*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

APR 29 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DAVID L. DAVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GENE HILL, Montrose County Sheriff; BRIAN

BLACK, Montrose County Undersheriff; RICK

ROWAN, Montrose County Deputy Sheriff; JIM

MARTINEZ, Montrose County Deputy Sheriff; SUSAN

SHOTTELL, Montrose County Deputy Sheriff; JOHN

DOE #1, Montrose County Deputy Sheriff; ROBERT

BRETHOUWER, Montrose County Jail Doctor;

GARWEN S.J. JACKSON, Clerk of the Court, County

of Montrose; BECKY WOLFORD, Deputy Clerk;

VALERIE INDA, Deputy Clerk; CINDY BOWEN,

Montrose County Commissioner; DAVID GAAN,

Montrose County Commissioner; MEL STAATS,

Montrose County Commissioner; DENNIS

FRIEDRICH, District Court Magistrate,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-1229

(D.C. No. 97-S-520)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
1

 Mr. Davis’ complaint also asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim which the

trial court dismissed as legally frivolous. Mr. Davis apparently does not appeal

this action.

-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

Mr. David Davis, a state inmate and pro se litigant, appeals in forma

pauperis the trial court's dismissal of one cause of action contained in his civil

rights claims. 1 We conclude this appeal is frivolous and should be dismissed. We

also hold this appeal constitutes a "prior occasion" under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Mr. Davis filed his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against numerous

defendants, including the sheriff, undersheriff, four deputy sheriffs, the clerk of

the state court, the deputy clerk of court, a state magistrate judge, and a physician. 

A fair reading of this complaint shows Mr. Davis set forth essentially three causes

of action. The first is an assertion defendants denied him his constitutionally

protected right of access to the courts. He claims he was denied access to a law
-3-

library outside the jail "to work on the divorce case and other civil matters." The

second claim involved an assertion that Mr. Davis was improperly denied medical

treatment. The third claim asserted a deputy used excessive force against Mr.

Davis.

The trial court dismissed the denial of access claim by concluding it was

legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and failed to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The

basis of the trial court's ruling is found in Lewis v. Casey , 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2181-

82 (1996), where the Supreme Court held the right of access to the courts extends

only as far as protecting an inmate's ability to prepare initial pleadings in a civil

rights action regarding his current confinement or an application for a writ of

habeas corpus. See also Carper v. DeLand , 54 F.3d 613, 617, 616-17 (10th Cir.

1995). The trial court ordered Mr. Davis' claims concerning denial of medical

treatment and excessive force to proceed.

Mr. Davis filed his notice of appeal on the right of access claim. After

learning of a jurisdictional problem, Mr. Davis succeeded in obtaining a Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(b) certification from the trial court. We therefore have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

 Although the district court ruled Mr. Davis' action failed to state a claim,

the district court's decision and discussion appeared to center on whether the

complaint was frivolous. Because our ruling today rests on the frivolous nature

of Mr. Davis' claim, we need not conduct a de novo review of the Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) dismissal.

-4-

Mr. Davis' brief to this court is essentially a restatement of his complaint. 

The underlying basis of Mr. Davis' arguments is showing he was allegedly denied

access to the courts. He asserts the trial court erred in failing to consider Mr.

Davis was a pre-trial detainee. He also offers, for the first time, an affidavit of a

cellmate, alleging the state judge on Mr. Davis' case was angry Mr. Davis had not

been transferred from the county jail to the Department of Corrections, and a

letter from Mr. Davis to the county judge claiming it was his intention to file a

civil action against a Montrose County Sheriff.

We review the trial court's determination the denial of access claim is

frivolous for abuse of discretion. 2 Schlicher v. Thomas , 111 F.3d 777, 779 (10th

Cir. 1997). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) of Title 28 authorizes a district court to

dismiss a claim if the court finds "the action is frivolous or malicious." A

complaint is "frivolous" where it lacks an arguable basis, either in fact or law. 

Green v. Seymour , 59 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1995).
-5-

The Supreme Court, in Lewis, instructed Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817

(1977) "does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into

litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions

to slip-and-fall claims." Lewis , 116 S. Ct. at 2182. Rather, "[t]he tools it requires

to be provided are those that inmates need in order to attack their sentences,

directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their

confinement." Id. In Mr. Davis' complaint, he alleged he wished to pursue "civil

matters" including litigation relating to his divorce, but he did not refer to civil

matters concerning his condition of confinement or attack his sentence. 

Consequently the Supreme Court has spoken directly to the case at hand. Mr.

Davis' right of access to courts does not extend to the litigation he sought to

pursue. The fact Mr. Davis was a pre-trial detainee when he wished access to

legal materials is immaterial. See Love v. Summit County , 776 F.2d 908, 912 (10th

Cir. 1985) (recognizing pre-trial detainees have the same constitutional access

rights to vindicate fundamental constitutional rights), cert. denied , 479 U.S. 814

(1986). Further, we ordinarily do not consider evidence offered for the first time

on appeal. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weisman , 27 F.3d 500, 506 (10th

Cir. 1994) (stating the court will not consider evidence not presented to the

district court); Nulf v. International Paper Co. , 656 F.2d 553, 558 (10th Cir.

1981) (ruling matters not in the record will not be considered by this Court.). It is
-6-

clear Mr. Davis' claim lacks an arguable basis, either in fact or law. The decision

of the district court is correct and is therefore AFFIRMED.

As Mr. Davis' appeal is meritless and frivolous, it is a "prior occasion"

under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (limiting a

prisoner's invocation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 ( in forma pauperis ) to three or more

prior occasions of actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous or which failed to

state a claim).

Entered for the Court

WADE BRORBY

United States Circuit Judge