J-S05006-23

2023 PA Super 81

IN RE: PETITION OF J.G.F.

APPEAL OF: PENNSYLVANIA STATE 

POLICE

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 925 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered July 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at 

No(s): CC-22-00082

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: May 11, 2023

The Pennsylvania State Police (hereinafter “PSP”) appeals from the 

orphans’ court’s July 12, 2022 order granting Appellee’s, J.G.F., Petition to 

Vacate and Expunge Involuntary Civil Commitment Records and Restoration 

of Rights. After careful review, we reverse.

The PSP summarizes the pertinent facts and procedural history of this 

case, as follows:

On May 3, 2020, J.G.F. was involuntary committed to Western 

Psychiatric Institute and Clinic (hereinafter “WPIC”), pursuant to 

section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. § 7302 

(hereinafter “MHPA”), after an examination by Drs. Paul A. 

Valencia, MD[,] and Xixi Wong, MD[,] at the University of 

Pittsburgh Medical Center (hereinafter “UPMC”) and WPIC, 

respectively, in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. 

On March 22, 2022, J.G.F., by and through his counsel, filed a 

Petition to Vacate and Expunge Involuntary Civil Commitment and 

Restoration of Rights. In the Petition, J.G.F. generally alleged

[that] the evidence upon which the commitment occurred was 

insufficient and sought expungement of the records regarding his 
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involuntary commitment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2)

(hereinafter “section 6111.1(g)(2)”) and section 113 of the MHPA, 

50 P.S. § 7113 (hereafter “section 113 of the MHPA[”]). The final 

paragraph of the Petition requested that the [t]rial [c]ourt 

“[r]estore to petitioner any and all of his civil rights, which may

have been impaired as a result of the aforementioned involuntary 

commitment.”

A hearing was held on July 11, 2022. The PSP entered into 

evidence the certified record of the involuntary commitment of 

J.G.F. from May 3, 2020, upon stipulation.

During the hearing[,] J.G.F. testified as to the facts and 

circumstances surrounding the 302 commitment. No facts or 

testimony [were] produced about J.G.F.’s current mental stability 

or ability to possess a firearm without risk of harm to himself or 

others. 

After the close of testimony[, the] PSP argued [that,] pursuant to 

In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. ... 2017)[,] the [t]rial [c]ourt may 

only review what is contained within the certified 302 record[,] as 

section 6111.1(g)(2) reviews pose pure questions of law that

require no further testimony. [The] PSP further argued that any 

relief as to the restoration of firearms rights pursuant to section 

6105(f) [was] waived because [J.G.F.] failed to cite that authority 

and specifically plead for relief under that authority. Further, [the] 

PSP argued that [J.G.F.] provided “absolutely zero testimony ... as 

to why he is no longer a threat of harm to himself or others.”

Following the hearing, the [trial court] took the matter under 

advisement.... On July 12, 2022, the [t]rial [c]ourt signed an order 

granting expungement of the involuntary commitment and 

restor[ing] ... all civil rights that have been impaired[] as a result 

of the involuntary commitment. The [t]rial [c]ourt’s [o]rder was 

docketed July 18, 2022.

[The] PSP’s [n]otice of [a]ppeal was sent in for filing on August 

11, 2022, and docketed August 17, 2022. ... [T]he [t]rial [c]ourt

entered an [o]pinion dated October 14, 2022, and docketed 

October 17, 2022.

PSP’s Brief at 5-7 (citations to the reproduced record omitted).

In its brief, the PSP presents three issues for our review:
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1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in ordering the expungement of a record of involuntary 

commitment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2)[,] where the 

underlying facts, as recorded in the certified record, were 

sufficient to warrant an involuntary commitment under the 

[MHPA]?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering the restoration 

of firearms rights pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f) where [J.G.F.] 

failed to meet his burden in proving [he] was no longer a threat 

of harm to himself or others?

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit an error of law in ordering the 

restoration of firearm rights pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f) 

where [J.G.F.] waived such a request for relief by failing to 

specifically plead for that relief in his original petition?

Id. at 4.1

Before addressing the PSP’s issues, we begin by setting forth the legal 

framework governing the issues before us in this case. Our Supreme Court 

has explained:

The legislature enacted Pennsylvania’s [MHPA], 50 P.S. §§ 7101–

7503, to establish procedures “to assure the availability of 

adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill.” 50 P.S. § 

7102. The MHPA’s provisions “shall be interpreted in conformity 

with the principles of due process to make voluntary and 

involuntary treatment available where the need is great and its 

absence could result in serious harm to the mentally ill person or 

to others.” Id. One treatment option the MHPA governs is 

involuntary emergency examination and treatment, commonly 

referred to as a “302 commitment.” See 50 P.S. § 7302. Section 

302 of the MHPA provides that an involuntary emergency 

examination of a person may occur upon a physician’s 

certification. 50 P.S. § 7302(b). If the examining physician 

determines “that the person is severely mentally disabled and in 

need of emergency treatment, treatment shall be begun 

immediately” and may continue for up to 120 hours. 50 P.S. § 

7302(b), (d); see also 50 P.S. § 7301(a) (providing a person who 

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1 We note that J.G.F. did not file an appellee’s brief in this case.
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is “severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment” may be 

subject to “involuntary emergency examination and treatment”).

Section 301 further provides that a person is “severely mentally 

disabled” when mental illness causes the person’s “capacity to 

exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of 

his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs 

is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm 

to others or to himself[.]” 50 P.S. § 7301(a). Section 301(b)(1) 

lists the following criteria for showing a person is a clear and 

present danger of harm to others:

(b) Determination of Clear and Present Danger.--(1) 

Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by 

establishing that within the past 30 days the person has 

inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on 

another and that there is a reasonable probability that such 

conduct will be repeated. If, however, the person has been 

found incompetent to be tried or has been acquitted by 

reason of lack of criminal responsibility on charges arising 

from conduct involving infliction of or attempt to inflict 

substantial bodily harm on another, such 30-day limitation 

shall not apply so long as an application for examination and 

treatment is filed within 30 days after the date of such 

determination or verdict. In such case, a clear and present 

danger to others may be shown by establishing that the 

conduct charged in the criminal proceeding did occur, and 

that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will 

be repeated. For the purpose of this section, a clear and 

present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by 

proof that the person has made threats of harm and has 

committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1).1

1 Section 301(b)(2) contains the criteria for determining that 

a person is a danger to himself or herself:

(2) Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown by 

establishing that within the past 30 days:

(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence 

that he would be unable, without care, supervision 

and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his 

need for nourishment, personal or medical care, 

shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that there 
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is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily 

injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue 

within 30 days unless adequate treatment were 

afforded under this act; or

(ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there is 

the reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate 

treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes 

of this subsection, a clear and present danger may be 

demonstrated by the proof that the person has made 

threats to commit suicide and has committed acts 

which are in furtherance of the threat to commit 

suicide; or

(iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or 

attempted to mutilate himself substantially and that 

there is the reasonable probability of mutilation unless 

adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the 

purposes of this subsection, a clear and present 

danger shall be established by proof that the person 

has made threats to commit mutilation and has 

committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat 

to commit mutilation.

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2).

The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (UFA), 18 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 6101–6128, makes it unlawful for a person who has been 

involuntarily committed under Section 302 to “possess, use, 

control, sell, transfer or manufacture” a firearm or to obtain a 

license to conduct any of those activities. 18 Pa.C.S. § 

6105(a)(1), (c)(4). However, the UFA provides two ways for the 

subject of a 302 commitment to obtain relief from the Section 

6105(a)(1) firearm restrictions. [The first means] is a courtordered expungement of the 302 commitment record under 

Section 6111.1(g)(2), which provides:

(g) Review by court.—

* * *

(2) A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant 

to section 302 of the [MHPA] may petition the court 

to review the sufficiency of the evidence upon which 

the commitment was based. If the court determines 

that the evidence upon which the involuntary 

commitment was based was insufficient, the court 
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shall order that the record of the commitment 

submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police be 

expunged. A petition filed under this subsection shall 

toll the 60-day period set forth under section 

6105(a)(2).

18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2).

In re B.W., 250 A.3d 1163, 1165–67 (Pa. 2021) (one footnote omitted).

In this case, the PSP first argues that the orphans’ court abused its 

discretion in finding the evidence insufficient to support J.G.F.’s involuntary 

commitment. According to the PSP, the court erroneously conducted a de 

novo hearing, and then considered J.G.F.’s testimony at that proceeding in 

concluding the evidence was insufficient. The PSP insists that our Supreme 

Court in Vencil limited a sufficiency review in an involuntary commitment case

to the certified record and the facts known to the physicians at the time of the 

involuntary commitment. Because, here, the court instead considered J.G.F.’s 

hearing testimony in reaching its decision to expunge his involuntary 

commitment record, the PSP concludes that the “[c]ourt misapplied the law 

and committed reversible error.” PSP’s Brief at 9. For the following reasons, 

we agree.

“We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for expunction for an 

abuse of its discretion.” A.M.M. v. Pa. State Police, 194 A.3d 1114, 1117 

(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). 

[Our Supreme] Court clarified the appropriate review of a Section 

6111.1(g)(2) petition to expunge a 302 commitment record based 

on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 302 commitment 

in ... Vencil...:
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Under section 6111.1(g)(2), a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support a 302 commitment presents a 

pure question of law, and the court’s sole concern is 

whether, based on the findings recorded by the physician 

and the information he or she relied upon in arriving at those 

findings, the precise, legislatively-defined prerequisites for 

a 302 commitment have been satisfied and are supported 

by a preponderance of the evidence. We emphasize that 

the trial court’s review is limited to the findings 

recorded by the physician and the information he or 

she relied upon in arriving at those findings, and 

requires deference to the physician, as the original 

factfinder, as the physician examined and evaluated the 

individual in the first instance, was able to observe his or 

her demeanor, and has particularized training, knowledge 

and experience regarding whether a 302 commitment is 

medically necessary.

Vencil, 152 A.3d at 246 (rejecting de novo review subject to clear 

and convincing burden of proof for [s]ection 6111.1(g)(2) 

petitions).

Genits v. Commonwealth, No. 191 EDA 2021, unpublished memorandum 

at *4 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 8, 2021) (quoting B.W., 250 A.3d at 1167)

(emphasis added). 

Thus, it is clear that,

[s]ection 6111.1(g)(2) requires judicial review of “the sufficiency 

of the evidence upon which the commitment was based.” 18 

Pa.C.S.[] § 6111.1(g)(2) (emphasis added). “[T]he evidence 

upon which the commitment was based” is the information 

contained in the physician’s record of the examination of the 

individual and the resultant findings. See 50 P.S. § 7302(b) 

(requiring the physician to make a record of the examination and 

his or her findings). Therefore, the plain language of section 

6111.1(g)(2) directs a trial court to review the physician’s 

findings, made at the time of the commitment, to determine 

whether the evidence known by the physician at the time, as 

contained in the contemporaneously-created record, supports the 

conclusion that the individual required commitment under one (or 

more) of the specific, statutorily-defined circumstances. See 50 

P.S. § 7301.
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Vencil, 152 A.3d at 242. “[T]he appropriate standard of proof applicable to 

the physician’s record findings is a preponderance of the evidence standard, 

which is generally applicable to civil matters and has been classified as ‘a more 

likely than not inquiry,’ supported by the greater weight of the evidence; 

something a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a 

decision.” Id. at 246 (citations omitted).

In the instant case, the orphans’ court summarized the evidence 

presented at the hearing on J.G.F.’s petition to expunge, as follows:

[J.G.F.] testified that, on May 3, 2020, he had stopped at a 

convenience store in Monroeville and, while there, purchased and 

drank [a] blended drink of ice tea and beer. According to [J.G.F.], 

he became lightheaded from the drink, and, suspecting that the 

drink may have been tainted, he requested and received a ride 

from Monroeville Police to UPMC East Hospital for drug testing. At 

some point after arriving at the hospital emergency room, [J.G.F.]

made a request to use a restroom. That request was answered 

by a directive from two UPMC police officers that [J.G.F.] remain 

in the emergency room and use a urinal bottle. [J.G.F.] complied, 

but asserts that, as he did so, the officers “started laughing at me 

really hard.” [J.G.F.] reacted by throwing the container at one of 

the police officers and, as the second officer approached, striking 

that officer. [J.G.F.] avers, however, that the contact with the 

second officer was accidental. Following the outburst, [J.G.F.] was 

sedated, placed in restraints, and transported to UPMC Western 

Psychiatric Hospital (“WPIC”), where he remained for three days.

The report entered by the referring physician at UPMC East 

Hospital described [J.G.F.] as “delusional, possibly paranoid, 

believing someone is poisoning his beer, that someone killed his 

dog and raped his girlfriend[.”] The report stated that [J.G.F.]

“threw urine at staff and [was] physically and verbally abusive[,”]

and that [J.G.F.] “likely will require inpatient treatment, including 

medication and therapy.”

At WPIC, [J.G.F.] was examined by Dr. Xixi Wong. Dr. Wong 

found [J.G.F.] to be “calm and cooperative” and stated that 

[J.G.F.] understood the patients’ rights which were recited to him. 
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The justification entered for involuntary treatment was “an acute 

medical crisis in the emergency room.” The proposed course of 

treatment was “further evaluation, treatment and stabilization.” 

[J.G.F.] has testified, that, apart from an initial injection of Haldol 

administered at UPMC East Hospital, he received no treatment at 

either facility: “No medication. No nothing. I was released after 

72 hours.” [J.G.F.] testified that he met with a doctor at WPIC 

only twice, upon admission and at discharge.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/17/22, at 3-4 (citations to the record omitted).

Ultimately, the court determined that J.G.F.’s “own testimony set forth 

a credible account of events which asserted that his outburst at the UPMC East 

facility had resulted from the humiliation of being observed and laughed at as 

he was compelled to urinate publicly into [a] container.” Id. at 4. In rejecting 

the PSP’s allegation that the evidence was sufficient to support J.G.F.’s 

involuntary commitment, the court explained:

A difficulty with the [PSP’s] contention that the certified record 

provides sufficient evidence to have warranted an involuntary 

commitment pursuant to [s]ection 302 of the [MHPA] is that 

[J.G.F.] has testified that, although he was referred to 

WPIC, little was provided at that facility by way of 

examination or treatment: “they took me at 6:30 in the

morning to [WPIC] and I was there for three days. No 

medication. No nothing. I was released after 72 hours[.”]

Consistent with [J.G.F.’s] assertion, an examination of the WPIC 

record discloses that [J.G.F.] understood the rights explained to 

him, and indicates no course of further treatment.

Contrary to the contention made by the [PSP] during crossexamination that [J.G.F.] had asserted that “everything in the 302 

is just incorrect[,” J.G.F.] acknowledged that he had responded in 

an aggressive manner toward the UPMC police, throwing the 

container of urine toward them. [J.G.F.] acknowledged the 

conduct that had precipitated the 302 referral and the account 

of events as described by [J.G.F.] were found to be 

credible. Given that account of events, and the sparse WPIC 

record, it was determined that the evidence upon which the 

involuntary commitment was based was insufficient.
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Id. at 5 (emphasis added).

It is obvious from the emphasized language of the court that, in 

assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support J.G.F.’s involuntary 

commitment, it considered his testimony at the hearing on his petition to 

expunge. From that testimony, which the court found credible, it concluded 

that his involuntary commitment was unnecessary based, at least in part, on 

his statements that he was not thoroughly examined or provided any 

treatment during his 72-hour commitment. Because the orphans’ court clearly 

did not limit its review to the facts known to the physicians at the time they 

ordered J.G.F.’s involuntary commitment, the court abused its discretion in 

finding the evidence insufficient to support his involuntary commitment.

Instead, we agree with the PSP that the information contained in the 

physicians’ records of their examinations of J.G.F. and their resultant findings

were sufficient to support his involuntary commitment by a preponderance of 

the evidence. As the PSP summarizes:

In looking at the certified record, PSP Exhibit A ([reproduced 

record] 35-55), as required under Vencil, it is clear that sufficient 

evidence existed for an involuntary commitment. The first section 

302 application at UPMC was made because [J.G.F.] was unable

to care for himself unless adequate treatment was afforded to

him. The application states that [J.G.F.] was brought to UPMC 

East by EMS because of his belief that someone had poisoned his 

water and his demand to speak to police. It further states [J.G.F.]

stated someone had killed his dog and raped his girlfriend. It also 

states that he threw urine and became physically combative with 

staff requiring restraints. Dr. Paul A. Valencia found [J.G.F.] to be 

“delusional,” “paranoid,” and a “potential harm to others as he 

threw urine at staff and [was] physically and verbally abusive.” 

Dr. Valencia ultimately found [J.G.F.] severely mentally disabled 
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and in need of treatment by checking box A on Part VI Physician’s 

Examination of the certified record. 

Once transferred to WPIC, [J.G.F.] was re-evaluated by Dr. Xixi 

Wong. Dr. Wong checked a box indicating that [J.G.F.] was in an 

acute medical crisis in the emergency room justifying the need for 

involuntary treatment. Dr. Wong further noted that [J.G.F.] was 

“calm, cooperative, states that he is on 302 [because] he wanted 

covid testing” and needed “acute inpatient psych admission for

further evaluation, treatment and stabilization.” Dr. Wong 

ultimately also found the [J.G.F.] to be severely mentally disabled 

and in need of treatment by checking box A on Part VI Physician’s 

Examination of the certified record. 

Two separate physicians at two separate facilities examined the 

[J.G.F.] and found him to be in need of involuntary treatment. 

Each physician’s decision must be afforded great deference due to 

their experience and training. It is clear through their

observations that [J.G.F.] was in the midst of a mental health 

crisis evidenced by his delusional and paranoid thoughts 

concerning someone poisoning his water, killing his dog, and 

raping his girlfriend. Further, he did not understand why he was

being 302’d at UPMC, evidenced by him telling the doctor at WPIC 

[that] the 302 was based on [J.G.F.’s] desire to have covid testing. 

Additionally, [J.G.F.] also became physically combative and 

verbally abusive to the officers and security at UPMC and even 

threw urine on them. [J.G.F.’s] actions meet the definition of

being severely mentally disabled because his actions and thoughts 

show his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion 

in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his 

own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and 

present danger of harm to others or himself.

PSP’s Brief at 14-16.

According the appropriate deference to the two physicians who 

examined J.G.F., we conclude that the preponderance of the evidence 

supports their decisions that he was having a mental health crisis that 

impaired his “capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the 

conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal 
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needs[,]” such that he posed “a clear and present danger of harm to others 

or to himself[.]” 50 P.S. § 7301(a). Thus, we reverse the orphans’ court’s 

order granting J.G.F.’s petition to expunge the record of his involuntary 

commitment and reinstating his civil rights that were impaired by that 

commitment.2

Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/11/2023

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2 Based on our disposition, we need not address PSP’s remaining two issues.