NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JONATHAN L., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY,1 N.L., Y.L., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0090

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD23618

The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Robert D. Rosanelli

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Laura J. Huff

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

 

1 Pursuant to S.B. 1001, Section 157, 51st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 

2014) (enacted), the Department of Child Safety (DCS) is substituted for the 

Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) in this matter. See

ARCAP 27. For consistency, we refer to DCS in this decision even where, 

at the time, actions were taken by ADES.
JONATHAN L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

T H O M P S O N, Judge:

¶1 Jonathan L. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights as to N.L. and Y.L. (collectively the 

Children). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Leah S. (Mother) and Father are married and have two 

biological children together.3 In 2008 and 2009, Mother and Father adopted 

two children from Ethiopia - N.L., born in March 2008, and Y.L., born in 

June 2008 (the Children). Father re-entered military service in 2010 and was 

stationed in Afghanistan from March 2011 to January 2012. After Father 

completed his service, he and Mother moved from Arizona to Oregon. 

¶3 In March 2012, Mother intentionally overdosed by taking 

prescription pills in front of one of her biological children. Mother had a 

long history of prescription drug abuse and mental health issues.4 After her 

hospitalization following the overdose, Mother completed one week of inpatient substance abuse treatment. An allegation that Mother was 

negligent in the care of her biological child was filed with the Oregon 

Department of Human Services (DHS). The DHS report specified that 

 

2 We review the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in

the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court’s factual findings. 

Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 13, 53 P.3d 203, 207 

(App. 2002).

3 Neither Mother nor her two biological children are parties to this 

appeal. 

4 Before moving to Oregon, three reports of Mother’s physical abuse, 

neglect of the Children, and mental illness had been filed with DCS in 2010 

and 2011 and 2012, but were deemed unsubstantiated by DCS. 
JONATHAN L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

Father was aware of Mother’s mental health issues and prescription drug 

abuse, and that he agreed to implement a safety plan to supervise all contact 

between Mother and the Children until her mental health issues and 

prescription drug abuse were “under control.” DHS provided in-home 

services to Mother until May 2012 when Mother and Father were released 

from supervision. 

¶4 Three months later, Mother and Father separated, and Mother 

moved to Arizona with the Children. Shortly thereafter, Father moved to 

San Diego. Father returned to Arizona approximately once a month to visit 

the Children. 

¶5 On April 30, 2013, DCS took the Children into custody after 

receiving a report that they had been physically abused. A DCS case 

manager observed that N.L. had fresh and healing injuries to his back, was 

extremely thin and malnourished, and had a very flat affect. Y.L. had 

circular bruises on both forearms and broken blood vessels around her eye.

A medical examination revealed that Y.L. also had three concerning scars 

on her right upper arm; N.L. had several concerning scars in various 

locations; and N.L. was thin and malnourished with developmental delays 

“likely related to chronic malnutrition as an infant.” 

¶6 DCS learned that Y.L. told police investigators that Mother 

hits N.L. with a spoon, and Father hit N.L. in the head and made him bleed. 

N.L. was essentially non-verbal and was unable to be interviewed by the 

police. DCS also discovered that the Children had various special needs. 

Despite their awareness of the Children’s special needs, neither Mother nor 

Father sought services. 

¶7 DCS filed a dependency petition based on Father’s neglect of 

the Children and his failure to protect them from abuse, and Mother’s 

neglect, physical and emotional abuse, mental health issues, and substance 

abuse. The juvenile court found that the Children were dependent, noting 

Father and Mother stipulated to the dependency based on Mother’s mental 

health issues and Father’s inability to care for the children due to their 

special needs.

¶8 DCS established a case plan for Father of reunification and 

offered him the following services: supervised visitation; a psychological 

evaluation; and counseling. Father attended a visitation in November 2013, 

however, the following month DCS suspended Father’s visitation with Y.L.

because of her extremely negative reaction and violent behavior following 

the visit. Although DCS accommodated Father’s request for a visitation 
JONATHAN L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

with N.L. in February 2014, Father failed to attend the visitation. 

Thereafter, Father did not request visitation with N.L., did not inquire into 

the welfare of the Children, and did not send the Children any gifts or 

letters.

¶9 In April 2014, DCS filed a motion to terminate Father’s 

parental rights.5 The motion, as amended, alleged five grounds for 

termination: (1) abuse of failure to protect; (2) abandonment; (3) neglect; (4) 

nine months time-in-care; and (5) fifteen months time-in-care. After a 

contested severance hearing, the juvenile court found that DCS had 

established the grounds for severance, and that termination was the 

Children’s best interests. Accordingly, the juvenile court terminated 

Father’s parental rights to the Children. 

¶10 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 8-235 (Supp. 2014), and 12-

2101(A)(2) (Supp. 2013).

DISCUSSION

¶11 The juvenile court may terminate the parent-child 

relationship only upon finding that clear and convincing evidence 

demonstrates at least one statutory ground for severance and that severance 

is in the child's best interests. A.R.S. § 8–533(B) (Supp. 2014); Kent K. v. Bobby 

M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005). We review the 

juvenile court’s termination order for an abuse of discretion. Mary Lou C. v. 

Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004) 

(citation omitted). Under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(2), the juvenile court may 

terminate parental rights if a parent “has neglected or wil[l]fully abused a 

child.” “[A]buse includes serious physical or emotional injury or situations 

in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person 

was abusing or neglecting a child.” A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(2). 

¶12 Father argues that the juvenile court’s finding that he had 

willfully abused or failed to protect the Children was “clearly erroneous 

and contrary to the substantial evidence in the record” because he “had no 

reason to believe that the children’s mother would abuse or neglect the 

 

5 Mother signed a consent for adoption and termination of her 

parental rights to N.L. and Y.L., and the juvenile court subsequently 

terminated Mother’s parental rights.
JONATHAN L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

children and [he] did not place them in a situation where he reasonably 

should have known abuse or neglect would occur.”6 We disagree.

¶13 First, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding 

that the Children were abused. As noted above, the DCS case manager 

testified that N.L. had physical injuries, was very malnourished and small 

for his age. Similarly, a case manager also observed that Y.L. had physical 

injuries. Additionally, both Mother and Father failed to provide the 

necessary therapy and services for the Children’s special needs.

¶14 Second, although Father argues he “could not predict that the 

children’s mother would abuse or neglect the children,” Father testified that 

he was aware of Mother’s history of prescription drug abuse and mental 

illness. Father also admitted that he agreed to a safety plan with the Oregon 

DHS whereby he would supervise all of Mother’s contact with N.L. and 

Y.L. because of her substance abuse problem. Despite his knowledge of 

Mother’s substance abuse problem and her history of mental illness, Father 

left the Children in the sole custody of Mother in order to continue his 

education out-of-state. Thereafter, Father maintained only minimal contact 

with the Children, and has made no effort to contact or inquire about the

Children’s welfare since February 2014. 

¶15 Father's actions during the pendency of this case support a 

finding that he is unable to protect the Children from abuse. At the 

severance hearing, Father continued to defend Mother, denied that she 

abused the Children, denied Mother had a substance abuse problem, and 

claimed that Mother “loves those children and she gave them . . . everything 

she could.” Father’s refusal to take any responsibility for his children’s 

injuries supports an inference that he would be unable or unwilling to 

protect the children from future abuse or neglect. Thus, reasonable 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father “knew or 

reasonably should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting” 

the Children.7 See A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(2).

 

6 Father has not appealed the finding that termination was in the 

children’s best interest. We therefore accept that finding and do not address 

it further. See Schabel v. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97, 186 Ariz. 161, 

167, 920 P.2d 41, 47 (App. 1996) (“Issues not clearly raised and argued in a 

party's appellate brief are waived.”).

7 Only one statutory ground need be proven to justify the termination 

of a parent-child relationship. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 1, 110 P.3d at 1014 
JONATHAN L. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶16 Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

termination order.

 

(citing A.R.S. § 8–533(B)). Because we determine severance was appropriate 

based on A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(2), we need not discuss the other grounds for 

severance. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 203, 

205 (App. 2002).