2020 IL App (2d) 151282-U 

No. 2-15-1282 

Order filed March 25, 2020 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 14-CF-2268 

) 

DONALD CHAMBERLAIN, ) Honorable 

) Brian F. Telander, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Hutchinson and Zenoff concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary, 

specifically that he had the requisite intent when he entered the store where he 

committed a theft: the trial court could infer such intent from the evidence that he 

entered the store, hid behind his girlfriend as he removed a watch from its package 

and placed it in his pocket, exited the store about a minute later, and admitted to the 

police that he was “planning” to steal gifts from the store.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Donald Chamberlain, was convicted of retail theft (720 

ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014)) and burglary (id. § 19-1(a)), and he was sentenced to concurrent 

terms totaling six years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the State failed to prove him 

guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm. 
2020 IL App (2d) 151282-U 

- 2 -

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The count charging defendant with burglary provided that “defendant, without authority, 

knowingly entered a building, Kohl’s, *** with the intent to commit a theft therein.” 

¶ 5 Evidence presented at trial revealed that defendant and his wife, Lisa Gillespie, were in the 

Kohl’s store at around 3 p.m. on Christmas Eve in 2014. Kohl’s was “really busy.” David Stanton, 

who worked at that Kohl’s in loss prevention, was monitoring the salesfloor via surveillance 

cameras. While doing so, he saw defendant in the jewelry department.

¶ 6 Video submitted at trial revealed that defendant was walking quickly through various 

displays in the jewelry department. At one point, defendant walked past a display of watches. He 

grabbed one of the watches without looking at any similar merchandise and continued walking 

until he reached the adjacent accessories department. In that department was Gillespie. Without 

interacting with Gillespie, defendant stood between two short and narrow walls from which 

scarves were hung. Gillespie backed up so that her back was to defendant while he stood between 

the two displays. Defendant moved around while watching his surroundings and looking over 

Gillespie’s shoulder. According to Stanton, defendant removed the watch from the packaging, put 

the watch in his pocket, and placed the empty packaging in a cart. Video showed that defendant 

then left the department and walked out of Kohl’s a little over one minute later. 

¶ 7 When the police arrived, defendant was searched. No cash or credit or debit cards were 

found on him. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of Officer Robert Fortino’s squad 

car. During the drive to the police station, defendant told Fortino that he “was trying to get a 

Christmas gift, man.” Officers at the scene learned that defendant also had taken several other 

pieces of jewelry and a T-shirt.
2020 IL App (2d) 151282-U 

- 3 -

¶ 8 At the police station, defendant was advised of his rights. He admitted taking the watch 

and told Fortino that he was “planning on stealing those gifts.” Defendant’s written statement, 

which was prepared “much” later, did not contain this statement. 

¶ 9 While in custody, defendant phoned Gillespie, and that conversation was recorded. 

Defendant, who was talking quickly, told Gillespie that his attorney would contact her soon. He 

told her that “you had money in your pocket, you know what I’m saying.” She responded, “Oh, 

okay, so I had money?” (Emphasis in original.) When defendant advised Gillespie that he had to 

end the call, she interjected, “I need to know what happened, so, what—” 

¶ 10 Gillespie, who never spoke to the police, testified that her employer had paid her the 

morning that she and defendant went to Kohl’s to buy Christmas gifts. She claimed to be 

“prepared, if necessary, to pay for any purchases that [she] or [defendant] might make that 

afternoon.” Gillespie did not buy anything at Kohl’s. 

¶ 11 The trial court found defendant guilty of burglary, noting specifically that defendant had 

the intent to commit a theft before he entered Kohl’s. Supporting that position, the court found 

that defendant’s conduct in the store “[was] not the actions of a shopper.” Rather, defendant acted 

like “a person who ha[d] gone [to Kohl’s] to take as much property as he c[ould] and get out.” 

The court noted that defendant was “constantly moving from one area to the other;” “doing things 

with his hands that you can’t see;” “going behind different things, probably knowing that there is

a video or that someone is watching him;” and “using his wife as a shield.” The court also found 

Gillespie not credible and Fortino credible, mentioning specifically that Fortino testified that 

defendant confessed to having a plan to steal things from Kohl’s. 

¶ 12 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that he was not proved guilty of burglary 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion, reiterating again that “it looked like 
2020 IL App (2d) 151282-U 

- 4 -

[defendant] wasn’t there shopping.” Rather, “[i]t looked like he had a deliberate plan, when he 

walked directly up to that display and immediately grabbed” the watch. 

¶ 13 This timely appeal followed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 At issue in this appeal is whether defendant was proved guilty of burglary beyond a 

reasonable doubt.1 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we must 

determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not our 

function to retry the defendant or to substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. People v. 

Sanchez, 2013 IL App (2d) 120445, ¶ 18. Rather, it is within the province of the trier of fact “to 

assess the credibility of the witnesses, determine the appropriate weight of the testimony, and 

resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” People v. Graham, 392 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 

1009 (2009). We will reverse a defendant’s conviction only if “the evidence is so improbable or 

unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” Id.

¶ 16 As relevant here, section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 

2014)) provides that “[a] person commits burglary when without authority he or she knowingly 

enters [premises] *** with intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” A person may commit a 

burglary by entering a building that is open to the public if the entry is inconsistent with the purpose 

1 Defendant also argued in his brief that the limited-authority doctrine does not apply in 

cases involving retail theft. Defendant has withdrawn this argument in light of People v. Johnson, 

2019 IL 123318. 
2020 IL App (2d) 151282-U 

- 5 -

for which the building is open. People v. Durham, 252 Ill. App. 3d 88, 91 (1993); People v. Boose, 

139 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473 (1985). For example, entering a store with the intent to commit a theft 

is outside the scope of the purposes for which authority to enter a store is granted. See People v. 

Rudd, 2012 IL App (5th) 100528, ¶ 13; Boose, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 473. 

¶ 17 Defendant claims that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the 

intent to commit a theft when he entered Kohl’s. Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence 

and inferences drawn therefrom. Rudd, 2012 IL App (5th) 100528, ¶ 14. “Circumstantial evidence 

is ‘proof of facts and circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer other connected facts 

which reasonably and usually follow according to common experience.’ ” People v. McPeak, 399 

Ill. App. 3d 799, 801 (2010) (quoting People v. Stokes, 95 Ill. App. 3d 62, 68 (1981)). In a burglary 

prosecution, the relevant surrounding circumstances include, but are not limited to, the time, place, 

and manner of entry into the premises; the defendant’s activity within the premises; and any 

alternative explanations offered for the defendant’s presence. See People v. Richardson, 104 Ill. 

2d 8, 13 (1984). 

¶ 18 An inference of intent does not require the trier of fact to look at all possible explanations 

consistent with the defendant’s innocence or to be satisfied that each link in the chain of 

circumstances was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 

123094, ¶ 13. Rather, a defendant’s intent is proved beyond a reasonable doubt based on all the 

evidence, when considered as a whole. See id.

¶ 19 Viewing the circumstantial evidence in the State’s favor, as we must, we determine that a 

rational trier of fact could have found that defendant entered the store with the intent to commit a 

theft. As the trial court observed, defendant’s actions in the store were quick and deliberate. After 

taking the watch from the display area, he met up with Gillespie in an adjacent department. Then, 
2020 IL App (2d) 151282-U 

- 6 -

without interacting with Gillespie, he stood in an area concealed from the security cameras while 

Gillespie blocked shoppers from viewing defendant or accessing the area where defendant stood. 

Defendant left the store after removing a watch from its packaging and leaving the packaging 

behind. Once in custody, defendant confessed to having a “plan[]” to steal items from Kohl’s. 

¶ 20 Relying on People v. O’Banion, 253 Ill. App. 3d 427 (1993), defendant argues that, to 

prove him guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, the State needed to establish when 

defendant entered Kohl’s, the circumstances of his entry, and what transpired between his entrance 

and the commission of the theft. We disagree. Although O’Banion noted that such facts might 

have established beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s entry with the intent to commit a theft, 

the court in no way suggested that evidence supporting these facts is required before a defendant 

can be found guilty. Id. at 429. Rather, the court merely observed, after noting the absence of 

such facts, that “there [was] no evidence from which the defendant’s intent at the time of entry 

could be reasonably inferred.” Id. As noted above, the court here was presented with evidence of 

defendant’s confession and phone conversations. From these facts and his observed conduct, 

which were not present in O’Banion, the court could reasonably infer that defendant possessed the 

intent to commit a theft when he entered Kohl’s. Because of these additional facts here,

defendant’s reliance on O’Banion is misplaced.

¶ 21 In arguing that his intent to commit a theft before entering Kohl’s was not established, 

defendant emphasizes that (1) he was in Kohl’s for several minutes before taking the watch; 

(2) Gillespie’s testimony was unimpeached and revealed that she had money to pay for any 

purchases defendant wanted to make; and (3) defendant’s alleged confession to having a “plan[]” 

to commit a theft was not corroborated in any way. We disagree with defendant. First, defendant’s 

presence in the store for several minutes before he took the watch does not establish that his intent 
2020 IL App (2d) 151282-U 

- 7 -

to commit a theft was not established before he entered Kohl’s. Not only was the store crowded, 

thus hindering defendant from moving about, but his theft of the other jewelry and the T-shirt

certainly accounted for his presence in the store for a longer time. Second, Gillespie’s testimony 

was impeached. When defendant phoned her, he told her that she needed to tell his attorney that 

she had money that day. Gillespie replied, “Oh, okay, so I had money?” (Emphasis in original). 

This strongly suggested that that was not the truth. Third, although Fortino did not know the exact 

words defendant used when making his incriminating statement, and defendant’s written statement 

did not contain the statement, it was corroborated by, among other things, his actions in the store

and phone conversation with Gillespie. See, e.g., People v. Freeman, 25 Ill. 2d 88, 92-93 (1962). 

Considering the evidence presented, the court found Fortino’s testimony credible. See id. at 92. 

There is nothing in the record indicating that that assessment was improbable or unsatisfactory. 

See id. 

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County. 

¶ 24 Affirmed.