J-S15013-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BENJAMIN EASLEY

Appellant No. 1729 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 10, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005981-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2017

Benjamin Easley appeals from his judgment of sentence of two-andone-half to five years incarceration imposed after he entered a negotiated 

guilty plea to dealing in proceeds of unlawful activity. We affirm. 

The following facts underlie this matter. While residing in Washington 

D.C. in November of 2010, Appellant compelled his then-girlfriend, Makuyo 

Nettey, to purchase a 2008 Range Rover. Appellant assured Ms. Nettey that 

he would make payments on the car, but represented to her that he could 

not purchase it himself due to a hold on his credit. The Range Rover was 

titled in Ms. Nettey’s name. Appellant made a single payment on the vehicle 

loan in January 2011. That month, Ms. Nettey also gave Appellant 

permission to drive the car. Beginning in February of that year, and 
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continuing for many months afterward, Appellant refused to relinquish the 

car to Ms. Nettey, despite her many requests that he do so. In June of 

2011, Ms. Nettey reported the vehicle stolen with the Washington D.C. 

metropolitan police. Subsequently, after learning that Appellant had titled 

the vehicle in his name in this Commonwealth, she filed an additional police 

report in Pennsylvania. 

In order to title the car in Pennsylvania, Appellant first “washed” the 

title of a 1999 Ford Econoline Van in New Jersey by removing the original 

vehicle’s information on the title and replacing it with that of the 2008 Range 

Rover in his own name. Appellant then sold the car to a Pennsylvania car

dealer. Appellant’s deception was discovered when the vehicle was 

determined to be stolen by an auto body shop in Newtown Square, Delaware 

County. 

Appellant faced numerous charges in both State and Federal courts. 

On June 30, 2015, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea in state court. 

Sentencing was deferred pending resolution of his federal claims. 

Ultimately, Appellant was convicted in federal court for bank fraud, 

conspiracy, and identity theft, and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 

twelve years imprisonment, plus five years probation. 

On May 10, 2016, after the imposition of his federal sentence, 

Appellant was permitted to withdraw his original guilty plea, and entered a 

re-negotiated guilty plea to one count of dealing in the proceeds of unlawful 
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activity. The trial court conducted the mandatory colloquy and accepted his 

guilty plea. The court proceeded immediately to sentencing and imposed a 

sentence, in accordance with the terms of the negotiated plea agreement, of 

two-and-one-half to five years incarceration to run concurrently with 

Appellant’s federal sentence. 

Appellant was released to federal custody. While in federal custody, 

the Federal Bureau of Prisons determined that Appellant’s federal sentence 

would run consecutively to his state sentence. Thereafter, Appellant was 

transferred into state custody to serve his state sentence, after which he 

was to be remanded to federal prison to serve his federal sentence.1

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 9, 2016, but did not file a 

post-sentence motion. He complied with the court’s order to file a Rule 

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court 

authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion. This matter is now ready for our review. 

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1 Although the record is not clear on this point, presumably, the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons has not designated the state facility in which Appellant is 

housed as his federal place of imprisonment pursuant to its power under 18 

C.F.R. § 0.96(c), since it determined that his sentences were to run 

consecutively, and then transferred him into state custody. As long as the 

Commonwealth retains primary jurisdiction over Appellant, his federal 

sentence will not begin until the state relinquishes its custody over 

Appellant. Spruill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 158 

A.3d 727, 729 n.5 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2017) (noting, “State authorities retain 

primary jurisdiction over the prisoner and federal custody does not 

commence until the state authorities relinquish the prisoner on satisfaction 

of the state obligation.”). 
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Appellant lodges a single complaint for our consideration: “Whether 

[Appellant] is entitled to relief from a negotiated plea that was not entered 

knowingly and intelligently because [Appellant], his counsel, and the trial 

court thought [Appellant] was entering into the plea agreement with the 

belief that his state sentence would run concurrently with his federal 

sentence?” Appellant’s brief at 2. 

In order to successfully withdraw a guilty plea after a sentence has 

been imposed, a defendant must demonstrate “prejudice on the order of 

manifest injustice[.]” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 610 

(Pa.Super. 2013). We have previously held that “[a] plea rises to the level 

of manifest injustice when it was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or 

unintelligently.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Appellant wholly relies on this rubric to argue that he entered his guilty 

plea unknowingly. He claims that his plea constituted manifest injustice 

since the Federal Bureau of Prisons subsequently determined that his federal 

sentence would run consecutively to his state sentence despite the express 

and contrary terms of his negotiated guilty plea. He maintains that he 

accepted the Commonwealth’s plea agreement based on its promise that his 

sentences would run concurrently, and learned only after sentencing that the 

court lacked the power to bind the federal courts in this way. Insofar as 

Appellant relies on the supposed infirmity of his plea as a basis for vacating 

his judgment of sentence, we find this issue waived. 
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We have long held that “[a] defendant wishing to challenge the 

[validity] of a guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea 

colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.” 

Lincoln, supra at 609-610; Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Although 

Appellant apparently did not receive the benefit of his bargain, he did not 

lodge any objections during his plea colloquy or file a post-sentence motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea. Hence, this issue has not been preserved for 

review. 

However, Appellant does not rely on his purportedly unknowing guilty 

plea solely as a means to vacate his judgment of sentence. He also asserts 

that, because his plea constituted manifest injustice, this Court should enter 

an order requiring his state and federal sentences to be run concurrently. 

While Appellant does not explicitly develop this argument, he seems to be 

contending that this Court should specifically enforce the parties’ plea 

agreement. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (holding that bargained for plea condition that defendant 

did not have to register as a sex offender was specifically enforceable). 

Nonetheless, unlike the negotiated plea provision in Hainesworth, this 

Court lacks the power to grant Appellant his requested relief. 

Commonwealth v. Mendoza, 730 A.2d 503, 504 n.2 (Pa.Super. 1999) 

citing Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3d. Cir. 1990) (“neither the 

federal court nor the [Federal Bureau of Prisons] are bound in any way by 
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the state court’s direction that the state and federal sentences are run 

concurrently.”); see U.S. Const. Article VI, cl. 2. The commencement of a 

federal sentence and designation of a defendant’s place of confinement are 

matters delegated to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 28 C.F.R. § 0.96; 18 

U.S.C. § 3621. As we cannot direct the sentencing and confinement 

decisions of the federal courts or the Federal Bureau of Prisons, we are 

unable to grant Appellant relief.2

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/2017

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2 Appellant may still pursue the withdrawal of his guilty plea premised upon 

a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel on collateral review pursuant to the 

PCRA.