FILED

June 11, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

APRIL 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

 )

APPELLEE )

 )

VS. ) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9707-CC-00241

 ) MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 ) HONORABLE JOHN H. GASAWAY

STEVEN LEE EDMONDS )

APPELLANT ) (WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA)

FOR THE APPELLANT FOR THE APPELLEE

Gregory D. Smith John Knox Walkup

Attorney at Law Attorney General and Reporter

One Pubic Square 425 Fifth Avenue, North

Clarksville, TN 37040 Nashville, TN 37243

Janis L. Turner

Assistant Attorney General

425 Fifth Avenue, North

Nashville, TN 378243

John Carney

District Attorney General

204 Franklin St., Suite 200

Clarksville, TN 37040

Arthur Bieber

Assistant District Attorney General

204 Franklin St., Suite 200

Clarksville, TN 37040

OPINION FILED: _______________________

AFFIRMED

L. T. LAFFERTY, SPECIAL JUDGE
2

OPINION

This is an appeal as of right from the Montgomery Circuit Court whe rein it

is alleged the tria l court erred in not permitting the defendant to set aside his guilty

plea. The defendant had entered nine guilty pleas to various misdemeanors and

felonies and to an admission of violation of probation in an unrelated offense. The

trial court set a sentencing hearing and in the interim the defendant filed a pro se

motion to set aside his guilty pleas. After an evidentiary hearing to determine the

merits of the motion, the trial court denied the motion and imposed sentences in

compliance with agreed pleas. After a review of this issue and the entire record in

this cause, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

On August 26, 1996, the defendant, through his attorney of record, entered

pleas of guilty in indictment #36949 count one to the offense of evading an arrest,

a Class A misdemeanor; count two to the offense of stalking, a Class A

misdemeanor; count three to the offense of evading an arrest by use of a vehicle, a

Class E felony; count four to the offense of leaving the scene of an ac cident, a

Class B misdemeanor; count five to the offense of driving on revoked license, a

Class B misdemeanor; count six to the offense of aggravated robbery, a Class B

felony; count seven to the offense of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and in

count eight to the offense of kidnapping, a Class C felony. In indictment #36892,

the defendant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. 

Also, the defendant admitted to a violation of probation in cause #33717,

involving a conviction for aggravated burglary receiving four years. Since the

pleas were submitted to the trial court to determine the appropriate terms of

imprisonment, the trial court set a sentencing hearing for October 17, 1996,

requesting a pre-sentence report and victim impact statement.

On September 16, 1996, the defendant, through his attorney, filed a written

motion to withdraw (via an attached letter) his nine pleas of guilty entered August

26, 1996. The defendant alleges that “the defendant has never been informed of
3

any possible defenses” to his charges and his decision to ple ad guilty was quickly

entered and not in his best interest. Also, the defendant requested appointment of

substitute counsel.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on De cember 11, 1996, to

consider the merits of this motion.

A statement of the facts is helpful to put said offenses in context. A

transcript of the guilty plea proceedings of August 26, 1996, was introduced as

evidence in this hearing. Mr. Charles Bloodworth, assistant Public Defender and

counsel for the defendant, set out the facts before the trial court to support the

various pleas, including a little history of the defendant’s relationship with the

victim of violent offenses. The defendant became infatuated with the victim of the

violent offenses long before their occurrence. However, the victim found

someone else and evicted the defendant from her home. This eviction did not cool

the defendant’s amorous blood and the infatuation continued. Count one alleges

that on December 4, 1995, the defendant went by the victim’s home. She called

the police and the defendant ran away (apparently on foot) from the police thus

leading to the evading arrest charge. The defendant would not give up. In count

two, between December 5 and 21, 1996, he repeatedly called the victim on the

phone leading to the stalking charge. Specifically, on December 14, 1996, the

defendant really compounded his problems. The victim had asked him to come to

the house, he did not, but drove by the hous e and lo and behold the police are there

and the car chase begins, thus the evading arrest of locomotion (count three). 

Unfortunately for the defendant he is not a good driver, thus crashing his car. But

that does not stop him. He is also charged with leaving the scene of an accident

(count four) and driving on a revoked license (count five).
4

Beginning December 20, 1995, the defendant really begins to have

problems, when he goes to the Showboa t, the victim’s employment establishment. 

The defendant must resolve this relationship. Is he going to leave her? Is she

going to leave him? Unfortunately for the defendant has a pistol in his waistband

under his shirt. Unsatisfied with the victim’s responses, the defendant pulls the

pistol and says “Give me all the money,” which she did. As the defendant leaves,

does eternal hope thus rise? He turns, throws the money on the counter and

inquires, “Is he going to live his life as an outlaw?” She responds, “just go away.” 

He does with the money.

On December 21, 1995, this wily victim, knowing the defendant’s fatal

attraction for her, contacts the defendant under the watchful eyes of the police and

arranges a meeting at a convenience store. Amazingly, the defendant shows up

and gets in the victim’s car (all under watchful eyes) and when approached by the

police, the defendant pulls his pistol, points it a t the victim, and shouts, “Let us go. 

Let us go. I’ll shoot her, I will.” Fortunately for everyone, the defendant

exercised good judgment and surrendered. 

The defendant by admitting his guilt in these offenses, acknowledged these

offenses would violate his conditions of probation.

In support of the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty, the defendant

testified that after he had reread the copy of the charge concerning defens es, his

attorney never advised him of any de fenses a lthough the de fendant had a defense. 

The defendant presented his attorney several witnesses in support of a defense, but

the attorney failed to contact them. The defendant believed a co-employee of the

victim would testify that the victim actually stole the money and set him up and

the victim had stolen some money of a prior occasion and another employee was

fired for this. The defendant believes cameras in the store should have picked up

the robbery. The de fendant acknowledged his attorney explained the nature of a

best interest plea and entered such plea due to the duress of facing 50 years or
5

longer. Overall, the defendant alleges the attorney failed to conduct a proper

investigation.

The State offered the defendant’s attorney to explain the defendant’s

complaints. Defense counsel had been appointed to represent the defendant in the

General Sessions Court. Counsel represented the defendant through the

preliminary hearing, the indictment process, and the entry of the guilty pleas. 

Defense counsel obtained complete dis covery from the Sta te and as pa rt of his

investigation found no video camera in the store, or, if there were, no tape was

furnished to the defense. Defense counsel confirmed the defendant gave him the

name of a “Melody,” last name unknown, who would testify the victim had stolen

cash from a cash box on a prior occasion. Such witne ss would be utilized to

impeach the honesty of the victim. She could not be found. Defense counsel

enlarged on the State’s theory of the allegations surrounding the stalking and

especially aggravated kidnapping charges. Also, defense counsel had his

investigator attempt to talk to the victim, but she refused to talk to him. As to the

witness, Jennifer Kilbing, this witness would have testified that the victim had

mentioned she was going to stage a robbery with the defendant. There is some

confusion in the record if the armed robbery of December 20, 1995, was the faked

robbery. The defendant informed defense counsel that the robbery of the 20th was

not the staged robbery. Thus, defense counsel decided he could not call Jennifer

Kilbing as a witness and present perjured testimony.

As to the best interest plea, defense counsel gave to the defendant three

pages setting out the charges, applicable punishment, State’s first offer; a revised

settlement offer; maximum sentences if convicted by a jury; red dates and options. 

The pages were introduced into evidence. On August 26th, the victim appeared

for trial and the defendant decided to plead guilty.

Based on this evidence, the trial court denied the defendant’s request to set
6

aside these guilty pleas under the standard set out in rule 32, Tennessee Rules of

Criminal Procedure. The trial court found the defendant does not complain of any

Mackey violations, that the pleas were involuntary, nor were there any complaints

the District Attorney General withheld exculpatory evidence. The trial court

found de fense counsel’s representation to be competent and the decision not to

utilize Jennifer Kilbing was a matter of trial strategy. This Court agrees with the

trial court’s analysis and decision.

Rule 32 (f) governs the request for setting aside guilty pleas.

(f) Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to 

withdraw a plea of guilty may be made upon a showing by 

the defendant of any fair and just reason only before sentence 

is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice, the court after 

sentence, but before the judgment becomes final, may set aside 

the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw 

the plea . 

Generally, a defendant who submits a guilty plea is not entitled to withdraw

the plea as a matter of right. State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1995). The decision to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea is within the sound

discretion of the trial court and may not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse

of discre tion. Henning v. State, 201 S.W. 669 (Tenn. 1947); State v. Davis, 823

S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). 

The evidentiary hea ring in this record was a hybrid hearing, Rule 32(f)

proceeding and semi-petition post conviction proceedings. The trial court has

found the defendant’s pleas freely and voluntarily entered; no force or coercion in

the pleas; no misrepresentations made by defense counsel to the defendant; no

withheld exculpatory evidence by the State and no violation of Mackey

requirements. The Court finds in this record the trial court did not abuse its 
7

discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his pleas of guilty. The

judgment is affirmed.

___________________________

L. T. Lafferty, Special Judge

CONCUR:

____________________________

Gary Wade, Presiding Judge

_____________________________

Thomas Woodall, Judge