Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A05-1710-CR-2525| April 16, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark K. Leeman

Leeman Law Office and

Cass County Public Defender

Logansport, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Shawn Michael Perkinson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 16, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

09A05-1710-CR-2525

Appeal from the Cass Superior 

Court

The Honorable Richard A. 

Maughmer, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

09D02-1707-CM-579

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A05-1710-CR-2525| April 16, 2018 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Following a bench trial, Shawn Perkinson was convicted of criminal trespass 

and possession of a controlled substance, both Class A misdemeanors. 

Perkinson appeals his conviction of criminal trespass, raising one issue for our 

review: whether sufficient evidence supports his conviction. Concluding that 

the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for criminal trespass, we 

reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] Brittany Lambert rented a home in Logansport, Indiana, from Rudolpho 

Sanchez. In July of 2017, Lambert was evicted from the home by court order. 

The court order required Lambert to vacate the home by July 14.2 At some 

point prior to this date, Sanchez departed for Mexico and asked his son-in-law, 

John Quinones, to oversee the property while he was gone.

[3] On July 15, Quinones noticed the lights were on inside the home. Quinones 

entered the home, shut off the lights, closed the windows, and locked the doors. 

The next day, Quinones again noticed the lights were on inside the home and 

 

1 We held oral argument in this case on March 20, 2018, at Purdue University Northwest in Hammond, 

Indiana, in conjunction with the Lake County Bar Association. We thank the Lake County Bar Association, 

Purdue University Northwest, and its faculty, staff, and students for their hospitality and participation. We 

also commend counsel for their excellent oral advocacy.

2 The court order is not included in the record. John Quinones, Sanchez’s son-in-law, testified Lambert 

should have been out of the home by July 14. See Transcript, Volume 1 at 11. Officer Rozzi testified he 

believed the court order stated July 13. Id. at 15.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A05-1710-CR-2525| April 16, 2018 Page 3 of 6

the door and window were open. Quinones immediately called the police. 

Shortly thereafter, Officer Christopher Rozzi of the Logansport Police 

Department arrived at the residence and Quinones showed him the court order 

evicting Lambert.

[4] Upon entry into the home, Officer Rozzi found Perkinson asleep on a mattress 

in the living room. After waking Perkinson, Officer Rozzi placed him in 

handcuffs and began to question him. Perkinson told Officer Rozzi that 

“Brittany and . . . her boyfriend, Jesus, said that he could stay there to watch 

the residence.” Tr., Vol. 1 at 16. Perkinson also stated he “had no idea” 

Lambert had been evicted from the home. Id. at 18. Officer Rozzi then 

conducted a pat down of Perkinson and discovered twelve Clonazepam pills in 

a bag in Perkinson’s pocket. Officer Rozzi and Quinones never determined 

how Perkinson accessed the home, but Officer Rozzi noted there was no 

damage caused by Perkinson.

[5] The State charged Perkinson with criminal trespass and possession of a 

controlled substance, both Class A misdemeanors. On the morning of trial, 

Perkinson attempted to plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance in 

exchange for the State’s dismissal of the criminal trespass charge, but the parties 

failed to establish a factual basis to the trial court’s satisfaction. The trial court 

then immediately conducted a bench trial at which Quinones and Officer Rozzi 

testified for the State. The trial court found Perkinson guilty as charged and 

sentenced him to concurrent sentences of seventy days in the county jail on 

each count. Perkinson now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[6] In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh 

the evidence or judge witness credibility. Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878, 882 

(Ind. 2017). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 

supporting the verdict and will affirm a conviction if there is probative evidence 

from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence is sufficient if an inference may 

reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 

130, 133 (Ind. 2016). We will reverse if, after considering all the evidence, the 

evidence is insufficient to prove any element of the crime. Brown v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 464, 470 (Ind. 2007).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[7] The State charged Perkinson with criminal trespass under Indiana Code section 

35-43-2-2(b)(1). That section, in relevant part, provides,

(b) A person who:

(1) not having a contractual interest in the property, 

knowingly or intentionally enters the real property of 

another person after having been denied entry by the other 

person or that person’s agent;

* * *

commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.

* * *
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(c) A person has been denied entry under subsection (b)(1) 

when the person has been denied entry by means of:

(1) personal communication, oral or written;

(2) posting or exhibiting a notice at the main entrance in a 

manner that is either prescribed by law or likely to come to 

the attention of the public; or 

(3) a hearing authority or court order under IC 32-30-6 

[nuisance actions], IC 32-30-7 [indecent nuisance actions], 

IC 32-30-8 [drug nuisance actions], IC 36-7-9 [unsafe 

building law], or IC 36-7-36 [abatement of vacant 

structures and abandoned structures].

Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2. A person acts “‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the 

conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-

41-2-2(b). As such, there is no criminal trespass if a person has a fair and 

reasonable foundation for believing he has a right to be present on the property. 

Blair v. State, 62 N.E.3d 424, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[8] The record is absent of any evidence that Perkinson had knowledge of 

Lambert’s eviction or was otherwise “denied entry” by the landowner, Sanchez, 

or his agent, Quinones. As defined in the statute, a person is “denied entry” 

when they have been prohibited from entering the premises by personal 

communication, oral or written; posting or exhibiting a notice at the entrance; 

or by a hearing authority or court order. The State does not allege Perkinson 

received notice pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(c)(2) or (3), nor do 

these facts present a basis for such an argument. Moreover, the record does not 

support the fact that Perkinson was denied entry by either oral or written 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A05-1710-CR-2525| April 16, 2018 Page 6 of 6

personal communication. Neither Lambert nor Sanchez testified at trial and 

Quinones stated he had “[n]ever” seen or met Perkinson before. Tr., Vol. 1 at 

13. Even if the trial court simply did not believe Perkinson’s testimony that 

Lambert told him he could stay in the house, there is no evidence in the record 

from which a trier of fact could reasonably infer Perkinson had previously been 

denied entry to the home or had knowledge that Lambert had been evicted. 

Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to support Perkinson’s conviction of 

criminal trespass.

Conclusion

[9] The evidence is insufficient to support Perkinson’s conviction for criminal 

trespass and his conviction is therefore reversed. Accordingly, this case is 

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[10] Reversed and remanded.

Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.