II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 845 

To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the Russian 

Federation’s continued compliance with the New START Treaty, the 

United States should extend the Treaty through 2026. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 14, 2019 

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. REED, and Mr. WARNER) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the Russian Federation’s continued compliance 

with the New START Treaty, the United States should 

extend the Treaty through 2026. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘New START Policy 

5 Act of 2019’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

7 In this Act: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3 mittees’’ means— 

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

5 the Committee on Armed Services, and the Se6 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 

7 and 

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

9 Committee on Armed Services, and the Perma10 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

11 House of Representatives. 

12 (2) NEW START, TREATY.—The terms ‘‘New 

13 START’’ and ‘‘Treaty’’ mean the Treaty between 

14 the United States of America and the Russian Fed15 eration on Measures for the Further Reduction and 

16 Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 

17 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 

18 (commonly known as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’). 

19 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 

20 Congress makes the following findings: 

21 (1) Since the end of World War II, the United 

22 States has relied on a robust and effective nuclear 

23 deterrent as part of our national defense, particu24 larly against the Soviet Union and its successor 

25 state, the Russian Federation. 


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1 (2) In tandem with our nuclear deterrent, the 

2 United States pursued a number of arms control, 

3 disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements with 

4 the Soviet Union as a means of ensuring strategic 

5 stability and United States defense of the homeland, 

6 such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and 

7 the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. 

8 (3) The Nuclear Posture Review issued in Feb9 ruary 2018 states that arms control agreements dur10 ing the Cold War ‘‘increased transparency, mod11 erated competition, codified rough parity in strategic 

12 nuclear areas, and closed off areas of competition’’. 

13 (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet 

14 Union, the United States continues to rely on a com15 bination of nuclear deterrence and strategic arms 

16 control to protect the United States from nuclear at17 tack. 

18 (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and 

19 the Russian Federation signed the New Strategic 

20 Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). 

21 (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated 

22 December 2, 2010, former Secretaries of State 

23 Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. 

24 Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin L. 

25 Powell all urged the Senate to ratify New START, 


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1 stating that it was in ‘‘the national interest to rat2 ify’’. 

3 (7) During the ratification process, New 

4 START garnered bipartisan support, and the United 

5 States Senate approved New START on December 

6 22, 2010, by a 71–26 vote. 

7 (8) New START entered into force on Feb8 ruary 5, 2011, placing limitations on United States 

9 and Russian strategic systems, including interconti10 nental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic 

11 missiles, and heavy bombers, as well as warheads 

12 that threatened the United States. 

13 (9) On February 5, 2018, the central limits on 

14 United States and Russia strategic nuclear arsenals 

15 took effect. 

16 (10) In March 2018, the United States and the 

17 Russian Federation exchanged data on their respec18 tive strategic nuclear arsenals in accordance with the 

19 Treaty. 

20 (11) Through the Treaty’s verification regime, 

21 which includes short-notice, on-site inspections at 

22 military bases and facilities, the United States is 

23 able to verify the data provided by the Russian Fed24 eration regarding its strategic nuclear arsenal. The 

25 verification regime provides both countries insight 


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1 into each other’s strategic nuclear delivery systems, 

2 warheads, and facilities, as well as data exchanges to 

3 track the status and makeup of nuclear weapons 

4 systems. 

5 (12) During a February 26, 2019, hearing of 

6 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on 

7 nuclear deterrence requirements, Commander of the 

8 United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 

9 and Air Force General John Hyten voiced his enthu10 siastic support for the Treaty, saying he was ‘‘a big 

11 supporter of the New START agreement’’ stating, 

12 ‘‘The New START treaty’’ provides ‘‘insights into 

13 the Russians capabilities. Those are hugely bene14 ficial to me.’’. 

15 (13) During a March 2017 hearing of the Com16 mittee on Armed Services of the House of Rep17 resentatives on nuclear deterrence requirements, Air 

18 Force General Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman of the 

19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, also endorsed the treaty, say20 ing New START is ‘‘a bilateral, verifiable agreement 

21 that gives us some degree of predictability on what 

22 our potential adversaries look like’’. 

23 (14) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the 

24 Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deter25 rence and Nuclear Integration, asserted that New 


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1 START was of ‘‘huge value’’ to United States secu2 rity. 

3 (15) The Nuclear Posture Review states that 

4 arms control agreements can ‘‘foster transparency, 

5 understanding, and predictability in adversary rela6 tions, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding 

7 and miscalculation’’. 

8 (16) New START strengthens United States 

9 nuclear security and strategic stability by reducing 

10 the number of strategic systems in Russia’s nuclear 

11 arsenal and provides the United States with the in12 spection and monitoring tools necessary to con13 fidently verify Russian compliance with New 

14 START. 

15 (17) New START does not restrict United 

16 States nuclear modernization programs or limit 

17 United States missile defense efforts. 

18 (18) During a September 2018 hearing before 

19 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, 

20 Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy David 

21 Trachtenberg stated that ‘‘the transparency and 

22 verification requirements of the New START Treaty 

23 are a benefit’’ to United States security and, in re24 sponse to a question regarding missile defense, asVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:46 Mar 28, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S845.IS S845

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1 serted that New START had ‘‘no’’ effect on limiting 

2 our missile defense capabilities. 

3 (19) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic 

4 Forces Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 

5 Services of the House of Representatives, Retired 

6 Air Force General and former commander of U.S. 

7 Strategic Command Robert Kehler stated ‘‘I think 

8 that we have gotten tremendous benefit out of those 

9 kinds of agreements with the Russians over the 

10 years, provided that the Russians comply’’ regarding 

11 the importance of New START. 

12 SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

13 It is the policy of the United States to extend New 

14 START from its initial termination date in February 2021 

15 to February 2026, as allowed in the Treaty, unless the 

16 President determines and so informs Congress that Russia 

17 is in material breach of New START. 

18 SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS. 

19 (a) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—Not 

20 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 

21 this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 

22 a report and provide a briefing to the appropriate congres23 sional committees that includes the following elements: 


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1 (1) A description of the Russian Federation’s 

2 current nuclear forces and predicted force levels in 

3 2026. 

4 (2) An analysis of the impact New START has 

5 had on the size and posture of the Russian Federa6 tion’s nuclear forces and strategic delivery systems. 

7 (3) An assessment of how the Russian Federa8 tion’s nuclear and missile arsenals would change if 

9 the New START is not extended or if a follow-on 

10 agreement to New START is not concluded. 

11 (4) An assessment of how strategic stability 

12 would be impacted if New START is not extended 

13 or if a follow-on agreement to New START is not 

14 concluded. 

15 (5) A description of the strategic security rami16 fications for the United States and our allies if New 

17 START is not extended or a follow-on agreement to 

18 New START is not concluded. 

19 (6) An assessment of how our allies will re20 spond if the limitations on the Russian Federation’s 

21 nuclear arsenal are dissolved because of New 

22 START not being extended or a follow-on agreement 

23 to New START not being concluded. 

24 (7) An assessment of the impact on the United 

25 States intelligence community’s ability to accurately 


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1 assess the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear ar2 senal and future nuclear force levels if New START 

3 is not extended or if a follow-on agreement to New 

4 START is not concluded. 

5 (b) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—Not later than 180 

6 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec7 retary of Defense shall submit a report and provide a 

8 briefing to appropriate congressional committees that in9 cludes the following elements: 

10 (1) An assessment by the Secretary of Defense 

11 on the impact on the United States nuclear arsenal 

12 and posture if New START is not extended or a fol13 low-on agreement is not concluded. 

14 (2) A description of the options that the United 

15 States has to respond to potential changes in the 

16 Russian Federation’s nuclear posture if the limita17 tions contained in the New START treaty are re18 moved. 

19 (3) A description of the adjustments to the De20 partment of Defense budget that will be necessary if 

21 New START is not extended or a follow-on agree22 ment is not concluded. 


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1 (4) A description of the impact on strategic sta2 bility if New START is not extended or a follow-on 

3 agreement is not concluded. 

Æ 


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