MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020	ME	128

Docket: Cum-19-399

Argued	 September	15,	2020

Decided: November	3,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

JOHN	D.	WILLIAMS

HUMPHREY,	J.

[¶1]	 On	 an	 April	 night	 in	 2018,	 a	 deputy	 sheriff	 attempted	 to	 arrest	

John D.	Williams	on	drug	charges	outside	a	home	in	Norridgewock.		Early	the	

following	 morning,	 the	 deputy	 sheriff’s body	 was	 found	 on	 the	 lawn	 of	 that	

home.		Williams	now	appeals	from	the	judgment	of	conviction	entered	by	the	

court	 (Cumberland	 County,	 Mullen,	 J.)	 after	 a	 jury	 found	 him	 guilty	 of	

intentional	 or	 knowing	 murder of	 the	 deputy	 sheriff.	 	 See 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 201(1)(A)	(2020).		Williams	raises	three	issues	in	this	appeal	challenging	the	

court’s	admission	of	in-court	demonstrations	of	the	possible	circumstances	of	

the	shooting, the	court’s	partial	denial	of	a	motion	to	suppress	statements	he	

made	 to	 detectives	 after	 his	 arrest, and, finally,	 the	 court’s	 sentencing	
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proceedings	and	the	length	of	the	sentence it	imposed.		We	affirm	the	judgment

and	the	sentence.	

I.		BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶2]		Viewing	 the	evidence	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	State,	 the	

jury	rationally	could	have	found	the	following	facts	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.		

See	State	v.	Ouellette,	2019	ME	75,	¶	11,	208	A.3d	399.

[¶3]		On	April	21,	2018,	Somerset	County	Deputy	Sheriff	Corporal	Eugene	

Cole and	another	deputy	stopped Williams’s	car	because	they	saw	that	it	was	

being	 driven	 by	 his	 girlfriend,	 whose	 driving	 privileges	 they	 knew	 were	

suspended.		Williams	was	a	passenger	in	the	vehicle.		Williams’s	girlfriend	was	

arrested	for	operating	a	vehicle	while	her	license	was	suspended.		The	deputies	

determined	that	Williams	could	not	drive	the	vehicle	from	the	scene	because	he	

appeared	 to	be	under	 the	influence	 of	drugs	and	 the	 vehicle’s	insurance	had	

lapsed.		Williams	left	the	scene with	a	friend	who	arrived	to	pick	him	up.		

[¶4]		Arrangements	were	made	for	the	car	to	be	towed	from	the	scene.		

When	 illegal	 drugs	 were	 found	 during	 a	 subsequent	 search	 of	 the	 vehicle, a	

supervising	 officer	 authorized	 Corporal	 Cole	 and	 the	 other	 deputy	 to	 arrest	

Williams	on	drug	charges.		
3

[¶5]		On	the	night	of	April	24,	2018,	Williams	was	using	drugs	at	a	friend’s	

house	when	he	asked	another	friend	to	drive	him	to	a	home	in	Norridgewock	

where	he	had	lived	 for	a	 period	 of	 time	when	he	was	growing	up.		Williams	

wanted	 to	 borrow	 the	 homeowner’s	 car	to	 transport	 some	 of	 his	 guns	 to	 a	

location	 in	 Old	 Town	 because	 he	 had	 to	 be	 in	 court	 in	 Massachusetts	 the	

following	day	and	he	wanted	to	make	sure	his	weapons	were	safe.		The	friend	

agreed	to	drive	Williams	to	Norridgewock.		

[¶6]		While	parked	at the	home	in	Norridgewock,	Williams	and	his	friend	

saw	Corporal	Cole’s	police	truck	slow	down	as	it	passed	the	house.	 Williams	

removed	a	duffel	bag	containing	his	guns	from	the	trunk	of	his	friend’s	car	and	

placed them	next	to the	vehicle	he	planned	to	borrow.		The	friend	then	left.		

[¶7]	 Williams climbed the	front	steps of	the	home	and	tried	to	enter,	but	

the	door	was	locked.		At	 that	point,	Corporal	Cole	approached	Williams	 from	

behind	 and	 asked	 if	 he	 was	 John	 Williams.	 	 Once	 Williams	 confirmed	 his	

identity,	Corporal	Cole	told	Williams	that	he	was	under	arrest	and	attempted	to	

grab	his	wrist	to	take	him	into	custody.		Williams	pulled	away	and	drew a	9mm	

pistol	from	his	waistband.		Corporal	Cole	stepped	back	and	then	slipped	and	fell	

on	a	grassy	slope.		Williams	shot	Corporal	Cole	once	in	the	right	side	of	the	neck

at	close	range.
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[¶8]		Williams	fled	in	Corporal	Cole’s	police	truck	and	drove	to	a	nearby	

Cumberland	 Farms	 store,	 where	 he	 stole	 a	 bottle	 of	 water,	 cigarettes,	 and	 a	

lighter.		The	store	clerk	called	9-1-1, and	the	dispatcher	notified	another	deputy	

to	respond	to	the	store.		

[¶9]		After	Williams	left	the	store,	he	called	a	friend	and	told	him	that	he	

had	shot	Corporal	Cole.		Williams	then	asked	his	friend	to	meet	him	on	Martin	

Stream	Road,	where	Williams	hid	the	police	truck	behind	a	house.		As	the	friend	

was	driving	to	meet	Williams,	he	saw	a	deputy	sheriff	at	the	nearby	Cumberland	

Farms	store	and	pulled	over	to	tell	him	that	the	person	who	shot	Corporal	Cole	

was	on	Martin	Stream	Road.		The	friend	then	continued	on	to	meet	Williams.		

[¶10]		When	 the	 friend	arrived,	Williams	asked	if	he	could	use	his	car.		

The	friend	refused,	and Williams	asked	to	borrow	his	cell	phone,	saying	that	he	

was	going	to	go	into	the	woods,	use	the	phone	to	make	a	confession,	and	then	

kill	himself.		The	friend	let	Williams	take	his	phone	and	then	dropped	him	off	

near	some	train	tracks	about	a	half-mile	away	on	Martin	Stream	Road.		

[¶11]		The	State	Police	Tactical	Team	was	called	in	to	locate	both	Corporal	

Cole	 and	 Williams.	 	 Based	 on	 the	 information	 that	 Williams’s	 friend	 had	

provided,	 team	 members	 located	 Corporal	 Cole’s	 police	 truck.	 	 Law	

enforcement	also	set	up	a	command	post	at	a	fire	station	in	Norridgewock.		The	
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fire	station	was	across	the	street	from	the	house	where	Corporal	Cole	had	been	

shot.	

[¶12]	 	 In	 the	 morning	 hours	 of	 April	 25,	 2018,	 the	 owner	 of	 the	

Norridgewock	house	went	outside	and	saw	a body	on	her	lawn.		She	screamed	

and	called	for	help,	attracting	the	attention	of	officers	at	the	fire	station,	who	

came	over	and	saw	Corporal	Cole’s	body,	with an	apparent	gunshot	wound	to	

the	neck.		Members	of	 the	State	Police	Evidence	Response	Team	arrived	and	

found	a	bullet	and	casing	on	the	lawn	and	a	bulletproof	vest,	shotgun,	holster,	

and	a	backpack	containing	ammunition	in	a	car on	the	property.	

[¶13]		Corporal	Cole’s	body	was	 taken	 to	 the	State	Medical	Examiner’s	

Office.	 	 An	 autopsy	 concluded	 that	 the	 cause	 of	 death	 was	 a	 close-contact	

gunshot	wound	to	the	right	side	of	the	neck	below	the	ear	“which	perforated	

the	cervical	spinal	cord.”		

[¶14]		Meanwhile,	a	manhunt	for	Williams	was	underway.		On	April	28,	

2018,	officers came	upon	a	remote	camp	in	the	area	of	Bear	Mountain	Road	and	

set up	a	perimeter.		The	officers	heard	a	banging	noise	and	saw	Williams	come	

out	of	the	camp	shirtless,	carrying	a	clear	plastic	tote,	and	wearing	only	a	pair	

of	 long	 johns.	 	 Officers	 quickly	 surrounded	 Williams.	 He	 was	 taken	 to	 the	

ground	and	placed	under	arrest.		
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[¶15]		While	placing	handcuffs	on	Williams,	one	of	the	officers	punched	

Williams	in	the	head “two	or	three	times”	when	it	appeared	that	he was	refusing	

to	move	his	right	hand.

1		One	officer	pulled	down	Williams’s	long	johns	to	make	

sure	he	did	not	have	a	gun	in	his	waistband	and, observing	that	Williams	had	

defecated, removed	 the	 long	 johns.	 	 A photo	 was	 taken	 showing	 an	 officer	

pulling	Williams’s	head	up	by	his	hair while	he	was	lying	on	his	stomach.		The	

officers	then	reported	to	the	command	post	that	they	had	Williams	in	custody.		

[¶16]		After	approximately	twenty	minutes,	a	tactical	team	arrived	and	

walked	Williams out	 of	 the	woods.2	 	Williams remained	 naked	 and	 barefoot	

while	waiting	for	the	tactical	team	to	arrive	and for	most	of	the ten-minute walk,	

but	he	was	wrapped	in	a	blanket	before	exiting	the	woods.		Two	Major	Crimes	

Unit	detectives who met	Williams	near	the	edge	of	the	woods said	they	would	

like	to	speak	with	him, and	Williams	agreed.		The	detectives—who	had not	been	

involved	in	the	arrest—took	custody	of	Williams	from	the	arresting officers	and	

walked	him	to	their	cruiser.		

 1		Williams	may	have	been	unable	to	physically	comply	with	the	officer’s	request	because	another	

officer	was	standing	on	Williams’s	right	hand.		

2	 	 While	 Williams	 was	 being	 escorted	 out	 of	 the	 woods,	 Evidence	 Response	 Team	 members	

searched	the	camp	and	found	a	9mm	Ruger	handgun,	a	machine	pistol,	and	ammunition.		Although	

testing	 of	 the	 bullets	 recovered	 from	 the	 crime	 scene	 was	 inconclusive,	 the	 casing	 found	 near	

Corporal	Cole’s	body	matched	the	Ruger	recovered	from	the	cabin.		
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[¶17]	 	 The	 detectives	 drove	 Williams	 to	 the	 Waterville	 Police	

Department.		He	was	alert	and	responsive	to	the	detective’s	questions	about	his	

physical	condition,	reporting	that	while	he	was	not	injured,

3 he	was	cold and

hungry,	and	his	hands	hurt.		

[¶18]		The	detectives	brought	Williams	to	an	interrogation	room	at	the	

police	department,	where	he	was	examined	by	emergency	medical	personnel	

and	medically	cleared.		The	detectives	then	interviewed	Williams	and	gave	him	

food,	water,	fruit	punch,	and	clothing.		The	detectives	began	the	interview	by	

reading Williams	his	Miranda	rights and confirmed	that	he	understood	them.

Approximately	 nine minutes	 after waiving	 his	 Miranda	 rights,	 Williams	

confessed to killing	Corporal	Cole.		Later,	approximately	ninety	minutes	into	the	

interview,	 Williams	 described	 and	 participated	 in	 a	 reenactment of	 the	

shooting with	the	detectives	and	other	officers.		

B. Procedural	History

[¶19]	 	 On	 April	 25,	 2018,	 Williams	 was	 charged	 by	 complaint	 with	

intentional	or	knowing	murder,	17-A	M.R.S.	§	201(1)(A),	and with	the	consent	

of	 the	parties,	 the	court	 ordered	 that	 the	case	be	 transferred	 from	Somerset	

 3		At	one	point	during	the	drive	to	the	police	department,	Williams	stated,	“They	did	a	number	on	

me,”	an	apparent	reference	to	the	officers	who	arrested	him	at	the	remote	campsite.		
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County	 to	 Cumberland	 County	 on	 April	 30,	 2018.	 	 M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 21(b)(2).		

Later,	 on June 7,	2018,	the	 Cumberland	 County	 Grand	 Jury	 handed	 down	 an	

indictment	charging	Williams	with	intentional	or	knowing	murder,	17-A	M.R.S.	

§ 201(1)(A).		Williams	pleaded	not	guilty.		

[¶20]		On	August	27,	2018,	Williams	moved	 to	suppress	his	confession	

and	 other	 statements	 to	 the	 detectives,	 including	 the	 reenactment	 of	 the	

shooting,	arguing	that	they	were	not	voluntarily	given	because	he	was	fatigued,	

hungry,	suffering	from	drug	withdrawal,	and	fearful	for	his	safety	because	he	

had	been	“beat[en]	and	pummeled”	by	officers	during	his	arrest.		The	court	held	

hearings	 on	 Williams’s	 motion	 to	 suppress	 on February	 28, March	 1,	 and

April 8,	 2019.	 	 The	 court	 granted	 the	 motion	 in	 part,	 suppressing only

(1) statements	 made	 by	 Williams later	 in	 the	 interview,	 (2)	 Williams’s

participation	 in	 the	 reenactment	 of	 the	 shooting	 at	 the	 police	 station, and	

(3) the	statements	Williams	made	during	that	reenactment	and	afterward.4		

[¶21]		A	six-day	jury	trial	took	place	in	June	2019.		During	the	trial,	the	

court	allowed	the	State	to	introduce	expert	testimony	from	Investigator	Larry	

 4		Specifically,	the	court	suppressed	the	reenactment	and	all	statements	made	after	the	1:28:47	

mark	of	the	video	admitted	at	the	suppression	hearing	as	State’s	Exhibit	2, but	denied	the	motion	to	

suppress	as	to	Williams’s	statements	made	up	to	the	1:28:46	mark.		State’s	Exhibit	84,	admitted	at	

trial,	is	the	portion	of	the	video	that	was	not	suppressed.
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Morrill	of	the	Office	of	the	State	Fire	Marshal	describing	how	the	shooting	may	

have	occurred.		Based	on	Morrill’s	testimony,	the	court	permitted	the	State	to	

conduct a	 courtroom	 reenactment	 of	 the	 shooting.	 	 Before	the	 reenactment

began,	 the	 court	 gave	 a	 limiting	 instruction	 to	 the	 jury	 stating	 that	 the	

reenactment	only	represents	“the	State’s	version	of	the	events,”	that	it	should	

not	be	seen	as	“an	actual	re-creation	of	the	crime,”	and	that	the	jury	is	free	to	

accept	or	reject	it	“in	whole	or	in	part.”		

[¶22]		The	jury	returned	a	verdict	of	guilty	on	the	sole	count	of	intentional	

or	knowing	murder.		The	court	imposed	a	sentence	of	life	imprisonment	after	a	

sentencing	 hearing	 and	 entered	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 on	 September	 12,	

2019.

[¶23]	 	 Williams	 timely	 appealed	 from	 the	 judgment	 of	 conviction,	

15 M.R.S.	 §	2115	 (2020);	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(b)(1), and	also	applied	 for	leave	 to	

appeal	 his	 sentence,	 15	 M.R.S.	 §§	 2151,	 2153 (2020);	 M.R.	 App.	 P.	 20.	 	 The	

Sentence	Review	Panel	granted	Williams’s	application	 for	leave	 to appeal	his	

sentence	on	November	19,	2019.		State	v.	Williams,	No.	SRP-19-398	(Me.	Sent.	

Rev.	Panel	Nov.	19,	2019);	see	also	15	M.R.S.	§	2152	(2020);	M.R.	App.	P.	20(g),	

(h).
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II.		DISCUSSION

A. In-Court	Demonstration	

[¶24]	 	 Williams	 first	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 in	

permitting	the	State	to	introduce	an	in-court	physical	reenactment	of	how	the	

shooting	may	have	occurred	based	on	the	testimony	of	Investigator	Morrill.		He	

contends	 that Morrill was	 not	 qualified	 as	 an	 expert	 to	 give	 an	 opinion	 on	

shooting	 reconstruction or	 bloodstain	 pattern	 analysis and	that the	 opinion	

itself	was	not	relevant.		See	M.R.	Evid.	702,	401.		

1. Expert	Opinion	and	Relevance

[¶25]		We	review	“a	court’s	foundational	finding	that	expert	testimony	is	

sufficiently	 reliable	 for	 clear	 error”	 and	 its	 ultimate	 decision	 on	 the	

admissibility	of	expert	opinion	 testimony	 for	an	abuse	of	discretion.		State	v.	

Maine,	2017	ME	25, ¶	16,	155	A.3d	871 (quotation	marks	omitted).		Maine	Rule	

of	 Evidence	 702	 provides:	 “A	 witness	 who	 is	 qualified	 as	 an	 expert	 by	

knowledge,	skill,	experience,	training, or	education	may	testify	in	the	form	of	an	

opinion	or	otherwise	if	such	testimony	will	help	the	trier	of	fact	to	understand	

the	evidence	or	to	determine	a	fact	in	issue.”		To	be	admissible	under	Rule	702,	

expert	 testimony	 must	 be	 relevant	 and	 must “assist	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 in	
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understanding	the	evidence	or	determining	a	fact	at	issue.”		State	v.	Burbank,	

2019	ME	37,	¶	8,	204	A.3d	851	(quotation	marks	omitted).		

[¶26]	 	 Expert	 testimony	 is	 relevant	 if	 the	 proponent,	 among	 other	

requirements, “has	 presented	 a	 sufficient	 demonstration	 of	 reliability.”	 	 Id.		

Common	indicia	of	reliability	include	“whether	an	expert’s	conclusion	has	been	

tailored	 to	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case,”	 “whether	 any	 other	 experts	 attest	 to	 the	

reliability	 of	 the	 testimony,”	 and	 “the	 nature	 of	 the	 expert’s	 qualifications.”		

Maine,	2017	ME	25,	¶ 17,	155	A.3d	871.		

[¶27]		Investigator	Morrill	testified	in	great	detail	about	his	specialized	

training	 and	 experience	 in	 shooting	 reconstruction, trajectory	 analysis, and	

bloodstain	 pattern	 analysis.	 He	 then	 testified	 as	 to	 his	 opinion	 of	 how	 the	

shooting	may	have	occurred	and	thoroughly	explained	what	he	did	at	the	scene	

and	the	basis	for	his	opinion.		His	conclusions	were	drawn	from	the	facts	of	this	

case, and	his	work	was	peer-reviewed	by	longstanding	experts	in	the	field.		See	

id.		On	this	record,	we	conclude	that	the	court	did	not	clearly	err	in	finding	that	

Investigator	Morrill’s	qualifications	in	shooting	reconstruction	were	sufficient	

for	him	to	testify	on	the	matter	and	that	his	testimony	was	sufficiently	reliable	

and	would	be helpful	to	the	jury	“to	understand the evidence or to determine a

fact in issue.” M.R.	Evid.	702.		Further,	the	court	did	not	abuse	its	discretion	in	
12

admitting	Investigator	Morrill’s	testimony	after	finding	it	reliable.		See	Maine,	

2017	 ME	 25,	 ¶¶	 16-17,	 155	 A.3d	 871.	 	 Finally,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 doubt	 that	

Investigator	Morrill’s	opinion	was	relevant.		M.R.	Evid.	401.

2. Unfair	Surprise

[¶28]	 	 Williams	 next	 argues	 that	 he	 was	 unfairly	 surprised,	 meaning	

prejudiced,	 by	the	in-court	 reenactment	 of	 the	 shooting	 because	 he	was	 not	

shown	 the	 actual	 demonstration	 until	 the	 voir	 dire	 of	 Investigator	 Morrill	

during	trial.		See	M.R.	Evid.	403.		And,	in	line	with	this	argument,	he	contends	

that	 the	 trial	court	abused	its	discretion	in	denying his	motion	 for	a	mistrial	

based	on	that unfair	surprise.		

[¶29]		We	review	a	 trial	court’s	admission	of	evidence	over	a	Rule	403	

objection	for	an	abuse	of	discretion.		State	v.	Michaud,	2017	ME	170,	¶	8,	168	

A.3d	802.		Rule	403	provides	that	even	relevant	evidence	may	be	excluded	“if	

its	 probative	 value	 is	 substantially	 outweighed	 by	 a	 danger	 of	 .	 .	 .	 unfair	

prejudice,	confusing	the	issues,	misleading	the	jury,	undue	delay,	wasting	time,	

or	needlessly	presenting	cumulative	evidence.”		M.R.	Evid.	403.		

[¶30]		In-court	demonstrative	evidence	is	especially	persuasive, and	we	

have	 held	 that	 a	 trial	 court	 should	 “carefully”	 exercise	 its	 discretion	 before	

allowing	 such evidence	 because	 it	 “may	 convey	 an	 impression	 of	 objective	
13

reality	to	the	trier	[of	fact].”		State	v.	Philbrick,	436	A.2d	844,	859-60	(Me.	1981).

In	 Philbrick,	 we	 noted	 the	 dangers	 that	 demonstrative	 evidence,	 especially	

evidence	that	does	not	have	a	proper	scientific	foundation,	may	pose	to	a	jury:	

Such	 experimental	 demonstrative	 evidence	in	 the eyes	 of	jurors,	

because	 of	 its	 asserted	 foundation	 in	 scientific	 principle	 or	

technique,	carrie[s] such	an	inherent	objective	impact	that	it	could	

unduly	influence	the	jury	in	its	findings	of	the	underlying	necessary	

facts	 at	issue,	without	 adequate	 basic	 facts	 to	 sustain	 a	 scientific	

conclusion	.	.	.	.

Id.	at	860.		There,	we	concluded	that	the	court	erroneously	admitted	an	alleged	

expert’s	demonstration	of	the	shooting	because	it	had	not	been	shown	that	the	

demonstration	was	 substantially	 similar	 to	 the	 actual	 events	 of	 the	 shooting	

and	it	was	based	on	unreliable	scientific	methods.		Id.	at	859-60.		

[¶31]	 	 Here,	 the	 court	 determined	 that	 the	 demonstration	 was	 not	

unfairly	 prejudicial	and	did	not	waste	 time	 or	confuse	 the	issues.	 M.R.	Evid.	

403.	 To	the	contrary,	the	court	reasoned	that	Investigator	Morrill’s	testimony	

and	the	demonstration	helped clarify	and	tie	together	the	testimony	of	previous	

witnesses.		The	court	also	 found	 that	unlike	in	Philbrick,	 Investigator	Morrill	

was	qualified	to	present	his	opinion	and	the	report	he	prepared	that	served	as	

the	basis	for	the	demonstration	was	verifiable	and	scientifically	accurate.		

[¶32]		Most	importantly,	before	allowing	the	demonstration	to	proceed,	

the	court	instructed	the	jury	that	it	represented	“only	a	re-creation	of	the	State’s	
14

version	of	the	events”	that	“should	in	no	way	be	viewed	as	an	actual	re-creation	

of	 the	 crime”	 and	 could	 “be	 accepted	 or	 rejected	 in	 whole	 or	 in	 [p]art.”	 	 In	

crafting	this	instruction,	the	court	looked	to	language	found	in	Harris	v.	State,	

13	P.3d	489,	496 (Okla.	Crim.	App.	2000),	which	in	 turn,	 relied	 on	a	limiting	

instruction	created	in	Clark	v.	Cantrell,	529	S.E.2d	528,	537	(S.C.	2000).		

[¶33]	 	We	 commend	 the	 court’s	 use	 of	this language.	 	With	 respect	 to	

demonstrative	 or	 reenactment	 evidence,	 the	 court’s	 limiting	 instruction	

addressed the	 major	 concern	 we	 expressed	 in	 Philbrick,	 namely	 that	 such	

evidence	tends	to	be	highly	prejudicial	to	a	jury	by	“convey[ing]	an	impression	

of	 objective	 reality to	 the	 trier	 [of	 fact].”	 	 436	 A.2d	 at	 859.	 	 The	 court’s	

instruction	 alleviated	 this	 danger	 by	 making	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 demonstration	

only	 represented	 the	 State’s	 version	 of	 events	 and	 should	 not	 be	 seen	 as	 an	

actual	re-creation	of	the	crime	as	it	occurred.		Therefore,	we	conclude	that	the	

trial	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in	 allowing	 the	 demonstration	 to	 be	

presented	to	the	jury	over	Williams’s	Rule	403	objection.		

3. Motion	for	a	Mistrial

[¶34]	 	 Next,	 Williams	 contends—also	 based	 on	 his	 claim	 that	 he	 was	

unfairly	 surprised	 by	 the	 State’s	 in-court	 demonstration	 because	 he	 had	 no	

notice,	 until	 the	 fourth	 day	 of	 trial,	 that	 the	 State	 would	 be	 re-creating	 the	
15

shooting—that	 the	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 in	 denying	 his	 motion	 for	 a	

mistrial.

5 We	 review	 the	 denial	 of	 a	 motion	 for	 a	 mistrial	 for	 an	 abuse	 of	

discretion	 and	 “will	 overrule	 the	 denial	 of	 a	 mistrial	 only	 in	 the	 event	 of	

exceptionally	 prejudicial	 circumstances	 or	 prosecutorial	 bad	 faith.”	 	 State	 v.	

Logan,	2014	ME	92,	¶	14,	97	A.3d	121 (quotation	marks	omitted).		“A	motion	

for	a	mistrial	should	be	denied	except	in	the	rare	circumstance	that	the	trial	is	

unable	 to	 continue	 with	 a	 fair	 result	 and	 only	 a	 new	 trial	 will	 satisfy	 the	

interests	of	justice.”		State	v.	Poblete,	2010	ME	37,	¶	26,	993	A.2d	1104	(quoting	

State	v.	Bridges,	2004	ME	102,	¶	11,	854	A.2d	855).		

[¶35]		Notwithstanding	Williams’s contention,	the	record	indicates	that,

although Williams	saw	 the	State’s	physical	demonstration	of	 the	shooting	 for	

the	 first	 time	 on	 the	 fourth	 day	 of	 the	 trial,	 he	 had	 received	 a	 copy	 of	

Investigator	 Morrill’s	 report	 approximately	 five	 months	 before	 trial.	 	 That	

report	concluded	 that	 there	were	 two	possible	 scenarios	 or	explanations	 for	

Corporal	Cole’s	positioning	at	the	time	he	was	shot,	which	was	consistent	with	

 5		Williams’s	motion	 for	a	mistrial	was	prompted	by	an	overnight	conversation	that	Williams’s	

attorney	had	with	an	expert	between	the	fourth	and	fifth	days	of	trial.	 During	that	conversation, the	

expert	purportedly	said	that	he	believed	that	the	State’s	demonstration	was	inaccurate.		By	that	time,	

Williams	had	been	in	possession	of	Investigator	Morrill’s	report	and	conclusions	for	five	months,	and

it	is	unclear	why	he	waited	until	the	middle	of	trial	to	consult	with	his	expert.		
16

Investigator	Morrill’s	testimony6 at	trial	and	with	the	demonstration	itself.		The	

record	 also	 suggests	 that	 before	 trial, the	 State	had	informed	Williams	 of	its	

intent	 to	present	an	in-court	physical	demonstration	of	 Investigator	Morrill’s	

conclusions	regarding	the	positions	of	the	shooter	and	the	victim.		

[¶36]		Further,	if	Williams	wanted	to	offer	expert	testimony	to	challenge	

the	 accuracy	 of	 the	 State’s	 demonstration,	 the	 State	 offered	 to join	 with	

Williams	in	a	request	that	the	court	hold	the	evidence	open	to	allow	Williams

to	 retain	 the expert with	 whom	 he	 had	 consulted	 after	 the	 State’s	

demonstration.	 	 Williams	 declined	 this	 offer	 for	 strategic	 reasons,	 however,	

because	although	Williams’s	expert apparently	disagreed	with	portions	of	the	

in-court	demonstration, the	expert	agreed	with	many	of	Investigator	Morrill’s	

conclusions	 regarding	 the	 proximity	 of	 the	 gun	 to	 Corporal	 Cole’s	 neck	 and	

Corporal	Cole’s	position	on	the	ground.		

[¶37]	 	 In	 short,	 on	 this	 record,	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	 “exceptionally	

prejudicial	 circumstances	 or	 prosecutorial	 bad	 faith”	 that	 would	 provide	

grounds	 for	 overruling	 the	court’s	 denial	 of	Williams’s	motion	 for	 a	mistrial.		

 6		In	addition	to	being	consistent	with	his	pretrial	 report,	 Investigator	Morrill’s	testimony	was	

consistent	with,	and	 tied	together,	 the	already	overwhelming	evidence	against	Williams,	including	

the	physical	evidence	and	Williams’s	own	confession.		It	is	therefore	unlikely	that	the	verdict	would	

have	been	different	if	the	demonstration	had	been excluded.	
17

Logan,	2014	ME	92,	¶	14,	97	A.3d	121 (quotation	marks	omitted).	 Although	

Williams	did	not	see the	physical	demonstration	of	the	shooting	until	the	fourth	

day	 of	 trial,	 the	 State	 had	 informed	 Williams	 of	 its	 intent	 to	 re-create	 the	

shooting	during	trial, and	the	demonstration	itself	closely	tracked	Investigator	

Morrill’s	testimony	as	well	as	his	report.

[¶38]	 	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 State’s	 demonstration	 did	 not	

unduly prejudice Williams	or	prevent	him	from	receiving	a	fair	and	just	trial.		

See	Bridges,	2004	ME	102,	¶	10,	854	A.2d	855	(“The	court's	determination	of	

whether	 exposure	 to	 potentially	 prejudicial	 extraneous	 evidence	 would	

incurably	 taint	 the	 jury	 verdict	 or	 whether	 a	 curative	 instruction	 would	

adequately	 protect	 against	 consideration	 of	 the	 matter	 stands	 unless	 clearly	

erroneous.” (quotation	marks	omitted));	see	also	State	v.	Frisbee,	2016	ME	83,	

¶	 29,	 140	 A.3d	 1230	 (“Ultimately,	 the	 decision	 on	 whether	 to	 grant	 a	

defendant's motion	for	a	mistrial	comes	back	to	the	core	principles	of	fairness	

and	justice;	the	relevant	question	for	the	trial	court	is	whether	the	trial	court	is	

confident	that	the	trial	can	proceed	to	a	fair	and	just	verdict	in	the	context	of	

the	proceedings	before	it.”).		We	conclude	that	the	trial	court	did	not	abuse	its	

discretion	in	denying	Williams’s	motion	for	a	mistrial.		
18

B. Motion	to	Suppress

[¶39]	 	 The	 court	 concluded	 that	 all	 of	 Williams’s	 statements	 to	 the	

interviewing	detectives	up	to	the	1:28:46	mark	on	the	interrogation	video	were	

voluntary	and	denied	the	motion	to	suppress	his	statements	up	to	that	point.		

The	 court	 granted	 the	 motion	 to	 suppress	 his	 statements	 made	 after	 the	

1:28:46	mark along	with	Williams’s	subsequent	reenactment	of	the	shooting.		

[¶40]		Williams	contends	that	all	of	his	statements	to	the	detectives	were	

involuntary	 and	 should	 have	 been	 excluded.	 	 Williams’s	 voluntariness	

argument	is	in	two	parts:	First,	he	contends	that	the	court	“completely	ignored	

and	 dodged	 [his]	 argument	 regarding	 his	 reasonable	 fear	 based	 on	 his	

interactions	with	the	arrest	and	transport	teams.”		More	specifically,	he	argues	

that	his	treatment	by	the	arresting	officers	caused	him	to	fear	for	his	safety	and	

led	 him	 to	 believe	 that	 if	 he	 did	 not	 cooperate	 with	 police,	 including	 the	

detectives,	he	would	face	physical	retaliation.		Second,	Williams	contends	that	

his	fatigue,	hunger,	and	drug	withdrawal	affected	his	ability	to	knowingly	and	

voluntarily	waive	his	right	to	remain	silent	or	provide	voluntary	statements.		

[¶41]		“We	review	the denial	of	a	motion	to	suppress	for	clear	error	as	to	

factual	issues	and	de	novo	as	to	issues	of	law,	and	will	uphold	the	court’s	denial	

of	a	motion	to	suppress	if	any	reasonable	view	of	the	evidence	supports	the	trial	
19

court’s	decision.”		State	v.	Ormsby,	2013	ME	88,	¶	 9,	81	A.3d	336 (quotation	

marks	omitted).

[¶42]	 	 “A	 confession	 is	 admissible	 in	 evidence	 only	 if	 it	 was	 given	

voluntarily,	 and	 the	 State	 has	 the	 burden	 to	 prove	 voluntariness	 beyond	 a	

reasonable	doubt.”		State	v.	Wiley,	2013	ME	30,	¶	15,	61	A.3d	750;	see	also	State	

v.	Rees,	2000	ME	55,	¶	6,	748	A.2d	976.		“The	voluntariness	requirement	gives	

effect	to	three	overlapping	but	conceptually	distinct	values:	(1)	it	discourages	

objectionable	 police	 practices;	 (2)	 it	 protects	 the	 mental	 freedom	 of	 the	

individual;	and	(3)	it	preserves	a	quality	of	fundamental	fairness	in	the	criminal	

justice	system.”		Wiley,	2013	ME	30,	¶ 16,	61	A.3d	750	(quoting	State	v.	Sawyer,	

2001	ME	88,	¶	8,	772	A.2d	1173).		

[¶43]		A	voluntary	confession	is	one	that	“results	from	the	free	choice	of	

a	rational	mind,	if	it	is	not	a	product	of	coercive	police	conduct,	and	if	under	all	

of	the	circumstances	its	admission	would	be	fundamentally	fair.”		Wiley,	2013	

ME	30, ¶	16,	61	A.3d	750	(quotation	marks	omitted).		In	determining	whether	

a	confession	is	voluntary,	we	examine	the	totality	of	the	circumstances,	which	

includes	both	external	and	internal	factors,	such	as	

the	 details	 of	 the	 interrogation;	 duration	 of	 the	 interrogation;	

location	 of	 the	 interrogation;	 whether	 the	 interrogation	 was	

custodial;	 the	 recitation	 of	 Miranda	 warnings;	 the	 number	 of	

officers	 involved;	 the	 persistence	 of	 the	 officers;	 police	 trickery;	
20

threats,	promises	or	inducements	made	to	the	defendant;	and	the	

defendant’s	 age,	 physical	 and	 mental	 health,	 emotional	 stability,	

and	conduct.

State	v.	Sawyer,	2001	ME	88,	¶	9,	772	A.2d	1173;	see, e.g.,	State	v.	Mikulewicz,	

462	A.2d	497,	501	(Me.	1983).	

[¶44]		Williams	first	argues	that	his	confession	was	not	voluntary	because	

the	use	 of	 force	by	 the	arresting	 officers	caused	him	 to	be	in	 “fear	 of	 further	

beating”	if	he	did	not	cooperate	with	the	detectives when	they	interviewed	him.	

The	court	found	that	Williams	had	been	punched	by	an	arresting	officer	“at	a	

time	when	he	was	handcuffed	and	offering	no	significant	resistance,”7 and	that	

he	 had	 been	 held	 down,	 naked,	 on	 the	 ground	 for	 approximately	 twenty	

minutes	 before	 being	 escorted	 out	 of	 the	 woods.8	 	 Nevertheless,	 the	 court,	

informed	by	Leon	v.	State,	410	So.	2d	201	(Fla.	Dist.	Ct.	App.	1982),	and	Lyons	v.	

Oklahoma,	322	U.S.	596	(1944),	determined	that	the	effect	on	Williams	of	the	

“initial	impropriety	by	law	enforcement”	in	the	woods	did	not	render	his	later	

confession	involuntary.		

 7		Although	Williams	suggests	that	he	defecated	on	himself	because	of	the	punches	inflicted	on	him	

during	his	arrest,	his	own	expert	witness	testified	that	it	was	not	plausible	that	fear	and	stress	caused	

him	to	defecate;	rather,	the	expert	testified,	it	was	far	more	likely	that	he	did	so	because	of	opiate	

withdrawal	and	gastrointestinal	symptoms.		

8 The court also rejected	the	assertion	by	an	arresting	officer	that	pulling	Williams’s	head	up	by	

his	hair	had	been	necessary	to	confirm	his	identity.		
21

[¶45]		In	Lyons,	police	obtained	an	initial,	involuntary	confession	from	a

defendant	using	coercive	interrogation	techniques	before	obtaining	a	second,	

voluntary	confession	from	the	defendant	later	in	the	day.		322	U.S.	at	598-601.		

The	 Court	 stated	 that	 “[t]he	 question	 of	 whether	 those	 confessions	

subsequently	given	are	themselves	voluntary	depends	on	the	inferences	as	to	

the	continuing	effect	of	the	coercive	practices	which	may	fairly	be	drawn	from	

the	surrounding	circumstances.”		Id.	at	602.		Despite	the	initial	impropriety,	the	

Court	affirmed	 the	voluntariness	of	 the	defendant’s	second	confession.		Id.	at	

605.		 In	 reaching	 that	conclusion,	 the	Court	noted	 that	 twelve	hours	elapsed	

between	 the	 two	 confessions	 and	 that	 the	 second	 confession	 was given	 to	

individuals	who	had not engaged	in	 the initial,	coercive	interrogation.		Id.	at	

604-05.		

[¶46]		Similarly,	in	Leon,	the	District	Court	of	Appeal	of	Florida	concluded	

that	“under	appropriate	circumstances,	the	effect	of	an	initial	impropriety,	even	

a	coercive	one,	in	securing	a	confession	may	be	removed	by	intervening	events,	

with	 the	 result	 that	 a	 subsequent	 statement	is	 rendered	 free	 of	 the	 primary	

taint	 and	 thus	 admissible	 into	 evidence	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 free	 and	

voluntary	act.”		Leon,	410	So.	2d	at	203 (quotation	marks	omitted).		Under	the	
22

Florida	court’s	reasoning,	the	most	significant	factor	in	its	analysis	was	whether	

force	was	or	was	not inflicted	in	order	to	secure	the	defendant’s	confession.		Id.	

[¶47]	 	 Here,	 the	 court	 found	 that	 the	 arresting	 officers’	 treatment	 of

Williams was	not	for	the	purpose	of obtaining his	confession.		See	id.	(collecting	

cases).		Williams	was	not	asked	any	questions	about	the	crime	during	his	arrest	

and	transport	out	of	the	woods,	the	interrogation	itself	was	conducted	by	two	

detectives	who	were	not	present	in	the	woods	during	the	arrest,	the	arresting	

officers	had	no	further	interaction	with	Williams	after	he	was	handed	off	to	the	

detectives, and	 they	 were	 not	 present	 during the	 interrogation,	 which	 took	

place	at	 the	Waterville	Police	Department	away	 from	 the	scene	of	 the	arrest.		

Further,	the	interrogating	detectives	did	not	threaten, make any	promises, or	

offer	any	inducements to	Williams,	see	Wiley,	2013	ME	30,	¶¶ 18-30,	61	A.3d	

750, and	they	gave	Williams Miranda	warnings	before	questioning	him.		

[¶48]		Thus,	we	conclude	that	the	trial	court	did	not	err	in	determining	

that	 under	 the	 totality	 of	 the	 circumstances,	 the	 inappropriate	 force	 used	

during	Williams’s	 arrest	 did	 not	 render	involuntary	 his	later	 confession	 and	

other	statements	to	the	detectives.		See	Sawyer,	2001	ME	88,	¶	9,	772	A.2d	1173;

People	 v.	 Richardson,	 917	 N.E.2d	 501,	 516-17	 (Ill.	 2009) (stating	 that	 in	

determining	 whether	 incidental	 use	 of	 physical	 force	 renders	 a	 confession	
23

involuntary,	“[c]ourts	look	to	factors	such	as	gaps	in	time	between	the	use	of	

force	 and	 the	 confession,	 changed	 interrogators	 or	 location,	 and	 renewed	

Miranda	warnings”);	see	also	Lyons,	322	U.S.	at	602-05;	United	States	v.	Denton,	

246	F.3d	784,	786-88	(6th	Cir.	2001).	 But	see	United	States	v.	Jenkins,	938	F.2d	

934,	 939-40	 (9th	 Cir.	 1991); United	 States	 v.	 Gonzalez,	 719	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 167,	

181-83	(D.	Mass.	2010).

[¶49]	 	Turning	 to	Williams’s	 second	 contention	 regarding	 his	 physical	

condition	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 interrogation,	 the	 court	 did	 not	 clearly	 err	 in	

determining	that,	at	least	up	to	the	1:28:46	mark	on	the	video, Williams’s	prior	

drug	use	or	withdrawal	did	not	actually	impair	his	physical	or	mental	condition.		

We	 and	 other	courts	have	held	 that	addiction	 to,	use	 of,	 or	withdrawal	 from	

drugs	 does not	 automatically	 render	 an	 otherwise	 voluntary	 confession	

involuntary.		See	State	v.	Ashe,	425	A.2d	191,	193-94	(Me.	1981);	see	also	United	

States	v.	Palmer,	203	F.3d	55,	61-62 (1st	Cir.	2000);	People	v.	Johnson,	168	Misc.	

2d	 81,	 89	 (N.Y.	 1995).	 Rather,	 as	 we	 stated	 in	 Ashe,	 “[t]he	 particular	

circumstances	 of	 each	 case	 must	 be	 evaluated	 to	 determine	 whether	 a	

defendant’s	drug-related	condition	made	him	incapable	of	acting	voluntarily,	

knowingly	and	intelligently.”		425	A.2d	at	194.		
24

[¶50]		Here,	as	the	trial	court	found,	Williams	“appear[ed]	to	be	rational	

and	responded	to	questions	with	appropriate	answers,”	he	did	“not	disclose	any	

bizarre,	psychotic,	or	drug-induced	behavior,”	and	he	did not	“exhibit	any	fear	

or	resistance	to	speaking.”		Like	the	defendant	in	Ashe,	Williams	“appeared	lucid	

and	rational,	able	to	respond	coherently	to	questions,	and	able	to	engage	in	a	

narrative	 account	 of	 the	 events	 in	 question”	 while	 being	 questioned	 by	 the	

detectives.		See	id.		Prior	to	questioning	at	the	police	station,	Williams	had	been

examined	 by	 emergency	 medical	 personnel	 who	 concluded	 that	 he	 was	

“medically	clear,”	and	Williams	declined	their	offer	to	be	checked	out	further.		

[¶51]	 	 During	 the	 questioning,	 detectives	 provided	 Williams	 with	 a	

blanket,	clothing,	 food,	water,	and,	at Williams’s	specific	request,	 fruit	punch,	

because	 he	 was	 cold,	 hungry,	 and	 thirsty.	 	 Cf.	 State	 v.	 Blank,	 955	 So.	 2d	 90,	

106-08	 (La.	 2007);	 but	 see People	 v.	 Anderson,	 364	 N.E.2d	 1318,	 1321	 (N.Y.	

1977).	 Williams	 confessed	 early	 in	 the	 interview,	 and	 the	 unsuppressed	

portion	of	the	interview	was	not	particularly	lengthy,	lasting	less	than	ninety	

minutes.		Cf.	Berghuis	v.	Thompkins,	560	U.S.	370,	386-87	(2010) (“It	is	true	that	

apparently	he	was	in	a	 straight-backed	chair	 for	 three	hours,	but	 there	is	no	

authority	for	the	proposition	that	an	interrogation	of	this	length	is	inherently	

coercive.”); Blank,	955	So.	2d	at	105-06;	Commonwealth	v.	Tucker,	335	A.2d	704,	
25

708	 (Pa.	 1975). The	 detectives	 treated	 Williams	 well	 and	 were	 calm	 and	

respectful	 of	 him	 throughout	 the	 interview,	 which	 Williams	 himself	

acknowledged.		See	Blank,	955	So.	2d	at	106-08.

[¶52]		Finally,	up	until	the	1:28:46	mark, when	he	repeatedly	requested	

a	nap,	Williams	did	not	ask	to	stop	the	interview	at	any	point.		See	id.	at	107.	

Williams	 did	 not	 tell	 the	 officers	 that	 he	 was	 tired	 or	 needed	 a	 nap	 until	

approximately	 one	 hour	 and	 twenty-seven	 minutes	 into	 the	 interview.	 	 See	

State	v.	Timmendequas,	737	A.2d	55,	110	(N.J.	1999)(noting	that	the	“defendant	

never	indicated	 to	officers	 that	he	was	 too	 tired	or	hungry	 to	continue”).	 Up	

until	 that	point,	“there	was	no	evidence	 that	authorities	exploited	any	slowly	

mounting	 fatigue	 resulting	 from	 prolonged	 questioning,	 or	 that	 such	 fatigue	

occurred	 or	 played	 any	 role	 in	 defendant’s	 decision	 to	 confess.”	 	 People	 v.	

Williams,	233	P.3d	1000,	1031	(Cal.	2010) (quotation	marks	omitted).	 But	cf.	

Spano	v.	New	York,	360	U.S.	315,	321-24	(1959) (concluding	that	the	suspect’s	

will	 was	 overborne	 by	 “slowly	 mounting	 fatigue”	 during	 an	 eight-hour	

interrogation	 involving	 fifteen	 different	 questioners,	 during	 which	 the	

questioners	persisted	in	the	face	of	the	suspect’s	refusal	to	answer	on	the	advice	

of	 his	 attorney	 and	 refused	 his	 requests	 to	 contact	 his	 attorney).	 The	 court	

correctly	 found,	 however,	 that	 after	 the	 one-hour-and-twenty-minute	 mark,	
26

Williams’s	fatigue	and	weakness	reached	a	point	where	his	statements	were	no	

longer	voluntary.		See	State	v.	Kierstead,	2015	ME	45,	¶¶	16-17,	114	A.3d	984.

[¶53]		Considering	the	totality	of	the	circumstances,	we	conclude	that	the	

trial	 court	 did	 not	 err	 in	 denying	 Williams’s	 motion	 to	 suppress	 as	 to	 his	

confession	and	other	statements	made	up	until	the	1:28:46	mark	on	the	video.	

Ormsby,	2013	ME	88,	¶	29,	81	A.3d	336;	Sawyer,	2001	ME	88,	¶	9,	772	A.2d	

1173.		

C. Sentencing

[¶54]	 	Williams	 argues	 that	 “the	 sentencing	 court	 had	 pre-determined	

[his]	 sentence	 in	 this	 matter[]	 before	 the	 sentencing	 hearing”	 and	 that	 “the	

[c]ourt	did	not	consider	any	of	[his]	sentencing	arguments	strongly	mitigating	

against	a	life	sentence,	since	the	[c]ourt	had	clearly	already	made	its	decision	

before	the	parties	even	presented	their	arguments.”		

[¶55]	 	 In	 sentencing	 a	 defendant	 after	 a	 conviction	 for	 murder,	 the	

sentencing	court	employs	a	two-step	sentencing	process.		17-A	M.R.S.	§	1602(2)	

(2020).	 First,	 the	 court	 must	 “determine	 a	 basic	 term	 of	 imprisonment	 by	

considering	the	particular	nature	and	seriousness	of	the	offense	as	committed.”		

17-A	M.R.S. §	1602(1)(A).		Then,	the	court	must	“determine	the	maximum	term	

of	imprisonment	 to	 be	imposed	 by	 considering	 all	 other	 relevant	 sentencing	
27

factors,	 both	 aggravating	 and	 mitigating,	 appropriate	 to	 the	 case.”	 	 Id.	

§ 1602(1)(B).		

[¶56]		We	“review	the	court’s	determination	of	the	basic	sentence	on	the	

first	step	of	the	analysis	de	novo	 for	misapplication	of	law.”		State	v.	Holland,	

2012	 ME	 2,	 ¶	 38,	 34	 A.3d	 1130.	 	 We	 also	 review	 “the	 sentencing	 court’s	

determination	 of	 the	 basic	 period	 of	 incarceration	 for	 misapplication	 of	

sentencing	principles”	and	“for	an	abuse	of	the	court’s	sentencing	power.”		State	

v.	Nichols,	2013	ME	71,	¶	13,	72	A.3d	503.		The	maximum	sentence	set	by	the	

court	is	reviewed	 for	an	abuse	of	discretion.		See State	v.	Sweet,	2000	ME	14,	

¶ 15,	745	A.2d	368.		Finally,	we	review	the	sentence	imposed	for	“disregard	of	

the	relevant	sentencing	factors	or	abuse	of	the	court’s	sentencing	power.”		State	

v.	Koehler,	2012	ME	93,	¶	32,	46	A.3d	1134.			

[¶57]		“A	person	convicted	of	the	crime	of	murder must	be	sentenced	to	

imprisonment	for	life	or	for	any	terms	of	years	that	is	not	less	than	25.”		17-A	

M.R.S.	§	1603(1) (2020).		The	murder	of	a	law	enforcement	officer	while	in	the	

performance	of	his	or	her	duties	is	an	aggravating	circumstance	that	may	justify	

the	imposition	of	a	life	sentence.		State	v.	Shortsleeves,	580	A.2d	145,	149-50	

(Me.	1990).
28

[¶58]	 	 In	 determining	 the	 basic	 sentence	 at	 step	 one,	 the	 court	 was	

mindful	 of	its	 duty	 to	 “consider	 the	 particular	 nature	 and	 seriousness	 of	 the	

crime,”	weighing	“the	convicted	person’s	conduct	against	other	more	heinous	

and	 less	 heinous	 possible	 ways	 of	 committing	 the	 crime.”	 	 The	 court	 also	

articulated	the	purposes	and	goals	of	sentencing	that	it	considered appropriate	

to	 the	 case.	 	 Finally,	 the	 court	 observed	 that	 the	 authorized	 range	 was	

imprisonment	for	twenty-five	years	to	life.		State	v.	Lord,	2019	ME	82,	¶	25,	208	

A.3d	781.	 As	for	the	nature	and	seriousness	of	the	crime,	the	court	noted	that	

this	 was	 the murder	 of	 a	 police	 officer	 in	 the	 line	 of	 duty,	 an	 aggravating	

circumstance	according	to	our	precedent,	see	id.	¶¶	27-28,	30,	32; Shortsleeves,	

580	A.2d	at	149-50,	and	that	Williams	decided	to	“eliminate”	the	deputy	sheriff	

and	then	shot	Corporal	Cole	in	the	neck	at	close	range.		After	looking to	the	laws

of	Maine	and	many	other	jurisdictions	to	aid	in	its	effort	to	place	this	crime	in	

context	and	 fashion	 a	basic	sentence	consistent	with	 those	imposed	in	 other	

jurisdictions,	the	court	determined	that	the	basic	sentence	should	be	sixty-five	

years’	imprisonment.9		

[¶59]		The	court	then	proceeded	to	step	two	and	considered	aggravating	

and	 mitigating	 factors	 to	 determine	 the	 maximum	 sentence.	 	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

 9		Williams	does	not	argue	that	the	court	erred	in	setting	the	basic	sentence	at	sixty-five	years.	
29

§ 1602(1)(B);	Lord,	2019	ME	82,	¶¶	31-32,	208	A.3d	781. The	court	considered	

Williams’s	childhood	upbringing	and	drug	abuse	but	did	not	 find	 these	 to	be	

significant	 mitigating	 factors.	 	 The	 court	 found	 that	 the	 aggravating	 factors	

included	 the	 effect	 on	Corporal	 Cole’s	family	 and	 the	 community; Williams’s	

criminal	 history; the	 need	 to	 protect	 the	 public; Williams’s	 “relative	 lack	 of	

remorse”; and	his	failure	to	take	responsibility	and	ownership	for	his	actions.		

The	 court	 concluded	 that	 “the	 aggravating	 factors	 greatly	 outweigh	 any	

mitigating	 factors” and	 “that	 the	 appropriate	 sentence	in	 this	case	 should	be	

and	is	life	in	prison.”		

[¶60]		Contrary	to	Williams’s	contention,	nothing	in	the	record	suggests	

that	 the	 court	 had	 pre-determined	 that	 Williams’s	 sentence	 would	 be	 life	

imprisonment.		The	court	stated	that	“the	question	I	have	grappled	with	since	

the	verdict	was	whether	a	life	sentence	was	called	for	here,”	suggesting	that	the	

court	did	not	impose	a	life	sentence	lightly	and	arrived	at	 that	sentence only

after weighing	 the	 appropriate	 factors.	 	 Although	Williams	 suggests	 that	 the	

court	failed	to	“listen	to	arguments	and	statements	from	witnesses	regarding	

mitigating	circumstances,”	the	court	did,	in	fact,	consider	the	information	and	
30

statements	 from	 Williams,	 his	 mother,	 and	 his	 aunt.10	 	 There	 is	 simply	 no	

support	in	the	record	for	Williams’s	contention	that	the	court	disregarded	his	

arguments	in	mitigation.11		

[¶61]		The	court	objectively	considered	and	rationally	weighed	all	of	the	

information	 and	 arguments	 and	 determined	 that	 in	 Williams’s	 case, the	

aggravating	factors	greatly	outweighed	those	in	mitigation.		See	State	v.	Basu,	

2005	ME	74,	¶	24,	875	A.2d	686 (observing	that	a	sentencing	court	is	in	a	better	

position	for	evaluating	the	offender’s	circumstances	and	has	wide	discretion	to	

weigh	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors).	 We	conclude	that	the	court	did	not	

abuse	its	discretion	in	imposing	a	sentence	of	life	imprisonment.12		Sweet,	2000	

ME	 14,	 ¶	 15,	 745	 A.2d	 368	 (stating	 that	 “the	 sentencing	 court	 is	 in	 a	 better	

 10		The	court	stated	that	it	had	reviewed	the	sentencing	memoranda	and	statements	submitted	

before	the	hearing	more	than	once.		

11		Williams	appears	to	believe	that	the	court’s	rejection	of	his	arguments	in	mitigation	is	the	same	

as	failing	to	consider	his	arguments	at	all.		

12		The	most	closely	analogous	Maine	case	that	the	court	considered	as	part	of	its	analysis	was	

State	v.	Burdick,	2001	ME	143,	¶¶	1-2,	6,	782	A.2d	319,	in	which	we	upheld	a	sentence	of	forty	years’	

imprisonment	for	a	defendant	charged	with	the	attempted	murder of	a	police	officer.		Although	the	

forty-year	sentence	in	Burdick	is	significantly	shorter	than	the	life	sentence	imposed	here,	Burdick	

was	 fifty	 years	 old	 at	 the	 time	 of	 sentencing,	 rendering	 the	 forty-year	 sentence	 a	 “de	 facto	 life	

sentence,”	id.	¶	25,	and	although	he	shot	a	law	enforcement	officer	twice	in	the	chest	at	close	range,	

the	officer	was	wearing	a	bulletproof	vest	and	sustained	only	minor	injuries,	id.	¶ 6.		Here,	the	victim	

died	as	the	result	of	an	act	described	by	the	court	as	Williams’s	decision	to	“execute	Corporal	Cole.”		

Taken	 together	with	other	aggravating	 factors	identified	by	 the	court,	 the	court	did	not	abuse	its	

discretion	in	imposing	a	life	sentence	instead	of	a	sentence	 for	a	term	of	years	as	in	Burdick.		See	

Sweet,	2000	ME	14,	¶ 15,	745	A.2d	368.
31

position	to	 review	 aggravating	 and	 mitigating	 factors”); State	 v.	 Hewey,	 622	

A.2d	1151,	1155	(Me.	1993)	(stating	that	we	“accord	greater	deference	to	the	

weight	and	 effect	given	by	 the	court	 to	 those	 factors	peculiar	 to	a	particular	

offender	 in	 its	 determination	 of	 the	 offender’s	 maximum	 period	 of	

incarceration”).

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Verne	E.	Paradie,	Jr.,	Esq. (orally),	Paradie	&	Rabasco,	Lewiston,	for	appellant	

John	D.	Williams

Aaron	 M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General, and	 Donald	W.	 Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.

(orally),	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Cumberland	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2018-2275

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY