[Cite as State v. Croft, 2016-Ohio-449.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

AUGLAIZE COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 CASE NO. 2-15-11 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

CHRISTINA D. CROFT, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Auglaize County Municipal Court 

Trial Court No. 2014 TRC 6406 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: February 8, 2016 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Craig A. Gottschalk for Appellant 

Nick Catania for Appellee 

 
Case No. 2-15-11 

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WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Christina Croft (“Croft”), brings this appeal from 

the judgment of the Auglaize County Municipal Court, which found her guilty of 

speeding and operating a vehicle under the influence (“OVI”). For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶2} On August 8, 2014, Croft was pulled over for speeding by Trooper 

Posada from the Ohio State Highway Patrol. Upon approaching the vehicle, 

Trooper Posada noticed a moderate odor of an alcoholic beverage through a smell 

of a freshly-lit cigarette. When asked for a proof of insurance, Croft handed 

Trooper Posada a wrong document. Croft initially denied drinking any alcohol, 

but later admitted to having consumed two beers earlier in the evening. Trooper 

Posada administered several field sobriety tests. Based on her performance on the 

tests, trooper Posada asked Croft to submit to a preliminary breath test. Croft 

refused and she was subsequently arrested on a charge of OVI. Croft refused to 

take any further tests that night in spite of being advised that refusal would result 

in an automatic license suspension. 

{¶3} Croft was charged with speeding, a violation of R.C. 4511.21(D)(1), 

and with OVI, a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). (R. at 1.) She entered a plea 

of not guilty and filed a motion to suppress certain evidence and statements she 
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had made to the police upon her arrest, including the results of the field sobriety 

tests. (R. at 23, 28.) She argued that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to 

arrest. (Id.) The trial court assigned the motion for a hearing on December 16, 

2014. (R. at 26, 35.) On the day scheduled for the hearing, Croft withdrew the 

motion and the case proceeded to a trial to the court. (R. at 41, 43, 50.) The trial 

court found her guilty of both offenses and the instant appeal followed. Croft 

raises one assignment of error as quoted below. 

Assignment of Error

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO 

DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 

AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION 

BY ENTERING VERDICTS OF GUILTY, AS THE JURY 

VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S 

RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION BY ENTERING VERDICTS OF GUILTY, AS 

THE JURY VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 

SUPPORTING IT WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF 

LAW TO PROVE THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT 

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 

{¶4} Although the assignment of error confusingly repeats the same 

allegation twice and mistakenly indicates that the finding of guilt was made by the 

jury, rather than a judge, the statement of the issues clarifies what the actual 

contentions on appeal are. In particular, Croft alleges that her conviction was not 
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supported by sufficient evidence and that it was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. (App’t Br. at 4.) We address the two contentions as follows. 

Standards of Review 

{¶5} When reviewing a criminal case for the sufficiency of the evidence, 

“our inquiry focuses primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence; that is, whether 

the evidence submitted at trial, if believed, could reasonably support a finding of 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Willcox, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-11-08, 

2011-Ohio-3896, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997). We look at the evidence in the light “most favorable to the 

prosecution” and will affirm the conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 118. 

Importantly, this test raises a question of law and does not allow us to weigh the 

evidence. Willcox at ¶ 10. 

{¶6} The question of manifest weight of the evidence concerns an “effect in 

inducing belief.” Thompkins at 387. Therefore, it is not subject to a mathematical 

analysis. Id. When reviewing a conviction challenged as being against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court acts as a “thirteenth juror” and 

may disagree with the jury’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Id., quoting 

Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). But the 

appellate court must give due deference to the findings of the trier of fact, because 
Case No. 2-15-11 

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[t]he fact-finder occupies a superior position in determining 

credibility. The fact-finder can hear and see as well as observe the 

body language, evaluate voice inflections, observe hand gestures, 

perceive the interplay between the witness and the examiner, and 

watch the witness’s reaction to exhibits and the like. Determining 

credibility from a sterile transcript is a Herculean endeavor. A 

reviewing court must, therefore, accord due deference to the 

credibility determinations made by the fact-finder. 

(Alteration omitted.) State v. Dailey, 3d Dist. Crawford, No. 3-07-23, 2008-Ohio274, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Thompson, 127 Ohio App.3d 511, 529, 713 N.E.2d 456 

(8th Dist.1998). Therefore, an argument that a conviction is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence will only succeed if the appellate court finds that “in 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 

485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). 

Analysis 

{¶7} No particular challenges to the sufficiency or the weight of the 

evidence are made in the brief on appeal. Indeed, Croft states that she was 

“admittedly speeding,” thus contradicting any allegation that the conviction for 

speeding was against the sufficiency or the manifest weight of the evidence. 

(App’t Br. at 10.) At no point does Croft indicate that any of the elements of the 

OVI were not supported by the evidence or that there were any conflicts in 
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evidence. Therefore, there are no specific contentions as to the sufficiency or the 

manifest weight of the evidence. See App.R. 16(A)(7). 

{¶8} Instead, the brief appears to contest the probable cause to arrest and 

the methods of conducting field sobriety tests, challenges that are properly raised 

in a motion to suppress. See State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449, 1995-Ohio32, 650 N.E.2d 887 (1995); City of Defiance v. Kretz, 60 Ohio St.3d 1, 4-5, 573 

N.E.2d 32 (1991). But as we stated above, Croft withdrew her motion to suppress 

and did not object to the admissibility of the evidence on other grounds during her 

bench trial. Therefore, no challenges to the admissibility of the evidence are 

properly on appeal. See State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 501, 668 N.E.2d 489 

(1996) (“A court of appeals cannot consider the issue for the first time without the 

trial court having had an opportunity to address the issue.”); see also French at 

451 (holding that “challenges to the state’s compliance with statutory and ODH 

regulations * * * must be made in a pretrial motion to suppress, or such challenges 

are considered waived”), citing Kretz at 5. 

{¶9} Our review of the record does not disclose any issues that would 

require reversal on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence. In order to support a 

conviction, the State had to prove (1) that Croft operated her vehicle within the 

state of Ohio and (2) that she was under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, 

or a combination of them. See R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). The State provided 

evidence indicating that Croft was driving within the State of Ohio at the time she 
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was pulled over by Trooper Posada. The State further proved that Trooper Posada 

detected a moderate odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from Croft’s vehicle 

and that Croft first denied having any alcohol, but later admitted to having had two 

beers earlier that evening. She had some trouble providing her proof of insurance 

and exhibited a stronger odor of an alcoholic beverage upon exiting the car. The 

State further provided evidence of field sobriety tests, which showed that Croft 

had difficulty with both the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg-stand test. In fact, 

the testimony and video showed that she was unable to perform the walk and turn 

test in spite of several attempts. Finally, Croft’s refusal to take a breath test could 

be used by the fact finder to infer that she feared the results of the test. See 

Maumee v. Anistik, 69 Ohio St.3d 339, 342-343, 1994-Ohio-157, 632 N.E.2d 497 

(1994); State v. Gray, 85 Ohio App.3d 165, 171, 619 N.E.2d 460 (3d Dist.1993). 

This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficiently 

supported each essential element of the crime. 

{¶10} We note that Croft did not present any evidence that would conflict 

with the elements of the offense as proffered by the State. Her testimony 

consisted of providing explanations for her poor performance on the field sobriety 

tests and for refusing to take the breath test. To the extent that Croft challenges 

the weight of the evidence by suggesting that the trial court should have 

discounted Trooper Posada’s testimony, find it completely unreliable, and find her 

not guilty, we disagree. Although there was some dispute over whether Croft 
Case No. 2-15-11 

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raised her hands during the one-leg-stand test or did poorly on the alphabet test, 

other evidence of impairment was so significant that we cannot hold that the trial 

court clearly lost its way in finding Croft guilty of operating a vehicle while under 

the influence of alcohol. See Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. 

{¶11} Based on the foregoing discussion we overrule the assignment of 

error. 

Conclusion

{¶12} Having reviewed the arguments, the briefs, and the record in this 

case, we find no error prejudicial to Appellant in the particulars assigned and 

argued. The judgment of the Auglaize County Municipal Court, Ohio is therefore 

affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ROGERS and PRESTON, J.J, concur. 

/hls