alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §4657. Prohibition relating to foreign entities of concern

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out this chapter may be provided to a foreign entity of concern.

(Pub. L. 116–283, div. H, title XCIX, §9907, Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 4860.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this subtitle" and was translated as reading "this title", meaning title XCIX of div. H of Pub. L. 116–283, to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
### SUBCHAPTER LIX–CCC—NEW RIVER GORGE NATIONAL PARK AND PRESERVE

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Subchapter was formerly classified to subchapter LXXI–A (§460m–15 et seq.) of this chapter prior to transfer to this subchapter.
### subpart 4—advisory council
Exhibit






Exhibit 10.27
[Date]


[Name]


Dear [Name]:


On behalf of STARTEK, Inc., and as approved by STARTEK's Board of Directors, this letter serves as an Addendum to your letter of employment dated [Date]. This Addendum has no effect on the current terms and conditions of your employment as outlined in the letter referenced herein, as it is to serve the purpose of confirming changes as of [Date] listed below and the addition of Severance if such is ever required.


Job Title:    [Title]


Annualized Base Pay:    [$Base Pay]


Incentive Percent:    [Incentive %] of annualized base pay


Severance:    In the event Employee's employment is terminated without Cause (as defined herein) or Employee resigns for Good Reason (as defined herein) upon the consummation of a Change of Control or within two years after the consummation of a Change of Control and provided Employee executes a Release and a written acknowledgment of Employee's continuing obligations under the Proprietary Information Agreement, then in addition to payment of the Accrued Compensation, Employee shall be entitled to receive (A) the equivalent of 12 months [CEO: 24 months] of Employee's annual Base Salary as in effect immediately prior to the termination date and subject to Deductions, payable in a lump sum no later than sixty (60) days after the termination date; and (B) provided that Employee is eligible for and timely elects continuation of health insurance pursuant to COBRA, for a period of 12 months [CEO: 18 months], Company shall also reimburse Employee for a portion of the cost of Employee's COBRA premiums that is equal to, and does not exceed, Company's monthly percentage contribution towards Employee's health benefit premiums as of the termination date provided, however, that Company's obligation to pay Employee's COBRA premiums will cease immediately in the event Employee becomes eligible for group health insurance during the 12 month [CEO: 18 month] period following the termination date, and Employee hereby agrees to promptly notify Company if Employee becomes eligible to be covered by group health insurance in such event ((A) and (B) collectively, the "Change of Control Severance Benefits"). For purposes of this "Change of Control" shall have the same meaning as Change of Control as defined in the Company's 2008 Equity Incentive Plan.




Sincerely,






[Name]
[Title]






By your signature below, you acknowledge that you understand and accept this Addendum as stated herein.




            
[Title]    Date
###### Editorial Note on Part 0

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 0 appear at 73 FR 73 FR 54947, Sept. 24, 2008.

#### § 0.79 Redelegation of authority.

The Assistant Attorney General for Administration is authorized to redelegate to any Department official any of the power or authority vested in him by this subpart O. Existing redelegations by the Assistant Attorney General for Administration shall continue in force and effect until modified or revoked.

[Order No. 543-73, 38 FR 29585, Oct. 26, 1973. Redesignated by Order No. 565-74, 39 FR 15876, May 6, 1974, and further redesignated by Order No. 832-79, 44 FR 29891, May 23, 1979]
#### Marennus Symonds *et al. v.*William Lappin.

1. Homestead — *claim must be clearly shown.*In order to avail of the benefit of the Homestead law, it is incumbent on a defendant, in a suit to foreclose a mortgage, to allege, in his answer, such facts as certainly bring him within the protection of the law.

2. *Same—right must exist when the mortgage is given.*Hnless the right of homestead exists at the time a mortgage is given by the claimant, there is no necessity for its relinquishment, and an answer to a bill to foreclose a mortgage, which states that the land is occupied by the defendant as a homestead, and that he did not, by the mortgage, relinquish such homestead, but which does not state that the land was occupied as a homestead at the time of executing the mortgage, does not bring the question of the defendant’s homestead right before the court.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clay county; the Hon. James C. Allen, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. Chesley & Hagle, for the appellants.

Mr. B. B. Smith, and Mr. GIeeshoen A. Hoff, for the appellee.

Mr. Justice Scholfield

delivered the opinion of the Court:

Appellants bring this record here, and ask a reversal of the decree, upon the ground that the court erred in decreeing the foreclosure of a mortgage on property wherein they had a right of homestead, which they had not relinquished pursuant to the requirements of the statute in that regard.

Unless the right of homestead existed when the mortgage was executed, there was, obviously, no necessity for its relinqnish.ment; and it does not follow, either as a logical or legal conclusion, that because the property was occupied by appellants as a homestead, when they answered appellee’s bill to foreclose, it must have been so occupied when the mortgage was executed. To avail of the benefits of the Homestead law, *214it was incumbent on them to allege, in their answer, such facts as certainly brought them within the protection of the' law. We can not indulge in presumptions, not necessarily arising from the facts alleged, to aid them in this regard.

In the only answer filed,-which was by the appellant Marennus, he admits the execution of the mortgage to secure the indebtedness charged in the bill, but alleges as follows: “That the said real estate, in said bill described, is the homestead upon which defendant and his family reside; that in and by said mortgage, defendant does not waive his right under the homestead laws, and that said mortgage debt is not for purchase money of said real estate.” And this is all. When it became the homestead does not appear, and there is nothing but this answer in the record that relates to the question. The question of the homestead right of appellants, therefore, was not properly before the court, and we perceive no cause to disturb the decree, and it will be affirmed.

*Decree affirmed.*
HomeLatest FilingsPrevious Page

    - SEC Home  »
    - Search the Next-Generation EDGAR System  »
    - Company Search  »
    - Current Page

950 3RD AVENEW YORK NY 10022         

950 3RD AVENEW YORK NY 10022         212-822-4259

Coller Secondaries Private Equity Opportunities Fund CIK#: 0001969180 (see all company filings)
State location: NY | State of Inc.: **DE** | Fiscal Year End: 0331formerly: Coller Private Market Secondaries Fund (filings through 2023-03-24)formerly: Coller Secondaries Private Equity Fund (filings through 2023-07-24)Get **insider transactions** for this **issuer**.File Number: **812-15446**

||
||
No. 20,197.

#### Joe Martinez, et al., *v.*Bailey Bond, et al.

(379 P. [2d] 808)

Decided March 18, 1963.

Mr. D. E. Johnson, for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. Mitchell *&*Forbes, for defendants in error.

*In Department.*

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Sutton.

Martinez5 complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. To the judgment of dismissal he brings a writ of error to this court without having filed a motion for a new trial or obtaining an order of the trial court dispensing therewith.

Under the authority of *Minshall v. Pettit,*151 Colo. 501, 379 P. (2d) 394 (1963), and *Bayers v.*W.O.W., *Inc., et al.,*151 Colo. 554, 379 P. (2d) 815 (1963), the writ of error is dismissed.

Mr. Justice Hall and Mr. Justice Pringle concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Min Kang, Respondent, v Ameasia Corporation, Ltd., Appellant, and Uninsured Employer’s Fund, Respondent. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

[823 NYS2d 617]

*947Lahtinen, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed September 6, 2005, which ruled that claimant sustained a compensable injury and awarded workers’ compensation benefits.

In an amended decision filed March 4, 2005, a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (hereinafter WCLJ) determined that claimant sustained a work-related injury and awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Claimant’s uninsured employer, asserting that it was not provided adequate time to evaluate claimant’s medical report prior to the February 25, 2005 hearing upon which the WCLJ’s determination was based, submitted an application to the Workers’ Compensation Board requesting its review. The Board, in affirming the decision of the WCLJ, noted that the employer or its counsel had been present at hearings regarding the instant claim on December 5, 2003, June 7, 2004 and October 18, 2004. In addition to concluding that such appearances were evidence that the employer had ample time to prepare for the hearing but failed to do so, the Board observed that the employer’s application for review had not been served on all interested parties despite its earlier admonishment to the employer regarding the necessity for such *(see*12 NYCRR 300.13 [e] [1] [i]). The employer now appeals.

Inasmuch as a review of the record reveals that the Board’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm *(see Matter of Nomikos v Ionic Painting Corp.,*27 AD3d 843, 843-844 [2006], *lv denied*7 NY3d 701 [2006]). Here, claimant suffered her injury in the course of her employment on May 14, 2003 and informed her employer that same day. Counsel for the employer, meanwhile, was specifically informed on October 18, 2004 that the matter would proceed to a hearing on February 25, 2005. Nevertheless, the employer’s counsel waited until the day of the hearing to request copies of the medical reports, declined to cross-examine claimant, elected not to offer the employer’s testimony and failed to ask for an opportunity to further develop the record. Accordingly, we will not disturb the Board’s decision *(see Matter of Brown v Orange County Home & Infirmary,*283 AD2d 797, 797-798 [2001]).

The employer’s remaining claims were not presented to the Board and, thus, are not preserved for our review *(see Matter of Provenzano v Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,*30 AD3d 930, 932 [2006]).

*948Cardona, EJ., Mugglin and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
## Breadcrumb

-  Home 
-  Document Search 
-  National Ombudsman’s Annual Reports To Congress 

# National Ombudsman’s Annual Reports to Congress

## About this document and download

  Download  .pdf

##                 Variations of this document            

-         Version      2021 |             File size: 3080KB |          Download      .pdf        for 2021 /        
-         Version      2020 |             File size: 12916KB |          Download      .pdf        for 2020 /        
-         Version      2019 |             File size: 9029KB |          Download      .pdf        for 2019 /        
-         Version      2018 |             File size: 14141KB |          Download      .pdf        for 2018 /        
-         Version      2017 |             File size: 8470KB |          Download      .PDF        for 2017 /        
-         Version      2016 |             File size: 4538KB |          Download      .pdf        for 2016 /        
-         Version      2015 |             File size: 6650KB |          Download      .pdf        for 2015 /        
-         Version      2014 |             File size: 4857KB |          Download      .pdf        for 2014 /        
-         Version      2013 |             File size: 2107KB |          Download      .pdf        for 2013 /
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 24

- 0026

_________________ DENISE F. ARCHER, JAMES G. ARCHER, LISA BRYANT , GREGORY CHAPMAN, LAURA NIERS, RUTGER NIERS, GRE GORY SM ITH, ANTOINETTE WAGNER, and ROGER WAGNER, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. MICHELLE JANZ and GORDON TAIT ,

Defendants and Appellees. O R D E R

_________________ Pursuant to the Internal Operating Rules of this Court, this cause is classified for submission on briefs to a five

- justi ce panel of this Court. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy hereof to all counsel of record and to the Honorable Danielle Coffman, District Judge

. For the Court,

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 4 2024

09/04/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0026
OMB NO. 0930-0270

Fecha de vencimiento 30/09/2018

TARJETA DE RESPUESTAS

Piense en sus pensamientos, sentimientos y comportamiento DURANTE EL ÚLIMO MES. 

Use estas opciones para contestar con qué frecuencia ha ocurrido el problema en el último mes. 

Para cada pregunta seleccione UNA de las siguientes respuestas. 

1 2 3 4 5 

D L M M J V S D L M M J V S

X 

X 

D L M M J V S 

X X 

X 

X 

X X 

D L M M J V S 

X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

X X 

D L M M J V S 

X X X X X X X 

X X X X 

X X X X 

X X X X X X X 

nunca 2 veces por mes 1-2 veces por semana 2-3 veces por semana casi todos los días
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF AIRPORT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC. FOR THE YEAR
ENDED APRIL 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,812
<ALLOWANCES>                                        57
<INVENTORY>                                      7,988
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                14,030
<PP&E>                                           6,403
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,049
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  21,808
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           10,080
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            26
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    21,808
<SALES>                                         15,128
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                15,128
<CGS>                                           10,793
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,793
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,287
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 377
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (1,320)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (1,320)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (1,320)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.57)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.57)


</TABLE>
### §1692d. Harassment or abuse

A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.

(2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.

(3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 1681a(f) or 1681b(3) 1 of this title.

(4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.

(5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.

(6) Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity.

(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §806, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 877.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 1681b(3) of this title, referred to in par. (3), was redesignated section 1681b(a)(3) of this title by Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, §2403(a)(1), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–430.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective upon the expiration of six months after Sept. 20, 1977, see section 819 of Pub. L. 90–321, as added by Pub. L. 95–109, set out as a note under section 1692 of this title.

1 See References in Text note below.
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Department of Energy Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
 Docket No.Ashtabula Wind III, LLC
EG11-1-000Iberdrola Renewables, Inc.
EG11-2-000Flat Water Wind Farm, LLC
EG11-3-000Wildorado Wind Two, LLC
EG11-4-000Sandy Ridge Wind, LLC
EG11-5-000AES ES Deepwater, LLC
EG11-6-000Elk City II Wind, LLC
EG11-7-000
 Take notice that during the month of December 2010, the status of the above-captioned entities as Exempt Wholesale Generators became effective by operation of the Commission's regulations. 18 CFR 366.7(a). Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary.


[FR Doc. 2011-540 Filed 1-12-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
Recent interest and the commercial availability of marijuana oils and marijuana-infused food products have prompted inquiries about their use and subsequent effect on urine drug test results for individuals who have used these products.  Others have asked about the content of products labelled as “containing Cannabidiol (CBD).”  

The marijuana analyte tested in urine is tetrahydrocannabinol-carboxylic acid (THCA).  THCA is a metabolite of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the primary psychoactive constituent of marijuana.  CBD is a different chemical compound present in the marijuana plant.  Marijuana products, including CBD, are classified as Schedule I controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Act and, thus, are illegal under federal law.  Agencies can receive authorization to test for any Schedule I or II controlled substance that is not already tested for under the current Mandatory Guidelines on a case by case basis.  Schedule I substances have no acceptable medical application, so a legitimate medical explanation does not exist for a positive test. 

Many CBD oils and other marijuana-derived products are sold over the internet or at dispensaries in states allowing marijuana use, either recreationally or medically.  These products are not regulated by the Food and Drug Administration for content and may be contaminated by a host of cannabinoid chemicals, including THC and CBD.  CBD is chemically distinguishable from THC and will not cause a positive drug test result under the current drug testing panel but is a Schedule I drug.  However, CBD products may contain other cannabinoids such as THC, therefore, use of CBD oils and marijuana-derived products may result in a positive urine drug test for THCA. 

As a point of clarification, there have been no changes to the drug testing panel regarding marijuana, under the federal Drug-Free Workplace Program (DFWP).  The DFWP (as established under Executive Order 12564, Public Law 100-71 and the Mandatory Guidelines) will continue to operate in accordance with federal law, which identifies marijuana and marijuana extracts (e.g. CBD) as a Schedule I controlled substance.   

Page 2 - Federal Agency Drug Program Coordinators, Federal Medical Review Officers,    	  Federal Partners 

As such, federal civilian employees within the executive branch covered by the DFWP will continue to be tested for marijuana at the established cut off levels noted in the Mandatory Guidelines (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-23/pdf/2017-00979.pdf). 

Sincerely, 

   Ron Flegel 

Ronald Flegel, B.S. MT(ASCP), M.S. 

Director  

Division of Workplace Programs 

Center for Substance Abuse Prevention 

# image1.jpg

# image2.png

# image3.png
### §77m. Limitation of actions

No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77l(a)(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 77l(a)(1) of this title, unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under section 77k or 77l(a)(1) of this title more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section 77l(a)(2) of this title more than three years after the sale.

(May 27, 1933, ch. 38, title I, §13, 48 Stat. 84; June 6, 1934, ch. 404, title II, §207, 48 Stat. 908; Pub. L. 105–353, title III, §301(a)(3), Nov. 3, 1998, 112 Stat. 3235.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1998—Pub. L. 105–353 substituted "77l(a)(2)" for "77l(2)" in two places and "77l(a)(1)" for "77l(1)" in two places.

1934—Act June 6, 1934, substituted "one year" for "two years", "three years" for "ten years", and inserted "or under section 77l(2) of this title more than three years after the sale".