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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

308 Nebraska Reports

JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

Elicia Marie Johnson, appellee, v. Matthew 

Eugene Johnson, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 12, 2021. No. S-20-428.

1. Contempt: Appeal and Error. In a civil contempt proceeding where 

a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation of a court order, 

an appellate court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) 

the trial court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) the 

trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and (3) the trial 

court’s determinations of whether a party is in contempt and of the sanction to be imposed are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2. Divorce: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a divorce 

decree presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate 

court reaches a conclusion independent of the determination reached by 

the court below.

3. Courts: Jurisdiction: Divorce: Property Settlement Agreements. A 

district court, in the exercise of its broad jurisdiction over marriage dissolutions, retains jurisdiction to enforce all terms of approved property 

settlement agreements.

4. Courts: Jurisdiction. A court that has jurisdiction to make a decision 

also has the power to enforce it by making such orders as are necessary 

to carry its judgment or decree into effect.

5. Contempt. Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve and 

enforce the rights of private parties to a suit when a party fails to comply with a court order made for the benefit of the opposing party.

6. Courts: Jurisdiction: Divorce: Contempt. A court’s continuing jurisdiction over a dissolution decree includes the power to provide equitable 

relief in a contempt proceeding.

7. Contempt: Courts: Equity. Contempt proceedings may both compel 

obedience to orders and administer the remedies to which the court has 

found the parties to be entitled. Where a situation exists that is contrary to the principles of equity and which can be redressed within the 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

03/19/2021 12:08 AM CDT
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JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

scope of judicial action, a court of equity will devise a remedy to meet 

the situation.

8. Divorce: Property Settlement Agreements: Final Orders. A decree is 

a judgment, and once a decree for dissolution becomes final, its meaning, including the settlement agreement incorporated therein, is determined as a matter of law from the four corners of the decree itself.

9. Divorce: Judgments: Intent. The meaning of a decree must be determined from all parts thereof, read in its entirety, and must be construed 

as a whole so as to give effect to every word and part, if possible, and 

bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and 

reasonable interpretation.

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Stefanie 

A. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.

John A. Kinney and Jill M. Mason, of Kinney & Mason, 

P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Papik, J.

Matthew Eugene Johnson appeals from a district court order 

finding that the decree that dissolved his marriage required 

him to pay for his daughter’s college education and automobile. He contends that the district court order was punitive 

and thus inappropriately entered in a civil contempt proceeding, and that the district court should have found that he was 

not obligated to pay for the expenses at issue because his 

daughter had repudiated her relationship with him. We find no 

merit to Matthew’s contentions and therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

Dissolution Decree.

Matthew and Elicia Marie Johnson were married in 1995. 

During the marriage, they had two children: Kamren Johnson, 

born in 1999, and Mattison Johnson, born in 2001.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

308 Nebraska Reports

JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

In 2011, Elicia initiated divorce proceedings in the Sarpy 

County District Court. The parties negotiated a property settlement agreement and a parenting plan, both of which were 

approved by the district court and incorporated in a decree dissolving the marriage.

Under the decree, Matthew and Elicia were granted joint 

legal custody of both children. Physical custody of Mattison 

was awarded to Elicia, with parenting time for Matthew. 

Physical custody of Kamren was awarded to Matthew, with 

parenting time for Elicia.

The decree contained a provision requiring Matthew to 

establish college savings plans for Kamren and Mattison. It 

provided as follows:

COLLEGE FUNDS FOR MINOR CHILDREN. [Matthew] 

shall establish college savings plans for the minor children as follows: [Matthew] shall have discretion as to the 

amount of contributions he makes in each year and the 

manner in which he invests his contributions, provided 

that the college account for each child is “fully funded” 

by the time that the child graduates from high school. 

Each child’s account shall be considered “fully funded” 

at the point where its balance equals four (4) times the 

rate for undergraduate tuition, books, lab fees, and room 

and board at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln in the 

year immediately following the child’s graduation from 

high school. [Matthew] shall provide [Elicia] with documentation confirming that each account has been “fully 

funded” on or before the date of each child’s graduation 

from high school.

Another provision of the decree concerned automobiles for 

the children. It required Matthew to provide each child with an 

automobile upon turning 16 years old. The automobiles were 

to be of the same age and the same or equivalent model. It 

further provided that Matthew was to pay for the automobiles’ 

registration, insurance, and repairs in addition to their purchase price.
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308 Nebraska Reports

JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

In 2016, Matthew and Elicia asked the district court to 

approve a stipulated modification to the dissolution decree. 

The parties stipulated to changes in the parenting plan and 

Matthew’s child support obligations. The stipulated order of 

modification also contained a provision addressing Matthew’s 

obligation to pay for the children’s automobile expenses. It 

provided that Matthew “shall be financially responsible for 

providing both Kamren and Mattison suitable, safe, working 

cars for the children and the auto insurance and maintenance 

for said cars.”

Contempt Proceedings.

In December 2019, Matthew filed a verified application for 

an order to show cause in which he asked the district court to 

find Elicia in contempt. He alleged that Elicia had consistently 

denied Matthew the parenting time with Mattison allotted to 

him by the decree.

In January 2020, Elicia filed a verified application for an 

order to show cause in which she asked the district court to 

find Matthew in contempt. In the application, Elicia alleged 

that Matthew had refused to pay for an automobile and automobile insurance for Mattison, refused to pay for Mattison’s 

tuition and related expenses at the University of NebraskaLincoln, and refused to provide to Elicia documentation proving the college savings plan required by the decree was fully 

funded. Elicia contended that the decree required Matthew to 

take such actions, that his failure to do so was willful and malicious, and that he should be held in contempt.

In March 2020, the district court held a hearing on the parties’ contempt applications. At the hearing, Matthew testified 

that he had not had parenting time with Mattison since the 

summer of 2018, that Mattison did not respond to his attempts 

to communicate with her, and that he had no relationship with 

her. He testified that he believed Mattison had repudiated her 

relationship with him and that, as a result, he was no longer 

willing to pay for Mattison’s college education or automobile 

expenses. Matthew testified that he had funds available to 
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JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

pay for Mattison’s college tuition and related expenses, but 

admitted that he had not provided Elicia with documentation 

of such funds. He also testified that he had not received information regarding the specific expenses Elicia requested he pay 

until a few weeks before the hearing.

Mattison also testified at the hearing. She testified she was 

18 years old and a student at the University of NebraskaLincoln. She testified that when she went to Matthew’s home 

for his scheduled parenting time, Matthew was often working or sleeping, and that she was not comfortable there. She 

admitted that at some point in 2018, she stopped going to 

Matthew’s home during his scheduled parenting time. She also 

acknowledged that she had not communicated with Matthew 

and had not had a meaningful relationship with him for the 

last 11⁄2 years. She testified that she did not trust him and that 

while she would be willing to go to counseling with him if he 

would agree, she did not otherwise want him to be a part of 

her life.

Elicia was the final witness at the hearing. During her testimony, the district court received into evidence spreadsheets 

itemizing the out-of-pocket expenses Elicia had incurred for 

Mattison’s college education and automobile. The spreadsheets 

listed $12,715.43 in college expenses and $10,882.02 in automobile expenses. Elicia testified that she had notified Matthew 

of these expenses, but that he refused to pay them.

District Court Order.

After the hearing, the district court entered an order. It 

rejected Matthew’s argument that he should not be obligated 

to pay the expenses at issue because Mattison had repudiated 

him as her father. The district court explained that it found no 

authority under Nebraska law supporting the argument and that 

it contradicted longstanding Nebraska law requiring parents 

to provide support for their children until they reach the age 

of majority.

The district court went on to address the various reasons why Elicia contended that Matthew should be held in 
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308 Nebraska Reports

JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

contempt. The district court found that the decree clearly 

required Matthew to pay the automobile expenses, but that 

because Matthew was only recently presented with the specific 

expenses Elicia requested, and because Matthew had no part in 

choosing the automobile in violation of the “intent and spirit” 

of the relevant decree provision, he was not in contempt. The 

district court clarified that while Matthew was not in contempt, he was still obligated to pay the automobile expenses 

under the decree.

The district court found the decree less clear regarding college expenses, pointing out that it lacked language specifying 

how or when the funds were to be disseminated. It observed 

that the evidence showed that Matthew had complied with 

the college savings plan provision to the extent that he had 

established a college savings account that was fully funded as 

defined by the decree. The district court found that Matthew 

had not, however, complied with the provision of the decree 

requiring that he provide Elicia with documentation of the 

account. It concluded that Matthew was in contempt for not 

providing this documentation, but not in contempt for failing 

to pay the expenses. The district court ordered Matthew to 

pay $10,882.02 for the automobile expenses and $12,715.43 

for the college expenses. It ordered him to provide Elicia with 

documentation of the college savings account within 5 business 

days of its order.

The district court found that Elicia was in contempt for 

denying Matthew his parenting time.

Matthew appealed from the district court’s order. Elicia did 

not appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Matthew assigns three errors on appeal. He contends, reordered and restated, that the district court erred (1) by entering 

a damages award against him; (2) by ordering that he pay an 

unconditional fine; and (3) by failing to find that under the 

doctrine of repudiation, he owed no duty to pay the college or 

automobile expenses.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

308 Nebraska Reports

JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In a civil contempt proceeding where a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation of a court order, an appellate 

court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) the 

trial court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) 

the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, 

and (3) the trial court’s determinations of whether a party is in 

contempt and of the sanction to be imposed are reviewed for 

abuse of discretion. Yori v. Helms, 307 Neb. 375, 949 N.W.2d 

325 (2020).

[2] The meaning of a divorce decree presents a question 

of law, in connection with which an appellate court reaches 

a conclusion independent of the determination reached by 

the court below. Bayne v. Bayne, 302 Neb. 858, 925 N.W.2d 

687 (2019).

ANALYSIS

District Court’s Remedy.

Matthew’s first two assignments of error are based on an 

incorrect understanding of the district court’s order. Matthew 

asserts that the district court’s order that he pay Mattison’s college and automobile expenses was either a “type of damages 

award” or an unconditional fine, and he contends that neither 

are a permitted remedy for contempt. See brief for appellant 

at 7. The district court’s order that Matthew pay Mattison’s 

college and automobile expenses was not, however, a remedy 

for contempt.

The district court found that Matthew was in contempt 

for failing to provide Elicia with documentation regarding 

the funding of the college savings account for Mattison and 

ordered him to provide that documentation within 5 days. 

Because Matthew was presented with Mattison’s automobile 

expenses shortly before the hearing, the district court found 

that he was not in contempt for failing to pay them. But 

while the district court found Matthew was not in contempt 

for failing to pay expenses about which he was only recently 
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JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

notified, it found that the decree required that he pay those 

expenses. Similarly, the district court found that Matthew was 

not in contempt for not paying Mattison’s college expenses 

because the decree was not clear about how or when he was to 

pay them, but the district court still interpreted the decree to 

require that he pay such expenses.

[3,4] By ordering Matthew to pay Mattison’s automobile 

and college expenses, the district court was not entering a 

damages award or fining Matthew for contempt; it was exercising its authority to interpret and enforce the decree. A district 

court, in the exercise of its broad discretion over marriage dissolutions, retains jurisdiction to enforce all terms of approved 

property settlement agreements. Whitesides v. Whitesides, 290 

Neb. 116, 858 N.W.2d 858 (2015). A court that has jurisdiction 

to make a decision also has the power to enforce it by making 

such orders as are necessary to carry its judgment or decree 

into effect. Id.

[5-7] The district court’s authority to enforce the decree was 

not limited by the fact that Elicia initiated contempt proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve 

and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit when a party 

fails to comply with a court order made for the benefit of the 

opposing party. McCullough v. McCullough, 299 Neb. 719, 

910 N.W.2d 515 (2018). A court’s continuing jurisdiction over 

a dissolution decree includes the power to provide equitable 

relief in a contempt proceeding. Id. Contempt proceedings may 

both compel obedience to orders and administer the remedies 

to which the court has found the parties to be entitled. Where 

a situation exists that is contrary to the principles of equity and 

which can be redressed within the scope of judicial action, a 

court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the situation. Id.

Although the district court apparently concluded that Matthew 

did not willfully violate the decree by not paying Mattison’s 

automobile and college expenses, and therefore did not hold 

him in contempt for failing to do so, it still had authority to 

enforce the decree by compelling him to follow it.
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308 Nebraska Reports

JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

Repudiation.

Matthew also argues that because Mattison refuses to have 

any meaningful relationship with him, he should not have to 

pay her automobile or college expenses, and the district court 

erred by ordering him to do so. Matthew claims his argument 

is supported by a doctrine of repudiation or estrangement 

recognized in decisions from other states. He relies on cases 

from Indiana and Pennsylvania in which courts held that a 

parent was not required to contribute to his or her child’s college education because the child repudiated the relationship 

with the parent. See, e.g., McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164 

(Ind. App. 1994); Milne v. Milne, 383 Pa. Super. 177, 556 

A.2d 854 (1989). As we will explain, however, those decisions do not neatly map on to either the facts of this case or 

Nebraska law.

At the time of the Indiana and Pennsylvania decisions 

relied upon by Matthew, the law of those states permitted 

courts to order divorced parents to contribute to their child’s 

college education after the child reached the age of majority. 

See, McKay, supra; Milne, supra. In determining whether to 

order such a support obligation, courts in those states consider 

whether and to what extent the parents, if still married, would 

have contributed to the child’s college education. See, McKay, 

supra; Milne, supra. In the decisions relied upon by Matthew, 

the courts reasoned that because a parent would not ordinarily be inclined to contribute to the college education of a 

child who had rejected a relationship with the parent, a parent 

should not be obligated by a court to do so. See, McKay, supra; 

Milne, supra.

Even if we were to adopt the repudiation doctrine articulated by these Indiana and Pennsylvania decisions as Matthew 

urges, it does not appear that would be of any assistance to 

Matthew in this appeal. Both courts emphasized that a parent 

could be spared from a college support obligation only if an 

adult child rejected a relationship with his or her parent. See, 

McKay, supra; Milne, supra. Mattison, however, was 18 years 

old and thus still a minor when the expenses at issue were 
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incurred. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2101(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020) 

(unless married, persons under 19 years of age are declared to 

be minors).

But even setting Mattison’s age to the side, there is a more 

fundamental difference between this case and those Matthew 

relies upon—Matthew’s college support obligation arose 

because of an agreement with Elicia, not as a result of unilateral judicial imposition. In fact, in Nebraska, an obligation to 

pay for a child’s college expenses after the child has reached 

the age of majority could only come about through the parties’ 

agreement. Unlike their Indiana and Pennsylvania counterparts, 

courts in Nebraska are not authorized to order a parent, over 

his or her objection, to contribute to the support of children 

beyond their majority as part of a marriage dissolution decree. 

Compare Foster v. Foster, 266 Neb. 32, 662 N.W.2d 191 

(2003), with McKay, supra, and Milne, supra. Nebraska courts 

will, however, enforce an approved property settlement agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties which provides for 

postmajority child support. See Carlson v. Carlson, 299 Neb. 

526, 909 N.W.2d 351 (2018).

Because any obligation Matthew has to fund Mattison’s 

college education came about as a result of his agreement 

with Elicia, we view the repudiation or estrangement doctrine 

recognized in the Indiana and Pennsylvania cases Matthew 

relies upon as inapplicable. On this point, we are in agreement with other courts, including one from Pennsylvania. 

In Cook v. Covey, 415 Pa. Super. 353, 609 A.2d 560 (1992), 

a Pennsylvania court held that the fact that a daughter was 

estranged from her father had no bearing on the father’s college support obligation because the obligation resulted not 

from judicial fiat, but from the father’s agreement with the 

mother. That court explained:

The cases in which estrangement is relevant, however, have been those cases in which a child has asked 

the court to judicially impose on a parent an obligation to provide post-minority educational support in the 
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JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

absence of a specific agreement by the parent to do 

so. . . . Since Father agreed, in writing, to pay [the daughter’s] college expenses, the trial court did not judicially 

impose an obligation on Father. Rather, the court merely 

enforced an obligation that Father has already assumed. 

The agreement specifically imposes Father’s obligation 

and is enforceable as written. The agreement is between 

Mother and Father. [The daughter] is a third-party beneficiary. As we cannot presume to know what concessions 

were made in the formation of the separation agreement, 

or what rights Mother may have relinquished in return 

for Father’s promise to pay college expenses, we will 

not look beyond the written agreement. If the parties 

had intended Father’s obligation to provide college support to be contingent on a continuing relationship with 

[the daughter], the qualifier presumably would have been 

included in the agreement. Accordingly, whether Father 

and [the daughter] were estranged does not affect Father’s 

duty under the agreement with Mother.

Cook, 415 Pa. Super. at 358-59, 609 A.2d at 563. See, also, 

Miller v. Miller, No. M2017-01867-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 

2411591 (Tenn. App. May 29, 2018) (unpublished opinion) 

(holding that mother was not relieved of contractual agreement to pay college expenses based on son’s repudiation 

of relationship).

We find the reasoning of the court in Cook cogent and, for 

the same reasons, find that Matthew’s obligations to pay for 

Mattison’s expenses are controlled by the terms of the parties’ 

property settlement agreement incorporated in the dissolution decree.

Like the agreement in Cook, the property settlement agreement reached by Matthew and Elicia does not make Matthew’s 

obligations contingent on a continuing parent-child relationship. Matthew admitted this at oral argument, but advanced 

a different argument regarding the terms of the college savings plan provision. He contended that the provision required 
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JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

that he establish an account, but did not specify that the money 

in the account must actually be used to pay for the children’s 

college education. Matthew claimed that he could therefore 

refuse to pay Mattison’s college expenses in response to her 

refusal to have a relationship with him.

[8,9] A decree is a judgment, and once a decree for dissolution becomes final, its meaning, including the settlement 

agreement incorporated therein, is determined as a matter of 

law from the four corners of the decree itself. Bayne v. Bayne, 

302 Neb. 858, 925 N.W.2d 687 (2019). Unlike disputes over 

the meaning of an ambiguous contract, the parties’ subjective 

interpretations and intentions are wholly irrelevant to a court’s 

declaration, as a matter of law, as to the meaning of an ambiguous decree. Id. The meaning of a decree must be determined 

from all parts thereof, read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so as to give effect to every word and part, 

if possible, and bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this 

can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation. Id.

We find that Matthew has not offered a reasonable interpretation of the decree’s college savings plan provision. Matthew 

is correct there is no express language in the decree stating he 

must direct that money in the college savings plan be used to 

pay for his children’s college education. Neither, however, is 

there language giving him discretion to withhold funds from 

one of his children pursuing a college education or language 

setting forth what is to happen to those funds if not used to 

fund the children’s college educations. In addition, we believe 

the requirement that Matthew establish college savings plans 

“for the minor children” suggests that the money in the account 

was to be directed toward the children’s college education 

should they pursue one. (Emphasis supplied.)

In addition, Matthew’s argument that the decree does not 

require that the funds be used for the children’s college education sweeps beyond any alleged rejection of him by Mattison. 

If, as he asserts, the decree requires only that he contribute 

money to a college savings account, he could refuse to pay 
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JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

Cite as 308 Neb. 623

for his children’s college education for any reason or no reason 

at all. A parent would presumably have discretion to financially 

contribute to his or her child’s college education in the absence 

of a provision in a dissolution decree providing as much. It 

is thus difficult to discern what purpose would be served by 

requiring one party to a divorce to establish a college savings 

account for the parties’ children, but also allowing that party 

sole discretion as to whether those funds will actually be used 

to pay for a child’s college attendance. We find that the only 

reasonable interpretation of the college savings plan provision 

is that it requires Matthew to use the funds in the account to 

pay for Mattison’s college education.

We do not believe the district court erred by rejecting 

Matthew’s repudiation argument and requiring that he pay 

Mattison’s college and automobile expenses.

CONCLUSION

Because we find no merit to Matthew’s arguments on appeal, 

we affirm the order of the district court.

Affirmed.