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“Horrific as the violence since 

mid-December has been, the 

crisis also presents an opportunity 

to address unresolved issues and 

put South Sudan back on the path 

of democratization, good governance and peace – a path from 

which it deviated well before the 

current crisis.”

January 8, 2014

Princeton N. Lyman Crisis and Opportunity in South Sudan E-mail: plyman@usip.org 

Jon Temin

E-mail: jtemin@usip.org 

Susan Stigant

E-mail: sstigant@usip.org 

peaceBrieF164

Summary

•	 Ongoing negotiationsto end the South Sudan crisis cannotsimply return the country to the

previousstatus quo. For lasting peace, the negotiating parties and mediators will need to reach

beyond national political elites and those bearing arms and invite active involvement of the

international community.

•	 South Sudan needsto build national cohesion and addressfundamental issues of governance,

democracy, and human rights. Restarting the stalled constitution-making process presents an

opportunity to achieve these objectives.

•	 Following negotiations, a broad-based, inclusive, interim government that includes a degree

of joint South Sudanese-international community administration and managementshould

govern and ensure preparationsfor new elections.

Introduction

Only two and a half yearsremoved from its birth, South Sudan isin crisis. A political dispute

between President Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar, hisformer vice president, has quickly taken on

ethnic overtones and escalated into widespread fighting, with dire consequences. The exuberance

and optimism that accompanied independence is all but lost. In its place isfear of another failed

state and civil war in the heart of Africa.

Negotiations between delegationsrepresenting President Kiir and Dr. Machar have started

in Ethiopia under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an

organization of eight East African countries. The negotiations have so far focused on securing a

ceasefire, a positive firststep to bring an immediate end to the killing, destruction, and displacement. But thisis only the first of many steps. Horrific asthe violence since mid-December has

been, the crisis also presents an opportunity to address unresolved issues and put South Sudan

back on the path of democratization, good governance and peace—a path from which it deviated

well before the current crisis.

First Principles

The negotiationsshould be guided by three core principles.

• First, there cannot be a simple return to the previous status quo. Too much blood has been

spilled, and the status quo will not solve the underlying problems that led to the crisis.

Indeed, no short-term agreement will be sufficient if it does not lead to a longer process
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Crisis and Opportunity in South Sudan

page 2 • PB 164 • January 8, 2014

that addresses the underlying problems in South Sudan’s political system and chart a future

that will be acceptable to most parties. A return to the status quo, in either the government

or leading political party, only invites repeated failure. 

• Second, the negotiationsshould reach beyond national political elites and those bearing

arms. State-level officials must be consulted, engaged and informed about the agenda,

issues and optionsfor agreement. Members of parliament ought to be briefed regularly and

encouraged (and supported by international partners) to update their constituents. Civil

society should have a robust role,serving as a mechanism for citizen input to negotiators and

mediators and monitoring deliberations. Regular press conferences are needed to inform

media so that radio, newspapers, and social media can help to quell misinformation and

rumor, rather than incite violence. Youth and women must be present and heard from. A narrow bargain among elites, which has been the standard practice in negotiationsin Sudan and

South Sudan, only perpetuatesthe exclusionary and corrupt politicsthat are one cause of the

crisis, and will inevitably lead to future crises. The constitution-making processis one way to

move beyond the pattern of elite deal-making—provided that the mediators encourage this

as part of the talks.

• Third, the international community must play an active role in helping to define the longterm process crafted during negotiations and be a substantive participant in it. Governments, regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations and concerned individuals

around the world have been seized by the crisis and responded with relative haste. A major

increase in U.N. peacekeepers is in the works, more than 60,000 South Sudanese are under

U.N. protection, and the costs of picking up the pieces of the economy and restoring stability will fall heavily on donors. South Sudan’s history, notably the extensive international

support for its people’s right to self-determination and pressure on Khartoum to accept the

referendum result, also sets it apart from other fragile states. This history places additional

responsibilities on the international community (especially the United States, given its

strong support for South Sudan), and puts an additional onus on South Sudan to constructively engage the outside world. The international community, as guarantors, monitors,

donors, advisors and mentors, must insist that it be a constructive party to how this conflict

is brought under control and South Sudan’s future is defined.

Constitution Making

The process of developing a permanent constitution hasthe potential to be a vehicle for nation

building and reform in South Sudan. Work on the constitution has been stalled forsome time.

Reasonsfor the delay included inadequate funds due to austerity measures, a hands-off approach

by the political leadership who had come under criticism for how they developed the Transitional

Constitution and who demonstrated little commitment, and significant constraints on media, civil

society, and“opposition”voices which in turn impaired effortsto initiate education and dialogue.

As a result, international donors and partners hesitated to commitsupport, which only compounded the financial gaps and absence of an effective political champion.

Thisfailure presents an opportunity, and revitalizing and reforming the moribund constitutionmaking processshould be a South Sudanese and international priority. The parties need to renew

their commitment to a constitution-making processthat models democratic principles and sets

the stage for peaceful, credible elections. For thisto happen, there must be sufficient resources

and support. And there must be an understanding that constitution-making is notstrictly a technical exercise. Rather, constitution making should be a vehicle to define a national vision, forge a
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Crisis and Opportunity in South Sudan

page 3 • PB 164 • January 8, 2014

national identity, and rebuild trust between citizens and leaders, among citizens and between

communities. Through nationwide civic education, consultations and dialogue, South Sudanese

must be encouraged to freely discussfundamental principles: how powers are shared between

the national,state and local governments; how freedoms and human rights are guaranteed and

protected; how financial resources are raised and shared (especially sharing of oil proceeds across

states); principlesfor multiparty politics and internal party processes; and how powers are divided

acrossthe executive, parliament and judicial branches of government to ensure accountability.

Questions of term limits, rotating leadership,sequencing and timing of elections and other ideas

should also be debated.

The process cannotsucceed without fundamental changes. The National Constitution Review

Commission haslittle to show after two years, and the continued efforts by individualstaff and

members will not bear fruit withoutsignificantstructural reforms. Negotiatorsshould look to the

2011 referendum as a model of an effective process. For example, negotiatorsshould ask: Does

the current constitution-drafting body enjoy the trust, respect and relationships(within South

Sudan and with international partners) as did the Southern Sudan Referendum Committee (SSRC),

which was ably chaired by Chief Justice Chan Reec Madut? Doesthe commission have clear counterparts and sufficient gravitasto negotiate a balance between independence from the executive

and cooperation with the government, as did the SSRC? 

Negotiatorsshould also consider proposing a constitutional amendmentto make the process more

people-centered.This could be achieved by extending the period forthe national constitutional conference, guaranteeing participation by state and localrepresentatives and providing for adoption through

a popularreferendum.Any proposed amendmentshould be introduced according to law, debated by

parliament, and subjectto popularinput.Given their positive relations with South Sudan, SouthAfrica

and Kenya may be able to provide advice on and supportto such a process.

The constitution should also incorporate a clear commitment to accountability and mechanisms

to investigate, document, and address alleged human rights violations and atrocities. Accountability has been brushed aside in all of Sudan’s previous peace agreements, including the celebrated

Comprehensive Peace Agreement. If that happens again, many South Sudanese, especially victims

of politically-motivated violence, willsee any new agreement and constitution as business as usual,

and the process will again result in failure and violence. There are many possible models, among

them truth commissions, trials, reparations, and hybrid or international courts. The negotiating

partiesshould commit to supporting the design and implementation of a fair, transparent and

legitimate process. Further, negotiating parties and mediatorsshould consider whether individuals

who fail to subject themselvesto the agreed authority and procedures—as witnesses, victims or

alleged perpetrators – should be excluded from participating in government for a period or face

othersanctions. For its part, the African Union and broader international community should insist

on accountability mechanismsthat have credibility with the South Sudanese population. 

Finally, international experts and advisorsshould have a formal role in the constitution-making

process. There issome precedent forsignificant international participation in a country’s constitution

making. Namibia’s constitution was developed with international participation as a prelude to its

independence. Kenya invited two international expertsto serve on the committee that prepared the

constitution for the 2010 referendum following the 2008-2009 post-election violence. The circumstancesin South Sudan are different than those in Namibia and Kenya. Nonetheless, international

participation in South Sudan could complement (and should support) national expertise and robust

civilsociety engagement to prevent elite deal-making that ignoresthe interests of the general public

and build confidence among various communities about the process—and even the outcome.
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Crisis and Opportunity in South Sudan

page 4 • PB 164 • January 8, 2014

The Interim Phase

If the negotiating parties are assured that the constitution-making process will addresstheir fundamental concerns, then negotiationsshould turn to how South Sudan should be governed between

now and the next elections, currently slated for 2015. These conversationsshould address who

governs, how decisions are made, and what other transformation processes need to be prioritized.

It is unlikely that President Kiir would agree to step down as part of any agreement, nor would

that be the likely position of international mediators. He isthe elected president. But there could

be agreement on a broad-based government of national unity until the next elections. The interim

governmentshould be broadly representative of ethnic groups, geography, and political leaders,

including some of the senior politicians of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) detained when the crisis erupted.

 

Drawing on the GEMAP model and othersimilar experiences, a joint South Sudan-international

community committee should be established to assessthe state of the oilsector, the economy, and

how damage from the current conflict will be addressed. The government in Juba should submit its

budget and plansfor approval to this committee. After this crisis, it would be a mistake to return to

budgeting and aid programs as before.

During the interim phase, a deliberate and sustained process of national reconciliation and

healing should be prioritized. A reconciliation process, led by the Church-based Committee for

National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation, was already underway before the crisis. The process

started in mid-2013 and has made cautious progressso far, and takes on greatly added importance

in the current context. At the same time, this process cannot be burdened by outsized expectations. 

Any reconciliation processshould be kept at arm’slength from the government, especially if the

government isseen by some asinstigating violence. Itshould benefit from external assistance and

support, but not be smothered by well-intentioned outsiders. The ongoing negotiationsshould address how the reconciliation process will interact with the constitution-making process, and solicit

commitmentsfrom all partiesto participate in, and never impede, reconciliation. Church leaders

should be brought into the negotiations at the appropriate stage to ensure that the reconciliation

processis protected and prioritized. As with constitution making, thisis an area where South African

expertise and experience can be valuable.

Another major task during the interim phase will be standing down of military activity on all

sides. Ending fighting and providing humanitarian access on the ground – both of which should

be agreed to at the start of negotiations – have to be the firststeps. Eventually there must be

reintegration of divided military unitsinto the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and, over time,

a thorough disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process. But this can only succeed in

the context of the political processes discussed above. In the interim, the enlarged U.N. Mission

in South Sudan (UNMISS)should assume a greater role monitoring any ceasefire and protecting

civilians.
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Crisis and Opportunity in South Sudan

page 5 • PB 164 • January 8, 2014

Asthe ruling party, the SPLM leadership must commit to undertaking significant internal

reformsto overcome the weaknessesrevealed in the current conflict. An interim party leadership

structure and bodies will need to be formed until a new convention can be held. Nomination

proceduresfor candidatesfor local,state, and national positions need to be freely debated. Regular

communication between the local bodies,secretariat, and leadership structures need to be

implemented. Focus needsto shift from competition over titlesto tolerating – and encouraging –

constructive policy debate, open dialogue, and productive dissent both within the SPLM and with

other parties. And if visionsfor the future of the party and its policies cannot be reconciled, the

negotiating parties and mediators may need to consider reaching agreement on principles and a

processfor the peaceful dissolution of the SPLM and formation of new parties.

Most important, during the interim phase the governmentshould prioritize delivery ofservices

and addressing the basic needs of South Sudanese. South Sudan cannot afford to wait to rebuild

and improve the lives of citizens.Only by building roads, providing clean water, training teachers,

and ensuring primary health care can the civilservice and government begin to foster the trust of

its citizens and rebuild society and the economy.Without development and security, people will not

have the luxury to think, much less debate, about their constitution and future. And without a state

that can deliver, South Sudanese will continue to depend on ethnic allegiancesrather than a strong

national identity.

About This Brief

This brief analyzes the crisis in 

South Sudan and strategies for 

building lasting peace in the young 

country. Ambassador Princeton 

N. Lyman is a special advisor to 

the president of the United States 

Institute of Peace and the former 

United States Special Envoy to 

Sudan and South Sudan. Jon Temin 

is the director of the Africa program 

at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Susan 

Stigant is a senior program officer 

at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The 

views expressed here are those of 

the authors, and do not necessarily 

reflect the view of the U.S. Institute 

of Peace, which does not take 

policy positions.