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S. Hrg. 111–895 

STAFFORD ACT REFORM: SHARPER TOOLS FOR 

A SMARTER RECOVERY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 12, 2010 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

BEN BILLINGS, Staff Director 

ANDY OLSON, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 1 

Senator Graham ............................................................................................... 12 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 29 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2010 

Hon. W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ....................................................... 4 

Matt Jadacki, Deputy Inspector General, Office of Emergency Management 

Oversight, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ......................................................................................................................... 6

Hon. Joseph P. Riley, Jr., Mayor of Charleston, South Carolina, and Member, 

Stafford Act Reform Task Force, U.S. Conference of Mayors ........................... 15 

David Maxwell, Director and Homeland Security Advisor, Arkansas Department of Emergency Management, and President, National Emergency Management Association ............................................................................................ 18 

Sheila Crowley, Ph.D., President and Chief Executive Officer, National Low 

Income Housing Coalition ................................................................................... 20 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Crowley, Sheila, Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63 

Fugate, Hon. W. Craig: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31 

Jadacki, Matt: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

Maxwell, David: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57 

Riley, Hon. Joseph P. Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

APPENDIX 

Additional prepared statements submitted for the Record from: 

National Low Income Housing Coalition ........................................................ 72 

Catherine Earl, MSW, United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) .. 82 

National Fair Housing Alliance, (NFHA) ....................................................... 85 

Mary Joseph, Director, Children’s Defense Fund, Louisiana Office, with 

attachments ................................................................................................... 91 

Diana Rothe-Smith, Executive Director, National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster with attachments ................................................. 112 

Questions and responses submitted for the record from: 

Mr. Fugate ........................................................................................................ 125 

Mr. Jadacki ....................................................................................................... 131 

Mr. Riley ............................................................................................................ 135 

Mr. Maxwell ...................................................................................................... 138 

(1) 

STAFFORD ACT REFORM: SHARPER TOOLS 

FOR A SMARTER RECOVERY 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2010 

U.S. SENATE,

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:41 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mary L. Landrieu, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Landrieu, Graham, and Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU 

Senator LANDRIEU. Good afternoon. I would like to call the Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery to order. Let me begin by apologizing for starting just a few minutes late. I was called to the floor 

unexpectedly on an amendment that I am offering on the bill, so 

I apologize, but I am happy we could get started now. 

I am looking forward to both of our panels today and I would like 

to get right in, if I could, to my opening statement, and hopefully 

we will be joined by one or two other Members that are here to 

welcome individuals that are serving on the second panel from 

their home States, Senator Graham and Senator Pryor. 

But I am very happy to conduct this hearing this afternoon to 

focus on continued reform of the Stafford Act and to make sure 

that we are doing everything we can as a country to be ready for 

whatever disaster might unfold. And today in America, families in 

Tennessee and Rhode Island are striving to bounce back from some 

of the worst flooding in each of their States’ histories. Right now 

in the Gulf of Mexico, we are bracing for what could be the largest 

maritime oil spill in our Nation’s history. And New Yorkers are 

breathing a cautious sigh of relief that the car bomb in Times 

Square didn’t detonate. 

These are some events that have triggered the Stafford Act declaration or could conceivably have triggered such a declaration, so 

let us remember as we begin this hearing that the system that we 

are examining has to work in each and every one of these cases, 

and they are so very different—different parts of the country, different ramifications, different consequences, different public reactions, and even the cause of these are so different. So that is the 

difficulty of this work, but it is important work that we continue 

to do and I thank the panelists that are here to participate. 

2 

So the purpose of our meeting is to evaluate the Stafford Disaster Relief Act and to review the proposals for its reform. The law 

was originally written to provide some flexibility and discretion and 

freedom of action on the part of the President. I have noticed, 

though, in my own work on this issue that some of that discretion 

has actually served as a stumbling block as opposed to a stepping 

stone for recovery when it has not been adequately used to help 

people that are struggling, not that that is a reflection on this Administration, but I think there have been policies in the past and 

rules and regulations that have cropped up in and around this law 

that have rendered it at some times not as effective as it could be. 

But I also believe that Congress must revise the statute to provide clearer direction because of this and also sharper tools for a 

smarter recovery. Perhaps more tools are necessary, but maybe 

some of the tools in this tool box are a little dull and need to be 

sharpened. There are some limitations in the current Act with regards to presidential authority that I think we need to look at, and 

maybe some of those need to be changed. 

This Subcommittee has compiled numerous legislative recommendations from hearing witnesses over the last 4 years spanning 

public assistance, housing, mental health issues, case management, 

environmental reviews, interagency coordination, and the Administration of block grants. Let me just list a few that we may be considering. 

Lack of advanced funding. Right now, the Federal emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) does not provide under the current 

law advanced funding for public facilities until the facilities have 

been evaluated, they have been rebuilt, and then FEMAsa reimburses. Of course, in a situation where a tornado comes through a 

town and destroys one fire station and two schools, that process 

may work beautifully. But in a community like New Orleans, 

where 300 public buildings were destroyed and the city government 

was basically rendered inactive because of lack of budget and population, trying to—for a city or a State to advance this funding, 

waiting for the Federal Government to reimburse it doesn’t seem 

like the smart way to recover, in my book, and we want to look 

about changing that. 

Arbitration and appeals is another issue. Disagreements between 

FEMA and disaster-stricken communities frequently drag on for 

years. At the end of 2008, after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 3 

years after those two horrific storms and flooding caused by the 

levee break, we had 1,300 projects in dispute with FEMA—1,300. 

It was a bottleneck that could not be broken until I, with the help 

of many of my colleagues, had to literally pass another Act of Congress to establish an arbitration panel and to force FEMA. 

I am happy to say this Administration cooperated and Secretary 

Napolitano and Administrator Fugate have implemented that new 

provision very well, and as a result, disputes have been resolved. 

However, because of some question about it, it was limited only to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, so unfortunately today, as of September 30, FEMA still has 61 disasters that are still open and have 

been open for more than 10 years in communities throughout the 

United States, unable to resolve disputes between local governments and FEMA. There has got to be a better way. 

3 

Community disaster loans is another area. When Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita hit, I was shocked to know that the total limit 

of borrowing available to any community was $5 million. The budget of the City of New Orleans at the time, if I remember, was $240 

million. What was borrowing $5 million useful to New Orleans or 

to any city that might be hit, a significant metropolitan area, or a 

small town, for that matter, as well, by a major hurricane. I am 

sure it wasn’t much of a help for Galveston, either. We must review 

those limits. 

Individual assistance reform, mental health, the Federal Government doesn’t seem to have a strategy to assess disaster-related 

mental health needs, and they can be immense after a tragic, catastrophic disaster, as we know. Hurricane Katrina followed a common pattern that we see in catastrophes where demand for services 

rapidly outstripped supplies, leaving trauma, grief, and depression 

and anxiety there in the community. These storms and floods and 

levee breaks leave mental health facilities destroyed. They displace 

mental health professionals so that people have nowhere to go that 

are trying to rebuild their community to seek professional help. 

We want to see what we can do to fix this. Despite GAO’s recommendations issued over a year ago and to expand services under 

the program and three hearings by the Subcommittee on the subject and the development of a white paper by the Substance Abuse 

and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) proposing 

specific reforms, still no action on this has been taken. 

Trailers, alternative housing—the Stafford Act does not allow 

FEMA to repair rental units, which might be some of the quickest, 

most effective places for people to be housed and have the best 

long-term impact on a community, as opposed to having rental 

blight inside of a community while we are attaching trailers to the 

empty lots in the same neighborhood. It doesn’t seem to make a lot 

of sense to me in terms of long-term expenditure of taxpayer dollars. 

Case management is another situation. After Hurricane Katrina, 

the Federal Government simultaneously operated multiple case 

management programs on the Gulf Coast, each with different rules 

and standards. Service providers were unable to access FEMA’s 

database on household needs. Cases were closed based on referrals 

instead of outcomes. We want to look at that. 

And then, finally, a lack of interagency coordination, although I 

must say it has gotten considerably better since this Administration has come on board, and the Departments of Housing and 

Urban Development (HUD), Homeland Security, Commerce, and 

Small Business have really stepped up to see what they can do, 

and it is obvious in some of the recent executive decisions that 

have been made. I still think as we move forward, more integrated 

approaches for interagency cooperation is necessary. 

And finally, I would be remiss, particularly because of what happened in Haiti, although it is not the subject of this hearing, when 

you think about the long-term recovery needs of Haiti, it makes 

you realize there are still many long-term recovery needs along the 

Gulf Coast and that the Stafford Act is not completely silent but 

almost silent in terms of long-term recovery needs, which I think 

is important for this Subcommittee to evaluate. 

4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Fugate appears in the Appendix on page 31. 

So this has been a multi-year effort. We are hoping to have final 

legislation sometime developed this summer. Also, a children’s reform piece of legislation developed, as well, with the help of several 

other committees that have been working on that and an independent commission. 

So I would like to turn the hearing now over to our first panel— 

I am going to introduce them briefly—to receive your opening remarks on the subject of this hearing, and then we will proceed with 

a round of questioning. 

So let me welcome again to the panel Administrator Fugate. We 

are pleased again to have you here. This may be your sixth appearance before this Subcommittee, at least somewhere between four 

and six, and we are very appreciative of you making the time since 

you have come aboard as Administrator and we are looking forward to your testimony today. 

And Matt Jadacki, Deputy Inspector General for the Department 

of Homeland Security. I have reviewed your testimony and we are 

very interested in some of your findings and conclusions and suggestions. 

Mr. Fugate. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. W. CRAIG FUGATE,1 ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, good afternoon, Madam Chairman, and again, 

as any of the other Members join us. 

When you asked me questions in my confirmation hearing about 

how I wanted to approach dealing with the regulatory environment 

that FEMA operated in, I laid out a construct that said that I was 

governed by three principle doctrines, the Stafford Act and what 

did Congress say and the intentions behind the Stafford Act, and 

then the interpretation of implementing that through the Federal 

regulatory process and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), and 

then the area where I thought as Administrator we needed to look 

at first, which was in our actual policy and procedures and also our 

implementation of those policies and procedures and start with 

that effort first. 

In doing that, we are finding that, as you point out, the Stafford 

Act does have tremendous flexibility, but the application of it has 

sometimes been restricted or had self-imposed limitations which 

were not supported by statute or even by rule. 

One of the things that Secretary Napolitano did at the request 

of the President and working with the State of Louisiana was bring 

in new leadership to the Long-Term Recovery Office. Tony Russell 

was brought in to begin that process, and one of the things that 

is interesting about what happened in that following time frame, 

where almost a billion dollars in backlog of projects were able to 

start moving forward, was to question what did we change. And 

Tony points out that, by and large, about 90 percent of the workforce that was there the year before was the same workforce that 

was able to move forward, and that in many cases, it wasn’t changing our regulations, it was clarifying the recommendation. 

5 

As pointed out in the IG report, we have a challenge in making 

sure that we consistently apply our procedures and policies and we 

clearly understand what the outcome is supposed to be. So as we 

went through and began that process this year, I have asked and 

directed the Public Assistance and Individual Assistance Programs 

to look at our current policies. 

Well, since January, in the Individual Assistance area, we have 

reviewed 29 of those. We have actually looked at them and said 

four of them shouldn’t even be a policy. It is a standard operating 

procedure to have the consistency that, again, the IG points out 

that if you don’t have the consistency in this process, it leads to all 

kinds of challenges, particularly where you use a workforce that 

has combined permanent, semi-permanent, and contracted temporary hires. If you don’t have a good document to work from, you 

are going to get inconsistency. 

We looked at two of those policies and actually said they should 

be part of the CFR. They need to go through a regulatory review 

process and rulemaking. Public Assistance (PA) looked at theirs. 

They had about 55 policies they have worked through. And again, 

they saw that several should have been converted into the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The way it was written was actually a process, and in trying to do that, people were reading it 

differently than what the outcome should have been because they 

are reading a policy that is really about how you do something, not 

what the outcome was. I mean, to one of the policies, it should actually have just been a fact sheet. It shouldn’t have been a policy. 

And then, again, looking at four policies that should be regulatory 

and eight that need to be revised. 

So again, in this first go-around, we are looking at these from the 

standpoint, before we go back and ask for regulatory changes or 

look at Stafford, is making sure that we are doing the things that 

the statute says and the rules say we should be doing and making 

sure we are clear and consistent in that application. 

And I think from that process, several issues that were raised in 

talking with a lot of applicants that led, I believe, to some of the 

issues we had in arbitration was the requirement to provide information, and oftentimes going back and using other information. I 

will give you an example, Madam Chairman. 

If a professional engineer on behalf of an applicant, licensed in 

the State in which they are, certifies a level of damage, why don’t 

we accept that? We would actually bring in our own person, who 

may not be a licensed engineer, to do a review and do the worksheet. So we now have determined internally to be consistent that 

if we have a licensed professional engineer in the State of record 

in which they are that renders a decision, we are going to consider 

that decision the subject matter expert and not seek outside 

counter or another opinion. 

If you do that, I think it gets to some of the crux of these matters 

that we saw ourselves getting into, and by far, we have a lot of 

work to do. And in the IG report, I think you are going to see some 

themes there that we are starting to address but we have not gotten to where we need to be. We are doing this in response to current disasters. We are doing this in response to older disasters. 

6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Jadacki appears in the Appendix on page 38. 

But I would be remiss in my final 10 seconds to not bring up, 

I cannot do any of this going forward without the Disaster Recovery Fund being replenished with supplemental because I can do no 

permanent work in any open disaster or new disaster that is about 

to occur. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Fugate, and as you know, the 

Senate will be marking up that bill tomorrow and we are going to 

try to expedite that bill through Congress because the jar is empty 

right now and there are lots of projects that are in the Gulf Coast 

area and around the country that need this funding to continue, 

and we realize that it is an emergency and we need to move that 

bill as quickly as we can. 

Mr. Jadacki. 

TESTIMONY OF MATT JADACKI,1 DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT, 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. JADACKI. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman. Thank you for 

the opportunity to discuss Federal disaster assistance provided by 

FEMA through the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. 

I would like to begin my remarks by briefly outlining the views 

of DHS’s Office of Inspector General regarding the Stafford Act and 

potential amendments to it. Then, as requested, I will spend the 

balance of my time discussing our recent report, ‘‘Assessment of 

FEMA’s Public Assistance Program, Policies, and Procedures.’’ In 

the interest of time, I will be summarizing my written remarks and 

ask that my full statement be included in the record. 

The Stafford Act was enacted by Congress in 1988 and has been 

periodically amended since then. Much of the detail of how disaster 

assistance is handled, however, is governed by regulations or policies that derive from the Stafford Act. We contend that most of the 

challenges facing FEMA in the administration of disaster assistance, and in particular the Public Assistance and Individual Assistance Programs, can be addressed through regulations and policies 

that do not require new legislation. 

Having said that, the report I will discuss now does include several matters for Congressional consideration. My office conducted 

an in-depth assessment of the design and implementation of 

FEMA’s Public Assistance Program policies and procedures. The 

program provides critical assistance in the form of direct assistance 

and grants to State, tribal, and local governments as well as certain private, nonprofit organizations to enable communities to 

quickly respond to and recover from presidentially declared emergencies and disasters. Our assessment revealed multiple challenges 

that significantly hinder FEMA from consistently administering 

the PA Program in an efficient and effective manner. These challenges include untimely funding determinations, deficiencies in program management, and poorly designed performance measures. 

The first area I would like to discuss is the timeliness of Public 

Assistance funding. FEMA needs to improve timeliness to avoid 

7 

project delays and improve program efficiency. Such improvements 

should center on the appeal determination process, environmental 

and historic preservation process, and the reconciliation of insurance payments. 

Under the appeals process that you mentioned, FEMA takes an 

excessive amount of time to process appeals because it does not adhere to or does not establish timeliness standards for the entirety 

of the appeals process, nor does it have standardized systems to 

track appeals. FEMA frequently rendered its appeal decisions long 

after the appeal was submitted. In some cases reviewed, the process spanned several years. The problem is compounded because 

FEMA has no agency-wide system to track appeals from submission date to final determination. As a result, FEMA has no standardized means to identify delays for each appeal. Nearly all the 

subgrantees we spoke with expressed dissatisfaction with the process and its seemingly inherent lack of timeliness. 

The environmental and historic process has fostered significant 

delays in the PA Program and continues to have a negative impact 

on time lines. FEMA is required to determine subgrantee compliance with applicable environmental and historic preservation laws, 

regulations, and executive orders before any funds are provided 

and work can begin. FEMA faces a number of challenges in this 

area, but we believe there could be improvement if FEMA initiates 

and triages the Earthquake Hazards Program (EHP) workload immediately after a disaster, establishes and enforces formal time 

limits for the EHP process, and better coordinates through agreements with other Federal agencies. 

Another area that can benefit from improvement is FEMA’s management of the PA program. My testimony includes a list of challenges FEMA faces in these areas and recommendations for improvement. I will not go through all of them here, but would be 

happy to come back to them during the time for questions. 

One of the primary underlying causes, as we discussed, of the 

challenges FEMA faces in program management is turnover and 

limited training within FEMA’s disaster workforce. Because the 

workforce is drawn nationwide from permanent employees, intermittent employees, and contractors, these staff are often assigned 

to areas away from their homes, and may lack the commitment for 

long-term assignments as well as knowledge of critical local issues, 

such as contractor availability and pricing. Further, FEMA sometimes transferred these employees to other disaster sites before the 

recovery process is completed. This results in a revolving door effect and has been exacerbated because FEMA has not established 

permanent offices in those States most vulnerable to recurring 

large disasters. 

We identified a number of alternatives that could be employed to 

streamline the PA process in our report and we discussed both the 

pros and cons of each of these alternatives. I will briefly outline 

three of the alternatives that we have explored. 

The first is for FEMA to use negotiated settlements. This alternative would change the present reimbursement process, which is 

document intensive, to a fixed lump sum negotiated settlement between FEMA and the grantee and subgrantee based on FEMA’s estimates of damage and cost in conjunction with pertinent informaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:32 Mar 10, 2011 Jkt 057938 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57938.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
8 

tion provided by the subgrantee. These estimates would be binding 

and would not be subject to change. 

Another alternative discussed in our report is to increase the 

large project threshold while maintaining the current reimbursement process. This would result in a significant increase in the 

number of projects classified as small projects. Funding for projects 

classified as small projects is generally final and full payment is 

available upon approval of the original estimates. 

We also suggested that FEMA explore replacing some grantfunded work with mission assignments. Under this alternative, 

FEMA could use a prescripted system of tasking and funding other 

Federal agencies to perform the work rather than having grantees 

and subgrantees perform the work themselves. 

Despite the challenges presented here, we learned that many of 

FEMA’s customers consider the PA program design inherently 

sound. They believe the flaws are primarily in execution. Consequently, most of the challenges could be significantly diminished 

by focusing on the fundamentals upon which the PA program rests. 

If FEMA can address these fundamental challenges, it can then 

move to program enhancements that will speed the recovery process in the disaster-affected area. 

Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome any questions that you may have. Thank you. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you very much. We are going to take 

a very close look at the recommendations that you have made in 

your report and weave them into the proposals that we are going 

to have in this piece of legislation. 

But let me begin with just a few general questions. Since Hurricane Katrina happened, I have been very focused on the definitions 

of disaster, major disaster, catastrophe, in terms of triggers that 

could be applied based on actual damage. So could you, Mr. Fugate, 

outline for us under the current law what the two or three different—or four potential classifications of disasters are, and in your 

mind, is it clear to you and to your staff, and do you think clear 

to the public—let me say this, I don’t think it is clear to the public, 

I know that—but is it clear to you what you are able to do in certain types of disasters or are you operating under just one sort of 

general rule book, no matter if it is a river overflowing and flooding 

200 homes in X community or 10,000 homes destroyed in Y community? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, Madam Chairman, the State of Florida did a 

very similar thing after Hurricane Andrew. We used categories to 

describe levels of disaster. By the time I became a State Director, 

we had actually migrated to the point where we always prepared 

for the large-scale events and scaled down. 

In looking at how we define this, I will give you the example of 

the most recent response in Tennessee. Tennessee was a very large 

disaster, and as we are seeing, it is much larger than many people 

realize. It would probably not be the definition of catastrophic, but 

it certainly was not a small disaster. Our traditional approach to 

a disaster when we receive a request from a governor, as has been 

pointed out by the Inspector General (IG) and other folks numerous 

times in previous disasters, is we should go out and assess and 

verify the level of damage exceeds the capability at the governor’s 

9 

request and then make a written recommendation to the President 

for that determination. 

However, I short-circuited that process, because in looking at the 

level of damages that I saw in a very brief visit and also knowing 

what had been reported and what the governor was telling me, I 

felt that we could not wait for the formal preliminary damage assessment process to go forward. We needed to act. We needed to 

get to work. And we made a recommendation based upon a flyover 

that gave us some information to support the first initial four counties. We very rapidly have added on additional counties to that to 

a total now of 42. 

In those 42 counties, I have not conducted the first formal preliminary damage assessment and count houses. We are looking at 

the damages relative to the impacts, and if we feel that will probably meet or exceed the threshold, we are adding it on because our 

goal here in the initial response is to speed to the Individual Assistance. We have a lot of people that are either in homes that are 

flooded or staying in hotels and motels or staying with friends and 

we know we need to get these programs turned on. 

But it is that mental agility to know that this disaster warranted 

a much faster response than the neighboring States who were more 

widespread but less dense impacts. The community itself was coping with the immediate needs. There was not a pressing need for 

outside Federal intervention that early in the recovery, and we did 

do damage assessments. We did reach a conclusion to support the 

recommendation and the President did declare it as disasters. 

So it is that ability to change up and go, this is not something 

we can wait. This is not something that the local and State officials 

will be able to manage until we look at the recovery piece of this, 

and in both cases, neither one of them were requiring response. 

So it is that ability to change the mindset and have the flexibility 

to go, when do you use certain processes, when do you not—when 

do you loosen up the rigorous process you may be using in a much 

smaller disaster to give you the flexibility in a larger disaster, 

which are all permitted under the Stafford Act, all permitted under 

the CFR, but oftentimes have been reactions to previous findings 

that areas may have been declared—did not have any significant 

damage and you may have had the allegations of fraud and abuse 

there. 

And so it is doing this in such a way that we are responsible to 

the taxpayers, but we are also focused on the needs of the survivors 

and the balance between them. And I think when we look at classifications, the only danger I see in that is it sometimes gives a 

bright line that may not always fit the disaster, but it is getting 

people to understand, how do you shift. 

Another example you get is projects. A reimbursement program 

makes sense in a small disaster where it is not encompassing the 

majority of your budget. But one of the things that Tony Russell 

was able to do, which we have the authority to do, was to advance 

up to 90 percent of the projects to start moving projects through 

the State of Louisiana and hold 10 percent back for final payment. 

So that reimbursement process, we can push it to the other extreme and put more money into the project on the front end and 

hold very little on the back end for the final accounting. 

10 

That was well within our authority, but it was the mindset to 

understand, we need to quit doing what is easy for us to administer 

and will oftentimes give us the greatest accountability and transparency without any risk of a negative finding and focus in on delivering the service to the States and local communities under the 

authorities that Congress granted us and understand that it 

shouldn’t be easy for us, it should be easy for them. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me ask you, Mr. Jadacki, that same question about classifications of disasters. I mean, on one hand, I understand about not having these classifications so tightly drawn 

that you limit flexibility in the event that something like Tennessee 

is so obvious. But on the other hand, what concerns me is I don’t 

think if you took a survey of Americans, I don’t think they would 

have a general understanding of what they might be entitled to or 

what kind of help they might be able to get because every disaster 

seems to be so different. The reactions are so different, the levels 

of loan amounts and individual assistance. 

Do you think we need to sharpen our definitions or is the discretion better, in your viewpoint, from a management standpoint? 

Mr. JADACKI. We have grappled with this notion of catastrophic 

events for years. I spent 14 years working at FEMA and the last 

five as the CFO, and we always classified the larger disasters 

based on dollar amount. It was the Northridge earthquake, over 

$500 million. It was Hurricane Floyd. It was the Midwest floods 

and those types of things. But all that went out the back door with 

September 11, 2001, and then with the floods in Florida in 2004 

and then certainly Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Now, we are talking 

billions and billions of dollars and wide areas that were affected. 

So to categorize a dollar amount over a billion dollars, over two 

billion dollars, I don’t know if that is the right way to go. I think 

you need the flexibility. Some argue that if it is multi-State, multijurisdictional, it should be a catastrophic event. But how do you tell 

the folks who are affected by a tornado in one town that the event 

wasn’t a catastrophic event, even though in the grand scheme of 

things it was a small event? 

So to put a label on something to be a major event and then a 

catastrophic event is real difficult. I think you need that flexibility 

and I think, incidentally, Hurricane Katrina, certainly that was a 

catastrophic event, but putting some sort of limits on it or dollar 

amounts or some sort of a fence around it, I just think would be 

real difficult. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And I generally agree with that, but I will 

say that I think there needs to be some understanding of some of 

these contained situations, whether it is a tornado or a minor flooding event, although there could be a couple of hundred homes flooded, that at some level, that could and should be the responsibility 

of local governments and the States. And then only when a disaster 

gets to a point where it is overwhelming for a State or a group of 

States should then some additional tools kick in. And I would like 

to continue to pursue some of that. 

I just think it helps the States to have some understanding that 

they might want to have some emergency funds set aside for incidents that might occur to one of their poorer counties or poorer 

parishes where they could step up very quickly and it doesn’t take 

11 

the act of Congress to provide that help. But for States then to understand when it is beyond their capacity, and we are going to ask 

the Governors Association and we have the mayors here testifying 

about this so that we can really try to determine, when is it appropriate for the Federal Government to step in with massive aid and 

how that should be distributed and when and how quickly. 

Let me go on to just a couple of other questions. The Individual 

Assistance cap, it is set now for individuals and households for a 

major catastrophe or major disaster at $30,000. I don’t have in 

front of me what the cap is for minor disasters. If you know, you 

could speak it into the record. But is that sufficient? Where did we 

find that number from? Has it just grown by inflation index since 

it was initially put in the bill, and does it make any sense today? 

Mr. FUGATE. Madam Chairman, that number is for any disaster 

that is declared that includes Individual Assistance. It is based 

upon a previous number that was established through the rule 

process and was tied to the Consumer Price Index. And as we know 

in many disasters, as what we are seeing in Tennessee, we know 

absolutely that for many of those survivors, this amount of funds 

will not make them whole. 

It kind of gets back to your discussion about the catastrophic 

events, and what we are trying to address in the Administration 

through long-term recovery planning is, is it FEMA’s programs 

that we need to enhance or is it the other Federal programs that 

we need to fill in those gaps, because many disasters won’t require 

above that. So is it better to increase the FEMA funds or is it better to better tie HUD, SBA, Farm Service Agencies, and other programs when those programs are not adequate. 

So there are two approaches. We could either look at this in the 

Stafford Act or we could look at our other Federal programs that 

may actually do better at a longer-term solution, and how do we 

tie those together so that the survivor is not going to only one location and the outcome for that person is we were only able to help 

them in the immediate part of the response but not in the longerterm recovery. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I think it is a very important question 

to answer because it is just so troubling. The uncertainty in a disaster is bad enough based on the disaster itself. That is what a disaster is. It upsets the normal way of operating. But then to make 

it even worse, not only are governors not really clear about what 

help might be coming, or mayors and elected officials, but there is 

not a general understanding of the population about whether their 

hotel room will be paid for, when they might get that reimbursement. Are they going to be entitled to free housing for a month or 

2 months? Is there going to be a shelter provided? 

I think it is very important for us to try to be clear, and it may 

take us a couple of years to get this straight, but I really want to 

zone in on these details. Is it FEMA’s responsibility right after a 

home is filled with floodwater to say, for the next 2 weeks, your 

shelter is under our responsibility, or the first 30 days, and then 

after that, we are turning this over to HUD, which is the housing 

agency at the Federal level, and through their programs of either 

Section 8 vouchers or maybe a new disaster voucher that could be 

12 

implemented, we could provide some kind of decent, safe housing 

until you can return for your rebuilding effort in your community. 

I think we are going to have to—and anything that, Mr. Jadacki, 

that you might have that not only would work well for the person 

being affected but also the taxpayer. We have to keep in mind, 

there is not unlimited funding here, and we have to do the things 

that are most efficient and most within the fiscal constraints that 

this government is now facing and will for some time to come. 

I see I have been joined by my able Ranking Member, the Secretary—Secretary, I have already promoted you—Senator 

Graham—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I will take any job I can get right now. [Laughter.] 

Senator LANDRIEU. You will take any paycheck that comes, right. 

Senator GRAHAM. That is right. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Senator Graham, I don’t know if you have an 

opening statement, but we were about ready to move to the next 

panel—— 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRAHAM 

Senator GRAHAM. No. I came here, one, to tell my Chairman that 

you are always trying to find ways to make the government work 

better when it comes to disasters and the review of this Act, the 

Stafford Act, is probably long overdue. 

When something bad happens like a Gulf oil spill or a hurricane, 

it is understandable that confusion comes about. It is understandable that it doesn’t work perfect. But if you don’t learn from past 

disasters, that is not understandable. So if we don’t learn something from this Gulf spill and fix it, that is unacceptable. And I 

think you and I both understand that fossil fuels are part of our 

energy mix for a long time to come, and safe exploration for oil and 

gas here in America makes a lot of sense, because if we don’t do 

it here, we have to buy it somewhere else, and that somewhere else 

when it comes to oil is not the most friendly neck of the woods. 

Now, when it comes to how to make this legislation more flexible, 

we are talking about people who live on the front lines, and the 

next panel is with Mayor Riley and I look very much forward to 

what the Conference of Mayors have to say and Mayor Riley has 

to say about how Congress can learn from past disasters. 

Senator Landrieu really spends a lot of time on this, because I 

think after Hurricane Katrina, she understands as well as anybody 

in the whole Congress what happens if you are not prepared, and 

she is doing everything she can to make sure that if something else 

happens, that we are better prepared, and I want to be your partner in that regard. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that. 

I have one or two more questions for this panel and then we will 

have Mayor Riley and others come forward on the second panel. 

I want to ask you about the Disaster Recovery Block Grants, because as you know, they came in, I think, they were initially implemented after the New York September 11, 2001, disaster, and if 

you could correct me if I am wrong on this record. I think it was 

a decision that was made and now it is a precedent that is set for 

any catastrophic disaster. I am not sure that it was used for disasVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:32 Mar 10, 2011 Jkt 057938 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57938.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
13 

ters. The idea was, we have got to figure out a way to get this community some money as quickly as possible from the Federal Government. There was a quick review of all Federal programs, and 

bingo, Community Development Block Grants seemed to be the 

most flexible, something that was generally popular with local officials, and so it was put into effect. 

But when you think about it, it may not be the most appropriate 

kind of block grant to place in a disaster. In disasters, poor people 

are hurt, medium, I mean, middle-class folks are hurt, and actually, wealthy people can be brought to their knees, as well. Community Disaster Loans, their essence is to support struggling communities, and so when you layer that on top of a community like 

New Orleans, where you had wealthy neighborhoods devastated, 

middle-income neighborhoods destroyed, and poor neighborhoods 

destroyed, we found some difficulty in meeting the needs of the 

community through this adaptive process. 

Would it be possible for us to come up with just basic Disaster 

Recovery Block Grants that provide the flexibility that local officials need to actually meet the needs of their people, whether they 

are poor, middle-income, or wealthy? Would that be something we 

should consider? 

And, I am sorry, my staff said that we first used it in Oklahoma 

City in 1994 and then hurricanes in Florida in 2005. But it is sort 

of something that has evolved just as the needs have grown. 

Should we look at a more specific Disaster Block Grant that either 

HUD or FEMA could issue that might be a little bit more effective 

or efficient than just trying to use a program that wasn’t created 

for the disaster and kind of making it fit disaster recovery? 

Mr. FUGATE. Madam Chairman and Senator Graham, what you 

are describing is actually the process we have been working on at 

the President’s direction under the leadership of Secretary Donovan of HUD and Secretary Napolitano of DHS. And my shorthand 

is, I am calling it the bucket list. Rather than create a new program, which we know what the challenges will be in doing that, 

what are our existing programs? And we look at HUD a lot with 

the Community Development Block Grant dollars, but actually, 

there are other programs out there. We know within the Farm 

Service Agency, particularly more rural parts of the country, there 

are programs there. We have economic development programs 

within Commerce. We have disaster unemployment that Labor administers. We have education programs. 

And what we are going back through is, as you point out, local 

governments and State governments shouldn’t have to try to figure 

out what all the programs do. We need to deconflict that and roll 

in as a team, but also identify which programs exist today with authorities that would best meet the flexibility requirements, and 

then identify what the gaps are based upon our experience in these 

large, complex disasters. 

We know we are going to have to do this in Tennessee. We 

should have been doing this earlier. And if a State has been 

through this and a local government has been through it, they are 

better able to do this. But they should not have to learn this process in a disaster. 

14 

So in the first steps as we go forward and the President makes 

a recommendation as to how we are going to go forward in the 

long-term recovery, part of this will be identifying all the Federal 

programs and agencies, how we work together and line up, and 

that may show us where there may be gaps in that flexibility or 

areas that are not addressed in existing programs with existing authorities. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Jadacki. 

Mr. JADACKI. Yes. I agree. Our office issued a Compendium of 

Disaster Assistance Programs about a year ago, and we can certainly get a copy of that for the record, too. 

But there are hundreds of programs out there in some shape or 

form dealing with disaster assistance. It is just getting the right 

people at the table to say, this is what we need for this disaster, 

this is what we need for that disaster, because all of them aren’t 

needed, but in many cases a lot are. And it is not just the Stafford 

Act programs. There are other programs that are out there, too. 

For housing, there are four or five different agencies that can provide housing. For example, what is the best course of action after 

a disaster? Should it be FEMA housing? Should HUD take over? 

At what point should it go on? And I think you need to get the 

right players at the table to do those types of things. 

As far as providing assistance, I agree with Mr. Fugate. I think 

the States are in the best position to decide what best to provide 

for their citizens, for our preparedness. In a lot of States, some of 

the folks do need to be prepared for 72 hours. And we need to manage expectations. FEMA is not going to come in and give you a 

brand new house if your house gets washed away or blown away. 

You are going to get the $30,000, or maybe something less or some 

other form of assistance. So I think managing the expectations of 

what the Federal Government is going to do versus what the State 

is going to do versus what the local government is going to do is 

critical after a disaster. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, that is an excellent segue into our next 

panel, and I thank you very much. Thank you for being here. 

I would like our second panel to come forward, and I am going 

to have my Ranking Member have the honor of introducing Mayor 

Riley. And then David Maxwell and Sheila Crowley, I will introduce. And thank you very much to the first panel. 

Mayor, we are honored to have you here today and I would like 

to turn it over to my Ranking Member for some opening remarks. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. It is a real 

pleasure to be able to introduce Mayor Riley, the Mayor of Charleston. He is one of the longest serving mayors, I think, in the country. He must have started when he was 12. [Laughter.] 

Mr. RILEY. Aren’t you kind. 

Senator GRAHAM. I have never known anyone that enjoys their 

job more than Mayor Riley. I mean, he has an enthusiasm for the 

City of Charleston and really the State of South Carolina second 

to none, and when it comes to innovation and forward thinking and 

trying to be a problem solver, he is a real pleasure to work with. 

On this particular topic, after Hurricane Hugo and the experiences that we had in South Carolina, I think Governor Campbell 

and Mayor Riley made a great team back then and I look forward 

15 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Riley appears in the Appendix on page 47. 

to listening to what he has to say on behalf of the Council of Mayors and figure out how we can make the Stafford Act more efficient 

and more flexible. 

So, Mayor Riley, welcome to Washington. I appreciate what you 

do for Charleston and the people of South Carolina. I am glad to 

have been able to work with you and look forward to doing so in 

the future. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JOSEPH P. RILEY, JR.,1 MAYOR OF 

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, AND MEMBER, STAFFORD 

ACT TASK FORCE, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS 

Mr. RILEY. Thank you very much, Senator Graham, for all your 

kind words and for all you do. We in South Carolina are so proud 

of Senator Graham, not just in how he represents us, but how he 

represents our country. He could not be more responsive to me and 

to my constituents. He is absolutely amazing. 

Senator Landrieu, I thank you for your leadership on this issue 

and your leadership for Louisiana and our country. I had the privilege of serving with her father when he was Mayor of New Orleans 

and a great mentor of mine and one of the greatest mayors I have 

ever served with, one of the great mayors in the history of our 

country, and we are so happy another Landrieu will be leading 

New Orleans. I have talked with Mitch and look forward to working—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, you are welcome. Any time, Mayor. 

Mr. RILEY. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

I am pleased to be representing the U.S. Conference of Mayors. 

The former Mayor of New Orleans, Mayor Nagin, and the Mayor 

of Sacramento, California, Kevin Johnson, co-chaired our committee to look at the Stafford Act and to make recommendations. 

There are five key recommendations. I will mostly talk about one 

or two in my 5 minutes, but they are to provide special designation 

for catastrophic disasters, which the Chairman already raised; the 

issue of eliminating red tape that stymies recovery efforts; increase 

support to host communities; increase caps on disaster loans, which 

has already been mentioned; and make recovery dollars go directly 

to cities. 

In terms of the catastrophic disaster designation, all disasters 

are not created equal, and there is a problem with this, a kind of 

a systemic problem in that 4 or 5 years after the disaster, somebody appropriately with green eye shades on are going to be auditing what happened. There is no way that 5 years later the terror 

and the elements of the disaster and the crisis that existed at that 

time can ever be understood. So it is extremely important that 

when there are very catastrophic events, that they have a special 

designation. 

Let me give you two quick stories, I think, that go to that systemic challenge. Hurricane Hugo hit Charleston, the biggest hurricane in our city’s history, the biggest disaster in the country’s history until then, 1989. The roof blows off City Hall. That is my command post, the eyes over the city. A very nice FEMA representative 

was in the building and the eye was over. We were getting ready 

16 

for the worst part and then recovery. And I said, do you have a 

kernel of advice for me? And he said, ‘‘Yes, Mayor. Make sure you 

account for all expenses.’’ [Laughter.] 

And then 2 days later, we had received national attention. So 26 

counties in South Carolina, we had. But the attention was coming 

to us, so I was trying to help smaller communities. 

So in Berkeley County, I get a report their sewer system is out. 

Their generator doesn’t work. They need generators. I call Senator 

Hollings. We find out that Fort Campbell, Kentucky, has some generators. I called the General at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He says, 

‘‘OK, we will send you 48 generators.’’ I get a call from FEMA. 

They said, ‘‘Mayor Riley, you have ordered these generators and 

you can’t do that.’’ And I said, why? And they said, ‘‘Because we 

have not done an assessment.’’ I said, there is not a working power 

line within 100 miles of here. There is no power. What kind of possible assessment? 

So what you have is that systemic problem that eventually there 

is the worry about everything being spent, but during the crisis, I 

think it would be like during a battle and the enemy is on the 

other side of the hill and you have got to hit them with everything 

you have got. You don’t want to worry that, 3 years later, somebody is going to count the number of mortars you used and whether they were too many and you are going to get punished for that. 

So with the catastrophic disaster designation, you have the capacity of doing a number of things. For instance, waive the Stafford 

Act provisions in terms of regulatory compliance. Provide 100 percent Federal funding for all eligible categories. Establish a 90-day 

hold harmless period of procurement so you don’t have to worry 

about the mortars. 

The goal is—what it is with something like a catastrophic hurricane, it is like the person has a grievous injury and they need to 

get to the emergency room immediately. And the longer they wait, 

the greater risk that they are going to die or the longer it will take 

for them to recover and the greater permanent injury they will 

have. You need to get them to the emergency room immediately. 

You need to get all the help you possibly can. And so that is what 

the catastrophic designation will allow us. 

I am already out of time. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Take another minute or two, please. 

Mr. RILEY. The direct funding is a very important point to raise, 

and I wouldn’t use the CDBG criteria. For heaven’s sake, let the 

mayor and council, with the input from the citizens, figure out how 

to use the money. They are, spending 20 hours a day working on 

it. They understand. But to not force all the money to come 

through the States when the city is usually the place where everybody is looking for response. 

And just one very subjective or theoretical basis for this that I 

would assert, and it is what I did with my staff when Hurricane 

Hugo was 2 days out. We didn’t know for sure it was coming, but 

there was a low pressure system moving gradually across the continent, across the Mississippi. Lows attract hurricanes. There was 

a strong high, a Bermuda high, that was going to block it so the 

hurricane wasn’t going to turn to the right like they often do. So 

17 

it was looking like we might get it. It was a killer in the Caribbean, 

the biggest storm, 500 miles wide. The eye was 25 miles wide. 

So I brought all my staff in, department heads, division heads, 

into my office, and I said, OK. We might get a direct hit. We must 

see this as an opportunity. And they looked at me a little blankly, 

and I said, it is not an opportunity we would ever want, but if it 

comes, it is an opportunity for us to serve our people when they 

need it the most, when we can save their lives, when we can give 

them help in their time of greatest need. 

You know, governments, we have to tax. We have to regulate. 

City governments give speeding tickets and citations and do a lot 

of wonderful things, but this is the time when we have the opportunity to help our people when they need it the most. And I would 

argue, in the revisions of the Stafford Act, you can’t legislate that 

exactly, but to make sure that it is not the ‘‘gotcha’’ 4 years later, 

what in the world did you do doing that, and you can’t possibly—— 

This is my testimony 5 years ago, May the first, 1990, on this 

issue before a House Committee, and a fair amount of what is in 

here is still relevant today. And as I re-read it, it is a reminder of 

things I have long since forgotten in terms of the crispness of the 

event. But that is what this opportunity for a revision of the Stafford Act gives us, the chance to make this statute and our National 

Government’s response a special opportunity of service to the citizens of our country. Something happened to them they never wanted and they never thought would, and our country, with creativity 

and with fairness and with energy responds, and they will never 

forget it. That is part of the opportunity. And the country is a better place because you have done it. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mayor, no one in this Congress could have 

said that any better than you, and it takes a mayor that has been 

there with their people at a great time of need, and I so appreciate 

the comments that you have made. If we had more mayors like 

you, we wouldn’t have nearly the problems that we have, so thank 

you very much for your wonderful, heartfelt testimony. 

We are joined by the Senator from Arkansas, who is here to introduce our next panelist. We are glad you joined us, Senator 

Pryor. Thank you for your excellent work in this area, chairing our 

sort of sister or brother Subcommittee, and we thank you very 

much for being here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Well, thank you. I want to thank you, Madam 

Chairman, because your commitment to improving the way the 

country carries out disaster recovery has just been second to none. 

Since the early days of Hurricane Katrina, you have been fighting 

to make government more effective and efficient and responsible 

for people affected by disasters. Because of your work and the work 

of this Subcommittee and things you have done in the Senate, we 

have made a lot of progress since 2005. I know we still have a ways 

to go, but you have just really been a national leader on this. 

It is a great pleasure to introduce an Arkansas native today, 

David Maxwell. He is the Director of the Arkansas Department of 

Emergency Management (ADEM), and he is the 2010 President of 

18 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Maxwell appears in the Appendix on page 57. 

the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), and he 

is going to testify today. 

He has an extensive record of service to the State of Arkansas, 

which includes over 31 years of emergency management experience. His career in emergency management began in 1978 when he 

worked in temporary housing for the State after major flooding in 

Little Rock, and I remember that flood. I was in the middle of it, 

actually. 

He worked his way up from Planning Specialist to ADEM’s Plans 

and Operations Division Manager. On June 30, 2006, he was appointed Director of ADEM and State Homeland Security Advisor. 

He has overseen 11 presidentially declared disasters as Director of 

ADEM and served for six other declarations as a State Coordinating Officer prior to becoming Director. 

In addition, he serves on a number of State and national committees and working groups, including NEMA, the Central United 

States Earthquake Consortium, the Arkansas Terrorism Task 

Force, Arkansas Fire Protection Board, the State Emergency Response Commission, and the Arkansas Wireless Information Network Steering Committee. 

All of this is to say that I believe, and hope you agree, that Mr. 

Maxwell is uniquely qualified to talk about what needs to be done 

to improve the Stafford Act and our Nation’s response and recovery 

mechanism. 

In light of the tornado that we just had in our State that killed 

one person last week, the horrible floods in Tennessee that took 

more than a dozen lives, and the tornado this past Monday evening 

that killed five in Oklahoma, it is clear that we are never far away 

from the next disaster. It is imperative that we rebuild a stronger, 

more effective, and more flexible Stafford Act that is designed to 

give us our best tools for responding to and recovering from all disasters. 

So I am glad that he was invited today, and Madam Chairman, 

thank you for having him at this very important hearing. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. Mr. Maxwell. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID MAXWELL,1 DIRECTOR AND HOMELAND 

SECURITY ADVISOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, AND PRESIDENT, NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION 

Mr. MAXWELL. Thank you, Chairman Landrieu, Ranking Member 

Graham, and certainly Senator Pryor. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

Senator Pryor, thank you for that kind introduction and the continued support that you have shown for both Arkansas’s Department Emergency Management and homeland security programs, 

but also the emergency management and homeland security of this 

Nation, so thank you very much. 

I come before you today representing the National Emergency 

Management Association (NEMA), and the State Emergency Managers of all 50 States, Territories, and Washington, DC. Since the 

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19 

sponse, NEMA has an obvious interest in maintaining the integrity 

of the Act. 

Originally, the Stafford Act was intentionally written very broadly to allow maximum flexibility for practitioners and discretion by 

the President. NEMA continues to support this flexibility and national needs must be considered in any changes to the Act. 

Changes for one State or region do not necessarily translate to the 

other areas of the country and could present additional and unintended challenges. 

Furthermore, and perhaps above all else, should you decide to 

make changes to the Stafford Act, implementation at the State 

level should remain the single most important undercurrent to any 

such changes. It is the responsibility of the governors and State 

governments to support communities by ensuring a seamless response among all levels of government. State responsibility also includes providing timely and efficient resource coordination, deploying and requesting interstate mutual aid is necessary, and implementing State and Federal disaster assistance programs. By the 

way, 27 States have some form of disaster assistance on their own. 

But to achieve all of these responsibilities, legislative changes to 

the Stafford Act may not be necessary. A majority of NEMA members agree that the primary issue during disaster response is not 

with the Stafford Act overall, but rather with disaster assistance 

policy. In recent years, we have realized most roadblocks regarding 

the Stafford Act don’t lie in the legislation, but in unnecessarily 

strict interpretation and application of the law. These interpretations have led to more rigid regulations and policies not reflecting 

the true intent of the Act. 

While NEMA continues to discuss whether the Stafford Act 

needs amending to address catastrophic disasters, we do agree that 

the Stafford Act does not require broad and sweeping legislative 

changes at this time. Before looking at amending the Act, we encourage the Subcommittee to first address some programs that support Stafford functions but are in need of reauthorization. 

One of NEMA’s highest priorities is the reauthorization and 

funding of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

(EMAC). In short, EMAC allows States to rely on existing mutual 

aid agreements in the time of disaster for equipment, personnel, 

and other resources. But EMAC needs to be reauthorized, and due 

to a lack of reliable year-to-year funding, long-range planning is all 

but impossible. 

Another asset requiring legislative action is support to Urban 

Search and Rescue (USAR) Teams. FEMA should be provided clear 

authorities for Urban Search and Rescue Teams to protect local departments and task force members when injuries or other liabilities 

occur as a result of rescue efforts. 

We also support the reimplementation of the PA Pilot Program. 

This program was very popular among our membership and provides efficient ways to distribute funds from the Disaster Relief 

Fund (DRF) without creating new grant programs or funding 

streams. 

The final specific program I would like to discuss is the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program. This program is in desperate need of reauthorization, and I want to take the opportunity to thank the 

20 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Crowley appears in the Appendix on page 63. 

Subcommittee for supporting S. 3249, which passed the full Committee just a couple weeks ago. This reauthorization bill, with the 

Coburn amendment discouraging earmarks, will provide States and 

important tool to mitigate the effects of the disaster. NEMA remains committed to working with the Subcommittee to address any 

outstanding issues. 

Once these other programs are solidified and States are given 

the appropriate latitude to conduct their response, then potential 

shortfalls can be examined within the Act itself. But as changes are 

considered, there are some red flags to be careful of. 

Additional layers of bureaucracies should be avoided at all costs. 

New task forces, coordinating councils, or Federal offices cannot 

substitute for knowledgeable and properly trained Federal Coordinating Officers or planning efforts States should already have in 

place. 

FEMA should be allowed to complete the National Disaster Recovery Framework and implement some of those recommendations. 

Issues around public or individual assistance can be addressed 

through FEMA policy and regulations rather than legislation. 

Finally, with such complex programs all intertwined through the 

various levels of government, the States should remain the sole coordinator of these functions. The States have existing personnel to 

manage the programs and have the ability to view disaster response and recovery through the prism of Statewide and regional 

needs. 

As you can see, the Stafford Act is complex, but it works well, 

so we should be careful in making sweeping legislative changes. 

Such changes could dilute the original intent and create additional 

bureaucracies, thereby slowing future efforts. 

We continue to look forward to working with this Subcommittee 

and I will be happy to accept any questions at this time. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Maxwell. 

Ms. Crowley is here with us today and we are pleased to have 

her here representing the National Low Income Housing Coalition. 

You have testified before our Subcommittee before and welcome 

back. 

TESTIMONY OF SHEILA CROWLEY, PH.D.,1 PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 

Ms. CROWLEY. Thank you very much, Senator Landrieu, Ranking 

Member Graham, and Senator Pryor. I am happy to be here to testify today. 

I would like to begin by thanking you, Senator Landrieu, for your 

steadfast commitment to the complete recovery of all the Gulf 

Coast States from the 2005 hurricanes. When sometimes it seems 

like much of the country and the Congress has moved on, you are 

an inspiration to me and to others who will keep doing this work 

for as long as it takes, so thank you. 

The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) would like 

to associate ourselves with those who have suggested the current 

disaster response structure, which places primary responsibility on 

21 

States and local governments, is inadequate in the face of catastrophes such as Hurricane Katrina. A priority for Stafford Act reform should be to clearly define when a disaster is catastrophic, as 

you have discussed, and to direct the President to intervene swiftly 

and comprehensively in such a case. 

For most people who are displaced by a disaster, finding temporary housing or a new home is time consuming and costly, but 

not beyond their capacity. But for low wage earners, the underand unemployed, seniors and disabled people on fixed incomes who 

must leave their homes because of a disaster, the obstacles can be 

insurmountable. These are the people for whom government must 

plan. 

The true measure of how complete a disaster housing plan is will 

be the degree to which the most vulnerable people are covered. The 

National Disaster Housing Strategy now is required to take into account the special needs population, but does not really deal with 

the problems of people who are just too poor to make it on their 

own when a disaster strikes. 

Quick repair and reoccupancy of damaged housing should be the 

first order of business. Disaster housing policy can draw from the 

lessons we have learned on ending homelessness in the United 

States in which the concept of rapid rehousing is the preferred 

intervention today. Homeless people are provided with subsidies 

and services needed to move quickly into new permanent homes. 

Not only is the trauma reduced, but rapid rehousing is much less 

costly than lengthy stays in shelters or motels and hotels. 

When temporary housing will be required for many people after 

a disaster, the emphasis should be on making the transition from 

temporary to permanent housing as seamless as possible. One of 

the most serious flaws in the Hurricane Katrina housing response 

has been the disconnect between the temporary housing programs 

and the housing recovery strategies. A renter living in a trailer encampment is told to come up with a permanent housing strategy 

as use of the trailer is time limited. Yet the community in which 

the renter resides does not have a strategy for how to replace the 

rental housing that was lost. A displaced family’s temporary housing plan and permanent housing plan should be one of the same, 

just as a community’s temporary and permanent housing plans 

should be. 

For private market rental housing that is damaged, disaster resources should be used to restore the properties to habitable use as 

both temporary and permanent housing. The pilot program that allowed FEMA to pay for repairs to private rental housing in Iowa 

and Texas after the disasters in 2008 showed us that this approach 

is considerably more cost effective than the use of temporary housing units. Any reform of the Stafford Act should incorporate these 

findings. 

One of the most positive developments out of the Hurricane 

Katrina housing experience was the designation of HUD as the 

agency to administer disaster rent assistance. The HUD Disaster 

Housing Assistance Program (DHAP), announced in April 2007, 

was a vast improvement over the FEMA program. Any future disaster rent assistance programs should be run by HUD and its 

3,500 affiliated local public housing agencies. 

22 

One concern with DHAP that many advocates have is that rents 

are not based on tenant income and the tenant’s share of rent increases by $50 a month until it equals or exceeds the amount of 

assistance unless they can demonstrate economic hardship. Fortunately, under HUD Secretary Donovan’s leadership, very low-income people have been or will be transferred from DHAP to the 

Section 8 Housing Voucher Program. This should be made a permanent feature of DHAP. Stafford Act reform should also assure 

that DHAP recipients are afforded the same due process rights as 

are other recipients of HUD housing assistance. In 2006, Congress provided $400 million for the Alternative 

Housing Pilot program, a.k.a. Katrina cottages. The report on the 

pilot is not expected before the end of 2011. We would suggest that 

a more timely report is needed, as the pilot program is to inform 

Stafford Act reform. A number of issues have been raised by Gulf 

Coast advocates about how the Katrina cottages are being used, 

and we would suggest that the Subcommittee may want to look at 

that very specifically. 

In closing, I would like to point out that it is outside of the scope 

of Stafford Act reform to address the structural shortage of rental 

homes available to very low-income Americans, but there can be no 

viable disaster housing strategy as long as this shortage persists. 

To address this shortage, Congress established the National Housing Trust Fund in 2008, but has yet to provide funding. We are 

seeking $1 million this year for the initial capitalization for the National Housing Trust Fund and we urge your support. 

Thank you again for inviting me to come. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Ms. Crowley. I really appreciate 

it. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Maxwell, because I am very interested in 

the testimony on behalf of actually the professionals that are running the disasters that as an organization you are testifying that 

you think the current Stafford Act is sufficient. I have to say, I 

don’t hear that from anyone, from any mayor or public official from 

any part of the country. So I am very curious about this, and I am 

very interested in your perspective. I think it is very important for 

me to try to understand this. 

So let me ask you this. In Arkansas, in your experience, what is 

the largest dollar amount of disaster that you personally have dealt 

with? Do you remember or know, or even if you don’t know the dollar amount, just what it was? 

Mr. MAXWELL. The ice storm of 2000 was somewhere in the 

neighborhood of $200 million. Interestingly, our next largest disaster had no damage in Arkansas and that was Hurricane Katrina. 

That was around $50 million to support the operation. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. And the reason I raised this is because 

I really think it is important, and I know that you are professionals 

in your work, but just to give you, I had them put this document, 

this sign up. The insured damage for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

was $51 billion. For Hurricane Andrew, it was $23.8 billion. The 

World Trade Center was $22 billion. The Northridge earthquake 

was $18 billion. Hurricane William was $11.4 billion. Hurricane 

Ike was $10.7 billion. Hurricane Hugo was $7.3 billion, and that 

was in what dollars? What year was that? 

23 

Mr. RILEY. Nineteen-eighty-nine. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Nineteen-eighty-nine. So somebody quickly 

could do the calculation. It would have to be at least double, if not 

triple, so I would say probably triple, $21 billion. 

So from my perspective, my problem is that the Stafford Act may 

work for a couple of million dollar disaster, but from my perspective, it is clearly not working when it comes to these mega-disasters. 

Just to give you one example, the law—and I am going to ask 

you this, and maybe I am incorrect here, so that is what I want 

to get to—the law, I understand, not policy, limits the disaster 

loans to $5 million. Is that true? Is it the law, or is it a policy? 

Mr. MAXWELL. I believe that is the law. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. So you are recommending any change to 

that law? 

Mr. MAXWELL. No, ma’am. We are not recommending no changes 

to the Stafford Act. We are not recommending sweeping changes. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. I am just trying to struggle with this 

‘‘sweeping’’ definition, because one of the things we may recommend is an increase in that limit, considering—I think Senator 

Graham might not have been here when I said this—but as I recall, Senator, the budget of the City of New Orleans was somewhere around $240 million a year. Of course, borrowing $5 million 

wouldn’t have made a bit of difference. And we had to struggle for 

months, trying to figure out, because the law capped it at $five million, it took us months. Meanwhile, a mayor like Mayor Riley or 

Mayor Nagin, was sitting there day after day after day after day 

for months trying to figure out a financing package to literally keep 

the city functioning. 

Think about this. Every police officer, every firefighter, every city 

employee, every 24 hours that lost their house kept asking, do I 

have a job, and no one could tell them because there was no ability 

for the Federal Government to tell them. 

Now, whether you think that is sweeping or not, I think it is necessary to do something so that mayors and governors—and so, 

Mayor, let me ask you. What would you recommend? You don’t 

have to give me a dollar amount, but is there something that you 

or some of the other mayors would think might be fair, an application for a dollar amount of either low-interest loans or something 

to kind of keep you going while you are figuring out how to get the 

roof back on City Hall? 

Mr. RILEY. It depends on the city. The thing about hurricanes is 

this. They are a very different form of disaster because they are holistic. A tragic tornado, even a tragic earthquake and certainly a 

tragic flood, the path of damage is usually defined. With a hurricane, no one in the community isn’t hit. No one’s roof isn’t damaged. No one’s job isn’t at risk. I mean, the whole community. 

And so, maybe it is something relative to the budget or maybe 

even something within the regulatory power of FEMA, because, 

like the City of New Orleans, their need would be greater than a 

smaller city. But I think part of it is recognizing the scope. 

And I think in terms of the Stafford Act and the future, we know 

this, we don’t like to say it, but we know that more and more people are moving to our coasts. And so these great big hurricanes will 

24 

in time impact more people. And then for our country, the impact 

on our Nation’s economy of a big metropolitan area being substantially impacted and not being able to get back going—what worried 

me, among other things during Hurricane Hugo, were the jobs. 

I worked to get the power back on. They said it will take 3 

weeks. I said, that is crazy. My community will die in 3 weeks. I 

don’t care if you have to get every power company in America to 

have people down here. I want to have the power company up at 

midnight, because we couldn’t—but it was the jobs, because every 

business that is back in operation. It is another thing to deal with 

your roof if you don’t have a paycheck. Then you are talking, more 

serious problems. 

So I think it is something that has the flexibility to recognize. 

Charleston, it might be $10 million. In New Orleans, or I don’t 

want to mention another city, put bad karma on them—— [Laughter.] 

But it might be $100 million. You don’t know. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, perhaps we should think about a percentage. 

Go ahead, Mr. Maxwell, and then I am going to turn it over to 

Senator Graham. 

Mr. MAXWELL. It seems to be—that is one of those limiting factors within the law. I think our membership is for any additional 

flexibility that can be built into the law, we are for. I think, for the 

most part, we think that the law is limited by policies and regulations, but I think on a case-by-case basis, certainly we would look 

forward to working with you on recommendations that we could vet 

with our membership. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So you think that particular matter, you may 

support, your membership may support. Well, we will look forward 

to submitting some of those questions, because we would be very 

interested in that. It is important to have your support and your 

blessing for what we are doing. 

Mr. MAXWELL. We look forward to those questions. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I am learning a lot just by sitting here, 

but Mayor Riley is right. It depends on the size of the city, the 

scope of the damage done. 

But in the military—I am more familiar with this kind of system—like when you are in Iraq and Afghanistan, a company commander would have the ability to spend, say, $10,000, $50,000 

without having to go all the way to Washington to help the local 

community, but the more money involved, the more approval you 

have to get. So maybe one of the things we could look at is changing the number, but sort of have a staged approval process. The 

higher the number, the more the authority you have to get, but not 

let it stand in the way of getting some cash into the region, because 

it is a balancing act, Mayor Riley, that we are trying to achieve 

here. 

Three years later, everybody is Monday morning quarterbacks, 

but sometimes you look and say, my God, a lot of this money was 

just completely fraudulently spent. You have got to have some control before it happens. And I guess the balance I am trying to 

25 

achieve is a system of accountability and flexibility that are not 

mutually exclusive. 

Could you flesh out in your mind, Mayor Riley, how we would 

redefine catastrophic events, and is it your view this statute is 

marginally changed or major changes need to be implemented 

when it comes to the Stafford Act? 

Mr. RILEY. I would say major. In the National Response Framework, which is a document, their definition is catastrophic events, 

any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results 

in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption 

affecting the population, infrastructure, crime, the economy, national morale, or governmental functions. And so that is, I think, 

a definition you could work on. 

I don’t think you would want to use a number or anything. It 

would be something that the President and the head of Homeland 

Security would work on. But clearly, Hurricane Hugo would have 

been catastrophic, without any doubt. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, absolutely, and just as we think about it 

here, when a community is hit like this, how do you make payroll, 

because all the revenue stops. You can have a rainy day fund—it 

is one thing to have a rainy day fund. It is another thing to have 

a hurricane fund. 

Mr. RILEY. That is right. 

Senator GRAHAM. And I don’t think many cities can save money 

for a hurricane like Hugo. So being able to meet payroll, where the 

Federal Government comes in with loans that will change the quality of life, to me seems to be a major change that is necessary. 

We just learned, the people of New Orleans, their firemen and 

their policemen and their school teachers and the public servants 

there, not only were they on the front lines of the damage, the city 

was unable to pay them. And so I think most Americans would love 

to have a system that would interject some cash, not only to individuals for housing needs, but for the local government who has to 

bring about law and order as well as repair the damage. 

So I am in the camp of looking at this from a major overhaul, 

and anything I can do to make it more flexible and achieve accountability, count me in. I have really learned a lot from the hearing. 

Thank you, Mayor Riley, for coming. Thank you, Mr. Maxwell, 

Ms. Crowley. 

Mr. RILEY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I have just two more questions and then I 

think we can close the hearing. But in talking about accountability, 

I think some of the people that I represent are still shocked to 

know that some of the temporary housing in trailers, that the actual accounting of providing a trailer, managing the trailer, installing the trailer, and other services required in some instances 

amounted to anywhere between $70,000, I think, and $90,000. 

And I think this gets to your point, Ms. Crowley, that for the 

Federal Government to spend $70,000 to $90,000 on something 

that is temporary and after a certain time really quite unusable, 

not even entering into the area of formaldehyde and unsafe containers, it does seem to me that we need to pursue smarter housing 

26 

strategies that are not only more long-term, but also more affordable for the taxpayer. 

So would you like to just elaborate on maybe some of the successes of the rental repair that I think were tried in the Galveston 

situation—I don’t think it was necessarily tried in our situation— 

and what came of that? 

Ms. CROWLEY. Yes. I think that the rental repair pilot was a pilot 

and it wasn’t retroactive to recovery from Hurricane Katrina. 

In the beginning, around while the people were meeting to discuss what the housing response in the Gulf Coast should be, there 

was a significant amount of discussion around why can’t money be 

used to just get the existing housing back online. We were very fortunate to have part of our group folks who had argued similar 

kinds of things in disasters in California and had a fairly, we 

thought, strong legal opinion that FEMA could, in fact, do that, although FEMA said they were not allowed to do that. 

I think that it was an extraordinarily lost opportunity in the Gulf 

Coast for—and delayed the recovery, because if those dollars that 

went into all those trailers and all those motel rooms, etc., could 

have been spent to get much of that housing back in a way that 

it could be used, first of all, you would have more people back. Second of all, you would have your housing repaired. So you are not 

only just providing temporary housing, but you are providing permanent housing. 

I did read the report on what had happened in Iowa and Texas 

and the savings are quite extraordinary in terms of the difference 

between repairing rental housing and providing temporary housing 

units. I just glanced at Administrator Fugate’s testimony and saw 

that he had noted the same kinds of savings and that was something that FEMA would be looking into. 

So certainly, in clearing up whatever ambiguity there might be 

in the law about whether or not FEMA is authorized to do that, 

I think would be a really important step in the Stafford Act reform. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. My final question is on hazard 

mitigation, to you, Mr. Maxwell. You state in your testimony, for 

every dollar invested in mitigation projects, the Federal Government saves four dollars in averted disaster assistance, but it often 

takes 12 to 18 months for mitigation funds to begin flowing. Would 

State and local governments benefit from receiving a small advance 

on their hazard mitigation dollars? How would that work, and 

what are the details of your recommendations, if you can recall 

them? 

Mr. MAXWELL. I, frankly, can’t recall all the details, but certainly 

we have a lot of success stories from mitigation and preventing future disaster costs and getting money out quicker. There is a balance. You don’t want to confuse the mitigation money with Public 

Assistance money, although there is some 406 mitigation which is 

part of Public Assistance. 

In our recent floods in Arkansas, 90 percent of the eligible project 

worksheets that were written include mitigation in them. So I 

think—and we are working with engineers to make sure that it is 

not just a guess of building it—going to the next larger culvert. You 

find out really what you need, and we think we are going to prevent a lot of damage in the future just through the PA program. 

27 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. I would like to ask the panelists 

if you want to end with a minute or something you would like to 

add that you would like to get on the record before we close. Ms. 

Crowley. 

Ms. CROWLEY. Well, I would just like to go back to my final refrain in the testimony, and that is to recognize that when a disaster strikes and housing is one of the great casualties in there, 

that figuring out how to solve those problems is, for the people who 

are displaced, is dramatically compounded by the fact that we do 

have a structural shortage of housing that low-income people can 

afford. 

And so as we look at the National Disaster Housing Strategy and 

really think about what will happen in the future, and building on 

lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, we have to look at it in 

that context. And hopefully, that will help people see the broader 

picture of what the housing circumstances are. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. Mr. Maxwell. 

Mr. MAXWELL. I would just like to add to thank you for the long 

effort that you have gone through with a series of hearings on the 

Stafford Act. And I know you are getting closer and closer to coming to some conclusions and developing a bill and we look forward 

to any specific recommendations, running by our membership and 

certainly coming back to you with recommendations from the membership. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mayor Riley. 

Mr. RILEY. Senator, one specific and then one general. On specific, I think with regard to housing, it is important to have a 

greater role for HUD in that. They have great resources and great 

interest and capacity, technical capacity to be of assistance. 

And just on the broader one, it is the return to normalcy that is 

the challenge for the people of these disasters, every component of 

their lives getting back to normal, for their physical health, for 

their economic health, and for their emotional well-being. 

For us, as soon as the garbage could be picked up or the mail 

could be delivered or the streets cleared or the power turned on, 

all of those things, and so the speed and the quick response is more 

important than anyone would realize that hasn’t been through this, 

and that is why I think the change is needed. It just isn’t up to 

the standard that meets the potential of the disaster and the 

growth of our country. 

And I thank you for your very hard and thorough work on this 

issue, which will translate to people getting their lives back to normal, getting their feet back on the ground, restoring the economic, 

physical, and emotional health more quickly than it otherwise 

would have. Thank you very much. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, and let me just end with a short 

comment. Two things come to mind. 

One of the things that helped the people of Louisiana and the 

Gulf Coast feel more normal as quickly as possible was getting 

their children back into schools. We had 300,000 children that went 

to school on Friday morning and could not return on Monday, and 

some of those children didn’t return to those schools for 2 to 3 

years. Most schools in the region after Hurricanes Katrina and 

28 

Rita didn’t open for at least 6 months. So normal wasn’t normal for 

those families. 

Some families I know drove two hours to put their children in 

school in the morning, drove back to try to repair their house during the day with no water and no electricity for months, drove back 

to pick their children up. It took them 2 hours. And the Federal 

Government at the time this happened had no plan—no plan—to 

pay, reimburse, help the local communities find classrooms for 

300,000 children, and that took an act of Congress. 

We can’t do this anymore. We have to have automatic buttons 

that get pressed so that mayors and governors can respond and 

local officials can respond to the cries of their constituents. And I 

am going to press forward until those green buttons and those tools 

are in their hands to do it. 

On a more positive note, my staff, I couldn’t go, but my staff just 

got back from Kobe, Japan. Fifteen years ago, the largest earthquake that ever hit Japan hit Kobe, Japan. I don’t know the 

amount of damage. It was billions and billions. The city was hit. 

And the best statement that my chief of staff made to me, or my 

State director when he got back, is, ‘‘Senator, you couldn’t even tell 

the earthquake hit.’’ 

And I think that is where we want to go. I think, Mayor, that 

is where we want to go. When we operate so efficiently that after— 

now, it is not going to be the next year, but after 10 years, 5 years, 

10 years, 15 years, a major catastrophe, I hope I can walk the 

shores of the Gulf Coast in New Orleans even 10 years from now 

and look and say, you can’t even tell that anything happened here, 

because these catastrophic events take time. But the light at the 

end of the tunnel is, that city is stronger, brighter, more vibrant, 

and richer, more prosperous for all of its citizens because of what 

was done there, and we hope that will be the truth for Haiti. We 

hope it will be true for the Gulf Coast. We hope it will be true for 

many communities in America. 

Thank you very much. The record will remain open for 15 days. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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