J-A19022-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

KIMBERLY GADD

v.

TERENCE GADD, 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 410 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2014-18499, 

PASCES 454114597

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J. FILED OCTOBER 12, 2017

Appellant, Terence Gadd, appeals pro se from the January 25, 2017 

Support Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery 

County, which ordered Husband to pay child support and alimony to 

Appellee, Kimberly Gadd. Upon careful review, we affirm.

The relevant factual and procedural history, as gleaned from the trial 

court’s 1925(a) Opinion, is as follows. Appellant and Appellee are currently 

divorced and share joint physical and legal custody of a six-year-old child. 

On November 12, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay Appellee 

$443.63 per month in child support and $735.00 per month in alimony 

pendente lite. On August 31, 2015, the parties executed a property 

settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) wherein Appellant agreed 

to pay Appellee $400.00 per month in non-modifiable alimony beginning in 
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September 2015 and continuing for twenty-four payments. Additionally, 

Appellant agreed to continue to pay Appellee monthly child support as 

calculated by the Montgomery County Domestic Relations Office. On 

September 28, 2015, the trial court issued a Divorce Decree and attached 

the Settlement Agreement. 

On January 4, 2016, Appellant filed a Petition to Modify Order of 

Support due to a reduction in his income. On February 25, 2016, after a 

hearing, the Support Master issued a recommendation for a support order 

that required Appellant to pay Appellee $443.94 per month in child support 

and $400 per month in alimony. In response, on February 26, 2016, 

Appellant filed exceptions to the Master’s recommendation. On August 3, 

2016, Appellee filed her own Petition for Modification of Support. 

On November 4, 2016, after a protracted support hearing, the trial 

court issued a Support Order, which ordered Appellant to pay monthly 

alimony and child support to Appellee. The trial court calculated three 

different child support amounts for three separate time periods in 2016 

based on Appellee’s changing employment and income status, and 

determined the amount of monthly alimony based on the parties’ Divorce 

Decree and Settlement Agreement.1 On November 18, 2016, Appellant filed 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court ordered Appellant to pay $400 per month in alimony. The 

trial court calculated a child support amount of $424.00 per month from 

January 4, 2016 to January 15, 2016, $446.00 per month from January 16, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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a Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court granted on November 30, 

2016. On January 24, 2017, after review, the trial court denied Appellant’s 

Motion for Reconsideration. 

Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following five issues on appeal:

1. When a complaint in support is filed with the Court, is 

[Appellant] as obligor required to pay support pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16 (all parts) and that any deviations to the 

amount of support shall also be consistent with said rule?

2. Is Due Process a legal right that is owed to [Appellant] by the 

[c]ourt and that a [c]ourt must respect all applicable rights owed 

to said [Appellant], and is it true that when a [c]ourt harms a 

person without following the exact course of the law, this 

constitutes a Due Process Violation?

3. Is it true that an act of judicial Abuse of Discretion occurs when 

the [t]rial [c]ourt [j]udge acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable 

way that results in unfairly denying a person an important right 

or causes an unjust result?

4. Is it true that an act of Manifest Abuse of Discretion occurs when 

the [t]rial [c]ourt [j]udge’s decision is clearly exercised with 

improvidence or with thoughtlessness and without due 

consideration, and that such injustice can clearly be shown that 

the decision is obviously or shocking to the conscience and refers 

to unfairness that is direct, obvious, and observable?

5. Is it true that a [t]rial [c]ourt [j]udge commits an Error in Law 

when the [j]udge has made a decision that was derived from 

purported facts that were misunderstood or not determined?

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

2016 to May 28, 2016, and $445.00 per month from May 29, 2016 forward. 

The trial court then reduced the total amount of support by $60.29 per 

month to account for Appellant providing medical insurance. 
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Appellant’s Brief at 9-10 (emphasis omitted).

We review support matters for an abuse of discretion. Christianson 

v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). “A support order will not be disturbed 

on appeal unless the trial court failed to consider properly the requirements 

of the Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Actions for Support, 

Pa.R.C.P.1910.1 et seq., or abused its discretion in applying these Rules.” 

Id. at 634 (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error 

of judgment. Kimock v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 854 (Pa. Super. 2012). “[I]f 

in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill will, then discretion has been abused.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

In his first issue on appeal, Appellant avers that the trial court was 

obligated to grant support pursuant to the Pennsylvania Support Guidelines 

(“Support Guidelines”), and the trial court abused its discretion when it 

deviated from the Support Guidelines and did not comply with Pa.R.C.P. 

1910.16-5 by specifying the reasons for deviation in writing or on the 

record. Appellant’s Brief at 9, 17. This issue lacks merit.

In support cases, “there is a rebuttable presumption that the amount 

of an award for support which results from the application of the Support 

Guidelines is correct.” Landis v. Landis, 691 A.2d 939, 941 (Pa. Super. 

1997) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, “where the facts demonstrate that 
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this award is unjust or inappropriate, the trier of fact has the discretion to 

rebut that presumption and deviate from the guidelines.” Id. at 941 

(citations omitted). Rule 1910.16-5 provides, in pertinent part, “[i]f the 

amount of support deviates from the amount of support determined by the 

guidelines, the trier of fact shall specify, in writing or on the record, the 

guideline amount of support, and the reasons for, and findings of fact 

justifying, the amount of the deviation.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-5(a).

In its Support Order, the trial court calculated three separate monthly 

child support amounts pursuant to the Support Guidelines and based on 

Appellee’s changing employment and income status. The trial court also 

ordered Appellant to pay Appellee “$400.00 per month alimony pursuant to 

the parties’ September 1, 2015 agreement (docketed with the Court on 

September 10, 2015).” Order, 11/4/16. The trial court then deviated from 

those amounts, reducing the amount that Appellant had to pay because 

Appellant provided medical insurance. The trial court issued a written Order 

that added together the child support amount and alimony amount for three 

separate time periods, “Less $60.29 per month for medical insurance 

provided by [Appellant].” Order, 11/4/16. The trial court specified in 

writing the reasons for the deviation in compliance with Rule 1910.16-5 and, 

thus, we find no error. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(a).

A review of the record reveals that Appellant did not raise his

remaining four issues in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) Statement of Errors 
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Complained of on Appeal. It is well settled that when an appellant files a 

Rule 1925(b) Statement, any issues not raised in that Statement are waived 

on appeal. Dietrich v. Dietrich, 923 A.2d 461, 463 (Pa. Super. 2007). We 

acknowledge that Appellant is proceeding pro se in this appeal. While this 

Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se appellant, pro 

se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. Commonwealth v. 

Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005). Hence, Appellant’s pro se

status does not relieve Appellant of his duty to properly raise and develop 

his appealable claims. Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159 (Pa. Super. 

1996). Accordingly, we find Appellant’s remaining issues to be waived.2 

See Dietrich, supra. 

Order affirmed. 

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2 We further note that in the Argument section of his Brief, Appellant fails to 

comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119. He fails to ensure that the argument is “divided 

into as many parts as there are questions to be argued.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a),

(c). Appellant provides some citations of authorities but fails to engage in 

meaningful discussion or analysis of any authority that he cites. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(d). The argument section consists of disorganized 

thoughts and references to the record, and Appellant fails to apply the 

relevant legal principles to the facts. Appellant’s failure to develop these 

issues prevents this Court from conducting meaningful appellate review, and 

provides an additional reason for this Court to conclude that these issues are 

waived. See Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 371-372 (stating 

that failure to develop an issue in appellate brief results in waiver of that 

issue); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119. 

 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/12/2017