Acquisition Efforts: Lessons Learned for Future Vertical Lift’’, http://csis.org/event/challenges-complex-acquisition-efforts, CSIS, Washington, DC 

August 5, 2014, Moderator, Workshop on ‘‘Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) or Best Value: Which Way Are We Going?’’, AFCEA Defense Acquisition Modernization Symposium ‘‘Better Buying Power: Do We 

Have It Right?’’, Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, DC 

July 15, 2014, ‘‘U.S. Defense Outlook and Macro Trends’’ DOD Cost Analysts Symposium, Fort Belvoir, VA 

June 27, 2014, Panelist, ’’A Discussion of the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland 

Security Review’’, http://csis.org/event/discussion-2014-quadrennial-homeland-security-review, CSIS, Washington, DC 

May 15, 2014, ‘‘Overall Defense Contract Trends and Policy Implications’’ 

on Panel #21, Exploring Managerial Implications of Current DOD Contracting Trends, Harry Hallock, chair, NPS Acquisition Symposium, Seaside, CA 

May 14, 2014, ‘‘Identifying Governance Best Practices in Systems-of-Systems Acquisition’’ on Panel #5, Beyond Better Buying Power: Assessing 

Progress and Institutionalizing Success, Jim Thomsen, chair, NPS Acquisition Symposium, Seaside, CA 

May 1, 2014, ‘‘U.S. Defense Outlook and Macro Trends’’, TechAmerica Vision Federal Market Forecast Kick-off, Mclean, VA 

April 22, 2014, ‘‘State of the Government’’, National Security Studies Program Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 

April 12, 2014, Acceptance Speech, Distinguished Public Service Award, 

http://youtu.be/qNQJv729EE4, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of 

Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 

March 14, 2014, Panel Moderator for ‘‘Discussion on the 2014 QDR and 

FY 15 Defense Budget’’, with Clark Murdock, Maren Leed, Stephanie Sanok 

Kostro, and Sam Brannen, http://csis.org/event/discussion-2014-qdr-andfy15-defense-budget, CSIS, Washington, DC 

February 11, 2014, Federal Budgets and the Debt Ceiling, LBJ School of 

Public Affairs GPS International Speaker’s Colloquium Series, Austin, TX 

February 10, 2014, Keynote Speech on the Defense Budget, (Also panelist 

on Installations 2030 Breakout Session), Winter Forum, Association of Defense Communities, San Antonio, TX 

February 5, 2014, Presenter at ‘‘Joint Think Tank Event: Alternatives to 

the QDR and Fiscal Year 2015 Defense Budget’’ With Todd Harrison and 

Jim Thomas of CSBA, Tom Donnelly of AEI, and Nora Bensahel of CNAS, 

Hosted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, http:// 

csis.org/event/joint-think-tank-event-alternatives-qdr-and-fy15-defensebudget, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 

December 19, 2013, Presentation with Greg Sanders on ‘‘U.S. Department 

of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base, 2000– 

2012.’’ http://csis.org/files/publication/131207—Sanders— 

DODContractSpending—Web.pdf, CSIS, Washington, DC 

983 

December 16, 2013, Panel Member, ’’The Federated Defense Project 

Launch’’, http://csis.org/event/federated-defense-project-launch, CSIS, Washington, DC 

November 18, 2013, Moderator and Discussant, ‘‘A Path for Durable Defense Reform with HASC Vice-Chair Mac Thornberry (R–TX)’’, http:// 

csis.org/event/path-durable-defense-reform, CSIS, Washington, DC 

November 7, 2013, Panel Moderator, following speech by Frank Kendall, 

USD(A&L), on ‘‘Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: Looking 

Ahead’’, with panelists Pierre Chao, Jon Etherton, and Arnold Punaro, 

http://csis.org/event/performance-defense-acquisition-system-looking-ahead, 

CSIS, Washington, DC 

November 5, 2013, Presenter and Panel Moderator on ‘‘Global Security 

Forum 2013: Has the Budget Crisis Shattered the Cold War Consensus on 

Defense Budgets?’’, with Steve Cortese, Jim Dyer, Charlie Houy, and David 

Lyles, http://csis.org/event/global-security-forum-2013-has-budget-crisisshattered-cold-war-consensus-defense-budgets, Global Security Forum, 

CSIS, Washington, DC 

September 3, 2013, Presentation of ‘‘Structure and Dynamics of the U.S. 

Federal Services Industrial Base, 2000–2012’’ with Greg Sanders, http:// 

csis.org/event/us-federal-services-industrial-base-report-release-O, CSIS, 

Washington, DC 

August 14, 2013 ’’The Asia Pacific Rebalance—What Does It Mean for 

Space and Missile Defense’’ http://smdsymposium.org/wp-content/uploads/ 

2013/09/Berteau—Asia-Pacific-Rebalance1.pdf, U.S. Space and Missile Defense Symposium, Huntsville, AL 

July 30, 2013, Presentation of Conference Summary Evaluation, IGCC 

2013 Annual Conference on the Chinese Defense Industry, San Diego, CA 

July 23, 2013, ‘‘Setting the Stage for the 2014 QDR’’, Panel Moderated by 

Kim Wincup, with Clark Murdock, Stephanie Sanok Kostro, and Sam 

Brannen, http://csis.org/event/setting-stage-2014-qdr, CSIS, Washington, DC 

July 19, 2013, Moderator ‘‘Expanding Foreign Sales of U.S. Military 

Equipment: Industry Perspectives’’ with Jon Barney, David Scruggs, and 

Jim Lovelace, http://csis.org/event/expanding-foreign-sales-us-militaryequipment-industry-perspectives, CSIS, Washington, DC 

June 13, 2013, ‘‘Keynote Address: Policy Perspective’’, National Logistics 

Forum, National Defense Industrial Association, Arlington, VA 

June 4, 2013, ‘‘Facing Down the Debt: Impacts on National Security’’, 

CSIS, International Policy Roundtable, Washington, DC 

June 3, 2013, Panel on the Think Tank Letter for Defense Reform, With 

Gordon Adams, Mackenzie Eaglen, Todd Harrison, and Larry Korb, Hosted 

by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Hart Senate Office 

Building, Washington, DC 

April 25, 2013, ‘‘The Ground Forces Industrial Base: A Conversation with 

Brett Lambert’’, http://csis.org/event/ground-forces-industrial-base, Willard 

Hotel, Washington, DC 

April 15, 2013 ‘‘Implications of the Fiscal Year 2014 Defense Budget’’ With 

Maren Leed, Jim Dyer, and Clark Murdock http://csis.org/event/implications-fy14-defense-budget, CSIS, Washington, DC 

April 9, 2013, ‘‘The Budget ‘Deep Dive’ ’’ Spring Conference, Professional 

Services Council, Special Post-Conference Session, Tampa, FL 

February 27, 2013, Panel Presentation ‘‘American Views on the Rebalance’’, Georgetown-CSIS Conference on ‘‘The U.S. Rebalance to Asia, A One 

Year Assessment’’, http://csis.org/event/us-rebalance-asia-one-year-assessment-where-have-we-been-and-where-are-we-going, Georgetown University, 

Washington, DC 

February 21, 2013, ‘‘Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2012)’’ with Steven L Schooner, West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference, 

Washington, DC 

February 8, 2013, ‘‘Preparing for a Deep Defense Drawdown’’, CSIS Panel 

with Clark Murdock, Maren Leed, and Jim Dyer, CSIS, Washington, DC 

January 30, 2013, Keynote speech ‘‘The Triple Threat -CR, Sequestration, 

and Debt Ceiling and the Dysfunctional Environment’’, National Defense 

Industrial Association, Conference on Earned Value Management Systems, 

Cleaiwater, FL 

January 25, 2013, ‘‘Preparing for the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review’’, 

panel on ‘‘Unique Challenges Facing DoD Under Budgetary Pressures’’, 

with Gordon Adams, Todd Harrison, and Michael O’Hanlon, http://csis.org/ 

event/preparing-2014-quadrennial-defense-review, CSIS, Washington, DC 

984 

January 14, 2013, Keynote address ’Where Are We, How Did We Get 

Here, Where Are We Going, and What Do You Watch For?’’, Association of 

Defense Communities Winter Forum, San Antonio, TX 

January 14, 2013, Keynote address to the Defense Acquisition Symposium 

National Defense Industrial Association, Procurement Division, RitzCarlton Hotel, New Orleans, LA 

December 18, 2012, ‘‘European Defense Trends 2012: Budgets, Regulatory 

Frameworks, and the Industrial Base’’ report release presentation with Guy 

Ben-Ari http://csis.org/event/european-defense-trends-budgets-regulatoryframeworks-and-industrial-base-2011, CSIS, Washington, DC 

December 12, 2012, ‘‘It’s Not About China’’—Strategic Guidance and Air 

Sea Battle, NDU Conference on ‘‘Rebalancing to Asia: Air Sea Battle Concepts for Assured Access’’, Ft. McNair, Washington, DC 

December 7, 2012, ‘‘Service Contracting’’, with Allan Burman, 2012 Nash 

& Cibinic Roundtable, Washington, DC 

November 29, 2012, Panel Member, ‘‘Maturing the Homeland Security Enterprise’’, Ken Rapuano, moderator; with Alan Cohn, James Loy, and Chad 

Sweet, CSIS Conference ‘‘Toward Strategic Outcomes: Envisioning the Future of the Homeland Security Enterprise’’, http://csis.org/event/toward-strategic-outcomes-envisioning-future-homeland-security-enterprise, CSIS, 

Washington, DC 

November 16, 2012 ‘‘Debt and Defense’’ with Maren Leed and Clark 

Murdock http://csis.erg/event/debt-and-defense CSIS Washington, DC 

November 13, 2012 ‘‘The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Contract 

Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base’’ report release presentation 

with Guy Ben-Ari, http://csis.org/event/us-department-homeland-securitycontract-spending-and-supporting-industrial-base-0, CSIS, Washington, DC 

October 16, 2012, Panel Moderator ‘‘Program Budgets: Fiscal Years 2013– 

2015 Global Look Ahead’’ With Rob Jenkins (OTI, USAID), Chuck Call 

(State), Moshe Schwartz (CRS), 2012 ISOA (lnt’I Stability Operations Association) Annual Summit, Washington, DC 

October 15, 2012, ‘‘Asia Defense Spending Report’’ report release presentation with Guy Ben-Ari and Joachim Hofbauer, http://csis.org/event/asiandefense-spending-report-roll-out, CSIS, Washington, DC 

October 12, 2012, ‘‘U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region’’, 

Professional Military Education session, Joint Staff J–8 Deputy Directorate 

for Force Management, Application and Support, Arlington, VA 

October 3, 2012, ‘‘Asia Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for the U.S. 

Army’’, Army G–8 Annual Symposium, The Clubs, U.S. Marine Corps Base, 

Quantico, VA 

September 24, 2012 ‘‘U.S. Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific Region’’ 

presentation on ‘‘CSIS Independent Assessment of U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region’’ with Michael Green, http://csis.org/evenVusforward-presence-asia-pacific-region, CSIS, Washington, DC 

September 18, 2012 ‘‘DOD Contract Trends’’ report release presentation 

with Guy Ben-Ari and Greg Sanders, http://csis.org/even/dod-contracttrends-report-release, CSIS, Washington, DC. 

September 6, 2012, Panel Presentation ‘‘Where Do We Go From Here? Options for Congress and the Department of Defense’’, Moshe Schwartz, Moderator, With Jacques Gansler and GiL Decker, DAU–CRS Conference ‘‘25 

Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here?’’, Washington, 

DC 

August 2, 2012, ‘‘Press Briefing: Report on U.S. Force Posture in Asia-Pacific’’ with Michael Green, http://csis.org/event/press-briefing-report-us-forceposture-asia-pacific, (transcript available), CSIS, Washington, DC 

July 26, 2012, ‘‘Contract Spending by the Department of State and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development’’, Report Release and Briefing, 

with Guy Ben-Ari and Dan Runde, http://csis.org/event/report-launch-contract-spending-department-state-and-us-agency-international-development, 

CSIS, Washington, DC 

May 2, 2012, ‘‘0bligations of Leadership’’ case study with Ron Fogleman, 

National Security Management Program, Syracuse, NY 

February 16, 2012, Panel ‘‘The New Budget Environment’’ with Steve Miller, Dale Johnson, and Doug Meade, DODCAS, Williamsburg, VA 

February 15, 2012 ‘‘Defense Industrial Base Implications of the Fiscal 

Year 2013 Budget’’ with Brett Lambert and Byron Callan, http://csis.org/ 

event/defense-industrial-base-implications-fy13-budget, CSIS, Washington, 

DC 

985 

February 13, 2012, Panel Moderator on ‘‘Identifying, Prioritizing, and Coordinating Necessary Maritime Capabilities’’ with Michael Kostelnik CPB. 

VADM John Blake USN. and VADM John Currier USCG, CSIS Conference 

on ‘‘Maritime Security: Confronting New and Non-Traditional Challenges in 

the Age of Austerity’’, Washington, DC 

January 27, 2012,‘‘Implications of the Fiscal Year 2013 Defense Budget’’ 

with Todd Harrison, Clark Murdock, and Stephanie Sanok http://csis.org/ 

event/implications-fy13-defense-budget, CSIS, Washington, DC 

December 2, 2011, ‘‘Deficits, Defense. and the Industrial Base—What’s 

Next?’’ with Gordon Adams, Jim Dyer. and Doug Holtz-Eakin, http:// 

csis.org/event/deficits-defense-and-industrial-base-whats-next, CSIS, Washington, DC 

November 29, 2011, Panel Chair for ‘‘Resource Issues’’, ‘‘Economics, Politics and Security of China and U.S.’’ conference, University of Maryland, 

College Park, MD 

November 23, 2011, ‘‘U.S. Federal Services Industrial Base Report Release’’ with Guy Ben-Ari and Greg Sanders, http://csis.org/event/us-federalservices-industrial-base-report-release, CSIS, Washington, DC 

October 13, 2011, ‘‘Future Defense Challenges’’ Panel on CSIS Report 

‘‘U.S. Ground Force Capabilities Through 2020’’, With General John 

Sheehan, Kim Wincup, and Nathan Freier, http://csis.org/event/future-defense-challenges, CSIS, Washington, DC 

October 3, 2011, Panel Member on ‘‘An Industry SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats)’’—with Charles Rosotti, Moderated by 

Anne Reed, 2011 Annual Conference, Professional Services Council, 

Greenbriar, VA 

September 29, 2011, Panel Member, ‘‘Domestic Implications of a Defense 

Drawdown’’, with Steve Grundman and Todd Harrison, Conference on ‘‘Defense in an Age of Austerity’’ http://csis.org/event/defense-age-austerity (for 

audio, video), http://csis.org/files/attachments/110929—panel3—transcript.pdf (Panel Transcript), CSIS, Washington, DC 

July 29, 2011, European Defense Trends, with Julianne Smith, http:// 

csis.org/event/european-defense-trends, CSIS, Washington, DC 

July 21, 2011, ‘‘DHS Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial 

Base’’ Report Presentation and Briefing, With Guy Ben-Ari, CSIS, Washington, DC 

July 15, 2011, Panel Speaker ‘‘The Present and Potential Future of the 

National Security Industrial Base’’ Peter Singer, Moderator, with Tom 

Davis, Brookings, Washington, DC 

June 8, 2011, ‘‘Lessons from the Last Budget Drawdown’’ Global Security 

Forum 2011 http://csis.org/event/global-security-forum-2011-lessons-lastbudget-drawdown (audio/video), http://csis.org/files/attachments/110608— 

budget—drawdown—transcript.pdf (transcript), Willard Hotel, Washington, 

DC 

May 20, 2011, ‘‘A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership? The Impact of 

the Financial Crisis on European Defense and Foreign Assistance Capabilities’’ with Heather Conley and Steve Flanagan, http://csis.org/event/diminishing-transatlantic-partnership, CSIS, Washington, DC 

May 17, 2011, ‘‘Workforce Cost Realism Assessment Report Release’’, 

http://csis.org/event/workforce-cost-realism-assessment-report-release, CSIS, 

Washington, DC 

May 12, 2011, ‘‘Cost and Time Overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs’’ on Panel #14, Major Programs: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 

Jim Thomsen, chair, NPS Acquisition Symposium, Seaside, CA 

May 11, 2011, ‘‘Shipbuilding: Global vs. National, Military vs. Commercial’’ on Panel #7, Global Influences and the Defense Industrial Base, John 

Birkler, chair, NPS Acquisition Symposium, Seaside, CA 

May 6, 2011, ‘‘Defense Contract Trends’’ with Guy Ben-Ari http://csis.org/ 

event/dod-contract-spending-and-supporting-contractor-base, CSIS, Washington, DC 

March 29, 2011, National Journal’s ‘‘Insiders Conference’’—Panel discussion on ‘‘The Defense Budget and Future Force Structure’’, Grand Hyatt 

Washington, Washington, DC 

March 22, 2011, ‘‘The True Cost of Government Performance’’, Professional 

Services Council Marketview 2011 Spring Conference, Phoenix, AZ 

March 17, 2011, ‘‘DOD’s Better Buying Efficiency Initiative’’, Defense Intelligence Acquisition Conference, Miami, FL 

986 

February 24, 2011, ‘‘Emerging Federal Contract Policy and Practice 

Issues’’ with Steve Schooner, West Government 2010 Contracts Year in Review Conference, Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, DC 

February 23, 2011 ‘‘Roundtable Discussion III: Transatlantic Industrial, 

Regulatory and Acquisition Policies In the Security Sector’’ with Rick Nelson and Jean-Pierre Darnis, Conference on Enhancing Euro-Atlantic Security Amid Uncertain Times: EU–U.S. Security Strategies and Recommendations, http://csis.org/event/enhancing-euro-atlantic-security-amid-uncertaintimes-eu-us-security-strategies-and-recommenda, CSIS, Washington, DC 

February 16, 2011, ‘‘Implications of the Fiscal Year 2012 Defense Budget’’ 

with Maren Leed and Clark Murdock, http://csis.org/event/implicationsfy12-defense-budget, CSIS, Washington, DC 

February 15, 2011, via Video Teleconference, Panel Member on General 

Session on Budget With George Schlossberg, Dan Else, and Brian Polly, Association of Defense Communities, San Antonio, TX 

January 26, 2011, ‘‘U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and 

the Industrial Base’’ with Guy Ben-Ari, http://csis.org/event/us-departmentdefense-contract-spending-and-supporting-contractor-base, CSIS, Washington, DC 

December 9, 2010, Panel Member: ‘‘The Federal Budget and the Economy’’, Steve Schooner, Moderator, with Matthew Blum and Karen Wilson, 

National Contract Management Association, Washington, DC, Chapter, Arlington, VA 

December 3, 2010, ‘‘Department of Defense Cost Saving Initiative’’, with 

Brett Lambert, 2010 Nash & Cibinic Roundtable, Washington, DC 

November 16, 2010, Panel Chair: ‘‘Defense Industrial Base and U.S. Competitiveness: Implications for the Manufacturing Base and U.S. National 

Security’’, http://csis.org/event/defense-industrial-base-and-us-competitiveness-implications-manufacturing-base-and-us-national, CSIS, Washington, 

DC 

November 15, 2010, ‘‘Report Rollout: U.S. Federal Professional Services Industrial Base’’, http:l/csis.org/event/report-rollout-us-federal-professionalservices-industrial-base (audio only, no video), CSIS, Washington, DC 

November 5, 2010 ‘‘Report Rollout: European Defense Trends’’ with Jim 

Townsend, http://csis.org/evenUreport-rollout-european-defense-trends, 

CSIS, Washington, DC 

October 5, 2010 Panel Member, Executive Roundtable on ‘‘X-treme Supply 

Chain Volatility’’, University of Maryland Robert H Smith School of Business, Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, DC 

August 24, 2010, Panel Chair: ‘‘The Economic Element of National Power’’, 

Conference on Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security?, NDU, Washington, DC 

July 27, 2010 ‘‘Delivering Better Acquisition Value: Conversations with Industry: Session Two’’ with Brett Lambert, DASO (Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy). http://csis.org/event/delivering-better-acguisitionvalue-conversations-industrv-session-two, CSIS, Washington, DC 

July 26, 2010, ‘‘Report Release: National Security and the Commercial 

Space Sector’’ with Greg Kiley, http://csis.org/event/report-release-nationalsecurity-and-commercial-space-sector, CSIS, Washington, DC 

July 19, 2010, General Session Panel Member: ‘‘Economic Outlook 2010 

and Beyond: How the Transformed Global Economy Will Impact How We 

Do Business’’, National Contract Management Association World Congress, 

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 

July 15, 2010, ‘‘Delivering Better Acquisition Value: Conversations with 

Industry’’ with Brett Lambert, DASD (Manufacturing and Industrial Base 

Policy). http://csis.org/event/delivering-better-acquisition-value-conversations-industry, CSIS, Washington, DC 

May 26, 2010, ‘‘Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) 2009 

Progress Report’’ http://csis.org/eventiweapon-systems-acquisition-reformact-wsara-2009-progress-report, CSIS, Washington, DC 

April 30, 2010, ‘‘Draft Report Release: National Security and the Commercial Space Sector’’ with Greg Kiley, http://csis.org/event/national-securityand-commercial-space-sector, CSIS, Washington, DC 

April 2, 2010, Host Speaker ‘‘Defense Logistics Modernization and Information Systems of the 21st Century’’, http://csis.org/event/defense-logisticsmodernization, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 

DC 

987 

March 22, 2010, Opening Plenary Session Speaker ‘‘The Quadrennial Defense Review: Implications for Contractors’’, ‘‘Outlook 2010: The Federal Logistics, Sustainment, and Installations Markets’’, Professional Services 

Council Spring Conference, Camelback Inn, Scottsdale, AZ 

March 17, 2010, ‘‘Agricultural Development in Iraq and Afghanistan: Recent Lessons Learned’’, Conference on Closing the Gap: Examining an Alternative Future: Linkages Between Adequate Food Supply and Global Security, National Press Club, Washington, DC 

March 10, 2010, ‘‘How the QDR Addresses the Need to Preserve and Enhance the Force in Equipment and Support’’, National Defense University 

Conference on Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, NDU, Washington, DC 

February 23, 2010, ‘‘Defense Update’’ with George Schlossberg, Association 

of Defense Communities Winter Forum 2010, Albuquerque, NM 

February 18, 2010, ‘‘Emerging Federal Contract Policy and Practice 

Issues’’ with Steve Schooner, West Government 2009 Contracts Year in Review Conference, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562842, Omni Shoreham 

Hotel, Washington, DC 

February 17, 2010, Chair of Plenary Session Panel on the Purpose and 

Goals of Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act 2009, DOD Cost Analysis 

Symposium, Williamsburg, VA 

February 5, 2010 ‘‘Industrial Base Impact of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2010’’—Panel Moderator and Speaker, with Brett Lambert, Byron 

Callan, Jeff Bialos, and Stan Soloway, http://csis.org/event/industrial-baseimpact-quadrennial-defense-review, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, DC 

February 2, 2010, ‘‘2010 QDR: An In-Depth Initial Appraisal’’—Panel 

Speaker, http://csis.org/event/2010-quadrennial-defense-review, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC 

February 1, 2010, ‘‘CSIS Press Briefing Conference Call: The Quadrennial 

Defense Review’’, Transcript: http://csis.org/files/attachments/100201—csis— 

qdr.pdf, CSIS, Washington, DC 

December 16, 2009, ‘‘Anticipating the Quadrennial Defense Review 2010’’, 

Macquarie Defense Industry Conference, Arlington, VA 

November 3, 2009, ‘‘Strengthening National Defense’’, NAPA JLUS Report 

Release, 2009 Defense Community Conference ‘‘Partnering for Success’’, Orlando, FL 

September 16, 2009, ‘‘Insourcing, Budgets, and Contracts’’ CFO Dinner, 

ExecutiveBiz, McLean, VA 

September 3, 2009, ‘‘CSIS Complexity Project—Phase II Organizing for a 

Complex World: The Way Ahead’’, Presentation: http://csis.org/files/attachments/090903—complexity—presentation.pdf, CSIS, Washington, DC 

August 3, 2009, Keynote Speaker Annual Conference of the Association of 

Defense Communities, Boston, MA 

July 28, 2009, Luncheon Speaker, DHS Acquisition Seminar, Ft. Belvoir, 

VA 

May 20, 2009, ‘‘Managing the Future of DOD Acquisition’’, DOD Business 

Managers Conference, Ft. Belvoir, VA 

April 23, 2009, Panel Moderator, ‘‘Strategic Framework, Requirements, 

and Industrial Base’’, TacAir Issues Series: F–22, with Rebecca Grant, 

Gregory Martin, and John Nathman, http://csis.org/event/tacair-issues-series-f-22, CSIS, Washington, DC 

February 25, 2009, ‘‘Transitioning Defense Organizational Initiatives’’, Association of Old Crows, Capitol Hill Conference, Washington, DC 

February 17, 2009, ‘‘Emerging Federal Contract Policy and Practice 

Issues’’ with Steve Schooner, West Government 2008 Contracts Year in Review Conference, Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, DC 

February 10, 2009, Panel Member, ‘‘Smart Stimulus?: Potential ramifications for recovery, reinvestment, trade, security and U.S. global leadership’’ 

http://csis.org/event/smart-stimulus-potential-ramifications-recovery-reinvestment-trade-security-and-us-global-lead, CSIS, Washington, DC 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

988 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

DAVID J. BERTEAU. 

This 19th day of November, 2014. 

[The nomination of Mr. David J. Berteau was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on December 9, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on December 16, 2014.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Alissa M. Starzak by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I believe that Goldwater-Nichols and other reforms significantly improved interservice and joint relationships within the Department of Defense (DOD). 

At this time, I am unaware of any need to amend Goldwater-Nichols. However, if 

I am confirmed and become aware of a need, I will recommend any changes I believe 

to be warranted through the established process. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. As noted above, I am not aware of any need to amend Goldwater-Nichols. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the General 

Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

989 

Answer. The duties and functions of the General Counsel of the Army are determined and assigned by the Secretary of the Army. The General Counsel provides 

legal advice to the Secretary of the Army, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, and other offices within the Army Secretariat and serves as the chief legal 

officer of the Department of the Army responsible for determining the controlling 

legal positions of the Department. I understand that the General Counsel’s responsibilities extend to any matter of law and to other matters as directed by the Secretary, to include overseeing matters in which the Army is involved in litigation, 

taking final action on certain claims filed against the Army, providing professional 

guidance to the Army’s legal community, and establishing and administering the 

Army’s policies concerning legal services. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. Because of the broad nature of the duties and responsibilities of the office, the Army General Counsel must not only have good judgment and legal skills, 

but also the ability to build strong relationships and work collaboratively with individuals in the Army, across the executive branch, and in Congress. I believe my experience, both inside and outside DOD, has prepared me for this role. 

After receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree, magna cum laude, from Amherst College, I attended the University of Chicago Law School, where I was an editor on 

the Law Review and graduated with honors. After graduation, I served as a law 

clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly, on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit in Jackson, Mississippi. I subsequently moved to Washington, D.C., to practice law at the law firm of O’Melveny and Myers, where I focused on compliance, 

corporate investigations and white collar defense. In 2005, I joined the Office of 

General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency, before becoming a counsel on 

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2007. I currently serve as a Deputy 

General Counsel in the DOD Office of General Counsel, working on a variety of 

legal issues related to Congress, including issues directly related to the Army. I believe that this legal and practical experience—in three branches of government—will 

serve me well in addressing the wide range of issues that will face the Department 

of the Army. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. I am confident that I have the necessary legal and professional experience, analytic skills, and leadership abilities to be the General Counsel of the Department of the Army. If I am confirmed, I will establish and maintain close and 

professionally cooperative relationships with the talented and dedicated attorneys in 

the Office of the General Counsel, with The Office of The Judge Advocate General 

of the Army, and with other offices dealing with matters of mutual interest in order 

to provide the best possible legal services to all members of the Department of the 

Army. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will be ready to execute the responsibilities of the 

General Counsel set forth in the General Order prescribing the duties of each principal officer of Headquarters, Department of the Army. In addition to these duties, 

I anticipate that the Secretary of the Army will expect me to manage the Office of 

General Counsel efficiently and effectively, ensuring that it provides accurate and 

timely legal advice. I also anticipate that the Secretary will expect me to work collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General, the General Counsels of DOD, the 

other military departments, and the defense agencies, and the legal staff of other 

Federal agencies. 

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the General Counsel of DOD? 

Answer. While the General Counsels of the Army, Navy and Air Force serve as 

the chief legal officers of their respective departments, the General Counsel of DOD 

is the chief legal officer and final legal authority for the entire DOD. If confirmed, 

I intend to continue the close professional relationship I have with Mr. Stephen 

Preston, the General Counsel of DOD, by meeting regularly and collaboratively 

working in furtherance of the best interests of DOD. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. The General Counsel of the Department of the Army must provide accurate and timely legal advice on the full spectrum of matters that arise in the Army. 

990 

In a time of shrinking budgets, the General Counsel will be confronted with significant legal matters related to balancing and transitioning the Army. In addition, I 

expect that the General Counsel will confront significant challenges related to the 

prevention of, and response to, sexual assault, military and civilian personnel policies, acquisition, and compliance with environmental law. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to prioritize legal issues consistent with the Secretary of the Army’s priorities, and to work closely with the Secretary, the Chief of 

Staff, The Judge Advocate General, and the attorneys in the Office of the General 

Counsel to provide timely, accurate, and candid legal advice. If confirmed, I will also 

ensure that the Office of the General Counsel is appropriately resourced and staffed 

to address those priorities. 

Question. What do you see as the most significant legal issues the Army will face 

in the coming year? 

Answer. In an environment of declining resources, the Army is facing difficult policy choices and a period of significant transition. Those efforts to rebalance and reform the Army will invariably involve significant legal questions. Although it is difficult to predict exactly what other significant legal issues will arise in the coming 

year, if confirmed, I will work closely with the talented team of attorneys and judge 

advocates in the Office of the General Counsel to address those issues. 

Question. Does the Army Office of the General Counsel have the resources to deal 

with these problems? 

Answer. At this time, I believe the Office of the General Counsel has the resources needed to address the many difficult legal issues confronting the Army 

today. If I am confirmed, I will be in a better position to evaluate this important 

management and leadership issue. 

Question. What broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues which must 

be addressed by the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to carefully examine the structure and functioning 

of the Office of General Counsel to ensure that it continues to appropriately address 

the needs of the Army as changes are made to the Army’s operating framework. To 

provide high-quality, timely legal advice, the Army legal community must be integrated into the broader Army community and involved at all stages of the decisionmaking process. If confirmed, I also intend to carefully review programs for attorney 

recruitment and retention to ensure that the Office has the skills and capacity to 

address the challenges of the future. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the formal and informal relationship between the General Counsel of the Army and the following offices? 

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense. 

Answer. I understand that the General Counsel of DOD, Mr. Stephen Preston, 

has worked closely with the general counsels of the military departments. If confirmed, I intend to continue the professional relationship I have with Mr. Preston, 

which will include routine consultation, communication, and cooperation on matters 

of mutual interest, furthering the best interests of the Department of the Army and 

DOD. 

Question. The Secretary of the Army. 

Answer. As the head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the Army 

is responsible for all affairs of the Department. If confirmed, my primary responsibility will be to provide the Secretary with clear, concise, and correct legal advice 

and counsel, and to perform the duties and functions he has assigned. In order to 

execute these responsibilities to the highest standard, I intend to establish a strong 

relationship with the Secretary of the Army that will enhance my ability to communicate with him directly and candidly on all matters. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military officer of the Department of the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Staff is 

directly responsible to the Secretary of the Army on all matters except those related 

to his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely 

with The Judge Advocate General to continue the excellent relationship between the 

Army General Counsel, the Chief of Staff, and the Army Staff. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army. 

Answer. I understand that the five Assistant Secretaries of the Army perform the 

duties and responsibilities assigned to them in statute and prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. In broad terms, the Assistant Secretaries formulate and oversee 

991 

policies and programs within their functional areas. As the chief legal officer of the 

Department of the Army, the General Counsel is responsible for providing legal advice, counsel, and guidance to the Assistant Secretaries and their staffs. If confirmed, I will seek to establish strong, productive relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries and ensure that the Office of the General Counsel continues to 

provide timely and correct legal advice to their respective staffs. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army. 

Answer. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, I understand The Judge 

Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and 

the primary legal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army, members of the Army 

Staff, and members of the Army generally. Additionally, I recognize that The Judge 

Advocate General has the primary responsibility for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the administration 

of military discipline. A close, professional relationship between the civilian and uniformed members of the Army’s legal community is critical. If confirmed, I will work 

collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General to provide the best possible legal 

support to the Army. 

Question. The Inspector General of DOD. 

Answer. The Inspector General of DOD is responsible for advising the Secretary 

of Defense on criminal investigative matters and all other matters relating to the 

prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse within DOD. If confirmed, I will 

work with the Inspector General of DOD on matters related to the Department of 

the Army to ensure that Army interests are fully and fairly represented and to ensure Army actions taken as a result of DOD Inspector General recommendations are 

executed in compliance with applicable law, directives, and regulations. 

Question. The Inspector General of the Army. 

Answer. The Inspector General of the Army reports directly to the Secretary of 

the Army regarding the discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army, and on 

other matters specifically assigned by the Secretary. If confirmed, I anticipate maintaining a close and professional relationship with The Inspector General to ensure 

that he and his staff have the legal advice and support they require for mission success. 

Question. The General Counsels of the other military departments. 

Answer. Like the General Counsel of the Army, the General Counsels of the other 

military departments serve and act under the authority, direction, and control of the 

Secretaries of their respective Departments. If confirmed, I would expect to work 

closely with them on matters of mutual interest. I know that the General Counsel 

of DOD, Mr. Preston, facilitates this effort in order to best use the legal services 

across DOD. I look forward to participating in this effort. 

Question. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice. 

Answer. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the executive branch 

and may issue controlling guidance on certain legal issues. I also know the Attorney 

General and the Department of Justice represent the Department of the Army in 

litigation before Federal district courts and State courts. I view a strong relationship 

between the Army and the Department of Justice to be critical to success, and if 

confirmed, I will work in conjunction with The Judge Advocate General and the 

General Counsel of DOD to ensure the continuation of the Army’s current cooperative relationship with the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. 

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Question. In carrying out your duties if you are confirmed, how will you work with 

the Judge Advocate General of the Army? 

Answer. It is essential that the Army General Counsel maintain a close and cooperative relationship with The Judge Advocate General. A productive and positive relationship sets the tone and the direction for the effective delivery of legal services 

to the Army at all echelons. I know The Judge Advocate General shares this view, 

and if confirmed, we will work together to ensure the Offices of the General Counsel 

and The Judge Advocate General work closely together in the spirit of teamwork 

to deliver the best possible legal services to the members of the Army. 

Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Department of the Army allocated between the General Counsel and the Judge Advocate General? 

Answer. The Army General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer for the Department of the Army. As a component of the Army Secretariat, the Office of the 

Army General Counsel is charged to provide advice to the Secretary of the Army 

and other Secretariat officials on any subject of law and on other matters as directed by the Secretary of the Army. The Army General Counsel is authorized to 

provide the controlling legal opinion in any matter for the Army. The Judge AdvoVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00999 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
992 

cate General is the chief legal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army, members 

of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the 

Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as the military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. The law prohibits interference with the ability 

of The Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice to the Secretary 

of the Army, which I fully support. The Judge Advocate General provides supervision over the delivery of a wide-range of legal services across the Army. The Judge 

Advocate General also has primary responsibility for providing legal advice and 

services regarding the UCMJ and the administration of military discipline. The Offices of the Army General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General have a welldeveloped and supportive working relationship in their respective responsibilities. If 

confirmed, I will work to continue this productive partnership for the benefit of the 

Army. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that legal opinions of your office 

will be available to Army attorneys, including judge advocates? 

Answer. I understand the respective offices of the General Counsel and The Office 

of The Judge Advocate General have a longstanding routine and cooperative working arrangement. Open lines of communication and collaboration are essential to ensure legal views and opinions issued by the Office of the Army General Counsel and 

the Office of The Judge Advocate General are readily available to all Army attorneys, both civilian attorneys and judge advocates. If confirmed, I will support this 

relationship in a positive manner. 

Question. In response to attempts within DOD to subordinate legal functions and 

authorities of the Judge Advocates General to the General Counsels of DOD and the 

Military Services, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting any officer or employee 

of DOD from interfering with the ability of the Judge Advocates General of the Military Services and the legal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

provide independent legal advice to the Chairman, Service Secretaries, and Service 

Chiefs. 

What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General of the Army to 

have the authority to provide independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Army 

and the Chief of Staff of the Army? 

Answer. I believe it is essential that the expertise of The Judge Advocate General 

be available to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. I fully 

support the law, in both principle and in spirit, empowering The Judge Advocate 

General of the Army to provide independent legal advice honed by years of experience and informed judgment on military affairs to the Secretary of the Army and 

the Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Army judge advocates to provide independent legal advice to military commanders? 

Answer. Army commanders are charged with the responsibility to maintain discipline and to ensure the lawful conduct of the forces under their control, in addition 

to the proper functioning of their unit or organization. Army Judge Advocates at all 

levels provide valuable aid to commanders and leaders to maintain discipline and 

to help avoid a myriad of legal pitfalls in the day-to-day business of command. A 

Judge Advocate’s ability to provide candid legal advice to a commander and staff, 

both openly and in confidence as needed, is absolutely critical. Army commanders 

need and deserve the best legal advice and judgment available. This is best achieved 

when Judge Advocates are empowered to provide commanders with independent 

legal advice, supported by appropriate guidance from supervising attorneys. 

Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the current relationships between the uniformed judge advocates and the Army General Counsel? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will always look for opportunities to improve and to 

strengthen the relationships between the uniformed judge advocates and the staff 

of the Office of the General Counsel. At this time, I am not aware of any need for 

change, and my understanding is that the current relationship works well. 

Question. Are legal opinions of the Office of the Army General Counsel binding 

on all Army lawyers? 

Answer. Because the Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer for the Department of the Army as directed by the Secretary of the Army, legal opinions 

issued by the Office of the Army General Counsel are controlling throughout the Department of the Army. As a general matter, however, I understand that opinions 

are typically drafted in collaboration with The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I would ensure that significant legal opinions are informed by the expertise 

of both civilian attorneys and judge advocates. 

Question. How will you ensure that such legal opinions are available to Army lawyers? 

993 

Answer. Written opinions of the Office of the General Counsel for the Department 

of the Army are distributed in the ordinary course of business, using normal departmental distribution processes. If confirmed, I expect to continue this practice. 

Question. If confirmed, are there specific categories of Army Counsel legal opinions that you expect to reconsider and possibly revise? If so, what categories? 

Answer. I am not aware of any specific categories of Army General Counsel legal 

opinions in need of reconsideration or revision. If confirmed, however, as the need 

arises, I would review opinions warranting revision consistent with contemporary 

law in consultation with the appropriate attorneys and subject matter experts within the Army and elsewhere as appropriate. 

Question. Article 6 of the UCMJ gives primary jurisdiction over military justice 

to the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 

How do you view the responsibilities of the Army General Counsel in the performance of military justice matters with regard to the Judge Advocate General of the 

Army? 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General’s responsibilities to ensure the proper administration of the military justice system require direct and independent advice to 

the Secretary of the Army. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting The Judge Advocate General on military justice matters with consultation, advice, and assistance, 

as needed. 

ATTORNEY RECRUITING AND RETENTION ISSUES

Question. If confirmed, how do you assess your ability to hire and retain top quality attorneys and provide sufficient opportunity for advancement? 

Answer. I believe my background and experience have prepared me to meet the 

challenges of recruiting and retaining top quality attorneys and providing meaningful and rewarding opportunities for those attorneys to advance. Nevertheless, I believe the Army will face significant challenges in the coming years as we compete 

with the private sector and other Federal employers for quality attorneys, while 

shrinking resources will force us to demand more from the highly qualified attorneys we already have. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Army allocates sufficient resources to attract and select only the best qualified candidates for military 

and civilian attorney positions. In doing so, I will work closely with the Office of 

The Judge Advocate General to retain the best attorneys to provide first-rate legal 

services to the Army, its commanders, soldiers, and family members. 

Question. In your view, does the Department of the Army have a sufficient number of civilian and military attorneys to perform its missions? 

Answer. My understanding is the Army General Counsel has a sufficient number 

of civilian attorneys to perform its mission, and the Judge Advocate General’s Corps 

(JAG) has enough military and civilian attorneys to meet its current requirements. 

To address emerging requirements, however, including special victim capabilities 

(required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013) and special victim counsel (required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2014), the Army JAG Corps is planning to grow. Recognizing that as the Army 

draws down, legal support requirements may increase, I will closely monitor these 

emerging requirements and ensure they are resourced appropriately. 

Question. In your view, what incentives to successful recruiting and retention of 

attorneys, if any, need to be implemented or established? 

Answer. I understand the legal market is projected to become increasingly competitive over the next several years, with fewer students graduating from law school 

and a likely increase in hiring by private sector law firms. In my view, it is crucial 

that the Army renew our commitment to funding current incentive programs, like 

student loan repayment and career retention bonuses, notwithstanding the current 

fiscal challenges. These programs are needed to attract and retain the highest quality attorneys. 

DETAINEE ISSUES

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing legal issues 

regarding detainees? 

Answer. Although issues relating to the treatment of detainees most often arise 

in combatant commands, there are many Army judge advocates serving in those 

combatant commands, and the General Counsel of the Army may in some circumstances have an appropriate role in assisting those judge advocates with legal 

issues regarding detainees. 

Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the 

994 

U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to 

cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 

In your view, is the section 1403 prohibition in the best interest of the United 

States? Why or why not? 

Answer. Yes, I believe this prohibition is in the best interest of the United States 

and is fully consistent with protecting our national security. 

Question. Do you believe that the phrase ‘‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 

or punishment’’ has been adequately and appropriately defined for the purpose of 

this provision? 

Answer. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act 

of 2009 define ‘‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment’’ as the cruel, 

unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. I think this definition provides a clear standard for ensuring that detainees in the custody of the U.S. Government are treated in a humane manner. 

Question. What role do you believe the General Counsel of the Army should play 

in the interpretation of this standard? 

Answer. The General Counsel should play an independent role in advising the 

Secretary of the Army and those who fall under his command on the standards governing the treatment of persons detained by the U.S. Army, including any interpretation of this legal standard. 

Question. What role do you believe the Judge Advocate General of the Army 

should play in the interpretation of this standard? 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army should be intimately involved 

in the interpretation of legal standards governing the treatment of detainees and 

should provide independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge 

Advocate General and the lawyers she leads—many of whom have served multiple 

deployments—bring experience and an important perspective to these and many 

other operational matters. If confirmed, and if called on to offer any guidance on 

this standard, I would expect to work collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General to provide clear advice to the field. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, 

dated September 5, 2006? 

Answer. Yes, I support the requirements in revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and DOD Directive 2310.01E, reissued on August 14, 2014, that all detainees and detained personnel be treated humanely and with respect for their dignity. 

Question. Section 2441 of title 18, U.S.C., as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment. 

In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S. detainees in foreign custody and 

to foreign detainees in U.S. custody? 

Answer. I believe section 2441 provides an appropriate standard for protecting 

both U.S. detainees in foreign custody and foreign detainees held in our custody. 

Question. Section 812 of title 10, U.S.C. states: ‘‘No member of the Armed Forces 

may be placed in confinement in immediate association with enemy prisoners or foreign nationals not members of the Armed Forces.’’ 

Consistent with the statute, what recommendations would you provide the Secretary of the Army, if confirmed regarding the possible holding of foreign detainees 

at DOD Regional Corrections Facilities and Disciplinary Barracks? 

Answer. In the event that the Secretary of the Army sought my advice on such 

a matter, I would ensure that my advice was consistent with applicable law, including section 812. 

Question. What types of modifications would be needed at military detention facilities to ensure they are compliant with domestic and international law as well as 

meeting the special security considerations necessary for the safe detention of foreign law of war detainees? 

Answer. At this time, I am not familiar with what modifications, if any, would 

be needed to ensure that a military detention facility complies with domestic and 

international law. 

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for addressing the 

safety and security of the general public living near these facilities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would defer to law enforcement experts about what measures would be necessary to ensure the safety and security of the general public livVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01002 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
995 

ing near these facilities, and would work closely with them to ensure that safety 

issues are appropriately and lawfully addressed. 

Question. In November 2012, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

published a report titled: Guantanamo Bay Detainees: Facilities and Factors for 

Consideration if Detainees Were Brought to the United States. That reported noted 

that only one DOD facility, the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

currently holds ‘‘inmates with sentences exceeding 5 years as well as inmates sentenced to death.’’ The report also stated: ‘‘in order to conform with international law 

and DOD policies . . . ’’ detainees are to be ‘‘protected from public curiosity (for example, pictures of detainees’ faces are not disseminated publicly).’’ 

In your view, what steps would need to be taken in the handling of law of war 

detainees in order to comply with international law and DOD regulations, including 

the ‘‘public view’’ prohibition raised by GAO? 

Answer. DOD takes seriously its obligation to comply with the Geneva Conventions and other legal requirements relating to the treatment of detainees, including 

the requirement not to hold detainees out for public curiosity. If confirmed, I would 

ensure any advice I provide regarding law of war detention is consistent with those 

requirements. 

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was enacted in 

2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to persons employed by 

or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States. 

In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of combat operations? 

Answer. I believe that the MEJA of 2000 does provide appropriate criminal jurisdiction over contractor employees in areas of combat operations. Although these 

types of prosecutions are rare, MEJA is an effective tool to hold contractors and 

DOD civilian employees accountable for serious criminal acts. All people supporting 

our Armed Forces, regardless of their location, should be held accountable for their 

actions, and MEJA can be an effective means of achieving that end. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA? 

Answer. My understanding is that MEJA is sufficient in its current form. 

Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in developing administration recommendations for changes to MEJA? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be actively involved in any effort to develop administration recommendations for changes to MEJA. Because MEJA applies to civilian personnel working across DOD and its contractors, I would certainly work with 

officials in other agencies and military departments on any recommended changes 

to MEJA. 

Question. Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2007 extended criminal jurisdiction of the military courts under the UCMJ to persons serving with or accompanying an Armed Force in the field during time of declared war or a contingency operation, such as our current operations in Afghanistan. 

In your view, does the UCMJ provide appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal 

actions of contractor employees in Afghanistan and other areas of combat operations? 

Answer. Yes. The UCMJ provides appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Afghanistan and other areas of combat operations. 

Civilians serving with or accompanying our Armed Forces overseas who commit 

crimes should be held appropriately accountable. While it is difficult to prepare for 

every scenario that may arise in a deployed environment, Article 2 of the UCMJ 

provides a means to address the misconduct of civilians accompanying the force in 

areas of combat operations. 

Question. What is your view of the procedures agreed upon by DOD and the Department of Justice to reconcile jurisdictional responsibilities under MEJA and the 

UCMJ? 

Answer. If confirmed, I am prepared to examine, from an Army perspective, the 

relationship between the Department of Justice and DOD and to give thought to 

whether it reflects the appropriate balance. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to ensure appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees? 

Answer. I have no recommendations for any such changes to the UCMJ at this 

time. If confirmed, and if after further review I perceive a need, I will recommend 

any changes I believe to be warranted. 

996 

IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL EXTREMIST VIEWS

Question. In your view, do current Army policies limit the ability to include information about extremist views in official records that may assist in the identification 

of potential threats? 

Answer. No. To my knowledge, current Army policy does not limit the ability to 

include this type of information in official records. The Army maintains several 

types of records that may help identify individuals whose extremist views could pose 

a threat. These official records include, but are not limited to, records managed by 

several U.S. Army commands, such as the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 

the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, and the U.S. Army Intelligence 

and Security Command. 

Question. Do current Army procedures hinder the ability to share this type of information with other official agencies charged with identifying and monitoring potential extremist or terrorist activities? 

Answer. My understanding is that Army procedures do not prohibit sharing this 

type of information with other official agencies where appropriate. Documents collected in official records are available to individuals or organizations that have a 

‘‘need to know,’’ which includes appropriate law enforcement agencies. 

Question. What is your understanding of how the Army balances the need to identify and respond to potentially harmful extremist views held by soldiers against individual privacy and respect for the right of soldiers to hold and express personal 

beliefs? 

Answer. Commanders are responsible for building healthy and positive social climates based on dignity and respect for treatment of one another, and maintaining 

good order and discipline. As such, the Army emphasizes the exercise of calm and 

prudent judgment to achieve the proper balance between security and the need to 

preserve a Soldier’s right of expression. I understand that the Army gives commanders discretion and latitude to balance the mission of safeguarding the security 

of the United States while preserving the constitutional right of expression. 

Question. Do you see a need for a change in this balance? 

Answer. I do not currently see a need for change, but I am prepared to examine 

this issue if confirmed. 

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. In your view, do DOD policies concerning religious accommodation in 

the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who 

have different beliefs, including no religious belief? 

Answer. I believe the Department of the Army and the DOD’s policies support the 

goals of religious tolerance and mutual respect. If confirmed, in this area as well 

as other areas, I would ensure all Army policies uphold the Constitutional tenets 

of the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment. 

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers 

offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the 

proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her 

religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs? 

Answer. I have been advised that under current Army policy, when participating 

in mandatory official events, chaplains are not compelled to offer prayers that are 

inconsistent with their personal beliefs or faith, but they are expected to remain 

sensitive to the pluralistic Army and society they serve. Given the diversity of religious views in the Army, this policy appear to strike the proper balance. 

Question. Section 533 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013 (P.L. 112–239), as amended by section 532 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (P.L. 113–66) protects rights of conscience of members 

of the Armed Forces and chaplains and prohibits, so far as possible, use of such beliefs as the basis of any adverse personnel action, discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some religious denominations have sincerely held beliefs in opposition to same-sex marriage. 

In your view, may a member of the Armed Forces who has a sincerely held belief 

in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse personnel action or similar 

other adverse action, if he or she shares those personal views on the subject in a 

personal capacity? 

Answer. If soldiers wish to express their personal views about this issue in an 

open forum and caveat those as such, it is within their right to do so, and they will 

not be subject to adverse personnel action or similar other adverse action for exVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01004 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
997 

pressing those views. This is a fundamental right, and if confirmed, I will ensure 

that all Army policies protect this and similar rights. 

ROLE IN THE OFFICER PROMOTION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General Counsel of the 

Department of the Army in ensuring the integrity and proper functioning of the officer promotion process? 

Answer. I understand the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the proper 

functioning of the Department of the Army’s promotion selection process. The Army 

General Counsel is responsible for ensuring that the conduct of the board process 

conforms to all legal requirements; this includes reviewing all Memoranda of Instruction and selection board reports to ensure they comport with statutory standards. The Office of the Army General Counsel works closely with the Office of The 

Judge Advocate General to advise the Secretary of the Army of any case in which 

a selection board report or selection board process fails to adhere to the statutory 

standards and to provide counsel on appropriate corrective action. 

Question. Do you see a need for change in this role? 

Answer. I have been advised that the current process is working well; however, 

if I am confirmed and determine that a change is necessary and proper, I would 

work closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), The Judge Advocate General, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1, to effect 

such change. Proper execution of this process is essential to maintaining the trust 

of the Army Officer Corps, Congress, and the American people. 

GENERAL OFFICER NOMINATIONS

Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated by senior leaders in 

the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to nomination for 

promotion and certain assignments. 

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in the officer promotion system, 

particularly in reviewing general officer nominations? 

Answer. I have been informed that for all Army officer promotions, including general officer promotions, the Office of the Army General Counsel, in coordination with 

The Office of The Judge Advocate General, plays an active role in the officer promotion system, to include reviewing Memoranda of Instruction that govern the conduct of promotion selection boards and subsequent promotion selection board reports. 

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General Counsel of the 

Department of the Army in ensuring the legal sufficiency of statutory selection 

board processes? 

Answer. I understand the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the proper 

functioning of the Department of the Army’s promotion selection process. Prior to 

approval by the Secretary of the Army, all Memoranda of Instruction for officer promotion selection boards are reviewed by the Office of the Army General Counsel, 

in coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General, to ensure the Secretary’s instructions conform to statutes and accurately reflect his guidance regarding attributes necessary for service in the next grade. All reports of promotion selection boards are processed through the Office of the Army General Counsel prior to 

final action on the report by the Secretary. The Army General Counsel must be satisfied that the Army has met applicable statutory standards and that individual selection board reports conform to the law. The Army General Counsel must advise 

the Secretary of the Army of any case in which a selection board report fails to adhere to the statutory standards, either generally or with regard to a particular officer being considered for promotion. In advising the Secretary of the Army and the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the 

Army General Counsel helps to ensure that Army promotion policies properly implement applicable laws and regulations and are fairly applied. 

Question. What is the role, if any, of the General Counsel of the Department of 

the Army in reviewing and providing potentially adverse information pertaining to 

a nomination to the Senate Armed Services Committee? 

Answer. It is my understanding that under current Department of the Army practice, regarding General Officer nominations, the Office of the Army General Counsel 

reviews each selection board report, as well as departmental communications to the 

committee, the President, and the Secretary of Defense, to ensure that the reports 

and communications comply in form and substance with law and applicable directives and regulation. The Office of the Army General Counsel gives special attention 

to cases of nominees with substantiated or potentially adverse information and 

998 

cases with reportable information in order to ensure that such information is reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee in a timely, accurate, and comprehensible manner. 

MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY AND CASES

Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the General Counsel and civilian 

attorneys assigned to the Office of General Counsel play in military personnel policy 

and individual cases, including cases before the Board for Correction of Military 

Records? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army, the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and other senior leaders to 

ensure that the Army properly develops and fairly applies military personnel policies. If I am confirmed and become aware that the Department did not fairly and 

lawfully apply military personnel policies, I will take appropriate action to ensure 

that the Army properly resolves the issue. I understand and fully respect the independent role that the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) 

plays in the correction of military records, and if confirmed, I will coordinate with 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), who exercises 

overall responsibility for the Army Review Boards Agency regarding the legal sufficiency of ABCMR recommendations to the Secretary of the Army. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Fiscal Year 2013 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual 

Assault in the Military reflects that reports of sexual assaults in the Army increased 

by 51 percent from fiscal year 2012 to 2,149 reports of sexual assault in fiscal year 

2013. 

What is your assessment of this report? 

Answer. Although DOD did not conduct a study of the prevalence of sexual assault in fiscal year 2013, I understand there are indications that the increase in reporting in fiscal year 2013 reflects an increased willingness of victims to come forward rather than an increase in the number of sexual assaults. Nevertheless, there 

is still more to do to prevent and punish the crime of sexual assault. If confirmed, 

I intend to provide my full support in helping the Army achieve this goal. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s sexual assault prevention and 

response program? 

Answer. I understand that the Army has taken substantial steps to addressing 

the issue of sexual assault. Through the combined efforts of military and civilian 

leaders at all echelons, I am informed that the Army has implemented an unprecedented number of program and policy initiatives to address this insider threat. 

I support the Army’s commitment to a holistic approach to change culture, prevent sexual assault and harassment in the ranks, support and advocate for victims, 

and hold offenders appropriately accountable. 

Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? 

Answer. I am informed that since implementing the restricted reporting option 

(which does not initiate a law enforcement investigation) in 2005, the number of 

total reports has continued to increase. The restricted reporting option gives victims 

time to understand the process, seek the counseling and care they need, and to consult with an attorney if they wish. I understand the conversion of restricted reports 

to unrestricted continues to increase, which I believe is an indication that victims 

are gaining more trust in the system. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to work to improve upon its response system and to enhance victim support. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

Answer. I believe the chain of command has an important role to play in providing compassionate care and necessary support to victims of sexual assault. As a 

general matter, the commander—as well as the commander’s subordinate commanders and staff members—has a responsibility to care for Soldiers in the commander’s charge. I understand that the Army is working hard to foster a climate 

in which victims trust their chain of command to support them if and when sexual 

offenses occur. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Army resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help 

they need? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Army is dedicated to providing Soldiers, 

civilians and eligible family members who are the victims of sexual assault with extensive medical, psychological, and legal support services. I am aware that sexual 

999 

assault victims are offered the services of a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator 

(SARC) and a Victim Advocate (VA). When a victim of sexual assault comes to any 

Military Treatment Facility in the Army, his or her medical needs are managed by 

a Sexual Assault Clinical Provider and his or her behavioral health care is provided 

by the Sexual Assault Behavioral Health Provider. Victims of sexual assault are 

also entitled to the services of a Special Victim Counsel. The Army Special Victim 

Counsel program is staffed, resourced, and supported by the Department of the 

Army; the Army JAG Corps is currently growing to meet emerging requirements. 

Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional 

sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations? 

Answer. I understand that both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff 

of the Army have made the prevention of sexual assault a top priority and are providing resources consistent with that prioritization. As a result, leaders at every 

echelon and in every location must be committed to preventing sexual assaults and 

caring for victims, and the Army is working diligently to ensure that all Soldiers 

share these commitments. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the 

Army has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. I understand that the Army has invested substantial resources and training toward the investigation and response to allegations of sexual assault. As stated 

above, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff have made the prevention of 

sexual assault a top priority and are providing resources consistent with that 

prioritization. 

Question. What is your view on the value of the Army’s Special Victims Counsel 

Program? Has this program had an impact on the reporting and prosecution of allegations of sexual assault in the Army? If so, what is that impact? 

Answer. My understanding is that the Special Victim Counsel Program has been 

successful for both victims and commanders. The feedback from victims is that this 

program is an invaluable resource as they navigate the administrative, medical and 

justice systems within the Army. Commanders indicate that they can now act with 

confidence that they understand the victim’s position and preferences. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur? 

Answer. I believe that commanders can drive change in culture. Commanders are 

responsible for everything their command does or fails to do, which includes training 

Soldiers on how to prevent sexual assault and holding all leaders accountable for 

creating a culture that does not tolerate sexual assault. As part of these responsibilities, commanders are responsible for fostering respect within their units, creating 

a climate in which sexual assaults and sexual harassment are not tolerated, holding 

offenders accountable, and cultivating an environment in which victims feel comfortable reporting all forms of misconduct. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. I think it is difficult to fully assess the potential impact of such a significant change to the military justice system. Requiring a judge advocate outside the 

chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be 

prosecuted would, in effect, create a separate justice system for sexual assault cases, 

with uncertain consequences. 

The Army must encourage a climate in which victims feel comfortable in reporting 

misconduct, perpetrators of sexual assault are held accountable for the crimes they 

commit, and all Soldiers believe the system to be fair and transparent. I believe that 

both commanders and judge advocates have important roles to play in all components of that effort. 

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will be an ardent supporter of the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program and will work with the Secretary 

of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Manpower & Reserve Affairs), and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 to ensure that 

eliminating sexual assault remains a top priority throughout the Army. 

ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. In January 2013, Secretary of Defense Panetta rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, excluding women from assignment to units and positions whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat 

on the ground. The Military Departments are required to develop detailed plans for 

1000 

implementation of this directive and to complete integration of women into newly 

opened positions and units as expeditiously as possible, considering good order and 

judicious use of fiscal resources, but no later than January 1, 2016. Any recommendation to keep an occupational specialty or unit closed to women must be 

personally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Secretary of Defense. 

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play in the evaluation of the 

plans of the Department of the Army to integrate women into occupational specialties or recommendations to keep specific occupations or units closed to women? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to provide legal advice regarding plans to 

integrate women into those occupational specialties. 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RESPONSE SYSTEMS TO ADULT SEXUAL ASSAULT CRIMES

PANEL

Question. On June 27, 2014, the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault 

Crimes Panel (RSP) released its report fulfilling the requirements of section 576 of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (P.L. 112–239). This report 

contained 132 recommendations in the areas of victim services, victim rights, the 

role of the commander in the military justice process, and the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of sexual assault. 

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play in the evaluation of the 

recommendations of the RSP for possible implementation in the Department of the 

Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with The Judge Advocate 

General to advise the Secretary of the Army about the RSP’s recommendations and, 

where appropriate, how they should be implemented. 

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

Question. Section 1034 of title 10, U.S.C., prohibits taking retaliatory personnel 

action against a member of the Armed Forces as reprisal for making a protected 

communication. By definition, protected communications include communications to 

certain individuals and organizations outside of the chain of command. 

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that senior military leaders understand the need to protect servicemembers who report misconduct to appropriate 

authorities within or outside the chain of command? 

Answer. The General Counsel has the primary role of advising the Secretary of 

the Army and those who fall under his authority on the standards governing treatment of servicemembers reporting misconduct to any appropriate authority. I am 

fully committed to protecting those who report misconduct to appropriate authorities. Army policy provides for reporting and investigation of retaliatory actions, and 

for appropriate corrective and disciplinary action. Additionally, the Secretary of the 

Army, pursuant to the requirements of section 1034 of title 10, has a special obligation to ensure appropriate action is taken to correct the record of those who have 

been subjected to reprisal and to ensure appropriate disciplinary action is taken 

against those who engage in prohibited personnel actions against servicemembers 

reporting misconduct. It is critical for senior Army leaders to be aware of legal requirements so as to avoid improper retaliatory actions against those who bring matters of interest to our attention. My staff and I will work to ensure statutory and 

policy requirements are understood and appropriately executed. 

SUPPORT TO ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL

Question. What role, if any, do you think the General Counsel of the Army should 

have in reviewing the investigations and recommendations of the Army Inspector 

General? 

Answer. The Inspector General is a key member of the Secretariat, and if confirmed, as counsel to all Secretariat officials, I will ensure the Office of the General 

Counsel of the Army continues its current professional relationship with The Inspector General. I personally intend this to include routine, direct, and candid communications. I have been advised that we routinely provide independent and objective 

legal advice to the Office of The Inspector General in regard to all matters that relate to Inspector General programs, duties, functions, and responsibilities. In coordination with The Judge Advocate General, I will oversee the provision of effective 

legal guidance to the Office of The Inspector General in conducting investigations 

and making recommendations. Additionally, based on the Army General Counsel’s 

responsibility to review legal and policy issues arising from the Army’s intelligence 

and counterintelligence activities, I will work closely with The Inspector General 

concerning proper reporting of the Army’s intelligence oversight activities. 

1001 

CIVILIAN ATTORNEYS

Question. Judge advocates in the Armed Forces benefit from an established career 

progression, substantial mentoring and training opportunities, and exposure to a 

broad spectrum of legal areas and leadership responsibilities. By contrast, civilian 

attorneys in the military departments normally do not have established career programs and may do the same work for many years, with promotion based solely upon 

longevity and vacancies. 

What is your understanding of the personnel management and career development system for civilian attorneys in the Army? 

Answer. Civilian career development is important to me, and it is my understanding that all civilian attorneys and paraprofessionals supporting Army legal 

services are now covered by a comprehensive career program that promotes and facilitates their recruitment, training, education, development, advancement and retention. To achieve these goals, a career program office was established. I have been 

informed that the career program office publishes two governing documents, which 

the Army terms ‘‘Army Civilian Education, Training, and Education Development 

System’’ plans. There are separate guides for civilian attorneys and paraprofessionals, but both are functionally tailored to the legal career field and combine formal training with developmental assignments. 

Question. In your view does that system need revision? If so, what do you see as 

the major problems and what changes would you suggest? 

Answer. From what I have been told, the career program is still in its early stages 

of operation, and program evaluation is ongoing. If confirmed, I will serve as the 

career program’s functional chief, and will advocate for, or direct, revisions when appropriate. 

CLIENT

Question. In your opinion, who is the client of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. The client of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army is the 

Department of the Army, acting through its authorized officials. 

ACQUISITION ISSUES

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army procurement programs are executed in accordance with the law and DOD acquisition 

policy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the 

Under Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics and Technology, the Chief Information Officer, the Director of Small Business Programs, and other senior Army officials to ensure that Army acquisition programs comply with applicable laws, regulations, and policies. The Army’s acquisition 

leadership must accomplish its primary mission of acquiring equipment and services 

for the Department while complying with an extensive framework of legal and policy 

requirements. Army lawyers best support this mission through early involvement in 

acquisition program and procurements and through proactive assistance in identifying potential issues and shaping effective, legally-supportable business strategies 

throughout the acquisition life-cycle. 

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army acquisition officials understand flexibilities provided by Congress in the acquisition 

and financial statutes and can take advantage of those flexibilities to act in the best 

interests of the Army? 

Answer. I believe the legal community is uniquely suited to assist Army officials 

in this area. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department’s senior leadership to ensure that Army acquisition programs and financial operations comply with 

their governing legal and policy framework but also to question and modify program 

strategies that reflect an inaccurate or unduly restrictive interpretation of applicable authorities. 

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that ethics provisions on conflict of interest are followed both by Army personnel and by Army contractors? 

Answer. It is essential that the Department have well-understood business rules 

designed to avoid or mitigate organizational and personal conflicts of interest. Army 

lawyers play an important role in this area through robust programs for acquisition 

ethics training and proactive involvement in the Army’s acquisition, logistics and 

technology programs and contracting operations. If confirmed, I will work closely 

with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 

1002 

and other Army senior leaders to foster an organizational climate that is sensitive 

to the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest and that appropriately addresses 

specific situations that arise. 

ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AND ABUSE DURING CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND

AFGHANISTAN HAVE BEEN WIDE-SPREAD. 

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army personnel are properly trained in contingency contracting and are supervised in the 

performance of their duties? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the 

Under Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics and Technology, and other senior officials to ensure that the Army legal 

community continues to support the contingency contracting initiatives adopted in 

response to the 2007 Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 

Management in Expeditionary Operations, also known as the ‘‘Gansler Commission 

Report.’’ I would also work closely with The Judge Advocate General of the Army 

and other senior leaders in the Army legal community to ensure that an appropriate 

level of legal resources are allocated in support of contingency contracting. 

DETECTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Question. Personal and organizational conflicts of interest have become a major 

concern. DOD’s expanded use of private contractors being tasked to perform key 

functions that the services had formerly performed in-house and the new requirement to fill thousands of DOD civilian positions with experienced, qualified individuals present challenges in preventing conflicts of interest and the appearance of conflicts of interest. 

What do you think the Army should do, and what should the General Counsel’s 

role be, in ensuring that the Army identifies personal and organizational conflicts 

of interests and takes the appropriate steps to avoid or mitigate them? 

Answer. Because of their potential not only to result in an unfair competitive advantage, but also to damage the credibility of the institution, conflicts of interest 

are unacceptable in any organization. As the Army’s Designated Agency Ethics Official, the General Counsel is responsible for management and oversight of the Army 

Ethics Program. These duties include ensuring that Army personnel who are required to file financial disclosure reports do so at the appropriate time and that ethics counselors timely review these reports to prevent or mitigate conflicts of interest. 

In addition, if confirmed, I will help ensure that other circumstances of potential 

conflict of interest are addressed promptly, consistent with legal requirements. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps the Army takes to identify and 

address potential conflicts of interest during the hiring process? 

Answer. At this time, I am not aware of the steps the Army takes to identify and 

address conflicts of interest during the hiring process. If confirmed, I will look into 

that issue and ensure that appropriate safeguards exist. 

LEGAL ETHICS

Question. What is your understanding of the action a Department of the Army attorney or an Army judge advocate should take if the attorney becomes aware of improper activities by a Department of the Army official who has sought the attorney’s 

legal advice and the official is unwilling to follow the attorney’s advice? 

Answer. If an Army attorney suspects that the Army official, either in exercising 

functions or in failing to do so, violates a law or standard of conduct, the attorney 

should immediately bring the matter to the attention of the attorney’s supervisor. 

If not satisfactorily resolved at that level, the matter should be brought to higher 

level supervisory lawyers or authorities in the chain of supervision or command. 

Question. Do you believe that the present limits on pro bono activities of government attorneys are generally correct as a matter of policy or does the policy need 

to be reviewed and revised? 

Answer. I understand the former Army General Counsel established a supportive 

and permissive pro bono legal practice policy for the Office of the Army General 

Counsel, consistent with statutory restrictions prohibiting Federal employees from 

representing clients before the Federal Government, including the Federal courts. 

Many rewarding pro bono activities are available to government attorneys in their 

private, non-official capacity in areas such as family law, consumer law, landlordtenant disputes, and other civil and criminal law matters. If confirmed, I would review pro bono policies to determine whether any change would be appropriate. 

1003 

Question. In your view, do the laws, regulations, and guidelines that establish the 

rules of professional responsibility for attorneys in the Department of the Army provide adequate guidance? 

Answer. Much of the value and respect for the law depends on the proper ethical 

conduct of lawyers. I believe that the laws, regulations, and guidelines establishing 

rules for attorney professional responsibility for the Department of the Army are 

well developed and adequate. The Army’s ethical rules are based on the American 

Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Both uniform and civilian 

Army attorneys are subject to State licensing authority ethical codes. By regulation, 

Army attorneys must remain, at all times, in good standing with a at least one licensing authority in the United States, including those of U.S. States, U.S. territories, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. This complimentary system of ethical oversight is implemented on a day-to-day basis by the 

exercise of competent and conscientious supervision by experienced Army attorneys 

at all levels. If confirmed, I would consult and review the current professional responsibility policy and systems with The Judge Advocate General and, as appropriate, seek revisions and improvements. 

LITIGATION INVOLVING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Department 

of the Army and the Department of Justice with respect to litigation involving 

DOD? 

Answer. Under section 516 of title 28 of the U.S. code, the authority to represent 

the military departments in litigation is reserved to the Department of Justice, 

under the direction of the attorney general. It is my understanding DOD and the 

Department of the Army, along with the other military departments, have a positive 

and mutually supportive relationship with the Department of Justice. I understand 

coordination between the Department of Justice and the military departments is 

timely and consistent on every level. If confirmed, I will work collaboratively with 

The Judge Advocate General and the General Counsel of DOD to ensure the interests of the Army are fully understood and appropriately pursued with the Department of Justice in litigation. 

Question. In your view, does the Department need more independence and resources to conduct its own litigation or to improve upon its current supporting role? 

Answer. In general, because of established close working relationships, I think the 

Department of Justice is effective in defending the interests of the Department of 

the Army. If confirmed, I will routinely consult with The Judge Advocate General 

and the General Counsel of DOD to determine whether adequate authority and resources are available to protect the full measure of the Army’s interests in litigation. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

1004 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

SEXUAL ASSAULT

1. Senator GILLIBRAND. Ms. Starzak, some have used the argument that there are 

insufficient numbers of military lawyers to implement the Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA). Yet in your advance policy questions you said that ‘‘To address 

emerging requirements, including special victim capabilities and special victims 

counsel, the Army JAG [Judge Advocate General] Corps is planning to grow.’’ How 

do you reconcile this plan to grow the JAG Corps to address what we all agree is 

a top concern for the military with claims that there are an insufficient number of 

judge advocates to implement MJIA? 

Ms. STARZAK. I understand that enactment of MJIA would require additional 

judge advocates in grade O–6 or higher who have significant experience in trials by 

general or special court-martial. Given these requirements, I do not believe that 

growing the JAG Corps by commissioning new judge advocates would suffice to meet 

the needs that would be created by the MJIA in the near term. 

2. Senator GILLIBRAND. Ms. Starzak, in your advance policy questions you stated, 

‘‘Although the Department of Defense did not conduct a study of the prevalence of 

sexual assault in fiscal year 2013, I understand there are indications that the increase in reporting in fiscal year 2013 reflects an increased willingness of victims 

to come forward rather than an increase in the number of sexual assault.’’ My concern is that the percent of restricted reports has gone up and unrestricted reports 

have gone down and the rates of retaliation have stayed the same. That suggests 

survivors want to receive care, but it doesn’t suggest improved confidence in the 

military justice system. What to you suggests an increase in confidence in the military justice system, rather than the system of care provided to victims? 

Ms. STARZAK. Although I understand that the percentage of reporting victims who 

made unrestricted reports decreased slightly between fiscal years 2013 and 2014, I 

also understand that there was an increase in the number of both restricted and 

unrestricted reports in 2014, as well as a significant increase in the percentage of 

victims converting from restricted reports to unrestricted reports. I believe this increase in reporting, as well as the willingness to convert from restricted to unrestricted reporting, conveys increased victim confidence in the Department’s overall 

response system. I agree, however, that it is difficult to attribute this increase in 

reporting to any particular component of the Department’s response system. In addition, given the concerns victims expressed about retaliation in the 2014 Survivor 

Experience Survey, as well as the fact that sexual assault continues to be an underreported crime, I believe the Department still has much work to do to improve victim confidence. 

GENDER INTEGRATION

3. Senator GILLIBRAND. Ms. Starzak, on January 2013, former Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Army General Martin E. Dempsey rescinded the ground combat exclusion policy of 1994. The objective 

in rescinding this policy is to ensure that the mission is met with the best-qualified 

and most capable servicemember, regardless of gender. I understand that the Services are approaching this with phases of implementation. As the Army’s General 

Counsel, what is your role in implementing combat integration? 

Ms. STARZAK. If confirmed, my role as General Counsel would be to provide legal 

advice to the Secretary of the Army regarding integration of women into closed positions, units and occupations consistent with the guidelines established by Secretary 

of Defense Panetta and Chairman Dempsey in January 2013. 

4. Senator GILLIBRAND. Ms. Starzak, what challenges do you anticipate with the 

new policy implementation and do you think the Army will hit the target of January 

2016 for integration of women into newly opened jobs, positions, and units? 

Ms. STARZAK. My understanding is that the Army is on track to meet the target 

of January 2016. I have been informed that studies are in progress to identify any 

potential obstacles to full integration, and, if confirmed, I will work closely with the 

Army leadership to address any obstacles that are identified. 

1005 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

SPECIAL VICTIMS’ COUNSEL

5. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Starzak, regarding military sexual assault, I worked with 

Senator Patty Murray to introduce legislation to provide sexual assault victims with 

a Special Victims’ Counsel (SVC)—a trained military lawyer to assist survivors 

throughout the legal process—in all military branches. What is your assessment of 

the SVC program? 

Ms. STARZAK. I believe the SVC program to be a significant resource for sexual 

assault victims. Under the program, sexual assault victims who file a report of sexual assault—either restricted or unrestricted—are provided an attorney who represents their interests and helps them navigate the administrative, medical and 

military justice systems. Although it is still a relatively new program, the initial 

feedback on the SVC program has been very positive. The 2014 Survivor Experience 

Survey recently conducted by the Department found that, of the 68 percent of respondents who interacted with a SVC, 90 percent were satisfied with the services 

they were provided. I also understand that commanders have expressed positive 

views about the SVC program, because SVCs clearly communicate the victim’s position and preferences. 

6. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Starzak, are we seeing an increase in unrestricted reporting? 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes, the Army has seen a significant increase in unrestricted reporting of sexual assault in the last 2 years. In fiscal year 2014, the Army received a 

report from an estimated 23 percent of victims—up from 14 percent in fiscal year 

2012. In fiscal year 2014, victims converted from a restricted report to an unrestricted report to trigger a law enforcement investigation at a rate of 20 percent— 

the highest rate yet seen since the creation of the unrestricted reporting option in 

2005. 

7. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Starzak, are victims feeling more confident that if they 

come forward, they will receive the support, protection, and justice they deserve? 

Ms. STARZAK. I understand that recent statistics on victim reporting of sexual assault suggest increased victim confidence about coming forward. I have been advised 

that the last few years have shown an increased rate of reporting, with the Army 

now receiving a report from an estimated 1 in 4 victims, up from an estimated 1 

in 7 victims in 2012. Although this is an encouraging trend, sexual assault remains 

an underreported crime, and victims continue to express concerns about retaliation, 

particularly from their peers. I believe it is critical for the Army to continue to work 

to address those concerns to improve victims’ confidence. 

8. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Starzak, Senator Klobuchar and I introduced the National 

Guard and Reserve Access to Counsel Act to ensure victims receive services if there 

is any connection between the crime and their service. What is your assessment of 

the SVC program with respect to the National Guard and Reserve? 

Ms. STARZAK. Although I have limited knowledge of the Army National Guard and 

Reserve programs specifically, I understand that all components of the Army have 

worked closely together to stand up strong SVC programs. During the start-up time 

frame, this coordination between Army Active Duty, National Guard and U.S. Army 

Reserve has ensured that every eligible client who requests representation by an 

SVC has an assigned SVC. 

9. Senator AYOTTE. Ms. Starzak, do you believe that National Guard and Reserve 

members should have access to the same services as Active Duty personnel have, 

should they also be victims of sexual assault in connection with their military service? 

Ms. STARZAK. Yes. I strongly believe that National Guard and Army Reserve 

members should have access to the same services as Active Duty personnel should 

they be victims of sexual assault in connection with their military service. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TED CRUZ

FORT HOOD

10. Senator CRUZ. Ms. Starzak, you were appointed to the Deputy General Counsel (Legislation), Office of the General Counsel, at the Department of Defense, on 

May 31, 2011. During your tenure in that position, in the Department of Defense 

1006 

Language Position Paper, citing section 552 of H.R. 4310 (Fiscal Year 2013 Defense 

Authorization Bill), a great deal of time was spent explaining that awarding a Purple Heart to the victims of the Fort Hood massacre would ‘‘directly and indirectly 

influence’’ the trial of Major Hasan. Despite my obvious objection to that premise, 

terrorism should be identified as terrorism and not dismissed as workplace violence, 

the trial has now concluded—Major Hasan was convicted of murder and justly sentenced to death. What is your position on awarding the Purple Heart in recognition 

to those who were killed or wounded during the tragedy that occurred at Fort Hood 

on November 5, 2009? 

Ms. STARZAK. The criteria for award of the Purple Heart is set by law and Executive Order. According to Executive Order 11016, as amended, the Purple Heart is 

to be awarded to servicemembers killed or wounded ‘‘as the result of an act of an 

act of an enemy of the United States,’’ or ‘‘as a result of an international terrorist 

attack against the United States’’ among other possible criteria. My understanding 

is that the Department is reviewing whether those criteria are met with respect to 

the tragedy at Fort Hood. 

In addition, section 571 of H.R. 3979, the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 that passed the 

House of Representatives on December 4, 2014, would require the award the Purple 

Heart to servicemembers who are wounded or killed as the result of an attack carried out by an individual or entity that was ‘‘in communication with [a] foreign terrorist organization before the attack’’ where ‘‘the attack was inspired or motivated 

by the foreign terrorist organization.’’ If that provision is enacted into law, I believe 

the Department would need to review whether the Purple Heart should be awarded 

to those who were killed or wounded during the tragedy that occurred at Fort Hood 

under the modified criteria. 

11. Senator CRUZ. Ms. Starzak, what is your broader consideration for presentation of a Purple Heart to victims who are killed or wounded in a domestic terrorist 

attack, where that attack is inspired or motivated by a foreign terrorist organization? 

Ms. STARZAK. As noted above, the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which passed the House of 

Representatives on December 4, 2014, contains a provision requiring the Department to award the Purple Heart to servicemembers who are wounded or killed as 

the result of an attack carried out by an ‘‘individual or entity that was in communication with [a] foreign terrorist organization before the attack’’ where ‘‘the attack 

was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization.’’ 

[The nomination reference of Ms. Alissa M. Starzak follows:] 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

July 14, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Alissa M. Starzak of New York, to be General Counsel of the Department of the 

Army, vice Brad Carson, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Ms. Alissa M. Starzak, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK

Education: 

Amherst College 

• 1991–1995 

• AB 

University of Chicago 

• 1997–2000 

• JD 

1007 

Employment Record: 

Department of Defense (Washington, DC) 

• Deputy General Counsel (Legislation) 

• May 2011–Present 

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington, DC) 

• Counsel 

• January 2007–May 2011 

Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC) 

• Assistant General Counsel 

• August 2005–January 2007 

O’Melveny & Myers (Washington, DC) 

• Attorney 

• November 2001–August 2005 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (New Orleans, LA) 

• Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly 

• 2000–2001 

Honors and awards: 

Military Awards: N/A 

Federal Civilian Awards: N/A 

Academic Awards: N/A 

Other Awards: N/A 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Ms. Alissa M. Starzak in connection with his 

nomination follows:] 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Alissa Michelle Starzak. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

General Counsel, Department of the Army. 

3. Date of nomination: 

July 14, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

1008 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

August 3, 1973; Binghamton, NY. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Andrew G. Ferguson. 

7. Names and ages of children: 

Cole Ferguson, age 5. 

Alexa Ferguson, age 1. 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Amherst College, 1991–1995, AB, May 1995 

University of Chicago, 1997–2000, JD, June 2000 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

May 2011–Present: Deputy General Counsel (Legislation), Department of Defense, 

Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

January 2007–May 2011: Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. 

Senate, Washington, DC. 

August 2005–January 2007: Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence 

Agency, Washington, DC. 

November 2001–August 2005: Associate, O’Melveny & Myers, Washington, DC. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly, U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Fifth Circuit, 2000–2001. 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

None. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. Obama for America, 2012, $200. 

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

N/A. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

None. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None. 

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service: 

(a) Have .you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

Yes. 

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear 

to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

No. 

1009 

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for 

requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? 

Yes. 

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Yes. 

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? 

Yes. 

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? 

Yes. 

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies ofelectronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

orto consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

ALISSA M. STARZAK. 

This 27th day of August, 2014. 

[The nomination of Ms. Alissa M. Starzak was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on December 9, 2014, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was returned to the President at the end of the 113th Congress on 

December 17, 2014, under provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules of the Senate.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., 

USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of 

the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant 

commanders. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications? 

Answer. No. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the need for any modifications. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command? 

Answer. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, is responsible for deterring attacks against the United States and its territories, possessions, and bases; proVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01017 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
1010 

tecting Americans and American interests; and, in the event that deterrence fails, 

winning our Nation’s wars. The Commander is also responsible for expanding security cooperation with our allies, partners, and friends across the Asia-Pacific region. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. I believe my 36 years of military experience, culminating in command of 

the U.S. Pacific Fleet, have prepared me well for assuming command of U.S. Pacific 

Command (PACOM). 

Over my career, I have served in every geographic combatant command region, 

including seven tours in the Pacific. This has given me a broad understanding of 

our military, economic, and geopolitical challenges and opportunities around the 

globe. During my operational tours, I participated in numerous major operations including the S.S. Achille Lauro terrorist hijacking incident, Attain Document III 

(Libya, 1986), Earnest Will (Kuwaiti reflagged tanker operation, 1987–1988), Desert 

Shield/Desert Strom, Southern Watch, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Willing 

Spirit (Columbia hostage rescue, 2006–2007), and Odyssey Dawn (Libya, 2011). I 

have commanded at every level, including squadron, wing, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, the U.S. Sixth Fleet, Striking and Support Forces NATO, and my current 

assignment. 

Between operational tours, I was assigned three times to the Navy staff and twice 

to the Joint Staff in the Pentagon where I gained valuable insights and experience 

into the resourcing, administrative, Joint, Interagency, and Title 10 processes that 

underpin an effective Department of Defense (DOD). 

I have been truly fortunate to have been sent by the Navy to Harvard, Georgetown, and Oxford Universities for post-graduate education where I studied East 

Asia security, political terrorism, and the ethics of war. 

Prior to my current assignment as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, I served as the 

assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where I was the Chairman’s 

direct representative to the Secretary of State. In this assignment, I travelled extensively throughout the Asia-Pacific region and met senior government leaders, including Defense and Foreign Ministers, many of whom I will work with if confirmed as 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. 

Finally, as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, I have had the opportunity to establish 

or renew personal and professional relationships with political and military leaders 

in the region. If confirmed, I will continue strengthening those relationships, while 

enhancing the rebalance to the Pacific. My assignments over my career have given 

me broad theoretical and practical operational experience leading to a firm understanding of the military’s role in the whole-of-governmental approach to global and 

regional challenges. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will take every opportunity to better my knowledge of, and 

relationships with, our allies and partners across the Asia-Pacific. I look forward to 

engaging senior leaders within DOD and the Department of State, regional security 

experts, leading think tanks and universities, and military and civilian leaders 

throughout the Asia-Pacific in order to improve my understanding of the challenges 

and opportunities in the region. I look forward to coordinating closely with members 

of this committee as we work together. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, performs duties under the authority, 

direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Commander, U.S. Pacific 

Command, is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the ability of the 

command to carry out its missions. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as directed by the Secretary and performs the duties of the Secretary when the principal is absent. The 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, ensures the Deputy has the information necessary to perform these duties and coordinates on all major issues. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. Under Secretaries are key advocates for combatant commands’ requirements. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategic and regional security issues involving the Asia-Pacific theater. 

1011 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

Answer. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as needed to set and meet 

the Command’s intelligence requirements. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman functions under the authority, direction, and control of the 

National Command Authority. The Chairman transmits communications between 

the National Command Authority and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and 

oversees the activities of Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the combatant commanders, Interagency, and Service Chiefs. 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, keeps the Chairman informed on significant 

issues regarding the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR). Commander, U.S. Pacific 

Command, communicates directly with the Chairman on a regular basis. 

Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). 

Answer. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command maintains a close relationship and 

communicates directly with the Commander, SOCOM, on issues of mutual interest. 

PACOM coordinates requirements and operations of Special Operations Forces within the PACOM AOR through the Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific 

(SOCPAC) to support PACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Program, deliberate 

plans, and real world contingencies. SOCPAC is a subordinate component to 

PACOM. 

Question. The other combatant commanders. 

Answer. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, shares borders, and maintains close 

relationships, with the other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information on key 

issues. 

Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs. 

Answer. The Service Secretaries are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to combatant commands. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates with the Secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, 

train, and equip PACOM forces are met. 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, communicates and exchanges information 

with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing, training, and 

equipping forces. Successful execution of PACOM’s mission requires close coordination with the Service Chiefs. The Service Chiefs are valuable sources of judgment 

and advice for the combatant commanders. 

Question. Commander United Nations/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces 

Korea. 

Answer. As a subordinate unified commander, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea 

receives missions and functions from the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. I recognize his unique responsibilities in armistice and during hostilities as Commander 

United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and will fully support his actions in those sensitive and demanding roles. 

Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War (POW)/ 

Missing Personnel. 

Answer. Earlier this year, Secretary Hagel directed the Department to transform 

how it accounts for its personnel missing from past conflicts. Specifically, he directed that he be provided with a plan to organize the Department most effectively 

to increase to the maximum extent possible the numbers of missing Service personnel accounted for annually while ensuring timely and accurate information is 

provided to their families. 

As a result of the plan that was presented to Secretary Hagel, the Department 

submitted a legislative proposal to eliminate in statute the position of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs. The 

DASD’s duties and responsibilities will be assumed by the director of a new Defense 

Agency that is being formed by merging three existing organizations, and will be 

overseen by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I fully understand the priority our Nation places on this issue and, should I be confirmed, I will fully support 

the Department’s efforts to account for personnel missing from past conflicts. 

Question. Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan/Commander, International Security Assistance Force. 

Answer. When needed, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, communicates and 

exchanges information with the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan/Commander, 

International Security Assistance Force via the Commander, U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM). 

1012 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, maintains a close relationship and communicates directly with the Commander, CENTCOM, on issues of mutual interest that 

affect both of their AORs so that respective strategies, policies and operations are 

coordinated and mutually supportive. India-Pakistan issues have heightened the importance of close cross-COCOM coordination. Additionally, Commander, U.S. Pacific 

Command, must be alert to the possibility of ‘‘spillover’’ into this region of Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) fighters and sympathizers, especially the return 

of these fighters to countries in this region. 

As a force provider, PACOM routinely sends forces to CENTCOM including and 

most notably, aircraft carrier strike groups, Marine expeditionary forces, Air Force 

fighter squadrons, and Army Brigade Combat Teams. These forces support 

CENTCOM and the fight in Afghanistan by providing land and sea based striking 

power, expeditionary flexibility, and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). 

Question. Director of the National Guard Bureau. 

Answer. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, communicates and exchanges information with the Director of the National Guard Bureau to support the Bureau’s responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Like the Service Chiefs, 

successful execution of PACOM’s mission requires close coordination with the National Guard Bureau. 

Question. The Chief of Naval Research. 

Answer. The Office of Naval Research is a valuable resource for technologies that 

help the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, counter developing threats in the 

Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will maintain a close relationship with the Chief 

of Naval Research as well as the other Services’ research organizations and national 

laboratories to ensure the requirements for developing technologies for PACOM are 

understood. 

CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command? 

Answer. This region is critical to U.S. and global security and prosperity. The 

United States works with its allies and partners to ensure the region’s security and 

set the conditions for economic prosperity. As our Nation globally rebalances toward 

the Asia-Pacific region, and if confirmed, I will focus on three main challenges in 

the PACOM AOR. First, North Korea’s large conventional military, relentless quest 

to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, and consolidation of power by Kim Jong Un present a clear and present danger to regional security and stability. This is the region’s most volatile challenge and my greatest concern. Second, China’s rise as a regional military and global economic power, and in 

particular, its rapid military modernization and assertive behavior toward regional 

neighbors present opportunities and challenges that must be managed effectively. 

This is our most enduring challenge. Finally, the stability, security, and prosperity 

of the Asia-Pacific will depend on strong relationships with our treaty allies and 

partners to ensure that we are able to maintain access to, and use of, the global 

commons, including cyber. We must remain alert to the potential for ISIL fighters 

from Asia-Pacific nations to return to their countries of origin. With their combat 

experiences and extremist ideology, they could rejoin or establish new Violent Extremist Organizations in the region. Importantly, we must ensure that our relationships, especially in the security assistance arena, help instill respect for human 

rights and do not abet rights violations. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. I will support the administration’s whole-of-government approach to 

achieve a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future security environment on the Korean Peninsula. Forward-based and forward-deployed U.S. military presence in the 

Western Pacific will continue to reassure our treaty allies and deter aggression by 

North Korea. If this fails, I will ensure PACOM forces are prepared to fight and 

defeat North Korean forces. 

I will work to continue modernizing and strengthening our treaty alliances and 

partnerships in the region as we orient them toward the challenges of the 21st century. These critical relationships are enhanced by maintaining interoperable military capabilities that deter regional aggression and build partner security capacity. 

Additionally, I will work toward maturing the military-to-military relationship with 

China. Both China and the United States have a strong stake in the peace and stability of the region. Building a cooperative bilateral relationship will reduce the likelihood of a miscalculation, increase the clarity of Chinese strategic intentions, and 

encourage mutual engagement in areas of common concern. Finally, I will work to 

1013 

improve the Japanese and Korean relationship, especially in the military-to-military 

arena. Enhancing our trilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea will strengthen 

regional stability in Northeast Asia. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed? 

Answer. My first priority will be to continue to maintain a credible deterrent posture and reassuring military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Second, I will continue to 

strengthen our alliances and partnerships. Third, I will work through DOD and 

with this committee to collaborate with other elements of the U.S. Government and 

our allies to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula and bring about the verifiable 

elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Fourth, I will actively pursue steady and measured military-to-military engagement with China toward a cooperative and constructive relationship. Lastly, while supporting our Nation’s strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific and sustaining the realignment and transformation 

processes already underway, I will work to carefully shepherd and repeatedly assess 

progress toward our desired force posture. 

FORCE POSTURE IN THE PACOM AOR

Question. Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region have already 

begun or are planned to begin in the next few years, including movement of Marines 

from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea. There 

are also plans to increase U.S. presence in southern parts of the Asia-Pacific, including in Australia and Singapore, and to develop comprehensive engagement strategies with a number of other countries in the region, such as the Philippines and 

Vietnam. These initiatives will likely compete with other global commitments for increasingly constrained funding. 

What is your understanding of the national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific? 

Answer. Our national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific include encouraging 

the peaceful resolution of disputes, including territorial disputes and those based on 

history; upholding the freedom of navigation; standing firm against coercion, intimidation, and aggression; building a cooperative regional architecture based on international rules and norms; enhancing the capabilities of our allies and partners to 

provide security for themselves and the region; and strengthening our own regional 

defense capabilities. 

The North Korean threat is the most significant threat to stability in the region, 

while a tactical miscalculation arising from territorial disputes such as those that 

exist in the East and South China Seas is the most likely. Natural disasters such 

as typhoons, earthquakes and tsunamis will surely occur and some of these will 

overwhelm the ability of the Nations involved to overcome without assistance from 

the PACOM must have key capabilities in theater, including robust predictive intelligence, readily available to demonstrate America’s commitment to the region and 

to our allies, friends, and partners there. We must be prepared to address incidents 

and crises quickly and, if needed, to fight on short notice. 

Question. In your view, what strategic criteria, if any, should guide the posture 

of U.S. military forces in that region to best address those priorities at acceptable 

risk? 

Answer. I believe the posture of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific should ensure that 

U.S. forces are able to operate near potential sources of conflict, safeguard critical 

assets and infrastructure, respond rapidly to crises, maintain a politically sustainable force laydown, meet contingency and steady state sustainment requirements, 

and guarantee our ability to execute contingency operations. The presence of U.S. 

forces on the Korean Peninsula, the risk associated with proximity of those forces 

to North Korean military capabilities, and the advanced technological capabilities 

resident in the Asia-Pacific require that the most technologically advanced and 

ready forces are forward deployed in the AOR. 

Question. How, if at all, do the methods of forward basing, rotational forces, and 

agreements with allies for training and logistics activities support our national security priorities throughout the region? 

Answer. DOD views posture as a combination of three elements: forces, footprint, 

and agreements. ‘‘Forces’’ are U.S. military capabilities, equipment, and commands, 

assigned or deployed. ‘‘Footprint’’ describes our infrastructure, facilities, land, and 

prepositioned equipment. ‘‘Agreements’’ are treaties, as well as access, transit, support, and status of forces arrangements with allies and partners. Together, these 

elements enable the United States to maintain a forward presence to achieve our 

national security objectives and demonstrate our commitment to the region. 

PACOM operations, activities, and actions help shape an Asia-Pacific region into 

one that is secure, prosperous, and underpinned by a rules-based international 

1014 

order. If confirmed, I will posture our forces, footprints, and agreements in a manner to effectively communicate U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard our national interests, strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the 

region, prevent conflict and, in the event of crisis, respond rapidly and effectively 

across the full range of military operations in order to resume steady state activities. 

Question. In your view, is the right mix of these forward presence methods necessary to achieve an affordable theater posture at acceptable levels of risk? If so, 

how would you propose broadly assessing each method relative to its cost and benefit? 

Answer. Yes. However, our current force structure and presence are not optimal 

to counter the threats we face. The size of the Asia-Pacific region and the diversity 

of threats—from military provocation to illicit trafficking in all its forms to countering terrorism to responding to natural disasters—warrant a more stable forwarddeployed presence and readiness posture. 

Risk measures our global force structure, including the availability of forces, access, and basing against the full range of regional threats and challenges. With 

fewer forces, we become more reliant on access and basing. With even less forces, 

the combatant commander is forced to accept even more risk. A more stable budget 

environment would allow better management of this risk. Although DOD already 

has processes in place to continuously evaluate these variables and make adjustments, some risks cannot always be mitigated. These risks must be managed based 

on the context of the moment. 

Question. How important is a forward basing strategy to the ability of PACOM 

to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency plans? 

Answer. I believe the United States’ forward-based forces are our most visible sign 

of our commitment to regional peace and stability and are critical to PACOM’s dayto-day operations. They are essential to our ability to respond quickly and effectively 

to contingencies. Forward based forces are not only the first responders in any contingency, they also serve to assure allies and partners and deter aggression by potential adversaries. Additionally, forward-based forces are vital for day-to-day engagement where we train and exercise with allies and partners to enhance capabilities and capacity across the region. 

Question. How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam 

and other locations in the Pacific improve U.S. security in the region? How does the 

planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security? 

Answer. Maintaining ready forces close to potential sources of conflict is a key pillar of force posture in the Asia-Pacific region. The relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and other locations in the Asia-Pacific will allow us to maintain a 

significant number of ready forces west of the international dateline, signaling and 

assuring our steadfast commitment to the region and our regional alliances. Our 

forces will be readily available for multi-regional security, humanitarian assistance, 

disaster relief, and operational contingencies. Moreover, this strategic dispersal of 

forward-deployed forces will increase our agility to respond to crisis and, at the 

same time, complicate the calculus of potential aggressors. 

The United States’ commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea is 

unshakeable. The planned posture changes in Korea support a broader force posture 

in the Asia-Pacific that is geographically distributed on the Korean peninsula, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. These changes addresses host nation 

concerns and simultaneously improve our mutual defense infrastructure. The 

Army’s rotational plan is a global model designed to rotate fully trained formations 

with high unit cohesion, yielding a net increase in combat capability. I support the 

posture changes on the Peninsula consistent with the joint vision for the alliance 

laid out by both Presidents and further developed by the Secretary of Defense and 

his Republic of Korea counterpart. If confirmed, I will continue close defense cooperation with South Korea. 

Question. In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region? Do you foresee a requirement to increase or to decrease those funding levels in the coming years? 

Answer. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the March 2014 

Quadrennial Defense Review place an emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. If confirmed, I will review levels of funding, manning, and military-to-military 

engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and, if there are shortfalls in existing resources, I will advocate for additional resources required to support the President’s 

priorities. My preliminary assessment is that there is a great deal that must be accomplished out here and we are limited by current resources. While I do believe 

funding levels must be increased in the future if we are to meet all of our commitVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01022 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
1015 

ments, the ability to do so will be influenced by budgetary requirements and limitations such as sequestration and continuing resolutions, changes to the regional security environment, and the relative priority of other military commitments around 

the globe. 

Question. What are your views on the current number and types of ships forwardstationed in the Asia-Pacific region? Are they sufficient to support the current operational and contingency plans or would you foresee the need to increase or change 

that naval force structure in the AOR? 

Answer. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the March 2014 

Quadrennial Defense Review place an emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. Admiral Locklear has gone on record asking for consideration that the 10th 

Amphibious Ready Group or elements of that unit be based west of the dateline, 

options for homeporting the hospital ship USNS Mercy west of the dateline be considered, and additional maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

assets be kept forward in the Western Pacific. I believe recent events such as Operation Damayan (Typhoon Haiyan disaster relief effort in the Philippines in 2013) 

and the search for Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 validate forward basing such assets. If confirmed, I will review levels of assigned forces in the Asia-Pacific region 

and, if I believe there are shortfalls, I will advocate for additional resources required 

to support the President’s and Secretary’s priorities. 

Question. Specifically, what is your assessment of the number of amphibious ships 

required in the AOR? 

Answer. In addition to the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) forward deployed in 

Sasebo, Japan, the Program of Record will provide 5 Amphibious Ready Groups in 

San Diego to meet rotational assignments in the PACOM and CENTCOM AORs. 

Once the Program of Record is executed, these amphibious ships are adequate to 

meet current demands. However, forward basing the 10th ARG west of the international dateline would increase theater security cooperation opportunities and enhance PACOM’s ability to quickly respond to contingencies. 

Question. How would fully funding construction of 12 LPD–17 class ships impact 

AOR needs? 

Answer. The current plan is to fund construction for the 11th LPD–17 to fulfill 

the 5–Amphibious Ready Group requirement in San Diego. Constructing an additional LPD–17 ship would provide additional flexibility to meet additional Marine 

Corps requirements. 

Question. What is your assessment of the feasibility of using the LPD–17 hull to 

support BMD requirements? 

Answer. I am not aware that adapting the LPD–17 hull to support BMD requirements is an initiative that has been vetted at senior levels within the Navy. As the 

Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, my opinion is that we don’t have enough of 

these ships in the inventory today to support Marine Corps requirements and that 

they are fully employed in their current mission sets. Adding BMD to these ships 

would not only be expensive, it could potentially cause either mission (BMD or amphibious) to suffer in support of the other. 

Question. What is your assessment of the force level requirements in the AOR, 

and potential impact of longer deployments on quality of life for following ship 

types: Carriers (CVN), Attack Submarines (SSN), and Auxiliaries (Fast Combat 

Support). 

Answer. Global demands for forces and the price of 13 years of war place a heavy 

tax on our forces. As part of ‘‘fair sharing’’ as adjudicated through the global force 

management process, PACOM routinely falls short of formally-stated force requirements. Personnel and operations tempo limitations, planned and unplanned maintenance, and necessary training requirements all detract from the commander’s ability to get purposeful presence from those forces permanently assigned to PACOM. 

Admiral Locklear’s stated demand for carriers, attack submarines, and auxiliaries 

is not met. If confirmed, I will review the PACOM force requirements and will not 

hesitate to ask for the forces I believe we will need to meet our assigned missions. 

While force levels in the AOR from a permanent homeport basis (i.e., ‘‘forces for’’) 

are adequate, meeting demands of COCOMs in other AORs detracts from PACOM 

presence. For example, when the forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) carrier in 

Japan is in planned maintenance we do not always have a ready replacement carrier in the Western Pacific because of other worldwide demands. 

Deployments for carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups are expected 

to normalize over time as the Navy fully implements its Optimized Fleet Response 

Plan (OFRP) to a nominal 7-month deployment length. OFRP should help improve 

both quality of life and training/readiness as schedules become more predictable. Attack submarines are generally able to maintain 6-month deployments. Auxiliary 

ships (T–AKEs, T–AOs, T–AOEs) are Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships with 

1016 

rotational civilian mariner crews and not subject to deployment restrictions. JHSVs 

and MLPs will also be operated my MSC under similar conditions. 

Question. In view of declining ship force structure numbers, and lengthened deployments becoming the norm, what proposals would you suggest to better leverage 

the current force and minimize adverse quality of life manning impact? 

Answer. The Navy is on track to achieve its goal of homeporting 60 percent of 

the fleet in the Pacific by 2019. Implementing the new Optimized Fleet Response 

Plan across all ships will provide greater stability in schedules, as well as time to 

conduct adequate maintenance and training. That said, homeporting ships in the 

Western Pacific increases presence without the 4:1 turnaround ratio for rotational 

deployments, providing for quicker response to contingencies and greater awareness 

of the operating areas. I fully support forward presence including the near term addition of two more BMD destroyers to Japan, a fourth SSN to Guam, and expanding 

littoral combat ship presence in Singapore. 

Question. How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam 

improve U.S. security in the region? 

Answer. The United States’ commitment to the security of Japan is unshakeable. 

Maintaining ready forces close to potential sources of conflict is a key pillar of our 

force posture in the Asia-Pacific. The Marine Corps Distributed Laydown is a critical enabler to PACOM’s Asia-Pacific strategy. The relocation of U.S. forces from 

Okinawa to Guam will allow PACOM to maintain a significant number of ready 

forces west of the international dateline, signaling and assuring our steadfast commitment to the region and our regional alliances. Forces will be readily available 

for multi-regional security and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions in 

addition to operational plan/contingency plan operations. At the same time, PACOM 

will be able to reduce the number of Marines on Okinawa, which is politically sustainable as it comports with the desires of the host government. If confirmed, I will 

continue the close defense cooperation with Japan. 

Question. How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula 

improve security? 

Answer. Our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea is unshakeable. 

The planned posture changes in Korea will produce a force that is geographically 

distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The changes appear 

to address host nation concerns and simultaneously improve our mutual defense infrastructure. I support the posture changes on the Peninsula consistent with the 

joint vision for the alliance laid out by both Presidents and further developed by the 

Secretary of Defense and his ROK counterpart. If confirmed, I will continue the 

close defense cooperation with South Korea. 

Question. What is your understanding of the plans for rotational deployments of 

U.S. marines to Australia and how, in your view, will such a presence advance U.S. 

security interests? 

Answer. During the August 2014 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

Julie Bishop, and the Australian Minister of Defense, David Johnston signed a 

Force Posture Agreement that enables the investments required to reach a full rotational deployment of up to 2,500 U.S. marines and enhances U.S. Air Force cooperation and access to Northern Australian airfields. The initiatives that we implement 

under this agreement will continue to enhance our alliance with Australia and our 

engagement with other regional partners. Smaller Marine rotations to Darwin over 

the past several years have proven that the multilateral engagement opportunities 

are beneficial to both U.S. security interests and to our allies’ and partners’ interests in the region. Additionally, Marine Corps presence in Darwin will help both nations better respond cooperatively to a crisis in the region, including humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief. These initiatives—developed in cooperation with our 

important Australian ally—demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-Australia alliance 

and its ability to enhance regional stability and security. If confirmed, I will continue the close defense cooperation with Australia. 

Question. Do you have any concerns about the timing and readiness of follow-on 

forces arriving in PACOM to meet operational plans? If yes, what are they and how 

can they be resolved? 

Answer. Yes. The time it will take to deploy the forces/capabilities to locations of 

most likely crisis and contingency within the PACOM AOR remains a concern. The 

tyranny of distance involved in moving forces from the West Coast to the Western 

Pacific, especially Korea, impacts my ability to provide a timely response. 

If confirmed, I will advocate for the necessary forward deployed forces, in conjunction with a dynamic force presence and required lift—both sealift and airlift—to ensure we are able to meet required operational timelines. 

1017 

Question. The rebalance to the Pacific will increase the percentage of U.S. ships 

in the region from 50 percent to 60 percent of the Navy’s entire fleet. However if 

the fleet size is reduced from about 300 ships to about 250 ships, the number of 

ships forward deployed the region will remain the same at about 150. 

Does the potential of increasing the percentage of ships in the region, but the 

number of ships in the region remaining the same, lead to challenges regarding the 

expectations of allies, and if so, how would you plan to mitigate such an effect? 

Answer. The Navy is on track to meet its goal of homeporting 60 percent of the 

fleet in the Pacific by 2019. Current projections show that the fleet size in 2019 will 

be 286 ships, meaning that 60 percent would total 171 ships. This represents an 

increase of 21 ships from today’s current presence. That said, if the number of ships 

in the Navy inventory shrinks to 250 because of sequestration or other mandates, 

the Pacific Fleet would certainly field a proportionally smaller force. However, while 

I agree that quantity has a quality all its own, looking solely at the number of ships 

provides only a partial view of our capability—our platforms and systems are dramatically more advanced and capable than their predecessors. Risk in capacity is 

mitigated by improvements in capability, including the leverage provided by the 

Joint force. 

Question. How do you plan to mitigate the effects of reduced U.S. aircraft carrier 

presence in the region? 

Answer. The Navy does not plan to reduce carrier numbers in the Pacific Fleet. 

In fact, once CVNs 78 and 79 come on line, the Navy’s carrier numbers will be at 

11 with 6 CVNs homeported in the Pacific. While not optimal, until then, PACOM 

has significant deployable assets across the Joint force that can achieve meaningful 

deterrent and/or kinetic effects. If confirmed, I will continue to posture these forces 

to achieve PACOM objectives and mitigate operational risk. 

Question. The March 14, 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report said that’’ . . . there is growing concern among U.S. allies and partners 

that the United States will be unable to follow through on its commitment to the 

rebalance due to declining defense budgets and continuing security challenges elsewhere. Furthermore, some regional countries almost certainly began to question the 

willingness of the United States to restrain China’s increasing assertiveness after 

China in 2012 gained de facto control of Scarborough Reef, territory also claimed 

by the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally. This perception could lead some regional countries to increasingly accommodate China or pursue military capabilities that could 

be used offensively or preemptively.’’ 

Do agree with this assessment and what mitigation steps would you recommend? 

Answer. While I agree that some countries are concerned, I disagree with the 

premise that the United States is unable to follow through on its commitment to 

the rebalance and is, therefore, a poor security partner. The Rebalance is real and 

being realized now. I firmly believe our allies and partners are confident about the 

U.S. commitment to the region. In fact, in meetings I’ve had with civilian and military leaders across the region, countries are consistently turning to the United 

States as their security partner of choice. 

Additionally, I have not observed evidence to suggest any significant alignment 

or accommodation to China among our allies and partners. To the contrary, China’s 

provocative behavior troubles them greatly, which has created a demand signal for 

greater partnership with the United States. Most nations (including the United 

States) have increased their economic relationship with China over the past few 

years—this, of itself, is not a bad thing as it helps promote a strong and prosperous 

Asia-Pacific region. However, economic arrangements do not portend security relationships. I do not see the demand signal for partnership with the U.S. abating. 

ENGAGEMENT POLICY

Question. One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been 

military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint combined exchange training exercises, combatant 

commander exercises, humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are 

used to achieve this goal. 

If confirmed, what modifications, if any, would you make to the engagement activities of the U.S. military in PACOM? What would be your priorities for such activities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would not modify Admiral Locklear’s approach to engagement in the region, which is properly focused on strengthening existing alliances 

and partnerships and building new relationships. Our deepening partnerships with 

Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia are examples of recent progress. I 

would continuously assess and adjust engagement activities based on changing reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01025 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
1018 

gional dynamics and adjustments to national guidance and initiatives. Should I be 

confirmed, my priority would be to continue this process of expanding our network 

of partners to improve the stability and prosperity of the region. 

Question. In your opinion, how do these activities contribute to U.S. national security? 

Answer. Military engagement activities strengthen the network of alliances and 

partnerships in the Asia-Pacific, reinforce deterrence, and build partner capacity 

and competence which, in turn, advance common interests, address shared threats, 

and facilitate freedom of movement and access. Military engagement builds partnership capacity in order to reduce risk to U.S. forces and postures the United States 

as the security partner of choice. 

Question. In February 2014, General Herbert Carlisle, Commander of U.S. Pacific 

Air Forces, warned in an interview that America’s cancellation of a number of military-to-military exercises in Asia is ‘‘incredibly concerning amongst our friends, 

partners and allies,’’ and added: ‘‘If there is any angst out here [from allies], it is 

the budget situation we are facing; the rebalance of the Pacific; and if, given the 

fiscal constraints that the United States has, if we are going to be able to follow 

through on that.’’ 

Do you share General Carlisle’s assessment regarding ‘‘angst’’ about the ability of 

the United States to properly resource and execute its Asia Rebalance strategy? 

Answer. General Carlisle made those comments after Pacific Air Forces, Pacific 

Fleet, and the other PACOM components cancelled or down-scoped numerous exercises, large and small, in 2013 due to the sequester. I agree with him completely 

that continuous changes in fiscal fact and assumptions hamper our ability to execute mid- and long-term plans and exercises. This leads to poor utilization of resources. These budget uncertainties affect not only our ability to exercise and operate with our allies and partners, they also affect our people, equipment, and infrastructure by reducing training and delaying needed investments. These delays reduce our readiness and the ability to reliably interact with our allies and partners 

in the region. 

Question. Do you believe that in order to demonstrate a serious U.S. commitment 

to the Asia-Pacific, that PACOM will need significantly more resources than would 

be permitted under the Budget Control Act? 

Answer. Continued reductions to meet sequestration-mandated resource levels 

will diminish our military’s size, reach, and margin of technological superiority. All 

of these factors will impact the U.S. rebalance to the Pacific. For example, there will 

be fewer aircraft and ships, and these will be under-maintained; there will be fewer 

troops, and they will be under-trained; and we will have to fight with older weapon 

systems and equipment. 

Question. What specific military risks do you think the United States and its allies and partners in Asia will incur if the Budget Control Act goes forward? 

Answer. The cumulative effect of continuing resolutions and sequestration will result in significant reductions to the readiness, presence, capability, and interoperability of U.S. forces in the region. It will decrease our ability to train, exercise, and 

engage with allies and partners throughout the Asia-Pacific, which will limit the 

progress in building capable partners that can operate in coalition with, or in lieu 

of, U.S. forces. As a result, the United States will bear more significant risk in the 

event of a regional contingency. 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the 

global train and equip authority (‘‘section 1206’’) and Global Contingency Security 

Fund. 

What is your understanding of the purpose of the section 1206 global train and 

equip authority and Global Contingency Security Fund? 

Answer. Congress approved section 1206 global train and equip authority in 2006 

in part to give the State Department and DOD a more flexible capacity building authority to address urgent and emergent threats before the threats destabilize theater partners or threaten the Homeland. I worked with this authority when I was 

assigned to U.S. Southern Command as its Director of Operations in 2007–2008. In 

2009, the scope expanded to assist coalition partners as they prepare for deployment. This rapid funding tool is PACOM’s most agile mechanism to address counter 

terrorism capability gaps in partner nations. 

The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is an initiative to pool the resources of the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the expertise of other 

1019 

departments, to provide security sector assistance for emergent challenges and opportunities. 

The GSCF has no appropriated funding; rather State and DOD can transfer funds 

from other appropriations into the GSCF. DOD can transfer up to $200 million from 

defense-wide Operations and Maintenance and State can transfer up to a combined 

$25 million from Foreign Military Financing, International Narcotics Control and 

Law Enforcement, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. The GSCF 

can provide assistance to: (1) national military and security forces, as well as the 

government agencies responsible for overseeing these forces; and (2) the justice sector when civilian agencies are challenged (including law enforcement and prisons), 

rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country. 

PACOM currently has two GSCF projects in progress, one in the Philippines and 

one in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh project is valued at $3.5 million and focuses on 

increasing interoperability between the Bangladesh Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Home Affairs. The Philippines project is valued at $40 million and focuses 

on strengthening maritime domain awareness and transferring internal security 

from the military to law enforcement agencies. Both of these projects are in the execution phase now and should enhance security in those nations. 

Question. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities 

of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific region? 

Answer. The United States’ primary objective in building the capacity of foreign 

partners is to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that 

can provide for their countries’ security while contributing to regional and multilateral responses to shared threats. Capacity building provides opportunities to build 

defense relationships and promotes both interoperability between our forces and access to the region during peacetime and contingency operations. Lastly, building this 

capacity in our allies and partners lessens the burden on U.S. forces responding to 

security threats outside the United States. 

Question. In a resource-constrained fiscal environment, how would you prioritize 

the types of programs or activities that should receive support under these security 

assistance authorities? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize the most critical partner capability shortfalls in the PACOM AOR that present risk to the United States, our allies, and our 

partners first. In order to receive the most value from these programs, regardless 

of the fiscal environment, I would aggregate the critical gaps from PACOM’s country 

plans, find common gaps and areas of concern such as maritime security and 

counter-terrorism, and identify gaps in overlooked and under-resourced areas. Additionally, I would work closely with our Ambassadors to synchronize our efforts with 

other U.S. Government entities to ensure a whole of government approach to the 

region. 

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis other civilian 

departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft 

power (civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance)? 

Answer. DOD does, and in my view should, play a role in supporting other U.S. 

Government departments and agencies to create a whole-of-government effort when 

exercising soft power. For example, following a natural disaster, DOD often responds to U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) requests for humanitarian assistance. DOD and partner agencies and departments have liaisons embedded in each other’s major headquarters to enable the DOD to effectively provide that 

support. At PACOM, for example, there are liaison officers from the Department of 

Energy, Department of the Interior, USAID, Department of State, Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), among others. DOD also plays a key role in working specifically with partner nation defense institutions in order to build capacity by contributing perspectives and lessons learned that reside uniquely within the Department; however, it 

is critical that these efforts be undertaken in close coordination with other Federal 

agencies, particularly the Department of State. 

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of these building partner 

capacity programs conducted in the PACOM AOR in supporting U.S. strategic objectives? 

Answer. I believe the building partner capacity programs are very effective. 

PACOM’s planning priorities directly support U.S. strategic objectives and PACOM’s 

Theater Security Cooperation operations, activities, and actions receive the coordination and resourcing rigor necessary to ensure the best use of resources to achieve 

those objectives. 

1020 

CHINA

Question. China’s defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for 

about the past 20 years. 

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China? 

Answer. The senior-most leaders of our two countries have consistently affirmed 

the need for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. It 

is a relationship which includes elements of cooperation and competition. It is one 

of the most complex and important relationships in the world. China’s efforts to cooperate with the international community, such as help with the removal of chemical weapons from Syria, counter piracy in the Horn of Africa, and participation in 

humanitarian and disaster relief operations during the search for Malaysia Airlines 

Flight 370 and Typhoon Haiyan should be encouraged. At the same time, China is 

rapidly modernizing its military and engaging in aggressive behavior against its 

neighbors, particularly in the East and South China Seas. 

Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China’s steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program? 

Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery, including, potentially, countering 

U.S. military intervention in regional conflicts. In this respect, we are watching 

carefully China’s investments in so-called anti-access/area denial capabilities. Its 

near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial capabilities. 

China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations 

beyond Taiwan and China’s immediate periphery. Beijing’s growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through modernization 

of its nuclear forces. Additionally, China is improving other strategic capabilities 

such as in space, counter-space, and computer network operations. 

Question. How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth 

and modernization? 

Answer. I believe the United States should continue to monitor developments in 

China’s military concepts and capabilities while encouraging Beijing to be more 

transparent about its military and security affairs. The United States has been, and 

should remain, the pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to preserve the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. The United States’ response to China’s military modernization should be flexible and supported by the 

continued transformation of our force posture in the region, the maintenance of our 

global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities in areas such 

as countering anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our alliances 

and partnerships. 

Question. What are your views of China’s deployment of warships to counter piracy in the western Indian Ocean and how does this deployment contribute to China’s ability to project power? 

Answer. Counter piracy is an area of mutual concern as Indian Ocean pirates 

threaten the commercial shipping of both our countries. Ultimately, we want to see 

China become a net contributor to global stability. These operations allow China to 

take a more active role in contributing to the international effort of safeguarding 

sea lines of communication. It demonstrates to China the value of multilateral approaches to global problems. China’s power projection ability is progressing and we 

recognize the evolution of its military modernization. Operations like those off the 

Horn of Africa can improve China’s ability to operate at greater distances from 

China. 

Question. What do you believe are the Chinese political-military goals in the AsiaPacific region? Globally? 

Answer. The overarching objectives of China’s leaders appear to be ensuring the 

continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continuing China’s economic development, maintaining the country’s domestic political stability, defending China’s 

sovereignty and territorial claims, and securing China’s influence and status. Within 

this context, leveraging its political, economic, and military clout to move toward 

unification with Taiwan is a key part of Beijing’s strategy. 

Question. What effect is China’s military growth having on other countries in the 

region? 

Answer. China’s rapid rise and the relative lack of transparency surrounding its 

intentions are increasingly a source of instability in the region. Other countries in 

the region are closely watching the growth of China’s military and how its military 

1021 

acts. Tensions between China and its neighbors in the East and South China Seas 

have increased, spurring regional actors to modernize their forces. 

Answer. Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have contributed 

to a greater focus on regional forums such as ASEAN, where issues may be addressed multilaterally. Such security concerns have also led to stronger and more 

welcoming relations between Asia-Pacific countries and the United States as a security partner of choice. 

Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship between China 

and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on either side? 

Answer. Both China and Taiwan have made significant strides to reduce tensions 

in the Taiwan Strait. These initiatives should be encouraged and we welcome the 

progress made by both sides. I believe the United States can help contribute to 

cross-strait stability by continuing to abide by our longstanding policies, based on 

the one China policy, three U.S.-China Communique ́s, and the Taiwan Relations 

Act, including making available to Taiwan ‘‘defense articles and services in such 

quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.’’ 

Question. How do China’s efforts to establish a strategic presence in the Indian 

Ocean by securing and maintaining access to seaports in various South and Southeast Asian countries affect its political-military posture and influence in the region? 

Answer. China looks to South and Southeast Asia as areas of strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to ports, and access to resources, 

trade, and investment. I remain concerned with how China intends to use its presence. As China increases its naval deployments to the region, including ongoing participation in counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, China will require greater 

forward logistics capabilities to sustain operations. We have already seen Chinese 

submarines pull into Sri Lanka, for example. Establishing access to various seaports 

will require improving ties with states along the Indian Ocean littoral and closer 

cooperation with other regional navies, which could expose them to more nontraditional security challenges such as terrorism. The U.S. retains strong relationships 

in South and Southeast Asia and should continue to monitor China’s growing presence in the region. 

Question. What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China’s nuclear 

power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 

region? 

Answer. China is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 

United States should continue to insist that China meet its obligations under that 

accord. DOD participates in the U.S. Government effort to execute the President’s 

vision to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, along with related technologies and material throughout the globe. DOD must 

maintain robust ISR capabilities to ensure we are aware of developments in this 

area. Finally, I believe that DOD should continue to work with the interagency to 

ensure that any proliferation concerns relating to China are expressed to the Chinese Government in the appropriate forums. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-tomilitary relations? 

Answer. I believe the United States and China desire a healthy, stable, reliable, 

and continuous military-to-military relationship. There are recent examples where 

we have seen improved practical cooperation, such as counter-piracy, humanitarian 

assistance, disaster relief, and military medicine exchanges. The PLA (Navy) participated—at U.S. invitation—in this year’s Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime exercise in the Hawaiian operating areas (even though they also deployed an intelligence-collecting ship in the U.S. exclusive economic zone during the exercise). 

China hosted the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao earlier this year, 

during which the Navies for the region (including the PLA Navy) adopted the Code 

for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). I attended, was treated extremely well, 

and had frank discussions with its Chief of Navy, Admiral Wu Shengli. The PLA 

(Navy) leadership attended the International Seapower Symposium in Newport this 

September where I again met with Admiral Wu. The PLA and the U.S. military 

have made strides in the Rules of Behavior Working Group forum as well, which 

culminated in the Secretary of Defense and China’s Military of Defense signing a 

Memorandum of Understanding regarding the rules of behavior for safety of air and 

maritime encounters. However, a deeper U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue is 

needed to address many of the sources of insecurity and potential competition that 

may arise as our two forces come into closer and more frequent contact. For example, the PLA routinely conducts close and unsafe intercepts of our aircraft operating 

in international airspace. 

1022 

The U.S. military continues to pursue opportunities to cooperate where there is 

clear, mutual benefit while establishing a dialogue on areas where there are differences. I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China to 

demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region, and to press China to partner 

with the United States and our friends in the region to address common security 

challenges. 

Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the 

quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and 

why? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would look for ways to strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, consistent with U.S. law. The U.S.-China military-tomilitary relationship has experienced positive momentum over the past 2 years. Our 

approach should continue to pursue this positive development consistent with U.S. 

interests in a sustained, substantive dialog with China; concrete, practical cooperation where it makes sense; and enhanced risk reduction measures to manage our 

differences constructively. At the same time, I would seek to ensure that we balance 

these exchanges with continued robust interactions with allies and partners across 

the region. 

Question. What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections and criticism from China? 

Answer. I personally strongly support the Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. policy on 

arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides 

that the United States will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services 

in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 

self-defense capability. The Act also states that the President and Congress shall 

determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely 

upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. It is my view that this policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 years and is consistent 

with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a 

manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 

Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China’s possible reaction 

to such sales be considered by the United States when making decisions about the 

provision of defense articles and services to Taiwan? 

Answer. Our decisions about arms sales to Taiwan are based solely on our assessment of Taiwan’s defense needs. The Taiwan Relations Act states the United States 

will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such 

quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense 

capability. In my view, we should not stray from our commitments out of concern 

for how China may react. 

Question. By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and space. There are numerous 

examples of this assertiveness, including: China’s increased aggressiveness in asserting its maritime claims in the South China Sea, the recent declaration of its Air 

Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), and its stationing of an oil rig in waters claimed 

by Vietnam which led to a series of unsafe encounters between Vietnam and China 

this past summer. Other incidents include a Chinese vessel intercepting the USS 

Cowpens and a Chinese fighter plane flying dangerously close to a Navy P–8 Poseidon surveillance plane off the coast of China. These incidents underscore the nature 

of Chinese maritime claims and the Chinese sensitivity associated with U.S. Navy 

operations in these areas. 

What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime disputes in the 

South China Sea? 

Answer. I agree with the assessments of the Departments of State and Defense 

that the United States should not take a position on the competing territorial claims 

over land features in the South China Sea. I believe all parties should resolve their 

disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with customary international 

law, without resorting to the threat or use of force. 

The United States is a Pacific nation that has a national interest in freedom of 

navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and 

stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law in the South 

China Sea. The United States should sustain its presence in the South China Sea 

and uphold its commitments to its allies and partners in order to maintain peace 

and stability in the region. 

Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in 

that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation? 

1023 

Answer. Although the United States does not take a position on the territorial 

and maritime disputes, I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain its 

presence and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the South 

China Sea in accordance with customary international law. The U.S. Navy is a key 

provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, 

including in the South China Sea. 

If confirmed, I will work with our military commanders to evaluate the appropriate level of naval activities in the South China Sea to maintain regional peace 

and stability as well as unimpeded access for lawful commerce and economic development. 

Question. What should the United States do to help prevent dangerous encounters 

in the South China Sea? 

Answer. To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I believe the 

United States should continue to support initiatives and confidence building measures that will help claimant states reach agreement on a binding Code of Conduct 

in the South China Sea. Additionally, the United States should continue serving as 

a positive example of a nation that adheres to the international norms of safe conduct through policy implementation, effective training, and proper accountability. 

The United States should also continue to engage China through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) as a positive bilateral mechanism to address 

operational safety issues in the maritime domain. 

Additionally, the United States should continue to promote existing international 

‘‘rules of the road,’’ such as the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 

at Sea and other established international safety and communication procedures, 

such as the new CUES. The United States should also encourage all South China 

Sea claimants to abide by these international standards of safe conduct to ensure 

greater operational safety and reduce the risk of dangerous incidents at and over 

the sea. 

Question. How should the United States view China’s recent declaration of an 

ADIZ zone that includes the area over the Senkaku Islands and does the declaration 

increase the risk for instability in the region? 

Answer. The United States has been very clear that every nation has a right to 

establish ADIZs, but should not do so unilaterally without collaboration and consultation. We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status 

quo in the region. The way China announced its East China Sea ADIZ—uncoordinated and without consultation—increased the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Contrast this with the Republic of Korea’s new ADIZ in the same general area—it was done in consultation with its neighbors, including Japan. China’s 

unilateral approach and unclear procedures have certainly increased tensions in the 

region. 

Question. The March 14, 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report said ‘‘Particularly since 2012, China has increased control over some disputed areas by stepping up enforcement of its territorial claims with coercive but 

nonkinetic measures.’’ 

What specific capabilities, strategy, tactics, techniques, and procedures do you 

think are required to counteract China’s ‘‘coercive but nonkinetic measures’’. 

Answer. China’s ‘‘coercive but non-kinetic measures’’ have primarily been through 

non-military means, but backed up by threat of force. For example, Chinese coast 

guard and fishing ships have harassed Japanese shipping vessels near the 

Senkakus, Vietnamese ships in the Paracels, and Philippine resupply of its outpost 

on Second Thomas Shoal with shouldering and water cannon, but no kinetic responses from military combatants. While the U.S. military has many options available to address PRC coercion, military actions should be a supporting element of the 

overall U.S. Government strategy, not the main effort. Just as the rebalance to the 

Pacific is a whole of government effort, so are the potential solutions to current territorial disputes. That said, forward presence and support to our allies, partners and 

friends are critical. Discussion of specific capabilities is a conversation best Reserved 

for a classified forum. 

Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and also represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports 

that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely 

seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential 

conflict situation. 

What is your understanding of China’s efforts to develop and deploy cyber warfare 

capabilities? 

Answer. As part of China’s military modernization, it is making efforts to degrade 

the effectiveness of critical enabling nodes of modern warfare, such as space, cyber, 

and the electromagnetic spectrum. China’s military modernization efforts are aimed 

1024 

at increasing its relative military advantage and closing what it perceives as a technological capability imbalance between its Armed Forces and modernized militaries. 

As does the United States, China fully understands the critical importance of 

cyber as an element of modern warfare. Chinese military writing clearly shows that 

China views itself at a disadvantage in any potential conflict against a nation with 

a modern high-tech military, such as the United States. To overcome this disadvantage, China has developed organizations and capabilities that are designed to reduce 

its perceived technological gap and to reduce the effectiveness of United States and 

other advanced militaries’ core competencies in a crisis. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected 

in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with other parts of DOD and interagency partners to include STRATCOM, CYBERCOM, and Departments of State, 

Homeland Security, and Commerce, to facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber 

threats, not only from China, but from any potential adversary. While an increased 

cyber defensive posture is important, it is not enough for us to build thicker walls 

and continue to absorb daily cyber-attacks. Defense in itself will not deter our Nation’s adversaries. We must work together as a government to defend, and take appropriate response measures to deter, against future exploitation and attack. As the 

President stated in his International Strategy for Cyberspace, we Reserve the right 

to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—as 

appropriate and consistent with applicable international law to defend our Nation, 

our allies, and our interests against hostile acts in cyberspace. 

Question. In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy 

one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China 

has continued its active pursuit of defense and anti-satellite technology. 

What is your view of China’s purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities? 

Answer. The United States’ goal should be to promote the responsible use of 

space. In my view, this test was a troubling incident. It was yet another element 

of China’s comprehensive, long-term military modernization effort to develop and 

field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area denial, as 

well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. 

Question. What do you see as the long-term implications of such developments for 

the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space? 

Answer. The United States should seek ways to protect our interests in space. 

Space systems are vital to our national security and our economy. I believe we need 

to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded environment. Therefore, U.S. space policies and programs should be informed by China’s space and 

counterspace capabilities, which have contributed to today’s challenging space environment. At the same time, the United States should seek to engage China, a major 

space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of space. However, our concern 

should not be focused on only one country, but on the range of actors that make 

space increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. 

Question. What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space and 

the international agreements to prevent space weaponization? 

Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, especially that all nations have a right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, 

and that all nations should act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, 

misperceptions, and mistrust. 

I support our longstanding national policies of affirming the right of all nations 

to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the right of free passage through space, 

and the right to protect our forces and our Nation from those that would use space 

for hostile purposes. 

But space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners. 

We must not concede this truly high ground to anyone. 

TAIWAN

Question. What is your view of U.S.-Taiwan security relations? 

Answer. I personally strongly support the Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. policy on 

arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides 

that the United States will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services 

in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 

self-defense capability. The Act also states that the President and Congress shall 

determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely 

upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. It is my view that that policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 years and is consistent 

1025 

with the longstanding United States calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue 

in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. To achieve 

these ends we maintain a strong military-to-military engagement with Taiwan. 

Question. What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S. military assistance 

to Taiwan? 

Answer. We closely monitor the shifting balance in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s defense needs. Given the rapid pace of PRC military modernization, I believe 

our priorities should include assisting Taiwan with its joint operations capabilities 

and training; streamlining, modernizing, and integrating its existing (and aging) defense programs to be more effective; helping Taiwan develop its new All-Volunteer 

Force; and seeking innovative solutions to complement its traditional military capabilities. 

Question. What is your opinion of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)? Enacted 30 

years ago this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current 

state of affairs in the region? If so, how? 

Answer. The Taiwan Relations Act, which guides our unofficial relations with Taiwan, has been in force now for over 30 years and plays a valuable and important 

role in our approach to the Asia-Pacific region. As called for in the TRA, our longstanding policy to assist Taiwan with maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability 

helps ensure security and stability in the region. I would not recommend any 

changes to the law at this time. 

Question. Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, do 

you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities? 

If not, what is the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military? 

Answer. Taiwan must ensure that it adequately resources its defense programs 

and defense transformation to include considering increasing its defense budget. We 

can (and should) proactively help Taiwan see where it should improve its capabilities in the face of the imbalance across the Strait. I believe the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military is to send strong and consistent messages 

from the U.S. Government to Taiwan, and to demonstrate our resolve to engage 

them in a positive and professional manner. Finally, I believe that we must continue 

to emphasize to our friends in Taiwan that they must be resolute in protecting and 

securing sensitive and classified military and technological information, particularly 

as they move forward with its all-volunteer force modernization program. 

Question. What military capabilities do you believe would be most effective in improving Taiwan’s self-defense capability over the next 5 to 10 years? 

Answer. Capabilities that deter the PRC—especially an amphibious invasion—and 

increase the Taiwan military’s survivability are critical. No less important are nonmateriel solutions such as improved jointness, recruitment, training, integration and 

innovative solutions. Finally, one of the most cost effective solutions Taiwan can 

adapt from the U.S. military is to continue developing its NCOs and Junior Officers. 

Question. What do you believe should be appropriate criteria for the consideration 

of potential United States sales of military aircraft to Taiwan? 

Answer. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act states the United States will make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services required to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Act also states the President and Congress will determine the nature and quantity of required defense articles based on 

the needs of Taiwan. Taiwan’s self-defense strategy should dictate the need for specific military capabilities, and the United States should make available to Taiwan 

the defense articles and services required to maintain a sufficient self-defense, consistent with its defense strategy. 

Specific to military aircraft, Taiwan may need a replacement airframe for its 

aging and outdated F–5 E/F and MIRAGE 2000 fighters in order to maintain a sufficient self-defense. However, Taiwan should look more broadly across its armed 

forces in all domains to determine what capabilities are best to ensure a sufficient 

self-defense. We should help them with this analysis. 

Question. What is your opinion of Taiwan’s proposed plan to develop an indigenous submarine program? 

Answer. I believe a Taiwan military equipped with a credible defensive undersea 

warfare capability will directly contribute to its self-defense and to long-term stability in the region. 

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea still represents one of the greatest near term challenges 

to security and stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean peninsula remains a top U.S. priority. 

1026 

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and of the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade North Korea to comply with 

international mandates regarding its ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programs? 

Answer. Following the consolidation of power under Kim Jong Un, North Korea 

remains my number one security concern. It is what ‘‘keeps me awake at night.’’ 

While Kim Jun Un’s consolidation appears to have eliminated de-stabilizing factors 

inside the country in the near term, the Nation’s volatility and unpredictability are 

troubling. The frequent reshuffling of senior leadership surrounding Kim Jong Un 

heightens our concern as new variables have been added to North Korea’s decisionmaking calculus. Diplomatic and other outreach efforts underscore Kim Jong Un’s 

national strategy of promoting economic development and nuclear deterrence together. However, enduring U.S. and allied concerns—North Korea’s past provocative 

behavior, large conventional military, provocations, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs (including uranium enrichment)—present the most serious threat to the United States, our allies and partners in the region, and the international community. 

The U.S. State Department is best positioned to assess diplomatic efforts, but U.S. 

Special Envoy for North Korean Policy Glyn Davies testified this summer that ‘‘We 

have no misconceptions about North Korea’s willingness to give up its arsenal voluntarily. All of North Korea’s actions over the past few years, from its nuclear tests 

to the amendment of its constitution to declare itself a nuclear state, signal that 

it has no interest in denuclearizing. We take this threat seriously, and remain ironclad in our commitment to the defense of our allies, the Republic of Korea and 

Japan. Together with our allies and partners, we are working to shift Pyongyang’s 

calculus from believing that a nuclear program is necessary for regime survival to 

understanding that such a program is incompatible with its national interests . . . 

That is why our policy mix includes sanctions and traditional deterrence measures. 

In short, ours is a comprehensive approach that seeks to denuclearize North Korea 

through diplomacy while ensuring deterrence of the North Korean threat.’’ Well 

said! 

Question. What is your understanding of the threat posed to the United States 

and our allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, and the possible export of those capabilities? 

Answer. North Korea’s potential use of WMD presents a clear and present threat. 

We must ensure our forces are prepared to respond and that North Korea is deterred from using WMD. North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile program 

that poses a significant threat to the entire Pacific region. As witnessed in 2014, 

North Korea continues to develop and flight-test short and close-range ballistic missiles—demonstrating the capability to target South Korea and Japan. North Korea 

also continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD–2), which Pyongyang claims to have 

tested in a space launch configuration but could also reach the United States. if developed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Furthermore, North Korea 

continues to develop newer systems—including an intermediate-range ballistic missile and a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile known as the KN08, which 

was first publically paraded in Pyongyang in April 2012. Though never flight tested, 

the KN08 could reach the continental United States. 

North Korea’s continued proliferation efforts pose a significant threat to the Pacific region and beyond. It is a proven proliferator of ballistic missiles and associated 

technologies to countries like Iran—creating a serious and growing capability to target U.S. forces and our allies in the Middle East. North Korea assisted Syria in 

building a covert reactor in the early 2000s, which would have been capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, we must continue to work with our 

allies and partners to build a regional capability to combat North Korean WMD. 

Question. How has the new government of Kim Jong-Un changed the Department’s risk assessments of North Korea? 

Answer. Kim Jong Un is approaching his third year in power in December 2014. 

We assess that his actions throughout his first years were intended to consolidate 

power and project his capacity for dealing ruthlessly with his enemies, both foreign 

and domestic. His actions reaffirm that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear and missile 

capabilities poses an immediate and evolving threat to the United States and our 

allies. Our assessments of the risk have not changed, and we continue to conduct 

operations and refine plans to address these threats. 

Question. What concerns you most about North Korea and, if confirmed, what 

would you do to address those concerns? 

Answer. North Korea maintains a large and offensively postured conventional 

military, continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles, seeks to develop nuclear 

1027 

weapons and the means to deliver them intercontinentally, and engages in the proliferation of ballistic missiles in violation of international norms and law. North 

Korea has also conducted provocative attacks against the Republic of Korea. Most 

concerning about this range of threats is that they come from a single state standing on the outside of the international community. If confirmed, I will continue the 

strong relationship with USFK/CMC/UNC to drive intelligence, refine forecasts and 

warnings, sustain and advance our military readiness, and coordination with allies 

and partners. I will continue to work closely with my friends and counterparts in 

the Korean military. Finally, I will both seek and welcome opportunities to apply 

all means of national power to affect North Korean behavior. 

Question. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report established 

a policy and program priority for defending against near-term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased Adaptive Approach to regional missile 

defense, including to defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats. 

Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including a tailored phased adaptive approach to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region to defend against North Korean regional ballistic missile threats? 

Answer. Yes. The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review provides the PACOM region with an integrated effort to strengthen regional deterrence architectures 

against North Korea. It aligns our defensive strategy, policies, and capabilities to 

the strategic environment. Today, we are deploying a second TPY–2 radar to Japan 

to enhance early warning and tracking. In 2013 we deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to Guam, and as the Secretary of Defense first 

announced in April 2014, we will soon deploy additional Aegis BMD-capable ships 

to Japan. These additional sensors and shooters will enhance a robust missile defense capability to defend the U.S. Homeland and support PACOM’s regional missile 

defense mission against ballistic missile attack. 

Question. According to South Korean press reports, recent Nodong missile tests 

conducted by North Korea appear to have been designed to fly the missiles at higher 

altitudes, and relatively shorter ranges. For example, although the Nodong has an 

estimated range between 1,000 and 1,500km, the March 2014 tests flew about 

650km before landing in the Sea of Japan. In addition, because the missiles attained 

relatively high altitudes, they would challenge the ability of the Patriot system to 

intercept them. 

Do you believe that these tests represent an attempt by Pyongyang to overcome 

missile defense systems currently emplaced in South Korea, and if so, what steps 

do you recommend in order to meet this threat? 

Answer. We assess North Korea is developing mobile ballistic missiles for various 

reasons, which obviously could include trying to mitigate the effectiveness of U.S. 

and allied missile defense systems. But, we have no specific information to confirm 

that hypothesis. It is possible that these missiles were simply fired at a shorter 

range to demonstrate North Korea’s capability without actually firing into another 

country’s territory and thereby creating increased diplomatic friction. Whatever the 

motivation, North Korea is a threat to the region and to us. 

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the U.S.-South Korean security relationship? 

Answer. The U.S.-ROK alliance is a linchpin of security in East Asia. This was 

most recently reaffirmed by the Secretary of Defense during participation in the Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, DC in October of this year. Our security 

relationship is based on the mutual commitment to common interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning to ensure a comprehensive strategic alliance. It is robust and enduring. 

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve this security relationship? 

Answer. I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean publics continue 

to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this alliance, and that the 

United States effectively works with the ROK as it plays an increasing role in regional and global security issues commensurate with the ROK’s economic status and 

influence. If confirmed, I would work hard to maintain close contact with ROK military leadership and General Scaparrotti as we work together to improve a vitally 

important security relationship built upon an amazing foundation of 60 years of alliance. 

1028 

Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea that was planned for December 2015 and has now been delayed? 

Answer. The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have a comprehensive way forward to transition wartime operational control (OPCON). If confirmed, 

I will work with ROK military leadership and General Scaparrotti to complete this 

process, ensuring the transition is implemented methodically and that the combined 

defense posture remains strong and seamless. I support the current plan for 

OPCON transition, which calls for the ROK to assume wartime OPCON when critical ROK and alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula is conducive to a stable transition. The conditions 

for the transfer are based on meeting capability-based milestones, including acquisition of weapon systems, command and control systems, ISR platforms, and adequate 

supply of munitions, along with the right certification process to validate the readiness for the transfer. The ROK military is a very capable force, but it has had some 

setbacks in funding to achieve these milestones. General Scaparrotti and his team 

at U.S. Forces Korea are working hard in concert with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to meet the certification and capability requirements. If confirmed, I will help them. 

Question. Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should 

remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed 

in Korea be available for regional or global deployments? 

Answer. In accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 

States and the ROK, U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile actions that would threaten the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. In my view, this presence has both deterred further 

war on the Korean Peninsula and contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asia 

region. As ROK military forces have served, and will continue to serve, with the 

U.S. military in places off the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Gulf 

of Aden), I believe the U.S.-ROK Alliance will continue to serve an important role 

regionally and globally. With regard to deploying U.S. forces stationed in Korea to 

other AORs, the forces in Korea serve an important mission there and we remain 

committed to maintaining current troop levels on the Korean Peninsula. Before deploying any forces from the Korean Peninsula to other AORs we will have to carefully weigh the potential risk to regional security and stability with competing national security objectives. We would not do anything that diminishes the Alliance’s 

capability to fulfill its objectives. 

Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation 

Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on 

the Korean Peninsula? 

Answer. The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces from north 

of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations south of Seoul, primarily 

to the U.S. Army Garrison at Camp Humphreys and to Daegu. The movement of 

units and facilities to areas south of the Han River improves force protection and 

survivability, placing the majority of personnel and equipment outside of the effective tactical range of North Korean artillery. In addition, the move to a central location outside of Seoul provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to the political 

sustainability of our forward presence, and improves military readiness on the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, I will support it. 

Question. Is the relocation plan affordable? 

Answer. The majority of costs associated with the Yongsan Relocation Plan will 

be paid by the ROK. However, costs associated with the Land Partnership Plan will 

remain a concern in today’s fiscal environment. 

Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an 

attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe U.S. Armed Forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea? 

Answer. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty, when the political independence or security of South Korea or the United States are threatened by external armed attack, 

the United States and South Korea will consult together and develop appropriate 

means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of North Korean 

provocations, the two sides should continue to consult closely so that responses are 

effective. The United States and South Korea also recognize that an external armed 

attack would be dangerous to peace and safety and will act to meet the common 

danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. Because of the uncertainty 

of actions by Kim Jung Un, we must be ready to fight tonight. 

1029 

JAPAN

Question. How would you characterize the current U.S.-Japan security relationship? 

Answer. The U.S.-Japan relationship is a cornerstone of security in East Asia. 

Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. Our 

alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the Cold War, the Vietnam era, the 

post-Cold War period, through political turnover and economic woes in Japan, and 

through periods of very contentious trade disputes. Our alliance stands poised as 

a truly global one. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a complicated 

realignment process that is part of a larger alliance transformation agenda which 

includes a review of roles, missions, and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the 

relevance, capability, and cohesiveness of the alliance for the next several decades. 

In terms of our military-to-military relationship, it is stronger than ever. We welcome Japan’s reinterpretation of its constitution. 

Question. How does Japan’s relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly 

China, North Korea and South Korea influence the U.S.-Japan relationship? 

Answer. I believe it is important for Japan to continue to maintain and further 

develop constructive relations with all of its neighbors. Japan can and should increase its security cooperation with South Korea. Working with other U.S. allies and 

partners in the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and 

prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and essential partner in 

the Six-Party Talks process and in other important regional security architectures. 

Progress made to bolster trilateral security dialogues in Northeast Asia effectively 

links Japan, U.S. and South Korean approaches. That said, I remain concerned that 

the Japan-South Korea relationship is strained and exacerbated by historical animosities and territorial disputes. This is distracting to us and doesn’t allow for the 

full realization of truly transformative defense architectures in East Asia. I worry 

that other powers may try to use this friction to drive a wedge between us and either ally. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more 

active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international 

security arena? 

Answer. Japan is already a strong security partner with the United States and 

is increasingly contributing to international security activities. Japan is taking a 

number of domestic policy measures that will enable a greater degree of cooperation 

with us and with other like-minded international partners. For example, Japan has 

passed and will soon implement a new law regarding the handling of classified information which will strengthen information sharing ties with the United States, 

permitting a greater degree of cooperation. The Prime Minister’s office also announced its intention to permit the limited exercise of collective self-defense and is 

embarking on the legislative process to implement that change. 

Earlier this year, Japan announced a revision to its self-imposed prohibition on 

the export of military technology, permitting export in certain situations where it 

contributes to the peace and security of Japan, does not violate U.N. sanctions, and 

the recipients have appropriate safeguards to prevent unauthorized third party 

transfer, thereby opening the door to increased security cooperation and capacity 

building efforts in the region. In August 2014, Japan agreed to the transfer of 6 

coastal patrol boats to Vietnam and is considering other transfers of military technology to partners in the region. This is a positive development that complements 

U.S. security cooperation activities, and assists the United States in developing ally 

and partner capabilities and capacities throughout the region. 

The changing security environment in Asia will present new challenges and the 

United States and Japan must continue to work together to deal with these challenges, including greater interoperability between our Armed Forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

If confirmed, I will encourage Japan’s development of joint doctrine and organizations that will enhance Japan’s ability to undertake complex missions to build security in Asia. I will also encourage trilateral and multilateral security cooperation 

with the Republic of Korea, India, and Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture. Regarding international security activity, Japan has actively participated in 

combined counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, deployed a battalion-sized 

Reconstruction and Support Group to southern Iraq from 2004–2006, is participating in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, has been a significant donor 

to the ongoing Afghanistan reconstruction, and sent forces to help the Philippines 

during the Typhoon Haiyan crisis last year, among many other such activities. I beVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01037 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
1030 

lieve Japan’s participation in such global operations is a very positive development, 

and I would encourage future Japanese participation in such missions. 

Question. What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint development of 

the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense? 

Answer. Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a success story for the 

alliance and has resulted in Japan’s fielding of both sea and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our most important ballistic missile defense partners 

and U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important 

role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM3 Block IIA 

is an important cooperative program that will result in a significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability. 

Question. The current plan is for the closure of the Marine Corps Air Station on 

Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp 

Schwab on Okinawa. While the Governor of Okinawa has signed the landfill permit 

to allow construction of the FRF to go forward, local opposition and a long construction timeline make the completion of the FRF uncertain. 

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the 

Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa? 

Answer. I believe the Government of Japan, like the U.S. Government, remains 

committed to the Futenma Replacement Facility. This was restated in the October 

2013 2+2 and October 2014 Assistant Secretary of Defense-level meetings. Currently, the Futenma Replacement Facility Roadmap is scheduled to be completed in 

2022. Recent significant progress includes the signing of the required landfill permit 

by former Okinawa Governor Nakaima in December 2013 and the start of a preliminary construction geotechnical survey. Of course, there will be future challenges 

with continued implementation and we are committed to working closely with the 

Government of Japan to see this through to completion. 

Question. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan 

to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? 

Why or why not? 

Answer. I believe the cost-sharing arrangements with the Government of Japan 

(GOJ) to be among the best we have. From an alliance perspective, the current 

laydown in Okinawa is not politically sustainable; the relocation of approximately 

10,000 Marines and the return of land to Japan are critical. Guam is the only location outside of Japan where the GOJ has agreed to provide funds to offset the cost 

of relocation. For the GOJ, funding the construction of facilities for the use of U.S. 

forces on U.S. sovereign territory was an unprecedented step. Japan will provide 

$3.1 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars towards this effort. To date, the GOJ has provided over $900 million towards fulfillment of that commitment. For relocations 

within Japan, the GOJ is paying the majority of the costs to develop new facilities. 

In April 2011, we entered into a new, 5-year host nation support agreement with 

Japan that maintained the overall level of support we receive from Japan for labor 

and utilities while, for the first time, putting a floor on the amount the GOJ provides for facilities construction. 

Question. How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least $3.6 billion, 

serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa 

relations in particular? 

Answer. The Governments of Japan and the United States agreed to construct a 

Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab, in conjunction with reducing the 

number of U.S. forces on Okinawa and consolidating U.S. basing on the island. The 

Futenma Replacement Facility will enable the closing of Marine Corps Air Station 

Futenma (MCAS Futenma), which is located in a very densely populated portion of 

Okinawa. At the same time, the plan preserves U.S. forces’ ability to meet our security commitments to Japan, in accordance with the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty. Thus, when fully executed, this new force posture will improve U.S.- 

Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular. 

Question. Is Japan carrying a fair share of the burden of the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan under the current Special Measures Agreement? 

Answer. The Government of Japan’s contribution under the Special Measures 

Agreement covers the cost of approximately 90 percent of the Japanese labor force 

that work on our bases, 70 percent of utilities used on our bases and the cost of 

relocating training that the Government of Japan views as politically sensitive. Negotiations for a new Special Measures Agreement will begin in 2015. In my view, 

what Japan provides for overall Host Nation Support is fair, but as the current 

1031 

agreement runs its course, we must carefully evaluate how it was implemented and 

identify areas where Japan’s contributions will be especially value-added in the future, considering the regional environment and our own fiscal challenges. 

Question. The United States and Japan are currently negotiating updated Bilateral Security Cooperation Guidelines which will, according to a recent update, support ‘‘a more balanced and effective Alliance’’ and will ‘‘reflect’’ the cabinet decision 

by the Government of Japan to allow its Self Defense Forces to engage in collective 

security operations. 

What specific steps do you believe the United States and Japan should take to 

strengthen security cooperation, particularly with regard to China’s aggressive behavior in the East China Sea? 

Answer. Maintaining regional peace and stability is a shared goal between the 

United States and Japan, and I firmly believe the actions both countries have been 

taking to strengthen our alliance contribute to that end. Under our rebalance to the 

Pacific, the United States has increased our force posture in Japan by deploying our 

most advanced equipment, such as the AN/TPY–2 radars, MV–22 Ospreys, U.S. 

Navy P–8 aircraft, and announced future initiatives, to include replacing the USS 

George Washington with the USS Ronald Reagan. Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan 

has embarked on a multi-pronged effort to improve the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces, which range from collective self-defense, relaxing the restrictions on 

arms sales, and strengthening information security regimes, to operational initiatives such as increasing the missile defense, cyber, and amphibious capabilities of 

the Self-Defense Forces. Japan recently announced its intention to purchase U.S.- 

made E–2D Hawkeye early warning/command and control aircraft, Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft, and MV–22 Osprey aircraft. This significantly increases Japan’s capabilities and interoperability with the United States. The way 

ahead will leverage the relationships we have forged with Japan over the past 60 

years to increase the interoperability and synergy between our forces. Seamless coordination between our forces provides the most effective deterrent against aggression and best underwrites regional peace and stability. 

Question. What updated division of military roles and missions do you hope to see 

reflected in the Bilateral Security Cooperation Guidelines going forward? 

Answer. The United States and Japan are currently revising the bilateral Guidelines for Defense Cooperation which will support ‘‘a more balanced and effective Alliance.’’ Additionally, the revised Guidelines will reflect an expanded scope of cooperation to reflect the global nature of the alliance, encompassing areas such as 

space, cyberspace, counterterrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building, 

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement. I hope that the cabinet decision by the Government of Japan to allow its SelfDefense Forces to engage in collective self-defense operations will be reflected in the 

final product, but that is ultimately a decision for the Government of Japan. 

INDIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations? 

Answer. A close, continuing, and expanding security partnership with India is important for security and stability in Asia and for effectively managing Indian Ocean 

security in the 21st century. The United States and India have a range of common 

security interests that include maritime security, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Over the past decade, there has been a transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has evolved into a strategic partnership. Today, 

U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing stronger, including a robust slate of 

dialogues, military exercises, defense trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments 

cooperation. Efforts over the past 10 years have focused on relationship-building and 

establishing the foundation for a long-term partnership. The strong ties between our 

two militaries reflect this, but there is much more room to grow. The United States 

remains committed to a broad defense trade and technology relationship that enables transfers of some of our most advanced technologies to assist India’s military 

with its modernization efforts. The continued growth of our partnership should focus 

on working closely on common interests in a true partnership. 

Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship? 

Answer. India is critical to regional economic development, security and stability, 

and wide-ranging cooperation to counter extremism and radicalization. This comports with U.S. goals in the region. If confirmed, I will focus on increasing maritime 

security cooperation, expanding the military-to-military relationship across all ServVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01039 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
1032 

ices, and deepening cooperation on defense trade and production. I believe there is 

real potential to meaningfully cooperate on counter-proliferation, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, counter-piracy, counterterrorism, greater intelligence 

sharing on common threats, and stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian 

Ocean region. 

Question. What expectations do you have for a change or shift in the defense relationship with India now that Narendra Modi has been elected as Prime Minister 

of India? 

Answer. I am optimistic that our strategic partnership will continue to mature in 

the coming years and we are on the correct path to do so. Right now, our partnership is strong in defense trade. We are also India’s partner of choice in military exercises—but this is an area where I would like to see more routine and regularity. 

The Indian Navy’s (INN) first-ever participation in the RIMPAC exercise with one 

of its most advanced warships this past summer was an enormous boon to that exercise and I look forward to the INN’s growing participation in this and other engagements in the future. Pacific Fleet has an exceptional exercise relationship with 

India’s MALABAR series. While this is normally a bilateral exercise between our 

Navies, I have encouraged the Indian Navy to make MALABAR a trilateral event. 

The Indians agreed and this year MALABAR included India, United States, and 

Japan. The exercise was successful and was conducted at the higher end of the operational/tactical level complexity. This effort adds to our interoperability and understanding among India, Japan, and my Pacific Fleet forces which improves our ability to advance confidence building measures within the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Pacific Fleet has an excellent USN–INN dialogue program. The annual Naval 

Engagement Steering Group discussions involve a wide range of issues to include 

exercises, foreign military sales, maintenance practices, subject matter expert exchanges and an emphasis on safety at sea and in the air, particularly with the Indian Navy submarine force. The INN is very appreciative of the ongoing efforts to 

assist them in submarine safety and to have the expert exchanges address issues 

involving operational/tactical mission areas to both increase its professionalism and 

our naval interoperability in the maritime domain. Finally, I have emphasized the 

need to share information so that we can work together in the maritime domain to 

ameliorate transnational crime which benefits every nation in the region. If confirmed, I will do all that I can to continue and further our dialogue with India. 

Question. What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if any, of the civil 

nuclear cooperation agreement with India? 

Answer. The civil-nuclear cooperation agreement was a landmark agreement that 

significantly transformed the U.S.-India bilateral relationship. The agreement deepened the level of trust between the United States and India and will have positive 

effects on DOD interests leading to greater military-to-military cooperation and increased defense trade. Successful implementation of this agreement will serve to 

strengthen and mature U.S.-India ties. 

Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between India and China 

and how does that relationship impact the security and stability of the region? 

Answer. The current relationship between the region’s two fastest growing powers, India and China, is complicated by a trust deficit stemming from China’s longstanding relationship with Pakistan, India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and 

increasing competition for resources. The ongoing border dispute, trade imbalances 

and competition for influence across South and Southeast Asia complicate efforts to 

reduce the mistrust, and ultimately complicate the security and stability of the region. Some regional states seek to exploit the competitive Sino-Indian relationship, 

seeking favorable aid packages from New Delhi and Beijing to enable their own development. New Delhi and Beijing do find common ground and cooperate in international forums such as BRICS, the G20, and in Climate Change Conferences where 

both countries leverage their convergent interests to shape international trade rules 

to ensure their continued domestic development and economic growth. 

Question. What do you believe the United States should do to assist the Indian 

government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events in India? 

Answer. As the world’s largest democracy, I believe India is a significant strategic 

partner of the United States. Both India and the United States share a strong interest in preventing terrorism. Cooperation between the United States and Pakistan 

against shared militant threats has increased since 2012, and the United States 

should continue its efforts to ensure Pakistan takes effective action against all militant groups within its borders. 

Regarding capability and capacity building, counterterrorism efforts in India are 

primarily a Ministry of Home Affairs responsibility that employs domestic intelligence assets in conjunction with police and paramilitary forces. Therefore, counterterrorism cooperation with India is through a whole-of-government approach led by 

1033 

the Departments of State (via the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative) and 

Homeland Security (via the Homeland Security Dialogue), with support from the 

Department of Justice and DOD. If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to support this whole-of-government approach to address 

counterterrorism efforts with India and seek to expand the relationship. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and 

Pakistan? 

Answer. Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought four wars and weathered recurring border crisis. The election of India’s Prime Minister Narenda Modi generated some hope that Indo-Pakistan relations may improve, but that has yet to 

occur. India and Pakistan share a legacy of animosity, mistrust, and conflict. Violent 

extremist organizations strain the relationship and are the most likely catalyst for 

the next military conflict. We are, of course, concerned that a conventional military 

conflict between these two nuclear powers could escalate with devastating consequences. Dialogue is currently at a standstill and substantive progress on core security issues and territorial disputes is unlikely in the near term. Neither side has 

the political space to make unilateral concessions, yet both know that regional stability is absolutely essential to achieve their national interests. Barring military 

miscalculation or another major terror attack in India, Pakistan’s focus on internal 

stability and New Delhi’s desire to restore economic growth will likely preclude significant conflict along the border that could potentially escalate. 

Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan 

and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan? 

Answer. India’s actions in South and Central Asia generally align with U.S. 

goals—increasing economic growth and political stability through strengthened 

democratic institutions and developmental assistance to help prevent radicalization. 

India shares our interest in ensuring Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for 

violent extremists. As New Delhi continues to provide financial and training support 

to the ANSF, Pakistan could grow concerned about Indian influence, but regional 

stability depends on cooperation between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Transparency in Afghanistan’s bilateral relations with both India and Pakistan is essential to reduce India-Pakistan misunderstanding and mistrust. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure the close coordination of U.S. security policy with respect to South Asia, much of which is in 

the CENTCOM AOR, and in particular coordination with respect to India-Pakistan 

relations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate across the combatant command boundary, 

as is being done today, to continue to minimize opportunities to exploit the seam 

in that part of the world by malign actors. The PACOM and CENTCOM J5s (Plans) 

regularly hold cross-boundary coordination meetings to discuss issues that not only 

exist on the physical boundary between India and Pakistan, but also conceptual 

seams such as proliferation both to and from each other’s AORs. We have significant 

collaboration between both combatant command J2 (Intelligence) sections. The 

South Asia security policy of the United States is not a military-only effort; it is an 

interagency effort with State’s South and Central Asia Affairs Bureau, which strides 

both PACOM and CENTCOM AORs, and a number of other departments and agencies playing significant roles—and in many cases the lead role. I will actively seek 

to travel to India and Pakistan with the CENTCOM commander at the first opportunity so we can meet with the right folks on both sides of their border and our 

shared boundary. 

BURMA

Question. There has been a lot of discussion recently about increasing military to 

military engagements between the U.S. and Burmese military, which has a long history of human rights abuses. 

What is the strategic importance of Burma to PACOM and how does it fit within 

PACOM’s overall Southeast Asia strategy? 

Answer. Burma represents economic, diplomatic, and developmental opportunities 

with its untapped potential and strategic location. But, since 1962, the Burmese 

people have been on a hard and long road to get to democracy. They are attempting 

to shake off over 50 years of brutal military junta rule, oppressive and documented 

egregious human rights violations, and bitter ethnic and religious conflict—all of 

which combine to make a difficult environment in which to grow democracy. Although there have been some steps toward reform, Burma remains firmly under 

military control. In my opinion, the time is not right to expand or elevate militaryto-military activities. Ambassador Derek Mitchell’s approach is exactly what is 

1034 

needed—a limited and calibrated engagement designed to promote and further reforms. His cautious and reciprocal step-for-step approach, while looking for opportunities, will help democracy take root. Any U.S. military effort must demonstrate robust civilian and military teamwork, with the civilian side unquestionably in the 

lead, both for efficiency of effort and to provide the Burmese a template for success. 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine military relations? 

Answer. The Philippines is one of the America’s five treaty allies in the Pacific 

and remains a committed security partner facing regional challenges characteristic 

of current geo-strategic realities. Our alliance is strong and the foundation of our 

security partnership. The U.S. military-to-military engagement with the Philippines 

is mature and focused, allowing the Philippines security forces (military, coast guard 

and police) to better address security needs as evident by enhanced counterterrorism performance, expanded maritime security activities, increased multilateral 

engagement, and effective participation in U.N. Peacekeeping operations. 

Question. What do you believe the U.S. goals should be in the Republic of the 

Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals? 

Answer. The primary goals of the United States should be to strengthen the alliance with the Philippines and assist in building and maintaining the capabilities 

of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Our network of alliances in the Asia-Pacific, 

including with the Philippines, are the bedrock of U.S. security strategy in the region. A Philippines that is capable of mitigating terrorist threats, providing a secure 

maritime environment that ensures freedom of navigation within its region, and 

leading multilateral approaches towards peace and stability will enable it to fulfill 

its treaty obligations to the United States, directly benefit U.S. interests in the AsiaPacific region, and contribute to regional security and stability. 

Question. What is your assessment of U.S. military efforts in the Philippines and 

the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance being provided to the Philippine military in 

its fight against insurgent groups? 

Answer. U.S. military efforts and assistance in the Philippines support the U.S.- 

Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. The United States, however, does not operate 

in a combat role alongside the Philippines in its fight against insurgent groups, such 

as the New People’s Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. U.S. military assistance is focused on helping the Philippines fight terrorism by assisting with the 

development of skill sets that are no different than those needed to adequately help 

and protect its civilian populations. As detailed in the 2010 Government of the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) ‘‘Bayanihan’’, we continue to see 

progress with the Philippines accomplishing its goal of transitioning from a military 

focused on internal security to one focused on territorial defense. 

Question. Do you anticipate a reduced U.S. military footprint or change in mission 

for U.S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to mid-term? 

Answer. The United States and the Philippines are discussing arrangements that 

will allow greater flexibility for U.S. and Philippine security forces to train and work 

together. We do not seek a return to the basing and bases of years past. Through 

the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, we may, on a rotational basis, increase U.S. military engagement with the Philippines in the future. 

Question. What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat or law enforcement in 

the Republic of the Philippines? 

Answer. Current U.S. guidelines in place for the conduct of U.S. forces in the Philippines adequately address the roles and responsibilities of our military forces. All 

U.S. military personnel are in the Philippines under the Philippines-U.S. Visiting 

Forces Agreement and operate under the auspices of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual 

Defense Board and Security Engagement Board. Its activities, which will always be 

in consultation with, and agreement by, the Philippine government, are limited to 

conducting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response; assisting Philippine security forces to improve its capacity and capability including training and upgrading 

equipment; and supporting Philippine counter-terrorism operations through activities such as intelligence fusion and sustainment support. Our forces in the Philippines continue to operate ‘‘by, with, and through’’ their Philippine Armed Forces 

counterparts in a strictly non-combat role. 

1035 

INDONESIA

Question. Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim country in 

the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and 

expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where possible. In July 2010, Secretary Gates 

announced that DOD intended to resume working with elements of the Indonesian 

Special Forces, known as Kopassus. DOD engagement with Kopassus had been suspended for more than a decade because of past human rights violations by some of 

its members. 

What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus? 

Answer. In 2010, Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono inaugurated the U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership. A key element of this broad partnership is the 

security component. Our defense relationship with Indonesia—a pivotal country to 

U.S. national interests—is managed through the Defense Framework Arrangement 

and facilitated through several forums and mechanisms. Our military-to-military relations with Indonesia are robust and continue to progress and mature, with over 

140 theater security cooperation activities scheduled for this fiscal year. These security cooperation engagements include a wide range of activities focused on four main 

areas of emphasis: Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, Peace Keeping Operations, maritime security and continued professionalization/reform of the Indonesian 

Defense Forces (TNI). Beginning with the normalization of military-to-military relationship in 2005, engagements have increased in number and evolved from initial 

small-scale bilateral exchanges into more complex bilateral and multilateral activities. 

The Indonesian Army Special Forces (known as Kopassus) has undergone a nearcomplete transformation over the past decade and is at the forefront of TNI 

professionalization and adherence to human rights standards. Following a 12-year 

pause in bilateral activities, PACOM established a measured and gradual program 

of security cooperation activities with Kopassus. These security cooperation activities have consisted of key leader engagements and small-scale subject matter expert 

exchanges in areas such as military decisionmaking, medical planning, law of war, 

and safeguarding human rights. I expect future activities of this type to continue 

and gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress in 

TNI transparency and reform efforts. Chief among these reform efforts are the fulfillment of commitments made by Indonesian leaders to then Secretary Gates in 

2010 to continue to safeguard human rights and accountability throughout the Indonesian military through the unequivocal investigation and prosecution of those military personnel accused of human rights abuses and, if convicted, their removal from 

military service. 

Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian government is cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism? 

Answer. The Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with 

the United States and our partners in combating global terrorist networks in the 

region. Indonesia has shown tremendous success in arresting and convicting terrorists. Additionally, Indonesia has leveraged its leadership role within the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by electing to co-chair the Executive Working 

Group on Counter-Terrorism with the United States in the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus forum for the 2011–2013 cycle. This initiative seeks to encourage greater regional counterterrorism cooperation, reinforce military support to civil 

authorities, build capacity, and collectively address regional security issues in an 

open consultative forum. 

Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If 

so, under what conditions? Why? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support increased military-to-military contact 

within the context of the Comprehensive Partnership, guided by close consultation 

with the Departments of State and Defense, and within the boundaries of existing 

legal mechanisms. I believe close military-to-military relations with Indonesia are 

integral to achieving U.S. national interests in the region. I also believe that one 

of the most effective methods for encouraging reform is through interaction between 

Indonesian and U.S. servicemembers. Regardless of their mission, any interactions 

with U.S. servicemembers reinforce professional military practices, to include respect for human rights and the rule of law. Increased interactions facilitate greater 

understanding and reinforce professional values. 

Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, 

improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses? 

1036 

Answer. Indonesian defense reform progressed at a rapid pace after the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, with the separation of the police from the military, the elimination of formal political roles for the TNI, increased accountability, 

and the establishment of widespread human rights training initiatives. While reform efforts appear to have slowed, they have not reversed. According to several 

public opinion polls, the TNI enjoys the respect of the majority of the Indonesian 

populace and is often noted as the most respected government institution. This is 

a concrete indicator of progress. Continued reforms that the United States should 

continue to encourage include accountability for past human rights abuses, 

strengthening civilian control and oversight of the military, and continued professionalism of the TNI officer corps. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights 

and accountability in the Indonesian military? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support TNI’s continued progress by encouraging senior Indonesian leaders to fulfill its stated commitments with particular emphasis on 

accountability, transparency and respect for human rights. We can accomplish this 

through bilateral security discussions, joint training, and military assistance, including military training programs. Our engagements with the TNI, and especially its 

Special Forces (Kopassus), frequently involve Human Rights and Rule of Law Training. We have seen significant improvement in Human Rights and Accountability 

from the senior leadership. I view U.S. interaction with TNI counterparts as an effective method to encourage professionalism and continued reform within the Indonesian military. 

OPERATIONAL ACCESS AND FREEDOM OF ACTION

Question. Much has been made in recent years of the development of anti-access/ 

area denial capabilities of certain countries, and the impact such capabilities might 

have on the United States’ freedom of action and ability to protect power. 

What is your understanding of the emerging challenges associated with anti-access and area denial strategies in the Asia-Pacific? 

Answer. As discussed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and specifically 

the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, ‘‘China will continue to pursue asymmetric 

means to counter our power projection capabilities.’’ This would include China’s pursuit of anti-access/area denial strategies. The United States maintains robust regional and global power projection capabilities that provide a full range of options 

to succeed in defense of national interests and of our allies. To this end, if confirmed, I will work closely with OSD and the Services in support of policy and programmatic inputs based on assessed operational risk, to ensure we have the ability 

to project power throughout the theater and preserve the capabilities necessary to 

maneuver within it. 

Question. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) released on January 17, 

2012 broadly describes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s intent for how 

joint forces will respond to the operational challenges associated with potential adversaries’ anti-access and area denial capabilities. 

What, in your view, is the JOAC’s contribution to better understanding and dealing with the challenges of military operations in the PACOM AOR? 

Answer. The JOAC’s primary contributions are illuminating the variety of challenges for which U.S. forces must be prepared across an increasingly diverse and 

rapidly evolving set of domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyber—and identifying 

Cross-Domain Synergy as the central tenet for addressing these challenges in order 

to assure operational access. The JOAC provides Strategic Guidance focused on 

overcoming A2/AD challenges and is intended to guide how the U.S. military is organized, trained, equipped and employed. 

Question. The JOAC identifies 33 capabilities required for its implementation, but 

this list of capabilities is not exhaustive nor is it prioritized. 

In view of the PACOM mission, how would you prioritize the required capabilities 

listed in the JOAC and what capabilities, if any, would you add? 

Answer. Unlike Joint Concepts in the past, JOAC has an implementation plan 

that bridges the gap between concept and operational reality. The 2014 JOAC Implementation Plan (JIP), which is a classified document, provided a priority for the 

30 JOAC capability areas. In general, I would agree with the prioritization in the 

JIP, but more importantly the JIP was designed to provide a comprehensive view 

of all JOA related activities within the DOD to provide coherence and guide the development of the future joint force. What I can say about the JIP is that all DOD 

Components participated equally in its formulation. Additionally, the JIP currently 

has 165 actions, 84 percent of which are non-material activities focused on finding 

better ways to employ the material capabilities currently planned for the Joint force. 

1037 

Annual updates to the JIP will be conducted to maintain currency with strategic 

guidance and combatant commander requirements. The implementation plan will 

ensure the Department stays focused on the important and innovative capabilities 

needed to ensure operational access now and in the future. 

Question. What new technologies would you suggest DOD pursue in order to develop or improve these capabilities? 

Answer. In general, I would suggest pursuit of technologies that improve situational awareness, command and control, and interagency coordination. As Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, we contributed to the development of PACOM’s Integrated Priority List (IPL), which details the commands warfighting capability gaps 

and the many specific technologies we will be pursuing over the next several years. 

Additionally, PACFLT, in conjunction with PACOM, will develop and test these concepts and capabilities in realistic joint exercises that will be used to evaluate the 

operational utility of a given technology. PACOM’s requirements are well documented and, if confirmed, I will continue to pursue those priorities set out in the 

Sep 2014 IPL. 

Question. With respect to air, sea and land capabilities, some proponents of the 

‘‘air-sea battle’’ concept appear to de-emphasize ground combat forces. 

What are your views on the requirement for land forces before, during, and after 

operations to gain and maintain assured access? 

Answer. Land forces are necessary for all phases of an operation, including peacetime and steady-state. Most notably, in Phase 0 ‘‘Shaping’’, land forces are critical 

to tangibly demonstrate U.S. commitment to allies and partners, as well as resolve 

to potential adversaries. Land forces, as an integrated part of the Joint force, engage 

with allies and partners in the region to influence, train with, and improve, the capabilities and integration of those capabilities enabling allies and partners to better 

defend themselves against aggression. In many cases land forces may also facilitate 

relationship building, as many Pacific defense establishments are dominated by 

their armies. Ground forces allow rapid and effective response, not only to conflict, 

but also to natural disasters and humanitarian crises. 

During conflict, we must be able to credibly project ground forces in a maritime 

environment consisting of numerous islands, archipelagoes, and littoral population 

centers. Expeditionary land forces provide indispensable capabilities which complement our navy and air forces in the region. Land force headquarters and staffs 

also provide a Joint Task Force command and control capability that is necessary 

to pursue multiple operations simultaneously, a necessity for a region that spans 

52 percent of the globe. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the CNO, Chief of Staff of the Army, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Commander, U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM) on ground force sourcing and lift. 

Question. What, in your view, are the required size and capabilities for ground 

combat forces in the Pacific region, and what capabilities, if any, may be needed to 

improve their effectiveness? 

Answer. PACOM is resourced to Admiral Locklear’s demand signal for U.S. Army 

ground forces. However, PACOM’s ability to employ them throughout the theater is 

a shortfall. U.S. Army Pacific, in coordination with TRANSCOM, has identified solution sets that will enable U.S. Army employment in the Western Pacific. 

PACOM routinely experiences a shortfall of Amphibious Readiness Groups/Marine 

Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEU). Shortfalls in amphibious shipping, coupled with 

global demand for both the ARG/MEU teams and Afloat Forward Staging Bases, 

leave PACOM at about 40 percent of requirement. 

Land forces are necessary throughout the range of military operations. Most notably, land forces are critical in demonstrating U.S. commitment to allies and partners 

as well as the resolve to dissuade, disrupt, or defeat potential adversaries. Land 

forces, as an integrated part of the joint force, engage with allies and partners in 

the region to influence, train with, and improve their ability to defend themselves 

against aggression. Ground forces allow rapid and effective response, not only to 

conflict, but also to natural disasters and humanitarian crises, events which are 

commonplace in the PACOM AOR. 

Expeditionary land forces provide indispensable capabilities which complement 

our naval and air forces in the region. The land force headquarters and staffs also 

provide a Joint Task Force command and control capability that is necessary to pursue multiple operations simultaneously, a necessity for this expansive region. 

Potential categories that may need improvement include expeditionary basing, 

mobility, and ISR technologies. Adequate access to basing and logistical support 

throughout Asia Pacific is necessary to address the whole of the region, and the 

vastness of the AOR means that forces must have adequate mobility in the form 

of sealift and air transportation to allow them to engage, train, and respond to criVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01045 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
1038 

ses. Adequate ISR is also needed to enable the rapid and focused application of limited resources to the point of greatest necessity. 

HIGH ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS

Question. DOD intends to retire the U–2 ISR fleet in the middle of this decade 

and replace these aircraft with the Global Hawk RQ–4. Under the Air Force’s plans, 

the RQ–4s will apparently be a PACOM-wide asset, flying missions throughout the 

region, whereas the U–2s have been dedicated to supporting U.S. and Korean forces 

on the Korean peninsula. 

The Chairman of the JROC recently sent the Armed Services Committee a letter 

indicting that ‘‘I certify that the combatant commanders will have nearly equivalent’’ ISR capability when the U–2 retires in fiscal year 2016. 

What is your view of the plan to retire the U–2? 

Answer. If confirmed, it will be my responsibility to place an ISR demand signal 

for the Services to fulfill. PACOM currently has an enduring requirement that, even 

with the U–2, the Services struggle to fulfill. Any PACOM commander would be concerned about the possibility of a diminished ISR capability and capacity as result 

of retiring any platform prior to full RQ–4 sensor parity. As a result of our shift 

toward the Asia-Pacific region and rising tensions throughout the theater, any decrement to existing capability and capacity concerns me in my current assignment, 

and would do so as PACOM commander, should I be confirmed. 

Question. Does a ‘nearly equivalent’ ISR capability meet PACOM ISR requirement? 

Answer. Deep-look multi-intelligence collection capabilities support both U.S. and 

ROK daily intelligence requirements. If confirmed, I would be agnostic to platform 

as long as ‘‘nearly equivalent’’ provides equal or greater capability and capacity to 

what is currently employed in the PACOM AOR. If ‘‘nearly equivalent’’ means less, 

then I would be concerned. 

Question. Do you believe there will be an ISR capability gap created by its retirement? 

Answer. If the U–2 is allowed to retire prior to full Global Hawk system parity, 

then there could well be an ISR capability gap globally, not just in the PACOM 

AOR. Competing priorities could significantly impact theater operations if the U– 

2 is allowed to retire prior to system parity in follow-on platforms. 

Question. Based on your military expertise, can the Global Hawk provide ‘‘nearly 

equivalent’’ ISR capability today? 

Answer. Today, no. When Global Hawk system is on parity with the U–2 there 

is reason to believe the platform will be able to satisfy theater collection requirements with equivalent capability; that is not the case today and is of concern to me. 

Question. What is the risk if sequestration requires further cuts into our ISR platforms to include not funding Global Hawk improvements needed to bring it closer 

to parity to the U–2? 

Answer. I believe PACOM would assume much greater risk and have to re-assess 

the impact of gapping or operating sub-optimal systems for standing and crisis ISR 

requirements. 

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Question. A number of the Nations in the PACOM AOR contribute large numbers 

of police and troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations. 

What role, if any, do you believe PACOM should play with regard to engaging the 

troops from Asia-Pacific nations which contribute to peacekeeping missions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue engagement with Asia-Pacific nations in regards to peacekeeping contributions. This is important opportunity and venue for 

military-to-military cooperation that allows us to increase partner capacity in military capability, professionalism, and increased awareness of human rights issues 

such as the protection of civilians in a U.N. mission area. I believe that it is in our 

best interest that countries contributing peacekeepers provide quality troops that 

are capable, respected, and have the requisite tactical and technical ability, and will 

enforce the U.N. mandate of that particular mission. 

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to 

counter terrorism? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue PACOM’s highly successful ‘‘by, with, and 

through’’ approaches to counterterrorism that have produced measurable success in 

the Asia-Pacific region. These efforts rely on a capacity, capability, and network 

building approach that emphasizes working together with regional host nation partVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:23 Mar 31, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01046 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\93919.TXT JUNE
1039 

ners, other U.S. Government agencies, and key allies, such as the Australians, to 

deny al Qaeda, adherents, affiliates, and associated forces the ability to operate in 

the region. 

Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated 

groups in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Answer. The threat of attack by al Qaeda, its affiliates, and like-minded groups 

and individuals against U.S. and partner nation interests in the PACOM AOR remains a serious concern. The possible re-emergence of other terrorist organizations, 

like Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu Sayyaf Group, that have been weakened but not 

defeated by the counter-terror efforts of our allies and partners, could quickly affect 

the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Compounding the concern, other 

decentralized groups and individuals ideologically linked to al Qaeda, as well as organizations based primarily outside the PACOM AOR (like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba), desire to support their agendas by conducting destabilizing attacks inside the region. 

Additionally, al Qaeda affiliated groups operate in the PACOM AOR using facilitation networks that support threats to U.S. interests throughout the world. Finally, 

emerging terror groups such as Islamic State (ISIL) are of concern, particularly as 

sympathizers from some of the countries in the region go off to the Middle East to 

fight and then return to their home countries. 

Question. Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal networks in the 

Asia-Pacific? 

Answer. Yes, there is a nexus and it is a serious impediment to regional stability. 

Transnational crime and terrorism thrive on common enablers such as illicit transportation networks, weapons trafficking, corruption, trafficking in persons, counterfeiting, and movement of money to support nefarious activities. These threats impact political, social, and economic systems by eroding the rule of law and undermining the legitimacy of governments and institutions. 

Question. In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and Indonesia, U.S. 

engagement with partner nations has helped combat violent extremist ideology and 

activities. The integration of operations by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building, development, and information support operations has dramatically 

reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate. 

What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat the threat 

of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists? 

Answer. The United States should sustain current engagements with individual 

nations in the region and continually look for opportunities to assist with ally and 

partner efforts. Additionally, we should continue multilateral efforts, specifically 

through organizations like the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), to 

build regional networks that deny transnational violent extremist and global terrorist facilitation networks the ability to operate within or through Southeast Asia. 

A sustained effort to build and enhance the capacity of our allies and partners is 

the cornerstone of our counter terrorism strategy in Southeast and South Asia. We 

are encouraged by the persistent pressure that partner nations are placing on these 

networks. 

Question. Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the fight 

against terrorism in that region and what should the United States do to enhance 

relations with those countries? 

Answer. Even though Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines have seen tremendous counter-terrorism successes, they remain vulnerable to violent extremism 

through radicalization and recruitment and are potential terrorist safe havens. Additionally, Malaysia and Thailand have been used as facilitation hubs by violent extremist organizations that operate across the region. Recent well-publicized efforts 

by Australia to arrest or detain at least 16 persons suspected of supporting or sympathizing with terrorists point to the subversive nature and determination of these 

organizations to gain footholds throughout the region. PACOM must maintain its 

robust presence and continue its ‘‘by, with, and through’’ engagement strategy in 

Southeast Asia. 

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent legislation, 

authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to 

regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military 

operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism. 

What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority? 

Answer. Section 1208 funding is most effective in the CENTCOM and U.S. Africa 

Command AORs, and currently limited in its application in PACOM. I worked with 

1040 

this funding stream when I was the Director of Operations at U.S. Southern Command in 2007–2008. It is an extremely effective authority for specific threats. If confirmed, I will work with the DOD to identify any potential possibilities for using 

1208 authority, similar to the way we have used section 1206 successfully in building capacity in the Philippines and Cambodia. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends ap- proximately $1 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign 

governments in Asia and around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related 

matters. 

What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics industry in the PACOM AOR? 

Answer. The illegal narcotics industry within the PACOM AOR is primarily focused on feeding the Asian demand for methamphetamine and supplying the growing Australian and Chinese demand for both cocaine and methamphetamine. 

Growth in market share within Asia for Eurasian, West African, Iranian, and Mexican based drug trafficking organizations has been reported—a clear demonstration 

of the globalization of the illicit narcotics trade. 

Countries in South and Southeast Asia have become increasingly attractive as 

bases for drug trafficking organizations’ production and smuggling operations. Many 

nations in the PACOM AOR have experienced an increase in the production, transshipment, trafficking, or consumption of narcotics in recent years. 

In terms of direct impacts on the United States, licit chemicals produced in Asia 

are the primary precursors that are diverted and used to produce methamphetamine 

trafficked to the United States. Much of the violence on our southwest border is a 

result of methamphetamine trafficking by the Mexican cartels. 

Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering—either directly or 

with our Asian partners—the illegal narcotics industry in the PACOM AOR? 

Answer. In cooperation with other U.S. Government, and Partner Nation Agencies, PACOM executes activities within DOD counter-drug authorities to address the 

threats to U.S. national security posed by the illegal narcotics industry. As 

PACOM’s executive agent for counterdrug operations, the Joint Interagency Task 

Force West (JIATF–West) plans, integrates, synchronizes, conducts, and assesses 

DOD counter-drug activities in the region in order to shape the theater and disrupt 

organizations that threaten U.S. interests in the region. DOD should continue to 

play a critical role, through information sharing and building partner nation capacity, working with U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies responsible for counternarcotics. 

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Question. What, if any, threat does transnational organized crime pose to U.S. national security interested in the PACOM AOR? 

Answer. The organizations that have amassed unprecedented wealth from illegal 

activities, including the illicit trafficking of people, drugs, weapons, or other contraband, pose a significant threat to our national security. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are not only expanding their operations, but are also diversifying 

their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that is becoming 

even more complex, volatile, and potentially destabilizing. The major players use 

their amassed wealth to buy influence and subvert governmental institutions—creating instability, disrupting legitimate commerce, putting civilian populations at 

risk, and undermining democratic processes. 

TCOs are becoming increasingly globalized and interconnected. As the global 

economy continues to grow, change, and innovate, so will criminal organizations, 

and they will react quickly to changes in both licit and illicit economies. The permissive environments, loose financial controls, corruption, and fraudulent document facilitation networks fostered by transnational organized crime are also key enablers 

for the freedom of movement of international terrorist organizations operating in the 

region. 

The United Nations estimates 2.5 million people worldwide are victims of human 

trafficking at any given time. With more than half the world’s population resident 

in the Asia-Pacific, it is logical to assume a significant percentage of those victims 

are in PACOM’s AOR. 

Question. What role, if any, should PACOM play in countering the threats posed 

by transnational organized crime? 

Answer. PACOM intelligence capabilities can contribute significantly to the identification of threat networks and provide the necessary analysis to support law enforcement and other activities required to disrupt TCO operations. As part of the 

1041 

whole of government approach, DOD can provide critical resources to interagency 

efforts countering TCOs. 

Further, PACOM lead capacity building efforts and the development of regional 

cooperative networks provide critical reinforcement to partner nation governments. 

These efforts provide opportunities to hinder the growth of TCOs and reduce risks 

to the U.S. Homeland. Beyond just being a ‘‘force multiplier’’, these efforts are essential to addressing the problems where they begin. By addressing the regional environment—strengthening relationships with, and capabilities of, international partners throughout the PACOM AOR—we shrink the operational space within which 

both extremists and criminals can grow and prosper. 

LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea? If so, why? 

Answer. Yes. Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention serves the enduring interests of the United States to lead the promotion of the rule of law, including in 

and on the world’s oceans. Accession would send a clear signal to the world that 

we remain committed to advancing the rule of law at sea. Acceding to the Convention would not affect or limit our rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and 

airspace needed to project power, reassure allies and partners, deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain deployed combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication. Accession would put the United States on the firmest possible international legal foundation for those rights, freedoms, and uses. We currently rely on 

customary international law and physical presence to secure global freedom of access. Customary international law depends in part on states’ practices and is subject 

to change over time. This is less so in the case of treaty- or convention-based international law, which comes from written and agreed-upon terms and conditions that 

are contained in such treaties or conventions. Ironically, by not being party to the 

Convention and relying on customary international law, our rights within the maritime domain are less well-defined than the rights enjoyed by the 165 other nations 

around the world who have acceded to the Convention. 

Question. Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 

benefit the U.S. military’s mission in the Asia-Pacific region? If so, how? 

Answer. Yes. U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would advance U.S. 

national security interests in the Asia-Pacific region by enabling the United States 

to legally reinforce and assert protections contained within the Convention for our 

navigational rights and freedoms, over-flight rights and freedoms, military activities 

beyond the territorial seas of any coastal state without notice or permission, and our 

rights to transit international straits and choke points without impediments. Clearly, we are powerful enough to do so anyway, but acceding to the Convention gives 

us the moral high ground to criticize those countries that would seek to inhibit freedom of maneuver in the oceans and airspace around the world, including the AsiaPacific region. 

As the Asia-Pacific continues to rise, competing claims and counter claims in the 

maritime domain are becoming more prominent. Nowhere is this more prevalent 

than the South China Sea. Numerous claimants have asserted broad territorial and 

sovereignty rights over land features, sea space, and resources in the area. The 

United States has consistently encouraged all parties to resolve their disputes 

peacefully through a rules-based approach. The Convention is an important component of this rules-based approach and encourages the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes. Accession would send a powerful and affirmative message to the 

international community that the United States believes the legal regime reflected 

in the Convention is worth supporting and upholding against any nation that might 

seek to manipulate the ordinary and intended meaning of certain provisions in its 

self-interest. 

POW/MIA ACCOUNTING EFFORTS

Question. The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is critical to the recovery 

and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of 

U.S. servicemembers from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War 

continues to be a high priority. Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires that the Secretary of Defense ensure that sufficient resources, personnel, and funds are provided to attain at least 200 identifications per year by fiscal year 2015. 

What is your view of the Department’s and the POW/MIA community’s ability to 

achieve this goal? 

1042 

Answer. Earlier this year Secretary Hagel directed the Department to transform 

how it accounts for its personnel missing from past conflicts. Specifically, he directed that he be provided with a plan to organize the Department most effectively 

to increase to the maximum extent possible the numbers of missing Service personnel accounted for annually while ensuring timely and accurate information is 

provided to their families. 

As a result of the plan that was presented to Secretary Hagel, the Joint POW/ 

MIA Accounting Command will soon be merged with two other organizations to 

form a new Defense Agency that will be overseen by the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy. I believe the Department’s budget request provides the necessary resources to increase its capability and capacity to achieve this goal and implement 

Secretary Hagel’s direction. I fully understand the priority our Nation places on this 

issue. If confirmed, until the consolidation of these agencies is completed, I will fully 

support JPAC in its efforts to account for personnel from past conflicts. After the 

merger occurs, I will fully support the new Defense Agency. 

Question. On October 20, 2011, DOD announced an agreement with North Korea 

that will allow U.S. personnel to return to North Korea to resume recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers missing from the Korean War. Recovery operations 

in North Korea were suspended in 2005. 

What is your understanding of this recent agreement to resume recovery operations in North Korea? 

Answer. The arrangement negotiated in 2011 covered 1 year and is no longer 

valid. The operations negotiated as part of the arrangement did not occur and were 

suspended due to North Korea’s provocative actions. This is truly unfortunate. 

Question. How might the resumption of recovery efforts in North Korea impact 

the future of the Six Party talks or the stability on the Korean Peninsula? 

Answer. The U.S. Government’s mission to account for our personnel is not linked 

to the Six Party talks or to Korean stability. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA 

recovery efforts in the PACOM AOR? 

Answer. I fully understand the priority our Nation places on this issue. If confirmed, I will ensure the necessary resources are available to JPAC until the new 

Defense Agency assumes the mission. When that happens, I will ensure the necessary resources are available to the new Defense Agency, as well as the full support of PACOM in the conduct of their important mission. 

QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. Combatant commanders have an interest in the quality of life of military personnel and their families assigned within their AOR. 

In your view, what is the role and responsibility of combatant commanders for the 

quality of life of personnel assigned to their AOR? 

Answer. The combatant commander is a strong advocate for programs which will 

ensure the needs of our servicemembers and their families continue to be met, even 

during an era of fiscal constraint. The commander advocates for sustainment of critical quality of life programs and for improvement where needed in the quality of 

life of assigned personnel. The Commander ensures that quality of life issues are 

articulated to community leaders, military installation commanders, DOD policymakers, and Members of Congress. If confirmed, I will continue Admiral Locklear’s 

strong advocacy of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen assigned 

to PACOM, and their families. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to enhance quality of life programs for 

military members and their families within the PACOM AOR? 

Answer. Even though quality of life programs fall under the purview of the individual Services, if confirmed, I will make quality of life for servicemembers and families assigned to PACOM a top priority. I will work with my Service component commanders to ensure our servicemembers’ and their families’ needs are met. 

Question. What is your view of the challenges associated with global rebasing on 

the quality of life of members and their families in the PACOM AOR (including adequate health care services and DOD schools)? 

Answer. Preserving the quality of life for our servicemembers and their families 

while we realign our forces in theater is a big challenge. Throughout the transition 

process, we must focus efforts on maintaining quality housing, excellent DOD 

schools, commissary and exchange services, medical/dental facilities, higher education, work life, family and community support programs for our people. 

1043 

IN-KIND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Question. The committee released a report on April 15, 2013, titled ‘‘Inquiry into 

U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the U.S. Military Presence Overseas.’’ Among other things, the committee’s inquiry found that in-kind payments 

from partner nations to support the overseas presence of U.S. military forces in Germany, South Korea, and Japan, have been used to fund questionable military construction projects. In response, the committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 includes a provision (section 2801) that would 

require that all future military construction projects funded using in-kind payments 

pursuant to bilateral agreements with partner nations be submitted for congressional authorization in the Military Construction Authorization Act. 

If confirmed, how would you ensure that in-kind payments be utilized for identified U.S. priorities to offset costs that DOD would otherwise pay with appropriated 

funds? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, my staff, and my subordinate commanders to ensure we effectively and efficiently prioritize and apply every taxpayer 

dollar, won or yen, regardless of the type of project or the source of the appropriation. As we press ahead under section 2801, we must be sensitive to the appearance 

of encroaching on another country’s sovereignty if our actions appear to be directing 

allied budget procedures. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department has developed comprehensive policies and procedures 

to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including 

providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. 

What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults 

in PACOM, including assaults by and against U.S. civilian and contractor personnel? 

Answer. Sexual assault is a crime. I have seen great focus by commanders and 

subordinates to address the issue of sexual assault and a deep commitment towards 

prevention of incidents and appropriately and adequately responding to reported incidents. Commanders monitor their command climate as it relates to sexual assault 

more than ever and are proactive in taking steps towards ensuring they maintain 

a climate free from sexual assault and reprisals against victims. Zero is the only 

acceptable level for sexual assault in our military. 

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place 

in PACOM to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault? 

Answer. PACOM components have adequate resources and training in place to investigate and respond to allegations. All Services have established guidelines for a 

24 hour, 7 day a week sexual assault response capability for victims in all locations. 

Additionally, PACOM provides oversight for ensuring that adequate resources are 

present at deployed locations to maintain the appropriate level of resources to respond to incidents. With regard to investigations, the Department has multiple efforts underway to improve the utilization of existing resources and enhance its ability to investigate and respond to sexual assaults. 

Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to 

hold assailants accountable for their acts? 

Answer. I believe my colleagues take this seriously and are able to hold perpetrators accountable. I personally have a strong public record in this regard. Through 

actions and words, we reinforce this on a continuing basis. We have the responsibility to enforce regulations and hold our personnel accountable to the high standards that our core values demand. That said, we as leaders must also be held accountable for our actions regarding those in our commands that commit sexual assault and the victims of those assaults. 

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and programs in PACOM to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, 

and legal help they need? 

Answer. Service components within the PACOM have appropriate resources and 

programs in place to offer victims of sexual assault medical, psychological, investigative, and legal support. Service components have enhanced the support services 

available through the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Coordinators and established Victims’ Legal Counsel Programs wherein Judge Advocates will help protect a victim’s rights through the investigative and adjudicative stages of the military justice process. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing 

necessary support to the victims of sexual assault? 

1044 

Answer. Leaders and commanders set the tone for their organization and ensure 

that all applicable services are available and rendered to the victim. Proactive and 

positively engaged commanders are vital to providing the necessary support to victims. Beyond this, commanders are responsible for maintaining a climate and culture free from reprisal against victims. We must hold our commanders and leaders 

accountable to get this right. 

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing 

the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred? 

Answer. Change starts and momentum continues from the top of organizations. 

If confirmed, I will set PACOM-wide expectations for conduct through guidance on 

core values and will demand that subordinate leaders set the example in their organizations. Commands shall monitor their climates and the climates of their subordinate units. Chains of command shall be proactively engaged in resolving issues pertaining to command climate and commanders will be held accountable for their 

units’ actions. 

Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate 

outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault 

should be prosecuted? 

Answer. The commander’s role in military justice is longstanding and essential to 

the effectiveness of command in our forces. Removing commanders from the military 

justice system would signal a lack of confidence in our commanders that would undermine good order and discipline. It would foster doubt in our servicemembers in 

the competency and abilities of their commanders that are entrusted with their 

lives. The maintenance of good order and discipline is the responsibility of the commander. Removing this responsibility would certainly erode the ability of a commander to effectively command his unit. That said, I believe in and support the assignment of Judge Advocates as formal Victim Advocates and Victim’s Legal Counsel. We as leaders must also be held accountable for our actions regarding those in 

our commands that commit sexual assault and the victims of those assaults. 

Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective? 

Answer. Yes. Restricted reporting allows victims of this crime to come forward 

and receive needed services while maintaining confidentiality. Survey data shows 

that confidentiality is a key driver in accurately assessing the extent of sexual assault in the military. Without restricted reporting, many of these victims would be 

left without an avenue to access needed services as they would simply forgo reporting. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess current policies, procedures and programs and to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts 

to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in PACOM? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will establish clear policies and procedures for my leaders, 

at all levels, to take action to prevent sexual assault, protect and support victims, 

hold offenders accountable, and to ensure a safe and healthy environment for those 

in their charge. As is the case in most major commands, subordinate commanders 

in PACOM are required to immediately notify the combatant commander of any sexual assault report made. I will ensure all personnel (military and civilian) are fully 

aware, trained, and committed to eradicating sexual assault. 

Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging the sufficiency 

of component commanders’ efforts in preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate and intend to implement as PACOM commander? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure commanders comply with all requirements in 

accordance with DOD Directive 6495.0 and other established Department policies. 

Additionally, I will require commanders provide me assessments of their prevention 

efforts as well as their responsiveness to incidents. From these assessments, I will 

monitor trends and provide further guidance and direction as necessary. I will emphasize the importance of commanders monitoring their command climate with respect to sexual assault and ensuring sexual assault response capabilities continue 

to be available at all locations in my AOR. I will demand victims be treated with 

fairness and respect and that sexual assault incidents be given the highest priority 

and treated as emergency cases. I will not allow sexual assault to injure our personnel, our friends, our families, destroy our professional values, or compromise 

readiness. I will hold my subordinate commanders accountable. 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

Question. What should be the role for the U.S. military in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region? 

1045 

Answer. PACOM continues to provide Foreign Disaster Relief in the Asia-Pacific 

on an ‘‘as needed’’ basis. When countries request assistance, PACOM either provides 

immediate assistance within the initial 72-hours of a disaster based on life and limb 

or after the USAID validates the request against an urgent and unique capability 

that only PACOM can provide. PACOM continues to assist Asia-Pacific nations with 

their disaster preparations by engaging in multinational forums to share best practices, participating in various bi/multilateral humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 

exercises, as well as partnering with the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance and USAID in country resiliency training. Overall, PACOM should be viewed as a quick response force for countries in dire need 

with an ability to respond rapidly, for short duration, and to provide assistance 

when requested. 

Additionally, steady-state Humanitarian Assistance activities are an important 

part of PACOM’s Theater Campaign Plan. PACOM provides humanitarian assistance annually to countries within its AOR. These HA activities are low cost, nonobtrusive, but highly effective efforts that improve DOD access, visibility, and influence in a partner nation or region, generate positive public relations and goodwill 

for DOD, and build collaborative relationships with the partner nations’ civil society. 

Question. Are the resources necessary to fulfill this role currently available to the 

PACOM commander? If not, what additional resources are necessary? 

Answer. Yes. PACOM receives adequate funding from the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid appropriation, under 10 U.S.C. 2561 for humanitarian assistance activities, and 10 U.S.C. 404 to respond to disasters within the 

PACOM AOR. 

Additionally, USAID/OFDA has embedded two representatives within the PACOM 

staff to synchronize and coordinate crisis response in situations where DOD is requested to provide ‘‘unique capabilities’’ that exceed host nation or USAID/OFDA 

partner capacity. 

Question. How should the PACOM Commander incorporate ‘‘lessons learned’’ from 

prior humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the PACOM AOR? 

Answer. The Asia-Pacific’s tectonic plate structure produces its well-known Ring 

of Fire, which regularly triggers earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis in the region. 

Weather extremes and anomalies also continue to plague the region, and understanding the scope and severity of long-term climate change, unexpected climate 

shocks, and inter-annual climate variability such as El Nino, attest to the shared 

challenges we face with our partners and allies. Capturing lessons learned is critical 

to properly planning and responding to these enduring challenges. 

PACOM, in accordance with the established Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff policy, 

uses the PACOM Lessons Learned and Issue Resolution Program to incorporate 

‘‘lessons learned’’ from prior humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in the PACOM AOR. These lessons are analyzed and validated to identify 

issues requiring resolution for staff process improvement and/or to address gaps in 

plans or resources. The issues are then either resolved internally by PACOM or forwarded up the chain of command for resolution. Once resolved these ‘‘lessons 

learned’’ are used by PACOM during future HA/DR operations. 

Additionally, the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, a PACOM direct reporting unit, focuses on pre-crisis preparedness and capturing lessons learned from HA/DR operations. They provide regional 

and global information sharing across foreign and domestic government agencies, 

work to improve multilateral civil-military cooperation, and offer a small but rapid 

response capability to disasters and humanitarian crisis. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. As with other combatant commands, a Science and Technology (S&T) 

advisor is assigned to support PACOM. 

If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the PACOM Science and Technology advisor? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will rely on the PACOM Science and Technology (S&T) 

Advisor to discover, develop and demonstrate innovative solutions to meet 

warfighter challenges, help ensure adversary technology advancements are identified early and mitigated, help build requirements for Service resourcing, and help 

build science and technology partnerships among PACOM component commanders 

and industry, the private sector, academia, the interagency, and regional allies and 

partners. I would expect that the PACOM S&T Advisor continues to expand collaboration with the national research enterprise composed of Service, DOD, and Department of Energy laboratories, as well as international partners. Additionally, I would 

expect the S&T Advisor to continue to provide expert advice to the PACOM staff 

1046 

on new and emerging capabilities that can aid the command in meeting theater objectives. 

Question. What role do rapid fielding programs play in developing and delivering 

new capabilities to the warfighter? 

Answer. Rapid fielding programs are designed to be primarily focused on Combatant Command priorities. PACOM has aggressively leveraged rapid fielding programs such as Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations and the Quick Reaction 

Capabilities through the Joint Urgent Operational Needs program. If confirmed, I 

intend to continue placing significant emphasis on these processes. Rapid fielding 

provides a pathway to innovative, agile and affordable solutions for the Combatant 

Commands and we mustcontinue to build on the excellent work in this area. 

Question. The Secretary of Defense has established a Strategic Capabilities Office 

(SCO) to develop new systems and technologies to counter anti-access and area denial capabilities. How would you work with SCO to prioritize their programs and 

support the development and deployment of new capabilities? 

Answer. Prioritization of SCO programs is accomplished through close coordination between the SCO-West office created within PACOM and the central SCO stake 

holders at the Pentagon. If confirmed, I would be in the unique position of offering 

the forces and exercise venues necessary to effectively test the new and innovative 

strategic capabilities which SCO puts forward. Additionally, the Asia-Pacific offers 

the opportunity for operationally realistic scenarios which will help to validate the 

OT&E prerequisites for new capabilities and allow them to move forward more rapidly in the acquisition process. 

Question. DOD has, in recent years, put greater emphasis on research and development of persistent ISR capabilities. 

In your view, how can persistent ISR improve operations in the Pacific theater, 

and how would you utilize new platform and sensor technologies? 

Answer. Persistent ISR in the Pacific Theater provides real time situational 

awareness for increased ability to gain indications and warnings and to hold strategic threats at risk. By working with allies and partners we can enhance our understanding of the region in real time and share this information, as needed. New 

and improved capabilities would provide more reaction time to indications and 

warning allowing more time to find off-ramps to de-escalate the situation. More capacity and capability would provide actionable intelligence to support theater operations while minimizing delays and keeping us ahead of potential crisis, natural disasters and other unplanned contingencies. 

Question. Do you believe that airship platforms can be effectively employed in the 

Pacific theater? 

Answer. Yes. I believe that persistent ISR is one of the most important capabilities for PACOM as it increases the ability to anticipate and react to potential crises 

to enable the commander to gain a better understanding of activities in the region. 

To satisfy PACOM’s ISR requirements, a broad array of platforms is needed. Airship 

platforms have demonstrated an exciting potential to fulfill part of this requirement, 

especially in permissive environments in missions such as air and surface domain 

awareness. Furthermore, airships of sufficient scale also offer a promising capability 

to conduct mobility operations independent of traditional aerial or seaport facilities 

in missions such as disaster response. If confirmed, I would be interesting in any 

platform that could meet my ISR requirements, including airships. 

MINERVA AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

Question. Since 2009, DOD has been funding, under the Minerva Initiative, academic research focusing on the evolving relationship between technology and national security in China. The goal of this research is to create a better understanding of China’s dynamic science, technology and innovation enterprise and its 

impact on its military. 

Are you aware of this research and in your view, should DOD continue to fund 

activities like this to increase its breadth and depth of the Chinese military-industrial enterprise? 

Answer. Yes to both questions. China is increasingly emphasizing the fusion of 

civil and military research and development as a key to accelerating the technological advance and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As the 

relationship between China’s science and technology sectors and the PLA grows 

closer, the type of research that the Minerva Initiative provides becomes more important in helping us to assess the pace and longer-term trajectory of China’s military modernization. 

1047 

Question. The Human Terrain System has been effectively used to support efforts 

to better understand the socio-political environment in which military forces have 

deployed. 

Are you aware of the work of the Human Terrain System teams, and in your 

view, should similar capabilities be developed to support the PACOM AOR? 

Answer. It is very important to have socio-cultural understanding of the people 

and places where we engage and operate. I am aware of the Army’s Human Terrain 

System, and its use in Iraq and Afghanistan. PACOM employs analysts and foreign 

area specialists throughout the command in an effort to best integrate that knowledge into our efforts. Several initiatives with similar capabilities are underway, 

leveraging a variety of knowledge sources as we work to continue expanding this 

important area. One challenge we face is the size and complexity of the Asia-Pacific. 

The region is home to over half the world’s population who represents thousands 

of groups, tribes, and societies, and collectively speak over 1,000 languages. The 

PACOM staff is currently assessing how the Human Terrain System might be utilized in the PACOM AOR. I am very interested in the outcome of that assessment. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the 

PACOM commander? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE

1. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Harris, during the hearing you commented on the legality of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that was declared by China. 

Would you please clarify that response? 

Admiral HARRIS. I erred when I used the term ‘‘illegal.’’ Freedom of overflight and 

other internationally lawful uses of airspace are essential to prosperity, stability, 

and security around the globe. International law does not prohibit nations from establishing an ADIZ in international airspace, adjacent to their national airspace. 

However, it is inconsistent with international law to establish an ADIZ which applies its procedures to aircraft not intending to enter national airspace. We also do 

not support efforts of any nation to establish its ADIZ unilaterally without consultation and collaboration with neighboring nations (e.g. China’s ADIZ overlaps Japan 

and the Republic of Korea’s ADIZs). By establishing and announcing its East China 

Sea ADIZ, especially over disputed waters, and without coordination or consultation, 

China increased the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation in one of the most 

highly sensitive areas in the world. I view this development as an improper attempt 

by China to unilaterally alter the status quo in the region. Because of this, we don’t 

recognize the ADIZ or comply with it. 

1048 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC ATTACK REQUIREMENTS

2. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Harris, in this year’s congressional testimony, the

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, highlighted the 

critical need for additional EA–18G Growlers in operational support for both carrier 

and expeditionary strike forces. Congress is in the process of addressing a portion 

of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) needs in Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA). 

The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are now asking DOD to provide 

additional information on the extensive analysis taking place at the Navy level 

and—most important to your future role—the need for additional Joint AEA at the 

expeditionary level. Would you please provide your thoughts on the importance of 

AEA in the Pacific area of responsibility? 

Admiral HARRIS. Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) is critically important to the 

Pacific area of responsibility as control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is 

vital for PACOM to preserve its warfighting advantage in the Asia-Pacific. AEA enables PACOM to effectively gain access to heavily contested environments, which 

consist of state of the art networked systems, distributed controls, and sophisticated 

sensors integrated into military equipment, civilian infrastructure, and commercial 

networks. While the demand for this mission is high, the platforms able to perform 

this mission are decreasing. For this reason, the Navy’s fleet of expeditionary and 

carrier based EA–18 Growlers is vital to Pacific Fleet’s ability to achieve my mission 

sets, and if confirmed, I expect to place a demand on Navy to provide even more. 

AEA provides innovative, asymmetric, cost imposing solutions to counter anti-access/area denial challenges. Potential adversaries are developing and fielding Electronic Warfare capabilities (air, surface, subsurface, space, cyber) and the subject 

matter expertise to decrease our warfighting advantage. Therefore, PACOM must 

continually invest in research and development of the AEA solutions it will need to 

maintain the asymmetric advantage in the future. 

3. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Harris, based on what you currently know, what specific areas of Joint AEA do you feel need additional support with the turn-to-thePacific strategy that DOD is conducting? 

Admiral HARRIS. As our Nation rebalances to the Pacific, we face growing and 

modernizing adversarial militaries with advanced electronic warfare systems. As 

such, we must invest in robust, offensive, non-kinetic electronic attack capabilities 

in order to stay ahead of rapidly modernizing threats in the region. Additionally, 

we need to improve our electronic protection capabilities for our existing platforms 

to increase joint operational access. Furthermore, U.S. forces require the tactics, 

training, and procedures necessary to recognize, identify, and counter current and 

next generation threats. 

4. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Harris, are there additional assets, both platform and

technology, that you feel are key to addressing the AEA role in the Pacific? If so, 

please elaborate. 

Admiral HARRIS. The EA–18 Growler is the premier AEA platform in the U.S. 

military, and the demand for that platform continues to increase. It is the primary 

enabler to defeat adversarial A2/AD strategies. PACOM requires EA–18G aircraft, 

equipment, and personnel in sufficient quantity within Carrier and Expeditionary 

Air Wings to support a Joint Campaign to complement the U.S. Air Force’s fleet of 

EC–130H Compass Call aircraft. Additionally, PACOM requires next generation 

Electronic Attack pods for manned and unmanned aircraft in order to disrupt, degrade, or defeat current and next generation threats. Finally, the development and 

fielding of penetrating, long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles able to conduct 

AEA in medium to high threat environments are essential to imposing cost and 

minimizing risk to U.S. forces. 

[The nomination reference of ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN, 

follows:] 

1049 

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

September 18, 2014. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under Title 10, 

U.S.C., section 601: 

To be Admiral. 

ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] 

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR ADM HARRY BINKLEY HARRIS, JR., USN 

07 June 1978 .......................... Ensign 

07 June 1980 .......................... Lieutenant (junior grade) 

01 July 1982 ........................... Lieutenant 

01 November 1987 .................. Lieutenant Commander 

01 May 1993 ........................... Commander 

01 June 1999 .......................... Captain 

01 May 2005 ........................... Rear Admiral (lower half) 

01 November 2007 .................. Rear Admiral 

13 June 2008 .......................... Vice Admiral 

16 October 2013 ..................... Admiral, Service continuous to date 

Assignments and duties: 

From To

Patrol Squadron ONE ONE (DUINS) .................................................................................................... June 1978 Sep 1978 

Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL (DUINS) ............................................................... Sep 1978 Nov 1978 

Training Squadron ONE ZERO (DUINS) ............................................................................................... Nov 1978 Mar 1979 

Naval Air Training Unit, Mather AFB, CA (DUINS) ............................................................................. Mar 1979 Sep 1979 

Patrol Squadron THREE ZERO (DUINS) ............................................................................................... Sep 1979 Feb 1980 

Patrol Squadron FOUR FOUR (Avionics/Armament Division Officer) .................................................. Feb 1980 Jan 1983 

Commander, Naval Forces Japan, Yokosuka, Japan (Flag Lieutenant) ............................................. Jan 1983 Feb 1985 

Fleet Combat Training Center Atlantic, Dam Neck, VA (DUINS) ........................................................ Feb 1985 May 1985 

USS Saratoga (CV 60) (Tactical Action Officer) ................................................................................ May 1985 May 1987 

Patrol Wing ONE (Task Force Surveillance Officer) ............................................................................ May 1987 July 1989 

Patrol Squadron THREE ONE (DUINS) ................................................................................................. July 1989 Nov 1989 

Patrol Squadron FOUR (Operations Officer) ....................................................................................... Nov 1989 July 1991 

Harvard University (DUINS) ................................................................................................................. July 1991 June 1992 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Action Officer) (N51) ........................................................ June 1992 July 1993 

Georgetown University (DUINS) ........................................................................................................... July 1993 Apr 1994 

XO, Patrol Squadron FOUR SIX ........................................................................................................... Apr 1994 June 1995 

CO, Patrol Squadron FOUR SIX ........................................................................................................... June 1995 May 1996 

Patrol Wing ONE (Operations Officer) ................................................................................................ July 1996 Nov 1998 

Joint Staff (Special Assistant to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) ......................................... Nov 1998 Dec 2000 

Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing ONE ......................................................................... Jan 2001 July 2002 

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Political-Military Affairs) ....................................................................................................................... Aug 2002 Aug 2004 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Director, Current Operations) (N31)/AT–FP Division) 

(N32/N34) ....................................................................................................................................... Aug 2004 Mar 2006 

Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, U.S. Southern Command ............................................. Mar 2006 June 2007 

U.S. Southern Command (Director for Operations) (J3) ..................................................................... June 2007 May 2008 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication 

Networks) (N6) ................................................................................................................................ June 2008 Nov 2009 

Commander, Sixth Fleet/Commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, U.S. 

Naval Forces Africa/Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Europe .................................. Nov 2009 Oct 2011 

Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .................................................................... Oct 2011 Oct 2013 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet ........................................................................................................... Oct 2013 To date 

1050 

Medals and awards: 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Distinguished Service Medal with one Gold Star 

Defense Superior Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters 

Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars 

Bronze Star Medal with one Gold Star 

Meritorious Service Medal with three Gold Stars 

Air Medal with numeral ‘‘1’’ 

Joint Service Commendation Medal 

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with four Gold Stars 

Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award 

Navy Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars 

Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon with four Bronze Stars 

Kuwait Liberation Medal (Saudi Arabia) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star 

Navy ‘‘E’’ Ribbon with three ‘‘E’’ devices 

Navy Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star 

National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal 

Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Stars 

Afghanistan Campaign Medal 

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal 

Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with four Bronze Stars 

Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait) 

Expert Rifle Marksmanship Medal 

Expert Pistol Shot Medal 

Civilian Award: 

Department ofState Distinguished Honor Award 

Special Oualifications: 

BS (Engineering) U.S. Naval Academy, 1978 

MPA (Public Administration) Harvard University, 1992 

MA (National Security Studies) Georgetown University, 2000 

Designated Naval Flight Officer, 1979 

Awarded the Stephen Decatur Award, 1987 

Capstone, 2005–3 

Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009 

Awarded NECO Ellis Island Medal of Honor, 2014 

Awarded APAICS Lifetime Achievement Award, 2014 

Summary of joint duty assignments: 

Assignment Dates Rank 

Joint Staff (Special Assistant to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) ................ Nov 98–Dec 00 ..... CDR/CAPT 

Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, U.S. Southern Command .................... Mar 06–June 07 ... RDML 

U.S. Southern Command (Director for Operations) (J3) ............................................ June 07–May 08 ... RDML/RADM 

Commander, Sixth Fleet/Commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO/Deputy 

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa/Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Europe.

Nov 09–0ct 11 ..... VADM 

Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ........................................... Oct 11–Oct 13 ...... VADM 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN, in connection with his nomination follows:] 

1051 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Harry B. Harris, Jr.. 

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. 

3. Date of nomination: 

September 18, 2014. 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.] 

5. Date and place of birth: 

4 August 1956, Yokosuka, Japan. 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to CDR Brunhilde K. Bradley, USN (Ret.) (Maiden name unchanged). 

7. Names and ages of children: 

None. 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

Honorary ‘‘Colonel Aide de Camp,’’ State of Tennessee 

Honorary ‘‘Admiral in the Texas Navy,’’ State of Texas 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Fraternal: Japanese American Veterans Association, member 

Fraternal: U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, member 

Fraternal: Army-Navy Club, Washington DC, member 

Professional: Maritime Patrol (Aircraft) International, member 

Fraternal: Maritime Patrol Association 

Professional: U.S. Naval Institute, member 

Other: National Association of Watch and Clock Collectors, former member 

Other: National Association of the Carabao, former member 

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements for outstanding service or achievements other than those 

listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

1052 

National Ethnic Coalition of Organizations (NECO) Ellis Island Medal of Honor 

2014 

Asia-Pacific American Institute of Congressional Studies Lifetime Achievement 

Award, 2014 

Who’s Who in America, 2012 

U.S. State Department Distinguished Honor Award, 2012 

Who’s Who in Asian American Communities Spirit Award, 2009 

Fellowship: MIT ‘‘Seminar 21’’ fellow, 1999–2000 

Scholarship: Navy ‘‘Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Scholarship in International Affairs’’ to Georgetown and Oxford Universities, 1994 

Fellowship: Georgetown University ‘‘Fellows in the School of Foreign Service’’, 

1993–1994 

Scholarship: Navy ‘‘Harvard-Tufts Scholarship’’ to the John F. Kennedy School of 

Government, 1992 

Honors: U.S. Navy League ‘‘Stephen Decatur Award for Operational Competence,’’ 

1986 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? 

Yes. 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B– 

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

HARRY B. HARRIS, JR. 

This 27th day of August, 2014. 

[The nomination of ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on December 9, 2014, with 

the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 11, 2014.] 

(1053) 

APPENDIX 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL

AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

(202) 224–3871 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

2. Position to which nominated: 

3. Date of nomination: 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

5. Date and place of birth: 

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

7. Names and ages of children: 

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted. 

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

1054 

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution. 

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

13. Political affiliations and activities: 

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Information furnished in Parts B through F will 

be retained in the committee’s executive files and will not be made available to the 

public unless specifically directed by the committee. 

Name: 

PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Will you sever all business connections with your present employers, business 

firms, business associations or business organizations if you are confirmed by the 

Senate? 

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the government? If 

so, explain. 

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or organization? 

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after 

you leave government service? 

5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where? 

6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable? 

1055 

PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and 

other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers. 

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which 

could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been 

nominated. 

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you 

have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or 

acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict 

of interest in the position to which you have been nominated. 

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for 

the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification 

of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy. 

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any 

that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy 

of any trust or other agreements.) 

6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the 

General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Attorney 

General’s office concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments 

to your serving in this position? 

PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional 

conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, 

professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, 

provide details. 

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, 

State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county 

or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, 

provide details. 

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details. 

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) 

of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense? 

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination. 

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a 

foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please 

fully describe such relationship. 

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, 

public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s 

associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe 

such relationship. 

1056 

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation 

from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details. 

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration 

Act? If so, please furnish details. 

PART F—FINANCIAL DATA

All information requested under this heading must be provided for yourself, your 

spouse, and your dependents. 

1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of which you, your 

spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of the trust agreement. 

2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power of attorney which 

you hold for or on behalf of any other person. 

3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income 

arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and other future benefits which 

you expect to derive from current or previous business relationships, professional 

services and firm memberships, employers, clients and customers. 

4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past 10 years? If 

not, please explain. 

5. Have your taxes always been paid on time? 

6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed and paid) as of the 

date of your nomination? 

7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax return? If so, 

what resulted from the audit? 

8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed against you or 

against any real property or personal property which you own either individually, 

jointly, or in partnership? 

(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax returns be 

provided to the committee. These documents will be made available only to Senators 

and the staff designated by the chairman. They will not be available for public inspection.) 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

—————————————————. 

This ————— day of —————————————, 20———. 

1057 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL

AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CERTAIN SENIOR

MILITARY NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228 

Washington, DC 20510–6050 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES FOR CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: 

Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional 

sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which 

the continuation of your answer applies. 

If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military nomination, 

you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a new form. In your letter 

to the Chairman, add the following paragraph to the end: 

‘‘I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments contained 

in the Senate Armed Services Committee form ‘Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees for Certain Senior Military Positions,’ submitted to the committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all such 

commitments apply to the position to which I have been nominated and that 

all such information is current except as follows:... .’’ [If any information on 

your prior form needs to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the 

question number and set forth the updated information in your letter to the 

chairman.] 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public. 

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

2. Position to which nominated: 

3. Date of nomination: 

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses. Also include 

your office telephone number.) 

5. Date and place of birth: 

6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including wife’s maiden 

name.) 

7. Names and ages of children: 

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

1058 

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution. 

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations. 

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Information furnished in Parts B through E will 

be retained in the committee’s executive files and will not be made available to the 

public unless specifically directed by the committee. 

Name: 

PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military service. If so, explain. 

2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after 

you leave military service? 

PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and 

other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers. 

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which 

could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been 

nominated. 

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you 

have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or 

acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict 

of interest in the position to which you have been nominated. 

4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any 

that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy 

of any trust or other agreements.) 

5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the 

General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments 

to your serving in this position? 

6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where? 

1059 

PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional 

conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, 

professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, 

provide details. 

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, 

State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of Federal, State, county or 

municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details. 

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or litigation? 

If so, provide details. 

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) 

of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense? 

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination. 

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a 

foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please 

fully describe such relationship. 

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, 

public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s 

associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe 

such relationship. 

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation 

from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details. 

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration 

Act? If so, please furnish details. 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

—————————————————. 

This ————— day of —————————————, 20———. 

Æ