J-E01005-24 

 2024 PA Super 223 

 

MARCELO AITA 

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NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 510 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2022 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2019-00981 

MARCELO AITA 

 Appellant 

 v. 

NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 615 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2022 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2019-00981 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, 

J., NICHOLS, J., KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and LANE, J. 

DISSENTING OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2024 

 Based upon the particular facts of this case, I join the learned Dissent’s 

opinion reversing the order of the trial court. I write separately, however, 

because the Dissent’s correct statutory analysis of the Wage Payment and 

Collection Law (“WPCL”) highlights a shortcoming that may frustrate the very 

purpose of the statute. 
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 “The primary goal of the WPCL is to make whole again employees whose 

wages were wrongfully withheld by their employers.” Ely v. Susquehanna, 

Inc., 130 A.3d 6, 13 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Under the WPCL 

an employee has a remedy when any type of wage “is payable”, and the 

penalty of “liquidated damages” is collectable if the wages remain unpaid for 

more than 30 days, or more than 60 days in certain instances defined under 

the statute. See 43 P.S. §§ 260.9a(a) and 260.10. Where statutory 

language is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the words 

of the statute. When interpreting a statute, courts may not look beyond the 

plain meaning of a statute under the guise of pursuing its spirit. See City of 

Johnstown v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 255 A.3d 214, 220 

(Pa. 2021).

 While I agree with the dissent’s interpretation of the plain meaning of 

the phrase “is payable,” see Dis. Op. at 4-7, I am concerned that under that 

interpretation, an employer could, without good reason, make a practice of 

paying its employees one-to-two weeks late, with interest, which would make 

it practically impossible for the employees to have wages “payable” for a 

sufficient period to allow them to file suit under the WPCL and, if unpaid for 

more than 30 days, seek liquidated damages. For the innumerable employees 

who live paycheck to paycheck, such a practice could have dire financial 

consequences, including, for example, penalties for late payment of rent or 

the necessity to take a “pay day” loan at exorbitant interest rates, which could 
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heavily burden an employee’s personal budget with no statutory opportunity 

to be made whole. Yet under such a scenario, the employer would not be 

required to pay liquidated damages and would have no disincentive to 

discontinue the practice. 

 It is, however, not within the purview of this Court to “disregard the 

letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Goodwin v. 

Goodwin, 280 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). The Legislature, 

not this Court, is charged with the authority to make any changes in the WPCL 

it deems necessary to protect employees against the hypothetical employer 

practice described above. Thus, because I agree with the Dissent’s 

interpretation of the plain language of the WPCL, I join the Dissent. 

 Judge Dubow joins this dissenting opinion.