ctnsp.dodlive.mil dh No. 79 1 

The Ukraine conflict poses unique and asymmetric challenges to the 

international community. Since the earliest days of the Crimean crisis, Russian support of “separatists” within Ukraine has ranged from 

plainclothes thugs to more traditional uniformed troops, munitions, and other 

forms of aid. Some of the individuals involved may have had links to the Russian 

military or its intelligence community. While much of the aid comes through 

the porous border between Russia and Ukraine, Russia also leverages the opportunity to use Black Sea smugglers as a way to supply ongoing rebellions or to 

initiate new revolts. Two Black Sea–bordering regions, Odessa and Transnistria, 

are home to active pro-Russian movements that could potentially evolve into 

a pro-Russian state. Worries of Russia supplying separatists via illicit movements on the Black Sea and generally advancing its Novorossyia claims should 

be matched to a general concern over Black Sea smuggling rings, which traffic 

humans, weapons, and nuclear materials into Europe via Odessa’s port.

To solve these problems, American unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) offer 

an effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) solution. Assets 

could conduct maritime ISR of the Crimean Peninsula, Russian borders, main 

smuggling corridors, and littoral regions over international waters. Based on the 

ISR accumulation, such assets could provide intelligence on Russia-based aggression while aiding Black Sea Allies to apprehend criminals. Assets such as the 

RQ-4 Global Hawk or MQ-4C Triton systems would fit this mission profile and 

could operate out of the existing U.S. airbase at Romania’s Mihail Kogălniceanu 

International Airport (M.K. Base) for maximum persistence across the Black 

Responding to Russia after the 

NATO Summit: Unmanned 

Aerial Systems Overmatch in 

the Black Sea

by Conor Sullivan, Schuyler Standley, and James M. 

Keagle

Defense Horizons

National Defense University

Center for 

T

e

chnology and 

National Se

curity Poli

c

y

Key Points

◆ In the aftermath of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

summit in Wales in September 

2014, the Obama administration 

pledged $1 billion to assist Allies 

on the eastern front. This was in 

response to Russian initiatives and 

our Allies’ requests for increased 

U.S. presence.

◆ A potential response could be 

the introduction of intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance 

capabilities around the Black Sea.

◆ Given the increasing concern 

over the strategic importance 

and therefore vulnerability of the 

areas bordering the Black Sea, 

such as Odessa, Transnistria, and 

the Danube Delta, this asymmetric 

response from the United States 

not only would add a less escalatory pressure on Russian interests 

in the area but also could alleviate some of the concerns of some 

NATO members.

April 2015

About the Authors

Conor Sullivan is a Senior in 

the Maxwell School at Syracuse 

University majoring in International 

Relations and Policy Studies. Schuyler 

Standley is a Research Intern in the 

Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University (NDU). James M. 

Keagle is a University Professor at 

NDU.
2 dh No. 79 ctnsp.dodlive.mil

Sea. Given the increasing concern over the strategic importance—and therefore vulnerability—of the areas bordering the Black Sea, such as Odessa, Transnistria, and 

the Danube Delta, this asymmetric response from the 

United States not only would add a less-escalatory pressure on Russian interests in the area but also could alleviate some the concerns of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members in the area. 

Background

Prior to 2014, few people assumed the Black Sea region would be of international consequence in the near 

future, despite growing evidence of a Russian presence 

(see figure 1). However, the Black Sea has emerged as a 

serious fault line between the East and West. Months after Ukraine’s Maidan protests in November–December 

2013 demonstrated the strength of pro-Europe grassroots 

movements, Russian-backed separatists and psychological operations (PSYOPs) overshadowed Ukraine’s success 

against corruption and oligarchy. Now, with dim prospects 

for the February 15, 2015, Minsk accords after the rebel 

victory over the strategically essential city of Debaltseve, 

claims of direct Russian military support to rebels seem 

to grow daily in parallel to successes on the battlefield (see 

figure 2).1

In response to the crisis, the West subjected the Russian economy to multiple rounds of sanctions. However, 

although the European Union still resists implementing 

the most punishing steps due to concerns over energy 

security and Russian retaliation, the progressively obvious ineffectiveness of the Minsk accords has increased its 

support for stronger sanctions.2

 Meanwhile, a more passive-aggressive Russian propaganda policy superficially subsumed Russian President 

Figure 1. Russian Forces in the Greater Black Sea Region

RUSSIAN ARMY RUSSIAN ARMY

ROMANIA

SERBIA

BULGARIA

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

GEORGIA

TURKEY

GREECE

MACEDONIA

SYRIA IRAQ

MOLDOVA

RUSSIAN FLEET

M.K. BASE
ctnsp.dodlive.mil dh No. 79 3 

Vladimir Putin’s candid support of reclaiming historic 

Novorossiya. His propaganda campaign largely focuses 

on Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania, bringing into 

question whether NATO Article V guarantees are hollow in the face of Russian aggression. Even more issues 

emerged following the downing of Malaysian Airlines 

Flight 17 over Ukraine in July 2014, and cross-border artillery renewed questions of direct Russian engagement 

in the crisis. 

The rapidly evolving events in the Black Sea region 

could be interpreted as pointing toward either a period of 

peaceful unease in Eastern Europe or one of expanding 

proxy conflicts. For the sake of its Allies and their interests, the United States and NATO should not optimistically hedge their positions in the Black Sea but instead 

strengthen their deterrence through enhanced preparation for contingency operations.

Perhaps the most likely outcome of pro-occidental 

maneuvering by Eastern Europe is the risk of further Russian territorial encroachment and/or PSYOPs in various 

“frozen conflicts.” These conflicts result from “the combination of a weak state and aggressive local elites” that 

eventually leads to an ethnic security dilemma based on 

mutual mistrust.4 One example is in Transnistria, a region 

bordering Moldova and Ukraine, which previously sought 

to join the Russian Federation in 1990 through open warfare. Cossacks from Ukraine and Russia operated and supplied the rebellion with some success; Transnistria remains 

a semi-autonomous state within Moldova. Soon after the 

Crimea referendum in March 2014, the Transnistrian 

government again asked for accession into Russia. With 

over 1,200 Russian soldiers currently stationed in the 

state, popular opinion heavily in favor of unification with 

Russia, and the possibility of arms and agitators being 

smuggled into Transnistria through Odessa or the Black 

Sea, another armed rebellion could easily be fomented.5

Another possible area of conflict lies in Odessa, the 

fourth largest city in Ukraine with around 20 percent of 

the population consisting of ethnic Russians according 

to the latest census in 2001.6 The port city remains economically and militarily vital for Ukraine and is a center for criminal smuggling across the Black Sea. Despite 

Odessa’s proximity to Crimea and Transnistria, its location on the Black Sea, and its ethnic ties to Russia, the 

area has been relatively calm. On May 2, 2014, however, 

an altercation unfolded involving pro-Ukrainian and 

pro-Russian mobs, some of which were from Transnistria. By the end of the street clashes, several government 

Figure 2. Growth of Rebel-Held Areas
4 dh No. 79 ctnsp.dodlive.mil

buildings had been burned down and 48 people were 

dead. The relative peace in Odessa does not preclude the 

future possibility of a Russian state security or intelligence operation (perhaps by the Federal Security Service 

or Main Intelligence Directorate) to smuggle Russian 

special forces and weaponry into the city. Any proRussian sympathy in Odessa may be all the justification 

Putin needs to put his stamp of approval on a spontaneous populist “revolution.” Considering Odessa’s close ties 

with organized crime and Ukraine’s already hard-pressed 

military, such an operation remains feasible.

Regardless of whether historical conflicts in the Black 

Sea devolve into open rebellions, international dependence 

on oil and gas pipelines that run through the Black Sea emphasize the importance of securing an internationally strategic energy hub. Pipelines pass through Turkey, Georgia, 

Ukraine, and Bulgaria and will transit the Black Sea itself if 

the South Stream pipeline project is ever completed. Homes 

as far away as France use the gas from these pipelines, which 

are vital to the global economy. Likewise, the Black Sea sees 

tanker traffic daily among its littoral states and through the 

Bosporus. Guaranteeing that these essential energy routes 

remain open and secured from Russian pseudo-separatist, 

terrorist, or criminal actions should be a top priority for the 

United States and its Allies in the region. 

The conflict in Crimea also presents organized crime 

groups in Eastern Europe with a prime opportunity to 

expand throughout the Black Sea region. After the collapse of Soviet authority in the area, all that remained for 

the Black Sea states was a “legacy of a lack of respect for 

the rule of law, absence of civil society, a large criminal 

underworld and shadow economy, endemic corruption 

and a demoralized law enforcement and legal apparatus.”7

 Drug and weapons smuggling, human-trafficking, 

and even nuclear arms and materials trafficking have all 

taken place through the Black Sea corridor. The separatist-controlled areas around Donetsk and Luhansk provide organized crime an easy border crossing from Russia 

into Ukraine. Putin’s strategy may be to either connect 

these geographically disconnected areas or to leave them 

separated following a Kaliningrad model.8

These two ongoing crises are more closely linked than 

one might suspect. Both former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and Putin hold some connection to organized crime–affiliated oligarchs, albeit to varying degrees of 

certainty.9 Likewise, reports surfaced that a significant portion of the foot soldiers and “regional commanders” in the 

People’s Republic of Donetsk are actually mid-level mafiosos securing direct control over land long controlled by the 

criminal underworld.10 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Donetsk, 

Odessa, and Crimea represent historic areas of mafia control with large populations of native Russian speakers, and 

they became centers of rebel sentiment in Ukraine.

Policy

While Putin still holds ambitions to match German 

or U.S. soft power in Eastern Europe through the Collective Security Treaty Organization or Eurasian Union, potential conflict zones, energy interests, and trade concerns 

in the Black Sea must remain at the forefront of Western 

foreign policy concerns and garner the application of the 

most appropriate instrument of power. The dual threat of 

Russian-manipulated organized crime and separatist rebellions in a global trade and energy hub creates an asymmetric nexus of threats to global security on the Black Sea. 

Washington must emerge from its current policy of heavy 

reliance on economic sanctions as a deterrent. Instead, 

the United States should implement a policy of extended 

deterrence on the Black Sea by using UAS to promote 

security in the region and to provide palpable action that 

assures U.S. Allies of Article V commitments. Neither 

former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s guarantees to Estonia that “you may be on NATO’s 

border geographically, but you are right at the core of our 

alliance politically,”11 nor President Barack Obama’s statement that “in the 21st century, the borders of Europe cannot be redrawn with force”12 is sufficient. More action by 

both the United States and NATO will be necessary. 

Creating this climate of extended deterrence in the 

Black Sea is achievable using modern U.S. military technology. The United States should deploy UAS to deter 

both organized crime in the Black Sea and Russian ag-
ctnsp.dodlive.mil dh No. 79 5 

gression in the guise of popular uprisings. This would require a contingent of American ISR UAS deployed to the 

region with partnerships of U.S.-aligned or allied regional 

coast guard and police forces.

Focusing specifically on American UAS assets for 

ISR, law enforcement, and homeland defense appears 

less threatening than other offensive military capabilities. 

It also improves the legality, given the lack of Montreux 

Convention regulations on aircraft entering and operating in the Black Sea. The convention regulates which ships 

may pass through the Bosporus. The most pertinent of 

these regulations prohibits non–Black Sea countries from 

sailing individual ships weighing over 15,000 tons into 

the sea, having single warships linger for longer than 21 

consecutive days, and carrying guns larger than 8 inches. 

It also requires a 15-day notice to Turkey before any ships 

can pass through the Bosporus.13 Finally, non–Black Sea 

powers’ ships must maintain a limit of 45,000 tons of aggregate displacement in the sea for all ships. While several 

U.S. ships have entered the Black Sea since the start of the 

Ukrainian conflict, all were small-displacement vessels that 

exited the area after their 21-day tour expired.14

These requirements effectively preclude a large-scale, 

ship-based security operation. Hypothetically, if the U.S. 

Navy decided to stage an operation despite the 45,000-

ton limits, then 5,000- to 9,000-ton Arleigh Burke–class 

destroyers could enter the Black Sea and patrol the 

168,496-square-mile area for a maximum of 21 days.Assuming a ship cruised at a high average of 30 miles per 

hour for the entire deployment, it would cover 15,120 

miles, a mere fraction of the total sea. In addition to the 

impracticality of constantly cycling several destroyers or 

frigates to patrol the Black Sea, such rotations and U.S. 

presence would surely draw a severely caustic response 

from Russia, no matter the stated mission.

UAS may also be a more viable option than deployment of physical ships to the Black Sea due to the 

presence of M.K. Base (see figure 3). The base, located 

within 20 miles of the Black Sea, is a key location in the 

Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan. In 2009, 

the U.S. military declared the base a permanent forward 

operating site. The infrastructure exists to place a cadre of 

UAS at this base, and the Romanian government would 

permit it.15 Potential UAS deployments at other U.S. airbases around the Black Sea could also be beneficial, offering longer loiter times and thus more persistent ISR 

coverage of the region. UAS also have an advantage over 

ships in terms of range of view, loiter time on station, and 

cost of deployment.

President Obama’s June 3, 2014, request for $1 billion could make this aforementioned deployment of 

American UAS possible. The money was tasked to assure NATO Allies in Eastern Europe of continued U.S. 

support for their security. Much of this money has been, 

or will be, spent on reinforcing U.S. garrisons in Poland, 

Estonia, and Latvia and conducting military exercises 

with Eastern European countries. Many Eastern European NATO members, however, want a permanent U.S. 

base within the region. Assuring Allies such as Romania 

and Bulgaria of continued NATO engagement in their 

security situations remains vital to sustained belief in 

Article V commitments for all member countries. Using 

the money to deploy UAS assets and expand M.K. Base 

would be an investment in regional stability now and into 

the future. As the Black Sea stands at a natural nexus for 

NATO-Russian soft-power conflict, natural gas trade, and 

radical Islam, a well-established U.S. presence in the region 

would give legitimacy to any subsequent stability-minded 

operations. Additionally, saving fuel costs by basing UAS 

Figure 3. M.K. Base Ranges

Source: Map data: Basarsoft, Google, ORION-ME

M.K. BASE
6 dh No. 79 ctnsp.dodlive.mil

out of M.K. Base allows for greater efficiency over the 

lifespan of the operation.

UAS Options

The RQ-4 Global Hawk system would fit the proposed Black Sea anti-smuggling operation well. Northrop 

Grumman developed its Global Hawk, which first saw 

service during the war in Afghanistan, in the late 1990s. 

The UAS operates as a high-altitude, long-loiter ISR platform. The sensor package carried by the Global Hawk, 

which was developed specifically to provide ISR information on naval vessels, varies based on the block number of 

the aircraft. While the maritime inverse synthetic aperture radar is available on the new RQ-4 Block 40, a more 

accessible option could come from the RQ-4 Block 30, 

which holds a payload based on signals intelligence and 

a long-range Raytheon integrated sensor suite package.16

With that configuration, the Block 30 could observe vessels and troop movements and pick up potentially critical 

chatter. With many Block 30 Global Hawks remaining 

usable after their anticipated retirement and available at 

a drastically lower total cost per operational hour (about 

half) than the U-2,17 they may be an ideal choice for the 

initial mission parameters (see figure 4). 

Regardless of block, the Global Hawk has a range of 

approximately 10,000 nautical miles (nm), operates at a 

service ceiling of 60,000 feet, and can loiter on a location 

for up to 32 hours.18 With a base located so close to the 

Black Sea, fuel expenditures to arrive on station should be 

relatively low, allowing the Global Hawk a wide operational 

range and long loiter time. As shown in figure 4, the cost 

per flight hour of the RQ-4 continues to fall over its lifetime, costing only $14,600 in 2014, compared to the U-2 at 

$32,000. However, the Global Hawk is far from aging out, 

with 96 percent of the fleet life remaining. Figure 3 depicts 

the Global Hawk’s general effectiveness through range only. 

Figures 4 and 5 compare the RQ-4 with the U-2. The data 

show the Global Hawk system’s overall increases in cost effectiveness throughout its years of service. Figure 4 demonstrates the likely cost of keeping a Global Hawk in perpetual orbit over the Black Sea. From M.K. Base, the Global 

Hawk can reach anywhere in the Black Sea at a maximum 

of 539 nm, a fraction of the UAS 10,000-nm range. Even at 

maximum orbit distance, achieving a year-round continual 

orbit of any location within the Black Sea would cost $350 

million or less.

The Global Hawk exemplifies a less threatening 

global option; most perceive it as a system used only in 

permissive environments. With the pivot toward Asia and 

the new Air-Sea Battle doctrine, the United States should 

phase out nonstealthy UAS, now unsuitable for use against 

enemies with sophisticated antiaircraft capabilities. In the 

interim, by deploying the currently nonstealthy Global 

Hawk as a law enforcement force multiplier in the Black 

Sea, the UAS can continue to operate only if the environment remains permissive and can provide meaningful ISR 

for the duration of the mission or lifetime of the aircraft.

Another alternative is the U.S. Navy–developed 

MQ-4 Triton, which will enter production in 2015 and 

will modify the Global Hawk. The Triton has an operational ceiling of 56,500 feet and includes de-icing and 

weather protection systems on the basic fuselage. It also 

carries a more advanced sensor package than the basic Global Hawk Blocks 20–40, focused specifically on 

identifying ships at both its operational ceiling and at 

10,000 feet.19 Built explicitly to support the U.S. Navy’s 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program, the Triton 

maintains a loiter time of approximately 24 hours. Its 

specifications match exactly what would be called for in 

this type of mission. However, unlike the Global Hawk, 

the Triton has yet to deploy. Both the Global Hawk and 

Figure 4. UAS Costs per Flight Hour 

Source: Air Force Total Ownership Cost Database, FYs 2011–2014
ctnsp.dodlive.mil dh No. 79 7 

Triton systems have the advantage of being unarmed and 

dedicated to information-gathering, and therefore nonprovocative compared to other long-range UAS options.

Some combination of both systems would be the most 

viable configuration for this ISR security mission. Because 

UAS are force multipliers, creating overlapping coverage of 

ISR assets would give much more flexibility to commanders 

on the ground and better intelligence to analysts back home. 

Using both systems could make this possible. The Global 

Hawk often carries a sensor package specifically made for 

high-altitude flight but cannot manage harsh weather or icing, whereas the Triton’s enhanced sensors improve the ISR 

capabilities in the 10,000- to 56,500-foot range, giving the 

UAS more resolution on objects of interest. The additional 

benefit of Global Hawk satellite communication data link 

systems to provide immediate downloads provides a nearreal-time bonus to intelligence collection. If these systems 

could operate in conjunction, with a Global Hawk spotting objects over a great distance before tasking for Triton’s 

further identification, they would be operating at peak efficiency based on their respective strengths.

Likewise, any steps in this process of loitering ISR—

whether development of flight path, assessment of objects, 

tasking onto unidentified targets, or more automated functions—could be automated or manually controlled. The integration of these two systems using middleware technology is already possible, as both are built and operated on 

the same systems framework and middleware previously 

developed by Northrop Grumman. The more these ISR 

UAS automate, the less manpower they will require to operate, thus reducing costs outside of maintenance and fuel. 

As artificial intelligence systems develop more effective algorithms and become more efficient at spotting abnormal 

behaviors, integration between different long-loiter UAS 

assets could be a useful tool to any combat commander 

without the manpower or bandwidth requirements that 

come from continuous UAS operation. Regardless of longterm collaborative efforts, applying some sort of presence in 

the area with one system is preferable to having no presence.

Other developmental UAS might also be suitable 

for this mission. This could include the RQ-170 Sentinel, 

a leading-edge stealth system recently developed and still 

heavily classified. However, it seems difficult to imagine a 

vanguard stealth UAS system deployed for anti-smuggling 

ISR, at least as an unclassified operation. Another usable 

system for this mission could come from the Unmanned 

Figure 5. High-Altitude ISR Comparison for Single 24/7 Orbit 

Source: Air Force Total Ownership Cost per flight hour (2012)

Orbit Distance (nm)

2,000

1,800

1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

 800

 600

 400

 200

 0

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500

O&S Cost per Year per Orbit

Misawa–North Korea

South Korea–Taiwan

Guam–Taiwan

Guam–North Korea

Guam–Spratly Islands

Guam–Singapore

South Korea–DMZ

Above Base

Above Base (Zero nm):

$565M

$741M

$268M $291M $307M $334M $365M

$469M

$347M $376M $397M $431M $472M

$606M

$925M

$1,429M

$3,144M Unable to 

Perform Global Hawk Cost/Yr = $301M Mission

U-2 Cost/Yr = $383M

Global Hawk New CLS Cost/Yr = $233M

Global Hawk

Global Hawk–New CLS
8 dh No. 79 ctnsp.dodlive.mil

Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike 

(UCLASS) program, a U.S. Navy project to develop a 

carrier-launched UAS. For the mission parameters described 

herein, a carrier-launched UAS could be projected from a 

U.S. carrier group in the Mediterranean into the Black Sea. 

This would negate the need for a land base but likely would 

harm the system’s loiter time. Regardless, the UCLASS project has yet to release a winning design, and even then it could 

likely take several years to complete development and begin 

production. This underscores the viability of a Global Hawk– 

or Triton-based solution for the near term.

Conclusion

Strong information is crucial in a rapidly developing conflict and requires a cohesive ISR picture of 

the battlespace at every level of thinking—tactical, 

operational, and strategic—to ensure improved decisionmaking. Our suggested policy supports that ISR 

picture. Knowing what is moving through the Black 

Sea remains vital to the containment of further Russian 

PSYOPs, as well as to the security of U.S. allies, trading 

partners, and economic interests. Targeting Odessa (and 

the strategic Danube Delta) might also offer a means 

to apply more effective pressure on Russia and relieve 

some of our Allies’ concerns. Having another layer of 

redundancy, which simultaneously secures Allies and 

inexpensively projects American power, is a smart decision. This approach also benefits from its less escalatory 

and less threatening capabilities, both of which should 

be at the forefront of our considerations.

Notes

1 Michael Birnbaum and Karoun Demirjian, “Fighting Spreads in 

Eastern Ukraine after Rebel Rout,” Washington Post, February 20, 2015. 

2 Tomas Malmöf et al., “Economy, Energy and Sanctions,” in A 

Rude Awakening: Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine, 

ed. Niklas Granholm, Johannes Malminen, and Gudrun Persson 

(Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2014), 73–79; 

John Irish and Ingrid Melander, “France says Russia would face more 

sanctions if Mariupol attacked,” Reuters, February 20, 2015.

3 Christian Caryl, “Novorossiya Is Back from the Dead,” Foreign 

Policy, April 17, 2014.

4 Mykola Kapitonenko, “Resolving Post-Soviet ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Is Regional Integration Helpful?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1 (2009).

5 Alexander Smoltczyk, “Soviet Yearnings: Hopes Rise in Transnistria of a Russian Annexation,” Der Spiegel, April 24, 2014.

6 Ukrainian National Census of 2001, available at <http://2001.

ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/odesa/>.

7 Lada Roslycky, “Organized Transnational Crime in the Black 

Sea Region: A Geopolitical Dilemma?” Trends in Organized Crime 12, 

no. 1 (March 2009).

8 The city of Kaliningrad, which is part of the Russian state but 

is separated from the Russian mainland by Lithuania, Belarus, and 

Poland, is completely under Russian rule and jurisdiction.

9 Benjamin Bidder, “Dossier of Dubiousness: Did Putin’s Man in 

Crimea Have Mafia Ties?” Der Spiegel, March 25, 2014; Piotr Kosicki 

and Oksana Nesterenko, “Eastern Ukraine Has Been a Mafia State 

for Years. Can Kiev Break the Cycle of Violence?” New Republic, June 

5, 2014.

10 Jamie Dettmer, “The Mafia Ruling Ukraine’s Mobs,” The Daily 

Beast, March 23, 2014.

11 Scott Abel, “Rasmussen Calls for Russia ‘to Step Back from 

the Brink,’” Estonian Public Broadcasting, May 9, 2014.

12 Michael Shear and Peter Baker, “Obama Renewing U.S. 

Commitment to NATO Alliance,” New York Times, March 26, 2014.

13 The full text of the Montreux Convention is available at 

<http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreux_ENG.pdf>. 

14 Lolita Baldor, “Hagel Tours U.S. Navy Cruiser Deployed Off 

Romania,” Associated Press, June 5, 2014.

15 Radu Marinas, “Romania Calls for Greater U.S. Military Presence in Black Sea,” Reuters, May 1, 2014.

16 Northrop Grumman, “RQ-4 Block 30 Capabilities,” available 

at <www.northropgrumman.com>.

17 Email from Walt Kreitler, Northrop Grumman Director of 

International Programs, February 6, 2015.

18 Ibid.

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

(CTNSP) within the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

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