49–010 

Calendar No. 73 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 1st Session 114–42 

THE BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL TRADE PRIORITIES 

AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2015 

MAY 12, 2015.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on Finance, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 995] 

Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office 

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the bill (S. 

995) to establish congressional trade negotiating objectives and enhanced consultation requirements for trade negotiations, to provide 

for consideration of trade agreements, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that 

the bill as amended do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ................................................................. 2 

II. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 2 

III. GENERAL EXPLANATION ......................................................................... 2 

A. BACKGROUND ................................................................................ 2 

B. ACTION IN COMMITTEE ............................................................... 6 

1. Hearings ...................................................................................... 6 

2. Consideration of Legislation ...................................................... 7 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS ........................................................... 7 

A. ADDENDUM ..................................................................................... 47 

V. VOTES OF THE COMMITTEE .................................................................... 48 

VI. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE BILL ....................................................... 51 

VII. REGULATORY IMPACT AND OTHER MATTERS ................................... 53 

VIII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS ................................................................................... 54 

IX. MINORITY VIEWS ....................................................................................... 55 

X. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED 57 


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I. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the bill (S. 

995) to establish congressional trade negotiating objectives and enhanced consultation requirements for trade negotiations, to provide 

for consideration of trade agreements, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that 

the bill as amended do pass. 

II. SUMMARY 

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 

Act of 2015 (S. 995) establishes rules for the implementation of 

international trade agreements that the President concludes prior 

to July 1, 2018, with the possibility of extension through July 1, 

2021. The bill would provide the President with the authority to 

proclaim modifications to certain tariff rates in order to implement 

such agreements. Where specific conditions have been met, legislation to implement trade agreements—including tariff reductions 

not subject to proclamation authority and other changes to current 

U.S. law—would be subject to agreed upon procedures (known as 

‘‘trade authorities procedures’’) for consideration in the House of 

Representatives and the Senate. Under these trade authorities procedures, a bill to implement a qualifying trade agreement would 

not be subject to amendment and would be guaranteed a vote in 

each Chamber by a date certain. 

For implementing legislation to qualify for trade authorities procedures, the underlying trade agreement must make progress toward achieving the applicable objectives, policies, and priorities set 

forth in the bill. Furthermore, the President must consult regularly 

with Members of Congress regarding agreements under negotiation. Congress retains the right to withdraw the application of 

trade authorities procedures to an agreement or agreements in the 

event the President fails to consult as required. 

Trade authorities procedures for trade agreement implementing 

legislation were last enacted in 2002 and extended in 2005 with respect to agreements entered into before July 1, 2007. It is expected 

that the present extension of trade authorities procedures will 

guide the President’s efforts to conclude a free trade agreement 

with the Trans-Pacific Partnership countries, a free trade agreement with the European Union, agreements entered into under the 

auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), agreements with 

respect to the international trade in services and with respect to 

environmental goods entered into with WTO members, as well as 

other agreements entered into under the auspices of the WTO and 

efforts to conclude additional agreements the President may identify during the period covered by the bill. 

III. GENERAL EXPLANATION 

A. BACKGROUND

Article I, section 8, clause 2 of the Constitution grants the power 

to regulate foreign commerce to Congress. Congress has historically 

exercised that power through legislation regulating imports of 

goods, services, and investment into the United States. For the 

first 145 years of the Republic, Congress exercised its power over 


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trade policy by setting tariffs directly through frequent enactment 

of tariff acts, establishing in detail duty rates for individual imports. 

The high tariffs enacted in the Trade Act of 1930 (the SmootHawley tariff) and the deepening economic depression of the early 

1930s, however, led Congress to establish new tariff-setting roles 

for the legislative and executive branches. Under the Reciprocal 

Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (P.L. 73–316), Congress authorized 

the President to negotiate reciprocal reductions of tariffs, within a 

limited range and time period, and to implement them by proclamation without the need for implementing legislation. 

Under the Trade Agreements Program initiated by Secretary of 

State Cordell Hull under authority of the 1934 Act, the United 

States negotiated selective reciprocal tariff agreements with many 

countries prior to, and during, World War II. Following the war 

and for the next several decades, Congress extended the President’s 

tariff-cutting authority a number of times. Under this authority, 

the President negotiated reductions in tariff levels multilaterally in 

five rounds under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT) and afterward proclaimed the lower tariffs under the authority Congress had delegated. 

The sixth round of multilateral trade negotiations, called the 

Kennedy Round (1964–67), involved negotiations on nontariff as 

well as tariff barriers. Congress had extended presidential tariffcutting authority for the Kennedy Round under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87–794). That authority did not include negotiation of nontariff barriers. Nonetheless, the Administration negotiated agreements that involved two nontariff barriers: (1) the 

American Selling Price (ASP), which was a relatively high U.S. import valuation based on domestic producer prices that primarily 

protected the U.S. chemical industry; and (2) a code, or set of rules, 

on antidumping. Although the 1962 Act, like the 1934 Act, authorized the President to negotiate a reduction of ‘‘any existing duty or 

other import restriction,’’ the view in Congress was that by entering into the antidumping agreement, the President had overstepped his delegated power. Congress subsequently did not enact 

legislation to implement the agreements with respect to the two 

nontariff barriers. 

The decision by Congress not to approve the nontariff commitments made by the President posed a dilemma in terms of the implementation of any agreement that called for reciprocal reductions 

in nontariff measures. Consistent with its constitutional responsibilities, Congress could not delegate authority to the President to 

revise U.S. domestic law by proclamation in the manner it had delegated the authority to proclaim changes in tariffs. At the same 

time, Congress recognized that the President, as a practical matter, 

might be unable to conclude future trade agreements unless he 

could assure U.S. trading partners that the agreement would be 

considered in a timely manner and would not be amended by Congress after the fact. 

In the early 1970s, in anticipation of a seventh round of multilateral negotiations that was to include nontariff barriers, Congress 

considered a new type of negotiating authority to grant the President proclamation authority for nontariff barriers much like the 

previously granted authority for tariffs. The proposed legislation 


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would have allowed the President to reach a nontariff agreement, 

submit it to Congress, and unless Congress legislatively disapproved the agreement, the President would put the changes into 

effect by proclamation. There would be no need for implementing 

legislation. Legislation granting the President nontariff proclamation authority was passed by the House but stopped in the Senate. 

In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress enacted procedures that, in 

its view, properly balanced the objectives of enabling the President 

to negotiate reciprocal reductions of nontariff barriers while maintaining Congressional authority over changes to U.S. law. These 

procedures came to be known as the ‘‘fast track,’’ and more recently 

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), procedures for the consideration 

of legislation implementing trade agreements. The procedures were 

designed to preserve Congress’ constitutional role in the regulation 

of foreign commerce, while offering the President and U.S. trading 

partners the assurance that a trade agreement requiring changes 

in U.S. law would receive an up-or-down vote within a time certain 

when brought before Congress. 

In order for a trade agreement to qualify for these procedures, 

Congress required that the President would have to consult with 

the appropriate congressional committees before and during the negotiation of the agreement and to give notice to Congress at least 

90 days before entering into the agreement. The President was also 

required to submit implementing legislation, a statement of administrative actions to be taken to implement the agreement, and reasons why the agreement serves the interests of U.S. commerce. At 

the time, there was little, if any, controversy about the procedures 

Congress had created; to the contrary, the commonly held view was 

that Congress had achieved an enlarged role in trade negotiations 

by imposing consultation and notification requirements. 

Congress has preserved the basic structure of the Trade Act of 

1974 each time it has renewed the procedures for the consideration 

of trade agreements. These provisions are contained in Sections 

151–154 of the 1974 Act, as amended. The trade agreement approval procedures under the 1974 Act are not subject to sunset provisions, but Congress must periodically reauthorize the President 

to negotiate agreements that will qualify for the procedures. Over 

the years, Congress has periodically renewed and revised the procedures. 

The negotiating authority in the 1974 Act enabled the Administration to negotiate the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1974–79) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT). After the Tokyo Round was completed, this Committee 

took the position that Congress should have an active role in drafting the legislation to implement the agreement. The result was 

that the Committee considered a draft of the implementing bill 

through a ‘‘mock’’ legislative process, with committee consideration, 

amendments, and conference committee. The President then submitted final legislation to Congress based on the results of the 

‘‘mock’’ legislative process. Although not formally outlined in any 

document, the executive and legislative branches thus agreed on a 

process that allowed congressional involvement in crafting legislation that would eventually be formally considered under expedited 

procedures. The so-called ‘‘mock-markup’’ process continues to this 

day. 


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In the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (P.L. 96–39), the procedures for the consideration of trade agreements were renewed for 

eight years. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (P.L. 98–573) amended the 1974 Act by providing for the negotiation of bilateral free 

trade agreements (FTAs). Agreements were subsequently negotiated with Israel and Canada. 

The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 extended 

the procedures for the consideration of trade agreements for an additional five years, during which time legislation to implement the 

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 was enacted. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under 

the GATT, launched in 1986, was concluded after an extension to 

the 1988 Act, and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103– 

465) was enacted under the authority of 1988 Act. 

The launch of the Doha Round of World Trade Organization 

(WTO) negotiations in November 2001, and the Bush Administration’s interest in bilateral FTA negotiations, including with Chile 

and Singapore, led to the enactment of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 on August 6, 2002 (P.L. 107–210). 

Authority provided under this Act was used to implement eleven 

FTA implementing bills, including with respect to FTAs with Chile 

(2003), Singapore (2003), Australia (2004), Morocco (2004), the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement 

(CAFTA–DR) countries (2005), Bahrain (2006), and Oman (2006). 

FTAs with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea were concluded prior to the expiration of the 2002 authorities on July 1, 

2007, and legislation to implement these FTAs was enacted for 

Peru in 2008 and Colombia, Panama and South Korea in 2011. Negotiations for the WTO Doha Round have not yielded an agreement 

requiring congressional action. 

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 

Act of 2015 (S.995) is being considered for the ongoing negotiations 

of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T–TIP) being negotiated 

with the European Union (EU), the Trade in Services Agreement 

(TISA) being negotiated with certain members of the WTO seeking 

to expand the scope of the WTO Trade in Services Agreement 

(GATS), and an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) being negotiated with certain members of the WTO. It may also be used to 

implement any agreement resulting from the WTO Doha Round of 

negotiations, or any other trade negotiations concluded by the 

President before July 1, 2018 or July 1, 2021 if no extension disapproval resolution is adopted. Trade authorities procedures would 

also apply to additional trade negotiations that may begin after approval of this Act but have not yet been notified to Congress. 

The TPP is a proposed regional free trade agreement being negotiated among the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 

Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. U.S. negotiators describe the TPP as a ‘‘comprehensive and 

high-standard’’ FTA that aims to liberalize trade in nearly all 

goods, including agriculture, and services and contain rules-based 

commitments beyond those currently established in the World 

Trade Organization (WTO). The negotiations have been underway 

since 2010, and a broad outline of an agreement was announced in 

November 2011. If concluded as envisioned, the TPP potentially 


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could significantly reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and 

investment among the parties and could serve as a template for a 

future trade pact among Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum 

(APEC) members and potentially other countries. 

The T–TIP is a proposed ‘‘comprehensive and high-standard’’ 

FTA being negotiated between the United States and the European 

Union (EU). Formal negotiations commenced in July 2013. The 

United States and the EU seek to enhance trade and market access 

by addressing remaining transatlantic barriers to trade and investment in goods and services, while seeking to establish new rulesbased commitments and to address nontariff regulatory barriers. 

TISA is a proposed sectoral trade agreement among 23 countries, 

including the EU, launched in April 2013. It seeks to expand commitments to the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services 

(GATS). While this negotiation is not being conducted under the 

auspices of the WTO, it may be incorporated into the GATS in the 

future. 

The Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) is a proposed sectoral trade agreement which was announced in January 2014 by 14 

countries, including the United States, representing 86% of global 

trade in goods such as wind turbines, solar panels or advanced batteries. The talks are expected to be handled as an open plurilateral, 

i.e., the agreed tariff reduction or elimination would be applied on 

a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis to all WTO members, similar to 

the 1996 WTO Information Technology Agreement. 

B. ACTION IN COMMITTEE

1. Hearings 

On January 22, 2015 the Committee held a hearing on Jobs and 

a Healthy Economy which discussed the important role of international trade in creating and sustaining a healthy U.S. economy 

as well as the need to renew Trade Promotion Authority. On January 27, 2015 the Committee discussed the role of Trade Promotion 

Authority in advancing America’s international trade agenda during a hearing with United States Trade Representative Michael 

Froman on President Obama’s 2015 Trade Policy Agenda. 

On April 16 and 21, 2015, the Committee held a hearing entitled 

Congress and U.S. Tariff Policy which included robust discussion 

on the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015. On April 16, 2015, the Committee heard testimony from Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, and United States Trade Representative Michael Froman. On April 21, 2015, the Committee heard testimony 

from Thomas Donahue, President and Chief Executive Officer of 

the United States Chamber of Commerce, and Richard Trumka, 

President of the AFL–CIO. 

In general, witnesses expressed support for creating high-quality 

jobs and expanding opportunities for American businesses through 

increased U.S. trade taking advantage of U.S.-led trade agreements. Witnesses stated that increasing access to foreign markets 

for U.S. exports through enhanced trade opportunities should be a 

priority for the United States. Witnesses also noted that U.S. trade 

supports good jobs, spurs growth, and strengthens the American 

middle class, while sustaining American strength and influence 


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abroad. The witnesses generally agreed that Trade Promotion Authority is a critical tool for achieving those objectives, and that 

there is a need to update Trade Promotion Authority since it was 

last enacted in 2002. One witness expressed a view in favor of an 

approach to trade and globalization based on including labor and 

environmental provisions that go beyond those found in recent U.S. 

FTAs., elimination of investor-state dispute settlement, and requiring enforceable currency provisions in trade agreements. The witness also favored changes to the process for considering trade 

agreements, including changes to rules on transparency, restrictions on expedited procedures for the consideration of bills implementing trade agreements, and other policies such as enforcement. 

Another witness noted that while the U.S. market is largely open 

to imports from around the world, foreign governments continue to 

maintain tariffs on U.S. exports that in some cases are quite high, 

and often erect other kinds of barriers against U.S. goods and services. The need for U.S. trade agreements to address these barriers 

and establish U.S.-led rules for international trade was agreed on 

by the witnesses. 

2. Consideration of Legislation 

On April 16, 2015, S. 995 was read twice and referred to the 

Committee on Finance. The Committee held a meeting to consider 

the bill on April 22, 2015. A motion to report the bill as amended 

was approved by a vote of 20 to 6. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 

Section 1. Short title 

The short title of the bill is the ‘‘Bipartisan Congressional Trade 

Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015.’’ 

Section 2. Trade negotiating objectives 

Summary 

Section 2 of the bill sets forth the objectives, policies, and priorities of the United States in negotiating trade agreements. In order 

for legislation implementing a trade agreement to qualify for consideration under the trade authorities procedures set forth in section 3 of the bill, the President must state that the agreement 

makes progress in achieving the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of the bill. Further, these purposes, policies, 

priorities, and objectives should serve as the basis for consultations 

between the President and Congress during the course of an agreement’s negotiation. 

Section 2 is organized into three subsections defining the trade 

negotiating positions of the United States. Subsection (a) addresses 

overall objectives—that is, goals that cut across sectors and issue 

areas. Subsection (b) addresses objectives that are specific to particular sectors, such as goods, services, and agriculture, and particular issue areas, such as investment, intellectual property, digital trade in goods and services, the intersection between trade and 

core labor standards and trade and the environment, and currency 

practices. Subsection (c) addresses capacity building and other priorities that may have a bearing on the international trade of the 


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United States and should be pursued in parallel to trade negotiations. 

It is the expectation of the Committee that in affirming that a 

trade agreement makes progress toward achieving the applicable 

purposes, policies, priorities and objectives of this bill, the President will address the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives in 

each of the subsections of section 2. 

Section 2(a). Overall trade negotiating objectives 

Section 2(a) identifies twelve overall trade negotiating objectives, 

as follows: • Obtaining more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access; • Obtaining the reduction or elimination of barriers related 

to trade and investment and other trade-distorting policies and 

practices; • Further strengthening the system of international trade 

and investment disciplines and procedures, including dispute 

settlement; • Fostering economic growth, raising living standards, enhancing the competitiveness of the United States, promoting 

full employment in the United States, and enhancing the global economy; • Ensuring that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive, and seeking to protect and preserve the environment and enhance the international means of doing so, 

while optimizing the use of the world’s resources; • Promoting respect for worker rights and the rights of children, consistent with core labor standards as defined in section 

11(7) of the bill; • Seeking provisions in trade agreement under which parties 

to those agreements ensure that they do not weaken or reduce 

protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws 

in order to gain trade advantages; 

• Ensuring that trade agreements afford small businesses 

equal access to international markets, equitable trade benefits, 

and expanded export opportunities, and provide for the elimination of barriers that affect small businesses disproportionately; 

• Promoting universal ratification and full compliance with 

ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 

Labor; 

• Ensuring that trade agreements reflect and facilitate the 

interrelated, multi-sectoral nature of trade and investment; 

• Recognizing the significance of the Internet as a trading 

platform in international commerce; and 

• Taking into account other legitimate U.S. domestic objectives, including the protection of legitimate health or safety, essential security, and consumer interests and the law and regulations related thereto. 

These overall objectives have been updated to reflect the central 

importance of trade agreements in expanding U.S. access to foreign 

markets, strengthening the international trading system, and fostering growth and full employment in the United States, while 


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making clear that trade agreements can and should be consistent 

with other priorities, such as protecting the environment, the 

rights of workers, and legitimate domestic regulatory objectives 

such as protecting health or safety and consumer interests. In addition, a new overall negotiating objective recognizing the significance of the Internet as a trading platform in international commerce makes clear that as negotiators seek to expand trading opportunities for U.S. producers of goods and services, they should be 

mindful of new opportunities and barriers arising from technological advances. This bill provides numerous related provisions 

that facilitate continued growth of digital trade, which includes 

both trade in digital goods and services and Internet-enabled trade 

in goods and services. 

Section 2(b). Principal trade negotiating objectives 

Section 2(b) sets forth 20 objectives that are sector- or issue-specific, as follows: 

1. Trade in goods 

The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade in goods are: • To expand competitive market opportunities for exports of 

goods from the United States and to obtain fairer and more 

open conditions of trade, including through the utilization of 

global value chains, by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities for U.S. exports and distort U.S. trade, and • To obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier elimination 

agreements, including with respect to products covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. 

The negotiating objectives in section 2(b)(1) apply to goods exports of the United States, and direct U.S. negotiators to seek to 

reduce or eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. products. 

Goods exports of the United States continue to be subject to often 

high duties at the borders of U.S. trading partners. The language 

directs the reduction or elimination of tariff barriers. The negotiating objectives also apply to nontariff barriers that restrict the export of U.S. goods. Nontariff barriers to U.S. exports are applied 

both at the border, such as quantitative restrictions and import licensing requirements, and behind the border, such as discriminatory trade-related regulations, standards, or conformity assessment 

procedures. The objective is directed at policies and practices, as 

well as formal statutes and regulations. The Committee recognizes 

that some of the most onerous foreign trade barriers faced by U.S. 

exporters consist of informal policies and practices that may not be 

as easy to identify as a written law that violates an international 

trade obligation. 

Section 2(b)(1)(B) directs the President to continue to seek the 

elimination of duties on a reciprocal basis, including for products 

covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. 

It is the Committee’s intention that the President pay particular 

attention to the elimination of tariffs on these products, which 

could result in substantial benefits to U.S. industry and workers. 

For many of these products, U.S. producers remain at a significant 


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competitive disadvantage. In other sectors, tariff inequities are aggravated by tariff escalation, which occurs when a country establishes low or zero tariffs for raw materials but maintains relatively 

high tariffs for processed products. The Committee intends that the 

Administration pursue ending such practices for the sectors covered by the proclamation authority provided in section 111(b) of the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act. 

The Committee intends this negotiating objective, in combination 

with other negotiating objectives, to support improvements in trade 

facilitation. Trade facilitation is critical to creating and sustaining 

a healthy U.S. economy. Thus, this negotiating objective is intended to be read consistently with the overall negotiating objective 

to ensure that trade agreements reflect the increasingly interrelated and multi-sectoral nature of trade and investment activity, 

and the negotiating objectives regarding capacity building, specifically relating to customs and trade facilitation. 

2. Trade in services 

Section 2(b)(2) reflects the view of this Committee that trade 

agreements should be structured to expand U.S. services trade substantially. Cross-border services exports now exceed $500 billion 

annually, generating large, consistent, trade surpluses in the sector. Yet cross-border U.S. services exports continue to comprise less 

than 15 percent of total U.S. exports, and the United States exports a much lower percentage of its overall services production 

than of its goods production. This Committee intends the parallelism between the objectives regarding trade in services and the 

objectives regarding trade in goods to signal the importance of expanding U.S. services exports as well, in the manner described in 

the bill. 

The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding trade in services is to expand opportunities for U.S. services 

and obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade, including 

through utilization of global value chains, by reducing or eliminating regulatory and other barriers that deny national treatment 

and market access or unreasonably restrict the establishment or 

operations of service suppliers. 

Section 2(b)(2)(B) recognizes for the first time that the expansion 

of services opportunities generates benefits for all sectors of the 

economy and facilitates trade. Section 2(b)(2)(B) also encourages 

the pursuit of this objective through all means, including through 

a plurilateral agreement with countries that are willing and able 

to undertake high standard services commitments for both existing 

and new services. It is the view of the Committee that the United 

States should not agree to the inclusion of any party in the Trade 

in Services Agreement unless that party has demonstrated a commitment to meeting the high standards of the agreement in a timely manner. It is also the view of the Committee that the Trade in 

Services Agreement not be delayed, and that the negotiations move 

forward only with parties willing and able to meet the negotiations’ 

ambitious objectives. 

The Committee notes that there are four modes of trade in services: (1) delivery of a service from the territory of one country into 

the territory of other country; (2) supply of a service of one country 

to the service consumer of any other country; (3) services provided 


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by a service supplier of one country in the territory of any other 

country, and (4) services provided by a service supplier of one country through the presence of natural persons in the territory of any 

other country. 

Congress has long held that trade agreements are not an appropriate vehicle for enacting immigration-related law or modifying 

immigration policy. Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution 

gives Congress the power to ‘‘establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,’’ and the Supreme Court has long found that this provision of the Constitution grants Congress plenary power over immigration policy. For many years, Congress has made it abundantly 

clear that international trade agreements should not change, nor 

require any change, to U.S. immigration law and practice. For example, in July 2003 the Senate unanimously passed a resolution 

(S. Res. 211) stating that: 

(1) trade agreements are not the appropriate vehicle for enacting immigration-related laws or modifying current immigration policy; and 

(2) future trade agreements to which the United States is a 

party and the legislation implementing the agreements should 

not contain immigration-related provisions. 

The Committee continues to believe that it is not appropriate to 

negotiate in a trade agreement any provision that would (1) require 

changes to U.S. immigration law, regulations, policy, or practice; 

(2) accord immigration-related benefits to parties to trade agreements; (3) commit the United States to keep unchanged, with respect to nationals of parties to trade agreements, one or more existing provisions of U.S. immigration law, policy, or practice; or (4) expand to additional countries immigration-related commitments already made by the United States in earlier trade agreements. 

3. Trade in agriculture 

The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to agriculture is to obtain competitive market access opportunities for U.S. agricultural exports substantially equivalent to opportunities afforded foreign exports in U.S. markets and to achieve 

fairer and more open conditions of trade by: 

• Securing more open and equitable market access through 

robust rules on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures 

that encourage the adoption of international standards and require a science-based justification for SPS measures, improving 

regulatory coherence, requiring that SPS measures are transparently developed and implemented, and based on risk assessments that take into account relevant international guidelines 

and scientific data, and are not more restrictive on trade than 

necessary, while recognizing that countries may protect 

human, animal, or plant life or health in a manner consistent 

with their international obligations; 

• Reducing or eliminating tariffs that decrease market opportunities for U.S. exports, while providing adjustment periods for U.S. import-sensitive products; 

• Reducing tariffs to levels that are the same as or lower 

than those in the United States; 

• Reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease market 

opportunities for U.S. exports; 


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• Preserving non-trade distorting programs that support 

family farms and rural communities; • Eliminating government policies that create price depressing surpluses; • Eliminating state trading enterprises; • Establishing and strengthening rules, subject to dispute 

settlement, that decrease U.S. market access opportunities or 

distort agricultural markets, including: trade distorting activities of state trading enterprises; unjustified trade restrictions 

or commercial requirements, such as labeling, that affect new 

technologies, including biotechnology; unjustified sanitary or 

phytosanitary restrictions, including restrictions not based on 

scientific principles; other unjustified technical barriers to 

trade; and restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate 

quotas; • Eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in perishable or cyclical products; • Ensuring that import relief mechanisms for perishable and 

cyclical agriculture are as accessible and timely to growers in 

the United States as those mechanisms that are used by other 

countries; • Taking into account whether a party to the negotiations 

has failed to adhere to existing obligations; • Taking into account whether a product is subject to market distortions by reason of a failure of a major producing 

country to adhere to existing obligations; • Ensuring that countries that accede to the World Trade 

Organization have made meaningful market liberalization commitments in agriculture; • Taking into account the impact that agreements covering 

agriculture to which the United States is a party is having on 

U.S. agriculture; • Maintaining bona fide food assistance programs, market 

development programs, and export credit programs; 

• Securing the broadest market access possible in multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations, while recognizing the 

effect that negotiations in multiple fora may have on United 

States import sensitive commodities; 

• Seeking to develop an international consensus on the 

treatment of seasonal or perishable agricultural products in investigations relating to dumping and safeguards; 

• Seeking to establish the common base year for calculating 

the Aggregated Measurement of Support, as defined in the 

Agreement on Agriculture; 

• Ensuring transparency in the administration of tariff rate 

quotas; and 

• Eliminating and preventing the undermining of market access for United States products through improper use of a 

country’s system for protecting or recognizing geographical indications. 

The Committee recognizes that since the last enactment of Trade 

Promotion Authority in 2002, the nature of barriers to U.S. agricultural trade has continued to evolve. Advanced developing countries, 

such as Brazil, China, and India, have significantly increased their 

use of agricultural subsidies since 2002. Domestic support in many 


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advanced developing countries is now higher than domestic support 

levels in many developed countries. In many cases, domestic support provided by advanced developing countries appears to exceed 

domestic support limits established under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture. It is particularly important for the United States to press advanced developing countries 

to make domestic support programs transparent, including through 

complete and timely WTO notifications; to enforce agreed upon limits on domestic support, including the establishment of the common 

base year for calculating Aggregated Measurement of Support 

under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture as the end of each country’s Uruguay Round implementation period, as reported in each 

country’s Uruguay Round market access schedule; and to develop 

meaningful disciplines on the use of market-distorting domestic 

support by advanced developing countries. 

Barriers imposed through the improper use of Sanitary and 

Phytosanitary (SPS) barriers remains one of the most significant 

disruptions to U.S. agricultural exports. While the Committee recognizes that SPS measures may be used to address legitimate 

health and safety concerns, these measures must not be used as 

disguised barriers to trade. It is the expectation of the Committee 

that U.S. trade agreements to be considered under trade authorities procedures will achieve stronger rules on SPS measures than 

those contained in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and that the SPS chapters of 

U.S. trade agreements will be subject to the same enforcement procedures and remedies as other enforceable chapters of the trade 

agreement. 

United States agricultural producers also face increasing use of 

regulatory restrictions, and political interference with science-based 

regulatory decisions, that impede the trade of innovative agricultural products, including biotechnology. The United States is the 

world’s leader in research and development of innovative, safe technologies, but trade in these products is routinely being disrupted 

through the delay or denial of approvals, particularly in Europe 

and China. The Committee expects that U.S. negotiators will ensure that foreign regulatory approval processes are not used to prevent, deny, delay, or reduce foreign market access to U.S. agriculture exports with biotechnology traits, and the bill contains several negotiating objectives aimed at preventing foreign regulatory 

approval processes from being used as a trade barrier to new agriculture technologies. In particular, the Committee references the 

objectives in section 2(b)(1)(A); section 2(b)(3)(A)(i), 2(b)(3)(A)(ii), 

2(b)(3)(A)(iv), 2(b)(3)(I)(ii), and 2(b)(3)(I)(iv); section 2(b)(5)(A)(iii), 

and 2(b)(5)(B); and section 2(b)(7)(G). 

The Committee also recognizes the significance of the barriers 

imposed on U.S. agricultural producers by the misuse of systems 

of protection for geographical indications (GIs). Production of U.S. 

specialty agricultural products using common food names continues 

to grow at a significant rate. The continued growth in exports of 

these high value-added agricultural products represents a major 

opportunity for U.S producers. While reasonable rules for identifying and protecting GIs are appropriate and have benefits, certain 

trading partners misuse their systems of GI protection to discriminate against U.S. products by, for example, employing a registraVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:16 May 19, 2015 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR042.XXX SR042

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tion process lacking in transparency or procedural fairness that results in the improper protection of generic terms. The bill directs 

U.S. negotiators to seek to eliminate or prevent such practices. The 

Committee also intends for this section to reflect the importance 

the Congress has placed on this issue, including in ensuring continued use of semi-generic terms as codified in 26 U.S.C. 5388(c). 

Lastly, the Committee also seeks to prevent further attempts to expand systems for protection of GIs to include terms commonly used 

as descriptors by claiming such terms are to be protected as traditional specialty or traditional quality terms. 

4. Foreign investment 

The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign investment are to reduce barriers to foreign investment, 

while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not 

accorded greater substantive rights than U.S. investors in the 

United States, and to secure for U.S. investors rights comparable 

to those available in the United States, including by: 

• Reducing or eliminating exceptions to national treatment; 

• Freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments; 

• Reducing or eliminating performance requirements, forced 

technology transfers, and other unreasonable barriers to investment; 

• Establishing standards for expropriation and compensation 

for expropriation, consistent with U.S. legal principles and 

practice; 

• Establishing standards for fair and equitable treatment, 

consistent with U.S. legal principles and practice, including the 

principle of due process; 

• Providing meaningful procedures for resolving disputes; 

• Improving investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms 

through procedures to eliminate and deter frivolous claims, ensure the efficient selection of arbitrators and the expeditious 

disposition of claims, enhance public input, and provide coherence to the interpretation of investment provisions through an 

appellate body or similar mechanism; and 

• Ensuring the fullest measure of transparency in investorstate dispute settlement mechanisms, to the extent consistent 

with the need to protect information that is classified or business confidential. 

The Committee recognizes that U.S. law provides a high level of 

protection for U.S. and foreign investors in the United States, but 

that U.S. investors in foreign jurisdictions often do not receive the 

same level of basic protections available in the United States. The 

lack of adequate legal protections for U.S. investors is a significant 

barrier to U.S. exports. Foreign investment by U.S. companies 

spurs U.S. exports, as over 48 percent of U.S. large company exports are exports to foreign affiliates. Moreover, U.S. parent firms 

export more goods and services to their foreign affiliates than foreign affiliates export to the United States, thus improving the U.S. 

balance of trade. In order for these beneficial effects of foreign investment to continue, it is important that U.S. investors abroad receive legal protections similar to what U.S. and foreign investors 

receive in the United States. 


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The negotiating objectives therefore direct U.S. negotiators to secure for U.S. investors rights comparable to those available in the 

United States. This includes protections against discriminatory 

treatment, similar to the guarantees set out in the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution; fair and equitable treatment, 

similar to the protection against arbitrary and capricious treatment 

in the Administrative Procedures Act; and against uncompensated 

expropriations, similar to U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of 

the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 

Recent investment treaties and trade agreements of the United 

States include a number of important clarifications to ensure that 

the rights afforded to investors under those agreements do not go 

beyond those available under U.S. law. These provisions include an 

annex clarifying the standard for indirect expropriation to ensure 

consistency with U.S. law, and a provision clarifying the minimum 

standard of treatment to ensure that arbitral decisions reflect U.S. 

legal principles and practice. The Committee regards all of these 

provisions as important for ensuring investor-state obligations remain comparable to U.S. law. 

Additionally, investment treaties and trade agreements of the 

United States now provide more detailed guidance for both parties 

and tribunals with regard to procedural and other matters not included in earlier U.S. investment treaties, including the expedited 

review of claims, rules on frivolous claims, participation of non-disputing third parties in the arbitration, a statute of limitations, and 

consolidation of related claims. The 2012 Model BIT and recent 

FTAs also formalized the transparency and openness of arbitral 

proceedings. The Committee believes these provisions help ensure 

that investor-state dispute settlement meets high standards of due 

process and transparency. 

The United States has concluded bilateral investment agreements with more than fifty countries. For the past thirty years, 

those agreements have typically included provisions establishing a 

mechanism through which neutral arbitrators resolve disputes between investors and governments relating to government measures 

that violate the provisions of U.S. investment agreements. It is the 

Committee’s view that it is a priority for negotiators to seek agreements that protect the rights of U.S. investors equally abroad, 

without product discrimination, while ensuring all U.S. investors 

the existence of an effective investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. 

Where such agreements include a mechanism for investors to 

seek redress through investor state dispute settlement, it is also 

the Committee’s view that this mechanism should not impinge on 

the ability of governments to regulate in the public interest. The 

Committee believes that current U.S. investment agreements do 

not restrict the ability of government to regulate in the public interest. The Committee also believes the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral 

Investment Treaty serves as a strong basis for the negotiation of 

provisions to deter frivolous challenges to legitimate public interest 

measures, to ensure independent and impartial arbitration, and to 

ensure high levels of transparency. 

In recognition of the particular importance the Committee places 

on ensuring that U.S. sovereignty is not impinged upon by U.S. 

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tor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, the bill for the first time 

includes a section setting out Congressional direction on sovereignty (see section 8, below). This section makes clear that no 

government can be compelled to change its law due to an adverse 

finding by an arbitration tribunal. The Committee notes that the 

United States has never lost a case. 

5. Intellectual property 

The principal negotiating objectives regarding intellectual property are to further promote adequate and effective protection for intellectual property rights through: • ensuring full implementation of the WTO Agreement on 

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), particularly with respect to the enforcement obligations; • ensuring that provisions of any trade agreement governing 

intellectual property rights reflect a standard of protection 

similar to that found in U.S. law; • providing strong protection for new technologies and methods of transmitting and distributing intellectual property, including in a manner that facilitates legitimate digital trade; • preventing or eliminating discrimination regarding intellectual property rights; • ensuring standards of protection and enforcement keep 

pace with technological developments, and in particular ensuring that rights holders have the legal and technological means 

to control the use of their works through the Internet and prevent the unauthorized use of their works; • providing strong enforcement of intellectual property 

rights; • and preventing or eliminating government involvement in 

the violation of intellectual property rights, including through 

cybertheft and piracy. 

The principal negotiating objectives also include securing fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market access opportunities for U.S. 

persons that rely upon intellectual property protection, as well as 

respecting the 2001 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and ensuring that trade agreements foster innovation 

and promote access to medicines. 

Protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) is critical to the 

U.S. economy, jobs, national security, and the health and safety of 

the American people. Much of the U.S. economy relies on some 

form of IPR because virtually every industry either produces or 

uses it. IPR infringement causes significant financial losses for U.S. 

right holders and businesses around the world. It undermines U.S. 

innovation and creativity, hurting U.S. economic competitiveness to 

the detriment of American businesses and workers. IPR infringement also endangers the public and harms national security, as 

counterfeit products may pose significant risks to consumer health 

and safety. 

For these reasons, the principal negotiating objective directs negotiators to ensure that all countries provide adequate and effective 

protection and enforcement of IPR. Intellectual property enforcement, however, remains inadequate in many countries around the 

world. The rates of counterfeiting and piracy in much of the world 

remain alarmingly high. The Committee, therefore, directs U.S. neVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:16 May 19, 2015 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR042.XXX SR042

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gotiators to ensure U.S. trading partners provide strong enforcement of intellectual property rights. 

In addition to more traditional forms of IPR infringement, such 

as sales of counterfeit and pirated goods by street vendors or in 

other physical markets, the increased availability of broadband 

Internet connections around the world has fueled the market for 

IPR infringing products online. To help address the challenges to 

IPR protection and enforcement related to the Internet, U.S. negotiators should ensure standards of protection and enforcement keep 

pace with technological developments, and in particular ensure 

that right holders have the legal and technological means to control 

the use of their works through the Internet and to prevent unauthorized use of their works. 

Inadequate protection for trade secrets and trade secret theft are 

increasing problems around the world. A trade secret is often 

among a company’s core business assets, and protection of its trade 

secret is essential for that company’s ability to compete. Trade secret theft, including industrial and economic espionage, imposes 

significant costs on the U.S. economy, weakens U.S. competitiveness, puts U.S. jobs at risk, and threatens national security. For 

these reasons, the Committee is concerned about inadequate protection for trade secrets and the rise in trade secret theft by U.S. 

trading partners. 

The Committee updated the intellectual property rights negotiating objectives to address the concern of trade secret theft by governments, directing U.S. negotiators to prevent or eliminate government theft of intellectual property rights, such as trade secret 

theft, including through cyber theft. 

The updated negotiating objective to prevent or eliminate government theft of intellectual property rights is also intended to direct 

U.S. negotiators to address another problem faced by U.S. right 

holders, which is foreign governments’ continued use of pirated 

software. U.S. negotiators should ensure foreign governments do 

not use unauthorized software. The Committee has updated section 

(5)(A)(ii) to emphasize the critical importance of including in U.S. 

trade agreements IP provisions that facilitate legitimate digital 

trade. In particular, this section reflects the view of the Committee 

that U.S. trade agreements should contain copyright provisions 

that provide adequate and effective protection for U.S. right holders as well as foster an appropriate balance in copyright systems, 

inter alia by means of limitations and exceptions consistent with 

the internationally recognized 3-step test. 

Adequate and effective intellectual property protection is critical 

to provide the incentives necessary for is critical to provide the incentives necessary for the development and marketing of new 

medicines, including biologics. Without these innovative medicines, 

the market for generic medicines would not exist. U.S. negotiators 

must, therefore, ensure that trade agreements foster innovation so 

that patients around the world can benefit from access to lifesaving 

medicines. Strong regulatory data protection is a key factor to 

incentivize research and investment in biologics. Thus achieving 

terms of regulatory data protection similar to those found in U.S. 

law should continue to be a high priority for U.S. trade negotiators. 

The existence of a robust generic market increases the affordability 

of medicines. U.S. negotiators should promote access to innovative 


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and generic medicines by addressing the market access barriers 

faced by U.S. producers of medicines, including those market access 

barriers that are discriminatory and non-transparent. 

While the TRIPS Agreement was an important milestone in the 

effort to raise standards of IPR protection and enforcement around 

the world, TRIPS provides only minimum standards. Nearly 20 

years after the TRIPS Agreement came into force, all WTO member 

countries should at least meet the minimum standards for protection and enforcement of IPR provided by the TRIPS Agreement. 

U.S. negotiators must ensure that U.S. trading partners have fully 

implemented the TRIPS Agreement, particularly the enforcement 

obligations. 

This Committee further intends for U.S. negotiators to seek bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral agreements that include intellectual property provisions that go beyond the TRIPS Agreement and 

reflect a high standard of intellectual property protection similar to 

that found in U.S. law. 

Finally, the Committee notes that U.S. industries that rely on intellectual property protection continue to suffer from unnecessary 

and discriminatory market access barriers around the globe. U.S. 

negotiators must remain vigilant in their efforts to eliminate these 

barriers, since they stunt the growth of otherwise highly productive 

industries. 

6. Digital trade in goods and services 

The principal negotiating objectives for digital trade in goods and 

services and cross-border data flows are: 

• to ensure that current trade agreement obligations, rules, 

disciplines, and commitments apply to digital trade and crossborder data flows; 

• to ensure that electronically delivered goods and services 

are treated no less favorably than products delivered in physical form and classified so as to ensure the most liberal trade 

treatment possible; 

• to ensure that governments do not impede digital trade, 

restrict cross-border data flows, or require local storage or 

processing of data, and to ensure that domestic regulations required by legitimate policy objectives are the least restrictive 

on trade, non-discriminatory and transparent, and promote an 

open market environment; and 

• to extend the World Trade Organization moratorium on 

duties on electronic transmissions. 

Digital trade in goods and services and cross-border data flows 

continues to grow in importance to the U.S. economy. U.S. companies move data over the Internet to provide digital goods and services to consumers around the world, as well as to enhance competitiveness by increasing productivity, streamlining operations, and 

facilitating creativity and problem solving. It is, therefore, critical 

that U.S. negotiators ensure that all trade agreement obligations, 

rules, disciplines, and commitments apply to digital trade and cross 

border data flows, that digitally traded goods and services receive 

no less favorable treatment than comparable goods and services, 

and that they are classified to ensure the most liberal trade treatment possible. 


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U.S. companies depend on the free flow of data across borders to 

identify market opportunities, innovate and develop new goods and 

services, maintain supply chains, and serve their customers around 

the globe. Unfortunately, an increasing number of governments are 

considering or imposing restrictions on cross-border data flows or 

requirements to store and process data locally. This section directs 

negotiators to seek provisions in trade agreements to ensure that 

governments refrain from such restrictions and requirements, 

which are detrimental to all sectors of the economy, including the 

digital economy that is facilitated by the Internet. The Committee 

expects U.S. negotiators to pursue provisions that afford equal protection to all sectors, including financial services. 

7. Regulatory practices 

The principal negotiating objectives with regard to regulatory or 

other practices of foreign governments used to reduce market access for U.S. goods, services, and investments are: • to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for participation in the development of regulations; • to require proposed regulations be based on sound science, 

cost benefit analysis, risk assessment, or other objective evidence; • to improve regulatory practices and promote increased regulatory coherence; • to seek greater openness, transparency, and convergence of 

standards-development processes; • to promote regulatory compatibility through harmonization, equivalence, or mutual recognition and to encourage 

the use of global and interoperable standards, as appropriate; • to achieve the elimination of government measures such as 

price controls and reference pricing which deny full market access for United States products; • to ensure that government regulatory reimbursement regimes are transparent, provide procedural fairness, are nondiscriminatory, and provide full market access for U.S. products; and 

• to ensure that government collection of undisclosed proprietary information is limited to that necessary to satisfy a legitimate and justifiable regulatory interest and that such information is protected against disclosure. 

Foreign government regulatory practices may effectively constitute trade-distorting barriers that diminish or nullify negotiated 

trade agreement benefits. For example, market access for agricultural products accorded through tariff concessions may be substantially offset by non-scientifically based health and safety regulations that cause delay in getting the products to consumers. The 

problem of laws and regulations that act as disguised trade barriers is compounded when a government’s processes for making its 

laws and regulations are not open to public view and are not receptive to public input. 

While the world’s economies continue to grow more interconnected, trade flows are often disrupted by a myriad of regulations in multiple countries that may seek the same objectives and 

standard of protection, but are opaque, duplicative, or conflicting. 

Such confusing, duplicative, or incompatible regulations act as a 


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trade barrier, and impose significant and unnecessary costs on U.S. 

businesses and consumers. Accordingly, the Committee updated 

these negotiating objectives to direct U.S. negotiators to use a variety of means to improve regulatory practices and promote increased 

regulatory coherence, to improve international standards development processes, and to promote regulatory compatibility. 

There is an increasing consensus across the spectrum of U.S. industry that binding commitments to remove or lower trade barriers 

abroad can be nullified by decisions, either of national and regional 

governments or industry standard setting and accrediting bodies, 

that are taken as part of regulatory processes. It has also become 

clear to the Committee that regulatory reform encompasses three 

important prongs: (1) transparency, including the ability of all affected parties to participate in rule-making processes; (2) the need 

to ensure that regulations are fair and that they are applied without regard to the nationality of the industry or company affected 

by them; and (3) the need to expand cooperative activities to encourage regulatory harmonization, cooperation, and coherence. 

It is the Committee’s intent that each of these prongs should be 

pursued while maintaining the strong levels of protection embodied 

in U.S. law. To reflect this important concept, the legislation establishes an overall negotiating objective that ensures that the President continue to take into account legitimate United States domestic objectives, including, but not limited to, the protection of legitimate health or safety, essential security, and consumer interests. 

New provisions affirm that trade agreements cannot change U.S. 

law without Congressional action, nor prevent the United States 

from changing its law in the future, and confirm that U.S. law prevails in the event of a conflict. 

While it is taken for granted in the United States that government processes take place in the ‘‘sunshine’’, such is not the case 

in many other countries. Recent trade agreements have encouraged 

greater transparency and cooperation in regulatory processes, but 

the Committee believes that more needs to be done. It is imperative that U.S. stakeholders be given an opportunity for meaningful 

participation in the developing of regulations abroad. Thus, the 

Committee strongly urges USTR to pursue the negotiation of crosscutting transparency disciplines, particularly in the areas of services, digital trade, and government procurement. 

The Act also includes new and expanded provisions directing the 

administration to seek greater openness, transparency, and convergence of standards-development processes and encouraging the use 

of international and interoperable standards. Such concepts are 

particularly important for high-tech and innovative industries. 

The objectives on regulatory practices also direct U.S. negotiators 

to seek the elimination of price controls and reference pricing 

which deny full market access for United States products. Under 

these barriers, the government of an importing country restricts 

market access by arbitrarily limiting the prices at which particular 

products can be sold. Examples of measures covered under Section 

7(F) with regard to regulatory practices include the use by foreign 

governments of reference pricing classification systems for Customs 

valuation and other regulatory measures. 

The objectives were also updated to direct negotiators to ensure 

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parent, provide procedural fairness, are nondiscriminatory, and 

provide full market access for United States products. The sale of 

certain U.S. products, such as pharmaceuticals and medical devices, in foreign markets very often depends on regulatory reimbursement regimes, which decide whether these products can be 

listed for reimbursement and the amount of the reimbursement. It 

is critical that regulatory reimbursement regimes make these listing and pricing decisions in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner. 

It is also critical that these reimbursement regimes provide full 

market access for U.S. products, which includes setting the reimbursement amount based on competitive, market-derived pricing or 

an equivalent process, such as one that appropriately recognizes 

the value of a patented product and allows the product manufacturer to apply for an increased amount of reimbursement based on 

factors such as safety and efficacy. 

A growing problem around the world is foreign governments’ 

forcing the transfer of trade secrets and other technology from U.S. 

businesses. As a condition of doing business, some foreign governments require U.S. companies to provide them with unnecessary 

information, including trade secrets and other proprietary information. The foreign government will then steal the proprietary information to use it to compete against U.S. companies. Trade secrets 

are often among a company’s core assets and once they are stolen 

the impact can be devastating for the company and for future innovation. This type of trade secret theft threatens to diminish U.S. 

competitiveness around the globe, puts American jobs at risk, and 

poses threats to U.S. national security as well. This negotiating objective has been updated to reflect the importance of this threat by 

directing U.S. negotiators to ensure foreign governments collect 

only undisclosed proprietary information that is necessary to satisfy a legitimate and justifiable regulatory interest, and protect any 

information collected against disclosure. 

The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding regulation or other practices to reduce market access for United 

States goods, services, and investments, include ensuring that foreign governments: (i) demonstrate that the collection of undisclosed 

proprietary information is limited to that necessary to satisfy a legitimate and justifiable regulatory interest; and (ii) protect such information against disclosure, except in exceptional circumstances to 

protect the public, or where such information is effectively protected against unfair competition. Undisclosed proprietary information includes all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, 

technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, 

plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, 

methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, 

whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing. 

8. State-owned and state-controlled enterprises 

The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding competition by state-owned and state-controlled enterprises is 

to: 

• Eliminate or prevent trade distortions and unfair competition; and 


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• Ensure that the commercial activity of state-owned and 

state-controlled enterprises is based solely on commercial considerations. 

The negotiating objective specifically directs U.S. negotiators to 

seek disciplines in agreements that eliminate or prevent discrimination and market-distorting subsidies and that promote transparency. 

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 

Act of 2015 is the first time that U.S. negotiators have been directed to eliminate trade distortions and unfair competition by 

state-owned and state-controlled enterprises (SOEs) and ensure 

that they act based solely on commercial considerations. Since 

2002, SOEs have increasingly entered commercial markets. It is 

the view of the Committee that U.S. trade agreements should ensure private firms are not disadvantaged by the participation of 

SOEs in commercial markets and that governments do not unfairly 

favor SOEs, including through measures such as subsidies and 

preferential financing, and selective regulation or enforcement of 

laws. These disciplines should also address measures including licensing requirements and discriminatory tax treatment. 

9. Localization barriers to trade 

The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to localization barriers to trade is to eliminate and prevent 

measures that require U.S. producers and service providers to locate facilities, intellectual property, or other assets in a country as 

a market access or investment condition, including indigenous innovation measures. This new negotiating objective reflects the view 

of this Committee that localization barriers to trade are a major 

and increasing impediment to a level playing field for U.S. exporters of both goods and services, as well as investors. Forced localization of facilities, as described in this provision, includes, but is not 

limited to, forced localization of computer servers and, thus, relates 

to the objectives on digital trade in goods and services and crossborder data flows, which identify the need for disciplines on measures that require local storage or processing of data. 

10. Labor and the environment 

The principal negotiating objectives with respect to labor and the 

environment are: 

• To ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the 

United States adopts and maintains measures implementing 

internationally recognized core labor standards and its obligations under common multilateral environmental agreements in 

a manner affecting trade or investment between the United 

States and that party after entry into force of a trade agreement between those countries. 

• To ensure a party does not waive or otherwise derogate 

from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from its statutes 

or regulations implementing internationally recognized core 

labor standards, in a manner affecting trade or investment between the United States and that party, where the waiver or 

derogation would be inconsistent with one or more such standards, or its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or 

reduces the protections afforded in those laws and in a manner 


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affecting trade or investment between the United States and 

that party, except as provided in its law and provided not inconsistent with its obligations under common multilateral environmental agreements or other provisions of the trade agreement specifically agreed upon. • To ensure a party does not fail to effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring 

course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or investment between the United States and that party after entry 

into force of a trade agreement between those countries. • To recognize that, with respect to environment, parties to 

a trade agreement retain the right to exercise prosecutorial 

discretion and to make decisions regarding the allocation of enforcement resources with respect to other environmental laws 

determined to have higher priorities, and a party is effectively 

enforcing its laws if a course of action or inaction reflects a 

reasonable, bona fide exercise of such discretion, or results 

from a reasonable, bona fide decision regarding the allocation 

of resources. • To recognize that, with respect to labor, decisions regarding the distribution of enforcement resources are not a reason 

for not complying with a party’s labor obligations; a party to 

a trade agreement retains the right to reasonable exercise of 

discretion and to make bona fide decisions regarding the allocation of resources between labor enforcement activities among 

core labor standards, provided the exercise of such discretion 

and such decisions are not inconsistent with its obligations. • To strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards. • To strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to protect the environment through the promotion of sustainable development. • To reduce or eliminate government practices or policies 

that unduly threaten sustainable development. 

• To seek market access, through the elimination of tariffs 

and nontariff barriers, for United States environmental technologies, goods, and services. 

• To ensure that labor, environmental, health, or safety policies and practices of the parties to trade agreements with the 

United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate 

against United States exports or serve as disguised barriers to 

trade. 

• To ensure that enforceable labor and environment obligations are subject to the same dispute settlement and remedies 

as other enforceable obligations under the agreement. 

• To ensure that a trade agreement is not construed to empower a party’s authorities to undertake labor or environmental law enforcement activities in the territory of the United 

States. 

For purposes of the bill, the term ‘‘internationally recognized core 

labor standards’’ means the core labor standards only as stated in 

the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 

Work and its Follow-Up (1998). 

The bill also specifies the specific agreements that are considered 

common multilateral environmental agreement for purposes of the 


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bill. Any common multilateral environmental agreement must include both the United States and one or more other parties to the 

negotiations as full parties, including any current or future mutually agreed upon protocols, amendments, annexes, or adjustments 

to such an agreement. The common multilateral environmental 

agreements specified by the bill are: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 

done at Washington March 3, 1973 (27 UST 1087; TIAS 8249); the 

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 

done at Montreal September 16, 1987; the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 

from Ships, 1973, done at London February 17, 1978; the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, done at Ramsar February 2, 1971 (TIAS 11084); the 

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done at Canberra May 20, 1980 (33 UST 3476); the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done at Washington December 2, 1946 (62 Stat. 1716); the Convention for the 

Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 

done at Washington May 31, 1949 (1 UST 230). 

The Committee notes with satisfaction that no changes to U.S. 

labor or environmental laws have been required to implement any 

of the four agreements to which the May 10th Agreement provisions have applied, and the Committee expects that agreements 

considered under these trade authorities procedures will achieve 

similar results. 

11. Currency 

The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to currency practices is that parties to a trade agreement 

with the United States avoid manipulating exchange rates in order 

to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an 

unfair competitive advantage over other parties to the agreement, 

such as through cooperative mechanisms, enforceable rules, reporting, monitoring, transparency, or other means, as appropriate. 

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 

Act of 2015 is the first time TPA includes a principal negotiating 

objective addressing currency manipulation. The addition of this 

objective reflects the concern of the Committee that foreign countries gain an unfair advantage by undervaluing their currency. The 

negotiating objective establishes a strong standard for negotiators 

to achieve in trade agreements, and provides tools—including, 

where appropriate, enforceable provisions—for addressing currency 

manipulation. 

12. WTO and multilateral trade agreements 

Recognizing that the World Trade Organization is the foundation 

of the global trading system, the principal negotiating objectives of 

the United States regarding the World Trade Organization, the 

Uruguay Round Agreements, and other multilateral and 

plurilateral trade agreements are: 

• To achieve full implementation and extend the coverage of 

the World Trade Organization and multilateral and 

plurilateral agreements to products, sectors, and conditions of 

trade not adequately covered; 


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• To expand country participation in and enhancement of 

the Information Technology Agreement, the Government Procurement Agreement, and other plurilateral trade agreements 

of the World Trade Organization; • To expand competitive market opportunities for United 

States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions 

of trade, including through utilization of global value chains, 

through the negotiation of new WTO multilateral and 

plurilateral trade agreements, such as an agreement on trade 

facilitation; • To ensure that regional trade agreements to which the 

United States is not a party fully achieve the high standards 

of, and comply with, WTO disciplines, including Article XXIV 

of GATT 1994, Article V and V bis of the General Agreement 

on Trade in Services, and the Enabling Clause, including 

through meaningful WTO review of such regional trade agreements; • To enhance compliance by WTO members with their obligations as WTO members through active participation in the 

bodies of the World Trade Organization by the United States 

and all other WTO members, including in the trade policy review mechanism and the committee system of the World Trade 

Organization, and by working to increase the effectiveness of 

such bodies; and • To encourage greater cooperation between the World Trade 

Organization and other international organizations. 

The World Trade Organization has proven to be a successful 

mechanism for nations to monitor and enforce international trade 

commitments. The Committee expects our trade negotiators to continue to use all tools available under the WTO to expand market 

access for U.S. products, eliminate unjustified nontariff barriers, 

and hold member nations accountable for meeting their international trade commitments, including through formal consultations and dispute settlement as appropriate. 

With respect to the directive to increase cooperation with other 

international organizations, the Committee intends this to include, 

but not be limited to, CODEX Alimentarius, World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 

International Labor Organization, International Telecommunications Union, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Organization for Animal Health, United Nations, 

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Environment Program, World Bank, World Customs Organization, and World Intellectual Property Organization. This Committee expects increased cooperation between the WTO and these 

organizations to result in increased support for and consistency 

with WTO rules. 

13. Trade institution transparency 

The principal negotiating objective with respect to trade institution transparency is to seek improved transparency in the WTO, in 

institutions established through other trade agreements, and in 

other international trade for a through: 

• Timely public access to information regarding trade issues 

and activities of trade institutions; 


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• Openness by ensuring public access to meetings, proceedings, and submissions; 

• Public access to all notifications and supporting documents 

submitted by WTO members. 

The Committee believes that the success of the WTO and other 

trade institutions in setting and administering the rules of international trade requires that these institutions operate in transparent ways. This means that their decision making processes 

must be clear and, where practicable, open to public observation 

and to input by interested parties. These principles should govern 

all decisions international trade institutions make, whether in dayto-day administration, dispute settlement, or otherwise. 

The objectives regarding transparency reflect principles that govern decision making within the institutions of the United States 

and other democratic governments. Transparency reinforces support for democratic institutions, even though individuals may disagree with particular decisions by those institutions. 

Similarly, greater transparency will allow the WTO and other 

trade institutions to build confidence that they are operating fairly, 

even though individuals may disagree with particular decisions. 

Just as important, greater openness within these international institutions should encourage greater openness within countries that 

are members of these institutions. U.S. trade negotiators should 

seek improved transparency, which requires that trade institutions 

provide timely public access to information regarding trade issues 

and institution activities, provide openness by ensuring public access to meetings, proceedings, and submissions, and provide public 

access to written submissions. 

14. Anti-corruption 

A strengthened principal negotiating objective of the United 

States with respect to corruption affecting trade seeks to obtain 

high standards and effective domestic enforcement that prohibits 

attempts to influence acts, decisions, or omissions of foreign governments or officials or to secure an improper advantage; to ensure 

that such standards level the playing field for United States persons in international trade and investment; and to seek commitments to work jointly to encourage and support anti-corruption and 

anti-bribery initiatives in international trade fora, including 

through the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 

Officials in International Business Transactions of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD Convention). 

The Committee is increasingly aware of the negative effects that 

corruption and weak rule of law has on the ability of U.S. companies to compete in foreign markets. Reducing corruption in international trade and investment is fundamental to the expansion of 

free and fair trade around the world. Trade is a vital force for economic development, democratization, social freedom, and political 

stability in countries struggling to achieve these objectives. Corruption involving the use of money and other things of value to influence acts, decisions, or omissions of foreign government officials or 

to secure any improper advantage in a manner affecting trade or 

investment undermines the objectives of this legislation. 


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It is the Committee’s view that ‘‘high standards’’ are those that 

are equivalent to those established under section 30A of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and sections 104 and 104A of the 

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Only standards equivalent 

to these will ensure that United States persons, who are bound by 

the FCPA, compete on a level playing field. 

The Committee believes it is particularly important for U.S. trading partners to participate in and take commitments under international anti-corruption and anti-bribery initiatives. The negotiating objectives on anti-corruption therefore directs U.S. trade negotiators to carefully consider how to more effectively utilize instruments such as the OECD Convention to advance high anti-corruption standards among our trading partners. 

15. Dispute settlement and enforcement 

The principal negotiating objectives regarding dispute settlement 

and enforcement are: • To seek provisions in trade agreements providing for resolution of disputes between governments in an effective, timely, 

transparent, equitable, and reasoned manner requiring determinations based on facts and the principles of the agreement, 

with the goal of increasing compliance; • To seek to strengthen the capacity of the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism to review compliance with commitments; • To seek improved adherence by WTO dispute settlement 

panels and the Appellate Body to the mandate of those panels 

and the Appellate Body to apply the WTO Agreement as written, and to apply the standard of review in applicable WTO 

Agreements, including greater deference to the fact finding and 

technical expertise of national investigating authorities; • To seek provisions encouraging the early identification and 

settlement of disputes through consultations; • To seek provisions encouraging trade-expanding compensation; 

• To seek provisions to impose a penalty that encourages 

compliance, is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter, and scope of the violation, and has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or interests not party to the dispute 

while maintaining the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism; and 

• To seek provisions that treat U.S. principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to ability to resort to dispute settlement and availability of equivalent procedures and remedies. 

Fair and efficient dispute settlement mechanisms are essential to 

well-functioning trade agreements. An effective dispute settlement 

mechanism must be capable of interpreting the rights and obligations of disputing parties and rendering determinations that the 

parties treat as binding, including with respect to bringing national 

measures into compliance with trade agreements when a measure 

of a party is found to be inconsistent with its commitments under 

an international trade agreement. 

In order to be effective, a dispute settlement mechanism must 

maintain the trust of the parties that it is faithfully adhering to— 


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and not adding to or diminishing—the rights and obligations of the 

parties to the agreement. A dispute settlement mechanism must 

therefore render equitable and reasoned decisions, based on the 

facts of cases presented and a faithful interpretation of agreements. 

The Committee has previously expressed concern with the standard of review that dispute settlement panels and the WTO Appellate Body have applied in cases involving measures taken by administrative agencies of the United States, in particular, the U.S. 

International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce. 

Those concerns remain. The Committee is also concerned that WTO 

Appellate Body has made findings that appear to go beyond directly resolving the dispute before it, and at times making findings 

that appear to go beyond the text of the WTO Agreement by giving 

meaning to text that, interpreted properly, reflects the decision by 

WTO Members to not create an obligation with respect to certain 

measures. 

The Committee considers that the long-term effectiveness of the 

WTO dispute settlement mechanism depends on WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body faithfully adhering to Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which state that the 

recommendations and rulings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 

‘‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in 

the [WTO] agreements.’’ The negotiating objective directs U.S. negotiators to ensure that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 

meets this standard, and to negotiators should address any systemic failure to do so. 

16. Trade remedy laws 

The principal negotiating objective with respect to trade remedies are: • to preserve the ability to enforce rigorously U.S. trade 

laws, including antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws; 

• to avoid agreements that lessen the effectiveness of unfair 

trade disciplines or safeguards provisions to ensure that U.S. 

workers, agricultural producers, and firms can compete fully 

on fair terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade concessions; and 

• to address and remedy market distortions that lead to 

dumping and subsidization. 

The trade remedy laws of the United States provide firms the 

means to ensure that they and their workers are not harmed by 

unfair trade practices of U.S. trading partners. The Committee considers that the laws are essential for allowing U.S. firms to participate fairly in international trade, and that U.S. trade remedy laws 

help to maintain support for trade liberalization. U.S. trade negotiators should, therefore, ensure that trade agreements do not 

weaken the enforcement or the effectiveness of U.S. trade remedy 

laws. 

17. Border taxes 

The principal negotiating objective regarding border taxes is to 

obtain a revision of the WTO rules with respect to the treatment 

of border adjustments for internal taxes to redress the disadvanVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:16 May 19, 2015 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR042.XXX SR042

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tage to countries relying primarily on direct taxes for revenue rather than indirect taxes. The principle negotiating objective regarding 

border taxes directs U.S. negotiators to seek a revision of WTO 

rules that will eliminate the current disadvantage to countries, 

such as the United States, that rely primarily on direct taxes (such 

as income taxes), rather than indirect taxes (such as sales and 

value-added taxes), and that tax income on a worldwide rather 

than a territorial basis. WTO subsidy rules as interpreted by dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body give rise to a disparity that favors territorial tax jurisdictions over worldwide tax 

jurisdictions. The view of the Committee is that this disparity must 

be corrected to preserve the sovereign right of every country to 

choose its own rules of taxation. 

18. Textile negotiations 

The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to trade in textiles and apparel articles are to obtain competitive opportunities for United States exports of textiles and apparel 

in foreign markets substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign exports in United States markets and 

to achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in textiles and 

apparel. 

The negotiating objectives seek to promote the export of U.S. 

made products. In 2013, approximately one-third of U.S. textile 

production was exported, with a value of $17.8 billion. More than 

half of this output was shipped to Western Hemisphere nations 

that are members of the North American Free Trade Agreement 

(NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 

Agreement (CAFTA–DR), and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). 

Exports to the NAFTA and CAFTA–DR countries contributed to a 

U.S. trade surplus of $2.4 billion in yarns and fabrics in 2013. The 

strong markets for U.S. yarn and fabric in free trade agreement 

countries underscores the importance of the negotiating objective. 

The textiles and apparel sector is highly integrated into international supply chains, many of which originate in the United 

States. The objective supports expanded participation in global 

value chains and seeks to ensure that trade agreements reflect the 

increasingly interrelated and multi-sectoral nature of trade and investment activity. Many of the world’s largest apparel retailing and 

marketing firms are headquartered in the United States, where 

countless functions related to apparel are done domestically, such 

as design, branding, and marketing of finished products. By some 

estimates, nearly 70 percent of the value of a garment imported 

into the United States stays in the U.S. economy, supporting highskill and high-pay jobs. As negotiations on textiles and apparel are 

undertaken, supply chains and support for new job growth in the 

United States should remain a significant goal. 

19. Commercial partnerships 

The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to an agreement under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership countries regarding commercial partnerships is: 

• To discourage actions by potential trading partners that 

directly or indirectly prejudice or otherwise discourage commercial activity solely between the United States and Israel; 


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• To discourage politically motivated actions to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel and to seek the elimination of politically motivated nontariff barriers on Israeli goods, services, 

or other commerce imposed on Israel. 

• To seek the elimination of any boycott fostered or imposed 

by a foreign country against Israel and compliance with the 

Arab League Boycott of Israel by prospective trading partners. 

Congress has previously expressed its sense that the Arab 

League Boycott of Israel is an impediment to peace in the region 

and to United States investment and trade in the Middle East and 

North Africa, and that the boycott should be immediately terminated. (See the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, P.L. 113– 

76). The Committee is concerned about support by potential trading 

partners of politically-motivated boycotts of, divestments from, 

sanctions of, or other discriminatory economic actions against 

Israel. The Committee is particularly concerned by retaliatory or 

discriminatory actions taken against U.S. businesses for the sole 

reason that the U.S. business has commercial ties with Israel. Such 

actions impair the ability of U.S. firms to export goods and services, and directly invest in foreign markets. The Committee therefore considers that negotiators should seek to ensure that Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership countries do not prejudice the ability of U.S. firms to engage in commercial activity in 

Israel or with Israeli persons, and that Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership countries do not support or engage in politically-motivated actions to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel, 

or take other politically-motivated nontariff barriers to Israeli commerce. 

20. Good governance, transparency, the effective operation of 

legal regimes, and the rule of law of trading partners 

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 

Act of 2015, for the first time, establishes principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to ensuring implementation of trade commitments and obligations by strengthening good 

governance, transparency, the effective operation of legal regimes 

and the rule of law of U.S. trading partners through capacity building and other appropriate means. These objectives are important 

parts of the broader effort to create more open democratic societies 

and to promote respect for internationally recognized human 

rights. Through these negotiating objectives, the Committee emphasizes that the effective implementation of and adherence to 

trade agreement obligations contribute to broader policy goals of 

the United States, such as the promotion of democracy and respect 

for internationally recognized human rights. 

The Committee understands that the Transpacific Partnership 

negotiations will seek to achieve this negotiating objective through 

rules on good governance, including the promotion of greater transparency, participation, and accountability in the development of 

regulations and other government decisions, including by promptly 

publishing laws, regulations, administrative rulings of general application, and other procedures that affect trade and investment, 

and providing opportunities for stakeholder comment on measures 

before they are adopted and finalized; and through commitments 


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discouraging corruption and establishing codes of conduct to promote high ethical standards among public officials. 

Section 2(c). Capacity building and other priorities 

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 

Act of 2015 establishes for the first time priorities related to capacity building for U.S. trading partners as a means of addressing and 

maintaining U.S. competitiveness in the global economy. Section 

2(c) directs the heads of relevant Federal agencies to work to 

strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to carry out obligations under trade agreements by consulting with any country 

seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning that 

country’s laws relating to customs and trade facilitation, sanitary 

and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, intellectual property rights, labor, and the environment, and to provide 

technical assistance if needed. It is the Committee’s expectation 

that capacity building be directed to each of these elements. Relevant Federal agencies are also directed to seek to establish consultative mechanisms to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading 

partners to develop and implement standards for the protection of 

the environment and human health based on sound science, and to 

promote consideration of multilateral trade agreements. The agencies are also to submit to the Committee on Finance of the Senate 

and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives an annual report on capacity-building activities undertaken 

in connection with trade agreements. 

Section 3. Trade agreements authority 

Section 3 provides that the President may enter into trade agreements subject to the trade authorities procedures prescribed in the 

present bill before July 1, 2018 or, if such procedures are extended 

as provided in section 3(c), before July 1, 2021. 

Section 3 contains two different procedures for implementing 

trade agreements. The first procedure pertains to implementing the 

results of certain tariff-only negotiations; the second procedure pertains to implementing all the results of other tariff negotiations, as 

well as other changes to U.S. law required by trade agreements. 

Section 3(a). Tariff proclamation authority 

Section 3(a) contains the first of these two procedures, commonly 

referred to as ‘‘tariff proclamation authority.’’ Tariff proclamation 

authority permits the President to proclaim the results of certain 

tariff negotiations and commitments directly into U.S. law, without 

need for separate legislation. The President must notify Congress 

of his intention to enter into an agreement under section 3(a). One 

recent example of a commitment result that would fall within this 

authority is the commitment the United States is undertaking 

through APEC to reduce its tariffs on certain environmental goods 

to no more than 5% by the end of 2015. 

Section 3(a) imposes limits on the President’s tariff proclamation 

authority: where a current duty rate exceeds 5 percent ad valorem, 

the President would not be authorized to reduce it by more than 

50 percent. Any greater reduction would have to be approved by 

Congress. Where a current duty rate is 5 percent ad valorem or 


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less, the President may reduce it or eliminate it without separate 

congressional approval. 

An additional restriction on proclamation authority pertains to 

tariffs on certain import-sensitive agricultural products. The President may not proclaim reductions of tariff rates on such products 

below the rates applicable under the Uruguay Round Agreements. 

Products subject to this restriction are those agricultural products 

as to which the U.S. rate of duty was lowered by no more than 2.5 

percent on the day the WTO Agreements went into effect (January 

1, 1995). Tariff reductions on these products must be approved in 

separate legislation, described in section 3(b). 

Finally, the President may not, by proclamation, increase any 

rate of duty above the rate applied on the date this bill is enacted. 

Any such increases would require separate legislation. 

To the extent that tariff reductions may be implemented by proclamation, the bill requires that, in general, such reductions take 

place in stages. The stages may vary in size from period to period. 

However, the aggregate reduction in place at any given time may 

not exceed the aggregate reduction that would have been in place 

if, beginning on the date an agreement is implemented, tariffs had 

been reduced in equal annual stages of the greater of either 3 percent ad valorem, or one-tenth of the total reduction. The bill permits the President to round numbers off, within limits, to simplify 

staging calculations. 

An exception to the staging requirements is made where the U.S. 

International Trade Commission determines that there is no domestic production of an article. 

Finally, the bill reaffirms the residual proclamation authority 

granted to the President in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round 

Agreements Act (‘‘URAA’’). That provision authorizes the President 

to proclaim certain tariff rate changes for articles that were the 

subject of duty elimination or harmonization negotiations during 

the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 

The present bill (in section 3(a)(7)) also grants the President authority to modify any duty or the staged rate reduction of any duty, 

pursuant to a reciprocal elimination or harmonization of duties 

under the auspices of the WTO, regardless of whether the sector 

at issue had been subject to duty elimination or harmonization negotiations during the Uruguay Round. This authority is not subject 

to the ordinary limitations on the scope of proclaimed tariff reductions, the prohibition on proclaimed tariff increases, and the staging rules. However, this authority may not be used to proclaim the 

reduction or elimination of tariffs on import sensitive agricultural 

products as provided for in section 3(a)(3)(B). 

Tariff reductions proclaimed under section 3(a)(7) of the present 

bill, like tariff reductions proclaimed under section 111(b) of the 

URAA, are subject to the layover and consultation requirements 

prescribed by section 115 of the URAA. That is, the President must 

receive advice from the appropriate industry advisory committee 

and the ITC on the proposed proclamation, and the proclamation 

must lie before the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means 

Committees for a period of 60 days before going into effect, in order 

to give the Committees an adequate opportunity to consult with the 

President on the proposed changes. 


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Section 3(b). Agreements on tariff and nontariff barriers 

The second procedure for implementing trade agreements is 

found in Section 3(b) and is commonly referred to as ‘‘trade authorities procedures.’’ Section 3(b)(1) authorizes the President to 

enter into a trade agreement with a foreign country when the 

President determines that any duty or other import restriction, or 

any other barrier to or distortion of international trade, unduly 

burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the United States or adversely affects the U.S. economy, or that the imposition of any such 

barrier or distortion is likely to result in such a burden, restriction, 

or effect, and that entering into such agreement will promote the 

purposes, policies, priorities and objectives of this bill. The agreement must provide for the reduction or elimination of such duty, 

barrier or other distortion or prohibit or limit the imposition of 

such a barrier or distortion. 

Conditions. Section 3(b)(2) provides that the trade agreement approval procedures may be used only if the agreement makes 

progress in meeting the applicable objectives set forth in sections 

2 (a) and (b) (Overall and Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives), 

and the President satisfies the requirements set forth in sections 

4 and 5 (Congressional Oversight, Consultations, and Access to Information and Notice, Consultations, and Reports). 

Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures. Section 3(b)(3) 

provides that bills implementing trade agreements qualify for trade 

authorities procedures only if those bills consist solely of provisions 

approving the trade agreement and any statement of administrative action accompanying the agreement, and provisions strictly 

necessary or appropriate to implement the trade agreement. 

If the foregoing conditions are met, then the trade authorities 

procedures described in section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 apply 

to the implementing bill. Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 sets 

forth a timetable for consideration of implementing bills in the 

Committees of jurisdiction and on the floor of each House of Congress. Ordinarily, the maximum time for consideration in both 

Chambers will be 90 legislative days. Section 151 also prohibits 

amendments to implementing bills and limits the time for debate 

on the floor of each House to 20 hours (subject to further limitation). 

The Committee intends to extend authority to the President to 

negotiate agreements subject to the trade authorities procedures 

similar to that given to past Presidents. The Committee also intends to provide the President with the flexibility needed to negotiate strong trade agreements. However, the Committee believes 

that for constitutional reasons, it is important to make trade authorities procedures as tailored as possible, so as not to unnecessarily intrude on normal legislative procedures. Trade authorities 

procedures are exceptions to the ordinary rules of procedure, which 

are permitted only because of the co-equal status that the executive 

and legislative branches share in the area of trade. The President 

and Congress both have important powers with respect to trade 

and foreign affairs issues. Therefore, trade agreements do not readily fit the legislative model used to consider other types of legislation. Trade authorities procedures assure that trade relations with 

other countries are handled expeditiously and efficiently, with the 

involvement of the executive and legislative branches. 


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The Committee believes that these procedures should apply only 

to meet the special requirements of trade agreements. Further, the 

trade authorities procedures should apply only to those provisions 

in an implementing bill that are strictly necessary or appropriate 

to implement the underlying agreement, as stated in the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committee reports accompanying the Trade Act of 2002. It is the Committee’s intent that 

this authority is consistent with prior grants of authority. While 

the Committee considers that implementing bills introduced since 

the 2002 Act have met this standard, there are disagreements 

about some aspects of bills prior to 2002. As has been recognized 

in the past, to apply the procedures more broadly would encroach 

on Congress’s constitutional authority to legislate. The Committee 

continues to take a strict interpretation of this requirement. 

Time period. Sections 3(a)(1)(A) and 3(b)(1)(C) grant trade promotion authority for agreements entered into before July 1, 2018. 

An extension until July 1, 2021 would be permitted unless Congress passed a disapproval resolution, as described under section 

3(c). New language is included in the bill to clarify that any substantial modifications or substantial additional provisions of a 

trade agreement entered after July 1, 2018 (or July 1, 2021 if trade 

authorities procedures are extended), shall not be eligible for approval under trade authorities procedures. This will ensure that 

trade agreements are concluded only within the time frame authorized by Congress and that substantial modifications or additions 

after that date are not eligible for approval under trade authorities 

procedures. 

Extension procedures. Section 3(c) outlines a process for extending the tariff proclamation authority of section 3(a) and the trade 

authorities procedures of section 3(b). Under this process, the 

President must request the extension from Congress and provide 

his reasons for that request, along with an explanation of the trade 

agreements for which he expects to need fast track authority, and 

a description of the progress he has made to date toward achieving 

the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of the present bill. 

The President must promptly notify an extension request to the 

Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations established 

under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974, which then must file 

its own report with Congress. The President also must promptly 

notify the International Trade Commission of his request for an extension. The International Trade Commission must file a report 

that contains a review and analysis of the economic impact on the 

United States of all trade agreements implemented between the 

date of enactment of this bill and the date upon which the President requests an extension. 

Consistent with prior law, the President’s request for an extension to July 1, 2021 will be granted, unless either House of Congress passes a ‘‘resolution of disapproval.’’ Any Member of Congress 

may introduce such a resolution in his or her respective House of 

Congress. Such a resolution will be referred, in the Senate, to the 

Committee on Finance, and in the House, jointly to the Committee 

on Ways and Means and the Committee on Rules. Floor action on 

such a resolution will not be in order unless the resolution is reported by the aforementioned committees. 


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In the event the Committee on Finance reports an extension disapproval resolution, the resolution will be considered on the Senate 

floor under the expedited procedures set forth in section 152(e) of 

the Trade Act of 1974. In the event the Committee on Ways and 

Means and the Committee on Rules report an extension disapproval resolution, the resolution will be considered on the House 

floor under the expedited procedures set forth in section 152(d) of 

that Act. 

Commencement of negotiations. In order to contribute to the continued economic expansion of the United States, section 3(d) directs 

the President to commence negotiations covering tariff and nontariff barriers where the President determines that such negotiations are feasible, timely, and would benefit the United States. In 

doing so, the President must take into account all of the trade negotiating objectives set out in section 2. 

Section 4. Congressional oversight, consultations, and access to information 

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 

Act of 2015 significantly strengthens the requirements on consultations and access to information the President must meet with respect to Congress and the public both during trade negotiations 

and before a trade agreement may enter into force. Section 4 contains new consultation and information sharing provision, establishing additional requirements not previously set out in trade promotion authority legislation. The enhanced consultation requirements of this section reflect the necessity of close and regular legislative-executive consultation and coordination to ensure that, during negotiations, the President seeks to achieve the trade negotiating objectives set out in section 2. Close consultation and coordination by the President with Congress during negotiations increases the likelihood that Congress will support a trade agreement 

concluded by the President. If the President fails to meet these new 

and expanded consultation requirements, and the requirements of 

sections 5 and 6 of the bill (discussed below), Congress can disallow 

application of trade authorities procedures to a bill implementing 

a trade agreement through a procedural disapproval resolution or 

a consultation and compliance resolution. 

Section 4(a). Consultation with Members of Congress 

Section 4(a) establishes new consultation requirements the 

United States Trade Representative must meet during negotiations 

and prior to a trade agreement entering into force. The bill for the 

first time requires the United States Trade Representative to meet 

upon request with any Member of Congress and provide pertinent 

documents relating to the negotiations, including classified materials. The Committee expects that these consultations will be held 

promptly and that they will be responsive in scope to the Member’s 

request. The United States Trade Representative must consult 

closely with the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, and 

with respect to negotiations relating to agricultural trade, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate, and 

the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives. The 

United States Trade Representative must also consult closely with 


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the Congressional Advisory Groups on Negotiations (discussed further below). While previous versions of TPA required close consultations with this Committee, the Committee specifically intends 

that these consultations and the sharing of negotiating text will be 

expansive in scope and as detailed as feasible. Such consultations 

must be meaningful and timely, including consulting on negotiating 

positions before those positions are shared with cleared advisors or 

our trading partners. 

For the first time, the bill establishes consultation requirements 

for the Administration to follow when determining whether to 

bring an agreement into force. Before a trade agreement enters 

into force, the United States Trade Representative must consult 

with Members of Congress, committees of jurisdiction, and the Congressional Advisory Groups and keep them fully apprised of the 

measures a trading partner has taken to comply with the provisions of the trade agreement. The Committee expects the Administration to maintain the same level of detailed and timely consultations prior to entry into force as it maintains in other stages of the 

negotiations. 

Additionally, within 120 days after this bill is enacted, the 

United States Trade Representative will be required, in consultation with the chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on 

Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of 

the House of Representatives, to develop written guidelines on enhanced coordination with Congress. The guidelines will establish 

procedures to ensure timely briefings with any Member of Congress 

and the sharing of information, including documents and classified 

information, with Members of Congress, and their staff with proper 

security clearances as appropriate, as well as cleared Committee 

staff as appropriate in light of Committee responsibilities. The 

Committee intends to play a substantial and meaningful role in the 

development and finalization of these guidelines. 

The expanded requirements set out in this section regarding the 

sharing of text with Members and appropriate staff reflects the importance of detailed engagement with Members to ensure that 

trade agreements reflect the priorities set out in this bill. The bill 

provides that staff members are entitled to receive information regarding trade negotiations, while acknowledging security clearances may be required of staff where classified information is being 

reviewed. It is the expectation of the Committee that the United 

States Trade Representative will carefully monitor its classification 

procedures to ensure that material is not overclassified. The Committee expects that consultations and the sharing of text will be 

prompt and responsive in scope to the Member’s request. 

Section 4(b). Designated congressional advisers 

Designated congressional advisers are any Members of Congress 

so designated, in the Senate, by the President pro tempore, in consultation with the chairman and ranking member of the Committee 

on Finance, and in the House of Representatives, by the Speaker 

of the House, in consultations with the chairman and ranking 

member of the Committee on Ways and Means. The United States 

Trade Representative must consult closely with any congressional 

adviser so designated. Additionally, the United States Trade Representative, on behalf of the President, must accredit designated 


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congressional advisers as official advisers to the United States delegation to international conferences, meetings, and negotiating sessions relating to trade agreements. 

Section 4(c). Congressional advisory groups on negotiations 

Section 4(c) establishes the Senate and House Advisory Groups 

on Negotiations. The membership of the Senate Advisory Group on 

Negotiations is to be comprised of the chairmen and ranking member of the Committee on Finance, and three additional members of 

the Committee (with no more than two from the same political 

party), plus the chairman and ranking member of any committee 

with jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a trade agreement. The House Advisory Group on Negotiations would be similarly comprised. Members of the Senate and House Advisory 

Groups on Negotiations will be accredited by the United States 

Trade Representative, on behalf of the President, as official advisers to the United States delegation in negotiations for any trade 

agreement subject to trade authorities procedures. Section 4(c) further provides that the House and Senate Advisory Groups on Negotiations will consult with and provide advice to the United States 

Trade Representative regarding the formulation of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and positions; the development of the 

applicable trade agreement; and the compliance with and enforcement of the negotiated commitments under the trade agreement. 

Within 120 days after this bill is enacted, the United States 

Trade Representative will be required, in consultation with the 

chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Finance of 

the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 

of Representatives, to develop written guidelines to facilitate the 

exchange of information with the House and Senate Advisory 

Groups on Negotiations. The guidelines will establish procedures 

concerning detailed briefings on a fixed timetable; access to pertinent documents, including classified materials; coordination between the United States Trade Representative and the House and 

Senate Advisory Groups on Negotiations, including at negotiation 

sites; and, after a trade agreement has been concluded, ongoing 

compliance and enforcement efforts. The Committee intends to play 

a substantial and meaningful role in the development and finalization of these guidelines. 

Section 4(d) and 4(e). Consultations with the public and with 

advisory committees 

Within 120 days after this bill is enacted, the United States 

Trade Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the 

Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 

is to develop guidelines on public access to information regarding 

negotiations with the purpose of facilitating transparency, encouraging public participation, and promoting collaboration. Also within 

120 days, the United States Trade Representative, in consultation 

with the chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the 

House of Representatives, is to develop guidelines regarding the 

advisory committees established under section 135 of the Trade Act 

of 1974. The guidelines are to ensure timely briefings and regular 


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opportunities to provide input, and the sharing of detailed and 

timely information regarding negotiations, including pertinent documents. The Committee intends to play a substantial and meaningful role in the development and finalization of these guidelines. 

Section 4(f). Establishment of Chief Transparency Officer in 

the Office of the United States Trade Representative 

The bill amends Section 141(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 to create 

a Chief Transparency Officer at the Office of the United States 

Trade Representative with the responsibility of consulting with 

Congress regarding transparency policy, coordinating transparency 

in trade negotiations, engaging and assisting the public, and advising the United States Trade Representative on transparency policy. 

The addition of this requirement reflects the importance the Committee places on ensuring transparent engagement with the public 

and the role of Congress in overseeing USTR transparency policies. 

Section 5. Notice, consultations, and reports 

Section 5 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 

Accountability Act of 2015 establishes procedures for consultations 

between Congress and the President before negotiations on a trade 

agreement commence, during negotiations, and before a trade 

agreement enters into force. The purpose of the requirements established under section 5 is to help ensure close coordination and 

consultation at every stage of trade agreement negotiation. 

Section 5(a)(1) requires the President to provide written notice to 

Congress at least 90 calendar days prior to entering into negotiations with a country. In the notice, the President must set forth the 

date on which he intends to initiate negotiations, the specific objectives for the negotiations, and whether the President intends to 

seek a new agreement, or to change an existing agreement. Failure 

to provide notice may trigger the introduction and consideration of 

a procedural disapproval resolution or a consultation and compliance resolution under the provisions of section 6(b). If a procedural 

disapproval resolution or a consultation and compliance resolution 

were adopted, it would withdraw trade authorities procedures for 

legislation implementing the agreement at issue. The Committee 

intends that consultations should be robust and meaningful and 

that the Administration consult closely with Congress during the 

exploratory phase. The Committee believes that it is essential that 

the United States not join a consensus in favor of a new entrant 

to an agreement that is already being negotiated if that entrant is 

not willing and able to live up to the standard of the agreement, 

or if its entry would negatively affect, rather than advance, U.S. 

objectives of the agreement. 

Section 5(a)(1)(B) requires the President to consult with relevant 

Committees, and the Congressional Advisory Groups on Negotiations, regarding the negotiations before and after formal submission of the notice of intention to negotiate. Section 5(a)(1)(C) requires the President, upon the request of a majority of the members of either the House or Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations, 

to meet with the requesting advisory group before initiating negotiations or at any other time concerning the negotiations. Section 

5(a)(1)(D) requires, for the first time, that the United States Trade 

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ating negotiations with a country, a detailed and comprehensive 

summary of the objectives with respect to the negotiations, and 

thereafter regularly update the summary, as appropriate. 

Section 5(a)(2) establishes a special consultation requirement before the President initiates negotiations with a country concerning 

tariff reductions in agriculture. The provision requires the President to assess whether U.S. tariffs on agricultural products that 

were bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than 

the tariffs bound by that country. In his assessment, the President 

is also required to consider whether the tariff levels bound and applied throughout the world with respect to imports from the United 

States are higher than U.S. tariffs on like products, and whether 

the negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such disparity. 

The President is required to consult with the Committees on 

Ways and Means and Agriculture of the House, and the Committees on Finance and Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 

Senate, concerning the results of this assessment, whether it is appropriate for the United States to agree to further tariff reductions 

under such circumstances, and how all applicable negotiating objectives will be met. 

Section 5(a)(2)(B) sets forth special consultation procedures for 

import-sensitive agricultural products. It requires the United 

States Trade Representative, before initiating agriculture negotiations, to identify import-sensitive agricultural products, and consult 

with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on 

Agriculture of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 

Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 

of the Senate concerning whether further tariff reductions on these 

products would be appropriate, whether these products face unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions, and whether the 

countries participating in the negotiations maintain export subsidies or other programs that distort world trade in these products. 

The United States Trade Representative also must request that the 

International Trade Commission prepare an assessment of the 

probable economic effect of any tariff reduction on the U.S. industry producing an import-sensitive agricultural product. After complying with these provisions, the United States Trade Representative must notify the aforementioned Committees of his or her intention to seek tariff liberalization in the identified products. Further, if during the course of negotiations additional import-sensitive agricultural products become candidates for tariff reductions, 

the United States Trade Representative must notify the aforementioned Committees promptly and explain the reasons for seeking 

the proposed tariff reductions. 

Section 5(a)(3) requires the President, before initiating or continuing negotiations directly related to fish or shellfish trade, to 

consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Resources of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation of the Senate and to keep these Committees apprised of negotiations on an ongoing and timely basis. 

Section 5(a)(4) sets forth a special consultation requirement for 

negotiations regarding textiles. Before initiating trade negotiations 

with a country, the bill requires the President to assess whether 


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U.S. textile and apparel tariffs bound under the Uruguay Round 

Agreements are lower than tariffs bound by that country, and 

whether the negotiation affords an opportunity to address that disparity. The President then must consult with the House Ways and 

Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee about his assessment, whether the United States should agree to further textile 

and apparel tariff reductions, and how all applicable negotiating 

objectives will be met. 

The Committee believes that a country’s demonstrated commitment, and demonstrated ability, to meet its current international 

trade and investment commitments is an important factor that 

should have a strong bearing on whether a prospective trading 

partners is ready and able to undertake trade obligations which 

will reflect the higher standards that a reciprocal trade agreement 

with the United States requires. Therefore, section 5(a)(5) requires 

the President, in determining whether to enter into a trade agreement with a particular country, to take into account the extent 

which the country has implemented its international trade and investment commitments to the United States. 

Section 5(b) sets forth consultation requirements the President 

must meet before entering into an agreement. The President, before entering into any trade agreement, must consult with the relevant Committees and the Congressional Advisory Groups on Negotiations concerning the nature of the agreement; how and to 

what extent the agreement will achieve the applicable purposes, 

policies, and objectives set forth in section 2; and all matters relating to implementation under section 6, including the general effect 

of the agreement on U.S. laws. 

Under section 5(b)(3), at least 180 calendar days before entering 

into a trade agreement, the President must notify the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance 

of any proposals that may be in the final agreement that could require changes to the antidumping, countervailing duty, or safeguard laws of the United States. At any time after receiving the 

report from the President, either Chamber of Congress may consider a resolution finding that the proposed changes to U.S. trade 

remedy laws are inconsistent with the negotiating objectives set 

out in section 2(b)(16). 

Section 5(c) requires the President, at least 90 days before entering into a trade agreement, to ask the International Trade Commission to assess the agreement, including the likely impact of the 

agreement on the U.S. economy as a whole, specific industry sectors, and U.S. consumers. The ITC’s report of its assessment must 

be transmitted to Congress and the President not later than 105 

days from the date on which the President enters into the agreement. For the first time the report is required to be made public 

in the interest of greater transparency. 

Section 5(d)–(f) sets out reports that the President must submit 

to Congress with a trade agreement. The reports consist of an environmental review, an employment impact review, and a meaningful 

labor rights report on country with which the President is negotiating along with a detailed and comprehensive description of any 

provision that would require changes to the labor laws and labor 

practices of the United States. The reports are to be submitted to 


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the Committee on Ways and Means of the House and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and are to be made public. 

The President, at the same time he submits a copy of the final 

legal text to Congress, is also required to submit to Congress a 

plan for implementing and enforcing the agreement, including descriptions of additional personnel required at border entry points, 

additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible for 

monitoring and implementing the trade agreement, additional 

equipment and facilities needed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the impact the trade agreement will have on State and 

local governments, with an analysis of the cost of each. 

The President must also submit, not later than one year after the 

United States imposes a penalty or remedy permitted by a trade 

agreement, a report on the effectiveness of the remedy, including 

whether the remedy was effective in changing the behavior of the 

targeted party and whether the remedy had any adverse impact on 

U.S. entities. The United States International Trade Commission, 

not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

and not later than 5 years thereafter, is to submit a report on the 

economic impact on the United States of all trade agreements with 

respect to which Congress has enacted an implementing bill under 

trade authorities procedures since January 1, 1984. Prior to preparing these reports, it is expected that the International Trade 

Commission will consult with this Committee regarding the appropriate methodology to be used for purposes of these reports, and 

possible new approaches. The Committee expects that these reports 

will provide greater information and analysis about the benefits of 

trade agreements to the U.S. economy. 

The Committee believes it needs to be fully informed of the actions the Administration is taking to enforce obligations under the 

trade agreements. Therefore the bill requires the United States 

Trade Representative to consult with the Committee on Ways and 

Means of the House and the Committee on Finance of the Senate 

after acceptance of a petition for review or taking an enforcement 

action in regard to an obligation under a trade agreement, including a labor or environmental obligation. The Committee expects to 

be fully informed regarding the nature of the enforcement action, 

including the legal basis on which it is predicated, as part of these 

consultations. 

Section 6. Implementation of Trade Agreements 

Section 6 sets forth conditions the President must meet for a 

trade agreement entered into under trade authorities procedures to 

enter into force, and establishes the conditions under which Congress may withdraw the application of trade authorities procedures 

to a trade agreement and the procedures for doing so. 

Section 6(a) specifies the documentation that the President must 

transmit to Congress to enable Congress to make a fully informed 

decision as to whether to approve a trade agreement. The requirement set out here complements the various requirements that the 

President consult with Congress during the course of an agreement’s negotiation. Consultation during negotiation, combined with 

a complete accounting after negotiation, will enable Congress to 

participate in the trade policymaking process to the fullest extent 

of its constitutional authority. 


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At least 90 days before entering into a trade agreement subject 

to this bill, the President must notify Congress of his intention to 

enter into the agreement and publish notice of that intention in the 

Federal Register. For the first time, the President, at least 60 days 

before entering into the agreement, must publish the text of the 

agreement on the website of the Office of the United States Trade 

Representative. Within 60 days after entering into the agreement, 

the President must transmit to Congress a description of changes 

to U.S. law he believes would be necessary to bring the United 

States into compliance with the agreement. At least 30 days before 

submitting to Congress the materials required by the bill to accompany the submission to Congress of the final legal text of the agreement (i.e., the complete agreement, including any legal and technical corrections and clarifications made subsequent to the publication of the text on the USTR website), the President is to submit 

to Congress a draft statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the agreement, and a copy of the final legal 

text of the agreement. 

Collectively, these provisions help ensure that Congress is given 

adequate time and documentation to fully understand a trade 

agreement subject to this bill and inform the consideration of legislation to implement that agreement. In particular, by making the 

text of the agreement public 60 days before the President enters 

into the agreement, the public will have time to examine the agreement and inform Congress of their views. Furthermore, by requiring the receipt of a draft statement of administrative action and a 

copy of the final legal text of the agreement at least 30 days before 

the President provides the final legal text of the agreement to Congress, the bill ensures Congress will have adequate time to review 

the agreement and develop implementing legislation before the 

timeline for the consideration of implementing legislation set out in 

section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 begins. 

Before Congress considers a bill implementing a trade agreement, the President must submit to Congress, on a day on which 

both Houses of Congress are in session: (1) the final legal text of 

the agreement, (2) a draft bill to implement the agreement; (3) a 

statement of administrative action proposed to implement the 

agreement; and (4) additional supporting information (described in 

greater detail, below). 

It is the expectation of the Committee that, for any agreement 

subject to trade authorities procedures under the present bill, the 

draft implementing bill and statement of administrative action will 

be developed by the President in close collaboration with the Committees of jurisdiction in both Houses of Congress. This has been 

the practice under trade promotion authority legislation. Because 

an implementing bill subject to trade authorities procedures is not 

subject to amendment, close cooperation between the executive 

branch and the Committees of jurisdiction prior to the bill’s introduction is essential for positive consideration of the implementing 

bill. In addition to such cooperation, the Committee expects that 

other past practices—such as hearings, informal markups, and informal conferences between House and Senate Committees of jurisdiction—will precede formal transmittal of a trade agreement, draft 

implementing bill, and supporting documentation to Congress. To 

ensure that the legislative and executive branches have adequate 


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time to complete these pre-transmittal processes, the bill establishes no deadline for transmittal. It simply provides, in section 

6(a)(1)(E), that this is to happen ‘‘after entering into the agreement.’’ 

The supporting information that the President must transmit to 

Congress, along with the agreement, draft implementing bill, and 

statement of administrative action, consists of: • An explanation as to how the bill and proposed administrative action will change or affect existing law. • A statement asserting that the agreement makes progress 

in achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 

set forth in section 2 of the bill, and an explanation of how and 

to what extent it does so. This should be a detailed statement, 

addressing each of the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives in section 2 (recognizing that there may be certain purposes, policies, and objectives that are not applicable). • A statement of whether and how the agreement changes 

provisions of previously negotiated agreements. • A statement of how the agreement serves the interests of 

U.S. commerce. • A statement of how the draft implementing bill meets the 

requirements for the application of trade authorities procedures, set out in section 3(b)(3) of the bill. Section 3(b)(3) provides that the rules for the consideration of bills implementing 

a trade agreement contained in section 151 of the Trade Act 

of 1974 apply only if the implementing bill contains certain 

provisions. As explained above, such bills must (1) contain a 

provision approving the underlying trade agreement and the 

proposed statement of administrative action, and (2) only contain changes to existing law that are strictly necessary or appropriate to implement the underlying agreement. The supporting information accompanying transmittal of the bill must 

explain how the bill meets each of these requirements. In particular, it is important that the President explain his reasons 

for believing that the changes to existing law contained in the 

bill are strictly necessary or appropriate to implement the 

agreement. 

To ensure that a trade agreement does not inadvertently bestow 

benefits on countries not party to the agreement, section 6(a)(3) requires that an implementing bill provide explicitly that benefits 

and obligations under the agreement apply only to the parties to 

the agreement. This section also provides that an implementing bill 

may treat different trade agreement partners other than uniformly, 

if such treatment is consistent with the underlying agreement. 

Section 6(a)(4) provides that in enacting a trade agreement implementing bill, any side agreements between governments that 

have not been disclosed to Congress will not be considered as part 

of the agreement approved by Congress. In other words, Congress’s 

approval of a trade agreement is not an approval of any undisclosed deals that may be ancillary to that agreement. It is an approval only of those terms that have been expressly disclosed and 

identified to Congress. 

Section 6(b) sets forth certain conditions under which a trade 

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lishes three circumstances under which the trade authorities procedures described in section 3(b)(3) of the bill will not apply to trade 

agreement implementing legislation. First, trade authorities procedures will not apply to a particular agreement if a procedural disapproval resolution has been adopted by Congress with respect to 

that agreement. Second, trade authorities procedures will not apply 

to an agreement if a consultation and compliance resolution has 

been adopted by either Chamber of Congress with respect to that 

agreement. Third, trade authorities procedures will not apply if the 

Secretary of Commerce fails to transmit to Congress, by December 

15, 2015, a report identifying a strategy for the United States to 

redress past instances in which WTO dispute settlement panels 

have effectively added to obligations or diminished rights of the 

United States. 

A procedural disapproval resolution may be introduced at any 

time by any Member of either House. The language of the resolution is prescribed by section 6(b)(1)(B) of the bill. A procedural disapproval resolution, if adopted, withdraws application of trade authorities procedures to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a trade agreement or agreements as to which the President 

has failed or refused to notify or consult, as defined by the bill (and 

discussed in detail below). The Member introducing the resolution 

must identify in the resolution the agreement or agreements as to 

which that Member believes the President has failed or refused to 

notify or consult with Congress. 

Upon introduction, a procedural disapproval resolution will be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee 

on Rules in the House of Representatives, and to the Committee on 

Finance in the Senate. A procedural disapproval resolution may not 

be amended, and may not be considered on the floor of the House 

unless it has been reported by the Committee on Ways and Means 

and the Committee on Rules, or the floor of the Senate unless it 

has been reported by the Committee on Finance. 

If a procedural disapproval resolution is reported by the Committee or (in the House) Committees to which it has been referred, 

the procedural disapproval resolution will be considered under expedited procedures in the Chamber to which it has been reported, 

as set out in section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade Act of 1974. Under 

those rules, a motion to proceed to consideration of a qualifying 

procedural disapproval resolution is considered privileged (in the 

Senate) or highly privileged (in the House), and time for debate is 

limited. A procedural disapproval resolution with respect to a particular agreement may be considered under these rules in a given 

Chamber only once per Congress. For trade authorities procedures 

to be withdrawn pursuant to a disapproval resolution, both Houses 

of Congress must adopt the procedural disapproval resolution within 60 days of one another. 

Section 6(b)(3) and (4) creates a new Consultation and Compliance Resolution process for the Senate and House, respectively. 

The Consultation and Compliance Resolution is an additional 

mechanism to withdraw trade authorities procedures for legislation 

implementing a trade agreement when it does not comply with 

TPA, in particular because the President fails or refuses to consult, 

or the agreement fails to make progress in achieving the purposes, 

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flects the critical role that effective Congressional oversight plays 

in ensuring that the President secures trade agreements that reflect Congressional negotiating priorities. Furthermore, for Congressional oversight to be effective, the Administration must adhere to the consultation requirements established in the bill so that 

Members, cleared advisors, and the public are appropriately kept 

informed throughout the negotiation process. In that regard, the 

House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee 

on Finance play a particularly important role in engaging with the 

Administration and ensuring that negotiations reflect Congressional priorities. 

The Committee intends to fully perform its responsibility over 

the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements. It is expected that, for any trade agreement transmitted to Congress pursuant to this bill, the Committee will meet on whether to report 

the implementing bill before it is considered on the floor of the 

Chamber. When the Committee meets to consider an implementing 

bill, it plans to report that bill, either with a favorable recommendation, or with a recommendation that is other than favorable. For every trade agreement considered under expedited procedures since the Trade Act of 1974 became law, the Ways and 

Means Committee of the House and Finance Committee of the Senate have convened meetings prior to floor consideration of an implementing bill. These meetings have provided an important opportunity for members of the Committees to discuss the merits of the 

agreement and express their views on whether or not the agreement reflects Congressional negotiating priorities and the degree to 

which consultation requirements have been met. Furthermore, the 

Committees have always reported implementing bills to their respective chambers and expect to continue that practice. 

Under the new procedures in Section 6(b)(3) and (4), if either of 

the Committees fails to favorably report an implementing bill when 

the Committee meets on whether to report an implementing bill, 

it will report a Consultation and Compliance Resolution to its respective chamber that can result in the disqualification of a bill implementing the trade agreement from receiving trade authorities 

procedures in that chamber. The Consultation and Compliance Resolution will ensure that the Administration is particularly mindful 

of Congressional negotiating priorities and consultation requirements. As a result, the Administration will be more likely to negotiate agreements that accurately reflect the views of Congress and 

provide the greatest benefit to American workers, businesses, farmers, manufacturers and service providers. 

Both a procedural disapproval resolution and a consultation and 

compliance resolution withdraw trade authorities procedures for an 

implementing bill when the President has failed or refused to comply notify or consult in accordance with the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 with respect 

to negotiations of the trade agreement submitted with the implementing bill. The term ‘‘failed or refused to notify or consult in accordance with the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 

Accountability Act of 2015’’ is defined to make clear that the President has not met his obligations simply by going through the formalities of consultations. Section 6(b)(1)(B)(ii) establishes that the 

President has failed or refused to notify or consult if: 


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• The President has failed to consult in compliance with the 

consultation requirements of sections 4 through 6 of this bill; 

• The U.S. Trade Representative has failed to develop or 

meet the consultation guidelines required by section 4 of the 

bill; 

• The President has not met with the Congressional Advisory Groups on Negotiations pursuant to a request of the 

groups; or 

• The agreement or agreements at issue fail to make 

progress in achieving the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of the bill. 

The bill also states that trade authorities procedures shall not 

apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a trade 

agreement entered into under section 3(b) with a country to which 

the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking (as set 

forth in section 108 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 

2000 (22 U.S.C. 7106)) are applicable and the government of which 

does not fully comply with such standards and is not making significant efforts to bring the country into compliance, as determined 

in the most recent annual report on trafficking in persons submitted under section 110(b)(1) of the Trafficking Victims Protection 

Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)(1)). 

Section 6(c) affirms that the provisions for withdrawal of trade 

authorities procedures contained here and elsewhere in the bill are 

adopted pursuant to the constitutional authority of each House of 

Congress to determine the rules of its proceedings and to change 

those rules as it deems appropriate. 

Section 7. Treatment of certain trade agreements for which negotiations have already begun 

Section 7 provides that the requirements (set forth in section 

4(a)) that the President notify and consult with Committees of jurisdiction in Congress before initiating trade agreement negotiations do not apply to certain negotiations already underway at date 

of enactment. Specifically, the pre-negotiation notice and consultation requirements do not apply to negotiations commenced before 

enactment of the present bill. This section applies to agreements 

(1) entered into under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, (2) entered into with the Trans-Pacific Partnership countries, 

(3) entered into with the European Union, (4) entered into with respect to international trade in services entered into with WTO 

members, or (5) with respect to environmental goods entered into 

with WTO members. 

Since the foregoing negotiations already have commenced, the 

absence of the formal notification and consultation that ordinarily 

would be required before initiating negotiations will not preclude 

trade authorities procedures from being applied with respect to 

these agreements. Similarly, failure to formally notify and consult 

with Congress before initiating these agreements cannot form the 

basis for a disapproval resolution under section 5(b)(1)(B). However, all notification and consultation requirements that apply after 

negotiations have commenced will apply with equal force to the negotiations commenced and specified above. 


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Section 8. Sovereignty 

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 

Act of 2015 specifies, for the first time, that no provision of any 

trade agreement entered into under trade authorities procedures 

that is inconsistent with the laws of the United States or any State 

or locality will have effect. Section 8 further states that no provision of any trade agreement entered into under trade authorities 

procedures will prevent the United States or any State or locality 

from amending or modifying the laws of the United States or any 

State or locality, and that dispute settlement proceedings shall 

have no binding effect on the law of the United States or any State 

or locality. 

Section 9. Interests of small businesses 

Section 9 expresses the sense of Congress that the United States 

Trade Representative should facilitate participation by small businesses in the trade negotiation process, and designates Assistant 

USTR for Small Business, Market Access, and Industrial Competitiveness in the Office of the United States Trade as responsible for 

ensuring the interests of small business in trade negotiations are 

considered. 

A. ADDENDUM

Hon. ORRIN G. HATCH, 

Chairman Committee on Finance, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN HATCH: I am writing to express strong support 

for the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation introduced last 

week. The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 is a critical step toward delivering high-quality 

trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T–TIP). 

The Administration shares the concerns of many in Congress 

about the currency policies of some of our major trading partners. 

We know that unfair and inappropriate currency polices have hurt 

our workers and firms. This is why the Treasury Department remains strongly engaged with our trading partners, both bilaterally 

and through the G–7, the G–20, and the IMF. These efforts are 

showing real results: in particular, China’s exchange rate is up 

nearly 30 percent on a real effective basis since 2010, and Japan 

has not intervened in the foreign exchange market for more than 

three years. Many Members of Congress and various stakeholders 

have made a strong case in favor of addressing currency in the context of trade agreements such as the TPP, and we support the current draft of the TPA that includes a strong currency negotiating 

objective. 

We are committed to continuing to work with you and with other 

Members of Congress to best address currency concerns through 

approaches that complement our ongoing engagement on currency 

issues and help to expand U.S. exports and the high-quality jobs 

associated with trade. 

In light of the currency objective that is included in the current 

TPA legislation, we began formal consultation with our TPP partners and had a number of these conversations last week during the 


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Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank. Our partners indicated a willingness to constructively discuss our concerns about inappropriate currency policies, providing an opportunity to work 

with them to develop an historic new approach to promote greater 

accountability. Nonetheless, all of the partners consulted have 

made clear that they will not support the introduction of enforceable currency provisions in the context of trade agreements, and 

specifically, the TPP. Our partners fear that a trade agreement 

with an enforceable currency discipline could constrain the ability 

of their monetary authorities to conduct appropriate macroeconomic policies, and that is a risk they are unwilling to take. 

We have a serious concern that in any trade negotiation other 

countries would insist that an enforceable currency provision be designed so it could be used to challenge legitimate U.S. monetary 

policy, an outcome we would find unacceptable. Seeking enforceable 

currency provisions would likely derail the conclusion of the TPP 

given the deep reservations held by our trading partners. As such, 

any amendment to TPA legislation requiring that the Administration only seek enforceable currency provisions as a principal negotiating objective would undermine our ability to successfully conclude a TPP negotiation. 

We also oppose the current legislation that would use the countervailing duty process to address currency undervaluation. The 

legislation raises questions about consistency with our international obligations, and other countries might pursue retaliatory 

measures that could hurt our exporters. Taking such a unilateral 

step would be counterproductive to our ongoing bilateral and multilateral engagement, as well as to our efforts to promote greater accountability on currency policies in the context of the TPP. 

We look forward to working with you to effectively address the 

currency issue in the context of our trade agreements. The passage 

of bipartisan TPA legislation will allow us to enter into trade 

agreements that expand opportunities for American businesses, 

create high-quality jobs, and further unlock the macroeconomic 

gains from expanded trade and investment. Reducing trade barriers and securing reforms abroad through well-crafted trade agreements benefit both U.S. economic competitiveness and global economic prosperity. 

Sincerely, 

JACOB J. LEW. 

V. VOTES OF THE COMMITTEE 

In compliance with paragraph 7(c) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the following statements are made concerning 

the roll call votes in the Committee’s consideration of S. 995. 

A. MOTION TO REPORT THE BILL 

S. 995, as amended, was ordered favorably reported on April 22, 

2015. The vote on the motion to report the bill was 20 to 6. 

Ayes: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, 

Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, Cantwell, 

Nelson, Carper, Cardin, Bennet, Warner. 

Nays: Burr, Schumer, Stabenow, Menendez, Brown, Casey. 


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B. VOTES ON AMENDMENTS 

Amendments offered to S. 995 were considered and disposed of 

as follows: 

(1) Senators Cardin, Portman, Cantwell, Schumer, Menendez, 

Warner, Casey, and Heller offered an amendment to include, with 

respect to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 

countries, a principal negotiating objective of the United States to 

discourage politically motivated actions to boycott, divest from, or 

sanction Israel or otherwise discourage commercial activity between the United States and Israel. The amendment was agreed to 

by a roll call vote, 26 ayes, 0 nays. 

Ayes: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi (proxy), Cornyn, 

Thune, Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller (proxy), 

Scott, Wyden, Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, Menendez 

(proxy), Carper, Cardin, Brown, Bennet, Casey, Warner. 

(2) Senators Portman, Stabenow, Burr, Brown, Casey, and Schumer offered an amendment to include as a principal negotiating objective of the United States with regard to currency exchange practices to target exchange rate intervention undertaken to gain advantage in trade by establishing in trade agreements enforceable 

rules against exchange rate manipulation, subject to the same dispute settlement and remedies as other enforceable obligations 

under the agreement. The amendment was defeated by a roll call 

vote, 11 ayes, 15 nays. 

Ayes: Grassley, Crapo, Enzi, Burr, Portman, Schumer, Stabenow, 

Menendez, Cardin, Brown, Casey. 

Nays: Hatch, Roberts, Cornyn, Thune, Isakson, Toomey, Coats, 

Heller, Scott, Wyden, Cantwell, Nelson, Carper, Bennet, Warner. 

(3) Senator Menendez offered an amendment to disallow the application of trade authorities procedures to trade agreements with 

countries included as a Tier III country on the State Department’s 

Trafficking in Persons Report. The amendment was agreed to by a 

roll call vote, 16 ayes, 10 nays. 

Ayes: Cornyn, Burr, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Wyden, Schumer 

(proxy), Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, 

Bennet, Casey, Warner. 

Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Thune, Isakson, 

Heller, Scott, Carper. 

(4) Senator Stabenow offered an amendment to disallow the application of trade authorities procedures to trade agreements with 

countries that engage in currency manipulation. The amendment 

was defeated by a roll call vote, 9 ayes, 17 nays. 

Ayes: Grassley, Burr, Portman, Schumer (proxy), Stabenow, 

Menendez, Cardin, Brown, Casey. 

Nays: Hatch, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, Isakson, 

Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, Cantwell, Nelson, Carper 

(proxy), Bennet, Warner. 

(5) Senators Stabenow, Cantwell, and Brown offered an amendment to include equal remuneration as a core labor standard. The 

amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 10 ayes, 16 nays. 

Ayes: Schumer (proxy), Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, Menendez, 

Cardin, Brown, Bennet, Casey, Warner. 


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Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, 

Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, Carper (proxy). 

(6) Senators Menendez and Brown offered an amendment to require parties to a trade agreement to implement measures to bring 

labor laws and regulations into compliance with the agreement before the agreement enters into force. The amendment was defeated 

by a roll call vote, 7 ayes, 19 nays. 

Ayes: Schumer, Stabenow, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, Bennet, 

Casey. 

Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo (proxy), Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, 

Thune, Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, 

Wyden, Cantwell, Nelson, Carper, Warner. 

(7) Senators Casey, Schumer, Stabenow, Menendez, Brown, and 

Cardin offered an amendment to disallow the application of trade 

authorities procedures to a trade agreement that would weaken, 

undermine or necessitate the waiver of the Buy American Act and 

the Buy America provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. The amendment was defeated by a voice vote. 

(8) Senator Brown offered an amendment to the principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign investment 

to strike language concerning investor-state dispute settlement. 

The amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 9 ayes, 17 nays. 

Ayes: Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, 

Brown, Bennet, Casey. 

Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo (proxy), Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, 

Thune, Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, 

Wyden, Carper, Warner. 

(9) Senators Brown, Menendez, Stabenow, Casey, and Schumer 

offered an amendment to prevent countries not already party to the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations from joining the negotiations without certification by Congress that the country meets the 

standards of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The 

amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 11 ayes, 15 nays. 

Ayes: Grassley, Portman, Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, 

Menendez, Cardin, Brown, Bennet, Casey. 

Nays: Hatch, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, Burr, Isakson, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, Carper, Warner. 

(10) Senator Menendez offered an amendment to the principal 

negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade in goods 

to provide that new trade agreements should avoid negative effects 

on existing value chains established under previous trade agreements. The amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 8 ayes, 18 

nays. 

Ayes: Schumer, Stabenow, Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, 

Bennet, Casey. 

Nays: Hatch, Grassley, Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, Thune, 

Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, 

Cantwell, Carper, Warner. 

(11) Senator Brown offered amendments, considered en bloc, to 

establish certain consultation requirements on automobiles, auto 

parts, and industrial products. The amendments were defeated by 

a roll call vote, 10 ayes, 16 nays. 

Ayes: Portman, Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Menendez, 

Cardin, Brown, Bennet, Casey, Warner. 


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Nays: Hatch, Grassley (proxy), Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, 

Thune, Burr, Isakson, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, Nelson, Carper. 

(12) Senator Brown offered an amendment to require that, in 

order for a trade agreement to be considered under trade authorities procedures, the Senate Finance Committee and the House 

Ways and Means Committee must certify that trade agreement 

achieves the negotiating objectives of the United States. The 

amendment was defeated by a roll call vote, 7 ayes, 19 nays. 

Ayes: Schumer, Stabenow, Cantwell, Menendez, Cardin, Brown, 

Casey. 

Nays: Hatch, Grassley (proxy), Crapo, Roberts, Enzi, Cornyn, 

Thune, Burr, Isakson, Portman, Toomey, Coats, Heller, Scott, 

Wyden, Nelson, Carper, Bennet, Warner. 

(13) Senator Cardin offered an amendment to establish as a principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to ensuring implementation of trade commitments and obligations by 

strengthening good governance, transparency, the effective operation of legal regimes and the rule of law of trading partners of the 

United States is through capacity building and other appropriate 

means, which are important parts of the broader effort to create 

more open democratic societies and to promote respect for internationally recognized human rights. The amendment was agreed to 

by voice vote. 

VI. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE BILL 

A. COMMITTEE ESTIMATES

In compliance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate and section 308 of the Congressional Budget 

and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as amended (the ‘‘Budget 

Act’’), the following statement is made concerning the estimated 

budget effects of the revenue provisions of the bill. 

Enacting S. 995 would have no budget impact. 

B. BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

Budget authority. In compliance with section 308(a)(1) of the 

Budget Act, the Committee states that no provision of the bill as 

reported involves new or increased budget authority. 

Tax expenditures. In compliance with section 308(a)(1) of the 

Budget Act, the Committee states that the bill will result in no 

change in tax expenditures. 

C. CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

In accordance with section 402 of the Budget Act, the Committee 

advises that the Congressional Budget Office has submitted the following statement on the budgetary impact of the bill. 


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APRIL 30, 2015. 

Hon. ORRIN G. HATCH, 

Chairman, Committee on Finance, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 995, the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Ann E. Futrell. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL, 

Director. 

Enclosure. 

S. 995—Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 

Act of 2015 would restore the President’s authority to enter into 

multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. The authority would 

be extended through July 1, 2018, with the possibility to extend for 

another three years at the President’s request. Pay-as-you-go procedures apply because enacting the legislation could affect revenues. 

Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending. 

The bill would authorize two different methods for the United 

States to enter into multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. 

First, the bill would reinstate a rarely used authority that would 

allow the President to reduce certain duty rates within specified 

limitations without further Congressional action. While this authority could result in a reduction in revenue, CBO has no basis 

for determining when or if the President would lower duty rates or 

the extent of such changes. Therefore, CBO cannot estimate the effect of enacting this provision. 

Second, the bill would restore the President’s authority to propose trade agreements under an expedited procedure for Congressional approval, often referred to as ‘‘fast track authority.’’ For such 

trade agreements, the Congress would not be able to amend the 

implementing legislation once it was introduced. Furthermore, as 

long as the President met statutory requirements concerning Congressional consultation during the negotiation process, the Congress would be required to act on the legislation following a strict 

timetable. CBO estimates that enacting this authority would not 

affect revenues or direct spending because future trade agreements 

would require the Congress to pass implementing legislation. 

In addition, implementing the legislation would affect spending 

subject to appropriation. Based on information from the U.S. International Trade Commission, CBO estimates that implementing the 

reporting requirements under the bill would cost less than 

$500,000 over the 2015–2020 period, assuming the availability of 

appropriated amounts. 

The bill also would amend current law regarding oversight and 

consultations during trade agreements. Specifically, the bill would 

require a number of consultations by the U.S. Trade Representative with congressional advisory committees regarding trade talks. 

According to the U.S. Trade Representative, this provision would 


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generally codify the agency’s current policy and practice. Thus, 

CBO estimates implementing these requirements would cost less 

than $500,000 over the 2015–2020 period. 

On April 29, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 

1890, the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, as ordered reported by the House Committee 

on Ways and Means on April 23, 2015. This bill contains similar 

language to that of H.R. 1890 and CBO’s estimates of the budgetary effects of the two pieces of legislation are the same. 

The bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Ann E. Futrell. The 

estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director for 

Budget Analysis. 

VII. REGULATORY IMPACT AND OTHER MATTERS 

In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee states that the bill will not significantly regulate any individuals or businesses, will not affect the 

personal privacy of individuals, and will result in no significant additional paperwork. 

The following information is provided in accordance with section 

423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 

104–4). The Committee has reviewed the provisions of S. 995 as approved by the Committee on April 22, 2015. In accordance with the 

requirements of Pub. L. No. 104–04, the Committee has determined that the bill contains no intergovernmental mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would not affect the budgets of state, local, 

or tribal governments. 


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VIII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HELLER 

One amendment of this report deserves further elaboration. On 

April 22, Senator Menendez’s #1 amendment to S.995 passed by a 

vote of 16–10. The amendment passed as a part of legislation to establish congressional trade negotiating objectives and enhanced 

consultation requirements for trade negotiations. 

As someone who offered an amendment that was included in the 

Senate-passed human trafficking legislation, the Justice for Victims 

of Trafficking Act, this is a very important issue to Nevadans. That 

being said, I do not believe human trafficking should be the sole 

litmus test on expedited consideration of trade legislation. I look 

forward to working with my colleagues on the most effective ways 

to eradicate human trafficking in all countries. 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN 

I have one additional comment regarding this bill. With respect 

the investment negotiating objectives, I note that it may be appropriate in some circumstances to limit the scope of remedies available to investors in certain sectors or products in the interest of 

public health, and the negotiating objectives in the bill with respect 

to investment do not exclude that possibility. This understanding 

is consistent with the overall negotiating objective requiring negotiators to take into account legitimate domestic objectives such as 

the protection of legitimate health or safety. 


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IX. MINORITY VIEWS 

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR BROWN, SENATOR CASEY, 

AND SENATOR STABENOW 

The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority provides fast track 

authority to the President for the purposes of completing the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, as well as other agreements. Together, TPP and 

TTIP account for more than 60 percent of the world’s gross domestic product and will have an enormous impact on the United States 

economy. It is critical that we get these agreements right. Unfortunately, the negotiating objectives in the underlying bill are insufficient, and the fast track process leaves little room for Congress to 

ensure our trade agreement will create jobs and grow wages for 

American workers. 

First, the negotiating objectives outlined in the bill are not mandatory. The bill stipulates only that the President ‘‘make progress 

in achieving’’ the negotiating objectives. As a result, the President 

is not required to negotiate an agreement that meets the priorities 

provided by Congress in the negotiating objectives. This is particularly convenient for the Administration with respect to TPP, for 

which negotiations are nearly complete. It is difficult to see how 

the priorities outlined by Congress in this bill could influence the 

trade talks at such a late stage. 

Second, the negotiating objectives are not strong enough, and efforts to strengthen them were blocked in committee. The labor and 

environment negotiating objective, for example, does not require 

U.S. trading partners to meet the labor and environmental standards before receiving the benefit of an agreement. This is of particular concern for TPP, which includes Vietnam where workers do 

not have the right to collectively bargain or choose their own representation. An amendment was offered in committee to ensure 

trading partners’ compliance before an agreement is implemented, 

but it was defeated. Another amendment was offered to ensure the 

labor standards reflected in the bill include equal remuneration. 

This amendment was defeated as well. 

The negotiating objective with respect to currency in the underlying bill is weak and does not specify that currency disciplines in 

an agreement must be enforceable and subject to the same dispute 

settlement provisions as all other provisions in the agreement. An 

amendment was offered in committee to strengthen the provision 

but it was not adopted. Diplomatic efforts to address currency manipulation have been woefully insufficient because they have not 

been accompanied by any enforcement mechanisms. The TPP 

agreement includes countries that have a history of manipulating 

their currencies, and there have been discussions about China joining the agreement in the future. Strong and enforceable currency 


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manipulation disciplines in TPP are necessary to ensure American 

workers and businesses compete on a level playing field. Without 

improvement, the negotiating objectives in the bill will not lead to 

strong and enforceable provisions in our trade agreements. And if 

the negotiating objectives are not mandatory, the President can 

continue to pick and choose which ones he or she tries to achieve. 

Third, the bill outlines a process by which trade agreements are 

to be considered in Congress, but this process relegates Congress’ 

role in trade negotiations to that of a rubber stamp. In exchange 

for giving up its right to amend a trade agreement, Congress receives some assurances that they will be consulted by the President. The details of these consultation requirements, however, are 

left to the United States Trade Representative in guidelines. In addition, the process does not obligate the President to consult adequately on all important issues before trade negotiations. For example, an amendment was offered in committee that would require 

the President to consult with Congress on industrial products and 

automobiles and auto parts before negotiations begin. This amendment would have brought pre-negotiation consultation requirements for those goods in line with agricultural goods. The amendment was defeated. The bill also allows the President to certify 

that the agreement has made progress in achieving Congress’ negotiating objectives. The President certainly will certify that the 

agreement he or she has negotiated has done so. An amendment 

was offered in committee that would have required Congress to certify that the negotiating objectives have been met, but it was not 

adopted. 

Lastly, the bill does not adequately address how future countries 

may join the TPP agreement. An amendment was offered in committee to require the House Ways and Means Committee and the 

Senate Finance Committee to certify that a potential TPP partner 

has met the standards of the agreement. The amendment also required both chambers of Congress to vote for that country to join 

the agreement. The amendment was defeated, and Congress’ role 

in evaluating China’s participation in TPP remains unclear. Underlying bill is the first trade promotion authority legislation that Congress has considered in 13 years, and the TPP agreement is the 

largest agreement the U.S. has ever negotiated. Careful consideration of fast track procedures, the negotiating objectives, and Congress’ role in trade authority is needed to ensure TPP and TTIP are 

high standard agreements that create a level playing field for 

American businesses and workers. Unfortunately, efforts to 

strengthen the negotiating objective and expand Congress’ role in 

trade negotiations were not accepted. As a result, the underlying 

bill will allow for expedited consideration of trade agreements that 

will further erode the American middle class. 


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X. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS 

REPORTED 

In the opinion of the Committee, in order to expedite the business of the Senate, it is necessary to dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 

Senate (relating to the showing of changes in existing law made by 

the bill as reported by the Committee). 

Æ 


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