109th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 

1st Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

UNREST IN UZBEKISTAN:

CRISIS AND PROSPECTS

May 19, 2005

Briefing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington: 2007
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

234 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515

202–225–1901

csce@mail.house.gov 

http://www.csce.gov

Legislative Branch Commissioners

HOUSE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY,

Co-Chairman 

FRANK R. WOLF, VIRGINIA

JOSEPH R. PITTS, PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, ALABAMA

MIKE PENCE, INDIANA

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, MARYLAND

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER,

NEW YORK

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA

MIKE MCINTYRE, NORTH CAROLINA

SENATE 

SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS,

Chairman 

GORDON SMITH, OREGON

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK

VACANT 

VACANT 

VACANT

Executive Branch Commissioners

VACANT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

VACANT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WILLIAM HENRY LASH III, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 

1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of 

January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 55 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. 

The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the participating States’ permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and 

meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior 

Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government. 

Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military 

security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian 

concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage 

and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys 

numerous missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>. 

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage 

compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 

emphasis on human rights. 

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of 

State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the 

Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff 

assists the Commissioners in their work. 

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that 

reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details 

about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating 

States. 

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy 

regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with 

parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission 

is: <www.csce.gov>. 

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UNREST IN UZBEKISTAN: CRISIS AND PROSPECTS

MAY 19, 2005

PARTICIPANTS 

Page 

Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ......... 9

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in

Europe .......................................................................................................................................... 1

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe .......................................................................................................................................... 3

Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .... 2

Hon. Mike McIntyre, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .... 3

Ron McNamara, International Policy Director, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe .......................................................................................................................................... 2

Samuel Z ̆ bogar, Slovenia Ambassador to United States on behalf of OSCE ............................. 4

Michael Cromartie, Commissioner, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom .... 7

Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ............. 12

Abdurahim Polat, Opposition Party Leader, Uzbekistan ............................................................ 15

Daniel Kimmage, Central Asia Regional Analyst, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty .............. 18

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UNREST IN UZBEKISTAN: CRISIS AND PROSPECTS 

MAY 19, 2005

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington, DC

The briefing was held at 1:32 p.m. in room 138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, 

Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, moderating. 

Panelists present: Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Mike McIntyre, Commissioner, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Ron McNamara, International Policy Director, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Samuel Z ̆ bogar, Slovenia Ambassador 

to United States on behalf of OSCE; Michael Cromartie, Commissioner, U.S. Commission 

on International Religious Freedom; Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace; Abdurahim Polat, Opposition Party Leader, 

Uzbekistan; and Daniel Kimmage, Central Asia Regional Analyst, Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty. 

Mr. SMITH. We’ll begin this briefing of the U.S. Helsinki Commission. My name is 

Chris Smith. We’ll be joined very shortly by Chairman Brownback. I’m the Co-Chairman 

of the Commission on Security Cooperation in Europe. And we’re joined by fellow Commissioner Joseph Pitts from Pennsylvania. And then we will do an introduction of all of our 

very distinguished panelists. 

Almost a year ago the Helsinki Commission held a hearing on Uzbekistan. At that 

time, we heard testimony about the closed nature of Uzbek society. Some of the consequences now seem to be unfolding in the Fergana Valley. 

After Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, we may have become used to largely peaceful transfers of power in former Soviet republics. Clearly, as we read about the ongoing 

situation in Andijan, it was too good to be true. 

It seems to me, that after the revolutions in the former USSR over the last 18 

months and the bloody confrontation last Friday in Uzbekistan, that all bets are off in 

that country. We have now witnessed the most lethal use of force unleashed by an OSCE 

participating State against protesters in the former Soviet space. 
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In March 2002, when President Karimov came to Washington to sign the agreement 

on strategic cooperation with the United States, I participated in his meeting with the 

congressional leadership and, as a matter of fact raised issues relevant to human rights. 

During that conversation, he said a very interesting thing. Responding to expressions 

of gratitude from some of the other Members of Congress for Uzbekistan’s cooperation 

against international terrorism, President Karimov countered that he should be grateful 

to the United States for getting rid of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan. 

That, he explained, effectively ended the most serious security threat to Uzbekistan. 

Yet President Karimov never drew the appropriate conclusions from his own geopolitical premises. Instead of seeing the fall of the Taliban and their allies as an opportunity to loosen the state’s grip on Uzbek society, he made gestures calculated to appease 

Western states calling for reform. For example, a few independent human rights groups 

were registered. Tashkent allowed the U.N. rapporteur on torture to visit the Uzbek penal 

system. And some policemen who had tortured detainees were themselves convicted and 

jailed. 

But no fundamental changes have occurred. Though the U.N. rapporteur concluded 

that torture was systemic in Uzbek jails and Tashkent drew up an action plan to combat 

torture, the practice continues. 

Last December’s parliamentary election went much as did previous Uzbek elections. 

Even though Uzbek spokesmen and apologists proclaimed the participation of five government-created political parties to be major progress, the OSCE rightly refused to send a 

full-fledged observer mission. 

No opposition parties were registered or allowed to take part. Individual members of 

opposition parties could not run, despite assurances from Uzbek officials that they would 

be able to do so. 

Moreover, widespread religious persecution continues in the country. The U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom recently recommended to Secretary of 

State Rice that Uzbekistan be designated a country of particular concern, a CPC country, 

because of the severe, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom. 

I agree with that recommendation, as designating Uzbekistan would send a clear 

message that the United States will not tolerate the continued oppression of selected Muslims and other religious groups. 

Today, almost 15 years after independence, Uzbekistan remains a police state, and 

President Karimov is confronting what I fear is only the beginning of a major challenge, 

largely of his own making. 

As we know, the United States maintains a base in southern Uzbekistan. However, 

if peaceful protests spread throughout the country and Uzbek forces respond indiscriminately with deadly violence, the United States would be forced to reevaluate its strategic 

partnership with Uzbekistan. 

I’d like to now yield to my good friend and colleague Joe Pitts for any opening comments he might have. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this important briefing. 

And I want to thank the distinguished witnesses for coming today. 

In the interests of time, I will yield. And I’m not sure who to yield to, by the way. 

Who’s the chair? 
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Mr. MCNAMARA. Yes. My name is Ron McNamara. I’m currently serving as the Helsinki Commission’s International Policy Director. 

I’m pleased to welcome you here to this briefing, the latest Commission initiative 

focused on developments in Uzbekistan. The Commission has had a long series of engagement on issues relating to that country, and I would encourage you to visit the Commission’s Web site where all of the materials are available, at www.csce.gov. 

I see that our Ranking Member from the House, Mr. Cardin, has arrived. I know that 

our Chairman, Senator Brownback, is en route as well. And I should also mention that 

Commissioner McIntyre has arrived. 

So certainly we’ll entertain any statements or comments that they may have before 

turning to our panelists. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, Ron, thank you. Let me apologize for being a few minutes late. 

And obviously the members will be moving in and out. On these briefings, the main purpose is for the Commission to get a better understanding of what’s happening in trouble 

spots of the world. 

Uzbekistan presents to us a real challenge, a real dilemma. There’s no way that we 

can justify the actions of the government and what is happening in that country. They 

are not complying with Helsinki commitments. And we have a right to expect that they 

will, in fact, do that. 

We don’t condone at all the violence of the population and what they’re doing, the 

rebels. That obviously needs to be brought under control. But the manner in which the 

government has responded, in just creating an untenable situation, the failure to comply 

with Helsinki principles, is of great concern to all of us. 

So I have a full statement that I’m just going to make sure is available for the record 

which expresses in detail these concerns. But the main purpose for briefings is for us to 

get more information so that our Commission can function to bring these matters to the 

international attention. 

So with that in mind, Ron, you noticed that Commissioner McIntyre is here, and I’ll 

be glad to yield to Commissioner McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much. I too will be brief. 

Having been to Uzbekistan when I was visiting Afghanistan in August of 2003, I 

found it very interesting. We did spend quite a bit of time in the palace with President 

Karimov. And so now to see how things have transpired since that visit that we had then 

has been very concerning to us. And so I’d look forward to hearing the testimony today. 

I am also interested in how these developments have affected the stability of the 

government and our concerns, because we know of our military relationship as well. And 

as a member not only of this Commission but of the Armed Services Committee, I share 

concerns about the unrest that is going on in Uzbekistan. 

So thank you very much. And we’ll look forward to the hearing. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. As with all Commission briefings, we’ll first 

hear from our expert panelists before opening up to questions from our Commissioners 

and if time permits from the audience as well. 

When approaching the microphone that’s been provided, please state your name, any 

affiliation, and pose your question as succinctly as possible to a specific member of the 

panel. 
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An unofficial transcript of today’s proceedings will be available within 24 hours on 

the commission’s Web site, www.csce.gov. 

I’m pleased to introduce—and again, the panelists will begin subject to the arrival 

of our Chairman and whatever statement he might have. 

Our first panelist is Ambassador Z ̆ bogar, Ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia to 

the United States. Ambassador Z ̆bogar will be speaking on behalf of the OSCE Chairman 

in Office, Foreign Minister Rupel. 

The OSCE is engaged with this crisis through the center in Tashkent, as well as 

monitoring refugee flows in the border regions in neighboring southern Kyrgyzstan. 

Minister Rupel has expressed the OSCE’s readiness to assist in preventing further 

bloodshed as well as in finding a lasting solution to developments of late. 

Next we’ll hear from Michael Cromartie, who serves as a Commissioner on the U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom. Mr. Cromartie is a 2004 Bush appointee 

to the Commission and also serves as Vice President of the Ethics and Public Policy 

Center here in Washington. 

The Commission on International Religious Freedom recently recommended to the 

Secretary of State that Uzbekistan be designated a country of particular concern because 

of the severe, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom in that country. 

Next we’ll hear from Dr. Martha Olcott, a Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and one of the foremost experts on Central Asia, who has 

testified several times before our Commission. She specializes in the problems of transitions in Central Asia and the Caucasus region, as well as security challenges in the Caspian region more generally. 

She testified at the Commission’s 2004 hearing on human rights in Uzbekistan. And 

we welcome her as well. 

Next we’ll be hearing from Dr. Abdurahim Polat, who testified at that same Commission hearing on Uzbekistan in 2004. 

Since 1989, Dr. Polat has been the leader of Birlik, one of the main Uzbek opposition 

parties. Dr. Polat had to leave Uzbekistan in 1993, after he was almost beaten to death 

on the streets of Tashkent in June 1992. 

Since then, he has been an opposition activist in exile, first in Turkey, then in the 

United States, where he now resides. In February 1998, he received political asylum 

status here in the United States. 

Finally, we’ll hear from Daniel Kimmage, who works at Radio Free Europe, Radio 

Liberty, as a Central Asia regional analyst. He writes frequently about Central Asia and 

is one of the best informed analysts here in Washington. 

He also writes about the Arab world and Russia, with a particular focus on the ideology of Islamic movements. 

We’ll now turn to Ambassador Z ̆ bogar. 

Amb. Z ̆ BOGAR. Thank you very much. 

Members of the Commission, and ladies and gentlemen, first, thank you very much 

for giving me the opportunity to speak here at the Commission and to brief you on the 

activities and the role of the OSCE in Uzbekistan. 

The OSCE is closely monitoring the situation in Uzbekistan through its presence on 

the ground. As it was mentioned, OSCE has a center in Tashkent that has been in con-
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stant touch with the Uzbek Government since the conflict in Andijan started on the 13th 

of May. 

The OSCE Chairman in Office, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovenia, Dimitrij 

Rupel, has expressed concern about recent events in the city of Andijan on the 15th of 

May. He has encouraged all sides to work toward a peaceful resolution of the present 

crisis. 

And to this end, the OSCE and he, in the name of the OSCE, have offered assistance 

to address both immediate and deeper causes of unrest in order to find a sustainable solution. 

The very fact that the OSCE has a presence on the spot allows the OSCE community 

to have a clearer picture of the situation on the ground and it can play a key role in 

working with the parties to reduce tensions. 

First of all, the OSCE stands ready to facilitate immediate political dialogue. As the 

Chairman-in-Office put it, ‘‘Further loss of human lives must be avoided at all cost. Any 

differences that may exist should not represent an excuse for the use of force on either 

side,’’. 

This is something that the OSCE is well placed to perform through the center, 

through the Chairmanship in Office and/or through an envoy of the Chairman. 

Second, the organization is ready to assist Uzbekistan with upholding its OSCE 

commitments. The center in Tashkent is already implementing such assistance through 

concrete projects across the OSCE three dimensions of security, the political, military, economic, and the environmental and human dimensions. 

The concrete examples of what OSCE is doing already are the prison reform program, 

the media program, small and medium enterprise development, water management, 

border management, and helping with trafficking in human beings. 

Third, in addition to existing projects, OSCE has particular expertise and experience 

in a range of issues related to conflict prevention and civil society building. 

Through its institutions, like the representative on freedom of the media, the high 

commissioner on national minorities, the organization is particularly well placed to focus 

on issues such as access to information, promotion of interactive dialogue, and human 

rights training for police, military and prison officials. 

If requested by the Uzbek authorities, such short-term activities could have an immediate impact. 

Fourth, trial monitoring activities, particularly with regard to the case of the 23 

businessmen in Andijan, could be conducted with immediate effect. 

And fifth, in close cooperation with the Uzbek authorities and possibly partner 

organizations, such as the United Nations, the OSCE is ready to help conduct or support 

an international investigation into recent events in Andijan. 

The future involvement of the OSCE will depend on several factors. The most important will be the political will of the Uzbek Government. 

So first, what is needed in Uzbekistan now? We have immediate needs and we have 

short- and medium-term needs. 

Immediately, there is a need for prevention of further use of force and/or prevention 

of humanitarian problems on the border region with Kyrgyzstan. There is a need for independent international investigation of the events in Andijan. There is a need to allow the 
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local population and international community to get information. There is a need to monitor trials, arrests and demonstrations. And there is a need for closer cooperation in 

fighting terrorism. These are all immediate needs. 

Short- and medium-term needs would be deepening of democratization processes, like 

promotion of media freedom, rule of law and development of civil society. And there is 

also a short- and medium-term need to intensify the speed of economic reform through 

further liberalization. 

What could be the possible OSCE activities and OSCE role in the future? OSCE 

should focus on the following possibilities: First, follow very closely the developments 

related to events in Andijan and prevent other violent actions and help with post-conflict 

and post-trauma assistance. 

Next, OSCE could have a role in confidence-building measures within the country 

and with the international community. And OSCE has a role in reaching out to the local 

community. 

Next, OSCE should be involved in international investigation of what happened. An 

international expert commission should be established, and if it materializes, the OSCE 

could offer international experts, like anti-terrorism, policing, intelligence, prison, media, 

et cetera. 

Next, OSCE could tailor training based on the outcome of the investigation. The 

president acknowledged himself that Andijan happened also as a consequence of serious 

shortcomings in the work of different services, like military, police, prison and intelligence. 

Next, the role of mass media: There has been an information blockade on TV and 

Internet, and the government informed very late and has not offered clear answers to several very important questions. This is something that OSCE could address. Then OSCE 

could establish programs in promoting the freedom of media through legal assistance, furthering access to information, holding of training for local journalists, for government 

agency official spokespersons. 

Next, is the trial monitoring activities. OSCE could get involved in close monitoring 

of trials related to the events in Andijan. 

And of course the last, economic evaluation and assessment: An investigation should 

be conducted of business development, for example, the availability of credit for small and 

medium business development. There should be strengthening of business associations 

and improve their lobbying capabilities with the government and with parliament. And 

the OSCE could provide farmers and businesspeople with knowledge about their legal 

rights. 

So these are some of the activities that OSCE has already been undertaking and 

others that OSCE could undertake or could engage in Uzbekistan with the aim of helping 

stabilize the situation and in helping the Uzbekistan Government approach necessary 

reforms. 

For all the activities of the OSCE, given the role of the OSCE, the consensus role 

in the OSCE, for all the activities that the mission at the center in Tashkent will perform 

in Uzbekistan, we need the approval of the Uzbekistan Government. 

Thank you very much for your attention. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

Mr. Cromartie? 
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Mr. CROMARTIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom is an independent government agency that was created by the International Religious Freedom Act 

of 1998. The commission monitors religious freedom in other countries and advises the 

President and Secretary of State and Congress on how to best advance religious freedom 

abroad. 

In October of last year, the commission visited Uzbekistan and met with government 

officials, human rights activists, religious leaders and former prisoners in the Fergana 

Valley, including in Andijan as well as Tashkent and Samarkand. 

The commission notes that many of the Uzbek Government policies toward religious 

groups and individuals foreshadowed the tragedy in Andijan. In April 2005, the commission found the Government of Uzbekistan to be responsible for severe human rights violations, including freedom of thought, freedom of conscience and religion, and recommended 

to the Secretary of State that Uzbekistan be named a country of particular concern. 

Uzbekistan has a highly restrictive law on religion that severely limits the ability of 

religious communities to function and that criminalizes all unregistered religious activity. 

The 1998 Uzbek law on religion is used by government officials to deny registration 

of various religious groups, particularly minority religious communities, resulting in an 

effective ban on activities of these groups. At present, some 100 unregistered religious 

communities of all faiths are seeking registration. 

The Uzbek Government also exercises a high degree of control over the manner in 

which the Islamic faith is practiced. There are very few outlets for Muslims to learn about 

or practice their faith, other than those provided by the government via the Muslim Spiritual Board. 

After 1998, the Uzbek Government authorities closed 3,000 of the reported 5,000 

functioning mosques in the country. The USCIRF delegation in Uzbekistan experienced 

directly the government’s determination to monitor the activities of Muslim leaders. 

Certain officials from the Uzbek interior ministry insisted on being present at the 

commission’s meetings with local imams in Samarkand and in cities in the Fergana 

Valley. Even more heavily handed tactics were used in the city of Fergana, where Uzbek 

security agents made overt efforts to disrupt the commission delegation’s meeting with 

Uzbek human rights activists, former prisoners and other victims of repression. 

Government authorities crack down harshly on Muslim individuals, groups and 

mosques that do not conform to government prescribed practices or that the government 

claims are associated with extremist political programs. This crackdown has resulted in 

the imprisonment of thousands of persons in recent years, many of whom are denied the 

right to due process. 

There are also credible reports that many of those arrested continue to be tortured 

or beaten in detention. There are, according to the 2004 State Department Human Rights 

Report, approximately 5,500 prisoners in Uzbekistan who have been convicted because 

they chose to exercise their faith outside the state’s control or who the government claims 

are associated with extremist groups. 

Mr. Chairman, would you like me to stop while you make a statement? 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Please go ahead. 

Mr. CROMARTIE. Sure? OK. 
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Confessions are the main evidence used to convict persons accused of membership in 

suspect organizations. Such confessions are often obtained before the accused has gained 

access to a lawyer or doctor, and frequently result from ill treatment or torture. 

A defendant’s lawyer frequently is denied access to his or her client until after a 

confession has been obtained, although such access should be granted within 24 hours 

under Uzbek law. 

There is also a widespread reliance on guilt by association. Members of the same 

family are arrested and sentenced for alleged involvement with proscribed religious 

organizations. Any outward display of piety can arise suspicion and may lead to sanctions, 

including possible arrest. 

Now security threats do exist in Uzbekistan, including from members from Hizb-utTahrir and other groups that claim a religious linkage. But these threats do not excuse 

or justify the scope and harshness of the government’s ill treatment of religious believers. 

Because the Uzbek criminal justice system is not transparent, it is impossible to 

know fully the basis on which people have been detained or convicted. Nonetheless, the 

State Department, as well as domestic and international human rights organizations, concluded that many of these prisoners have been convicted on charges that relate to their 

religious beliefs or alleged association, not on specific evidence or advocacy of acts of 

violence. 

I should note that USCIRF’s recommendation that Uzbekistan be designated a CPC 

should not—should not—in any way be construed as a defense of H.T., an extremist and 

highly intolerant organization that promotes hatred against moderate Muslims, the West, 

Jews and others. 

The strict governmental control over the content and character of Islamic teaching, 

worship, and practices results in the aspiration on the part of some in Uzbekistan to seek 

alternative voices and sources of religious authority. The USCIRF delegation heard from 

many people that the absence of permitted religious alternatives only serves to generate—

it only serves to generate more support for underground groups, including H.T. 

The U.N. special rapporteur on torture concluded in his February 2003 report on 

Uzbekistan that, and I quote, ‘‘Torture or similar ill treatment is systematic,’’. Uzbek 

human rights activists and relatives of prisoners confirmed these findings to the commission delegation. 

Prisoner’s relatives are also often denied access to the trials of their family members. 

Uzbek human rights activists told the commission delegation that even after the publication of the report on U.N. special rapporteur on torture, reliance on the use of torture 

in detention has not decreased, indeed one Uzbek human rights lawyer said the methods 

of torture have become more advanced. 

Now the recent tragic events occurred as a result of public protest over the trial of 

23 local businessmen who reportedly employed thousands of people in an impoverished 

region. The Uzbek Government claims that the charitable activities of these 23 businessmen are criminal and extremist and linked to H.T. 

Given the nature of the Uzbek judicial system along with the Uzbek practice of convicting persons solely for their alleged membership in banned organizations, it is impossible to ascertain the veracity of such official claims. The commission joins those who are 

calling for an international investigation, possibly by the OSCE which has on the ground 

presence in Uzbekistan, to clarify the tragic course of events in Andijan. 
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Now I would like to highlight some of the policy recommendations made by the 

commission to the U.S. Government. And I would also like to request that the full set 

of the commission’s recommendations in its 2005 annual report section on Uzbekistan be 

included in the record. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. It will be in the record. 

Mr. CROMARTIE. Thank you, Senator. 

First, the U.S. Government should ensure that it speaks in a unified voice in its relations with the Uzbek Government. This has not always been the case. For example, last 

year the State Department refused to provide funding for the Uzbek Government due to 

its human rights violations. Yet, one month later, the Defense Department granted funds 

to the Uzbek Government. 

U.S. statements and actions should be coordinated across agencies to ensure that 

U.S. concerns about human rights conditions in Uzbekistan are reflected in all dealings 

with the Uzbek Government. 

Second, U.S. assistance to the Uzbek Government, with the exception of assistance 

to improve humanitarian conditions and advance human rights, should be made contingent upon establishing and implementing a specific timetable for the government to take 

concrete actions to improve conditions of freedom of religion and observe international 

human rights standards. 

Initial steps by the Uzbek Government should include ending reliance on convictions 

based solely on confessions; halting the detention and imprisonment of persons on account 

of their religious beliefs; establishing a mechanism to review the cases of persons previously detained under suspicion or charged with religious, political or security offenses; 

implementing the recommendations of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe Panel of Experts on Religion and Belief to revise the 1988 law on freedom of worship in religious organization to bring it in accordance with international standards; registering religious groups that comply with the legal requirements; and ensuring that every 

religious prisoner has access to his or her family, adequate medical care, and a lawyer, 

as specified in international human rights instruments. 

Third, the U.S. Government should reinstate the Uzbek language radio broadcasts at 

Voice of America and should use VOA and other appropriate avenues of public diplomacy 

to explain to the people why religious freedom is an important element of U.S. foreign 

policy, as well as specific concerns about religious freedom in their country. 

Fourth, the U.S. Government should advocate greater involvement of the OSCE 

center in Tashkent, including the collection of monitoring data on religious freedom and 

hiring a staff member in the OSCE center in Tashkent for monitoring these activities. The 

staff member should report to the OSCE tolerance unit in the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw. 

And finally, the U.S. Government should urge the Uzbek Government to agree to a 

visit by U.N. special rapporteurs on freedom of religion of belief and the independence of 

the judiciary and provide the full and necessary conditions for such a visit. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Dr. Cromartie. Appreciate your being here 

and appreciate your testimony. 
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I want to make a brief statement at this time and then we will continue with our 

witnesses, if we could. I apologize for being late. I’ve had a series of sessions today, and 

it’s been a quite busy time on Capitol Hill. 

This is a very serious time and it’s a very serious issue regarding Uzbekistan. It’s 

a country that I’ve dealt with over the years in various capacities from being on the Foreign Relations Committee and now Helsinki Commission Chairman. It is a country of vital 

and strategic interest to the United States. 

It’s a country coming out of the former Soviet Union that a number of us had great 

hope for and the kind of promise that over a period of years, with engagement from the 

United States, would liberalize economically, democratically, develop human rights. A 

number of us have pushed that agenda for some period of time. 

I’ve traveled to the country myself. I’ve met with President Karimov previously, and 

I have urged liberalization. 

Since 2001 and the initiation of the war on terrorism, Uzbekistan has been a key ally 

of the United States. We maintain a military base in that country that has been key for 

us, particularly in our prosecution of the war in Afghanistan and continued efforts. 

But the economic and human rights and democratic liberalization that has been 

pushed by the West, particularly by the United States, has not been heeded by President 

Karimov or the Uzbek Government. And I think that’s why we are where we are today. 

If that had been pursued, if economic liberalization, human rights liberalization, 

democratic liberalization had been pursued, there would have been ways and means for 

people to legitimately express their viewpoints. That’s not taken place and then you have 

this sort of situation that happens here today or that has happened here recently in 

Uzbekistan. 

I do want to note that there are apparently a series of factual questions remaining 

to be investigated as to what actually took place and how it actually occurred. 

Undoubtedly, and we do know, that there were a number of civilians who were killed 

by officials of the Uzbek Government. That did occur. It also appears that there was an 

armed assault on a government institution taking place by militants within Uzbekistan. 

That did occur as well. 

Whatever specific provocations and the broader sources of frustration, it was not 

appropriate for a militant armed assault on a government institution and it was not 

appropriate for the government to respond the way they did. 

I am very concerned and worried about how the government responded to this situation. And the attack on unarmed civilians is deeply disturbing. Even if armed groups had 

previously stormed a jail to release prisoners, possibly even including terrorists and even 

if the number of killed and wounded is far smaller than what had been reported by the 

media, it is a flagrant application of lethal force by the Uzbek Government. That’s 

inappropriate, and it is wrong. 

Along with the State Department I condemn the indiscriminate use of force against 

civilian populations in Uzbekistan. 

But I think we come now to a moment of serious thought and reflection and opportunity. We got here because Uzbekistan has had too little democracy and economic opportunity and human rights. It is my opinion, and I believe a number of people in the legislative and executive branch and people around the world opinion believe that what needs 
11

to take place now is for liberalization to occur, for human rights, for democracy, and for 

economic opportunity. 

Instead, despite rhetorical claims to the contrary, President Karimov of Uzbekistan 

has insisted on maintaining the tightest controls. The most basic freedoms are flouted. 

In Uzbekistan, no opposition parties have been registered since the early 1990s, a Sovietera type of censorship of the media remains in place. 

President Karimov has justified his policies by the need to crack down on Islamic 

radicals who want to topple his secular regime. It’s true, of course, that Uzbekistan has 

faced and continues to face a genuine, albeit reduced threat from militant radicals. But 

I fear President Karimov’s approach has produced the very outcome he wants to prevent. 

We have many shared interests with Uzbekistan, especially cooperating against international terrorism. I have long counseled moderation in U.S. policy and called for realistic 

expectations, hoping for slow and steady progress. But we have not seen that take place. 

If there’s any hope to be found in what has recently happened, I believe that President Karimov and the government in Uzbekistan has a major opportunity here. I urge 

them to launch serious reforms to democratize the political system and liberalize the 

economy and provide for human rights for the citizens of Uzbekistan. 

Uzbekistan stands at a crossroads, and time is of the essence. I believe it is not too 

late to take this opportunity and try to salvage the situation through liberalization, 

human rights, democracy, and economic reforms. I sincerely hope the Uzbek Government 

and President Karimov understand the stakes that are involved for his nation. 

This briefing was intended to offer some concrete suggestions on how to proceed. I 

am appreciative of the witnesses putting forth their testimony. We cannot continue to see 

civilians shot and killed by the government in Uzbekistan. That is wrong. 

But I think the way forward is the liberalization that many have pushed for some 

time, and that’s something that we need to see take place. 

I’d also call for an outside, exterior international investigation into the instances that 

have taken place in Uzbekistan over the past several weeks. This needs to be investigated 

by outside bodies, people outside of Uzbekistan, to get at the factual situation and to make 

a report not to the Uzbek Government, but to the world community, of what’s taken place 

in that nation. 

It’s my hope that this hearing will help move that process forward of the investigation and also reforms within Uzbekistan. 

There are several other witnesses to present here today. I’m going to have to be 

leaving myself in a little bit, but I do want to invite to testify now Dr. Martha Olcott, 

who has testified previously in front of this body, and I appreciate her thoughts. A Senior 

Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, she’s worked in the region 

of Central Asia for a number of years. 

I don’t know that any of us anticipated—I don’t think anybody anticipated how things 

would unfold in Central Asia. I think everybody saw the factors building up in this region, 

but how those become expressed, I don’t know if anybody saw that, although I do believe 

this situation was probably predictable, given the factors that have been developing in 

Uzbekistan. 

Dr. Olcott, if you have particular thoughts on what we should be doing from this 

point on forward, I’d be most appreciative. 
12

Ms. OLCOTT. Thank you very much. Thank you for the invitation to appear before 

you today, less than a month after my most recent visit to Uzbekistan, which included 

a trip to the Fergana Valley. 

While many aspects of recent events in Uzbekistan remain unclear, one thing is perfectly obvious. Unless the government of President Islam Karimov moves quickly to introduce economic and political reforms, it will not regain public confidence. And if it fails 

to regain public confidence it will face an escalating series of political crises like the one 

it confronted in Andijan, with little reason to assume that the Uzbek Government will 

handle these better than it did the current one. 

The Karimov regime shows no signs of outward remorse over how it handled last 

week’s crisis and has given no indication that it will forsake an exclusively force-driven 

solution to future challenges. 

Virtually all independent observers, though, concur that a strategy based exclusively 

on the use of force cannot secure its desired outcome—that of maintaining the government 

of Islam Karimov. And saying this does not diminish the moral implications of allowing 

such a strategy to be perpetuated, even if it was presumed to be able to succeed. 

Recognizing that the continued use of force in Uzbekistan—in the absence of offering 

some economic relief and allowing basic political freedoms to its population—will create 

diminishing public order in Uzbekistan creates a different set of moral imperatives for the 

international community. 

The recent actions in Uzbekistan create preconditions that require policy-makers to 

examine whether the rights of national sovereignty should be breached in the name of 

international responsibility to protect populations who are endangered and to restore their 

basic human rights. 

As a result, it is incumbent upon the U.S. Government and the OSCE to be satisfied 

that they know what actually occurred in Andijan and its environs on May 12th, 13th, 

and 14th. This will not occur without the creation of an independent international 

commission under the auspices of the OSCE, the United Nations, or as an independent 

commission. 

The Uzbek Government has offered its version of events, not once, but several times, 

and not only have their accounts been inconsistent, but they are seriously at odds with 

what has been reported by journalists who have interviewed refugees in Kyrgyzstan and 

interviewed witnesses in Uzbekistan—eyewitnesses. 

As horrifying as some of these accounts are and as incompetent as the Uzbek Government has been in mounting its own defense, the international community has to make 

clear that it is looking for answers to what wanted and not for villains, answers that are 

necessary to provide the de-escalation of the tensions between the government and its 

population. 

And in asking for answers, the international community must make clear that it is 

not prejudging outcomes, it is not prejudging the guilt or innocence of the 23 businessmen 

who stood accused of supporting an outlawed religious group, that it recognizes that force 

was used to seize arms stores and to take control of a prison, that it doesn’t by definition 

preclude the version that siege takers from within the crowd fired on government troops. 

Furthermore, there is no way that the Uzbek Government will be permitting an 

international inquiry until they are convinced that this will be done by neutral and unbi-
13

ased observers. And even then it is going to be a very hard sell, a point that I will return 

to in a couple of minutes. 

At the same time, U.S. policymakers and their OSCE colleagues must continue to 

ensure that discourse about these events move from the question of international terrorism where the Uzbeks would like them to rest to the underlying causes of why so many 

people were drawn out to protest in the squares of Andijan on May 13th and 14th. 

We cannot allow the issue of whether Hizb ut-Tahrir is a terrorist organization and 

whether it and splinter groups like Akhromiya should be placed on a list of international 

terrorist organizations to become a focus of current concern. The focus must remain on 

why the events in Andijan played out the way they did. 

The U.S. administration has drawn attention to the fact that armed individuals broke 

into weapon stores, used weapons to forcibly release prisoners, and then set siege to public 

buildings. It is important to learn more about who these individuals were and to do so 

from independent sources as well as from the Government of Uzbekistan. 

Knowing as much about the history of religious ferment in the Fergana Valley region 

as I do, it is hard for me personally to believe that the armed individuals who helped plan 

and carry out the attack on the weapon stores and prisons did not include at least a few 

individuals who passed through the network of terror training camps that initially began 

in Tajikistan and then moved to Afghanistan, where they enjoyed direct funding from Al 

Qaeda. 

But the existence of such people—and there were prisoners in Andijan convicted for 

membership in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—and the reality of the threat that 

they may pose to the Government of Uzbekistan is but one of the questions before us. 

The threat that armed individuals committed to the use of terror in the name of 

Islam may pose is magnified exponentially when the population they are appealing to has 

lost confidence in its government and lacks the means of expressing this in peaceful 

fashion. 

This is one of the things that make the current Uzbek strategy so dangerous. 

But at the same time, the international community must be aware of the security 

risks that will be created if the Karimov regime is ousted. There are two ways that this 

might come about, in my mind. 

Karimov might be sacrificed, a la Nicolae Ceaucescu, by the heads of the very power 

ministries upon which his survival depends. This is unlikely, given the degree of rivalry 

that exists between these security services, but it is not impossible. 

However, these men are no more likely to endorse an economic or political reform 

agenda than is the current president and may come to power through making alliances 

with local quasi-Islamist religious leaders. 

More likely is the scenario where the government simply crumbles in the face of widening popular opposition which can no longer be contained through the use or the threat 

of force. 

While Uzbekistan has the region’s largest and best-equipped internal and external 

security forces, its capacity is limited and would not extend to squelching unrest in several cities simultaneously. 

It could not contain a nationwide protest and might well splinter into competing 

armed groups, each backing up claims of competing regional elites, who might in turn be 

backed by competing clerics. The situation would be roughly analogous to what we saw 
14

in Tajikistan in the early and mid-1990s. But those invoking Islamic themes might find 

easy access to far deadlier global networks. 

Tragically, one thing is clear: There will not be the same smooth transfer of power 

that we saw in Uzbekistan that we saw in Georgia and Ukraine or even the bumpier 

Kyrgyz experience. 

Among other things, there is no Saakashvili or Yushchenko waiting in the wings in 

Tashkent. While the secular democratic opposition in Uzbekistan includes many brave 

men and women, these people lack the political clout and the proven administrative skills 

of their Georgian and Ukrainian colleagues. 

There are also members of the ruling elite found in most walks of Uzbek life who 

support reform but who have been frightened to speak up for fear of their jobs. But identifying them will be a difficult job. And more difficult will be to convince the small group 

of secular reformers and the long-time regime supporters to work together. 

Rebuilding after regime collapse is difficult work, as we see in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

and requires close international engagement of the kind that has been lacking in Central 

Asia in the years since independence. 

The consequences of state collapse in Uzbekistan are profound and would endanger 

the survival of the Kyrgyz and Tajik states and would change considerably the path of 

development in Kazakhstan. 

Even today, the crisis is creating serious complications for the interim government 

in Kyrgyzstan. The Bishkek government must manage refugee flow and sort through 

requests of asylum seekers in a way that assures its own large Uzbek population of its 

fairness, while not antagonizing the government in Tashkent, or permitting individuals 

that are part of outlawed groups in Kyrgyzstan to inadvertently gain refuge. 

In a situation in which the risk of chaos or civil war is rapidly moving from vague 

to impending, U.S. policymakers must find a way to translate noble pronouncements into 

action plans. But they cannot simply decide to abandon a sitting president without a plan 

of what they will do next and without making sure that the Uzbek President understands 

the door to chaos and civil war that he has opened. 

An important first step is the formation of an international commission to investigate 

what occurred in Andijan. This is a project worthy of considerable back-door diplomacy 

to get Uzbek acquiescence through face-to-face contact with this man, with President 

Karimov, to warn him of what fate awaits him and his people if he does not change his 

policy. 

Karimov will not be able to survive politically unless he engages in a whole range 

of economic and political reform. Some seemingly small changes in policy—freeing the 

purchase price of cotton and grain, introducing a flat tax system for income and profit, 

offering a staged withdrawal of trade restrictions—would all produce new strains of support for the currently beleaguered Uzbek President and substantially improve the lives 

of Uzbek citizens. 

This is especially true if they were accompanied by the registration of foreign NGOs 

and the removal of restrictions on assembly, a new attitude toward open media, et cetera: 

all the things we’ve heard about today. 

Some of these steps would create quick, but hopefully temporary, budget deficits, 

which, if the Uzbeks showed good faith with key political reforms, the international 

community could help Tashkent absorb. 
15

But if the best offices of the United States, the OSCE and the United Nations and, 

of course, those of friendly European and Asian states are unable to convince the current 

Government of Uzbekistan that an independent inquiry into the events in Andijan is 

required, the international community must prepare itself to face a much greater humanitarian intervention in Uzbekistan and quite probably in the Central Asian region more 

generally. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you. 

Dr. Polat? 

Mr. POLAT. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Commission, I am grateful for this 

given opportunity to make this speech here at the U.S. Helsinki Commission. 

I am making my third presentation to the members of the Helsinki Commission here. 

Perhaps some people are bored to hear what I will say again. 

On the positive side, I was thinking that this will be beneficial for Mr. Brownback—

but he’s already left—the Chairman of the Commission, to hear the voice of Uzbek opposition for the first time, as opposed to Congressman Christopher Smith, who has heard us 

few times already. 

I say my presentations are boring because time and time again I make the same 

statements: President Karimov is a dictator. Democratic reforms are not taking place in 

Uzbekistan. Human rights are not respected in this country. 

The first time I was here in 1999 after the Tashkent terrorist bombings, I said here 

that Uzbek authorities killed at that time two members of our party who had no relationship to terrorism. But what happened after the hearing? My friend, one of the leaders 

of Birlik Party, a former member of Uzbek Parliament, Shakhrukh Ruzimuradov, was 

killed. 

And I spoke about it during the last hearing in June 2004. And what happened? Now, 

we are already hearing about mass killing in Uzbekistan. 

And I’m a mathematician and I see some ties between our hearings and the behavior 

of Mr. Karimov. 

There is an Uzbek proverb: [speaking in Uzbek.] 

Here is my translation: If you say to a person that he is mad, he will be mad a little 

bit more. 

So that’s the same with Karimov. We say he is a dictator, we say he’s authoritarian 

leader; he has become more dictator and more authoritarian. Maybe the roots of the 

problem is here in Washington. 

So everything is going to become worse and worse. But there is another proverb, it’s 

a Russian proverb: Not everything is bad as it seems; but in reality, it’s even worse. 

And I will give some examples why I think it’s even worse. And the example is not 

from Uzbekistan or from United States. 

Two months ago, Uzbek human rights activists conducted protests at the Tashkent 

office of the American Organization, Freedom House. Did you think this demonstration 

was organized to support the activities of this organization in Uzbekistan? No. 
16

On the contrary, it was organized against its activities, which lately is attempting 

to validate activities of Karimov’s regime and does not deal with defending human rights 

protection. 

Can you imagine Freedom House, the symbol of human rights and freedom becomes 

a target for Uzbek human rights activists? What’s going on? Maybe there are some roots 

in the United States [inaudible]. 

In another example, the Minister of Justice of Uzbekistan sent warnings recently to 

such organizations as National Democratic Institute and International Republican 

Institute, clearly telling them not to cooperate with unregistered opposition parties. 

As a result, representatives of these organizations are even afraid to hold meetings 

with the members of Birlik Party at their office locations. And often they have meetings 

at barely visible chaykhanas, tea houses. 

I think if the guys from this institute were a little bit smart, they can say: Ministry 

of Justice of Uzbekistan, OK, we will help to register these political organization, political 

parties and cooperate with them little bit using [inaudible]. 

Therefore, I think it will not be coincidence if the Uzbek democrats start protesting 

near the American Embassy in Tashkent, because the United States remained as the only 

Western state that did not accuse the Uzbek authorities of the massacre of peaceful citizens in Andijan. 

I am confident that the last events in Uzbekistan should be looked at in the context 

of the above-mentioned facts. And what had happened in Andijan may [inaudible]. 

Early morning on May 13, a group of unidentified armed people first attacked a military base, then a local prison and, finally, the Regional Administration Building. The 

Birlik Party issued statements on May 13 and May 15—it’s very important—condemning 

these unlawful and forcible acts of this unidentified group. At the same time, we offered 

our help to the authorities to resolve this conflict, but no one was interested in our advice. 

An armed group, after taking charge of the Regional Administration Building, has 

requested to free people who were sentenced by Uzbek courts heavy-handedly without following elementary rules of the justice system. 

It is very important to note this is the exact demand put forward to the authorities 

by Uzbek and international human rights organizations. And very interesting that Islamic 

extremist groups are demanding the same as local and international human rights 

organizations. 

And after this, several thousand demonstrators gathered around the building supporting demands of this group. Here, we can already make a first very important conclusion: Several teams of lightly armed people can easily take charge of the power in the 

city, one of the biggest cities of Uzbekistan. This indicates in regional locations the power 

of Karimov does not exist. Even police and the national security service are not willing 

to protect this regime. 

At that stage, President Karimov, who is at the same time—this is important, too—

commander-in-chief of the national army, swiftly arrives to Andijan and throws in the 

military to deal with the situation. Note that army should get involved in dealing with 

external danger and usually is not trained to deal with such peaceful events. 

In doing so, Karimov completely dismissed the fact that there are several thousand 

peaceful civilians out there in addition to only tens of armed group. As a result, several 

hundred innocent citizens of the country were killed during the event. 
17

Here we come to our second conclusion: the President of the country and the commander-in-chief of the nation’s army steps into criminal act by forcing the army to perform activities which is not their responsibility in the first place. 

And, finally, we have to remember the shooting down of hundreds of innocent peoples 

occurred in a country which is member of OSCE and strategic partner of United States. 

So now we’re thinking—we have to think, what to do next? And I’m not thinking 

about opposition, about the Birlik Party. We are doing something and we will do it—we 

are doing things for the last 15 years. 

But I want to say about what we are waiting from international community, from 

OSCE and United States. I think it necessary to do the following: an OSCE commission 

should be established to investigate Andijan tragedy. If OSCE will not do it, I think OSCE 

will be dead already. 

Second, United States should condemn the shooting of peaceful demonstration in 

Andijan as did it other West countries. Maybe I didn’t understand well Mr. Brownback. 

He said that United States condemned it. I think it’s not true because United States never 

condemned it. They only expressed some concern about this event——

Mr. MCNAMARA. Just to make a point on that. Definitely, there have been statements 

issued by the administration condemning the indiscriminate use of force against the population. 

Mr. POLAT. OK. And next, OSCE and United States should require the Government 

of Uzbekistan to start democratic reforms. In particular, registration of the opposition parties. And in the first place, Birlik Party since it is the most prepared party amongst 

others. The requirement should be made now without waiting OSCE Commission results. 

Furthermore, Uzbekistan should take steps to conduct constitutional reforms where 

a single chamber parliament will be set up with the participation of opposition, limiting 

powers of the president. 

I am aware of the fact that Western countries are worried that weak opposition and 

attempts of change the current setup of the governance in the country will result in destabilization and enhancing power for Islamic extremists. 

I completely disagree with this position. Not wasting too much time on this subject, 

let me point out that, first, it is impossible to set up atheistic state in Uzbekistan which 

is what Karimov has attempted to do so far. And second, Uzbekistan will have a religious 

model over time, very similar to Turkish system. High secular educational level of population in the country gives enough optimism to hope that this will be the case. 

The people who say that power maybe will catch by Islamic fundamentalists in 

Uzbekistan, they’re only thinking about Uzbekistan very close to Afghanistan and very 

similar country . 

It is impossible. Uzbekistan is already for about 150 years, almost a European-style 

country under Russian control. 

Let me take last few points about opposition, in my last minutes. At this point in 

time, Birlik is the most prepared democratic opposition in the country. Everybody knows 

that authorities have been trying to destroy us over the last 15 years. It’s very important. 

For 15 years, Karimov has tried to destroy us. But he cannot. 

Most similar national opposition movements around Commonwealth of Independent 

States, which were set up at the time of Gorbachev era, have disappeared. But Birlik is 

still functioning. It’s very important. We have over 20,000 registered members. Over the 
18

past 2 years, the Minister of Justice strictly followed Karimov’s orders and refused Birlik 

to register five times. You can imagine—that we cannot prepare the papers for registered 

political parties. It is very easy but they don’t want it. But party is existing and we have 

20,000 registered members of Birlik. But both OSCE and United States are keeping silent 

about this tough violence against political rights of people of Uzbekistan. 

Nevertheless, I believe Birlik is in a position to resolve any political problems. It is 

true that we may not have enough capabilities to work in executive bodies, but we know 

that many people who are working in the executive bodies under Karimov’s regime are 

not supporters of this regime and they are ready to work with us. And they will work 

with us. 

In conclusion, I would like to say the following: Andijan tragedy has showed a real 

weakness of Karimov’s regime. It will not last long. We have to be prepared—I mean we, 

Birlik—for the change of power, and we are getting ready. 

Many thanks for your attention. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Kimmage? 

Mr. KIMMAGE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity. I prepared a written statement and I ask that it be entered into the record. And 

the views that I express here today are my own. 

The events that took place on and after May 13 in Andijan, Uzbekistan, have drawn 

the attention of the entire world and prompted the U.S. State Department to say that 

there needs to be an open and credible transparent inquiry into this and that the international community would stand ready to assist. 

In the hope that such an investigation will take place, I would like here to summarize 

some of what we know about what happened in Andijan and put forward a number of 

concrete recommendations for lines of inquiry. 

On closer examination, the bloodshed in Uzbekistan breaks down, into two events 

that raise two separate groups of issues. 

The first is an attack by armed militants on the night of May 12 on a military garrison and prison, freeing of prisoners and the seizure of the Regional Administration 

Building in Andijan. 

The second is the use of deadly force on May 13 against unarmed demonstrators in 

Andijan. 

President Islam Karimov and his government have presented official explanations for 

both events. But independent reports cast the first event in a different light and paint 

a radically different picture of the second. 

I will briefly speak about both of these questions now. 

On the assault, the basic details are relatively clear that on the night of May 12, a 

group of armed men attacked a police unit, military garrison and prison. They freed several hundred prisoners and then went on to seize the Regional Administration Building 

in Andijan. 

President Karimov has described them as religious extremists whose goal was to set 

up a caliphate in Uzbekistan which he said would have then gone to include Afghanistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and all other countries. 
19

He has also linked the attackers to Hizb ut-Tahrir, which we heard Commissioner 

Cromartie speak about earlier. Independent reports do not refute Karimov’s statement 

that these attackers resorted to violence. But they provide little support for his other 

assertions. And as Commissioner Cromartie noted, this is a crucial in Uzbekistan with 

issues of militant ties. 

As the State Department has documented, there is ample evidence of rights violations 

and unfair trials and it is very difficult to know exactly what connections to militant 

groups may exist. 

What I would say is that at present, the evidence we have does not allow us to conclude that these were or were not extremists. Rather, it shows that there are ample 

grounds to doubt the official Uzbek claim. 

Thus far, none of the independent accounts we have of the events in Andijan 

indicates that the armed men on the anti-government side employed extremist rhetoric 

or symbolism. 

On the second count, which is the use of deadly force against armed civilians. The 

Uzbek official version is that the rebels who are responsible for the violence, which they 

say killed 169 people, 32 members of government forces, five women and children, and 

the remaining dead would then be either armed terrorists or their hostages. President 

Karimov has stressed that no one gave any orders to shoot. 

Independent accounts contrast this. In addition to my statement, I’ve prepared a list 

of media accounts, of reported eyewitness statements which you could find on the table. 

I will quote one eyewitness statement from a reporter for the Institute for War and 

Peace reporting who was in Andijan who said that, ‘‘armored personnel carriers appeared 

out of nowhere, moving through the streets at speed. A second column arriving 5 minutes 

later suddenly opened up on the crowds, firing off round after round without even slowing 

down to take aim.’’

There are even more disturbing eyewitness accounts of troops moving through the 

crowds and killing wounded protesters. 

The independent death toll—and this is all unconfirmed, I have to say—stands at 

745. 

Given this, an inquiry should proceed along two groups of issues: The first, as I said, 

is the attack by armed militants. 

The questions we need to ask are: Who were the armed men who attacked a military 

garrison and prison? Did they have any ties supported by hard evidence to an extremist 

organization? What were their ultimate aims? How many inmates did they release from 

prison? Are there reasonable grounds for believing that any of those inmates were members of extremist or terrorist organizations? 

What are the current whereabouts of the inmates who were released? Did negotiations take place between the government and the rebels? And if so, what was their substance and outcome? 

On the second group of issues involving the use of deadly force: Who started the 

violence in the center of Andijan on the center of May 13? Did Uzbek troops fire on 

unarmed civilians? If so, were they acting under orders? If so, who gave those orders? 

Finally, how many people were killed, and under what circumstances? 
20

The precise format of a future investigation can only emerge through cooperation 

between the Uzbek Government and the international community. One possible vehicle, 

as has been suggested today, is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Finally, I would like to say one remark about the refugee situation. There are over 

500 Uzbek refugees now in Kyrgyzstan, many of them from Andijan. They’ve been 

accorded asylum secret status but President Karimov has said that he does not consider 

them refugees. And some Kyrgyz officials have said that they can’t stay. 

Kyrgyz NGOs have warned that they could face torture or other reprisals if they’re 

returned to Uzbekistan. 

Kyrgyzstan recently experienced significant political upheaval and they could thus be 

especially vulnerable to pressure from its larger and more powerful neighbor. In order to 

forestall this potential pressure on the Kyrgyz Government and safeguard the wellbeing 

of the refugees, the operation and management of the camp where they are housed should 

be transferred with the consent of the Kyrgyz Government, to the United Nations or Red 

Cross. And international organizations should also take responsibility for the admission 

of new refugees from Uzbekistan. 

In conclusion, I would say that the tragic events in Andijan have left many questions 

unanswered. But the information available is sufficient to justify a concerted search for 

answers. What I hope to have done here is to underscore the pressing need for the ‘‘credible and transparent accounting’’ that the State Department has urged, as well as to suggest some of the lines along which it might be conducted. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. 

Excuse me. Before we proceed with questions, I would point out just perhaps a historical note. And that is that President Karimov is certainly no stranger to the OSCE. 

Indeed, the president himself signed the original Helsinki Final Act document in 1992 

when his country joined the OSCE accepting all the commitments relating to democracy, 

human rights, and the rule of law. 

So we have a signature, if you will, on paper. 

Before opening up to questions from the audience, there were a few questions that 

came to my mind. One has the impression that the regime has been quite effective in 

eliminating alternative voices in Uzbek society. Even if President Karimov were open to 

dialogue, which is certainly an outstanding question, are there meaningful interlocutors 

for him to engage with? 

Who would like to address that question? 

Ms. OLCOTT. I’ll start then. I think myself, and Abdurahim said that he believed that 

Birlik would have strong support in the executive branch and, in fact, the Senate. And 

I think that’s really a very critical point. 

I think if we talk about potential interlocutors, one of things that if anybody could 

get President Karimov to begin political reform, you would find this that a very large part 

of the Uzbek ruling—I mean, not the top top, but even very close to the top—include 

individuals in every different walk of life, in the judiciary and some of the new 

parliamentarians, members of the economic ministries, even in the military, there are 

people that really do want to see meaningful economic and political reform. 
21

So I think if you are really creative at changing the political environment in the 

country where the existence of independent groups made it easier for independent groups 

even to speak their mind, then I think that you would find that interlocutors do develop. 

Interlocutors can’t appear overnight but Uzbekistan is more than capable of producing interlocutors. Also, I think there’s been a lot said about religious life in 

Uzbekistan. 

As somebody who has been studying Uzbek religion intimately for the past 4 years 

and non-intimately for the last 30, I mean, I think that there’s a lot more fluidity in Islam 

in Uzbekistan than we see—that the state’s attitude is much more—it’s changed in the 

last few years, creating a real alternative within Islam for people to be debating what the 

nature of their own religious life is. 

Here, it’s really focused on these religious groupings that are illegal. But there is a 

dynamism in Uzbek Islam which is critical, I think, for Uzbekistan to develop a civic 

society because Uzbekistan has been under Russian rule for 150 years. But it’s also been 

an Islamic country for 1,500 years—I’m probably not doing the math right—about 1,400 

years. And this part of its heritage has to be brought back on the table if civic life is to 

have any meaning. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. And just picking up on that last point, and certainly, others are welcome to chime in as well. One has a sense, though, and correct me if I’m wrong, that the 

regime has also vilified all Muslims operating outside of sort of the structures of state 

control. That’s the impression that one gets. 

Ms. OLCOTT. I think that impression has—I mean, I think the situation is really 

changing and I’m not always sure how close to the very top people are aware of how it’s 

changing. 

And so early this year, Uzbek Government introduced an experimental program—it’s 

the second year it’s pursued this—of teaching history of religion in state schools. And next 

year it’s going to become nationwide. I interviewed people on my most trip involved in 

that program. And it’s really under the guise of history of religion. There’s an awful lot 

of propagation of the faith. I saw the books being used. I mean, it’s not just text being 

written by atheists in the state. This is really a form of almost what used to exist in some 

European countries of state religion being taught in state schools. 

So I think there’s this—a much more fluid religious life under the banner of statesponsored Islam. And that’s increased. There have been legal changes. The 1998 law is 

still there. And I’m not making excuses for the way it’s implemented. But from 2000 on, 

there have been changes in the way the official Islamic community is able to carry on 

its activities which has really created a great deal more space for independent religious 

actors. And that’s very different from saying ‘‘organized religious actors’’ but independent 

religious actors. 

I mean, I just see a much more vibrant religious life there than is often reported in 

the pages of Western publications. I’m not talking about those that monitor this for a 

living. 

That doesn’t mean that the abuses that the Commission reports or are that covered 

in the Western press do not exist. I mean, individuals may have their rights abused but 

at the same time, you can also have a vibrant religious life developing. And I see both 

realities in Uzbekistan. 
22

Which is why so many of the actions of the regime seem to me so troubling because 

I do see, as Abdurahim was implying, there are exit strategies available out of this current situation that would produce a better life for everybody in Uzbekistan if somehow 

the people at the top could be made to understand this. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Anyone else? [inaudible] 

Mr. POLAT. I’m sorry for my bad English. Maybe I speak not bad but my understanding is absolutely worse. Because I’m in the United States 7 years, but I’m saying 

staying—not living. I’m not living here. It’s true. I’m living in Uzbekistan. But now you 

can do it because of the Internet, the telephone. That’s why my English is very bad. That’s 

why I’m not sure I understand what has been said. 

But I will say something about role of religious or in our country. Even under the 

Soviet Union, it was officially an atheistic country. But even the everybody felt themselves 

as Muslim. And very important is that country was secular country and religions were 

separated from politics. That’s very important. 

But Karimov tried to continue these policies. It’s impossible. And I think, in general, 

Uzbekistan will take place in this specter of distribution between secular and religious 

countries. It will be something between Pakistan and Turkey. Of course, we will try to—

it should be close to Turkey where I lived before the United States, 6 years in Turkey. 

That’s why I have good experience about Turkey. And actually, Uzbekistan should be Turkey. 

Maybe I will say very tough things but I have to say it. For example, if Mr. Karimov 

sometimes will visit mosque, the situation will change by 60 degrees. Because you said 

90 percent of the population are Muslims and the president is atheist. For 15 years, one 

time he visited mosque when he was at Saudi Arabia. 

It is impossible. But in other case, I know some people are worrying that it will pick 

up power Islam fundamentalists. It is impossible that in all this—the population is not 

supporting fundamentalism. They’re Muslims. I’m Muslim. But now under the pressure 

of the Karimov regime, they are becoming maybe not more powerful. No. It is small 

groups but they are becoming more active, maybe. 

That’s why I told you if Mr. Karimov and some representatives of Uzbek Embassy 

here will go time from time as I am doing, and I see it in Turkey—of course, now the 

power in Turkey is almost religious party but before there was a was secular president, 

prime ministers. 

They are visiting mosques and the people saw it is the same Muslim as they are. 

That’s why it should be changed in Uzbekistan something cardinally. It’s in big degree. 

And second about opposition. And I’m not saying this only because I’m Birlik Party 

leader. I’m saying it to promote understanding responsibly of what I’m saying. 

Many peoples know about Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan’s opposition’s activity from 

Russian media. It’s a fact. But nobody—very few people even in United States knows the 

real situation with opposition. 

Birlik is a real power in Uzbekistan. Everybody knows who is Karimov—and 

Karimov, for 15 years, tried to destroy it but he couldn’t. And he cannot do it. Never. 

Because it’s a very strong organization, with about 20,000 registered members of party 

in the country. They’ve gone totalitarian. It’s not a dictatorship. It’s a totalitarian country, 

Uzbekistan. Here we have 20,000 registered members, not peoples who are saying 20,100 

registered party. 
23

It’s very important and I’m sure it will take power——

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much for your comments. 

Mr. POLAT [continuing]. Through the secular regime but it will be role of religious 

Muslim, of course, will be improved or increased. I don’t know how much person, but it 

should be increased. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CROMARTIE. Just quickly. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Sure. Go ahead. 

Mr. CROMARTIE. Your question was who are the potential interlocutors for engagement? We shouldn’t, of course, forget the former Chief Mufti Mohammed Saadiq Saadiq 

who is in Tashkent now and he’s returned from exile, voluntary exile. He met with our 

commission. He’s a scholar who has published a lot on Islam and human rights. He’s certainly a [inaudible] partner. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. As I said earlier, we’re now open to questions from the audience. 

If there’s a representative from the Embassy of Uzbekistan who would like to pose the 

first question, certainly, I’m very pleased to allow that to happen. 

Again, we would ask that you ask questions and avoid making statements. And 

please, if you could indicate your name and the affiliation that you have and utilize the 

microphone because that will be part of the transcription and unofficial record of today’s 

briefing. 

So I open to the floor. So it’s your time. 

QUESTIONER. Thank you. My name is Erika Schlager and I’m with the staff of the 

Helsinki Commission. I think my question might principally be directed to Dr. Olcott, 

although others may wish to comment as well. 

The United States has certainly counseled Uzbekistan to undertake political and economic human rights democratic reform. And particular concern has been raised here 

about ongoing problems such as torture and abuse in Uzbekistan. 

At the same time, it’s been widely reported that the United States is rendering 

detainees to Uzbekistan. And I’m wondering if you think that might send a mixed message or suggest that we’re not as serious about our concerns regarding torture as we 

really are. Thank you. 

Ms. OLCOTT. I think that the question is really complicated. I honestly don’t think—

I think this is much more an issue for the way the United States is perceived outside 

of Uzbekistan and the way the United States is perceived inside of Uzbekistan. 

I think that there is very little awareness about the United States having sent prisoners—the accusations that were made, I think, initially by former [UK] Ambassador 

Craig Murray was the one who started this whole campaign. 

I’ve made several trips to Uzbekistan since that first emerged as an issue. And I 

actually had heard more about some of the way Ambassador Murray—some of the things 

associated with his public statements there than I did about the torture issue. 

I do think it has colored how the United States is perceived elsewhere because of 

sending people there. But I think you’re really talking about a small group of human 

rights activists within Uzbekistan who would even know of the issue and be bothered by 

the double standard. 
24

I think more seriously, and I’m not diminishing the importance of this issue, I think 

the United States, which was very vivid to Uzbekistan in 2001 at the time of the war 

in Afghanistan and when the base first opened, has become more and more remote for 

the Uzbeks over the past few years. 

I think it’s really important to note that when—apparently—I mean, this was 

reported everywhere and they got somebody to put their declaration on the Web—that 

when these people took—the hostage takers took hostages, they sent a message in Russian to Vladimir Putin to intervene in their behalf. 

They did not write to the United States. They did not appeal to the United States. 

And if you want to turn to, I mean, Russia’s record on some of these issues is well more 

problematic than ours, but this was a more vivid personage to these people than we were. 

That’s something that as an American, not to mention a policy activist, as well as analyst, 

is something that deeply disturbs me—that America is being eclipsed in this part of the 

world by states that are much less visible as defenders as democratic values. I mean, you 

know, I think that’s really the much bigger tragedy. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Any other questions? 

QUESTIONER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

I want to take an opportunity to make a short 1-minute statement if you permit, and 

it relates to your original question about the interlocutors. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. If you can sort of pose it as a question, that would be very helpful, 

or if not, please make it as brief as possible. 

QUESTIONER. Make it quick and short. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

My name is Atabek Nazirov, and I’m the chairman of the Global Uzbek Council. It’s 

a diversified group of professionals from Uzbekistan who mostly work and live abroad. 

But first of all, let me on behalf of the founders and fellows of the Uzbek Global 

Council, to express sorrow and deepest condolences to the friends and families of the 

people who lost their relatives and loved ones during the tragic events that took place past 

week in Uzbekistan. 

Unfortunately, nothing will ever replace the loss of these human souls. 

Now, dear audience and panel, allow me to take this unique opportunity to publicly 

introduce our group, established as a de facto organization last year in London. 

Since our inception, we have expanded our membership to include fellows in New 

York, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, Moscow, and, of course, Uzbekistan. 

Over the last couple of months, we’ve been in the process of formalizing the existence 

of our organization and registering it as a nonprofit entity in the United States. 

Our objective has been to effectively utilize a diverse pool of human capital available 

within our group for the benefit of Uzbek society, and more importantly now for the stability in Uzbekistan. 

We’re planning on sponsoring various educational research initiatives, facilitating 

networking and development opportunities, and also promoting charitable work, all of 

which in the long run would contribute, we hope, to the improvement of the socioeconomic 

environment of Uzbekistan and to the challenging process of democratization. 

Given the current situation in Uzbekistan, I would like to inform the audience and 

the public that the members of the Global Uzbek Council are eager to become actively 
25

engaged in helping to fund and implement solutions that will bring Uzbekistan out of this 

crisis. 

I’ll be available after the briefing to provide any information or details to the 

audience if necessary. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you for keeping it short. 

And again, there is material available, and if you have materials outside, people can 

avail themselves of those items. 

Don’t be shy, please. I see a representative of the media, which are usually not shy. 

QUESTIONER. Yes, the media. 

Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Liberty. Asta Banionis. 

If anyone on the commission—the religion commission—could possibly think back to 

another situation where violence has been used against civilians to? From that experience, 

what is the next step? 

You’ve all spoken and recommended investigations to go forward and independent 

investigations to go forward. How likely is that? What methodology would you use under 

the trigger of the CSCE [Helsinki] documents to try to implement that? 

Mr. CROMARTIE. Wait. Let me ask you, is the question what—after violence against 

civilians, what kind of pressure can be applied to——

QUESTIONER [Ms. Banionis]. [Off-mike.] the investigation——

[Crosstalk.] 

Mr. CROMARTIE. Right, I mean——

QUESTIONER [Ms. Banionis]. [Off-mike.] 

Mr. CROMARTIE. Well, let me just say that as with anywhere else, I would—Dr. Olcott 

would know the answer to that better I think than anyone. Well, maybe the chair would 

like to answer that one. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Sure. 

Just my observation on that. In fact, there is an impression that the Government of 

Uzbekistan is open to a truly independent investigation of the circumstances surrounding 

developments, especially in the eastern part of the country, of late. 

That said, certainly the representative of the OSCE is Foreign Minister Rupel, and 

before one could undertake a meaningful investigation, they would first obviously have to 

be some direct communications. And it’s my impression that even establishing the most 

fundamental contact has been difficult, if not impossible. 

So, again, there are certain steps that would need to be taken. That said, there has 

been a willingness on the part of the government—in the past, I can recall at least one 

circumstance of allegations that an individual had been tortured to death while in detention, where the government did show a willingness to have independent forensic experts 

visit the country and to try to do some kind of an assessment very much after the fact. 

Ms. OLCOTT. Could I be blunt, but subtle on the record? 

I mean, one of the problems is that he is the leader of a sovereign state. And I 

would—the parallel that I thought about—I mean, you’re asking a question. 
26

Of course, there is Russia and Chechnya. You know, that’s a dispute in which there 

has been violence, force used against unarmed civilians to the best of all our knowledge, 

and the international community has tried to come in and been rebuffed. 

I mean, President Karimov has given very, very mixed signals. He’s talked about 

wanting some investigation, but he doesn’t want to be publicly slapped, and that’s I think 

part of the problem, that you are—he doesn’t have the international position of somebody 

like the leader of Russia, that they can unilaterally say no. 

But the whole question, I think, is really one of what is the proper approach to get 

a leader, and that’s very difficult. There is no easy formula. But that was why I alluded 

to the need for backdoor diplomacy. 

It’s not simply a question of what the rules of international engagement require. 

Oftentimes, fulfilling those rules is a final stage and you get people to ask for things they 

don’t really want in order to not be put in the record publicly against it. 

In my mind, the key is to find a way—for international interlocutors to find a way 

to convince this very proud and stubborn man who is not seeing things in the way that 

many of us are seeing them—you know, doesn’t share the same view of what the reality 

of the next stage in his country is that many of us do to accept. And that’s very problematic unless it is done at the highest levels and in private, and that’s one of the problems. 

And you know sometimes that it’s been done, because it succeeded. [Laughter.] 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Well, again, I would just repeat that as a logical first step, there 

would have to be some direct communication at the highest levels. And as I understand 

it, even that first step has not occurred unfortunately. 

QUESTIONER. Margarita Assenova, Freedom House. I would like to make one short 

remark and pose one question. 

The remark is in response to Mr. Polat when he said that Freedom House was 

opposed in Tashkent for trying to open channels of communication with the government. 

I would like to say the investigations—there were three independent investigations of suspicious deaths in custody. They were facilitated by Freedom House with the participation 

of international experts. The second one was with local human rights defenders. And the 

third one was a combination, international experts and local human rights defenders. And 

we can see that this is a good sign of opening of communication with the government officials in order to prevent cases of abuse and torture. 

So Freedom House has rated Uzbekistan as a not-free country in all its publications. 

It’s one of the worst regimes in the world. It’s also in the publications of Freedom House, 

it’s very difficult to accuse Freedom House of washing the bloody face of Karimov, as some 

human rights defenders pointed, because the fact of the matter is the truth is set, but 

there has to be a constructive approach to addressing grave human rights problems when 

one is dealing with a country with lack of practices, lack of understanding of human 

rights standards, and there is a lot of need for education and for mentality change to 

make this work. 

The question I would like to ask is, I have insights about this, but it’s important for 

the audience to hear. Are there reformers in this government? How homogeneous the 

government is? And what would be the future of a—what would be a future succession 

option for Uzbekistan, sooner or later? 
27

This moment is really critical, and everyone regrets these tragic events took place, 

but for the sake of Uzbekistan and for the sake of peace in the region, there has to be 

some alternative of succession that would benefit both Uzbekistan and the entire region. 

Maybe Martha or Daniel could answer the question. Thank you. 

Mr. KIMMAGE. I’ll go first, because it’s very short. 

I don’t think this is the right forum to publicly speculate on who a successor to President Karimov would be. 

Ms. OLCOTT. I would like to take a slightly—take the same answer, but twist it back 

to the—what our topic is today. 

I think that’s one of the reasons why this hearing and this crisis is really so critical. 

I don’t see the prospect of—I think it’s in a sense if there’s not an opening of Uzbek 

society quickly, it’s pretty irrelevant who the successor is going to be. 

The key is the opening to proceed the succession struggle, and the whole nature of 

that what that struggle is going to be is going to play out very differently if there is any 

stability in the country itself, because as I alluded to in my testimony, contenders for 

power regardless of who they are today and how they may change in the next six months 

or a year or two years are going to take advantage of this to expand their own power 

base. 

And that’s why I think there is no tomorrow for opening prospects for political 

reform. But the only way you’re going to get people off the street is if you have economic 

reform. 

And so I think that it’s really—I mean, you want political reform for reasons other 

than just blowing off steam. But right now political reform in the absence of economic 

reform will blow off steam for today or tomorrow, but it’s going to lead to even more 

demands for economic change. 

In this case, they must come hand in hand. And today is too late, but tomorrow is 

really too late. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. A quick question, because corruption hasn’t really come up as an 

issue, per se, but certainly the corrosive nature of that—I wonder if you could touch 

briefly on that. 

Ms. OLCOTT. I think that the corruption issue is really critical to the difficulty in our 

response to what’s going on. Even understanding it in 5 to 7 minutes would be difficult, 

even if we all got 10 minutes it’s hard. 

One of the reasons that the case of the businessman was so troubling is that both 

versions of reality are plausible to me, again, as somebody working in these—with these—

with the development of Islam in the Fergana region. The existence of—and Dan knows 

way more about Akramia than I do—but the existence of the way Akramia exists is 

around enterprises. And they use these enterprises to fund their activities. And Akramia 

was based in Andijan. 

So the charge that these businessmen, in addition to employing 2,000 people, or 

whatever number of people, were giving money to an Islamic charity that had as its goal 

creating a caliphate. Whether through armed use or not, you know, I at this point certainly can’t say. It’s plausible. 
28

This is the model that the United States is investigating throughout the world, you 

know, the use of Islamic charities to transfer funds to other kinds of groups. So it’s a plausible claim. 

But equally plausible is the claim that there were people in the local administration 

that wanted to buy the enterprises of some of these people at below market price and that 

they went to jail because of that. 

Both realities exist in Uzbekistan, and it’s impossible to know sitting here or even 

sitting in Tashkent, and possibly even sitting in Andijan, which version is true unless you 

can get somebody who can document in your presence the takeover. Until that takeover 

bid succeeds, you usually never learn about it. 

But both realities are part of Uzbekistan. Corruption has been a serious problem, and 

anytime you open up the prospects of making money, of expanding the private sector, the 

corruption escalates. 

The government has had some ineffectual and very slow economic reform in recent 

years, and there is a slight improvement in the private sector in Uzbekistan over the past 

two years, especially over the past 18 months or so, which is why some of the changes 

I propose would really have a rapid effect on de-escalating some of the economic tensions. 

But anytime you do that, corruption increases as a factor, and you can’t go two steps 

in Uzbekistan without people beginning to complain about corruption. It is something that 

the Uzbeks are no longer frightened to discuss. This is—and that’s going to continue. You 

know, this is really an issue that really disturbs everybody deeply. 

But you can’t begin to cope with corruption issues unless you open economic opportunity and build a constituency of your interlocutors, in a sense, who are going to push 

within the regime and against the regime from outside for economic protection. 

Economic protection of private businesses is the biggest problem I see in post-Soviet 

space. It’s not simply an Uzbek phenomenon. And the only thing that exerts pressure on 

it is the existence of a local class that feels like it’s going to disappear . 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. POLAT. [Off-mike.] 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Sure. A brief comment, sure. 

Mr. POLAT. [Off-mike.] understand almost anything, but I will try to say something. 

About the political and economic reforms, I read in many articles in United States, 

in Internet, Web sites, about important economic reforms. But I think some people—they 

give the examples of Pinochet in Chile, he did economic reforms without political reforms, 

example of Indonesia. But they didn’t understand one thing, that this is a quite different 

situation. I don’t know how the people—they compare about it, because big problem in 

Uzbekistan, for all former Soviet Union countries, is reprivatization. There was not 

problem with reprivatization in Chile, Indonesia, in anywhere. 

And so without political reforms, it is impossible to have any economic reform in 

Uzbekistan. And now you see it—Yeltsin—now everybody is blaming him, but he began 

political reform and as a result of his reform is now they have something in economic, 

Russia. 

The same in Kazakhstan. They have political reform, that’s why they have economic 

reform. 
29

And look, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan—they have no economic, political reform. As a 

result, they don’t really have any economic reforms. So that’s why Karimov cannot do anything in economic without changing the political system. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you. 

If there are no further questions, then I will close the briefing, reminding you that 

a transcription of today’s proceedings will be available on the Commission’s Web site at 

www.csce.gov. 

Thank you for attending this afternoon’s briefing. 

[Whereupon the briefing ended at 3:15 p.m.] 

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