IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-16-00093-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF G.L.B., A CHILD

From the 74th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015-152-3

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Raising one issue, Appellant C.B. appeals the trial court’s termination of her 

parental rights to her child G.L.B. under subsections D, E, N, and O after a bench trial. 

We will affirm.

Appellant’s issue asserts that the trial court erred in not granting a 180-day 

extension of the statutory dismissal deadline under Family Code subsection 263.401(b), 

which allows the trial court to extend the dismissal deadline if the court finds “that 

extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing 

conservatorship of the department and that continuing the appointment of the 

department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child.” TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b) (West Supp. 2015).
In the Interest of G.L.B., a Child Page 2

We review a trial court’s denial of an extension request under section 263.401(b) 

for an abuse of discretion. In re D.M., 244 S.W.3d 397, 416 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no 

pet.) (op. on reh’g); see also In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, 

pet. denied); In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 647 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008), pet. denied per 

curiam, 260 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2008). “The focus is on the needs of the child, whether 

extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary custody of 

the Department, and whether continuing such is in the best interest of the child.” A.J.M.,

375 S.W.3d at 604.

To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must 

decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules 

or principles; in other words, we must decide whether the act was arbitrary 

or unreasonable. Merely because a trial court may decide a matter within 

its discretion in a different manner than an appellate court would in a 

similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has 

occurred.

An abuse of discretion does not occur where the trial court bases its 

decisions on conflicting evidence. Furthermore, an abuse of discretion does 

not occur as long as some evidence of substantive and probative character 

exists to support the trial court's decision.

D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 647 (citations omitted).

The Department removed the child based on allegations of domestic violence and 

Appellant’s drug abuse (methamphetamines). Appellant’s service plan required her to 

complete a drug and alcohol assessment, which she did. Appellant entered drug 

treatment twice for her methamphetamine addiction and was unsuccessful. At the time 

of the final hearing, she was undergoing in-patient drug treatment.

On October 19, 2015, Appellant filed her Motion for Extension Pursuant to Texas 
In the Interest of G.L.B., a Child Page 3

Family Code 263.401; among other things, the motion stated that she had entered a drug 

treatment program as of October 5, 2015, was participating in ongoing therapeutic 

services, and needed “more time to complete the services and demonstrate sobriety.” 

Appellant asked the trial court to find extraordinary circumstances.

At the November 10, 2015 Second Permanency Hearing, Appellant’s attorney

advised the trial court that he had filed a motion for extension that had not been set for 

hearing. Appellant was not present at this hearing. The trial court set the case for trial 

on January 12, 2016 and withheld ruling on the motion. According to the trial court, it 

was “no skin off of anybody’s nose ... if we go ahead and go toward the last of the year. 

That does give [Appellant] if she is in rehabilitation now, we can see if she’s actually 

going to stay. We’re going to see if she completes the program and see what she does. If 

she is in a program and if she does stay and complete it, that may be a - - that may be a 

situation for extenuating circumstances, ... .”

On January 12, 2016, when this case was called for trial, Appellant was not 

present; she was in inpatient-drug rehab and had been there since December 28, 2015. 

Her attorney re-urged the motion for an extension. The Department opposed the

extension because Appellant had “done no services,” had “attempted rehab two times

before, dropped out, relapsed, had not completed the rehab programs already multiple

times in this case,” and had not been visiting the child. The Department did not believe 

that it was in the child’s best interest to prolong the case to give Appellant yet another

chance to do what they had asked her to do a year ago and delay the child’s 

permanency. The child’s ad litem also opposed the extension because, other than her
In the Interest of G.L.B., a Child Page 4

“late-in-the-day effort to work services” regarding drug rehab, Appellant really had

done nothing else on her service plan. The ad litem also argued that G.L.B. had been 

thriving in foster care and was with a placement that had regular contact with him for

an extended period of time, Appellant really had no relationship with G.L.B. at the time

of trial, and an extension would just keep the child in limbo.

The trial court then inquired of Michelle Allison, the CPS caseworker, about when 

Appellant had entered rehab and confirmed that she was not in rehab during the

November hearing that she had not attended. The trial court also confirmed with Allison 

that Appellant had not visited G.L.B. since the November 10 hearing date and further 

had not visited G.L.B. since August 20, 2015. The trial court also confirmed with Allison 

that Appellant had only sporadic contact with Allison during the past months.

The trial court denied the extension request and proceeded to the final hearing that 

resulted in the order of termination.1 Based on the record before the trial court, we cannot 

say that it abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a 180-day extension of 

the statutory dismissal deadline. See In re K.P., No. 02-09-00028-CV, 2009 WL 2462564, at 

*4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“when a parent, through 

his or her own choices, fails to comply with a service plan and then at the time of the 

 

1 The evidence at the final hearing included the following: Appellant had not maintained consistent

contact with Allison; had no home, did not have a safe place or other reasonable place for G.L.B. to

live, and had not been able to provide G.L.B. a safe and stable home; had no job and had not maintained

employment during the case; had seven visits with G.L.B. during the case and could have had in

excess of 20-25 visits during the case, and had not been in regular contact with G.L.B.; did not

participate in individual therapy; had not provided any support for G.L.B.; did not make specific 

inquiry regarding the needs of G.L.B. (who had had significant special needs and received various

therapies while in the Department’s care), or how she could help with those needs; did not have the

ability to provide the special attention needed by G.L.B., and had no support group.
In the Interest of G.L.B., a Child Page 5

termination trial requests a continuance or an extension of the statutory dismissal 

deadline in order to complete the plan, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by 

denying the continuance or extension”).

We overrule Appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s termination order.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 3, 2016

[CV06]