Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-CR-2101 | April 17, 2018 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joel M. Schumm

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lisa Banks,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 17, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1709-CR-2101

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable David Certo, Judge

The Honorable David Hooper, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G12-1609-CM-35139

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] Following a jury trial, Lisa Banks was convicted of Class A misdemeanor 

operating a vehicle while intoxicated and Class B misdemeanor leaving the 

scene of an accident. On appeal, Banks challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence with respect to both convictions.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] The evidence most favorable to the jury’s verdicts follows. On September 5, 

2016, IMPD Officer Jeffrey Wilkins was dispatched to the 1700 block of 

Bellefontaine Street on a report of a traffic accident. Upon arriving at the scene, 

Officer Wilkins saw that the door to a building was broken and that there was a 

vehicle inside the building. Officer Wilkins then observed a “civilian” in the 

middle of the intersection and a female, later identified as Banks, “stumbling 

down the street.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 8. Officer Wilkins, who was in full 

uniform and driving his marked police car, drove toward Banks. Banks turned

toward an alley and kept walking away. Officer Wilkins located Banks sitting 

behind a bush next to a house. Officer Wilkins observed that Banks smelled of 

alcohol, had slurred speech and glassy eyes, and had difficulty standing. He 

also noted that her clothing was disheveled, and she was not wearing shoes. 

Officer Wilkins’s involvement ended when Officer Craig Wildauer, a DUI 

investigator with IMPD, arrived on the scene. 

[4] Officer Wildauer determined that Banks was the registered owner of the vehicle 

that had crashed into the building. In speaking with Banks, Officer Wildauer
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observed that she had a strong odor of alcoholic beverage, slurred speech, glassy 

and bloodshot eyes, and her balance was poor. He also noted that Banks did 

not cooperate with his instructions while he attempted to perform the 

horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and that generally, she became “argumentative 

and belligerent.” Id. at 21. Based on his observations, Officer Wildauer

concluded that Banks was intoxicated. Officer Wildauer read to Banks 

Indiana’s implied consent warning, and Banks refused to submit to a chemical 

test. Officer Wildauer then applied for, and was granted, a search warrant to 

obtain a blood sample from Banks. At trial, the parties stipulated to the 

admission of the results of Banks’s blood test that showed Banks’s B.A.C. was 

0.178%.

[5] When Officer Wildauer asked Banks what had happened, she told him that she 

had been at a party at 38th and Byrum and that a black male wearing a blue hat 

took off in her vehicle. She said she ran after her vehicle until the point of 

collision. The distance between the location of the crash and the party was 

more than two miles. Although Banks claimed she had run after her vehicle for 

quite a distance, her bare feet had no injuries. Banks then requested her shoes 

from her vehicle, and Officer Wildauer located a pair of women’s sandals on 

the driver’s side floor area. As he left the scene to transport Banks to the 

hospital for the blood draw, Officer Wildauer looked around, but did not see a 

black male wearing a blue hat in the vicinity.

[6] On September 7, 2016, the State charged Banks with Count I, Class A 

misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated, Count II, Class A 
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misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more, and Count III, 

Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. A jury trial was held on 

August 17, 2017, at the conclusion of which the jury found Banks guilty as 

charged. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered convictions 

only on Counts I and III.1 The trial court sentenced Banks to concurrent terms 

of 363 days on Count I and 180 days on Count III, all suspended to probation. 

Banks now appeals. Additional evidence will be presented where necessary.

Discussion & Decision

[7] In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh 

the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Atteberry v. State, 911 N.E.2d 

601, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence 

supporting the conviction and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Id. 

If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier 

of fact could have drawn the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of the 

crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be disturbed. 

 

1 The sentencing order indicates that the disposition of Count II was “Conviction Merged.” Appellant’s 

Appendix Vol. II at 14. At the sentencing hearing, however, the trial court clearly stated that it was “vacating 

the verdict on Count II.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 122. As we have explained: “[i]f a trial court does not formally 

enter a judgment of conviction on a [finding] of guilty, then there is no requirement that the trial court vacate 

the “conviction,” and merger is appropriate.” Townsend v. State, 860 N.E.2d 1268, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 

(quoting Green v. State, 856 N.E.2d 703, 704 (Ind. 2006)). However, if the trial court does enter judgment of 

conviction on a [guilty finding], then simply merging the offenses is insufficient and vacation of the offense is 

required.” See id. It appears as though the trial court intended to merge Counts I and II prior to entering a 

judgment of conviction and that the sentencing order simply contains a typographical error in that it indicates 

that a conviction on Count II merged with the conviction for Count I. We have not been provided an 

abstract of judgment, however, so the status of Count II is unclear. If a conviction was entered as to Count 

II, such conviction must be vacated to avoid a double jeopardy violation. 
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Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). It is not 

necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be 

drawn from it to support the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 

(Ind. 2007). “A verdict may be sustained based on circumstantial evidence 

alone if that circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt.” 

Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000). Although presence at a crime 

scene alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction, presence combined with other 

facts and circumstances, including the defendant’s course of conduct before, 

during, and after the offense, may raise a reasonable inference of guilt. Id.

Operating While Intoxicated

[8] Banks argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for Class 

A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated. To convict Banks of 

operating a vehicle while intoxicated, the State was required to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Banks operated a vehicle while intoxicated and in a 

manner that endangered a person. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2. At issue here is 

whether the State proved that Banks was driving the vehicle and crashed into 

the building on Bellefontaine Street. 

[9] While the State offered no direct evidence that Banks was driving the vehicle, 

the State presented plenty of circumstantial evidence from which the jury could 

have reasonably inferred that Banks was driving the vehicle when it crashed 

into the building. Indeed, the State presented evidence that Banks was 
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stumbling away from the crash scene. With the exception of one other person, 

Banks was the only individual at the scene and it was determined that the 

vehicle was registered to her. Banks was not wearing any shoes and a pair of 

women’s sandals was found on the floor of the driver’s side of the vehicle. 

[10] The jury was also made aware that Banks told inconsistent stories. At the 

scene, Banks told Officer Wildauer she had been at a party and that a black 

male wearing a blue hat took her vehicle and she ran after her vehicle until it 

crashed into the building. The distance between the two locations was more 

than two miles. Although Banks claimed she had run that far, her bare feet 

were unscathed. At trial, however, Banks told a different story. She claimed 

that someone at the party took her keys away and that she only remembered 

getting into the passenger seat of her truck, her legs getting caught in the door as 

someone tried to close it, and that a black male whom she did not know was 

driving. Banks testified that she did not remember anything about the drive 

except for waking up in the crashed vehicle inside the building. 

[11] Banks’s argument that her mere presence in the vicinity of the accident is the 

only evidence that she was driving the crashed vehicle is simply a request to 

reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will not 

indulge such request on appeal. The State presented sufficient circumstantial 

evidence to support Banks’s conviction for operating while intoxicated as a 

Class A misdemeanor. See Thang v. State, 10 N.E.3d at 1256 (Ind. 2014) 

(affirming defendant’s conviction for public intoxication because a reasonable 

inference that the defendant arrived at the gas station by driving his automobile 
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on the public streets while intoxicated could be drawn from evidence of the 

sudden presence of the defendant and his vehicle at a gas station, his 

intoxication, his possession of car keys, and the absence of any other person).

Leaving the Scene of an Accident

[12] Banks also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for 

leaving the scene of an accident. Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1 provides, in pertinent

part, as follows:

(a) The operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident shall 

do the following:

(1) [I]mmediately stop the operator’s motor vehicle:

(A) at the scene of the accident; or

(B) as close to the accident as possible;

in a manner that does not obstruct traffic more than is 

necessary.

(2) Remain at the scene of the accident until the operator 

does the following:

(A) Gives the operator’s name and address and the 

registration number of the motor vehicle the 

operator was driving to any person involved in the 

accident.
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(B) Exhibits the operator’s driver’s license to any 

person involved in the accident or occupant of or 

any person attending to any vehicle involved in the 

accident.

* * *

(4) If the accident involves a collision with an unattended 

vehicle or damage to property other than a vehicle, the 

operator shall, in addition to the requirements of 

subdivisions (1) and (2):

(A) take reasonable steps to locate and notify the 

owner or person in charge of the damaged vehicle 

or property of the damage; and

(B) if after reasonable inquiry the operator cannot 

find the owner or person in charge of the damaged 

vehicle or property, the operator must contact a law 

enforcement officer or agency and provide the 

information required by this section.

(b) An operator of a motor vehicle who knowingly or 

intentionally fails to comply with subsection (a) commits leaving 

the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor.

[13] Banks first argues that the State failed to prove she was an “operator” who had 

any obligation under the statute. Having concluded above that the State 

presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably 

inferred that Banks was driving the vehicle, Banks’s argument in this regard is 

similarly without merit.
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[14] Banks also argues, however, that even assuming she was the operator of the 

vehicle, she fulfilled her statutory duties. There is no dispute that the vehicle 

was stopped at the scene of the accident and that, being inside a building, it was

not obstructing traffic. Further, because there were no other vehicles or persons 

involved in the accident, Banks was not obligated to provide any information to 

others “involved in the accident.” See I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1(a)(2)(A), (B).

[15] Here, the accident involved damage to a building. Pursuant to I.C. § 9-26-1-

1.1(a)(4)(A), (B), Banks was required to “take reasonable steps to locate and 

notify” the owner of the damaged building, or after those efforts failed, to 

“contact a law enforcement officer or agency.” Banks argues that the State 

failed to offer specific evidence about her efforts to contact the owner of the 

building. She also argues that when approached by the officers at the scene, she 

provided the information they requested. In sum, Banks argues that she 

fulfilled her statutory obligations and therefore, her conviction for leaving the 

scene of an accident must be reversed. 

[16] Again, we find Banks’s argument to be a request to reweigh the evidence. The 

State’s evidence established that the first officer to arrive at the scene of the 

accident saw Banks stumbling down the street, away from accident scene. As 

the officer approached in his marked police car, Banks turned toward an alley 

and kept walking away from the officer. The officer ultimately located Banks 

sitting behind a bush next to a house. Banks did not summon the police to 

provide them with the required information; rather she provided the 

information to the police as part of their investigation. A reasonable inference 
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can be drawn from this evidence that Banks was leaving the scene of the 

accident. Based on the forgoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient 

evidence to support Banks’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident as a 

Class B misdemeanor.

[17] Judgment affirmed.

[18] Najam, J. and Robb, J., concur.