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“Since the assassination 

of Rafik al-Hariri in 2005 and 

mounting regional conflict along 

ostensibly Shia-Sunni lines... 

sectarian tensions within the 

Lebanese political scene have 

spiked. The Syrian political crisis 

has only amplified this trend. 

Nonetheless, mounting sectarian 

tensions will not necessarily 

result in a full-blown civil war 

in Lebanon.”

November 18, 2013

The Syrian Conflict’s Impact 

on Lebanese Politics 

Summary

•	 The Syrian crisis has had a negative impact on Lebanon’s politicalscene, including the dynamics among political factions within and acrossthe country’s majorsectarian communities. 

•	 The political fragmentation of the Sunni community hasimplicationsfor the growing trend

toward political violence triggered by the Syrian conflict. The rise of challengers and the

decline of centralized authority within the Sunni community further increase the probability

of violence perpetrated by in-group factions.

•	 Despite the pressuresfrom the Syrian conflict, mounting sectarian tensions will not inexorably

spark another all-out civil war.

•	 If Lebanon does not move past the current political deadlock and stagnation, the spillover

from the Syrian crisisstandsto undermine the country’sstability in the longer term. 

Melani Cammett

E-mail: melani_cammett@brown.edu

peaceBrieF158

Background

The direct effects of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon—such as, increased incidents ofsectarian

political violence, massive refugee inflows, cross-border movements of fighters—have been well

reported during the past two years. Less evident but no lessimportant in assessing the effects of

the Syrian crisis on the Lebanese politicalscene isitsimpact on relations among political factions

within and acrossthe country’s majorsectarian communities. The political dynamics of inter- and

intra-sect relations affect the nature of linkages between politicians and in- and out-group

members at the grassrootslevel. They also influence the nature and extent of political violence,

which has accelerated in the past few yearsin Lebanon.

The Lebanese politicalsystem incentivizes political parties and movementsto become the

dominant representatives of their respective sectarian communities. Executive power-sharing

arrangements, which distribute political offices by sect, and the electoralsystem, which adopts

sectarian quotas at the district level,1 compel political factionsto prevail over in-group rivalsto

control key levers of the state and, more fundamentally, to gain accessto lucrative patronage opportunities. The dynamics of intra-sect politics are therefore particularly consequential in Lebanon.

Changes within Lebanon’s Sunni community since 2005 illustrate the ramifications of intra-sect

relationsfor the linkages between politicians and citizens and for trendsin political violence. Upon

the end of the Lebanese civil war in the early 1990s, Rafik Hariri, a politician originally from Sidon who

earned a massive fortune in Saudi Arabia, gradually gained control over political representation of
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

The Syrian Conflict’s Impact on Lebanese Politics 

page 2 • PB 158 • November 18, 2013

the Sunni community. Through the cooptation and defeat of in-group rivals as well as welfare-enhancing initiativestargeting Lebanese citizensfrom diverse religious communities, Hariri expanded

hisinfluence among Sunnis across much of Lebanon and even among some non-Sunnis.

In-group political dominance shapesthe linkages between politicians and citizens at the

grassrootslevel: Because political parties or movements do not need to prove theirsectarian

credentials as vociferously once they have outmaneuvered in-group rivals, they are more at liberty

to offersocial benefits across communal lines and, more generally, to position themselves as

national political actorsrather than merely representatives of a sectarian subset of the Lebanese

population.2Thus, a position of dominance within the Sunni community granted the Hariri political machine the freedom to woo supportersfrom out-group communities. Having achieved a near

monopoly over political representation of Lebanese Sunnis, Hariri was able to position himself as a

national leader and not just a Sunni politician.

Due to an accumulation of political developments, the dynamics of intra-sect politicsin the

Sunni community have changed. With Hariri’s assassination in 2005, the increasing polarization

of Lebanese politics along the March 8 versus March 14 axis, violent clashesin May 2008 between

factionsled by the Future Movement and Hezbollah, and heightened struggles over the control

of key government posts, Hariri’s movement has positioned itself more overtly as a sectarian

party. Interviews conducted between 2007 and 2009 of Future Movement officials confirmed

this assessment in remarkably blunt terms. Furthermore, the Future Movement, the loose political organization established in 2007 and formally headed by Saad Hariri, Rafik Hariri’sson, has

weakened substantially. Poor leadership and dwindling economic fortunes, among other factors,

have contributed to the gradual deterioration of the movement.

Partly in response to the Future Movement’s decline, a variety of challengers within the Sunni community have emerged orstrengthened. These include established organizationssuch asthe Muslim

Brotherhood; localstrongmen in Sidon, Tripoli and other predominantly Sunni areas; various hardline

groups,some of which are linked to al-Qaida; and marginal Arab nationalist and leftist organizations

such asthe SSNP and Baath party. Some of these challengers,such as Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir in Sidon,

have employed violence, a tactic that the Future Movement haslargely avoided, despite a brief and

ill-fated effort to field a militia in clashes with Hezbollah and its alliesin May 2008. 

The Impact of the Syrian Conflict 

The Syrian conflict has greatly amplified the trend toward political fragmentation within the Sunni

community. Although many Sunni political leaders and followers have intervened directly in the

Syrian conflict, no consensus has emerged on the appropriate strategy to adopt toward the crisis

and its effects on the Lebanese politicalscene. Different factions within Lebanese Sunni politics

have allied themselves with Syrian opposition forcesfrom distinct ideological orientations and

disagree on appropriate responsesto acts of violence targeting Sunni areas within Lebanon. For

example, after car bombs killed at least 45 people Tripoli on August 23, one Sunni group called

for communal policing initiatives(al-amn al-thati) to protect against future attacks. The Future

Movement, however, rejected this approach.

The political fragmentation of the Sunni community also hasimplicationsfor the growing trend

toward political violence triggered by the Syrian conflict. The rise of challengers and the decline of

centralized authority within the Sunni community increase the probability of violence perpetrated

by in-group factions. Emerging localstrongmen and clericstied to extremist groups are not only

participating directly in the fighting in Syria but also are more inclined than the Sunni establish-
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

The Syrian Conflict’s Impact on Lebanese Politics 

page 3 • PB 158 • November 18, 2013

ment to employ violence as a political tactic within Lebanon. Because communal leaders

exercise minimal if any control over these newer Sunni challengersto their authority, they are

less able to reign in in-group perpetrators of violence.

Intra-sect politics have followed a distinct trajectory within the Shia community. Thusfar, the

Syrian crisis has not fundamentally transformed political dynamics within the Lebanese Shia

community. Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s open participation in the Syrian warseemsto have further

undermined itsreputation among non-Shia and may have caused some existing supportersto

question the wisdom of the group’s actions. Furthermore, the conflict has amplified preexisting

tensions within the March 8th political alliance, in which Hezbollah, the Amal Movement and

the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) are the key political actors. The FPM, headed by Michel Aoun,

clearly does not approve of Hezbollah’s decision to engage militarily in the Syrian conflict and

Aoun has held several meetings with the Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon, which some claim is an

indicator that he isless committed to the coalition with Hezbollah. Yet Aoun does not appear to

have imminent plansto withdraw from the alliance. At thisjuncture, it isstill politically expedient

for the FPM to remain in the March 8th bloc, despite longstanding and mounting tensions with

its other main Shia“partner,”the Amal Movement.

The Prospects for Deeper Sectarianism in Lebanon 

In considering the ramifications ofthe Syrian crisisforsectarianism in Lebanon, itisimportantto bear

in mind two general points. First, while Shia-Sunnitensions are at a high pointin Lebanon and in the

region,they do notreflect essential and irreconcilable differencesrooted in identity. By design,the

Lebanese power-sharing system, both in its post-independence and post-TaifAccord incarnations,

entrenchesthe politicalsalience ofsectarian identity.However,sectarian identities have not been

equally salientin the political lives of Lebanese citizens at alltimes. Since the assassination of Rafik

al-Hariri in 2005 and mounting regional conflict along ostensibly Shia-Sunni lines, which hassteadily

intensified acrossthe Middle East afterthe secondGulfWar,sectarian tensions within the Lebanese

politicalscene have spiked.The Syrian political crisis has only amplified thistrend.

Nonetheless, mounting sectarian tensions will not necessarily result in a full-blown civil war in

Lebanon. Thusfar, inflammatory slogans have not gained masssupport and incidents of political

violence have not rippled out of control. Asresearch on ethnic conflictshows, elite“political entrepreneurs”play a key role in sparking violence. At thisjuncture, the most prominent Lebanese

political leaders with the greatest numbers of followers do not appear to favor full-blown war

and have even tried to contain potential backlash following the most egregious acts of terrorism

within Lebanese borders.

While the fragmentation of political representation within the Sunni community may contribute to an uptick in violent incidents, it will not inexorably lead to a return to an all-out civil war.

This emphasis on the variability ofsect as a politically salient category reflectsthe conventional

wisdom among socialscientists but is not merely an academic proposition. It hasimplications

for policy-making: To the extent that political elitesfrom Lebanon and from influential countries

in the Lebanese politicalscene, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, are incentivized not to

ratchet up inter-group conflict, then tensions may be defused.

Second, an important but largely overlooked by-product of growing sectarian tensionsin

Lebanon isthe continued decline of living conditionsfor the Lebanese population. At this

juncture, the major political factions have even lessincentive and capacity to focus on pressing

issuesrelated to governance and to the provision of public and social goods. A robustsocial
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The Syrian Conflict’s Impact on Lebanese Politics 

page 4 • PB 158 • November 18, 2013

science literature contendsthat ethno-religious diversity is associated with suboptimal welfare

inputs and outcomes, particularly at the national level. Lebanon confirmsthis association, at least

on the national level: The Lebanese power-sharing system, which compels parties and politicians

to demand equal accessto socioeconomic resources, undercutsthe potential achievement of

national economies ofscale and equity in economic and social policy initiatives.

The spillover of the Syrian conflict into Lebanon has exacerbated the politicalstalemate in

Lebanon. Political deadlock has postponed the holding of electionsindefinitely and undercuts

any possibility forserious consideration ofsocioeconomic reform in the country. The continuing

stagnation, if not decline, of economic and social outcomes harmsthe well-being of the population and, assome research suggests,3 can threaten longer-term stability in Lebanon.

Notes

1.	 At the same time, the electoralsystem adopts a system of“joint electorates,”which requires

that politicians win the support of out-group voters.

2.	 AsI argue elsewhere, the choice of politicalstrategy—state-centric or electoral v. extra-state

—also affectsthe linkages between political organizations and members of in- and out-group

communities. See Melani Cammett. Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism

in Lebanon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming 2014; and Melani Cammett and

Sukriti Issar.“Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: The Political Geography of Welfare in Lebanon.”In

World Politics 62, no. 3(July 2010): 381-421.

3.	 See Melani Cammett and Edmund Malesky.“Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Societies: Implicationsfor Peace and Governance.”In Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 6 (December 2012):

982-1016.

About This Brief

Melani Cammett is an associate 

professor of political science 

specializing in the political 

economy of development and the 

Middle East at Brown University. 

Her most recent book is Compassionate Communalism: Welfare 

and Sectarianism in Lebanon. This 

Peace Brief is one in a five-part 

USIP series on sectarianism in the 

Middle East.