IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

February 10, 2016 Session

IN RE: ESTATE OF BRUCE CHAPMAN BOWER

Appeal from the Probate Court for Sevier County

No. 12024918 Jeffrey D. Rader, Judge

No. E2015-01510-COA-R3-CV-FILED-JUNE 8, 2016

This appeal arises over a dispute regarding the terms of a trust. Bruce Chapman Bower 

(“Decedent”) died having executed a trust (“the Trust”), the primary asset of which was a 

lake house. Decedent‟s son, Christopher R. Bower (“Successor Trustee”), served as 

Successor Trustee. Decedent‟s widow, Denise Bower (“Widow”), objected to the 

appointment of Successor Trustee, and the parties engaged in litigation over various 

terms of the Trust. The Probate Court for Sevier County (“Trial Court”) found that, 

under the Trust, Widow was entitled to exclusive use of the lake house as well as 

payments of $2,000 per month. Successor Trustee appealed to this Court. We reverse 

the judgment of the Trial Court in its interpretation of the terms of the Trust. We also 

modify the Trial Court‟s award of attorney‟s fees to Widow. The judgment of the Trial 

Court is modified, in part, and reversed, in part.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Probate Court is Modified, 

in part, and Reversed, in part; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JJ., joined.

Richard T. Scrugham, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, and, Steven C. Compton, Nolensville, 

Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher R. Bower, as Successor Trustee of the Bruce 

Chapman Bower and Lissa Leland Bower Revocable Living Trust Agreement.

R. Alexander Johnson, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Denise Bower.
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OPINION

Background

This appeal concerns a contentious dispute over the terms of the Trust. In 

May 1995, Decedent and his then wife, Lissa Leland Bower, executed the Bruce 

Chapman Bower and Lissa Leland Bower Revocable Living Trust Agreement. Lissa 

Leland Bower died in 1999. Decedent married Widow in 2002. Shortly after Decedent 

married Widow, the two executed a postnuptial agreement wherein the parties waived 

rights to each other‟s estate. In May 2010, Decedent executed the Third Amendment To, 

and Restatement of, the Bruce Chapman Bower and Lissa Leland Bower Revocable 

Living Trust Agreement, the Trust. In July 2011, Decedent died. Decedent was survived 

by Widow and his three adult children, Christopher R. Bower—the Successor Trustee, 

Todd L. Bower, and Kimberly Ann Tooker.

In February 2012, Successor Trustee filed a petition to submit Decedent‟s 

last will and testament to probate. Widow objected to the appointment of Christopher R. 

Bower as Successor Trustee. A protracted legal battle ensued, including proceedings in 

Florida before the matter was returned to Tennessee. Crucially, a dispute arose over the 

provisions of the Trust as to whether Widow was entitled to payments of $2,000 per 

month until she died or remarried or until she died, remarried, or became eligible for 

Medicare. This was significant because Widow already had attained Medicare eligibility 

at the time of the execution of the Trust. Successor Trustee took the position that, under 

the terms of the Trust, Widow was not entitled to these payments because she was of 

Medicare eligibility age, and Successor Trustee did not make any such payments to 

Widow. Another issue was whether Widow was entitled to primary or exclusive use of 

the lake house, the principal asset of the Trust.

Given the centrality of the Trust provisions to this appeal, we quote a large 

section of the Trust agreement as follows:

TRUSTEE SUCCESSION

Upon the death, resignation, or incompetence of the original Trustee, 

BRUCE CHAPMAN BOWER, Grantor‟s son, CHRISTOPHER R. 

BOWER, shall serve as Successor Trustee. If CHRISTOPHER R. 

BOWER is unable or unwilling to serve as Successor Trustee, then and in 

that event, Grantor‟s son, TODD L. BOWER, shall serve as Successor 

Trustee. The successor Trustee shall be paid $100 per month from the 

Trust assets for services rendered.

DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL
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A. During the lifetime of the Grantor, the Trustee shall pay to or for the

benefit of the Grantor all of the net income of the trust, in at least quarterannual payments, and so much of the principal of the trust as the Grantor 

may from time to time request and direct by written instrument delivered to 

Trustee.

B. Upon the death of the Grantor, the Successor Trustee shall administer 

the trust as follows: 

1. The Successor Trustee shall pay the Grantor‟s just debts, expenses of last 

illness, and burial expense, to the extent that these items shall not be paid or 

the responsibility for their payment be assured by some other person or 

estate, except that the Successor Trustee, in his discretion, shall not be 

required to pay and discharge, both as to principal and interest, any valid 

lien, mortgage, or charge against any real property, including buildings and 

improvements, but may elect to treat such as a continuing debt.

2. The Grantor has executed a Postnuptial Agreement dated February 12, 

2003, with his spouse, DENISE BOWER (“Denise”). The Successor 

Trustee is hereby directed to comply with all of the provisions of that 

Postnuptial Agreement. Grantor‟s obligations under that Agreement 

include:

(a) Furnishing Grantor‟s surviving spouse, Denise, all of the benefits of 

Allianz Life Insurance Company of North American Annuity Contract . . . 

(Agent‟s telephone number: . . . , Knoxville, Tennessee 37918), owned by 

the Trust. It is suggested that Denise continue this contract as an 

investment, using benefits only, as needed. 

(b) Allowing Denise, along with Grantor‟s descendants, the use of the 

residence located at . . . , Sevierville, Tennessee 37862. Denise‟s use of the 

property shall continue unto such time as she dies, remarries, or abandons 

the use of the property. Denise shall have the primary use of the property. 

My Trustees are directed to pay from the trust assets all of the real estate 

taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses of this residence, so long as the

residence is occupied by Denise or my descendants under the provisions of 

the Trust. All utilities shall be paid by the current occupant or occupants of 

the property, or if not occupied, then paid by the Trust.

(c) The Trust shall pay to Denise the sum of Two Thousand Dollars 

($2,000.00) per month from the date of the death of the Grantor. In 

addition, Denise shall also be given sufficient sums to pay her medical 

insurance premiums, which are currently automatically deducted from

Tennessee State Bank account. The payments called for under this 
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subparagraph shall be in addition to any social security or other similar 

benefits which Denise may receive as Grantor‟s surviving spouse, or 

otherwise, and shall continue until such time as Denise dies, remarries, or is

qualified to receive Medicare Benefits.

(d) Denise shall be entitled to the ownership of at least one motor vehicle, 

which may be provided by being the joint owner of a motor vehicle with 

Grantor, or being the owner of a motor vehicle at Grantor‟s death, title to 

which is in Denise‟s name alone. The Toyota pickup truck shall remain 

with the residence at . . . . All other vehicles, including RVs or antique 

vehicles, owned by the Grantor shall remain in the Trust, with disposition

being the responsibility of the Trustee. 

(e) Should Denise survive Grantor, Denise shall be the exclusive owner of

the common furnishings purchased during Grantor‟s marriage to Denise.

(f) In addition to the foregoing provisions under this paragraph B2 relating 

to DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL following the Grantor‟s 

death, and in compliance with the Postnuptial Agreement entered into

between the Grantor and Denise, the assets of the Trust, including but not 

limited to securities, real estate, cash on hand, and ownership in any 

business ventures which may be owned by the Trust, shall remain in the 

Trust during the lifetime of Denise, or until she remarries, whichever first

occurs. The income from the Trust shall be distributed to Denise during her

lifetime, or until her remarriage, whichever first occurs.

3. At the death or remarriage of Denise, and after all of the above and

foregoing obligations have been met, the Successor Trustee shall distribute 

the remainder of the Trust, in equal shares, among Grantor‟s children, 

TODD L. BOWER, CHRISTOPHER R. BOWER, and KIMBERLY ANN 

TOOKER, provided, however, that no distribution shall be made to any 

child until any outstanding debt by that child due the Grantor or the Trust is 

satisfied.

***

VALIDITY-AND-CONSTRUCTION

The validity of the Trust created under this Agreement and the 

validity, construction and interpretation of the provisions herein contained 

shall be determined in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida.

In November 2014, the Trial Court entered an order for declaratory 

judgment in which it found that Widow was entitled to $2,000 per month payments under 

the Trust until she died or remarried, and that, despite the plain and unambiguous 
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language of the Trust, her Medicare eligibility did not affect her right to receive the 

$2,000 per month payments. The Trial Court also found that Widow was entitled to 

exclusive use of the lake house, rather than simply primary or first use. The Trial Court 

reserved other matters such as attorney‟s fees. 

In May 2015, the Trial Court heard evidence on all remaining matters in the 

case. Testimony was elicited revealing the tensions between Widow and Decedent‟s 

family members. There was contradictory testimony as to whether Widow‟s continued 

use of the lake house was disturbed by members of Decedent‟s family. It also emerged 

that Widow apparently previously may have misstated her age, purporting to be five 

years younger than she actually was based upon an error on her marriage certificate. 

Widow testified that she was born in 1945 rather than in 1950 as stated on the marriage 

certificate. What impact this had on Decedent‟s intent in drafting the Trust was disputed 

below and now on appeal. Another issue raised, this one relevant to attorney‟s fees as 

part of a breach of fiduciary duty theory advanced by Widow, was Successor Trustee‟s 

testimony concerning a debt he settled which was owed to the Trust by his brother Todd

Bower. Successor Trustee testified that that the original debt was $181,000 and was 

made to Todd Bower‟s business by Decedent. The debt had been paid down to 

approximately $85,000, but the business faced bankruptcy nevertheless. Successor 

Trustee accepted 50% of the debt, around $42,000. Successor Trustee testified that he 

believed this was a resolution that made the best of a bad situation.

In July 2015, the Trial Court entered its final judgment, finding in relevant 

part as follows:

1. There is a significant lack of trust between Denise E. Bower and 

the Successor Trustee which has resulted in miscommunications and 

misunderstandings. However, based upon Christopher R. Bower‟s 

testimony and the record before the Court, the Court finds that the taxes and 

insurance for the Residence have been paid either by the Successor Trustee 

or by Brian Mansfield, the administrator ad litem for the estate of the 

decedent. Further, there is not sufficient evidence before the Court to verify 

the claims against Christopher R. Bower that he took malicious actions in 

changing locks, removing security barriers, or invading the privacy of 

Denise E. Bower. Further, the failure of the Successor Trustee to make the 

$2,000.00 payments to Denise E. Bower during the pending litigation does 

not constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty.

2. However, it was uncontroverted that Christopher R. Bower settled 

a debt owed to the trust by Todd L. Bower in such a manner that no 

proceeds of the debt repayment could ever benefit Denise E. Bower, the 
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primary beneficiary of the trust. In fact, the debt settlement directly 

benefited Christopher R. Bower, who is also a remainder beneficiary; to the 

detriment of Denise E. Bower. This debt settlement is partially to blame 

for the reduced liquid assets available to the trust to pay Denise E. Bower 

the $2,000.00 per month to which she is entitled under the terms of the 

trust. The Successor Trustee breached his fiduciary duty as a result of this 

debt settlement.

3. It is also uncontroverted that Christopher R. Bower instituted an 

action in the Florida courts on behalf of the trust which Denise E. Bower 

opposed. In that process both parties incurred significant attorney fees, in 

large part due to the appeal filed by Christopher R. Bower after the action 

was initially dismissed because the Florida trial court found it was not the 

proper venue, rather, the Florida court found that Tennessee was the proper 

venue with jurisdiction of the matter. It is uncontroverted that Denise E. 

Bower incurred $20,360.00 in attorney fees defending against the Florida 

action to insure the trust-related litigation was brought in the proper Court. 

Likewise, it is uncontroverted that Denise E. Bower incurred $24,610.79 in 

attorney fees in litigation before this Court.

4. The Successor Trustee‟s contention that the primary purpose of 

the Trust is to provide a home for Bruce and Lissa Bower‟s family to enjoy 

is not supported by the text of the Trust. When read using the ordinary and 

plain meaning of the language of the Trust and when considered in light of 

the entire Trust document the Trust provides that the Successor Trustee is 

granted the power to sell the Residence under the terms of the Trust, it is 

also uncontroverted that Denise E. Bower is to have “primary use” of the 

Residence until she dies, remarries or abandons the Residence, and when 

the Trust terminates upon the death or remarriage of Denise E. Bower the 

Residence is to be transferred to Christopher R. Bower, Todd L. Bower and 

Karen Ann Tooker in their individual capacities outside of trust without any 

restraint on its alienation.

5. The Court finds that based upon the ordinary and plain meaning of 

the language of the Trust, when considered in light of the entire Trust 

document, the primary purpose of the Trust is to provide for Denise E. 

Bower until she dies or remarries. Given that the Residence is for Denise 

E. Bower‟s “primary use” until she dies, remarries, or abandons, and that 

the Trust provides monthly payments to Denise E. Bower until she dies or 

remarries, and all trust income is also payable to Denise E. Bower until she 

dies or remarries, and there is no provision for any distribution or rights for 
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any other person until Denise E. Bower dies or remarries, it is clear that her 

care and well-being was the settlor‟s intent and the primary purpose of the 

Trust. 

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED, that the Successor Trustee did breach his fiduciary duty as a 

result of the settlement of a debt owed to the Trust which benefited himself 

while depriving the trust of available assets to pay Denise E. Bower the 

$2,000.00 per month she is due under the terms of the Trust. However, said 

breach does not rise to the level to warrant his removal as the Successor 

Trustee. Therefore, Denise E. Bower‟s petition to remove Christopher R. 

Bower as Successor Trustee is hereby denied.

It is further Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed, that the primary 

purpose of the Trust is to provide for the care and well-being of Denise E. 

Bower, not to provide a home for Bruce and Lissa Bower‟s family to enjoy, 

and the Successor Trustee‟s petition to amend or alter the Trust is therefore 

denied. Likewise, Denise E. Bower‟s request to modify the trust is also 

denied.

It is further Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed, that Denise E. 

Bower‟s attorney‟s fees resulted in a benefit to the Trust by virtue of 

causing this action to be brought in the proper venue and causing the Trust 

to be interpreted so that the settlor‟s wishes can be carried out. Denise E. 

Bower also brought this action as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty and 

under Florida Statute §736.1004 this Court is required to award Denise E. 

Bower her attorney fees in such actions. Further, under Florida Statute 

§736.1005 this Court has discretion to award said attorney fees. Therefore, 

Denise E. Bower‟s motions for attorney fees are granted.

It is further Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed, that the Court‟s 

Order staying the Order for Declaratory Judgment, entered on November 

17, 2014, in regards to any monies ordered to be paid by the Successor 

Trustee Christopher R. Bower to Denise E. Bower is lifted and said monies 

shall be paid immediately along with the monies due to Denise E. Bower as 

reimbursement for her attorney fees.

This is a final order and resolves all outstanding issues and claims 

before this Court pursuant to Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The costs of this cause shall be taxed against the Trust for 

which execution may issue if necessary.
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Successor Trustee timely appealed to this Court.

Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Successor Trustee raises the following 

issues on appeal: 1) whether the Trial Court erred in ruling that Successor Trustee was 

required to pay Widow $2,000 per month after she had reached the age of qualifying for 

Medicare benefits; 2) whether the Trial Court erred in ruling that, despite the Trust 

granting Widow “primary” use of the lake house, Widow was entitled to exclusive use of 

the lake house; 3) whether the Trial Court erred in declining to modify the terms of the 

Trust; and, 4) whether the Trial Court erred in granting Widow her attorney‟s fees.

The Trust by its own terms required it to be construed under the laws of 

Florida. Florida law provides as follows:

The trial court‟s interpretation of the trust documents is reviewed de 

novo. See Vetrick v. Keating, 877 So.2d 54, 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) 

(reviewing summary judgment interpreting trust document, noting review 

was de novo ); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Morcom, 125 So.3d 320, 

321 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“The standard of review governing the ruling of 

a trial court on a motion for summary judgment posing a pure question of 

law is de novo.”).

Generally, “[t]he polestar of trust or will interpretation is the settlor‟s 

intent,” which should be “ascertained from the four corners of the 

document through consideration of „all the provisions of the will [or trust] 

taken together....‟ ” Bryan v. Dethlefs, 959 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2007) (quoting Sorrels v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 105 So. 106, 109 (1925)). 

Where the terms of a trust agreement are unambiguous, the court should not 

refer to parol evidence to interpret its meaning. In re Estate of Barry, 689 

So.2d 1186, 1187-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). “The fact that both sides 

ascribe different meanings to the language does not mean the language is 

ambiguous so as to allow the admission of extrinsic evidence.” Bryan, 959 

So.2d at 317 n. 2 (quoting Kipp v. Kipp, 844 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2003)).

Minassian v. Rachins, 152 So.3d 719, 725-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
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We first address whether the Trial Court erred in ruling that Successor 

Trustee was required to pay Widow $2,000 per month after she had reached the age of 

qualifying for Medicare benefits. Section B(2)(c) of the Trust states as follows:

The Trust shall pay to Denise the sum of Two Thousand Dollars 

($2,000.00) per month from the date of the death of the Grantor. In 

addition, Denise shall also be given sufficient sums to pay her medical 

insurance premiums, which are currently automatically deducted from 

Tennessee State Bank account. The payments called for under this 

subparagraph shall be in addition to any social security or other similar 

benefits which Denise may receive as Grantor‟s surviving spouse, or 

otherwise, and shall continue until such time as Denise dies, remarries, or is 

qualified to receive Medicare Benefits.

Successor Trustee argues that the plain and unambiguous language of the 

Trust requires that payments called for under Subsection B(2)(c) terminate upon 

Widow‟s reaching Medicare eligibility age. Widow was, in fact, of Medicare eligibility 

age when the Trust was executed. Widow argues that interpreting Subsection B(2)(c) as 

Successor Trustee suggests would undermine the whole purpose of the Trust. According 

to Widow, Decedent‟s primary intent in executing the Trust was to provide for Widow 

upon his death.

From our reading of the above quoted unambiguous Subsection B(2)(c), it

appears the most natural and ordinary meaning to be ascribed is that all of the “payments 

called for under this subparagraph” are subject to all the conditions listed for termination 

of payments. Widow asserts that the $2,000 per month payments are required to continue 

until she dies or remarries because the part regarding payments terminating upon her 

reaching Medicare eligibility somehow applies only to the health insurance payments. 

This interpretation would inure to the benefit of Widow, but we cannot ignore the plain 

and unambiguous language of the Subsection as written. There are no qualifying terms 

before or after “payments called for under this subparagraph.” Our polestar, as required 

by Florida law, is to determine the settlor‟s intent. When presented with unambiguous 

language in a trust, we may not substitute our own judgment. The plain, unambiguous, 

and ordinary meaning of the words therein will control. We find and hold that the $2,000 

monthly payments, as did all the other payments under Section B(2)(c), terminated upon 

Widow reaching Medicare eligibility.

Our interpretation of Subsection B(2)(c) may seem harsh with respect to 

Widow, but the language is plain and unambiguous. We cannot probe the late 

Decedent‟s mind to determine his intent other than by the plain and unambiguous 

language he used. Why did he include a provision in the Trust that effectively was a 
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nullity upon execution? Did Decedent know or not know Widow‟s true age and take it 

into account while establishing the Trust? We will not guess. There could be any 

number of reasons why Decedent chose to include Subsection B(2)(c) as written. 

Attempting to effectuate judicially a decedent‟s “real” intent, in the face of unambiguous 

trust language to the contrary, is a course fraught with peril and one we decline to embark 

upon. We reverse the Trial Court as to this issue. 

We next address whether the Trial Court erred in ruling that, despite the 

Trust granting Widow “primary” use of the lake house, Widow was entitled to exclusive 

use of the lake house. Section B(2)(b) of the Trust states as follows:

Allowing Denise, along with Grantor‟s descendants, the use of the 

residence located at . . . , Sevierville, Tennessee 37862. Denise‟s use of the 

property shall continue unto such time as she dies, remarries, or abandons 

the use of the property. Denise shall have the primary use of the property. 

My Trustees are directed to pay from the trust assets all of the real estate 

taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses of this residence, so long as the 

residence is occupied by Denise or my descendants under the provisions of 

the Trust. All utilities shall be paid by the current occupant or occupants of 

the property, or if not occupied, then paid by the Trust.

Successor Trustee argues that the Trial Court erred in interpreting

“primary” use to mean “exclusive” use. Widow, in her brief on appeal, cites MerriamWebster Dictionary to define primary to mean “of first rank, importance, or value.” We 

agree with Successor Trustee that the terms “primary” and “exclusive” are not 

synonymous. Rather, primary means, as Widow herself acknowledges, first in 

importance. Exclusive on the other hand means sole or complete. Subsection B(2)(b) 

provides that Widow, “along with Grantor‟s descendants,” would enjoy use of the lake 

house, with Widow having “primary use.” The Trial Court‟s interpretation of this 

unambiguous language effectively removes “along with Grantor‟s descendants” from this 

section of the Trust. This was error.

In this Court‟s judgment, the most straightforward interpretation of this

unambiguous language is that Widow and Decedent‟s descendants are allowed 

concurrent use of the lake house, with Widow having first rank, or choice, in exercising 

this use. In other words, when Widow is using—that is, staying in or residing in person

at—the lake house, Decedent‟s descendants may not use the lake house. However, when 

Widow is not making use of the lake house, Decedent‟s descendants are free to use the 

lake house. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court on this issue. 
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We next address whether the Trial Court erred in declining to modify the 

terms of the Trust. Florida law does provide for modification of trust terms in some 

circumstances. Successor Trustee frames this as an alternative argument in the event that 

the Trial Court‟s interpretation of the Trust‟s language is upheld. Given our reversal of

the Trial Court in its interpretation of the disputed Trust provisions, we find it 

unnecessary to address whether the Trial Court erred in declining to modify the terms of 

the Trust. 

The final issue we address is whether the Trial Court erred in granting 

Widow her attorney‟s fees. The Trial Court relied on two sections of the Florida Statutes 

in its decision to award attorney‟s fees to Widow. First, Section 736.1004 of the Florida 

Statutes provides that in all actions for breach of fiduciary duty, “the court shall award 

taxable costs as in chancery actions, including attorney fees . . . .” The Trial Court found 

that Successor Trustee had breached his fiduciary duty in settling his brother‟s debt. 

However, the Trial Court‟s rationale for its finding was intertwined with its interpretation 

of the Trust, which we hold to be in error. The Trial Court found “that the Successor 

Trustee did breach his fiduciary duty as a result of the settlement of a debt owed to the 

Trust which benefited himself while depriving the trust of available assets to pay Denise 

E. Bower the $2,000.00 per month she is due under the terms of the Trust.” We have 

determined that there was no such requirement under the Trust for Successor Trustee to 

pay Widow $2,000 per month because she already had attained Medicare eligibility age. 

Given this, Successor Trustee could not deprive the Trust of available assets toward a 

duty which did not, in this Court‟s judgment, exist. We hold that the Trial Court erred in 

awarding attorney‟s fees to Widow on this basis. 

Second, Section 736.1005 provides “Any attorney who has rendered 

services to a trust may be awarded reasonable compensation from the trust.” Widow was 

successful in her legal effort to move the case from Florida to the proper venue in 

Tennessee. The Trial Court found that Widow incurred attorney‟s fees defending against 

the action in Florida.

1

 By ensuring that the case was brought in the proper venue, Widow 

saved the Trust resources that otherwise would have been expended litigating the matter 

in the wrong venue. We find that Widow‟s successful effort in bringing the Trust 

litigation to the proper venue benefitted the Trust. We, therefore, find that Widow is 

entitled to those attorney‟s fees of $19,950.46 she incurred in the Florida litigation, and 

those attorney‟s fees alone. The Trial Court‟s award of attorney‟s fees to Widow is so 

modified.

 

1

The Trial Court found that Widow incurred $20,360 in attorney‟s fees in defending against the action in 

Florida. However, it is clear from Widow‟s filings that she requested $19,950.46 in attorney‟s fees for 

defending against the action in Florida. The Trial Court used the wrong figure for the Florida attorney‟s 

fees. We instead use the correct figure of $19,950.46.
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In summary, the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the relevant Trust 

provisions. Since Widow has been of Medicare eligibility age since the execution of the 

Trust, she is not entitled to the $2,000 per month payments. Widow also is not entitled to 

exclusive use of the lake house, but rather she is entitled to primary use until she dies, 

remarries, or abandons the use of the property. Decedent‟s descendants may use the lake 

house only if and when Widow is not staying in or residing in person there. Finally, we 

modify the award of attorney‟s fees to Widow such that Widow is entitled only to those 

attorney‟s fees of $19,950.46 she incurred defending the Florida action and successfully 

moving the case back to Tennessee. The judgment of the Trial Court is modified, in part, 

and reversed, in part.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is modified, in part, and reversed, in part,

and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for collection of the costs below. The costs 

on appeal are assessed equally one-half against the Appellant, Christopher R. Bower, as 

Successor Trustee of the Bruce Chapman Bower and Lissa Leland Bower Revocable 

Living Trust Agreement, and his surety, if any, and, one-half against the Appellee, 

Denise Bower.

____________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE