U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

93–712 PDF 2015

EXAMINING NEW EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION: ARE 

NEW ADMINISTRATION POLICIES PUTTING 

AMERICANS OVERSEAS IN DANGER? 

HEARING 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 10, 2014 

Serial No. 113–159 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

Vacancy 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN CASTOR, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 10, 2014 ............................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Ms. Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operation, U.S. 

Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 10 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12 

Ms. Casey Jones 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 18 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20 

The Hon. Grant S. Green, Jr. 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 27 

APPENDIX 

Opening Statement, Rep. Elijah E. Cumming ...................................................... 74 

GAO report to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

and accompanying documents ............................................................................. 76 

6–23–14 letter to Hon. John F. Kerry from Mr. Issa and Mr. Chaffetz .............. 80 

Reponding to Committee Document Requests ...................................................... 86 

10-9-2007 letter to Condoleezza Rice, submitted by Mr. Cummings ................... 93 

Questions for the record by Mr. Chaffetz to Ms. Muniz ....................................... 103 

Questions for the record by Mr. Walberg to Ms. Muniz ....................................... 106 

‘‘Guide to Design Excellence,’’ submitted by Mr. Chaffetz ................................... 110 

Questions for the record submitte by Mr. Mica to Ms. Muniz ............................. 148 

(1) 

EXAMINING NEW EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION: 

ARE NEW ADMINISTRATION POLICIES PUTTING AMERICANS OVERSEAS IN DANGER? 

Thursday, July 10, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, WASHINGTON, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Issa, Mica, Turner, Jordan, Chaffetz, 

Walberg, Lankford, Amash, Fartenthold, Woodall, Meadows, 

Bentivolio, DeSantis, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Tierney, Lynch, 

Connolly, Duckworth, Kelly, Welch, Horsford and Grisham. 

Staff present: Alexa Armstrong, Legislative Assistant; Brien 

Beattie, Professional Staff Member; Melissa Beaumont, Assistant 

Clerk; Richard Beutel, Senior Counsel; Molly Boyl, Deputy General 

Counsel and Parliamentarian; Sharon Casey, Senior Assistant 

Clerk; John Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director; Adam Fromm, Director of Member Services and Committee Operations; Linda Good, 

Chief Clerk; Tyler Grimm, Senior Professional Staff Member; Frederick Hill, Deputy Staff Director for Communications and Strategy; 

Caroline Ingram, Counsel; Jim Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor; Mark 

Marin, Deputy Staff Director for Oversight; Laura Rush, Deputy 

Chief Clerk; Andrew Shult, Deputy Digital Director; Rebecca Watkins, Communications Director; Sang Yi, Professional Staff Member; Jennifer Hoffman, Minority Communications Director; Chris 

Knauer, Minority Senior Investigator; Julia Krieger, Minority New 

Media Press Secretary; Juan McCullum, Minority Clerk; Dave 

Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; and Valerie Shen, Minority Counsel. 

Chairman ISSA. The committee will come to order. 

Today’s hearing, Examining New Embassy Construction, questioning, Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in Danger? 

The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform exists to 

secure two fundamental principles. First, Americans have a right 

to know that the money Washington takes from them is well spent, 

and second, Americans deserve an efficient, effective Government 

that works for them. 

Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold Government accountable to taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right 

to know what they get from their Government. It’s our job to work 
2 

tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to protect these 

rights and to deliver the facts to the American people and bring 

genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy. This is our mission 

Statement. 

Today we are examining the results of a Department of State 

2011 decision to transition from a successful program of standard 

embassy design, which stressed security, functionality, to a new 

undefined, loosely defined design excellence program, which has led 

to untimely delays in construction as well as increased cost. These 

delays put American diplomats and their staff in an unnecessary 

risk. Keeping them safe should be our primary priority. 

In response to the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, the State 

Department implemented sweeping reforms in the way it constructed new embassies and consulates overseas. Among these reforms are the development of a standard embassy design that could 

easily adapt for size and location, the use of design built contract 

delivery method, the implementation of performance management 

and strategic planning principles. These reforms produced an impressive record of successful overseas facilities construction, leading to embassies and consulates being well built on time and on 

budget and offering superior security. 

In 2001, the Government was only building an average of one 

new embassy per year. One new embassy means 200 years to replace all our embassies and consulates. By comparison, in 2006, following the implementation of the new reforms, the State Department Bureau of Overseas Building Operations, known as OBO, 

opened an unprecedented 14 new facilities. That same year, the 

independent Government Accountability Office, known as GAO, 

found that the construction time for embassy projects had been reduced from 69 months, basically 6 years nearly, to 36 months, 3 

years. In addition to reducing the amount of time required to build 

new embassies, GAO also found that the majority of standard embassy design projects it reviewed ended up costing significantly less 

than State Department cost estimates. 

The embassy construction program with standard embassy design at its core, went on to move a total of 32,000 overseas employees into secure facilities by 2013. Starting in 2011, however, the 

State Department decided that a working and efficient program 

wasn’t good enough, and although they will report that they maintained these tools in their toolbox, they have gone to a program 

known internally as Design Excellence. State maintains that the 

new initiative will incorporate the successes of standard embassy 

design while also allowing for more flexibility to adapt its buildings 

to unique environments. 

In reality, however, the committee has learned that under the 

current management, OBO has decided to transition away from 

standard embassy design programs in favor of a unique, 

architecturally sophisticated and more expensive embassies. Embassies look better and cost more. 

Through this move, this may be visually attractive. The new design process does not prioritize security, it prioritizes appearance. 

The new standards view security and safety as something that 

must be designed around and disguised rather than the first priority. 
3 

I am now going to play a short video featuring architects that 

was produced by the State Department about the Design Excellence Program. 

Please play the clip. 

[Video shown.] 

Chairman ISSA. I am sorry to have to say this, but were our diplomats in Benghazi murdered because their building felt hostile in 

its context and didn’t welcome the population there? They were 

vulnerable because they were in a non-standard, non-secure building, a building in which the refuge point was not designed safely, 

and Chris Stevens died likely of asphyxiation as a result of buying, 

renting an off-the-shelf facility by exception to the requirements for 

a consulate safety facilities. 

Did Americans die in the African embassy bombings because the 

buildings didn’t do enough, to have enough openness and balance 

of security? Are disguising security measures really a good strategy 

to deter terrorist attacks? In the post-September 11th world, is it 

disconcerting to hear State Department pushing these arguments? 

And the answer is yes. 

In May 2013, an internal State Department panel on Diplomatic 

Security organization and management, which arose out of 

Benghazi’s Accountability Review Board’s recommendations, issued 

a final report. In the report, the panel, which was chaired by 

former Under Secretary for Management, here today, Grant Green, 

raised concerns about Design Excellence Program. The panel found 

no evidence for a business case or cost-benefit analysis supporting 

Design Excellence Program. The panel also expressed concern that 

under Design Excellence, fewer facilities can be built over the same 

timeframe, which could leave U.S. Government personnel exposed 

to inadequate facilities for longer periods of time. 

Losing momentum in construction of new or more secured facilities on time and at a reasonable cost would leave U.S. Government 

employees in harm’s way and expose taxpayers to unnecessary fiscal risk. 

OBO received $2.65 billion in Fiscal Year 2014 for embassy security and construction and maintenance, a significant increase over 

prior years, but how many embassies you build is how many you— 

large a figure you divide into that amount. 

When the department requested and Congress granted a budget 

increase, it was based on Stated need to construct new secure facilities, not to produce more architecturally pleasing ones. 

Today, we are conducting oversight of the State Department’s 

Design Excellence Program. Though we have made meaningful and 

very specific document requests to the State Department, to date 

the department has delivered a—has not delivered a single document, and this is unprecedented. 

Today, we are today here to examine whether OBO has proper 

management and program in place to preserve the tremendous 

gains made under the standard embassy design Program in securing U.S. Diplomats and their families overseas at a reasonable cost. 

In closing, you are not the people responsible, but people who are 

listening today and watching today at the State Department understand they have stonewalled our request, they have even used mail 

to disguise—ordinary mail to disguise and delay responses, and 
4 

this is contemptible. This is serious oversight of the Congress, over 

the very lives and safety of State Department employees. This committee is reaching the end of its rope with State Department stalling. 

You stalled on Benghazi, and 2 years after the tragic death, we 

only learned that, in fact, State Department was complicit with the 

White House in attempting to disguise a false narrative as to how 

and why the consulate was attacked. 

You are not the messengers that will be shot, but understand, 

you may very well be back again and again as the documents that 

were requested finally come in. For that, I am truly sorry that you 

may come back here again and again, but if we do not receive documents that were requested in plenty of time, then much of your 

testimony today will be a first round and not, in fact, the definitive 

oversight that we expected do have. 

With that, I recognize the ranking member for his opening Statement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for holding this very important hearing. And I thank 

you, all of our witnesses, for being with us today. 

The horrific bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 

in 1998 were a watershed moment for our Nation. Following those 

attacks, the State Department reported that 80 percent of its overseas facilities did not, I repeat, did not meet security standards. 

Congress authorized billions of dollars to expedite embassy construction around the world. As part of this effort, the State Department’s Bureau of Overseas Building Operations launched the 

standard embassy design Initiative to promote the use of standardized designs of small, medium and large embassies. This program 

has been very successful in achieving its goals. Since the year 2000, 

the State Department has constructed 111 new buildings and more 

than 30,000 U.S. personnel—and moved more than 30,000 U.S. 

personnel into safer facilities. 

The program also has its limitations. The program, for example, 

typically requires large parcels of land, which sometimes result in 

buildings being constructed further from urban centers. Critics contend that this impairs U.S. diplomatic efforts overseas, it makes it 

harder for officials to conduct their work. As one commentator 

noted, the standard embassy design Initiative was, ‘‘an expedient 

solution to an urgent problem, but one that narrowly defined an 

embassy as a protected workplace and overlooked its larger representational role.’’ 

So we commend the tremendous progress made under the standard embassy design Initiative, but we must always ask whether we 

can do more. We must ask the question whether we can do better. 

On this committee in particular, we must ask how to make this 

program run even more efficiently and even more effectively. To 

me, there are three basic factors we must consider: one, security; 

two, cost; and three, function. 

In 2011, the Department launched a new embassy construction 

effort called Design Excellence. As I understand it, this effort aims 

to provide the same or better security at the same or lower cost 

while improving the ability of American officials overseas to do 

their jobs. This new program seeks to achieve these goals by being 
5 

more flexible than the current program. For example, by incorporating more customized designs rather than standard designs, 

the Department may be able to build on smaller or irregular lots. 

This may allow more embassies to be located in urban centers to 

improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our missions. 

These more flexible designs also may reduce costs, lower initial 

construction costs and lower long-term maintenance and operating 

costs. For example, the new U.S. embassy in London, although not 

constructed entirely under this new Design Excellence concept, 

shares many of its principles. According to the State Department, 

this new facility will be more secure than the existing embassy, it 

will be more functional and effective for our diplomatic missions, 

it will be completed on time, and it will be built at no cost to the 

United States taxpayer. This entire project is being funded through 

the proceeds of sales from existing U.S. properties there. 

The challenge with this program, however, is the lack of data. No 

embassies have been constructed to date based entirely on this new 

concept. The new embassy in Mexico City will be the first facility 

constructed from start to finish under this initiative, but it will not 

be completed until 2019 and according to Mr. Green, who’s testifying here today, the Department has not put together a comprehensive business case that analyzes the potential costs and benefits of this new program in detail. 

We all know what can happen with the lack of adequate planning. Under the previous administration, the new embassy constructed in Iraq went wildly over budget, came in well after the 

deadline, and was plagued with corrupt contractors. It ended up 

costing the American taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars 

more than it should have, and that money could have been used 

to secure other U.S. facilities and American personnel throughout 

the world. 

So as we evaluate the merits and drawbacks of this new effort, 

we must keep one goal at the top of our list: the security of our 

diplomatic officials serving overseas. 

Mr. Chaffetz, who serves as the chairman of our National Security subcommittee has asked whether this new initiative to customize diplomatic facilities could delay their completion; in other 

words, if customizing is slower than using standard designs? Does 

that keep our people in harms way longer as they wait for new secure buildings? I believe that this is a legitimate question and a 

legitimate concern, and I want to know from the Department what 

their answer is. 

Our diplomatic officials deserve the safest embassies in the world 

and they also deserve facilities that help them conduct U.S. foreign 

policy in the most effective and efficient manner possible. I truly 

believe that every member of this panel feels the same way. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I anxiously look forward to the 

testimony of our witnesses, and I yield back. 

Mr. MICA [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. 

I am pleased to recognize the chair of the National—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Prior to that, can I ask unanimous consent to introduce into the record a number of items? 
6 

Mr. MICA. Without objection, at this point, do you want to go 

ahead and State your—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I would. I would like to introduce into the record, 

the GAO report on embassy construction dated January 2001, another GAO report from November 2004, regarding embassy construction, an additional GAO report from June 2006 about embassy 

construction, the July 2010 GAO report, new embassy compounds. 

I would also like to enter into the record a letter that Chairman 

Issa and myself sent on June 23d, 2014, to Secretary Kerry requesting a series of documents that we have not yet received. I 

would also like to enter into the record the response from the State 

Department dated July 3d, which we actually received on July 8th 

of this year. 

And then the final document is the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Overseas Building Operations fact sheet: CBS News, Are 

Modern U.S. Embassies Becoming Too Costly to Build? They had 

issued a response to a couple news programs. I would like to enter 

that fact sheet back into the record as well. I would ask unanimous 

consent to do so. 

Mr. MICA. Without objection, the request is agreed to. 

Mr. MICA. And now I would like to recognize the gentleman from 

Utah for an opening Statement. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to be clear. This is the beginning of a series of hearings 

that I think are essential to figure out and get to the bottom of the 

truth of a situation that is—that thousands of Americans are facing 

with their mission and their service overseas. 

The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations’ core mission is to 

place American officials located overseas into safe, secure facilities 

as fast as possible. I would note for the record that the State Department budget, overall State Department budget since Fiscal 

Year 2008 has increased more than 58 percent, going from $17 billion to over $27 billion, and that security funding from Fiscal Year 

2008 to Fiscal Year 2014 has increased more than 100 percent. 

Prior to 2011 and Design Excellence, the Bureau seemed to be 

fulfilling its core mission, constructing secure overseas facilities 

both quickly and effectively; not only that, they were doing it on 

time and on budget, yet in 2011, OBO decided to take this rare 

government success story and replace it. The new program focuses 

instead on constructing fancy buildings to enhance the U.S. reputation around the world, all the while, many Americans are still 

waiting for their new secure facilities. 

Hailed as Design Excellence, the Bureau has subscribed to a 

view that fancy buildings equal successful diplomacy, that officials 

serving overseas and those whom they serve care first and foremost 

about aesthetics and that aesthetics alone can further U.S. diplomatic relations. 

Since the Bureau initiated the major overhaul of its overseas 

construction program 3 years ago, embassy construction has slowed 

significantly while construction costs have sky rocketed to millions 

over initial price tags. Long awaited facilities in less secure cities 

have been delayed for years, while American officials overseas, who 

devote their lives to furthering U.S. interests abroad must remain 
7 

in unsecured, dated structures awaiting State to construct safer facilities. 

Earlier this year I traveled to Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 

where I saw firsthand the ill effects of the Bureau’s new Design 

Initiative. There I saw an embassy construction project that was 

originally slated to cost $50 million, yet this has ballooned to a 

price tag of more than $200 million, all in the name of aesthetics. 

During my short visit, there was an attempted carjacking of an 

embassy staffer. This event, along with my conversations with foreign service officials stationed at Port Moresby, allowed me to see 

firsthand that having a fancy building is not high on their list of 

concerns. No one told me, ‘‘what we really need is a building that 

represents innovation, humanity and openness,’’ as Design Excellence purports. They wanted a facility that offered safety and security for themselves, their families and many visitors. 

Why the Department is allowing foreign service officials to remain in unsecured, dilapidated facilities at the price of aesthetics 

is beyond me. We had a chief of mission there who has tried to secure his people. They are in an old bank building. It is not secure. 

Those poor people, they work in an office, they have to have an 

armed guard take them from their living facilities to the embassy 

itself, that facility that by any standard is not properly secure. 

In a May 2013 internal State Department panel on Diplomatic 

Security organization and management, which was chaired by 

former Under Secretary for Management, Grant Green, issued its 

final report. The panel found no evidence of a business case or costbenefit analysis supporting Design Excellence. In short, the program has yet to produce results, but introduces significant risks to 

constructing facilities on time, on budget while moving officials 

overseas into secure facilities. 

Despite requesting—and to my ranking member and my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, we cannot do the work on 

either side of this aisle unless we get the documents and operate 

from the same set of facts. We issued a letter the third week of 

July—I am sorry, third week of June asking for a series of things 

in preparation for this meeting. I have been working with the State 

Department for months. They have known that I’ve been curious 

about this. I have traveled overseas. I have visited a number of facilities. Yet despite that, we have not received a single document. 

I got one page that said, we will get this to you as soon as possible. 

And if you look at the document request, to have nothing coming 

into this hearing is inexcusable. 

How can you provide us nothing? We don’t have documents that 

Mr. Lynch or Mr. Welch or myself or Mr. Walberg can look at. How 

can you do that to the Congress? It is a waste of time and money 

and effort. And we will bring you back, we will do it again, but you 

cannot come to the U.S. Congress when we ask you for these basic 

documents and provide us nothing. Our staff worked with you and 

said, if you have problems with, you know, one or two or three of 

the documents, whatever, just give us on a rolling basis what you 

have, and we got nothing. 

And I think on both sides of the aisle, this is a fair criticism. I 

hope my colleagues will, on the other side of the aisle, also, please, 

help us with that. 
8 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the gentleman yield for just 1 second? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Sure. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I agree that, and I am hoping, Mr. Chaffetz, that 

the witnesses will provide us with reasons as to why we have not 

gotten what we need. You are absolutely right, in order to do oversight, we have to have documents. 

And so I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And I thank the gentleman. 

Let me give you an example. One of the documents we asked is 

this report on Diplomatic Security organization and management. 

It is on the Al Jazeera website, and yet our own State Department 

won’t give it to us, so I printed it out on the Al Jazeera website. 

Why do I have to go to Al Jazeera to get the information that you 

have and that you are withholding from Congress? 

I will yield back. 

Mr. MICA. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. MICA. Let me recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Tierney. I am sorry. Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. We all look alike. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Tierney is the ranking member, he is not here, of 

the subcommittee, but Mr. Lynch is here. And you are given 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. I’m sure Mr. Tierney would take offense. 

Mr. MICA. I’m sure he would not. You’re much better looking. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the gentleman’s courtesy. 

Let me just say to begin with, we really do need to have prompt, 

accurate response as an oversight committee regarding these matters. It helps no one to have the allegation of obstructionism cast 

back and forth here. 

So, I think that some of the gentleman’s from Utah’s complaints 

are well founded about the responsiveness of the State Department 

to our requests. So we need to do better. OK? And that’s from everybody up here. There’s just—this committee is coming up on too 

many instances where there has been a long delay in providing information. Things blow up and then it looks like you’re being less 

than honest and less than forthcoming, at least with respect to the 

conduct of this committee. 

I will say that like the gentleman from Utah and many members 

on this committee, I’ve spent a lot of time at embassies in some of 

the tougher spots around the world, and we’ve had an ongoing debate about how to secure the personnel at our embassies. 

And it’s a difficult problem, and I don’t think there’s any cookie 

cutter approach to this and I know that there’s an earlier—before 

the more creative design initiative was adopted, we also had during 

the 110th Congress, this was during the Bush Administration, we 

conducted an extensive investigation into the reports of the rampant waste, fraud and abuse around the construction of the new embassy compound in Baghdad, Iraq, and I’ve spent many nights 

there at the old embassy, the new embassy. 

That was a huge expense. It’s going to be very difficult to staff. 

It’s got more staffing requirements than the White House, to be 

honest with you; I think 3,400 people as opposed to, you know, 
9 

1,700 at the White House. It’s just, you know, it’s just unreasonable to expect that that is suitable to our requirements in Baghdad. 

You know, we’ve had situations in Yemen. I’m happy to hear 

that—and when I was there, we had, you know, reconstruction efforts and strengthening efforts there in Yemen, with good cause. 

We had fruitful discussions, up to a point, with the Syrian Bashar 

al-Assad about relocating our embassy there in Damascus. We 

don’t have it there anymore. I know it’s not staffed, but we’re going 

to have to get around to relocating that. It’s far too vulnerable to 

car bombs. We’re right on a main street. We’ve got to look at that 

again. 

And I do support having a more remote, not necessarily remote, 

but a little bit of a setback for our embassies in and around the 

world, so, and that goes for not only Damascus when we eventually 

get back in there, but also Beirut, but there has been a profound 

lack of oversight in the construction process. 

One of the things I used to do, you know, I was a construction 

manager and that’s what my undergraduate degree is in, so I’ve 

had an opportunity to see how we’re going about this. And there 

is, to put it bluntly, there is great room for improvement here in 

terms of how we’re going about spending this money and as I said 

before, the sort of cookie cutter way that we’ve tried to approach 

this in the past. 

I’ll be very interested in your answers to a number of questions 

regarding some of these arrangements. I know that in the case of 

the Baghdad embassy, we had $130 million plus in questionable 

charges by the first Kuwaiti corporation, that was allegedly engaged in a $200,000 bribery and kickback scheme in order to obtain 

subcontracts. 

We’ve had flagrant oversight lapses on the part of the State Department, and that had been previously warned by the Defense Department audit agency, and it’s just been a series of missteps on 

our part. 

And underlying all of this is just a new world out there in terms 

of the risk to our people in these embassies. Benghazi is one example, although that was not an embassy, still, it. You know, it shows 

us what can go wrong and we have a real obligation here to reassess the defense protocols that we have at our embassies, and that 

obviously includes how we’re building them and what kind of apron 

of security that we provide for these facilities. 

So. We’ve got to get smart about this in a big hurry. We’ve got 

to be more effective with our architectural design, and we’ve got to 

be much more wise with the expenditure of taxpayer money in support of these efforts. We can’t afford to—we can’t afford to fail. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield back. 

Chairman ISSA [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. I thank him 

for his important comments. 

And, Mr. Lynch, I thank you for your being a willing traveler to 

tough places. Over the years, you and I have had the privilege of 

going to some of those places. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. We now welcome our witnesses. Ms. Lydia 

Muniz is the Director of the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations at the United States Department of State, and again, OBO, 
10 

as it’s known. Mr. Casey Jones is a Deputy Director of the Bureau 

of Overseas Buildings and Operations at the United States State 

Department. And the Honorable Grant S. Green, Jr., is the former 

Under Secretary for Management at the Department of State. 

Lady and gentlemen, pursuant to the committee rules, would you 

please rise to take a sworn oath, and raise your right hands, 

please. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 

the truth? Please be seated. 

Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow sufficient time for questions and answers on 

both sides, I would ask that—I’d let you know that your written 

Statements are already part of the record, and so please use your 

5 minutes either to read a portion of that or to other comments as 

you please. 

Ms. MUNIZ. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF LYDIA MUNIZ 

Ms. MUNIZ. Thank you. 

Chairman Issa, Ranking Member—— 

Chairman ISSA. Oh, and I must tell you, these mics, really want 

them closer to you, not further away in order to be heard, so if you 

will pull it significantly closer, it will make it easier. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Like this. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings and 

committee members, I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss 

the State Department’s program to build safe and secure facilities 

for our U.S. Government staff serving abroad. 

I am Lydia Muniz, Director of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations. I’ve been with OBO since 2009, and came to the Department with nearly 20 years of Government and real eState development experience. 

The State Department is deeply committed to the safety and security of our personnel overseas. Every new construction project 

that OBO undertakes must and will meet the security and life safety standards required by law, by our colleagues in the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security and by OBO. Security is the cornerstone of our 

building program, and because we have an obligation to the American taxpayer to be efficient in constructing our facilities, we are 

committed to ensuring that we neither compromise the speed at 

which we can deliver safe facilities nor incur unjustified and unnecessary costs. 

OBO facilities serve as the overseas platform for U.S. diplomacy. 

They provide access to consular services, promote American commercial interests, ensure food and product safety with trading partners, and implement programs critical to our national security interests. Since Congress enacted the Secure Embassy Construction 

and Counterterrorism Act, or SECA, in 1999, OBO, has with the 

continued support of Congress, completed 76 new embassies and 
11 

consulates, with 16 more under design and in construction. We 

have moved over 31,000 employees to more secure facilities, with 

plans to move another 14,000 within the next 5 years. 

After 10 years of a successful building program, we examined our 

work and instituted an initiative that deployed the lessons learned 

over the years; this includes how best to construct facilities that 

meet the requirements of our missions abroad, most critically safety and security, but also durability, efficiency, flexibility, proximity 

for personnel and visitors, and a platform that serves the needs 

and mission of America abroad. We know that security, safety and 

excellence are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive. 

The standard embassy design, or SED, standardized facility requirements and the way in which they were met, and created a discipline within OBO to deliver those facilities. Using the standard 

embassy design, OBO came to better understand the common requirements of missions, like consular sections and specialized office 

space, but we also learned that while embassies and consulates 

have a number of things in common, they also vary widely. Their 

missions in dense urban environments and in rural areas, posts 

with as few as three staffs to as many as 2,500, some have consular sections with one window, others have more than 100. 

So while the SED’s provided consistency, we learned that a 

standard design did not always permit OBO to meet the very needs 

of the mission or to deploy taxpayers’ dollars in the most cost-effective manner. We learned that we should take into account local 

conditions and materials in order to have buildings perform better 

in the long-term, and to consider not only first costs, but long-term 

operating costs. 

And we recognized that our facilities not only meet the functional 

requirements of our missions, they represent the United States to 

the rest of the world. Our embassies are the most America that 

many who live around the globe will ever see. At a time when it 

is increasingly important that we provide for the security of our 

citizens at home through diplomacy and engagement with people 

around the globe, embassies that convey U.S. values, culture, 

strength and know-how can be instrumental in that effort. 

All of this can and must be done in meeting all of the department’s security standards and without compromising on schedule 

or cost. We must protect our staff abroad, and using the lessons 

learned over the decades, we can design and build embassies and 

consulates that serve our mission and colleagues, are a better value 

to the U.S. taxpayer, and make better use of scarce resources in 

the short and in the long-term. 

I would like to thank Congress for their consistent support of 

OBO’s building program, including in Fiscal Year 2013 providing 

increased funding, to help our program keep apace of inflation. 

In these uncertain times, we know that our facilities must keep 

our staff safe and secure. The Excellence Initiative will ensure 

that, will meet the needs of our missions and will provide the best 

value to the American taxpayer. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[The prepared Statement of Ms. Muniz follows:] 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Jones. 

STATEMENT OF CASEY JONES 

Mr. JONES. Good morning, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member 

Cummings and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I am a Deputy Director in the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations at the U.S. Department of State and have served in this 

position since October 2013. 

The safety and security of the individuals who work for the U.S. 

Government agencies overseas and creating and maintaining safe 

and secure facilities in all parts of the world is critical to the Department. I know firsthand the reality of living in a high threat environment as part of a foreign mission. As a child, I lived in Pakistan through periods of marshal law and civil unrest. In 

Islamabad, we lived on the grounds of the embassy, returning to 

the United States just months before it was stormed in November 

1979. This experience had a profound impact on me. 

Security has been OBO’s top priority since the 1998 bombings of 

the American embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. For 10 

years, OBO executed a successful building program utilizing a 

standard embassy design. This work is now being enhanced by our 

Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities Initiative, which will build the 

next generation of safe and secure facilities. 

I want to assure you that the Excellence Initiative does not diminish the safety and security of new embassies. Every office within OBO, real eState, design, engineering, construction, facilities 

cost, and security was involved in developing the initiative, as well 

as collaboration with other bureaus, including Diplomatic Security. 

Briefings on the proposed improvements were provided to the department, Congress and the industry at large. 

The Excellence Initiative is about constructing cost-effective 

buildings, buildings that meet all of the requirements for our missions, safety and security chief among them, but including function, 

durability, flexibility and efficiency. DS and OBO worked together 

throughout planning, design, construction and day-to-day operations of diplomatic facilities. 

I also want to assure you that the Excellence Initiative does not 

lengthen the delivery time of new embassies and consulates. OBO 

uses two common delivery methods for its projects. Both methods 

have time, cost, design control and risk implications. That must be 

evaluated. The choice of which to use depends on the unique conditions of the building project. Under Excellence, OBO will utilize 

whichever method is most cost-effective, most expedient and reduces the most risk. 

Finally, I want to assure you that Excellence does not increase 

project budgets of new embassies and consulates. OBO establishes 

project budgets whether for an Excellence project or a standard embassy design that are based on scope, local conditions and prior 

year cost information. 
19 

OBO has a depth and breadth of data that allows us to be very 

accurate in setting project budgets for new, safe and secure buildings, but OBO cannot anticipate every potential impact. Real world 

events, unforeseen cost increases in materials, civil unrest, currency fluctuations, and natural disasters can affect our projects. 

We are also not immune to policy changes. If the U.S. Government decides it is in the Nation’s best interests to significantly increase or decrease the size of a mission or change the functions located at a post, the cost of our projects are impacted, sometimes 

significantly. 

An example of this is the new embassy compound in Port 

Moresby. In 2011, OBO awarded a contract to build a standard 

lock-and-leave embassy. In spring 2013, with construction well underway, the U.S. Government made two policy decisions that significantly changed the project. 

First, a Marine guard detachment was added, and second, staff 

population was increased by almost 75 percent. The cost-benefit 

analysis conducted by OBO concluded that the additional requirements could not be accommodated in the existing contract without 

incurring an additional $24 million over the de-scoping scenario. As 

a result, OBO stopped the remaining work, and will re-compete a 

modified project with the additional requirements. This option utilizes what has already been built onsite, provides the best value, 

and yields the best end product. Continuing with the contract as 

is would not have provided safer, more secure facilities any faster. 

As Deputy Director at OBO, I want to emphasize that I take the 

responsibility to provide safe and secure facilities very seriously 

and that there has not been, nor will there be, a move away from 

that critical mission. 

Diplomatic facilities are an essential function of our national interests. The individuals who represent the U.S. deserve safe and 

secure workplaces and as good stewards of taxpayer dollars, it is 

our goal to see that those resources are invested wisely. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[The prepared Statement of Mr. Jones follows:] 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Green. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. GRANT S. GREEN, JR. 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am 

pleased to be here this morning to respond to your questions related to embassy security. 

My background, part of which has been mentioned, I served as 

Under Secretary of State for Management for 4 years under Colin 

Powell, I subsequently served as a commissioner on the Commission for Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and most 

recently chaired the panel that has been talked about here, which 

looked at the management and the organization of Diplomatic Security. This panel grew out of the Accountability Review Board following Benghazi that was chaired by Admiral Mullen and Ambassador Pickering. 

As we on the panel progressed with our deliberations, we looked 

at one thing, and we looked at many things, but one thing we 

looked at was the relationship of Diplomatic Security to other bureaus and organizations both within the State Department and 

across the Government where appropriate. Obviously OBO, a close 

partner of Diplomatic Security, was included in that. 

As we talked to many DS employees and others who are familiar 

and certainly concerned with security issues, it became evident 

that they had security concerns with certain aspects of Design Excellence. 

You know, we can talk about the importance of security, the 

President includes it in his letter to all chiefs of mission, Secretary 

Kerry has Stated publicly that that is his most important mission, 

is to protect the people working for this country overseas. 

But when we hear from people who are close to DS, OBO operations and they have voiced concern, then we were concerned, and 

as a result, we came up with a number of observations and a recommendation. It wasn’t to throw the baby out with the bathwater, 

it wasn’t to say do away with this crazy scheme and go back to 

standard embassy design. 

All we said was, State Department, you need to take an in depth 

look at the security implications of this program. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I conclude my opening remarks and 

would be happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. Ms. Muniz, I just want to go through briefly one 

embassy, not including the ones that were primarily here. On a bipartisan basis, with staff from both sides, I went to London and I 

looked at the facility there, and we understand that is an iconic facility. 

The justification for a glass curtain wall building, and a stunning 

appearance and an even a moat has a great deal to do with our 

relationship with our most close—one of our most and perhaps our 

most close ally. Is that correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. I think that’s accurate. 
28 

Chairman ISSA. And it’s not part of either standard design or Design Excellence? It has its own purpose. 

Ms. MUNIZ. That’s accurate. 

Chairman ISSA. Let me ask—yes. Would you turn your mic on 

when you answer, please? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, that’s accurate. 

Chairman ISSA. But I have one question, which is, do you believe 

that it is a good policy for Congress to ever say you can spend all 

that you get from the sale of other buildings, not a penny more, 

and no encouragement to spend a penny less? And that’s really a 

yes or no. Do you believe that is a good policy, because that’s what 

they’re doing there? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think that, as you noted, London is unique, it’s—— 

Chairman ISSA. I know, but I really want the yes or no, because 

I want to get on with the rest of the time. 

The Congress made a decision and State Department is spending 

every penny, adjusting up or down based on how much money they 

have, they’re spending every penny that they got from all the revenues that they had on there. They’re not spending any more, because they are prohibited by Congress, but they’re not spending 

any less; and we watched as they’re adding and subtracting to 

reach that. 

Do you believe that that is an appropriate way to design any 

building? Yes or no, please. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I can’t answer yes are or no. These are unique circumstances. London—— 

Chairman ISSA. Ma’am. 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. Allowed us—— 

Chairman ISSA. The issue—no, no. And my time’s limited. Do you 

believe that that is appropriate doing it that way? 

First of all, do you disagree that that’s what they’re doing, is 

they’re spending exactly what they got from the sales? Yes or no? 

Ms. MUNIZ. They’re spending marginally less. The budget has 

been fixed, and there should be additional income coming from the 

sales of proceeds back to the U.S. Government. 

Chairman ISSA. I wish that was so. That’s not the report we got 

on a bipartisan basis less than 2 weeks ago. 

OK. I’ll consider that you’re not going to answer the other question yes or no, but I’ll answer it for you. No, it is not appropriate 

to say spend all the money you can get. They could have spent 

$200 million less and we could have built two other embassies. If 

they needed $200 million more to do it right, we should have considered that and it should have been made in a request. That is 

not how the private sector builds corporate headquarters or anything else. I don’t want to get into the details of that building, because it’s not a part of it here. 

Mr. Green, basic, basic question that you found in your study. 

Standard embassy designs have a certain look, which could be 

modified quite a bit, but is it fair to say that what they look like 

to a great extent is like industrial, commercial office buildings all 

over America, what is commonly called Class B or concrete tilt-up 

buildings that are made to look nice, but they’re ultimately fairly 

industrial? 
29 

Mr. GREEN. I don’t think so. I think when we adapt the facade 

of a building, the goal there was to fit it in with the culture, the 

country, to make it as unattractive as we possibly could, and in my 

time at the Department, I visited more than 100 of our posts overseas. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, how about Burkina Faso? 

Mr. GREEN. About which? 

Chairman ISSA. Burkina Faso. If we could put one of those up. 

I think it’s important, because quite frankly, Design Excellence 

seems to be about pretty look. You see those two buildings? 

Mr. GREEN. Uh-huh. 

Chairman ISSA. Now, the State Department has not given us any 

of the information for us to evaluate the cost per desk or anything 

else, but, which makes it very hard to do some of the assessment, 

but your study shows us that they’re not cost justifying. The building on the top is made with non-local materials that are only made 

in three places in the world, this concrete facade. It clearly is an 

architectural design rendering to a great extent, not necessarily all 

functional. It’s not a standard build. It cost a lot of money and it’s 

in an area in which there are more security guards than there are 

embassy personnel at desk. It’s a high risk area. 

Is that justified versus a standard built, in your opinion? If I 

need 550 people to provide security for 400 embassy personnel, do 

I in fact have a place in which the priorities should be on looking 

pretty for the population so that they can be happy with us? 

Mr. GREEN. Not in my opinion. 

Chairman ISSA. Security, if it takes 550 people to protect 400 

people, is that a place in which there’s any question about what the 

priorities should be? 

Mr. GREEN. No. The priority has got to be security. In the department, there’s always this argument, whether it be with embassy construction, or anything else, we used to—or housing, for 

example. We used to have those who would say, we need to be out 

in the community, we need to live out in the community. There 

were others who say, I don’t want to live out there, because of the 

hazard. I want to be on a compound. 

If you pin people down, security is the most important to them. 

So—— 

Chairman ISSA. Well, let me just ask one closing question, because I have picture after picture, cost after cost, and we are going 

to have some of these folks back here once the State Department 

delivers the actual arithmetic so that we can evaluate it. 

But, Mr. Green, I know that you were above the folks here, and 

so you oversaw people doing the jobs of Muniz and Jones, but from 

a construction standpoint, from what you were trying to achieve, 

during your tenure, weren’t we essentially making a decision to cut 

out architectural fees and changes that made embassies dissimilar 

versus similar? 

Mr. GREEN. I don’t know that we were trying to make embassies 

similar, but we were trying to stay within a fixed amount of money 

so we could build as many embassies as we could to get as many 

people out of harms way as we could. If they weren’t as beautiful 

as somebody might like, that wasn’t the main factor. The main factor was get embassies built. 
30 

As you mentioned, there were—after the Inman report after the 

Beirut bombing, we had 120 some odd embassies that were rated 

unsatisfactory, and what we wanted to do was get as many of those 

fixed as we could. 

And, you know, as I said, I’ve been to 100 of our posts. Are all 

of them beautiful? No, they’re not beautiful, but I think—in fact, 

I opened Dar es Salaam in Nairobi after the bombing when we 

opened new embassies there, and they’re fine. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, I want to give you a chance to answer, Ms. 

Muniz, but I want to get two things into the record. 

First of all, the pretty building on the top is in the 19th most 

dangerous highest priority area, so this is an embassy that needs 

to be built sooner rather than later and which security is clearly 

one of our greatest concerns. 

Second, I want to mention that my trip to Britain was interesting in that as the Ambassador and key staff went through and 

explained to me how awful the embassy was and how desperately 

we need to replace it, he also, of course, reminded me that this 

rather ugly, dysfunctional building was designed by the man that 

designed Dulles Airport. 

That it was built during a time in which Design Excellence, gorgeous buildings, were in the modernist, eye of the beholder, and we 

were building them all over the world, and that, in fact, Design Excellence is in fact inherently like a designer suit, it ages more 

quickly than if you will, the industrial look. 

But if you have any other answers, I wanted to make sure I gave 

you that opportunity. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What I would like to add—what I’d like to go back to, really, 

when talking about this project is that as my colleague, Casey, 

noted, we base our budgets on standard embassy design budgets, 

on the number of desks, on the local context, which has us taking 

into account distance to get materials, we fix that budget and we 

work within that budget. 

So the building that you see that might be more attractive, might 

be more tailored to the missions in question—— 

Chairman ISSA. OK. Well, when we’ve—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. Would cost no more—— 

Chairman ISSA [continuing]. When we have the numbers—— 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. Than the standard—— 

Chairman ISSA. Well, when we have the numbers, we can have 

that discussion. I would love to hear your answers today, but since 

the State Department has refused to comply with a lawful request 

for any data, even one shred of it, we only have, if you will, sort 

of the whistleblower side of it, we don’t have your side, but I will 

say that to fly in concrete from Europe for the top building, to me 

is a questionable item that I’m going to want to see why those materials were chosen over materials that could be provided more locally. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am sitting here, I want us to take a deep breath and focus on 

what you said, Mr. Green: security. When all is said and done, a 
31 

lot of these buildings will be in existence when we’re dead and 

gone. 

And this is our watch, we have a moment in time right now to 

get this right, not just for our present diplomatic corps, but for generations yet unborn. 

And I want us to stay focused, because I think we can kind of 

drift off and not zero in and that’s why I think one of Mr. 

Chaffetz’s comments about the data that we’ve asked for is so important, so that we can try to figure this thing out using the best 

information that we have in the time that we have. 

And so with that backdrop, I want to go to you, Mr. Green and 

let me start by—you know, Congressman Chaffetz, who serves as 

the chairman of our national security subcommittee, has raised a 

legitimate question about whether this new Design Excellence Initiative to customize diplomatic facilities could delay their completion. 

Mr. Green, you raised a similar concern in your report, which 

said this, ‘‘despite schedule, cost assurances from OBO, there is 

concern that fewer facilities’’ and you just said this a minute ago, 

too, ‘‘embassies, consulates can be built on the same timeframe, 

leaving more personnel exposed in inadequate facilities for longer 

periods of time.’’ 

Mr. Green, can you elaborate briefly, and what are some of the 

challenges with customizing versus using standard designs? And 

you said a moment ago that you didn’t say throw the baby out with 

the bathwater, you said we need to make, you said, certain recommendations and I assume that you were saying, look, we just 

want to be practical—— 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS [continuing]. To get back to that security theme, 

cost and function so that we can be effective and efficient in what 

we’re doing. So could you comment, please, sir? 

Mr. GREEN. Sure. Yes, sir. 

The observations that we made, and this is in the report, are certainly not all inclusive. This wasn’t six smart guys in the mess hall 

that dreamed these things up. These were based on comments we 

got from security experts who work with OBO on a daily basis. I 

would tell you for one, if you could build a beautiful embassy under 

Design Excellence and you can do it as fast and it doesn’t cost anymore, I’m all for it. I don’t care. I don’t care what we build. 

But what I am concerned with, it’s just not logical to the people 

we talk to and frankly to me that you can build under Design Excellence, as quickly and as cost effectively as we did under Standard Embassy Design. You know, to pull a design off the shelf and 

build it and adopt the facade in a way that is fitting with the 

local—the country as opposed to going through a design bid/build 

with architects and builders, it just doesn’t make sense. Now, if you 

can show me with facts and figures that it does, I’ll salute and 

agree with you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. There’s one thing that you did not mention, and 

I assume you meant to, function, too. You talk about security, No. 

1—— 

Mr. GREEN. Sure. 
32 

Mr. CUMMINGS [continuing]. Cost and function. So you want to 

make sure they function properly, too. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, absolutely. And I think that, you know, Standard Embassy Design was a living, breathing thing. I mean, there 

were reviews done constantly and, sure, was everything perfect? 

No. The ceiling is too high. We can’t put the light bulbs in, or we 

don’t have enough parking or the medical facility is not large 

enough and those challenges were addressed periodically and 

Standard Embassy Design was modified accordingly. 

Function is certainly important, and I think that the director 

mentioned 100 consular windows versus one. That should—and 

maybe that happened. But that should be worked out as you’re 

planning the design in a certain country that says, you know, five 

consular windows aren’t enough for us. And hopefully within the 

budget we can adopt that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Ms. Muniz, what’s your response and, will 

the Design Excellence program delay embassy construction? 

Ms. MUNIZ. My response is no, but I need to go into detail, which 

can sometimes lose folks, but if you would bear with me. 

First of all, we use two different methods to deliver projects at 

OBO. We use design/build and we use design bid/build. Sometimes 

we don’t have a lot of advance notice. Sometimes we need to turn 

around and we need to go into Tripoli immediately, set up an embassy and move quickly. But because our appropriation is regular, 

it allows us to do advance year planning very easily. 

So what we’re able to do is, we know in any given Fiscal Year 

that we’re going to do these five embassies, we design before. But 

because we are going to get under the excellence initiative to 100- 

percent designs, when we award the contract, the duration from 

award to cutting the ribbon and letting people into that safe, secure facility is actually shorter. Because we will only be doing construction; we will not be doing design and construction after the 

award of the project. 

If we don’t have a lot of advance notice, I think that we really 

do need to go back to design/build and re-examine the type of building that we would put in place. But, I think what’s great about this 

initiative and this new approach is that it will allow us not only 

to meet the same schedules but in cases to improve on them. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, what do you have to say to that, Mr. 

Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Well, I mean, I’m not—— 

Chairman ISSA. Your microphone, please. 

Mr. GREEN. I’m not an architect, nor am I an engineer. And if 

OBO contends that they can build things as quickly, you know, I 

may or may not question it. All I’m saying is the folks that work 

with OBO on a regular basis questioned it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Ms. Muniz, the new United States embassy 

in Iraq was built during the previous administration. Is that right? 

Mr. GREEN. Uh-huh. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Before the department started the Design Excellence program. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, that is—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That project was fraught with delays, cost overruns, contractor corruption. In fact, this committee found 7 years 
33 

ago back in 2007 that the project was delayed 16 months and the 

cost to the United States taxpayer was $144 million more than 

originally projected. So the issue of delays and increased cost can 

occur regardless of whether the department uses Standard Embassy Design, concept or Design Excellence concept. Would you all 

agree on that? Do you agree? 

Mr. GREEN. I would agree. Baghdad was kind of a unique situation. Once it had been planned initially, then the Defense Department wanted to put more people in there so we had to modify the 

size of it. And I’m sure there were many, many other things that, 

you know, I want to be there, I want 15 desks instead of three. It 

was a moving train, believe me. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Muniz? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think that’s accurate. In fairness, as my colleague, 

Mr. Jones, pointed out, we build in different environments. There 

are all kinds of things that our projects are subject to which can 

complicate delivery. The Department, the country can decide to 

change the staffing pattern significantly and require us to modify. 

War, shortages, natural disasters can impact those schedules. 

So while I haven’t looked at the Iraq project in detail, I’ve looked 

forward since coming to OBO, I do think that in difficult environments, as folks who know construction firsthand, those can have a 

real impact. 

But I do think that having a dialog with Congress, with our appropriators, our authorizers, and this committee, on such changes 

so that people understand those changes I think can be helpful. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, as I close, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a letter sent to the State Department 

on October 9, 2007, by the committee’s previous Chairman Henry 

Waxman describing in detail the many flaws with the construction 

of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq in 2007. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman ISSA. And if the gentleman will yield. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Of course. 

Chairman ISSA. I want to join with you. I was on the committee 

at that time, Chairman Waxman did a great job of exposing that 

our wartime construction of an embassy as Fortress USA, as a base 

for when we departed and with vague ideas of what they wanted 

at the beginning, and ever changing was the best example of a bad 

example of how to build an embassy. I think the ranking member 

has made a good point that that is exactly what we don’t want to 

be doing. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. If I could have the indulgence for 30 

seconds to followup on the ranking member. 

Mr. Green, I just want to have the public sort of understand 

something about the Standard Design. If we were looking, let’s say, 

a 737 aircraft, something most people have flown in that are listening, they started making them in the late 1960’s, early 1970’s, and 

they are very different than they are today. But it’s a continuous 

design that at any given time the 737 is a standard built. 

Would that be somewhat similar to how the evolution of standard built goes, is that what you build 20 years from now would be, 

the standard would change over time, but the idea is to effectively 
34 

have a continuously improving product like a 737 Boeing aircraft 

that everyone kind of recognizes it but it keeps getting better over 

time? 

Mr. GREEN. I think that’s a fair analogy. 

Chairman ISSA. OK. Well, and Ms. Muniz, same idea. We all understand it’s not a fixed design but an evolution of a standard 

build. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the chairman, and I thank you for holding this hearing. It is pivotal. 

Ms. Muniz, in response to a CBS morning news program and a 

CBS evening news program, State Department was able to put out 

its fact sheet. They did produce those documents, but, again, no 

documents produced to the U.S. Congress. In this you say all facilities will be delivered on the same, if not shorter schedules. There’s 

no evidence to the contrary. 

Do you have any examples of a Design Excellence building, that 

is coming in on time or as a shorter schedule than Standard Embassy Design, and do you have any examples of any building that 

has been built for less-than money or less than the money that we 

would have spent under Standard Embassy Design? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Thank you for that question. What I would like to 

go over is that, as the committee knows, the process to—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No, no, no. I’m sorry. I have 5 minutes, and I’ve 

got like 100 questions. Do you have a single example of success as 

you have Stated it? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Which one? 

Ms. MUNIZ. There are Early Excellence Initiative projects. There 

was one in 2011, one in 2012. There are three in 2014. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I need the names of these facilities. 

Ms. MUNIZ. We could submit that for the record, and I will take 

a bit more time to go over those. All of those are on budget and 

on schedule. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Hold on. I’m sorry, but you have already taken 

up a minute and-a-half. You’re going to give us the names of these 

buildings, and when will you give them to us? 

Ms. MUNIZ. 2011 is—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No, no, no. You said you want to submit them for 

the record. When are you going to give them the Congress? What 

are the names of these buildings? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I could give them to you now or we could leave it—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Go ahead. 

Ms. MUNIZ. 2011 is Vientiane; 2012 is Emabon; 2013, 

N’Djamena, Nouakchott, Paramaribo. Those are Early Excellence 

Initiatives. The first projects that will be awarded under the full 

initiative and the new standards are in Fiscal Year 2014. Those are 

typically awarded at the end of the fiscal year, and they are all on 

budget and on schedule and we will provide additional data about 

those projects as soon as those projects are awarded. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let’s go to Port Moresby for a second, because I 

had a chance to go visit there in February. When was that originally slated to be completed? 

Ms. MUNIZ. In 2014. 
35 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. May 2014, correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And now when is it slated to be completed? 

Ms. MUNIZ. In early 2018. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So they’re having to stay in the same facility. It 

is exceptionally dangerous, correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The reason Port Moresby is on the vulnerability list 

and getting a new embassy is because it’s dangerous. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. When did you get the final determination that the 

Marines were going to be located at Port Moresby? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The embassy that is being built in Port Moresby was 

based on numbers that were provided in 2008. As the committee 

members know, the numbers and the program for embassies is not 

set by OBO. It’s set by the policy side of the Department. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I’m asking you, when did you get notification that 

Marines would be located at Port Moresby? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We were awarded the contract in 2011. Two years 

into the construction of that project we were notified that Marines 

would be going to Port Moresby and that a staff of 41 had increased by 31. Including the Marines, that’s a doubling of the size 

of the embassy. 

There was no way to continue with the project in a way that allowed us to deploy our resources intelligently that would have allowed diplomatic security to certify the building and to co-locate all 

of the staff. We made the modifications that were necessary based 

on real changes that reflected American priorities in Port Moresby. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So I am going to try again. When did you get the 

official notification that you were getting Marines? 

Ms. MUNIZ. 2013. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Can you provide that to this body? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And when will I get that? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The Department is part of that answer, so we will 

provide that as quickly as possible. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. This is the challenge, chairman. 

If it’s so dangerous and they need Marines, why aren’t they there 

now? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The deployment of Marines is not something which 

is within OBO’s purview, so I would refer that question back to DS. 

We could get back to you on that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Again, you have got to get back to us on it. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Tell me, what happened, so that cost was going 

to be what? Originally under Standard Embassy Design it was 

going to be an expense of roughly $50 million was the projection, 

correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. No, that’s inaccurate. The $50 million is the construction contract only. The information that we provided to the 

committee and to the CBS reporter who reported on this is that the 

budget was $79 million. Let’s call it $80 million. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And what’s the budget now? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The budget is not yet reconfirmed. I think we’re 

going to be close to $200 million. 
36 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Wait a second. Wait a second. It’s not reconfirmed? What about this document here that I have that has initials on it? It says will remain $211 million for this option. 

Ms. MUNIZ. We believe that the cost will be under that. We are 

at 35 percent design. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Why? So, but that is what was signed off on. 

Ms. MUNIZ. That is not what was signed off on. That is not a 

final budget. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We will go through that in further detail. I pass 

my time, and I’ve got a host of other questions, chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Massachusetts, the other Mr. 

Tierney, Congressman Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And again, I appreciate this and I know we’re beating up on the 

State Department a little bit. So I do want to say to be fair that 

the State Department did turn around an immediate request from 

the chairman last weekend to support a delegation to inspect the 

embassy in London. That request came in on a Friday. The CODEL 

left on a Sunday and the meetings and briefings were lined up for 

Monday. Usually, CODELs, congressional delegations, are planned 

for weeks ahead, so the department should be thanked, I think, for 

the effort in helping the committee do that inspection. 

But I would caution you, and to your colleagues that have the 

authority to approve oversight committee CODELs for inspecting 

these various embassies, that we do need cooperation. We need cooperation right now in Iraq, and I know you have limited resources, 

but we have a responsibility here as the civilian part of this Government to get in and make sure that our folks are safe so we need 

cooperation there. We need cooperation in Yemen, we need cooperation in Afghanistan. 

And so we understand very well the trepidation that you have. 

But, this is a necessary part of our job, and we need full cooperation from the State Department on doing oversight. It’s not just 

your job; it’s also our job. So we just want to amplify our need to 

get in and out of these countries as expeditiously as possible, and 

we apologize for any diversion of resources to make that happen, 

but if we’re going to sign off on a budget, we need to know what 

the situation is on the ground. We owe that to the taxpayers and 

also to the personnel that are in these facilities. So enough of that. 

I do want to talk a little bit, Ms. Muniz, about the drawback. I 

understand, you know, Mr. Chaffetz has an affinity for the Standard Design, but looking at it, it requires a pretty good parcel of 

land in order to set it down. This is the problem we had with 

Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. We’re sort of downtown there. We’re 

on street, very exposed. We were trying at that point to try to get 

the set design configuration for the new embassy there, new location. 

So, there was nothing downtown, so we end up further out. That 

exposes us even though we would have sort of Mr. Chaffetz’s idea 

about set design with an apron of security there. We would have 

to be further out, out of town with a long commute for our people 

once they fly in. They will be very much exposed in getting to the 

embassy. 
37 

This is the same problem we have had in Afghanistan. The most 

dangerous drive, you know, in recent years is when delegations fly 

in to Afghanistan and then you’ve got to drive up that road 

through Massoud Circle out to the embassy. They tried to tip my 

car over there in that rotary there a while back. A bunch of people 

very upset about somebody flushing a Quran down the toilet or 

something like that and, you know, the crowds just went wild. But, 

so putting our people out in a remote location is not the safest result for our embassy either. 

Tell me the answer, how to configure this. Now, you haven’t 

abandoned that whole set design, right? Is that still on the table 

when the land is available? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Thank you for the question. Let me try to reply to 

it quickly. You make a great point. Part of the difficulty of the 

Standard Embassy Design is that it was a largely horizontal solution, so that where land is abundant, where we could still be on 

that much property in close proximity to our colleagues so that 

we’re not required to travel back and forth, which has not only security but extensive cost implications, it made sense. 

But in a lot of the cities that we’re required to build in now, not 

only is it not possible to find those 10 acres; if we were able to find 

it, it is extra ordinarily expensive. The example of London. We are 

building on less than 5 acres, 4.9 acres. Property in London is very 

expensive. It makes a huge difference to be able to be on a smaller 

plot of land while still meeting all the security requirements including the legal requirement for 100-foot setback. 

But, so both cost and security, I think, play, but it also gives us 

a lot of flexibility in building in all of the locations that we need 

to build in where 10 acres may simply not be available. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. So what you’re saying is, does the Design Excellence model gives you that flexibility? 

Ms. MUNIZ. It absolutely gives us that flexibility. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. All right. You know, when I try to think about 

the different locations and the different demands, the different environments that our embassies have to operate in, you know, it 

does give me pause to, you know, try to come up with a one-sizefits-all solution to that, which I think the set design more or less 

requires and I do support your ability to have modifications on that 

more toward the Design Excellence piece. 

But, you know, sometimes we do have what someone, a casual 

observer might observe as being, you know, far beyond what is necessary. So you have to caution people on the cost aspect of that, 

as well. 

I have exhausted my time and I’ll yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ [presiding]. Will the gentleman yield for a moment? 

Mr. LYNCH. Sure I would. Sure I would. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I believe there are multiple examples of Standard 

Embassy Design on less than 10 acres. 

And one of the concerns I have is we have multiple GAO reports, 

we have an Inspector General report all confirming that these 

buildings in general, there’s some exceptions, but we are coming in 

under budget and faster. And—— 
38 

Mr. LYNCH. Well, you know, just to reclaim my time just for a 

minute, you know, the Baghdad embassy, though, dear Lord, that 

was $750 million. That was three quarters of a billion dollars. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And Baghdad is not a Standard Embassy Design. 

Mr. LYNCH. It’s modified. That’s what it started out as. I mean, 

we have more than 10 acres there. We have got, you know, we’ve 

got the ideal situation. So all I’m saying is it’s not just a question 

of one method versus the other. I think that, you know, whatever 

allows us some flexibility to consider the situation on the ground 

would probably provide the best—and I don’t disagree with the 

points you’re raising. I don’t. I don’t. 

I just think that it is so varied, the landscape under which the, 

you know, OBO and the State Department have to operate, they 

need that flexibility. That’s all I’m saying. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Gentleman yield backs. 

We will now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 

Walberg for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you the 

panel for being here. 

I just opened my Statement having had the privilege to travel to 

a number of embassies and consulates in regions of a great insecurity. My impression of our public servants that are in those positions was enhanced, increased almost to disbelief that some would 

take those positioning’s. So we do want to make sure that they are 

cared for appropriately. We want to make sure the taxpayers are 

cared for appropriately, as well. 

And I would add my comments to those already requesting that 

you please convey to people who can get us documents that we 

have been requesting. It’s so important when I’ve been listening to 

questioning already and find disagreements on numbers, on size 

figures and things like that, simply because we don’t have the information. And we can’t do the work. I don’t expect any hard drive 

to break down, I hope not, before we get that information, but we 

really need that. 

In your testimony, Ms. Muniz and Mr. Jones, you talk about the 

development of Design Excellence. You talk how working with 

them was a very participatory process within the State Department. Can you describe how the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

participated in development of this divine excellence? Divine excellence, we know that works, but Design Excellence. 

Ms. MUNIZ. The foundation of our excellence—— 

Mr. WALBERG. Your microphone, please. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m sorry. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You can move that microphone up closer. Thank 

you. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m sorry. 

The foundation of the excellence initiative, sort of our base goingin Statement was we are not changing the security standards, period. I have been in discussions with my colleagues in diplomatic 

security at the highest levels and at the working level and have 

made that assurance. I think that that is what is most important 

to them, and they have every reason to insist that that still be the 

case. 
39 

Mr. WALBERG. Did they clear—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, they did. 

Mr. WALBERG [continuing]. On Design Excellence? 

Ms. MUNIZ. They cleared our process yes, and they support the 

process, yes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Who cleared? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would have to get back to you on the clearances, 

but, again, how we put those buildings together is in the responsibilities of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations. To the 

degree that we continue to build facilities that meet all of diplomatic security’s concerns, that’s what they need to sign off, in addition to understanding that we not add cost or add time to schedules 

in a way that would also jeopardize security, and we have committed to not doing that. 

Mr. WALBERG. But they haven’t signed off yet or they have 

signed off? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We have the support at the highest levels of diplomatic security in moving forward with this. A formal signoff within 

the department was not in the process, but they have signed off on 

our documents describing the process and how we’re going to go 

about it. 

Mr. WALBERG. Could you get those documents to us? Could I give 

you that assignment—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Mr. WALBERG [continuing]. To get those documents to us. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would also like, if I could, a number of members 

have mentioned the document request. I would like to convey, both 

personally and professionally, that I take seriously the role of this 

committee and of other congressional committees. It was a vast request. We are working as quickly as we can to collect that information together and will get information to the committee. 

Mr. WALBERG. But, again, even the information that was in Al 

Jazeera didn’t come to us. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I understand. 

Mr. WALBERG. And, you know, that—I appreciate your emotion 

on that. I appreciate your promise, your intentions, but we really 

need the documents. 

Mr. Green, the panel on diplomatic security organization and 

management, a group which you chaired, says in its final report 

that, ‘‘that it understands the desire to have embassies and consulates be more welcoming and to reflect the openness of American 

Society;’’ and that, ‘‘OBO is convinced that Design Excellence has 

widespread support within the department.’’ However, the report 

also mentions that from a diplomatic security standpoint, there are 

questions raised by the changes under way in the embassy construction program. 

The question is, can you explain what those concerns are from 

a security perspective? 

Mr. GREEN. Sure. And we outline them in the report and I’d 

leave that to the committee to read at your leisure. But, there’s another one that came up later and it goes to an earlier discussion 

here about the flexibility that Design Excellence provides in real 

eState and smaller places. That is one of the areas that DS really 
40 

objected to in our discussions with them, both urban sites and 

smaller areas. 

Are we going to just have more waivers for the 100-foot setback? 

I know the difficulty in transiting if you’re out in the boondocks 

somewhere. But there’s got to be some accommodation. If security, 

in fact, is our most important issue, then, and let me quote from 

an OBO document here, it says, ‘‘Whenever possible, sites will be 

selected in urban areas, allowing U.S. Embassies and consulates to 

contribute to the civic and urban fabric of those host cities. Special 

attention will be paid to the general ensemble of surrounding buildings, streets and public spaces, which the embassies and consulates 

will form a part.’’ 

What DS doesn’t want is something on the street that a car 

bomb can drive up to and blow a hole in the wall. So I agree with 

the flexibility. There are cost issues as the director has mentioned. 

But some way, as we recommend it in our report, the Department 

has got to do an in-depth analysis of the security implications before you just start building downtown. 

Mr. WALBERG. I appreciate that. My time has expired. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes, I was going to say the gentleman’s time has 

expired. I thank the gentleman. 

Now recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Kelly for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board made 

several recommendations to enhance embassy security, including 

the creation of a panel to evaluate the organization and management of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Mr. Green, you led this 

panel, which issued a report last year raising concerns with the Design Excellence program. 

This report Stated, ‘‘While the panel agrees that special consideration for posts in places like London and Paris are warranted, security concerns for many other posts deserve serious consideration.’’ 

The report also found, ‘‘no evidence of a business case or cost benefit analysis supporting this initiative.’’ Mr. Green, is that correct? 

Mr. GREEN. When we did the report, there was no evidence of 

any business case or cost benefit analysis. That’s correct. 

Ms. KELLY. And why is such a study worthwhile? 

Mr. GREEN. Why is such the study that we did worthwhile? 

Ms. KELLY. Or why—— 

Mr. GREEN. This was only one recommendation of 35. There were 

34 other recommendations that dealt with DS management and operations and organization and training. So this was only one which 

came to light as we begin to talk to DS people that express concern 

about security. 

Ms. KELLY. OK. And has the Department responded to this finding and—— 

Mr. GREEN. No, the Department has not responded to any of 

these recommendations. I’ve heard informally that they’ve accepted 

in part or in whole 30 of the 35, but I frankly was not expecting 

them to respond. This was a report that was asked for by the Undersecretary for management based on the ARB recommendation. 

We did the report. We turned it in and went home. 
41 

Ms. KELLY. So you’re saying there’s no cost benefit study on the 

new initiative? 

Mr. GREEN. Not that I know of. 

Ms. KELLY. Director, I gather the department has not dismissed 

Mr. Green’s panel in its finding as irrelevant. So what has the Department done in response to the report? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Typically, a cost benefit analysis is done before we 

go into a scenario where there’s additional cost to make sure that 

that additional cost is warranted. As I’ve explained and assured 

the committee, there’s no additional cost under the excellence initiative. We’re setting budgets based on Standard Embassy Design 

budgets. If anything, we are hoping that costs will go down as 

we’re able to look at longer-term operating cost and to make decisions that allow us to effect that. 

The recommendation was also that we ensure—that we look at 

what the impact was on security. Again, as I’ve explained to the 

committee and to the members, there’s no impact on security. We 

will meet all of the security standards. Two of those standards, as 

you know, are in law, that’s setback and colocation. 

So as Mr. Green describes the concern about being on urban 

plots, we will always meet that set back that is required in law regardless of being in a smaller plot. It is simply that the ability to 

have a building go up rather than be horizontal, to not have a 

warehouse in a place where we’re able to get materials in realtime 

and to build one would be wasteful. We’re able to take those into 

consideration and build on smaller pieces of property. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my friend yield just for a second? 

Ms. KELLY. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would you please remind us what the setback requirement is? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The setback requirement is 100 feet. 

Ms. KELLY. Mr. Green, any other comment about the director’s 

response? 

Mr. GREEN. No. 

Ms. KELLY. OK. Well, I’d like to thank you and your committee 

for the work on the panel. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Would the gentlewoman yield for a moment? 

Ms. KELLY. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. On the one hand, Ms. Muniz, you say you’re confident that it is going to come under budget. At that same time, 

we don’t have a cost benefit analysis. That hasn’t been done, correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’ve not said under budget; I’ve said on budget. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You were hoping that it would come under budget, but—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. No. The Department sets budgets, OBO sets budgets 

based on number of desks and based on the program for a facility. 

We use historical data, historical data accumulated from the construction of the Standard Embassy Design to set our budgets. We 

know that people work—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But you have no completed Design Excellence 

building. In fact, you used as an example N’Djamena, which is in 

Chad, as a success story, correct? That was one of your examples. 
42 

If we went to Chad right now and looked at N’Djamena what would 

we see? 

Ms. MUNIZ. It’s one of the early projects that I described. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What would we see if we went to Chad? You used 

it as an example of success. What would we see if we went to 

N’Djamena? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I am not certain what we would see. I’m obviously 

not—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do we even have a hole in the ground yet? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I don’t have the status of the N’Djamena project 

right in front of me. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You came up with the example, and I’m telling 

you that it’s not even scheduled to be completed until October 

2016. We’re not even sure if there’s a hole in the ground yet and 

you’re using that as a success story; am I wrong? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I described the projects that were awarded using the 

excellence principles. To say that those projects are awarded is not 

the same thing as to say that those projects are completed. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you have any completed studies or any completed projects under the standard, or under the Design Excellence 

program? 

Ms. MUNIZ. As I explained, we do not. The first project that we 

awarded as a variation on the excellence initiative was in 2011. 

The first real projects that we were awarded—we will award, as I 

Stated, are in 2014. That is this fiscal year. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So the success that you have is just the awards. 

It’s not actually achieving. 

Time is expired. I appreciate the gentlewoman from Illinois yielding me time. 

We will now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 

Bentivolio for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here today to testify. The chairman earlier 

alluded to the beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and I can tell 

you from experience, the sandbag bunker looks really good to a soldier under a mortor attack, but I am sure that we don’t want to 

build the embassies looking like a sandbag bunker. But I know we 

do have a need for curb appeal. But after going through these reports and talking to some other people outside of this hearing, I 

just have a real few simple questions. 

I want to know, do we have a final number for the Baghdad embassy cost? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I believe we do, but I don’t have it at the top of my 

head. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. I heard that the contractor made over $500 million profit. Did you hear the same thing? $500 million in profit? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Again, this was a project that was awarded 

years—— 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. One of the most expensive embassies ever built. 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. Years ahead of my time, under the Bush 

Administration. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Well, you have access to those numbers? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, and we can certainly provide those to the committee. 
43 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Great. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. And what did we say the London embassy is 

going to cost? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The total project cost for London is near a billion dollars. If you exclude—— 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. A billion dollars. How many people are going to 

work in there? 

Ms. MUNIZ. If you exclude the property price, it is under $800 

million. The cost to do a major rehabilitation and security upgrades 

of the existing chancery, which would have never met security 

standards including two in law, we have spent $730 million. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. I understand the need. For $1 billion, I would 

probably—well, we can’t say that. We do need an embassy in London. But $1 billion seems like we should be looking at some alternatives. I know in places like Iraq we use Hesco barriers, concrete, 

prefabricated concrete barriers that are placed relatively quickly in 

times of danger. 

I have some questions in regards to costs, let’s see, rap heavy reenforcement, standoff distance of 100 feet, I understand, steel 

structures with curtain walls, all kinds of things that, well, deal 

with security but you’re putting more emphasis, it seems, on curb 

appeal. 

And I just, a few more questions. Can you give me a few reinforced concrete examples of how moving to this new design strategy 

enhances security? 

Ms. MUNIZ. So I think London is a great example, and I would 

like to speak in that context. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. A billion dollars worth. Yes, you have my—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. We sold the properties that were existing in London, 

this is a project that did not have to be done, for net zero for the 

taxpayer. We are able to 100 percent replace those facilities for $50 

million more than it would have cost to do massive upgrades to the 

existing facilities that would have still left it vulnerable due to setback. No colocation and not meeting other security examples. We 

are able to build the brand new embassy. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Would it hurt to be outside of London, just outside of London where the cost is less expensive? One billion dollars. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would argue, in London it would hurt to be outside 

of London. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Did you have a uniform layout for all embassy 

facilities which could aid security personnel in training during 

emergencies? I mean, you have to go from one embassy to the next. 

Everything is different. The design plan is different. Everything 

seems to be tailored at expensive costs. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Our diplomatic security staff are incredibly skilled, 

and right now they deal with a wide variety of context and of buildings. 

I would also like to say that if we stayed with the Standard Embassy Design which basically had two separate bars of construction, 

it is less efficient, it is harder to get from one bar to the other than 

a cube, London is a good example of that, and to build more efficiently also saves dramatically in terms of cost. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. A billion dollars for an embassy, and that is efficient. I just have a real problem with that because having experi-
44 

enced in Iraq and Vietnam, I know we build the same bunkers, 

pretty much the same standard design, a few improvements here 

and there by they suffice. I know we can do the same thing with 

a more modern building uses standard format design either going 

up or out. 

You could probably have three standard designs that would fit 

just about anywhere. Why do I know that? Because I have experience in that business. You know, we build our military vehicles 

pretty much the same way. They’re compartmentalized. We can 

drive an Abrams tank and change the engine out in a matter of 

hours. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a real problem with $1 billion designs and 

costs when contractors are making $500 million profit on some of 

our most expensive embassies. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

Now recognize the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. You’ve got a pretty hard job. It really is. But two 

things: One, Mr. Lynch indicated a gratitude for your cooperation 

in turning around a CODEL; second, I know the chairman of the 

subcommittee sent some requests for information. It is helpful to 

the committee. It is a burden on you, but it really makes for a better life all around if there can be as much cooperation as possible 

in a timely way, but I do want to acknowledge the hard work that 

you have to do. 

One question I have is, how much—I mean, the costs are high. 

How much of the complications that you face day-to-day in making 

decisions about an embassy wherever it may be, have to do with 

the enormous security requirements that now seem to be part of 

everything? And I’ll ask you, Ms. Muniz. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think the security requirements clearly significantly add to the expense, but I don’t know that anybody in the 

State Department on this committee would call into question the 

need for those security measures, both operationally during building and the measures physically that are put in place. But it does, 

when you look at the average cost of an embassy as compared to 

an office building on the market, those costs are very different but 

they are really driven by what are some of the safest facilities in 

the world. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, Mr. Green, you know, one of the things that 

I find a little bit troubling is when I visit embassies, they’re remote 

in many cases and difficult working circumstances, it seems, for 

some of the embassy personnel as a result of the security requirements and is there some indication that there are some cases 

where too much security actually interferes with the ability of the 

embassy personnel to do their job effectively? 

Mr. GREEN. I would say generally no, but if you talk about access, for example, for employees, particularly non-U.S. employees 

who are held up going through various security check points, possibly there is. But I think generally DS is not going to spend money 

to over-secure a place. If anything, we probably have some that are 

under secured. 
45 

Mr. WELCH. OK. Well, that’s helpful. 

And Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to yield the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my colleague yield his time, Mr. Welch? 

Mr. WELCH. Yes. I want to yield my time to Mr. Chaffetz. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, I’m sorry. I’m sorry. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Go ahead. If you wanted to, go ahead. 

Mr. WELCH. All right. I yield my time to Mr. Connolly. Thank 

you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend. I’m sorry for the misunderstanding. 

You know, this is not a theoretical discussion. Mr. Green, when 

you were in the Reagan Administration I was in the Senate, and 

I went to Beirut for the embassy bombing, no setback, right on the 

main thoroughfare, and I had a friend killed, Bill McIntyre in that 

bombing embassy, and of course, our embassy was bombed again 

in Beirut, to say nothing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport. 

Kenya, Tanzania, some of the loudest critics of, you know, the 

cost of security and securing our embassies, of course, are the first 

to talk about the lack of security in Benghazi and it is a balance. 

But security, we have learned all too painfully, is a very important 

component in making decisions about fortifying setbacks and the 

like. Is that not true, Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. It is the most important decision. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, let me ask, how do we balance, though, the 

need for accessibility, the need for visibility, the need for convenience in another country? I mean, we cannot forget, it isn’t just 

about us and our security and convenience. It’s also about the population, our embassy consulate is serving. Lots of people want to 

get visas and do business and so forth. Help us understand a little 

bit from your point of view with your commission, how do we strike 

the right balance? 

Mr. GREEN. That’s probably the toughest question that anyone 

here has asked today. I don’t know that there’s a magic bullet to 

do that, but you’ve got to manage risk and people have different 

opinions of how you do that, whether security takes precedence or 

access takes precedence. 

I remember when I was still at the State Department there was 

a big battle between those who, in the old USIA who wanted more 

access for the local populous to go to the libraries and then on the 

flip side of that were the security people that said we can’t afford 

to have a library hanging out there in some commercial building. 

So we haven’t solved it. I think it’s, you know, you have to manage 

risk based on the situation, based on the threat and if you need 

more security or less security then that’s what you do. I mean, we 

can adjust. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I’ll finally just add, based on what you just 

said, you can’t just have a cookie-cutter approach because the situation is going to be different everywhere. 

Mr. GREEN. That’s right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you. 

And Mr. Welch, thank you so much for your courtesy, and thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 
46 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Gentleman’s time is expired. 

We will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chaffetz. And I think this is a very 

important hearing. Sometimes it doesn’t get the attention others 

do, but it is an important meat-and-potatoes hearing that talks 

about our embassy security. A lot of that was highlighted by the 

events at Benghazi, and also our vulnerability with our various 

posts around the world. 

Now, it’s kind of interesting, my brother was a Member of Congress who chaired the subcommittee, I think it was international 

operations, that did the Inman buildings when they were looking 

at secure facilities. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Mica, if I may, that was your Democratic 

brother. 

Mr. MICA. That was, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. Thank you. 

Mr. MICA. And if he got it right, we wouldn’t be there today with 

this hearing. But touche, Mr. Connolly. 

In any event, you can do just about everything Mr. Green said. 

It’s almost impossible to protect every compound, our employees 

are at risk around the world. They can’t all be confined in the compound. But some things can be done. And we have two lists, I understand. One is prepared by OBO and another one is by the security folks, diplomatic security folks. 

On the risk level, I just saw a copy of one of those which you all 

have not provided to us, but we’ve gotten a copy of it, and for obvious reasons, we don’t publicize that. We don’t want our enemies to 

know where our emphasis is. But there are just some commonsense 

things that need to be done and some posts are more at risk than 

others, right, Ms. Muniz? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, that’s absolutely right. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Mr. Jones, you’d agree, and Mr. Green. 

One of the problems we have is there’s a security list I have seen 

and it differs from the OBO list. Can you tell me about the differences, Ms. Muniz? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, I can, and I appreciate the opportunity. DS assesses every facility worldwide on an annual basis for its risk. That 

is called the vulnerability list. 

Mr. MICA. Right. 

Ms. MUNIZ. That list is very, very extensive, because it includes 

every building in a compound which may have, say, a half dozen 

facilities spread around the town. We take that information—— 

Mr. MICA. But it does rank them? 

Ms. MUNIZ. It does rank them. It absolutely ranks them. 

Mr. MICA. And your list is different from their list. Is that correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We basically translate their list into the highest risk 

post. We pull up, in other words, if they’re assessing 12 facilities, 

we pull up the highest at risk and put it on our vulnerability list 

or our capital security cost-sharing program. 

Mr. MICA. But they don’t match, I’m told. 

Ms. MUNIZ. They can’t match exactly because for their ten entries, we would have one. 
47 

Mr. MICA. Well, again, this started out as looking at Design Excellence and choosing design as opposed to security. You have diplomatic security that is directed to make certain that our folks are 

protected and then you have your organization, overseas building, 

and you’re making your determinations. But they don’t mesh and 

that may leave some of our facilities at risk. 

For example, Benghazi, I was told, was high on a list but actually didn’t get the attention either from reenforcement after a number of requests of security personnel and other safeguards and that 

some of the attention that should have been focused there and that 

would be the Secretary of State’s ultimate responsibility. Is that 

correct? Would the Secretary of State make a determination there, 

or is this—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. We, the department, OBO and DS basically decide 

on that capital security construction schedule. So the list that you 

see—— 

Mr. MICA. Does the Secretary review the list? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. MICA. Not to your knowledge. Now that’s something we 

might need to change in the law. But, again, I would think that 

the Secretary of State charged with a safety and security of our 

embassies would at least look at the list, and you don’t think like 

the former Secretary when Benghazi occurred even looked at a list 

or was given the list? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I can’t speak to that, but I can assure you that working with diplomatic security which we do every year on that list, 

that diplomatic security signs off on the order of that list and that 

it is based on the ranking—— 

Mr. MICA. Well, someone failed in Benghazi, and I’m told that it 

was high on the list, that the proper attention was not paid to 

making certain it had the protections. Because, I mean, even a 

high schooler could look at the list on Libya, Benghazi and pick 

that as a top priority. Wouldn’t you say that would be a top priority 

if you were looking at a list a year ago or whenever? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The Capital Security Construction Program provides 

us funding to build embassies and consulates. Benghazi was neither an embassy nor a consulate and was not on the list. 

Mr. MICA. But it had American personnel and it also posed a 

risk. Diplomatic security was also responsible for the security of 

the personnel there, and they contracted also for services; is that 

correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I could make a general Statement about Benghazi 

and about OBO’s role, but I think beyond that, I didn’t come today 

prepared nor was OBO’s role in Benghazi extensive. 

Mr. MICA. Well, I just want to know the general procedure. Mr. 

Issa and I visited, post-Benghazi, some of the diplomatic posts. We 

saw some simple comments and things that needed to be done, improvements in video capability, improvements in a whole host of 

areas. Are you aware that those improvements that have been 

identified by the different groups and Congress have been made so 

that our personnel are not at risk? Final question. 

Ms. MUNIZ. You’re talking about improvements in Benghazi. We 

no longer—— 
48 

Mr. MICA. Security improvements in our diplomatic posts. There 

have been a host of groups investigating, reporting and they’ve said 

that certain things need to be done. I cited one as video capability. 

There are many others, but maybe we don’t want to discuss them 

in open form. But can you tell the committee, from your position, 

have those improvements been made and addressed? 

Ms. MUNIZ. So let me respond on two fronts. As the committee 

knows—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Excuse me, can you please speak into your microphone. Put it up to you. Thank you. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Sorry. As the committee knows, the Secretary in the 

wake of Benghazi appointed an accountability review board. That 

review board made 29 recommendations. The Department accepted 

all of those recommendations and has been aggressively implementing those recommendations. They’ve also reported to Congress 

on the implementation. OBO is involved in—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Can I interrupt you right there? Because part of 

that accountability review process was the development of this report by Mr. Green and you had Under Secretary Kennedy go on 

CBS news and say they don’t accept it. So how do you represent 

that the State Department has accepted all those recommendations 

when the work of Mr. Green was not accepted? 

Mr. MICA. And also, Mr. Chairman, if they could for the record, 

and I think all the members would want this, can you also give us 

for the record what has been implemented. If some of those recommendations have to remain not public, that’s fine, but give them 

to the committee. So can you answer the two questions? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I can certainly take that back to the Department and 

we could reply to that request. 

Mr. MICA. You didn’t answer Mr. Chaffetz. 

Ms. MUNIZ. If he could repeat the question. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We’re going to recognize Mr. Connolly now and 

then we’ll come back to this. 

Gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Don’t repeat the question, Ms. Muniz. The assertion is being 

made that Patrick Kennedy contradicted the Secretary of State, 

and I don’t believe that’s true. I believe that’s inaccurate. And for 

the record, I would ask you to go back and have Mr. Kennedy clarify, but I’m quite confident knowing Mr. Kennedy, he was not contradicting the secretary of State who said she had accepted all recommendations, as you just said. And if there’s any daylight between those two points of view, by all means, come back and clarify. But I didn’t hear Mr. Kennedy say any such thing. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think that assumption is right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I’m sorry. Thank you. 

I also find it interesting that in hindsight we have perfect understanding of the security needs in Benghazi and you should have 

understood that Benghazi of all of the posts in the world was No. 

1. Shame on you for not understanding that. How many posts do 

we have in the State Department around the world, Ms. Muniz? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We have roughly 270. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I’m sorry? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We have roughly 270. 
49 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You really don’t like that microphone, do you? 

You need to put—thank you. 

Ms. MUNIZ. We have roughly 270. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Perfect. 270, is that right? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So we have lots of security challenges and 

Benghazi, as you point out, was neither a consulate nor an embassy. That doesn’t mean it’s unimportant. We want to protect all 

American personnel. We don’t want anyone at risk, but unfortunately, we live in a dangerous, imperfect world. And here is the 

same crowd complaining about you spending too much money 

which, well, you know, in any security situation you’ve got to do 

some triage in terms of where you put your money and how you 

prioritize it. Is that not correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think that’s absolutely right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. And obviously, you wish all 270 posts, including Benghazi, were perfectly secure with the perfect setbacks 

and in the right location that met all of the demands, the 

functionality of the State Department, the needs of the host country, accessibility for everybody, but security that is impregnable. Is 

that not correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think that’s accurate. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And that would be called a perfect world. Would 

that be fair, Ms. Muniz? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, that would be. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. So I’m not quite sure how much that perfect 

world would cost, but absent a perfect world, the question is, can 

we do better? Can we make better decisions, better informed decisions? As Mr. Green and I were talking about earlier, that clearly 

understand that in the world we live in right now security in some 

ways it is going to dominate some decisions or at least take preponderance of the weight as we consider all the factors. 

But it can never be the only consideration because what’s the 

point of having a State Department facility, an embassy, a consulate if it can’t function, you know? And that’s the dilemma, and 

that’s what Mr. Green and I were talking about a little bit earlier, 

that balance. And I assume that’s something that bedevils you, too, 

Ms. Muniz, and your colleague, Mr. Jones. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would say that I’m naturally optimistic, and I really do believe that with great architects, great engineers, great 

builders that we can crack that nut, that we can build buildings 

that are secure, we can make them as efficient as possible. 

But I really do think that we could do everything that’s humanly 

possible and have those buildings do the maximum that they 

should do. I think the standard embassy design taught us a lot. I 

think we were able to take a lot of those lessons and help inform 

what we do, and I think that we’re going to continue to learn and 

make these facilities better and better, and faster, and economical 

and efficient, but I really believe that we’re going to get there, and 

I’m dedicated to getting us there. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I want to pick up on Mr. Bentivolio’s point, however. While I do—I am bothered by sort of a double standard some 

seem to have about this whole issue of security; you should have 

known, but don’t spend so much money, and a cookie-cutter ap-
50 

proach will do fine. As Mr. Green said, it really won’t do fine. We 

have to take cognizance of the variations among the 270 posts overseas, and the different cultures, and threat assessments and so 

forth. 

But a billion dollars is a lot of money. Now, first of all, did—it 

was not clear. It was hard to follow your math. Were you telling 

us that all but $50 million of that $1 billion has been recovered by 

the sale of other property we own in London and vicinity? 

Ms. MUNIZ. So let me go over it very briefly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. There’s that microphone again, Ms. Muniz. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m sorry. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That’s all right. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Let me go over it very briefly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. Very briefly. I’ve got 19 seconds. 

Ms. MUNIZ. OK. We sold all of our current properties in London. 

The proceeds of the sale from those properties are paying for the 

projects. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. OK. 

Ms. MUNIZ. There will likely be a small amount of money left in 

reserve at the end of the London projects. 

The comparison I was making is that the Bureau, before my time 

there and I believe at the time that Mr. Green was at the Department, assessed whether it would be better to fix the current chancery, which would have cost $730 million, or to build a new one. 

And when you compare the cost, excluding the site in London, it’s 

under $800 million. So for a difference of about $50 million, we’re 

able to build a facility that meets setback, that collocates staff, that 

meets all of our security requirements, and that doesn’t require 

any new appropriated funds. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you for that clarification. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina Mr. 

Meadows for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank each of you for your testimony. 

One, before Mr. Connolly leaves, because he may need to comment, the gentleman from Virginia, because he sits on the Foreign 

Affairs Committee with me. And I guess I’m troubled that this is 

the first time that we’re really hearing about Design Excellence in 

terms of the re-auth and the way that it’s gone. And I’m passionate 

about foreign affairs, and I attend the majority of those hearings, 

and so I think the gentleman from Virginia would say that this is 

the first time he’s heard it, but I’d yield for a couple of seconds 

to—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can I just say to my friend from North Carolina, 

I’m sympathetic to the challenge that we face, and it’s real, and as 

I said, I think, maybe before you arrived, for me this is not some 

political ball—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I had a friend killed in one of our embassies in 

a terrorist attack because there was no setback and because we 

weren’t diligent, frankly, about the threat assessment. 
51 

Mr. MEADOWS. Is this the first time you’ve heard about Design 

Excellence? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It is. And I want to tell you, this whole issue of 

building security, when I worked in the Senate 30 years ago, we 

were talking about this. And it seems to bedevil the State Department in part because it’s not their expertise. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, and that’s where I want to followup. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. And I thank the gentleman from Virginia. 

It is very troubling to me that when I sit on an authorizing committee and now on an oversight committee, and probably even 

more difficult for me because I’ve built million-dollar buildings, I’ve 

worked with architects, I know design bid/build very well, that how 

do we have a set of standards—for example, let’s talk about security, because all of us in a bipartisan manner here agree on security. What diplomatic security standards do we have for this Design Excellence component? Who’s weighed in on that, or are you 

just counting on architects and engineers? 

Ms. MUNIZ. So all of the standards are established by Diplomatic 

Security and in law, setback and collocation and law. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I’m not talking about setbacks; I’m talking about 

the actual design part of it. The setbacks is pretty easy. We talked 

about that today. So you have a set of standards by Diplomatic Security that are published that I can find today? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I know—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Because I couldn’t find them. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I know that some of those standards are classified, 

so—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I’ve got—I’ve got security clearance. I’d be glad to 

go look at it. So you’re saying—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. We can provide—— 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. That if I go in a classified setting, I 

can find that today, because I—make sure. You’re under oath. You 

know, you’ve got some staff behind you. Are you sure about that? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We—let me put it this way: We meet all of the security standards established by Diplomatic Security for every new 

consulate and embassy that we build. 

Mr. MEADOWS. How do you do that when—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. As you might also know, Diplomatic Security certifies that those buildings meet not only their requirements and 

their standards established by the OSPB, but also those standards 

set in law. All of the standards that are established by DS and by 

OBO to the degree that we’re responsible for life safety standards, 

fire, all of those are met. Nothing will be changed with respect to 

those security standards going from the standard embassy design 

to—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So what does change? 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. The Excellence Initiative. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So what does change? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think the way I would explain it is that we took 

what was a fixed module, a fixed solution to building, we 

deconstructed it in a way that it became more a kit of parts that 

could be—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Why? 
52 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. Assembled in different ways. 

Mr. MEADOWS. To make it look better? 

Ms. MUNIZ. No. To make it more efficient, to make it cost less, 

to build less in environments where we don’t need a warehouse, 

where we don’t need 10 acres—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. OK. But—— 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. And to make sure that—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Let me just say that we don’t—— 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. That these buildings are crafted to 

maintain low operating costs. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I understand that that was the goal. Where do we 

have any example where that’s actually really happened to date? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. To date. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Today. 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. That’s a fair question, but it’s a relatively recent initiative. So while there are early examples—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So is the answer yes or no? Do we have any example? One. One example. 

Ms. MUNIZ. The examples that we consider early examples are 

in the pipeline and—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So do we have one completed example? Yes or no. 

Ms. MUNIZ. No. No, we don’t. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So how can you say definitively that it’s costing 

the taxpayers less, that it’s secure, that it meets the standards, 

that it does all of that? How can you say that? I mean—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. We know—— 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. Are you projecting it? 

Ms. MUNIZ. No. We know that the designs are certified by Diplomatic Security. We know what the costs are because we set the 

budget. And we know what the schedules are, because that—those 

are the schedules that we self-set to build those facilities overseas. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So why—why wouldn’t we have heard about this 

in Foreign Affairs? 

Ms. MUNIZ. So I’d like to go back and answer that question. We 

have briefed this program and there have been numerous settings 

on the Hill where this program has been discussed since 2011. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes. So when was the major initiative briefed 

to—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. The first time it was briefed to the Hill was in March 

2011. 

Mr. MEADOWS. No, to Foreign Affairs. I sit on that committee, 

too. So—and I’m not aware that you ever briefed us. When did you 

brief us, the major initiative? Ever? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We offered briefings. I’d have to go back to my staff 

to see—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, they’re behind you—— 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. Which committee and which staff. 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. So just turn around and ask them. 

When did you brief us? I’ve got my calendar. I’ll be glad to check. 

And I’m talking about the major initiative here. I’m not talking 

about some little, teeny component. When was that—— 
53 

Ms. MUNIZ. No. I understand. It’s my understanding that we offered briefings. When we went up and briefed in March 2011, we 

offered all committees the opportunity to be briefed in this program. 

Mr. MEADOWS. And so the House Foreign—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. Our authorizers—— 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. Affairs turned you down? 

Ms. MUNIZ. My understanding is that, yes, it is. Yes, they did. 

I’d like to go back and put together the schedule, but we offered 

briefings to our authorizers—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. OK. Well—— 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. Our operators and the—— 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. Let me just tell you that I—— 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. In the Senate. 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. I sit on that committee. 

Ms. MUNIZ. And in—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. It hasn’t been authorized. You’ve had new budget 

requirements. I would suggest as part of the normal order that you 

would go before that committee as well; don’t you think? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would be more than happy to brief any committee 

that’s interested in the program and to answer any of the questions. I know that we have invited staff to—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I—— 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. Have provided materials, but I would be 

more than happy to go to any committee and have a conversation 

about this program. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Before you put out any more bids and award any 

more contracts. Would you be willing to commit to that? 

Ms. MUNIZ. No. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois 

Ms. Duckworth for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So I understand the tension between making sure our embassies 

are accessible to the host-nation citizens who want to do business 

with the United States, as well as to allow our embassy personnel 

to do the jobs that they need to do, but also the need for security. 

And we could focus on the past all we want and who voted for 

what, who voted for funding, who didn’t vote for funding, who—you 

know, folks who are now saying, well, there’s not enough security, 

but these are the same folks who voted to cut funding to the State 

Department. 

I wasn’t here then. I’m here now, and my focus is moving forward. And in looking at the Design Excellence program, as I have 

so far, I do applaud its modularity concept, that you have these 

components that help with security, and that you can put them together in different ways as appropriate to the Nation, the security 

risk, the available land, all of those things, as opposed to a single 

monolithic embassy design that is the single embassy design, because there’s a security issue with that as well. We don’t want one 

single embassy design where every single embassy we’ve ever built 

is exactly the same, because if I were a terrorist, I’d just have to 

figure out one, and then I know the weaknesses for all of our embassies. 
54 

So I do understand that, but I do have a concern with the Design 

Excellence program, and that is the involvement of security experts 

in development of the Design Excellence program. I know there 

were some who were on the commission to develop it, but, Ms. 

Muniz and then Mr. Green, if you could each address this issue of 

the actual input of security experts into the program, into setting 

the standards that are in the program, and whether that is— 

there’s an ongoing effort to keep the security experts involved beyond what the State Department comes up with on its own, because one of the criticisms that has happened has been that the 

State Department has underestimated the security needs and the 

security threats. And I want to make sure as we move forward and 

we build these embassies that security considerations are part of 

that ongoing process of assessment. 

So, Ms. Muniz, if you could sort of address that, starting from 

who is on the initial commission and whether that involvement in 

security continues. And, Mr. Green, if you could give us your assessment as well, as a security expert yourself. 

Mr. GREEN. I’m not really a security expert. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Well, you led the committee that was asked by 

the ARB, and I think that you have some very valid comments that 

I would like to hear about in terms of security in the Design Excellence program. But I’d like Ms. Muniz to start, if you don’t mind. 

Ms. MUNIZ. As I mentioned earlier, the founding commitment 

with this program, as with any other programs that would evolve 

over time relating to embassy and consulate construction, is that 

we meet all of the security standards established by DS. They increase some; they change them over time. Whatever they throw at 

us, we are going to implement, because that’s our responsibility. So 

I want to make that point very clear. 

Our goal with this process is also to improve our coordination 

with Diplomatic Security, so to have them more involved with us 

and to have them more involved earlier to make sure that they see 

everything that we’re doing throughout the development of the 

project. So I would argue that their involvement is going to increase, and that the key commitment that I know is important to 

them is that we continue to meet all of the security standards. And 

I have assured—I have assured the Department, I assure this committee that we will continue do that. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. OK. Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. I don’t know what the interaction today is between 

DS and OBO as they develop new plans for embassies and consulates. What I do know is—and recognize, this report what was 

done now more than a year ago. Maybe they’re all joining hands 

and singing Kumbaya now. But when we interviewed people who 

were concerned with security, not just DS, but people from other 

parts of the government also, they were not happy. The people we 

talked to were not happy in their role—with their role in the selection process and felt very strongly that the pendulum had shifted 

from security to design. 

I mentioned—and there are several examples of our observations, 

as I said before, didn’t come from the six of us. These were based 

on the interviews that we did with more than 100 people. Not all 

of them, obviously, opined on OBO and security, but many did. And 
55 

so their—those observations are in there. It’s not my opinion. It’s 

what we got from people who work on a daily basis, or hopefully 

work on a daily basis, with OBO. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. I’m out of time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. If the gentlewoman will yield so she can reclaim 

some time and respond to this. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Yes, I’ll yield. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Green spearheads this effort, puts together 

this report, which was an offshoot and started because of the Accountability Review Board. Ms. Muniz, has the State Department 

accepted this? Has this been approved? Is there anything under 

your mind that has been—or did they disagree with it? 

Ms. MUNIZ. As Mr. Green pointed out, the DS Management Review Board really looked at DS’ organization. So I don’t know the 

status of the response or the implementation of those recommendations. I could take that back to my colleagues—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And that’s one of the concerns. 

Ms. MUNIZ. With respect to—let me finish. With respect to the 

questions relating to OBO, there was one recommendation that we 

look at the cost implications—or the security implications of this 

program, and we have affirmed time and again that there will be 

no security implications to this program. We are dedicated to meeting all of the security requirements that DS establishes, that are 

established in law, and in working with DS to innovate better and 

better products every year that better meet those security standards. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So if it takes longer to build something, do you 

consider that a security implication? 

Ms. MUNIZ. As I explained to the committee, from the time of 

award, which is how OBO receives its funding annually, the time 

to build the facility, because we will be doing construction only, will 

be the same or shorter, which means that we will have people in 

safer facilities faster than using the design/build methodology, in 

particular when we have advance time to plan. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And I hope—and to my ranking member and my 

colleagues on both sides of the aisle, this report was done. We’ve 

asked for a copy. The State Department has thus far refused to 

give us a copy. Al Jazeera has it. They print it out on their 

Website. We don’t have one here in the U.S. Congress, even though 

I’m holding one that I got off of Al Jazeera. You have Patrick Kennedy in a very significant post go on CBS News and say that he 

disagrees with this report. I think it’s part of our business to understand what does he disagree with, what does he agree with. And 

if the very person who’s implementing this office isn’t totally familiar with it, isn’t necessarily implementing it, there’s a problem. 

There’s a problem. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Again, I—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Sure. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would like to restate, it was a DS management report. It hit and touched on DS. Diplomatic Security would be better 

positioned to answer that question. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I think they’d be in a great position to answer. 

And I think next time we have this panel, we should include Diplo-
56 

matic Security. If I had to do it over, I’d include Diplomatic Security here as well. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would the gentlelady continue to yield to me? 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thanks. 

Just one question, Mr. Green, again, trying to get to the bottom 

line, security. When you did your survey, exactly what were you— 

you said you talked to 100 people, you surveyed 100 people. Can 

you tell us a little bit about that process so we can—— 

Mr. GREEN. Well—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS [continuing]. Fully—fully understand and appreciate what it was that you did, and what you were telling these 

people, and why you were asking, because that’s significant? You 

went to people whose interests—whose interests would be to make 

sure that they were secure; am I right? 

Mr. GREEN. Well, we—we—yes. We interviewed more than 100 

people. We had them come in, and they spread across all the bureaus in the State Department and some from outside State. We 

interviewed some of the people that were on the Accountability Review Board. We asked different questions of different people. Some 

were organizational questions: Does the Assistant Secretary for 

Diplomatic Security have enough of a role within running the organization? There was a lot of emphasis on high-threat posts postBenghazi, to establish a special cell for high-threat posts. 

Not all of the people that we talked to did we ask about the relationship with OBO and others, but many of them we did ask that 

question to, and out of those questions came these observations 

that we laid out in our report. 

And the final recommendation, as I said before, we didn’t make 

a determination that Design Excellence should be tossed out the 

window. All we said was before you go a lot further with this, we 

recommend that the State Department do an in-depth analysis to 

look at the security implications of this program. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. It just seems to me that, you know, a lot of times 

we have departments and individuals disputing issues in government, and the people suffer during the dispute. You know, at some 

point we’ve got to figure this out so that our people are protected. 

I think Members of Congress and certainly the public, when they 

hear the debates, they—you know, they’re not necessarily interested in watching the sausage being made; they want to make sure 

that people are secure, that the costs are reasonable, and that the 

facility is functional—— 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS [continuing]. And that we’re doing whatever we 

do effectively and efficiently. 

Mr. GREEN. Right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just think sometimes, you know, it seems as if 

we feel like we’ve got to argue this and argue that, but at the same 

time, the people who need what we’re supposed to be yielding, 

they’re not getting it, or if they’re getting it, they’re not getting it 

in a timely fashion. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, what our—our report obviously focused on security. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand. 
57 

Mr. GREEN. And as I said early on, if someone can show me that 

we can do it just as inexpensively, just as securely, just as fast 

using Design Excellence, I will sign up tomorrow. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

I thank the gentlelady for yielding. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentlewoman. 

I’ll now recognize myself. But I want to ask unanimous consent 

to enter into the record the—it’s called the Guide to Design Excellence; includes a message from you, Ms. Muniz. A question for— 

without hearing any objections, so ordered. We’ll enter it into the 

record. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Who at State Department has approved this? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The Director of OBO approved that document. Before 

I was Director, it was Adam Namm. But I also want to make clear 

that this is a document that was widely briefed within the Department with our colleagues in Diplomatic Security, was briefed on 

the Hill, was briefed publicly, and was provided widely. So while 

it’s within OBO’s authority to innovate and to develop programs 

that help us build the best buildings that we can that are cost-effective—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. OK. OK. 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. And are efficient—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I got it. 

Ms. MUNIZ. That—that is the concept—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I know. And the question that we have long term 

is Diplomatic Security’s feeling about that. We’ll come back to that. 

In response to CBS News, the State Department put out this 

Statement: There has been no evidence that Excellence projects 

take longer to build. In fact, under the Excellence Initiative, from 

the Fiscal Year award to occupancy, facilities will be delivered on 

the same, if not shorter, schedule. 

In a separate part, again in response to CBS News, it says, all 

facilities will be delivered on the same, if not shorter, schedules. 

There is no evidence to the contrary. 

Help me understand, then, why this unclassified document—help 

me understand what’s going on in Maputo. In Maputo, it started 

as a standard embassy design with an estimated development of 39 

months, and yet now it says that on March 28th of 2014, they were 

changing to Design Excellence, and that it was going to take 46 

months. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I don’t have the document that you have. I’d like to 

be able to respond to that, but I need to be able to go back and 

look at detailed budgets and schedules. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But this is something—this is the frustration. We 

request this type of document formally, you play hide and seek, you 

don’t provide it to us. You make all these representations that everything’s ahead of schedule; in fact, it’s probably going to be shorter is what you say. You tell that to the world. You put out—you 

put that out to the world. You gave that to CBS News. You let everybody know that, oh, no, no, no, no, nothing’s behind schedule, 

and yet I go find this document. Why is that? 
58 

Ms. MUNIZ. As I said, I’d like to look at the case and look at the 

document you’re holding to be able to speak knowledgeably about 

that particular project. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you dispute what I’m saying? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m not sure what you’re saying. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I’m saying that in Maputo, you went from a 39- 

month project to a 46-month project. And if you’re in Africa and 

don’t have the proper security, you’re going to feel the effects of 

that. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Again, I’ll have to go back and look at the details of 

that project—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Tell me about—— 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. Before I talk about—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Tell me about Oslo. Is Oslo ahead of schedule or 

behind schedule? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Oslo has a new contractor working on that project. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Is it behind schedule or ahead of schedule? 

Ms. MUNIZ. It is at this time behind schedule. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And it’s a Design Excellence project. 

Ms. MUNIZ. No, it’s not. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What is it? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Oslo was a project that was developed and could not 

be done as a standard embassy design, because many cities, in particular in Europe, have zoning requirements that require us to develop buildings differently. That is the case in Oslo. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. It seems very convenient that you toggle between 

is it Design Excellence, is it standard embassy design, is it or is 

it not? We don’t have that clear definition. There are a lot of people 

and, I believe, some documents out there that say it is Design Excellence. 

So help me with what’s going on in the Hague. Is the Hague 

ahead of schedule or behind schedule? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’d have to look up details about the Hague. Again, 

the Hague is like an Oslo project. The Hague was a project that 

was developed based on—it had to be an adjusted design based on 

city requirements. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Based on Design Excellence? 

Ms. MUNIZ. No, not based on Design Excellence. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Is it design/bid/build? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I believe that the Hague is design/bid/build, because 

the requirements in those cities force a very extensive development 

of the project in a way that indicates that design/bid/build is the 

better option. That is a condition that we find in very many cities, 

in Europe in particular. We have that issue—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And is—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. We had that issue in London, we had it in Oslo, we 

have it in the Hague. But those are projects that were started before the Excellence Initiative. Why the—while the way in which 

they were developed, I think, may very well be responsive to the 

environment in a way in which the Excellence Initiative would 

have—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, let’s go to Kiev in the Ukraine. What happened there? We needed some more seats, we needed more personnel? What did you do there? 
59 

Ms. MUNIZ. USAID added an annex in Kiev. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So we added how many seats? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I don’t have that at the tip of my finger. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. More than 100, right? More than 100 seats. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I don’t have that at my fingertips. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I do. 

Ms. MUNIZ. If you do—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. It was standard embassy design, and we added 

more than 100 additional seats. 

Ms. MUNIZ. We added an annex. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes. Well, still seats. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let me go to Mr. Jones. You’ve been sitting very 

patiently for a long time. I don’t think we’ve asked you any questions. 

So let me go to you about Port Moresby, because you were the 

one in your testimony here—let me ask you, if it takes longer to 

build an embassy, we have people in harm’s way, and it takes 

longer to build it, do you think that that puts people in harm’s way 

or not? 

Mr. JONES. In the case of Port Moresby? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. JONES. Is that the question? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. JONES. The situation in Port Moresby is that we had a significant increase in the number of people who would be located onsite and the addition of U.S. marines. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. OK. So just for those of you that aren’t as familiar with Port Moresby, we had 41 personnel, and that number was 

going to go up to 71 personnel, correct? 

Mr. JONES. Right. But under law, we are required to collocate the 

mission and would not have been able to do so had we only built 

a building for 41 people. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So there is a way, though, to build under standard embassy design an increase in the number of personnel. Let’s 

go back as to why—why was the number of personnel increased? 

Mr. JONES. At Port Moresby we started with what was essentially a standard embassy design. It was a mini standard design. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Right. 

Mr. JONES. When we got the increase to add the marines, we 

were unable to—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. When did that decision that marines were going 

into Port Moresby become—— 

Mr. JONES. I believe that the decision—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. When did you get that? 

Mr. JONES [continuing]. To add the marines was in March 2013. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And do you have documentation for this? Could 

you provide that to the committee? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. When we provide the other documents that 

you’ve requested, we will include that among it. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. OK. So there are no marines there now. And I 

think the public in general has a misconception as to what the marines actually do and don’t do. They don’t go outside—they don’t go 

outside the wall. They’re there to protect classified information. 
60 

In Port Moresby there is an Exxon Mobil project, multibillion-dollar project that is being developed to support the Chinese. The Chinese have a 20-year contract. And so I still don’t fully understand 

or appreciate—and you’re not necessarily the right person to answer this question, I don’t want to put you on the spot—as to why 

we suddenly had to have this surge in the number of personnel, 

but nevertheless, the occupancy date for Port Moresby was going 

to be May 2014, correct? 

Mr. JONES. That is correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And the cost of that embassy was estimated to be 

what? 

Mr. JONES. I believe the cost of the—all-in cost of the original facility was to be somewhere around $79 million. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. My understanding it was going to be less than 

$50 million. 

Mr. JONES. OK. The cost to construct the facility itself was $49- 

. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. OK. 

Mr. JONES. That includes site—the number I gave you includes 

site costs and things like that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Right. So we have the site, whether it’s standard 

embassy design or Design Excellence. I happened to go there in 

February. The chief of mission has no clue that any of this is going 

on, none of the discussions, no—had no idea. He was still anticipating—he understood there was a delay, but still thought that 

during his tenure they were going to be able to move into that. 

What is the new date for Port Moresby that they are going to 

move in? 

Mr. JONES. I believe that the new date will be in 2018. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So—and what is the estimated cost? 

Mr. JONES. We don’t have a final cost yet, because we don’t have 

a completed design. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Because it’s not a standard embassy design, correct? 

Mr. JONES. No. That’s not the issue. The issue—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Are you telling me that this is not Design Excellence, that this is under standard embassy design, Port Moresby? 

Mr. JONES. No. What I’m saying is that the compound in Port 

Moresby began as a standard facility. It then experienced a significant increase in staffing, which prevented us from being able to use 

a standard design. The facility was not capable of being modified 

because it was so small, so it required an annex. And it is the addition of the people, the annex and the marines that are now making 

the delivery date in 2018. That is based on a cost-benefit analysis 

that the Department has done. That is the fastest time that we are 

able to get the folks from that mission collocated on the compound 

with the marines. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. This is so amazingly frustrating. The estimate 

that—the paperwork that I have, not from you, but the paperwork 

that I have says that this facility now costs in excess of $200 million. We’re going to spend $3 million per seat, per seat, in Port 

Moresby, Papua New Guinea. Average per capita income is, like, 

$2,500. 
61 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’d like to take some of these questions. So one thing 

I’d like to point—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, I’m not asking you. I’m asking Mr. Jones. 

So I’m going to—I’ll come to you. I’ll give you plenty of time. 

So we’re going to spend $3 million per seat in there, and they’re 

not going to be there for a good 4 years. You don’t have a final design. What are they supposed to do for security there for the next 

4 years while they wait? 

Mr. JONES. We are attempting to get safe and secure facilities in 

Port Moresby on the fastest time schedule that we can. We are 

doing everything in our power to ensure that we’re delivering safe, 

secure and functional facilities to the mission as expediently and 

as efficiently as possible. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. My understanding, let me share this with the 

ranking member, is we added more than 105 desks in the Ukraine. 

Here we’re talking about 30. It cost us about $24 million, and now 

we’re looking at a project that was less than $50 million to build 

estimated to go north of $200 million in Papua New Guinea. And 

the consequence to this is they’re going to be in harm’s way for a 

longer period of time. We’re going to have less budget and less 

money to build other facilities in other parts of the world. It is behind schedule. And these poor people are working in some of the 

most difficult situations I’ve seen in a very—when I was there, 

there was an attempted carjacking of U.S. diplomatic personnel, 

while I was there. We also had two people who showed up at the 

door trying to represent themselves as somebody that wanted to 

come see me and come see the—this is on a Saturday, dressed in 

garb that represented that they were there to meet people in the 

embassy, because you can walk right up to it. Right across the 

street, multiple times a year, I mean, very close at the pharmacy 

there, armed—armed bandits come in and try to rob that place. 

And there was no communication with that facility there in Port 

Moresby. The chief of mission should not have been getting that 

message from me, that’s for sure. 

Ms. Muniz, I think you wanted to say something. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I wanted to point out that, as we explained earlier, 

the forces causing the change to the design are outside of the Bureau. We talked about Iraq earlier. When you’re in any environment where things are changing rapidly, you have to adjust to 

those changes. There are costs related to those changes. 

A decision was made 2 years into a construction contract to add 

marines to a facility, to add significantly to the staff, to add classified capacity. That adds an extraordinary amount of expense in an 

existing contract. 

I think that when we have detailed information, and you have 

received the detailed information that you’ve asked, we can go over 

those costs in detail, but I think given the location of Papua New 

Guinea, given the fact that we learned that all materials and labor 

need to be shipped into Papua New Guinea, given the environment, 

the discovery of natural resources there have led to greater competition in a small market, those cost increases can be explained 

when a mission doubles in size. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I have gone way over time. I have more on this 

issue, but I’ll now recognize the ranking member Mr. Cummings. 
62 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Green, where do we go from here? I mean, 

really. I mean—— 

Mr. GREEN. I—you know, I think unfortunately where we go is 

we need to see the dollars and the time that it’s going to take to 

do Design Excellence. We don’t have that. We’re comparing apples 

and oranges. 

You know, I’m not so concerned personally with the appearance 

of embassies. The State IG did a report in 2008, and the key findings were essentially that people were happy with the appearance, 

and the host countries of those 12 embassies that they looked at 

were happy with the appearance, so that’s not what I’m worried 

about. 

What I am worried about, and I think what DS is worried about 

from a security standpoint is can you actually produce these things 

in the same amount of time with the same security at the same 

cost. And until we know that—and I don’t know how you get to it 

before you do some of them, but I think the chairman raised an 

issue, what is—what is cost per desk? You know, what is cost per 

desk under standard embassy design? We have some good figures 

on that, I’m sure. What is cost per desk under Design Excellence? 

Until we can compare apples and apples, you know, I think there’s 

going to be—continue to be a lot of skepticism that you can do this 

as fast and as cheap. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Muniz, I’ve listened carefully, and I am concerned, and I think we all should be concerned, when we don’t get 

documents. And it becomes very frustrating. Time is valuable. 

And, you know, I listened to Admiral Mullen and Ambassador 

Pickering when they talked about the report, the ARB report, and, 

you know, it was some of the most—I think it was Ambassador 

Pickering that said—I asked him why was he—why did he agree 

to get on that board, and he talked about the fact that—the review 

board—that he felt that he owed it to his country and to those who 

died and their families to make things better so it didn’t happen 

to anybody else. 

And in some kind of way—I mean, when I listen to you, Mr. 

Green, it makes sense that if I’ve got something that’s already designed and—I mean, it’s—I’ve got it, I’ve got something that I’m 

working with, and I guess you’ve had years to make any adjustments that you would see, right? I mean, is that right? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. In other words, you’ve got—it’s like you’ve got 

this house, you use the same—pretty much the same material, 

same structure over and over again, and then—but in the meantime, if there were problems, you can make those adjustments or— 

and just correct me if I’m wrong. I’m trying to put this in simple 

language for the American people. Or if you want to—if you’re in 

a country where there’s some unique situations, where you need a 

different kind of door, you know, you may have some height requirement or whatever, but still using the basic same model; is 

that right? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. Correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So logic tells me that if I’m using the same 

model, then it’s—I mean, it’s just logic that it would be quicker if 
63 

I then go to another country and use that model. That’s basically 

what you’re saying, right? 

Mr. GREEN. That’s the logic that makes sense. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so I think for the State Department, Ms. 

Muniz, it becomes a difficult argument to sell not only to us, but 

to the American people, because the American people, they don’t 

know everything that you know. So you’ve got—it’s easy for us to— 

I mean, and I can understand, because it’s your expertise and what 

you all do, but sometimes you have to break this stuff down so the 

people get what you’re talking about, because to them it makes no 

sense. And I’m not saying—I’m saying with the—with limited 

knowledge, it makes no sense. With all of your information, it probably makes a lot of sense. 

And so we find ourselves in a situation where you’ve got what 

Mr. Green’s saying, we’ve got what you’re saying, and—but the bottom line is, going back to what Mr. Green has said, if you had the 

data to show that we could get the same security, costs—— 

Mr. GREEN. Time. 

Mr. CUMMINGS [continuing]. Same time, all those factors pretty 

much the same, that he would sign on the dotted line. Am I right? 

Mr. GREEN. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So why can’t we get the information? There 

seems to be some reluctance, and I don’t know why that is. Can 

you help us with that? 

Because, see, one of the things that happens here, and I’ve lived 

long enough and seen enough and been up here long enough, we 

can get distracted from the mission by getting caught up in a lot 

of—and I’m not saying we don’t have to deal with those issues, but 

it doesn’t allow us to do what we’re supposed to be doing, and that 

is providing security. So we’ve got, oh, why didn’t I get this report 

or what? I mean, they’re legitimate questions, they really are, but 

at the same time, that’s the time that we could be taking our energy and focusing on making sure that our folks are safe, because 

that’s what the American people want. 

So go ahead. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think that’s absolutely right, and I’d be happy to 

explain in more detail why it is that if we award 100 percent design on the date of award, the period of performance is shorter, and 

we could have people into safer facilities faster. 

What it means is that if we know that our appropriation is fixed, 

we know which buildings we’re doing, it might take us longer to 

do the design. We’re going to be looking closely at the requirements, what are the materials that—that are going to work in that 

environment, how do we put that building together in that environment. But from the date of award, when we award that project, it’s 

not going to include any design time; it will be no longer than it 

would be with the design/build standard embassy design, and it 

will likely be shorter. I could go into more detail, we could provide 

the—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. There’s one little thing—— 

Ms. MUNIZ [continuing]. Analysis—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS [continuing]. That—whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. Rewind. There’s one little thing that bothers me, and that is why? In 

other words, if I’ve got my model, it is working, I know what it’s 
64 

going to cost, I know how much time it’s going to take, am I missing something that I then—then I have to go to something else? So, 

OK, oh, let me run and do something else, when I’ve already got 

this—I’ve got it finally. You follow me? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. I think it’s a fair question. And what I’ve tried 

to lay out is that the standard embassy design was a fixed solution 

based on an average hypothetical size embassy or consulate. We 

build embassies and consulates in every environment, whether 

that’s because it’s very hot, whether it’s because it’s very cold, 

whether because some systems are going to work there on the 

seafront and other systems are not going to work in a completely 

different environment. We’re looking at the real requirements of 

missions and thinking about how do we build the best buildings for 

those missions. 

The standard embassy design was a good fixed solution, but it 

also required us to build free-standing warehouses regardless of the 

location. There are some places we don’t need a warehouse. Why 

build a warehouse if we could get—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Then you take it off. Am I right? Right? I mean, 

you take it off. If I don’t need a garage, if I got a house with a garage, and I suddenly don’t need a garage, I take the garage off. 

And, by the way, it’s not just one design, right? There are a lot— 

several designs, right? 

Ms. MUNIZ. There’s one. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. There’s one? OK. 

Ms. MUNIZ. There’s one standard embassy design. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you just take the garage off. 

Ms. MUNIZ. All of those things taken together—and if I could try 

to sort of put or describe the Excellence Initiative in a nutshell, it’s 

really to say that we are taking those lessons learned from the 

standard embassy design, we’re taking those modular pieces of it, 

but we’re providing a lot more flexibility in how those could be put 

together in a way that’s meaningful. Again, you build a very large 

embassy, having these two bars is not efficient. You’re cladding two 

buildings as opposed to one. You’re securing two separate buildings 

almost as opposed to one. 

So I think that using architects, engineers, folks within the Department, our security professionals, we look at each case and come 

up with the best and the most efficient solution. In many ways 

what the Excellence Initiative is doing is exactly what you’re suggesting, right? It’s taking sort of the baseline and modifying that 

baseline in the way that is sensible for the mission. 

Right now the standard embassy design or the standard embassy 

design that we’re moving forward from was a very fixed solution, 

again, very horizontal: 10 acres, warehouse. That’s not always the 

best solution in all of the environments. 

And I—and I’d like to also State that the cost per desk, we use 

that cost per desk to develop our budget, so we have a cost-estimating office in our Bureau. When we build a budget, whether it’s 

a standard embassy design budget or an Excellence Initiative 

project, they tell us, you know what you’ve spent historically for 

this many desks and this many people in this environment? This 

much. That’s what your budget is. We’re going to work to that 
65 

same budget under the Excellence Initiative or under the standard 

embassy design. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Muniz, let me tell you something. You just— 

you helped me, what you just explained. Now I’m finally getting— 

so in other words—you know, what I thought you were going to say 

is that circumstances change, that we have new technology. I 

thought that’s what I was going to hear you say, that new technology, better use of certain—in other words, better materials, all 

those kind of things might go into—and I’m not—I don’t know anything about building, so—but all those things might go into changing the box. And what you’re saying is is that you may—help me 

if I’m wrong. You may look at the box, but you’re forever changing 

the box. It’s not that you don’t look at it, you don’t take it into consideration, but it may be changed substantially. Is that—all you’re 

talking about is a brand-new box, period? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would say that it depends. So, again, if we’re looking at a very large mission, to have these—the standard embassy 

design and to put that in place would simply not be efficient. 

London is a good example in the case that not only are we building a cube, which is much more efficient than sort of two separate 

boxes that go up, which would require twice as much cladding, but 

we’re also using materials that make the building significantly 

lighter; that reduce the size, the weight and the expense of the 

foundation that needs to be put down. The curtain wall reduces the 

weight, which also influences the foundation, and it’s all able to go 

up faster than a traditional concrete building would have been able 

to go up in that place. So I think it’s both materials and base building in certain cases. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Last question. Is it your—do you anticipate being 

able to take, say, that—a box—London is, I know, very unique, but 

other—that perhaps the creation of another box or something that 

you can use in more than one place, do you follow what I’m saying, 

as you’re developing? And how does that play into that? Do you follow me? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. I think I do. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. In other words, if you have a—if you build an 

embassy, you do all the things you just said. You say, OK, now 

we’ve got great design, we’ve got security. This is the best buck— 

we get the best bang for our buck. Time, everything is straight. Do 

you anticipate being able to use, say, for example, that model, a 

model like that, somewhere else? Do you follow me? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. Let me use an example, which may be too common, but I think it sort of demonstrates the point. There was a 

time when most people who drove had a Model T. It was a great 

car. It was a simple car. As we evolved, cars got better and better. 

They evolved, and they also sort of separated it out into the different types of cars. So today, rather than going with the Model T, 

you could go with a version that is much more secure, much more 

safe, but you could also choose to have an Austin Mini in one case, 

and you could go with an SUV, but those things depend on where 

you are. One, you want to be in a small urban environment, you’re 

a small mission, you could go with a smaller size and still meet all 

your requirements and be more efficient to run, but there are those 
66 

other times when you’re going to need the larger solution, you’re 

going to need—you’re going to need the SUV. 

And I think that being able to put the appropriate solution with 

the mission, and to consider those things, and to make sure that 

we’re appropriately spending the money that the taxpayer gives us, 

and considering not just first costs, but long-term costs, I think 

that’s what we’re talking about doing. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

Thank you all for being here. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Recognize the chairman of the committee Mr. 

Issa. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. And for the—Chairman Chaffetz and 

Ranking Member Cummings, I appreciate your questioning. 

And fortunately I came back in just in time to have you talk 

about automobiles. And I agree that sometimes—I actually don’t 

think the Fiat 500 or the Morris Mini is ever appropriate from a 

safety standpoint for our men and women in the State Department. 

But having said that, I certainly understand the difference of 

size and scale and some of the urban versus rural considerations, 

but, Mr. Green, those considerations really aren’t what we’re asking about today. What we’re asking about is do you, to the greatest 

extent possible, use a mass-production concept, which is what 

standard build is? It’s about do you build a one-of-a-kind formula 

race car that’s beautiful and fast and has unique characteristics, 

and each one is different—as a matter of fact, the secrets aren’t 

even shared between formula racers—or do you build a Toyota 

Camry in order to get a—or a Ford Focus or a Ford 500? Do you 

build a mass-produced, consistent, reliable, understood, bugs 

worked out, repeatable product so that you get a highly reliable 

product that can be maintained throughout the system, standard 

windows, standard other characteristics if possible, in order to get 

a good product at a better price? 

And I switched to Ford quickly when I realized it is about Henry 

Ford’s model of greater value for less cost, isn’t it, Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, it is. And I think it’s like standard embassy design might be the Chevrolet Suburban, but, when necessary, it becomes the Escalade. 

Chairman ISSA. And there are options to further uparmor—— 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA [continuing]. And so on. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. Ms. Muniz, one of the other questions, Inman is 

all about security, right, the so-called Inman designs? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m not as familiar with the Inman designs as that 

program was over long before I came in. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, let me tell you what I was told 14 years 

ago when I came in and started going to embassies as a member 

of Foreign Affairs. We didn’t used to think of embassies in the 

same security sense we do now. And what we discovered, the Beirut barracks, and the Marine barracks, and the Beirut embassy 

bombing and others taught us was there is no substitute for setback. Do you understand that as the person making these decisions? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. Absolutely. 
67 

Chairman ISSA. So when you talk about urban versus rural and 

location—and I was just in Britain where setback is highly compromised, and they were compliant, but they made a 5-acre decision and went vertical and did the best they could, including the 

famous moat, part of—and, in fact, some crash considerations. 

Those safety considerations, any time you give up setback, you 

have to tradeoff higher cost for that setback, don’t you? 

Ms. MUNIZ. You do, but we are not suggesting under this program to ever trade setback. 

Chairman ISSA. OK. So when you talk about large footprint, 

which you did, and small footprint, the truth is that standard 

build—and I’ll go back to Mr. Green for part of this—is about starting off with a footprint sufficient for current and future embassy 

considerations, including possible add-ons, in a country so that we 

can make a 50-year decision on sovereign U.S. soil, isn’t it? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Correct. 

Chairman ISSA. I was on this codel—and I apologize, I was able 

to take a Democratic staffer, but none of my counterparts were able 

to attend because it was short notice—but I was struck by something that I want to make sure is in the record today, and what 

was talked about earlier in Papua New Guinea: changing characteristics. 

When they were talking about—and they flew in people from 

your offices to be there where we were in London. They started 

talking about, well, you know, it’s individual, and we have to work 

it out. And I suddenly realized what you’re doing is you’re custom 

building more and more. You’re going into a rut, which is instead 

of saying, State Department will plan, including excess space if appropriate—we will plan for the anticipated 50-year necessary facility, and we want to make sure that it’s very much understood, instead what they were talking about was one group might need a 

little more here, and somebody may—which suddenly hit me what 

you’re talking about is you’re talking to the current—according to 

what I was told, you’re talking to the current people in an embassy, 

the current Ambassador, the current staff, in order to find out 

what they want as part of this design characteristic. 

And that is one of the things that I came back profoundly concerned about from the trip to London. It wasn’t the London facility, 

because at half a million square feet, there’s a lot of room, but 

when you’re looking at embassies and starting to ask, well, should 

it be plussed or minused based on unique character—or current 

characteristics, aren’t you inherently creating that downstream 

problem that you’re designing based on what an ambassador and 

their staff want, not based on a plan that looks 50 years in the future? And I’d like each of you to answer that to the extent you can. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think it’s a great question, because it really addresses one of the enduring challenges of the Department. We’re 

trying to build buildings for 50, 100 years, and things change over 

that time period. 

I think that where we can financially, and based on the urban 

environment or the environment where we’re building, we do try to 

buy larger sites, and we actually make a deliberate effort, and this 
68 

was not always done with the standard embassy design. We site 

the building in such a way that we know where a later annex will 

go. For years, maybe forever, it’ll be a lawn, but we know in advance how we might use that space so that it gives us that flexibility. 

The other thing that we’ve done under the Excellence Initiative, 

and I think this is something that is meaningful and reduces costs 

in the long term, so we’re looking at things like using raised floors, 

using demountable partitions, making sure that infrastructure is 

sized in a way that, within a given envelope, you could have a significant increase in staff with very little cost. That wasn’t true with 

the older model. 

Again, I think the standard embassy design taught us a lot, but 

I think we can improve on it. We can improve on it in meaningful 

ways that give us more flexibility for the long term. And I 

think—— 

Chairman ISSA. Right. 

And Mr. Green, as you respond to that question, I just want you 

to include from your research from your committee’s activities, in 

fact, isn’t that what standard build is supposed to do is to include 

that? So isn’t it ‘‘mend it don’t end it’’ rather than staying standard 

build didn’t include future annexes and expansion in their consideration? 

Mr. GREEN. No. It’s a continuously moving standard that is done. 

Let me just respond to your earlier question, though. And, you 

know, what do we need 50 years out? You know, the Ambassador 

wants a bigger latrine in his office or we want 50 consular windows 

instead of five. That changes all the time. I mean, we saw it here 

today. It changed with Papua New Guinea. You had a plan to do 

something and all of a sudden the Department says, nope, we need 

more for whatever reason. 

There’s rightsizing that goes on constantly within the Department. There’s the much publicized, but I’m not sure how much it’s 

occurring, the pivot to Asia. What does that mean for the those embassies in Asia? More people. Well, you know, 5 years from now it 

might be a pivot somewhere else. I don’t know that we’re ever 

going to reach the perfect solution to say that we could build something that’s good today, and it will be good even 10 years from now. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

And Mr. Chairman, I think the point that your research and 

what we’re hearing today is all about is, that as you standardize 

and drive down the cost per square foot, the ability to build that 

few extra square feet and the flexibility is inherent in it. As you 

drive up the square foot cost, you inherently are building smaller 

and tighter. 

And tight-sizing is not what we need for flexibility; it’s 

rightsizing with a plan to expand or to add in and hopefully as you 

continue your research and we get the numbers, we’ll begin seeing 

how standard build can be made to do just that. 

And I thank you for your indulgence and yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the chairman. We’ll now recognize a very 

patient member from Michigan, Mr. Bentivolio, for 2 minutes. No, 

I’m just teasing. 5 minutes. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. 5 minutes, good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
69 

During our last conversation, I forgot to ask you a very, very important question when it came time, when we were discussing London, and you clarified it’s going to cost about $800 million, and you 

don’t look at how many employees it’s going to house, you call them 

desks; is that correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. OK. So how many desks in the London embassy? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m sorry, I believe 644. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Six hundred and forty four. So what does that 

work out to? Let’s see, $800 million divided by, how many did you 

say? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Six hundred and forty four desks. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. That works out to be, what, $1 million a desk? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Some of our costs can be very high including for secure space. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. A million dollars a desk? OK. But, I understand 

the risk in London and the cost per square, or is it meters, per meters. What’s that cost? Do you know the breakdown, how much it 

costs per meter or per square foot? I know here in America we look 

at the square foot cost. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Right. Right. For London, I don’t have the square 

foot cost at the top of my head. I would like to add for London, 

though, for those members who may not be aware—— 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. I think you said that you’re selling property to 

cover the cost of the $800 million embassy, correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. You did say that, OK. So you’re in these old 

buildings now, am I correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, these are old existing buildings at the embassy. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. And if it runs over, the London building takes 

longer than expected, what’s it going to cost to house our employees 

in the older buildings per month? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We’re not expecting that to happen. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. You’re not expecting. Have you—seriously, for 

the life of me, and I’m sure there probably has been one or two 

Government contracts that didn’t go over budget and didn’t go over 

or came in on schedule, but OK. 

So let’s just ask you this: How many work orders or change orders are pending or in process in the London embassy new construction? Change orders do delay a project, don’t they? Or do you 

add that to the, you know, it’s another—it’s a change that’s going 

to take longer so we’ll just move the schedule, completion date out. 

Ms. MUNIZ. As you might imagine, with over 200 projects in construction, I don’t have the number of change orders in London. But 

what I would like to make clear is that while delays pose, like on 

any project, a certain amount of risk, the Department made the decision in 2006, many years before I was there under a different administration that this was the best value for the taxpayer. 

And I think it was a great decision. We, for $50 million more, 

are getting a brand new embassy that meets all of the security 

standards in exchange for property that we had been in for years. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. So you’re going to meet all the security standards in London? 
70 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Versus not in Phnom Penh or some of these 

other countries that, well, seem to be, look to me maybe in the future a greater threat. 

And let’s talk about that threat. We had, a while back, we had 

some Secretary of State people tell us they don’t do a risk analysis 

when it comes to risks in the country that they’re housed, thus 

Benghazi, they didn’t really read what was happening and a lot of 

our Americans were killed. 

So do you do a risk analysis every day in, you know, what the 

dangers are outside of the embassy no matter what country you’re 

in? But wait a minute. I’m sorry. I just answered my own question. 

You don’t do that, do you? What you do, apparently, is in places 

like London, you take every risk imaginable and come up with a 

building that’s worth $800 million at a cost of $1 million per desk. 

You know, I can’t really, I’m just thinking about the soldiers in 

Iraq. You know, we looked at the risk out there and if we thought 

the risk was greater, and by the way, they shot rockets at us once 

a week, we put these concrete barriers in front of us, sandbags and 

we’d adjust and I’m sure, because of curb appeal, we can do those 

things a little nicer, a little fancier, and take every single building 

including a modular or cookie-cutter design and add to that building outside to address any risk that, well, if you actually looked at 

the risk outside of your embassies and addressed them, you could 

take proper precautions. 

But I will say, and I know my time is running out, Mr. Chairman, but you have always had at every embassy in the world the 

best security system you could possibly buy. It’s called the United 

States Marine. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I’m now going to recognize myself in consultation with Mr. 

Cummings here. Just a couple quick things and then we will, I 

promise we will end. 

I do have a question about London. London is unique. Beijing 

was unique. There are some iconic properties. There are some 

amazing relationships, security needs. That’s understood. There’s 

been a suggestion that you’re still on time in London and on budget 

in London. What is your current assessment of where we’re at in 

London in terms of budget and time? 

Ms. MUNIZ. That’s exactly my assessment, that we’re on budget 

and on schedule. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What about the VAT issue? Where are we at with 

the VAT issue? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’d like to keep that conversation limited because our 

conversations with our counterparts in Britain are sensitive, but I 

would like to say that we’re making good progress, and we are comfortable that we’re within the budgets on that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And I appreciate that. I see that as a potential 

threat. They have a, I believe it’s a 20 percent VAT which could 

obviously be a huge and major issue and something we would appreciate if you’d keep us apprised of. 
71 

I had an opportunity to visit Dubai, which was one of the last 

standard embassy designs. What do you find wrong with the facility in Dubai? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I don’t know that particular facility. So I wouldn’t be 

able to address it, but I would like to say that there are many 

standard embassy designs that I think work well for their missions. I think there’s some that could work better, and I think this 

initiative is about improving on something that was good and that 

did a lot of good. So I could look at Dubai more closely and get back 

to you with comments, but I don’t have any in particular, not 

knowing it in great detail. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The general concern here is it just doesn’t make 

commonsense to me, it’s just not commonsense to suggest that 

we’re going to spend more time on design and ultimately that’s 

going to take a shorter period of time. I just—I still, and we’ll followup, and we’ve been talking for hours here, but as a followup, 

this is just conceptionally, I just don’t understand it. There have 

been some suggestions that standard embassy design was just onesize-fits-all. That’s not true. That’s never been true. We build nearly 90 different buildings. 

And one of the things that drives me personally, and I shared 

this with Mr. Cummings and others, one of the things that drives 

me on this is that you have multiple GAO reports and an Inspector 

General report that says, my goodness, standard embassy designs, 

they’re going faster and they’re generally coming in under budget. 

We never get reports like that. 

And yet, I look at the State Department and they say, but we’re 

going to totally scrap that. We’re going a different design, different 

way and we’re going to focus on architecture because architecture 

is diplomacy. 

You can shake your head no, but that’s the video that the State 

Department put out. That is the video they put out. You’re shaking 

your head. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Because as I explained, we are committed to being 

on those same budgets. We’re committed to that schedule. We’re 

committed to meeting all the security requirements. I just know 

that we can build even better buildings, right. What we’re doing is 

what we should be doing, what bureaucrats should be doing, we 

are trying to improve on a good product. And you rightly pointed 

out, the standard embassy design did require modifications for different—we’re taking that a step further and making sure that it 

is not a fixed envelope, that it takes all of the lessons learned from 

that and allows us to modify our buildings in a way that’s smart 

for the mission, smart for the taxpayer and smart for the long 

term. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And I really challenge those assumptions. It will 

play itself out. I don’t believe they’ll be faster. I think we have 

strong evidence that it’s taking longer. I think the consequence is 

it will cost more, and I think the other consequence is we’re going 

to have more people in harm’s way. 

If you brought the people from Papua New Guinea here and 

lined them up and had them raise their hand and say, which design would you like? They just want to be safe. They just want to 

be safe and secure and it’s going to be the most opulent and ex-
72 

travagant building in that country under the standard embassy design and those modifications could have been there. 

I appreciate the dialog. This is the general concern. You said it 

in response to Mr. Cummings, the design portion will take longer. 

So again, the consequence, I think, will be more people in harm’s 

way, will take longer, it will be more expensive and we’ll have ongoing security concerns. 

I really do appreciate your participation here. I have no doubt 

about the sincerity of wanting to come in under budget and on 

time. I just don’t think you can get from here to there and I find 

very few people that agree that you can get there. That’s why we 

need the documents, that’s why we’re going to continue to push the 

Inspector General and the GAO to continue to look at this. It’s why 

we’re going to continue to have some hearings on this. 

So I do appreciate all your participation here. I know you care 

deeply about your country and the work that you do and you’re 

passionate about that. We want people that are passionate about 

that. But we also have an obligation to have this back and forth. 

It’s what the oversight committee is all about. It’s what the Congress is all about. It’s part of the process that makes this country 

unique and better and the greatest country on the face of the planet. 

So I thank you again for your participation. We look forward to 

getting the documents from the State Department sooner rather 

than later and this committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
(73) 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 

Æ