J-S03003-17

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MATTHEW KEITH BYARS

Appellant No. 1740 WDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 28, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009814-2011

CP-02-CR-0009815-2011

CP-02-CR-0009816-2011

CP-02-CR-0009817-2011

CP-02-CR-0009824-2011

CP-02-CR-0009825-2011

CP-02-CR-0009826-2011

CP-02-CR-0009827-2011

CP-02-CR-0011638-2011

CP-02-CR-0011639-2011

CP-02-CR-0011640-2011

CP-02-CR-0011641-2011

BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2017

Appellant, Matthew Keith Byars, appeals from the order entered on 

September 28, 2015 in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Allegheny County. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural history in this case 

as follows:

[Appellant] was charged with 74 offenses[] at 12 separate 

[c]riminal [i]nformations in relation to a series of assaults on 

boys at a local day care center and in his home. [Appellant] 
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appeared before th[e trial c]ourt on January 30, 2012 and, 

pursuant to a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, pled 

guilty to all charges in exchange for a term of imprisonment of 

35 to 70 years. [Appellant] was also found to be a Sexually 

Violent Predator. No [p]ost-[s]entence [m]otions were filed and 

no direct appeal was taken.

No further action was taken until May 14, 2014, when 

[Appellant] filed a pro se Post Conviction Relief Act1[(PCRA)] 

Petition, which he captioned “Amended Petition.” Scott Coffee, 

Esquire, was appointed to represent [Appellant], but he later 

filed a [no-merit letter under Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 

213 (Pa. Super. 1988)] and sought permission to withdraw. 

After granting Attorney Coffey’s withdrawal and giving the 

appropriate notice of its intent to do so, th[e trial c]ourt 

dismissed [Appellant’s] pro se [PCRA p]etition without a hearing 

on July 16, 2014. On August 11, 2014, [Appellant] filed a pro se

“Motion and Order for Extension of Time to File Appeal to 

Dismissal of PCRA Petition” with th[is C]ourt, which [we] denied 

[] on August 20, 2014. [Appellant] eventually perfected a 

[n]otice of [a]ppeal which was initially docketed at 1557 WDA 

2014, but which was later quashed sua sponte by th[is] Court as 

untimely on December 5, 2014.

On March 30, 2015, [Appellant] filed a “Motion to Have 

Appellant’s Appeal Rights Restored[.]” That motion was denied 

on April 10, 2015.

No further action was taken until May 11, 2015, when 

[Appellant] filed a “Motion to Have Appellant’s Appeal Rights 

Restored ‘Nunc Pro Tunc[.]” After reviewing the record, th[e 

trial c]ourt denied [Appellant’s m]otion on September 28, 2015. 

This appeal followed.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/23/16, at 1-2.

Although Appellant lists 17 issues for our consideration, we note 

initially that his petition sought nunc pro tunc reinstatement of his right to 

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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appeal from the denial of his first PCRA petition. Such a claim falls under 

the auspices of the PCRA and, thus, is subject to the timeliness requirements 

of that statute.2 See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 

(Pa. 2007) (claim seeking reinstatement of PCRA appeal rights nunc pro tunc

constitutes cognizable claim under the PCRA and is therefore subject to 

applicable statutory time constraints). Accordingly, we shall treat 

Appellant’s May 11, 2015 request for restoration of his PCRA appeal rights as 

a petition for collateral relief.

We conclude that the trial court properly denied relief on Appellant’s

untimely filing.

[T]he timeliness requirements of the PCRA are 

jurisdictional in nature....

A petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the 

date the judgment becomes final unless the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to 

the time for filing the petition set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.[ ]

____________________________________________

2 The trial court in this case does not appear to have examined Appellant’s 

current filing within the context of the PCRA, including its attendant time 

restrictions. We respectfully remind the court that it is well-settled that the 

PCRA offers the sole means for obtaining collateral relief on cognizable 

claims, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542, and that, as a result, all claims for relief lodged 

after a judgment of sentence becomes final, in the vast majority of cases, 

must be considered under the PCRA’s statutory scheme.
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Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(citations omitted). In this case, Appellant’s petition was clearly filed outside 

the one-year time limit found in the PCRA and he failed to invoke a statutory 

exception to the limitations period. In his brief, Appellant alleges, without 

citation to the certified record or to pertinent authorities, that his petition 

should be reviewed because of unspecified interference by government 

officials, his ignorance of the facts upon which the petition was predicated, 

and since the right he asserts is one that would have been recognized by the 

Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 8b-8d. These generic contentions are woefully 

inadequate to invoke the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions and compel our 

conclusion that Appellant waived appellate review of his assertion that his 

second petition was timely under one of the exceptions set forth at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii). See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 

A.3d 291, 342-343 (Pa. 2011) (appellate filings must cite and discuss 

pertinent authorities). Thus, Appellant’s request for nunc pro tunc 

reinstatement of his PCRA appeal rights was untimely and the PCRA court 

lacked jurisdiction to address his claims. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 

937 A.2d 1062, 1073 (Pa. 2007) (appellate court may affirm a valid 

judgment based on any reason appearing as of record).

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2017