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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

WILLIAM STUMPE, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

August 18, 2016 

v No. 328614 

Genesee Circuit Court 

DEBORAH STUMPE, LC No. 11-302568-DM 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and STEPHENS and BOONSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 The trial court conducted a nine-day evidentiary hearing with respect to plaintiff’s motion 

to modify custody of the parties’ minor child, KS. In a lengthy opinion and order, the trial court 

denied plaintiff’s motion, and plaintiff appeals as of right the court’s ruling. We affirm. 

 On appeal, plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in concluding that proper cause 

or a change of circumstances did not exist to warrant reexamination of the existing custodial 

arrangement. Plaintiff alleges a litany of factual circumstances that he claims amounted to 

proper cause or a change of circumstances. 

 “This Court reviews a trial court’s determination regarding whether a party has 

demonstrated proper cause or a change of circumstances under the great weight of the evidence 

standard.” Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599, 605; 766 NW2d 903 (2009), citing 

Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 507-508; 675 NW2d 847 (2004). The great weight 

standard requires that the trial court’s factual findings be affirmed unless the evidence clearly 

preponderates in the opposite direction. Butler v Simmons-Butler, 308 Mich App 195, 200; 863 

NW2d 677 (2014). A trial court’s custody order must be affirmed on appeal “ ‘unless the trial 

judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse 

of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.’ ” Diez v Davey, 307 Mich App 366, 389; 

861 NW2d 323 (2014), quoting MCL 722.28. 

 The seminal case on the issue of proper cause or a change of circumstances as 

contemplated by MCL 722.27(1)(c) is Vodvarka, 259 Mich App 499. In Vodvarka, this Court 

recognized that if a trial court makes a determination that proper cause or a change of 

circumstances does not exist warranting reexamination of an existing custody arrangement, the 

trial court is statutorily precluded from revisiting a valid prior custody decision and from 
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engaging in a reconsideration of the best interest factors. Id. at 508-509. The person moving to 

alter custody bears the burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, of demonstrating that proper 

cause or a change of circumstances exists before the trial court may undertake an inquiry into 

whether an established custodial environment exists. Id. at 509. In Vodvarka, this Court set 

forth an “objective test for courts to apply in determining what constitutes proper cause or a 

change of circumstances.” Id. at 510. Recognizing that the underlying purpose of MCL 

722.27(1)(c) is to minimize unwarranted disruptions in a child’s custody and to “[p]rovid[e] a 

stable environment for children[,]” this Court first provided guidelines for determining if proper 

cause exists. Id. at 509, 510-512. In doing so, the Vodvarka panel observed that there are no 

applicable “hard or fast rule[s]” and that the inquiry is a “fact-intensive” one. Id. at 511. 

 Therefore, we conclude that in context, proper cause means one or more 

appropriate grounds that have or could have a significant effect on the child’s life 

to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial situation should be 

undertaken. 

* * * 

 [T]o establish “proper cause” necessary to revisit a custody order, a 

movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an 

appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court. The appropriate 

ground(s) should be relevant to at least one of the twelve statutory best interest 

factors, and must be of such magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s 

well-being. When a movant has demonstrated such proper cause, the trial court 

can then engage in a reevaluation of the statutory best interest factors. [Id. at 511-

512 (footnote omitted).] 

Likewise, to demonstrate a change of circumstances as set forth in MCL 722.27(1)(c), the 

moving party must establish that, “since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions 

surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s 

well-being, have materially changed.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 513. The Court cautioned 

that not just any change will amount to a change of circumstances, rather, the evidence must 

show more than normal life changes that occur during a child’s life, and “there must be at least 

some evidence that the material changes have had or will almost certainly have an effect on the 

child.” Id. at 513-514. 

 In ruling on the issue whether plaintiff had demonstrated, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that proper cause or a change of circumstances existed that would warrant 

reexamination of the custody status, the trial court undertook a detailed analysis of the factual 

allegations that plaintiff mounted against defendant. First, concerning the testimony that 

defendant was an absentee mother, the trial court noted that the nanny’s testimony had credibility 

issues where she had prior acrimony with defendant and plaintiff paid her salary. The trial court 

recognized that defendant may have “overstepped” when using the nanny’s services, but that 

plaintiff had not proven his essential claim that defendant did not properly parent KS. With 

regard to defendant’s mental health issues, the trial court noted the lack of any arrests or charges 

concerning domestic violence, and that there were no reports from Child Protective Services 

(CPS) or any other agency to substantiate plaintiff’s allegations that defendant’s anger issues 
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made her an unfit parent. The trial court also considered a psychologist’s opinion that any 

anxiety or depression that defendant was experiencing would abate after the conclusion of this 

custody action and did not interfere with her ability to parent. The trial court also noted that 

plaintiff could be very mean and aggressive himself, referring to text messages that the parties 

had sent to each other.1 The trial court then stated that the record evidence did not support 

plaintiff’s assertion that defendant had mental illnesses that would prohibit her from being an 

effective parent. 

 Addressing defendant’s past substance abuse, drinking, and partying lifestyle, the trial 

court noted that plaintiff encouraged this behavior before the parties’ relationship collapsed in 

Hawaii in October 2013, and that after plaintiff requested drug testing in this case, defendant 

complied and the drug tests came back negative. Noting that defendant likes to party, the trial 

court found that her drinking did not rise to the level of rendering her an unfit parent. The trial 

court also noted that of the myriad safety issues plaintiff raised with regard to KS while in 

defendant’s custody, “this list of complaints” did not evidence that KS was in danger and 

amounted to gamesmanship on the part of plaintiff. Finally, the trial court detailed the history of 

KS’s dental issues, noting that the dental decay had developed over a two-year period, during 

which both plaintiff and defendant had custody of KS. The trial court also emphasized the fact 

that when defendant took KS to the doctor in July 2014, the doctor’s medical records provided 

that “[n]o periodontal disease was present[,]” and there was no sign of any problems at that time. 

The trial court determined that there was nothing in the record leading it to conclude that KS’s 

dental problems were the “fault” of either plaintiff or defendant, or that either parent was unfit. 

The trial court also emphasized that when defendant was aware of the issue, she “took action to 

provide dental care” for KS. The trial court specifically stated: 

 In summary, Plaintiff has failed to show proper cause or a change in 

circumstances to entertain a change of the custodial environment. The Court is not 

giving Defendant the Mother of the Year award. This is not validation. Some of 

the criticism of her is deserved. The Court is simply making a legal determination 

that there is a failure to meet the Vodvarka threshold. 

 Plaintiff’s arguments in his brief on appeal on this issue essentially contend that the trial 

court was remiss in not considering and accepting key evidence that amounted to proper cause or 

a change of circumstances warranting reexamination of the custody arrangement. Plaintiff 

makes several assertions in support of this primary claim. 

 Specifically, plaintiff contends that the evidence concerning defendant’s mental health 

issues, her anger, her alcohol and past substance abuse, as well as her stated desire to be away 

from her child for “kid free time” are all issues that directly impact defendant’s parenting of KS. 

According to plaintiff, these issues are all relevant to best interest factors (b) “[t]he capacity and 

disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance . . .” and (g) 

 

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 A telling text message from plaintiff to defendant read, “I will be up ur ass for the rest of ur life 

. . . that I will promise u.” 
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“[t]he mental and physical health of the parties involved[,]” and therefore amount to proper 

cause. MCL 722.23(b), (g). Plaintiff further asserts that the trial court’s conclusion that 

plaintiff’s mental health issues did not amount to proper cause or a change of circumstances was 

inconsistent with its finding, when weighing the best interest factors, that factor (g) weighed in 

favor of plaintiff. 

 A review of the trial court’s written opinion and order confirms that the trial court duly 

considered plaintiff’s allegations regarding defendant’s mental health, her issues with anger, her 

consumption of alcohol and her history of cocaine abuse, as well as her reliance on the nanny 

and her need for time away from her children. Indeed, the trial court opined that in spite of her 

use of a nanny, defendant does successfully parent KS on her own and that plaintiff failed to 

demonstrate that defendant had a mental health condition or diagnosis that would impede her 

from parenting KS. The trial court also recognized that while plaintiff had “successfully raise[d] 

some concerns about defendant’s anger . . .[,]” these issues predated the divorce judgment, 

originating at the beginning of plaintiff and defendant’s relationship, and did not amount to a 

change of circumstances. While plaintiff no doubt raised appropriate grounds that were relevant 

to MCL 722.23(b) and (g), the trial court’s findings reflect its conscientious determination that 

these grounds were not “of such magnitude to have a significant effect” on KS’s well-being. 

Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. The trial court also clearly made credibility determinations in 

reaching this conclusion, as was properly within its province. Wright v Wright, 279 Mich App 

291, 299; 761 NW2d 443 (2008). This conclusion is also not inconsistent with the trial court’s 

finding with regard to factor (g), where the trial court noted that any mental health issues that 

defendant has, as the psychologist noted, do not impede her ability to parent. 

 Addressing plaintiff’s allegation that defendant liked to drink alcohol and the issues 

surrounding her past substance abuse, the trial court noted that plaintiff himself, particularly 

during the trip to Hawaii in October 2013, encouraged defendant to consume alcohol. The trial 

court also noted that plaintiff encouraged defendant’s use of his Vicodin pills during the Hawaii 

trip when defendant expressed an issue about her tooth pain. The trial court indicated concern 

that plaintiff criticized defendant’s past cocaine abuse, yet married her knowing about this issue, 

had a child with her, and agreed that she would have primary custody of KS after they divorced 

knowing of her past. The trial court gave weight to the fact that defendant had been tested for 

drugs with both a urine and hair follicle drug test and that she passed both tests. In sum, the trial 

court determined that allegations pertaining to defendant’s mental health, her anger issues, her 

need to have time away from KS, and her alcohol consumption and past substance abuse did not 

rise to the level of proper cause or a change in circumstances. The trial court’s factual findings 

were supported by the record evidence, and therefore cannot be said to be against the great 

weight of the evidence. 

 Plaintiff also argues that the trial court inconsistently favored plaintiff pursuant to factor 

(k), the best interest factor in MCL 722.23 involving domestic violence, but concluded that 

defendant’s abusive behavior and verbal disparagement of plaintiff to KS did not amount to 

proper cause or a change of circumstances. While the trial court, in weighing the best interest 

factors, did note that factor (k) favored plaintiff where he had alleged three instances of physical 

violence and defendant had acknowledged one, the trial court gave this factor limited weight, 

particularly where the record evidence reflected that plaintiff was likewise demeaning and 

aggressive toward defendant. The trial court cited text messages from the record in support of 
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this conclusion. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the trial court’s determination 

concerning proper cause or a change of circumstances, where the trial court’s rationale on the 

Vodvarka threshold clearly reflected its factual determination that these issues predated the 

judgment of divorce, and that they were not “significant enough, especially in comparison with 

Plaintiff’s own issues, to constitute ‘proper cause.’ ” 

 Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court did not adequately address the issue of KS 

sleeping with defendant at night, the significant dental health issues that arose with KS while in 

defendant’s custody, and the multiple safety issues that plaintiff raised regarding KS while in 

defendant’s care. Plaintiff further states that these issues are also relevant to factors (c), “[t]he 

capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical 

care . . . [,]” (d) “[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and 

the desirability of maintaining continuity[,]” (f) “[t]he moral fitness of the parties involved[,]” 

and (j) [t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and 

continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent[.]” MCL 722.23(c), 

(d), (f), and (j). A review of the trial court’s opinion reflects that it duly considered the safety 

issues alleged against defendant, concluding that they were “unproven” and therefore did not 

amount to proper cause or a change of circumstances. 

 The trial court also considered the issues with KS’s dental care in great detail, noting that 

KS’s dental problems developed over a period of time when both plaintiff and defendant had 

custody of KS and that neither party had noticed that KS was experiencing dental issues. The 

trial court also acknowledged that while KS’s dental problems were indeed “unfortunate[,]” there 

were no grounds to conclude that they were the fault of either party, and that defendant 

addressed the situation to the best of her ability as soon as she became aware of it. The trial 

court ultimately ruled that plaintiff was unavailing in contending that defendant was at fault for 

KS’s dental issues and that a finding of proper cause or change of circumstances was not 

substantiated on that basis. To the extent that the trial court’s opinion and order does not 

expressly reference the evidence that KS had begun sleeping with defendant and the purported 

impact it was having on her relationship with plaintiff, the trial court was free to weigh the 

record evidence and discern what weight, if any, to give that evidence in rendering its factual 

findings. Wright, 279 Mich App at 299. 

 Finally, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s findings on the Vodvarka threshold where he 

asserts that the trial court improperly “minimiz[ed]” most of the pertinent evidence in this case 

where it originated from the nanny. Plaintiff also argues that the trial court did not consider 

evidence from defendant’s former husband that corroborated the nanny’s testimony and that it 

erred in giving defendant’s testimony credibility over the nanny’s. These issues question the 

trial court’s credibility assessments, as well as its weighing of the record evidence, 

determinations that this Court will defer to on appeal. Wright, 279 Mich App at 299; Draggoo v 

Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 429; 566 NW2d 642 (1997). In sum, the trial court did not err in 

concluding that plaintiff failed to establish proper cause or a change of circumstances. 

 Because the trial court had conducted a full trial, it decided to make a determination 

concerning the established custodial environment, MCL 722.27(1)(c), and to analyze the 

statutory best interest factors, MCL 722.23, although the court understood that it was 

unnecessary to do so considering its resolution of the threshold issue on proper cause and a 
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change of circumstances. Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s rulings with respect to the 

established custodial environment and the best interest factors. Given our holding affirming the 

trial court’s decision that plaintiff failed to establish proper cause or a change of circumstances, it 

becomes unnecessary for us to examine whether the trial court erred in regard to the established 

custodial environment and best interest factors, and we decline to do so. The trial court did not 

err in denying plaintiff’s motion to modify custody. 

 Affirmed. Having fully prevailed on appeal, defendant is awarded taxable costs pursuant 

to MCR 7.219. 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra