TAILORED DETERRENCE

Influencing States and Groups of Concern

Edited by 

Barry R. Schneider

and

Patrick D. Ellis

USAF Counterproliferation Center

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 

May 2011 
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, 

Department of Defense, U.S. Air Force, or the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center.

ISBN 978-0-9747403-8-6 
iii

Contents

Disclaimer .............................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................. v 

Abbreviations...............................................................................vii

 

1 New Thinking on Deterrence

Dr. Barry Schneider and Mr. Patrick Ellis.......................................1 

Part One - Deterring State and Non-State Actors: Case Studies

2 Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries: A Key 

Requirement for Tailored Deterrence

Dr. Jerrold Post........................................................................................10 

3 Tailoring U.S. Strategic Deterrence Effects on Russia

Mr. Franklin Miller.................................................................40 

4 Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait

Dr. Douglas McCready..................................................................58

5 Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use 

Mr. Gregory F. 

Giles.........................................................................................117 

6 Deterring North Korea from Employment of WMD in Future 

Korean Conflicts and Crises 

Dr. Bruce Bennett........................................................................152 

7 Deterrence & Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the 1990-1991 Gulf War 

Dr. Barry Schneider.....................................................................191 

8 Influencing Terrorists’ Acquisition and Use of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction – Exploring a Possible Strategy

Dr. Lewis Dunn..........................................................................247
iv

Part Two - Deterrence Issues and Challenges: A Topical Approach

9 U.S. Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?

Mr. David Trachtenberg...............................................................265 

10 Deterrence Issues in a World of Very Few or Zero Nuclear Weapons 

Dr. Barry Blechman.....................................................................299 

11 Deterrence, the Triad, and Possible Dyads 

Mr. Kurt Guthe...........................................................................317

12 The Role of Strategic Communications in Deterrence: 

Lesson from History 

Mr. Richard Estes........................................................................347 

13 A Nation’s Resilience as a Deterrence Factor 

Mr. Patrick D. Ellis..............................................................372

14 Summary and Conclusions

Dr. Barry Schneider and Mr. Patrick Ellis...................................408

 

Contributors..............................................................................436 
v 

Acknowledgements

We thank Bonita Harris and Christy Truitt for their great work in 

processing and copy editing support in creating this book, and the 

contractor team at Northrop Grumman led by Michelle Spencer for 

securing access to seven of the key contributors of this volume. Thanks 

also go to Susan Fair, illustrator for the Air Force Research Institute, for 

the wonderful book cover, and to Technical Sergeant Wesley Powell for 

helping to coordinate the publishing of this book. Finally, we want to 

thank Headquarters Air Force, Office of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 

Integration, HQAF/A10, for their funding and support of this project. 
vi 
vii 

ABBREVIATIONS

ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missiles

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense 

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear 

CBW Chemical And Biological Weapons 

CD Civil Defense 

CENTCOM Central Command 

CEP Circular Error Probable

CIKR Critical Infrastructure And Key Resources

DCA Dual-Capable Aircraft

DIME Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military and Economic 

DMZ Demilitarized Zone 

DPRK Democratic Peoples’ Republic Of Korea

EMT Equivalent Megatons

EXCOMM Executive Committee

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces Of Colombia 

GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile

GNP Gross National Product

HML Hardened Mobile Launchers

HEU Highly Enriched Uranium 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IHO International Humanitarian Organizations

INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 

IRGC-QF IRGC Qods Force

IW Information Warfare 

JOC Joint Operating Concept 

KT Kiloton 

LTTE Liberation Tigers Of Tamil Eelam 

MAD Mutual Assured Destruction

MAK Maktab Al-Khidamat

MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle 
vii

NCA Nuclear Command Authority 

NIAC National Infrastructure Advisory Council 

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NPT Nonproliferation Treaty 

NSS National Security Strategy 

PAL Permissive Action Link 

PGM Precision Guided Munitions 

PNI Presidential Nuclear Initiative 

P.R.C. People’s Republic Of China 

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

ROK Republic Of Korea

SALT Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 

SDV Strategic Delivery Vehicles 

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan

SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SOF Special Operations Forces 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine

START Strategic Arms Reductions Talks 

TLAM-N Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear 

TRA Taiwan Relations Act 

UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles

UNSCR UN Security Council Resolution 

USEUCOM U.S. European Command

WMD Weapons Of Mass Destruction
9 
CHAPTER 1

New Thinking on Deterrence

Barry Schneider and Patrick Ellis

Deterrence thinking has evolved from the Cold War to the present. 

During the period from 1945-1991 when the United States sought to deter 

attacks by the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact, U.S. nuclear forces were fielded 

primarily to prevent nuclear war or escalation of war. However, with the 

breakup of the Soviet Union, as an immediate threat to the United States, 

and the rise of lesser nuclear states proliferating nuclear technologies, 

deterrence is once again reexamined for newer solutions. 

During the Cold War, deterrence strategy evolved over time as 

officials and defense strategists thought through the changes brought by 

nuclear weapons. Clearly after 1945, warfare had a new component. 

Long-range airpower gave states an intercontinental reach. The first Abombs had an explosive power a thousand times more powerful than an 

equivalent weight of high explosive bombs like TNT. When 

thermonuclear weapons were created half a decade later, they, in turn, 

were a thousand times more powerful per unit weight than the A-bombs 

that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

So in a period of four or five years, bomb explosive yields per unit 

weight increased a thousand times a thousand. This combination of longrange delivery vehicles coupled with warheads or bombs a million times 

more powerful than their World War II conventional counterparts led to a 

revolution in the way wars might be fought in the future if such weapons 

were employed. 

In the nuclear era the homelands of the United States and other 

great powers are vulnerable to attack within a very short time. Everyone 

was now “at the front.” The two great oceans had historically protected 

America, but now everyone was in the cross-hairs. There was no longer 

any delay in receiving or delivering absolutely devastating blows that 

could threaten the existence of a nation. A central nuclear war could start 

and be essentially over in a day. Indeed, nuclear weapons and long-range 
 

Schneider and Ellis 

________________________________________________________________

2 

delivery opened up the possibilities that the populations and societies of a 

country might be destroyed even before their military forces were fully 

defeated – in just a few short minutes or hours. 

Classic Cold War Deterrence

Because strategic defenses lagged so far behind bomber and 

missile-offensive forces, the United States came to embrace a Cold War 

deterrence strategy dependent upon several key elements including: 

• Maintaining a retaliatory capability that could inflict what an 

adversary would clearly believe to be an unacceptable level of 

damage to their own country and regime. 

• Having a “second-strike force” capable of such retaliatory power, 

even after the United States was attacked first in a surprise attack.

• Having the will to use such overwhelming force in retaliation, or, 

if necessary, in a first strike if war had begun and appeared 

heading toward Armageddon. 

• Being able to clearly communicate the U.S. had such a retaliatory 

capability and the will to use it. 

• Having a rational adversary that values its own leader and 

population survival, national power and key assets more than being 

able to inflict losses on the United States.

• Having the capability to identify the origins of any nuclear attack 

on the United States in a timely way, so as to remove doubt about 

the target of a U.S. retaliatory strike.

• Being able to hold at risk, locate and identify those assets that a 

rival leadership most values. 

As long as these conditions held true, the U.S. leadership believed 

it could deter a Soviet attack on the United States and its declared allies. 

Even so, there were tense times when a wrong move might have triggered 

a nuclear war. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is often cited as the event 

when we came closest to nuclear war with the U.S.S.R. and its allies.
 

Schneider and Ellis 

________________________________________________________________

3 

Since the overthrow of the Communist Party in all eight past 

Warsaw Pact countries and 15 Soviet republics, a whole new set of 

nuclear rogue state and terrorist aspirants and powers have emerged on the 

world scene, each presenting their own unique threat and profile. Even 

Iraq, at one point before 1991, had a robust program to acquire nuclear 

weapons. Fortunately, this program was snuffed out by subsequent 

inspections and destruction of their capability. 

For the most part, every country that embarks on nuclear weapons 

procurement presents dynamic challenges since there is no cookie cutter 

approach to deter any of them. North Korea, a rogue totalitarian state run 

by Kim Jong Il and a small group of family members presents its own 

unique set of problems. Other distinct problems are presented by Iran 

where the Ayatollah Khamene’i rules the Islamic Republic, a theocracy 

that is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world, and whose brand 

of Islamic revolution threatens everyone else in the region. Still another 

threat is posed by Syria, a state that appears to have collaborated with 

North Korea in pursuit of a nuclear weapon. 

Rollbacks have averted some nuclear threats in Belarus, 

Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa. Further, pressure or regime 

changes have terminated or temporarily blocked nuclear weapons research 

program in Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Argentina, Romania and 

Brazil. Further, a nuclear Libya was narrowly averted by adroit U.S. 

negotiation with the regime of Muammar Qadhaffi, assisted by the 

interception of a shipment of A.Q. Khan black-market centrifuges bound 

for Libya. 

And, alas, somewhere in the world, the al-Qaeda leaders still hide 

and still plot attacks on the “far enemy.” They say they aspire to attack 

and are authorized to kill up to four million Americans using, if necessary, 

weapons of mass destruction. They are known to have sought nuclear, 

biological and chemical weapons, so far without result. At present, they 

have no known return address to retaliate against if they succeeded in 

acquiring and using a nuclear weapon. Such opponents may prefer 

martyrdom and “paradise” if they could strike a devastating nuclear blow 

against their declared enemy in the West.

Pakistan and India are recent entrants into the nuclear weapons 

state club. Still other states may start or re-start their nuclear weapons 
 

Schneider and Ellis 

________________________________________________________________

4 

programs if the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs are allowed to 

proceed unchecked. 

The many new actors in the nuclear weapons arena mean that 

persons of very different cultures, languages, experiences, strategic 

situations and intentions must be deterred from using the ultimate weapon. 

This fact argues for a second approach to nuclear deterrence, namely 

tailored deterrence. Building on the deterrence elements of the Cold War 

and those assumptions, it can be argued that each regime, each leadership 

and each national situation is somewhat unique and therefore requires an 

approach to deterrence uniquely tailored to achieve maximum effect on 

that particular group of decision-makers. 

Tailored Deterrence of New Actors

Tailored deterrence is, in the words of Dr. Jerrold Post, an actorspecific set of deterrence capabilities designed to influence a specific 

leader or leader’s group.

Deterrence strategy may be tailored to the actors to be deterred, the 

capabilities needed to execute this strategy, and to the points in ongoing 

scenarios where there are opportunities to deter the adversary.1

This book looks at all three. We look at tailoring a deterrence 

strategy to Russia, North Korea, Iran and al-Qaeda. We discuss specific 

capabilities necessary to enhance deterrence like good strategic 

communications, attribution capability and programs to improve public 

resilience. In addition, we explore unfolding scenarios to look at decision 

points for deterring a conflict or escalation of a conflict such as in the 

example of the 1990-1991 Gulf War when Saddam Hussein’s forces 

invaded Kuwait. 

 

To increase the possibility of influence requires a full 

understanding of the enemy or potential enemy, and act accordingly. This 

means that one will have to develop an understanding of: 

• Who in the regime is in charge of what kinds of national security 

decisions? 

• Adversary decision-maker personalities, tendencies, views and 

experiences.
 

Schneider and Ellis 

________________________________________________________________

5 

• Opponent leadership value hierarchy.

• Rival perceptions and knowledge of the situation, stakes and views 

of the U.S.’s willingness to use force in the scenario.

• The rival leadership’s commitment to achieving particular 

 outcomes in a given crisis or conflict. 

• Past regime security decisions, decision processes and standard 

operating procedures. 

• Regime behavior in past conflicts, crises and exercises.

• Regime history, strategic situation and strategic culture of the state.

• Regime military leaders, their unit capabilities, military doctrine 

and strategy.

• Regime internal and external allies, opponents and publics. 

• Regime strengths: leaders, diplomatic, intelligence, military and 

economic.

• Regime weaknesses: leadership splits; any diplomatic, intelligence, 

military and economic (DIME) flaws; and their international rivals 

and borders. 

Scenario Dependent Deterrence

In addition to these two views of what goes into effective 

deterrence, classic Cold War deterrence and tailored deterrence of a 

regime, it is important to mention the importance of context. Decisionmakers can act very differently in different scenarios. These diverse 

scenarios give context to discussions about deterrence. Potential 

flashpoint scenarios must be anticipated and thought through ahead of 

time. This may allow the U.S. to take actions and communicate clearly in 

a timely way before events take on a life of their own. Just as a winning 

chess strategy requires the correct sequencing of moves to achieve a 

checkmate, the same is true of crisis and conflict decisions. Thinking 

through potential scenarios is an international chess match to be 

undertaken before the events take place so correct moves can be taken to 

prevent disastrous surprises and defeats. As the proverb says, an ounce of 

prevention is worth a pound of cure. Correct sequencing of moves can

bolster deterrence, and scenario analysis may help inform such moves. 
 

Schneider and Ellis 

________________________________________________________________

6 

Tailoring Deterrence

This book was written with senior United States government 

leadership and decision-makers in mind as a key audience. It is meant to 

help them analyze the best means of deterring future conflicts with state 

and non-state adversaries in the 21st century. The central focus is on actorspecific tailored deterrence that influences force postures, communications

and actions based on contextual and scenario considerations. Any top 

government decision-makers who formulate policy and strategy to counter 

nuclear and other WMD threats should read it. In addition, this volume 

would be instructive to interested national security experts, military 

officers and informed citizens. 

This book addresses this series of deterrence questions: 

• Why is it important to develop an actor-specific approach to 

deterrence of adversaries? Does one standard deterrence formula 

fit all adversaries and situations? Or must we craft a unique 

deterrence approach to each potential adversary? 

• How do you deter a peer competitor like Russia, the only other 

nuclear superpower on the planet, and what is different about 

deterring Russian adventurism than any other state?

• How can we deter Iran, the leading state sponsor of terrorism in

the world, after it achieves a nuclear weapons capability? 

• Similarly, how can we influence North Korea’s leaders to avoid 

war and spreading nuclear weapons to others now that they are a 

nuclear weapons state?

• What kind of extended deterrence policy is in the United States 

interest, and how much nuclear capability do we need to make an 

extended deterrent credible and capable?

• How can we deter non-state actors with no return address from 

using nuclear or other WMD weapons against us and our allies? 
 

Schneider and Ellis 

________________________________________________________________

7 

How can we influence a terrorist leader’s WMD acquisition and 

use calculus?

• How might the United States have better deterred the Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait in 1990? To what degree did deterrence play 

in the decisions of both sides of the 1990-91 Gulf War as it 

unfolded? 

• Why might the demonstrably weaker side sometimes attack much 

stronger opponents as has happened often in history? Why did or 

might deterrence fail in such cases of the weak attacking the 

strong? 

• How might deterrence succeed or fail in a future Taiwan crisis that 

pits the People’s Republic of China against the Taiwan 

government supported by the United States? What might be the 

role of asymmetric interests and asymmetric military power?

• How might deterrence work or fail to work during future crises in a 

world of zero nuclear weapons? Would the removal of nuclear 

weapons leads to a greater likelihood of conventional war? 

• What United States strategic nuclear force structure will represent 

the strongest deterrent to war as deeper cuts are made by 

negotiated arms control treaties? Is a triad superior to either an 

ICBM-SLBM or Bomber-SLBM dyad? What are the deterrence 

tradeoffs?

• What is the role of strategic communications in transmitting our 

capability and will to potential adversaries and allies dependent on 

the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent? How can strategic 

communications be improved? 

• Can the U.S. and allied publics be organized, trained and equipped 

to bounce back after a WMD attack and can the increased 

resiliency improve deterrence of adversary attacks? How might 

resilience be improved?

• What is the importance of being able to identify in a quick and sure 

way the identity of an adversary that has struck the United States 

with a weapon of mass destruction? What impact can possessing a 

known nuclear attribution capability have in deterring such state 

and terrorist attacks on the United States?
 

Schneider and Ellis 

________________________________________________________________

8 

It has been said if one wishes to keep the peace, prepare for war. 

Part of that preparation is to tailor the retaliatory threat to the specific 

potential enemy in such a way you maximize your influence on their 

decisions in all likely scenarios. This will require tailored deterrence that 

builds upon the elements of Cold War deterrence strategy and thinking 

through deterrence opportunities in future scenarios. 

Notes
 Schneider and Ellis 

________________________________________________________________

9 

 

1 See Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence be Tailored?” Strategic Forum No. 225, (January 2007), Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Also, see Karl-Heinz Kamp and David S. Yost, NATO and 21st

Century Deterrence, (Rome: NATO Defense College, May 2009), 11-58.
CHAPTER 2 

Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries: A Key

Requirement for Tailored Deterrence

Jerrold M. Post, M.D1

Deterrence theory makes assumptions about the nature of the 

adversary. Explicitly, or more often implicitly, how the adversary reasons 

and reacts to the prospect of violence as it considers pursuing a particular 

path is at the heart of deterrence theory. Thus the concept of deterrence is 

“primarily a psychological phenomenon, involving as it does calculations 

of the behavioral dispositions of an adversary state. In this sense, a 

complete understanding of the nation’s security cannot be based solely on 

estimations of its military capability.”2

Observing that deterrence theory is a sub-set of theories of rational 

choice, Janice Gross Stein characterizes deterrence as seeking “to prevent 

undesired action by convincing the party who may be contemplating such 

action that its cost will exceed any possible gain.” She has emphasized 

there is no single theory of deterrence.

 

3

 In reviewing the literature of 

deterrence, she observes that the first wave of deterrence theories, by 

scholars such as Schelling, were for the most part deductive in nature.4

As observed by Keith Payne in his trenchant critique of deterrence 

theory, “the leaders are assumed to be rational and willing to engage in 

cost-benefit calculations when making policy decisions.”

 It 

emphasized the credibility of threats and commitments. 

5 In her edited 

book, Psychological Dimensions of War, in a chapter on “Dilemmas of 

Deterrence: Rational and Irrational Perspectives,” Glad has critiqued 

models of deterrence deriving from game theory, observing that “one 

assumes a certain rationality in both of the adversaries.”6

But that assumption of rationality, as Keith Payne emphasizes, also 

assumes shared values and understandings. In his analysis of 20th century 

history, the political psychologist Ralph White coined the phrase “mirror 

imaging” to refer to the pre-war period leading up to conflicts, where each 

 She then 

discusses multiple examples of misperceptions of adversary motivations. 
 Post

 

11

side resembled the other in its aggressiveness and in justifying the 

primarily defensive motivation of its own aggressiveness. He sees this as

war-promoting motivation. He especially emphasizes the role of false 

attribution of motivations to escalating spirals of conflict.7

The underlying assumption of deterrence during the Cold War was 

indeed the rationality of the adversaries. Surely the Soviet leaders would 

not be so irrational as to risk assured destruction, strategists in the West 

reasoned. Surely, the United States leaders would not be so irrational as to 

risk assured destruction, reasoned the Soviet Union counterparts. Hence, 

Mutual Assured Destruction, suitably characterized by the acronym MAD, 

was the governing doctrine. But, proponents of MAD theory will note it 

worked. Whether the fact there were no nuclear conflicts during the Cold 

War era was a consequence of MAD doctrine is, however, a dubious, and 

ultimately improvable, proposition. For leaders are flesh and blood, and 

fall prey to the gamut of human emotions — pride, over-optimism, fear, 

insecurity — as the rest of us. And, as emphasized by Graham Allison in 

his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Essence of Decision, a hazard of 

the rational national actor level of analysis is it forecloses the ability to 

incorporate into analysis the impact of bureaucratic politics, what he 

termed the Organizational Process Model. Nor did it take into account the 

Governmental Politics Model which reflects the factional strivings and 

palace politics among leaders striving for influence.8

One of the puzzling aspects of the discovery of possible offensive 

missiles in Cuba by U-2 photography to the Executive Committee, 

President Kennedy’s small advisory group, was the apparent absence of 

attempts to camouflage the sites under construction. Surely, the 

reasoning went, if the Soviet Union attempted to install offensive missiles 

in Cuba to close the missile gap, they would wish to accomplish this by a 

fait accompli. And yet the sites were not camouflaged. Therefore, the 

reasoning went, perhaps these were not offensive missile sites after all, 

delaying the conclusion of the gravity of the posed threat. 

 

We now know from a series of meetings with Soviet interlocutors 

that gaining political-military advantage through a fait accompli was 

indeed the strategic goal of the Soviet politburo. But it turned the 

implementation of the decision over to the strategic rocket forces, which 

used the same standard operating procedure in establishing a missile site 

in Cuba that they had employed in the Warsaw Pact states. This 
 Post

 

12

conclusion required analysis at the level of bureaucratic politics and could 

not be discerned at the rational national actor level of analysis. 

But in fact, organizations don’t make decisions, policy-making 

groups do. Allison depicts the intense interplay among the participants in 

EXCOMM during the 13 days of the Cuban missile crisis. Three military 

options were under consideration: a surgical air strike, an invasion of Cuba 

and a military blockade. Demonstrating the power of analogy and 

framing, Attorney General Robert Kennedy framed the airstrike on the

missile bases as analogous to Pearl Harbor and indicated history would 

view his brother as the Tojo of the Western world if he carried out this 

sneak attack. That was enough for JFK, who already had his eye on the 

history books, to take this quite sensible option off the table. As they were 

debating between an invasion and a blockade, U.N. Ambassador Adlai 

Stevenson indicated that it was unwise to push the Soviet into a corner. 

Since the missiles in Turkey were considered outmoded and needed to be 

removed anyway, why not offer the Soviets a face-saving way out of the 

dilemma, and offer to remove U.S. offensive missiles in Turkey in return 

for the Soviets removing their offensive missiles from Cuba? After 

raising this suggestion, he excused himself to go to the rest room. After he 

departed, a hawkish member of the Joint Chiefs made a derisive comment

to the effect that Stevenson was a cowardly impotent old man. When he 

returned from the restroom, his idea had been discarded, and they were 

debating the merits of the two military options. 9

 This is a classic example 

of “groupthink” as described by Irving Janis, where the general served as a 

“mindguard,” making an ad hominem attack on the messenger, thus 

keeping his idea out of play.10 Such a maneuver contributes to the socalled “risky shift” phenomenon, wherein social psychologists have found 

that groups of individuals can make riskier decisions than those 

individuals would if making the decisions on their own.11

But in fact, ultimately, groups don’t make decisions, people do. 

And the retrospective analysis conducted by Sherman Kent, the father of 

national intelligence, of the intelligence failure during the Cuban missile 

crisis concerning the delay in understanding the gravity of the Soviet 

threat concluded insufficient attention was paid to the political 

personalities of the two principal actors, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel 

Castro, who were uncritically assumed to be rational. This is not to say 

they were viewed as irrational. Rather, the nature of Krushchev’s and 
 Post

 

13

Castro’s decision-making, especially their risk-taking propensities, was 

insufficiently taken into account. 

In fact, as Payne emphasizes, had Khrushchev followed the 

counsel of Castro and Che Gueverra, nuclear conflict might well have 

occurred with devastating consequences.12 Payne quotes James Blight 

who was one of the negotiators in the historic meetings between U.S. and 

Soviet participants involved in the Cuban missile crisis.13 Col. Viktor 

Semykin describes the Cuban leadership’s extreme urgings of the Soviets 

to carry out a missile attack and reported they seemed heedless of the 

consequences: “The Cubans really insisted we use our weapons. ‘Why 

else did you come here? Use your weapons. Fire.’ They were ready for 

war. Maybe they believed so strongly, they were ready to sacrifice 

themselves.” They would say, ‘Cuba will perish, but socialism will win.’ 

They were ready to sacrifice themselves.” Che Guevara in particular 

expressed his willingness to sacrifice himself and Cuba for the cause of 

socialism. “If the rockets had remained, we would have used them all and 

directed them against the heart of the United States, including New York, 

in our fight against aggression.” This “ultimate showdown” with the

United States, in his view, was “the final aim of Communism.”14

Reflecting a cooler disposition, and, as Payne notes, “a cost-benefit 

calculus more susceptible to deterrence threats,” Soviet Deputy Premier 

Anastas Mikoyan is quoted as replying, “We see your readiness to die 

beautifully, but we believe that it isn’t worth dying beautifully.” 

Khrushchev himself was to remark later, “At that time he [Castro] was a 

very hot-tempered person.... He failed to think through the obvious

consequences of a proposal that placed the planet on the brink of 

extinction.”

 

15

In discussions with Allison, I have observed that a fourth level of 

analysis is called for in that while his Governmental Politics Model does 

take individuals into account, it does so in the capacity as individuals, as 

rational actors, and as black boxes striving to maximize their interests. At 

this level, the individual is a coolly calculating Machiavellian. But this 

ignores the passions that drive men’s souls. It ignores jealousy, 

suspiciousness, vengefulness, hubris and the gamut of emotions that drive 

men’s actions. Thus, individual personalities and group dynamics both 

powerfully influence decisions. 
 Post

 

14

The goal of the above discussion is to cast doubt on the assumption 

of rationality that governed deterrence theory during the Cold War. Even 

then, by no means were decisions the consequence of coldly calculated 

cost-benefit analysis. And if that was the case even then, what of the postCold War environment? Surely a requirement for deterrence in the postCold War environment is a nuanced understanding of the adversary in his 

cultural and political context. Optimally, to deter an adversary requires 

nuanced understanding of the adversary’s psychology and decisionmaking. In his contribution to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing 

Deadly Conflict under the leadership of David Hamburg, Alexander 

George stressed in particular the need for accurate nuanced analysis of the 

adversary — what he called actor-specific behavioral models — as an 

indispensable requirement undergirding coercive diplomacy.16

This suggests that a required answer to the question posed by 

Elaine Bunn in her 2007 article in the Strategic Forum, “Can Deterrence 

Be Tailored?” is that it must be.

 The report 

stressed the critical role of leadership both in promoting deadly conflict 

and in avoiding it. 

17 Bunn identifies three facets of tailored 

deterrence: first tailoring to specific actors and specific situations; second 

tailoring capabilities; and third tailoring communications.18

The end of the Cold War has been destabilizing, producing not a 

“peace dividend,” but an unpredictable international climate in which 

major political crises have been produced by rogue leaders of outlaw 

nations. The relatively stable and predictable superpower rivalry has been 

supplanted by a series of regional conflicts often started by the actions of 

previously unknown or poorly understood leaders. Leaders of transnational terrorist organizations must be added to the list of dangerous 

adversaries. There has been a proliferation of destructive power in the 

hands of nations and trans-national organizations with hostile agendas 

toward the United States.

 

There is “no one size fits all” deterrence, and what deters one 

adversary can be an incitement for another. Recognizing this, the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, sets forth a concept of 

tailored deterrence with three classes of adversaries in mind: advanced 

military competitors, regional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) states, 

as well as non-state terrorist networks. It is interesting to observe the 2006 

date, which is fully 17 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and marked 
 Post

 

15

the end of the Cold War and the super-power rivalry. Yet the cold warrior 

mentality and attendant-deterrence strategy continued to dominate with a 

tendency to extrapolate uncritically deterrence theory established during 

the Cold War to new classes of adversaries. But to tailor deterrence to 

these new adversaries will in turn require a level of knowledge concerning 

the adversary which we often do not possess, and that is one of the 

dilemmas with which Bunn struggles in her essay; namely, we can never 

possess the degree of knowledge necessary to fully tailor deterrence to the 

adversary’s unique psychology. 

However, if we can never possess the full degree of knowledge of 

our adversaries’ psychology, decision-making, and strategic calculus 

necessary to tailor deterrence with confidence that our policies will be 

perceived and our communications received in the desired fashion, we 

certainly can and must improve in our ability to accurately construct actorspecific behavioral models. 

One of the first tasks is to define the locus of decision-making. 

Here the work of Hermann, Hermann and Hagan who have systematically 

studied how government makes decisions is particularly helpful.19

Earlier, White had observed that both Hitler and Mussolini were 

“one-man dictatorships, and also aberrant personalities of an extremely 

macho and narcissistic if not also paranoid type.” Observing that Stalin

with his morbid suspicion of the West was also paranoid, he contrasts the 

Stalin period with the post-Stalin period of the Cold War.

 They 

usefully distinguish among three types: first, the predominant leader, 

where a single individual has the power to make decisions and to stifle 

opposition; second, single group, a set of interacting individuals, all of 

whom are members of a single body, who have the ability to select a 

course of action and obtain compliance; and finally, multiple autonomous 

groups - the important actors are members of different groups or 

coalitions, no one of which has the ability by itself to decide or force 

compliance on the others and, no overarching body exists in which all the 

necessary parties are members. 

20 The former 

was a leader predominant society, whereas the latter more closely 

resembled a single-group leadership, which to some degree guarded 

against a dominant aberrant personality. Within the Politburo, to be sure, 

the chairman was first among equals, but was indeed constrained by the 

dynamics of the politburo. Consider, for example, during the Cuban 
 Post

 

16

missile crisis that Khrushchev was compelled to resign after the forced 

Soviet withdrawal and humiliation in the crisis. 

The balance of this chapter will focus on tailoring to specific 

actors, including trans-national terrorist organizations. The four examples 

chosen, Iraq, North Korea, Iran and al-Qaeda all were, or are of concern, 

with reference to weapons of mass destruction. This review of these four 

actor-specific behavioral models will also consider the importance of such 

models for coercive diplomacy. Several of the examples chosen will be 

from leader predominant states and will note the value of communications 

tailored to split the leader from his inner circle and/or followers. 

Saddam Hussein of Iraq: “Saddam is Iraq, Iraq is Saddam” 

 

Iraq under Saddam Hussein surely represents a leader predominant 

society, as reflected in the aphorism in the sub-head, “Saddam is Iraq; Iraq

is Saddam.” In the testimony I presented to the House Armed Services 

Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in December 1990, 

a month before the outbreak of conflict, I summarized a political 

personality profile of Saddam I had developed after the invasion of 

Kuwait, depicting him as a malignant narcissist.21

In contrast to the wide-spread caricatures of Saddam as “the 

madman of the Middle East,” closer analysis revealed him to be a rational 

calculator. He nevertheless often miscalculated because of his 

ethnocentric framework and because he was surrounded by a leadership 

circle composed of sycophants. For good reasons, they were reluctant to 

constructively criticize their leader, for to do so would result not only in 

losing their job, but could also lead to losing their life. Thus Saddam was 

in touch with reality psychologically, but could be out of touch politically 

because he was if he were only told what he wanted to hear rather than 

what he needed to hear. 

 Indeed in his own 

mind, Saddam and Iraq were one and the same. He viewed himself as one 

of history’s great leaders. He had a paranoid orientation, had no constraint 

of conscience, and was willing to pursue whatever aggression was 

necessary in pursuit of his goals. 

Having traced a pattern of reversals during his career, Saddam 

could reverse himself and withdraw from Kuwait, only if he came to 
 Post

 

17

believe that he could do so without losing face and that he would retain his 

power — a double contingency. But if backed into a corner, he could lash 

out. 

During the 1990-91 confrontation in the Gulf, President George H. 

W. Bush pounded on the table and said, “There will be no face saving.” 

Moreover, a U.S. general had leaked contingency plans to remove 

Saddam. So, neither of the two contingent requirements was met, and 

Saddam felt no choice but to hunker down and attempt to survive the 

initial massive air campaign which had been well announced, hoping to 

engage the coalition in a ground campaign. Saddam believed the U.S. 

suffered from a Vietnam complex and could not tolerate again the 

spectacle of America’s youth in body bags, which would lead to public 

protests. He believed given enough Iraqi resistance political impasse 

would result followed by a ceasefire. Thus Saddam also calculated he 

would win while losing by showing he had the courage to stand up to the 

mightiest military force on earth. Indeed, he held a press conference after 

five days of the massive air campaign, declaring victory. Since it had 

been predicted he could only withstand three days of aerial bombardment 

before crumbling, by holding out for five days he had already “won” and 

each additional day only further magnified the scope of his victory. The 

Mother of All Battles Mosque was erected to commemorate his great 

“victory.” Here the attempt to coerce him with the threat of the massive 

battle looming failed because it did not take into account his political 

psychology, in particular, his need to save face and be guaranteed he 

would remain in power.22

In the run-up to the second Gulf War, two themes dominated the 

debate. One concerned administration contentions that Saddam Hussein

and Osama bin Laden collaborated. The second involved the requirement 

to attack preemptively, lest Saddam Hussein provide nuclear weapons to 

terrorists. But careful analysis of political personalities of the principals 

would have cast serious doubt on both of these propositions. In the first 

place, there was considerable evidence that the committed Wahabi Sunni 

Muslim Osama bin Laden and the secular Saddam Hussein were bitter 

rivals, seeking support from the same constituency. Moreover, accepting 

the premise that Saddam was both a prudent decision-maker and risk 

averse, if he did have weapons of mass destruction, the likelihood he 

would give them to terrorists so they were out of his control was unlikely 

 
 Post

 

18

to the extreme, for the terrorists had no fixed address, whereas if the 

weapons were traced to him, he knew he would be incinerated. At a 

minimum, the conclusions springing from this level of analysis should 

have raised enough questions so as to prompt a Team B review. 

In the second Gulf war, the administration of President George W. 

Bush was concerned with the possibility Saddam would use WMD. In the 

fall of 2002, it made use of tailored communications delivered publicly, in 

what could be characterized as public diplomacy or information 

operations. First, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated the Iraqi 

generals had an important role to play in the reconstruction of their 

country Iraq. Of course, he went on, if they became involved in weapons 

of mass destruction, all bets were off. Two weeks later, President Bush 

indicated President Saddam might order the use of weapons of mass 

destruction. If he did so, Bush went on, the Iraqi generals would be well 

advised to disobey those orders. Even though Iraq was clearly a leader 

predominant society, Saddam nevertheless required the loyalty of his 

generals. This double-barreled salvo of public diplomacy was designed to 

drive a wedge between Saddam and the generals and convince them to 

look out for their own welfare. 

In the run-up to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq with 

intelligence revealing a massive buildup of Iraqi troops on the Kuwait 

border, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie was instructed to meet with 

Saddam Hussein. While she has been much criticized, the message she 

was instructed to deliver carefully avoided the threats of serious 

consequences should Iraq invade Kuwait. Referring to the massive 

deployment of troops in the South, she indicated she had received “an 

instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship — not confrontation —

regarding your intentions.”23

A subsequent profile characterized Saddam as a prudent decisionmaker, who indeed was not prone to taking unnecessary risks. It further 

 Later she continued, "We have no opinion 

on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary 

Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in 

the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America." When 

this became public, it was widely assumed this explicitly nonconfrontational language was taken as a go- ahead by Saddam, and in 

effect reassured him there would be no serious consequences for his 

planned invasion. 
 Post

 

19

emphasized he tended to see the world through Arab eyes and take 

threatening language as hyperbole. In terms of coercive diplomacy, this 

emphasizes the importance in delivering an unambiguous demarche of the 

gravity of the consequences should Saddam proceed with what seemed to 

be preparation for an invasion of Kuwait. 

Had Saddam already determined to go forward at that late hour? 

Perhaps. But as a prudent decision-maker who had often reversed himself 

in the service of “revolutionary pragmatism,” Saddam might well have 

had his attention focused by a clear confrontational demarche in which it 

was made clear that an invasion of Kuwait would be met with force and 

avoided the destructive conflict that followed. Instead he took the 

explicitly non-confrontational language, coupled with statements from the 

Department of State that there were no security commitments to Kuwait, 

as reassurance that there would be no negative consequences. 

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 

of Iran: Seeking Chaos?

Much of the provocative statements from Iran are from President 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It was Ahmadinejad on April10, 2010, who 

revealed Iran had a centrifuge that would process uranium six times faster 

than the earlier models. Then on April19, Iran announced it would build a 

new uranium enrichment plant, giving emphasis to the memorandum from 

Secretary of Defense Bob Gates that starkly asserted the U.S. “does not 

have an effective long-range policy for dealing with Iran’s steady progress 

toward nuclear capability.” 

Were he a predominant leader in the mode of Saddam Hussein of 

Iraq, there would be reason to be gravely concerned that Iran, under his 

leadership, as summarized in the following profile, was undeterrable. But, 

as Gregory Giles emphasizes in Chapter 5, “Deterring a Nuclear-Armed 

Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use,” Iran is assuredly not a 

predominant leader state. Indeed, the national security decision-making is 

a very complex calculus, with many balancing factions, and the most 

important leader, Supreme Leader Khamenei, carefully balances out the 

often contradictory factions. This political personality profile of President 

Ahmadinejad is presented both as a profile of one of the important leaders, 
 Post

 

20

certainly the most vocal, but most importantly, to emphasize the 

importance of carefully analyzing the nature of the leadership and its 

decision-making and the constraints on any single leader. 

Ahmadinejad’s father, Ahmad Saborjhian, was a business failure, 

both as a barber and as a grocer. His name, signifying he was in the rugweaving industry, suggested a peasant background. When he went to 

Teheran in the construction boom, he changed his name to Ahmadinejad, 

“from the race of Prophet Muhammad.” He sacrificed for his family, 

whose success would be his. 

Young Ahmadinejad was known as an intelligent, diligent and 

studious child. He was excluded from Koran classes because he was too 

young, but insisted he could read the Koran and demonstrated such. He 

was an excellent student, who boasted to his fellow students that he would 

be in the top 10 nationally in the Concours university exams. (150,000 

took the exam). He finished 132, which was in the top 1 percent, but this 

suggested a special sense of self.

Ahmadinejad started his university studies in civil engineering 

during the second half of the 1970s, a time of political turmoil in Iran. He 

was the founder of the Islamic Students Union and was involved in a 

radical anti-Shah student magazine. He was reportedly a member of the 

group that planned the takeover of the American embassy in Iran in

1979.24

Despite his cosmopolitan appearance and being at ease before 

international audiences, there is considerable evidence that Ahmadinejad 

is ideologically extreme. When Ayatollah Khomeini launched his human 

wave attacks of children, armed only with pink plastic keys to paradise 

around their necks, this terrifying tactic turned the corner in Iran-Iraq war. 

It was, according to some reports, Ahmadinejad that trained the children 

and purchased some 500,000 pink plastic keys from Taiwan.

 

25

His comments on Israel have been extremely provocative and 

raised deep concerns, especially in Israel which felt existentially 

threatened. He spoke of the inequity of “the way the elected Government 

of the Palestinian people is treated” compared to the “support of the 

Zionist regime.” In a conference in Teheran in October 2005 entitled 

“The World Without Zionism,” he stated, “the establishment of the Zionist 

regime was a move by the world oppressor against the Islamic world," and 
 Post

 

21

that the state of Israel was illegitimate. Referring to Ayatollah Khomeini, 

he stated, “as the Imam said, Israel must be wiped off the map.” 

Ahmadinejad’s statements concerning other nuclear powers have 

been equally provocative. Accusing them of using “the deadly weapons” 

as “instruments of coercion and threat against other peoples and 

governments,” he stated they “consider themselves as the masters and 

rulers of the entire world and other nations as only second class in the 

world order.” Between the provocative comments on Israel and his 

flaunting of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which includes for nuclear 

enrichment, he seems to be pushing for confrontation and seeking chaos. 

Why?

To answer this question requires an understanding of 

Ahmadinejad’s religious beliefs. There is a messianic tradition within 

Islam that believes the Mahdi (the “guided one”), who is a descendant of 

the prophet, will appear at a time of chaos just before judgment day and 

this will introduce a period of universal peace under the leadership of 

Shi’ite Muslims. The “Twelver” branch of Shia Islam refers to the 

Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, in lineal descent from the prophet, 

who is said to have gone into a state of “occultation” in 874 A.D. 

According to legend, he is not dead, but will reveal himself in a period of 

chaos for a battle in the final days.26

Ahmadinejad’s mentor is Ayatollah Yazdi, a committed 

“Twelvers” activist, a supporter of the clerical regime of Ayatollah 

Khomeini, and a supporter of his successor Supreme Leader Khamenei. 

Yazdi is considered the most conservative member of Khamenei’s inner 

circle. He is a member of the Council of Experts. It was Yazdi who 

persuaded the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah al-Khameini, to support 

Ahmadinejad’s presidential candidacy, a crucial political act that paved 

the way for his electoral victory election.

 Most “Twelvers” are quietists, 

waiting for the arrival of the hidden imam. But there is a group of 

Mahdists who are religious belligerents, seeking to precipitate the final 

days by promoting chaos, “Twelvers” activists. There is persuasive 

evidence that Ahmadinejad is an activist “Twelver.”

During his tenure as mayor of Teheran Ahmadinejad made major 

investments in preparing the infrastructure for the arrival of the Mahdi, 

which he informed an Iranian journalist would be in two years. After his 

surprise victory in the presidential election, he gave $17 million to the 
 Post

 

22

Jamkaran mosque, which houses the well from which “Twelvers” believe 

the Mahdi will emerge. In November 2005, he said publicly the main 

mission of the Islamic Republic was to bring about the reappearance of the 

Twelfth Iman. 

After the September 2005 address to U.N. General Assembly, he 

was caught on videotape telling a cleric that during the speech a halo 

appeared around his head on the podium. “I felt the atmosphere suddenly 

change. And for those 27 or 28 minutes, the leaders of the world did not 

blink...It seemed as if a hand was holding them there, and it opened their 

eyes to receive the message from the Islamic Republic.” 

So, if the apparent drive to develop a nuclear weapon and his calls 

to wipe Israel off the map seem designed to produce chaos, which may 

indeed be President Ahmadinejad’s goal as a committed “Twelver” 

Muslim, a Mahdist religious belligerent, who apparently believes actions 

that produce chaos can help hasten the arrival on earth of the messiah. 

This has major implications for deterrability. If Iran were a leader 

predominant state, one would have to conclude Iran was not deterrable. 

But in presenting this profile to the annual security conference in 

Herzlea, Israel, on a panel entitled “Can a Nuclear Iran be Deterred?” an 

important distinction was made. In contrast to President Saddam Hussein

of Iraq who assuredly ruled a leader-predominant state, despite being 

president, Ahmadinejad not only did not control the major resources of the 

state, in fact, he was not the main decision-maker. This was the role 

occupied by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who has ultimate 

authority. As the Supreme Leader it is he who: 

• determines the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

• has the power to declare war and peace and general troop

mobilization.

• resolves differences and regulate relations among the three 

branches of the government. 

• appoints and dismisses the:

o Members of the Council of Guardians 

o Head of the Judiciary 

o Director of radio and television networks 

o Chief of staff of the armed forces
 Post

 

23

o Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards 

o Commander-in-Chief of the military and security services.

But Khamenei too is not entirely free to act, as he is constrained by 

a complex web of decision-making bodies, including the Assembly of 

Experts, the Council of Guardians and the Council of Expediency. So 

Iran, in vivid contrast to Iraq under Saddam Hussein represented the third 

type of state described by Hermann, Hermann and Hagan, one that is 

directed by multiple autonomous leader groups, with no one group having 

the sole authority.27

Moreover, it is important to take into account that 70 percent of the 

Iranian population under 30 years of age yearn to join the modern world. 

In contrast to North Korea, Iran is fully “wired” and connected to global 

connections networks. This restive population is actively informed 

through the internet. As a consequence, the reins of theocratic control are

loosening. 

 So there is a complex matrix of competing forces, 

with pragmatists versus theocrats, and a Supreme Leader with ultimate 

authority and a President who is a religious conservative with a special 

sense of self, whose authority is constrained. 

Having a political personality profile of Ahmadinejad is necessary, 

but not sufficient in dealing with Iran as it pursues nuclear ambitions. A 

nuanced understanding of the complexities of Iranian decision-making, 

including profiles of the principal Iranian leaders and their complex 

interactions, is essential in attempting to influence Iran through coercive 

diplomacy. 

Kim Jong-Il of North Korea: In the 

Shadow of His Father

One cannot understand the personality and political behavior of 

Kim Jong-Il without placing it in the context of the life and charismatic 

leadership of his father, Kim Il-Sung, North Korea’s first leader. One of 

the difficulties in assessing the personality and political behavior of Kim 

Il-Sung has always been discerning the man behind the myth. The gap 

between the facts that scholars have been able to piece together and the 

hagiographic portrait presented to the people of North Korea is staggering. 
 Post

 

24

Kim Jong Il was raised to succeed his heroic, charismatic father, 

Kim Il Sung. But, the present North Korean leader is no guerrilla fighter 

or nation builder. He inherited his charismatic image and national 

ideology of Juche and reunification from his father. As director of the 

Bureau of Agitation and Propaganda, he played a major role both in 

creating the cult of personality surrounding his father, but also in creating 

the existing myth that he is the “Man from Mt. Paektu,” when in fact, he 

was raised in squalid circumstances under Soviet protection and is the boy 

from the U.S.S.R. 

The disparity from his father contributes to profound insecurity in 

his son: “majesty sits uncomfortably on his shoulders.” His father’s giant 

shadow always looms over him. Succeeding a powerful father is a 

challenge. Succeeding a father of god-like stature is psychologically 

impossible. In many ways he is trapped by his father’s ideology. 

Malignant Narcissism 

Kim Jong-Il’s personality also reflects, in his cultural context, 

malignant narcissism. His extreme grandiosity and self-absorption 

overlay extreme insecurity about stepping into his father’s god-like shoes. 

This insecurity is not just about his stature as a political leader, but also 

about his literal stature. Standing roughly 5 feet 2 inches tall, Kim Jong-I1 

reportedly has platform shoes custom built for him to enhance his height 

and weighs in around 175 pounds. Clearly his short stature is a longstanding issue for him; he reportedly was teased as a boy, called “Shorty.” 

Upon first meeting the South Korean actress Choe Un-hui, whom he had 

kidnapped to help develop a North Korean movie industry, Kim reportedly 

asked, “Well, Madame Choe, what do you think of my physique? Small 

as a midget’s droppings, aren’t I?”28

This long-standing insecurity leads him to be extremely sensitive 

to slights. He displays a lack of empathy for his own people, but this 

deficiency also leads him to not understand his adversaries. An aspect of 

his compensatory grandiosity is a tendency to be overly optimistic about 

himself and his nation and to underestimate his adversary. He has no 

constraint of conscience and has a paranoid orientation, and a tendency to 

find scapegoats when things do not go as he wishes. 

 His hair is worn in a flamboyant 

style adding the appearance of additional height. 
 Post

 

25

Hedonistic Life Style

Kim has an extremely hedonistic lifestyle, especially striking, 

given the stark poverty in which most of his countrymen live. He lives in 

a seven-story pleasure palace in P’yong-yang, gives extravagant gifts to 

his senior leaders and likes to throw wild parties. Kim recruits young girls 

with clear complexions in junior high school for “joy brigades” to provide 

entertainment for his hard-working senior officials. During the 1990s, he 

spent between $650,000 and $800,000 annually on Hennessey Paradis 

Cognac, their most expensive cognac at $630 a bottle, when the annual 

income of North Koreans was $900-$1000. Kim has a movie collection in 

excess of 10-20,000 titles. 

Km Jong-Il’s Vulnerabilities

It is official DPRK policy that maintaining the military is the 

foremost priority. Military spending has come first at the expense of the 

North Korean economy and the general population. But the economy is 

broken and cannot be fixed. Communist-style central control and 

disproportionate military spending is leading to the implosion of the 

D.P.R.K. As many as three million North Koreans starved to death in 

famines; hundreds of thousands lost lives in subsequent relocation to 

government-run camps. Yet Kim Jong Il asks the population to endure 

continuing hardships while the elite live in luxury. 

What Kim Jong-Il Values

While he pays lip service to pursuing the ideology of self-reliance 

(Juche), in fact he often plays the role of mendicant, seeking aid to keep 

his impoverished nation afloat. Often these requests are accompanied by 

belligerent threats in terms of his nuclear capability. He explains this 

source of funding as representing the tribute from nations who admire his 

leadership. But analysis reveals what he truly values are the following: his 

safety and regime survival; P’yong-yang, which is an oasis in the 
 Post

 

26

impoverished desert of North Korea; his personal wealth; elite comfort; 

and total domestic control. 

There is persuasive evidence that he cares not a whit for the North 

Korean peasant. He has lived an extravagantly luxurious lifestyle while 

tolerating starvation at home. In confronting North Korea’s famine, 

saving lives has not been a top priority, and early in the famine cycle, Kim 

cut off nearly all food supplies to the four eastern provinces and denied 

these provinces access to international aid.29 Large numbers of deaths 

also occurred when, between 1997 and 1999 on Kim’s orders, several 

hundred thousand people displaced by the famine were herded into camps 

where conditions allowed few to survive.30 Moreover, according to the 

testimony of eyewitnesses, Kim has ordered the systematic killing of 

babies born in North Korea’s camps to political prisoners.31

This lack of concern for the Korean people is in contrast to the 

image of his father, Kim Il-Sung. Kim Jong-Il reportedly acknowledges 

the one occasion where he disobeyed The Great Leader and indeed seems 

to take pride in this incident: 

 

Only once have I disobeyed President Kim Il Sung. The 

President said, “Can you shave off some defense spending and 

divert it for the people’s livelihoods?” I responded, “I am 

afraid not. Given the military pressure from the U.S., the 

Korean people must bear the hardship a little longer.” How 

much pain I felt at my failure to live up to the expectations of 

the President who is concerned about raising the living 

standards of the people!32

The gap between the self-indulgent hedonistic lifestyle of Kim 

Jong Il and his inner circle in P’yong-yang and the privation of his people, 

and, for that matter, the lower-level military, is extreme. Kim regularly 

calls for sacrifice from the Korean people in pursuit of the mission of 

reunification. But the lack of sacrifice in the life of Dear Leader and his 

inner circle is striking. While information is tightly controlled, penetrating 

the information barriers with stories concerned with the lavish selfindulgent lifestyle of Kim and his inner circle could significantly 

undermine the legitimacy of his leadership and his capacity to sustain the 

public psychology to maintain the nation on a continuing war footing. 
 Post

 

27

The Role of Strategic Communication in 

Undermining Kim Jong-Il

As Bunn has emphasized, tailored communications are an 

important dimension of tailored deterrence. In vivid contrast to Iran, one 

of the most remarkable aspects of the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 

Korea is the control it maintains over information, so that defectors are 

regularly surprised when they make their way via China to South Korea 

with the quality of life they discover. Penetrating information control is 

key. The above values and vulnerabilities of the Kim Jong-Il regime 

suggest the utility of a program of strategic communications which: 

• Identifies P’yong-yang as prime military target using extensive and 

overt surveillance, 

• Counters the “one-a-match-for-one-hundred” military myth 

propagated by the DPRK by demonstrating US military 

capabilities, and 

• “Educates” lower level military and the general population on the 

gap between their deprivation and the profligate hedonism of Kim 

Jong-Il and the national elites. 

On the other hand, some believe undermining the regime might 

cause it to initiate hostilities with the U.S. and ROK to divert North 

Koreans and cause them to rally against an external enemy rather that 

focus on regime shortcomings. In short, efforts at regime change might 

increase the chance of war and reduce U.S./ROK deterrence effects on 

North Korean behavior. 

In the foregoing sections, key aspects of the personality and 

political behavior of the leadership of the “axis of evil” have been 

presented; these are highlights of major political personality profiles. The 

intent is not to prescribe particular courses of deterrence for these nations, 

but rather to reflect the diversity of the leadership and decision-making of 

key adversaries; there cannot be a “one size fits all’’ deterrence strategy. 

Moreover, it is to make clear that in order optimally to develop deterrent 
 Post

 

28

strategies in the post-Cold world, it is imperative these strategies are 

tailored to fit the unique aspects of the leadership and strategic culture of 

the adversary in its unique political, cultural, historical and psychological 

context.

But in this age of terrorism, it would be remiss in reflecting on 

tailored deterrence not to consider how one might deter transnational 

terrorism, in particular, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda

In reflecting on deterrence and deterrability of a trans-national 

terrorist adversary, it is useful to consider the note that Mohammad Atta, 

the ringleader of Sept. 11, sent to the members of the four teams that 

would hijack the planes. Concerned they might betray their deadly 

mission with signs of facial anxiety, his notes communicated words to the 

effect of, Be calm and serene. Have a smile upon your face, for soon you 

will be in Paradise. But in his last will and testament, Atta prayed, 

quoting a sura from the Koran, Spare me O Lord, a lifetime in shackles 

and irons. While one should not uncritically extrapolate from Atta’s 

words to the question of how to deter al-Qaeda from pursuing and 

employing weapons of mass destruction, it should give us pause to 

consider the prospect of death was considered calming for these potential 

martyrs, whereas life in prison was to be dreaded, suggesting that for 

Islamist fundamentalist terrorists, the death penalty was not a deterrent, 

but if anything an incentive, and a much more powerful deterrent would 

be life imprisonment without the prospect of release.33

In the following remarks on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, a 

brief profile is presented; consideration is given to his interest in weapons 

of mass destruction, with implications for deterrence.34

Osama bin Laden was born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1957, the 

17th of 20-25 sons of Mohamed bin Laden, who had 52-54 children. 

Originally an immigrant from Yemen, Muhamed bin Laden, by 

befriending the royal family, had established a major construction 

company and had amassed a fortune of some $2-3 billion by the time of 

his death in 1967 in a plane crash. Although estimates range from $18 

million to as high as $200 million, it is most commonly agreed that bin 
 Post

 

29

laden inherited approximately $57 million at age 16 from his father’s 

estate.

Osama’s mother, Hamida, a Syrian woman of Palestinian descent 

was the least favorite of Mohamed’s 10 wives, and Osama was the only 

child of this marriage, perhaps the basis of Osama bin Laden’s later 

estrangement from his family. Hamida was reportedly a beautiful woman 

with a free and independent spirit who, as a result, often found herself in 

conflict with her husband. Reportedly, by the time Osama was born, 

Hamida had been ostracized by the family and had been nicknamed “Al 

Abeda” (the slave). As her only child, Osama was referred to as “Ibn Al 

Abeda” (son of the slave). Hamida did not live on the compound with the 

larger bin Laden family and as a result, was virtually non-existent in her 

son’s early life. When Mohammed bin Laden died, Osama, at the age of 

10, for all intents and purposes, did not know his mother. 

Osama bin Laden attended King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. 

He is a certified civil engineer, and worked toward a degree in Business 

Management (although it is not clear that he completed his course work), 

preparing him to play a leadership role in the family’s far-flung business 

interests. These two skill areas would serve him in good stead in 

Afghanistan. 

An important influence on bin Laden’s political ideology was 

Abdullah Azzam, a radical Palestinian professor at the university who 

became an important intellectual mentor for bin Laden. It was Azzam, a 

noted Islamist, who provided the vision to bin Laden of what should be 

done in response to the invasion of the Muslim state of Afghanistan by the 

Soviet Union and what role bin Laden could play. In particular, he 

conveyed to bin Laden the importance of bringing together Muslims from 

around the world to defend the Islamic nation of Afghanistan against the 

godless Soviet Union. 

Demonstrating his already blossoming management skills, Osama 

bin Laden assisted Azzam who founded the international recruitment 

network Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK - Services Office). MAK advertised 

all over the Arab world for young Muslims to fight the Afghan jihad. This 

massive international recruitment effort brought in Muslims from around 

the world who were to become the Afghan Arabs, the nucleus of bin 

Laden’s loyal followership — 5,000 were recruited from Saudi Arabia, 
 Post

 

30

3,000 from Algeria and 2,000 from Egypt. Recruitment booths were set up 

in the United States and Europe. 

A leader is not formed until he encounters his followers, and bin 

Laden’s leadership experience during the struggle in Afghanistan against 

the Soviet invasion was crucial in his psychological development which 

was transformational for him as a leader. He came to Afghanistan 

unformed and naïve. Generously using his own funds, he built clinics and 

hospitals. Eschewing an opulent lifestyle, he lived an ascetic life in the 

caves of Afghanistan with his followers. Regularly preaching about their 

holy mission and inspirational in his rhetoric, bin Laden inspired his 

followers who came to adulate him. 

That they were able, with substantial American aid to be sure, to 

triumph over the Soviet Union in what was to become their Vietnam, 

surely confirmed the correctness of bin Laden’s vision for him and his 

followers. Allah favored the weak and the underdog, and surely they 

could not have triumphed over the Soviet super-power unless God was on 

their side. This was the template of the destructive charismatic 

relationship between bin Laden and his religiously inspired warriors, the 

mujahedeen.

Bin Laden had not yet broken with the Saudi government, which 

after all, was the main foundation of his family’s wealth. But he had 

successfully vanquished one of the three major enemies identified by 

Muhammad Abdel Salam Faraj, who wrote The Neglected Duty: the 

existing Arab state, the Western-Zionist nexus, and the Communists. 

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the critical enemy among this triad was 

the “near enemy,” the Arab state, according to leading Islamists. In 

Faraj’s manifesto, he argued, “We must begin with our Islamic country by 

establishing the rule of God in our nation...the first battle for jihad is the 

uprooting of these infidel leaders and replacing them with an Islamic 

system from which we can build.”35

Bin Laden had come to see the Soviet super-power as a “paper 

tiger” that could be defeated, but also had already set his sights on the 

remaining super-power, the United States, as the next target. This 

represented a fundamental departure from the strategy of Faraj, in that it 

replaced ‘the enemy that is near” with “the enemy that is afar,” the superpowers. 
 Post

 

31

With the victory in Afghanistan, bin Laden the warrior king and 

his loyal Afghan Arab fighters, were eager to continue to pursue the jihad. 

Bin Laden broadened his vision and decided to pursue the jihad on a 

worldwide basis, seeking to reconstruct the nation of Islam throughout the 

world, assisting Muslims who were in conflict in Algeria, Angola, Bosnia, 

Chechnya, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and so forth. 

While bin Laden was committed to the international struggle, 

Abdullah Azzam believed in focusing all efforts on building Afghanistan 

into a model Islamic state. Following a split with Abdullah Azzam in 

1988, with the nucleus of his loyal followers, bin Laden and Ayman alZawahiri, a founding father of the Islamic Jihad of Egypt, established alQaeda (The Base) as a direct outgrowth of MAK. The following year 

Abdullah Azzam died in a mysterious car bomb explosion. Although 

there has been suspicion of involvement by bin Laden, there has never 

been any proof linking him to the death of his one-time mentor.

But with the departure of the Soviet Union, in what was to become 

their Vietnam, the warrior-king bin Laden and his loyal warriors had lost 

their enemy. As Eric Hoffer observed, the power of a charismatic leader 

derives from his capacity to focus hatred against a single enemy, as Hitler

did in the 1930s, unifying the German people in their hatred of the Jews. 

Bin Laden traveled to Sudan in 1999 and was distressed, indeed incensed, 

to find the United States with a military base on Saudi soil in the wake of 

the crisis in the Gulf, defiling the sacred Islamic land “of the two cities” 

(Mecca and Medina). Decrying this desecration of holy Saudi soil by the 

infidel Americans, bin Laden had seamlessly transferred his enmity from 

the first defeated super-power, the Soviet Union, to the remaining superpower, the United States, despite its aid in the struggle against the Soviet 

Union, which he dismissed. 

Initially he sought only to expel the American military from Arab 

lands, but later in the 1998 fatwah, expanded the enemy to include all 

Americans, whether civilian or military, throughout the world. In the 1998 

fatwa, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, bin Laden declared: 

In compliance with God's order, we issue the following 

fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and 

their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty 

for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it 
 Post

 

32

is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque 

and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order 

for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, 

defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in 

accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight 

the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and 

"fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, 

and there prevail justice and faith in God." We - with 

God's help - call on every Muslim who believes in God 

and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to 

kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and 

whenever they find it.36

Note, in this message it is not bin laden but God who has ordered 

religious Muslims to kill all the Americans; God for whom bin laden 

speaks with authority. There is not an action bin Laden orders that is not 

couched and justified in language from the Koran. 

Moreover, he actively criticized the Saudi royal family for 

apostasy, decrying the failure of stewardship of the land of the two cities, 

Mecca and Medina. The vigor of his criticism led Saudi Arabia to revoke 

his citizenship in 1994, and his family, which depended upon the Saudi 

leadership for their wealth, turned against him. This resembles the 

generational dynamics of social-revolutionary terrorists, such as the Red 

Army Faction and the Red Brigades, who attack the generation of their 

family which is loyal to the regime.37

Now bin Laden righteously attacked the other two enemies in the 

triad of enemies, the Western-Israeli nexus, and one of the newly 

designated apostate Arab nations, Saudi Arabia. But he maintained the 

primary focus on the external enemy, the United States. Yes, the 

leadership of the apostate nations had to be replaced, but the United States 

was the prime enemy, for America was responsible for propping up the 

corrupt leadership of these countries. Thus he continued the strategy born 

in Afghanistan of focusing on the enemy who is afar, the ZionistCrusaders, rather than the enemy who is near, the targhut (oppressive 

domestic rulers).

 

There has been a series of triumphs for bin Laden—Khobar 

Towers , the first World Trade Center bombing, the bombings of the U.S. 
 Post

 

33

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 

Yemen, and now, the most spectacular terrorist act in history, the events of 

Sept. 11. Osama bin Laden seems to be on a roll, speaking with messianic 

grandiosity, ever expanding his vision. The events of Sept. 11 were in 

many ways a “perfect storm.” A destructive charismatic leader 

manipulated, in Eric Hoffer’s words, “the slime of discontented souls”38 to 

focus the hated and violence of his “true believers” against the identified 

enemy, the United States.

Al-Qaeda and the Threat of WMD Terrorism

Al-Qaeda and its allies have shown a willingness to perpetrate acts 

of mass casualty terrorism, as exemplified by the bombings of Khobar 

Towers in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and 

the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Osama 

bin Laden, responsible for the embassy bombings and the attacks of Sept. 

11, has actively discussed the use of weapons of mass destruction in 

public interviews. In an interview with Jon Miller of ABC News in May 

1998, bin Laden first discussed such weapons. 

In a follow-up interview with TIME magazine, in January of 1999, 

when asked, “The U.S. says you are trying to acquire chemical and 

nuclear weapons. How would you use these?” Bin Laden replied, 

“Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I 

have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to 

do so... It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the 

weapons.”39

How does one tailor deterrence for an adversary whose members 

seek martyrdom? Is such an adversary deterrable? Not in the conventional 

sense. But let us rephrase the question: how can we reduce the threat of 

CBRNE terrorism? 

Whether this was psychological warfare or represented 

genuine intent is not entirely clear. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda are not seen 

as constrained against carrying out chemical, biological, radiological or 

nuclear attacks, including attacks against the defined major enemy, the 

United States. 

It is difficult for the West to critique radical interpretations of 

Islamic doctrine which have been employed by bin Laden and his 
 Post

 

34

leadership to justify mass casualty terrorism. Moderate critics have until 

recently been muted. But, recently there have been cleavages in the ranks

with internal critics of extremist violence beginning to speak out. 

• Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl) who was a radical ideologue 

whose earlier work has set the template for al-Qaeda’s violent 

jihad: “There is nothing that invokes the anger of God and his 

wrath like the unwarranted spilling of blood and wrecking of 

property,” The Rationalization of Jihad

• Salman Al Ouda, a radical Saudi cleric, “My brother Osama, how 

much blood has been spilt?” 

• Noman Benotman-Open letter rebuking Zawahiri. 

 

The conflict initially was highly personalized focusing on Osama 

bin Laden, who, in President Bush’s words, was “wanted dead or alive,” 

with a $25,000,000 bounty on his head. Each personalized threat against 

bin Laden only served to magnify his stature among his constituents. 

Moreover, there was an implication that the capture or death of bin 

Laden would mean the end of the threat. This assuredly is not the case, 

for al-Qaeda differs significantly from other terrorist groups and 

organizations, perhaps reflecting bin Laden’s training in business 

management. Al-Qaeda was a loose umbrella organization of semiautonomous terrorist groups and organizations. In effect, bin Laden was 

chairman of the board of radical Islam, Inc., a holding company, providing 

guidance, coordination, and financial and logistical facilitation, and 

expanded his corporation through mergers and acquisitions. 

Unlike other charismatically led organizations, such as Guzman’s 

Sendero Luminosa (Shining Path) of Peru, Ocalan’s PKK of Turkey, and 

Prabhakaran’s Tamil Tigers, all of which were mortally wounded when 

their leader was killed or captured, bin Laden designated Ayman alZawahiri as his successor and number two and has delegated significant 

authority and responsibility to other members of his organization. Should 

bin Laden be killed or captured, the reins of the organization would pass 

seamlessly to Zawahiri. Should the entire leadership echelon be 

eliminated, the threat, while diminished, would still remain. It is 

estimated al-Qaeda operates in 68 nations, and the semi-autonomous 
 Post

 

35

organizations under its umbrella would devolve and continue to pursue 

their terrorist mission. 

President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair took pains to 

clarify this is not a war against Muslims, but a war against terrorism. 

Seeking to frame this as a religious war, bin Laden has now laid claim to 

the title of commander-in-chief of the Islamic world, opposing the 

commander-in-chief of the corrupt, secular modernizing Western world; 

President George W. Bush is in a religious war. Alienated Arab youth 

find resonance in his statements, and see him as a hero. 

And this is the real challenge. Osama bin Laden may be 

eliminated and the al-Qaeda network rolled up, but the path of antiWestern radical Islamist extremism is increasingly attractive to alienated 

Islamic youth. Terrorism, at heart, is a vicious species of psychological 

warfare; it is violence as communication. Smart bombs and missiles will 

not win this war. The only way to combat this vicious species of 

psychological warfare is with information warfare, countering the 

distorted extremist rhetoric of Osama bin Laden and radical Islamist 

clerics that rationalizes violence with verses from the Koran. This will be 

a long struggle. 

One of the key tools in this struggle is tailored communications 

that accomplishes four goals.40

Secondly, it will be important to produce dissension in the terrorist 

group. The underground group is an emotional pressure-cooker, and it 

may be possible to foster paranoia by injecting rumors of traitors in the 

ranks. Also, a tailored communication plan should attempt to alienate 

followers from leaders and facilitate the cleavages in the ranks. 

 First, inhibit potential terrorists from 

joining the group in the first place by de-romanticizing terrorists, 

providing alternate pathways to redress grievances, assisting in opening up 

autocratic societies and encouraging moderate secular education. 

A third goal of anti-terrorist communications plan is to facilitate 

exodus from the group by its members. This can perhaps be accomplished 

by measures such as amnesty programs, offering reduced sentences for 

those who cooperate and using defector as a source of rumors to sow 

distrust. 

Fourth and finally, the communications plan should try to reduce 

support for the group and delegitimize its leaders in society at large and in 

the recruitment pool. The program should seek to marginalize al-Qaeda 
 Post

 

36

and delegitimize bin Laden. 

The alienated Islamic youth must not see violence as the only 

pathway. Most importantly, support for this dangerous movement must be 

reduced, so that radical Islamic extremism is marginalized, its leaders 

delegitimized. The program above summarizes a program of tailored 

communication designed to counter terrorism. What themes should be 

incorporated into such a tailored program to inhibit the development and 

use of weapons of destruction? 

Let us turn to the terrorists for answers to this question. Among 

the incarcerated Islamist terrorists we interviewed, when asked about their 

views concerning weapons of mass destruction, most said something to 

the effect of “just give me a good Kalashnikov.”41

While the majority was not averse to using a weapon that could kill 

10,000 enemies, many had not even considered it. But some raised 

reservations. One spoke of his fear of “the silent death,” concerns about 

dangers from handling poisons or bacteria. Another quoted the Koran and 

its prohibitions against poisoning the creatures of the earth. 

 

In a focused program of psychological warfare, tailored 

communication designed to counter the development and use of weapons 

of mass destruction, these two themes should be prominently featured, i.e., 

the danger of the “silent death” and the prohibition in the Koran against 

poisoning the creatures of the earth. 

Conclusion

In this post-Cold War era, given the variability of the leaders 

described above, deterrence must be tailored and based on nuanced actorspecific behavioral models. This in turn requires increased intelligence 

resources devoted to developing such models, for it is now more true than 

ever, in this era of rogue leaders of outlaw nations and transnational 

terrorism, there is no one-size-fits-all deterrence. 

An important aspect of the analysis of adversary intentions is the 

locus of decision-making. When it is a leader- predominant society, such 

as Iraq under Saddam, and the leader is judged to not be deterrable, this 

calls for a tailored communications program designed to drive a wedge 

between the leader and his followers. This is also true for a more complex 
 Post

 

37

leadership society with multiple autonomous actors, such as Iran, where 

on the one hand President Ahmadinejad may not be deterrable, may 

indeed be seeking chaos, but he is not the sole or even principal actor. 

A special dilemma is posed by transnational radical Islamist 

terrorism, many of whose members seek martyrdom. For this challenging 

target, a four-point program of tailored communications is proposed with 

the overall goal of reducing the ranks of terrorists by inhibiting potential 

terrorists from joining the group, producing dissension in the group, 

facilitating exit from the group, and reducing support for the group and 

delegitimizing its leaders. Messages designed to inhibit the development 

and uses of weapons of mass destruction are included in the suggested 

program. 

Notes 
 Post

 

38

 

1 Jerrold Post is professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs, and director of the Political 

Psychology Program, the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C.

2 Han Park and Kyung Park, “Ideology and Security: Self Reliance in China and North Korea” in National Security 

in the Third World, Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds.) (Hampshire, England: Edgar Elgar, 1988).

3 Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance” in Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, Volume II, Philip 

Tetlock, Jo Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul Stern and Charles Tilly (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 

1991), 8-72. 4 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Boston, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Arms and Influence, 

(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966). 5 Keith Payne, “The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction,” Comparative Strategy, Volume 22

(2003), 411-428.

6 Betty Glad, “Dilemmas of Deterrence: Rational and Irrational Perspectives” in Betty Glad Psychological 

Dimensions of War’ (New York: Sage, 1990), 277-294. 7 Ralph White, Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of US-Soviet Relations (New York: Free Press, 1984), 

256-257.

8 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1971).

9 Jerrold Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World (Ithaca, N.Y. and London, UK: Cornell 

University Press, 2007), 15-16.

10 Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Boston, 

Mass.: Houghton-Miflin, 1972). 11 Dorwin Cartwright, “Risk taking by individuals and groups: An assessment of research employing choice 

dilemmas, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 20(3) (Dec. 1971), 361-378. 12 Payne, Comparative Strategy, 418.

13 James Blight, et al., Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse, (New York: Pantheon 

Books, 1993), 29.

14 Ibid. 15 Blight, ibid, as quoted by Payne, op cit.

16 Hamburg, D. A., George A., and Ballentine, K., "Preventing Deadly Conflict: The Critical Role of Leadership," 

Archives of General Psychiatry 56.11 (1999), 971- 976.

17 M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence be Tailored?,” Strategic Forum, Volume 225 (Jan. 2007). 

18 Bunn, op cit.

19 Margaret Hermann, C. Charles, F. Hermann, and Joe Hagan, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy 

Behavior,” Chapter 16, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Harper Collins, 1991). 

20 White, op cit, 259. 21 Jerrold Post, Congressional Record, testimony before House Armed Services Committee (Dec. 1990). 22 Schneider, Barry R, Deterrence and Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the 1990-1991 Gulf War, USAF 

Counterproliferation Center, Future Warfare Series, No. 47 (August 2005), 19-24

23 “Confrontation in the Gulf: Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy,” The New York Times

(Sept. 23, 1990). 24 Al-Jazeera (June 19, 2005).

25 “Ahmadinejad's Demons,” The New Republic (April 25, 2006).

26 This resembles messianic traditions of the “final days” in Christianity and in Judaism. The use of weapons of 

mass destruction by Shoko Asahara of the Japanese millenarian cult Aum Supreme Truth also was designed to 

precipitate the final apocalypse. 

27 Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan op cit.

28 Elaine Sciolino, “Blurred Images of North Korea’s ‘Junior,’” The New York Times (July 17, 1994), Section 1, 1.

29 Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: 

United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 106-107.

30 Ibid., 73-74.

31 “Defectors from North Korea Tell of Prison Baby Killings,” The New York Times, (June 10, 2002). 
 Post

 

39

 32 Kim Myong Chol, “Kim Jong Il’s Military Strategy for Reunification,” Comparative Strategy, Volume 20(4) 

(2001), 305.

33 This consideration was introduced in testimony by the author during the death penalty phase of the 2001 trial of 

one of the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaan, Tanzania in 1998. 

The defendant was sentenced to life without parole in a super-max prison.

34 This brief profile is drawn from the introductory chapter “The Explosive Force of Personality and Political 

Behavior” of Leaders and their Followers in a Dangerous World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 5-

9.

35 A. Hashim, “Osama bin Laden’s World View and Grand Strategy,” paper presented to conference at Navy War 

College (Nov. 19, 2001). 

36 World Islamic Front, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Al-Quds al-Arabi (Feb. 23, 1998). 

37 Post, (2007), op cit, 7.

38 Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, [1951] 1966), 59-60. 

39 “Conversation With Terror,” TIME (Jan. 11, 1999). 

40 For an extended discussion of the important role of psychological operations as a principal weapon in countering 

terrorism, see Jerrold Post, “Psychological Operations and Counter-Terrorism,” Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 

2005), 105-110. 41 Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita Denny, “The Terrorist in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 

Incarcerate Middle East Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume. 15(1), (2003), 171-184.
CHAPTER 3

Tailoring U.S. Strategic Deterrent Effects

on Russia

Franklin C. Miller

The concept of deterrence is not new. Presenting a potential 

enemy with major obstacles to achieving his aggressive military objectives 

by building a strong and credible defensive posture dates back at least to 

ancient Rome. As the fourth century Roman military writer Vegetius 

observed: igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum (therefore, he who 

wishes peace, should prepare war). Indeed, in the infant United States, 

President George Washington, in his very first State of the Union Address 

on Jan. 8, 1790, told Congress (in the context of calling for a sufficient 

national military establishment and a domestic arms industry): “to be 

prepared for war is the most effectual mans of preserving peace.” And 

yet, as history has demonstrated again and again, deterrence based on 

conventional military forces fails to deter military aggression.

Presented with strong defenses, aggressors have employed their 

military’s creative genius to develop and devise plans and capabilities to 

guarantee—in their own minds—a sufficient chance of success to make 

the risk of war acceptable. In the 20th century, the Nazi campaign through 

the Ardennes which negated France’s Maginot Line defenses and the 

Japanese surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor (which 

had been forward deployed to demonstrate resolve in what we would call 

today a “flexible deterrent option”) stand out. 

All of this changed, however, in 1945. The U.S. development of 

the atomic bomb, the onset of the Cold War, and the U.S.S.R.’s 

subsequent acquisition of atomic weapons ushered in a new era. Nuclear 

weapons gave a state the ability, even as its conventional military forces 

were on the verge of defeat, to turn the aggressor’s victory to ashes: 

nuclear retaliation could devastate the aggressor’s homeland even as his 

armies won on the battlefield. War had suddenly become too dangerous 
 Miller

41 

for the nuclear-armed great powers. It took several decades, however, for 

this new reality to be absorbed by political and military leaders.

Deterring the Soviet Union: the Early Years

In the early years of the Cold War the United States adopted a 

relatively simple approach to deterring Soviet aggression. The U.S. 

government viewed nuclear weapons as more powerful versions of their 

conventional predecessors. At first, given the relatively small number of 

U.S. atomic weapons and our lack of intelligence information on the 

Soviet Union, the U.S. deterrent was conceived as an extension of the 

massive bombing raids against German and Japanese cities. We knew 

where Soviet cities were located, and, in the event of war, those cities and 

the political leadership, social infrastructure and industrial capacity which 

resided in them were targeted. When the United States joined with our 

European Allies to create NATO, we also planned to use nuclear weapons 

to defeat invading Soviet armies. And when, in August 1949, Russia

demonstrated it too had developed an atomic weapon, destroying that 

nuclear capability became a priority U.S. goal.1

The Eisenhower administration, on entering office, was convinced 

one of the U.S.S.R.’s goals was to bankrupt the West by forcing it to 

spend enormous sums on building conventional forces; in response, the 

administration adopted a defense policy known as “the New Look” in 

which nuclear weapons would provide a cheaper alternative to building 

the massive conventional capabilities deemed necessary to defeat the Red 

Army. 

The scientific prowess of U.S. nuclear weapons scientists allowed 

the Defense Department to field nuclear weapons to meet every need of 

the military. The Army even re-organized its force structure into 

“Pentomic Divisions” optimized to employ nuclear firepower and 

deployed nuclear artillery shells, nuclear landmines, nuclear-tipped shortrange missiles, and nuclear surface-to-air missiles. The Navy had ship 

launched, submarine launched and air-dropped tactical nuclear antisubmarine warfare weapons, nuclear surface-to-air missiles, nuclear 

bombs for use by carrier air wings, and even nuclear shells for 16-inch 
 Miller

42 

battleship guns; the Air Force deployed nuclear bombs for use by strategic 

and tactical aircraft as well as nuclear-tipped air-to-air missiles.

As Henry Kissinger famously observed in his 1957 book Nuclear 

Weapons and Foreign Policy, “We added the atomic bomb to our arsenal 

without integrating its implications into our thinking.”2 U.S. deterrence 

policy was neither particularly sophisticated nor was it tailored. As 

annunciated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: “...there is no local 

defense which alone can contain the mighty land power of the Communist 

world. ... [The United States therefore has decided] to depend primarily 

upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our 

own choosing”3

The challenge to the Soviet leadership was straightforward: attack 

the United States or our allies, and we will immediately launch an all-out 

nuclear response against the Soviet homeland and on its forward deployed 

military forces using all elements of our nuclear arsenal. As noted, this 

was neither tailored nor subtle. 

As the U.S.S.R. began to mirror the United States’ creation of a 

widely deployed nuclear arsenal, American strategists worried about two 

issues:

• Did the Soviet leadership, in the time-honored tradition of warfare, 

believe its military and scientific genius could devise a way to 

preemptively attack and destroy the U.S. capability to strike the 

Soviet homeland? Could the deterrent be negated? 

• Would the Soviet leadership truly believe that in a crisis the United 

States would respond to any act of military aggression by initiating 

all-out nuclear war? In other words, was the deterrent threat in fact 

credible in Soviet eyes?

Tailoring U.S. Strategic Deterrence: the First Steps

The Kennedy administration leaders entered office convinced the 

answers to those two fundamental questions were (1) yes, and (2) possibly 

no. Accordingly, it quickly made major changes to U.S. war-planning 

policy and force structure. 
 Miller

43 

To increase the survivability of the U.S. strategic deterrent the 

administration embarked on a major expansion of the Polaris-missile

carrying submarine fleet and of the Minuteman ICBM force. The triad 

combination of (1) submarines designed to be invulnerable once at sea, (2) 

land-based missiles housed in silos designed to be resistant to nuclear 

attack by relatively inaccurate Soviet missiles, plus (3) the different 

strengths of the Strategic Air Command long-range bomber force, was 

judged sufficient to ensure a survivable and highly lethal U.S retaliatory 

threat credible to Soviet leaders. 

Convinced the Soviet leadership would consider conducting 

limited conventional attacks unless confronted with tailored (as opposed to 

all-out) responses, the administration introduced the “Flexible Response” 

policy, premised on two concepts: 

First, the United States and its allies would increase conventional 

force capabilities so that limited or small-scale Soviet attacks were 

unlikely to succeed. This would force the Soviet leadership to have to 

resort to major attacks, which in turn could credibly draw a nuclear 

response. 

Second, the all-out, “one-shot” U.S. nuclear war plan was divided 

into multiple options so the president was given the choice of having U.S. 

regional commanders respond with variously-sized nuclear attacks, 4

More significantly, the U.S. strategic war plan (the Single 

Integrated Operational Plan or SIOP introduced in 1960) would henceforth 

provide the president the option of ordering a retaliatory strike against 

three major target groupings: (1) Soviet military forces including military 

command and control targets; (2) of those forces and the Soviet political 

leadership and its command and control structures; (3) or those two target 

sets plus Soviet cities and industrial capacity. Secretary of Defense Robert 

McNamara, in a series of highly publicized speeches designed to influence 

the Kremlin leadership, made clear the United States now had powerful 

but less than all-out responses available to it. 

 

In the event deterrence failed, the U.S. could exercise these more 

limited options if it chose not to strike Soviet cities – thereby explicitly 

suggesting to the Soviets their war plans should include a similar 

capability to halt a nuclear war short of destroying urban areas.
 Miller

44 

However, McNamara proceeded to muddy the signal within a 

relatively short period of time. In 1961 and 1962 he spoke publicly of the 

United States having both a “counterforce” (or “damage limiting”) 

capability, (the option to strike against Soviet nuclear and conventional 

military forces) and also a “counter-value” capability, the option which 

expanded the counterforce strike to include cities and infrastructure. 

Shortly after the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962, he ceased 

discussing counterforce publicly and instead spoke only of counter-value.5

This rhetorical shift, if nothing else, has completely confounded 

American scholarship of nuclear deterrence ever since. Several 

generations of professors and their students believe the two concepts 

competed rather than complimented, and the United States maintained a 

counterforce strategy (viewed by many academics as a “nuclear 

warfighting strategy”) until 1963-1964, when it adopted a counter-value 

strategy (portrayed in academic circles as a “pure deterrent” approach). 

Nothing could be less accurate. The United States held at risk the fulltarget set developed by war-planners in the late 1940s and early 1950s: 

Soviet nuclear and conventional forces, Soviet political authorities and its 

control mechanisms, and urban population and industrial capacity. 

McNamara was well aware of this, even if he misled Congress and 

the American public. In February 1966, in a meeting with NATO

counterparts, long after “counterforce” had disappeared from his 

congressional testimony and public statements, McNamara engaged in the 

following colloquy with a NATO counterpart who asked “if in SIOP

options the first launch covered only military targets.”6 McNamara 

replied: 

This depended on the attack. Only in the event of an allout Soviet attack would we make a total response. In the 

event the Soviets did not deliver an all-out attack, we 

would have the option of making a less than total response. 

The counterpart continued by “pointing out that a [Soviet] 

first strike hardly seemed rational...If the Soviets went all 

out we would have a surviving Assured Destruction 

capability. The refinements in SIOP options would be 

relevant only in the unlikely event of a limited Soviet 
 Miller

45 

nuclear attack.” McNamara replied “Our first priority is 

Assured Destruction. This we have achieved....We have 

three times the forces needed to achieve Assured 

Destruction. However this 300 per cent excess is 

fundamental to the survival of the West...7

Tailoring U.S. Strategic Deterrence: One step 

forward and one back in the early 1970s

As the U.S.S.R.’s strategic arsenal grew throughout the 1960s and 

early 1970s, first reaching parity with the United States and then 

surpassing it, U.S. strategic planners sought additional means to influence 

the Soviet leadership. While McNamara had succeeded in providing 

options to allow a U.S. president to threaten limited responses, those 

“limited” options remained quite large. The smallest still involved 

employing thousands of nuclear weapons. Concern grew in the U.S. 

strategic community that all of the options were too massive, and therefore 

not a credible response, to Soviet limited aggression or attack. As a result, 

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger directed the creation of a series of 

smaller strike options which might represent more credible deterrents to 

limited nuclear or conventional attack. The development of these plans 

was heralded in a series of speeches and public documents in an effort to 

ensure the Soviet leadership was aware of them.

U.S. planners also spent considerable time and energy analyzing 

whether the SIOP — which, as previously noted, was in fact a war plan 

rather than a plan to deter Soviet actions — presented the Kremlin 

leadership with sufficient disincentives to aggression. Deciding that it did 

not, they embarked on a study to determine what would convince the 

Soviets that the cost of aggression was unacceptable. Focusing 

unfortunately on American values, they concluded the nation which 

emerged from a nuclear war with sufficient resources to rebuild its 

economic infrastructure and economic–industrial capacity would be “the 

winner.” The U.S. government then spent considerable energy in both 

seeking to convince the Kremlin the United States would “recover” faster 
 Miller

46 

and restructuring SIOP priorities so that Soviet “recovery targets” were 

covered.

Getting Tailored Deterrence Right

The Soviet build-up of its strategic nuclear forces continued 

unabated throughout the 1970s. The Soviet efforts emphasized fielding 

increasingly accurate ICBMs capable of destroying U.S. Minuteman silos. 

The Soviets also went to great lengths to “super-harden” their own ICBM

silos. They were observed conducting exercises in which they re-loaded 

ICBM silos, thereby suggesting an interest in protracted nuclear warfighting. Soviet writings and exercises also demonstrated an interest in 

launching SLBMs in so-called “depressed trajectories,” flight-paths 

sufficiently low to escape detection by U.S. early warning radars. Such 

attacks, it was feared, were designed to destroy the U.S. bomber force on 

the ground, and, more importantly, to destroy Washington before the 

president could issue orders for a retaliatory strike. Additionally, the 

Soviets were observed to have begun construction covertly of a series of 

deep-underground command posts for their senior political and military 

leaders.

All of these developments convinced the U.S. government the 

Soviets had decided they might in fact “win” a nuclear war by emerging 

from the conflict with military forces and a command structure which 

would permit them to dominate the post-war world. 

Accordingly, U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown ordered the 

initiation of a “Nuclear Targeting Policy Review” to determine if the focus 

of American deterrent policy needed to be changed. Based on extensive 

analysis of Soviet expenditures, force structure, exercises, classified and 

unclassified writings, and other all-source intelligence information, the 

study concluded the Soviet leadership had never bought into the “recovery 

paradigm.” 

To the contrary, it appeared they had concluded that a combination 

of pre-emptive capabilities, dispersed, buried and survivable commandand-control facilities, and reconstitutable strategic offensive forces would 

permit them to dominate a post-war world, and such a position would 
 Miller

47 

allow the U.S.S.R. to obtain the resources necessary to subsequently 

rebuild the Soviet economy. 

This should not have been a major surprise given the Soviet 

experience in World War II, an experience which the Soviet leaders had 

lived through. The most important point made by the Nuclear Targeting 

Policy Review was that deterrence could only be achieved when the 

United States focused on what the Soviet leadership valued — and then 

threatened to destroy those assets if war occurred. “Mirror imaging,” 

assuming that the Soviet leadership’s outlook reflected US goals and 

values, was a dangerous self deception. 

By 1980 Secretary Defense Harold Brown had brought about 

changes in U.S. targeting priorities and had put more resources behind 

programs to reinvigorate U.S. strategic programs which would undercut 

Soviet confidence in their ability to retain the assets they believed 

necessary to dominate the post-war world. This advertised to the Kremlin 

the United States leadership had understood them and was determined to 

deter them. In a speech at the Naval War College in August 1980 Brown 

made clear U.S. policy had embarked on a new course. Henceforth the 

United States would study what the Soviet leadership indicated — through 

its force developments, defense resource allocations, exercises and 

writings — what it valued most...and then would proceed to hold those at 

risk:

• “By definition, successful deterrence means, among other 

things, shaping Soviet views of what a war would mean...” 

• “What we have done ... is to look more closely at our 

capabilities, our choices, our doctrine and our plans in light 

of what we know about Soviet forces, doctrine and plans. 

The Soviet leadership appears to contemplate at least the 

possibility of a relatively [nuclear] prolonged exchange if 

war comes, and in some circles at least, they seem to take 

seriously the theoretical possibility of victory in such a war.” 

• “We cannot afford to ignore these views — even if we think 

differently, as I do. We need to have ... a posture – both 

forces and doctrine that makes it clear to the Soviets and to 
 Miller

48 

the world that any notion of victory in nuclear war is 

unrealistic.”8

Brown had created the intellectual foundation of tailored 

deterrence. To deter successfully, the United States must understand an 

enemy (or potential enemy) leadership’s value structure and then make 

clear, by policy, force structure and exercises, that the value structure 

would be destroyed — without question — should deterrence fail. 

Brown re-emphasized the point in his last Annual Report to Congress, 

sending a signal to the Kremlin as well as to the U.S. defense 

establishment. His words are worth reviewing carefully because they 

form the starting point of how the United States has practiced deterrence 

since 1980. The Secretary of Defense stated that:

“To the Soviet Union, our strategy makes clear that no 

course of aggression by them that led to the use of nuclear 

weapons on any scale of attack and at any stage of the 

conflict, could lead to victory. Besides our power to 

devastate the full target system of the U.S.S.R., the United 

States would have the option for more selective, lesser 

retaliatory attacks that would exact a prohibitively high 

price from the things the Soviet leadership prizes most —

political and military control, nuclear and conventional 

military force, and the economic base needed to sustain 

war. ...Our planning must provide a continuum of options, 

ranging from small numbers of strategic and/or theater 

nuclear weapons aimed at narrowly defined targets, to 

employment of large portions of our nuclear forces against 

a broad spectrum of targets.”9

Over the ensuing 12 years, the Reagan and George H.W. Bush

administrations reinforced the credibility of this tailored approach by 

reaffirming the deterrent policy set forth by Secretary Brown, by 

aggressively pursuing a program to modernize U.S. strategic nuclear 

forces and their command and control backbone and by revising U.S. 

nuclear targeting plans.
 Miller

49 

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in a widely publicized 

congressional testimony, made the retaliatory threat clear:

“To deter successfully, we must be able – and we must be 

seen to be able – to retaliate against any potential aggressor 

in such a manner that the costs we will exact will 

substantially exceed any gains he might hope to achieve 

through aggression. We, for our part, are no under no 

illusions about the consequences of a nuclear war: we 

believe there would be no winners in such a war. But this 

recognition on our part is not sufficient to ensure effective 

deterrence or to prevent the outbreak war: it is essential that 

the Soviet leadership understands this as well. We must 

make sure that the Soviet leadership, in calculating the risks 

of aggression, recognizes that because of our retaliatory 

capability there can be no circumstance where the initiation 

of a nuclear war at any level or of any duration would make 

sense. If they recognize that our forces can deny them their 

objectives at whatever level of conflict they contemplate and, 

in addition, that such a conflict could lead to the destruction 

of those political, military and economic assets which they 

value most highly, then deterrence is enhanced and the risk of 

war is diminished.”10

The recapitalization of U.S. strategic forces — largely the product

of the Kennedy administration’s efforts — was designed demonstrably to 

offset any advantages the Soviets had sought to achieve through their own 

programs. The deployment of highly accurate systems such as airlaunched cruise missiles, the MX (Peacekeeper) ICBM and, later, the 

Trident II SLBM offset Soviet silo-hardening efforts. 

The U.S. early warning system and nuclear command and control 

network was upgraded. This made attacks far more survivable, and 

thereby resistant to pre-emption. The Trident II ensured a survivable hardtarget capability invulnerable to pre-emption. Further the United States 

revealed (in an annual Defense Department publication entitled “Soviet 

Military Power”) the U.S.S.R.’s covert efforts to build deep underground 
 Miller

50 

leadership command bunkers in sufficient detail to signal to Moscow those 

efforts had been detected, and the bunkers would not escape a retaliatory 

strikes.

The revision to planning was long overdue. Because, for 

bureaucratic reasons the link between policy makers and the war planners 

in Omaha (home to the Strategic Air Command and the Joint Strategic 

Target Planning Staff) was weak, the latter never fully comprehended the 

intent behind the smaller strategic options which Secretary Schlesinger 

had directed in the early 1970s. As a result, the implementation of 

Schlesinger’s policy failed to provide what was needed: the options were 

still too large and were designed in such a manner the Soviet warning 

systems — and therefore the Soviet leadership — could not have 

determined the combined signal of determination and restraint the options 

were intended to send. By the latter part of the 1980s, these and other 

targeting issues had been corrected, and the White House had a war plan 

which was both a deterrent plan and which conformed to the policy 

requirements set by the United States’ political leadership.11

The Cold War Ends

In an ironic and not altogether unrelated series of developments, as 

the United States finally established and deployed a highly credible and 

tailored deterrence policy against the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Union

collapsed. The emergence of Russia and 14 other countries — four of 

which (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus) possessed former Soviet 

nuclear weapons – created new challenges for the United States. The most 

pressing task was not deterring Russian attack, since Russia had become 

inwardly focused and was consumed with establishing its emerging 

democracy.

The greatest danger was the possibility that former Soviet weapons 

would fall into the hands of terrorists or other illegal groups. Closely tied 

to this was the possibility that Ukraine, Kazakhstan or Belarus might 

decide to retain possession of resident nuclear weapons and become 

recognized nuclear weapons states. As a result, while Cold War era 

contingency plans remained in place in Omaha, the United States devoted 

its main efforts to ensuring Russia would be the only nuclear state to 
 Miller

51 

spring from the ashes of the U.S.S.R. and to helping Russia safeguard or 

destroy the inherited nuclear weapons.

As Russia’s infant democracy battled coup attempts by dissident 

parliamentarians, as dissatisfaction with Russia’s course arose within both 

the elites and the Russian population more generally, and as the Russian 

economy threatened to implode, Russian President Boris Yeltsin plucked 

an obscure former KGB colonel named Putin to serve first as his prime 

minister and then, in 1999, as his successor. 

Russian Nuclear Policy under Putin and Medvedev

As is well known now, Vladimir Putin was not committed to 

democracy. Rather, he was and remains an authoritarian who has worked 

to crush democratic reformers and to re-establish state control over most 

areas of Russian life. As a result, the Russian security services regained 

much of the authority they had lost during the Yeltsin years. With the 

Russian government’s coffers newly replenished thanks to the dramatic 

rise in oil and gas prices in the first decade of the 21st century, and 

Russian petro-diplomacy providing a coercive tool against Russia’s 

neighbors, Putin embarked on an aggressive foreign policy which was, in 

some respects, reminiscent of Soviet efforts to intimidate nations on its 

borders. 

With his conventional military forces capability greatly reduced 

from that once possessed by the Soviet armed forces, Putin has engaged 

from time to time in nuclear saber-rattling. He authorized Russian 

strategic bombers to violate Norwegian, British, Icelandic, Japanese and 

American airspace.12 He stated Poland and the Czech Republic would be 

subject to nuclear strikes if they hosted elements of a U.S./NATO missile 

defense shield;13 and Russian spokesmen announced that Russia could 

potentially use nuclear weapons in “local or regional wars.”14

Having served his statutory time as president of Russia, in May 

2008 Putin orchestrated a succession arrangement in which his protégé 

Dmitry Medvedev succeeded him as president while Putin became prime 

minister. The nuclear saber-rattling has continued unabated. Russian 

bombers continued to fly near and into Western airspace;15 the Russian 

government announced a new nuclear doctrine which asserted the right to 
 Miller

52 

attack preemptively with nuclear weapons those threatening Russian 

security;16 and, in the fall of 2009, Russian forces conducted an exercise 

simulating conventional and nuclear strikes against Poland.17

Deterring Russia (and from what)

The question which must confront U.S. policymakers today and in 

the future is the degree to which the evolution of Russian nuclear policy 

represents an active threat to be deterred, a latent threat to be watched 

carefully, or simply the pronouncements of a leadership determined both 

to warn the West against aggression and to reassure the Russian public the 

government’s failure to modernize Russian conventional forces is 

compensated for by Russian nuclear forces.

It appears fairly clear at this point in time (2010) that Putin and 

Medvedev are different from their Soviet predecessors and they do not 

believe nuclear war is “win-able” as did the Soviet leaders. Yet, it is also 

clear they still place a very high reliance on nuclear weapons particularly 

to threaten and intimidate the governments of former Soviet and former 

Warsaw Pact states. 

In the same period of time the Obama administration has reduced

the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national strategy (and aims at a very 

long-term goal of eventually eliminating nuclear weapons altogether) the 

two Russian administrations have taken a very different point of view, 

placing nuclear weapons at the very center of Russian national security 

policy. Some of this may be attributable to classic Russian paranoia, 

fueled by the many advantages which U.S. conventional forces today 

enjoy over their Russian counterparts. But it stretches credulity to believe 

the Russian leadership seriously fears a U.S. attack. 

A more reasonable explanation is the Russian leadership believes 

its nuclear saber-rattling provides some degree of cover for the aggressive 

foreign policy for which the Putin-Medvedev team has shown a penchant. 

Whether cutting off energy supplies to neighbors, assassinating a former 

KGB official in London, poisoning a Ukrainian presidential candidate or 

continuing to occupy Georgian territory after the 2008 border conflict, 

Russia has engaged in activities which would under other circumstances 
 Miller

53 

draw, at minimum, international sanctions and condemnation. So too 

should the nuclear saber-rattling, so redolent of the Cold War and so 

seemingly out of place in our view of the 21st Century. The absence of 

such international reaction suggests the fear with which other nations view 

Russia and reinforces, therefore, the Russian government’s penchant for 

continuing to play the nuclear card. 

Are Putin and Medvedev foolish enough to contemplate military 

confrontation with the United States? The answer is probably not, but 

America’s NATO allies, particularly the Baltic States but also others 

whose borders touch Russia’s can draw no comfort from the Russian 

intervention in Ossetia.

Tailoring Deterrence against Russia Today

In the unlikely event the Russian leadership at some point in a 

crisis contemplated conducting a limited military attack against the United 

States or against one of the allies over whom we have placed a “nuclear 

umbrella. U.S. policymakers would do well to recall points made by 

Caspar Weinberger in his 1982 Senate testimony. 

He said, “...in order for our retaliatory threat to be seen as 

credible, we must be able, and be seen to have the means, to respond 

appropriately to a wide range of aggressive actions. If our threatened 

response is perceived as inadequate or inappropriate, it will be seen as a 

bluff and ignored.” 

Further Weinberger argued,“...deterrence is a dynamic effort, not a 

static one. In order to continue to deter successfully, our capabilities must 

change as the threat changes and as our knowledge of what is necessary to 

deter improves.”18

A successful U.S. deterrent policy must have identified in advance 

those assets the Russian leadership values most, it must make obvious to 

that Russian leadership the consequences of aggression, and those 

statements will need to be reinforced by capable nuclear forces and 

command and control capabilities which we are confident can make the 

deterrent threat credible in Russian eyes.

As to what the Russian leadership might value, this could change 

each time the leadership changes hands. Putin/Medvedev presumably 
 Miller

54 

place high value on the nuclear forces they employ to intimidate their 

neighbors, on the security services which permit them to exercise their 

authoritarian style of government, on their ability to control Russia, and on 

the petroleum and gas infrastructure which provides the economic support 

the Russian government requires. 

Their successors may or may not share the same values. To the 

degree Russia evolves in a democratic manner, as we hope it does, the 

tools of intimidation of neighbors and of Russian citizens presumably will 

be of less and less interest to future Russian leaders. To the degree Russia 

becomes even more authoritarian then those same elements of power and 

intimidation may be of equal or greater value to the leadership. The U.S. 

government needs to place considerable emphasis on understanding who 

the future leaders will be and what they value; scholarship and intelligence 

need to be brought together to create a coherent and accurate picture. This 

applies, of course, to the leadership of any nation whom we believe we 

may need to deter, now or in the future. 

Once the United States has identified what it might need to hold at 

risk, it must ensure it has deployed the appropriate mix of forces to ensure 

the leaders of the government we seek to deter understand clearly and 

unequivocally we possess the means necessary to back up our threats. The 

U.S. nuclear force of 2010 is largely a product of the Reagan-“Bush 41” 

strategic modernization plan. 

The Minuteman force is aging and will require some kind of 

replacement in the next 10-15 years. The Trident II missiles will continue 

to be operational for several decades, but the submarines which carry them 

will need to be replaced beginning in another 15-20 years. The airlaunched cruise missiles carried by the B-52 bombers are 30 years old; 

they need to be replaced soon or the decision needs to be made to remove 

the B-52s from a nuclear role. 

The nuclear weapons infrastructure — and indeed some of the 

nuclear weapons types in the U.S. inventory — also needs to be 

modernized. If we lost confidence in the weapons we deploy or the 

delivery systems that would become known to our potential adversaries, 

and our deterrent effect would be the weaker for it. And, additionally, in 

the case of Russia, the United States will need to maintain parity in 

strategic nuclear capabilities with Moscow in order to prevent 
 Miller

55 

misperceptions from arising in Russian calculations. Finally, the 

Department of Defense must be a good and faithful steward with respect 

to our nation’s nuclear forces. The department must display the utmost 

competence in carrying out all aspects of its nuclear responsibilities.

Notes
 Miller

56 

 

1

 For an excellent discussion of the origins of U.S. nuclear targeting policy see David Allen Rosenberg, “The 

Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960 International Security (Spring 1983). 2 Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957), 8.

3 John Foster Dulles, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Volume XXX, No. 761 (Jan. 25, 1954). 4 While completely overlooked by historians, in November 1957 NATO Commander (and U.S. General) Lauris 

Norstad delivered a speech which modified Dulles “Massive Retaliation” policy by stating that in the event of a 

Soviet attack against NATO the first U.S. response would be massive use of nuclear weapons by theater-based 

forces against the invading Red Army; only if that failed, he suggested there would be a massive attack on the USSR 

itself. Flexible Response required however that theater commanders develop nuclear war plans which featured 

multiple options. See David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, 1983), 58.

5 In part, this was a bureaucratic attack against the U.S. military regarding any further expansion of nuclear forces, 

which McNamara believed were sufficiently sized. Counter-value capability, which he defined as being able to 

destroy 25 percent of the USSR’s population and 50 percent of its industry, was a relatively small target set, and the 

number of weapons required to meet this goal was easily calculable. Counterforce requirements, on the other hand, 

were more open-ended, and “damage limitation” called for further investment in an anti-ballistic missile system, 

with which McNamara had become disenchanted.

6 From unpublished and declassified minutes from the February 1966 NATO Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial 

meeting in the author’s possession. 7 Ibid.

8 Harold Brown, speech at the U.S. Naval College (Newport, R.I., Aug. 20, 1980).

9 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 1982 (January 1981), 40-41.

10 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Dec. 14, 

1982). 11 Because these changes were corrective rather than intended to create new policy, and because they were highly 

classified at the time, none of this was discussed publicly.

12 See for example: Richard Norton-Taylor, “Typhoons scrambled to intercept Russian aircraft,” Guardian (Aug. 

22, 2007); Matthew Hickley and David Williams, “RAF fighter jets scrambled to intercept Russian bombers,” Daily 

Mail (Aug. 22, 2007); Erik Holmes, “More Russian bombers flying off Alaska,” Air ForceTimes (April 8, 2008),

article notes: ‘there have been 16 such [incidents] since July [2007]’; Wojocieh Moskwa, “Russian Bombers fly 

unusual N. Sea sortie: Norway,” Reuters (July 20, 2007). 

13 See for example: Bronwen Maddox, “Putin raises spectre of nuclear war in Europe,” Times, (June 4, 2007); 

Nicole Winfield, “Putin: Russian missiles will be aimed at U.S. bases,” Independent (June 4, 2007). 14 See for example, Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Ministry of Defense's New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle,” James 

Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (October 2003).

15 See for, example, Mike Wade, RAF Intercepts Russian bombers over Stornoway, The Times (March 25, 2010). 

The article notes 20 such violations have occurred since January 2009.

16 See for example: Fred Weir, “Would Russia really use nuclear weapons against neighbors?,” The Christian 

Science Monitor (Nov. 15, 2009); “Russia may revise use of nuclear weapons in new military doctrine,” RIA Novosti

(Oct. 8, 2009); “Russia to Allow Preventative Nuclear Strikes,” CBSNews.com (Oct. 14, 2009).

17 Matthew Day, “Russia Simulates Nuclear Attack on Poland”, Telegraph (Nov. 1, 2009).

18 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Dec. 14, 

1982). 
 Miller

57 

 
CHAPTER 4

Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait*

Douglas McCready

Despite the warming of Chinese-American relations, the Taiwan

Strait remains a potential flash point between the People’s Republic of 

China (P.R.C.)1 and the United States.2 Although Taiwan is only one 

aspect of the complex relationship between the United States and China, it 

remains the most volatile part. The U.S. National Defense Strategy for 

2008 describes China as an ascendant state with the potential for 

competing with the United States. It continues to modernize and develop 

military capabilities, primarily focused on a Taiwan Strait conflict and is 

developing technologies to disrupt traditional American advantages.3

A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies concluded, “Unless China renounces the use of force as a possible 

avenue for reunification, the possibility of conflict with China over 

Taiwan will remain a central feature in American contingency planning.”

 

4

Similarly, in 2001, a Chinese official described Taiwan as the most 

sensitive issue in Sino-American relations.5

These somber conclusions reflect the overwhelming view of 

American and Chinese specialists in Sino-American relations. More 

broadly, “the challenge presented by a rising China is the principal issue 

facing American policy.”

 

6

 

* This chapter was originally published as a Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 

monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., in November 2003. The 

author has updated and revised it to reflect changes since its initial publication. 

Denny Roy puts this into regional perspective: 

“Taiwan’s security problem is Asia’s security problem: cross-Strait 

conflict would disrupt regional trade and force other Asian states to side 

with or against the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan’s security problem 

is also America’s: one likely consequence of such a conflict would be 
McCready

59

unambiguous Chinese opposition to, and corresponding action against, the 

U.S. military presence in Asia.”7

The challenge facing the U.S. is to convince both the P.R.C. and 

Taiwan to refrain from precipitous action toward unification and 

independence respectively. This will be much less difficult with respect to 

Taiwan than the P.R.C. Roy explains the situation with regard to the 

P.R.C. thus: “Taiwan remains the substance of a classic security dilemma 

between China and the United States: one country sees its own actions as 

justifiably self-defensive, but these same actions appear aggressive to 

another country. Beijing views itself as trying to preserve the status quo 

and Chinese national territory ... against the threats of [Taiwanese] 

separatism and U.S. intervention to prevent unification. In America’s 

view, however, China is a large authoritarian country menacing a small 

democratic polity and trying to change the status quo by building up a 

military imbalance in China’s favor.”8

For almost 60 years, the American policy of strategic ambiguity

has successfully prevented a major conflict. Domestic developments in 

both the P.R.C. and Taiwan require all three parties to reevaluate their 

policies. The continued success of American deterrence has become 

questionable. The stated American position that resolution of the conflict, 

whatever the result, must be by peaceful means appears increasingly 

unlikely and does not adequately address U.S. interest in the region. That 

the U.S. can delay Chinese actions is almost certain; that it can indefinitely 

deter China is unlikely.9

This study considers the Taiwan situation in terms of deterrence 

theory and its application across cultures to see under what conditions the 

P.R.C. might be convinced not to use force to resolve the Taiwan situation 

to its satisfaction. This study also examines the perceptions and 

misperception of each of the parties involved; their interests, capabilities 

and possible intentions; and how the P.R.C. intends to deter U.S. 

intervention in the Taiwan Strait. 

An examination of the options available to each party concludes by 

suggesting likely courses of action and ways to increase the likelihood of 

successful U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. There is no presumption 

China will soon become a peer competitor to the United States. Chinese 

decision-making and actions regarding Taiwan will be driven by what the 

P.R.C. – but not necessarily other nations – views as domestic concerns.
McCready

60

Unlikely to defeat the U.S. in a direct military confrontation in the 

near term, China seeks to develop “niche weapons” and strategies that 

would make U.S. intervention too difficult or too costly, especially antiaccess and area denial measures. Cliff notes, however, as serious as the 

threat is, the U.S. can do much to lessen it.10

The complexity of the Taiwan Strait situation suggests any future 

American attempt at crisis deterrence will be exceedingly difficult, and 

long-term success is unlikely unless at least one party to the conflict 

makes significant concessions to the others. The tangled relationship 

involves a combination of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. As the U.S. 

seeks to deter Chinese military action and Taiwanese provocation, the 

P.R.C. seeks to deter U.S. intervention and formal Taiwanese 

independence. 

A dangerous aspect of the relationship is the confrontation 

between an inconsistent U.S. policy regarding Taiwan and the P.R.C., and 

a P.R.C. that exhibits simultaneous characteristics of paranoia, 

entitlement, victimization and arrogance arising out of its history. The 

paranoia leads China to view all actions of potential adversaries as 

directed primarily against China. Its historical self-image as the paramount 

state in Asia causes China to view the behavior of regional rivals, the U.S. 

and Japan, as intended to weaken or marginalize China and deny its 

rightful place in the international community.11

The complexity of China’s self-image can be seen in its 

simultaneous expectation of receiving the prestige and authority of a 

permanent member of the United Nations Security Council with the right 

to a decisive say on events in Asia, the expectation of the preferential 

treatment given to developing nations, and opposition to any modification 

of the U. N. Charter to give Japan a permanent Security Council seat 

because this would dilute Chinese primacy as the spokesman for Asian 

interests.

 

Both the U.S. and the P.R.C. see themselves as occupying the 

moral high ground in their international dealings.12 This makes 

compromise and communication difficult because each presumes it is in 

the right while the other acts wrongfully and must be brought around to its 

way of thinking. This moral self-image is deeply ingrained in both 

Chinese and American culture. 
McCready

61

The most desirable outcome would be for China to transform into a 

pluralistic, democratic society where Taiwan could be accommodated and 

feel comfortable, but not necessarily required to integrate politically with 

the Mainland. This is highly unlikely in the short-term, so the U.S. needs 

to plan now for alternatives. This study explores a range of alternative 

courses of action with the intent that good crisis management will make a 

long-term peaceful solution possible. 

History of the Conflict

Without a sense of the post-World War II history of the region, 

nothing else about its potential for crisis makes sense. Historically, 

Taiwan’s relationship to the mainland was tenuous, but Japan claimed the 

island after defeating China in 1895. After World War II, the island was 

returned to China, and the Chinese Nationalists fled there after their defeat 

in the Chinese civil war. Although the Chinese Communists had expressed 

little interest in Taiwan previously, the island now became a symbol of the 

incompleteness of the communist victory in the civil war. Plans to invade 

the island were stymied by U.S. actions at the outbreak of the Korean War. 

Thus, since 1950, the Taiwan Strait has been a source of 

international tension. After the warming of U.S.-P.R.C. relations, China 

seemed willing to live with the status quo for decades. Taiwan’s move to 

democratic government since 1987, however, renewed earlier tensions. 

Democracy seemed to imply a move toward formal independence and a 

denial of the one-China policy that both the P.R.C. and the Chinese 

Nationalists had affirmed since 1949. This led to military confrontation 

between the P.R.C. and the U.S. in 1995-96 and periods of tension during 

the summer of 1999 and in early 2000. 

Repeated conflict in the Taiwan Strait during the past 60 years has 

resulted in a variety of mutual perceptions and misperceptions on the part 

of each of the parties involved. China and Taiwan have images of each 

other that do not adequately reflect their history and aspirations. The 

P.R.C. ignores that Taiwan has had a separate history and developmental 

path for more than a century. 

Both the P.R.C. and the U.S. view each other through the lens of 

their participation in conflicts going back to the Korean War. Some of 
McCready

62

these perceptions are well grounded, but others are simply wrong. Both 

lack of understanding and misunderstanding can spark a new Taiwan

Strait crisis as easily as can irreconcilable national interests.

A residue of bitterness remains among Chinese leaders toward the 

U.S. dating back to the Chinese civil war, when the U.S. sided with the 

Chinese Nationalists.13 This distrust prompted P.R.C. intervention in the 

Korean War. Believing war with the U.S. was inevitable, P.R.C. leaders 

decided their best hope lay in choosing the time and place for that war.14

Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Relations

Wars result most often from real conflicts of national interest. 

They may also, and too often do, arise from misunderstandings and 

misperceptions between nations. John Stoessinger considers misperception 

the most important single precipitating factor in the outbreak of war.15

This does not mean there is no conflict of national interest. For 

China, the U.S., Taiwan and even Japan, the resolution of Taiwan’s 

international status involves important, even vital, national interests. 

Probably the most dangerous misunderstanding is the belief, prevalent in 

both the U.S. and China, that the U.S. has no significant national interest 

at stake. Therefore, it is imperative that U.S. political leaders define and 

explain, both to the American public and Chinese decision-makers, its 

interests, why they are important, and to what extent the U.S. is prepared 

to defend them. 

Misunderstanding and misperception often exacerbate the clash of national 

interests. The situation becomes more complicated when adversaries have 

different cultural backgrounds and different histories, as do China and the 

U.S.

What could possibly be so important about Taiwan that U.S. 

leaders should speak and act as forcefully as they have on several 

occasions? The U.S. has a legal commitment under the Taiwan Relations 

Act to support Taiwan in defending itself against forcible integration into 

China; it also has a moral obligation going back more than half a century 

to provide for Taiwan’s defense. This moral obligation has only increased 

in the two decades since Taiwan has taken the path of democracy. 
McCready

63

American failure to keep its word to Taiwan would cause regional allies to 

doubt U.S. commitment to them. 

In Japan’s case, this could lead to rearmament and even 

development of a nuclear capability backed up by a missile-delivery 

system. This would be in no one’s interest, least of all China’s. Finally, “a 

China that is conventionally predominant along the East Asian littoral 

could pose a direct, difficult, broad and enduring challenge to the U.S. 

position as guarantor of regional stability and security, a challenge that 

could extend well beyond Taiwan.”16 Some who do not consider Taiwan’s 

democratic society, the security of Japan, and the credibility of U.S. 

commitments as vital interests, still view conflict in the Taiwan Strait as a 

danger to the peace and stability of the region, which does constitute a 

vital American interest.17

In the Taiwan Strait case, the problem of misperception and 

misunderstanding includes a difference of cultures and for the U.S. 

disagreement about what constitutes the relevant Chinese culture. Alistair 

Iain Johnston has challenged the conventional wisdom about China by 

suggesting modern Chinese strategic thinking is not simply a repetition of 

the ancient classics such as Sun Tzu’s Art of War. Instead, China’s 

strategic culture resembles much more the hard realpolitik of western 

international relations theory albeit with a greater potential for 

flexibility.

In any case, what happens in the Taiwan Strait 

concerns the United States, and it needs to understand and proclaim this 

interest.

18

Johnston found the P.R.C. has been much less reluctant to use 

force in strategic concerns involving territory than have other major 

powers.

 

19 This contrasts with the Chinese image (which is promoted by 

the P.R.C.) of China as a gentle Confucian nation that must be sorely 

provoked before it will resort to force. Andrew Scobell has taken this a 

step further in suggesting China has a dualistic strategic culture 

comprising Confucian-Mencian and Realpolitik elements which he calls a 

“Cult of Defense.”20 In practice, this means “Chinese elites believe 

strongly that their country’s strategic tradition is pacifist, nonexpansionist, and purely defensive but at the same time able to justify 

virtually any use of force − including offensive and preemptive strikes −

as defensive in nature.”21 
McCready

64

Which interpretation is correct makes a difference in how the U.S. 

should approach the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese 

misperceptions of the world around it are affected by its history of 

xenophobia, a sense of having been humiliated by the West and Japan, a 

measure of paranoia, and a sense of moral and cultural superiority (which 

is not unique to China). No matter which interpretation of Chinese 

strategic culture is correct, domestic concerns will always influence how it 

operates in specific situations (especially Taiwan).

Misperceptions come in several varieties. The one that comes most 

naturally to mind is when the other party incorrectly interprets what we

have said or done. No less serious, although much more difficult for us to 

understand, is the misperception where we communicate with the other 

party in ways it cannot understand or finds unconvincing because we do 

not see that party as it really is. This happens when we fail to understand 

the other party’s culture and history, when our actions and words appear to 

conflict, or when our message seems unbelievable. The second kind of 

misperception frequently leads to the first kind. A third kind of 

misperception involves how each party sees itself. Few nations see 

themselves as others see them, yet most are prone to believe everyone else 

sees them as they see themselves. Each of these forms of misperception 

has occurred more than once in the century and a half relationship between 

China and the United States − the 1949 communist revolution in China 

only made it more acute.

Those unfamiliar with their adversary’s culture often presume their 

adversary looks at the world and at the issues being contested in the same 

way they do.22 They tend to project their own cultural values and 

historical experiences on to their adversary. In a conflict situation, this 

means each side misjudges the price its adversary is willing to pay, the 

suffering it is willing to endure, and what constitutes a compelling 

deterrent or reward to that adversary. They have difficulty seeing how 

their actions will affect their adversary domestically,23 regionally and 

internationally. They also believe their own actions are as transparent to 

their adversary as to themselves and do not understand why their 

adversary would look for a hidden agenda. They forget people see what 

they expect to see and interpret the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. 

This means they interpret our actions in terms of their expectation, not our 
McCready

65

intention. People also are prone to see as intentional what in reality is an 

accidental, unintended consequence or is just plain muddling through.24

Neither the U.S. nor China has considered sufficiently how the 

other country views it in terms of their relationship over the past 150 

years. Each country knows what the other has done to it, but thinks much 

less about what it has done or what the other thinks it has done to the other 

country. Each sees itself in terms of its intentions and interests − which it 

puts in the best light − not the other country’s perceptions and experience 

of it.25 This does not mean we need to agree with the other country’s 

actions or beliefs, only that it is essential we try to understand the other 

country on its terms.26

There are at least four areas of mutual misperception whose 

correction is necessary for peace in the Taiwan Strait. Although their 

revision will not remove the conflict of national interests involved, it will 

enable us to see that conflict more clearly. These areas are the nature of 

the national interest involved, the level of commitment to that interest, the 

governmental decision-making process, and the attitudes that drive each 

nation’s international behavior. American China watchers and Chinese 

America watchers now have a good sense of the other nation in each of 

these areas, but they appear to have had less success in communicating 

this to their national leadership. Due to the nature of the regime, the 

problem is greater on the part of Chinese leaders. Correcting these 

misperceptions and misunderstandings is difficult because people tend to 

see what they want to see, especially when they have made an investment 

in that conclusion. 

Then we can predict better how it will interpret and 

respond to our words and actions and craft our messages in a way more 

likely to be understood by the Chinese in the way we intend them to be 

understood. 

Chinese leaders appear not to understand how the U.S. government 

is organized and how it makes policy. They do not appear to understand 

the balance of power among the branches of government, particularly the 

limits to presidential authority. They also have a hard time understanding 

American idealism and a political system so complex even the president 

cannot ignore special interests.27 Thus, Chinese leaders do not understand 

the Taiwan Relations Act directs American policy despite the 

communiqués signed by American presidents and Chinese leaders. 
McCready

66

One Chinese analyst complained, “Many Chinese analysts don’t 

understand the domestic political and bureaucratic motivations” 

underlying U.S. policy. They see a coherent, hostile, anti-China strategy, 

not a series of ad hoc decisions made in response to competing interests.28

They may also misinterpret the open debate in the U.S. media as 

expressions of U.S. government policy, particularly the hostile portion. 

This could lead China into precipitous action in response to what it sees as 

hostile U.S. intent. Additionally, Chinese leaders appear not to fully 

appreciate the influence of public opinion on American foreign policy.29

Swaine notes that China has repeatedly been unable to correctly predict 

U.S. responses to its military initiatives.30

Possibly the most dangerous Chinese misperception is the oftstated belief the United States lacks the political will to fight. This derives 

from the U.S. interventions in Somalia and Haiti during the 1990s. China’s 

perception is eerily reminiscent of Japanese leaders in 1941, who believed 

a devastating surprise attack against U.S. forces would destroy the 

American will to fight without regard to American capacity to ultimately 

defeat Japan. This is, however, a flawed reading of American history and 

ignores those wars where the U.S. was prepared to sustain heavy 

casualties. 

Richard Halloran comments on this misperception. “A careful 

reading of U.S. history in the 20th century... shows that Americans will 

fight for causes they understand to be vital to their principles or national 

interest.”31 Richard Sobol agrees the American public will make sacrifices 

when its leaders explain the cost and benefit of a policy to them.32 Should 

China act on the basis of this misperception, it risks unleashing what some 

have called the American “crusade mentality.” China likewise views 

Taiwan as a “soft” society where people would sooner flee overseas than 

fight to defend their island.33

This means China views the American will to fight as our weakest 

link. So it will threaten casualties in an effort to break that will early in 

any confrontation. One scenario would have China sink a U.S. aircraft 

carrier. The most powerful threat would be one that placed the continental 

U.S. at risk. 

One serious American misunderstanding of China involves the 

matter of “face.” The U.S. does not appreciate the impact of its behavior 

on China’s sense of public honor. Given the disparity between the two 
McCready

67

nations’ military powers, this can be serious. In 1996, the U.S. was slow to 

appreciate that the Chinese missile tests and war games required some 

reaction from the United States. When that reaction finally came, it 

signaled clearly and overpoweringly the U.S. was still supreme in Asian 

waters. One well-publicized deployment of a carrier battle group and a 

firm public diplomatic warning would have sufficed. Two carrier battle 

groups was overkill and a public humiliation administered to the P.R.C. 

leadership. Chinese military leaders have vowed this will never happen 

again.

Another problem lies in the different ways the U.S. and China 

perceive their own and the other’s actions. For example, the U.S. tends to 

separate the military and political in such a way it often ignores the 

political implications of its military actions. China, however, sees political 

implications behind every military decision (even when none is 

intended).34 In part, this may result from the different relationship that 

exists between civilians and the military in American and Chinese society, 

but there is also a cultural element. Where the U.S. mandates a clear 

separation and subordination of the military to the civilian, China has 

emphasized a close inter-relationship between the two.35

Chinese have described the most dangerous American 

misperception as our failure to understand the seriousness of their intent to 

regain Taiwan. This leads the United States to interpret Chinese warnings 

as “mere rhetoric,” to conclude China is bluffing, and to underestimate the 

price China is willing to pay to achieve its aim. It also leads American 

policymakers to conclude if China has no reasonable hope of victory, it 

would not use force against Taiwan because “people don’t start wars they 

expect to lose.” Chinese leaders respond that, quite to the contrary, Taiwan 

is such a serious matter of regime legitimacy that any government would 

sooner fight a war it knows it would lose than allow Taiwan to go its own 

way unchallenged.36

Chinese have stated repeatedly no cost is too great if the issue is 

political control of Taiwan. In 2001, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

colonel told a group of visiting American academics China is willing to 

suffer a 20-year or 30-year setback to its economy in order to gain control 

of Taiwan.

 

37 The flip side of this American misperception is China’s 

failure to recognize the U.S. may have interests related to the status of 

Taiwan it considers no less important than China’s.38
McCready

68

Another crucial difference seems to lie in how the U.S. and China 

understand victory. For the U.S., victory is measured in military terms. 

For China, the political and psychological (and moral) are at least as 

important. The U.S. should have learned this from the Vietnam War. 

China, with its fundamentally realpolitik approach to international 

relations, does not understand American foreign policy is an often 

inconsistent blend of realism, idealism, naiveté and ad hoc solutions. 

Instead, it sees American behavior as carefully thought out, devious and 

always directed toward some strategic interest.39 Thus, it was 

incomprehensible to the Chinese the U.S. could have bombed their 

embassy in Belgrade by accident. Likewise, U.S. humanitarian 

intervention must have an ulterior motive. China described NATO

intervention in Kosovo as a warm up for intervention in China’s domestic 

affairs.40

The second aspect of China’s realpolitik approach is its belief the 

costs to the U.S. of challenging China over Taiwan so outweigh any 

possible gain as to make such a challenge unlikely.41 Nonetheless, Chinese 

America-watchers believe the U.S. will intervene in any military 

confrontation the P.R.C. initiates against Taiwan, although China seeks to 

influence American behavior so as to avoid a confrontation.42

China’s fixation on Japan is the one great exception to its realist 

approach, but given the recent history between the two countries, it is 

understandable and not unique to China. Nonetheless, China has an 

exaggerated picture of Japanese interest and involvement in the Taiwan

area and invariably interprets Japanese actions alone and in conjunction 

with the United States as threats to Chinese interests and sovereignty. At 

the same time, it is unable to understand how Japan can interpret 

threatening Chinese behavior negatively. This reflects a pattern where 

China’s focus on bilateral relations prevents it from seeing how its actions 

appear to other nations. The 1996 missile firings near Taiwan’s ports are 

an example of this. China was shocked that countries around the world 

reacted unfavorably to China’s coercive diplomacy. It had expected they 

would ignore its effort to punish Taiwan.43

Closely associated with this is what Johnston calls Chinese 

leaders’ failure to understand the security dilemma: “where a defensive 

action taken by one status quo actor is interpreted as threatening by 

another; the second actor then takes what it believes are defensive 
McCready

69

counteractions that, in turn, are interpreted by the first actor [as 

threatening].”44

The Chinese, in particular, seem not to understand the unintended 

impact of their military actions on others and are prone to misinterpret 

their responses.

 

45

A final misperception is China’s failure to understand the history 

and perceptions of those living on Taiwan. P.R.C. leaders appear 

predisposed to view apparently innocuous actions and statements by 

Taiwan’s leaders as covert moves toward independence. The result has 

been a Chinese loss of patience, setting of time and behavioral limits, and 

coercive actions.

This was clear in 1997, when Chinese leaders described 

Japan’s willingness to establish new security guidelines with the United 

States (apparently in response to China’s actions against Taiwan) as part 

of a new U.S.-Japan conspiracy to prevent Chinese control of Taiwan.

Since the late 1980s, native-born Taiwanese have increasingly 

taken political control from the Mainlanders who arrived after World War 

II. Taiwanese public opinion now limits the options of the island’s 

leaders, but China does not appear to understand or appreciate this (just as 

it discounts American public opinion). Taiwanese public opinion is 

overwhelmingly opposed to union with Mainland China. 46

The 1996-1996 Crisis

The 1995-96 Crisis in the Strait shows how cumulative 

misperceptions and miscommunication can create and then exacerbate a 

crisis. The crisis is important because it led the P.R.C. to a reassessment of 

its military structure and doctrine to which the U.S. and Taiwan have not 

yet fully responded. The proximate cause of the crisis was Taiwan 

President Lee’s visit to Cornell University, where he delivered a speech 

lauding the achievements of a democratic Taiwan. 

China responded by staging missile tests in the sea off Taiwan’s 

two main ports during July and August 1995. This was to show China’s 

displeasure with U.S. actions and teach Taiwan a lesson, said Chinese 

spokespersons. The U.S. and other major states showed little response 

although the test areas endangered commercial shipping. 
McCready

70

Both Taiwan and the U.S. ignored China’s sensitivity about its 

sovereignty claims over Taiwan. China viewed Lee’s trip as an attempt to 

gain international standing for an independent Taiwan. China’s anger at 

American “duplicity” resulted from its inability to understand how the 

U.S. government works, especially the relationship between the executive 

and legislature. U.S. failure to respond vigorously to China’s missile 

diplomacy led Beijing to believe the U.S. wouldn’t get involved. This 

would come back to haunt both countries six months later. 

In December 1995, China decided to use coercion to influence the 

outcome of Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections. This included 

military exercises and more missile tests. The tests were close enough to 

Taiwan’s major ports to affect ship traffic and cause panic in Taipei’s 

financial markets. This time, the U.S. dispatched two carrier battle groups 

to the scene. The Chinese were publicly outraged at what they saw as an 

American overreaction. China threatened war in order to avoid the need to 

go to war and expected the U.S. would understand. China was also 

publicly humiliated because it was obvious to all it could do nothing about 

the presence of the carriers.

On Taiwan, candidates favoring independence expressed their 

views without considering how China would respond. China considered 

coercion to be a matter solely between itself and Taiwan, somewhat like 

the relationship between the U.S. Government and Rhode Island. It 

misread the Clinton administration’s previous inaction as signaling a lack 

of interest. China believed the U.S. would understand the missile tests and 

invasion exercises posed no immediate threat to Taiwan. It also believed 

Japan and other regional states would not interpret China’s actions as 

potentially threatening even though many of them also had territorial 

disputes with the P.R.C. The United States waited too long after China 

announced its exercises to respond. Following the weak response to the 

first set of exercises, this delay signaled American indifference to Beijing.

When the U.S. did respond, it overreacted. The American 

response highlighted China’s relative military weakness in contrast to 

American ability to operate in the area virtually unimpeded. China 

probably learned from this crisis the U.S. will respond forcefully should 

China attempt to use overt military force against Taiwan, but if China opts 

for a less confrontational approach, the U.S. will be unsure how and when 

to react.
McCready

71

While the crisis is over, the consequences are not. A series of basic 

misperceptions, and the actions and communications based on them, led to 

a crisis that could have resulted in war. Clearing away misperceptions and 

miscommunications is no guarantee the crisis would not have occurred, 

but it makes the possibility of crisis less likely and less serious. 

As Scobell warns, P.R.C. behavior during the crisis offers four 

reasons for concern. It reminds us China is serious about using force to 

gain control of Taiwan if necessary. It warns China finds the possibility of 

a first strike against Taiwan attractive. It shows China’s preference for 

using missiles against Taiwan, emphasizing China’s deployment of these 

weapons and Taiwan’s impotence against them. It also demonstrated a 

“dangerous lack of clear communications” between the U.S. and China. 

Although each thought the signals it sent were clear, the other side 

misinterpreted them.47

Interests

Each of the parties involved – China, Taiwan, the United States, 

even Japan – has important national interests at stake in the Taiwan Strait 

conflict. The situation is complicated because not every party recognizes 

the intensity or validity of the others’ interests. China has expressed its 

interests in terms of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the 

respect due a major state. A 2000 White Paper listed a number of basic 

interests including: desire for settlement of the Taiwan issue and 

reunification of China, affirmation Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, 

resolution of the Taiwan issue is an internal Chinese affair, desire for 

peaceful reunification, use of force is a last resort, no one must attempt to 

change Taiwan’s status by referendum, and the U.S. must deal with China 

and Taiwan on the basis of the Three Communiqués of 1972, 1979 and 

1982.48

To achieve what it views as its proper role as the paramount state 

in Asia, China needs to remove American power and presence from the 

region. It sees regaining Taiwan as essential to achieving this. China 

China’s unstated interests are no less important. Chinese leaders 

fear if Taiwan becomes independent, this will encourage separatists in 

Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia. Taiwan also threatens the Chinese 

Communist regime because it offers a successful political alternative to 

the Mainland in a Chinese cultural setting.
McCready

72

believes the U.S. is a state in long-term decline.49

Taiwan has no incentive to unite with the Mainland. It would 

prefer to remain free to continue its development as a democratic society 

and economically successful state. Anything China might interpret as a 

move toward independence would jeopardize everything Taiwan has 

gained because of the likelihood of war, but union would inhibit Taiwan’s 

economic development and political freedom. 

When China talks about 

a multi-polar world, it appears to see itself as the preeminent (Asian) state 

in that world. The P.R.C. is more like the “Middle Kingdom” of Chinese 

history than a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist state. So, having discarded their 

Marxist ideology, China’s communist leaders are increasingly dependent 

on the theme of national unification to legitimize their rule, as reflected in 

their playing the nationalism card in times of crisis.

Taiwan desires international recognition and membership in 

international organizations commensurate with its democracy and 

economic power, but China opposes both and has been able to enforce this 

opposition through diplomatic and economic coercion.50 Taiwan faces a 

conflict between promoting its status and survival. Taiwan has the greatest 

stake in maintaining the status quo, but its slow drift away from China 

presents the greatest threat to status quo – and the P.R.C. appears to 

understand this better than anyone else.51

The United States, consistent with its policy of strategic ambiguity, 

has been vague about its interests in the P.R.C.-Taiwan situation. The 

2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) said an American goal in the 

region is encouraging “continued reduction in tension between the 

People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.” Also, the U.S. “will encourage 

China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as 

its influence rises.”52

P.R.C. leaders appear convinced the U.S. is committed to Taiwan’s 

security such that a P.R.C. attack on Taiwan would result in American 

The previous NSS was similarly ambiguous but did 

define several kinds of U.S. interests. Although few would describe 

Taiwan itself as a vital national interest, it can be linked to vital interests. 

Taiwan’s existence as a democratic society is the result of American 

encouragement, so U.S. acquiescence in any solution to the Taiwan Strait 

situation that ignores or rejects the views of Taiwan’s population would be 

inconsistent with the stated American goal of supporting democracy 

around the world. 
McCready

73

military intervention. Taiwan’s leaders seem less confident.53

Soon after passage of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Sen. Jacob 

Javits explained his understanding of the TRA’s impact on American 

commitments to Taiwan: “I was particularly concerned with other dangers 

which in fact seemed more realistic than an outright invasion from across 

the Strait. The language finally adopted ... referred to U.S. concern for 

activities which jeopardized not only the security, but also ‘the social and 

economic system, of the people on Taiwan.’”

American 

failure to act would cause allies in the region who have treaty 

commitments with the U.S. to reconsider those treaties. 

54 Similarly, Ralph Clough 

describes Taiwan as an important economic partner that “has been linked 

to the United States for many years by a diverse and growing web of 

interrelationships.”55 Despite this history, it is important to remember U.S.

and Taiwanese interests are not identical.56

The United States has at least three basic interests in how the 

Taiwan Strait situation is resolved. The United States has been a Pacific 

power for more than a century. For it to allow another state to dominate 

the East Asia-Pacific region contradicts not only current U.S. policy, but 

also American grand strategy since the late 1800s.57 The United States has 

security commitments to several key East Asian and Pacific states. It also 

has a legal, and many would argue moral, obligation under the TRA to 

assist Taiwan in defending itself against forcible assimilation by the 

P.R.C. Regional states view the U.S.-Taiwan relationship as a significant 

commitment; the consequences of U.S. failure to support Taiwan would be 

more far reaching than the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975,58

It is unclear that the U.S. should find acceptable even a peaceful 

assimilation of Taiwan to the P.R.C. This would provide China with the 

technology the U.S. has given Taiwan, and that Taiwan has developed 

itself. It would also project P.R.C. military power eastward into the Pacific 

with naval and air bases on Taiwan controlling the sea lanes vital to the 

Japanese and South Korean economies. The U.S. also has a longstanding 

“soft” interest in encouraging and supporting democracy, and ignoring 

American idealism is not realistic.

causing 

American allies in the region to rethink their relationship with the U.S.

59 Taiwan is an example of democratic 

transformation as the P.R.C. is not. Abandonment of Taiwan would 

contradict values enshrined in America’s founding documents. So while 

the U.S. has stated an interest in the peaceful settlement of the conflict 
McCready

74

between Taiwan and the P.R.C., this not necessarily reconcilable with 

other U.S. interests. 

Japan also has interests in the situation. It wants to retain its 

relationship with the U.S. without antagonizing China. Any basing or 

logistical support for U.S. assistance to Taiwan could result in military 

retaliation and certainly in economic retaliation. Refusal to assist the U.S., 

however, could be the end of the mutual security relationship. Japan also 

has an interest in China not becoming so powerful that it could threaten 

Japanese security. This includes P.R.C. control of the sea lanes east of 

Taiwan that are vital to the Japanese economy. Balancing these interests 

will require Japan to walk a fine line. This is especially the case because 

Japan has a strong pacifist element, and the countries of East and 

Southeast Asia have unpleasant memories of the Japanese occupation 

during World War II. 

There is a clear conflict among the interests of the parties involved. 

The danger is the parties do not fully recognize or acknowledge the 

interests of the others. China does not believe U.S. interests relating to 

Taiwan justify going to war. The U.S. is skeptical about China’s territorial 

claim, may not fully appreciate its regime-survival concern, and probably 

has concerns about how resolution of the Taiwan situation would affect 

China’s standing as a rising power. 

Capabilities

Most studies of the situation compare the relative military 

capabilities of the P.R.C. and Taiwan (and sometimes the U.S.). This is 

necessary because intentions and capabilities are related, but by itself it 

can be misleading. Capabilities and intentions influence each other, but 

neither determines the other. Different viewers evaluate capabilities 

differently, so what we see as capabilities do not necessarily limit our 

adversary’s intentions. In the Taiwan Strait case, this comparison is 

usually of a conventional military confrontation. But, as the U.S. learned 

in Vietnam, military capability is only one consideration for engaging in 

or winning a war. Also, military confrontations need not be purely 

conventional. 
McCready

75

The P.R.C. says assimilation of Taiwan would signal the end of 

China’s civil war. China would prefer to resolve the situation peacefully, 

but, failing that, is willing to resort to force to gain its end. Chinese leaders 

have said repeatedly they would fight rather than allow China to be 

permanently divided. That they might not win does not preclude their use 

of force.60

There are historical precedents for this “irrational” course of 

action. In 1941, Japan initiated a war against the U.S. it doubted it could 

win because every other option seemed worse than war. Japan’s leaders 

had concluded the nation’s survival was at stake.

For domestic reasons, China appears willing to use force even 

when defeat is certain. Many western analysts find this incomprehensible, 

but they shouldn’t. They conclude such a course of action is irrational, so 

China wouldn’t follow it. But, in doing this, they impose their sense of 

rationality and values on the Chinese, who may have their own reasons for 

reaching a different conclusion. 

61

The difficulty in planning for a Taiwan Strait crisis arises from 

disagreement about China’s capabilities, intentions, goals and strategy. 

This includes the P.R.C.’s regional and international goals and where 

Taiwan fits into them, whether the P.R.C. and the U.S. are on an inevitable 

collision course in East Asia, whether the P.R.C. will be subtle or heavyhanded in its dealings with Taiwan, how much the P.R.C. is willing to pay 

to gain control of Taiwan and where nuclear weapons fit into the P.R.C.’s 

strategy.

In 1973, the Arab 

states attacked Israel although they knew Israel was militarily more 

powerful than they were. Achieving surprise, they almost won, but they 

understood a military defeat could still be a political victory. China’s 

perspective appears little different.

Comparisons of the military capability of the P.R.C. and Taiwan

usually begin with the major weapons systems each side has or plans to 

purchase. They also analyze the parties’ strategic doctrine and public 

statements. Occasionally, they probe behind the numbers to ask if the 

military has integrated the weapons systems in its arsenal; if there are 

sufficient trained personnel to maintain, operate and support the systems; 

which systems can be employed in the Taiwan area; and what other threats 

or responsibilities the military must be prepared to handle.62 Questions 

about joint operations and command and control reflect unfavorably upon 

both the P.R.C. and Taiwan. The 2000 Department of Defense report on 
McCready

76

Taiwan and the P.R.C. listed significant U.S. intelligence gaps regarding 

logistics, maintenance and training of both militaries.63 Michael Pillsbury 

adds command and control,64 doctrine, special operations and mine 

warfare to the list.65

As capability affects intentions, so intentions influence capability. 

Analysts who look at the structure of the P.R.C. military, Taiwan’s 

geography and Taiwanese airpower generally conclude an invasion of 

Taiwan would be unsuccessful. P.R.C. leaders have likely reached the 

same conclusion and decided to configure their military accordingly.

More important than how these militaries function in 

peacetime is their ability to increase their tempo in a combat environment 

and maintain it for the duration of a war. 

66

The different cultures involved in the Taiwan Strait conflict make 

more difficult an accurate assessment of military capabilities because of 

differing attitudes toward public disclosure. American capabilities, apart 

from classified details of weapons systems, are widely available in opensource materials. The U.S. seeks to deter opponents by letting them know 

how powerful it is.

Thus, China has chosen to concentrate on weapons that will enable it to 

intimidate Taiwan and deter U.S. intervention. This is a situation where 

intentions help determine capability. Some Chinese strategists believe a 

multifaceted surprise attack could so demoralize Taiwan’s population that 

an invasion would be unnecessary. 

67

This lack of transparency is a part of Chinese strategic culture. As 

Jason Ellis observes, “Significant information gaps have intensified the 

effects of Chinese deception, internal debate and lack of transparency, 

which have further hampered the U.S. ability to discern the nature, 

purpose and likely extent of Chinese plans in this area and to craft an 

appropriate policy response.”

In contrast, the P.R.C. attempts to deter potential 

adversaries by denying them knowledge of its military organization, 

doctrine, plans and capabilities. 

68 The U.S. has stated officially P.R.C. lack 

of transparency is destabilizing and increases the likelihood of 

misperception and miscalculation.69

It is one thing to have modern weapons. It’s another matter to be 

able to maintain these weapons and use them to their full potential. It is 

even more difficult to employ them in a combined arms scenario where 

communications and coordination are essential. It is doubtful the P.R.C. 

has sufficient training or experience to mount major combined arms 
McCready

77

operations.70 The Secretary of Defense’s 2009 report on China said, “The 

content of Integrated Joint Operations has yet to be formally defined, 

remains largely an aspiration, and will likely continue to be so until at 

least 2010.... China’s military leaders recognize and acknowledge that one 

of the primary obstacles to Integrated Joint Operations is that many PLA 

commanders have little or no training for, or experience operating in, a 

joint environment.” 71

An additional difficulty regarding the P.R.C. is although the U.S. 

knows where it is focusing its weapons development and acquisition, it is 

unclear how well the P.R.C. can integrate its various systems into a 

coherent war-fighting force, implement its doctrine for joint operations, 

and sustain its forces in a combat environment. American analysts have a 

better idea of Taiwan’s general capabilities because P.R.C. pressure has 

made the U.S. into Taiwan’s only major source of arms. But Chinese 

pressure also means the U.S. no longer has the relationship with Taiwan to

enable it to evaluate Taiwan’s military readiness, maintenance, command 

and control, and weapons survivability. The quality and quantity of 

Taiwan’s domestic arms production are likewise unclear.72

The consensus is the conventional military balance is shifting in 

the P.R.C.’s favor, but is at the same time becoming more complex. 

Assessing China’s efforts toward employing asymmetrical warfare against 

Taiwan, Stokes says, “Emphasis on preemptive, long-range precision 

strikes, information dominance, command and control warfare, and 

integrated air defense could enable the PLA to defang Taiwan’s ability to 

conduct military operations.”73 Kaplan adds the P.R.C. is developing 

niche capabilities in submarines, missiles and space technology “that will 

allow them to potentially embarrass us at sea ... or to lock us out of the 

Taiwan Strait.”74

China is also developing a cyber warfare capability to attack 

Taiwanese, Japanese, and American command and control centers, 

financial markets and other key electronic facilities so essential to the 

functioning of modern society.

This could also seriously degrade U.S. capability for 

military action in the region, especially the mobilization and deployment 

necessary to support Taiwan against attack. 

75 The P.R.C. has repeatedly tested its cyber

war capability against U.S. government and civilian computer networks.76

Yet, as Mulvenon has pointed out, while we know the extent and direction 

of China’s interest in cyber war because they are discussed in open-source 
McCready

78

literature, we do not know Chinese capabilities in the field because that 

information is highly classified.77

Richard Clarke warns although P.R.C. offensive cyber war 

capabilities may be less than those of the U.S., China has superior 

defensive capabilities (including the ability to quickly disconnect the 

entire country from the Internet). Clarke describes the U.S. cyber war 

defense as minimal, enabling an enemy to take down both the military and 

civilian infrastructure in a first strike.78 Mulvenon, however, suggests the 

P.R.C. tends to overestimate the U.S. military’s reliance on computers.79

China lacks sufficient sealift capacity to successfully invade 

Taiwan, although it probably can achieve air superiority over the Taiwan 

Strait. 80 The west coast of Taiwan is notoriously unsuited to amphibious 

operations – and the east coast is worse.81 The P.R.C. has shown no 

intention of improving its amphibious capability, but has focused on antiaccess weapons whose greatest utility would be in deterring U.S. 

intervention. It is improving the quality and accuracy of its ballistic and 

cruise missiles, expanding and modernizing its submarine fleet,82

China’s large inventory of short- and medium- range ballistic 

missiles can quickly reach neighboring states and its ICBMs can reach the 

continental United States. With the mobile solid fuel and submarinelaunched ICBMs being deployed, the P.R.C. has a limited second strike 

capability. Chinese officers have threatened to use nuclear weapons 

against American cities if the U.S. intervenes to defend Taiwan. It remains 

unclear whether this was more than bravado. 

developing its cyber war capability, and developing other asymmetrical 

capabilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses and hinder U.S. intervention. 

Chinese ballistic missiles are being configured to enable terminal 

precision guidance so they can damage Taiwan’s major airfields, ports, 

and key infrastructure, degrading Taiwan’s ability to launch fighter 

aircraft and coordinate air defense, and possibly putting U.S. carriers at 

risk. The P.R.C. is also developing cruise missiles with an over-thehorizon capability that to fly under current and projected missile defense 

systems. The P.R.C. has also purchased advanced anti-ship cruise missiles 

and torpedoes from Russia. 

The U.S. technological warfare in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo

shocked and impressed China. It decided it needed to develop at least 

some of these capabilities itself. Pillsbury says some Chinese strategists 
McCready

79

want the P.R.C. to leapfrog American technology by investing in exotic 

weapons systems, developing new doctrines and deploying new 

organizations.83 The same technological prowess the Chinese want for 

themselves they also believe they can turn against the United States. 

Because the U.S. military has built information technology into every 

aspect of war-fighting, disrupting that technology would have devastating 

consequences on American ability to use its military. Chinese military 

leaders believe if they disable these high-tech systems, they can keep the 

U.S. out of the fight or defeat it when it engages.84

Interestingly, China considers the U.S. vulnerable because of its 

dependence on technology yet believes it can exploit technology to deter 

or defeat the U.S. in a regional conflict without exposing itself to the same 

vulnerability. China seems to understand technology instrumentally 

without necessarily understanding the organizational elements required 

and believes technology can quickly and inexpensively transform China’s 

offensive military capability to enable a weaker nation to defeat a stronger 

one. These ideas go by the names Assassin’s Mace and “Inferior Defeats 

the Superior” in the Chinese military literature.85

Chinese military authors have written extensively on the potential 

of Information Warfare (IW) to enable China to bypass several 

generations of technology to defeat a more powerful and advanced 

adversary. They believe many aspects of IW can be found in embryonic 

form in the Chinese military classics. Drawing on these for inspiration, 

China is likely to develop innovative IW strategies that will look nothing 

like American IW programs.86

The United States has the most powerful military in the world. 

This is not the same, however, as being able to concentrate that power in 

support of Taiwan. U.S. forces are deployed around the world, limiting 

their ability to focus on any one place, whereas, as a regional power, 

China can focus on its immediate vicinity. In the future, the U.S. is likely 

to need more than carrier battle groups. American ability and willingness 

to support Taiwan militarily will depend on the magnitude of the crisis; 

whether other international situations require a U.S. presence; the 

willingness of allies, especially Japan, to allow the U.S. to use bases on 

To the extent they are different and the 

U.S. fails to recognize the differences, they will be difficult for U.S. forces 

to counter. 
McCready

80

their territory and even to provide some direct assistance; American public 

support;87

The most important factor for America’s regional allies will be 

how China threatens to respond. Robert Kaplan, who doubts a war will 

ever be fought in the Taiwan Strait, warns that even the perception the 

U.S. couldn’t win such a war would change the entire balance of power in 

Asia.

and the nature of Chinese deterrence. 

88

American support to Taiwan can range from political and 

diplomatic intervention, through provision of replacement and 

supplementary weapons systems and intelligence, to direct military 

involvement with naval and air forces. Deployment of American ground 

forces is unlikely. The U.S. stations one carrier battle group in the region 

and has land-based aircraft in Japan. Anti-submarine warfare and 

minesweeping might require Japanese assistance if the political climate 

permits.

Taiwan would have difficulty defending itself against a 

coordinated attack by P.R.C. conventional air and naval forces, especially 

if softened up by a missile barrage. Taiwan cannot defend itself against 

ballistic or cruise missile attack and likely would face difficulty in 

responding to a concerted special operations or cyber attack. Taiwan’s 

anti-submarine warfare capability is limited. Its submarines are obsolete. 

Thus, Taiwan has virtually no self-defense capability against a first strike 

of the sort China has been talking about.89 It could defeat many of the 

individual parts, apart from ballistic missiles, but a coordinated, 

multifaceted surprise attack would overwhelm it. Stokes notes that, absent 

a viable defense against Chinese ballistic missiles, Taiwan may consider 

such counterforce operations as preemptive strikes on missile sites.90

Taiwan needs to refocus away from ground forces toward air and 

naval forces. The battle will be at least half lost if the PLA secures a 

beachhead on Taiwan. Historically, the army has been the most powerful 

of Taiwan’s armed forces. It is skeptical the air force and navy can prevent 

an invasion, so it wants weapons able to defeat the PLA on the beach. 

Thus, until recently, anti-submarine ships and helicopters have not been 

high on Taiwan’s list of desired purchases, and no one has been willing to 

sell it modern submarines. Taiwan also needs to upgrade its air force to 

include fourth-generation fighters if it is to maintain air superiority.91

China has effectively used the threat of economic retaliation to deter 
McCready

81

countries other than the U.S. from selling weapons to Taiwan, but remains 

frustrated by its inability to make the U.S. stop selling weapons to 

Taiwan.92

As important as acquiring new weapons are integrating current 

systems, improved pilot and crew training, hardened airfield facilities, 

improved air defense command and control, and better interoperability 

with U.S. forces.93

Because it cannot defend against Chinese ballistic missiles, Taiwan

risks losing the air superiority over the Strait necessary to defeat any 

P.R.C. invasion attempt.

These are less glamorous than some of the new 

weapons systems Taiwan would like, but they are more essential to a 

successful defense of the island.

94 This assumes China attains sufficient precision 

with its missiles that it can render runways at least temporarily inoperable, 

slowing the Taiwan air force’s sortie rate, decreasing the number of 

defensive aircraft that can be in the air at any one time and destroying 

AWACS aircraft on the ground.95

With its modern, technological economy and educated population, 

Taiwan’s capacity for offensive cyber warfare probably exceeds the 

P.R.C.’s. But Taiwan’s defenses against a computer network attack are 

inadequate. As a technologically advanced and open society, Taiwan is 

more vulnerable to cyber warfare than the P.R.C. Taiwan is also 

concerned by the P.R.C.’s declared interest in developing an 

electromagnetic pulse weapon. Detonated high over Taiwan, such a 

weapon could destroy all unshielded electronics on the island without 

causing any direct casualties.

Taiwan has the know-how to develop nuclear weapons and 

delivery systems. It halted its nuclear program more than 30 years ago 

because of U.S. pressure. China has threatened Taiwan’s development of 

nuclear weapons now would constitute grounds for war. Stokes notes, 

however, should Taiwan doubt U.S. support, it might try to develop 

nuclear weapons and delivery systems.96

Intensions

The only party to make its intentions clear is the P.R.C. It wants to 

integrate Taiwan with the Mainland, and is willing to use force to achieve 
McCready

82

this goal. In various public pronouncements, the P.R.C. has stated 

conditions that would cause it to use force against Taiwan and nations 

aiding Taiwan and has drawn a firm line on acceptable international and 

domestic behavior by Taiwan, the intent of which is to isolate Taiwan 

internationally. Taiwan has refused to accept P.R.C. conditions for 

negotiations because it believes they would predetermine the outcome,97

The U.S. has sought to leave unclear to both Taiwan and the 

P.R.C. its willingness to intervene in cross-Strait conflict, saying only that 

it expected a mutually agreeable, peaceful resolution of differences 

between Taiwan and the P.R.C. In part, this strategy results from U.S. 

uncertainty about what it would do in various contingencies. 

but it has carefully avoided statements hinting at formal independence. 

Japan is the fourth actor which must be considered. Despite P.R.C. 

complaints, it is unclear how supportive Japan would be of U.S. military 

assistance to Taiwan. The preference of all four parties involved appears 

to be a continuation of the status quo, but this may not be a viable option. 

China believes Taiwanese separatism encourages separatists on the 

Mainland. For the current generation of Chinese leaders, who lack the 

revolutionary legitimacy of Mao and Deng, the final unification of China 

that began with Hong Kong and Macao must include Taiwan (this 

legitimacy concern is also likely to make them less willing to compromise 

if a crisis does arise). The P.R.C. considers political control of Taiwan a 

vital national interest. It is not clear that the U.S. recognizes the emotional 

and nationalist depth of Beijing’s interest or the widespread support of the 

Chinese public for unification. 

Because China considers Taiwan a “renegade province,” it does 

not consider its dealings with Taiwan to be a matter of concern to other 

nations. This includes weapons sales, visits by government officials, and 

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and defense 

arrangements. The P.R.C. reserves the right to treat Taiwan as it does 

Mainland provinces. But to many Americans, what China considers 

quelling domestic disturbance or concluding a civil war appears as 

aggression and evidence of P.R.C. belligerence. As a firm supporter of the 

Westphalian view of national sovereignty, the P.R.C. has consistently 

opposed international interventions in what it considers domestic matters 

of other countries. The primary reason for this is China fears a similar 
McCready

83

argument could be used to justify intervention in what China considers its 

domestic concerns. 

Traditionally, China has seen itself as a nation that prefers to settle 

disputes peacefully. This is called the Confucian-Mencian strategic 

culture. Johnston has challenged this self-image. He says China’s dispute 

behavior in some cases has been “higher risk, more militarized, and less

connected to specific limited political demands than was once believed.” 

He suggests China will be “more likely to resort to force – and relatively 

high levels of force – when disputes involve territory and occur in periods 

when the perceived gap between desired and ascribed status is growing or 

large.”98

Many Chinese believe Americans see a rising China as a threat to 

the United States that must be countered with political, economic and 

military measures.99

Taiwan’s ability to defend itself against P.R.C. attack is becoming 

increasingly problematic.

This affects their perception of U.S. actions with

regard to Taiwan and other regional states and potential deployment of 

any missile defense system. China considers including Taiwan in any 

missile defense a political statement and sees the existence of any missile 

defense as intended to intimidate what it considers legitimate Chinese 

action in the region and deny it a credible nuclear deterrent.

100

Taiwan has become a lively, even raucous, democracy. The 

governing party has changed peacefully twice in the past decade. The 

downside of this interparty conflict has stymied military modernization.

It can probably repel an invasion if it 

maintains air superiority over the Taiwan and the Strait. Its ability to 

control the sea east of Taiwan is doubtful because it lacks blue water navy, 

and it lacks the resources to defend against P.R.C. submarines or sweep 

mines from its ports and their sea approaches. If the P.R.C. gained air 

superiority over the Strait, it likely could coerce Taiwan into submission. 

101

As the relationship between the P.R.C. and Taiwan has improved, 

visiting across the Strait has begun. This has decreased Taiwanese interest 

in incorporation into the P.R.C. Taiwanese are willing to construct 

factories, do business, and even live on the Mainland, but most don’t want 

to become part of it. Extensive economic investment on the Mainland has 

given Taiwanese businessmen an interest in peaceful and expanding crossRapid economic growth has improved the Taiwanese standard of living far 

beyond that of the average Mainlander. 
McCready

84

Strait relationships, and their political clout has impacted the 

government’s ability to set policy. The P.R.C. believes increasing 

economic integration with Taiwan has given it both a carrot and a stick to 

achieve unification, but Roy suggests the situation is more complicated 

than the P.R.C. believes.102

Crisis Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy

Deterrence theory is part of western international relations theory, 

developed primarily in a Cold War setting. Thus, there is some question 

about applying it cross-culturally and in non-western settings. Apart from 

the Taiwan Strait, the United States has had limited success in deterring 

Asian adversaries. We hope with a proper understanding of ourselves and 

our adversary and openness to solving our disagreements we can achieve 

either a peaceful resolution or successful deterrence, but this is not always 

the case.103

Deterrence theory presumes our adversary is rational, reasonable 

and generally predictable. It also presumes each side knows its own and 

the other side’s interests. Only when we know our interests can we know 

what we are trying to deter, and only when we know the other side’s 

interests can we know what deterrence is likely to cost. The problem is 

adversaries frequently misunderstand one another and act in ways the 

other considers irrational, making it hard for us to know our adversary. 

What we often miss in all this is our standard of rationality does 

not necessarily apply to our adversary’s situation, especially in the 

interplay between domestic and international concerns.104

According to classic deterrence theory, successful deterrence 

requires threatening to exact a cost greater than any potential gain the 

adversary might achieve or removing a benefit the adversary currently 

enjoys.

The adversary 

we call irrational might only be “crazy like a fox.” When the adversary has 

a different culture and history, the gap only increases unless each party 

makes a determined effort to understand the other. 

105 It can also mean reducing the expected benefit the adversary 

hopes to gain,106 a course of action too rarely considered. Thus, successful 

deterrence requires understanding how the adversary measures the value 

of gains and losses. It also means convincing that adversary the deterrent 
McCready

85

threat is credible. Thus, the threat should be relevant to the subject of the 

dispute and proportional to the value of the gain sought.107 The deterrent 

threat must be understandable, believable and certain to the adversary.108

In 1950, China’s threat to intervene militarily in Korea was 

unconvincing to the U.S. because the messenger was a known P.R.C. 

sympathizer, the U.S. believed China incapable of intervention to the 

extent required for success, and Chinese intervention in the face of 

overwhelming U.S. power appeared irrational.109

American efforts to deter Chinese intervention were equally 

unsuccessful. Neither side understood what motivated the other, but

thought it did. For the P.R.C., intervention was a regime survival issue of 

paramount importance. Chinese leaders thought that the U.N forces’ 

attempt to occupy North Korea was directed at China.

From a Chinese 

perspective, all three perceptions were wrong. Yet, in making its threat, 

China failed to consider the difference between American and Chinese 

perspectives. The result was a deterrence failure and three more years of 

war. 

110

The problem is not merely that the U.S. and China have different 

cultures, but the leaders of both nations have acted as if they do not. 

Moreover, deterrents may not have the same meaning in Washington and 

Beijing.111

Not every adversary can be deterred. Sometimes the value to be 

gained or maintained is greater than any threat we can credibly make. This 

would be true in the case of national and possibly regime survival. It 

would also be true if the adversary believes it can evade the conditions of 

the threat, considers any condition better than the status quo, or cannot 

evaluate the threat for cultural, domestic or psychological reasons.

Effective deterrence requires understanding our adversary’s 

thought processes and preferred way of behaving. This information is both 

difficult to obtain and, once obtained, to interpret and apply to specific 

situations.

112

Further, the formal U.S. position regarding resolution of the issue 

conveys no strategic American interest in the continued existence of a 

Taiwan separate from Mainland China − it merely says the U.S. expects 

Potential aggressors do not always recognize credible deterrent threats. 

This is a real danger with regard to Taiwan. The U.S. has not articulated 

its tangible interests as clearly as the P.R.C. and its intangible interests do 

not impress China as commensurate with its own. 
McCready

86

both sides to settle the conflict peacefully. Rightly or wrongly, this signals 

a low level of interest in the situation. Successful deterrence, however, 

requires a credible (to the intended audience) reason why the deterring 

power opposes the intended action. 

Even when threats are clearly and deliberately communicated, the 

opponent may engage in wishful thinking, distort information about the 

deterrer, or ignore or twist the evidence it has in order to make the 

evidence fit its desires. The opponent may be too occupied with domestic 

concerns to pay sufficient attention to the international environment.113 In 

the post-Cold War environment, potential conflicts are likely to involve 

intrinsic interests for the regional state and non-intrinsic interests for the 

U.S. This means the U.S. commitment will appear less credible.114

The most effective deterrent appears to be convincing potential 

aggressors they will not be able to achieve a quick victory or maintain

control of the situation.115 China has said that if using force becomes 

necessary, it intends to defeat Taiwan before the United States can 

intervene. The most effective deterrent threats are issued before one’s 

adversary has committed psychologically and physically to act. Even 

tentative decisions are difficult to reverse.116

Getting our adversary’s attention can be difficult. States tend to 

focus on their own domestic political pressures and their strategic and 

domestic interests rather than on the interests and capabilities of those 

trying to deter them. The U.S. historically has sought to deter P.R.C.

action against Taiwan by deploying carrier battle groups to the area as a 

show of commitment. Rhoades suggests this ploy is usually unproductive 

despite American belief to the contrary.

For many Asians, 

involuntarily halting an action would involve loss of face. 

117

No matter how well thought out and appropriate to the situation, 

deterrence is always in the eye of the beholder, the adversary we are 

attempting to deter.118

Conventional deterrence theory usually operates with a “one size 

fits all” model. Most theorists developed their ideas during the Cold War 

This means it is not our perception of the issues 

involved, relative strength, or potential gain or loss that matters, but our 

adversary’s. At least as important as interests and capability is our 

adversary’s perception of relative will: will we actually carry out the 

threat? When it comes to Taiwan, China believes it may be able to deter 

the U.S. from intervening militarily in support of Taiwan. 
McCready

87

confrontation with the Soviet Union. Today, they tend to act as if the 

theory is universal in application. We cannot apply Soviet deterrence 

theory to China without major modifications. Both the U.S. and the Soviet 

Union found successful deterrence of China required threatening much 

higher levels of violence than required against each other. It is unclear the 

United States can morally and credibly threaten China with the use of 

force sufficient to deter action against Taiwan in every case. 119

Shulsky notes, “The historical record indicates that China’s 

adversaries often misunderstand its motives and willingness to use force, 

which affects their ability to deter the Chinese use of force.” He says 

China has been willing to use force because it can use the resulting tension 

to its own advantage. As long as China can control the tension level and 

escalation process, it believes the tension helps China and hurts its 

adversary.

And the 

U.S. is unlikely to risk a Chinese nuclear response directed against the 

continental United States to any action it might take in the case of 

deterrence failure. Or, as the Chinese general put it, would we sacrifice 

Los Angeles for Taiwan? Would U.S. leaders be willing to risk finding out 

if that would be the true cost? 

120

Possibly the greatest obstacle to successful crisis deterrence in the 

Taiwan Strait is neither the U.S. nor the P.R.C. sufficiently recognizes the 

other side believes it has important national interests at stake. In part, this 

is because the basic P.R.C. and U.S. interests involved are qualitatively 

different. China’s interests are more obvious: national sovereignty, 

territorial integrity and regime legitimacy. It is also a matter of national 

pride. 

For the U.S., credibility of commitments and support for 

democratic governments are more central than traditional security 

interests, although these are not absent. The credibility of U.S. 

commitments to Asian allies may be more important than China realizes. 

U.S. leaders have neither clearly nor convincingly articulated American 

interest in the situation and doubt China is as committed as it claims to be.

If the U.S. attempts to predict P.R.C. actions using conventional 

deterrence theory without considering China’s national self-image, it will 

seriously underestimate the cost China is willing to pay to gain Taiwan.

121

In part, this is because China in the past used bombastic rhetoric that 
McCready

88

significantly exceeded its capabilities and adversaries could too easily 

dismiss. This is no longer the case. 

An additional problem for the United States is Chinese strategic 

thought emphasizes achieving surprise and inflicting psychological shock 

on its adversary. This is especially important when facing a more powerful 

adversary such as the United States.122 Should China conclude resort to 

force is its only option; a surprise attack would be very difficult to deter. 

China has suggested such an attack would include not only Taiwan, but 

also Japan and American bases in East Asia and the Pacific. It probably 

would combine asymmetric and conventional attacks. Shlapak suggests 

making clear the escalatory consequences to the P.R.C. of attacking U.S. 

bases in the region could enhance deterrence.123

Closely linked with crisis deterrence is coercive diplomacy. 

Because it seeks to make a state undo a successful action instead of trying 

to convince that state not to attempt an action that may or may not be 

successful, coercive diplomacy is more difficult than deterrence. Since the 

early 1990s, however, the P.R.C. has used coercion successfully to rein in 

Taiwan’s attempts to acquire international space through informal 

diplomacy. The P.R.C. also has successfully coerced the U.S. to modify its 

Taiwan policy and its general policy toward China, including human 

rights, trade and technology transfer.124

Should Taiwan move toward formal independence, the P.R.C. 

likely would attempt coercive measures before resorting to military force. 

Should the P.R.C. successfully conquer Taiwan before the U.S. could 

intervene militarily, the U.S. would face the prospect of attempting 

coercive diplomacy before having to decide on a military response. 

Domestic and allied support for the latter is unlikely.

 

What the U.S. is unable to deter, it may be able to delay. The 

difference between deterring and delaying is a function of China’s 

willingness to pay the costs of military action. If forced to choose between 

Taiwanese independence and using force, China will use force. There is 

no credible threat serious enough to deter China. But as long as there is the 

likelihood of settling the conflict peacefully, it is less costly for China to 

delay acting. 

The likelihood of American intervention, the fear of failure, 

domestic and international consequences of military action, increased 

economic leverage over Taiwan, and belief in an improvement in the 
McCready

89

relative military balance over time may encourage China to delay action 

against Taiwan. One long-term concern for Taiwan is the large number of 

Taiwanese businessmen residing and educating their children on the 

Mainland. This is more important than it might appear. A delay measured 

in decades rather than years would allow for changes in both China and 

Taiwan that could lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in a way few 

may even be considering now. While long-term indicators, apart from 

Taiwanese public opinion, appear to favor the P.R.C., it is unclear that the 

P.R.C. leadership sees things that way due to its fixation on “Taiwanese 

independence.” 

Options

Crisis deterrence requires knowing what one is trying to deter. In 

the Taiwan Strait situation, it also means the U.S. needs to consider P.R.C. 

efforts to deter U.S. intervention. The latter is the more difficult task due 

to the nature of the P.R.C.’s deterrent threats and the secretiveness of its 

decision-making process. It will only become more difficult as the P.R.C. 

increases the quality, quantity, and survivability of deterrent assets. 

Each party involved in the Taiwan Strait has a range of options. 

Which option each will or should choose depends on what that party hopes 

to accomplish and the resources it has available. China has a wide range of 

options, and this creates a problem for U.S. policymakers because 

different options require different forms of deterrence. The cost of trying 

to deter all the possible Chinese options would exceed the resources and 

time available. 

Thus, the first task is to evaluate the P.R.C.’s options in terms of 

likelihood. The key determinants are Chinese capabilities and weaknesses 

and the risk to China involved in each course of action (China’s interest in 

Taiwan is clear). The less spectacular and blatant courses minimize the 

risk of international and domestic repercussions and can be tried more 

than once. 

A failed invasion would harm the P.R.C. economy, weaken the 

armed forces, probably delegitimize the Chinese Communist Party and 

topple the government, and irrevocably alienate the people of Taiwan
McCready

90

from the Mainland. That would be a high price to pay for an action with 

little likelihood of near-term success.

The P.R.C.’s minimal goal is to prevent Taiwan from becoming 

formally independent.125 China has stated clearly and repeatedly the 

behaviors by Taiwan and its allies that would provoke a P.R.C. military 

response. Most American analysts believe China is serious about its 

readiness to back its claim with force.126

No Chinese government can hope to survive if it allows Taiwan to 

gain its independence without a fight. Even war with the United States 

would be a lesser evil. It is equally doubtful the people of Taiwan would 

agree freely to assimilation apart from a drastic deterioration in the 

military balance or major improvements in the political and economic 

conditions in the P.R.C. China’s leaders need the support of the PLA, 

which sees itself responsible for successfully concluding China’s civil 

war, unifying the country, and defending its proper borders. For the PLA, 

Taiwan is non-negotiable. 

Unfortunately, Taiwan, the U.S. and Japan are less clear about 

their goals. Taiwan’s desire to remain separate from Mainland China does 

not currently include a plan for formal independence. The stated American 

goal is for the P.R.C. and Taiwan to settle their differences peacefully. 

This would not necessarily advance American interests, however. Any 

result that limited U.S. freedom of movement and action in East Asia and 

the western Pacific would be unacceptable. 

Japan’s goal or goals are even more unformed because of 

constitutional constraints, residual fears on the part of its Asian neighbors, 

and domestic political and generational differences. Japan doesn’t want to 

have to choose between the U.S. and China. Japan is concerned, however, 

about Chinese aspirations to regional hegemony and claims to the Senkaku 

or Diaoyutai Islands.127

Continuation of the status quo would be the best short-term 

solution. Although it is no one’s ideal (least of all the P.R.C.’s), there 

appears to be no alternative acceptable to all. China, however, looks at 

Taiwan’s democratic society, the growing Taiwanese sense of identity, 

and negative political attitudes toward the P.R.C. with concern. The 

P.R.C. fears the status quo is shifting subtly but steadily toward Taiwanese 

separatism.128 If so, coercion or direct military action will be required to 

achieve the P.R.C.’s goal. 
McCready

91

Despite China’s sovereignty claims, it is likely to prefer options 

least confrontational internationally and least likely to result in outside 

intervention. Shulsky says history suggests any Chinese military action 

against Taiwan is likely to occur at the lower end of the scale in terms of 

force.129 Whether he is right will depend on what precipitates P.R.C. 

military action, the window of opportunity before an American response, 

and the perceived likelihood of American action given the international 

situation at the time.

China’s Options

China has two deterrence concerns. First is preventing Taiwan

from taking steps toward formal independence and deploying weapons 

that would make P.R.C. actions against Taiwan more difficult or most 

costly. Second is deterring the U.S. from providing encouragement and 

support to Taiwan and from intervening militarily in support of Taiwan 

should a crisis lead to war. China has shown little reluctance to replace 

failed deterrence with coercive actions directed at both Taiwan and the 

United States, but it has also demonstrated a willingness to negotiate or 

compromise with regard to objectives.130

The P.R.C. and Taiwan have become increasingly economically 

interdependent. Much of this is the result of Taiwanese investment in and 

exports to the Mainland. Some have suggested this is causing Taiwan to 

be pulled increasingly into China’s orbit with inevitable unification; China 

certainly hopes so. Taiwan’s leaders have recognized this danger and 

encouraged businesses to diversify their investment into other parts of 

Asia. This cross-Strait economic relationship would make conflict 

extremely costly for both parties. Both stand to suffer enormous economic 

loss in the case of war. 

China also uses the lure of its 

potential market and trading relationship to discourage American support 

for Taiwan, even having U.S. business lobby in its behalf. It is doing the 

same with Taiwanese business and industrial leaders. When this fails, 

China has not hesitated to use trade as a form of coercive diplomacy. 

An underlying difficulty with the absorption theory, however, 

concerns China’s economy. Economists have suggested China’s rapid 

economic growth masks serious weaknesses in its banking system, state-
McCready

92

owned enterprises, and other parts of the economic infrastructure.131

Some China specialists have suggested that in the P.R.C. decisionmaking process good analysis and creative options are unlikely to survive 

the bureaucratic gauntlet and gain the attention of the actual decisionmakers.

Chinese have actually expressed concern that Taiwan might see a Chinese 

economic crisis as an opportunity to declare independence because China 

would be too distracted and disorganized to respond. Non-Chinese 

analysts have expressed concern the P.R.C. might use military action 

against Taiwan to divert domestic attention from a domestic political or 

economic crisis.

132

Chinese strategic culture differs significantly from the American 

way of war – use of these two different terms is intended to demonstrate 

this, although that oversimplifies matters. China’s strategic concept is 

broader than the American, more multidimensional and integrated. Well 

before conflict begins, China begins an integrated psychological, political, 

diplomatic, economic and military offensive intended to isolate and 

unsettle its potential adversary. 

This would mean any easing tensions in the Taiwan Strait are 

unlikely to come from China. Additionally, the PLA may keep Taiwan a 

matter of concern for budgetary reasons, to maintain a sense of mission, 

and to reinforce its nationalist self-image.

Following Sun Tzu’s famous (and widely misunderstood) adage,133

China would prefer to deter Taiwan from taking any step toward 

greater independence than it already enjoys. It can attempt this using 

military threats, psychological warfare and economic pressures. Because 

of domestic changes on Taiwan, China does not appear to consider this a 

long-term option, although its economic leverage over Taiwan continues 

to grow. China’s concern should not prevent American and Taiwanese 

policymakers from seeking innovative ways of maintaining the current 

China attempts to achieve victory without war, but, because this rarely 

happens, it also aims to shape the multidimensional battlefield to its 

advantage before the adversary even realizes there is a battlefield. So, 

Chinese goals are more complex than Americans recognize. They are 

often unsure what is at stake and what counts for victory or defeat. In any 

Taiwan Strait crisis, China probably will be engaged strategically before 

the U.S. realizes a crisis exists, hoping to outmaneuver the U.S. and 

foreclose options before any combat.
McCready

93

situation acceptable to China. Although most long-term indicators favor 

the P.R.C. over Taiwan, it is uncertain whether China’s leaders are 

inclined to wait as long as might be required. 

China has a history of provoking crises in order to test its 

adversaries’ reactions and show them the political and possible military 

costs of pursuing policies antagonistic to China.134

In seeking to deter the U.S. from responding militarily to Chinese 

initiatives to gain control of Taiwan, the P.R.C. has a range of options. 

China’s most likely courses of action, in terms of its strategic culture – and 

assuming non-military measures are unsuccessful – are those that could be 

accomplished before the U.S. could respond or those that never rise to a 

level that would trigger a U.S. military response. The latter includes a lowintensity, unconventional attack on Taiwan’s economic infrastructure and 

a long-term obstruction of Taiwan’s sea lines of communication, 

disrupting the trade that is the island’s lifeblood. So China’s best options 

are a quick, intense, surprise attack and a slow, low-intensity strangulation 

campaign.

Because China views 

crises as opportunities, not only dangers, it is willing to create a sense of 

crisis for its adversary and historically has been successful in evaluating 

risk. China might use a series of carefully orchestrated crises to try to 

unsettle the U.S. and Taiwan publics, divide the two parties, and damage 

their will to fight. While this is a low-risk strategy, it is not risk-free. The 

possibility of miscommunication and misperception raises the risk of 

unintended escalation. 

Because Taiwan is resource poor and has one of the world’s 

densest populations, its survival depends on a thriving export economy 

supplied by a steady flow of oil and raw materials.135 During the 1995-96 

Crisis, the P.R.C. learned it can disrupt Taiwan economically and possibly 

destabilize it politically at an acceptable cost and without the need for 

direct confrontation.136

Presenting the U.S. with a fait accompli would be the most 

advantageous military course for China,

This would both make it difficult for the U.S. to 

decide if or when to intervene and could wear out both the U.S. and 

Taiwan. This is a situation where a dictatorship has the advantage over 

democracies with limited tolerance for long-term conflicts.

137 although it would have serious 

political and diplomatic consequences − consequences China says it is 

willing to accept. P.R.C. success means the U.S. would have to counter 
McCready

94

P.R.C. action with its own invasion of the island to restore Taiwan’s 

independence. Gaining public support for this would be far more difficult 

than for assisting Taiwan in its own defense − as would the counterinvasion itself be − unless the P.R.C.’s quick strike included first strikes 

on U.S. forces in East Asia that caused heavy casualties, something PLA 

writers have discussed. 

Unfortunately, the Chinese discussion has emphasized U.S. 

timidity in Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo, concluding the U.S. is so averse to 

casualties it might be deterred from acting. Chinese writers have 

apparently ignored Pearl Harbor and forgotten American willingness to 

suffer major casualties in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Chinese belief the U.S. 

is casualty-averse could lead it to take provocative actions that would 

almost certainly result in war in the Taiwan Strait. 

Thus, one crucial aspect of crisis deterrence must be to disabuse 

the P.R.C. of this dangerous misperception about American casualties. 

The P.R.C. leaders’ view that Taiwan is much more important to them 

than to the U.S. joined with the (mis)perception that the U.S. is casualtyaverse creates precisely the condition for unintended war between China 

and the United States.

A second difficulty for the U.S. in the face of a swift P.R.C. 

conquest of Taiwan would be the response of America’s Asian allies. The 

U.S. would require, at a minimum, use of regional bases and local 

logistical support to mount a military response to the P.R.C. In the face of 

a fait accompli, regional allies would be unlikely to provide such support. 

This would be the result of limited domestic public support coupled with 

fear of P.R.C. retaliation. Japan, the only nation with first-hand experience 

of nuclear attack, would have to provide most of the support for such an 

operation. A credible Chinese threat, coupled with doubt the U.S. would 

be willing to suffer a nuclear attack in Japan’s defense, almost certainly 

would mean Japanese refusal to assist the U.S. in supporting Taiwan. 

One form of the fait accompli the Chinese have discussed is a 

surprise attack on Taiwan, Japan and U.S. military facilities in the East 

Asia-Pacific region. Some Chinese believe this would render all three 

unable to respond militarily to China before it could gain control of the 

island and would so shock the populations psychologically they would not 

permit their governments to act. Classic Chinese military writers 
McCready

95

emphasize the use of surprise and shock to gain strategic advantage.138

Such a first strike could be a conventional attack on Taiwanese, 

American and Japanese military assets in the region coupled with one or 

more high altitude electromagnetic pulses in the upper atmosphere. This 

would have the advantage of devastating high-tech weaponry without the 

provocation of a nuclear attack. Computer network attacks could degrade 

command and control, logistics and counterstrike assets.

Few American analysts and decision-makers take this as seriously as 

Chinese military history would seem to warrant, and Taiwan is unprepared 

militarily or psychologically for such an eventuality.

The least risky option for the P.R.C. would be a computer network 

attacks against Taiwan’s banking system, stock market, communications 

system, electrical grid, transportation network and early warning system. 

This is within the P.R.C.’s current capabilities. The P.R.C. has discussed 

openly using cyber warfare not only to damage Taiwan’s economy and 

communications, but also the U.S. information and financial 

infrastructure, which it considers vulnerable. 

Such serious disruption would devastate the economy and defense 

system and possibly panic the populace. If applied only to Taiwan, this 

course of action has the advantage it is unlikely to rise to the level where 

the U.S. could justify responding or to determine an effective way to 

intervene. It might even be carried out covertly. 

An attack on this same scale on American government and civilian 

computer networks probably would result in a public outcry for retaliation. 

While such an operation might be deniable, detection would expose the 

P.R.C. to a devastating response. The threat, however, to use cyber war is 

the one Chinese weapon that could affect the entire continental United 

States and place at risk essential infrastructure.

This option becomes increasingly attractive as Taiwan becomes 

more democratic. The P.R.C. fears this democratic trend for four reasons: 

it means the P.R.C. cannot reach an agreement with leaders over the heads 

of the people of Taiwan (as happened to Hong Kong and Macao), the 

people of Taiwan find political union with the repressive P.R.C. 

increasingly unattractive, a democratic Taiwan demonstrates democracy 

and Chinese culture are not incompatible, and the continued existence of a 

democratic Taiwan makes easier for western democracies to justify 

defending it.139
McCready

96

A second course of action would be an attack by precision guided 

ballistic and cruise missiles against Taiwan’s air force bases, radar 

installations, and command and control centers. If successful, The P.R.C.

could achieve air superiority over the Strait and Taiwan itself. This would 

allow the air drop of troops, capture of Taiwan’s ports, and the movement 

of large numbers of soldiers quickly across the Strait, followed by 

occupation of the island. 

This scenario assumes the P.R.C. can keep its preparations hidden 

from U.S. and Taiwan intelligence, that a missile attack followed by 

aircraft attacks would rapidly destroy Taiwan’s air force, P.R.C. troops 

delivered by aircraft could defeat Taiwan’s army on the ground, that the 

P.R.C. has accurate terminal guidance systems for its missiles, and – most 

important – that the P.R.C. could synchronize such an operation − all of 

this before the U.S. could react. Although P.R.C. writers have mentioned 

this course of action, each element is problematic. RAND analysts have 

concluded a missile attack, especially if China can argue it was directed 

exclusively against military targets, might not receive as serious an 

international response as would an invasion or an indiscriminate missile 

attack. They also suggest such an attack might seriously affect Taiwanese 

morale.140

A third option is some form of blockade. This would cripple 

Taiwan’s economy and further isolate it diplomatically. Chinese leaders

appear to consider this less provocative than missiles or an invasion, but it 

would tax China’s naval forces to enforce a full blockade. Anything less 

than a full blockade would take so long to be effective Taiwan and its 

friends could develop countermeasures. 

Michael O’Hanlon says, “Even a limited blockade effort conducted 

by China’s modern submarine force could stand a reasonable chance of 

dragging down Taiwan’s economy − and keeping it down for a prolonged 

period. U.S. military intervention might be needed to break the blockade 

quickly.”141 Current and proposed improvements to China’s navy are 

intended to inhibit U.S. Navy access to the area, hampering its ability to 

break blockade.142

A variation on this would involve using submarines to lay 

minefields outside Taiwan’s main harbors and even threatening to sink 

Any U.S. effort would probably require the assistance 

of Japanese minesweepers.
McCready

97

commercial vessels that entered an exclusion zone outside Taiwan’s main 

ports. This could be part of a larger blockade or implemented on its own. 

The sinking of one merchant ship would virtually halt seaborne commerce 

and devastate Taiwan’s economy. This is within the P.R.C.’s capabilities, 

but could provoke U.S. intervention. But if the operation spread over a 

sufficiently long period, the U.S. might tire of involvement and Taiwan 

become too worn down to continue resistance. The result, again, would be 

disruption and collapse of Taiwan’s economy with a probable capitulation 

by Taiwan.

The P.R.C.’s “one China” claim provides legal cover for this 

option. Blockades are acts of war under international law, but because it 

considers Taiwan a part of China, the P.R.C. asserts any blockade is solely 

a domestic matter. When considered in conjunction with China’s selfunderstanding as a moral actor, the domestic claim points in the direction 

of some form of blockade if the other relevant factors are conducive. 

The least likely scenarios involve an amphibious assault across the 

Taiwan Strait or a nuclear attack on Taiwan. The first is impossible 

without P.R.C. air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, additional sealift

capacity, and a combined arms capability the PLA has yet to demonstrate. 

In any case, it would be a formidable task and the cost of failure would be 

high, including almost certainly the de jure independence of Taiwan. This 

would be the last resort of a desperate Chinese government. 

The second course would produce a hollow victory with Taiwan’s 

economy destroyed, its surviving population forever alienated, and the 

P.R.C. an international pariah. China has stated repeatedly that it will not 

use nuclear weapons against other Chinese; the threat of their use appears 

directed at American and Japanese intervention.

Distinct from actual use of nuclear weapons would be the threat to 

use such weapons against the continental U.S. or forward deployed U.S. 

forces in East Asia and the western Pacific. A U.S. president would have 

to consider carefully how the crisis appeared to the Chinese leadership 

before deciding whether the threat was serious or a bluff. There are no 

adequate historical analogies to help in making this decision. 

The threat to use nuclear weapons is the most powerful deterrent 

the P.R.C. has to discourage American involvement in any Taiwan

conflict, but actual use of such weapons would invite a massive retaliatory 

response. The P.R.C. currently has more to lose to such retaliation than at 
McCready

98

any time in its history, so nuclear threats likely will be used to deter 

conventional U.S. intervention. 

Currently, the P.R.C. believes it can achieve its goal without 

resorting to force. It is convinced that if it does use force, the U.S. will 

intervene on the side of Taiwan. China also recognizes the U.S. is greatly 

superior to China militarily. So if the day ever comes that China believes 

war is inevitable, it will seek to choose the time, place (or places), and 

nature of the conflict so as to overcome the American material advantage 

through strategic and tactical surprise. The China Security Review 

Commission warns, “China’s leaders believe that the United States, 

although technologically superior in almost every area of military power, 

can be defeated, most particularly, in a fight over Taiwan in which China 

controls the timing.”143 China’s targets will be those Taiwanese, American 

and Japanese assets most able to respond to China militarily and those 

whose destruction will deliver the sharpest psychological blow to China’s 

potential adversaries. Chinese suggestions that the most effective action 

would be a powerful surprise attack inject an inherent instability into the 

situation.

Taiwan’s Options

Taiwan’s best option is to lay low and maintain the status quo. 

This leaves the initiative with China. The people of Taiwan do not want to 

become part of the P.R.C., and they now have a say in the matter. “There 

is strong popular opposition to China’s coercive diplomatic and military 

moves, little support for China’s position on unification, and strong 

support for maintaining Taiwan’s current status in the face of Chinese 

pressure. However, the public also wants to benefit from cross-strait 

economic and other exchanges and to avoid confrontation with China and 

tensions in relations with the U.S.”144

Taiwan’s political development precludes a simple unification with 

the Mainland. Events in China have done nothing to ease Taiwanese 

reluctance. Taiwan’s safest path is to maintain a low profile internationally 

while highlighting its democratic political system and thriving economy, 

improve its defensive capability by buying the weapons systems it really 

needs, developing or improving informal relationships with the United 
McCready

99

States and other regional actors, and doing nothing the P.R.C. could 

construe as steps toward formal independence. 

Taiwan needs to prepare its citizens for the domestic impact of 

P.R.C. action, coercion as well as attack, and make critical improvements 

to its defenses against surprise attack and cyber warfare. Taiwanese 

leaders should also develop unconventional options that respond to P.R.C. 

concerns and preserve P.R.C. “face” while preserving a separate existence 

for the island and its population. A moderate improvement in Taiwan’s 

defensive capability could help stabilize the situation as well as enhance 

deterrence.

U.S. Options

The United States has a range of options, not all of which are 

equally attractive. Actually, there are two sets of options regarding 

Taiwan. The first concerns U.S. actions when the situation is relatively 

calm and aims to maintain that calm. The intent is good decision-making 

and execution will prevent crises from developing. The second concerns 

U.S. actions when a crisis occurs. The purpose is two-fold: to prevent the 

crisis from becoming a shooting war and to prevail should war break out. 

The former includes unofficial travel between the U.S. and Taiwan, types 

of weapons sold to Taiwan, unofficial military exchanges and coordination 

with Taiwan, official military exchanges with the P.R.C., deployment of a 

national or theater missile defense system, and similar actions whose 

cumulative effect will influence U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. The latter 

involves trying to persuade both China and Taiwan not to choose a 

military solution or provoke the other party to do so. This could mean 

naval deployments, political and economic sanctions, breaking a blockade, 

or direct military intervention. Deterrence must be matched by 

reassurance. For both the P.R.C. and Taiwan, this means a strong 

reaffirmation of U.S. support for the status quo, as the Bush 

Administration did in reining in Taiwan’s President Chen. 

American policymakers have not tried to use China’s stated fear of 

a resurgent Japan to encourage China to moderate its international 

behavior. One benefit China gains from the U.S. presence in East Asia is 

a Japan whose military capability does not match its economic and 

political strength. Although China professes not to understand why Japan 
McCready

100

might have any reason to fear it, an American departure from East Asia or 

failure to keep its commitments is likely to cause Japan to consider 

rearming. Were Japan to apply its technological and industrial capability 

to military development, China would have grounds for concern. When 

China complains about a forward American presence in East Asia, the 

U.S. can remind China’s leaders this is a cheap price to pay for not having 

to worry about a militarized Japan. 

The U.S. remains obligated under the Taiwan Relations Act to 

provide Taiwan with adequate weaponry to defend itself. The emphasis 

should be on low-profile, defensive weapons Taiwan needs to counter 

areas of current and expected P.R.C. advantage. The greatest needs are for 

anti-submarine and mine-clearing capabilities, a more flexible command 

and control system, missile defense, and modern fighter aircraft. 

China also needs to be aware it does not have veto power over U.S. 

weapons sales. American weapons sales to Taiwan must walk the fine line 

of providing those items Taiwan needs for self-defense without providing 

systems or quantities that embolden Taiwan or cause the P.R.C. to react 

militarily.

Economic threats have often been proposed as a way to deter 

Chinese action. Actually, the only successful economic threats have been 

those China has made to the United States. Threatening sanctions has only 

turned China to alternate suppliers and led to vigorous lobbying by 

American businesses fearful of being shut out of the China market. Given 

the size of the U.S.-China trade imbalance and the P.R.C.’s creditor status 

regarding U.S. debt, the U.S. can take few economic measures within 

WTO rules.

Crisis-related options include withdrawing from the situation, 

seeking to maintain the status quo, or taking a clear position in support of 

the P.R.C. or Taiwan.

145 Much more than for China, American options 

must be evaluated in the context of domestic public opinion. A poll by the 

Foreign Policy Association questions the likelihood of public support for 

American military intervention if the P.R.C. invades Taiwan, the most 

blatant option Beijing has.146

A second limit to action is that as a superpower the U.S. has many 

interests other than Taiwan. One or more of those may already be claiming 

American attention and resources when a Taiwan crisis develops. Also, 

U.S. action in one area affects relations with nations in other areas. China 

 
McCready

101

could use American commitments to instigate a crisis in some other part of 

the world to divert American attention and resources as it prepared to act 

against Taiwan. This would fit neatly into the classic Chinese approach to 

warfare.

The foundation of U.S. policy for the past half century has been 

“strategic ambiguity.” This has left both the P.R.C. and Taiwan unsure of 

how the U.S. would respond to conflict in the Taiwan Strait – and that is 

how U.S. leaders have wanted it. This policy should be retained. It may 

not be the best policy, but none of the alternatives is better. 

Strategic ambiguity’s great advantage is it gives the U.S. room to 

maneuver. It also encourages caution on the part of both China and 

Taiwan because neither can ever be quite sure how the U.S. will act in a 

particular situation. The policy reflects the reality the U.S. cannot be sure 

how it will act in a crisis until one actually occurs. 

Too much of a shift in either direction is liable to tempt the gaining 

party to take destabilizing risks. The U.S. can always fill in details quietly 

to each party within the overall policy. The policy does not prevent the 

U.S. from telling Taiwan and the P.R.C. it views particular actions by each 

to be out of bounds and automatically precluding or mandating U.S. 

military intervention.

Probably the greatest advantage in an age of media-driven foreign 

policy is everyone knows the U.S. probably will act, but no one is quite 

sure how. The imprecision of strategic ambiguity provides U.S. leaders 

with flexibility and time to think if crisis arises. The U.S. response can be 

tailored to the particular crisis and not constrained by previous public 

statements. If the U.S. does decide it must act to prevent Chinese action 

against Taiwan, it should do so early and delicately enough to permit 

China a way out that doesn’t cause it to lose face – as happened in 1996. 

Withdrawal would have the same practical result as openly 

supporting the P.R.C.’s claim to Taiwan. Both courses would have 

domestic U.S. and regional repercussions. Domestically, there could be a 

revival of the “Who lost China?” debate of the 1950s, exacerbated by the 

fact Taiwan is a democracy in a way Nationalist China never was. 

Regionally, the action would undercut the credibility of U.S. commitments 

to allies, who likely would seek alternate security means or cut a deal with 

China.147 Here, Japan with military and technological potential and 

regional history becomes a matter of concern. According to Charles 
McCready

102

Freeman, “A U.S. failure to respond to a P.R.C. attack on Taiwan would 

so devalue the U.S.-Japan relationship that Japanese would feel even more 

impelled to develop a military capable of independent action to defend 

their strategic interest.”148

Open U.S. support for Taiwan might not lead to a formal 

declaration of independence, but certainly would encourage Taiwan in that 

direction. Such support would require a clear American security 

commitment. This would be unacceptable to the P.R.C. and would result 

in Chinese coercion against the U.S. and Taiwan. A declaration of 

independence or Taiwan’s obstinacy in the face of P.R.C. coercion 

probably would result in war. 

Open U.S. support of Taiwan would mean U.S. facilities in the 

region could be targeted as well as the Taiwan military. P.R.C. military 

have threatened this, and the missiles that can reach Japan and other U.S. 

allies are nuclear-capable.149 Chinese military history demonstrates 

readiness to use surprise attacks, especially against more powerful foes.150

During earlier crises, the U.S. was able to plan a response without 

needing to consider China’s capability to harm American forces in the 

region, much less the continental United States. For any future crisis 

involving the P.R.C., the U.S. must consider China’s potential use of 

conventional, cyber and nuclear weapons against U.S. forces in East Asia 

and the Pacific and targets in the continental United States. 

While many consider the statement by a Chinese general that the 

P.R.C. could act militarily against Taiwan without fear of U.S. intervention because U.S. leaders “care more about Los Angeles than they do 

about Taiwan” to include a great deal of bluff, it would be foolish to 

ignore such threats. It is not clear the P.R.C. leadership understands the 

seriousness of using nuclear weapons against another nuclear power, 

especially first use.151 In any case, all future U.S. planning regarding 

Taiwan must include the remote possibility it could escalate into a nuclear 

war.152

Current U.S. doctrine includes attacking the enemy’s command 

and control system, strategic weapons, airfields, and communications and 

utilities infrastructure, but the U.S. has never fought even a regional war 

against another nuclear power. American war planning for the Taiwan

Strait should consider potential consequences of striking Mainland 
McCready

103

Chinese facilities – or allowing Taiwan to do so – and consider options 

that do not risk escalation to nuclear war.153

The U.S. must also plan for a protracted crisis. Democracies do not 

handle long-term conflicts well, and the U.S. is known for its desire to get 

in, get done and get out. The P.R.C. would be at an advantage if the U. S. 

had to deploy resources to the region over an extended period, without the 

crisis ever rising to a level that would require military intervention. How 

the American public, Congress and American allies would respond to the 

expense, stress and impact on the U.S. to meeting its responsibilities in 

other areas is unclear, but history is not encouraging. 

One possibility relates to China’s self-image as a moral exemplar. 

This both places a limit on how the U.S. can deal with China and opens a 

door. The limit is the U.S. should neither put China in a place where it is 

forced to see itself or allow others to see it as acting immorally nor use 

language that portrays China’s behavior toward Taiwan as immoral. 

At the same time, it might be possible to portray to China what 

could constitute a settlement of the Taiwan situation that leaves Taiwan 

separate from China (but not formally independent) and puts China in a 

morally favorable light. This would have to be approached cautiously 

because of China’s sovereignty concern and fear of internal instability, but 

as a long-term process, it might offer the greatest prospect of enduring 

peace. 

Taiwan would have to be encouraged at the same time to accept 

the status quo with its lack of “international space” for the foreseeable 

future in order to ease domestic pressure on Chinese leaders. To be 

successful, this policy would have to maintain the status quo for several 

generations in hope Chinese irredentism would moderate over time.

Deterrence theory suggests effective deterrence requires 

understanding the motivation and degree of determination of our 

adversary. Ellis says the U.S. should “determine the pressure points to 

which Chinese leadership will respond.”154 Applying this to China’s 

expressed concerns about national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 

threat to encourage separatist movements within Mainland China would 

strike at a matter of expressed Chinese interest and concern. It would also

be relatively inexpensive and unlikely to result in a direct U.S.-P.R.C. 

military confrontation. 
McCready

104

The downside is being able to turn the threat off as readily as one 

turns it on. This option would require major preparation, and it could 

easily outpace U.S. ability to control or halt it. This option would also be 

constrained by both American law governing covert operations and 

domestic opinion when the operation became public knowledge (as it 

surely would).

A final possibility, one whose application in this case is unclear, 

would be to make conquering Taiwan appear much less valuable to China 

than it now does. This seems to be difficult to implement because China’s 

greatest perceived benefits are self-image and prestige, not economic 

resources or strategic position. 

Given Taiwan’s rugged interior and history of guerrilla activity 

against occupiers, well-publicized preparations for such operations and a 

discrete American expression of readiness to encourage and even assist 

them would warn China it could be entering into a situation that could 

slowly bleed its resources in the way Vietnam did the U.S. and 

Afghanistan did the Soviet Union. But would this threat deter China? 

Probably not. 

Japan’s Role

More than half a century after its defeat in World War II, Japan 

remains in an awkward position in East Asia. Despite its peace 

constitution, relatively small military and weakened economy, Japan’s 

neighbors have not forgotten its imperialist history and continue to fear the 

possibility of a remilitarized Japan. Japan has the strong scientific and 

economic foundation to quickly develop a powerful military. Japan has its 

own regional concerns, not the least of which is a potentially powerful 

China. Chinese success against Taiwan would only increase the P.R.C.’s 

regional power and the danger to Japan. Control of Taiwan would put the 

P.R.C. astride the sea lanes through which passes much of Japan’s 

commerce.

For Japan, the best option is continuation of the status quo, both in 

the China-Taiwan relationship and in the Japanese-American relationship. 

While the mutual security treaty and more recent security guidelines create 

obligation on Japan’s part, they also protect Japan from the need to create 
McCready

105

a powerful military with the regional reaction this would engender. If it so 

decided, Japan could quickly become the peer (other than in size) of any 

regional power except the United States.

Conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be a nightmare for Japan. 

Japan would have to choose between its U.S. alliance and the strategic 

benefit of a non-hostile relationship with China. Freeman believes this 

dilemma would lead many Japanese to advocate developing an 

independent defense force to pursue Japan’s strategic interests.155 Because 

of lingering anti-Japanese feelings in China, any direct Japanese 

involvement in a Taiwan crisis would likely exacerbate the crisis and even 

provoke escalation.156

Japan’s current leaders are disinclined to accept guilt for Japan’s 

imperial past and are also taking a close look at the U.S.-Japan security 

alliance. While the alliance is less costly to Japan and less threatening to 

Japan’s neighbors than other options, it brings with it the domestic 

consequences of having American military bases in Japan and is a source 

of contention on Okinawa where most of the U.S. bases are located. 

Conclusions

The Taiwan Strait remains a potential flash point between the 

United States and China. This is not only because the U.S. has interests in 

the East Asia-Pacific region that conflict with China’s, but also because 

the current status of Taiwan focuses those interests in a way that 

demonstrates their incompatibility. The tension has existed for 60 years 

without war, but the past is no guarantee of the future. The leaders of the 

P.R.C. appear to take the possibility of war more seriously than do 

American leaders and are preparing for that eventuality. There is the 

distinct possibility the U.S. and Taiwan are preparing for a different type 

of military crisis than the P.R.C. may be planning. The more this is true, 

the less successful will be deterrence efforts.

Part of the complexity the U.S. faces is historical attachment to 

Taiwan, but “Taiwan is a place that Americans ought to like.”157 In a part 

of the world populated by dictatorships and failed democracies, Taiwan 

has progressed in less than 20 years from a reactionary dictatorship to a 

vibrant, if rowdy, democracy. It has a strong economy, vibrant society and 
McCready

106

a range of freedoms. Taiwan offers a model for other Asian states, and that 

makes China uncomfortable. 

All parties would prefer the status quo continues. This worked well 

through the late 1980s, but political and economic developments have 

frayed it. So China and Taiwan no longer understand the status quo in 

precisely the same way. The new dynamic threatens regional stability 

because China faces the possibility of Taiwan following a separate path. 

Acquiescing in this would be political suicide for China’s leaders.

Most discussion of the Taiwan situation emphasizes the military 

elements. These are important, but not the most important. The P.R.C.-

U.S.-Taiwan relationship is fundamentally political and can only be settled 

politically. The military emphasis avoids the hard work of developing 

non-military options acceptable to all. Just as strategists attempt to “think 

outside the box” to develop better military solutions, so too must 

policymakers think unconventionally about Taiwan to find creative 

possibilities short of war.

The U.S. military has planned and war-gamed conflict in the 

Taiwan Strait. The question is whether it has been preparing for the right 

conflict. When deterrence breaks down, the course of action the U.S. has 

been preparing for may not be the one China chooses – and China is likely 

to strike first in case of war. China would prefer to gain control of Taiwan 

in a way that provides the U.S. no rationale for intervening and every 

incentive not to. American leaders should consider now how they might 

respond then, instead of waiting for a fait accompli. It is essential to 

convince Chinese decision-makers to remember Pearl Harbor and not 

“Blackhawk Down” when they think about American willingness to fight. 

At the same time, U.S. and Taiwanese leaders should remember other, no 

less crucial lessons of Pearl Harbor.

China brings many advantages to conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 

Geography is obvious, but probably even greater is timing. Unless Taiwan 

for some reason decides to strike first, China can decide when, how and 

even where to act. The ideal time for China would be when the United 

States is distracted by another part of the world and has deployed 

significant forces there.

In a war over Taiwan, everyone will lose, but some more than 

others (Taiwan the most). The military, political and economic cost will be 

high. The consequence of the P.R.C. forcibly gaining control over Taiwan 
McCready

107

without an American response would probably be even more serious 

because of the regional military and political repercussions. China’s stated 

interests are such that, apart from an unexpected resolution, deterrence 

will almost certainly fail in the long run. 

The U. S. can delay Chinese action against Taiwan, but cannot 

deter China indefinitely. At least in part, this is because China does not 

believe American interests and commitment match those of China. The 

U.S. needs to clearly define and explain its interests relating to Taiwan, 

both to the American public and to China’s leaders. 

The best situation would be an indefinite continuation of the status 

quo and of the American policy of strategic ambiguity. The former is 

unlikely, but the latter is possible. It will require close coordination within 

the U.S. government, careful consideration of the military and political 

impact of deploying a missile defense system to the region, continued 

visible American military presence in the region, and encouragement to 

the P.R.C. and Taiwan to explore unconventional options for settling the 

future status of Taiwan. 

The United States should begin by gaining a better understanding 

of how China sees itself and its place in the world. U.S. policymakers also 

need to consider how their words and actions appear to Chinese and 

Taiwanese leaders. What they intend from their historical and cultural 

perspective is not necessarily what the Chinese see from theirs. 

Equally important is recognizing the many Chinese misperceptions 

about the United States and working to correct them. Planners will have to 

take these misperceptions into account because they can increase political 

friction and lead to military conflict. The most serious misperception is the 

U.S. actively seeks to weaken China and block its rise and every U.S. 

action in the region is directed toward this end.158

Apart from a Taiwanese misstep, the crucial variable is the 

perception of China’s leaders. While recognizing Chinese interests 

regarding Taiwan, the U.S. must clearly state its interests in the area and a 

willingness to use force to defend them – without compromising the 

strategic ambiguity that has been central to U.S. policy. This should be 

balanced by encouraging China and Taiwan to see the advantages, 

especially economic, that derive from the status quo. 

The greatest danger is if China’s leaders come to believe they have 

more control over the situation than they actually do or they become 
McCready

108

convinced they have run out of options. There will be some situations 

where China believes the time is right for action, and it has the advantage, 

but can be convinced otherwise. Under other conditions, however, the cost 

becomes irrelevant and nothing will deter China from taking military 

action against Taiwan. 

Notes
McCready

109

CHAPTER 5

 

1 In this study, People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) or China designates the nation the United States, the United 

Nations and most of the world’s countries recognize as China. The government of the Republic of China and the 

island it is primarily located on will be called Taiwan. While this study focuses on the U.S.-P.R.C.-Taiwan 

relationship, it is important to remember Taiwan is not the only point of disagreement between the P.R.C. and the 

U.S.

2 Denny Roy, Taiwan Strait Update: Crisis Deferred (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 

2006), 2.

3 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (June 2008). The 2010 National Security Strategy, however, 

describes the military situation more indirectly and encourages development of a cooperative relationship between 

the U.S. and the P.R.C. See Barak Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington: The White House, May 2010), 

43. 4 Michael McDevitt, “For Taiwan, the Best Defense Is Not a Good Offense” (Pacific Forum CSIS, PacNet Number 

9, Feb. 22, 2007). See also Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a War over Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs 84/2 (March/April 

2005), 53. 5 Su Ge, “Sino-American Relations: Climbing High to See Afar,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, (September 2001), as 

found on the U.S.-China Commission web site, http:www.uscc.gov (Nov. 6, 2002).

6 Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, “China: Getting the Questions Right,” National Interest 62, (Winter 

2000/2001), p.17. 7 Denny Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” Survival 42 (2000), 78.

8 Roy, Taiwan Strait Update: Crisis Deferred, p. 8.

9 I am indebted to Alan Wachman for the language to make this distinction between delaying and deterring clear.

10 Roger Cliff, et al, Entering the Dragon’s Laire: Chinese Antiaccess Stretagies and Their Implications for the 

United States, “Some of the measures are relatively low cost, but others will require additional capabilities and still 

others may require a fundamental reassessment of operational doctrine and plans” (Santa Monica: Rand, 2007), xix.

11 See, for example, Gao Fuqiu, “The Real Purpose of the American March into Central Asia,” Liaowing (May 10, 

2002), as found on the US-China Commission web site, http:www.uscc.gov (Nov. 6, 2002). Su warns the P.R.C.

will not permit Taiwan’s status as part of China to change. 12 I am indebted to Andrew Scobell for emphasizing to me the P.R.C.’s self-image as an international moral leader.

13 Wang Jisi and Xu Hui, “Pattern of Sino-American Crises: A Chinese Perspective,” in Michael D. Swaine, et al. 

(editors). Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 2006), 135

14 Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” China Quarterly 121 

(1990), 115.

15 Cited in Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, “Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act,” Orbis 44, (2000), 69.

16 David A. Shlapak, et al., A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan

Dispute (Santa Monica: Rand, 2009), 141.

17 Alan Wachman, Challenges and Opportunities in the Taiwan Strait: Defining America’s Role, China Policy 

Series Number 17 (New York: National Committee on United States-China Relations, 2001), 27.

18 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1995). Scobell suggests both the Confucian-Mencian and realpolitik approaches are 

operative and interactive, combining dialectically. This could explain how China can display realism while at the 

same time claiming the moral high ground. Scobell made this suggestion at a conference on “The Rise of China: 

Security Implications” in Chapel Hill, N.C. (March 2-3, 2001).

19 Ibid., 256-257.

20 Andrew Scobell, China and Strategic Culture, (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 3. 21 Ibid, 3. What Scobell calls preemptive is better described as surprise attacks. See also Michael D. Swaine, 

“Chinese Crisis Management: Framework for Analysis, Tentative Observations, and Questions for the Future,” in 

Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (editors.), Chinese National Security Decisionmaking under Stress (Carlisle, 

Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 36.
McCready

110

 22 In his China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University, 2000), xv and 

39. Michael Pillsbury applies this to the U.S.-P.R.C. relationship and comments in particular that China seems to 

assume other nations share its view about the future use of military force. Interestingly, however, while the P.R.C.

sees itself as a peace-loving nation, it views the United States as guided by realpolitik. This makes it very difficult

for China to take “soft” American interests regarding Taiwan seriously. It also means not only that China sees itself 

as peace-loving, but also expects other nations to see it this way despite any actions to the contrary.

23 Swaine in Scobell and Wortzel, Chinese National Security Decisionmaking under Stress, 23. “In China, domestic 

factions often are critically important in a political-military crisis, and, in some instances, arguably more important 

than external factors.... Both elite and popular views and actions involving internal issues and concerns can limit 

options, increase rigidity, slow response times, and distort signals in a crisis.” 

24 Most of the insights in this paragraph come from Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 

Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

25 Michael D. Swaine, “Conclusion: Implications, Questions, and Recommendations,” in Michael D. Swaine, 

Managing Sino-American Crises, 436.

26 Susan L. Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2007), 1.

27 Ezra F. Vogel, “Current U.S.-China Relations,” Harvard China Review 2 (Spring/Summer 2000), 21-22.

28 Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s America Watchers: Changing Attitudes towards the United States,” China 

Quarterly 161 (2000), 50-51.

29 John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University of 

Washington Press, 1997), 150-151.

30 Michael D. Swaine and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Assessing the Threat,” in Swaine, et al. (editors), Assessing the 

Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, 2007), 351. 

31 Richard Halloran, “Who’s the Sleeping Tiger Now? U.S.?” Boston Globe (Sept. 10, 2000), F2. Halloran was 

specifically addressing the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship and challenging the widespread misperception that the 

U.S. is afraid to suffer casualties under any circumstance.

32 Richard Sobol at a discussion of his book, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam, at 

the Harvard COOP Bookstore (March 12, 2001).

33 Statement of Zhu Xianlong in Zhongguo Pinglun (March 5, 1999), quoted in Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan

Strait,” 88. See also Andrew J. Nathan “China’s Goals in the Taiwan Strait,” China Journal 36 (1996), 90; James 

Mulvenon, “P.R.C. Information Operations: Myths, Trends, and New Opportunities,” 246, in Swaine, Assessing the 

Threat; Denny Roy, Taiwan’s Threat Perceptions: The Enemy Within, Occasional Paper Series (Honolulu: AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies, March 2003), 2.

34 See Phillip C. Saunders, “Project Strait Talk: Security and Stability in the Taiwan Strait,” Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 2000), 5, 6.

35 Desmond Ball, “Strategic Culture in the Asian-Pacific Region,” Security Studies 3 (1993), 63-64.

36 Saunders, 9.

37 Interview with Alan Wachman at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Feb. 8, 2001). Dr. Wachman was 

one of the academics involved in the conversation.

38 Alan D. Romberg, “Future East Asian Security Architecture: Implications for the PLA,” in Swaine, Assessing the 

Threat, 319. 

39 Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats, p. 47; Richard E. Nisbett, The 

Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently ... and Why (New York: Free Press, 2003), 

45. 

40 Vogel, 21-22. 41 Garver, 147; Wang and Xu, in Swaine, Managing Sino-American Crises, 139. 42 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?,” 

Foreign Affairs 89/3 (May/June 2010), 38. 

43 Garver, 147. 44 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data,” 

China Quarterly 153 (1998), 2.
McCready

111

 45 Lonnie D. Henly, “Evolving Chinese Concepts of War Control and Escalation Management,” in Swaine, 

Assessing the Threat, 97. “One finds little consideration of the possibility that what China considers a resolute 

response to maintain the political initiative, the opponent might misconstrue as alarming preparations for aggressive 

military action. Chinese military authors seem to be unable to get outside of their own subjective view of china’s 

innocent intentions and righteous principled stance to see China as others might view it.” 

46 See Global Views Survey Research Center, Survey on Signing of Economic Cooperation Agreement with Other

Countries, People’s Views on Unification with China and Independence and President Ma Ying-jeou’s Approval 

Rating (March 23, 2010), 3, http://taiwansecurity.org/2010/GVMaApproval_ECFA-032310.pdf, (May 31, 2010).

47 Andrew Scobell, Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 1999), 16.

48 Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the P.R.C. State Council, “The One-China Principle and the 

Taiwan Issue,” (issued Feb. 21, 2000,) Asian Affairs 27 (2000), 37-53.

49 Banyan, “Bottoming out,” The Economist 395/8678 (April 17-23, 2010), 50. It has been suggested the P.R.C. has 

overstated U.S. decline and the P.R.C.’s rise, emphasizing U.S. weakness while minimizing Chinese weaknesses 

and greatly overrating China’s economic leverage over the U.S. 

50 David A. Shlapak, et al., A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan

Dispute (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009), 12. Shlapak says the P.R.C. has found economic coercion a potentially 

powerful weapon, but one difficult to use effectively. 

51 Shlapak, A Question of Balance, 16.

52 National Security Strategy (2010), 43.

53 Denny Roy, Taiwan’s Threat Perceptions: The Enemy Within, 8.

54 Jacob K. Javits, “Congress and Foreign Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act,” Foreign Affairs 60 (Fall 1981), 59. 55 Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 

187. See also Denny Roy, “Rising China and U.S. Interests: Inevitable vs. Contingent Hazards,” Orbis 47/1, (Winter 

2003), 136.

56 Denny Roy, “U.S.-Taiwan Arms Sales: The Perils of Doing Business with Friends,” Asia-Pacific Security Studies

3/3 (April 2004), 4. 

57 Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” Commentary 110 (November 2000), 17. At an IFPAFletcher-USMC Security Conference in 2001, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth said if an East Asian state achieved 

regional hegemonic status, U.S. vital interests would be very much affected. William Perry, then-Secretary of 

Defense, says in March 1996, then-National Security Advisor Anthony Lake told a delegation of senior Chinese 

officials the U.S. has vital national security interests in the western Pacific and the ongoing Chinese missile firings 

threatened those interests. See Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventative Defense: A New Security 

Strategy for America, (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1999), pp. 96-97.

58 Kurt Campbell, in a luncheon presentation at MIT’s Security Studies Program (Nov. 1, 2000).

59 Sandy Berger, National Security Adviser during the Clinton administration, at Harvard’s JFK School of 

Government (March 12, 2001). Governments like that of the P.R.C. often find it difficult to understand and respond 

to the American habit of making its national values part of its international relations − especially when these would 

appear to detrimental to U.S. national interest narrowly defined. Yet given the right set of circumstances, the P.R.C.

would respond to Taiwan in a way other nations might consider irrational and contrary to its national interest.

60 Douglas Porch, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy,” Naval War 

College Review 52 (1999), 29.

61 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 71. 

62 Recent reports suggest neither the P.R.C. nor Taiwan has integrated the weaponry it possesses. In addition, the 

P.R.C. pilots do not appear to be well trained or to receive sufficient flying hours each year to maintain proficiency. 

Taiwan has been reported to suffer a lack of pilots for its latest generation fighters because many pilots leave the air 

force to fly for the airlines. 

63 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to Public Law 106-113” (Dec. 18, 2000), DefenseLink at 

http://www.defenselink.mil/twstrait_12182000.html, (Dec. 20, 2000).

64 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Crisis Management: Framework for Analysis, Tentative Observations and 

Questions for the Future,” in Scobell and Wortzle, Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress, 28. 

“This critical set of variables influencing China’s crisis management behavior is very poorly understood in the West, 

and even, it seems, within much of the Chinese political system.” 
McCready

112

 65 Michael Pillsbury, “China’s Military Strategy toward the U.S.: A View from Open Sources” (Nov. 2, 2001), 4, 

U.S.-China Commission website http://www.uscc.gov, (Nov. 5, 2002).

66 Swaine and Mastro, “Assessing the Threat,” 346, in Swaine, Assessing the Threat. See also Shlapak, A Question 

of Balance, passim. 67 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 1999), 145.

68 Jason D. Ellis and Todd M. Koca, “China Rising: New Challenges to the U.S. Security Posture,” Strategic Forum 

number 175, Institute for National Security Studies (Washington: National Defense University, 2000), 7.

69 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 

2009 (March 2009), I.

70 Swaine and Mastro, 345. See also Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile: 

Developments and Missing Links,” Naval War College Review 62/4 (Autumn 2009), 93, 95. They note hitting a 

moving ship with an antiship ballistic missile requires synchronizing a lot of very advanced technology and are 

skeptical that China has all the technology, much less the ability to synchronize it.

60 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

(March 2009), 15.

72 Richard A. Bitzinger, “Taipei’s Arms Procurement Dilemma: Implications for Defending Taiwan,” Asia-Pacific 

Security Studies 3/4, (April 2004), 2.

73 Stokes, 137.

74 “Q&A with Robert Kaplan on China,” n.p., Foreign Affairs (May 7, 2010), 

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-robert-kaplan-on-china, (May 14, 2010). 75 For an excellent overview of China’s Information Warfare program, see Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Information 

Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat? (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).

76 Timothy L. Thomas, “Like Adding Wings to a Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory and Practice” (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas, Foreign Military Studies Office, 2001), 2, http://call.army.mil/ call/fmso/fmsopubs/ 

issues/China, (Feb. 1, 2001). 77 James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare,” 176, in James Mulvenon (ed.), The People’s Liberation 

Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 183, Mulvenon also notes P.R.C. military 

planners tend to view IW as a preemptive weapon, which would make it especially attractive in a Taiwan scenario. 

Actually, we know something about Chinese cyber war capabilities because they have been used in various ways 

against the U.S. since 1999.

78 Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about 

It (New York: HarperCollins, 2010). See especially Chapter 6. See also Wesley Clark and Peter Levin, “Securing 

the Information Highway,” Foreign Affairs 88/6, (November/December 2009), 2-10.

79 Mulvenon, in Swaine, Assessing the Threat, 256.

80 Shlapak, A Question of Balance, p. 118, “An invasion of Taiwan would, in the face of properly prepared defenses, 

remain a bold and possibly foolish gamble on Beijing’s part.” 

81 See Yu Chuanxin, “A Few Issues Concerning Logistic Support for the Cross-strait Amphibious Landing 

Operation,” Journal of Military Economics Studies (Jan. 15, 2001), 1, as found in translation on the U.S.-China 

Commission website, http://www.uscc.gov, (Nov. 6, 2002).

82 Steven M. Goldstein, “China’s Taiwan Strategy: Status Quo or Disequilibrium?” p. 186, in Jonathan B. Pollock 

(ed.), Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century (Newport, R.I., Naval War 

College Press, 2003). “All these trends suggest that submarines will form the centerpiece of a gradual Chinese 

strategic reorientation toward maritime priorities.” Robert Kaplan notes that a Chinese attack submarine tracked a 

U.S. carrier strike group in the Pacific undetected, finally surfacing within five miles of the carrier itself. 

83 Pillsbury, “China’s Military Strategy toward the U.S.,” 4. As Pillsbury notes, it is unclear how much influence this 

group has on P.R.C. military policy making.

84 Pillsbury, “China’s Military Strategy toward the U.S., 10-11. Pillsbury notes a People’s Liberation Army Navy 

(PLAN) officer as writing that instead of going head-to-head with U.S. Navy combatants, the PLAN should 

concentrate on attacking American naval command and control, information systems, and logistics because these are 

the minimally protected weak links in the system. 

85 Pillsbury, “China’s Military Strategy toward the U.S.,” 9-10.

86 Tim Thomas, “China’s Technological Stratagems,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 12 (December 2000), 39.
McCready

113

 87 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, America’s Place in the World 2009: An Investigation of Public 

and Leadership Opinion About International Affairs, (Dec. 2009), 2-3. A recent Pew survey found both that half of 

Americans believe the U.S. should “mind its own business and let other countries get along the best they can on 

their own,” and that the public views a rising China as more worrisome than do opinion leaders. 

88 “Q&A with Robert Kaplan on China,” n.p.

89 Tom Donnelly, “Dire Strait,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 35 (March 14, 2001), 26.

90 Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development: Implications for 

Security in the Taiwan Strait,” 151, in Susan M. Puska (ed.), People’s Liberation Army after Next (Carlisle, Pa.,

Strategic Studies Institute, 2000). Roy, Taiwan’s Threat Perceptions, 5. Taiwan’s population apparently supports a 

force structure that would enable punitive strikes against the P.R.C. if it launched a missile attack on the island.

91 This has become a political and security issue in the U.S. because compromise of the technology of the latest 

version of the F-16 fighter would harm U.S. airpower as well as Taiwan’s.

92 Drew Thompson, “China’s Temper Tantrum,” The National Interest Online (Feb. 2, 2010), 

http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=22832, (March 22, 2010). 

93 David A. Shlapak, David T. Orlesky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Aspects of the China-Taiwan

Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 51-54. Shlapak’s 2009 update to the 

study, A Question of Balance, does not change this conclusion.

94 Thomas J. Christensen, “Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan’s Security,” Orbis 44 (2000), 83.

95 See Schlapak, A Question of Balance, passim, for a current assessment of Chinese capabilities.

96 Stokes in Puska, People’s Liberation Army after Next, 151. 97 Richard Bush, “Chinese Decisionmaking under Stress: The Taiwan Strait, 1995-2004,” 150, “As part of its 

negotiations playbook, Beijing seeks to get it adversary’s acceptance of basic principles at the outset, which it 

manipulates to its advantage thereafter.” 

98 Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data,” 6-7, 28-29.

99 See NSS, (2010), 43. The 2010 National Security Strategy seeks to counter this: “We welcome a China that takes 

on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance 

priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation.” 

100 Swaine and Mastro, “Assessing the Threat,” 346. McDevitt says the only way Taiwan can deter the P.R.C. 

militarily is to convince it that it cannot seize the island. This would require hard economic decisions in order to 

create a military that could do this. Also, “many observers assert that Taiwan is not improving its own military 

capabilities in many areas to a level and at a pace sufficient to ensure the maintenance of a credible deterrent against 

Chinese coercion or a PLA attack.” 

101 Roy, Taiwan’s Threat Perceptions, 8. “Ultimately much of Taiwan’s insecurity stems from sources within 

Taiwan itself.... Taiwan in some instances lacks a mature democracy’s capacity for serious, rational debate on 

important questions.”

102 Roy, Taiwan’s Threat Perceptions, 5.

103 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), 55. “‘Reasonable Western 

thinking finds it very difficult to accept that there are some conflicts which cannot be ‘settled’ other than by brute 

force.”

104 Americans forget other countries have the same problem in dealing with the United States, where domestic 

concerns often take priority over what would otherwise be pressing foreign policy matters and can lead to foreign 

policy decisions that make no sense if one does not know the domestic influences at work.

105 I have drawn much of what I say about deterrence theory from Edward Rhoades, “Conventional Deterrence,” 

Comparative Strategy 19 (2000), 221-253, Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, (Lexington: 

University of Kentucky Press, 1996), and Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear 

Age,” Parameters 39/3, (autumn 2009), 32-48. For attempts to apply deterrence theory to China, I am indebted to 

Robert S. Ross, Shu Guang Zhang and Abram N. Shulsky, among others. For an application of this to the Taiwan

Strait, see Shlapak, A Question of Balance, 141-142. The conclusions with respect to China, however, are my own.

106 Abram N. Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 17.

107 This is not solely a matter of applying moral standards to deterrence; a grossly disproportional threat is likely to 

lack credibility. Such a threat would be neither moral nor a deterrent. My assumption here is we should apply Just 

War criteria to deterrence in the same way we do (or should do) to war itself. After all, when deterrence fails, war is 

usually the result. I recognize for many this assumption creates a difficulty in regard to nuclear deterrence, but that is 
McCready

114

 

all the more reason to inject moral criteria at the beginning of the process instead of appending them as an 

afterthought.

108 Gerson, 40. “The credibility of conventional deterrence – and execution of the threat if deterrence fails – requires 

convincing potential aggressors the United States can and will rapidly respond to aggression against its global 

interests, and there is nothing the regime can do to prevent or hinder the response.” 

109 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University 

Press, 1960), 109-110.

110 Gerson, 42. “Leaders motivated by the necessity to prevent losing something of value, however, may be willing 

to engage in a long and expensive conflict, especially if the stakes are deemed critical to national security or 

domestic political survival.” 

111 Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: 

Cornell University, 1992), 272, 4. 112 Rhoades, 222, 228.

113 Ibid., 234-238. 114 Payne, 79.

115 Rhoades, 243.

116 Robert Jervis, quoted in Rhoades, 238.

117 Rhoades, 239.

118 Payne, 121. “Because it is the challenger who ultimately chooses whether to be deterred but who cannot be 

controlled predictably, no deterrer, including the United States, can establish deterrence policies that it can be 

confident are ‘ensured’ or ‘conclusive.’ ” 

119 Shulsky, 36. 

120 Shulsky, 35, 38, 39. 121 Denny Roy, China’s Foreign Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 217. 122 See Zalmay Khalilzad, et al., The United States and a Rising China, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 85, and 

Alistair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking,’” International Security 20 (Winter 1995/96), 21.

123 Shlapak, A Question of Balance, xix. 124 Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” 

International Security 25 (2000), 104.

125 I agree with Betts and Christensen, page 28, about this. China will use all available military, economic and 

political options to achieve its goal.

126 See, for example, Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” 78.

127 Eric A. McVadon, “The Chinese Military and the Peripheral States in the 21st Century: A Security Tour 

d’Horizon,” 34, in Larry M. Wortzel (ed.), The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 1999).

128 Bernice Lee, The Security Implications of the New Taiwan, Adelphi Paper 331, International Institute for 

Strategic Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 53. “Taiwan’s domestic political development is 

gradually pulling the island away from reunification with China. Leaders in Beijing remain uncertain as how to 

respond, but know their nationalist agenda gives them little scope for compromise.”

129 Shulsky, 46.

130 Taiwan News, (Nov. 22, 2002), Taiwan Security Research website (Nov. 30, 2002). “Top Envoy Says China 

Willing to Disarm: Proposal Hinges on U.S. Reduction of Military Assistance.”

131 Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” 90, and interview with Dr. Leif Rosenberger at CINCPAC headquarters, 

(Nov. 13, 2000). But the often-predicted Chinese economic collapse has yet to happen.

132 Wachman, 17-18. See also Banyan, 50.

133 Sun Zi, The Art of War, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77. “To subdue 

the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” Those who understand this as the essence of Sun Zi’s advice forget 

that it is surrounded by several hundred other sentences about how to fight wars, campaigns and battles.

134 Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal 

Writings (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 17.

135 Maria Hsia Chang, “The Future of Taiwan-Mainland Relations,” 212, in Bih-jaw Lin and James T. Myers (eds.), 

Contemporary China and the Changing International Community (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
McCready

115

 

1994). The 2002 China Security Review Commission report says Taiwan officials estimate the island could last only 

120 days before it would require resupply of essential materials.

136 Robert S. Ross, “The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Lessons for the United States, China and Taiwan,” Security 

Dialogue 27 (1996), 468.

137 Gerson, 33-34. Gerson says preventing this is central to modern conventional deterrence.

138 Jianxiang Bi, “Managing Taiwan Operations in the Twenty-first Century: Issues and Options,” Naval War 

College Review 52 (1999), 38.

139 See Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, (New York: New York Review 

of Books, 2002), 216 f. In China’s New Rulers, however, Andrew Nathan quotes three members of the fourth 

generation of P.R.C. leaders as believing growing economic and cultural ties will inevitably draw Taiwan to the 

Mainland, the Democratic Progressive Party is passing phenomena, and the language of Taiwanese independence is 

an American plot. In a September 2002 study, the Atlantic Council reached much the same conclusion. It said 

China’s leaders now believe that the rapidly increasing investment in the Mainland by Taiwanese businessmen is the 

first step toward the eventual incorporation of Taiwan into China. See also Charles Snyder, “Beijing Now Thinks 

Time on its Side, Report Says,” Taipei Times (Sept. 6, 2002), Taiwan Security Research website, (Dec. 2, 2002).

140 Shlapak, Orlesky, and Wilson, p. 60. 141 Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25, (2000), p. 83. 142 Jim Yardley and Thom Shanker. “Chinese Navy Buildup Gives Pentagon New Worries,” New York Times (April 

8, 2005), A3. “America’s carriers responding to a crisis would now initially have to operate at least 500 miles from 

Taiwan” due to the threat of China’s submarine fleet. 

143 China Security Review Commission, Report to the Congress of the U.S. (July 2002), Chapter 1, 

http://www.uscc.gov, (Oct. 28, 2002). 144 International Crisis Group, China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, Asia Briefing No. 42 (Sept. 21, 2005), 5.

145 Both China and Taiwan recognize American intervention almost certainly would be in support of Taiwan, the 

only questions being the nature and extent of intervention.

146 Central News Agency (Taipei), “Poll Shows Americans Would Oppose Using Troops to Defend Taiwan,” (Feb. 

14, 2001), Taiwan Security Research homepage (Feb. 22, 2001). Other reports have suggested greater American 

support, especially if the P.R.C. attack were unprovoked and the U.S. president offered a clear and compelling 

statement of American interest in the outcome.

147 Tucker, 153. “Even without formal obligations, many in the region think of Washington as Taipei’s friend and 

patron, and might question their own relations with the U.S. if it stood aside.” 

148 Charles W. Freeman, Jr., “Same Strait, Different Memories,” 59, in Gerret W. Gong (ed.), Remembering and 

Forgetting: The Legacy of War and Peace in East Asia, (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 

1996).

149 China Security Review Commission, Report to the Congress of the U.S. (July 2002), Chapter 8, 

http://www.uscc.gov, (Oct. 28, 2002). 

150 Burles and Shulsky, vii.

151 Brad Roberts, “The Nuclear Dimension: How likely? How Stable?” in Swaine, Assessing the Threat, 234. China

appears to believe “the asymmetry of stake and interest between China and the United States in a Taiwan

contingency would only be magnified in a war that crosses the nuclear threshold.” 

152 An attendee at a March 2001 conference on “The Rise of China,” afraid China shows insufficient responsibility 

in the way it uses its nuclear status, commented that during the Cold War, no Soviet leader ever threatened nuclear 

attack on specific American cities if the U.S. intervened conventionally in a conflict the Soviet Union was interested 

in. 

153 See Shlapak, Orlesky and Wilson, xxi.

154 Ellis and Koca, 7.

155 Freeman, “Same Strait, Different Memories,” 59.

156 Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International 

Security 23 (1999), 67.

157 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Vintage, 1998), 149.

158 Michael Pillsbury, “Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions: The Implications for DOD” (Washington: Department 

of Defense Office of New Assessment, 1998), 2, 4. 
McCready

116

 
CHAPTER 5

Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran

from Adventurism and Nuclear Use

Gregory F. Giles

Introduction

U.S. policy is to deter four kinds of Iranian behavior: (1) Iranian 

acquisition of nuclear weapons; (2) Iranian adventurism abetted by such 

nuclear acquisition, (3) direct military conflict with Iran’s armed forces, 

and (4) escalation of U.S.-Iranian military conflict to the use of nuclear 

weapons. 

By definition, the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the 

failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy — the deterrence of 

proliferation. Both the Obama administration and its predecessor publicly 

committed the United States to keeping Tehran from acquiring nuclear 

weapons. So in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front 

that U.S. credibility – a key component of deterrence – had suffered a 

serious blow, one that will generally make it harder subsequently to deter 

various threats from the Islamic Republic.

Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined 

here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order 

than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency, 

clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to others. At the end of this 

spectrum is the potential for direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian 

nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation.

As a Shi’a revolutionary regime, it is not clear how readily Tehran 

will accept the same nuclear “rules of the road” that governed the Cold 

War. Therefore, checking Iranian nuclear adventurism and use will hinge, 

in part, upon our ability to adapt traditional deterrence concepts to the 

idiosyncrasies of this increasingly militarized theocracy.
Giles

118

As this chapter contends, the United States has a poor track record 

of deterring the Islamic Republic, and the regime itself seems ill-suited to 

the demands of nuclear crisis management. These factors pose 

fundamental challenges to reliably establishing and maintaining deterrence 

of a nuclear-armed Iran. 

With All Due Modesty: The U.S. Track Record

in Deterring Iran

In thinking through how to deter a nuclear-armed Iran it is 

essential to recognize we do not begin with a clean slate. The United 

States and the Islamic Republic have been locking horns ever since 1979. 

How Tehran has perceived American motivations and resolve in past 

confrontations will inevitably color how much credibility it places in U.S. 

deterrent threats once it acquires the bomb. Two such episodes are 

instructive in this regard: U.S.-Iranian naval clashes in the late-1980s and 

ongoing Iranian lethal support for the insurgencies in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

U.S. Convoy Operations in the Persian Gulf, 1987-88 

By the late 1980s, U.S. relations with the fledgling Islamic 

Republic of Iran were bitter. From the 1979-1981 U.S. embassy hostage 

crisis, to the 1983 U.S. Marine Corps barracks bombing in Lebanon, to the 

embarrassing Iran-Contra scandal of 1986, Washington had found itself 

burned time and again by the mullahs in Tehran. 

While the United States would have preferred to distance itself 

from the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian attacks on merchant shipping drew 

Washington deeper into the conflict in early 1987. At the request of 

Kuwait, America agreed to reflag a number of Kuwaiti tankers and 

provide naval escort protection for them. 

Deterrence was at the heart of the U.S. escort plan, as it was 

assumed by U.S. military planners at Central Command (CENTCOM) and 

the Pentagon that Tehran would not dare risk war with America by 

directly challenging the escort operations. “CENTCOM had contingency 

plans should Iran attack a convoy, but U.S. military leaders remained 
Giles

119

convinced that the presence of a U.S. aircraft carrier in the region would 

discourage such attacks.”1 For good measure, the United States issued a 

stern warning in June 1987 to Tehran via the Swiss embassy that the use 

of Silkworm cruise missiles against the Kuwaiti convoys would be 

tantamount to a declaration of war.2

With the USS Kitty Hawk carrier battle group on station in the 

Arabian Sea, the first U.S. escort mission passed through the Silkwormringed Strait of Hormuz unmolested the following month. Further up the 

Persian Gulf, however, one of the reflagged tankers, the Bridgeton, struck 

a mine laid by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval forces. 

In essence, U.S. assumptions about deterrence failed before the first 

convoy even reached its destination. Iran, for its part, denied any 

involvement, calling the mine attack the act of angels. Based on the 

limited damage and lack of casualties from the attack, Washington 

decided not to retaliate.

 Tehran did not respond to the 

warning.

3

In September 1987, U.S. forces caught IRGC naval forces in the 

act of laying mines from the deck of the Iran Ajr. Tehran maintained its 

denials, despite the capture of the Iran Ajr, its crew and a load of Iranianmanufactured mines, as well as other indisputable evidence. Within days, 

Iran resumed its attacks against merchant shipping, using missiles and 

gunfire against a Greek tanker despite the nearby presence of two U.S. 

warships. In October, Iran used its vaunted Silkworm missile to attack a 

U.S.-flagged tanker, Sea Isle City, wounding 18 sailors. The ship was in 

Kuwaiti waters and therefore not under the protection of the U.S. Navy at 

the time.

 Because U.S. naval forces were unprepared for 

mine warfare, the convoys were suspended until mine clearing assets 

could be brought to bear. The following month, Iran extended its mine 

laying to the Gulf of Oman, where the convoys formed up. 

In contrast to the Bridgeton attack, the United States struck back. 

In Operation Nimble Archer, U.S. forces attacked two oil platforms the 

Iranians had used to track the Sea Isle City and relay targeting data. U.S. 

warships warned the IRGC crews to abandon the platforms before they 

commenced firing. Back in Washington, the Reagan administration 

emphasized this was a “prudent yet restrained response.” Asked if the 

attack meant the United States and Iran were at war, President Reagan 

replied, “No, we’re not going to have a war with Iran. They’re not that 
Giles

120

stupid.”4 While another administration official cautioned, “In no way do 

we want this to be interpreted as an escalation,” Defense Secretary Caspar 

Weinberger warned “stronger countermeasures” would be taken if Iranian 

attacks continued.5 Then-Vice President Bush remarked, “Nobody thinks 

that this will end it.”6

In February 1988, the U.S. Navy executed a more aggressive 

strategy to harass Iran’s naval forces and disrupt its attacks on merchant 

shipping. Iran countered with another mining operation that hit the USS 

Samuel B. Roberts, causing extensive damage but only minor crew 

injuries. Washington debated retaliation. The State Department 

emphasized any retaliation had to be proportionate. U.S. military planners 

considered a range of responses up to an attack on the Iranian naval base 

at Bandar Abbas. In the end, two oil platforms that had been used by the 

Iranians to monitor the convoys and a major surface combatant were 

approved as targets.

 Within days, Bush had his confirmation as Iran 

fired another Silkworm missile into Kuwait’s Sea Island Oil Terminal on 

Oct. 22, 1987. The following month, Iran launched another mining

operation. 

7

On April 18, 1988, the United States launched Operation Praying 

Mantis. At the end of it, Iran suffered the loss of a number of ships, 

including the Sahand, which went down with most of its 135 men. The 

operation marked the end of Iranian mining operations. It did not, 

however, halt Iranian attacks against merchant shipping, with two more 

vessels being struck the following week. By month’s end, the United 

States expanded its protection scheme to include “friendly, innocent neutral 

vessels flying a nonbelligerent flag outside declared exclusion zones that are 

not carrying contraband or resisting legitimate visit and search by a Persian 

Gulf belligerent.”8

Flushed with the success of the Praying Mantis operation and 

coincidental Iraqi battlefield advances at the time, the Reagan administration 

hoped a more aggressive U.S. naval posture in the Gulf would push Iran to 

accept a cease-fire to end the war.

 

9

On July 3, 1988, U.S. warships operating under the new rules of 

engagement came to the defense of neutral merchant shipping. During the 

ensuing firefight with IRGC naval forces, the USS Vincennes mistook an 

Iranian airliner flying overhead for an Iranian fighter, shooting it down with 

 It seems Washington achieved that goal, 

although not without tragedy. 
Giles

121

the loss of all 290 civilians on board. While having pledged to fight until 

Saddam Hussein was vanquished, Ayatollah Khomeini suddenly announced 

to the Iranian nation on July 20 that he had agreed to a cease-fire with Iraq

“...based only on the interest of the Islamic Republic.”10

As a test case of American deterrence, the reflagging episode 

demonstrated a U.S. pattern of misreading Iran. Washington failed to 

appreciate that because Kuwait underwrote the Iraqi war effort, Tehran would 

view the U.S. naval escort of Kuwaiti tankers not as the defense of neutral 

shipping, but as a hostile act against the Islamic Republic. U.S. military 

planners compounded this misperception by assuming that sheer American 

“military might” would deter Iran from attacking the convoys. Iran disproved 

that notion with the very first escort mission. As the U.S. naval commander 

in the Gulf at that time observed, “The day [the Bridgeton] hit the mine 

was very important because it meant that deterrence would not succeed 

and the Iranian leadership had decided to take their chances by directly 

challenging the U.S. The threat of the carrier was not enough — 

deterrence failed.”11

The failure of the United States to retaliate for the Bridgeton

mining underscored American reluctance to antagonize Iran for fear it 

would escalate terrorist attacks against Americans abroad.12

In any event, it was not until Iran suffered major naval losses 

during Operation Praying Mantis in April 1988 that Tehran finally ceased 

mining and other attacks against the U.S. convoys. Iran continued 

attacking non-U.S. flagged merchant shipping (with guns and missiles) 

despite the extension of U.S. naval protection to them in late April, albeit 

with declining frequency. In short, Tehran made tactical adjustments in 

 In hoping to 

demonstrate restraint to Tehran, however, Washington likely only 

convinced Iranian hard-liners that, as with the U.S. withdrawal from 

Beirut after the bombing of the Marine barracks three years prior, America 

lacked the stomach for a fight. Two more mining operations followed. 

By the same token, U.S. retaliation for the October 1987 Sea Isle City

attack also failed to deter further Iranian mining operations. The mixed 

messages emanating from Washington at the time probably did not help, 

with the Pentagon warning of more serious consequences if Iranian attacks 

continued while the White House emphasized it was not seeking to 

escalate.
Giles

122

response to U.S. military pressure, but defiantly continued to attack 

merchant shipping until the July 1988 cease-fire.

Iran also demonstrated a proclivity for keeping its attacks just 

under the threshold of a devastating U.S. response. It studiously avoided 

use of its Silkworm missiles against the U.S. convoys as they transited the 

Strait of Hormuz where they were most vulnerable, an indication that 

Tehran took seriously the U.S. warning of June 1987. However, Iranian 

military planners exploited a loophole by using the Silkworm to attack a 

reflagged tanker once it was in Kuwaiti territorial waters and unprotected 

by U.S. naval escorts. Iran’s navy paid a stiff price for that strike, but the 

Iranian homeland remained untouched by the U.S. military. 

An important dimension of the American deterrence dynamic with 

Iran was the extent to which U.S. military operations influenced the 

Iranian leadership debate about courses of action. Throughout the war, 

pragmatists within the regime, such as then-Parliament Speaker Hashemi 

Rafsanjani and then-President Ali Khamenei, were constantly at odds with 

extremist clerics and the IRGC. 

To underscore this point, the IRGC launched the Iran Ajr mining 

operation just before President Khamene’i was due to speak at the U.N. 

General Assembly to complain about the U.N. Security Council’s unfair 

treatment of Iran in its war with Iraq. While the embarrassing U.S. 

capture of the Iran Ajr should have been a boon to Iranian pragmatists, it 

“actually allowed the radicals to prevail again by arguing that Iran needed 

to show the Americans that it would not be so easily deterred.”13

In an apparent compromise, the IRGC launched its Silkworm 

missile attack against the Sea Isle City the next month while further 

mining operations were suspended. 

 

In early 1988 the mining debate resumed in Tehran. The 

pragmatists sought to avoid provoking the United States which, in their 

view, would only increase the American military commitment to the 

region. Extremists insisted Iran needed to deal a decisive blow against the 

U.S. Navy.14 The extremists prevailed although not without further 

challenge. The regular Iranian navy opposed the resumption of mining 

and actually tried to sweep the mines laid by the IRGC just before the USS 

Samuel B. Roberts was struck.15 The heavy U.S. retaliation that followed 

led to the discrediting of the mining advocates within the top leadership 
Giles

123

circle and an end to the practice for the remaining three months of the 

war.16

In 2005, Mohsen Rezaie, the overall IRGC commander during the 

mining operations shed further light on the leadership’s deliberations over 

the 1987 U.S. naval intervention in the Gulf. According to Rezaie, 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini personally advocated attacking U.S. 

warships as they moved through the Strait of Hormuz, although he left the 

issue to the military to decide.17

In the end, the regime came to believe the downing of the Iranian 

airliner by the USS Vincennes was a deliberate signal by the United States 

it was about to unleash its full power to bring down the Islamic Republic, 

a factor that weighed heavily in the monumental decision days later to 

accept the UN cease-fire with Iraq.

 This fascinating footnote underscores 

Khomeini was not the least bit deterred by the U.S. warning of June 1987 

and apparently had utter disregard for the consequences of attacking U.S. 

warships. It also highlights the important role regime pragmatists played 

in attenuating the extremist tendencies of Khomeini and the IRGC and 

brokering a compromise attack plan – the equivalent of a “guerrilla war at 

sea” – that would inflict costs on America but remain below its threshold 

of devastating retaliation against the Iranian homeland. 

18

Iranian Lethal Support to Insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2003 

to Present

As they had with respect to deposing the Taliban in 2001, 

American and Iranian interests converged up to a certain point as the Bush 

administration prepared to topple Saddam Hussein the following year. 

While a U.S. invasion of Iraq would remove another of Tehran’s sworn 

foes, it would also complete the virtual encirclement of Iran by U.S. 

military forces. Having recently been lumped in with Iraq as part of the 

“Axis of Evil,” Iran’s ruling mullahs had reason to suspect they might be 

next on the Bush administration’s regime change list. 

Against this backdrop, Supreme Leader Khamene’i convened 

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council in early September 2002, 

concluding, “It is necessary to adopt an active policy in order to prevent 

long-term and short-term dangers to Iran.”19 That active policy entailed a 
Giles

124

range of diplomatic, military and paramilitary moves to safeguard Iran’s 

western flank.

Operating under the cover of the Geneva Contact Group on 

Afghanistan, Iranian diplomats engaged their American counterparts to 

assess U.S. intentions vis-à-vis Iraq. For American officials, the Contact 

Group provided an opportunity to elicit Iranian cooperation in the 

forthcoming invasion, akin to what had been achieved in Afghanistan.20 

Specifically, in early 2003 White House special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad

“asked Iranian officials in Geneva to pledge Tehran’s assistance for any 

American pilots downed in Iranian territory. Khalilzad also sought 

assurances that Iran’s armed forces would not join the fighting at any time. 

According to Iranian sources familiar with the meeting, Tehran agreed to 

both, but asked for a promise of its own: that the United States would not 

set its sights on Iran after the U.S. Army toppled Saddam Hussein’s 

regime. American officials reportedly equivocated...”21

Evidently still wary of U.S. intentions, Iran strengthened its 

military deployments in the West, moving up some 40 infantry and missile 

brigades.22 The regime’s security organs also began to build up networks 

of Shi’ite militias inside Iraq. By the spring of 2004, the decision to 

activate those networks appeared to have been made, with the commander 

of the IRGC Quds Force (IRGC-QF), Brigadier General Suleiman, 

reportedly instructing the proxy militias that “any move that would wear 

out the U.S. forces in Iraq should be done. Every possible means should be 

used to keep the U.S. forces engaged in Iraq.”23

Before long, lethal Iranian involvement in the unfolding Iraqi 

insurgency was detected. The initial U.S. response was to lodge a 

diplomatic protest with Tehran, via the Swiss embassy, in July 2005. The 

demarche took note of Shi’ite militants that had been trained in Iraq by the 

IRGC and Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah and supplied with bombmaking equipment. It further noted one of these bombs had now killed a 

coalition soldier. The protest concluded the United States “will continue 

to judge Iran by its actions in Iraq.” Iran’s response the following month 

flatly denied the allegations. 

Having been rebuffed privately, U.S. officials took their case 

public, with National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley noting that 

bombs used against allied forces, “seem to have a footprint similar to that 

of devices used by groups that have historically had Iranian support.” 
Giles

125

Despite the public attention, U.S. casualties in Iraq from Iranian bombs, 

so-called explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) continued to mount, 

accounting for about 30 percent by the end of 2006.24

Increasingly frustrated with Tehran, the Bush administration

adopted a more aggressive strategy. In a speech to the nation on January 

10, 2007, President Bush announced: 

...Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial 

integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of the 

extremist challenge.

This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These 

two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use 

their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing 

material support for attacks on American troops. We will 

disrupt the attacks on our forces. We will interrupt the flow 

of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and

destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and 

training to our enemies in Iraq. 

Behind the scenes, the Bush administration had already been 

employing a program to “catch and release” Iranian operatives in Iraq. 

With no attenuation of EFP attacks, however, in late-2006 the 

administration decided to escalate the pressure by authorizing the U.S. 

military to kill or capture Iranian operatives in Iraq. Within hours of the 

President’s speech, U.S. forces apprehended five members of the IRGCQF in the Iraqi city of Irbil. 

That month also saw a drop in the number of U.S. casualties from 

explosively formed penetrators, leading some U.S. officials to suggest that 

the decline was due to American efforts to publicly highlight Iran’s 

involvement.25

Whatever satisfaction that decline might have provided, Iran’s 

response to the seizure of the “Irbil 5” was swift. On January 20, an 

attempt to kidnap U.S. servicemen in a raid on the Karbala provincial 

headquarters resulted in five American fatalities. The following week, 

President Bush warned, “If Iran escalates its military action in Iraq to the 

detriment of our troops and/or innocent Iraqi people, we will respond 

firmly...we will do what it takes to protect our troops.”26 
Giles

126

At the same time, the President announced he had no intention of 

making an incursion into Iran. In March, Iran was hit with a U.N. Security 

Council resolution on its nuclear program, banning it from exporting arms, 

a provision directed at its arming of insurgents in Iraq.27

The following month, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

General Peter Pace, announced that Iranian arms (including explosively 

formed penetrators) were now being supplied to the Taliban in 

Afghanistan.

 

28

On the diplomatic front, the United States engaged Tehran in direct 

talks on the security situation in Iraq. In May 2007, U.S. Ambassador 

Ryan Crocker confronted his Iranian counterpart with “a number of our 

direct specific concerns about their behavior in Iraq, their support for 

militias that are fighting both the Iraqi security forces and coalition forces, 

the fact that a lot of the explosives and ammunition that are used by these 

groups are coming in from Iran, that such activities, led by the IRGC Qods 

Force needed to cease, and that we would be looking for results.” Iran’s 

Ambassador Kazemi-Qomi, himself an IRGC Command officer, denied 

the U.S. allegations. Neither Ambassador Crocker nor Iranian officials 

publicly indicated whether the United States warned Iran of any 

consequences if it failed to halt its lethal support.

At a second round of talks in July 2007, after the U.S. military 

publicly announced that the IRGC-QF had helped plan the deadly Karbala 

raid, Ambassador Crocker pointed out to his counterpart that Iranianbacked attacks had only increased since the initial meeting:

We made it clear to the Iranians that we know what they’re 

doing. It’s up to them to decide what they want to do about 

it because a point we have made previously is that Iran’s 

stated policy of...support for a stable democratic Iraq is not 

only consistent with U.S. policy. It makes sense in terms of 

Iran’s own interests... 

Crocker also informed the Iranians that IRGC-QF operatives and 

their surrogates “are not going to be safe in Iraq.”29 Once again, the 

Iranian delegation denied the U.S. allegations. In a meeting with Iraqi 

Prime Minister Maliki the following month, Iranian officials were more 
Giles

127

forthcoming, reportedly pledging to curb their aid to Shiite militias in 

Iraq.30

To help stem the flow of explosively formed penetrators from Iran, 

the U.S.-led coalition built up its bases and patrols near the Iraqi border in 

the fall of 2007. In the following months, U.S. officials noted a decline in 

the use of EFPs. A senior U.S. military spokesman in Iraq and an Iraqi 

official suggested that Tehran seemed to be holding up its pledge to Prime 

Minister Maliki. 

State Department officials were inclined to see the drop as the 

result of direct engagement with Tehran, whereas Defense Department 

officials attributed the decline to U.S. counter-measures rather than a 

strategic decision by Iran to alter its behavior.31

By spring, General David Petraeus, the overall U.S. commander in 

Iraq, Ambassador Crocker and CIA Director Michael Hayden had all 

publicly concluded Iran was waging a proxy war against the United States 

in Iraq. Petraeus’ successor, General Ray Odierno, noted in June 2009, 

“Iran is still supporting, funding, training surrogates who operate inside of 

Iraq — flat out...They have not stopped. And I don’t think they will 

stop.”

 Any sense of optimism 

was short-lived, however, with explosively formed penetrator attacks in 

January 2008 rising to the highest level in a year. 

32

As a test case for U.S. deterrence of Iranian adventurism, Iran’s 

lethal support for anti-American insurgents ranks as a near total failure. 

The failure is largely attributable to a misplaced American faith in 

common objectives with Iran. Iranian assurances in early 2003 not to 

intervene militarily in Iraq seem to have been accepted at face value 

without any indication from the United States there would be potentially 

serious consequences for welshing. 

 The following month, the Obama administration, which was 

committed to engaging Iran, released the “Irbil 5” to the Iraqi government 

which promptly turned them over to Tehran. 

Perhaps the U.S. failure to issue a clear deterrent warning was 

appropriate in 2003 given Tehran’s prior cooperation in Afghanistan, but 

this faith in common purposes was still evidenced by Ambassador Crocker 

in the July 2007 round of talks with Iran, which he himself pointed out 

were being conducted against a backdrop of increased Iranian-backed 

attacks. 
Giles

128

Even then, the strongest deterrent threat the United States could 

seem to muster in those direct talks was a warning that IRGC operatives in 

Iraq would not be safe. The continued use of explosively formed 

penetrators and other forms of lethal support for the insurgency indicate 

what little credibility Tehran placed in that threat.

In essence, Washington failed to anticipate the consequences of not 

adequately reassuring Iran it would not be invaded next. This is where 

common American and Iranian interests in deposing Saddam Hussein

diverged. For Tehran, bloodying U.S. forces in Iraq under the guise of a 

Shi’ite insurgency helped ensure the country could not be used as a spring 

board for an American invasion of Iran. The United States also seemed to 

underestimate Iran’s ability to “split hairs,” that is, sticking to the letter of

its pledge not to intervene in Iraq with its armed forces while instead 

employing the IRGC-QF, a military unit the regime does not acknowledge 

even exists, to train and direct proxies in Iraq.

Washington’s deterrence potential was also greatly diminished by 

self-imposed constraints. Having failed to deter the initiation of Iranian 

covert support for the Iraqi insurgency, the United States fell back on a 

posture of deterrence by denial, that is, it aimed to deny Iran the gains it 

sought from the insurgency by disrupting its networks inside Iraq and 

applying greater force protection measures. In reality, this was part of a 

wider Bush administration effort begun in late-2006 to confront Iran’s 

growing influence in the region, so as to press Tehran into giving up its 

nuclear ambitions,33

In any event, the path of deterrence by punishment was effectively 

undercut when President Bush took military options against Iranian 

territory off the table in January 2007, leaving an unenforceable U.N. ban 

on Iranian arms exports and rather weak U.S. economic sanctions against 

some IRGC-QF officials.

 an effort which yielded equally dismal results. 

34 Even the dispatch of a second U.S. carrier 

battle group to the Persian Gulf in April 2008 seemed half-hearted; with 

Secretary Gates observing the deployment was a “reminder” to Iran, not 

an escalation.35

The constraints themselves reflected wariness by many U.S. 

officials to confront Iran while American forces were already 

overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan. To Tehran, it must have appeared 

as an unmistakable lack of U.S. resolve. Thus hampered, Washington had 

to look elsewhere for influence over Iranian behavior. This led Secretary 
Giles

129

of Defense Gates in April 2008 to publicly encourage the Iraqi 

government to “...bring some pressure to bear on Iran” to stop the 

insurgents’ attacks.

36

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the insurgency debacle was 

the American reluctance even to attribute Iran’s covert activities to its top 

leadership. In April 2007, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Pace observed: 

“We know that there are munitions that were made in Iran

that are in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And we know that the 

Quds Force works for the IRGC. We then surmise from 

that one or two things. Either the leadership of the country 

knows what their armed forces are doing, or that they don’t 

know. And in either case that’s a problem.”37

Shortly thereafter, Gen. Petraeus remarked:

“With respect to how high does it go and, you know, what do they 

know and when did they know it, I honestly cannot – that is such a 

sensitive issue that – and we do not – at least I do not know of 

anything that specifically identifies how high it goes beyond the 

level of the Qods Force, Commander Suleiman. Beyond that, it is 

very difficult to tell – we know where he is in the overall chain of 

command; he certainly reports to the very top – but again, nothing 

that would absolutely indicate, again, how high the knowledge of 

this actually goes...”38

In essence, top U.S. military commanders publicly connected the 

provision of explosively formed penetrators and other lethal support to the 

IRGC-QF and its commander, who they acknowledged reported to the 

Supreme Leader, but they would not affirmatively tie the activity to the 

Supreme Leader himself.

This reluctance extended elsewhere. In claiming IRGC-QF

operatives helped plan the January 2007 raid in Karbala in which five U.S. 

soldiers were killed, Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner noted, “Our intelligence 

reveals that the senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity.” When 

asked if Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamene’i could be unaware of the 

activity, Bergner said, “That would be hard to imagine.”39 
Giles

130

Commenting on Iran’s lethal support to the Taliban in June 2007, 

Secretary Gates observed, “...given the quantities [of Iranian weapons] 

we are seeing, it is difficult to believe it’s associated with smuggling or the 

drug business or that it’s taking place without the knowledge of the Iranian 

government.”40 Indeed, it was not until April 2008 that C.I.A. Director 

Hayden remarked, “I will share with you my view that it is the policy of 

the Iranian government, approved to the highest levels of that government, 

to facilitate the killing of Americans in Iraq, okay? So just make sure 

there’s clarity on that.”41

Some of this reluctance could be attributed initially to a simple 

lack of incriminating intelligence. However, the American reticence to 

finger publicly Iran’s Supreme Leader endured even as the picture came 

into focus. The overriding U.S. concern appears to have been not 

inflaming the conflict further. Indeed, Washington may have been trying 

to leave the regime a face-saving “exit ramp,” namely, the top leadership 

could act as if it had been unaware of the lethal support and put a stop to it 

without appearing to have been cowed by “the Great Satan.”

 Alternatively, U.S. officials may have concluded that to publicly 

accuse the Supreme Leader for the ongoing killing of U.S. soldiers would 

have only increased pressures for escalation, something they studiously 

sought to avoid. In the end, the only exit ramp Tehran was interested in 

was the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. It 

never wavered from its denials of U.S. allegations or strategically altered 

its lethal support for the insurgents. 

The U.S. failure to hold Iran’s top leaders publicly accountable for 

this lethal support has set a dangerous precedent for deterrence of a 

nuclear-armed Iran. It needlessly raised doubts at home and abroad that 

Iran’s top leaders might not be cognizant of hostile cross-border acts by 

their security forces. As explained further below, the Supreme Leader is, 

in fact, tightly coupled to all sensitive security matters. The episode also 

has taught Iran’s rulers that in the future they can hope to exploit this 

window of uncertainty over so-called rogue operations and make quick 

gains before the U.S. builds its case for regime culpability. 

Indeed, the implicit potential for Iranian nuclear escalation will 

naturally extend that window of opportunity by raising the standard of 

evidence that the top leadership in Iran is, in fact, responsible for a given 

provocation. Even then, U.S. public diplomacy seems to be easily 
Giles

131

checked with persistent Iranian denials of any wrongdoing, helping to 

delay and deflect pressure on the regime. 

Where U.S. deterrence registers with Iran is in the broader sense; 

as with the mining of the Persian Gulf in 1988, Iran remains wary of 

engaging American forces in direct conventional combat. This has driven 

Tehran to rely on asymmetric warfare and plausible deniability. Indeed, 

the manner in which Iran prepared the Iraq insurgency indicates that the 

regime does not perceive itself as completely invulnerable to outside 

scrutiny or pressure. From the outset, Iran adopted a “train the trainer” 

approach, whereby selected insurgents would receive advance instruction 

in Iran and then return to Iraq to train others. This was done in 

anticipation that coalition forces would tighten up the border with Iran and 

to avoid unwanted attention directed at Tehran.42

At the same time, Iran indicated once again it was quite willing to 

engage in tit-for-tat retaliation, if not escalation, with the United States; in 

this case planning the Karbala raid that killed five American servicemen. 

In the end, what Iranian hard-liners are likely to take from this conflict is 

that even though America’s diplomats, generals and spymasters, not to 

mention its hawkish president, all publicly conceded Iran was fighting a 

proxy war against it – with hundreds of American soldiers killed by 

explosively formed penetrators – the United States was neither prepared to 

hold the Supreme Leader accountable nor shed Iranian blood to stop it. 

 

Is the Ruling Regime Rational?

The foregoing case studies highlight a key question for future U.S. 

deterrence planning; namely, can we count on Iran’s rulers to rationally 

calculate when it is in their best interest to avoid conflict with the United 

States? Expert opinion on this issue is roughly divided into two camps, 

deterrence optimists and pessimists.

Generalists among the Iran deterrence camp contend if the United 

States could successfully deter a nuclear-armed Soviet Union and China, 

two other “revolutionary” states, it could certainly deter a nuclear-armed 

Iran as a “lesser included case.”43 Iran experts in this camp point to 

various examples of the regime’s rationality. Among them, Ayatollah 

Khomeini’s dictum that survival of the state supersedes religious 
Giles

132

considerations, his acceptance of the cease-fire with Iraq in 1988, and 

more recently, the growing economic interests of the IRGC, which 

presumably give the Corps more to lose in a conflict with the United 

States.

In contrast, Iran deterrence skeptics tend to worry about Iran’s 

capacity for irrational behavior. Indeed, such behavior can be gleaned 

from the foregoing case studies. For example, Tehran insisted on 

attacking U.S. convoys in 1987-1988 despite the fact the broader 

campaign against merchant shipping had no diminishing effect on the Iraqi 

war effort, while the mining of international waters only served to 

coalesce the West against Iran, increase the U.S. military presence in the 

Gulf, and invite the destruction of Iran’s navy. Tehran had so badly 

played its hand by 1988 that the only international condemnation of the 

USS Vincennes’ downing of the Iranian airliner came from Syria.44

As we have seen, extremist clerics, including Ayatollah Khomeini 

himself and their equally zealous comrades in the IRGC have shown little 

to no regard for the consequences of their actions – a key assumption in 

the rational actor model and deterrence theory. In short, they seemed to 

discount earthly costs for heavenly gains. While Khomeini is long gone 

from the scene, religious extremism has not subsided in Iran. Indeed, 

concern is mounting that an apocalyptic Shi’a sect, the Hojjatieh, is 

gaining influence in the regime through the efforts of Ayatollah Mesbah 

Yazdi and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Given the shadowy nature 

of the Hojjatieh sect, it is difficult to assess the group’s potential impact on 

the regime’s cost-benefit calculus once it acquires nuclear weapons. What 

is clear is that Iranians themselves express concern today that religious 

extremists within the leadership, referred to as the “Shi’a Taliban,” should 

not be trusted with an atomic bomb.45

The reality is that the Iranian regime is capable of both rational and 

irrational behavior, a reflection of the enduring internal struggle for power 

between pragmatists and extremists. The latter are devoted to 

metaphysical concepts. They see ideological and armed “resistance” as an 

end to itself. Once committed, the regime’s extremists will stubbornly 

adhere to a course of action beyond the point where it proves counterproductive and risks self-preservation. Of particular concern in the event 

Iran acquires nuclear weapons is that these extremists are 
Giles

133

disproportionately represented in the regime’s intelligence, military and 

security organizations. 

Regime pragmatists play an important role in restraining the 

irrational tendencies of the radicals. Yet, because the two camps are semiautonomous, Iran can demonstrate rational and irrational behavior 

simultaneously, confounding outsiders with such contradictory behavior. 

Thus, for example, the IRGC with Khomeini’s blessing undertakes a risky 

mining operation in September 1987 that undercuts a concurrent attempt 

by Iran’s president to generate greater international sympathy for Iran 

before the United Nations. Likewise, in 1994, Iran supports a terrorist 

attack against the Jewish center in Buenos Aires at the same time it seeks

nuclear cooperation with the Argentine government. 

Compounding this schizophrenic behavior is a deep-seated 

religious and cultural predisposition in Iran not to knuckle under to 

illegitimate power, which, in the regime’s world view, means any 

government besides the Islamic Republic. Refusing to have terms 

“dictated” to it by “arrogant” powers, Tehran is thus balking at an 

international offer to convert its low-enriched uranium into fuel rods for 

the Tehran research reactor, which makes radioisotopes to treat cancer 

patients but is running out of fuel. 

Notably, President Ahmadinejad favors this deal but is being 

thwarted from within by his political opponents in the traditional 

conservative, pragmatic conservative and reformist camps. The episode 

underscores that Iran’s extremists do not necessarily have a monopoly on 

irrational behavior. Indeed, such behavior can be tactically employed for 

over-arching rational goals (e.g., undermining one’s political opponent). 

Iranian National Security Decision Making

How rational Tehran’s behavior seems to outsiders will also be a 

function of how well its decision makers hold up under the stress of a 

crisis. Intra-group dynamics and psychological predispositions have been 

known to distort rational thinking. Therefore, the resiliency of Iranian 

decision making processes and key players merits careful consideration. 
Giles

134

Processes and Institutions

In terms of processes, Iranian national security decision making 

reflects the broader distribution of political power. At the top is the 

Supreme Leader, former-President Khamene’i, who is constitutionally 

designated as the commander in chief of the armed forces with the power 

to declare war. He does not wield absolute power, however, in that he 

lacks the personal charisma and religious credibility of the Islamic 

Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Khomeini. Therefore, Supreme Leader 

Khamene’i must balance various other semi-autonomous power centers, 

grouped into major factions. 

Since the end of the Khatami presidency in 2005, the reformist 

faction has essentially been excluded from national security decision 

making, leaving Khamene’i to balance the views of pragmatic 

conservatives like Rafsanjani with those of traditional conservatives such 

as Ali Larijani, and extremists like Ahmadinejad. 

After the disputed re-election of President Ahmadinejad in June 

2009, Iranian politics has become increasingly polarized, with the 

Supreme Leader leaning more in favor of Ahmadinejad, leaving many to 

speculate how much influence the pragmatists continue to wield. This is 

an important development, bearing in mind the pragmatists’ role in 

attenuating the regime’s more extreme tendencies.

The overall national security decision making process therefore 

operates on a consensus basis with the Supreme Leader as the highest 

decision authority. Outwardly, the regime likes to portray the process as 

one of elite solidarity. Behind the scenes, the intense factionalism 

translates into a tendency to adopt lowest common denominator policies.46

The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is the highest 

constitutionally sanctioned deliberative body on national security affairs. 

It is headed by the President and represents the heads of the ruling system, 

as well as the IRGC. Decisions of the SNSC do not take effect, however, 

until they are approved by the Supreme Leader. More secretive sub-

 

Those policies are constantly subject to renegotiation, moreover, as 

factions challenge decisions not to their liking. This helps explain the onagain, off-again mining operations of 1987-1988 and may also help 

account for the dialing up and down of lethal support to the Iraqi 

insurgency since 2003. 
Giles

135

groupings of the SNSC and the Supreme Leader have been publicly 

reported for particularly sensitive operations, such as cross-border 

terrorism.47

Other institutions also likely play a significant role in Iranian 

national security decision making, including the Supreme Leader’s Office. 

Among its staff are Ayatollah Khamene’i’s most trusted foreign policy 

and military advisors, such as former-Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati 

and former IRGC commander Rahim Safavi. 

The Leader’s Office is also responsible for the network known as 

the Supreme Leader’s Representatives. These “clerical commissars” are 

embedded in all major security institutions. The Leader’s Representatives 

ensure the political reliability of the armed forces but can also intervene in 

operations at will, thereby superseding the bureaucracy’s chain of 

command. The Supreme Leader also maintains direct ties to military 

officers and officials, routinely meeting with them privately on a weekly 

basis or as events warrant.48

These sessions provide another oversight mechanism for the 

Leader, as well as an opportunity for the officers and officials involved to 

influence the Leader’s views. According to opposition sources, Iran’s 

intelligence apparatus spies on top regime officials and officers, providing 

tape recordings to the Supreme Leader on a routine basis, further keeping 

Ayatollah Khamene’i apprised.

 

49

In the event Iran acquires nuclear weapons, these mechanisms and 

processes will provide a basis from which to construct a Nuclear 

Command Authority (NCA). Undoubtedly, the Supreme Leader will be 

the ultimate decider on questions of nuclear use. Equally certain is that 

the IRGC, as the most trusted of security organs, will play a leading role in 

the control of Iranian nuclear weapons. How widely an Iranian NCA 

would consult with other heads of the ruling system is an open question. 

In peacetime, top regime officials may well be invested with an 

advisory role on the development of nuclear forces, akin to the Nuclear 

Development Committee of Pakistan’s NCA.50 An Iranian NCA might 

also make provisions for consulting the state president on questions of 

nuclear use, as does Pakistan’s NCA Employment Control Committee – 

time and communication links permitting. It is also possible that Iranian 

nuclear control arrangements would allow for delegation of nuclear launch 
Giles

136

authority to IRGC commanders under certain conditions, such as the 

incapacitation of the Supreme Leader. 

Key Decision Makers

As for the psychological dispositions of the regime’s top leaders, a 

good deal can be gleaned from their tenures in office. Ayatollah 

Khamene’i generally has proven to be a cautious Supreme Leader. His 

measured approach to most policy matters probably reflects his 

diminished authority compared to his predecessor. He simply cannot 

impose his will in the way Khomeini did. In turn, his questionable 

religious credentials have forced Khamene’i into an alliance with those 

most supportive of the concept of a Supreme Leader, militant extremists. 

More recently, Khamene’i has acted hastily and clumsily, 

exacerbating the disputed re-election of President Ahmadinejad by preempting the constitutionally mandated three-day waiting period before 

endorsing Ahmadinejad’s supposed victory. This pre-emption helped 

solidify the views of the Green movement that the electoral “fix was in.”

At other times, Khamene’i can be indecisive.51 Perhaps to break 

this indecisiveness, Khamene’i reportedly resorts to estekhareh, an Islamic 

form of fortune-telling, to make critical decisions for the country.52 In the 

most common form of estekhareh, a cleric takes the Koran in both hands, 

says some prayers, then opens the book and reads the first line of the page 

on the right. The cleric then offers his impressions of what God 

recommends a person should do.53 A relative of Khamene’i’s speculates 

the Supreme Leader is especially prone to use estekhareh when he is 

depressed,54 in part the result of listening to the recordings of officials 

who pledge their loyalty to him face-to-face but berate him behind closed 

doors.55

Publicly, Khamene’i maintains that nuclear weapons are against 

Islam and has issued a fatwa, or religious edict, prohibiting their 

development, possession or use by Iran. Behind the scenes, however, he 

has been a staunch advocate of acquiring the bomb. According to an 

investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as president in 

1984, Khamene’i pushed for nuclear weapons, saying, “A nuclear arsenal 

would serve Iran as a deterrent in the hands of God’s soldiers.”56 
Giles

137

Khamene’i is able to reconcile this duplicity under the Shi’a 

practice of taqiyya, whereby it is not only morally acceptable but 

obligatory to lie to one’s enemies if that will avert harm. Because it can 

be practiced collectively, taqiyya makes it difficult to place much stock in 

the public utterances of Khamene’i or other members of the ruling regime. 

Likewise, Khamene’i is deeply distrustful of the United States, believing it 

is intent on regime change in Iran, President Obama’s offer of engagement 

notwithstanding. 

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in many ways represents the 

future of the Islamic Republic. He embodies the so-called “second 

generation” of Islamic revolutionaries, having come of age in the late1970s and fighting in the Iran-Iraq War as a member of the IRGC. As a 

university student leader, he advocated the seizure of the U.S. embassy in 

1979 and remains committed to the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini. 

This helps explain his anti-American and anti-Israeli tirades. 

As an IRGC veteran, Ahmadinejad has supported the political and 

economic ascendancy of the Guards Corps. Although he is not in the 

operational military chain of command, as state president and chair of the 

Supreme National Security Council, Ahmadinejad has asserted himself as 

the face and voice of the Iranian government. 

Ahmadinejad’s decision-making style has a certain “shoot first, ask 

questions later” quality to it. He is widely criticized within Iran for his 

arrogance and disdain for expert opinion. He regularly invokes conspiracy 

theories to explain world events, including the assertion that America 

staged the 9/11 attacks itself so it would have a pretense to invade Muslim 

lands,57 a view publicly shared by Rahim Safavi, the Supreme Leader’s 

military advisor.58 Ahmadinejad is widely seen as being “...susceptible to 

neither offers of incentives nor threats of force.”59

Although not a cleric, Ahmadinejad harbors extremist religious 

views. He is widely suspected of belonging to a secret apocalyptic 

society, such as the Hojjatieh. Ahmadinejad routinely invokes the Shi’a 

messiah, the so-called Hidden Imam or Mahdi, and asserts his return is 

imminent. 

In Shi’a eschatology, when the Mahdi returns he will impose

universal Islamic Government and many infidels will be massacred. In 

contrast to mainstream Shi’a who believe it is impossible to know when 
Giles

138

the Mahdi will return, Ahmadinejad seems to believe that his return can be 

hastened by creating chaos and conflict.60

Ahmadinejad’s public diatribes closely link the killing of Jews and 

the Imam’s return,

 

61 an incendiary combination in the event Iran acquires 

nuclear weapons. In critical situations, Ahmadinejad also reportedly 

resorts to estekhareh to help him decide on a course of action.62

Hashemi Rafsanjani is the antithesis of Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani 

is one of the clerical founding fathers of the Islamic Republic, having 

worked closely with Ayatollah Khomeini. After serving as speaker of the 

Iranian Parliament and two-terms as president, today Rafsanjani 

simultaneously chairs two key regime institutions, the Assembly of 

Experts, which has the power to elect or remove the Supreme Leader, and 

the Expediency Council, which arbitrates disputes between the Parliament 

and the Guardian Council. 

Rafsanjani is known as the regime’s top pragmatist. He was 

largely responsible for persuading Khomeini to end the war with Iraq in 

1988. Politically, he lacks conviction and seems to be motivated by 

whatever cause will best enhance his personal power and wealth, the latter 

being quite considerable. In the past Rafsanjani opposed the reformists 

but since the rise of Ahmadinejad and the extremists, he has found 

common cause with the Green movement. In addition to being a 

consummate opportunist, Rafsanjani is a pivotal coalition builder. He has 

tried to bridge the chasm between reformists and extremists in the wake of 

the disputed re-election of President Ahmadinejad. His lack of progress in 

this endeavor has led to speculation that his influence, and those of his 

fellow pragmatists, may be waning in the regime.

In the late-1980s, Rafsanjani publicly advocated that Iran acquire 

WMD, a key lesson of the war with Iraq. He has been a long-time 

proponent of Iran’s nuclear program, which secretly engaged in 

cooperation with the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network during his 

presidency. He supports better ties with the United States, presumably 

from a position of nuclear strength. 

Another key leader of the system is Ali Larijani, the current 

Speaker of Parliament. Larijani is a sophisticated intellectual, with a 

Ph.D. in Western philosophy. A traditional conservative, Larijani served 

in the IRGC and was the Secretary of the Supreme National Security 
Giles

139

Council from 2005-2007 when he resigned amid a dispute with President 

Ahmadinejad. 

Ali Larijani is often mentioned as a likely successor to President 

Ahmadinejad when the latter’s term of office ends in 2013. If so, we 

should not expect the substance of the regime’s policies to change. As 

Larijani has remarked, “Ideologically, I have no differences with 

Ahmadinejad, but we indeed have differences in style, approach and 

management.”63

Scions of a prestigious religious family, Larijani and his brothers 

have long held special positions of trust with the Supreme Leader. Ali’s 

brother Sadeq previously served as a clerical member of the Guardian 

Council and was recently appointed head of Iran’s judiciary. Brother 

Mohammad Javad has long been a foreign affairs advisor to Khamene’i. 

Ali Larijani proved to be pivotal in winning the release of British sailors 

detained by Iran in 2007, demonstrating greater personal influence within 

the regime than the Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki,

64

While Supreme National Security Council Secretary, Larijani was 

the regime’s lead negotiator with the West on Iran’s nuclear program, and 

he steadfastly refused to accept limits on it. More recently, Larijani has 

opposed President Ahmadinejad on the aforementioned deal with the West 

to exchange Iran’s enriched uranium for research reactor fuel. This 

opposition stems from an opportunistic desire to undercut a political rival, 

as much as his staunch nuclear nationalism. 

who has 

since been fired by Ahmadinejad.

Larijani is thought to favor Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, 

recently claiming the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a 

State Party, should simply be ignored.65 His pro-nuclear stance seems to 

be influenced by the trauma of the Iran-Iraq War: “We witnessed the 

effect of WMDs when the Americans and the Europeans provided Saddam 

with them and he used them, in places like Halabja. I was there when he 

attacked and I can’t wipe the images from my mind. Everything and 

everyone – children, men, women and animals were exterminated.”66 In 

effect, while WMD are heinous, acquiring nuclear weapons would deter 

their use against Iran in the future. As noted further below, Larijani also 

believes nuclear weapons will give Iran greater freedom of action.
Giles

140

Crisis Management

In terms of crisis management, the ruling regime has demonstrated 

it can perform reasonably well where there is a build-up of tensions that 

measures weeks or longer. In the 1998 near-war crisis between Iran and 

Afghanistan’s Taliban, Supreme Leader Khamene’i proved he was 

capable of resisting domestic pressures for a war that he deemed not to be 

in Iran’s interest. By contrast, Tehran seems less capable of performing 

under the stress of fast-breaking crises. In both the 2005 false report of an 

attack on the Bushehr nuclear reactor and the more recent demonstrations 

against Ahmadinejad’s re-election, the regime demonstrated poor 

situational awareness. 

Key leaders were unavailable publicly and lesser officials gave 

conflicting accounts of events. The leadership also seemed to face 

difficulty in building a consensus on the proper course of action. As an 

exalted religious figure, Khamene’i frequently will not even comment 

publicly on controversial topics for weeks, if then. This can lead to 

improvisation that carries unintended consequences (e.g., the abuse of 

protestors in an ad-hoc detention center became a major embarrassment 

and liability for the regime). 

These facets of Iranian decision making under stress will be an 

obvious and potentially disastrous liability in the event Iran becomes 

nuclear-armed, setting the stage for the failure of deterrence.

The Potential for Deterrence Failure

There are essentially two modes of deterrence failure pertinent to 

Iran; instances where regime decision making is not constrained by 

rationality and cases where rationality is otherwise impaired. In terms of 

the former, the regime may deliberately undertake a course of action that, 

by Western standards, seems utterly reckless because it all but assures 

harsh consequences for itself. 

Such would be the case, for example, where the regime discounts 

costs and focuses primarily or even solely on prospective gains, or where 

the bearing of costs itself is considered a virtue. The regime demonstrated 

its capacity to act in such a manner during its war with Iraq. In short, the 
Giles

141

regime locked itself into an eight-year-long conflict that nearly brought 

about its collapse by extolling the virtues of suffering in the name of 

“justice,” as well as large-scale martyrdom. 

It is said that 30 years past the revolution, the regime can no longer 

inspire such mass martyrdom. Since June 2009, however, the eagerness of 

Iran’s Basij militia to torture, rape and kill fellow citizens in the name of 

loyalty to the Supreme Leader should serve as a timely reminder the 

regime still has a large base of fanatical devotees and a willingness to 

exploit them. Left to their own devices, apocalyptically-inspired Hojjatieh

and other radicals could likewise prove to be undeterrable since conflict 

with the United States, possibly including even the use of nuclear 

weapons, serves their agenda. 

The latter form of deterrence breakdown involves cases where 

rationality is impaired by the stress of crisis decision making. This could 

stem from an inadequate understanding of U.S. national security interests, 

resolve, and decision-making processes. Here, it is noteworthy that 

despite top priority access to information, Supreme Leader Khamene’i has 

acknowledged he does not understand how foreign policy decisions are 

made in the United States.67

Cultural influences could further skew rational decision making in 

Tehran, given the aforementioned presence of conspiracy theorists among 

the top leadership, as well as the high political costs of backing down 

under U.S. pressure. Decisions for war or peace may well hinge on the 

advice top leaders receive from their estekhareh religious advisors, who 

likely will have no appreciation for the stakes involved or the implications 

of their advice. 

Bureaucratic politics and standard operating procedures, while 

certainly not unique to Iran, could similarly lead to a breakdown of 

deterrence. For instance, Iran’s ability to signal to Washington its intent to 

de-escalate a confrontation could be compromised by IRGC commanders 

who countermand orders to stand down, as they have done in the past. 

Compounded by the lack of diplomatic relations and interaction between 

Washington and Tehran since 1979, such mixed messaging could well be 

interpreted by the United States as a deception intended to mask Iranian 

preparations to initiate nuclear use.

In essence, the seeds for deterrence failure have already been sown 

in Tehran. The regime’s highly stylized form of decision making seems 
Giles

142

ill-suited to the demands of fast-breaking crises where the potential for 

nuclear escalation exists. Depending on circumstances, there may not be 

enough time for the regime to achieve consensus on a course of action 

among the heads of the system. This would tend to shrink the circle of 

advisers in proximity to the Supreme Leader, probably in favor of hardliners, who are his natural constituency and are disproportionately 

represented in that circle. 

The results could be skewed in favor of escalation, or if the 

Supreme Leader is unable to decide, paralysis at the top. The latter 

outcome carries risks of its own, since a lack of responsiveness may be 

misinterpreted as non-compliance with U.S. demands. Paralysis at the top 

might also afford more radical Iranian commanders, including in the 

nuclear forces, an opportunity to escalate a crisis on their own. U.S. 

deterrence planning must contend with both potential failure modes. 

Increasing the Prospects of Deterring a 

Nuclear-Armed Iran

As we speculate about the steps necessary to deter a nuclear-armed 

Iran it is important to set realistic expectations. It should be clear that a 

Cold War, cookie-cutter approach to nuclear deterrence will find itself out 

of step with the complex and confounding idiosyncrasies of the Islamic 

Republic. 

U.S. deterrence planning therefore needs to be more culturally 

attuned and tailored to Iran’s decision-making environment if we hope to 

influence leadership calculations about the wisdom of challenging U.S. 

interests. Even under ideal circumstances, deterrence is an uncertain 

business. Despite our best efforts it can fail at different points on the 

spectrum of conflict and for a variety of reasons. 

Along these lines, various forms of adventurism could be quite 

difficult to deter once Iran gets the bomb. As we have already seen, the 

Reagan administration was reluctant to confront Iran for fear it would 

retaliate with terrorist attacks against Americans abroad. The George W. 

Bush and Obama administrations have likewise been reticent to use 

military force against Iran for fear Tehran would retaliate against 

American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Giles

143

Arguably, we are already self-deterred when it comes to Iran. 

Why would we be any more willing to confront the Islamic Republic once 

it acquires nuclear weapons and the ability to hold American cities at risk? 

This is a conundrum that Iranian leaders seem to understand quite 

well. As Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani remarked, “If Iran becomes 

atomic Iran, no longer will anyone dare challenge it, because they would 

have to pay too high a price.”68

U.S. nuclear superiority is plainly understood in Tehran.

 We should therefore expect that a 

nuclear-armed Iran will be even more prone to engage in terrorism and 

insurgency in the heady days following nuclear weapons acquisition since 

the leadership’s greatest perceived cost of doing so – U.S. retaliation 

against the homeland – will likely shrink to zero.

69

All of this suggests the single most important step the United 

States can and must take to enhance the prospects for successfully 

deterring a nuclear-armed Iran is to restore the credibility of its threat to 

use force against the Islamic Republic.

 

American conventional military superiority is likewise acknowledged, 

though the regime contends asymmetric warfare can neutralize it. What 

Iran sees as lacking is America’s will to confront it. Indeed, as noted at 

the outset, Iranian leaders will point time and again to their acquisition of 

nuclear weapons as proof that American threats have no credibility. 

To rebuild the credibility of its deterrence strategy, the United 

States must begin by clearly delineating unacceptable red lines for the 

most threatening aspects of potential Iranian behavior, namely nuclear 

weapons-related transfers and use. It will be necessary to put the regime 

on notice publicly and privately that the United States will hold it 

accountable for transferring nuclear weapons-related technology, materials 

and the like to others. 

Washington should further make clear such transfers to non-state 

actors will be deemed a direct threat to U.S. national security, subjecting

the regime to the full range of military responses. To lend credence to 

these deterrent warnings, the United States could consider overt or covert 

operations to interdict other types of Iranian weapons smuggling, as a 

surrogate demonstration of American resolve.

Deterring Iranian nuclear use is a multi-faceted challenge. To 

deter such use against the United States, it will likely be necessary to 

dampen Iran’s initial nuclear euphoria with sober reminders that 
Giles

144

America’s nuclear arsenal was now specifically targeted against the ruling 

regime, that America had missile defenses while Iran did not, and that if 

Tehran was nonetheless foolish enough to use nuclear weapons against the 

United States, American nuclear retaliation would ensure Shi’a clerical 

rule and influence in Iran and within Islam more broadly would come to 

an abrupt end. 

For those among the ruling elite who may be apocalypticallyminded, a slightly more tailored message through an appropriate medium 

would be in order, namely that far from hastening the return of the Shi’a 

messiah, the initiation of nuclear weapons use by Iran would only insult 

God by disgracing Shi’ism and triggering the destruction of His Islamic 

Republic. 

Deterring Iranian nuclear use against U.S. allies, in particular 

Israel, raises challenges of its own. While Iranian leaders routinely 

castigate Israel for its presumed nuclear weapons stockpile, they 

nonetheless perceive the Jewish states as particularly vulnerable to nuclear 

destruction given its lack of strategic depth and concentrated population. 

As Hashemi Rafsanjani remarked in 2001, “...the use of a nuclear 

bomb in Israel will leave nothing on the ground, whereas it will only 

damage the world of Islam.”70 The issue of a future Iranian nuclear attack 

against Israel was debated during the Democratic presidential primary 

campaign in 2008. Then-Senator Hillary Clinton took a decidedly hard 

line on the issue. Speaking to ABC News, Clinton explained: 

Well, the question was, if Iran were to launch a nuclear 

attack on Israel, what would our response be? And I want 

the Iranians to know that if I am president, we will attack 

Iran. And I want them to understand that. Because it does 

mean that they have to look very carefully at their society. 

Because whatever stage of development they might be in 

their nuclear weapons program, in the next 10 years during 

which they might foolishly consider launching an attack on 

Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them. That's a 

terrible thing to say, but those people who run Iran need to 

understand that. Because that, perhaps, will deter them 

from doing something that would be reckless, foolish and 

tragic.71
Giles

145

Iran responded to Clinton’s remarks by filing a protest at the 

United Nations. President Ahmadinejad brushed off the comments by 

claiming that neither Clinton nor her opponent, then-Senator Obama, 

could ever get elected president.

Obama took a more circumspect stance than Clinton. He 

acknowledged Israel was America’s “most important ally” in the Middle 

East, and Washington would respond “forcefully and appropriately” to any 

attack. “But it is important that we use language that sends a signal to the 

world community that we’re shifting from the sort of cowboy diplomacy, 

or lack of diplomacy, that we’ve seen out of George Bush. And this kind 

of language is not helpful.” In Obama’s view, “When Iran is able to go to 

the United Nations complaining about the statements made and get some 

sympathy, that’s a sign that we are taking the wrong approach.”72

 Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons during the Obama 

administration, it will be necessary for the President and Secretary of State 

Clinton to revisit their respective campaign remarks. Inevitably, the 

President would be asked by the press if he now endorses the more 

hawkish views expressed by Clinton in 2008. At a minimum, the 

President will need to commit explicitly U.S. nuclear forces to the defense 

of America’s allies in the region.

More careful deliberation will be needed as to whether Washington 

should then also specify that the societal destruction of Iran will be the 

price Iran’s leaders pay for attacking Israel or another U.S. ally with 

nuclear weapons. It may be the case that most of the deterrence burden 

can rest on a narrower target set linked to the personal and corporate 

interests of the ruling elites. In this regard, it will be important to identify 

those values (e.g., personal wealth; societal control mechanisms such as 

state-run media, the IRGC and Basij; avoidance of diplomatic isolation, 

etc.) and how best to imperil them. In many, if not most, cases nuclear 

weapons will be overkill. 

Given the short missile flight times involved, it will also be

necessary to beef up the forward presence of U.S. forces in the region in 

order to: present the President with viable pre-emption options in the 

event Iran begins preparations for a nuclear attack, otherwise blunt such an 

attack with integrated and layered missile defenses, and rapidly hold Iran’s 

leaders and military chain of command accountable for initiating nuclear 

weapons use. 
Giles

146

Such forward basing carries risks, however, in exposing U.S. 

forces to attacks, from Iranian-backed terrorists and IRGC special forces 

to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Therefore, great attention will need to 

be devoted to U.S. force protection measures, as well. More intense 

security cooperation with our regional allies, including arms sales and 

counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency training, will help boost their 

confidence in resisting Iranian intimidation. 

As in other cases of extended deterrence, we should expect Tehran 

to seek to undermine our allies’ confidence in American security 

guarantees. Firm, consistent, and authoritative declaratory policy backed 

by the right force posture to implement it, as well as enhanced allied 

cooperation, should help parry Iran’s rhetorical jabs.

To lend further credibility to its red lines, the United States must 

demonstrate a greater willingness to fight “in the shadows,” as Iran does. 

Even after it acquires nuclear weapons, Tehran can still be expected to 

probe and exploit loopholes in U.S. deterrent warnings, employing lethal 

force either overtly or covertly in a manner designed to stay below the 

U.S. threshold for retaliation. Convincing Iran we will fight below that 

threshold can only help bolster our deterrence of conflict above it. In 

short, the demonstrated willingness to hold Iran accountable for lower 

levels of violence could have a credibility “multiplier effect.”

This is not to suggest, however, that a greater U.S. willingness to 

fight Iran at lower levels of the conflict spectrum will immediately put an 

end to Iranian adventurism. As we have seen in the Persian Gulf and in 

Iraq, the IRGC in particular has demonstrated its willingness to engage in 

tit-for-tat retaliation against U.S. forces. We should therefore expect Iran 

to reply in-kind to demonstrate that Tehran will not be so easily deterred. 

How this cycle has been broken in the past is for the United States 

to inflict major losses on Iran’s military capabilities. We will need to be 

prepared to do so again in the future. Moreover, since we are postulating 

that Iran would have recourse to nuclear weapons, we will need to act a 

little Iranian ourselves, modulating our application of force to remain 

under Tehran’s threshold for nuclear use. This will require careful 

consideration, as Tehran itself may not have a clear sense of when it 

would use nuclear weapons. In any event, to help keep a lid on the actionreaction cycle, we will also likely need to remind Iran of our escalation 

dominance. 
Giles

147

Lastly, we should expect recurring crises with a nuclear-armed 

Iran. Indeed, the period immediately after nuclear weapons acquisition 

could be particularly perilous as Iranian historical grievances, insecurity, 

ambition and nuclear chauvinism all combine into a volatile mixture. In 

time, Iran will learn, as all previous nuclear powers have, that nuclear 

weapons have very limited utility. The question then becomes whether it 

will take a limited conventional conflict like the Pakistan-India clash over 

Kargil in 1999 to bring that lesson home to Tehran or will it require a near 

nuclear war like the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In either case, we can be 

sure the United States will be involved. 

Therefore, we must be prepared to defuse nuclear crises with Iran. 

This will likely require greater agility and flexibility on the part of 

Washington. It will entail careful messaging to the right audiences, a 

major challenge for our Intelligence Community and our diplomats. It 

will also likely require us to make important trade-offs. 

For example, will it be more important to hold Tehran strictly to a 

given deadline – which it will be predisposed to defy – or can we allow a 

deadline to pass if, in doing so, it enables Iran to save face and both sides 

to defuse a given crisis? Moreover, will we be prepared to accept Iranian 

proclamations of “victory” over the United States if that helps to achieve 

our objectives? These are complex and challenging issues that should be 

explored by our policy and military planners in crisis simulations and 

exercises.

Conclusions 

Deterrence will have to bear a very heavy load in the event Iran

acquires the bomb. The regime’s idiosyncrasies, including intense 

factionalism, belief in conspiracy theories, apocalyptic messianism and 

superstitious reliance on fortune telling, all seem destined to impair 

rational behavior under the intense stress of a nuclear crisis. Add to this 

environment intent to spread the Islamic revolution and a perception that 

the United States lacks the will to confront it and the stage seems set for 

deterrence to fail.

To decrease the risks of deterrence failure, much work will need to 

be done by U.S. military and policy planners. To begin, they must 
Giles

148

recognize America’s track record of deterring the Islamic Republic since 

1979 is rather poor and they must understand why that has been the case. 

They will need to tailor deterrence strategy and tactics to Iran’s unique 

decision-making environment. Above all, they will need to rebuild the 

credibility of U.S. deterrent threats. This will require a greater willingness 

to employ limited force against Iran despite its possession of the bomb 

while maintaining U.S. escalation dominance to discourage Iran from 

initiating nuclear use.

Given the potential for nuclear chauvinism in Tehran, especially in 

the heady days following acquisition of the bomb, U.S. planners and 

decision makers should also use simulations and exercises to explore 

various means by which a nuclear crisis with Tehran could be defused. 

Even after making these investments, deterrence of a nuclear-armed Iran

may still fail. We should also hedge against that possibility by buttressing 

the full panoply of offensive and defensive capabilities to limit their 

capacity to inflict damage and to defeat Iranian adventurism and nuclear 

use.

Notes
Giles

149

 

1 David B. Crist, Gulf of Conflict: A History of US-Iranian Confrontation at Sea, Policy Focus No. 95 (June 2009), 

Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 3, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=313. 2 Ibid., 10.

3 Stephen Andrew Kelley, “Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will As Gunboat Diplomacy,” U.S. Naval 

Postgraduate School Thesis (June 2007), 57. 

http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/research/StudentTheses/kelley07.pdf . 4 Steven V. Roberts, “U.S. Ships Shell Iran Installation in Gulf Reprisal,” New York Times (Oct. 20, 1987), 

http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/20/world/us-ships-shell-iran-installation-in-gulf-reprisal.html?pagewanted=1. 5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Kelley, op cit., 67-68.

8 Ibid., 73.

9 Ibid., 74.

10 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (New York: Random House, 2005), 233. 11 Crist, op cit., 4. 12 Pollack, op cit., 226.

13 Ibid., p. 227. 14 Crist, op cit., 13.

15 Kelley, op cit., 67.

16 Crist, op cit., 13.

17 According to Rezaie, Khomeini said, “‘If I was in your place, I would attack the [U.S.] warship just as it entered 

the Strait of Hormuz,’ but he left the final decision to the officials. Later, we arrived at the conclusion that this 

approach was not wise, and the imam easily accepted our argument.” See, “Iran: Former IRGC Commander Reza’i 

Narrates Memoirs of Iran-Iraq War,” Open Source Center, IAP20051002011015 (Sept. 25, 2005).

18 Pollack, op cit., 232. Among the reasons cited by Hashemi Rafsanjani for Iran’s decision to accept the ceasefire 

was, “The Americans had blatantly intervened on Iraq’s side...” See “Former Iran President Comments on the End 

of the 1980s War with Iraq,” Open Source Center, IAP20060928950007 (Sept. 26, 2006). 

19 Michael Ware, “Inside Iran’s Secret War for Iraq,” Time (Aug. 15, 2005).

20 Ibid., p. 354. 21 Afshin Molavi, “Iran-US Relations: A Cold, Fragile Peace,” Eurasia Insight (April 7, 2003), 

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav040703.shtml. 22 Ware, op cit.

23 Ibid. 24 Information in this paragraph is drawn from Michael R. Gordon and Scott Shane, “U.S. Long Worried That Iran

Supplied Arms in Iraq” New York Times, (March 27, 2007), 

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/world/middleeast/27weapons.html. 25 Gordon and Shane, op cit.

26 “Full Transcript: NPR Interview with President Bush,” National Public Radio (Jan. 29, 2007), 

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7065633. 27 Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq, Congressional Research Service (Dec. 26, 2007), 5, 

http://www.comw.org/warreport/iraqarchiveregion.html. 28 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Iranian Arms Seized in Afghanistan,” New York Times (April 18, 2007),

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/middleeast/18military.html?pagewanted=print. 29 “On-the-Record Briefing: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker on His Meeting With Iranian Officials,” U.S. 

Department of State (July 24, 2007), http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iran/State/88999.pdf. 30 Katzman, op cit.

31 Ibid.

32 Steven Lee Myers, “Americans Release Iranian Detainees to Iraq,” New York Times, (July 9, 2009), 

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/world/middleeast/09release.html. 33 Dafna Linzer, “Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2007),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/25/AR2007012502199.html.
Giles

150

 34 Washington designated the IRGC-QF as a supporter of terrorist organizations in late-2007, but pulled its punches 

and has yet to designate the IRGC-QF as a foreign terrorist organization. 

35 “Gates: 2nd Carrier in Gulf a ‘Reminder’ to Iran,” MSNBC (April 29, 2008), 

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24377396/. 36 Lolita C. Baldor, “Gates: Iran Boosts Support for Militias,” Washington Post (April 11, 2008).

37 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Iranian Arms Seized in Afghanistan” New York Times, (April 18, 2007),

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/middleeast/18military.html?pagewanted=print. 38 “DoD News Briefing with Gen. Petraeus from the Pentagon” (April 26, 2007), 

http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3951. 39 Michael R. Gordon, “US Ties Iran to Deadly Iraq Attack,” New York Times (July 2, 2007), 

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/02/world/middleeast/02cnd-iran.html. 40 Thom Shanker, “Iran May Know of Weapons for Taliban, Gates Contends” New York Times, (June 14, 2007),

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/world/middleeast/14gates.html. 41 “Transcript of Remarks by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Gen. Michael V. Hayden at the Landon 

Lecture Series, Kansas State University April 30, 2008,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/newsinformation/speeches-testimony/speeches-testimony-archive-2008/landon-lecture-series.html. Emphasis added. 42 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means,” Combating Terrorism 

Center at West Point (Oct. 13, 2008), 64, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Iran. 43 This assumes deterrence actually worked during the Cold War, a proposition Keith Payne and others have called 

into question. See, for example, Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, Ky.: University 

Press of Kentucky, 1996), 37-60. 44 Kelley, op cit., p. 83.

45 Jackson Diehl, “In Iran, Apocalypse vs. Reform,” Washington Post (May 11, 2006), 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/10/AR2006051001791.html. See also, Karl Vick, 

“In Iran, Even Some on Right Warning Against Extremes,” Washington Post (March 27, 2006), 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/26/AR2006032600755.html. 46 Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, (Washington, DC: 

RAND, 2001), 21-23,

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1320/. 47 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2005), 47.

48 Mohsen Makhmalbaf, “The Secrets of Khamene’i’s Life: Part I – His Interests” (Dec. 29, 2009), 

http://homylafayette.blogspot.com/2009/12/makhmalbaf-secrets-khameneis-life.html. Makhmalbaf is the Iranian 

opposition’s main spokesman abroad and claims to have compiled this information from former staff members of 

the Supreme Leader’s Household and the Intelligence Ministry who have fled abroad.

49 Mohsen Makhmalbaf, “The Secrets of Khamene’i’s Life: Part II – His Entourage and Household Operations” 

(Dec. 30, 2009),

http://homylafayette.blogspot.com/2009/12/makhmalbaf-secrets-of-khameneis-life.html. 50 “Pakistan Establishes Nuclear Control Body,” Arms Control Today, (March 2000), 

http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2899. 51 Pollack, op cit., 359.

52 Mehdi Khalaji, Apocalyptic Politics: On the Rationality of Iranian Policy, Policy Focus No. 79, Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy (Jan. 2008), 19, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=286. 53 Ibid., 16. 

54 Ibid., 19. 55 Makhmalbaf, “The Secrets of Khamene’i’s Life: Part II – His Entourage and Household Operations.” 

56 Julian Borger, “IAEA Secret Report: Iran Worked on Nuclear Warhead,” Guardian (Sept. 18, 2009), 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/18/iran-nuclear-warhead-iaea-report. 57 According to Iranian state media, Ahmadinejad described the destruction of New York’s twin towers on Sept. 11, 

2001 as a “complicated [U.S.] intelligence scenario and act,” adding, “The September 11 incident was a big 

fabrication as a pretext for the campaign against terrorism and a prelude for staging an invasion against 

Afghanistan.” See “Iran’s Ahmadinejad Calls Sept. 11 ‘Big Fabrication,’” Reuters (March 6, 2010), 

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6251AO20100306. 
Giles

151

 58 According to Safavi, “The events of September 11 were ordered by US officials and Mossad [Israeli intelligence] 

so that they could carry out their strategy of pre-emption and warmongering and unipolarisation in order to dominate 

the Middle East.” See “Iran says U.S., Israel Ordered September 11 attacks,” Iran Focus (Sept. 6, 2006), 

http://www.iranfocus.com/en/special-wire/iran-says-u.s.-israel-ordered-september-11-attacks-08512.html. 59 Ray Takeyh and Joseph Cirincione, “ElBaradei is Quietly Managing to Disarm Iran,” Financial Times (Feb. 26, 

2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/06a1fa90-e4d7-11dc-a495-0000779fd2ac.html. 60 Khalaji, op cit., 32.

61 Ibid., 24-25.

62 Ibid., 16.

63 Sami Moubayed, “‘President’ Larijani: A Star is Born,” Asia Times (June 21, 2008), 

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF21Ak02.html. 64 Paul Reynolds, “Ahmadinejad’s Final Flourish,” BBC News (April 4, 2006), 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6526359.stm. 65 “Larijani Sees Ulterior Motives Behind West N-hype,” PressTV (Dec. 5, 2009), 

http://www.presstv.ir/pop/Print/?id=112902. 66 Amira Howeidy, “Taking Matters in Hand,” Al Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 791 (April 20-26, 2006), 

http://weekly.ahram.or.eg/print/2006/791/re6.htm. 67 For example, in his 2009 New Year’s address, Khamene’i remarked, “I do not know who is making the decisions 

in America. Is it the President? Is it the Congress? Or is it the unknown people who pull the strings?” See, “Supreme 

Leader’s Speech in Mashhad,” (March 21, 2009), The Center for Preserving and Publishing the Works of Grand 

Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei,

http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1076&Itemid=4. 68 Larijani’s 2005 remarks to IRGC commanders quoted in Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, 

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 33.

69 As noted by Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, “...But let’s suppose that Iran would go for nuclear weapons. How 

many warheads do you think Iran would have? In a couple of years, let’s say one or two. If we were to get a 

nuclear weapon we would be at a disadvantage, competing with the United States, which has thousands of warheads. 

It would be a tactical mistake for our country to do that, and our leaders are clever enough not to do it...” See, 

“Interview Excerpts: Iran Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh,” Washington Post (Sept. 17, 2009), 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/17/AR2009091703072.html. 70 “Former Iranian President Rafsanjani on Using a Nuclear Bomb Against Israel,” Special Dispatch Series, No. 

325, (Jan. 3, 2002), Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 

http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/582.htm. 71 “Iran: Considering Hillary Clinton’s ‘obliterate’ remarks,” Los Angeles Times, (April 24, 2008), 

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2008/04/iran-considerin.html. 72 “Obama: Clinton’s 'obliterate' Iran statement too much like Bush,” CNN (May 4, 2008), 

file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilesg/My%20Documents/Iran/US%20Policy/Obliterate%20Iran/5-5-

08_Obama_Clinton%27s%20%27obliterate%27%20Iran%20statement%20too%20much%20like%20Bush_CNN.ht

m. 
CHAPTER 6

Deterring North Korea from Using WMD 

in Future Conflicts and Crises

Bruce W. Bennett

For nearly 60 years, North Korea has determinedly pursued the 

development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) usually defined as 

involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. 

In recent years, North Korea has used its nuclear weapons to deter action 

against it and to coerce its neighbors in crises. As the North Korean 

regime continues to suffer many failures, it may someday lash out and 

cause a major war in Northeast Asia or the North Korean government may 

collapse into civil war and anarchy. With almost no chance of winning a 

conflict limited to conventional weapons, and having invested so much of 

their limited resources in WMD, North Korean leaders are likely to use 

these weapons in conflicts or further crises. North Korean WMD could 

cause immense damage to the populations and economies in Northeast 

Asia, potentially destabilizing the region for many years.

It is therefore incumbent on the United States and its allies to 

develop means to deter North Korean use of WMD. But doing so is not 

easy. The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have clearly 

failed to deter multiple North Korean provocations associated with WMD. 

Moreover, the North Korean leaders appear insensitive to the kind of 

“assured destruction” nuclear weapon retaliatory threats against cities and 

industry that were the major basis for Cold War deterrence. Instead, 

deterrence of North Korean WMD use needs to be based more on the 

ability to defeat that use and deny its objectives, while still threatening 

retaliation that would undermine or destroy the North Korean regime. 

 This chapter describes such a deterrent approach. It first 

characterizes North Korea as a failing state, one which has used crises and 

may yet try to use conflict to strengthen the regime. It then addresses the 

nature of the North Korean WMD threat, how North Korea might use that 

threat, and the damage it could cause. This chapter concludes by 
Bennett

153

discussing how the United States and the ROK might deter the North 

Korean WMD threats in conflict and crisis. 

“Know Thy Enemy”

The ancient Chinese philosopher/strategist, Sun Tzu, urged, 

“Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand 

victories.” The situation in North Korea is serious, complicating efforts to 

deter North Korean use of WMD. 

The Situation in North Korea

North Korea is a failing state. Its economy has had many failures. 

Its agricultural production is usually much less than its subsistence food 

requirements.1

Despite the North Korean efforts to control people’s lives, North 

Korea sees a lot of rebellious behavior. This includes refugee flows into 

China,

 As a result, many North Koreans starve to death, while the 

rest of the population survives in part because of substantial foreign aid 

and in part because of market activities. But the North Korean regime 

fears that North Korean merchants are beyond the regime’s control, 

especially given the merchants’ extensive use of bribery. The regime 

therefore carried out a currency revaluation in late-2009 that allowed only 

minimal currency exchange and prohibited the use of foreign currency, 

seeking to wipe out the merchants’ capital. This currency revaluation also 

took away the savings of many North Korean elites, caused hoarding of 

goods (especially food) and resulted in hyperinflation. 

2 major black market activities, graft and corruption by North 

Korean authorities3 and even reported attacks on the North Korean 

leaders.4

Social unrest appears to be spreading in North Korea. The North 

Korean regime has tried to maintain its control of the country through the 

heavy use of propaganda. But “there is mounting evidence that Kim Jong 

Il is losing the propaganda war inside North Korea, with more than half 

the population now listening to foreign news, grass-roots cynicism 

undercutting state myths and discontent rising even among elites.”5
Bennett

154

Meanwhile, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-Il, is in bad health, 

may die, and his succession is not clearly resolved. His apparently 

designated successor, his third son Kim Jong-Un, is young and 

inexperienced. Trying to build his image, the regime credited him with 

the December 2009 currency revaluation, in the end making him appear to 

have caused a disaster.

The U.S. commander in South Korea, General Walter L. Sharp, 

has summarized this situation as the following: “Combined with the 

country’s disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, 

insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and 

developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership 

change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable.”6

How Is North Korea Coping?

The North Korean leadership has a culture of empowerment to 

justify its legitimacy. As the regime has faced the many failures described 

above, it has used provocations to demonstrate it is still empowered and to 

create a diversionary conflict effect: the North Korean regime seeks to 

unify its elites against the common external adversaries, mainly the ROK

and the United States, trying to steer the elites’ displeasure away from the 

regime.

For example, in 2006 North Korea faced serious U.S. economic 

sanctions imposed because of illegal North Korean activities such as 

counterfeiting U.S. currency and goods. North Korea could have reversed 

these sanctions by admitting its illegal activities, apologizing for them and 

promising to stop them. But in the culture of empowerment, such North 

Korean action would make the leadership appear weak and subject to 

overthrow. 

Instead, the leadership prepared for, and carried out, a series of 

provocations, including missile launches on July 4 (U.S. time), and 

escalating to a nuclear weapon test on October 8 (U.S. time). Kim Jong-Il

had demonstrated his empowerment, and by February 2007, he had 

concluded an agreement with the United States and the other regional 

powers that reversed the U.S. economic sanctions and otherwise proved 

very advantageous to North Korea. 
Bennett

155

North Korea has continued its pattern of escalating brinksmanship 

to deal with its many challenges. North Korea used missile launches and a 

nuclear test again in 2009 to demonstrate Kim Jong-Il’s continued 

empowerment despite his very poor health, to support regime succession, 

to continue his use of diversionary conflict and to achieve other objectives 

discussed below. And in 2010 North Korea sank a ROK warship, 

escalating its pattern of provocations.

North Korean Asymmetric WMD Threats

As ROK and U.S. conventional military superiority developed over 

several decades, the North Korean economy could not keep pace. Instead, 

North Korea opted to pursue various asymmetric threats, especially 

WMD. This was a natural evolution from Kim Il-Sung’s emphasis on 

special operations forces in World War II. This section describes the 

North Korean WMD component of its asymmetric capabilities.

How Much WMD Might North Korea Have?

Most experts in the United States assume North Korea has 

developed its nuclear weapon capabilities independently. For example, 

the CIA said North Korea produced enough plutonium by 1994 for one to 

two weapons,7 and North Korea did not produce any more plutonium until 

2003. These experts typically argue North Korea could have roughly five 

to 10 nuclear weapons today,8

However, a number of stories suggest North Korea has had 

external help. For example, in 1999 Dr. AQ Khan of Pakistan said he 

went to North Korea and was shown three plutonium weapons that could 

be assembled for use on ballistic missiles in one hour.

though given the limited testing of the 

weapons and their delivery means like missiles, only two to six of these 

would likely be deliverable and reliable. 

9

Moreover, North Korea would not likely have put all of its 

weapons in one place at one time and shown them to a foreigner, as a 

security failure could have led to U.S. preemption. North Korea may thus 

If he was right, 

North Korea must have had an external source of plutonium. 
Bennett

156

have had at least five to six nuclear weapons in 1999, consistent with what 

the defector Hwang Jong-Yup said he was told in 1996.10

If these stories are correct, North Korea may have developed more 

than 10 nuclear weapons. In particular, one story from Russian 

intelligence claimed that in 1992, North Korea got 56 kilograms of 

plutonium from the former Soviet Union.

11

There are many reports on North Korean chemical and biological 

weapons. “We also assess Pyongyang has an active biological weapons 

research program, with an inventory that may include anthrax, botulism, 

cholera, hemorrhagic fever, plague, smallpox, typhoid and yellow 

fever.”

 If so, North Korea could have 

enough fissile material today for perhaps 20 nuclear weapons. And if 

some organizations risked giving North Korea fissile material, they may 

have also provided the technical expertise necessary to make ballistic 

missile warheads, as Dr. Khan asserted.

12 “North Korea has an assessed significant chemical agent 

stockpile that includes blood, blister, choking and nerve agents.”13 “In the 

assessment of U.S. intelligence services, their reserves, accommodated in 

perhaps half a dozen major storage sites and as many as 170 mountain 

tunnels, are at least 180 to 250 tons, with some estimates of chemical 

stockpiles run as high as 2,500-5,000 tons.”14 “In May 1996 ROK

Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha reported to the National Assembly that it 

was estimated that North Korea possessed approximately 5,000 tons of 

biological and chemical weapons. Given the extensive production 

facilities, this later estimate may constitute the low end of the actual 

stockpile.”15

In terms of delivery systems, “chemical weapons can be delivered 

by virtually all DPRK fire support systems. This includes most artillery, 

multiple rocket launchers (including those mounted on CHAHO-type 

boats), mortars, FROG and SCUD missiles, and some bombs.”16 “The 

North has about 600 SCUD missiles capable of hitting targets in South 

Korea, and possibly also of reaching Japanese territory. There are a further 

200 Nodong-1 missiles which could reach Tokyo.”17 North Korea would 

likely use its special operations forces (SOF) to deliver biological 

weapons. “Military authorities in Seoul estimate that North Korea's special 

operations forces currently exceed 200,000 soldiers.”18 “North Korea has 

recently deployed about 50,000 special forces along its border with South 

Korea.”19
Bennett

157

Potential North Korean Uses of WMD

In peacetime, North Korea regularly uses its nuclear weapons to 

threaten neighbors, hoping to coerce them and/or deter their actions. For 

mainly internal purposes, North Korea has used nuclear weapon 

possession and tests to illustrate the strength or formidability of its regime 

and to claim North Korea is one of the most powerful (and respected) 

countries in the world. It has also used nuclear weapons as a bargaining 

chip to secure goods and agreements from other countries. North Korea 

generally does not use chemical and biological weapons for these strategic 

purposes. 

It is less clear how North Korea would use WMD in wartime. 

North Korea has threatened to use nuclear weapons against the cities and 

military facilities of neighbors. An “unofficial spokesman” talks of North 

Korea using nuclear weapons to: (1) create electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 

effects to disable electronic systems, (2) attack nuclear power plants 

(causing wide-spread nuclear fallout), and (3) attack cities in various 

ways.20

While the use of nuclear weapons against cities would be horrific, 

the United States planned a similar concept during the Cold War with its 

so-called “assured destruction” concept of threatening Soviet cities. As 

early as 1945, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff explained the concept of 

targeting Soviet cities: “The atomic bomb, in the foreseeable future, will 

be primarily a strategic weapon of destruction against concentrated 

industrial areas vital to the war effort of an enemy nation. In addition, it 

may be employed against centers of population with a view to forcing an 

enemy state to yield through terror and disintegration of national 

morale.”

 

21

North Korea is likely to view the survivability of its nuclear forces 

as limited, pushing it to use them relatively early in a conflict. This 

attitude would be strengthened by a belief the United States will use 

nuclear weapons early,22 and nuclear weapons would provide greater, 

potentially conflict winning leverage early on. For example, North Korea 

might hope appropriate nuclear weapon use would convince Japan to not 

become involved in the conflict, and thereby deny the United States the 

use of Japan to support U.S. deployments and operations.23
Bennett

158

North Korea might alternatively wait until an invasion of the ROK

fails and the ROK/U.S. start a counteroffensive before using North Korean 

nuclear weapons. The North Korea regime would know it had to stop the 

counteroffensive or not survive, and would be prepared to take very risky 

actions to survive, including nuclear attacks on cities. Many analysts 

argue this would be the most likely kind of North Korean nuclear weapon 

use.

North Korea is more likely to use its chemical and biological 

weapons to achieve specific operational objectives. These objectives 

would likely include causing breakthroughs on the battlefield, disrupting 

airfield and port operations and disrupting the flow of US forces into 

Korea. Such attacks would most likely support North Korean objectives if 

done very early in a conflict. Given the potency of biological weapons, 

North Korea may prefer to use them at some significant geographical 

distance from the Korean peninsula, such as in Japan or the United States. 

Nuclear Effects on People and Things

Table 1 evaluates the expected effectiveness of North Korean 

nuclear attacks delivered by ballistic missiles against ROK ground forces, 

airfields and population centers. This analysis assumes an airburst 

weapon to maximize prompt effects and eliminate most fallout. The 

Republic of Korea today, in peacetime, has 47 Army divisions, 15 major 

military airfields and a population of 48,500,000. 
Bennett

159

Table 1

Approximate North Korean Nuclear Weapon Effects 

on ROK Target Types

*

Expected casualties, including reliability/delivery probability. Thus a 

10 Kt weapon launched at a city like Seoul will cause an expected 200,000 

fatalities and serious casualties (assuming a baseline reliability/delivery 

probability of 60 percent); if it actually detonates in the middle of the city, it will 

cause an expected 340,000 fatalities and serious casualties.

Thus, if North Korea uses one 10 kiloton (Kt) weapon against a 

ground force division (the second to last row), prompt effects would cause

an expected 7 percent attrition, whereas the same weapon would cause an 

expected attrition of 31 percent at a typical airfield or nearly 200,000 

expected casualties in a city like Seoul. A high effectiveness warhead (the 

last row) with higher explosive yield (50 Kt), accuracy (0.5 km CEP), and 

delivery probability (70 percent) would cause several times as much 

damage, depending upon the target type, suggesting the value North Korea 

might place on improving nuclear weapon capabilities. 

The earlier rows of Table 1 show multiple nuclear weapons would 

do even more damage. For example, if North Korea uses (launches) three 
Bennett

160

nuclear weapons against ground forces, 21 percent of a division would be 

damaged, while three weapons (spread across three airfields) would create 

an expected damage of 31 percent at each of three airfields, or casualties 

equivalent to 93 percent for a single airfield. At the extreme, 20 nominal 

North Korean nuclear weapons launched against these targets would affect 

about 3 percent of the ROK ground forces, or almost six ROK major 

airbases, or about 3 million ROK civilians. The very high potential 

damage to the civilian population suggests why North Korea might focus 

its attacks on cities as targets. 

The Effects of Chemical and Biological Weapons 

Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) can also cover large 

areas with their effects. Consider a 12.5 Kt nuclear air burst will cause 

fatalities over perhaps 8 km2

, a large area in a city. In contrast, chemical 

and biological weapons are carried by the wind; their effects are a function 

of the original dispersal pattern, wind direction and speed, and 

atmospheric conditions. If dispersed across a wide base, 1,000 kgs of 

sarin might cause lethal effects over 0.7 to 8 km2

, depending upon these 

various factors. Similar dispersal of 10 kgs of anthrax might cause lethal 

effects over 5 to 30 km2

.

24

The other key difference between the chemical and biological 

weapons and nuclear weapons is the fraction of people in these areas most 

likely affected. With an airburst nuclear weapon, most people in the lethal 

area would be affected. Even those inside buildings would see their 

buildings collapse or seriously damaged, contributing to the injuries the 

people would suffer. With chemical and biological weapons, the buildings 

in these areas may provide some degree of shelter from weapon effects. 

This would be especially true of buildings without central air conditioning 

and having many floors, as is typical in Seoul. Thus, only a fraction of the 

people in these areas would be affected depending upon the time of year 

and building ventilation, leading to somewhat fewer casualties if a similar 

area is affected. Still, even if the casualties are only half or a quarter as 

much as with nuclear weapons over a similar amount of area, these 

 These areas suggest that possible quantities of 

chemical and biological weapon could affect similar areas to those shown 

for nuclear weapons in Table 1. 
Bennett

161

quantities of chemical and biological weapons could cause tens of 

thousands of casualties or more in ROK cities.

Against military targets, chemical and biological weapons would 

tend to cause far less damage than is shown for nuclear weapons in Table 

1. Military personnel tend to have protective clothing, medicines and 

other counters to chemical and biological weapons, protections that would 

significantly reduce casualties. Still, these military forces would need 

timely warning to apply many of these protections, and thus warning of 

WMD use would become a key determinant of the damage North Korean 

chemical and biological weapons could do to military forces. 

Deterrence Theory

Deterrence occurs when an adversary expects the benefits of an 

action are less than the costs. The Deterrence Operations Joint Operating 

Concept (JOC) is the official Defense Department statement on 

deterrence. It says: “Deterrence operations convince adversaries not to 

take actions that threaten U.S. vital interests by means of decisive 

influence over their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by 

credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while 

encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an 

acceptable outcome.”25

Basic Deterrence Concepts

The Deterrence Operations JOC uses a rational deterrence theory 

framework.26 This theory examines the adversary’s perception of the net 

benefits (benefits minus costs) of any action as well as the probabilities of 

these net benefits to determine the utility of the action. It then compares 

the utilities of the alternative actions; if the utility of restraint (the status 

quo) is greatest, then deterrence is achieved.27 This assessment does not 

require an adversary to find an action that is clearly beneficial. In some 

situations, all of an adversary’s choices (even the status quo) may have 

negative utility, as appears to be the case with North Korea. In such cases, 

the adversary looks for the “least miserable option.” Said differently, a 

noted deterrence expert, Robert Jervis, has argued, “It is rational to start a 
Bennett

162

war one does not expect to win ... if it is believed that the likely 

consequences of not fighting are even worse.”28

Rational deterrence theory assumes the adversary is risk neutral: 

The adversary’s decision is based upon expected value calculations, and 

neither takes nor avoids risk.29 The alternative theory considered by the 

Deterrence Operations JOC is called prospect theory, which assesses risk 

differently. It argues that when an adversary faces serious losses, as in the 

North Korean conditions described above, the adversary becomes a risk 

taker, ready to try actions that avoid or reduce its losses even if there is 

serious risk in those actions. Deterrence of risk takers is a much more 

difficult effort, as US experience with North Korea has illustrated.

Understanding Deterrence Leverage

As suggested, deterrence is achieved by affecting the benefits and 

costs perceived by an adversary, as well as the adversary’s perceptions of 

the probabilities it will experience these costs and benefits. The literature 

talks about two kinds of deterrence efforts: deterrence by threat of 

punishment and deterrence by threat of denial.30

Deterrence by threat of punishment usually seeks to increase the 

costs an adversary will suffer from an unwanted action, while deterrence 

by denial seeks to reduce the benefits the adversary hopes to achieve. For 

example, if the United States wants to deter a North Korean missile test, it 

could threaten economic sanctions if North Korea proceeds with the test 

(punishment) or it could threaten to preemptively destroy the missile on 

the launch pad (denial). 

 

Deterrence is in the eye of the adversary. What does he perceive to 

be the benefits and costs of particular actions, and what does he believe 

the probabilities of each outcome are? Those perceptions are in turn based 

on U.S. capabilities for denial and punishment and U.S. will to impose 

denial and punishment. When adversaries perceive the U.S. lacks will

(e.g., the U.S. fails to act against the bad behavior of an adversary), they 

may discount other U.S. denial and punishment threats (they perceive 

lower probabilities of costly outcomes, and higher probabilities of 

beneficial outcomes).
Bennett

163

Each U.S. deterrent action has consequences for both sides. For 

example, a U.S. preemptive attack on a missile launch pad could destroy 

the missile and potentially embarrass the North Korean leadership, 

contributing to deterrence. But this action would likely lead to further 

escalation, something the United States would usually prefer to avoid but 

which North Korea may be prepared to accept to rally its military and 

other elites around a failing regime. North Korea’s escalation might be to 

an artillery attack on the ROK, an attack the ROK would want to avoid. 

Thus, the ROK might pressure the United States not to carry out a 

preemptive attack to avoid this escalation. 

Many in the international community would also likely 

communicate their view that U.S. preemptive action was unnecessary and 

inappropriate, hence reducing the probability of such U.S. action. If the 

United States has strong incentives not to carry out a preemptive attack, 

the adversary may conclude that the probability of such a U.S. action, 

despite U.S. capabilities, is extremely low.

In addition, if the United States cannot fully prove bad behavior by 

an adversary, it will normally be reluctant to take action. For example, 

despite assertions by then-President Bush in 2006 he would hold North 

Korea accountable for nuclear proliferation, no serious US action was 

taken against North Korea when its assistance in building a Syrian nuclear 

reactor was discovered the following year, assistance the United States 

could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 

To the extent that U.S. adversaries can keep their WMD activities 

covert, the United States will have difficulty responding against them. 

Adversaries may thus feel undeterred from pursuing covert WMD 

development and proliferation efforts. 

Finally, there is a difference between U.S. efforts to deter an attack 

upon the United States and U.S. efforts to deter attacks on U.S. allies. 

Most adversaries will perceive the United States would respond very 

seriously to an attack on the United States. But deterrence that supports 

U.S. allies—so-called extended deterrence—often appears less probable to 

draw a serious U.S. response, given the lower level of U.S. interest. To 

counter this concern, the U.S./ROK Presidential Summit in June 2009 

declared a Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America 

and the Republic of Korea. This Joint Vision said in part, “The Alliance is 

adapting to changes in the 21st century security environment. We will 
Bennett

164

maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities that

support both nations’ security interests. The continuing commitment of 

extended deterrence, including the US nuclear umbrella, reinforces this 

assurance.”31

Applying the Theory

In practice, few decision makers explicitly calculate the costs and 

benefits of each possible outcome, estimate the probability of that 

outcome and calculate the preferred action based on precise calculations. 

Instead, consideration of these factors is more subjective and approximate. 

Moreover, it is difficult to estimate these factors for Kim Jong-Il and his 

regime, given how the regime strives to deny information on its attitudes 

and decision making to the outside world. Nevertheless, North Korean 

behavior does give some baselines against which to examine this 

framework and at least try to understand the tradeoffs North Korea might 

perceive.

Consider the case of the April 2009 North Korean missile test 

provocation.32

The long-range missile launched on April 5, 2009, was likely seen 

as Kim Jong-I1’s best course of action for creating the appearance of 

regime empowerment, while not causing much chance of retaliatory

actions that could threaten regime survival nor giving the appearance of 

weakness to his internal or external enemies. Doing nothing in his 

regime’s deteriorating position was likely seen as unhelpful, and doing too 

much—such as a North Korean artillery attack on Seoul—was likely 

viewed as unleashing a concatenation of escalation responses that could 

destroy the Pyongyang regime.

 Why did Kim Jong-Il select this action? To keep this 

example simple, assume there were three alternative North Korean courses 

of action at that time: (1) restraint (the status quo), (2) the use of artillery 

to fire into the ROK, and (3) the North Korean missile test. 

With the missile test Kim Jong-I1 probably hoped to counter the 

appearance of regime weakness associated with its many failures and his 

recent illnesses. He likely also hoped to create a “diversionary conflict” 

where his military and other elites focused on the United States and the 

ROK as their enemies, responsible for North Korea’s problems, thereby 

creating an environment where his son had the best chance to succeed 
Bennett

165

him. While his past provocations have invariably led to the United States 

and the ROK imposing some form of costs in return, usually economic 

sanctions, Kim Jong-Il has turned these costs to political benefit by 

unifying his military and other elites against their external enemies and in 

support of the regime. 

Kim’s missile test in April 2009 might have backfired if the United 

States had shot down the missile during the boost phase, preventing Kim 

Jong-Il from demonstrating his missile capability.33

The United States might have deterred a second North Korean 

missile launch if it had prepared to intercept the missile. The United 

States could have announced that it would not allow North Korea to 

launch another intercontinental-range ballistic missile.

 Alternatively, a North 

Korean artillery fire provocation could have failed due to effective ROK

counter battery fire that quickly silenced the North Korean artillery, 

demonstrating North Korean weakness rather than strength. Further, 

North Korean artillery fire into the ROK was clearly too escalatory and 

dangerous, and thus an unacceptable action. 

34

The U.S. announcement could have said, “If North Korea

launches, the U.S. will use the opportunity to test its missile defenses 

against the target missile kindly provided by North Korea. Of course, 

since this would be an initial ballistic missile defense (BMD) test against 

this kind of threat, there would be a significant potential that the missile 

intercept would fail. But even then, the United States would gain 

significant experience in, and data about, intercepting real North Korean 

missiles.”

 

35

Kim Jong-I1 might have viewed such a U.S. BMD threat as posing 

a good probability of making the regime look weak (by successfully 

intercepting the missile), plus some chance the launch episode could have 

escalated out of control toward full-scale war if the United States was 

prepared to be so aggressive. Under those conditions, Kim Jong-Il could 

have preferred the status quo to the outcome of a second missile launch.36

This simple example illustrates many of the characteristics of 

deterrence. In particular, it suggests Kim Jong-Il might be deterred by 

U.S. efforts to deny his provocations. Historically, much of the deterrence 

literature, and especially the nuclear deterrence literature, has focused on 

deterrence by the threat of punishment: An adversary could be deterred 

from taking an action because of the punishment threatened if it takes the 
Bennett

166

action. But the United States and the ROK also need to apply denial 

threats and find punishments that deter North Korean provocations like 

missile launches.37

Deterring WMD Use 

When trying to deter North Korean WMD use, what is the relative 

utility of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment? Is there 

sufficient leverage in these two approaches combined to somehow control 

or prevent North Korean WMD use?

Options for Deterrence by Punishment Threats and Deterrence by 

Denial Threats 

During the Cold War, the United States focused its deterrence of 

the Soviet Union on punishment. Deterrence by the threat of punishment 

can be achieved by threatening various assets of an adversary. Early in the 

Cold War the United States recognized nuclear weapon attacks against 

adversary cities were a serious deterrent threat (as noted above). The 

United States also discussed targeting adversary military forces and/or 

adversary leadership to achieve deterrence by threat of punishment (and 

also a significant level of deterrence by denial).

There are four basic actions that support deterrence by denial: 

counterforce, active defense, passive defense and consequence 

management. Counterforce attacks seek to destroy adversary WMD 

forces (both weapons and delivery means) to prevent their use, and may 

also target command and control capabilities as well as adversary leaders 

to prevent WMD launch. Active defenses seek to intercept WMD when 

en route to targets, and include air and missile defenses as well as border 

control against Special Operations Forces. Passive defenses seek to 

protect people and assets from WMD effects once the weapons detonate or 

are otherwise released. Consequence management seeks to deal with the 

effects of WMD after people/assets have been exposed, providing medical 

care and other kinds of damage recovery. 

These denial means provide different levels of leverage against 

WMD use. Counterforce can be powerful if preemptive action is possible 
Bennett

167

and if the locations of the WMD forces are known. Active defense can be 

technologically challenging but potentially very effective as technologies 

mature. Passive defenses are relatively more effective against chemical, 

biological and radiological weapons, having a more limited role against 

nuclear weapons (though sheltering and evacuation/dispersal can still be 

important). And consequence management is important for dealing with 

WMD effects, but consequence management capabilities have generally 

not been considered very effective in achieving deterrence of WMD use.

The Historical Approach to Deterrence by Punishment

Nuclear deterrence was a major international issue during the Cold 

War. For much of the period, the United States talked about strategic 

nuclear deterrence almost interchangeably with the concept of assured 

destruction: The United States deterred Soviet nuclear attacks on the 

United States by threatening to destroy Soviet cities with their associated 

population and industry (imposing a high punishment cost). Many in the 

United States felt that if the Soviet cities were destroyed then most of their

society would also be destroyed, and the risk averse Soviet leadership

would not take that chance since their power flowed from the talents and 

productivity of their people. 

In the 1970s, the abilities of the United States and the Soviet Union 

to destroy each other’s cities were assessed in the terms shown in Figure 

1.38 At the time, both the United States and the Soviets had thousands of 

equivalent megatons (EMT) of nuclear weapons,39 as suggested by the 

“capability” mark at the right.
Bennett

168

Figure 1

Deterring Nuclear Weapon Use: Cold War vs. North Korea

The curves in Figure 1 indicate even if the Soviets could have 

somehow destroyed most of the U.S. nuclear forces, the United States 

could still have destroyed most of the Soviet industrial capacity,40 since 

even a “small” city attack (a few hundred EMT) would have been 

devastating.41

But the North Korean nuclear threat is a different problem because 

it is on the part of the curve with steep returns. A North Korean force of 

five to 20 nuclear weapons of 10 Kt yield each would amount to about 

0.25 to 1 equivalent megatons (EMT). Because North Korea has relatively 

few nuclear weapons, serious US/ROK efforts to destroy those weapons 

combined with effective active defenses could significantly reduce the 

 And the same was true for the Soviets: They also deterred 

U.S. nuclear attacks by threatening U.S. cities. Moreover, the cost of 

adding one more warhead to the attack to insure damage would always be 

much less than the adversary’s cost of destroying one more warhead. 

Thus, there was little leverage achieved by the capability for counterforce 

attacks or active defenses: Not enough of the opposing threat could be 

denied to make a difference.
Bennett

169

damage North Korea could cause against its possible nuclear targets in 

ROK and Japanese cities and elsewhere.

Deterring of Chemical and Biological Weapon Use 

During the Cold War, the U.S. approach to deterring chemical and 

biological weapon use was less clear. The United States carried out a 

serious chemical and biological weapons defense program (passive 

defenses), seeking protection against the use of these weapons and 

deterrence of their use by being able to deny their effects. U.S. 

counterforce and active defense capabilities would also have helped deny 

chemical and biological weapon effects and thereby had some role in 

deterrence.

Early in the Cold War, the United States developed its own 

chemical and biological weapons to allow it to retaliate in kind against any 

Soviet chemical or biological weapon attack. Effectively, the United 

States was prepared to use these weapons to deny the Soviets any 

advantage from having employed similar weapons; in addition, research 

on offensive chemical and biological weapon capabilities significantly 

aided passive defense efforts against those threats.

Eventually, the United States joined the Biological and Toxin 

Weapons Convention (BWTC) in 1972 and the Chemical Weapons 

Convention in 1993 in the hopes of precluding these weapons from future 

conflicts. But toward the end of the Cold War, the United States learned 

that the Soviet Union had not given up its biological weapons efforts 

despite having joined the BWTC. Lacking biological weapons at that 

point, the United States implied it would employ nuclear retaliation 

against the use of these weapons. 

But in the 2010 Nuclear Policy Review Report (NPRR), the United 

States declared, “With the advent of U.S. conventional military 

preeminence and continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and 

capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW, the role of U.S. 

nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks – conventional, 

biological or chemical – has declined significantly. The United States will 

continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear 

attacks.”42 This statement does not preclude a nuclear response to 
Bennett

170

adversary chemical and biological weapon use, but it makes such a 

response unlikely (a low probability), potentially reducing the deterrence 

of such attacks unless highly effective conventional force responses are 

guaranteed. 

Deterring North Korean Use of WMD in a War 

Deterrence of North Korean WMD use in war requires 

understanding what North Korea would think it could gain from war and 

from using WMD. Given North Korea’s circumstances, a North Korean 

invasion of the ROK would most likely be an act of desperation for a 

regime losing control, a “diversionary war” used to secure support from 

the North Korean military for a near-failed regime. 

At that point, the regime may even have some evidence of military 

plotting to overthrow the regime. Facing serious survival risks if it does 

nothing, the North Korean regime may decide that a general war will 

restore military support for the regime and give it a chance for survival, 

despite all the other risks.

Such a North Korean decision to invade the ROK would not be 

easy. North Korea has been deterred from invading the ROK since 1953, 

suggesting that the North Korean leadership already doubts its prospects in 

a major war. Indeed, the current U.S. Commander in South Korea, 

General Walter Sharp, has said, “I’m absolutely confident that if they 

[North Korea] came south, the ROK-U.S. Alliance would be able to defeat 

them.”43

North Korean asymmetric means — its WMD — likely provides 

the only option for a favorable outcome. By using WMD, North Korea 

may feel there is some chance it could break Japanese support of the 

United States, and also overcome U.S. and ROK technological 

advantages. It has put considerable investments into WMD capabilities: 

investments that could have been spent on other weapons had North Korea 

not truly valued WMD. This is especially true for chemical and biological 

weapons. It has paid the price to develop these weapons almost entirely 

for wartime utility.

 If the North Korean regime concludes that war is necessary for 

political reasons, it must thus also find a way to win or achieve some kind 

of “draw” in the conflict.
Bennett

171

Moreover, if the North Korean regime expects U.S. nuclear 

weapon use in a war regardless of North Korean actions, it may view 

WMD use as just part of a war with the United States. While the North 

Korean prospects for success in such a war would be poor, in challenging

circumstances the regime may perceive the prospects of war would be 

better than the prospects of outright regime failure. Thus, the key to 

deterring North Korean WMD use is to deter a North Korean invasion of 

the ROK in the first place, to convince the North Korean regime war is not 

an alternative for handling its internal problems.

Deterring North Korean WMD Attacks by Punishment

Some military analysts argue that if North Korea ever uses a 

nuclear weapon (or perhaps other forms of WMD), the United States will 

launch a large nuclear weapon response to massively damage North 

Korea. Some even talk of turning North Korea into a “sea of glass,” 

reminiscent of the Cold War assured destruction logic. Would such a 

threat against mainly innocent civilians deter the North Korean regime’s 

use of WMD? 

The regime has shown little value for the North Korean common 

people, allowing the starvation of at least hundreds of thousands, and also 

allowing the massive societal disruption associated with a failing North 

Korean economy. The regime is unlikely to perceive much cost to a Cold 

War-like assured destruction threat.

In addition, it is unlikely that either the ROK or the United States 

would want to devastate North Korean society with nuclear weapons. The 

ROK government wants the unification of Korea, a unification that would 

be immensely complicated by extensive nuclear damage. Moreover, the 

United States would find massive societal destruction to be morally 

repugnant. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report said the United 

States, “... would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme 

circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies 

and partners.”44

Retaliation against the North Korean military or the North Korean 

political leadership would be alternative punishment approaches. These 

targets would also provide denial effects. But a North Korean leadership

 Massive societal damage to North Korea would do 

relatively little to defend US and allied vital interests.
Bennett

172

worried about instability might welcome attacks on its military, attacks 

which would likely increase military support for the political leadership.

Thus, the best punishment approach would be to threaten the North 

Korean political leaders themselves. Kim Jong-Il and his other leaders 

must come to feel their prospects for surviving a war are much less than 

their prospects of surviving a failing regime. A threat to target those 

leaders could provide much of the leverage needed to deter a North 

Korean invasion if the North Korean leaders believe that: (1) the 

U.S./ROK can effectively target them, and (2) the U.S./ROK have the will 

to execute such an attack.

The greatest difficulty in effectively targeting the North Korean 

leadership is in locating that leadership. Indeed, Kim Jong-Il has regularly 

“disappeared” from public view when he has committed provocations,45

Kim Jong-Il may also wonder: “Would the United States have the 

will to attack me, personally?” Many in the United States talk about 

avoiding such targeting of adversary leaders, which may give the North 

Korean regime hope. The United States needs to disabuse the regime of 

this notion through clear strategic communications. In particular, it should 

consider practicing attacks on the North Korean leaders as part of its 

exercises in Korea, demonstrating that a decision to pursue them has 

already been made.

likely hoping to avoid the possibility of being targeted. The North Korean 

leaders may therefore perceive they can avoid damage even from nuclear 

attacks, undermining deterrence of their actions. In addition, North 

Korean leaders would likely locate underground in a conflict situation, 

making it difficult to cause them damage. The United States must 

demonstrate to the North Korean leaders that it does regularly find them 

when they are “hiding” and can cause destruction even against 

underground facilities, seeking to erase any perception of the North 

Korean leaders that they could survive a retaliatory attack.

The quotes above from the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report 

raise the question of whether punishment for North Korean WMD use, and 

nuclear weapon use in particular, should be done with conventional or 

nuclear weapons. There are several reasons for preferring the U.S. use of 

nuclear weapons in such punishment: 
Bennett

173

• The North Korean leaders will likely have much greater fear of 

U.S. nuclear weapon use. According to an East German report in 

1986, “Comrade Kim Il Sung affirmed that the Democratic 

People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) does not intend to attack 

South Korea, nor could it. More than 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads 

are stored in South Korea, ostensibly for defense, and it would take 

only two of them to destroy the D.P.R.K.”46

• If North Korea uses nuclear weapons early in a conflict and the 

United States does not answer with a U.S. nuclear response, the 

North Korean leaders will likely conclude that they can continue to 

use nuclear weapons without a U.S. nuclear weapon response. 

This would effectively reinforce their peacetime impression of 

U.S. threats lacking substance, thereby undermining transwar 

deterrence.

 To the extent that 

such a view persists in North Korea, U.S. nuclear weapon threats 

will be far more effective in deterring the North Korean leaders’ 

use of WMD and invasion of the ROK. 

• The United States has promised a nuclear umbrella to both the 

ROK and Japan, which is a commitment of a U.S. nuclear response 

to North Korean nuclear weapon use. But the purpose of the 

nuclear umbrella commitment is to deter adversary nuclear weapon 

use. Once an adversary has used nuclear weapons, the U.S. 

nuclear umbrella has failed, and may be questioned globally. The 

United States would therefore need to reestablish (or abandon) the 

credibility of its global nuclear umbrella commitments, 

commitments that many would not perceive as being met by a 

conventional weapon response. The U.S. nuclear umbrella 

commitments are intended to persuade both U.S. adversaries and 

U.S. allies not to pursue nuclear weapon development. A failure to 

act consistently with these commitments could spur both US 

adversaries and U.S. allies to develop their own nuclear forces, 

something not in the U.S. interest.

In summary, the United States should threaten nuclear attacks 

against the North Korean leaders as punishment for North Korean nuclear 

weapon use and prepare to employ those threats. The North Korean 
Bennett

174

leaders need to be convinced there is no chance they would survive an 

invasion of the ROK and associated WMD use. Other punishment threats 

are much less likely to deter North Korean WMD use, while punishment 

threats against the North Korean military may actually aid the diversionary 

strategy of the North Korean leaders.

Deterring North Korea by Threat of Denial 

As argued above, deterrence by denial involves primarily 

possessing effective capabilities for counterforce attacks, active defenses 

and passive defenses. 

 

Counterforce

In wartime, U.S. and ROK counterforce efforts would be launched

to attempt to destroy the North Korean WMD forces (both weapons and 

delivery means) and potentially the associated command and control. 

While the United States and the ROK have many capabilities to destroy 

such targets, they must first identify each target’s location. Since the 

United States and the ROK do not even know how much WMD North 

Korea possesses, they likely do not know all of the locations necessary to 

be attacked to destroy the North Korean WMD and associated delivery 

means. 

The ROK Minister of National Defense has indicated that, “There

are about 100 sites related to the nuclear program in North Korea.”47

Better intelligence on North Korean WMD, delivery means and 

leaders would help facilitate counterforce efforts. North Korean defectors 

could provide such intelligence, much as Russian defectors from its 

 

Many of these are likely underground and destroying each could require a

large force, much more than would likely be available early in a conflict 

when other targets would also need to be struck and when standoff attack 

forces would be limited. Still, whatever North Korean WMD is destroyed 

by counterforce attacks reduces the burden on active and passive defenses. 

Unfortunately, any incomplete effort to destroy the North Korean WMD 

could push the North Korean leaders into a “use them or lose them” 

approach, prompting WMD attacks on the ROK and/or Japan, an 

unwanted consequence. 
Bennett

175

biological program provided the United States critical intelligence on that 

program toward the end of the Cold War. Dissatisfaction among the 

North Korean elites48 may make such defections more possible now than 

ever before.

Active Defenses

Active defenses seek to destroy WMD after it has been launched 

and before it arrives on target and detonates/or is dispersed. US ROK and 

Japanese air defenses would likely deny effective WMD attacks by North 

Korean aircraft, and thus few experts expect North Korea to deliver WMD 

bombs. But ballistic missile defenses provide only limited protection in 

Japan and especially in the ROK today. This means some North Korean 

missiles could leak through the missile defenses, and the missile defenses 

could also be exhausted by initial North Korean missiles strikes. 

Broader deployment of missile defenses around potential targets 

plus the addition of more broad area defenses (like the U.S. Navy SM-3 

interceptor and the U.S. Army THAAD system) could increase the 

effectiveness of the defenses and, to the degree of North Korean leaders 

appreciate these capabilities, thereby enhance deterrence of North Korea’s

aggressive actions. 

In addition, enhanced control of immigration into Korea49 and 

surveillance of ROK coastal areas could reduce the ability of North 

Korean Special Operations Forces (potentially carrying biological 

weapons) to infiltrate the ROK. 

Passive Defenses

 Passive defenses seek to protect people and assets from the 

effects of WMD once those weapons detonate or are dispersed. 

Because nuclear weapons are so powerful, the best passive 

defenses against them involve evacuation of likely target and fallout zone 

areas and dispersal of assets to less likely target areas. In addition, the 

hardening of some target areas can be helpful, using blast protected 

shelters and underground facilities to avoid fallout casualties. The Soviets 

attempted such an approach to overcome U.S. assured destruction during 

the Cold War, and the North Koreans have made similar efforts with vast 
Bennett

176

numbers of underground facilities. But building such shelters would be 

prohibitively expensive in the ROK, Japan or the United States for all but 

modest-sized groups. And evacuation would also prove challenging and 

difficult to sustain.

As noted earlier, passive defenses would be far more powerful 

against North Korean chemical and biological weapons. The United 

States and the ROK should use strategic communications to convey the 

level of passive defenses they have developed, including advanced 

medical measures, to convince North Korea that these weapons will not 

yield the leverage the North would seek in a war. Such U.S. and ROK

efforts should describe the level of protection afforded by these defenses 

without divulging the details of the defenses, seeking to avoid North 

Korean work on counters. 

Conclusions on Deterring North Korean WMD Use

Deterrence of WMD use would clearly be very difficult when the 

North Korean leaders become desperate. The United States and its allies 

would need to convince the North Korean leaders that they are more likely 

to survive with peace (facing rebellion) than with war (facing destruction): 

peace is still the least miserable option. 

Key would be the denial component of deterrence, the ability to 

prevent North Korea from perceiving any chance of achieving victory. 

Focusing punishment on the North Korean leaders would also be 

important: they must be convinced they will not survive a war, even if 

North Korea uses WMD for leverage. In short, the United States and the 

ROK should focus on deterring North Korea from invading the ROK and 

thereby deter North Korean WMD use. 

Deterring North Korean WMD Crises/Provocations

From February through July 2009, North Korea created a number 

of serious crises with WMD-related provocations. These provocations 

were apparently motivated by the conditions in North Korea described at 

the beginning of this chapter, some rising to the crisis level inside North 
Bennett

177

Korea even before the provocation. Such crises jeopardize regime control 

and could eventually imperil the regime. 

The provocations appear to reflect the regime’s view of its 

jeopardy: serious enough to take modest risks with provocations, but not 

so serious as to justify an invasion of the ROK or major attacks on it. The 

North Korean sinking of the ROK warship Cheonan and the artillery 

shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 escalated this pattern to 

unprovoked, limited attacks. This escalation makes North Korea appear 

even more dangerous.

Can the United States and the ROK deter such provocations? Thus 

far, the United States has failed to deter a number of North Korean 

provocations, but it has likely deterred others. It is important to recognize 

while little is known for certain about North Korea, such uncertainty 

should not prevent purposeful US/ROK action.

Understanding the North Korean Provocations

The underlying instability in North Korea in 2009 was Kim JongIl’s bad health. He apparently suffered a stroke in August 2008, was slow 

to recover and has not fully recovered. Indeed, he may not ever fully 

recover. This serious illness undermined his appearance of empowerment 

needed for leadership in North Korea. Reports of his bad health had 

started even before the reported stroke, with some claims that he had heart 

surgery in May 2007. By the spring of 2009, there were many reports of 

North Korea speeding succession efforts for his third son because Kim 

Jong-Il’s health was so serious;

50

To solve his appearance of weakness and support potential 

succession, Kim Jong-Il needed to create an image that the North Korean 

regime is powerful, and he and his son are responsible for that power. His 

2009 provocations showed North Korea is close to acquiring a space

launch capability and intercontinental ballistic missiles and has produced 

nuclear weapons, capabilities few other countries possess. 

by September 2010, Kim Jong-Il had put 

his son in positions that made his succession appear likely. His son’s 

previous lack of such positions and his mid-20s age made him an unlikely 

ruler by North Korean leadership standards. 

While the North Korean regime likely anticipated U.S. efforts to 

implement sanctions in response, the United States made no specific 
Bennett

178

sanction threats, failing to reinforce deterrence. And the previous UN 

sanctions had not been particularly harmful to North Korea because they 

were largely unimplemented.51

Indeed, the regime likely planned to use any sanctions to once 

again claim that the United States and its allies are the enemies of the 

North Korean people and responsible for everything wrong in North 

Korea. Still, the regime apparently hoped to extort further aid and 

recognition from the United States and the regional powers, using 

escalatory brinksmanship until rewarded for de-escalating tensions.

 

North Korea’s second nuclear test in late-May 2009 was a major 

North Korean escalation. While many in the West had criticized the first 

North Korean nuclear test in 2006 as a likely failure, the second test had a 

much higher yield (at least several kilotons), about 10 times the first test. 

North Korea apparently had mastered the basics of nuclear weapons, 

increasing its appearance of empowerment as well as its ability to deter 

action by the United States and others. It had also increased its ability to 

market nuclear expertise. And North Korea had reached the threshold at 

which it may have hoped to be considered a nuclear power. “There was a 

sense that every North Korean escalation was intended as a bargaining 

chip. Now there’s an alternative view taking hold: that Kim Jong-Il wants 

to force the world to acknowledge it as a nuclear power before he dies.”52

Immediately after the North’s nuclear test, the ROK announced it 

would join those nations supporting the Proliferation Security Initiative 

(PSI). But before the test, the ROK had refused to threaten to join PSI in 

response to North Korean provocations, and thus its joining PSI likely had 

little impact on the North Korean decision to do a nuclear test. The UN 

also implemented fairly serious economic and military/nuclear test 

sanctions against North Korea in UN Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 1874, but no specific sanctions threats were made prior to the 

nuclear test, seeking to deter the test. 

Especially with a risk-taking state like North Korea, threats need to 

be explicitly stated before the state takes an action or the threats will have 

little credibility and thus little deterrent value. And the United States had 

already failed to take action against North Korea for its nuclear 

proliferation to Syria, as noted earlier; the North Korean regime likely felt 

there was little probability it would pay serious costs for a nuclear test. In 
Bennett

179

summary, the United States and its allies did not use, or poorly used, the 

means they had for deterring the North Korean provocations. 

This is not to say the United States totally failed in deterring North 

Korean provocations in 2009. Just after the North Korean second nuclear 

test, North Korea appears to have moved intercontinental-range missiles to 

both its east and west coast launch facilities.53

Shortly after the second nuclear test, President Obama announced, 

“We are not intending to continue a policy of rewarding provocations. I 

don’t think that there should be an assumption that we will simply 

continue down a path in which North Korea is constantly destabilizing the 

region and we just react in the same ways by, after they’ve done these 

things for a while, then we reward them.”

 It appeared to be preparing 

for another ICBM/space launch test, similar to its April test. North Korea

was likely trying to continue its escalating brinksmanship, as done in 

2006, hoping to achieve a major payoff from the United States. 

54

It is impossible to know whether these statements changed North 

Korean plans, but North Korea did not launch an ICBM with its missile 

launches on July 4, 2009. North Korea may have chosen to launch only 

short- to medium-range missiles then, trying to stay below a provocation 

threshold that might have triggered a major U.S. response. Within North 

Korea, the regime could still claim it had: (1) violated the UN sanctions 

after its second nuclear weapon test, (2) defied the U.S./UN, and (3) 

deterred a significant U.S./UN response. 

 He was joined in such 

comments by several other members of the U.S. administration. The 

consistency and strength of these statements suggested North Korea’s 

escalatory brinksmanship campaign would not pay off like its similar 

campaign did in 2006/7. 

Then former President Bill Clinton went to Pyongyang to free a 

U.S. woman jailed by North Korea. According to the North Korean secret 

police agency, “Thanks to Commander Kim Jong-Un’s cleverness, former 

U.S. President Clinton crossed the Pacific Ocean to apologize to the 

General (Kim Jong-Il).”55 For North Korean audiences, this provided Kim 

Jong-Il the appearance that the United States had surrendered, and he was 

very much empowered; the Clinton visit also supported Kim Jong-Un’s 

succession. The regime could accept such an outcome as a very adequate 

end state for the 2009 provocations. 
Bennett

180

U.S./ROK Options for Deterring North Korean Provocations 

How should the United States and the ROK try to deter/counter 

future North Korean provocations? For example, how should they have 

acted to deter the North Korean sinking of the warship Cheonan? Threats 

of economic sanctions have generally proven inadequate to deter North 

Korean provocations, and U.S./ROK threats of military actions have very 

little likelihood of being carried out. 

Indeed, even with fairly strong evidence of North Korean 

culpability in the Cheonan sinking, the United States and the ROK did not 

pursue military responses, in part because of the escalatory danger of such 

responses. 

There are two key parts of a strategy to deter North Korean 

provocations, corresponding to deterrence by threat of denial or 

retaliation.

Deterrence by Denial

The ROK has already recognized the Cheonan sinking reflected 

gaps in its military capabilities. ROK President Lee has committed to, 

“...make sure such an incident does not occur again.”56

The ROK has singled out North Korean asymmetric threats as a 

particular area of focus, within which North Korean WMD falls.

 The ROK needs 

to fill the gaps in its military preparations against provocations and limited 

warfare threats, with US help, and appears to be proceeding to do so. This 

means not only developing capabilities to detect and counter North Korean 

submarines in ROK territorial waters, but also addressing North Korea 

missile, artillery, SOF and other limited threats. Poor ROK military 

capabilities on Yeonpyeong Island undoubtedly contributed to North 

Korea feeling it could fire artillery at the island in November 2010; the 

ROK has greatly reinforced the ROK Marine forces on all of the 

Northwest Islands since then. 

57 Thus, 

the earlier discussion of counterforce, active defense and passive defense 

against WMD is equally relevant here. North Korea is unlikely to execute 

provocations which it anticipates will fail, causing the regime to look 

weak.
Bennett

181

Deterrence by Punishment

As with major warfare, U.S./ROK efforts to punish North Korean 

provocations via limited attacks on its military would be unlikely to do 

immediate, significant damage to North Korean military power, but would 

likely drive the North Korean military to be more supportive of the 

regime, exactly the opposite of the desired response. Instead, punishment 

needs to focus more on the North Korean regime’s political weaknesses, 

where the regime would likely perceive a major cost being imposed.

This approach needs to start by recognizing that North Korea is a 

failing state, and that sooner or later, the North Korean government will 

collapse. If a collapse were to occur today, the United States and the ROK

are woefully unprepared to handle the consequences58

Anything the United States or the ROK does to prepare for a North 

Korean government collapse would be offensive to the North Korean 

regime. These actions therefore become the perfect political threats that 

can be applied in trying to deter North Korean provocation. They would

include simply talking about collapse and the subsequent ROK-led 

unification of Korea. Thus, the United States and the ROK should outline 

a unification strategy and plan and use some actions from them to punish 

North Korea for its provocations while threatening other (stronger) actions 

to deter further North Korean provocations.

(as is China, the 

other major player in such a collapse). This lack of preparation could be 

extraordinarily costly to these countries if collapse were to occur in the 

short term. Thus, they need to prepare for a collapse and shape the North 

Koreans to reduce the potential negative outcomes. 

59

But to correct earlier weaknesses in U.S./ROK deterrence efforts, 

the U.S./ROK would need to explicitly threaten North Korea with specific 

deterrent responses and then be prepared to execute them if necessary. 

Vagueness in making threats or showing little apparent U.S./ROK will to 

take these actions could thoroughly undermine deterrence of North Korea, 

especially as the regime feels more threatened internally and thus more 

willing to take risks.

 Any US/ROK actions to 

shape North Korea for unification would impose costs on North Korea and 

directly undercut the benefits North Korea seeks in its provocations (a 

denial outcome). 
Bennett

182

For example, to respond to the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the 

United States and the ROK leaders could have announced that North 

Korean internal instability led to the shelling, and such instability forces 

the ROK to prepare for a North Korean collapse. As a first step in these 

preparations, the ROK president could ask the U.S. and ROK Marines to 

train to deliver humanitarian aid (especially food and medicine) along the 

North Korean coastlines. 

Such an effort is needed because food and medicine are already in 

short supply in North Korea and would largely disappear in the aftermath 

of a collapse, leading to a humanitarian disaster. The roads across the 

demilitarized zone (DMZ) would be inadequate to transport all of the 

needed humanitarian aid into North Korea, making across-the-beach 

deliveries one appropriate option. 

ROK and U.S. Marines would need to perform this task (as 

opposed to international humanitarian organizations--IHOs) because of the 

lack of security in a collapse environment and the danger posed by the 

North Korean military and black market criminals. IHOs could take over 

once a secure environment in specific areas of North Korea is achieved.

The North Korean regime would clearly hate such declarations and 

actions by the United States and the ROK, as these efforts would impose 

serious costs. The costs could be enhanced by training along the ROK

coasts for humanitarian aid delivery, filming those exercises, and 

broadcasting those films and pictures into North Korea. The message to 

the North Korean people and even the elites would be clear: the United 

States and the ROK are not your enemies and are instead preparing to help 

you when the North Korean regime allows. By directly countering the 

propaganda of the North Korea regime leaders, a significant penalty could 

be imposed on them. 

North Korea is likely to respond unfavorably to these U.S./ROK

actions and could escalate, seeking to retain the appearance of 

empowerment but also to deter further ROK/U.S. actions of this kind. The 

potential for escalation compels the U.S./ROK into planning deterrence 

against a range of North Korean escalations, as well as other North Korean 

provocations. 

The U.S./ROK actions that could be used for deterring further 

North Korean provocations could also be used to prepare North Korea for 

ROK-led unification. These measures could include: demonstrating high 
Bennett

183

technology ROK military capabilities, actively seeking North Korean 

defectors especially from the North Korean nuclear program and senior 

North Korean political/military leaders, a declaration that the U.S. will 

attempt to shoot down any North Korean missiles launched, development 

of counter-fire plans against North Korean artillery use, pursuit of laser or 

other weapons to destroy North Korean artillery in flight,60 selective 

amnesty for the elites, and a discussion of ROK plans for retirement 

payments to be offered to senior North Korean elites. The ROK/U.S. 

should prepare these and then privately threaten to take some of these 

actions if the North Korean regime initiates any further provocations. 

Proper Terminology with Nuclear Powers

The United States and the ROK must also deny North Korean 

efforts to achieve its objective of becoming a recognized nuclear weapon 

power. Such a designation would be a major accomplishment for the 

regime, strengthening its ability to deter external threats and coerce its 

neighbors, while demonstrating the empowerment of the regime and 

partially legitimizing North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons. 

Unfortunately, even the former “...head of the United Nations nuclear 

agency, has said that North Korea is a fully fledged nuclear power.”61

It is neither accurate nor in the interest of the world to so recognize 

North Korea or to reward Kim Jong-Il. Eight other countries currently 

possess nuclear weapons, and even the country with the smallest nuclear 

arsenal in this group may have 10 times as many weapons as North Korea. 

In addition, each of these other countries has forces equipped to deliver 

nuclear weapons on targets. North Korea is just not in the same league. 

More importantly, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) recognizes only five 

nuclear powers, and they are designated as the only states approved for 

possession of nuclear weapons. 

To avoid rewarding North Korea and other aspiring nuclear 

weapon countries (like Iran or even Myanmar), the international 

community should develop new terminology associated with state 

possession of nuclear weapons. Appropriate terms might be: 
Bennett

184

• A Compliant Nuclear Power: One of the five countries 

recognized in the NPT as a nuclear power (the United States, 

Russia, China, Great Britain, and France). 

• A Noncompliant Nuclear Power: Countries which have 

circumvented the NPT in fielding significant numbers of nuclear 

weapons, and organized nuclear forces for the delivery of those 

weapons. Today, the states in this category apparently would be 

India, Pakistan, and Israel. 

• A Noncompliant Nuclear Experimenter: Countries which have 

circumvented the NPT and begun testing nuclear weapons but still 

have few such weapons and little delivery capability. Today, 

North Korea is the state in this category.

The U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report makes a big issue 

of compliance with the NPT, and argues global policy should follow that 

precedent. But it is also important to characterize even a “noncompliant 

nuclear power” as a country that has done much more than just test 

nuclear weapons. The nuclear power designation should be reserved for 

those responsible states that: 

• Field secure, transparent nuclear forces of a size appropriate for 

regional minimum deterrence.

• Establish nuclear weapon safety programs to prevent unauthorized 

use of nuclear weapons. These efforts would include weapon 

employment limits like the U.S. permissive action link (PAL). 

• Limit nuclear testing and do not test nuclear weapons on delivery 

means like ballistic missiles

A state unwilling to meet these standards is either a non-compliant 

nuclear experimenter or a designation like a noncompliant nuclear rogue. 

Speaking of North Korea as a non-compliant nuclear experimenter 

more accurately captures its nuclear weapon capabilities. It downgrades 

the recognition North Korea wants, which is a good thing, and discourages 

other states from thinking they can quickly improve their international 

standing by testing a nuclear weapon. While North Korea appears 

determined to pursue further nuclear weapon tests to demonstrate its 
Bennett

185

nuclear weapon status, these terms would reduce the incentive North 

Korea would have with further tests and leave it permanently designated 

as out of compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This 

would reduce a major benefit North Korea has sought with its nuclear 

weapon tests (thereby increasing the disincentives for North Korean 

provocations in the future) and might dissuade other countries seeking to 

gain nuclear weapon capabilities.

Conclusions

North Korea appears to pose a serious WMD threat. In particular, 

its nuclear weapon threat is potentially greater than normally assumed. 

Because North Korea is a failing state, it will have considerable incentives 

to employ its WMD in crises and conflict.

The United States and the ROK need a deterrence strategy against 

this threat, addressing both North Korean provocations and potential 

WMD use. This strategy will be different from the Cold War nuclear 

deterrence strategy because of North Korean risk taking behavior and the 

nature of the North Korean WMD capability (especially the small number 

of its nuclear weapons). The U.S./ROK deterrence strategy must thus be 

based on a combination of their capabilities for denial and punishment, 

both of which need to be increased. 

To prevent significant North Korean WMD use, the United States 

and the ROK need to focus on the internal threats the North Korean 

regime faces. They need to convince the North Korean regime it has no 

prospects of survival in war, and thus war is not an alternative for dealing 

with internal threats. Moreover, they need to convince North Korea its 

WMD use would often be thwarted by U.S./ROK denial capabilities, 

reducing the North Korean incentives to use WMD. 

To prevent North Korean provocations and limited attacks, 

potentially including WMD use, the United States and the ROK must first 

work to resolve the ROK gaps in defenses against limited attacks. This is 

not just a naval issue after the sinking of the Cheonan, but rather a broader 

issue including North Korean missile, artillery and SOF attacks. The 

ability to deny North Korea success in these limited attacks will 

significantly strengthen deterrence against a regime wishing to avoid 
Bennett

186

embarrassment and the appearance of weakness. The United States and 

the ROK should also develop a strategy and plans for ROK-led unification 

of Korea and use key elements of such a strategy to punish and deter 

North Korean provocations. The North Korean regime is likely to see that 

these actions impose serious costs on the regime. And these actions will 

generally be within the feasible set of actions available to the United 

States and the ROK, thereby strengthening deterrence.

Notes
Bennett

187

 

1 North Korea needs about 5.4 million tons of grain to feed its people, and produced only about 4.1 million tons in 

2009. See, for example, “Food shortage worsens in N. Korea: official,” The Korea Herald (Feb. 10, 2010), 

http://www.koreaherald.com.kr/ NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2010/02/10/201002100069.asp. 2 “Tens of thousands of North Koreans have crossed the border seeking a better life. Some 15,000 have successfully 

defected to the South, while an estimated 100,000 to half a million are in China seeking asylum.” Tae-hoon Lee, 

“NK Regards OPLAN 5029 as Declaration of Warfare,” The Korea Times (Nov. 8, 2009),

http://www.koreatimes.com.kr/www/news/nation/2009/11/116_55089.html. 3 “Survival of the Wickedest,” Strategypage.com (June 26, 2008), 

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/korea/articles/20080626.aspx.

4 Sang-hyun Um, “N. Korea: Kim Jong-il's Distant Relative Tried to Kill Him With Chinese Blessing,” Shin-DongA (S. Korean Monthly, October 2004). 5 Blaine Harden, “Dear Leader Appears To Be Losing N. Koreans' Hearts And Minds,” The Washington Post

(March 24, 2010), 11. See also “Millions of N.Koreans Listen to Foreign Radio Broadcasts,” The Chosun Ilbo

(April 30, 2010), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/04/30/2010043001070.html.

6 “USFK commander warns of possible N.K. instability,” The Korea Herald, (Mar. 26, 2010),

http://www.koreaherald.com.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2010/03/26/ 201003260041.asp. 7 “North Korean Nuclear Weapons: CIA Estimate for Congress” (Nov. 19, 2002), 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/cia111902.html,. 8 See, for example , David Albright, and Paul Brannan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock,” Institute for Science 

and International Security (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKplutoniumFEB.pdf.

9 Smith, R. Jeffrey, and Joby Warrick, “Pakistani scientist depicts more advanced nuclear program in North Korea,” 

The Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2009). 

10 “Hwang Jang-Yop ... said that Jong Pyong-Ho, a senior party official in charge of military matters, had told 

Hwang in 1996 that North Korea had five plutonium-based nuclear weapons,” International Institute of Strategic 

Studies, North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.iiss.org/publications/

strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/north-koreas-nuclearweapons-programme. 11 Larry A. Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, Congressional Research Service, IB91141 (updated 

Aug. 27, 2003), p. 9, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ organization/24045.pdf. 12 General Leon J. LaPorte, “Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee” (April 1, 2004), 5, 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/ 040401-laporte.pdf.

13 Ibid. 14 GlobalSecurity.org, “North Korea: Chemical Weapons Program,” 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/cw.htm.

15 Federation of American Scientists, “North Korea: Chemical Weapons Program,”

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/cw/. 16 Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea Handbook, PC-2600-6421-94, (1994), 3-15 to 3-16.

17 “Longer-Range Seoul Missiles In The Works,” Singapore Straits Times (Oct. 9, 2009), 38.

18 “N.Korea Believed to Have 200,000 Special Forces Troops,” The Chosun Ilbo (October 11, 2010), 

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/10/11/ 2010101101081.html.. 19 Ibid.

20 Myong Chol Kim, “Nuclear war is Kim Jong-il's game plan,” Asia Times (June 12, 2009), 

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KF12Dg01.html.

21 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Over-All Effect of Atomic Bomb on Warfare and Military Organization,” J.C.S. 

1477/1, (from the US National Archives) (Oct. 30, 1945).

22 For example, “Korea cannot be unified in a peaceful way. They [the North Koreans] are prepared for war. If a war 

occurs in Korea, it will be waged by nuclear weapons, rather than by conventional ones.” This quote is from a 

report by one of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry Staff, based on a 1976 conversation with one of the staff of the 

North Korean Embassy in Hungary, in Balazs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko, “North Korea’s Efforts to Acquire 

Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian Archives,” Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #53, (August 2006), 

Document No. 28, 55, www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/WP53_web_final.pdf. 
Bennett

188

 23 “North Korea threatened Thursday to turn Japan into a ‘nuclear sea of fire’ if the United States launches a nuclear 

war against the communist country.” See “Yonhap Cites DPRK Warning to Japan on U.S. Cooperation Causing 

‘Nuclear Sea of Fire,’” Seoul Yonhap in English, FBIS translation KPP20040923000069 (Sept. 23, 2004). 24 The areas compared here are from U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (August 1993), 53-54.

25 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, (December 2006), 3.

26 “This is a stylized view of deterrence often associated with rational choice/expected utility deterrence models of 

the Cold War era. The DO JOC expands upon rational choice considerations and incorporates elements of prospect 

theory in its approach.” Ibid., 20.

27 Mathematically, the adversary’s utility (U) of each action (j) is assessed by combining the benefits (B) and costs 

(C) of each outcome (i) with the probability (P) of that outcome if the action is taken:

 U(Action j) = Σ (Bji-Cji)*Pji 

The utilities are then compared and “restraint” is chosen if: U(restraint)> max(U(Action 1), U(Action 2), ..., 

U(Action n))

28 Robert Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), 80-

81.

29 By analogy, monetary gambling almost always involves a negative expected value payoff to the individual 

because the “house” takes a portion of the money bet. Gamblers are thus normally risk takers (unless they believe 

that they have a “system”), because while they may win a large amount of money, on average they will lose.

30 These concepts were introduced in Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National 

Security, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 14-16.

31 “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea” (June 16, 2009), 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-theRepublic-of-Korea/. 32 On April 5, 2009, North Korea test launched a long-range missile that it described as a space-launch vehicle.

33 There is, however, a risk to the United States in trying to shoot-down a North Korean missile: If the United States 

tries but then fails to shoot down the missile, the US missile defense capabilities would be discredited, and Kim 

Jong-Il would appear to be further strengthened and even more capable.

34 On March 19, 2009, Admiral Keating, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, “said the U.S. is ‘fully 

prepared’ to shoot down the missile and added that the U.S. military has the capability to do it.” But Secretary of 

Defense Gates subsequently indicated that the United States would not attempt an intercept, likely fearing the 

escalatory implications and perhaps anticipating that the North Korean test would have likely failed. “Does Obama 

Have a N.Korea Policy?” The Chosun Ilbo (March 31, 2009), 

http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200903/200903310031.html. 35 Of course, North Korea would claim that such a missile launch was actually of a space launch vehicle, allowed by 

international law. Thus, the United States would have to carry out a strategic communications plan to preemptively 

discredit such a North Korean claim and to focus on the destabilizing implications of operational North Korean 

ICBMs.

36 This is an extremely simple example for illustrative purposes. In practice, U.S. strategic planners need to be 

developing more sophisticated assessments, including potential escalations, and also sensitivity testing the uncertain 

factors, seeking robust counters to North Korea’s threats.

37 In trying to deal with the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “Gates, who 

met counterparts from Japan and South Korea ... admitted Washington and its allies had limited options.” Dan De 

Luce, “Gates warns of more N.Korea ‘provocations’,” Agence France-Presse (June 6, 2010), 

http://www.google.com/ hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j2tSpWVOsgH_J-qS1H874U1CMSQg. 38 The Soviet cities curve shown here is derived from Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is 

Enough?, Harper and Row (1971), 207. The U.S. cities curve is derived from U.S. manufacturing value added data 

of the same era.

39 An equivalent megaton consists of the number of weapons of any given explosive yield needed to do the same 

damage as a single 1-megaton weapon. Three 200 Kt weapons, seven 50 Kt weapons, or twenty-one 10 Kt weapons 

would constitute 1 EMT.

40 In practice, the database used to make this assessment included only about 77 percent of Soviet industry. Thus the 

fact that the lines quickly peak at 77 percent does not mean that 23 percent of Soviet industry would necessarily 
Bennett

189

 

have survived, but rather that the information needed to determine the survivability of that 23 percent was not 

available.

41 This analysis was extremely simplistic and assumed, for example, that all nuclear weapons would be targeted on 

cities, and that weapons destroyed by counterforce attacks would be replaced by surviving weapons in attacking 

each target. 

42 Department of Defense, Nuclear Policy Review Report (April 2010), viii.

43 “U.S. General Concerned by Threat to Seoul Posed by N. Korea's 800-Missile Arsenal,” East-Asia-Intel.com (Oct. 

17, 2008). General Sharp’s predecessor, General Bell, said, “‘I also know with some certainty that if for some 

reason deterrence fails and North Korea attacks South Korea in any way, that we would quickly and decisively 

defeat the aggression.’” Anna Fifield, “U.S. General Warns of N Korean Nuclear Test,” The Financial Times (Oct. 

30 2006). 44 Department of Defense, Nuclear Policy Review Report (April 2010), viii-ix. 

45 See, for example, “Kim Jong Il Vanishes From Public Eye,” Donga Ilbo, (Aug. 7, 2006), and more recently, Jihyun Kim, “Kim Jong-il lying low,” The Korea Herald (June 2, 2010), http://www.koreaherald.com/national/

Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100602000180.

46 This quote is from a report on the visit of Erich Honecker to North Korea in 1986, and is included in Balazs 

Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko, op. cit., Document No. 52, 74. 

47 “Seoul Suspects About 100 Sites in N.K. Linked to Nuclear Program,” The Korea Herald (Oct. 5, 2009), 

http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2009/ 10/05/200910050098.asp. 48 The December 2009 North Korean currency revaluation took most of the wealth away from even the North 

Korean elites, leading to reports of North Korean social unrest that may open the door to defection for some.

49 The author has been told stories of North Korean SOF coming into the ROK on commercial airlines, using forged 

passports. This kind of activity could be largely eliminated by tying the passport databases together for the regional 

countries, and dealing with anyone using a forged passport. 

50 See, for example, Yonhap News, “Kim's Failing Health Prompting N. Korean Power Transfer to Son: Seoul 

Minister,” The Korea Herald (June 4, 2009). 

51 The North Korean leaders were likely surprised by the relative strength of the subsequent UN Security Council 

Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 and the sanctions it applied.

52 David E. Sanger, Mark Mazzetti and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korean Leader Is Said To Pick A Son As Heir,” 

New York Times (June 3, 2009), 1.

53 “N.Korean Missile Train on the Move,” The Chosun Ilbo, (June 17, 2009), 

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/06/17/2009061700282.html.

54 Jennifer Loven, “Obama Vows Tougher N. Korea Stance,” Arizona Daily Star (June 7, 2009). 55 So-hyun Kim, “N. Korean Agency Uses Clinton's Visit to Praise Kim Jong-un,” The Korea Herald (Aug. 10, 

2009), at http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/ data/html_dir/2009/08/10/200908100042.asp. 56 Jeong-ju Na, “President Plans Stern Steps After Cause of Ship Sinking Revealed,” The Korea Times (April 19, 

2010), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/ 04/116_64442.html. 57 Sung-ki Jung, “Lee directs W3 tril. rise in arms buying: Seoul seeking to counter NK’s asymmetrical warfare,” 

The Korea Times (May 16, 2010), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/05/205_65967.html. 58 See, for example, Victor Cha, “We Have No Plan,” The Chosun Ilbo (June 9, 2008), 

http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200806/200806090015.html. 59 The United States and the ROK could make such threats privately to the North Korean regime to have the best 

chance at deterrence.

60 A laser weapon to shoot down artillery was developed years ago in the United States and could jump-start ROK 

efforts.

61 Malcolm Moore, “North Korea now 'fully fledged nuclear power',” Telegraph.co.uk (April 24, 2009), 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/ northkorea/5212630/North-Korea-now-fully-fledged-nuclearpower.html.
Bennett

190

 
CHAPTER 7

Deterrence and Saddam Hussein: 

Lessons from the 1990-1991 Gulf War

Barry R. Schneider

War and deterrence both begin in the minds of men. Deterrence is 

a psychological phenomenon and begins between the ears of the adversary 

you try to influence. When you seek to deter a rival from doing something 

you do not wish him to do, you must find a way to influence his 

perceptions of situations, for people act not necessarily on reality but on 

their perception of it. As Henry Kissinger once said, “A bluff taken 

seriously is more useful than a serious threat interpreted as a bluff.”1

To deter, you need to influence the rival’s cost/gain evaluations. 

He needs to understand he has far more to lose by initiating conflict, or by 

escalating it to unacceptable levels, than by not doing so. 

In this study, we look at President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and 

President George H.W. Bush of the United States and their respective 

governments’ attempts to deter one another in the period just before Iraq 

invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and through the subsequent Gulf conflict 

that ended in February 1991. On the United States side of this deterrence 

effort, one must also include the deterrent effect of U.S. coalition partners 

in the crisis and war.

In this analysis we look at a series of deterrence questions:

1. What are the limits of deterrence theory? Are the clearly stronger 

military powers able to deter significantly weaker powers all or most 

of the time?

2. What are the elements of deterrence strategy Western strategists 

developed during the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union? 

3. Why was Saddam Hussein not deterred from ordering the Iraqi 

invasion of Kuwait in August 1990? 
Schneider 

192

4. Why was Saddam Hussein not deterred from facing vastly superior 

and coalition forces assembled to force him out of Kuwait between 

August 1990 and January 1991? 

5. Why were the United States and the coalition forces not deterred 

by Iraq from initiating combat in January 1991? 

6. Why did Saddam Hussein not resort to use of chemical and 

biological weapons in the war as an equalizer against more powerful 

coalition forces?

7. Why during this conflict was Saddam Hussein not deterred from 

attacking Israel, a state with a nuclear arsenal?

8. Why did the United States and the coalition not pursue Iraqi forces 

into their country and end the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad? 

Was the United States deterred from pursuing the war all the way to 

Baghdad by the residual Iraqi military capability?

9. Was the United States deterred from the use of nuclear weapons in 

the war by the threat of Iraqi retaliation with chemical and/or 

biological weapons? 

10. What conclusions and lessons can be extracted from this conflict 

regarding deterrence as a strategy for future crises?

The Limits of Deterrence

Deterrence is based on deductive reasoning, not evidence from 

history. It is a rational deduction that a weaker power should not be 

willing to risk almost certain defeat if it starts a war with a much more 

powerful rival. Also, it is a logical assumption that leaders of countries 

should not enter into conflicts where it appears to them they would be 

incurring catastrophic losses or would likely lose things the leadership 

values most. 

On the face of it, this seems very rational and almost indisputable. 

The problem is deterrence does not work so often and so clearly in the real 

world. An inductive approach that looks at the empirical evidence from 

past international conflicts shows a very mixed picture. 

Surprisingly, reviews of case studies show history is full of 

occasions when demonstrably weaker opponents have initiated what 

appear to be absolutely irrational attacks on much stronger opponents.2
Schneider 

193

According to one RAND study, in 22 percent (17 of 76) of conflicts 

that occurred from 1816 to 1974, weaker military powers initiated wars 

with stronger states. This obviously can have disastrous results in some 

cases. For example, in the 1864-1870 War of the Triple Alliance, 

Paraguay’s dictator, Francisco Solano Lopez, invaded Brazil. He also 

attacked Argentina when that state did not allow his forces free passage 

through the territory. Uruguay then joined these two giants in the conflict 

against Paraguay. By the end of this ill-advised aggression by Paraguay, 

that small country had 85 percent of its population killed, reduced from 

1.4 million in 1864 to just 0.22 million by 1870. By the war’s end, 

Paraguay had just 29,000 adult males left alive.3

They can also be initiated by those simply unwilling to live under 

the heel of the enemy, thereby putting honor and their cause above 

survival. Think, for example, of Patrick Henry’s famous words in the 

American Revolution, “Give me liberty or give me death.” The signers of 

the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 all were willing to risk 

their lives in their cause. Indeed,

Such wars can be caused 

by crazy rulers.

[F]ive signers were captured by the British and brutally 

tortured as traitors. Nine fought in the War for 

Independence and died from wounds or from hardships 

they suffered. Two lost their sons in the Continental Army. 

Another two had sons captured. At least a dozen of the 

fifty-six had their homes pillaged and burned... Seventeen 

of them lost everything that they owned.4

Weaker states also start ill-advised wars due to wishful thinking, 

misperception, groupthink, illogic born of stress or a stubborn refusal to 

confront the facts.5

Another situation that pushes weaker powers to attack much 

stronger states is when time is considered not to be on their side. Saddam 

Hussein in 1980 is thought to have attacked Iran, a larger country with 

 In some historical cases, decision-makers have chosen 

to focus primarily on their aims and own resources and have discounted 

those of the adversary despite clear evidence they will lose if they push 

further into the crisis.
Schneider 

194

more resources and three times the population of Iraq, because he feared 

Iran would attack in a year or so when better organized. Leaders 

sometimes feel forced to start a war immediately when their chances of 

success, while slim, would be even poorer at a later time.

Weaker indigenous groups also often launch wars against stronger 

opponents out of nationalist sentiment and a desire to remove foreign or 

rival group influences. This is an old story repeated many times as 

revolutions opposed colonial regimes or the domination of other ethnic 

groups. In many cases these revolutionaries pit their superior zeal and a 

greater stake in the outcome against superior rival military forces that 

often do not have the same commitment to victory over time. Many times 

these revolutions and insurgencies fail. Sometimes, however, the fortunes 

of the sides reverse over time such as happened in China when communist 

guerrilla forces challenged initially superior nationalist Chinese forces and 

eventually became the stronger side in winning a protracted civil war. 

Others may decide to fight an enemy with superior potential rather 

than give up long-standing goals or a way of life. They may be willing to 

bet their willingness to absorb casualties is greater than the rival’s, and he 

will tire of the war and be willing to sue for peace short of total victory, 

leaving the smaller state that initiated the war in possession of their goals. 

This appears to be the line of thought of the Japanese leadership before 

Pearl Harbor and of Saddam Hussein after the coalition buildup in Saudi 

Arabia had put a powerful army in Saudi Arabia in the fall and winter of 

1990 after his invasion of Kuwait. It also appears to have been the mindset 

of the Confederate leaders when they challenged the much more populous 

and industrialized North in the American Civil War.

Moreover, deterrence assumes state leaders can control their 

subordinates. Leaders of weaker states might not authorize an attack on a 

stronger power, but it may take place anyway because some subordinates 

do not follow orders. 

Others might decide to strike out and start a war if they believed their 

regime was about to fall. Some might initiate a conflict or escalate one 

against a hated enemy for highly emotional reasons or if they calculated it 

might marshal more domestic support for their leadership at home. This is 

the inside-outside theory of war causation, a conflict started for internal 

domestic reasons. This appears to have been a partial cause of the 1982 
Schneider 

195

Argentine-United Kingdom war in the Falklands, where for largely domestic 

political reasons the ruling junta challenged British control of the islands.

Still other leaders might be religious, cultural or ideological zealots 

who will stop at nothing to destroy some hated adversary, leaving the 

consequences to chance. For example, at the height of the Cuban Missile 

Crisis the Castro brothers, in a fit of revolutionary zeal, urged the Soviet 

leadership to fire at the United States their nuclear-tipped missiles 

stationed in Cuba, even though it meant their own likely deaths and the 

wholesale destruction of their country. Some initiators of combat may 

care more about their place in history rather than about the immediate 

consequences for themselves and their people. 

However, this is not to say deterrence cannot or should not work in 

the majority of cases. Rather, it is wise to remember deterrence of war or 

escalation still can fail, even when a much stronger power confronts a 

weaker one, or even where both sides would suffer catastrophic warfare 

losses if they entered into a conflict.

Cold War Deterrence Theory

Luckily this did not happen during the Cold War when a central 

nuclear war could have caused hundreds of millions of deaths. By 1949, 

both the United States and Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, and both 

sides held the life or death of the rival society in their hands. The peace 

was secured by the dual hostage situation described as mutual assured 

destruction.6

Deterrence theory developed as U.S. and allied policy-makers and 

strategists worked to understand the implications of nuclear weapons and 

how they might be used to keep the peace and advance U.S. and allied 

security. Several elements were eventually recognized as fundamentally 

important to strategic deterrence.

 If the system failed, it would have failed deadly. 

First, it was deemed crucial that the U.S. and its allies maintain a 

nuclear retaliatory force that could inflict what an aggressor leadership 

would consider unacceptable damage to themselves and their vital 

interests.7 Aggressors must be made to believe the risks of attacking the 

United States and its allies were clearly and significantly greater than any 

conceivable rewards they might gain from such action. 
Schneider 

196

Second, a potential aggressor must be made to realize the U.S. and 

allied leaders not only must have such lethal capabilities, but also must be 

willing to use such retaliatory power if challenged. Adversary risk-taking 

leaders must be convinced, by word and deed, that our leaders are willing, 

not simply to threaten to use force in response to aggression, but also to 

act should the line be crossed. Without both the physical capability to 

inflict unacceptable levels of damage on an aggressor party and the 

evident will to use such force, the U.S. and allied deterrent would lack 

credibility and might risk war where an adversary adventurer 

misperceived the situation. For example, this might have been the cause 

of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis.8

Third, the origin of the attack must be known if the real aggressor 

is to be deterred. If an adversary leader thought he could disguise the 

origin of his attack, perhaps making it seem as if it came from another 

state, he might feel he could strike and escape the consequences. This is 

the problem discussed by the late Herman Kahn when he talked about the 

possibility of what he termed catalytic war.9

Fourth, the U.S. and allied retaliatory forces must be able to ride 

out an adversary surprise attack and still retaliate with overwhelming and 

accurate force, holding hostage what rival leaders value most. This has 

led the United States to rely on a mix of forces in a strategic triad of 

nuclear-armed ICBMs deployed on U.S. soil, strategic bombers, deployed 

worldwide, carrying both nuclear standoff missiles and nuclear gravity 

bombs, as well as nuclear-tipped SLBMs carried on ballistic missile 

submarines that roam the world’s oceans. 

 Party A might strike Party B, 

making it look like it came from Party C, causing B and C to fight. Thus, 

a vigilant early warning and tracking system and an effective forensics 

capability should be a fundamental part of any successful deterrent 

posture. Deterrence requires a return address.

Even the former Soviet Union, with its very extensive nuclear 

forces, could not have hoped to preemptively destroy so much of the U.S. 

and allied nuclear forces as to escape nuclear annihilation in return. It was 

seen as impossible for anyone to destroy all retaliatory elements of the 

U.S. alliances and strategic triad to the degree necessary to escape assured 

destruction in return. Maintaining this “second strike” capability was 

deemed an essential component of a classical deterrence posture.
Schneider 

197

Finally, deterrence is based on assuming an opponent has complete 

knowledge of the situation and will act rationally. This sounds plausible but 

how do you define rationality? Are suicide bombers rational? Further, if 

adversary leaders are willing to die, or see most of their followers die, in 

order to inflict terrible wounds on the United States and/or its allies, then 

deterrence may fail even if you can “take them with you.”

In an era where multiple personalities guide rogue states, some of 

them high-risk takers, deterrence could fail. If it fails, the United States 

and its coalition partners will need capable counterforce units and 

excellent missile and air defenses all the more to limit casualties and 

preserve the chance for a military victory. In a crisis that has not yet 

escalated to war, the presence of such capable offensive strike forces and 

effective defenses may help to deter war.

If an adversary knows there is a good chance his deployment of 

chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear (CBRN) weapons may 

attract U.S. counterforce strikes that could destroy his weapons before 

they can be employed, he might be deterred from acquisition or attempted 

use of them. The same logic pertains to a situation where his use of WMD 

in wartime would be nullified by effective active and passive defenses. 

Either way, through offense or defense, if U.S. and allied forces were to 

rob him of a potent threat, he may be more reluctant to incur the costs of 

building and deploying such weapons. Thus, a rogue state regime may be 

deterred by the threat of retaliation or by the threat of having his attack 

neutralized by effective defenses. He might be deterred either by the 

sword or the shield, or by a combination of both. Deterrence produced by 

possessing effective military countermeasures (i.e., deterrence by denial) 

and deterrence produced by the threat of an overwhelming retaliation 

should be mutually reinforcing. 

On the other hand, we can never be absolutely sure when deterrence 

has worked, but it is obvious when it has failed to work. When it fails, a 

war begins or a conflict escalates. When a deterrence policy and posture is 

successful, this is a non-event since no war starts or no escalation takes 

place. However, correlation is not necessarily causation. Just because A 

precedes B, it does not prove A caused B. Indeed, B might have another 

cause altogether.10
Schneider 

198

How do you prove that without a certain deterrence policy 

something, otherwise, might have happened? Unless you were able to 

step out of the present and rerun history to see what would have happened 

differently without a given deterrence policy or posture, you cannot prove 

the deterrence stance caused the outcome. So deterrence is far from an 

exact science. Deterrence is an art and we can only infer when it is 

successful since we have not yet found a way to read an adversary’s mind 

or re-run historical events with one or more of the variables changed. 

The Faceoff: George H.W. Bush versus Saddam Hussein

The 1990-1991 Gulf War involved 34 coalition governments and 

leaderships all pitted against Iraq. It was not simply crisis bargaining and 

warfare directed by two men. Thirty-four coalition leaderships had to be 

coordinated and military personnel from 34 militaries had to be made into 

one effective fighting force with unity of command. 

Things were simpler on the other side. In Iraq, all important 

military and diplomatic decisions were those of Saddam Hussein acting 

essentially alone. This was far less true of President George H.W. Bush, 

but in the end it was he who mobilized and led the coalition to war, and it 

was he who made the final decision about when to attack the Iraqi Army 

in Kuwait, and, after 40 days of air bombardment and 100 hours of a 

ground war later, it was his decision to declare and negotiate a ceasefire 

with Iraq that stopped short of going on to Baghdad. 

It would be difficult to find two more different men facing each 

other in a crisis or a war. They were separated widely in their educations, 

exposures to the wider world, family upbringings, values, cultures, 

languages, regional problems and political systems. Moreover, the leader 

of each country inherited a different set of world, regional and domestic 

problems and pressures. Both inherited a different set of previous 

commitments and policies from their predecessors and had a different 

public to deal with. Saddam Hussein and George Bush, therefore, came to 

this 1990-1991 conflict with very different backgrounds and perspectives. 

Simply put, George Herbert Walker Bush was born to privilege 

and power. His father was a U.S. Senator. Saddam Hussein was born in a 

poor Iraqi village and his father died before he was born. Bush attended 
Schneider 

199

Andover Preparatory School and Yale University. Hussein dropped out of 

school in his teenage years and did not finish high school until he was 24. 

At the time, he was sought in Iraq for an attempted killing of the Iraqi 

President, and was a fugitive living in Cairo, Egypt. Saddam never 

completed a college degree, although he attended several law classes 

while in Egypt.

The two also differed in other ways. Bush served as a pilot in the 

U.S. Navy in World War II, engaged in 58 air combat missions and won 

the Navy Cross for bravery. Saddam Hussein never served in the Iraqi 

military, and, when he applied as a young man, was denied entry into the 

Iraq Military Academy, one of the few paths available for poor Iraqis 

attempting upward mobility in their society.

Bush was widely traveled and had served overseas as U.S. 

Ambassador to China and later as Chief U.S. Ambassador to the United 

Nations. Hussein never has traveled outside the Middle East. Bush was 

very knowledgeable about the international system and worldwide threats. 

He served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Saddam worked 

exclusively within the Ba’ath Party where he first served as an organizer, 

then as a hit man, and later as the feared head of party security responsible 

for thousands of executions. 

Bush served in elective politics in the United States, first as a 

Congressman from Texas, later as Chairman of the Republican Party 

National Committee, and finally as Vice President and President of the 

United States. By 1990, Bush already had won five elections on his way 

to the top of the U.S. political system. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein

murdered and terrorized his way to the top of the Iraqi political system. 

He had never won an election until after he seized the Presidency in 1978. 

All political contests thereafter probably were rigged as he built a 

terroristic police state.

His was a fearful and feared regime, and Saddam Hussein

essentially was the sole foreign policy and defense policy decision-maker 

in Iraq. It could be said “Saddam was Iraq and Iraq was Saddam” from 

the standpoint of policy decisions. As Charles Duelfer later concluded in 

a 2004 report to the Director of Central Intelligence,“Saddam Hussein so 

dominated the Iraqi regime that its strategic intent was his alone.”11
Schneider 

200

It is instructive to realize how little knowledge Saddam Hussein

had of the United States or its leaders. While President Bush was no 

Middle East expert, he was far better informed than Saddam about the 

other side’s capabilities. However, both leaders lacked a clear knowledge 

of the other. FBI interrogator George Piro, assigned the task of 

interrogating Saddam after his capture in 2003, concluded from months of 

interviews, “One striking theme that emerged was just how little we knew 

about Saddam and how little he knew about us.”12

These two leaders came from opposite ends of the earth. One is 

reminded of the Kipling verse when considering these two: “East is East, 

and West is West, and never the twain should meet.” Their cultures were 

very different as were their life experiences. Saddam was a thug and mafialike Iraqi leader, originally born in poverty, who maneuvered and eventually 

killed his way into power in Iraq. In 1991, two of his biographers 

concluded, “In the permanently beleaguered mind of Saddam Hussein, 

politics is a ceaseless struggle for survival. The ultimate goal of staying 

alive and in power justifies all means. Plots lurk around every corner. 

Nobody is trustworthy. Everyone is an actual or potential enemy.”13

Bush was an American blue blood who started from a favored 

position and then achieved his way to the top of the U.S. political system. 

When they confronted each other over Kuwait, President Bush was leader 

of the richest country in the world at the head of the most powerful military 

force ever deployed. Confronting him was President Saddam Hussein, with 

his million-man army, the fourth largest in the world, now sitting astride 19 

percent of the world’s oil supplies after his occupation of Kuwait.

The Invasion of Kuwait

After the Iran-Iraq war, very badly needing funds to rebuild and 

protect his regime, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to seize oil-rich 

Kuwait in order to repay his creditors, recoup his wealth, and re-equip his 

security and armed forces.14 At that time “Iraq had approximately $80B 

in debts stemming from the war with Iran, compared with a GNP of about 

$35B, with a hard-currency income of about $14B.”15

If his biographers are to be believed, Saddam Hussein probably 

invaded Kuwait only after long and careful thought. In previous critical 
Schneider 

201

decisions he was a careful planner. For example, when deciding whether 

to nationalize the nation’s oil wells in 1972, Saddam exhibited a blend of 

caution and boldness. His chief biographers say, 

[T]he nationalization affords yet another vivid example of 

Saddam’s calculated risk-taking style of operation. He 

proved himself a cautious, yet daring decision-maker who 

did not flinch before a challenge. Weighing his options 

carefully and taking the necessary precautions, he did not 

rush into a hasty decision. But, once he made up his mind, 

he moved swiftly and resolutely toward his target.16

Later, after the invasion when his aggression against Kuwait was 

challenged by the United States and most of the rest of the world, Saddam 

refused to back down as the U.S.-led coalition poured military personnel, 

equipment and supplies into nearby Saudi Arabia starting in August 1990 

until continuing until the end of hostilities in February 1991. Early in this 

military buildup tensions were high at the White House because it took 

months to get enough firepower transferred to the theater to offset an 

initial Iraqi Army advantage in the theater. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and 

its oil reserves seemed at the mercy of Iraq’s Army if Saddam chose to 

continue its operations and invade the Saudi kingdom. 

Clearly, at this point the United States leadership had spelled out 

its determination to defend Saudi Arabia and its desire to compel Iraq to 

withdraw from Kuwait. To bolster this deterrence posture, the U.S. had 

the clear potential military might to defeat Iraq, and this was augmented 

by clear verbal and non-verbal signaling of U.S. and allied intentions. The 

U.S. began a continuing military mobilization in the Gulf, and engaged in 

a worldwide diplomatic campaign to enlist allies into a coalition and to 

condemn Iraq’s invasion at the United Nations. 

Why didn’t Saddam Hussein realize the catastrophe he was about 

to suffer and withdraw his forces back to Iraq before the coalition 

juggernaut destroyed his armed forces in the field? There are several 

hypotheses. First, he might not have had situational awareness and may 

have believed the U.S. President and coalition leaders simply bluffed. 

Second, Saddam might have engaged in wishful thinking and not faced the 
Schneider 

202

unpleasant possibilities he had not foreseen. Third, he might not have 

understood the total mismatch his forces faced and how few casualties 

they could inflict on a technologically superior force. Fourth, Saddam 

might have feared a military withdrawal would undermine his leadership 

and status in Iraq and lead to his replacement. Fifth, Saddam may have 

calculated he simply could not do without Kuwait’s oil revenue to finance 

his own depleted treasury and to rebuild his security forces and army, and, 

thus, perhaps he gambled on being able somehow to keep his Kuwaiti 

prize.17

As the crisis deepened and war was about to begin again, the 

United States sought to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without a 

fight, or, if a war was inevitable, at least tried to persuade the Iraqi leader 

not to order the use of chemical or biological weapons by warning he 

would face dire consequences. 

Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, may have sought to deter a 

coalition attack or a U.S.-U.K.-French use of nuclear weapons by 

threatening retaliation with his chemical and/or biological weapons. Once 

the war began, the U.S. hoped in vain to deter Saddam from attacking 

Israel, and, once that failed, acted to influence the Israelis to let the U.S. 

and coalition troops do the retaliating for them, rather than have Israel 

enter the war and split the coalition.

Saddam, facing a superior foe, misunderstood what a mismatch it 

was for his army and air forces to try to compete with the coalition forces 

and felt high U.S. casualty rates would buy him a compromise peace that 

would have left his regime intact. He badly miscalculated on how many 

casualties his forces could inflict, but his residual chemical and biological 

weapons, unused in the conflict, might have helped deter a U.S. invasion 

and occupation of Iraq after Saddam’s forces had been driven from Kuwait. 

Sometimes an adversary leader may operate in a world of his own, 

surrounded by “yes-men,” and cut off from realistic intelligence about the 

United States, its allies, and their intentions. This appears to be the case 

with Saddam Hussein at the time of Desert Storm. Such an enemy leader 

may disregard the messages and intelligence reports he receives, 

preferring instead to follow his own thinking and adhere to previous 

stereotypes or misinformation. 
Schneider 

203

U.S. Attempts to Deter Iraq from invading Kuwait

(July-August 1990)

When trouble brewed over rights in the Rumaila oil fields, a 

disputed area along the Iraq-Kuwait border, President Bush sent his 

ambassador, April Glaspie, to see if the dispute could be settled 

peacefully. Her meeting with Saddam Hussein appeared to be cordial and 

gave no hint of his inclination to take military action against Kuwait. Nor 

did it say much about the United States interest in backing Kuwait in the 

dispute. Indeed, according to reports, “U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie 

told Saddam that ‘We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like 

your border disagreement with Kuwait.’”18

Although it is likely Saddam Hussein had already decided on the 

invasion of Kuwait at that time, Ambassador Glaspie reported he seemed 

inclined to negotiate. This was communicated to President Bush who then 

had the U.S. State Department transmit the following message back to the 

Iraqi leader stating that:

Later, the U.S. State 

Department followed with another message that Washington had “no 

special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.” Saddam must have 

seen this as an indication he would have little to fear from the United 

States if he intervened in Kuwait.

I am pleased to learn of the agreement between Iraq and 

Kuwait to begin negotiations in Jeddah to find a peaceful 

solution to the current tensions between you. The United 

States and Iraq both have a strong interest in preserving the 

peace and stability of the Middle East. For this reason we 

believe these responsibilities are best resolved by peaceful 

means and not by threats involving military force or 

conflict.19

Perhaps if this letter had included a stronger tone, one that 

emphasized a threat to use military power to block any move by Iraq to 

settle the dispute by means of the Iraqi Army taking over Kuwait, Saddam 

might have put the invasion plan on hold. Using 20-20 hindsight, it is 

easy now to conclude that President Bush’s letter, though very reasonable 
Schneider 

204

on its face, was evidently not the warning shot across the bow the situation 

required. The U.S. response was too mild to influence a dictator who did 

not play by any agreed upon international rules and who was bent on 

seizing a rich prize that could solve most of his financial and security 

problems if his aggression went unopposed. 

Saddam Hussein might have interpreted the mild U.S. response as 

a green light to do what he wanted to do. Certainly it was not a stern 

warning to cease and desist. He might well have calculated the United 

States was distracted elsewhere and it would not respond forcefully to a 

fait accompli. Kuwait might have looked like a lucrative prize that could 

easily be taken, an immediate benefit realized with only a distant, 

intangible and uncertain risk being run in undertaking to occupy it. 

This would fit with the pattern of Saddam Hussein’s operational 

code at home and abroad. Plan carefully, conceal your moves, and then 

strike decisively and violently to achieve your ends. Preemptively attack

against your unprepared, unsuspecting, misled opponent. Moreover, 

Saddam did not think the United States leadership had much of an appetite 

for combat or battle casualties, as they had withdrawn when they had had 

their fill of casualties in previous conflicts in Vietnam and Lebanon. 

As James Baker notes in his memoir, “With his flagrant move into 

Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s ambitions revealed themselves in all their 

grandiosity.”20

Writing eight years later in his memoir, former Secretary of State 

James Baker explained:

The question that comes to mind regarding this scenario is 

why the United States did not do more to deter this attack on Kuwait. The 

answer was the Bush administration leadership was distracted and simply 

did not anticipate such a violent move from Saddam Hussein. 

With the benefit of hindsight, it’s easy to argue that we 

should have recognized earlier that we weren’t going to 

moderate Saddam’s behavior, and shifted our policy 

approach sooner to a greater degree than we did. At the 

least, we should have given Iraqi policy a more prominent 

place on our radar screen at an earlier date. I believe the 

reasons we didn’t change our policy approach earlier and to 

a greater extent are myriad and complex. And while I wish 
Schneider 

205

we’d focused more attention on Iraq earlier, given what 

happened, I remain unpersuaded that anything we might 

have done, short of actually moving armed forces to the 

region, would have deterred Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.21

Furthermore, Baker believes there was little support at first for 

blocking Saddam’s ambitions in Kuwait. In his “view the only realistic 

chance to deter Saddam would have been to introduce U.S. forces into the 

region – and neither the Kuwaitis, the Saudis, the Soviets, nor the Congress 

would have supported that course before August 2. Indeed, it was only the 

shock of the invasion that allowed us to intervene militarily at all.”22

Furthermore, the United States was fully occupied with events 

happening inside the Soviet Bloc as the Berlin Wall came down and 

Eastern Europe began to revolt against communist party control in 

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany and Soviet leader 

Mikhail Gorbachev was unwilling to implement the “Breshnev Doctrine,” 

and use the Red Army to terrorize the Eastern Europeans back into 

submission. The United States foreign policy leadership was primarily 

focused on these events and paid too little attention to the local squabble 

between Iraq and Kuwait over oil rights along their border. 

Saddam acted when the U.S. focus was directed elsewhere. His 

invasion caught everyone unprepared. As James Baker recalls,

Without exception, our friends in the region consistently 

argued that Saddam was only posturing and that 

confrontation would simply make matters worse. Si 

mply put, the reason why nobody believed Saddam would 

attack is because no realistic calculation of his interests 

could have foreseen a full-scale invasion of Kuwait. 

Shevardnadze had put it correctly in Moscow on the third 

day following the invasion: “this was an irrational act that 

made no sense.23

Baker also recalls,
Schneider 

206

[E]ven the Israelis believed that Saddam was bluffing to 

bully the Kuwaitis into economic concessions. Israel’s 

intelligence service, the Mossad, told U.S. intelligence 

counterparts that Saddam’s rhetoric was designed to deter 

an Israeli attack, not threaten one of his own. As late as 

July 31, King Hussein and President Mubarak reassured us 

that Saddam was engaged in verbal bluster, not literal 

threats. Ironically, most of our allies privately worried 

throughout the spring and summer of 1990 that the United 

States might overreact to Saddam’s new aggressiveness!24

However, no one who understood Saddam Hussein’s volatile 

nature, his extreme ambition and his lifelong tendency toward violence 

should have been surprised. Just the fact that a strong military under his 

command resided next door to a poorly defended neighbor in Kuwait that 

was oil rich should have suggested vigilance in any crisis brewing 

between the two. One has the image of a Lion contemplating a Lamb with 

the latter about to become dinner, or in Kuwait’s case, an oil prize that 

represented 8 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, sitting next to 

Saudi Arabia, another relatively defenseless state that owned another 25 

percent of the world oil reserves. Coupled with Iraq’s estimated 11 

percent, Saddam Hussein would control much of the Middle East oil 

supply. However, the United States and the rest of the world were caught 

by surprise and were unprepared to take the deterrence steps that might 

have persuaded Saddam to stop short of an invasion of Kuwait. 

Saddam Hussein’s first name translated into Arabic means “one 

who confronts.” He had lived up to that throughout his entire violent 

lifetime. The “Butcher of Baghdad” had a career filled with blood and 

violence. He was thought to have killed his first victim when only a 

young teenage boy. He was a hit man for the Ba’athist Party and tried to 

assassinate the leader of Iraq. Later, when his cousin ruled Iraq, he served 

as the head of a lethal and brutal security service that killed opponents 

without remorse. 

He ruled with fear, and his models were Stalin and Hitler whose 

biographies he had read with admiration. In 1978 he forced his cousin 

from power and took over as leader of Iraq. The bloodbath in Iraq 
Schneider 

207

escalated as he exterminated tens of thousands of domestic adversaries. In 

one of his first acts as Iraq’s supreme leader, he called a meeting of 

hundreds of top Ba’ath Party leaders, singled out many of them for socalled acts of disloyalty, arrested and read them their death sentences on 

the spot, and forced the remainder of his party leaders to serve in firing 

squads that shot their doomed colleagues the next day. 

Not satisfied with violence against possible domestic opponents, 

Saddam Hussein almost immediately went to war with his neighbors. In 

1980, less than two years after the coup that brought him to power, he 

ordered his army to attack Iran. The result was an eight-year war that bled 

both states and featured the extensive use of chemical weapons and 

ballistic missile attacks, both initiated by Saddam’s commands. In 

retrospect, the United States and other states concerned with the security 

of the region and its important oil reserves should have anticipated 

possible violence from a dictator whose entire career was marked with a 

resort to violence in solving his problems or acquiring his goals. 

Coalition Deterrence of Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia, 

1990-91

During the initial phases of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, both sides 

attempted to deter the other from certain actions. Saddam sought to deter 

U.S. intervention into the conflict by the threat of heavy U.S. and coalition 

casualties. From August 1990 until January 1991, the United States and 

the other coalition partners sought to deter Saddam from ordering his 

forces, then in Kuwait, to invade Saudi Arabia before it could be 

adequately defended. Iraq already had 11 percent of the world’s proven oil 

reserves when Saddam Hussein ordered his forces into Kuwait. Had he 

held on in Kuwait, he would have gained another 8 percent of the world’s 

oil reserves, or 19 percent overall. Had he continued on and conquered 

Saudi Arabia, a country that owns 25 percent of the world’s oil reserves, 

Saddam would have controlled 44 percent of the world’s oil reserves. 

Clearly, he had to be stopped or U.S. and allied vital interests in the region 

would have been threatened. 

However, it is not at all clear whether Saddam Hussein ever 

seriously considered invading Saudi Arabia after consolidating his hold on 
Schneider 

208

Kuwait. Thus, we do not know if deterrence worked or was not needed in 

this case.

Certainly the thin Saudi and United States forces there in August 

and September 1990 could not have offered much resistance. However, to 

invade Saudi Arabia would have shed U.S. and Arab blood and perhaps 

the few U.S. forces sent immediately to the Saudi kingdom served as a trip 

wire, a down payment on further U.S. fighters to come and give battle to 

the Iraqi Army should they be attacked. Thus, an Iraqi attack on Saudi 

Arabia almost certainly would have triggered a war with the United States, 

something the Iraqi dictator almost certainly should have wanted to avoid 

if possible. Thus, the U.S. forces trip wire force quite likely served to halt 

the Iraqi force at the Saudi border until a military buildup there would 

permit coalition offensive action in January 1991. 

Saddam’s Failure to Hold the Coalition at Bay

Once the U.S. began to move its own forces into the region after 

the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had one of two moves 

available.

First, he could order his forces to attack and occupy much of Saudi 

Arabia just as they had in Kuwait. If he was to do this, he would have had 

to act immediately, for time was not on his side. A seizure of the Saudi 

kingdom would have greatly complicated the United States task of 

introducing large forces into the region. Certainly, he could have inflicted 

far more casualties and been much harder to dislodge from Kuwait if he 

had continued his offensive in August or September 1990 on into Saudi 

Arabia. In retrospect, the best defense he could mount was a good offense 

early before Operation Desert Shield could establish a significant force in 

the region to oppose his forces. 

His second option was to do nothing except build up his defenses 

along the Saudi-Kuwait border and watch as the coalition troops poured 

into the theater opposite his army in Kuwait. Saddam elected the second 

option and relied upon his large army in Kuwait to deter an attack by 

threatening large coalition casualties should they attack. This was a 

contest of wills with the U.S. President and his allies, and ultimately 
Schneider 

209

Saddam Hussein lost. The coalition was not deterred from war and the 

result was a catastrophic defeat for the Iraqi military.

Why was the coalition not deterred from attacking Saddam’s

forces in Kuwait? First, Iraq dealt with states and forces much greater 

than his own. President Bush and his advisers and the other coalition 

leaders had a much greater appreciation of the qualitative superiority of 

their forces than did Saddam. Operation Desert Shield had put an 

impressive, well equipped army of 543,000 U.S. troops and thousands of 

other coalition military personnel at the disposal of General Norman 

Schwarzkopf Jr. and President Bush by January 1991. 

It was clear to most military experts the coalition would have 

control of the air and sea around Kuwait. Further, coalition ground forces 

had superior armor, superior artillery, superior mobility, superior training, 

superior protective gear against chemical and biological weapons, and 

superior intelligence.

Further, the United States, United Kingdom and France were states 

with nuclear weapons and Iraq had been warned that any use of CB 

weapons would possibly be met with overwhelming responses. The bottom 

line was it was not likely Iraq could win a war with the coalition.

Beyond this, most of the states in the region and the West would 

not allow Iraq to pose such a threat to their oil supplies and economies. 

As previously noted, Kuwait controlled 8 percent of the known world oil 

reserves and its neighbor, Saudi Arabia, 25 percent. Add to this Iraq’s 

control of 11 percent, and Saddam Hussein would either have or directly 

threaten up to 44 percent of world oil supplies. It was deemed in no one 

best interest to allow this to happen. Therefore, if Iraq did not willingly 

quit Kuwait, it must be expelled, and the coalition had the military means 

to make this happen. Saddam had very weak deterrent cards to play in this 

scenario and he was unable to deter the coalition attack that began on Jan. 

17, 1991. 

Saddam’s Fallback Position: Deterring a Coalition March 

to Baghdad

Why did Saddam Hussein refuse to withdraw from Kuwait as the 

coalition military buildup continued opposite his forces in Kuwait from 
Schneider 

210

August 1990 until January 1991? At some point, one would have thought 

he would have realized a military superpower and its allies would easily 

defeat his forces and bring catastrophic consequences to his armed forces 

and regime. What kept him from retreating in the face of overwhelming 

force before the coalition military hammer struck?

It is possible that Saddam Hussein believed his own rhetoric and 

believed either the coalition, despite the buildup of forces in Saudi Arabia, 

was bluffing or that his army could hold its own in combat with the United 

States.

It is likely Saddam felt he needed the resources from Kuwait to 

rebuild his regime and its security forces to remain in power. He might 

also have reasoned a forced retreat from Kuwait, coupled with the 

disastrous war he had just concluded with Iran, would so weaken him at 

home that rivals might take encouragement from his weakened position 

and reputation to overthrow his regime and execute him. He might have 

calculated it was better to fight and rally the Iraqi people against a foreign 

foe than to capitulate and face their censure.

Saddam Hussein appeared to believe even if Iraq failed to deter a 

coalition attack on his forces and country, he nevertheless calculated he 

could deter the U.S.-led coalition from horizontal escalation25

Saddam Hussein also thought the United States was less 

formidable than many others believed. Six months before his invasion of 

Kuwait, Saddam addressed the fourth summit of the Arab Cooperation 

Council in Jordan and stated: 

of the 

conflict into Iraq. He believed he could mount a stout enough defense so 

the coalition could not overrun his forces and occupy Iraq. He felt the 

U.S. leadership would stop short of attempting a total victory once U.S. 

forces absorbed very high casualty rates. He might also have retained 

hopes he could hang on to some of the Kuwait oil fields if the fighting led 

to a stalemate.

Brothers, the weakness of a big body lies in its bulkiness. 

All strong men have their Achilles heel. Therefore...we 

saw that the United States departed Lebanon immediately 

when some Marines were killed... The whole U.S. 

administration would have been called into question had 
Schneider 

211

the forces that conquered Panama continued to be engaged 

by the Panamanian Armed Forces. The United States has 

been defeated in some combat arenas for all the forces it 

possesses, and it has displayed signs of fatigue, frustration, 

and hesitation when committing aggression on other 

people’s rights and acting from motives of arrogance and 

hegemony...26

As one analyst wrote: 

Saddam was hoping for a political not military victory in 

the Gulf War. He believed that he would triumph if, in the 

course of the ground war, Iraq inflicted substantial 

casualties on the Americans. On one occasion he even 

mentioned a casualty figure that believed would break 

America’s will to fight; “We are sure that if President Bush 

pushes things toward war and wages war against us – his 

war of aggression which he is planning – once five 

thousand of his troops die, he will not be able to continue 

this war.”27

As a result of this conclusion, Saddam Hussein ordered his 

generals to direct their forces to “inflict ‘maximum casualties’ on U.S. 

soldiers when the fighting started.”28

Former Secretary of State Baker recalls, “In retrospect, the war 

may seem to have been a clinical and relatively straightforward affair. At 

the time, however, we were confronted with very sobering casualty 

figures, estimated by the Pentagon to be in the thousands; the specter of 

possible chemical and biological attacks; and a war expected to last for 

months not days.”

 He believed U.S. leaders would face 

mounting domestic pressure to halt their war efforts as the killing 

continued and the numbers of U.S. dead increased. 

29

Baker summarized, “Moreover, Saddam may have misread history. 

He apparently was fixated by our experience in Vietnam and, like Hafez 

al-Assad, thought our pullout from Lebanon after the Beirut barracks 

bombing in October 1983 showed Americans were ‘short of breath.’ 
Schneider 

212

Unlike Assad, however, Saddam was willing to test that proposition in a 

high profile, high-risk way.”30

As one analyst put it, Saddam Hussein was “a great believer in the 

eventual victory of the side willing to suffer the most.”31

General Norman Schwarzkopf clearly was worried Iraqi chemical 

weapons might cause major coalition casualties. In his memoir he wrote, 

 To win the war 

politically, if not militarily, Saddam was willing to lose thousands more of 

Iraqi dead to inflict the requisites number of American dead to achieve his 

ends. 

You can take the most beat-up army in the world, and if they 

choose to stand and fight, we are going to take casualties: if 

they choose to dump chemicals on you, they might even 

win....My nightmare was that our units would reach the 

barriers in the first hours of the attack, be unable to get 

through, and then be hit with a chemical barrage. The 

possibilities of mass casualties from chemical weapons was 

the main reason we had sixty-three hospitals, two hospital 

ships, and eighteen thousand beds in the war zone.32

Schwarzkopf was also worried Saddam Hussein prepared to use 

chemical weapons on the coalition army if it tried to go around the Iraqi 

flanks.33

Indeed, Saddam Hussein was perhaps both right and wrong in his 

deterrence estimates in late 1990. He was clearly mistaken about his 

Army’s ability to inflict five thousand or more coalition casualties in that 

war. The U.S. personnel killed in action were 148 battle-related deaths 

and 145 out-of-combat deaths.34 In addition, the U.K. suffered 47 deaths, 

38 from Iraqi fire. France suffered two deaths, and the Arab countries, not 

including Kuwait, suffered 37 deaths.

35 On the other hand it is clear 

President George H.W. Bush sought to minimize both coalition and Iraqi 

casualties and one reason he halted the war after only 100 hours of 

fighting was to stop the slaughter, on both sides, even at the price of not 

directly toppling Saddam’s regime in Baghdad, despite having that 

possibility well within his grasp when he ordered the ceasefire.36
Schneider 

213

Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, worried 

also about the downwind effects of targeting Iraqi biological warfare 

laboratories and facilities. He feared for civilians and coalition military 

personnel operating downwind, yet felt these sites still needed to be 

neutralized in the air campaign if possible. Powell was even more 

concerned about the effects of possible biological weapons attacks on 

allied troops than those of chemical attacks.37

And who can say if the Iraqi military had been able to fight a much 

more protracted war, that the Bush administration might not have called a 

ceasefire and settled on a compromise peace as the U.S. casualty toll 

reached Saddam’s estimate of 5,000 dead Americans? Note in the present 

war in Iraq, in mid-2009, U.S. casualties have yet to reach 5,000 killed, 

but the United States is withdrawing without having completely defeated 

the Iraqi insurgency, as the cost of continuing indefinitely is perceived as 

unacceptable.38

Once the shock and awe of the coalition combined arms attack sent 

the Iraqi forces into precipitate retreat, there was little to stand between the 

U.S.-led forces and Baghdad. However, eight reasons deterred President 

Bush from going beyond the Kuwait borders with Iraq. 

First, the United States did not want Iraq to dissolve, but rather 

wanted it to serve as a balancer to Iranian power in the region. 

Second, President Bush wished to stay within the limits of the 

United Nations mandate given him and feared he would lose the unity of 

the coalition if he widened the war beyond such legal limits. UN 

resolutions limited coalition actions to expelling Iraq from Kuwait. 

Third, the United States did not want the war to be perceived as a 

war of conquest for oil. President Bush felt the continuation of the war 

into Iraq would cause the U.S. to be portrayed as the aggressor rather than 

Iraq.

Fourth, President George H.W. Bush did not want the costs of 

occupying, pacifying and rebuilding Iraq if the U.S.-led coalition took it 

over. Moreover, there was no organized Iraqi opposition to turn power 

over to, so the occupation would be lengthy and painful. 

Fifth, President Bush wished to limit the economic and human 

costs of the war, not only to the coalition but to Iraq as well. He believed 

entering Iraq would increase the will of the Iraqi army to fight since they 
Schneider 

214

would be defending the homeland rather than Kuwait. President Bush and 

his advisers also felt they did not want to get into an urban house-to-house 

war, or a chemical or biological weapons war, with increased U.S. and 

coalition casualties.

Sixth, the U.S. leaders did not expect Saddam Hussein to be able to 

stay in power once the dimensions of his defeat were felt in his country. 

Carrying the war into Iraq might have made him a national hero in Iraq, 

rather than a defeated adventurer. As James Baker wrote in his memoirs, 

“Strategically, the real objective was to eject Iraq from Kuwait in a 

manner that would destroy Saddam’s offensive military capabilities and 

make his fall from power likely.”39

Seventh, U.S. leaders wanted to prevent Israel from intervening in 

the conflict and thereby undermining the Arab ally participation in the 

war. Also, had Saddam ordered chemical and/or biological attacks on

Israel as the war continued, the Israeli leadership might have responded 

with a nuclear attack on Baghdad. What might have occurred after such 

an exchange would have been very uncertain, but it was not a problem the 

Bush administration wished to risk. 

 President Bush and his advisers felt 

the U.S. political and military war aims had been obtained.

Finally, an invasion of Iraq might have backfired politically in the 

United States and triggered major political opposition to the President. 

Halting at the border left the United States and the Bush Administration 

with ultra-high approval ratings. Keeping the U.S. military in the theater 

would have been unpopular with the troops and at home. 

U.S. Deterrence of Iraqi 

Chemical and Biological Weapons Use

On the other hand, the United States and its coalition partners tried

to compel the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait short of war in the 

months from August 1990 until January 1991. Failing to deter war, 

President Bush, at least, was intent on deterring Saddam Hussein from 

ordering chemical and biological attacks on Coalition forces and from 

burning the Kuwaiti oil fields. He warned the Iraqi dictator in clear and 

forceful terms this would be a catastrophic step if enacted. 
Schneider 

215

Note the Jan. 5, 1991, letter addressed to Saddam Hussein. 

President Bush wrote and had Secretary of State James Baker deliver to 

the Iraqi Government via the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, in midJanuary, 1991: 

Let me state, too that the United States will not tolerate the 

use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of 

Kuwait’s oil fields and installations. Further, you will be 

held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any 

member of the coalition. The American people would 

demand the strongest possible response. You and your 

country will pay a terrible price if you order 

unconscionable acts of this sort.40

To augment Bush’s warning letter, James Baker restated to Iraqi 

Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz the consequences for Iraq if they were not to 

leave Kuwait: 

Our objective is for you to leave Kuwait. That’s the only 

solution we will accept. And if you do not do that, then 

we’ll find ourselves at war, and if you do go war with the 

coalition, you will surely lose. This will not be a war of 

attrition like you fought with Iran. It will be fought with 

the means and weapons that play to our strengths, not to 

yours. We have the means to define how the battle will be 

fought, and yours do not. 

This is not to threaten but to inform. You may choose to 

reject it, or not to believe what we say, but we have the 

responsibility to tell you that we have tremendous 

technological advantages in forces, and our view is that if 

conflict comes, your forces will face devastatingly superior 

firepower. In our view – and you may reject this and 

disagree – our forces will really destroy your ability to 

command your own forces. 

We owe it to you to tell you there will be no stalemate, no 

UN ceasefire or breathing space for negotiations. If 
Schneider 

216

conflict begins, it will be decisive. This will not be another 

Vietnam. Should war begin, God forbid, it will be fought 

to a swift, decisive conclusion. 

If the conflict involves your use of chemical or biological 

weapons against our forces, the American people will 

demand vengeance. We have the means to exact it. With 

regard to this part of my presentation, this is not a threat, it 

is a promise. If there is any use of weapons like that, an 

objective won’t just be the liberation of Kuwait, but the 

liberation of the current Iraqi regime and anyone 

responsible for using those weapons will be held 

accountable.41

To reinforce the idea WMD might be met with WMD, Secretary of 

Defense Dick Cheney also stated publicly, “Were Saddam Hussein foolish 

enough to use weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. response would be 

absolutely overwhelming and it would be devastating.”42

In cases like the Gulf War, there are certain possible advantages in 

dealing with an enemy leader like Saddam Hussein, who has seldom 

hesitated to use maximum violence to achieve his aims and solve his 

problems. Such a leader, in his own mind, may project his own 

ruthlessness upon his opponent, in this case the President of the United 

States.

If a Saddam-type of killer would not hesitate to use all his 

available weapons against a previous foe, he might expect a stronger 

adversary to do the same against him if he escalated to WMD use against 

it. 43

Since Saddam Hussein did not use chemical or biological weapons 

in the subsequent fighting in Kuwait, despite the fact he had previously 

shown no hesitation about using them against Iran in their eight-year war, 

or against his own Kurdish populations when they opposed him, it might 

fairly be concluded U.S. threats deterred his chemical and biological use. 

Of course, with deterrence one can never prove 100 percent that it worked. 

Saddam might not have wanted to use them for other reasons.

 In such cases the very ruthlessness of a rogue chief might become 

the ally of U.S. ability to deter his chemical or biological weapons 

employment against the United States or its allies.

44 Clearly, 
Schneider 

217

the U.S. threat of retaliation did not stop him from setting fire to Kuwait’s 

oil fields as his forces evacuated that country. That U.S. deterrent message 

obviously did not work. 

In 1998, seven years after Operation Desert Storm, ex-President 

George H.W. Bush and his former National Security Adviser Brent 

Scowcroft published a memoir of their times in power titled A World 

Transformed. Although Saddam Hussein was still in power in Iraq at the 

time of the memoir and was still considered a threat to U.S. and regional 

allies, Scowcroft nevertheless wrote the Bush administration had only been 

bluffing about using nuclear weapons should Saddam Hussein order the Iraqi 

Army to use chemical or biological weapons. Indeed, Scowcroft wrote that:

No one advanced the notion of using nuclear weapons, and 

the President rejected it even in retaliation for chemical and 

biological attacks. We deliberately avoided spoken or 

unspoken threats to use them on the grounds that it is bad 

practice to threaten something you have no intention of 

carrying out. Publicly, we left the matter ambiguous. 

There was no point in undermining the deterrence it might 

be offering.45

James Baker’s memoir tells the same story:

The President had decided, at Camp David in December 

that the best deterrent of the use of weapons of mass 

destruction by Iraq would be a threat to go after the Ba’ath 

regime itself. He had also decided that U.S. forces would 

not retaliate with chemical or nuclear weapons if the Iraqis 

attacked with chemical munitions, there was obviously no 

reason to inform the Iraqis of this. In hopes of persuading 

them to consider more soberly the folly of war, I purposely 

left the impression that the use of chemical or biological 

agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliations.46

Saddam might have believed this threat simply because he was not a 

person given to moral limits and had previously always used all weapons at 
Schneider 

218

his command, witness the merciless Iraqi chemical attacks during the IranIraq War against both military and civilian personnel. He might have viewed 

President Bush as like himself, willing to use everything for victory.47

However, it could not have helped subsequent deterrence efforts to 

publicize the United States had bluffed and never seriously considered 

using its nuclear advantages in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. After all, when 

the various memoirs of Bush, Scowcroft, Baker and Powell were 

published, Saddam Hussein was still in power in Iraq and might have 

needed to be deterred from future adventures by succeeding U.S. 

Presidents. Also, it should be noted other adversary leaders in other states 

like North Korea, Syria and Iran can also read, and as a result, might 

conclude in future crises they too, were relatively safe from any U.S. 

nuclear retaliations.

In any case, it is not clear Saddam Hussein believed his biological 

weapons in particular would be effective, because it later became clear in 

the mid-1990s, that Iraq had not made great progress at the time of the 

1990-91 Gulf campaign, in mating its experimental biological weapons 

program to an effective delivery system. However, chemical weapons were 

another thing entirely. His regime had manufactured tens of thousands of 

chemical weapons and had used them to deadly and strategic effect against 

Iran. As the CIA later concluded,

In Saddam’s view, WMD helped save the regime multiple 

times, He believed that during the Iran-Iraq War chemical 

weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that 

ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political 

will. Similarly during Desert Storm, Saddam believed 

WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their 

attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait.

48

Indeed, Iraq’s military had the most experience delivering

chemical weapons in actual battle conditions of any military in the world 

at the time of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. On the other hand, it is not clear 

Saddam and his commanders believed his forces were superior to U.S. 

forces on a toxic battlefield where U.S. forces, unlike most of his Iraqi 

military, were well trained and relatively better equipped than the Iraqi 
Schneider 

219

forces to fight in a chemical environment. U.S. and NATO preparations 

against the possible onslaught of the Warsaw Pact chemical threat had 

equipped the U.S. forces to fight better than the Iraq Army in this realm. 

Thus, it might have been that U.S. forces passive defenses played a major 

part in Iraq’s decision not to use chemical arms, perhaps as great a role as 

President Bush’s implied nuclear threat.

At any rate, it is likely the combination of the implied U.S. nuclear 

retaliatory threat and the superiority of U.S. training and better protective 

gear against chemical effects combined to keep the Iraqi chemical weapons 

out of play.

Iraqi Chemical and Biological Capability:

Deterrent to U.S. Nuclear Weapons?

What confidence did Saddam Hussein have that the United States 

would not use its superiority in nuclear arms to destroy his army in Kuwait? 

First, the Iraqi dictator hoped to deter President Bush and other 

coalition leaders from attacking because he believed the Iraqi military, at 

the time the fourth largest in the world in terms of numbers in uniform, 

could inflict substantial casualties on what he perceived as a casualtyadverse opponent. 

Second, even President Bush’s direct warning letter communicated 

to Saddam Hussein via Secretary Baker in a meeting with Tariq Aziz on 

Jan. 5, 1991, could be read the United States would not use its nuclear 

superiority so long as Iraqi chemical and biological weapons were not 

used (see Appendix B of this paper). Thus, there is the question of “who 

was deterring whom?” Was George Bush deterring Saddam Hussein’s use 

of chemical and biological weapons? Or was he also indicating Iraqi 

chemical and biological warfare capabilities would deter U.S. use of 

nuclear weapons on Iraq?49

Saddam Hussein clearly put out warnings that Iraqi chemical and 

biological weapons would be used in the contingency of a U.S. or U.K. 

use of nuclear arms. For example, in a meeting with former British Prime 

Minister Edward Heath in October 1990, Saddam said, “If the going gets 

hard then the British and Americans will use atomic weapons against me, 

and the chances are that Israel will as well, and the only thing I’ve got are 
Schneider 

220

chemical and biological weapons, and I shall have to use them. I have no 

alternative.”50 President Bush also was under no illusions on this as he 

had noted on more than one occasion that Saddam “has never possessed a 

weapon he did not use.”51

Saddam possibly felt his biological and chemical weapons were his 

ace in the hole. Saddam’s poison gases had played a key role in holding 

the stronger Iranian military at bay and had brought the Iranians to the 

peace table. According to one Middle East analyst, “Saddam took the 

experience of the war with Iran, in which gas eventually caused the 

Iranian military to lose its most potent weapon – its will to fight – to mean 

that Iraq possessed an absolute weapon capable of stopping modernized 

armies as well.”52

Clearly, the U.S. leadership had serious concerns about such 

chemical and biological weapons use or the President would not have made 

it such a central issue in his warning letter to Saddam Hussein. Further, the 

Combatant Commander, General Schwarzkopf, was especially concerned 

the Iraqi Army might ruin the “Left Hook” flanking movement by his 

ground forces with a devastating chemical barrage. General Colin Powell, 

then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was particularly focused on the 

potential casualties that might come from an Iraqi biological warfare strike.

James Baker also admitted the casualties that might flow from 

urban warfare and from Iraqis’ who would fight harder to protect their 

homeland would cause many more American deaths. Thus, it is plausible 

the chemical and biological threats and anything that had the potential to 

greatly escalate U.S. casualties impacted U.S. thinking and helped serve as 

an Iraqi deterrent to an invasion of Iraq.53 Thus, it is possible Saddam’s 

WMD threat, in the form of chemical and biological weapons, might have 

been responsible for saving his regime. 

U.S. and Israeli Failure to Deter Iraq from attacking Israel

The coalition air campaign began on Jan.17, 1991. The next day, 

Saddam Hussein ordered the first of 48 Scud missile attacks on Israel as 

well as the first of 41 such attacks against the coalition forces in Saudi 

Arabia. Apparently, the threat of possible Israeli nuclear retaliation did 

not deter such a decision. This was risky for clearly Israel had enough 
Schneider 

221

nuclear firepower to utterly destroy Iraq. Saddam played a very dangerous 

game with them.

On the other hand, Saddam attempted to split the coalition by 

attacking Israel. Would the coalition Arab allies fight on the same side as 

Israel against another Arab state? This was considered highly unlikely in 

Washington, D.C.54

Thus, U.S. leaders rushed Patriot theater missile defenses to help 

defend Israel from Iraqi missiles, and devoted over 2,000 air sorties against 

the Iraqi SCUD missile launchers in an attempt to protect Israel and keep 

them out of the fight. Ultimately, the swift and decisive air-land-sea war 

unleashed by the coalition made short work of the Iraqi military forces, and 

the combination of theater missile defenses and U.S. diplomacy all helped 

dissuade Israel from participating with its armed forces.

 For this reason, United States leaders were concerned 

an Israeli counter-attack would undermine the support of the Arab partners 

in the U.S. coalition against Iraq.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Lesson 1: What deterred the Soviet Union in the Cold War will not apply 

to all cases. 

Deterrence is a rational strategy and theory of how to prevent war 

or escalation of a war. However, the evidence of history is deterrence 

often fails. Deterrence is inexact, an art not a science. What works 

perfectly in one case may fail wholly in another. Indeed, it is the weaker 

party that attacks the stronger party in about one of every five wars. So 

deterrence is not a given even when your government or coalition has 

overwhelming military superiority over an opposing state. 

The Cold War strategy the West adopted to deter a Soviet nuclear or

conventional attack seems to have worked, although one can never be 

absolutely sure what kept the peace. Was it because the West had a 

retaliatory capability to destroy the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact? Was it 

because in crises, Soviet leaders believed the U.S. leaders had the will to use 

their nuclear weapons if necessary? Was it because the United States and 

its allies had a second strike force, one not vulnerable to a surprise 

disarming attack? Or was it because the West faced rational leaders in 
Schneider 

222

Moscow who understood the logic of mutual assured destruction? Or were 

we simply lucky? Would war have occurred if all these factors had not 

been put in place? Or would both sides have maintained the peace anyway? 

And how much retaliatory force was enough to deter a war with the 

U.S.S.R.? Did we need thousands of nuclear weapons or just a few? How 

much was enough to deter war and the escalation of crises?55

One thing clear from the Gulf War example is despite all the 

destructive power in the United States, U.K. and French nuclear arsenals, 

and for all the coalition’s conventional might, they could not deter Saddam 

Hussein from seizing Kuwait, and they could not compel him to withdraw 

his forces without first resorting to war. One reason for this is the U.S. and 

coalition did not develop a firm response to Iraq prior to Saddam’s decision 

to invade Kuwait. Had the United States delivered a strong warning and 

deployed forces to back this up prior to Saddam’s final decision to invade 

Kuwait, he might have been deterred. The tardiness of the deterrence 

signals ruined the chances for their success.

 We can never 

know for sure. We are only certain that we did not have a central nuclear 

war with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw pact and other allies.

This calls into question whether the Cold War calculus of what it 

takes to deter a conflict worked in the Gulf War. Apparently, the possession 

of nuclear weapons by his opponents did not deter Saddam Hussein or 

compel him to leave Kuwait or end the conflict until his forces were routed 

in Kuwait. He was willing to strike U.S., U.K., French and Israeli targets, 

risking possible nuclear annihilation. He was willing to fight a coalition of 

over 30 states in Kuwait rather than withdraw peacefully.

Lesson 2: States that possess WMD or other extraordinary military 

power may feel that they can afford to start a conflict and keep it within 

tolerable levels of escalation where they can achieve their aims.

Perhaps Saddam Hussein believed the threat of his chemical and 

biological (CB) weapons would deter any nuclear use by the coalition 

forces, and perhaps he even believed, under his chemical and biological 

deterrent umbrella, his forces in Kuwait were formidable enough to deter a 

coalition attack or to prevent a complete and utter defeat. 
Schneider 

223

Saddam Hussein may have relied on his CB capability first to deter 

any coalition attack on his forces in Kuwait. This failed on Jan.17, 1991, 

when the coalition air attack began. Second, he may have relied on his CB 

threat to prevent U.S., U.K., French and Israeli nuclear attacks. There is 

no evidence such weapons use had ever been seriously considered by any 

of the four states. Indeed, memoirs of U.S. decision-makers Bush, 

Scowcroft, Baker and Powell, indicate this was never seriously 

considered, although Secretary of Defense Cheney asked the Joint Chiefs 

to look into the utility of nuclear strikes if the President ever changed his 

mind. 

Finally Saddam Hussein may have assumed his CB arsenal would 

have made it too costly for the coalition to march to Baghdad, occupy 

Iraqi territory and replace his regime. Clearly, he might have been 

tempted to use such weapons and risk further coalition escalation to 

nuclear weapons, as his situation became more and more desperate. Even 

if he resisted the impulse to use CB weapons as the invasion of Iraq began, 

it is likely if it became clear to him his regime was about to fall, the CB 

gloves quite likely would have come off, and the coalition might have 

been struck with last minute chemical and biological revenge strikes.56 

Saddam Hussein probably realized coalition leaders would also understand 

the perils from Iraq’s CB weapons of trying to achieve a total defeat of his 

regime. It is likely he is correct this possibility weighed heavily in the 

U.S. and coalition decision not to press for a total defeat of his forces and 

regime in Iraq.

Lesson 3: Saddam felt he was willing to sustain deeper casualties than 

the United States, and this would give him a political if not military 

victory. States willing to suffer more than their opponents may count on 

their adversary halting the war effort when causalities reach a certain 

painful threshold that tempers their war aims.

It appears Saddam was willing to gamble the United States was so 

casualty averse we would halt our military operations after suffering the 

first 5,000 deaths from the clash with Iraq. Of course, he was badly 

mistaken in how his forces matched up with the coalition. Since his forces 

were able to kill only 148 U.S. fighters in the battles that ensued, not 5,000, 
Schneider 

224

his deterrence theory of U.S. and coalition escalation, estimated at a 

threshold of 5,000 killed in action, was never tested.

It should be noted President Bush and his field commander, General 

Schwarzkopf, prepared for possible heavy coalition causalities. Note the 

United States and the coalition had transported 63 mobile field hospitals to 

the region before launching Operation Desert Storm, as well as two hospital 

ships and 18,000 hospital beds.57

On the other hand, while Saddam Hussein thought the United 

States leaders were very averse to suffering casualties, nevertheless, he 

still perhaps underestimated President Bush’s regard for human life – Iraq 

lives as well as those of Americans and the rest of the coalition. Indeed, 

unlike Bush, it may never have occurred to Saddam Hussein to limit his 

military actions in order to prevent enemy combatant deaths as well as 

those of his own forces. 

Lesson 4: If the rival leadership does not understand when it faces 

extreme military disadvantages, deterrence of the weaker by the stronger 

side is more likely to fail. Situational awareness and rationality must be 

joined together in the rival leadership for the deterrent effect to work.

The Cold War deterrence requirement of having a situationally 

aware and rational opponent was not met fully in the Gulf War. Saddam 

Hussein may have been logical in his thinking, but ignorant of important 

facts. He was not situationally aware of the magnitude of military forces 

arrayed against him nor was he cognizant of much of the movement on the 

battlefield due to faulty intelligence. For example, he did not have 

satellites for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance of the coalition 

forces, and much of the Iraqi air force had fled by the time the coalition 

ground forces attacked. Saddam never detected the “Left Hook” flanking 

attack General Schwarzkopf put into motion at the beginning of the land 

battle.

Lesson 5: Dictators who kill the messenger seldom get good intelligence

and are far less effective in countering adverse possibilities.
Schneider 

225

Saddam Hussein had a decision style that produced “yes men” 

only, robbing him of much important information on which to inform his 

decisions. To disagree with him was literally to risk your life if you were 

in his circle. His extreme brutality gave him unrivaled power. It also gave 

him information that conformed only to what his advisers thought he 

wanted to hear. Saddam did not welcome negative news or views and thus 

became the prisoner of his own perceptions of reality and rarely had those 

views been challenged or informed by facts or interpretations counter to 

his preconceptions such as: (1) the view the United States would not 

respond to an attack on Kuwait, or (2) the belief the coalition would not 

attack him in Kuwait because he had chemical and biological weapons, or 

(3) the Iraqi force could hold its own with that of the coalition, or (4) his 

forces could at least inflict 5,000 U.S. casualties and save him from 

absolute defeat.

Lesson 6: Many variables go into whether deterrence will work: time, 

place, culture, politics, leadership and the personalities that make the 

decisions. The greater the divergence between the personalities, world 

views of the adversary leaders, and the leadership stakes in the outcome, 

the greater the chances for deterrence to fail.

In this 1990-1991 Gulf War there were two kinds of deterrence to 

consider: (1) deterrence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and (2) deterrence 

of an escalation of that war once it had begun. This was a war with many 

players, but it is fair to begin with the two key players in this drama, 

President Saddam Hussein and President George H.W. Bush. On the Iraqi 

side, the unquestioned chief decision-maker was Saddam Hussein. 

Saddam was Iraq, and Iraq was Saddam in this case. He was the unrivaled 

Iraqi decision-maker in foreign and defense policy.58

Things were a bit more complicated in the U.S. and coalition side. 

Clearly President George H.W. Bush was the ultimate decision-maker.59 

The United States was the key state in the formation of the coalition since it 

was and is the world’s military superpower. However, others like U.K. 

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were influential in collaborating with the 

United States leadership. Thatcher was considered particularly instrumental 

in advising President Bush to take an uncompromising policy requiring Iraq 
Schneider 

226

to abandon Kuwait or face war. And clearly, the instruments of power were 

provided by all the coalition members as they mobilized for war, sent their 

armed forces to Saudi Arabia and participated in Operation Desert Storm

that succeeded brilliantly in routing the Iraqi Army in Kuwait.

The frequent insensitivity of enemies to each other’s stakes and 

signals, and the all-too-often misperceptions they have of each other’s 

aims and motives is at the core of why deterrence theory so often fails to 

explain interstate behavior in conflict situations.

Lesson 7: Deterrence fails frequently, and what works in one case will 

fail in another. Governments run largely by a single dominant 

individual are rare and thus deterring Saddam Hussein and Iraq will be 

different from most cases where power is shared. Lessons learned from 

this case study should be applied very cautiously to other cases.

One must also be careful in drawing deterrence lessons from a 

particular case. In the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq 

with an iron fist and did not have to negotiate with others in forming his 

decisions. Thus, Iraq was a unitary actor. This will not always be the 

case. In most states power and decisions are shared by a group at the top. 

Power is often dispersed. Deterrence becomes a group affair. One must 

persuade a group of decision-makers and power holders before deterrence 

can succeed. Thus, on the Iraqi side at least this is a special case where 

one man, Saddam Hussein, could speak for the entire country, and his will 

became Iraq’s path.

On the opposing side, although he was by far the most influential 

decision-maker on his side of the conflict, President Bush could not have 

acted nearly as freely as Saddam Hussein did in Iraq. Bush and his able 

team first had to mobilize diverse coalition of allied states, secure the 

backing of the U.S. Congress, seek the support of the United Nations, and 

mobilize U.S. public support prior to kicking off the January 1991 

counterattack against Iraq. Even so, once such efforts to mobilize support 

had succeeded, it took additional time to deploy and equip a sufficient 

military force in the region to repel the Iraqi invaders from Kuwait. Nearly 

six months elapsed before the coalition was ready to go to war to reclaim 

Kuwait.
Schneider 

227

In other cases where a government attempts to deter a war or 

launch one, the power to make such decisions may be shared, and policy 

may be a product of multiple factors that combine to take the decision or 

policy in a certain direction. This becomes even more complicated when 

the more power is shared on both sides. Thus, the 1990-1991 Gulf War 

may be a special case, and you must be careful about drawing general 

conclusions about deterrence from it. 

Lesson 8: When dealing with an adversary bent on achieving a fait

accompli, quick reaction time is absolutely required. Be alert and ready 

to act at the outset or fail to deter leaders like Saddam Hussein. When 

still considering the opening move, a rival leadership can be more easily 

turned away from an act of aggression. After a decision has been made 

and a plan set in motion, deterrence can be far more difficult or 

impossible. 

Timing of the U.S. and coalition deterrence campaign was too late 

against Saddam to prevent Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Right from the start, 

the U.S. leadership needed to use unambiguous language with a violenceprone leader like Saddam Hussein. All he respected was superior force 

and will. Anything less was not going to keep him from seizing his prize, 

particularly since it represented, in his mind, the path to financial solvency 

and subsequent physical security. It would be wise for the United States 

and other allies to first inventory their absolute vital interests, things like 

preventing the Middle East’s oil reserves from falling under the control of 

a hostile dictator whose interests were opposed to peace and security in the 

region and whose grip on world energy supplies could not be trusted. 

After that, a continuous defense and deterrence policy and posture would 

be needed in the region to keep these vital interests secure.

Where these types of leaders and regimes are positioned to 

adversely impact U.S. and allied vital interests, particular high-level 

attention needs to be paid to them. When such a potential challenger is 

positioned to threaten a vital interest or vital ally, contingency plans need 

to be pre-formulated for deterring them from any power grabs or hostile 

interventions. These plans need to have forces attached to them so once a 

crisis begins, these forces can be rapidly mobilized and sent to the region 
Schneider 

228

to signal the seriousness of U.S. and allied intentions and to undergird the 

tough talk and warnings that U.S. and allied leaders must be prepared to 

give potential aggressors. 

Beyond that, it would be wise to profile and pay extra close 

attention to all foreign leaders like Saddam Hussein who have a track 

record of violence and aggression, and who have shown repeated lawless 

behavior against domestic rivals and their international neighbors. 

Interdisciplinary teams of profilers who have read every word and 

observed every action of aggressive leadership should help inform U.S. 

decision-makers about the motives, situation and operational codes of 

these potential trouble makers. Such teams of profilers should stay with 

the observation of these particular leaders over years and decades rather 

than be rotated into other assignments and succeeded by uninformed and 

inexperienced intelligence officers. Moreover, it would be wise to have at 

least two parallel teams of profilers to compete in their assessments and 

provide decision-makers with alternative evaluations. It would also be 

useful if a representative of these competitive “Red Team” groups would 

give their interpretations of likely next moves and motives of that 

particular rival leader or leadership team.

Lesson 9: Beware of the enemy whose modus operandi is to attack 

preemptively and who has a track record of extreme violence and bold 

risk taking. 

Saddam Hussein believed in careful plotting and swift and violent 

preemptive moves against his domestic and foreign foes. He came from a 

background that made him see enemies everywhere and he may have been 

seen as, or even actually been, paranoid. However, as the saying goes, just 

because he was paranoid does not mean people were not out to get him, 

especially after he had killed his way to the top of the Iraqi political 

system. He had actually made so many thousands of enemies by that time 

it was probably completely rational to act like a paranoid ruler. First he 

had killed the enemies of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq and anyone that stood in 

their way to power.60 After that was secure, he killed anyone who he 

thought might become a rival, even if that was not yet the case. He killed 
Schneider 

229

anyone who grew in popularity like some of the more successful Iraqi 

generals who fought well in the Iran-Iraq War.

He killed to maintain Sunni power over the majority Shia sect in 

Iraq. He killed Kurdish leaders who represented an independent power 

source. Once at the pinnacle of power after 1978, he launched wars 

against his neighbors in Iran61

Hussein constantly analyzed who might possibly become his rivals 

inside Iraq and planned brutal elimination campaigns to remove them by 

lethal means. In the summer of 1979, Saddam admitted to a colleague, “I 

know that there are scores of people plotting to kill me, and this is not 

difficult to understand. After all, did we not seize power by plotting 

against our predecessors? However, I am far cleverer than they are. I 

know they are conspiring to kill me long before they actually start 

planning to do it. This enables me to do it before they have the faintest 

chance of striking at me.”

and Kuwait and sent his forces to the 

doorstep of Saudi Arabia. Tens of thousands of Iraqis, Iranians and 

Kuwaitis therefore died as a result of his aggressions. 

62

Saddam’s violent and ceaseless domestic purges follow the pattern 

of the terror campaigns of Stalin’s rule in the Soviet Union, a leader whose 

bloody methods deeply impressed him. Saddam’s endless warring foreign 

policy also reminds one of Adolph Hitler’s ceaseless wars against all 

neighbors and all other ethnic groups. 

Saddam Hussein never felt secure and his prophylactic arrests and 

executions no doubt kept him in power longer than previous Iraqi leaders 

who were all removed by coups. Indeed, the five previous rulers of Iraq 

all lost power in this way. Hussein also felt the Islamic Republic of Iran

posed a potential lethal threat to his rule. Not only were they hostile, they 

were Shiite Muslims like nearly 60 percent of his Iraqi countrymen. Their 

revolution had targeted him. He felt he had to preemptively destroy them 

or see his regime destroyed by them, hence his decision to attack Iran in 

1979 while they were still getting organized. Like his domestic purges, he 

struck before his enemies realized his lethal intent.

Lesson 10: Understand the situation and perspective of adversary 

leaders to anticipate when and where they might decide to initiate 
Schneider 

230

hostilities. Plan to deter and counter them with contingency plans and 

quick reaction forces in anticipation of such contingencies. 

After the Iran-Iraq war ended in a ceasefire in 1988, Saddam was 

desperate to rebuild his armed forces and security forces before Iran 

regrouped and attacked again. Iran had come dangerously close to 

defeating him in the previous conflict and was a country with three times 

the population of Iraq, and four times the land area. Yet, his forces were 

spent, and because of his adventures, he was out of credit and deeply in 

debt. This led him to attack Kuwait as a means of recouping his fortunes 

and preparing for what he feared was the inevitable Iranian resumption of 

the war. The Bush administration in 1990 did not have its focus on the 

Iraq-Kuwait dispute, nor did it appreciate Saddam Hussein’s dilemma and 

his modus operandi enough to anticipate his attack and occupation of 

Kuwait. Bush and his advisers were surprised and unprepared for the 

event although the threat could have been anticipated with better 

intelligence and forethought. 

Lesson 11: Understand what motivates the adversary leadership in terms 

of retention of their personal power and survival in order to predict your 

chances of success or failure in attempts to deter further acts of war or 

escalation. Put yourselves in their shoes. See the world from their 

perspective when planning to counter them.

Saddam Hussein may have felt a retreat from Kuwait would have 

weakened him in the eyes of the Iraqi military and people and made him 

more vulnerable to overthrow. Already he was in a weakened position. 

He had just concluded a disastrous eight-year war with Iran costing 

hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars worth of funds. He 

may have reasoned that this, coupled with forced humiliating retreat from 

Kuwait, might have given strong encouragement to his domestic and 

international rivals to try to remove him from power. Better, he might 

have thought, to take on a foreign force, rally the Iraqi people once more 

behind his rule against an external enemy, than to slink back to Iraq in 

defeat without putting up a fight. That posture could get him deposed and 

killed.
Schneider 

231

Saddam likely reasoned it was better to fight in Kuwait, try to get a 

compromise peace, keep some of the fruits of his invasion, and stay in 

power and alive. Thus, Saddam appears to have concluded what was best 

for him personally was to put his people and his military through yet 

another war, however painful. He was willing to lose thousands more of 

Iraqis in order to preserve his own regime and his own life. Thus, Saddam 

was not to be compelled to leave Kuwait without a fight.

Lesson 12: While it certainly helps if you are trying to deter a rational 

opponent rather than an irrational one, rational leaders without 

situation awareness can still fail to understand the likely consequences 

of their actions and may fail to be deterred. 

Deterrence can be especially difficult when the opponent is 

severely lacking in situational awareness. Saddam Hussein was unfamiliar 

with the United States and its leadership. He had only a weak grasp of our 

political system.

Nor did Saddam Hussein appear to keep track of who President 

Bush and his key advisers met with the day he launched the invasion of 

Kuwait. On Aug. 2, 1990, President Bush met with British Prime 

Minister Margaret Thatcher, the “Iron Lady of Britain.” It would not have 

taken much analysis to ascertain the kind of strong action she was likely to 

and did recommend to President Bush in response to the Iraqi invasion. 

Further, other top U.S. leaders met in Moscow with top Soviet leaders. 

Thus, it was far easier to begin to mobilize the United States and its allies 

with its leaders in such close proximity. This does not seem to have 

occurred to Saddam Hussein and his advisers. 

Moreover, the Iraqi dictator was an untutored military leader who 

appears not to have grasped the power and capability of the U.S. and 

coalition forces arrayed against him once they were mobilized and 

deployed to the region. Saddam did not trust his own military. He 

launched the invasion of Iran division by division through personal calls to 

his commanders because he did not trust them to coordinate operations in 

a joint fashion. Allowing them to meet and plan operations jointly might 

have also given them an opportunity to conspire against him. He separated 

his commander and forced them to communicate only through him. As a 
Schneider 

232

result, when that war began, there was a day or two before some of his 

military leaders even were informed they were at war with Iran.63

General Chuck Horner, the Joint Forces Air Commander during 

Operation Desert Storm, observed it was probably not the wisest coalition 

strategy to try to target Saddam Hussein during the war. He noted had it 

occurred:

[K]illing Saddam may have turned out to be as serious 

mistake...In his paranoia; Saddam often had his top 

generals executed. The threat of execution sometimes 

concentrates the mind, but more often it leads to paralysis. 

This weakening of his military leadership could only 

benefit the coalition. And finally, as general Schwarzkopf 

pointed out after the war, Saddam was a lousy strategist, 

and thus a good man to have in charge of Iraqi armed 

forces, under the circumstances.64

In retrospect, it is difficult to imagine how Saddam Hussein

expected to fight a war effectively against the coalition when his air forces 

were swept from the skies, when his armor and artillery were out-ranged, 

when he did not have any air and space intelligence, surveillance or 

reconnaissance capabilities, when his forces were poorly trained and when 

he lacked adequate command and control of his own forces. Saddam 

Hussein clearly did not appreciate the caliber of U.S. and allied forces he 

faced and assumed his large army could inflict thousands of casualties on 

the coalition. This, he planned, would win him a compromise peace and the 

chance to survive and fight another day after the immediate conflict had 

ended. He was lucky to have survived and did not do so because his forces 

executed his plan or because his strategy worked.

Saddam Hussein’s leadership and lack of situational awareness led 

the Iraqi military into a catastrophic defeat. According to one summary of 

the war, “Iraqi military casualties, killed or wounded, totaled an estimated 

25,000 to 65,000 and the United Nations destroyed some 3,200 Iraqi 

tanks, over 900 other armored vehicles and over 2,000 artillery weapons. 

Some 86,000 Iraqi soldiers surrendered. In contrast, the U.N. forces 
Schneider 

233

suffered combat losses of some 200 from hostile fire plus losses of four 

tanks, nine other armored vehicles, and one artillery weapon...; Although 

coalition aircraft flew a total of 109,876 sorties, the allies lost only 38 

aircraft versus over 300 for Iraq...The terms of the cease-fire were 

designed to enable U.N. inspectors to destroy most of Iraq’s remaining 

missiles, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons facilities.”65

Lesson 13: Beware of situations where a potential adversary sees great 

immediate and easy gains to be achieved by taking military action, and 

where his risks are seen as remote, abstract and distant. It will be 

important to try to reverse these perceptions of limited and distant risk, 

and to do so emphatically early in a crisis situation, to improve the 

chances for deterrence to work.

Saddam Hussein saw an immediate prize in Kuwait where he could 

add 8 percent of the world’s oil supply to his resources, find a way out of 

his massive debt situation, gain the purchasing power to re-equip his 

armed forces and police to protect his regime and his life, and fund future 

extensions of his power and influence. He got a mild disclaimer from the 

United States that it had no particular interest in the outcome of his dispute 

with Kuwait over the Rumailia oil fields. There appeared to be no 

immediate strong opposition to his unspoken aspiration to add Kuwait to 

his realm. This could have been foreseen if the United States and other 

interested regional powers had been more alert and perceived the danger 

sooner. Clearly, in mid-1990 a violent and ambitious Saddam Hussein 

considered seizing a rich trophy, one that appeared could to be had for the 

taking, without any immediate or significant costs.

Richard Ned Lebow and Janet Gross Stein have examined over 20 

cases of deterrence failures and concluded their studies “support the 

conclusion that policy makers who risk or actually start wars pay more 

attention to their own strategic and domestic political interests than they 

do to the interests and military capabilities of their adversaries.”66 Indeed, 

such aggressors “may discount an adversary’s resolve even when the state 

in question has gone to considerable lengths to demonstrate that resolve 

and to develop the military capabilities needed to defend its 

commitment.”67 Thus, a government can do everything right to deter an 
Schneider 

234

adversary and still fail because the rival does not estimate the outcome the 

same way.

Lesson 14: Until a sizeable deterrent force can be sent to a region of 

potential conflict, it is a useful stopgap to send a tripwire force to signal 

U.S. intent to fight any attempt at aggression from the beginning. 

Such a U.S. tripwire force was sent early to Saudi Arabia in the fall 

of 1990 to show Saddam Hussein an attack on Saudi Arabia would spill 

U.S. blood and draw the United States into a conflict with Iraq. This 

action may have saved Saudi Arabia from an invasion in the period 

between the August 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait and the 

initiation of the coalition air war in January 1991 and the ground war in 

February 1991. Like the U.S. army forces stationed in Berlin, Germany, 

during the Cold War, these tripwire forces would not have been able to 

stop the enemy forces from seizing that territory immediately, but it would 

have been a down payment on a future U.S. military escalation and 

counterattack. Being drawn into a war with the world’s military 

superpower should serve as a considerable reason for rethinking an 

aggressive move. 

Lesson 15: In cases where both sides possess some form of mass 

casualty weapons, deterrence can work in both directions. Both can be 

deterred from use of the chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 

(CBRN) weapons by the threat of the other. On the other hand, both 

may still feel free to prosecute a limited conventional war, feeling secure 

that their CBRN deterrent will shield them from a similar enemy attack.

Saddam Hussein attacked the forces of the coalition that included 

three nuclear weapons states: The United States, United Kingdom and 

France. Moreover, he ordered his force to launch ballistic missile attacks 

against Israel, reputed to be another nuclear weapons state. This probably 

would not have happened if Saddam Hussein had not possessed chemical 

or biological weapons he thought could deter possible nuclear responses. 

Further, it is reasonable to assume Iraq’s possession of chemical 

and biological weapons may have been one of several factors that 

persuaded President Bush and other coalition members not to follow up 
Schneider 

235

their rout of Iraqi forces in Kuwait with a march all the way to Baghdad. 

Clearly, the U.S. military and political leaders were fully aware of the 

potential harm that might have come to U.S. and coalition personnel from 

a massive chemical or biological attack by Iraq. 

Indeed, it is possible massive medical problems were simply 

generated by allied bombing of chemical weapons storage and production 

facilities. Some 183,000 U.S. military personnel were victims of 

symptoms referred to as Gulf War syndrome, more than a quarter of the 

U.S. men and women sent to fight in the war were declared permanently 

disabled, and some speculate these casualties were resulted from coalition 

air attacks on Iraqi CW facilities that caused downwind fallout and 

contamination.68

In summary, it is not possible to prove without doubt that 

deterrence works since it is not feasible to prove war would have occurred 

in the absence of deterrence signals. On the other hand, it is clear when 

deterrence actions fail. War and conflict escalation are clear signals of a 

degree of deterrence failure. Even here, it is not possible to know how 

much further up the escalation ladder the conflict would have climbed if 

deterrent actions been taken and signals had not been sent. 

In the 1990-1991 Gulf War, no one successfully deterred the Iraqi 

invasion of Kuwait or successfully compelled the Iraqi Army to leave 

peacefully. U.S. deterrent signals were too weak at the beginning and too 

late to stop him. U.S. tripwire forces sent to early to Saudi Arabia in the 

late summer and fall of 1990 possibly deterred Saddam Hussein from 

sending his army through Kuwait and into Saudi Arabia, although it is not 

clear whether he was willing to risk such a gamble had U.S. 

reinforcements not been sent to assist the Saudi Kingdom. 

It seems likely Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemical 

and biological weapons in the stern warning communicated to the Iraqi 

leadership by President Bush and the nuclear forces at his command. 

Saddam could not be sure the United States would not use nuclear 

weapons in response to a CB attack, especially if the United States and its 

allies suffered mass casualties from such attacks.

We now know there was no serious consideration of employing 

U.S. or allied nuclear weapons during the conflict. The Bush policy team 

felt that U.S. nuclear superiority should deter Iraqi chemical and biological 
Schneider 

236

weapons use and coalition conventional superiority was so pronounced as 

to make victory very likely. 

Saddam Hussein was willing to let his forces and population bleed 

to whatever degree to inflict the level of losses that might make his 

opponents limit their war aims. Indeed, Saddam might have been correct. 

The potential threat of mass casualties may partly account for President 

Bush’s decision to end the war 100 hours after the ground campaign had 

routed the Iraqi army in Kuwait. Saddam may have considered Bush’s 

actions as an exercise in “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory” since 

he survived and retained power after the ceasefire took place.

The 5,000-death threshold Saddam Hussein predicted would cause 

the coalition leaders to sue for peace talks never was reached, and his 

theory of deterrence was therefore untested. However, it appears the 

coalition forces were prepared to suffer large losses to achieve their war 

aims, but since this threshold was never even approached, it is impossible 

to say when the allies would have considered discussing peace terms due 

to mounting casualties. 

Clearly, the Iraqi dictator took risks far beyond what Soviet leaders

were willing to risk in the Cold War when confronted with overwhelming 

U.S. military power and a dedicated deterrent posture. The risk-taking and 

violent personality of the Iraqi leader, coupled with the mild deterrent 

signals the U.S. sent at the beginning of the Iraq-Kuwait confrontation, led 

Saddam Hussein to gamble on seizing an oil-rich treasure that could bail 

him out of the financial problems caused by the huge costs of the Iran-Iraq 

war. He sought to recoup his losses in Kuwait. 

Thus, every crisis and conflict has different elements and players, 

Deterrence lessons from one case study may or may not apply to another. 

Deterrence is clearly an art and can fail despite the best practices of the state 

attempting it, since it takes two sides stepping to the same tune to have it 

work. Unfortunately, deterrence is a two-sided affair. Ultimately, it will 

work only if the potential aggressor concludes that the outcome will likely 

result in a price they are unwilling to risk. Those attempting to deter them 

can do everything possible to signal why a war would be too costly, but the 

ultimate decision is up to the Saddam Husseins of the world.
Schneider 

237

Appendix A

Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline69

August 1990

2 Iraq invades Kuwait. 

6 U.S. forces gain permission to base operations in Saudi Arabia. 

7 F-15s depart for Persian Gulf. 

7 USS Independence battle group arrives in south of Persian Gulf. 

8 First TFW and 82nd Airborne arrive in Persian Gulf. 

November 1990

8 The United States sends 200,000 additional troops. 

29 United Nations authorizes force against Iraq. 

January 1991

9 Baker delivers Bush warning letter to Saddam via Aziz. 

12 Congress approves offensive use of U.S. troops. 

15 United Nations withdrawal deadline passes. 

17 D day. Coalition launches airborne assault. 

18 Iraq launches Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia. 

25 Air Force begins attacking Iraqi aircraft shelters.

26 Iraqi aircraft begin fleeing to Iran. 

29 Battle of Khafji begins. Airpower destroys Iraqi force.

February 1991

24 Ground War begins. Start of 100 hour battle. 

26 Fleeing Iraqi forces destroyed along “Highway of Death.”

28 Cease-fire becomes effective at 0800 Kuwait time.
Schneider 

238

Appendix B

A Warning Letter to Saddam Hussein

From President George H.W. Bush

Mr. President, 

We stand today at the brink of war between Iraq and the world. 

This is a war that began with your invasion of Kuwait; this is a war that 

can be ended only by the Iraq’s full and unconditional compliance with 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 678. 

I am writing you now, directly, because what is at stake demands 

that no opportunity be lost to avoid what would be a certain calamity for 

the people of Iraq. I am writing, as well, because it is said by some that 

you do not understand just how isolated Iraq is and what Iraq faces as a 

result. I am not in a position to judge whether this impression is correct: 

what I can do, though is try in this letter to reinforce what Secretary of 

State Baker told your Foreign Minister and eliminate any uncertainty or 

ambiguity that might exist in your mind about where we stand and what 

we are prepared to do.

The international community is untied in its call for Iraq to leave 

all of Kuwait without condition and without further delay. This is not 

simply the policy of the United States: it is the position of the world 

community as expressed in no less than twelve Security Council 

resolutions. 

We prefer a peaceful outcome. However, anything less than full 

compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678 and its predecessors 

are unacceptable. There can be no reward for aggression. Nor will there 

be any negotiation. Principle cannot be compromised. However, by its 

full compliance Iraq will gain the opportunity to rejoin the international 

community. More immediately, the Iraqi military establishment will 

escape destruction. But unless you withdraw from Kuwait completely and 

without condition, you will lose more than Kuwait. What is at issue here 

is not the future of Kuwait – it will be free, its government will be restored 

– but rather the future of Iraq. The choice is yours to make. 
Schneider 

239

The United States will not be separated from its coalition partners. 

Twelve Security Council resolutions, 28 countries providing military units 

to enforce them, more than one hundred governments complying with 

sanctions – all highlight the fact that it is not Iraq against the United States 

but Iraq against the world. That most Arab and Muslim countries are 

arrayed against you as well should reinforce what I am saying. Iraq 

cannot and will not be able to hold on to Kuwait or exact a price for 

leaving.

You may be tempted to find solace in the diversity of opinion that 

is American democracy. You should resist any such temptation. 

Diversity ought not to be confused with division. Nor should you 

underestimate, as others have before you, America’s will. 

Iraq is already feeling the effects of the sanctions mandated by the 

United Nations. Should war come, it will be far greater tragedy for you and 

your country. Let me state, too that the United States will not tolerate the 

use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait’s oil 

fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for 

terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American people 

would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will 

pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort.

I write this letter not to threaten, but to inform. I do so with no 

sense of satisfaction, for the people of the United States have no quarrel 

with the people of Iraq. Mr. President, UN Security Council Resolution 

678 establishes the period before January 15 of this year as a “pause of 

good will” so that this crisis may end without further violence. Whether 

this pause is used as intended, or merely becomes a prelude to further 

violence, is in your hands, and yours alone, I hope you weigh your choice 

carefully and choose wisely, for much will depend upon it. 

George Bush70
Schneider 

240

Appendix C

Iraq Launches Missile Strikes71

If Iraq was forced to obey UN resolutions, the Iraqi government 

made it no secret it would respond by attacking Israel. Before the war 

started, Tariq Aziz, Iraqi Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, 

was asked, “If war starts...will you attack Israel?” His response was, “Yes, 

absolutely, yes.”72

The Scud missiles generally caused fairly light damage, although 

their potency was felt on Feb. 25 when 28 U.S. soldiers were killed when 

a Scud destroyed their barracks in Dhahran. The Scuds targeting Israel 

were ineffective due to the fact that increasing the range of the Scud 

resulted in a dramatic reduction in accuracy and payload. Nevertheless, the 

total of 39 missiles that landed on Israel caused extensive property damage 

and two direct deaths, and caused the United States to deploy two Patriot 

missile battalions in Israel, and the Netherlands to send one Patriot 

Squadron, in an attempt to deflect the attacks. Allied air forces were also 

extensively exercised in “Scud hunts” in the Iraqi desert, trying to locate 

the camouflaged trucks before they fired their missiles at Israel or Saudi 

Arabia. 

The Iraqis hoped attacking Israel would draw it into 

the war. It was expected this would then lead to the withdrawal of the U.S. 

Arab allies, who would be reluctant to fight alongside Israel. Israel did not 

join the coalition, and all Arab states stayed in the coalition. 

Three Scud missiles, along with a coalition Patriot that 

malfunctioned, hit Ramat Gan in Israel on Jan. 22, 1991, injuring 96 

people, and indirectly causing the deaths of three elderly people who died 

of heart attacks. Israeli policy for the previous 40 years had always been 

retaliation, but at the urging of the U.S. and other commanders, the Israeli 

government decided discretion was the better part of valor in this instance. 

After initial hits by Scud missiles, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir 

hesitantly refused any retaliating measures against Iraq, due to increasing 

pressure from the United States to remain out of the conflict. The U.S. 

government was concerned any Israeli action would cost it allies and 
Schneider 

241

escalate the conflict, and an air strike by the IAF would have required 

overflying hostile Jordan or Syria, which could have provoked them to 

enter the war on Iraq’s side or to attack Israel.

Notes
Schneider 

242

 

1 Quoted in Admiral Michael G, Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “It’s Time for a New Deterrence 

Model,” Joint Force Quarterly, 4th Quarter (2008), 2. 2 See Barry Wolf, When the Weak Attack the Strong: Failures of Deterrence, (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Report N 

3262-A, 1991). 

3 Original source was Ernest R. Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, (New York: 

Harper and Row, 1970), 910-911. See also, Barry R. Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation (Westport, CT: 

Praeger, 1999), Ch. 4. 4 See Wikipedia, Constitution and Founding Fathers, “What Ever Happened to the Founding Fathers?” This was 

their promise: “For the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of the Divine Providence, 

we mutually pledge to each other, our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor.” 5 For another good discussion, see Richard Ned Lebow, “Conclusions,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and 

Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), Ch. 9.

6 Mutual Assured Destruction went by the acronym MAD. Dr. Warner Schilling later added another acronym for 

those who wanted to develop offensive nuclear options to disarm the other side with a counterforce strike in this 

heavily armed nuclear environment. He called this option Capable of Firing First If Necessary (COFFIN).

7 Of course this still begs the question of how much U.S. and allied nuclear capability was enough to inflict that 

unacceptable level of damage, and what did the adversary think was an unacceptable level of damage? Further, how 

could we know for sure? What metrics could we use to determine this? This information or estimation of what was 

needed, of course, would be used to guide our deterrence strategy, our targeting policy (SIOP), our nuclear force 

composition, and our DOD and DOE acquisition and budget strategies.

8 For example, during the year leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, it appears Nikita Khrushchev, general 

secretary of the Communist Party and leader of the Soviet Union, had come to the conclusion that President John F. 

Kennedy was a weak leader who would not act to thwart a Soviet fait accompli that put Soviet missiles into Cuba. 

Khrushchev had seen Kennedy’s administration fail in the Bay of Pigs Crisis, fail to respond to a communist 

invasion of Laos and fail to respond to Soviet pressure on Berlin. Khrushchev had also engaged in bullying Kennedy 

at a Paris summit conference where the young President seemed not to acquit himself very forcefully. The relative 

youth and inexperience of Kennedy compared to Khrushchev may have also played a part in the Kremlin’s risky 

decision to place missiles into Cuba.

9 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

10 Here is an example of the logical problem. If almost all war began in the spring of the year, and the U.S. baseball 

season starts in the spring, does this then mean that the inception of the baseball season triggers war? No, obviously 

not. Just because A precedes B, does not mean it causes B. Both might be caused by another factor C. Clearly 

correlation (e.g., A then B) is not causation. It is very likely that another factor leads to fewer wars starting in the 

winter – the weather (Factor C). Clearly, military campaigns are far easier to launch in moderate weather rather than 

in the dead of winter when roads are clogged with ice and snow and army movements are much more difficult. 

Spring is the opening of campaigning season (and baseball) in parts of the world with severe winters.

11 Charles A. Duelfer, Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, See “Regime Strategic Intent,” Comprehensive 

Revised Report with Addendums on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 2004), 1. 12 See “Interrogator Shares Saddam’s Confessions,” 60 Minutes, CBS Television, (Jan. 27, 2008). Diane Sawyer of 

ABC News interviewed Saddam on June 24, 1990, and discovered he did not know there were no U.S. laws against 

joking about or criticizing the U.S. President. Nor did he fathom the working of checks and balances in the U.S. 

political system, where power is shared between the executive, legislative and judicial systems. Saddam asked, 

“Who, then, am I supposed to deal with?” See Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, A Political Biography (New 

York: The Free Press, 1991), 178-79.

13 Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 2. 14 See Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla, Deterring or Coercing Opponents in Crisis: Lessons from the War with 

Saddam Hussein (Santa Monica, Calif.; RAND, 1991), 7. In 1990, Saddam tried to re-arm Iraq before Iran could 

resume the war they had just fought to a draw. He was spending $5B per year on modernizing his military. As a 

result, Saddam Hussein had run out of credit and faced a mounting financial crisis. He feared this financial crisis 

would then result in a security crisis. To add injury, Kuwait and UAE produced and sold more oil than the limits 

they had agreed upon at the previous OPEC meetings. This reduced the profit margins for Iraqi oil and infuriated 

Saddam, who saw these declining oil prices as frustrating his expansionist dreams and as putting his regime in 
Schneider 

243

 

jeopardy. Much like the Japanese who before Pearl Harbor reacted to the U.S.-imposed oil embargo that threatened 

their aspirations for a Japanese co-prosperity sphere in Asia, Saddam had felt the financial noose closing on his 

dreams when he hit upon the idea of invading oil-rich Kuwait to solve his troubles. Thus, he was adamant about 

keeping the Kuwaiti prize he had just seized, the prize that was going to solve his financial and security dilemma.

15 Ibid.

16 Karsh and Rautsi, Op.cit. 78.

17 Some analysts of previous deterrence failures conclude, “Policy makers who risk or actually start wars pay more 

attention to their own strategic and domestic political interests than they do to the interests and military capabilities 

needed to defend its commitment. Their strategic and political needs appear to constitute the principal motivation for 

a resort to force.” This observation was based on 20 cases of failed deterrence. See Richard Ned Lebow, 

“Conclusions” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1985), 216.

18 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes,” New York Times

(Feb. 2, 2003).

19 James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G.P. 

Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 358-59.

20 James A. Baker,III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G.P. 

Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 276.

21 Ibid., 273. 22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 273-74. 24 Ibid.

25 Herman Kahn wrote about two kinds of escalation of a conflict, vertical and horizontal. Vertical escalation 

involved walking up the rungs of the escalation ladder to higher and higher levels of conflict. In a war between 

nuclear armed states, this might begin with low-level conventional conflict and escalate into higher-level nuclear 

exchanges. Horizontal escalation is where the theater of a conflict is widened, by involving adjacent territories or 

other countries in the conflict, perhaps even extending the conflict to a different theater or region of warfare 

altogether. See Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

26 From a speech given by Hussein at the fourth summit of the Arab Cooperation Council, Amman, Jordan (Feb. 24, 

1990). See FBIS NESAS (Feb. 27, 1990), 1-5. Found by this author in Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla, Deterring 

or Coercing Opponents in Crisis: Lessons from the War with Saddam Hussein (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND R4111-JS, 1991), 56.

27 Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm, Iraq’s Poisonous Weapons and Deterrence (New Haven, Conn.; Yale 

University Press 1999), 52. This estimate by the Iraqi dictator was made in an interview carried on German 

television and was released by INA, FBIS (NES) (Dec. 14, 1990), 22.

28 Ibid.

29 Baker, Op.Cit. 303-304.

30 Ibid., 349. Ambassador April Glaspie “recounted a very telling story about being invited along with other 

diplomats to a dam construction site in Northern Iraq. Saddam had made disparaging remarks about the Vietnamese 

laborers who were building the dam, dismissing them as sub humans. ‘And these are the people who beat the 

Americans,’ he marveled...Iraq’s leader thought that Vietnam had so traumatized the American psyche that we 

would never fight again.” See Baker, Op.Cit., 355.

31 Ibid. Haselkorn’s research lists as his source, an article in the Wall Street Journal (Feb. 17, 1991), written by Rear 

Admiral Mike McConnell, then Director of Intelligence for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, McConnell indicated that 

U.S. forces found such a written order in Kuwait. 32 H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, Autobiography: It Doesn’t take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 

1992), 439. 

33 Ibid. He wrote, “I was worried about the great empty area of southern Iraq where the (coalition) army would 

launch its attack. I kept asking myself, ‘What does Saddam know about that flank that I don’t? Why doesn’t he 

have any forces out there?’ The intelligence people suggested offhandedly, ‘Maybe he plans to pop a nuke out 

there.’ They then nicknamed the sector the ‘chemical killing sack.’ I flinched every time I heard it.”

34 “Gulf War,” http://www.answers/cp,/topic/gulf-war, 39.

35 Ibid.
Schneider 

244

 36 Ibid., The quote is from Barry Rubin, Cauldron of Turmoil; America in the Middle East (New York: Harcourt 

Brace Javanovich, 1992), 144.

37 Colin Powell with Joseph Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), 490-491. He said, 

“The biological worried me, and the impact on the public the first time the first casualty keeled over to germ warfare 

would be terrifying.”

38 U.S. deaths among military personnel in Operation Iraqi Freedom as of April 2009 were just over 4,200 killed 

over a period of six years of fighting.

39 Baker, Op.Cit., 437.

40 For the full text of this letter, see Appendix B of this paper. 41 Ibid., 358-359. 42 Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 25.

43 On the other hand, if a rogue state leader always expects the strong to use all its weapons against him, why not use 

his NBC weapons first when they could inflict maximum damage? 

44 As James Baker concluded in his book, The Politics of Diplomacy, “We do not really know this was the reason 

there appears to have been no confirmed use by Iraq of chemical weapons during the war. My own view is that the 

calculated ambiguity regarding how we might respond has to be part of the reason,” 359. 

45 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 463.

46 Baker, Op Cit., 359.

47 On the other hand, it could be argued that Saddam may have believed earlier U.S. pledges not to use nuclear 

weapons, even in wartime, against those non-nuclear parties in good standing with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty 

(NPT) regime. Iraq was considered in compliance with the NPT by the IAEA at the time of the invasion of Kuwait. 

Only later, after the ceasefire in February 1991, did UN inspectors prove Iraq had cheated massively on the treaty 

regime. In 1978, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made a unilateral and nonbinding U.S. pledge prior to a NPT Review 

Conference in order to persuade more nonnuclear states to back the treaty extension. This was a policy statement of the 

Carter administration, but not a treaty or legally binding commitment. However, by 1990, the United States had 

adopted a legal interpretation and doctrine called “belligerent reprisal” that got the U.S. out of that legal box. It 

announced the U.S. government interpreted its NPT pledge not to use nuclear arms against non-nuclear parties to the 

treaty as null and void if these states were to initiate the use of either chemical or biological weapons. It is more likely 

Saddam did not believe the earlier U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons if war began simply because he would not 

keep such a pledge himself if he were in the place of the U.S. President.

48 Duelfer, Op.Cit, 1.

49 Again, review President Bush’s letter of warning to Saddam Hussein, Appendix B.

50 Haselkorn, Op.Cit., 57. The original citation is CNN, cited in AFMIC Weekly Wire 02-91 (u),” File 

970613_mno2_91_0_txt_0001.txt (Washington, D.C.: DIA {?}, 1991). This plan of strategic reciprocity was 

confirmed in 1995 by Tariq Aziz who said that the Iraqi military had been authorized to use their biological weapons in 

the event that Baghdad was attacked with nuclear weapons. See Haselkorn, 53.

51 Ibid., 93.

52 Ibid., 31.

53 How seriously the U.S. leadership took the Iraqi CBW threat is testified by the fact that during the run-up to the 

war, until its conclusion, President George H.W. Bush was accompanied by a military officer who carried a gas 

mask for emergency use.

54 However, the Syrian Chief of Staff later stated in a Q&A session, when an Air War College group later visited 

Damascus, Syria would have stayed in the coalition despite Israeli participation in order to remove Saddam

Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. 55 McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, has written, “There 

has been literally no chance at all that any sane political authority, in either the United States or the Soviet Union, 

would consciously choose to start a nuclear war. This proposition is true for the past, the present and the foreseeable 

future... In the real world of real political leaders...a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city 

of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a 

disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.” Bundy’s analysis would suggest 

the United States and any other state should be content with a minimum deterrence posture. On the other hand, 

some U.S. strategists like former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, once enunciated a doctrine of essential 
Schneider 

245

 

equivalence saying the United States would be safest if it matched the numbers of strategic weapons on the Soviet 

side no matter their number or overkill capability. This was at a time when both sides had tens of thousands of 

nuclear weapons. Still others have attempted to strike a balance between the retaliatory power needed and the level 

of damage that could be inflicted on the adversary, Two RAND analysts calculated the optimal U.S. retaliatory 

capability for destruction against Soviet population and industry at a given time. They sought to find a posture that 

gave “the most bang for the defense buck,” yet suggested ways to put rational limits of the size of the nuclear forces 

required.” For example, see Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense 

Program, 1961-1969, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). A reading of their analysis would lead one to conclude 

the optimal size of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory force was 400 equivalent megatons of explosive power. This, would, 

for example, give in 1971, the U.S. capability to kill 39 percent of the Soviet population and 77 percent of Soviet 

industry. Their calculations also indicated this would put U.S. destructive power on the “flat of the curve.” Even a 

doubling of the U.S. equivalent mega tonnage to 800 EMT would “only” kill 5 percent more of its population and 

only 1 percent more of its industry. Thus, some might conclude the “optimal” solution would be to deploy enough 

nuclear weapons in such a fashion, in all likely scenarios, 400 EMT worth of U.S. nuclear weapons would make it 

through Soviet attacks and defenses to hit their targets in the USSR were the Kremlin leaders ever to launch a 

nuclear attack. See Enthoven and Smith, 207.

56 Note Saddam Hussein plotted an assassination attempt against George H.W. Bush on April 13, 1993, when the 

retired U.S. President visited Kuwait. This revenge strike failed, but revealed much about Iraqi dictator’s 

predilections. He was willing to risk the wrath of the United States just to kill the U.S. leader that had so soundly 

defeated and humiliated him in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. If he was willing to risk a renewed war and his grip 

on power to exact revenge it is not hard to imagine how much more willing he would have been to use all means at 

hard to deal a last chemical or biological death blow if he thought his regime was about to be destroyed.

57 Schwarzkopf, Op.cit., 439.

58 See Charles A. Duelfer, Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Comprehensive Revised Report with 

Addendums on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 2004).

59 Decisions may be influenced by key decision-makers, but these, in turn, may be influenced by allies, legal 

restrictions, political commitment and consideration and, bureaucratic politics, and standard operating procedures, 

psychological factors and group dynamics. Decision-makers seldom begin decisions on issues with a blank slate. 

See Allison Graham with Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York, 

Pearson Longman Publishers, 1999), 2nd Edition.

60 Indeed, Saddam’s earliest contribution to the Ba’ath Party was to attempt an assassination of Iraqi President 

General Qassem in 1958, a bungled attempt that brought him fame in the Ba’ath Party and exile in Syria and Egypt 

for three years. His later climb to the presidency of Iraq is akin to Lee Harvey Oswald becoming president of the 

United States 19 years after assassinating John F. Kennedy. 61 Some estimate the total dead from the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War to have been in the neighborhood of 500,000 

Iranians and Iraqis slain.

62 Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 2.

63 Author’s interview with an unnamed Iraqi general under contract with the CIA after leaving Iraq.

64 Tom Clancy with General Chuck Horner (Ret.), Every Man a Tiger (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1999), 374-375.

65 See “Gulf War,” http://www.answers.com/topic/gulf-war, p. 6. Unfortunately, 183,000 U.S. veterans of the Gulf 

War, more than a quarter of all who participated in the war, have been declared permanently disabled by the U.S. 

Department of Veteran’s Affairs as a result of “Gulf War Syndrome.” “About 30 percent of the 700,000 men and 

women who served in U.S. forces during the Gulf War still suffered an array of serious symptoms whose causes are 

not fully understood,” 40.

66 Jervis, Lebow and Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 

216.

67 Ibid.

68 “Gulf War,” http://www.answers.com/topic/gulf-war.

69 This chart is an adaptation of one found in Tom Clancy with General Chuck Horner, Every Man A Tiger (New 

York: G.P.Putnam’s Sons, 1999), xii.

70 See George Bush, Public Papers of George Bush: Book 1 (Jan. 1 to June 30, 1991), “Statement by Press Secretary 

Fitzwater on President Bush’s letter to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq” (Jan. 12, 1991). See also, Michael R. 
Schneider 

246

 

Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1995), Chapter 

9, “The Mailed Fist,” footnote 17.

71 “Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm,” Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.com.

72 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, 1990-

1991 (Princeton, 1993), 332.
CHAPTER 8

Influencing Terrorist Acquisition and 

Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

Exploring a Possible Strategy*

Dr. Lewis A. Dunn

The potential acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) by a terrorist group is one of the major security threats 

confronting the United States and its NATO allies in the early 21st century. 

At least for now, the most dangerous WMD threat is from the entities that 

comprise the al Qaeda-Jihadist movement, from the core leadership of 

Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to Jihadist groups or cells 

affiliated with or inspired by that core leadership and its vision of global 

jihad. 

This movement alone combines a proven past interest in acquiring 

WMD, arguments allegedly justifying the moral-religious legitimacy and 

justifiability of the use of such weapons, and writings that put forward a 

number of perceived strategic motivations for escalating to WMD 

violence. In turn, assistance by outside aiders and abettors not directly 

affiliated with the al-Qaeda-Jihadist movement could well be critical to its 

successful acquisition and use of WMD. 

Efforts to prevent al-Qaeda and its Jihadist affiliates – or for that 

matter, any other terrorist group – from acquiring WMD are the first line 

of defense against this threat. Since the start of the precedent-setting 

Cooperative Threat Reduction program in the 1990s, many actions have 

been taken by the United States and other countries to enhance security 

and controls on nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons-related materials and 

other WMD-related materials, know-how, components and inputs. 

 

* Originally published in the NATO Defense College book titled NATO and 21st Century 

Deterrence, edited by Karl-Heinz Kamp and David S. Yost, Rome, Italy, May 2009, pp.

126-142. 
Dunn 

248

A robust set of actions continue to be taken to buttress prevention, 

typified by cooperation among more than 60 countries under the U.S.-

Russian Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. By contrast, 

despite periodic talk of the need to think seriously about “deterring 

terrorist use of WMD,” the lack of a strategy to influence terrorists’ 

thinking about whether to seek to acquire or use WMD remains a major 

gap in U.S. and global actions to counter the terrorist WMD threat. 

Against this backdrop, this paper first sets out a framework for 

thinking about influencing terrorists’ WMD acquisition and use calculus. 

It then applies that framework in two different cases: the al-Qaeda core 

leadership and possible state, criminal and individual aiders and abettors 

of WMD terrorism. The discussion concludes by briefly discussing the 

way ahead.

Before proceeding, however, three prefatory points are in order. 

First, an influencing strategy should be viewed as only one element of an 

overall U.S. and global strategy to counter the threat of terrorist escalation 

to the use of WMD – but a potentially important and as yet still underdeveloped element. Second, the strategy set out here assumes an element 

of rational calculation, a weighing of costs and benefits, in any terrorist 

decision to attempt to acquire or eventually use WMD. That element of 

rationality may be more or less, depending on the group and its individual 

members. It also will be influenced by the particular lenses through which 

a group or its leaders view the world. 

Nonetheless, past terrorist behavior, including that of the most 

dangerous threat, al-Qaeda, warrants making this assumption. Third, use 

of the term influencing encompasses the concept of deterrence – whether 

by the threat of punishment or by denying terrorists the benefits sought. 

But the concept of influencing is intended to point toward a broader set of 

actions that might be pursued than simply punishment or denial. Use of 

the term “influencing” instead of “deterrence” also is intended to highlight 

a more uncertain nexus between U.S. and others’ actions and terrorists’ 

WMD calculus.
Dunn 

249

Framework for Influencing Terrorist WMD Acquisition 

and Use Calculus

The most important concepts of the framework set out here can be 

summarized by a series of propositions. These propositions are: 

Disaggregate the terrorist “whom” to be influenced; 

• Disaggregate the aider and abettor “whom” to be influenced;

• Identify the specific leverage points that could be used in an 

attempt to influence each of the different groups and their 

component entities as well as specific aiders and abettors; 

• Think broadly in terms of “who” does the influencing – not simply 

governments; and 

• Be prepared to use both soft and hard power, words and deeds. 

Consider each of these concepts in turn. 

Disaggregate the Terrorists.

There are many different terrorist groups and entities. With 

regard only to the most dangerous threat of the al Qaeda-Jihadist 

movement, that movement comprises: the al-Qaeda core leadership of Bin 

Laden and al-Zawahiri; directly affiliated organizations such as al-Qaeda 

in Mesopotamia and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb; inspired or more looselylinked groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah in southeast Asia; inspired cells 

such as those that have carried out terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom; 

and individuals often linked together and with other al-Qaeda entities via 

the Internet. Potential future recruits to any of these entities also are an 

important category of people to influence. 

More generally, it is useful to distinguish al-Qaeda and its Jihadist 

affiliates from the many non-al-Qaeda terrorist groups. Prominent among 

the latter are such Islamist groups as Hamas and Hezbollah and nonIslamist groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and 

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 
Dunn 

250

At least for now, these non-al-Qaeda terrorist groups do not appear 

interested in escalating to WMD violence, most likely reflecting a 

judgment that WMD use would alienate their supporters, antagonize their 

opponents and make it more difficult to achieve their goals. 

By contrast, the entities that make up the al-Qaeda-Jihadist 

movement have sought to acquire WMD. Prominent Jihadists also have 

argued WMD use and mass killing would be consistent with the Koran 

and the teachings of the Prophet – howsoever falsely.

Disaggregate the Aiders and Abettors

Three major categories of potential aiders and abettors of terrorist 

acquisition or use of WMD stand out: states, criminal and other 

organizations, and individuals. 

State involvement could be witting, involving senior-most 

leadership or lower-level officials or technical experts. Or state 

involvement could be unwitting, occurring despite best-faith efforts by a 

state to prevent terrorist access to WMD-related materials or know-how. 

There also are in-between cases. As for criminal organizations, ties 

already exist between some of those organizations and terrorist groups. 

Illicit trafficking in the former Soviet Union is a good example. In pursuit 

of financial or other organizational gain, there is little reason to distinguish 

between smuggling drugs, cigarettes, other contraband, or the small 

quantities of nuclear materials so far detected and seized. 

Personal gain also would be the most likely motivation for 

individuals to provide assistance to a terrorist group seeking to acquire or 

use WMD. The model would be the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons program, A.Q. Khan, who sold nuclear know-how to Iran, North 

Korea and Syria. But fear and blackmail also cannot be excluded as 

motivating forces. In turn, some individuals could well provide assistance 

unknowingly, whether due to the disregard of established procedures to 

control sensitive information, through unguarded conversations, or in 

other ways. 

Many different types of support could be provided by aiders and 

abettors. Some examples include: financial backing; insider access to 

facilitate diversion or to defeat detection and interdiction actions; direct 
Dunn 

251

supply of needed inputs; provision of technical information; and logistics 

and transportation. The provision of so-called technical know-how and art 

may be the most important type of assistance – that is, the often-unwritten 

knowledge needed to make a particular WMD-related production process 

work effectively or to carry out a given operational step in a WMD attack.

 The critical importance of technical art is best exemplified by the 

unsuccessful 1993 attempt by the Japanese cult group, Aum Shinrikyo, to 

kill hundreds of thousands of people by releasing anthrax in downtown 

Tokyo. The group mistakenly released a non-lethal vaccine strain of 

anthrax, thereby having no impact. More generally, lack of access to 

technical art has been a repeated source of terrorist WMD attack failure.

Identify Potential Leverage Points. 

At least in principle, there is a spectrum of potential leverage 

points that might be used to influence the calculations of different terrorist 

groups as well as their aiders and abettors. Is the use of WMD – and quite 

possibly the killing of innocent civilians – justifiable and legitimate in the 

terms of the religious or moral teachings adhered to by the group and 

equally so by its wider public audience of potential supporters? What is 

the prospect of technical success whether in acquiring WMD or in 

carrying out a successful attack – the feasibility? Are there better ways to 

use the group’s technical, organizational, financial, operational and other 

resources than seeking to acquire and then use WMD? More broadly, 

how smart would be the use of WMD as a means to achieve the goals that 

animate the group and its members? Finally, how much risk would be 

involved in attempting to acquire and use these weapons – or in aiding and 

abetting such acquisition and use? Depending on the particular group or 

on the specific aiders and abettors, the answers to these questions will 

vary.

Think Broadly Regarding “Who” Does the Influencing. 

 

Many different players will need to be involved in implementing 

an influencing strategy. At one level, the United States should seek the 

support of like-minded governments among traditional U.S. friends and 
Dunn 

252

allies. In addition, support could be sought from moderate governments 

throughout the Muslim world. Despite differences with the United States 

on certain issues, these Muslim governments share an interest in 

preventing the ascendance of the al-Qaeda-Jihadist movement. 

Moreover, neither traditional U.S. friends and allies nor other 

governments should assume that the victim of a terrorist WMD attack 

would necessarily be the United States. They, too, could be struck – 

whether due to an accident, loss of control, or deliberate intention. 

Somewhat differently, international, non-governmental and 

community organizations also can contribute, from a traditional entity 

such as the United Nations to professional, scientific, industry and 

academic organizations. Other players would be Islamic as well as nonIslamic religious councils and associations, non-violent wings of domestic 

political-separatist movements across different countries, and prominent 

groupings of individuals with religious, social action, or other affiliations. 

Certain types of individuals alone, e.g., a highly-respected clerical 

authority, also could be sources of influence. Moderate Muslims in 

NATO nations and elsewhere also may be able to exert some impact on 

the thinking of the wider Muslim community around the globe that is the 

ultimate audience as well as the source of recruits for the Jihadist 

movement inspired by al Qaeda.

Use Soft and Hard Power, Words and Deeds 

Influencing terrorists’ WMD acquisition and use calculus – and of 

aiders and abettors – will partly entail use of soft power. In particular, 

efforts are essential to foster a wider public debate to influence 

perceptions of the legitimacy and justifiability of WMD use. In that 

regard, the lack of widespread outrage across the Islamic world at al

Qaeda’s use of chlorine-explosive bombs in Iraq during 2006-2007 may 

have been a lost opportunity. Perhaps more controversially, the 

declaratory policies of the nuclear weapons states can shape more diffuse 

perceptions of the legitimacy of nuclear use. 

By way of example, consider a joint affirmation by the P-5 nuclear 

powers – the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and 

China – that given any use of a nuclear weapon would be a calamity, they 
Dunn 

253

will act individually and together to ensure that nuclear weapons are never 

used again. 

Closely related, decisive engagement by the P-5 in pursuing the 

goal of nuclear abolition also could de-legitimize nuclear use, though it 

would require them to make the case for their continued possession of 

nuclear weapons as a regrettable but necessary interim status pending the 

conditions for ultimate abolition. Declaratory policy is a means as well to 

influence perceptions of the risks of becoming involved in WMD 

terrorism.

For its part, the threatened use of hard power may be particularly 

important to influence perceptions of risk – whether on the part of certain 

terrorist entities or their aiders and abettors. Hard power encompasses but 

goes beyond military operations. It also includes economic and financial 

sanctions, covert operations and law enforcement actions. 

Influencing in Action: Applying the Framework

Turning to specific cases, this section illustrates how the 

“influencing framework” could be implemented. The discussion focuses 

first on influencing the al-Qaeda core leadership and then on possible 

state, criminal, and individual aiders and abettors. 

The al-Qaeda Core Leadership

Efforts to influence the WMD calculus of the al-Qaeda core 

leadership – Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and their close

associates in al-Qaeda center presumed to be located on the PakistanAfghanistan border – are the toughest case. As already noted, their 

writings and statements as well as those of individuals closely linked to 

them make clear in their view, even indiscriminate killing using nuclear or 

biological weapons is seen as fully legitimate and justifiable. Howsoever 

falsely, their writings contend WMD use is fully consistent with the Koran 

and the teachings of the Prophet. 

Thus, once in possession of WMD, the core leadership would have 

no moral or religious compunctions concerning use. For them, there is no 

controversy about the legitimacy or morality of using WMD against all 
Dunn 

254

enemies even if it results in loss of life among Muslims.1

Actions to influence the leaders’ perceptions of the risk of 

escalating to WMD violence would have somewhat greater but still 

limited applicability. For the past decade, the United States has sought 

unsuccessfully either to capture or kill both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. 

Particularly during the period when they were “on the run,” they would 

likely have discounted any additional threats of capture or death. Now 

that the al-Qaeda core leadership appears to be recreating a base of 

operations on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border – and now that the Taliban

is gaining strength in Afghanistan – the two leaders could be more 

concerned about the risks of WMD use. 

This leverage 

point simply does not apply. 

For such use could well provide a powerful argument for the 

United States to use with its NATO allies that these countries should step 

up greatly their on-the-ground military commitment to defeating the 

Taliban. After WMD use, Pakistan also could well come under irresistible 

U.S. and international pressure to take effective measures against al

Qaeda-Taliban safe-havens – or to turn a blind eye to stepped-up U.S. 

special operations in those regions. 

By contrast, a much more promising leverage point would be the 

core leadership’s perception of whether acquisition and escalation to 

WMD use would be smart. In part, smartness is tied to the leadership’s 

assessment of whether WMD acquisition and use would be a feasible and 

effective use of the organization’s resources as well as whether WMD use 

would shatter American resolve and lead to the elimination of U.S. 

influence from the Muslim world. Smartness also entails the leadership’s 

calculation of whether escalation to WMD violence would alienate alQaeda’s wider Islamic audience and make it all the more difficult to 

achieve its goals of an Islamic renewal and a new Islamic Caliphate. In 

different ways, each of these dimensions of “smartness” is subject to 

potential influence. 

Influencing Actions

With regard to perceptions of feasibility and use of resources, 

many denial actions already are taken to make it much harder for any 
Dunn 

255

terrorist group to acquire or use WMD successfully. The Cooperative 

Threat Reduction program and its wider counterpart the G-8 Global 

Initiative, the newer Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and 

implementation of United Nations Resolution 1540 (which obligates all 

states to put in place controls against WMD access by non-state actors) are 

but a few highly-visible examples. 

There are, of course, gaps in these prevention efforts which still 

need to be addressed. Even so, U.S. and global pursuit of these types of 

prevention, interdiction and consequence management actions all would 

create uncertainties in the al-Qaeda leadership about the feasibility and 

impact of WMD acquisition and use. As such, they all send the message 

to the core leadership that it would be smarter to invest its scarce resources 

in the more proven “bombs and bullets” modes of attacks that have long 

been at the core of its operational code.

Still other actions would be intended to influence the core 

leadership’s perception of whether escalation to WMD use would shatter 

U.S. political will and resolve. Continued actions to build habits of global 

cooperation against WMD terrorism would be one way to signal the core 

leadership that WMD use would not defeat the United States and its allies. 

Indeed, visible global cooperation would suggest that escalation to WMD 

violence could well rally other countries to the American side, much as 

occurred after the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 

Pentagon. 

Enhanced consequence management capabilities also would be 

important. Plans, procedures and capabilities to manage successfully the 

physical, psychological, social and economic consequences of a WMD 

attack – and more generally to foster public resiliency – are desirable in 

their own right. But they, too, could contribute to influencing the core 

leadership’s WMD calculus. 

Again, for influencing purposes, these actions need to be made 

highly visible. Not least, the outcome of the Iraq War is likely to be a key 

factor in shaping perceptions of U.S. resolve for better or for worse. If alQaeda in Mesopotamia is defeated and a measure of stability restored, it 

will be a major al-Qaeda defeat and a demonstration of American resolve.

Finally, actions also should be taken to heighten concerns that 

WMD use would provoke a backlash among the wider Muslim audience
Dunn 

256

that the al-Qaeda core leadership seeks to rally to its cause. One way to do 

so would be to encourage more moderate Muslims at all levels to condemn 

WMD use. Across the global Muslim community, as reflected in recent 

public opinion data, there is widespread rejection of Jihadist attacks on 

innocent civilians, including American civilians.2

Though it would be difficult and probably counter-productive for 

U.S. officials to do so directly, the United States should work with 

friendly Muslim governments to encourage Islamic religious associations 

and prominent clerics to speak out against al Qaeda’s escalation to WMD 

violence. In turn, a wider theological debate on the issues of the 

justifiability and legitimacy of WMD use should be encouraged, again 

with the aim of creating uncertainty in the minds of the core leadership 

about their audience’s response to mass killing using WMD. 

 

This last set of actions to influence the core leadership’s 

perceptions of smartness is perhaps the most controversial. Some U.S. 

experts argue bin Laden and al-Zawahiri ultimately arrogate to themselves 

the right to act on behalf of the right-thinking Muslim community. Thus, 

they would not be influenced by any such concerns about Islamic public 

attitudes. Instead, they would assume if WMD use had the desired 

decisive impact, their Muslim audience would rally behind al Qaeda’s 

decision.3

Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe the core leadership 

is concerned about how its wider Muslim audience would respond to mass 

killing and use of WMD. Its investment of considerable energies in 

arguing for the legitimacy of WMD use is but one indication that there has 

been push-back on this question. Indeed, the most authoritative Jihadist 

religious discourse on this subject, the May 2003 fatwa by a Saudi cleric 

linked to bin Laden, Nasir bin Hamd al-Fahd, acknowledges such 

questions about killing innocent civilians. Al-Fahd refers explicitly to 

“specious arguments” against the use of WMD before seeking to counter 

each of those arguments.4

In addition, in his Oct. 11, 2005 letter to Musab al-Zarqawi, 

Ayman al-Zawahiri expressed concern about the excessive violence of alQaeda in Iraq and went on to emphasize: “If we are in agreement that the 

victory of Islam and the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the 

Prophet will not be achieved except through jihad against the apostate 

 
Dunn 

257

rulers and their removal, then this goal will not be accomplished by the 

mujahed movement while it is cut off from public support. . . .” 

Al-Zawahiri continued“[t]herefore, the mujahed movement must 

avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve, if there is 

no contravention of Sharia in such avoidance, as long as there are other 

options to resort to.”5 Somewhat similarly, Osama bin Laden in his Oct. 

23, 2007 audiotape against the “fanaticism” of the “mujahidin in Iraq,” 

stressed “[t]he strength of the faith is the strength of the bond between 

Muslims and not that of a tribe or nationalism,” and urged “the interest of 

the Umma should be given priority.”6

This message again highlights the extent to which the al-Qaeda 

core leadership is sensitive to the impact of its actions on the wider 

Muslim community. For all of these reasons, therefore, seeking to 

reinforce concerns that WMD use would backfire should be part of an 

influencing strategy aimed at that leadership.

 

Other al-Qaeda and Non-Al Qaeda Terrorist Entities

Space precludes a comparable discussion of influencing either the 

other entities that make up the al-Qaeda-Jihadist movement or the many 

non-Al-Qaeda terrorist groups (whether Islamist or not).7

In addition, particularly for those non-al-Qaeda groups and entities 

that in the future could come to think about WMD acquisition and use, 

e.g., Hamas or Hezbollah among Islamist groups or the Tamil Tigers 

among non-Islamist groups, actions to influence their own perceptions not 

simply of the “smartness” but also of the justifiability and legitimacy of 

WMD use should not be dismissed out of hand. At least for now, unlike 

al-Qaeda, these non-al-Qaeda groups have not developed a line of 

 Suffice it only 

to state here that across these other different terrorist groups and their 

component entities, perceptions of the more instrumental aspects or 

“smartness” of WMD acquisition and use again appear to be the most 

promising leverage point. In turn, most of the specific influencing actions 

identified above – from denial measures to creating uncertainties about the 

possible blowback from their supporters – also offer means to influence 

these other groups’ calculus. 
Dunn 

258

argument to square WMD use and mass killing with their core religious, 

moral and political beliefs.

Aiders and Abettors

Turning to aiders and abettors, consider first possible state 

supporters. Two objectives stand out: on the one hand, the United States 

and like-minded countries should continue to take steps to encourage 

actions by state officials to prevent unauthorized or unwitting support to 

terrorist WMD acquisition and use and on the other, to dissuade official, 

authorized and witting support by a state’s leadership to a terrorist WMD 

attack. As above, what leverage points and associated influencing actions 

stand out? 

State Supporters 

Leaders’ perceptions that direct support for terrorist acquisition of 

WMD (or indirect support by not acting to put in place effective controls 

against diversion) would not serve their personal or national goals are one 

potential leverage point. Equally so, concern about the possible personal 

risks, especially of witting rather than unwitting support, is another 

leverage point. 

A belief that assistance to WMD terrorism is neither justifiable nor 

legitimate state behavior – and conversely, that it is international “good 

behavior” to take actions to prevent unintended or unintentional support 

from within their countries – also could shape the policies of leaders and 

elites in most if not virtually all states.

Given these leverage points, the May 2008 statement by U.S. 

National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated “the United States will 

hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor or individual fully 

accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use 

weapons of mass destruction -- whether by facilitating, financing, or 

providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts”8 is an important initial 
Dunn 

259

step. The United States should now seek other countries’ support for this 

type of “holding accountable” declaratory policy and posture. 

Going a step further, it could be desirable to seek a United Nations 

Security Council Resolution stating the international community’s 

readiness to hold accountable aiders and abettors – or supporters and 

enablers, to use the Hadley formulation – of terrorist acquisition or use of 

WMD. Short of a Security Council resolution, the five permanent 

members of the Security Council –the United States, Russia, the United 

Kingdom, France and China – could make a common holding accountable 

declaration.

How the United States and like-minded countries would implement 

an accountability policy would need to be determined in the specific 

situation. Sufficient flexibility should be retained to adapt the response to 

different degrees of witting or unwitting state leadership involvement, the 

relative certainty with which a particular terrorist WMD attack or 

attempted attack could be tracked back to those leaders, the outcome of 

the attack, and other unique situational dimensions. The credibility and 

wider acceptability of a holding accountable policy, moreover, calls for 

making clear that there is a very wide range of means to use to implement 

it – and not simply or exclusively military means. 

In a situation entailing unwitting state support for an unsuccessful 

terrorist WMD attack, for example, the response might be to demand the 

state’s leadership join with the United States and others to take needed 

security measures to prevent any repetition as well as to punish the 

perpetrators. By contrast, in the case of clearly established, witting 

involvement by a state’s highest leadership, military action proportional to 

the damage inflicted by the terrorist WMD attack could be warranted.9

Continued actions to build up habits, institutions and mechanisms 

of international cooperation against WMD terrorism are another important 

influencing action. The International Convention for the Suppression of 

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and United Nations Security Council

Resolution 1540 – as well as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 

Terrorism – are three such examples. Building these habits of cooperation 

would help to create a presumption in the minds of possible state 

supporters that the international community would act against them. It 
Dunn 

260

also would make it easier for all states to take needed actions to prevent 

unintentional assistance. 

The relative effectiveness of these types of efforts to influence 

state leaders’ calculations clearly would depend on the perceived ability of 

the United States and other countries, possibly in collaboration with 

international organizations, to track a terrorist WMD attack back to the 

source. Unless the aiders and abettors can be identified, it will not be 

possible to hold that state’s leaders accountable. Attribution will depend 

partly on technical forensics. It also would entail cooperation among 

intelligence and law enforcement authorities both in the United States and 

abroad. 

Attribution already is being emphasized as part of U.S. counterterrorism actions and a Working Group on the subject exists under the 

U.S.-Russian Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In support 

of an influencing strategy, it would be desirable to publicize advances in 

the attribution capabilities and cooperation of the United States and other 

nations, to the extent possible without compromising sensitive technical 

information. Additional exercises and table-top games on the subject of 

attribution also would showcase and build habits of cooperation in this 

area.

Criminal Organizations 

For criminal organizations, perceptions of risk stand out as the 

most compelling potential leverage point to convince them that the 

dangers of aiding and abetting a terrorist organization’s acquisition or use 

of WMD far outweigh possible financial or other gains – whether risk to 

the organization as a whole or to specific members. Continued actions to 

build habits of global cooperation against WMD terrorism would be one 

means to signal the risks of helping a terrorist organization to acquire or 

use WMD. 

Strengthening national legal mechanisms as well as procedures for 

international legal collaboration against WMD smuggling would be 

another such means. Here, both the International Convention to Suppress 

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and United Nations Security Council

Resolution 1540 provide a framework for accelerated action. Highly
Dunn 

261

publicized actions could be taken against criminal organizations tied to 

terrorist pursuit of WMC, whether legal prosecutions or more direct 

action. 

More unconventionally, likely informal if unacknowledged backchannels could be used to tell criminal organizations and their membership 

that the authorities would not tolerate aiding and abetting terrorist WMD 

acquisition and use – even if corrupt officials might have been prepared to 

look the other way at other types of smuggling. 

In turn, background briefings to the press as well as other means 

could be used to manipulate fears that personal injury to the smugglers 

themselves might result from engaging in this type of illicit trafficking 

even if they were not caught, e.g., from exposure to radiation in the case of 

nuclear smuggling or lethal disease from biological agents.

Individual Aiders and Abettors10

Particularly for those individuals that might become 

unintentionally involved, a desire not to have innocent blood on their 

hands could be a potential leverage point. Perceptions of feasibility also 

could provide leverage, particularly the prospects for successfully trading 

WMD-related materials, know-how or access for financial or other 

personal gain. Nonetheless, given likely motivations, actions aimed at 

influencing individuals’ perceptions of risk may be the most promising 

leverage point. 

Turning to specific influencing actions, steps to enhance national 

controls and to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1540 in that area would be one means to shape perceptions of the 

likelihood of success. Encouraging different technical communities, 

especially in the biological sciences area, to develop their own codes of 

conduct could help strengthen individual awareness and responsibility. 

Not least, actions are needed to influence individuals’ perceptions of the 

personal risk of indirectly or directly aiding or abetting terrorists’ 

acquisition or use of WMD. 

Here, too, a place to start is explicit declaratory policy statements 

by the United States and other countries they would join together to hold 

individuals accountable for such WMD-related activities. Highly 
Dunn 

262

publicized actions by states to put in place needed legal authorities and 

other mechanisms to allow cooperation to apprehend and/or extradite or 

prosecute WMD aiders and abettors also would signal heightened risks. 

 Going a step further, states could cooperate to make examples of 

publicly known figures involved in helping non-state actors seek or gain 

access to WMD materials or know-how – or in other WMD-related 

smuggling or illicit networks. Well-publicized prosecutions would be one 

means to do so; more direct covert action against such individuals could 

be another. Again the purpose would be to cause other potential aiders 

and abettors to reassess the risks of such action. 

A Concluding Thought

Many different U.S. and international actions to counter the threat 

of WMD terrorism by preventing terrorist access to WMD-related 

materials or weapons are currently being pursued. These prevention 

activities are the first line of defense against WMD terrorism – and should 

be vigorously pursued and where needed, strengthened. 

This paper has set out a complementary strategy for deterring – or 

better put, influencing – terrorists’ acquisition and use of WMD. It has 

also sketched how that strategy could be applied in two key cases: that of 

the al-Qaeda core leadership and that of possible aiders and abettors of any 

terrorist WMD attack. 

More important, though differences in their susceptibility to 

influence clearly exist, for all of today’s terrorist groups and entities, one 

or more potential leverage points can be identified – along with associated 

influencing actions. This includes the toughest case of the al-Qaeda core 

leadership. 

In turn, potential leverage points and actions can also be identified 

for influencing those aiders and abettors that could tip the balance between 

a failed and a successful terrorist WMD attack, including state supporters,

criminal organizations and individuals. Thus, the prospects for 

successfully influencing terrorists’ WMD acquisition and use calculus – as 

well as aiders and abettors – could well be considerably greater than might 

be initially assumed.
Dunn 

263

Application in practice of such an influencing strategy will call for 

a number of enabling actions, from developing more detailed knowledge 

of the thinking and workings of particular terrorist groups to enhanced 

technical-political capabilities for attribution of the source of a terrorist 

WMD attack – including possible involvement of aiders and abettors. The 

task will be a challenging one. However, pursuit of such an influencing 

strategy also can leverage the many other efforts to counter the threat of 

WMD terrorism, not least prevention and denial writ large. 

By way of conclusion, the argument of this paper is quite clear. 

Put most simply, the time has come to pursue a strategy to influence the 

WMD calculus of terrorist groups and their aiders and abettors. An 

influencing strategy can be a valuable adjunct to the overall set of U.S. 

and global actions to counter WMD terrorism. Influencing actions is part 

of the answer to dealing with the threat of a terrorist WMD attack against 

the United States, one of its friends or allies or any other country around 

the globe. 

Notes
Dunn 

264

 

1

 See the discussion in Rebecca Givner-Forbes, “To Discipline the Savage Cowboys – An Analysis of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction in Jihadist Primary Documents,” in Lewis A. Dunn (ed.), “Next Generation Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and Weapons of Mass Effect Terrorism,” op. cit. 2

 See Steven Kull, Principal Investigator, “Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians and alQaeda,” WorldPublicOpinion.ORG, University of Maryland (April 24, 2007), 9-13, passim. 3

 These points were emphasized to the author by an expert in an earlier not-for-attribution discussion of influencing 

terrorists’ WMD acquisition and use calculus. 

4

 See, Nasir bin Hamd al-Fahd, “A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction against 

Infidels” (May 2003).

5

 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi” (Oct. 11, 2005), released by the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, ODNI New Release No. 2-05, 4, 5. 6

 “Osama bin Laden, “A Message to the People of Iraq” (Oct. 22, 2007). Translation of bin Laden’s message, 

Aljazeera.net (Oct. 23, 2007). 7 For elaboration see Dunn, “Influencing Terrorists’ WMD Acquisition and Use Calculus” in “Next Generation 

WMD and WME Terrorism,” Section 3 – Part 2.

8

 Remarks by National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley at the Proliferation Security Initiative Fifth Anniversary 

Senior Level Meeting, Washington, D.C., (May 28, 2008).

9 Even assuming a military response to a WMD attack, there would be many options open to the United States short 

of responding with nuclear weapons. Though obvious given U.S. conventional capabilities, this point needs to be 

made because some persons have already asserted that the U.S. declaratory policy of “holding accountable” is 

tantamount to threatening a nuclear response against enablers and supporters of a terrorist WMD attack on the 

United States. 

10 This category partly overlaps with the two preceding ones to the extent that states and criminal organizations are 

made up of individuals. Nonetheless, it warrants separate treatment because potential individual aiders and abettors 

need not be either senior state officials or members of a criminal organization. 
CHAPTER 9

U.S. Extended Deterrence: How Much 

Strategic Force Is Too Little? 

David J. Trachtenberg 

“The objective of nuclear-weapons policy should not be solely to 

decrease the number of weapons in the world, but to make the world safer 

– which is not necessarily the same thing.”

-- Herman Kahn

At the dawn of the 21st century’s second decade, America finds 

itself on the cusp of what may be called the third atomic age. The first 

atomic age coincided with the period of the Cold War, which saw the 

United States transition from having a nuclear weapons monopoly to a 

superpower seeking to restore parity to the strategic balance in the wake of 

the Soviet Union’s development and deployment of a massive, powerful

and extensive nuclear weapons capability. 

The second atomic age emerged with the disintegration of the 

Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. It was characterized by a 

period of reassessment and restructuring of U.S. nuclear policies and 

forces to adapt them to a security environment that had changed 

dramatically and unexpectedly.

Today, a third atomic age emerges in which the role of nuclear 

weapons in U.S. national security strategy continues to diminish and the 

nuclear forces supporting that strategy shrink to historically low levels. 

However, the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies has 

led others to move in the opposite direction – seeking to acquire the very 

nuclear weapons that many in the West view as increasingly irrelevant to 

contemporary security challenges. The potential ramifications of this 

development have led some analysts to suggest the world is now at a 

nuclear “tipping point.” 

Throughout both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, the 

United States has relied ultimately on its nuclear potential to deter 
Trachtenberg

266

aggression. During the Cold War, the primary mission of U.S. nuclear 

forces was to deter the Soviet Union. In the early days of this period, U.S. 

policy makers calculated deterrence could be effectively maintained with a 

nuclear capability sufficient to inflict a certain level of damage to the 

Soviet Union’s industrial capacity and population, which would be 

deemed unacceptable. This “deterrence by punishment” calculus formed 

the basis of force sizing and planning for the U.S. nuclear arsenal for years 

to come. Yet a central fallacy in this approach was that it relied on 

American perceptions of what the Soviets would find “unacceptable,” 

rather than on definitive knowledge of what the Soviets themselves would 

consider sufficient to deter them. 

The debate over extended deterrence is similarly challenged by a 

need to understand that its effectiveness depends on how both allies and 

adversaries perceive the credibility of American commitments. American 

views of how others should perceive the credibility of U.S. nuclear threats 

are less relevant than how others actually perceive them. Moreover, the 

views of allies and adversaries can vary widely based on historical, 

cultural, and other unique circumstances. 

As the nature of nuclear threats evolved, the U.S. nuclear force 

structure and size also evolved. With the end of the Cold War and the 

demise of the Soviet Union, the missions and purposes of U.S. nuclear 

forces were increasingly called into question. This included not only the 

utility of nuclear forces for deterring direct attack on the United States, but 

the efficacy of extending a nuclear deterrent to third parties as a means of 

preventing aggression by others. 

The Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 

postulated a world of extant and emerging nuclear powers posing 

qualitatively different nuclear threats to the United States and its allies 

than existed during the Cold War. While deterrence of nuclear attack 

remained a central goal of U.S. nuclear forces, the U.S. nuclear arsenal 

was considered to play a broader role in ensuring global security. 

Along with traditional deterrence, the 2001 NPR articulated a role 

for nuclear weapons in “assurance,” “dissuasion,” and “defeat.” (These 

concepts were previously posited in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 

Review.) In other words, the NPR acknowledged that American nuclear 

forces play a major role in providing security guarantees to friends and 
Trachtenberg

267

allies that lack their own nuclear weapons and face challenges from hostile 

neighbors or adversaries (i.e., assurance). The U.S. nuclear potential was 

also seen as having a dissuasive effect on adversaries who might 

contemplate actions contrary to American interests. And, of course, 

should deterrence fail – an increasingly plausible prospect in a world of 

rogue states and terrorist actors – U.S. nuclear forces must have the 

capacity to defeat any aggressor. Without this capacity, the credibility of 

the U.S. nuclear deterrent may be called into question, undermining the 

central deterrence goal of American nuclear forces.

This chapter focuses on the assurance aspect of U.S. nuclear 

forces, i.e., helping to assure friends and allies of the American 

commitment to their security. There are many ways to assure friends and 

allies and not all rely on threatening potential aggressors with nuclear 

destruction. These can include declaratory policy, creating or 

strengthening mutual defense agreements and military alliances, fostering 

broader political relationships, bolstering reliance on missile defenses and 

the forward deployment of conventional forces.1

None of these means is mutually exclusive, and a sound policy of 

assurance will deploy all of them, as appropriate, tailored to specific 

circumstances. Nevertheless, it is the nuclear deterrence aspect of 

assurance that is being questioned more widely as nuclear force levels are 

reduced and which is the focus of this chapter. 

 

Importantly, the requirements for extended deterrence and 

assurance may not be identical. An adversary may be deterred from 

attacking an ally even though that ally does not perceive his security has 

been adequately “assured.” Therefore, in certain cases, the requirements 

for assurance may exceed those of deterrence. Clearly, the answer to the 

question of “how much is enough (or too little)?” depends on the 

perception of both allies and adversaries. 

In light of growing threats to the United States posed by the 

proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

capabilities to potential adversaries, the efficacy of American security 

guarantees also depends on how allies perceive the willingness of the 

United States to defend their security if doing so risks exposing the U.S. 

homeland to direct attack.
Trachtenberg

268

By extending its nuclear deterrent to other countries, the United 

States has historically provided a “nuclear umbrella” to others under 

which the United States sought to ensure their security. The prospect of a 

nuclear response by the United States to a third-party attack on a U.S. ally 

using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction has for decades added 

a degree of uncertainty to the calculations of potential adversaries who 

may have contemplated such aggression. However, in a world of 

proliferating nuclear powers, a renewed American emphasis on arms 

control and further nuclear reductions, and a growing tension between 

American policies that support the elimination of nuclear weapons entirely 

and American adversaries who increasingly seek them, the continued 

viability and credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent deserves closer 

examination.

Some of the questions this chapter addresses include: 

• How has extended deterrence worked in the past and what are the 

factors that influence its viability?

• Is there a link between extended deterrence and nonproliferation? 

• How do allies in Europe and Asia perceive the requirements of 

extended deterrence?

• Is the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal more relevant to extended 

deterrence than its composition?

• Are there alternatives to the extended deterrence provided by U.S. 

nuclear forces that can provide the same degree of assurance to 

friends and allies?

• What impact do nuclear reductions have on the ability of the 

United States to reassure allies of the credibility of American 

security guarantees?

• What are the implications for extended deterrence of current U.S. 

nuclear policies?

• And, as U.S. nuclear forces are reduced, is there some threshold 

level of nuclear capability beneath which the risks of aggression 

exceed the U.S. ability to deter it?
Trachtenberg

269

History of Extended Deterrence

At the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States confronted a 

numerically superior conventional army that had occupied the eastern half 

of Europe after World War II. As Cold War attitudes hardened and Soviet 

expansionist objectives became clearer, the United States sought to deter 

Soviet aggression by extending its nuclear deterrent abroad. The threat of 

an American nuclear response to a conventional invasion of Western 

Europe was integrated into U.S. military doctrine in the post-war era.

At a time when the United States possessed nuclear superiority 

over the Soviet Union, this extended deterrent was perceived as a credible 

threat sufficient to deter a move west by the Red Army. As the Soviets 

approached nuclear parity, and then surpassed the United States in the 

overall levels and capabilities of its nuclear forces, the credibility of U.S. 

threats to “go nuclear” to protect Western Europe against Soviet 

aggression became debatable.

Nevertheless, despite changes in the balance of nuclear forces 

between the two superpowers in the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. nuclear 

arsenal remained sizable enough to give pause to any aggressor. At its 

peak, the U.S. deployed more than 10,000 “strategic” and “non-strategic” 

(i.e., “tactical”) nuclear weapons on more than 2,000 delivery platforms. 

Although the Soviets maintained some significant advantages in nuclear 

firepower, throw weight, and other measures of nuclear capability, the 

sheer size of the American nuclear arsenal was thought by some to have 

an “existential” deterrent effect.2

As arms control became a central element of the bilateral 

superpower relationship, pressures emerged to reduce the size of nuclear 

stockpiles. Along with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and 

Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), which resulted in treaties 

reducing the number of long-range nuclear weapons systems, the 1986 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty resulted for the first time 

in the negotiated elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapon delivery 

systems. This included the Pershing II ballistic and Ground-Launched 

Cruise Missiles deployed in Europe that were a visible part of the U.S. 

extended deterrent commitment.
Trachtenberg

270

Extended deterrence was not limited to protecting European allies. 

For example, as Japan became one of the strongest post-war allies of the 

United States, the emerging nuclear weapons potential first of China, and 

then later North Korea, concerned Japanese officials, who became acutely 

sensitive to the role of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in assuring Japanese 

security.

After the Korean armistice in 1953, South Korea also enjoyed a 

degree of protection accorded by the American extended nuclear deterrent. 

U.S. nuclear weapons were stationed on South Korean territory. The 

painful shadow of Vietnam, however, and the fall of the Saigon 

government in 1975, led to questions about whether the United States 

would rather accept defeat in war than resort to the use of nuclear 

weapons. 

Since then, the United States has deployed veiled nuclear threats in 

limited circumstances to bolster deterrence. For example, then-Secretary 

of State James Baker articulated such a threat to Saddam Hussein in an 

effort to deter the Iraqi dictator from using weapons of mass destruction 

against U.S. and coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War. Even though 

Secretary Baker later admitted the United States had no intention of using 

nuclear weapons, the possibility they might be used was arguably a 

consideration in Saddam’s decision not to launch chemical or biological 

attacks against Israel or coalition forces.

The importance of extended deterrence has been recognized even 

by those who favor the ultimate elimination of the nuclear capabilities on 

which it rests. Speaking in Prague in April 2009, President Obama

reiterated his vision for a nuclear-free world, but noted “as long as these 

weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective 

arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our 

allies....”3 (emphasis added) Today, however, as nuclear weapons come 

to be seen by some decision leaders increasingly as weapons that serve no 

purpose, will never be used in combat, and should be eliminated, the 

credibility of U.S. nuclear threats is likely to be diminished in the eyes of 

both potential adversaries and long-time friends and allies.
Trachtenberg

271

The Relationship Between Extended 

Deterrence and Nonproliferation

For a number of states, their own security rests on the viability and 

credibility of American nuclear assurances. Without the assurance – or 

reassurance – that the U.S. nuclear “umbrella” provides, these states may 

pursue their own acquisition programs for nuclear weapons. As one 

observer has noted, “...for allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 

and some NATO states, the stability both of the U.S. deterrent and 

extended deterrence guarantees are a significant part of these countries’ 

own strategic calculus.”4

 Indeed, there have been numerous studies in 

recent years suggesting “the credibility and reliability of U.S. nuclear 

assurances are necessary to keep countries...from reconsidering their 

decisions to be nonnuclear states.”5

In a 2007 study that linked U.S. extended deterrence with nonproliferation, the State Department’s International Security Advisory 

Board (ISAB) concluded, “Nuclear umbrella security agreements, whether 

unilateral or multilateral, have been, and are expected to continue to be, 

effective deterrents to proliferation.”6

 The ISAB report stated, “There is 

clear evidence in diplomatic channels that U.S. assurances to include the 

nuclear umbrella have been, and continue to be, the single most important 

reason many allies have foresworn nuclear weapons” and further 

suggested that “a lessening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella could very well 

trigger a [nuclear proliferation] cascade in East Asia and the Middle 

East.”7

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has acknowledged the 

importance of U.S. nuclear weapons to extended deterrence and 

nonproliferation. In his 2008 speech to the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace he declared, “As long as others have nuclear weapons, 

we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves to deter potential 

adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on 

our nuclear umbrella for their security, making it unnecessary for them to 

develop their own.”8

In 2009, the bipartisan Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 

United States concluded, “The U.S. nuclear posture must be designed to 

address a very broad set of U.S. objectives, including not just deterrence 
Trachtenberg

272

of enemies in time of crisis and war but also assurance of our allies and 

dissuasion of potential adversaries. Indeed, the assurance function of the 

force is as important as ever.”9

By some estimates nearly 30 countries rely for their ultimate 

security on the extended deterrent U.S. nuclear forces provide. Some of 

these countries are strong U.S. allies that do not feel sufficiently 

threatened by neighbors or adversaries to contemplate developing nuclear 

weapons of their own. Others have been dissuaded from doing so as a 

result of formal defensive alliances with the United States (such as 

NATO). Still others are friends with which the United States does not 

have a formal defense relationship but whose security is nevertheless 

important to the maintenance of stability and defense of American 

interests; therefore, the American nuclear umbrella has been extended to 

them. 

Many of these countries can be found in dangerous or unstable 

regions with potentially hostile neighbors. If the American extended 

nuclear deterrent loses credibility, it is most likely to have significant 

repercussions among those states who may determine their own security is 

best served through the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons 

capability.

Allied Views of Assurance

The role of U.S. nuclear forces in extending deterrence to NATO

allies is codified in NATO’s Strategic Concept, promulgated in 1999. The 

document states: “Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to 

NATO provide an essential political and military link between the 

European and North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance 

will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe.” 

What constitutes “adequate” nuclear forces is a matter to be 

determined by the NATO members themselves. However, the Strategic 

Concept is clear on the inseparability of European and American security, 

noting the “unique contribution” of nuclear weapons to deterrence and 

declaring that they “remain essential to preserve peace.”10

At the Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit in April 2009, Alliance 

members decided to update NATO’s Strategic Concept before the next 
Trachtenberg

273

summit meeting at the end of 2010. This process is expected to revisit the 

issue of extended deterrence and the role of U.S. nuclear forces in 

providing that deterrence to NATO.11

Nevertheless, it is clear a number of U.S. NATO and non-NATO 

allies consider the U.S. extended deterrent to be critical to their security. 

A group of former NATO military officials, including former military 

chiefs of the United States, Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands, 

reaffirmed the importance of the extended deterrent role of U.S. nuclear 

forces and the credibility of nuclear escalatory threats by noting, “The first 

use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the 

ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, in 

order to avoid truly existential dangers.”12

For some, the value of the extended deterrent lies in the 

deployment of American nuclear weapons on their territory and the 

demonstration of resolve these deployments convey. In these cases, 

additional U.S. strategic offensive arms reductions may have less 

significance on allied perceptions of American credibility. For others, the 

value of extended deterrence lies more in the ability and willingness of the 

United States to maintain the effectiveness of its strategic nuclear arsenal. 

Therefore, additional strategic arms reductions may undermine the 

assurance value of American security guarantees.

In the past, some U.S. allies have expressed strong views regarding 

the U.S. extended deterrent. This includes non-NATO allies. For 

example, according to documents recently de-classified by Japanese 

officials, concern over a possible Sino-U.S. conflict in the mid-1960s led 

then-Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku to press U.S. Secretary of 

Defense Robert McNamara for assurances the United States would be 

prepared to use its nuclear weapons against China. 

In the wake of China’s nuclear testing, Secretary McNamara

subsequently expressed concern that without reassuring Japan of the 

American commitment to its security, Tokyo might seek its own nuclear 

weapons. Since then, other Japanese officials have sought to elicit similar 

American nuclear assurances, including comments by Foreign Minister 

Aso Taro after North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006.13

South Korea also reportedly sought nuclear assurances from the 

United States after North Korea’s nuclear test.14 Reportedly, former South 
Trachtenberg

274

Korean defense ministers approached the United States seeking the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea that had previously 

been withdrawn.15

In June 2009, President Obama and South Korean President Lee 

Myung-bak reaffirmed the U.S.-Republic of Korea security relationship 

included the “continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including 

the U.S. nuclear umbrella....”

 

16 During a subsequent visit to Seoul, 

Secretary of Defense Gates declared, “The United States is committed to 

providing extended deterrence using the full range of American military 

might,” to protect South Korea, including “the nuclear umbrella.”17

Obviously, allied views of extended deterrence will be shaped not 

only by what the United States does with respect to its nuclear forces but 

by the evolving global strategic situation. Although the Cold War division 

of Europe ended two decades ago, some allies in Europe grow 

increasingly concerned over what they perceive as a renewed 

aggressiveness in Russia’s foreign and defense policies. The Russian 

military action in the summer of 2008 against Georgia - a country seeking 

NATO membership – suggested that extending U.S. nuclear guarantees to 

countries on Russia’s periphery might be risky business. It also raised 

additional uncertainties on the part of Russia’s other neighbors regarding 

the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. 

On top of this, Russia has revised its military doctrine to place 

increased reliance on its nuclear forces, continued to pursue an aggressive 

nuclear weapons modernization program, resumed Cold War style 

exercises of its strategic nuclear forces, threatened some of its former 

satellite states with nuclear attack, and publicly proposed developing new 

“offensive weapons systems” to counter the United States.18

In the wake of Russian statements and actions, the concerns of 

Russia’s neighbors and their desire to be integrated into the security 

perimeter of the United States are understandable. So, too, is concern that 

Washington’s desire to “reset” its relationship with Moscow in the wake 

of Russia’s increasing assertiveness may actually lead others to question 

the attractiveness of, and confidence in, American security guarantees.

 Ukraine, a former Soviet state, has been wary of Russia and has 

sought the security guarantees that would accrue to it from NATO

membership. Yet the new Ukrainian government has changed course 
Trachtenberg

275

from its predecessor, declaring Kiev’s preference for neutrality and nonalignment, rejecting the previous government’s push for NATO 

membership, and seeking greater accommodation with Russia.19

Nevertheless, as more countries pursue the path to NATO

membership, the United States will likely find itself extending its nuclear 

umbrella to additional states in what was formerly viewed as Russia’s 

“sphere of influence.” Future reductions in European-based U.S. tactical 

nuclear forces, along with NATO’s prior assurances to Russia that new 

NATO members would not host U.S. nuclear weapons on their 

territories20

In Asia, the developing nuclear capabilities of North Korea have 

also sparked concern among America’s regional friends and allies. Japan, 

in particular, has encouraged the United States not to back away from its 

extended nuclear deterrent. After North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, one 

Japanese press report stated that “Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma spoke 

in no uncertain terms about strengthening the deterrence of U.S. nuclear 

weapons. The strongest deterrence would be when the United States 

explicitly says, ‘If you drop one nuclear bomb on Japan, the United States 

will retaliate by dropping 10 on you,’ he said.”

, may complicate the mission of extended deterrence. Indeed, 

when coupled with the movement toward significant reductions in U.S. 

strategic nuclear forces, it may become increasingly difficult to explain 

credibly how nuclear deterrence can be effectively extended to a greater 

number of states at a lower level of forces.

21

Japan is increasingly sensitive over the credibility of U.S. security 

guarantees. Japan’s 2004 Defense Program Outline declared “to protect 

its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will 

continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent,” a posture explicitly 

reflected in the country’s official Defense Program Outline since 1976.22 

A U.S.-Japan Joint Statement issued after a meeting of the bilateral 

Security Consultative Committee in May 2007 reaffirmed “U.S. extended 

deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security” and this 

includes “the full range of U.S. military capabilities – both nuclear and 

non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities.”23

Yukio Satoh, Vice Chairman of the Japan Institute of International 

Affairs and former Japanese diplomat recently expressed his country’s 

views of the importance of the U.S. extended deterrent by noting: 
Trachtenberg

276

...the importance for Japan of the American nuclear 

deterrence has increased since the end of the Cold War, as 

the country has become exposed to a diversity of 

conceivable nuclear threats, such as North Korea’s 

progressing nuclear and missile programs, China’s growing 

military power, and Russia’s strategic reassertiveness. 

These developments are making Japan increasingly 

vulnerable to possible or potential threats by nuclear and 

other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Ensuring 

American commitment to extend deterrence against such 

threats is therefore a matter of primary strategic importance 

for Japan.... 

In recent years, the Japanese have become 

growingly sensitive to the credibility of the American 

commitment. Exposed to a series of dangerous actions by 

Pyongyang, particularly its test-shooting of a missile over 

Japan in 1998, its nuclear testing in 2006, and yet another 

test of a long-range missile, the Japanese have come to 

realize anew the importance of the American extended 

deterrence for their security, and this has made the Japanese 

more sensitive than ever to Washington’s attitude to North 

Korea.

24

Ambassador Satoh, a supporter of the “Global Zero” movement to 

eliminate nuclear weapons, also recognized the potential hazards the move 

toward nuclear disarmament could pose for Japanese security, noting:

“Even the propositions advocated by eminent American strategists to 

pursue ‘a world free of nuclear weapons’ have given rise to some anxiety 

about the possible negative impact on the American extended 

deterrence.... Furthermore, the Japanese concern about the credibility of 

the American extended deterrence could increase if the U.S. government 

were to unilaterally move to redefine the concept of nuclear deterrence, 

particularly to reduce dependence upon nuclear weapons in providing 

deterrence, without proper consultations.”25
Trachtenberg

277

Satoh noted, “There have been no official consultations between 

Washington and Tokyo on how American extended deterrence should 

function, nor even any mechanism put in place for such consultations.” 

He stated “the time has come for us to create some kind of mechanism 

through which we can discuss the common strategy, particularly if the 

United States is going to reduce dependence upon nuclear weapons in 

their strategy.”26

Does Size Matter?

Assurance considerations may be affected not only by the size of 

the American extended nuclear deterrent, but by its composition. Some 

countries may not consider additional numerical reductions in U.S. 

strategic nuclear forces to be especially significant with respect to the 

credibility of American security guarantees unless those reductions impact 

the levels or operational utility of the types of nuclear forces those 

countries consider most useful to deter threats to their security.

For example, the threatened use of land-based ICBMs deployed on 

American soil in defense of allies may be seen as less credible than 

SLBMs on submarines that can deploy to crisis areas, especially since a 

strike using forces based in the United States may increase the risk of 

direct retaliation against the United States. For this reason, allies may 

consider the United States less willing to come to their defense by 

employing U.S. central strategic forces. Bombers, however, may provide 

the highest level of reassurance to allies, since unlike ICBMs they are 

mobile and unlike nuclear ballistic missile-armed submarines (SSBNs) 

they are visible. The bomber leg of the strategic Triad is the most flexible 

for signaling intentions, which can provide reassurance to allies in times of 

crisis.

Nevertheless, the overall level of U.S strategic nuclear forces may 

convey to allies a sense of how the United States views the relevance of 

these forces in the contemporary security environment. Strategic force 

reductions, if pursued for example as part of a bilateral U.S.-Russia effort 

to diminish reliance on nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence purposes, 

may have unintended negative consequences for assurance and extended 

deterrence.
Trachtenberg

278

The Role of Strategic and Non-strategic 

Nuclear Forces in Extended Deterrence

Discussions of “strategic” and “non-strategic” nuclear forces tend 

to obscure the fact that for the countries whose security depends on them, 

all nuclear weapons are strategic. The distinction is somewhat artificial 

and was derived to conform to an arms control process that focused on 

regulating arsenals based on the range of their delivery systems. 

Nevertheless, both longer-range and shorter-range systems have relevance 

for extended deterrence.

Today, the United States maintains a minimum number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Most European-based U.S. 

nuclear forces were removed as a result of the 1986 INF Treaty, which 

eliminated the Pershing II missile and GLCMs, or as a result of the 1991 

Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI), which led to the withdrawal of 

nuclear artillery shells, naval anti-submarine nuclear weapons, and shortrange ballistic missile nuclear warheads.27

In 1971, 11 types of nuclear weapons systems were deployed in 

Europe.

 

28

The deployment of these non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe 

has always been seen as a means of reinforcing America’s extended 

nuclear deterrent by providing a critical link between conventional forces 

in Europe and American strategic nuclear forces. This is recognized in 

NATO’s Strategic Concept, which notes “adequate sub-strategic forces 

based in Europe...provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, 

reinforcing the transatlantic link.”

 Today, the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO

Europe has been reduced by more than 97 percent from 1970’s levels. 

The only remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are air-delivered 

gravity bombs that reportedly can be deployed on dual-capable aircraft in 

Turkey, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 

29

The importance of maintaining U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces in 

Europe was highlighted in a 2008 report by the Secretary of Defense Task 

Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, which noted: 

 They have also provided a visible and

tangible expression of American solidarity with host countries, which 

some believe has strengthened their deterrent value.
Trachtenberg

279

The Allies believe in the U.S. nuclear deterrent as a pillar of the 

Alliance. Some Allies have been troubled to learn that during the 

last decade some senior U.S. military leaders have advocated for 

the unilateral removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. 

These Allies are convinced that the security of the United States is 

‘coupled’ to that of Europe. Moreover, these allies are aware of 

the greater symbolic and political value of allied aircraft 

employing U.S. nuclear weapons.... USEUCOM (U.S. European 

Command) argues that an “over the horizon” strategic capability 

is just as credible. It believes there is no military downside to the 

unilateral withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe. This 

attitude fails to comprehend—and therefore undermines—the 

political value our friends and allies place on these weapons, the 

political costs of withdrawal, and the psychological impact of 

their visible presence as well as the security linkages they 

provide.... DCA (dual-capable aircraft) fighters and nuclear 

weapons are visible, capable, recallable, reusable, and flexible and 

are a military statement of NATO and U.S. political will. These 

NATO forces provide a number of advantages to the Alliance that 

go far beyond USEUCOM’s narrow perception of their military 

utility. Nuclear weapons in Europe provide a continuous 

deterrence element; as long as our allies value their political 

contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and 

maintain the nuclear weapon capability.30

Should these forces be withdrawn completely, the willingness of 

the United States to “go nuclear” on Europe’s behalf could be called into 

question. It could also place increasing stress on the U.S. strategic nuclear 

forces by adding additional mission responsibilities (especially if the 

number of NATO countries protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella

continues to increase as a result of the NATO enlargement process) at a 

time when those forces are also likely to decline further.

It is plausible the requirements of extended deterrence may also 

necessitate the retention of certain types of nuclear forces that might 

otherwise be withdrawn or retired. As the Congressional Commission on 
Trachtenberg

280

the Strategic Posture of the United States noted, “Assurance [of allies] that 

extended deterrence remains credible and effective may require that the 

United States retain numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it might 

not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense.”31

The Commission also reported some European allies believe 

modernization of European-based nuclear forces is “essential to prevent 

nuclear coercion by Moscow” and for “restoring a sense of balance” in the 

face of Russia’s own nuclear modernization efforts.

 

32

In addition, Turkey has reportedly been concerned over the 

potential removal of nuclear gravity bombs that can be carried by dualcapable aircraft based on its territory. As recently as August 2009, 

Turkish officials reportedly expressed concern that Iran’s efforts to 

acquire nuclear weapons would lead Turkey to do the same.

 

33

Some Asian officials have expressed particular concern over the 

potential elimination of the U.S. TLAM-N cruise missile, one of the few 

non-strategic nuclear weapons remaining in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This 

was noted by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 

the United States.

34

One account of the concerns expressed by a “particularly important 

ally” indicated should the United States decide to eliminate TLAM-N, “we 

would like to be consulted in advance with regard to how the loss of this 

capability for extended deterrence will be offset.”

 

35 Additionally, the 

Commission noted the views of one ally, expressed privately, that “the 

credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific 

capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at risk, and to deploy forces in 

a way that is either visible or stealthy, as circumstances may demand.”36

Some analysts have suggested the TLAM-N has little military 

utility and its importance to countries like Japan is overstated. One 

challenged the Strategic Posture Commission’s conclusions in this regard, 

calling the notion TLAM-N is critical to extended deterrence in Asia 

“odd.”37

As one analyst noted, “Why, given these extensive U.S. forces 

earmarked for the Pacific region, anyone in Tokyo, Washington, Beijing 

or Pyongyang would doubt the U.S. capability to project a nuclear 

 In particular, the deployment of other capabilities to the Pacific 

region, including aircraft carriers, submarines and long-range bombers, is 

seen by some as a sufficient deterrent to aggression. 
Trachtenberg

281

umbrella over Japan – or see the TLAM-N as essential – is puzzling.”38

Since the change in Japan’s government in 2009, questions have 

been raised about that country’s views of the importance of the TLAM-N 

for extended deterrence. Japan’s Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada has 

noted, “...the Japanese government is not in a position to judge whether it 

is necessary or desirable for [the U.S.] government to possess particular 

[weapons] systems.... Nevertheless, if TLAM-N is retired, we hope to 

receive ongoing explanations of [the U.S.] government’s extended 

deterrence policy, including any impact this might have on extended 

deterrence for Japan and how this could be supplemented.”

 

Such reasoning, however, reflects a decidedly American perspective based 

on American views of what should be reassuring to allies. But clearly 

reassurance is in the eye of the reassured, and allied views may differ from 

ours, based on unique historical, cultural or other factors. These factors 

should be taken into account if the purpose of the U.S. extended deterrent 

is to reassure allies of the American commitment to their security.

39

Indeed, as a result of its recent review of the U.S. nuclear posture, 

the Obama administration has now decided to retire the TLAM-N arguing 

it “serves a redundant purpose in the U.S. nuclear stockpile” and its 

deterrence and assurance roles “can be adequately substituted” by other 

means including forward-deployed aircraft and U.S. central strategic 

forces.40 At the same time, however, the administration has declared “No 

changes to U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be made without 

continued close consultation with allies and partners.”41

With respect to the continued deployment of non-strategic nuclear 

forces in Europe, the Obama administration’s April 2010 Nuclear Posture 

Review argues such decisions should be made in consultation with NATO

allies and states the United States “is committed to making consensus 

decisions through NATO processes.”42 Moreover, it declares, “Any 

changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough 

review within – and decision by – the Alliance.”43

Despite the expressed U.S. commitment to consult closely with 

countries that benefit from America’s extended deterrent, some observers 

have argued the views of allies should not drive the United States to 

maintain nuclear weapons that have little military utility. They argue 

doing so would essentially hold American nuclear deployments “hostage” 
Trachtenberg

282

to the whims of other countries.44

Although a number of European and Asian allies share similar 

views of the importance of extended deterrence, there are also important 

nuances. For example, it is generally the case that European allies put 

great value in the deployment of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons on 

European soil, whereas a number of Asian allies would prefer to keep U.S. 

nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, “on call.”

 Nevertheless, it is clear American 

strategic interests are best served by considering Allied views – though 

these views may not be determinative – prior to any future decisions 

regarding the appropriate level or composition of U.S. nuclear forces. 

45

Extending Deterrence by Other Means

Extended nuclear deterrence worked well during the Cold War. 

NATO’s deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil, coupled 

with its refusal to preclude the first use of nuclear weapons in response to 

Soviet conventional aggression, arguably helped convince Soviet leaders

of the seriousness of America’s nuclear guarantees to its European allies. 

In the post-Cold War world, however, some have questioned the value of 

extended deterrence, suggesting other capabilities are capable of providing 

the deterrent value that U.S. nuclear forces once provided.

Third Party Nuclear Capabilities

In the European context, both the U.K. and France maintain their 

own independent nuclear forces and could presumably extend their 

nuclear deterrent to the rest of Europe. However, neither country is likely 

to do so for a variety of political and strategic reasons. These include the 

difficulty of persuading their populations they should not only use their 

independent nuclear deterrents to protect their own citizens but other
Trachtenberg

283

European countries as well, especially in a post-Cold War world where 

pressures to reduce reliance on nuclear forces continue to mount. 

UK strategic nuclear deterrent policy continues to be based on a 

2006 White Paper46 and supports a minimum nuclear deterrent, although it 

does recognize British nuclear weapons can play an important role in 

NATO’s collective security. British nuclear forces have been reduced by 

75 percent since the end of the Cold War and the British deterrent now 

consists of “no more than 160 operationally available warheads.”47 

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in a July 2009 report to Parliament, 

noted a “minimum nuclear deterrent remains an essential element of our 

national security,” and declared Britain “will continue to contribute our 

strategic nuclear deterrent to NATO’s collective security” but noted the 

UK “would only consider using nuclear weapons in self-defense 

(including the defense of our NATO allies), and even then only in extreme 

circumstances.”48

In his 2006 speech to the Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at Ile 

Longue, French President Jacques Chirac reiterated the importance of 

France’s nuclear deterrent, calling it “the ultimate guarantor of our 

security” and declared there should be no doubt “about our determination 

and capacity to resort to our nuclear weapons. The credible threat of their 

utilization permanently hangs over those leaders who harbor hostile 

intentions against us.” But he also suggested defending France’s vital 

interests could extend beyond the country’s borders as a result of “the 

growing interdependence of European countries and also by the impact of 

globalization.” 

Chirac noted, “Safeguarding our strategic supplies or the defense 

of allied countries are, among others, interests that must be protected.” He 

also declared France’s nuclear deterrent to be “a core element in the 

security of the European continent.”49

Nevertheless, this statement was offered in the context of a NATO

Strategic Concept that continues to rely on American nuclear capabilities 

for extended deterrence. It was not meant to suggest French nuclear 

forces could substitute for American capabilities. Moreover, some 

European countries have in the past been disinclined to stake their own 

security on France’s nuclear deterrent.50 This may, in part, reflect political 

as well as military concerns.
Trachtenberg

284

As a practical matter, extending deterrence to European allies 

through exclusive reliance on the relatively small independent UK or 

French nuclear deterrents is unlikely to convey the same measure of 

credibility as using U.S. nuclear forces. In addition, neither the British nor 

French nuclear capabilities are seen as sufficient to extend deterrence to 

Asian allies against a growing Chinese nuclear capability.51

Non-nuclear Capabilities

Some believe the contemporary strategic environment no longer 

requires American nuclear threats to be made on behalf of allies, if it ever 

did, and non-nuclear means can be equally effective as a deterrent to 

aggression. As a 2008 RAND Project paper on deterrence argued, “The 

United States, even when resting extended deterrence almost entirely on

nuclear weapons, was always extremely circumspect about even obliquely 

threatening their use; this was no less the case during the 1950s when it 

still retained a near-monopoly on long-range nuclear weapons. In 

addition, at present and for the near term, U.S. conventional capabilities 

greatly reduce the need to rely on nuclear weapons for extended 

deterrence relative to the 1950s.”52

Nuclear weapons deter by threatening severe punishment to a 

potential attacker. The effectiveness of this type of deterrence requires the 

ability to hold at risk those assets an adversary values most. Although in 

certain cases modern conventional weapons can accomplish military 

objectives once thought possible only by the use of nuclear weapons, they 

cannot substitute for nuclear weapons in all cases. 

For example, potential adversaries like North Korea and Iran have 

placed their most valuable strategic assets underground, in highly 

protected areas, beyond the reach of conventional strike capabilities. 

Removing the threat of a nuclear retaliatory strike would grant sanctuary 

to those assets or capabilities that could no longer be held at risk. Rather 

than deter aggression, this might provoke it if an adversary believes his 

most valuable assets could be spared from destruction. 

Moreover, some of the bloodiest conflicts in history, including two 

conventional World Wars, were fought as a consequence of the failure of 
Trachtenberg

285

pre-nuclear deterrence. In the words of one analyst, “The historical record 

of conventional deterrence is not encouraging.”53

One reason to question the ability of conventional forces to 

substitute for nuclear forces in providing extended deterrence is sufficient 

conventional forces may not be forward-deployed in time to regions where 

they can function as an effective deterrent. Moreover, while the United 

States continues to seek a prompt global strike capability that would allow 

swift and accurate strikes anywhere on the globe using non-nuclear 

weapons, those potential capabilities are not sufficiently mature to expect 

they can credibly serve the extended deterrence function that nuclear 

weapons do today. 

In addition to the strictly military aspects of deterrence, there are 

psychological ones at play as well. Nuclear weapons are perceived to be 

the ultimate weapons and the punishment they can exact is without equal. 

The psychological impact of a threat to employ a weapon with such 

significant damage potential may, in and of itself, bolster deterrence in 

ways the threat of conventional retaliation cannot. 

While the effectiveness of deterrence rests on the adversary’s 

perception of the consequences of aggression, and it is impossible to know 

with absolute certainty how an adversary perceives nuclear threats, it is 

nevertheless plausible conventional deterrence alone will carry less impact 

than deterrent threats that include a nuclear component. As General 

Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified 

last year, “The nuclear weapon has a deterrent factor that far exceeds a 

conventional threat.”54

Aside from reliance on non-nuclear weapons capabilities, it is 

possible that extended deterrence can be bolstered through a more robust 

American presence on allied territory. This can take the form of troop 

deployments, military facilities, or other types of visible linkages that bind 

friends and allies more tightly to the United States. 

However, the very visibility of an expanded American presence on 

the territories of sovereign states may also occasion negative political 

repercussions, especially in times of heightened tensions. Hence, the 

value of this means of assurance may be more susceptible to short-term 

fluctuations in internal host-nation politics that impact the credibility of 

American security guarantees.
Trachtenberg

286

Missile Defenses

In addition to the threat of punishment, deterrence can also be 

achieved through the ability to deny a potential attacker the objectives of 

his attack. This “deterrence through denial” strategy can be reflected in 

defensive measures – either as a substitute for or adjunct to – offensive 

retaliatory means.

The 2001 NPR reintroduced defenses into the calculus of 

deterrence by advocating the deployment of ballistic missile defenses. 

The ability to protect and defend against attack should deterrence fail was 

seen as a critical element of a sound nuclear strategy and a policy that 

reinforced deterrence by complementing the offensive threat of 

“punishment” with a defensive strategy of “denial.” 

By adding strategic defenses to the deterrent mix, the 2001 NPR

argued reliance on nuclear weapons could be reduced. This did not mean, 

however, it could be eliminated entirely. 

Ultimately, an adversary decides what best deters him from a 

particular course of action. For some aggressors, the threat of denial may 

be less of a deterrent than the threat of punishment. But it is impossible to 

know with certainty what will work best in all circumstances and under all 

scenarios. 

Therefore, a prudent strategic posture should seek to maximize the 

effectiveness of deterrence by maintaining the capability to both punish 

and deny. Like advanced conventional weapons, missile defenses can be 

an important adjunct to a deterrence policy that includes nuclear weapons, 

but defenses alone cannot be a substitute for them. 

Robustness of the Nuclear Enterprise

Regardless of whether nuclear deterrence relies on offensive 

punitive measures, defensive systems or a combination of both, the 

capabilities to punish or deny must be viewed as credible to be effective. 

In large measure, the credibility of a nuclear deterrent arsenal lies not only 

in a willingness to employ it if necessary but in its perceived reliability, 

i.e., its ability to accomplish its mission if employed. 
Trachtenberg

287

As the American nuclear arsenal continues to age and as the 

United States continues to abide by the unilateral nuclear test moratorium

imposed nearly two decades ago, there has been a rising chorus of concern 

expressed over the continued reliability and efficacy of the U.S. nuclear 

weapons stockpile. 

Some observers have suggested American decisions over nuclear 

weapons modernization and sustainment of the U.S. nuclear weapons 

enterprise have consequences for extended deterrence. While 

acknowledging the importance of the actual nuclear weapons in ensuring 

deterrence, the viability of the nuclear weapons complex is also seen as 

central to ensuring deterrence. 

As two Los Alamos National Laboratory officials put it, “It is not 

only the capabilities of the forces themselves that assure allies and deter 

potential adversaries, it is also the capability to sustain and modernize 

these forces, while also demonstrating that ability to rapidly respond to 

new or emerging threats.”55

A similar point was made in a recent study of extended deterrence 

published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which 

noted, “...perceived challenges to the credibility of U.S. deterrence 

capabilities in the long-term could have shorter-term consequences for 

assurance. Perceptions of the long-term viability of the U.S. stockpile and 

infrastructure and of the prospects for a national consensus on the future of 

the U.S. deterrent are salient factors affecting allies’ confidence in the 

durability of the U.S. commitment. Allies are paying close attention to 

American nuclear policy debates. Arguments from both sides of the 

ideological divide can undermine assurance by skewing allies’ perceptions 

of U.S. intentions and capabilities.”

 This suggests a failure to modernize and to 

adapt the U.S. nuclear infrastructure to contemporary security threats may 

cast doubt on the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent. 

56

There is also some evidence to suggest European allies view the 

continued viability of the overall U.S. nuclear enterprise to be more 

relevant to extended deterrence than either the levels or composition of 

U.S. nuclear forces.

57 Indeed, the significant decline in the U.S. strategic 

nuclear arsenal since the height of the Cold War, the removal of almost all 

non-strategic nuclear forces in Europe, the suspension of underground 

nuclear testing, the loss of nuclear design and engineering competence and 
Trachtenberg

288

talent in the national laboratories, the congressional prohibitions on 

nuclear modernization, the aversion to any “new” nuclear weapons, and 

the general lack of attention to nuclear matters are symptomatic of a trend 

that suggests a diminished overall utility for nuclear weapons. These 

developments may also suggest to allies there is reason for additional 

concern over the efficacy of America’s extended deterrent.

The Impact of the Obama Administration’s Nuclear Policies

The Obama administration has made the global elimination of 

nuclear weapons a key national security goal. In the same Prague speech 

in which he reiterated the importance of extending nuclear deterrence to 

U.S. allies, President Obama also declared the United States – as the only 

nation to have used nuclear weapons in anger – has a “moral 

responsibility” to work for their elimination. One year later, the President 

signed a “New START” treaty with Russia that would reduce the level of 

strategic nuclear offensive forces – both warheads and their associated 

delivery vehicles – to levels below those agreed to in the 2002 Strategic 

Offensive Reductions Treaty (a.k.a. Moscow Treaty). In addition, he 

committed the administration to pursuing significantly lower levels of 

nuclear forces with Russia as part of a follow-on arms control agenda. 

Subsequent to the signing of “New START,” the administration 

released its own Nuclear Posture Review. This new, congressionallymandated NPR articulated the rationale and provided the underpinning for 

decisions that will affect the size and composition of the American nuclear 

arsenal over the next decade.

As expected, the 2010 NPR reaffirmed the importance of extended 

deterrence, noting, “The United States remains committed to providing a 

credible extended deterrence posture and capabilities.”58 And it suggested 

a role for U.S. central strategic forces in the extended deterrence mission. 

In particular, it stated “nuclear-capable bombers are important to extended 

deterrence of potential attacks on U.S. allies and partners. Unlike ICBMs 

and SLBMs, heavy bombers can be visibly forward deployed, thereby 

signaling U.S. resolve and commitment in crisis.”59

The 2010 NPR’s recognition of the role U.S. central strategic 

forces can play in extending deterrence to allies and strategic partners 
Trachtenberg

289

raises the prospect that the demands on U.S. nuclear forces may grow 

beyond the ability to meet them. This includes the possible extension of 

U.S. nuclear guarantees to countries that heretofore have remained outside 

the formal protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In November 2008 it 

was reported the United States might extend an explicit nuclear guarantee 

to Israel in the event Iran acquired nuclear weapons.60

In July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appeared to 

broaden that guarantee by stating the United States might consider 

extending “a defense umbrella” over the Middle East region as a deterrent 

to a nuclear-armed Iran.

 

61

It seems odd at a time when American nuclear forces decline the 

United States may consider extending its nuclear deterrent to other nonNATO states with no formal alliances with the United States. The 

prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran has raised concerns among Iran’s 

immediate and regional neighbors. Countries like Saudi Arabia may feel 

threatened by a nuclear weapon in the hands of the leaders of the Islamic 

Republic. A heightened level of insecurity among countries in this 

volatile region may propel some toward acquisition of their own 

indigenous nuclear weapons capability. Such a prospect would not only 

be a setback to U.S. nonproliferation policy, but could ignite regional 

tensions that threaten American friends and interests.

 Although she did not explicitly refer to an 

extended nuclear deterrent, the implication was clear and was seen as an 

attempt to dissuade countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia and other 

Gulf states from seeking nuclear weapons as a counterbalance to Iran’s 

nuclear weapons potential. 

Seeking an Appropriate Nuclear Threshold

Global strategic developments and U.S. policy may move the 

United States in a potentially risky direction. The proliferation to 

dangerous actors of nuclear weapons and technologies is creating 

conditions where U.S. allies and friends place greater stresses on, and 

increasingly question the credibility of, American security guarantees. For 

example:
Trachtenberg

290

• Additional European states seek security against a resurgent Russia

through NATO membership that conveys the protection of the 

American nuclear umbrella;

• U.S. allies in Asia are wary of China’s nuclear modernization 

programs, as China increasingly invests in developing its regional 

nuclear capabilities;

• North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons continues 

unabated, fueling concerns over how the United States will ensure 

regional security; and

• Iran’s determined pursuit of nuclear weapons may lead Middle 

Eastern countries – some of whom do not even get along with one 

another – to quietly solicit American protection.

In all of these circumstances, the extended deterrent provided by 

U.S. nuclear weapons may assume greater prominence and importance. 

Yet, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has shrunk to its lowest levels since the 

Eisenhower Administration and is slated to be reduced even further 

consistent with an American policy whose stated objective is the complete 

elimination of nuclear weapons. 

It may be difficult to convince those who today see their own 

security guaranteed by the American nuclear umbrella and those who 

believe their future security depends on tying themselves more tightly to 

the safety American nuclear weapons provide that the shift toward other 

measures of assurance (e.g., advanced conventional capabilities, missile 

defenses, etc.) is not merely an attempt to justify policy decisions made in 

the absence of allied consultation and without sufficient understanding of 

the allies’ perceptions of their own vulnerabilities.

As the number of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery platforms 

declines, the burdens on the residual nuclear forces for implementing 

extended deterrence will rise. These burdens are unlikely to diminish 

given the strategic realities noted above. A decline in U.S. strategic 

nuclear forces may also impact the ability of the United States to forward 

deploy such forces to theaters of crisis. 

For example, although it may be seen as useful to forward deploy 

strategic bombers or submarines to the Pacific region as a signal of U.S. 

resolve, pressures to reduce these forces significantly – or even to abandon 
Trachtenberg

291

the traditional Triad and move to a “Dyad” or “Monad” – may mitigate 

against such deployments and diminish the credibility of extended 

deterrence in the eyes of allies, friends, and adversaries.

In Europe, the future disposition of remaining U.S. nuclear forces

will likely be addressed in NATO’s revised Strategic Concept. Though 

NATO publics are generally receptive to the goal of nuclear disarmament, 

NATO governments may be increasingly reluctant to abandon those 

remaining U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil in light of the 

Alliance’s enlargement, growing concerns over Russian policy and 

behavior directed against its neighbors to the West, and the traditionally 

anemic defense investment of individual NATO countries who prefer that 

the United States continue to assume the lion’s share of the burden for 

their ultimate security. Having suffered the consequences of a failed 

conventional deterrence that led to two World Wars on the continent, 

Europeans may not yet be ready to abandon the implements of deterrence 

that have successfully prevented a third World War for more than six 

decades.

Any changes to America’s strategic nuclear posture should not 

occur in the absence of detailed, robust consultations with allies and 

friends. Such consultations will be easier to implement with European 

allies, as mechanisms have long existed to involve NATO governments in 

the nuclear planning process. The modalities for adapting this 

consultative process to Asian allies and friends is more complex, however, 

as they have not been integrated into U.S. nuclear planning activities in the 

same way as NATO countries.

How Little Is Too Little?

Deterrence is an art, not a science. For these reasons, it is not 

possible to declare with certainty a particular level of nuclear weapons is 

sufficient to guarantee the effective functioning of deterrence – or 

extended deterrence – in all cases, at all times, against all possible 

adversaries. Indeed, what may be considered sufficient for deterrence 

today may prove insufficient tomorrow, as the strategic environment is 

highly dynamic.62
Trachtenberg

292

In the past, assurance considerations have factored into decisions 

regarding the overall size of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. This was 

certainly true with respect to the strategic force reductions postulated in 

the 2001 NPR. Consistent with its guidance, U.S. strategic forces have 

been reduced to their lowest levels in many decades. Despite these 

reductions, however, the range of 1,700 – 2,200 operationally deployed 

strategic nuclear weapons subsequently codified in the Moscow Treaty 

was chosen as “an assurance-related requirement for U.S. nuclear forces

that they be judged second to none.”63

To date, there has been no explanation of whether or how the 

reduced nuclear force levels of 1,550 warheads on 700 deployed delivery 

systems agreed to in the April 2010 “New START” accord have 

incorporated the assurance requirements of allies. The reductions required 

by New START, coupled with the Obama administration’s declared intent 

to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons even further on a path toward their 

eventual elimination, may complicate the long-term viability of extended 

deterrence. As one observer noted, “...as numbers go down extended 

deterrence concerns go up....”64

Assuming continued reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear forces, is 

there a threshold level beneath which the risks of aggression exceed the 

U.S.’s ability to deter it? There can be no definitive answer to this 

question, as the answer will vary depending upon the specifics of the 

scenario postulated. However, the ultimate answer to this question 

depends primarily on the perceptions of allies and adversaries, not on 

American calculations and theories.

Likewise, it is difficult to ascertain the appropriate level of 

forward-deployed non-strategic nuclear forces necessary to ensure the 

continued credibility of extended deterrence. For Europe, NATO’s new 

Strategic Concept will need to address this in the context of shifting 

perceptions of threats, Alliance membership changes, and unique national 

circumstances.65

In some cases, allies may feel extending a purely defensive 

umbrella (e.g., through deployment of active missile defenses on their 

territory), hosting the deployment of American troops, or other measures 

may provide sufficient deterrence against aggression from hostile

neighbors or powers. 
Trachtenberg

293

Yet this is an untestable proposition. Deterrence may succeed, but 

it is not possible to know with absolute certainty what accounted for its 

success. On the other hand, if it fails we will know with certainty that the 

measures we relied upon for it to work were insufficient. 

Preserving the credibility of U.S. security guarantees will always 

be challenging. Some of the difficulties were noted by two Lithuanian 

analysts who argued, “...security guarantees from third nations always 

suffer from credibility problem (sic.). History provides many examples 

when extended deterrence fails (e.g. British and French security 

guarantees did not deter Germany from attacking Poland in 1939). 

Extended nuclear deterrence is even more difficult to implement. For the 

United States, the United Kingdom or France to prove to other nations that 

they are ready to risk nuclear holocaust for the sake of the Baltic states is 

extremely difficult.”66

Indeed, on whose behalf the United States should risk “nuclear 

holocaust” is a matter of considerable dispute. Some argue the U.S. 

nuclear umbrella should not be extended to countries that do not share 

fundamental values with the United States. Others believe American 

nuclear security guarantees should only be extended to countries whose 

security is considered absolutely vital to U.S. survival. 

If, how and to whom the United States should extend additional 

nuclear guarantees should be carefully considered. As the nuclear 

umbrella shrinks, and the number of countries seeking protection under it 

grows, the implications for credible extended deterrence loom large. The 

benefits for deterrence must be balanced against the potential risks to the 

United States should it fail. This is not an easy task, and there are no 

simple answers. But decisions on whether to extend U.S. nuclear 

deterrence to other states should be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking 

a range of country-unique and alliance-specific military, political, 

diplomatic, and other variables into account. 

Despite these challenges, it is clear from the statements of some 

allies that reliance on the U.S. extended deterrent is more important than 

ever, especially in light of changes in the strategic environment they 

perceive as directly threatening their security. It is also evident additional 

reductions to U.S. nuclear forces may have negative consequences for the 
Trachtenberg

294

ability to assure allies that the United States is unwavering in its 

commitment to their security.

Conclusions

Extended nuclear deterrence has a long and relatively successful 

history. But most of that history was written during the Cold War under 

strategic circumstances that have been fundamentally altered. The demise 

of the Soviet Union, the rise of other nuclear armed states, the 

proliferation of nuclear threats, the restructuring of alliance relationships, 

and continued downward pressures on nuclear weapons and force levels 

suggest that extended deterrence, to be effective, must operate in new and 

challenging conditions unlike in the past. 

Despite this new strategic environment, extended deterrence 

remains an important element of U.S. security strategy. Its continued 

relevance has been recognized by the Obama administration through the 

statements of senior spokespersons like the Secretary of State and 

Secretary of Defense and including the President himself. It has also been 

reaffirmed in the 2010 NPR. 

Yet, at the same time, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella

may be strained as a result of the desire to rid the world of those weapons 

upon which it is based. Simultaneously, the number of states seeking or 

obtaining the protection offered by the U.S. extended deterrent may 

increase as the size of U.S. nuclear forces providing that extended 

deterrent diminishes.

Determinations of the appropriate size and composition of the U.S. 

nuclear arsenal must necessarily reflect the varied requirements of 

extended deterrence and assurance. Given the emergence of new threats, 

different regional security environments, and continuing challenges to 

reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, it is not possible to 

posit with certainty a static level of nuclear forces that can simultaneously 

accomplish all necessary missions. However, it does appear plausible 

that additional U.S. nuclear force reductions will complicate achieving 

these missions. For this reason, future decisions regarding the size and 

composition of U.S. nuclear forces should be informed by comprehensive 
Trachtenberg

295

consultations with friends and allies whose security depends on the 

viability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

Integrating allies into the formal consultative process on these 

issues may also have the attendant benefit of providing a form of 

reassurance. In the absence of such consultations, U.S. policies intended 

to strengthen deterrence may actually hasten its failure. The consequences 

of such could be unprecedented and catastrophic for all. 

Notes
Trachtenberg

296

 

1 For a more detailed examination of options for providing assurance, see “Nuclear Guarantees, Extended 

Deterrence, and the Assurance of Allies,” Planning the Future U.S. Nuclear Force: Volume II: Foundation Report,

National Institute for Public Policy (October 2009), 55-58. 2 This notion of “existential deterrence” was popularized by McGeorge Bundy in the 1980s and reflected a belief 

that the destructive power of nuclear weapons made them militarily useless and the possession of merely a handful 

of them would be a sufficient deterrent to any potential aggressor. 3 Remarks by President Barak Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic (April 5, 2009).

4 See Josiane Gabel, “The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons after September 11,” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 

28:1 (Winter 2004-2005), 193. 5 Ibid., 193-194. This includes Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear 

Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., (2004). 

6 U.S. Department of State International Security Advisory Board, Report on Discouraging a Cascade of Nuclear 

Weapons States (Oct. 19, 2007), 23. 7 Ibid., 15.

8 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century,” speech before the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Oct. 28, 2008).

9 William J. Perry, James R. Schlesinger, et. al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Washington, DC, U.S. Institute of Peace 

Press (2009), xvii.

10 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting 

of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., (April 23-24,1999), 

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. 11 For an excellent discussion of this process as it relates to extended deterrence, see David Yost, “Assurance and 

U.S. Extended Deterrence in NATO,” International Affairs, volume 85:4 (2009), 755-780. 12 General Dr. Klaus Naumann, General John Shalikashvili, Field Marshal The Lord Inge, Admiral Jacques 

Lanxade, and General Henk van den Breemen, Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing 

Transatlantic Partnership, Noaber Foundation, Lunteren, the Netherlands (2007), 94.

13 Cited by James L. Schoff, in “Does the Nonproliferation Tail Wag the Deterrence Dog?,” PacNet, Pacific Forum 

CSIS, Number 9 (Feb. 5, 2009).

14 Ibid.

15 Recounted in Keith Payne, “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (spring 2009), 

54-55.

16 “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” Office of the Press 

Secretary, The White House (June 16, 2009).

17 Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Yongsan Garrison, Seoul, Republic of Korea (Oct. 21, 2009).

18 For example, see Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s statement in “Russia ‘Must Counter U.S. Defenses’,” 

BBC News (Dec. 29, 2009),

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8433352.stm. 19 See, for example, Valentina Pop, “Ukraine Drops NATO Membership Bid,” http://euobserver.com/13/30212. 20 This assurance is often referred to as the “three no’s” and reflects NATO’s earlier commitment to Russia that it 

has “no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.” See the 

Founding Act on Mutual Reductions, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 

France (May 27, 1997).

21 Yomiuri, “North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: Reinforcing Alliance With U.S. Helps Bolster Nuclear Deterrence,” 

JPP20070323969090 Tokyo The Daily Yomiuri, (Internet version-WWW) in English (March 24, 2007), cited in 

“Nuclear Guarantees, Extended Deterrence, and the Assurance of Allies,” Planning the Future U.S. Nuclear Force: 

Volume II: Foundation Report, op. cit., 48. 22 See comments of Yukio Satoh, “Are the Requirements for Extended Deterrence Changing,” Panel Discussion at 

Carnegie Endowment International Nonproliferation Conference (April 6, 2009).

23 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (May 1, 2007), 

http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20070502-77.html. 24 Satoh comments, op. cit.
Trachtenberg

297

 25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Joseph F. Pilat, “Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament, and Extended Deterrence in the New Security 

Environment,” Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 4 (September 2009).

28 Vaidotas Urbelis and Kestutis Paulauskas, “NATO’s Deterrence Policy – Time for Change?,” Baltic Security and 

Defense Review, Volume 10 (2008), 87.

29 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” op. cit.

30 James R. Schlesinger, et. al., Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons 

Management, Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission (December 2008), 14-15, 59-60.

31 Strategic Posture Commission Final Report, op. cit., 13.

32 Ibid., 20.

33 See, for example, Alexandra Bell’s report, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,” http://www.good.is/post/turkeysnuclear-crossroads/, posted on Aug. 25, 2009. This account is also referenced in Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, 

and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Monterey 

Institute of International Studies, (December 2009), 22. In addition, a February 2008 report to the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee cited a meeting with Turkish politicians who argued that without strong American 

commitments to Turkey’s security, the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons capability would make it 

“compulsory” for Turkey to follow suit. See Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, 

Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, (February 2008), 41.

34 Strategic Posture Commission Final Report, op. cit, 26.

35 See “Nuclear Guarantees, Extended Deterrence, and the Assurance of Allies,” in Planning the Future U.S. 

Nuclear Force, Volume II: Foundation Report, op. cit., 55.

36 Strategic Posture Commission Final Report, op. cit, 20-21.

37 James M. Acton, “Extended Deterrence and Communicating Resolve,” Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 5 

(December 2009).

38 Hans M. Kristensen, “Japan, TLAM-N, and Extended Deterrence,” Federation of Atomic Scientists Strategic 

Security Blog (July 2, 2009),

http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/tlam.php. 39 Reported in Jeffrey Lewis, “Japan Hates TLAM-N,”

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2601/japan-hates-tlam-n. 40 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (April 2010), 28. 41 Ibid., 28. 42 Ibid., 27.

43 Ibid., 32. 44 For example, as Jeffrey Lewis has argued: “Would you do something dumb just because the Japanese asked you 

to? Of course not. That some Japanese officials irrationally focus on irrelevant capabilities to measure our 

commitment to Japan is a symptom of a much bigger problem that needs to be addressed with more than hardware.” 

See “Japan ♥ TLAM-N,” http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2284/japan-tlamn. 45 A discussion of this point can be found in “Nuclear Guarantees, Extended Deterrence, and the Assurance of 

Allies,” Planning the Future U.S. Nuclear Force: Volume II: Foundation Report, op. cit., 64.

46 The Future of the United Kingdom’s Future Deterrent, Cm6994, (December 2006).

47 See The Road to 2010: Addressing the Nuclear Question in the Twenty First Century, U.K. Cabinet Office (July 

2009), 5.

48 Ibid., 38-39.

49 Speech by Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, to The Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at 

Landivisiau / L'Ile Longue (Jan.19, 2006).

50 For example, former Defense Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Manfred Wörner stated in 1985, 

“France’s nuclear capability is insufficient to protect the Federal Republic. We will have to continue to rely on the 

American nuclear umbrella.” Cited in Yost, op. cit., 761.

51 See Mark Schneider, “The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent,” Comparative Strategy, Volume 27 (2008), 345-

360.

52 Austin Long, Deterrence From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research (2008), 63.

53 Pilat, op. cit.
Trachtenberg

298

 54 Testimony of General Kevin Chilton, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services (March 16, 2010).

55 Joseph C. Martz and Jonathan S. Ventura, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: The Role of Science and 

Engineering,” a paper produced by the Principal Associate Directorate for Nuclear Weapons, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory, LA-UR-08-05019 (2008)

56 Clark A. Murdock, et. al., Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: 

Workshop Proceeding and Key Takeaways, Defense and National Security Group, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, Washington, D.C., (November 2009), 2. 57 For a discussion of this point, see David Yost, op. cit, 755-780.

58 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, op. cit., 28.

59 Ibid., 24.

60 Aluf Benn, “Obama’s Atomic Umbrella: U.S. Nuclear Strike if Iran Nukes Israel,” Haaretz (Nov. 12, 2008).

61 For an interesting perspective on this statement and an analysis of U.S. efforts to extend deterrence to Middle East 

states, see James A. Russell, “Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees, and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and 

Policy Conundrums in the Gulf,” Strategic Insights, Volume 8, Issue 5 (December 2009), 

http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Dec/russellDec09.pdf. 62 Unlike previous arms control treaties that established precise numerical ceilings on nuclear force levels, the 2002 

Moscow Treaty allowed both the United States and Russia to maintain a range of between 1,700 and 2,200 

operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. This flexibility was arguably more appropriate and relevant to 

the variable and evolving requirements of deterrence, including extended deterrence.

63 Responses by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and General Richard B. Myers to questions submitted for 

the record by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction: The Moscow 

Treaty, S. Hrg. 107-622, 107th Congress, Second Session, GPO, Washington, D.C., (2002),

 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg622/pdf/CHRG-107shrg622.pdf. 64 Chris Jones, “The Shades of Extended Deterrence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (Jan. 4, 2010), 

http://csis.org/blog/shades-extended-deterrence. 65 As one analyst has noted, “Because NATO has not identified targets for its nuclear forces since the 1990s, it is a 

challenge to specify and analyze the 1999 Strategic Concept’s requirement for ‘adequate nuclear forces in 

Europe’.... The minimum level may derive more from judgments about an appropriate level of risk- and 

responsibility-sharing among allies, and about what is necessary to demonstrate continuing U.S. engagement and 

commitment, than from a quantitative analysis of potential contingencies.” Yost, op. cit., 758.

66 Urbelis and Paulauskas, op. cit., 99.
CHAPTER 10

Deterrence Issues in a World of Very Few 

Or Zero Nuclear Weapons

Barry Blechman

After the astounding power of nuclear weapons was unveiled at 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a proposal to transfer control of atomic energy to 

a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission was backed by both the United States 

and Soviet Union in late 1945. The Truman administration then offered 

the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan in March 1946 that proposed all worldwide 

fissile material would be owned by an international agency to parcel out 

small amounts to states for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This initial 

effort failed, and the nuclear arms race of the Cold War ensued.

However, the dangers of nuclear war kept alive the idea of putting 

the nuclear genie back into the bottle. In 1958 the U.N. Disarmament 

Committee discussed a treaty to control the nuclear arms race and move 

toward total elimination. By 1968 a multilateral treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been negotiated and was 

open for signature, and the NPT came into force on March 5, 1970. 

Currently, 189 states are party to the treaty. Article VI of the NPT pledges 

all nuclear-armed state parties to pursue negotiations toward a world free 

of nuclear weapons. 

In the 40 years since the NPT went into effect, the two nuclear 

superpowers have progressively reduced the size of their arsenals, thereby

making some Article VI progress, but the continuing spread of nuclear 

technologies (witness Pakistan, India, Israel, Iran, North Korea, etc.) and 

repeated terrorist attacks on major world cities have led many current and 

former high-level national security officials to advocate a new dedication 

to achieving the world-wide elimination of nuclear weapons. 

Such a radical departure from current policies would no doubt have 

profound political and military consequences and, thus, raises many 

questions. For example, what would be the consequences of such a 

development for the dynamics of deterrence and the risk of nuclear or 
Blechman

300

conventional war? Opponents of radical reductions in nuclear arsenals 

predict they would provide increased incentives for states to strike first in 

the event of crises, as well as increase the likelihood of conventional wars. 

Those who favor elimination predict the opposite, arguing radical 

reductions in nuclear arsenals would reinforce trends toward more positive 

political relations, and thus reduce the risk of war. 

Deterrence doctrine has a strong theoretical tradition, but only 

limited efforts document the phenomenon empirically. As a consequence, 

analyses of factors influencing deterrence in a hypothetical future will be 

strongly colored by the individual analyst’s understanding of how it 

operated during the Cold War and how it works in the current multi-polar 

international system. 

It is likely agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals to very low 

numbers would not occur in a political vacuum, but could only result from 

the emergence of a consensus in a world of improving political relations 

among the great powers that nuclear deterrence was incapable of 

preventing nuclear catastrophes. Presuming such a political context, 

consider two scenarios, one in which no nation has more than 100 

weapons, and a second scenario in which all nuclear weapons had been 

eliminated. Analysis of both indicates the former might pose a greater risk 

of strategic instability. 

With small arsenals, the key deterrent factors would be the 

survivability of those weapons which remain and the presence or absence 

of effective defenses. In the scenario envisioning the total elimination of 

nuclear weapons, it appears that the likelihood of great power 

conventional wars would not increase, even if a revisionist leadership 

emerged in one of the great powers, so long as the other great powers 

responded forcefully to any early diplomatic or military forays. In a world 

of zero nuclear weapons, the greater risk to deterrence would stem from 

the potential for one nation to break-out of the treaty and reveal a 

clandestine cache or start to rebuild its nuclear arsenal, steps that would 

trigger nuclear rebuilding efforts by other great powers and the political 

instabilities, tensions and risk of war that would accompany a renewed 

arms race.
Blechman

301

Introduction: Deterrence and the Context of 

Nuclear Disarmament

Humanity has lived with the possibility of millions of deaths and 

massive destruction resulting from nuclear war for more than 65 years. 

For many, this prospect is terrifying and unacceptable. They advocate the 

progressive reduction and eventual elimination of these weapons of mass 

destruction. Indeed, on Sept. 24, 2009, the leaders of the 15 members of 

the United Nations Security Council, including the permanent members, 

the first five states to possess nuclear weapons, unanimously approved a 

resolution committing each of their governments to “create the conditions 

for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way 

that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of 

undiminished security for all.”1

Many others, however, while recognizing the risks implicit in their 

continuing existence, believe nuclear weapons have served the world well 

during these 65 years and should be preserved. There have been no wars 

among the great powers since 1945, they point out, asserting that fear of 

unleashing nuclear conflict induced U.S. and Soviet leaders to behave 

cautiously during the crises of the Cold War, and to find ways to resolve 

conflicts without bloodshed. From this perspective, the maintenance of 

nuclear arsenals has deterred major wars, both nuclear and conventional. 

For those holding this view, the possibility of nuclear disarmament raises 

the concern the elimination of nuclear threats could lead to more 

adventurous policies by states with aggressive agendas or historical 

grievances, thereby renewing the risk of major world wars.2

Whether or not nuclear weapons kept the peace over the past 65 

years may not be knowable. While it is certainly true there have not been 

shooting wars among the great powers (omitting brief border skirmishes 

between China and the U.S.S.R.), one cannot prove war would have

occurred had nuclear weapons been absent. One can only say with 

certainty nuclear deterrence did not fail. 

 
Blechman

302

A war between the Soviet Union and the United States and its 

West European allies may have been possible after 1945 and seemed

dangerously close during the 1948, 1955, and 1961 Berlin Crises and 1962 

Cuban Missile Crisis. In all cases, both sides found ways to retreat from 

the precipice. Was this the result of their fear of escalation to nuclear 

war? Perhaps. However, it is not evident Soviet leaders ever had an 

appetite for a new war in Europe after 1945, given they had suffered 

enormous losses in manpower and industry during both world wars and 

had already achieved their long-sought security zone on the Soviet 

Union’s western border through the occupation of Eastern Europe. In 

short, there might not have been a new great power conflict after 1945 

whether or not nuclear weapons had ever been invented. 

In addition, nuclear weapons clearly have not been able to deter all 

wars, even wars involving nuclear-armed states. North Korea and China 

fought the nuclear-armed United States in the 1950s, as did North Vietnam 

in the 1960/70s. Israeli nuclear weapons did not deter Egypt and Syria 

from attacking in 1973 nor prevent Iraq from firing missiles at Israeli 

cities during the 1991 Gulf War. Nor did British nuclear weapons deter 

Argentina from attacking the United Kingdom’s Falkland Islands in 1982. 

Russian nuclear weapons were no help against the Mujahedin in 

Afghanistan in the 1980s, and China’s nuclear weapons did not deter 

Vietnam from attacking China’s ally, Cambodia, in 1979 and then tangling 

successfully with China’s own armies. 

Finally, and perhaps of greatest importance today, nuclear weapons 

have proven irrelevant in preventing deadly terrorist attacks against the 

capital cities of nuclear-armed Russia (1996 and later years), United States 

(2001), United Kingdom (2005), India (2008), and Pakistan (2008 and 

continuing). 

Thus, it appears nuclear deterrence is an uncertain phenomenon, 

both historically and in today’s world, one in which nine countries possess 

a total of more than 20,000 nuclear weapons.3

 The subject of this chapter 

must therefore be approached with humility and can only be discussed in 

general terms. Appropriately, the task is therefore to describe the broad 

factors that will influence the effectiveness of deterrence in a future world 

in which nuclear arsenals had been reduced to very low levels and, 

subsequently, eliminated. As different questions are raised in the two 

stages of this disarmament process, this analysis focuses on: (a) a world in 
Blechman

303

which no nation has more than 100 weapons; and (b) a world in which all 

nuclear weapons have been eliminated. 

Before turning to these scenarios, it is important to keep in mind 

the political context that likely would have emerged prior to, and as a 

consequence of, such deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. Arms limitation 

agreements historically have reflected underlying political relationships, as 

well as judgments about the military utility of certain types or numbers of 

weapons. 

The first U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements -- the 1972 ABM 

Treaty banning strategic missile defenses and the Interim Agreement on 

Strategic Offensive Arms Limitations -- were negotiated following the 

achievement of an understanding between President Richard Nixon and 

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev of the desirability of reducing tensions 

between the two superpowers (détente), as well as the two sides’ military 

leaders understanding that existing missile defense technologies could be 

easily overcome by increases to the other side’s offensive capabilities. 

In such circumstances, it made sense to agree to place extremely 

tight mutual limits on missile defenses and also to limit offensive 

weapons, thereby saving both nations expenditures on weapons that would 

have served no purpose and reinforcing their political détente.4

Similarly, the 1972 multinational agreement banning biological 

weapons and the 1993 multinational agreement banning lethal chemical 

weapons were reflections of judgments that these types of weapons were 

ineffective militarily.

 

5

The successful 2010 completion of U.S.-Russian negotiations for a 

follow-on strategic arms treaty (New START), allows each to have 1,550 

operational strategic nuclear warheads and additional thousands of shorter 

range and reserve warheads.6 France, China and the UK are estimated to 

have 300, 240 and 225 total warheads, respectively; no other country is 

believed to have more than 200 nuclear warheads.7

For the United States and Russia to have agreed to reduce their 

arsenals to the low levels assumed in this chapter, a significant 

improvement in relations must have occurred. Most importantly, the two 

great nuclear powers would have had to have reached an understanding 

concerning the security architecture governing Europe. 

 

Simply put, the two nations would never agree to eliminate 

virtually all nuclear weapons if either Russia still feared NATO expansion 
Blechman

304

or if the United States and its allies were still concerned Russia sought to 

reassert influence over former Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact countries, or 

both. Similarly, a U.S.-Russian agreement to reduce their arsenals to 

levels close to those maintained by China would require a significant 

improvement in Sino-Russian and Sino-U.S. relations, such that residual 

suspicions China might harbor long-term, aggressive aims had become 

irrelevant. Similar observations could be made about other nuclear weapon 

states.

Of course, international relationships could always deteriorate 

following the achievement of nuclear disarmament, hence our need to 

examine questions of deterrence under such circumstances. But, entering 

the discussion, one should presume that at least for a time, the nuclear 

powers had been able to reach mutual accommodations and achieve a 

level of political comity not yet apparent on the world stage. 

For the purposes of this discussion, it should also be assumed the 

move toward small nuclear arsenals had been accomplished in the context 

of the establishment of a disarmament regime which provided effective 

governance, verification and enforcement of the agreed-upon steps. If 

countries were uncertain about whether or not other signatories cheated on 

the disarmament treaty, it would introduce an additional set of deterrence 

issues arising from this uncertainty. 

To simplify the discussion, it is assumed for the purposes of this 

analysis, the regime provides comprehensive and intrusive governance, 

verification and enforcement provisions, and the disarmament process had 

proceeded over a sufficiently long period of time (decades), that the 

signatories had gained confidence that each of them, and all other states, 

were abiding by the stated rules.8

Deterrence of Great Power Conflicts at Low 

Levels of Nuclear Weapons

The primary deterrence issue to be addressed in a scenario 

envisioning the deep reduction of all states’ nuclear arsenals is whether the 

small size of a country’s offensive arsenal might tempt an adversary to 

strike first in the event of imminent war, believing it could either 

completely disarm the adversary or it could destroy enough of the 
Blechman

305

adversary’s offensive nuclear weapons as to minimize the damage from a 

retaliatory strike. 

If one or more of the nuclear weapon states possessed such a 

disarming capability vis-à-vis a potential adversary, and if political 

relations deteriorated such that two or more nations slid into crisis, the 

deterrence of war could be weakened. A world of small nuclear arsenals, 

in this case, might be more dangerous than the world we live in today. 

The ability of states to avoid this problem would depend on several 

factors including: (1) the survivability of countries’ remaining offensive 

weapons; (2) whether defenses existed and, if so, how capable they might 

be; and (3) the alert status of nations’ nuclear forces. Now let us examine 

each of these factors in turn. 

Survivability

Take Russia, for example, which tends to favor land-based missiles 

over submarine-launched missiles or bomber weapons. Russia has 

mastered advanced missile and missile warhead technologies, has large 

expanses upon which to deploy mobile land-based missiles, and fears 

U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities may threaten its sea-based 

missiles. As a result, if only permitted 100 warheads, Russia likely would 

place them all on land-based, mobile missiles and would have to decide 

how many warheads to place on each missile. 

: In this scenario, each nuclear weapon state could 

distribute its 100 nuclear weapons among launch platforms in any manner 

it chose. Each nation would be guided by history, technological prowess 

relative to potential rivals and geographical circumstances, but also would 

be compelled to consider the fact that more survivable forces are likely to 

be more costly than less survivable forces. 

The most survivable force would be composed of 100 missiles, 

each carrying one warhead. Such a force could not be attacked 

successfully by any other nation; no other nation would have more than 

100 missiles, and no missile could be assumed to be 100 percent effective, 

particularly against mobile platforms. 

The question then would be whether the attacking state’s defenses 

would be capable of destroying whatever number of Russia’s 100 missiles 

survived any preemptive attack. Given we are discussing a situation many 

years in the future, it is impossible to know how capable offensive 

missiles might be at that time when targeted against mobile land-based 

missiles, nor how effective missile defenses might have become.
Blechman

306

The current Russian ICBM force tends to favor missiles with 

multiple warheads and Russian arms control negotiators have insisted on 

warhead and launcher limits in the New START Treaty that went into 

effect in 2011 that would favor continuing to build this type of weapon 

system. Russia has limited resources and wide-ranging needs for military 

modernization and thus favors a posture permitting it to acquire and 

operate fewer missiles, each of which can deliver multiple warheads. 

Even in a situation in which it were permitted to deploy only 100 

warheads, given that such an agreement would presume a world of greatly 

reduced political pressures and thus the perception of a reduced possibility 

of a first-strike, Russia might be tempted to save money by deploying 

more than one warhead on fewer than 100 missiles. At an extreme, for 

example, Russian leaders could put 10 warheads on 10 missiles, making 

their force far less expensive – if more vulnerable to attack. Fifty missiles 

with two warheads each might be a more likely posture. 

The United States, on the other hand, while retaining land-based 

missiles, has tended to put greater emphasis on bombers and submarinelaunched missiles. This reflects the United States’ geographic situation 

and seagoing tradition, as well as the unique advantages attributed to each 

leg of the so-called “triad” of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and 

bombers. With only 100 weapons, you would expect the United States to 

probably reduce its forces to only two components, or even to only one 

type of basing mode. 

Deploying one missile with one warhead on each of 100 

submarines is highly unlikely, given the cost of submarines, but you could 

imagine a U.S. force of 50 silo-based (fixed) land-based missiles with one 

warhead each and three submarines with the remaining warheads 

distributed among them. 

Again, given we are speculating about capabilities some decades in 

the future, it is impossible to know whether potential rivals would have 

developed potent anti-submarine capabilities, but even if there were 

breakthroughs in anti-submarine technologies, such a U. S. force would 

likely be relatively survivable, as the 50 U.S. land-based missiles would 

require most of an opponent’s 100 weapons to be destroyed with high 

confidence. Again, much would depend on the capabilities of each 

nation’s offensive and defensive capabilities. 
Blechman

307

Defenses

As should be evident from the preceding discussion, the 

effectiveness of deterrence in a world of very small nuclear arsenals would 

depend in part on each nuclear power’s defensive capabilities--not only its 

capabilities to defend against missiles, but also anti-submarine defenses, 

anti-aircraft defenses, and even homeland defenses against unconventional 

weapon deliveries (e.g., in shipping containers) would be a factor in 

determining deterrent potential. 

In a world of small nuclear arsenals, deterrence would be 

strengthened if all defenses, or even certain kinds of defenses, could be 

prohibited. If such prohibitions were feasible, all nuclear weapon states 

would have the potential to deploy their 100 warheads in a manner such 

that they could not all be destroyed in a first-strike and thus would retain 

the ability to launch a retaliatory strike and exact considerable damage. 

To the degree there is merit to deterrence theory, this guaranteed 

retaliatory capability should thus deter any foe from attacking first 

The problem is systems intended to defend against military 

platforms armed with nuclear weapons likely could not be distinguished 

from systems intended to defend against tactical, conventionally-armed 

weapons. Thus, navies will develop and deploy anti-submarine 

technologies in order to defend warships from opposing submarines, as air 

forces will develop and deploy means of protecting tactical aircraft from 

surface-to-air missiles. Even tactical missile defenses – for naval forces or 

ground forces - increasingly will integrate with satellite-based detection 

and tracking systems, and thus gain the potential for defense against 

strategic nuclear attacks. 

Indeed, looking several decades into the future, many types of 

defensive systems might be entirely space-based, or utilize laser 

technology on various platforms, that would make distinguishing between 

tactical and strategic defenses virtually impossible. Assuming the 

reduction in nuclear arsenals had not taken place in the context of a 

broader disarmament agreement, it is very difficult to imagine nations 

limiting tactical defenses and, therefore, difficult to conceive of limitations 

on strategic defenses as effective and verifiable.9
Blechman

308

Thus, in all likelihood, in a world of small nuclear arsenals, to 

maintain an effective deterrent, nations would have to depend on the 

capability of the vast preponderance of their small force to survive a 

preemptive attack, thus making it more likely the survivors would 

penetrate the attacker’s defenses. This suggests nuclear weapon states 

must be willing to spend more per warhead than they do currently; 

avoiding placing several of their small number of warheads in single 

targets (e.g., multiple warheads on a single missile or multiple missiles on 

a single submarine). 

It also suggests that to strengthen deterrence, nuclear weapon states 

should be willing to diversify their force to two or more launch modes, 

thus forcing potential adversaries to develop multiple forms of defenses if 

they seek a first-strike capability. Finally, it suggests nuclear weapon 

states should invest in continuing advances in offensive weaponry, 

enabling them to stay ahead of developments in defenses.

While this picture of a continuing offense/defense competition 

suggests an unstable deterrent picture at a time of small nuclear arsenals, 

several ameliorating circumstances should be kept in mind. First, as has 

been mentioned, the agreement to move to small arsenals could only take 

place within a political context in which the possibility of acute crises and, 

therefore, first-strike temptations, would be very low; in all likelihood, 

these dangers would never arise. Second, given that offensive forces 

would be small, the cost of maintaining survivable offenses capable of 

penetrating an opponent’s defenses would likely not be great. 

Historically, it has always been easier for offenses to stay ahead of 

defenses. And, finally, the existence of defenses would have positive 

political effects, providing reassurances to citizens concerned about 

cheating on the agreement, or accidental launches, or irrational leaders. 

Indeed, the development and deployment of defenses would almost 

certainly be a political requirement for the United States, at least, to agree 

to move to very small nuclear arsenals. 

Alert status: Many analysts have suggested one way to reduce the 

risk of nuclear war and stabilize deterrence would be to reduce the alert 

status of nuclear forces.10 Currently, Russian and U.S. missiles can be 

launched within minutes of a command to do so; other nuclear weapon 

states maintain their forces in a more relaxed day-to-day posture. 
Blechman

309

Given the potential, if remote, possibility of deterrence instability 

when states deploy only small nuclear forces, the argument for reducing 

the forces’ alert level becomes more compelling. Presuming measures 

could be devised to ensure the steps to reduce nuclear forces’ alert status 

could not be reversed quickly and would be readily apparent to other 

nations’ intelligence systems, such means would add time before a crisis 

could deteriorate into an attempted first-strike, permitting negotiations to 

head off the conflict. More importantly, assuming they had confidence in 

the alert-status verification methods put in place, it would add to the 

nations’ confidence that their retaliatory forces were secure, thus 

strengthening mutual deterrence.

The downside, of course, is if a crisis occurred and a nation acted 

to increase its forces’ alert level – perhaps to signal seriousness to the 

adversary or because of fear the adversary was about to do the same – a 

race to increase readiness could ensue, worsening the crisis and, perhaps, 

leading nations to conclude that war was inevitable and, therefore, they 

had better strike first. This type of dilemma recurs as well in the zero 

weapons scenario to be analyzed next. In short, measures designed to 

increase the stability of deterrence could have the potential, if reversed, to

aggravate an already bad situation. In implementing de-alerting measures, 

nations would have to judge that the immediate, positive effect on 

deterrence would be well worth the remote risk that a decision to re-alert 

could worsen some future, unknown and unexpected crisis. 

Deterrence of Aggressive, Smaller Nations 

at Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons

Rogue states with smaller nuclear arsenals should not be an issue, 

even if such states had acquired a very small number of nuclear weapons 

(e.g., 10 or so). Presumably, the nuclear disarmament regime would not 

prevent the great powers from maintaining very capable conventionally 

armed forces. If the smaller state was not nuclear armed, such 

conventional forces should be adequate to either deter or, if necessary, 

defeat the aggression, especially if several of the larger states acted in 

concert. 
Blechman

310

If the smaller state had acquired a very small number of nuclear 

weapons, the 100 weapons retained by the larger states should be 

sufficient to deter any aggression or, if necessary, deter nuclear attacks 

while conventional forces defeated the aggressor. Again, collective 

military action would be even more effective in meeting this threat. 

If the smaller power was to continue to build its nuclear arsenal 

and was unwilling to join the nuclear limitation regime, then larger powers 

could act either singly or collectively to compel either disarmament or 

acceptance of the same limitations each had already accepted. In the latter 

case, the great powers’ superior conventional forces would ensure the 

deterrence of aggressive actions with conventional forces, while small, but 

more maneuverable, nuclear forces deterred against nuclear threats, albeit 

with the same uncertainties concerning survivability and defenses 

previously described. 

If it were not possible for the great powers to either prevent the 

smaller power from obtaining nuclear weapons militarily or to agree to 

adhere to the same limitation on the size of its forces as they had accepted, 

then they presumably would rethink their previous agreement to restrict 

forces and begin to build larger arsenals (see the section on “break-out” 

below). 

Deterrence in a World of Zero Nuclear Weapons

Presuming the total disarmament treaty had effective verification 

provisions and the signatories had gained confidence over the decades 

required to implement the treaty that all nations adhered to its provisions, 

the major deterrent issue would be whether or not such circumstances 

would make conventional wars more likely. The question is not really 

relevant for either internal conflicts (like the ongoing struggles in 

Somalia), or cross-border wars involving smaller powers (such as Saddam 

Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait in 1991). 

During the 65 years of the nuclear era, there have been at least 200 

such military conflicts.11 Clearly, nuclear weapons have not deterred such 

wars. As such, the absence of nuclear weapons should have no effect on 

frequency or lethality although, some would argue, the great powers’ 

decision to eliminate nuclear weapons would both reflect and reinforce an 
Blechman

311

era of greater international cooperation in which it might be easier for all 

nations to cooperate to help resolve the civil and international disputes that 

currently lead to such military conflicts.

The more difficult question is the effect of eliminating nuclear 

weapons, if any, on the deterrence of wars among the great powers. The 

introduction to this chapter noted that it was uncertain whether nuclear 

weapons had prevented great power conflicts during the Cold War. In 

addition, it should be assumed the great powers would not have agreed to 

eliminate nuclear weapons unless they had reached accommodations on 

central issues among themselves and had projected an era of lasting peace 

going forward. 

Still, history is full of surprises. As former Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld said, “The only surprise is that we are surprised when 

we are surprised.”12

The scenario envisions the emergence of a highly nationalistic 

regime in Beijing, determined to reassert China’s hegemony in Asia and to 

“right” perceptions of having been mistreated during the 18th, 19th and 20th

centuries by the United States and European powers. An expansionist 

China, seeking to gain control of resources in the region and to dominate 

regional political relations, could come into conflict with Russia, India and 

Japan. The United States also would be concerned about such 

developments and could have formal security commitments to any or all 

three of these countries. While the situation could deteriorate into a new 

Cold War, marked by political tensions and even military skirmishes, it 

need not lead to a new great power conflict, even in the absence of nuclear 

weapons. As China would be making claims on other states, it would be 

natural for them to cooperate to contain Beijing’s aspirations. 

 Let’s examine one illustrative, possible, if unlikely, 

scenario and how deterrence might or might not work in the absence of 

nuclear weapons.

Looking decades into the future, it seems likely at least Russia and 

India would have large and technologically advanced conventional 

military forces. Japan, although likely to have only small forces, would 

likely retain the backing of the United States. Facing such a formidable 

alliance, it is not clear China would pursue its aims by direct, military 

means, but likely would prefer instead a long-term political and economic 

strategy. In short, so long as China’s potential enemies maintained strong, 

modern, conventional forces and the means of cooperating against its 
Blechman

312

common foe, it seems likely China would be deterred from military 

aggression. 

Of course, if Chinese leaders were irrational or reckless, they 

might gamble on a surprise attack being successful, just as Japan did in 

1941. But this could be the case even if the nations in question were 

armed with nuclear weapons. In such circumstances, reckless Chinese 

leaders might believe they could win a conventional conflict while 

deterring nuclear responses with their own nuclear forces. 

Again, the conventional balance of power would be the key factor 

in the deterrence equation. Given this scenario takes place decades in the 

future, the United States and other advanced nations may well have 

developed and deployed highly accurate, prompt, non-nuclear global strike 

capabilities. Such weapon systems could be based at sea, on land or even 

in space, and pose the threat, that in the event of aggression, the 

transgressor’s key leadership and military targets could be destroyed 

almost immediately in retaliation.13

The strength of international responses to China’s initial sallies

would also be a key determining factor. It should be recalled that Hitler

was encouraged in his aggressions not by the absence of nuclear weapons, 

of which the world was ignorant in the 1930s, but by the other powers’ 

unwillingness to respond militarily to his early grabs for the Rhineland, 

Czechoslovakia, etc. – and by their very weak diplomatic responses.

 

A more difficult situation could arise if an expansionist China 

sought to split its potential opposition by reaching an alliance with one of 

the Asian great powers prior to revealing its intentions, just as Hitler did 

with Stalin prior to invading Poland. China’s most likely ally would be 

Russia, particularly if Russia had not regained its economic footing during 

the decades necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons. One could envision a 

mutually beneficial relationship in which Russia provided natural 

resources in exchange for Chinese technological and economic support. 

While Russia would seem an unlikely military partner for China, even in 

this circumstance, such a Sino-Russian entente would remove Russian 

forces from the alliance seeking to contain Chinese expansion to the south 

and east and greatly simplify China’s strategic calculations.

In these circumstances, would war be more likely if no nation was 

armed with nuclear weapons? Again, the question of war and peace 

would seem to hinge more on the calculations and personalities of China’s 
Blechman

313

leaders, on the balance of conventional military capabilities, and on the 

responses of the states China challenged, than on the presence or absence 

of nuclear forces. Quite apart from the potential damage caused by the 

war, conventional aggression would be at great cost to China – breaking 

the economic relationships and financial interdependencies which enabled 

it to advance so far during the past 30 years. 

No sane Chinese leader would wish to jeopardize the peaceful 

relations which facilitated China’s rapid economic development. The risk 

of nuclear war implied by the presence of nuclear weapons would raise the 

stakes even higher, but the likelihood would be, in this writer’s judgment, 

that so long as threatened nations reacted strongly, both the potential cost 

of conventional war and the lingering consequences for China’s economy 

and social well-being would be deterrence enough 

Break-Out

One additional deterrence issue should be considered in a world 

without nuclear weapons - the risk of one nation breaking out of the 

disarmament regime and rebuilding its weapons arsenal. Assuming the 

verification regime accompanying the treaty effectively precluded 

rebuilding a weapons arsenal surreptitiously; one nation’s decision to 

“break-out” would no doubt trigger similar responses by others. How 

quickly nations acted would depend on the strength of multinational 

controls in place on key civilian nuclear facilities, such as uranium 

enrichment facilities. Access to such facilities and the creation of 

weapons-grade materials are probably the most time-consuming aspects of 

a break-out strategy. Even without access to civilian facilities, however, it 

would not take very long for advanced nations to rebuild nuclear weapons. 

Starting with only knowledge of the basic physics, after all, the United 

States developed and built atomic weapons in less than four years in the 

Manhattan Project. Presuming the parties to the disarmament treaty would 

maintain a cadre of knowledgeable scientists and engineers, weapon 

designs, and perhaps even a stock of non-nuclear components, it should 

not take more than a year or two to turn out weapons at a rapid pace.14

Thus, if one nation decided to break-out of a disarmament regime, 

a race to rebuild nuclear manufacturing facilities, fissile materials, and 
Blechman

314

ultimately weapons could ensue. Given the initial break-out would likely 

have been triggered by some new conflict or re-emergence of an old 

grievance, or by a new leader with nationalistic ambitions, or by the 

kindling of a greater sense of insecurity in one nation or another, this new 

arms race would likely lead to an unstable political situation, an air of 

crisis in international affairs, and a heightened risk of war. Deterrence 

would likely be highly unstable in such a situation. The risk such a 

situation might develop needs to be weighed when considering policies 

that could lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. 

Conclusions

The controversial conclusion of this analysis is the elimination of 

nuclear weapons, in the context as described, would not necessarily make 

great power conventional conflicts more likely. This, of course, is a 

subjective conclusion; others may reach different judgments. No one can 

tell what might happen in the hypothetical worlds we discuss. The future 

nature of political and economic relations among nations is impossible to 

predict. So, too, it is impossible to predict the degree to which various 

nations will have invested the resources necessary to develop and deploy 

advanced conventional military technologies, including defensive 

technologies and prompt global strike systems. 

Even more to the point, with or without nuclear weapons, the 

effectiveness of deterrence depends strikingly on individuals – on 

perceptions of personal and national interests, on priorities, on willingness 

to run risks, on knowledge of the objective military situation, on 

judgments about other nations’ leaders and the credibility of the threats or 

promises they may be making. Few of these factors are knowable in 

advance of a specific situation and many can rarely be discerned even after 

a crisis has passed. 

The relationship between specific types of weapons and the 

stability of deterrence, or of the balances of specific types of military 

power and the stability of deterrence, is intrinsically a matter of 

conjecture. During the Cold War, experts and officials wove elaborate 

theories of deterrence. They may have been accurate depictions of real 
Blechman

315

international relationships and decisions about war and peace, or they may 

not have been accurate. 

In the much more complicated, multi-polar world that has emerged 

since 1989, uncertainties about the linkages between deterrence theory and 

reality have become even greater. Discussions about deterrence in future 

worlds in which drastic changes have been made to nations’ military 

capabilities can only be speculative. But this uncertainty does not mean 

the issues raised in this chapter should not be debated and planned for in 

all possibility.

Notes
Blechman

316

 

1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/523/74/PDF/N0952374.pdf?OpenElement. 2 Fred Ikle, “Nuclear Abolition, A Reverie,” The National Interest (September/October 2009), 

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22014. 3 The vagaries of deterrence are discussed at length in an excellent book by Keith Payne, The Great American 

Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-first Century (Fairfax, Va.: National 

Institute Press, 2008).

4 Gerard Smith, Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator

(Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1996), and Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (New York: Little, Brown and 

Company, 1979).

5 For more information on the BWC, see Marie Isabell Chevrier, “From Verification to Strengthening Compliance: 

Prospects and Challenges of the Biological Weapons Convention,” Politics and the Life Sciences, 14, 2 (August 

1995), 209-219. For more information on the CWC, see J.P. Perry Robinson, “Implementing the Chemical 

Weapons Convention,” International Affairs, 72, 1 (January 1996), 73-89. 6 An authoritative, if unofficial, source estimates that at the end of 2009 Russia had a total nuclear arsenal of 13,000 

intact nuclear warheads and the U.S. had a total of 9,400. See Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear 

Notebook: Worldwide Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6 (Nov/Dec 

2009), 65. In May 2010, the USG announced that the United States maintained 5,113 operational and reserve 

nuclear warheads. The larger estimate given above includes warheads awaiting dismantlement.

7 Ibid. The UK stockpile of 225 was announced officially by the British government in May 2010.

8 For detailed discussions of how a disarmament regime might be governed, verified, and enforced, see: Barry M. 

Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass, editors, Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, (Washington, D.C.: 

Stimson Center, 2010).

9

This reasoning suggests if the U.S. is serious about moving to very low numbers of nuclear weapons, or even 

eliminating them all together, it should make the development of effective, comprehensive defenses a very high 

priority in defense planning. It also suggests at low numbers, states may be better off to target remaining offensive 

forces on population centers, rather than to deter an opponent by posing a threat to its offensive capabilities.

10 For example, see Bruce G. Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Brookings Institution, Occasional Paper, 

1995); Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Ivan Oelrich, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New 

Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons (Federation of American Scientists and National 

Resources Defense Council, Occasional Paper No.7, April 2009). 11 Based on information from the “Correlates of War” project and a database of military conflicts compiled by the 

University of Maryland. See: Meredith Reid Sarkes, “The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997,” 

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1 (2000), 123-44; Joseph Hewitt, et. al, Peace and Conflict 2010,

Center for International Development and Conflict Management (College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, 2010), 

http://www.correlatesofwar.org/cow2%20data/WarData/InterState/Inter-State%20War%20Format%20%28V%203-0%29.htm. 12 Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld (New 

York: Public Affairs, 2009). 13 Of course, the credibility of this conventional, retaliatory threat would depend on the capabilities of defensive 

systems. There would also be the possibility that such advanced conventional systems might be limited in number 

as part of a nuclear disarmament treaty.

14 These issues are discussed at length in the chapters by Alex Glaser and Harold Feiveson in Blechman and 

Bollfrass, Editors, Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2010). The 

Stimson Center also has developed an on-line game in which players take the guise of rogue states and seek to break 

out of a disarmament treaty surreptitiously. It proves to be remarkably difficult. Go to www.cheatersrisk.com to 

play the game.
CHAPTER 11

Deterrence, the Triad, and Dyads

Kurt Guthe 

On November 15, 1960, U.S.S. George Washington left Charleston 

harbor for the first operational patrol by a nuclear-powered ballistic 

missile submarine (SSBN). Before then, the U.S. strategic nuclear force

comprised two elements: a large fleet of long- and medium-range bombers 

and a small but growing number of land-based intercontinental ballistic 

missiles (ICBMs). In the 50 years since, the United States has maintained 

a mix of long-range bombers, ICBMs, and ballistic missile submarines. 

Today this triad is made up of 76 B-52H and 18 B-2 bombers, 450 silobased Minuteman III ICBMs, and 14 Trident SSBNs that each can carry 

24 D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Continuation of 

the triad is called for by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, a review led by 

the Defense Department and approved by President Obama, that sets U.S. 

nuclear policy, strategy, and forces for the next five to 10 years.1

Though venerable, the triad is not immutable. It is not the product 

of a grand blueprint worked out at the start of the nuclear era, but emerged 

during the 1950s and 1960s from the interplay of technological 

developments, inter-service competition, and international events. Its size, 

composition, and capabilities all have changed significantly over the 

decades. In that time, its very necessity periodically has been called into 

question by proposals to dispense with one or perhaps two of the three 

legs. Some have argued the vulnerability of bombers to air defenses, or 

ICBMs to counter-silo attacks, warrants the elimination of one or both 

legs. Others have claimed the triad is unnecessarily redundant and could 

be reduced by one or two legs to achieve costs savings without 

diminishing the deterrence of attack. Both the 2010 Nuclear Posture 

Review and a similar review in 1994 considered, but ultimately rejected, 

options to move away from the triad.2

At some future point, reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear force

could make preservation of the triad difficult. The latest U.S.-Russian 
Guthe

318

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is unlikely to cause 

serious problems in this regard. The treaty sets a limit of 700 on deployed 

strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs)—a category that encompasses SLBMs, 

ICBMs, and bombers—as well as a combined limit of 800 on deployed 

and non-deployed SDVs.3 The United States currently has somewhat 

fewer than 900 deployed delivery vehicles.4 Under New START, it plans 

to retain a triad of up to 60 bombers, up to 420 ICBMs, and 14 ballistic 

missile submarines with a total of no more 240 missiles, all carrying an 

aggregate of 1,550 treaty-accountable warheads.5 If, however, further 

reductions led to a force level closer to 500 SDVs, maintaining a costeffective triad would become a greater challenge.6

There is, then, reason to examine again alternative strategic nuclear 

force configurations with fewer than three legs. Any plausible option 

would retain ballistic missile submarines, which offer the valuable 

combination of high survivability against attack (better than that of silobased ICBMs and bombers) and the lethality to neutralize a wide variety 

of targets (comparable to that of ICBMs and generally better than that of 

bombers). Not surprisingly, Trident submarines currently carry more than 

half of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.7

The move from the triad to a dyad would have important 

implications for nuclear policy, strategy, plans, programs, and budgets. 

Given the chief purpose of the strategic nuclear force is to discourage 

major aggression against the United States and its allies, a critical question 

would be how the shift to a dyad might affect deterrence. Deterrence, of 

course, is not simply a matter of a particular military balance, force 

structure, or weapons system, but greatly depends on the specific politicalmilitary setting in which a confrontation occurs, the characteristics of the 

adversary (such as motives, beliefs, perceptions, and decision-making 

process), and the ways in which the adversary and the United States 

interact.

 At the 

same time, a force of only ballistic missile submarines would have 

significant limitations, including the lack of a hedge against advances in 

the antisubmarine warfare or ballistic missile defense capabilities of 

hostile powers. Consequently, a dyad composed of submarines paired 

with either bombers or ICBMs would be the more likely alternative to the 

triad.

8 The complexity of deterrence as well as the likelihood of wild 

cards (miscalculation, misperception, inadvertence, and chance) preclude 
Guthe

319

sure predictions about the deterrent effect of a dyad, triad, or other force 

configuration. Nonetheless, the central deterrent role assigned to the 

strategic nuclear force would necessitate some judgments about the 

consequences a dyad might have for deterrence. 

The following discussion looks at possible effects on deterrence of 

a change from the present strategic nuclear triad to a dyad of either SSBNs 

and bombers or SSBNs and ICBMs. First, the appropriate time frame and 

prospective security environment germane to such an assessment are 

considered. Second, force qualities conducive to deterrence are defined. 

Third, the triad legs and the triad as a whole are evaluated against those 

force qualities. Finally, the two dyad options are examined in terms of the 

deterrence-related force qualities and possible offsets for the loss of either 

the ICBM or bomber leg are suggested. 

Strategic Context

While the long view is always useful in defense planning, it is 

particularly important in charting the future of the U.S. strategic nuclear 

force. A new bomber, missile, or submarine can take 10 to 20 years to 

design, develop, and build, and still more years to deploy in full. The 

planned follow-on to the Trident submarine, for example, will not become 

operational until 2028 and will not completely replace the Trident fleet 

until 2040.9 Like Trident submarines, other strategic nuclear weapons 

systems also are expected to remain in service for another 20 or 30 years. 

Current plans call for existing SLBMs, ICBMs, bombers, and bomberdelivered air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM-Bs) to be maintained and 

upgraded in the coming years, but not replaced before 2030 (for ICBMs 

and ALCM-Bs) or 2040 (for SLBMs and bombers).10 Similarly, there are 

programs to extend the service lives of missile warheads and gravity 

bombs already in the strategic nuclear arsenal, but no plans—or 

capacity—to produce new weapons.11 The lengthy acquisition cycles and 

long service lives for U.S. strategic nuclear arms mean any dyad 

alternative should be suited to the security challenges of 2030 or 2040, and 

not only those of 2010, 2015, or 2020 (the time horizon of the latest 

Nuclear Posture Review).
Guthe

320

Obviously, much can change over two or three decades. Simply 

recall some of the major international developments that have affected 

U.S. and allied security in the last 30 years: the end of the Cold War; the 

rise of China; wars in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan; the spread of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD); repeated confrontations with North 

Korea and Iran; and the emergence of Islamic terrorism. Few of these 

developments were foreseen.

The next 30 years could bring changes of similar consequence, 

perhaps unexpectedly. For example, efforts by Moscow to reestablish its

sphere of influence over former Soviet republics and ex-satellites in 

Europe—most of which are now NATO members—could fuel renewed 

military rivalry with the United States. The reliance Russia places on its 

nuclear forces could give any confrontation a distinct nuclear cast. 

Likewise, competition between China and the United States in the AsiaPacific region could lead to conflict, notably over the status of Taiwan. 

Nuclear threats or use in such a conflict are conceivable, especially in light 

of Chinese anti-access and area-denial capabilities that diminish U.S. 

conventional force advantages, and growth in the size and sophistication 

of Chinese nuclear forces that can strike U.S. forward deployments and 

the United States itself. In addition, U.S. allies in Northeast Asia and the 

Mideast could fall prey to future aggression by North Korea or Iran, 

respectively, including intimidation or attacks involving WMD. Within 

the next decade, both countries also could deploy nuclear-armed ballistic 

missiles capable of hitting the United States.12

In each of the foregoing cases, as well as others, the U.S. strategic 

nuclear force would have a deterrent role. That force, whether a triad or 

dyad, would need considerable flexibility to deal with the diversity of 

potential adversaries and conflicts. It also would require the adaptability 

to respond to political-military changes of the sort sketched above, as well 

as technical difficulties, operational challenges, and technological 

surprises. Flexibility, adaptability, and other force traits that aid 

deterrence are addressed below.
Guthe

321

Deterrence-Related Force Qualities

Deterrence prevents armed attack or coercion by threatening the 

would-be aggressor with unacceptable military counteraction.13 The 

threatened counteraction could take the form of retaliation that imposes 

costs greater than the expected gains of aggression (deterrence by 

punishment) or a response that makes those gains too difficult to achieve 

(deterrence by denial).14

The deterrent value of the U.S. strategic nuclear force for a given

crisis or conflict would be determined to a great extent by the beliefs of 

the adversary regarding whether, how, and with what consequence that 

force might be used. Deterrence would be weakened if enemy leaders 

believed they could escape unacceptable counteraction by destroying large 

numbers of U.S. missiles and bombers before launch or by protecting 

themselves and other vital elements of their state through active and 

passive defenses.

 Deterrent strategies often are a mix of both 

punitive and denial threats. 

15

Deterrence also would suffer if opponents calculated that 

counteraction by the United States would be inhibited by the fears U.S. 

leaders had regarding the dangers of uncontrolled nuclear escalation, the 

possibility of causing high enemy civilian casualties, or the prospect of 

nuclear retaliatory damage to the United States that outweighed the 

reasons for entering or continuing a conflict. To provide a credible 

deterrent, the U.S. strategic nuclear force overall must have qualities that 

would disabuse an adversary of such beliefs and promise counteraction 

that would be certain, effective, and appropriate to the act of aggression. 

Those qualities are survivability, lethality, flexibility, visibility, and 

adaptability. The first three are needed to pose credible deterrent threats 

for a range of contingencies, including those in which the strategic nuclear 

force must withstand a first strike. Visibility refers to shows of force used 

to amplify deterrent threats in times of crisis. And force adaptability is the 

quality that maintains the effectiveness of deterrent threats under changing 

political, military, and technological conditions. 
Guthe

322

Survivability 

A significant portion of the strategic nuclear force must be 

manifestly capable of surviving enemy attacks on operating bases and 

missile silos, operations against ballistic missile submarines at sea, and 

defenses for intercepting bombers and missiles. Force survivability helps 

frustrate enemy plans (deterrence by denial) and enables retaliatory strikes 

(deterrence by punishment). It also permits forces to be used in a 

deliberate, rather than a precipitate, manner, which contributes to 

flexibility. Were the United States to face a world of multiple nuclear 

competitors, the strategic nuclear force might require the capability to 

survive war with one antagonist and remain sufficiently intact, or able to 

reconstitute, to deter subsequent aggression by another. 

For the foreseeable future, concerns about the survivability of the 

bases and silos of the U.S. strategic nuclear force are likely to be greatest 

with regard to possible nuclear-prone conflicts with Russia, a nuclear peer, 

or perhaps with China, which may aspire to that status. Ongoing 

improvements in Russian and Chinese air defenses and the proliferation of 

advanced air defense systems to other potential adversaries would make 

penetration of enemy airspace more difficult for U.S. bombers and cruise 

missiles. Improvements in the antisubmarine warfare and ballistic missile 

defense capabilities of opponents also would adversely affect force 

survivability, although such changes are harder to predict. New problems 

for the survivability of U.S. forces would arise if potent long-range, 

precision-guided nonnuclear strike systems were to appear in the arsenal 

of a major nuclear-armed adversary.

In the Cold War, nearly 100 percent of ICBMs, 60 to 65 percent of 

SSBNs, and 33 to 50 percent of bombers were maintained on peacetime 

alert as insurance against the remote possibility of a Soviet surprise first 

strike. After the Cold War ended, U.S. bombers were taken off alert, but 

the alert rates for ICBMs and SLBMs stayed roughly the same.16 In the 

future, some parts of the strategic nuclear force should be kept on 

peacetime alert, though not because the threat of surprise attack will be 

any less remote. Rather, forces on alert are a quiet reminder of the 

readiness of the United States, in extremis, to act in defense of its security 

and that of its allies. They also hedge against the possibility that those in 

authority might be reluctant to increase alert rates during a crisis, because 
Guthe

323

strategic warning was ambiguous, or because a higher alert level was 

deemed too provocative and likely to deepen the confrontation. 

Lethality

Lethality is the ability to hold at risk and, in the event of conflict, 

destroy or sufficiently damage designated targets. Deterrence by threat of 

punishment entails holding at risk those things highly valued by adversary 

leaders, the individuals who would make decisions regarding peace or 

war. For the potential confrontations likely to involve the U.S. strategic 

nuclear force, adversary leaders would head authoritarian regimes. 

Authoritarian leaders place high value on continued rule, which requires 

their own survival, as well as that of supporting cadres and instruments of 

political control (intelligence services, secret police, and certain military 

units). Related targets would include command posts and wartime 

relocation sites for ruling elites, facilities associated with security 

apparatuses, and communications links used by these groups. 

Threats to destroy elements of enemy military power and defeat 

armed aggression would serve the purpose of deterrence by denial. 

Among the targets here might be WMD capabilities and conventional 

forces and their associated facilities. The ability to strike WMD targets 

offers the potential for limiting the damage from enemy attacks against 

U.S. and allied societies, which could reduce the prospective costs the 

United States would incur by countering aggression, and thereby 

strengthen the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats. The same would be 

true of active and passive defenses. Threats directed against defenseindustrial, transportation, communications, and electrical power targets 

could be a means of deterrence by punishment (promising to make the 

adversary pay a steep economic price for an attack) or deterrence by denial 

(confronting the adversary with the likelihood U.S. retaliatory strikes 

would impede the conduct, sustainment, and success of enemy military 

operations). 

To hold at risk the diverse targets related to deterrence, some or all 

elements of the strategic nuclear force require certain characteristics. One 

is intercontinental range, which allows strategic delivery vehicles to reach 

targets throughout Eurasia, where potential opponents are located.
Guthe

324

Another is prompt weapons delivery for striking time-sensitive 

targets, such as missile launchers ready to fire, command-and-control 

centers with responsibilities for WMD use, and forces preparing to leave 

their bases.

A third is high accuracy for attacking point targets, like missile 

silos; this means weapon delivery with a circular error probable of a few 

hundred feet.17

A fourth attribute is weapons of suitable explosive yield. Highyield weapons (yields of a few hundred kilotons), combined with high 

accuracy, have the destructive potential for dealing with targets hardened 

against attack through the use of steel-reinforced concrete or underground 

construction; missile silos and underground bunkers are examples. Some 

types of hard and deeply buried facilities, including command bunkers for 

key leaders, can only be destroyed by earth-penetrating weapons.

 Pending future progress in sensors, data-processing 

systems, and munitions, only bombers with their onboard crews are likely 

to have the capability for accurate weapon delivery against mobile missile 

launchers and other targets on the move. 

Finally, high reliability is necessary to avoid bomber or missile 

aborts and ensure weapons detonate at their specified yields. 

Of course, conventionally armed delivery vehicles, particularly 

those with precision-guided weapons, also can threaten a wide range of 

targets. Current nonnuclear strike capabilities, however, have limitations 

as substitutes for nuclear arms. Against certain targets—deeply buried 

facilities, for example—conventional weapons would be ineffective or less 

effective in comparison with the destructive power of nuclear weapons. 

Enemy countermeasures that impeded precision delivery of conventional 

munitions could render those weapons incapable of destroying or 

damaging assigned targets. Multiple aircraft sorties or missiles strikes 

conducted over some period of time might be necessary to deliver enough 

conventional munitions to neutralize a single target. In conflicts in which 

targets must be eliminated with dispatch, economy of force, and lasting 

effect, nuclear weapons may be preferred.

While the bombers of the nuclear triad also can deliver 

conventional weapons, other nonnuclear strike capabilities lack the 

intercontinental range of the strategic nuclear force. (This would change if 

planned research and development work on “a conventional, global strike 

capability” were to yield an operational system.)

18 Perhaps most 
Guthe

325

important, the widespread, rapid, and sure destruction promised by nuclear 

weapons has an intangible, but nonetheless real, deterrent effect on 

national leaders that threats posed by conventional bombs and missiles, no 

matter how lethal, cannot duplicate. The threat of nuclear use would 

greatly complicate the plans of would-be aggressors, making victory seem 

doubtful, if not impossible.19

Flexibility

The strategic nuclear force requires the flexibility to carry out 

strikes of varying scope, scale, and intensity, depending on the nature of 

the adversary and the type and level of aggression. Holding at risk certain 

kinds of targets might deter an adversary with one set of values, but not 

another with a different set. A disproportionate deterrent threat of largescale retaliation for a lesser provocation might be discounted by an 

opponent. A threat to destroy enemy population centers might seem less 

than credible if U.S. cities were vulnerable to enemy reciprocal attacks. A 

threat to defeat offensive military operations might ring hollow unless 

backed with the requisite capabilities to strike opposing WMD-armed 

forces. An inability to limit damage and control escalation through 

constrained attacks on those forces could inhibit a U.S. military response 

to acts of aggression against allies, and thus weaken deterrent threats made 

on their behalf. 

For these and other reasons, the strategic nuclear force must be 

capable of supporting a variety of attack options suited for assorted 

combinations of opponents and contingencies. This includes force 

elements that can target the mainstays of a hostile regime and its ability to 

project power, execute large or limited attacks, minimize unintended 

civilian damage, and conduct strikes quickly (against time-sensitive 

targets, for example) or at a slower pace if demanded by the character of 

the conflict and the direction of the command authorities. As these 

requirements suggest, both survivability and lethality are prerequisites for 

flexibility.
Guthe

326

Visibility

Increases in the readiness levels and changes in the deployments of 

military forces long have been used to deter war. These measures also can 

help prepare for conflict or support coercive efforts aimed at compelling 

an adversary to do something rather than, as in the case of deterrence, not 

to do something. In the pre-nuclear era, European powers often employed 

their forces, especially naval forces, in armed demonstrations to deter or 

coerce opponents.20 During the Cold War, the United States frequently 

used its armed forces to affect foreign perceptions and secure political 

objectives in confrontations short of war.21

In a number of Cold War confrontations, the alert level or 

deployment of the U.S. strategic nuclear force was changed for deterrent 

purposes. These included the 1948 and 1961 Berlin crises, the 1956 Suez 

crisis, the 1958 Taiwan Strait and Lebanese crises, the 1962 Cuban missile 

crisis, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.22 In the last case, the United States 

was intent on deterring the Soviet Union from unilaterally sending forces 

to the Mideast. U.S. diplomatic moves to dissuade the Soviets from 

intervening were deliberately reinforced by an increase in the defense 

readiness condition of all military commands. Strategic Air Command

assumed a heightened alert for a time and had bombers and aerial tankers 

ready for immediate takeoff. Fifty to 60 B-52s were brought back to the 

United States from Guam, where they had been based for conventional 

bombing missions in Southeast Asia. Their return, according to thenSecretary of State Henry Kissinger, was intended to “give the Soviets 

another indication that we were assembling our forces for a showdown.”23

In future circumstances, perhaps a severe crisis in which U.S. vital 

interests were endangered by a major nuclear power, the United States 

again might find reason to underscore the deterrent threat posed by its 

strategic nuclear force. Taking steps to gird the force for conflict can aid 

deterrence by making clear to the adversary the gravity with which the 

United States views its stakes in a confrontation and its determination and 

wherewithal to defend them. To have this effect, however, the steps must 

Besides the increase in bomber readiness, the ICBM force went to a 

somewhat higher footing and a few more ballistic missile submarines put 

to sea. 
Guthe

327

be visible to the adversary. A show of force must show force. This was 

true in all of the examples cited above. And in those crises, bombers put 

on most of the show. 

In one or more cases, bombers increased ground-alert activities at 

air bases, conducted airborne alert missions, dispersed to alternate 

airfields, deployed to locations abroad, or flew close to enemy airspace. 

All of these actions were detectable by the opponent. Moreover, U.S. 

decision-makers wanted these actions to be detected. Bomber alerts and 

redeployments, then, exemplify the quality of visibility that contributes to 

deterrence.

The other two legs of the triad have inherent disadvantages in this 

regard. The stationary nature of silo-based ICBMs limits, without entirely 

excluding, displays of force. Ballistic missile submarines, part of the silent 

service, depend on stealth for their survivability, although they, too, might 

have a role in lending visibility to deterrent threats. It is also worth noting 

that any future bomber alert would attract more notice in foreign capitals 

simply because all bombers have been off alert for nearly 20 years, 

whereas at the same time almost all ICBMs and a large fraction of the 

ballistic missile submarine fleet have been maintained at a high state of 

alert.

Adaptability

Adaptability is the quality with which the strategic nuclear force 

can retain or regain its deterrent effectiveness despite adverse political, 

military, or technical developments. Unfavorable developments in the 

future could include a sharp deterioration in relations with Russia or China 

that spurred military competition with one or both countries, a serious 

violation of a nuclear arms agreement, a defect in a bomb or missile 

warhead, a significant problem (structural, mechanical, or electronic) with 

a delivery vehicle, or a serious decrease in the expected operational 

effectiveness of a force element brought about by improvement in 

opposing offensive or defense capabilities. 

The strategic nuclear force can be adaptable in three ways. First, it 

can adapt through a force posture (deployed force, weapons stockpile, and 

readiness level) that has inherent resilience to meet new challenges 

without remedial changes. The diversity of delivery vehicles, weapons, 
Guthe

328

and deployment modes found in the triad, for example, affords the current 

force a large measure of adaptability.

Second, the adaptation can be done through modifications of the 

force posture that respond to the dangers and difficulties that emerge. 

Alert rates might be increased, additional weapons uploaded on delivery 

vehicles, bombers dispersed or redeployed, different tactics adopted to 

offset improved enemy offenses or defenses, and tasks reallocated among 

force elements if one leg experienced problems.

And third, the force mix can adapt through retrofits of deployed 

systems (with upgraded electronics, modified weapons, and other 

hardware fixes) or, over the longer run, the addition of next-generation 

missiles, aircraft, submarines, and weapons. The lack of warm production 

lines for strategic nuclear weapons systems, however, means the 

adaptability of the current triad or a future dyad would depend primarily 

on the resilience and modification of the force posture, and the 

improvement of existing capabilities, rather than the manufacture of nextgeneration delivery vehicles and weapons.24

Before examining how an SSBN-bomber or SSBN-ICBM dyad 

would rate when judged against the force qualities related to deterrence, 

some key attributes of the three strategic nuclear force elements need to be 

understood. Familiarity with the deterrent advantages of the triad also is 

useful, since this force configuration offers a standard against which dyad 

alternatives can be compared.

Attributes of Strategic Nuclear Force Elements 

and the Triad

Outlined below are the characteristics of ballistic missile 

submarines, ICBMs, and bombers, as well as the triad overall, relevant to 

the force qualities that support deterrence. 

Ballistic Missile Submarines

The 14 Trident submarines in the fleet operate from two bases, 

with eight at Bangor, Washington and six at Kings Bay, Georgia.

25 A 

number of submarines are in port at any given time, and of those, two 
Guthe

329

usually are undergoing long-term overhauls and thus unable to leave port 

even in a crisis. Several submarines are on patrol. Although a typical 

patrol lasts 60 to 90 days, some have exceeded 100 days. Resupply could 

extend time at sea. The Navy conducts exercises for the resupply and 

repair of Trident submarines at alternative ports in the Pacific and the 

Atlantic.26

Each Trident submarine has launch tubes for 24 D5 missiles, each 

missile capable of delivering multiple independently targetable reentry 

vehicles (MIRVs). Current plans call for the number of SLBM launch 

tubes per submarine to be reduced to 20, with no more than 240 SLBMs 

deployed in the fleet at any time.27 Each D5 SLBM can carry up to 12 

Mk-4 reentry vehicles (RVs) with W76 warheads or 8 Mk-5 RVs with 

W88 warheads.28 The average number of reentry vehicles per missile is 

likely four.29 W76 warheads represent the majority of those carried by 

SLBMs.30 Although the W88 and W76 both have high yields, the yield of 

the W88 is significantly greater than that of the W76. Both warheads can 

be delivered with high accuracy by the D5 SLBM. The D5 missile has a 

range that exceeds 4,000 nautical miles (nm).31 SLBMs can reach their 

targets in 30 minutes or less, depending on target location, the launch 

position of the submarine, and the trajectory of the missile.

ICBMs

The Minuteman III force currently has 450 silo-based ICBMs 

located at Air Force bases in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota. 

Each of the three bases has 150 missiles.32 The alert rate of the force is 

“near 100 percent.”33 Minuteman III ICBMs initially were deployed with 

three reentry vehicles each, but now carry one, two, or three RVs.34 In the 

future, no more than 420 missiles will be deployed and all will be 

equipped with only one reentry vehicle each.35 The two types of weapons 

for the ICBM are the Mk-12A RV with the W78 warhead and the Mk-21 

RV with the W87 warhead.36 Both warheads are high yield and can be 

delivered with relatively high accuracy. The range of the Minuteman III is 

over 5,000 nm.37 Time from launch to target would be roughly 30 

minutes.
Guthe

330

Bombers

Unlike SSBNs and ICBMs, bombers are dual-capable, with the 

ability carry out conventional as well as nuclear missions. Over the last 

two decades, bombers have been used extensively in the Kosovo, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan conflicts.38 Of the 76 nuclear-capable B-52Hs, 44 are 

combat-coded, with the other bombers used for training, test, backup, and 

attrition reserve. Sixteen of the 18 nuclear-capable B-2s are combatcoded.39 Under current plans, some B-52Hs will be converted to a 

conventional-only role and a smaller nuclear-capable fleet of up to 60 

bombers will be retained, including all nuclear-capable B-2s.40 The B-1B

bomber, originally dual-capable, was removed from its nuclear role 

following the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review.41

The B-52Hs are split between two Air Force bases, Barksdale in 

Louisiana and Minot in North Dakota. The B-2s are located at a single 

base, Whiteman in Missouri.42 The bomber force has not maintained a 

day-to-day alert status since 1991, but, if necessary, a portion of the force 

could placed on ground alert in a matter of days.43

The low-observable (stealth) features of the B-2 bomber aid it in 

penetrating opposing air defenses. This enables the aircraft to close on 

targets and deliver nuclear gravity bombs. The older B-52H bomber is 

more readily detected and thus is armed with long-range (1,300 nm) cruise 

missiles that can be launched from outside enemy air defense coverage.44 

The B-2 can carry up to 16 B61-7, B61-11, or B83 bombs. The B61-11 

bomb, it should be noted, is the only earth-penetrating nuclear weapon in 

the U.S. inventory and is specifically designed for use against hard and 

deeply buried facilities.45 The B-52H can be armed with up to 20 ALCMBs,

46 each cruise missile with a W80-1 warhead.47 Bomber weapons 

provide a variety of explosive yields “from megaton to subkiloton.”48 

Indeed, some of the weapon types can be employed with more than one 

yield. Gravity bombs can be delivered with high accuracy, while the 

guided ALCM-B can strike targets with even better “pinpoint accuracy.”49

Bombers have longer intercontinental ranges than ballistic 

missiles—6,000 nm for the B-2 and 7,500 nm for the B-52H50—but their 

flight times are measured in hours rather than minutes. 
Guthe

331

The Triad

In combination, SSBNs, ICBMs, and bombers make for a strategic 

nuclear force with diverse, advantageously redundant, and mutually 

reinforcing capabilities. While there are shared characteristics among the 

three force elements, each leg of the triad has a unique and useful set of 

attributes. Weaknesses in one leg are offset by strengths in others. 

Adjustments can be made within and among the legs as conditions change. 

The legs together make an enemy attack especially difficult. In the event 

of crisis or war, the three legs offer a range of possible military responses. 

Though elements of the strategic nuclear force in many ways could be 

improved, they nonetheless have important strengths with regard to 

survivability, lethality, flexibility, visibility, and adaptability.

Survivability

Small in number and soft, SSBN and bomber bases are vulnerable 

to attack. Submarines in port and bombers not on alert would be easily

destroyed by nuclear strikes and could suffer severe damage even in 

nonnuclear attacks. The harder and more numerous silos for ICBMs can 

be damaged or destroyed by high-accuracy, high-yield ballistic missile 

warheads, like those currently found in the Russian strategic nuclear force, 

but the need to expend two warheads per silo to ensure a high kill 

probability could make the price of such an attack prohibitive. The attack 

could be unprofitable as well, since many of the silos currently house 

Minuteman III missiles with only a single warhead, and all missiles will 

be single-warhead in the future. 

Ballistic missile submarines on patrol are virtually undetectable, 

barring breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare. In the aftermath of a 

nuclear conflict, surviving SSBNs could serve as a deterrent to 

opportunistic aggression as the United States sought to recover from the 

catastrophe.

SLBMs launched from submarines on patrol and ICBMs fired 

from silos that survived an attack would face, at worst, limited missile 

defenses. Because of the wide-ranging mobility of SSBNs, SLBMs could 

be launched from many different azimuths, complicating enemy plans. 
Guthe

332

The air defense threat confronting bombers would be greater, 

although the stealth of B-2s and the standoff missiles of B-52Hs would 

mitigate the danger. Bombers and cruise missiles also could be flown so 

as to attack an enemy from multiple directions, thereby stressing the 

opposing defenses, and to skirt parts of the defensive system. The 

combination of penetrating bombers and standoff bombers with cruise 

missiles can compel an adversary to develop and deploy not only 

perimeter air defenses, but also close-in defenses of high-value targets. 

This can complicate the attack planning of a would-be aggressor, impose 

costs on the adversary, dilute opposing defense efforts, and divert 

resources from enemy offensive forces.

Looking at the strategic nuclear force as a whole, the ballistic 

missile submarines on alert and the daunting number of aim points 

presented by silo-based ICBMs offset, at least partially, the vulnerability 

of submarine and bomber operating bases, individual missile silos, and 

unalerted bombers. Submarines and ICBMs on alert offer insurance 

against surprise due to lack of sufficient warning or lack of timely 

response. In the absence of effective enemy missile defenses, U.S.

ballistic missiles once launched are likely to reach their targets, even if 

defense penetration by bombers and cruise missiles is more problematic. 

Any enemy seeking to eliminate U.S. retaliatory capabilities would be 

burdened within an exceedingly complex military challenge.

Lethality

SLBMs, ICBMs, and bombers all have the intercontinental range 

to reach targets within the territory of any hostile power in Eurasia. 

Ballistic missiles could strike time-sensitive targets minutes after launch. 

Ballistic missiles, bombers, and cruise missiles all can deliver their nuclear 

weapons with high accuracy. Ballistic missiles have the accuracy/yield 

combinations to hold at risk most types of hard targets, including missile 

sites and command centers that would have to be struck quickly. Highconfidence neutralization of many of these targets would require the use of 

more than one weapon. Bombers, with the necessary targeting updates, 

could attack mobile targets. The B-2 could deliver the B61-11 earth-
Guthe

333

penetrating bomb against underground targets, although some hard and 

deeply buried facilities would be resistant even to its effects.51

Though not as great as in the past, the variety of delivery vehicles 

(D5, Minuteman III, B-52H, B-2, ALCM-B) and weapons (W76, W78, 

W80-1,W87, W88, B61, B83) is a hedge against problems with a vehicle 

or weapon type that could compromise operational effectiveness. Force 

diversity also allows high-priority targets to be covered by weapons from 

different triad legs (cross-targeting) in order to ensure their destruction. 

Thus, if a command bunker were slated to be hit by both a bomberdelivered weapon and an ICBM warhead, the loss of the ICBM warhead to 

an enemy counter-silo attack would not prevent the bunker from being hit. 

This collection of capabilities within the triad gives the overall 

strategic nuclear force the ability to threaten a wide array of military, 

regime, and economic targets. 

Flexibility

Force elements of the triad have a number of characteristics suited 

for selective nuclear attacks. Bombers could be used for limited attacks, 

including the delivery of just one weapon against a single target. The lowyield options for bomber weapons would be useful in limiting unintended

damage. Bombers could be routed to avoid overflight of sensitive areas, 

redirected in flight, or recalled from their missions. Bomber aircrews 

could assess damage inflicted by earlier attacks and carry out or refrain 

from follow-on strikes. Of course, bombers and cruise missiles would 

have to penetrate any air defenses protecting their designated targets, a 

task that might be especially difficult in a small attack, where, with 

advance warning, the enemy could concentrate defenses (airborne sensors, 

fighter-interceptors, and mobile surface-to-air missiles) to shield likely 

targets. Long flight times could limit the utility of bombers for selective 

strikes against time-sensitive targets.

Another force feature that offers flexibility is the single-warhead 

payload of many, and eventually all, Minuteman III ICBMs. While a 

ballistic missile with a MIRVed payload would have to deliver all of its 

warheads against multiple targets located within a certain elliptical area 

(or “footprint”), each single-warhead Minuteman III could be employed to 

hit just one target located at any point within a much larger area. Single-
Guthe

334

warhead ICBMs could be used, for example, in limited attacks against a 

small number of targets, attack options put together quickly, or strikes 

against time-sensitive targets suddenly discovered by U.S. intelligencegathering systems. Single-warhead ICBMs probably would be up against 

less effective defenses than those that bombers would confront in a limited 

attack. But their warheads would lack the low-yield options of bomber 

weapons. In some cases, overflight restrictions might exclude the use of 

ICBMs, though not the employment of bombers or SLBMs. 

D5 SLBMs have the valuable ability to strike a wide range of 

targets, but their MIRVed payloads and high-yield W88 warheads could 

be disadvantageous for certain limited attack options. The high 

survivability of Trident submarines on patrol is one of the most important 

force characteristics that would enable the United States to respond in a 

deliberate and flexible manner to a large-scale nuclear attack on the 

homeland. 

For flexibility, then, bombers offer low-yield weapon options and 

man-in-the-loop control, attributes ballistic missiles lack. A significant 

number of ballistic missiles, like bombers, can deliver a single weapon, 

but with greater speed. More survivable than bombers at their bases or 

ICBMs in silos, SSBNs on patrol would have greater flexibility for 

conducting strikes of different sorts (or withholding attacks) as a conflict 

evolved and the command authorities made changes in the strategic 

direction of U.S. operations. 

Visibility

As the earlier discussion of this force quality suggests, bombers 

constitute the triad leg most likely to be used for shows of force to back 

deterrent threats. Any display now, however, would be less impressive, 

probably less intimidating, and perhaps less deterring than those of the 

past. In all but the last of the aforementioned crises in which the alert 

level or deployment of the strategic nuclear force was changed, bombers 

made up all or most of the force. In each of those dangerous episodes, the 

United States had hundreds of bombers, not the tens of aircraft in the

inventory today. During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, more than 

1,000 bombers were on alert, some 180 bombers were dispersed to 

roughly 30 civilian and military airfields, and the number of bombers just 
Guthe

335

on airborne alert—65—was larger than the total number of combat-coded 

aircraft in the current nuclear-capable bomber force.52

In addition, the effectiveness of a future nuclear show of force by 

bombers could be adversely affected by lack of alert experience during the 

last two decades. An Air Force report in 2008 found that “[w]ithin the 

next few years, the USAF will no longer have a pool of bomber wing 

commanders who have performed extended alert duty” and “due to limited 

aircraft nuclear generations, aircrews have little experience interacting 

with operational issues involved with bringing aircraft to nuclear alert 

status.”53

It also should be noted that the training program to prepare for an 

airborne alert was canceled in 1993 because it had, in the words of an 

official history, “become anachronistic and, in [U.S. Strategic 

Command’s] view, served little purpose.”54 Changes instituted by Air 

Force Global Strike Command could improve the preparedness of the 

bomber force for alert duty. This command, which is responsible for all 

ICBMs and nuclear-capable bombers, was established in 2009 to provide 

greater attention to the nuclear mission.55

Adaptability 

In the past, the triad has demonstrated considerable ability to adapt 

to unfavorable military and technical developments. For example, from 

the 1960s through the 1980s, the overall resilience of the triad allowed the 

United States to pursue a long series of remedies for deficiencies in the 

bomber leg caused by improvements in Soviet air defenses. During the 

1970s and 1980s, the triad also afforded time to deal with the vulnerability 

of the ICBM force that arose from Soviet deployment of silo-busting 

missiles, although no fix was implemented before the Soviet Union

disintegrated. And when significant problems with Polaris and Poseidon 

SLBM warheads emerged, the insurance provided by the ICBM and 

bomber legs permitted the required retrofits to be made without undue 

haste.56

Similar adjustments in the strategic nuclear force might be 

necessary in the future. If, for example, bomber vulnerability increases 

because of air defense advances, more reliance might be placed on 
Guthe

336

ballistic missiles, with additional warheads loaded on SLBMs. Some 

number of SLBM warheads also might be allocated for the suppression of 

enemy air defenses. If the W88 warhead were to experience a serious 

technical problem, additional W76 warheads might be deployed as 

replacements (despite their lesser capability against some classes of hard 

targets) until the problem was solved. 

If, for various reasons, the strategic force required greater lethality, 

the guidance systems for ballistic missiles, bombers, and their weapons 

might be improved to increase delivery accuracies. And were the United 

States to find itself in a stepped-up nuclear arms competition with Russia

or China, part of the bomber force again might be placed on ground alert 

and the number of ballistic missile submarines on alert might be increased.

In addition, warheads could be uploaded on bombers and missiles. 

Under the planned reductions in the strategic nuclear force, bombers, 

ICBMs, and SLBMs all will retain the capacity to carry more warheads 

than the number in their standard operational payloads. Some number of 

non-deployed warheads that could be uploaded will be kept in the nuclear 

weapons stockpile as a hedge against adverse technical, military, or 

international developments.57 The bomber force could be uploaded in 

weeks, the SLBM force in months, and the ICBM force at a rate of one 

squadron (50 missiles) per missile wing (150 missiles) per year.58 Note 

the availability of upload options could help in deterring opponents from 

breaking out of nuclear arms agreements or engaging in competitive 

nuclear buildups with the United States. 

Dyad Alternatives

For the reasons cited at the beginning of this discussion, the force 

qualities of survivability, lethality, flexibility, visibility, and adaptability 

support—but do not guarantee—the deterrence of major aggression. As 

detailed in the previous section, the assorted attributes of ballistic missile 

submarines, ICBMs, and bombers invest the current strategic nuclear triad 

with all of these deterrence-related qualities, although below ideal levels. 

If one triad leg and its capabilities were removed from the current strategic 

nuclear force, it is reasonable to assume the expected deterrent 

effectiveness of the force might diminish, unless adequate offsetting 
Guthe

337

measures were adopted. In comparison to the triad, what capabilities that 

support deterrence would be lost or reduced? The brief assessments below 

look at the deterrent effectiveness of SSBN-bomber and SSBN-ICBM

dyads from this perspective. Given no new strategic nuclear weapons 

system is likely to be deployed for 20 years or more, next-generation 

bombers, missiles, and submarines are not among the offsetting measures 

considered here.

For the submarine-bomber dyad, it is assumed the current ICBM

force would be eliminated entirely. This assumption is consistent with 

dyad proposals that claim the ICBM leg is superfluous, vulnerable, 

“destabilizing,” and too costly to maintain and modernize. For the 

submarine-ICBM dyad, however, it is assumed bombers are removed from 

their nuclear role, but retained for nonnuclear missions. This assumption 

reflects both the significant utility bombers have demonstrated in 

conventional conflicts and the past precedent of removing the B-1B 

bomber from its nuclear role, but keeping it as a conventional strike 

aircraft.

SSBN-Bomber Dyad (No ICBMs)

Survivability

The absence of hundreds of silo-based ICBMs would make it less 

difficult for an adversary to plan an attack on the U.S. strategic nuclear 

force. All bombers not on alert and SSBNs not on patrol could be 

eliminated by an attack on just five main operating bases. SSBNs at sea 

would represent the main deterrent to a first strike. This deterrent could be 

strengthened by increasing the alert rate for the Trident submarine fleet. 

At the same time, if ballistic missile submarines on patrol were the only 

survivable element of the strategic nuclear force, hostile nuclear peers 

might devote greater effort to antisubmarine warfare. Maintaining part of 

the bomber force on alert and probably dispersed, at least during crises, 

would reduce prelaunch vulnerability, demonstrate that bombers could not 

be eliminated simply through attacks on their air bases, take some of the 

burden off the submarine force, and vex opponents with the problem of 

defending against air, as well as ballistic missile, attack.
Guthe

338

Lethality 

Without ICBMs, the strategic nuclear force would lose a large 

fraction of its capability for prompt, accurate, and deadly strikes against 

various types of targets, including those that are hardened. If required, 

this loss might be partially offset by uploading W88 warheads on SLBMs, 

assuming sufficient non-deployed warheads of this type were available.

Flexibility 

Removing the ICBM force from the triad would eliminate singlewarhead Minuteman III missiles. To retain the flexibility offered by a 

single-warhead ballistic missile, some D5 SLBMs might be converted to 

carry single-warhead payloads. Concurrent with this change, other D5 

missiles might be uploaded in order to maintain the total number of 

warheads carried by SSBNs. In comparison to single-warhead Minuteman 

III ICBMs, single-warhead D5 SLBMs would have the added advantages 

of greater prelaunch survivability and more flight profiles consistent with 

possible overflight restrictions.

Visibility 

The lack of ICBMs would not affect the ability of the bomber leg 

to be used for shows of force that signaled U.S. resolve. 

Adaptability 

Retiring all ICBMs would remove an entire force element that 

could hedge against technical problems, operational challenges, or 

technological surprises that might impair bombers or ballistic missile 

submarines. One of the options for uploading a significant number of hard 

target-capable warheads for prompt strikes would be lost. The diversity 

of the weapons stockpile would be diminished with the elimination of two 
Guthe

339

(the W78 and W87) of the seven warhead types. The decrease in 

adaptability would be worse if the bomber force, because of its dual 

capability and conventional commitments, were only a “half leg” in a

submarine-bomber dyad. 

SSBN-ICBM Dyad (No Bombers)

Survivability

With a submarine-ICBM dyad, improvements in opposing missile 

defenses would have the potential to weaken the entire strategic nuclear 

force. If adversaries no longer were threatened by nuclear-armed B-52Hs 

and B-2s, they might reallocate resources from air defenses to missile 

defenses, as well as to antisubmarine warfare aimed at SSBNs. But the 

fact they still faced threats from B-52Hs, B-2s, and B-1Bs with 

conventional payloads, not to mention from shorter-range nonnuclear 

strike aircraft, would likely militate against such a shift.

Lethality 

Ending the nuclear role for bombers would mean the loss of the 

only nuclear earth-penetrating weapon (the B61-11), another high-yield 

weapon (the B83), and the only guided strategic nuclear weapon (the 

ALCM-B). The delivery vehicle currently best suited for attacking mobile 

targets no longer would have a nuclear mission. 

With regard to offsetting measures, an earth-penetrating ballistic 

missile warhead might be developed and deployed to replace the B61-11. 

Here it is worth noting that three decades ago, engineering development of 

an earth-penetrating warhead for the Pershing II intermediate-range 

ballistic missile was completed and the design then put on the shelf.59 In 

the case of the B83, the current stockpile may not include a ballistic 

missile warhead with the yield and other characteristics that would make it 

a suitable substitute. To gain delivery accuracy comparable to that of the 

ALCM-B, Trident Mk-4 reentry vehicles might be retrofitted with global 

positioning system (GPS) guidance; some work along this line already has 

been done.60 At some future point, it might be possible to equip 

intercontinental-range ballistic missiles with small, powered unmanned 
Guthe

340

combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) that, like bombers, could be used to 

attack mobile targets.61

Flexibility 

Relieving bombers of nuclear duty would deprive the strategic 

nuclear force of the flexibility that comes from their readily changeable 

payloads, weapons with low-yield options, and man-in-the-loop control. 

As noted, these traits are valuable for conducting limited attacks and 

responding to rapid changes in conflict conditions. 

In the absence of bombers, the remaining strategic force still 

would, or could, offer some flexibility. Single-warhead ICBMs would be 

available for selective strikes. SLBMs would have some ability to avoid 

overflight of specified areas. Some ballistic missile warheads might be 

modified for reduced yields. Improvements in C4

ISR62 capabilities could 

facilitate the shoot-look-shoot employment of ballistic missiles. Small 

UCAVs delivered by future ballistic missiles might have some of the same 

advantages as the bomber with its man-in-the-loop control. And to give a 

submarine-ICBM dyad something akin to the recall option for bombers, a 

command destruct system might be installed on some or all ballistic 

missiles. It should be emphasized, however, that this last measure also 

would create a serious vulnerability that adversaries could exploit.63

Visibility 

If bombers were withdrawn from the strategic nuclear force, the 

best means for a nuclear show of force would be lost. In theory, test 

launches of ICBMs and SLBMs might be used to demonstrate the might 

and determination of the United States to stand against aggression. Given 

their own use of missile tests for political-military purposes, this type of 

signal is one potential opponents likely would understand. North Korea

and Iran have test-launched ballistic missiles as part of their strategies to 

counter international pressure aimed at halting their nuclear programs. 

China has used ballistic missile tests to intimidate the leadership and 

populace of Taiwan and to discourage the United States from interfering 

with any Chinese forcible attempts to reclaim the island. And Russia
Guthe

341

conducts ICBM and SLBM tests in exercises intended to put its strategic 

nuclear power on display. Yet a U.S. ballistic missile test in the context of 

an intense crisis could be misperceived as an attack, making it a more 

dangerous move than alerting and dispersing the bomber force. As an 

alternative, the crisis deployment of additional ballistic missile submarines

to patrols at sea might be announced, or made known to an adversary 

through diplomatic channels, but this could compromise operations 

security.

Adaptability 

As with the submarine-bomber dyad, the hedge offered by an 

entire force element would be eliminated with the removal of bombers 

from a nuclear role. In the absence of bombers, the two remaining legs of 

the strategic nuclear force both would be vulnerable to improved, 

expanded, or proliferated ballistic missile defenses. To respond to this 

danger, tactics for suppressing defensive systems might be devised, 

tailored penetration aids might be added to ICBM and SLBM payloads, 

and ballistic missiles might be uploaded with more warheads for saturating 

opposing defenses. 

The stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons would be less diverse 

without the bomber-delivered B61-7, B61-11, B83, and W80-1. The 

stockpile would retain some redundancy, however, with two ICBM

warheads (the W78 and W87) and two SLBM warheads (the W76 and 

W88). On the other hand, if the W76 warhead, the most numerous 

strategic weapon, were to suffer a major technical problem that afflicted 

the entire type, much of the strategic nuclear force would be rendered 

ineffective, since there are too few W88 warheads to be used as 

replacements.

Without bombers, the strategic nuclear force would lose its 

capacity for the rapid upload of a substantial number of nuclear weapons. 

Bombers are armed with no weapons today, because no aircraft are on 

alert, but several hundred bombs and cruise missiles could be uploaded in 

a matter of weeks.64 This option would be unavailable with a submarineICBM dyad.
Guthe

342

Conclusions

The move from the existing triad to a dyad could be detrimental to 

force survivability, lethality, flexibility, visibility, and adaptability—the 

qualities that support deterrence. For a submarine-bomber dyad, the 

quality of visibility would be unaffected because bombers would remain 

for shows of force. Survivability, however, would be diminished because 

adversaries would not confront the attack problem presented by a large 

force of silo-based ICBMs. The submarine-ICBM dyad would lack real 

options for shows of force. The entire dyad also would be vulnerable to 

improvements in opposing missile defenses. Both dyad alternatives would 

be less adaptable than the triad. With regard to lethality and flexibility, 

adjustments in the submarine-bomber dyad could be made to offset some 

of the capabilities lost by the elimination of ICBMs. For the submarineICBM dyad, the offsets might involve development and deployment of 

new systems.

Notes
Guthe

343

 

1 Department of Defense (DoD), Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 

2010), 21-24; and Statement by President Barack Obama on the Release of Nuclear Posture Review, Office of the 

White House Press Secretary (April 6, 2010). 2 DoD, Nuclear Posture Review Report, op. cit., 21; and Janne E. Nolan, An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons 

and American Security After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999), 52-55.

3 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Future Reduction 

and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (signed April 8, 2010), Article II.

4 Amy F. Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, R41219 (Washington, D.C.: 

Congressional Research Service, June 18, 2010), 19.

5 Unclassified fact sheet on the New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans report, submitted 

by the President to the Congress in response to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010 (May 13, 2010); and DoD, Nuclear Posture Review Report, op. cit., 21.

6 See, for example, Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testimony before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee (July 9, 2009), committee transcript, 22. 

7 “1,000 Trident Patrols: SSBNs the Cornerstone of Strategic Deterrence,” Navy News Service (Feb. 24, 2009).

8 See Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0 (Washington, D.C.: 

Department of Defense, Dec. 2006).

9 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, 

R41129 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 27, 2010), 4, 8-9.

10 James N. Miller, principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee (July 20, 2010), prepared statement, 3 and committee transcript, 21; and Vice Adm. John T. 

Blake, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources, testimony before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee (May 6, 2010), committee transcript, 27. According to Dr. Miller, DoD plans to sustain 

the B-52H through 2035 and the B-2 through 2050. 11 On the life extension programs for warheads and bombs, see Government Accountability Office, NNSA and DOD 

Need to More Effectively Manage the Stockpile Life Extension Program, GAO-09-385 (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Accountability Office, March 2009). Because of deficiencies in the nuclear weapons infrastructure 

(labs, plants and workforce), “the United States is now the only nuclear weapons state party to the [NonProliferation Treaty] that does not have the capacity to produce a new nuclear warhead.” Moreover, “[t]he United 

States has not designed a new nuclear warhead since the 1980s and has not built a new nuclear warhead since the 

early 1990s.” Department of Energy and Department of Defense, National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 

21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy and Department of Defense, Sept. 2008), 19 (emphasis in 

original).

12 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, NASIC-1031-0985-09 (WrightPatterson Air Force Base, Ohio: National Air and Space Intelligence Center, April 2009), 19.

13 The Defense Department formally defines deterrence as, “The prevention from action by fear of the 

consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable 

counteraction.” Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2001—as amended through April 2010), 139. 14 For an early discussion of the distinction between deterrence by threat of punishment and deterrence by denial, see

Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. 

Press, 1961), 14-16.

15 Active defenses are military systems designed for intercepting aircraft and missiles in flight. Examples of passive 

defenses include command posts that are underground or mobile, redundant (duplicate) military and industrial 

facilities, and plans for crisis dispersal of civilian populations, all of which are intended to mitigate the consequences 

of an attack.

16 Robert Standish Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, US-USSR Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1946-1990, NWD 

90-2 (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, May 15, 1990), 2; J.C. Hopkins and Sheldon A. 

Goldberg, The Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1986 (The Fortieth Anniversary History) (Offutt Air 

Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Sept. 1, 1986), 65, 98, 147; Dick 

Cheney, Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, Feb. 

1992), 59; U.S. Air Force, “LGM-30G Minuteman III,” fact sheet (July 26, 2010); and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. 
Guthe

344

 

Strategic Submarine Patrols Continue at Near Cold War Tempo,” FAS [Federation of American Scientists] Strategic 

Security Blog (March 16, 2009), http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp. 

17 Circular error probable is the radius of the circle within which half the weapons are expected to fall.

18 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and [JCS Chairman] Adm. 

[Michael] Mullen from the Pentagon (Feb. 1, 2010), transcript, DoD release; and Department of Defense, 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Feb. 2010), 33.

19 On the limitations of deterrent threats backed by conventional forces, see Edward Rhodes, “Conventional 

Deterrence,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July-Sept. 2000), 221-253.

20 Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: King’s 

Crown Press, 1956), 232-261. 21 Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978).

22 Hopkins and Goldberg, The Development of Strategic Air Command, op. cit., 14, 59, 73, 108-109; Samuel R. 

Williamson, Jr., with the collaboration of Steven L. Rearden, The View from Above: High-Level Decisions and the 

Soviet-American Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1950 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the OSD [Office of the 

Secretary of Defense] Historian, Oct. 1975), (Top Secret/Restricted Data; declassified in part), 104, 106, 111, 

http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/rdroom.html; Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, 

D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 103, 105; Robert J. Watson, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Vol. IV: Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 65, 66-67; Dwight D. Eisenhower, The 

White House Years, Vol. II: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), Chapter 11, 

“Landing in Lebanon,” esp. p. 59; Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on 

the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), esp. 49-52, 94-96; Robert Kipp, Lynn Peake, and 

Herman Wolk, Strategic Air Command Operations in the Cuban Crisis of 1962, Historical Study No. 90, Vol. I

(Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Strategic Air Command, 1963), (Top Secret/Formerly Restricted Data/ No Foreign 

Dissemination; declassified in part, 2008), 33-78, http://www.gwu/~nsarchiv/; and Barry M. Blechman and Douglas 

M. Hart, “The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis,” International Security, Vol. 7, 

No. 1 (Summer 1982), 132-156.

23 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1982), 591. 24 At present, only the D5 SLBM line remains open. Department of the Navy, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget 

Estimates: Justification of Estimates—Weapons Procurement (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, Feb. 

2010).

25 U.S. Navy, “Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines,” fact sheet, Navy Fact File (May 11, 2009).

26 Kristensen, “U.S. Strategic Submarine Patrols Continue at Near Cold War Tempo,” op. cit.

27 Unclassified fact sheet on the New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans report, op. cit.

28 Congressional Budget Office, Rethinking the Trident Force (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 

July 1993), 10. Special fittings would be required for the D5 to carry 12 Mk-4 RVs.

29 Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, RL33640 (Washington, 

D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Jan. 20, 2010), 17.

30 Loc. cit. There are, in fact, more W76 warheads in the strategic force as a whole than warheads of any other type. 

See Thomas Scheber, Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues, United States Nuclear Strategy 

Forum Publication No. 0005 (Fairfax, Va.: National Institute Press, August 2007), 9.

31 U.S. Navy, “Trident Fleet Ballistic Missile,” fact sheet, Navy Fact File (Jan. 17, 2009).

32 Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, op. cit., 9.

33 U.S. Air Force, “LGM-30G Minuteman III,” op. cit.

34 Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, op. cit., 10-11.

35 Unclassified fact sheet on the New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans report, op. cit.

36 Department of Energy, FY 2012 Congressional Budget Request, Vol. 1: National Nuclear Security 

Administration, DOE/CF-0057 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, Feb. 2011), 67, 69. 

37 U.S. Air Force, “LGM-30G Minuteman III,” op. cit.

38 Rebecca Grant, Return of the Bomber: The Future of Long Range Strike (Arlington, Va.: Air Force Association, 

Feb. 2007), 10-15.

39 U.S. Air Force, Long Range Strike Aircraft White Paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, Nov. 2001), 2; 

Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase I Report: The Air Force’s Nuclear 
Guthe

345

 

Mission (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Sept. 2008), D-1; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, 

"U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2010," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 66, No. 3 (May-June 2010), 58, 65; and Woolf, 

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, op. cit., 20, 21-23.

40 DoD, Nuclear Posture Review Report, op. cit., 24; and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, testimony before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee (June 17, 2010), committee transcript, 8. 

41 Kurt Guthe, Assessments of the Bomber Force: Lessons from the Past, Directions for the Future (Fairfax, Va.: 

National Institute for Public Policy, Dec. 1998), 19. The option to “re-role” the B-1 for nuclear missions was 

eliminated as a result of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. See Adm. James O. Ellis, commander in chief, U.S. 

Strategic Command, in Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for 

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003, Part 7, 107th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2003), 169. 42 “Air Force Global Strike Command Gains Three Bomber Bases,” Air Force News Service (Feb. 2, 2010).

43 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, JCS chairman, news briefing (Sept. 28, 1991), 

transcript, DoD release; and William S. Cohen, Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and the 

Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 92. 44 U.S. Air Force, “AGM-86B/C/D Missiles,” fact sheet (May 24, 2010).

45 William B. Scott, “Test Drops of B61-11 Penetrator Weapon Continue,” Aviation Week & Space Technology

(June 9, 1997), 75-76.

46 U.S. Air Force, Long Range Strike Aircraft White Paper, op. cit., 20.

47 Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters: A Practical 

Guide (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, 2008), 

37.

48 Ibid., 39.

49 U.S. Air Force, “AGM-86B/C/D Missiles,” op. cit.

50 U.S. Air Force, “B-52 Stratofortress,” fact sheet (April 23, 2010); and U.S. Air Force, “B-2 Spirit,” fact sheet 

(April 23, 2010). In-flight refueling can extend these ranges. 51 U.S. Air Force, Long Range Strike Aircraft White Paper, op. cit., 20; and National Research Council of the 

National Academies, Effects of Nuclear Earth Penetrator and Other Weapons (Washington, D.C.: National 

Academies Press, 2005), 3, 13-17, 26-27, 30-51, 110-112.

52 Kipp et al., Strategic Air Command Operations in the Cuban Crisis of 1962, op. cit., 33-59.

53 Maj. Gen. Polly Peyer, chair, Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures

(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, February 8, 2008), 16, 17, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp. 54 Command Historian’s Office, U.S. Strategic Command, History of the United States Strategic Command, June 1, 

1992—October 1, 2002 (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: U.S. Strategic Command, Jan. 2004), 30. 55 Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, prepared statement before the House 

Armed Services Committee (Jan. 21, 2010); and Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, op. cit., 22-23.

56 A Department of Energy-sponsored study done in the early 1980s reported “at times in the past, the warheads for 

a large part of the U.S. [fleet ballistic missile submarine] force have been found to be badly deteriorated. At 

different times, a large fraction of the warheads either obviously or potentially would not work; they were obvious 

or potential duds.” Jack W. Rosengren, Some Little-Publicized Difficulties With a Nuclear Freeze, RDA-TR122116-001 (Marina del Rey, Calif.: R&D Associates, Oct. 1983), 13-20 (the quote is from p. 13). See also Walter 

Pincus, “Scientists Bare Warhead Duds on ‘60s Polaris,” Washington Post (Dec. 2, 1978). 57 DoD, Nuclear Posture Review Report, op. cit., 22, 25, 38.

58 J.D. Crouch II, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, “Challenges of a New CapabilityBased Defense Strategy: ‘Transforming US Strategic Forces,’” briefing to the National Defense Industrial 

Association 2003 Science & Engineering Technology Conference (March 5, 2003), briefing slide 21, “Nuclear 

Forces and Contingencies.”

59 National Research Council, Effects of Nuclear Earth Penetrator and Other Weapons, op. cit., 20.

60 Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress, 

RL33067 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Jan. 26, 2009), 7-8.

61 Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February 2004), 7-8, 7-18—7-19.

62 C4

ISR refers to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Guthe

346

 63 Thomas Scheber, “Whither the Triad: Considerations for a Triad, Dyad, or Monad,” in Taylor Bolz, ed., In the 

Eyes of the Experts: Analysis and Comments on America’s Strategic Posture (Washington, D.C.: United States 

Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 73.

64 DoD, Nuclear Posture Review Report, op. cit., 24; U.S. Air Force, Long Range Strike Aircraft White Paper, op. 

cit., 2, 20; Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase I Report, op. cit., D-1; 

Norris and Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2010,” op. cit., 58, 65; Secretary of Defense Gates, testimony before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee (June 17, 2010), op. cit., 8; and Crouch, “Challenges of a New CapabilityBased Defense Strategy,” op. cit.
CHAPTER 12

The Role of Strategic Communication in 

Deterrence: Lesson from History

Richard H. Estes

Gone are the Cold War days of an enemy one could count on, the 

isometric exercise of two enormous powers leaning against each other to 

keep the military balance. No more alarming encounters as the nuclear 

clock ticked to zero, and seemingly beyond, with great nuclear forces a 

word away from launch, and the world an hour away from a war after 

which "the survivors would envy the dead." 1

During the Cold War the United States and its primary allies relied 

on a policy of deterrence to prevent the Soviet Union and its allies from 

starting a central nuclear war and from escalating crises or regional 

conflicts to that level.

To maintain an effective deterrent to war and escalation of 

conflicts, most believe seven essential elements needed to be in place: 

1. A U.S. and allied capability that could inflict an unacceptable 

level of damage in retaliation to an attack.

2. The will to use this retaliatory capability if the United States, 

its allies or vital interests were attacked or severely threatened.

3. The ability to effectively communicate both the U.S. will and 

its overwhelming retaliatory capability to adversary leaders so 

the U.S. deterrence threat was credible and understood. 

4. The capability to survive an enemy attack and still retaliate 

with overwhelming force. 

5. The capability to correctly and speedily identify the origins of 

any large-scale attack. 

6. Knowledge of the locations of the attackers and the capability 

to reach their vital assets in response.
Estes

348

7. A rational opponent who would understand all of the above and 

who, in self interest, would be dissuaded from risky aggressive 

behavior that could lead to central nuclear war.

During the Cold War period of 1945-1991, perhaps the closest the 

superpowers came to nuclear war was the October 1962 Cuban Missile 

Crisis. Rational behavior finally prevailed, and as a result, there was "the 

dawning of another day" – the metaphor used for the end of the crisis in 

the 2000 movie The Thirteen Days. This came about through a series of 

decisions, understandings, misunderstandings and blind alleys all 

communicated in some form among enemies. And that communication, 

that strategic communication, was essential in deterring both the United 

States and the Soviet Union from taking action that could quite possibly 

have spelled an end to civilization as we know it. 

We face a somewhat different challenge in the 21st century. The 

world has stepped back from the Armageddon threatened by the Cold 

War, but has moved down a different path with dangers of its own. As 

nuclear weapons proliferate, and tensions rise in areas of the world where 

nuclear weapons have spread and exist, the threat of a smaller state or 

terrorist organization using one or more nuclear weapons to wreak havoc 

on a rival regional enemy or on the United States becomes ever more 

likely. The nuclear club has now grown to include not only the big five 

(United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom), but also 

North Korea, Pakistan, India and reportedly, Israel. The Iranian and North 

Korea nuclear weapons programs may well spur their regional adversaries 

also to seek nuclear arms.

Nuclear know-how is available. A number of states which had 

nuclear weapons have now given them up: South Africa, Ukraine, 

Kazakhstan and Belarus. Libya nearly acquired nuclear arms through the 

black market before giving up its pursuit under pressure. Clearly, there is 

a widespread knowledge today of how to create highly enriched uranium 

or bomb-grade plutonium, as well as how to weaponize these highly 

explosive materials. While mounting such weapons on missiles or 

delivering them by aircraft or other means is somewhat more problematic, 

that knowledge is available as well. Deterring such attacks requires 

solving a variety of different equations, some with more variables. But 
Estes

349

one of the pivotal tools for solving that deterrence of war problem will 

again be strategic communication.

Effective strategic communication is at the heart of effective 

deterrence. It is public diplomacy, public relations, declaratory policy and 

actions that combine to send a deterrence message. It's all the ways a 

country or organization presents its intentions to its audience and attempts 

to influence that audience. Deterrence of war, escalation or proliferation 

relies heavily on messages of strategic communication, and those 

messages have little effect if they are not credible. To demonstrate 

credibility in the post-Cold War world, military power is necessary, but 

not sufficient. For deterrence of war to work, the United States must have 

a coherent message, the message must be well-explained, and others in the 

world must understand and buy into the message, whether from an allied 

or adversarial point of view. 

The strategic deterrence policy of the United States is among the 

most important for this country, and one that must be virtually perfect. In 

a coherent strategic communication plan, one that conveys the nuclear 

retaliatory power and will of the United States, the threshold for the use of 

nuclear weapons should be the centerpiece of the U.S. deterrence posture. 

For this enterprise to be successful the United States must have the 

absolute confidence and respect of its various audiences – and its threat of 

retaliation must be credible.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review

As this was written, the United States had just concluded its 

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR); a top-to-bottom look at all matters nuclear 

performed at the start of each administration. This review forms the 

foundation for the strategic deterrence policy and its underlying strategic 

communication plan of the United States. The 2010 NPR lays out the 

strategy and capability required to deter war, to deter escalation of 

ongoing conflict and is mated with a nuclear nonproliferation policy to 

reduce nuclear threats. This story, this vision the United States wishes to 

project, at once must be credible and at the same time be backed by 

policies that match the philosophical objectives.
Estes

350

The Nuclear Posture Review for the Obama administration had the 

benefit of front-end guidance from the President, namely his speech made 

in Prague in April of 2009.2

 The speech outlined four goals for his 

nuclear weapons national strategy:

1. Negotiation of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 

START) 

2. United States ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 

3. Strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 

which was reviewed in 2010. 

4. Locking down of all fissile material worldwide inside four years to 

prevent it from falling into hostile hands. 

The Prague speech was declaratory policy, a clear and 

unambiguous statement on the record that outlines the intentions of the 

President and the United States.3

This NPR, unlike any before it, is first and foremost a product of 

the front office, and the document does represent policies the President 

controls. President Obama was "making editing changes in the Nuclear 

Posture Review right up to the last minutes before it was to go to press,” 

says William J. Perry, defense secretary in the Clinton administration.

 Such statements are elements of 

strategic communication and help convey the vision of the United States. 

In President Obama's speech, he clearly lays out where he would like to 

lead the country and the world vis a vis nuclear weapons. But all four 

goals require the cooperation and approval of others. The first and third 

are treaties that require agreements with other countries and eventual 

ratification by the United States Senate. The Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty, part of the push for controlling nuclear spread, was concluded in 

1996 but has not yet been ratified by Congress. The President has told the 

world the direction he wishes to take, but that direction is anything but 

sure. But his willingness to enter into and abide by treaties with respect to 

nuclear weapons, rather than only take unilateral actions, is a strategic 

communication message all by itself and signals a declaratory policy that 

is a departure from the policies of the George W. Bush administration.

4

 In 

the past, this document was always important in the halls of the Pentagon 

and the scientific world, but had never risen to the level of political policy. 
Estes

351

But this NPR is presidential declaratory policy, and such emphasis 

reinforces its effectiveness as strategic communication.

Among the key conclusions of the NPR: 

• The United States will continue to strengthen conventional 

capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring 

non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of 

nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the 

sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. 

• The United States would consider the use of nuclear weapons only 

in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United 

States or its allies and partners.

• The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 

against non-nuclear states party to the NPT and is in compliance 

with their non-proliferation obligations.5

The language in the report concerned some the United States had 

not foresworn the first use of nuclear weapons. It concerned others the 

United States had been too transparent with non-nuclear states that may 

use chemical or biological weapons against it knowing in advance the 

penalty would not be nuclear, provided they were toeing the line with 

regard to the NPT. 

But no one could say the administration’s policy was not clearly 

communicated. And a reasonable case could be made the policy was 

credible. In the document, the administration made no claims not backed 

up. For instance, in the case of stating publicly the United States would 

not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country in compliance with 

the NPT, it merely stated the obvious. The threat of nuclear attack against 

a non-nuclear state as a policy may have excited some hard-liners in the 

past, but in fact almost no one believed the United States would have 

lowered the nuclear-use threshold to that level if the survival of the 

country were not in question; the threat of “nuking them back to the stone 

age” was simply not credible.

Leaving some ambiguity in the public declarations was good 

strategic communication as well. Allowing nuclear states, or those on the 
Estes

352

road to nuclear weapons such as Iran, to wonder just what the United 

States would do is effective strategic communication too, particularly 

when the target set has been narrowed significantly by eliminating the 

non-nuclear states as targets for possible nuclear retaliation. A state may 

be more deterred from acquiring its own nuclear weapons when it realizes 

the crosshairs of the United States and other nuclear states could be on it 

as a result of its acquisition. 

The ambiguity implied in not stating a policy of “no first use” is 

also useful as a deterrent. After all, first use was an unstated policy option 

during most of the Cold War in Western Europe to be ready to blunt the 

superior numbers of a conventional Warsaw Pact attack. Not taking the 

option off the table now is credible and good strategic communication 

provided the President and his national security team is willing, and seen

to be willing to use nuclear weapons in some contingencies. 

If the 2010 NPR, underpinned by the President's Prague speech, is 

a blueprint for the future, what did strategic communication look like 

during the Cold War?

Communicating Deterrence Threats 

During the Cold War

The various deterrence strategies used by the United States and the 

Soviet Union are well known to those who lived through those years, 

particularly those who participated actively. In some respects, strategic 

communication for deterrence of war was much simpler during the years 

following World War II and before the fall of the Berlin Wall. There were 

two major super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. A 

fabulously expensive arms race kept military capabilities at rough parity, 

rational leaders headed each country and both countries realized a nuclear 

war between them might possibly spell the end of civilization.

Despite endless variations on the theme – missile gaps, missile 

defenses, first use, survivable second strike, counterforce strategies, 

countervailing strategies, massive retaliation, flexible response and others 

– all focused on the same goal: not allowing the other side to gain enough 

of an edge that it thought it could win a nuclear war. To deter the Soviets 

or any other adversary from war or escalation, each side thought it 
Estes

353

important to communicate clearly to the other the existence of sufficient 

survivable retaliatory capability to make an attack by its rival futile at best, 

and, at worst, suicidal. Each side strove to communicate enough 

capability and will to use that capability to deter the other. This was 

strategic communication.

The United States and the Soviet Union deterred one another from 

nuclear attack by the concept of mutually assured destruction, or MAD, a 

term that actually came into use in the 1960s when coined by Robert 

McNamara. The underlying concept was each side controlled client states 

around the world, and the sponsor superpowers supplied arms and support 

to those clients. In turn, the sponsors could more or less count on those 

smaller states to do their bidding – particularly in time of war – and 

exercised extraordinary control over them in time of crisis. These smaller 

client states became part of the stalemate. The threat of nuclear war at the 

superpower level lessened the threat of conflict at the client state level out 

of fear such a war would escalate out of control. There were wars, to be 

sure – in the Middle East, Korea, Southeast Asia and others – but the 

superpowers kept a lid on these conflicts. This balance of power during 

the Cold War period brought a tense, stomach-churning, five-minutes-tomidnight sort of stability for close to 50 years. And stability and bi-polar 

alignment made strategic communication and resulting deterrence ever so 

much simpler than today. 

Why was deterrence and its vehicle, strategic communication, 

easier then? Primarily, it was because each side had a single audience. Of 

course China was a player to some degree, and the "China Card" was a 

factor in some of the thinking between the two super powers over the 

years. But, essentially, if the Soviet Union and the United States deterred 

one another, stability in the largest sense reigned throughout most of the 

world. Interestingly, this stalemate that could end civilization if broken 

played out with a set of rules, underpinned by the concept an accidental

war would be the cruelest of fates. Each side carefully monitored the 

activity of the other, and each side also informed the other when exercises 

or launches that could appear threatening took place so the opponent 

would not draw the wrong conclusion and launch on warning 6

Further, the two powers established elaborate, direct 

communications methods to discuss any movements or crises that required 

when the 

circumstances were actually benign. 
Estes

354

immediate and personal contact to provide assurance to the other side or to 

negotiate. The famous "hot line" between the two countries, originally a 

teletype at the Pentagon installed after the Cuban Missile Crisis, is an 

example of such a communications tool. 

All of the forgoing underscores the fact people on both sides were 

and are in the decision loop, and what looked like a reasonably straightforward deterrence equation during the Cold War was run by "by people 

who [were] ignorant of many facts, people who [could] be gripped by 

anger or fear, people who make mistakes—sometimes dreadful 

mistakes."7

 These were rational actors who tended to act like human 

beings in time of crisis, and these same rational actors saw the need for 

very careful communication, both tactical and strategic, to ensure 

deterrence held. It almost didn't in 1962. 

The Cuban Missile Crisis and Strategic Communication

President John F. Kennedy’s foreign policy during the first year of 

his administration was a succession of failures starting with the ill-fated 

Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, followed by the June-November 1961 

Berlin crisis during which the U.S.S.R. sealed off East Berlin by building 

a wall through the city while the United States did little but file diplomatic 

protests. The year was further marred by the March 1961 communist 

offensives in Laos that brought most of that country under their control. 

The year 1961 was also the year Nikita Khrushchev addressed the United 

Nations and pounded his shoe on the lectern to the dismay of the western 

world. The year 1961 also saw the Soviet Union exploding the world’s 

largest nuclear explosion in a test estimated at 50 megatons. 

Further, at the 1961 Vienna summit conference Khrushchev 

shouted across the negotiating table at the young American president, 

appearing to shake him. It seemed clear the Soviet leader’s perception of 

John Kennedy was of an inexperienced and timid decision-maker who 

could be bullied. It is in this context the Soviet leader apparently decided 

to gamble by sneaking nuclear weapons, and missiles with which to 

launch them, into Cuba in the early fall of 1962. 

The United States had long adhered to the Monroe Doctrine that 

admonished other great powers to avoid imperialistic adventures in the 
Estes

355

Western Hemisphere. The Kennedy administration had indeed verbally 

warned the Soviet leadership against putting nuclear weapons or 

establishing a major military buildup in Cuba and had been assured it 

contemplated no such moves – right up to the event itself. The U.S.S.R. 

leadership then did just what it said it would not do, only to be discovered 

by U.S. intelligence before it had presented the nuclear fait accompli in 

Cuba. 

Up until that point, U.S. deterrence policy had failed in terms of 

preventing the U.S.S.R. nuclear build-up in Cuba. U.S. strategic 

communication failed because, despite having superior nuclear forces and 

having verbally warned the Soviets against stationing nuclear arms in 

Cuba, the Soviet leader simply did not believe President Kennedy had the 

will to act against such a provocation. Khrushchev had underestimated 

President Kennedy, seeing in him the pattern of ineffectiveness and 

indecision at Vienna, Berlin, Cuba and during the Bay of Pigs disaster. 

U.S. verbal strategic communications were not congruent with previous 

U.S. actions “on the ground.” U.S. words of warning did not match its 

deeds and JFK did not personally impress the Secretary General of the 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 

However, once the missiles were discovered, President Kennedy

toughened his stance, turning to clear and decisive verbal and action 

communications, which eventually caused the Soviet leadership to 

backtrack and reverse course on its policy by withdrawing the nuclear 

weapons and missiles from Cuba. Kennedy’s public televised warning to 

the Soviet Union made it all but impossible for him to retreat and permit 

the Soviet gambit. In fact he was so committed publicly, that to retreat at 

that point would have likely resulted in calls for impeachment. His public 

and private communications during the missile crisis matched his actions – 

a blockade of Cuba accompanied by a massive buildup of military force 

opposite Cuba’s. 

The Soviet leaders were given absolutely crystal clear 

communication that the option was withdrawal or war, and that war would 

likely be nuclear war – at a time when the U.S.S.R. was at a military 

disadvantage. The U.S. strategic communication during the 13 days of the 

crisis was magnificent – a stark contrast from the previous 20 months 

where perceived weakness and lack of credibility were the hallmarks. The 
Estes

356

Kennedy administration strategic communication package included a well 

coordinated media campaign. 

The President’s televised challenge to the Soviet missile buildup 

left him little public room to reverse course, a fact Khrushchev had to 

realize. The U.S.S.R. had been put in the position of retreating or risking 

a nuclear exchange. In the second week of the crisis, JFK’s team took the 

communications initiative – mobilizing U.S. public opinion, allied public 

opinion, and world public opinion to back the U.S. position and isolate the 

Soviet Union. U.S. United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson 

dramatically presented the U.S. intelligence results to the U.N. Security 

Council, an event reported by the world press. Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary 

of State, called for a meeting of the Organization of American States 

(OAS) where U.S. representatives briefed Latin American allies on the 

developments and the Soviet threat in the Caribbean. U.S. officials 

briefed NATO allies. Meanwhile the United States and Soviet Officials 

exchanged diplomatic threats and possible solutions. 

Outside the public eye, Attorney General Robert Kennedy and 

other U.S. representatives met with Soviet diplomats to search for a 

peaceful solution. One was eventually found and negotiated, an 

agreement where U.S. Jupiter Missiles were to be withdrawn from Turkey

in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles and nuclear weapons from 

Cuba. The bargain was sealed, and its compromise terms agreed upon by 

the Soviet leadership only if the United States kept the promise to remove 

missiles from Turkey, an undisclosed secret during the Cuban drawdown. 

This solution helped preserve JFK’s reputation, as well as his ability to 

keep a lid on escalation pressures from his critics.

Strategic communication in the Cuban Missile Crisis played a 

large role in the build-up to the crisis. There could be no doubt it played a 

crucial role in its resolution. Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged letters. 

Khrushchev communicated through a businessman who happened to be in 

Moscow, and back channels in Washington were used, including ABC 

reporter John Scali. Diplomats in countries far removed from the crisis 

floated proposals intended to reach the principals, direct diplomacy 

between the administration and Ambassador Dobrynin took place in 

Washington and confrontations occurred at the United Nations. 

Communications were all over the map, and an atmosphere prevailed of, if 

not ‘try anything,” at least ‘let’s make sure we are exploring all avenues.’
Estes

357

Further, communications were slow in 1962, and the delay had two 

implications. First, each side had a few hours to interpret messages and 

decide courses of action. This aspect had the obvious down side of 

allowing each to misinterpret messages and take the wrong action – which 

almost happened on more than one occasion during the crisis. Second, the 

crisis suffered from lack of direct communication at the highest level, 

leaving messages to be sent through lower echelons and back channels 

with more inherent delay and chance for inappropriate action before the 

decision makers were privy to the latest thinking or offer. The delays and 

the routing of the letters from Chairman Khrushchev allowed President 

Kennedy and his Executive Committee to use the tactic of ignoring a 

second, more intractable, letter of uncertain provenance and to respond to 

the first which gave some breathing room. 

A case can be made the crisis was an inexorable slide into a war 

neither side wanted – but was saved by rational actors on both sides. An 

equally forceful case can be made that both sides were deterred from the 

start by the destructive and suicidal power that could have been triggered 

all too easily. In any case, a deal was struck.

The overarching implication of the whole crisis was both super 

powers stared down each others' gun barrels more than either would have 

liked. And for all of the tough talk and misinformed adventurism during 

that grim October 48 years ago, the Soviet Union and the United States 

realized they needed to be more careful in their actions and the strategic 

messages sent over the remainder of the Cold War. 

To be sure, the arms race continued between the two diametrically 

opposed ways of life, and both sides spent unimaginable fortunes to 

maintain parity with the other. But, that the world came close to 

Armageddon in 1962 later made the deterrence through careful strategic 

communication a bit easier. Neither side wished to peer over the precipice 

again, and both sides were willing to communicate – and listen. 

This was not a friendly arrangement – far from it. Rather, the two 

adversaries saw clear advantages to not blowing each other to bits and 

proceeded on that basis. The first of a series of arms control agreements, 

SALT I, came in 1972, and while honest men can argue the efficacy of 

arms control over the next 20 or so years, the process did at least signal a 

willingness to reduce tensions – or at a minimum – to talk. So, does that 

mean rationality prevailed during the Cold War? Probably so. But in 
Estes

358

retrospect, given the people involved could have been ignorant of many 

facts and could have been gripped by anger or fear, rationality seems like 

mighty thin gruel.

Robert Kennedy, writing in his memoir of the Cuban Missile 

Crisis, pointed to a key tenet of strategic communication (although the 

term was not yet coined in 1968) when he said, "The final lesson of the 

Cuban Missile Crisis was the importance of placing ourselves in the other 

country's shoes."8

 A corollary of the statement is, because of cultural 

differences and translation, others may not hear the same message being 

sent, and the sender must take care to ensure the message being heard is 

precisely the one intended. Robert Kennedy went on to quote his brother, 

the president, on the concept of leaving the other side the opportunity to 

retreat gracefully:

Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear 

powers must avert those confrontations which bring an 

adversary to the choice of either a humiliating defeat or a 

nuclear war.9

A New and Dangerous World

A combination of effective deterrence and some “plain dumb luck” 

allowed the Cold War to end without a central nuclear war. But 10 years 

after the Soviet Union came apart, a new kind of threat emerged to 

challenge the U.S. and its allies. The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, showed 

the world terrorist ability to commit mayhem on a grand scale. The salient 

questions in many quarters became: what if terrorists get their hands on a 

nuclear weapon? If they acquire such a weapon could they be deterred? 

Could they build one if they had the right materials? Could they buy a 

complete weapon? If they somehow came into possession of one, could 

they smuggle the weapon into the United States or an allied country and 

detonate it?

Two developments amplified these concerns. First, the detection 

of a nuclear technology smuggling and distribution network created and 

operated by Dr. A.Q. Khan, the force behind Pakistan's nuclear weapons 

program. Second, the crumbling of the Soviet Union and the questionable 
Estes

359

state of nuclear weapons security in the 15 republics of the former Soviet 

Union as the union came apart. Add the underpaid or out-of-work former 

Soviet nuclear scientists who could be available to other countries or 

terrorist organizations, and little doubt remained why President George W. 

Bush declared in 2002: 

The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of 

radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly 

declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, 

and evidence indicates that they are doing so with 

determination.10

Three Goals, Three Audiences

During the Cold War era, the United States had three major 

deterrence goals: (1) deterrence of armed attacks and major warfare; (2) 

deterrence of escalation of any military conflict to the level of use of 

weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological or 

nuclear); and (3) deterrence of the proliferation of WMD from one state or 

group to another. All three apply today. 

To pursue those goals, an effective strategic communication effort 

needs to be consistent, unified and plausible if it is to help the United 

States deter war, escalation and WMD proliferation. First, all elements of 

the administration need to speak with one integrated voice to the rest of 

the world. Second, once the U.S. deterrence policies are agreed upon, 

every opportunity needs to be used for broadcasting those policies to rival 

and allied audiences so they are clearly understood and emphasized. 

Third, actions and words must be coordinated to communicate the same 

messages:

• Military aggression against the United States, its vital interest and 

its allies will be so severely dealt with the aggressor could not bear 

the cost.

• The United States has escalation dominance making escalation of 

any ongoing conflict counterproductive in the extreme. 
Estes

360

• Nuclear proliferation, either by the state acquiring or the state 

assisting such efforts, will be dealt with so severely that those that 

go down that path will suffer losses that far exceed any gains in 

security and prosperity. 

As the United States goes about nuclear deterrence in the 21st

century, it also has three distinct audiences to consider: leaders of 

adversary nation-states, leaders of terrorist organizations and leaders of 

allied countries that depend on U.S. protection from the first two. Any 

strategic communication campaign must carefully delineate between these 

three.

Deterrence of military attacks or conflict escalation by other states 

in the international system still relies on the seven elements that helped 

deter superpower war during the Cold War. However, as noted elsewhere 

in the essays on tailored deterrence, each rival state is different in 

leadership, in regional pressures, in political history, strategic culture, 

military capability and situational awareness. Thus, the deterrence 

message must be tailored so rival leaders clearly understand the likely 

costs of starting or escalating a war or becoming a WMD proliferator and 

are presented with a persuasive package of messages, verbal and kinetic, 

that deter and contain them. 

Deterring Iran and North Korea

Deterrence of war, WMD use and WMD proliferation through 

strategic communication leans heavily on engagement – both with our 

allies (who can help bring pressure to bear on mutual adversaries and who 

must be convinced of U.S. backing in the face of growing dangers) and 

directly with those adversaries.

The USAF Counterproliferation Center has proposed increased 

engagement with our allies and adversaries in some of its earlier work on 

strategic communication.11 The central theme at the time was the United 

States did not have an effective government-wide integrated strategic 

communication campaign in place. Further, such a campaign when built 

must be more than just a public relations effort, and if such a campaign 

were to be successful, it should have a significant component focused on 

telling the U.S.'s story concerning WMD.
Estes

361

The United States was reasonably effective with its demonstration 

of action when it invaded Iraq in 2003, sending the clear message it would 

not tolerate a rogue state with a WMD program. While the invasion took 

place based on faulty intelligence and may have been ill-advised, it 

certainly had an effect around the world. Libya may have given up its 

WMD programs partially as a result of that demonstration. And we may 

never know if other countries decided to abandon or not start a weapons 

program as a result.

But, “The United States turned heads with its message of 

willingness to use force, but failed utterly in communicating the 

righteousness of the cause. The critical element missing was a coherent 

message – using precise and planned words, together with other 

instruments of influence, to explain to the world why the United States 

was worthy of being followed – and if not followed, at least 

understood.”12

Now the United States faces North Korea and Iran and their 

weapons programs. President Obama has indicated a willingness to 

engage both, but has significantly fewer cards to play than did his 

predecessor when he dealt with Iraq. North Korea already has detonated 

at least two nuclear weapons, however primitive, and is de facto in the 

nuclear club, even if its ability to deliver the weapons remains 

questionable. An Iraq-like invasion to preempt the use of those weapons 

is problematic at best and a formula for disaster at worst. Iran is not as far 

along in its program, but has developed the ability to enrich uranium (it is 

not clear North Korea has that capability) and has hardened most of its 

nuclear facilities, as has North Korea. Again, for that reason and others, a 

preemptive invasion of Iran does not seem advisable in the short term. 

Containment through deterrence is the fallback position of the United 

States if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon capability as it seems poised to 

do. 

In both cases, strategic communication is necessary, but probably 

not sufficient. While engagement is clearly in order, the United States and 

its allies must be prepared for continued obfuscation from governments 

that as a minimum do not think and function as ours does and are quite 

possibly irrational at times. Strategic communication is probably more 

effectively applied with our allies, partners and those who have more 

influence with North Korea and Iran than does the United States. These 
Estes

362

coalitions of sorts can be used to isolate the two countries and to bring 

pressure to bear. 

The sense of the entire world being against these rogue states 

should be a very effective strategic communication message in itself, but 

the danger always exists that the isolation could drive them to believe 

nuclear weapons are all the more necessary – a fine line the U.S. and its 

allies must walk.

Communications messages normally consist of a theme, a delivery 

method and the audience. In North Korea, the audience almost certainly 

must be the government and specifically Kim Jong Il. No civil society 

exists to speak of, NGOs are not trusted and the average citizen has no 

access to the outside world. He hears what the government wants him to 

hear. Pure communications directed at anyone but the highest members of 

the government are not likely to have much effect. Further clouding the 

strategic communication front is security issues tend to trump the plight of 

the population in dealings with North Korea.13

On the other hand, Iran seems a richer target ripe for strategic 

communication. There are two distinct audiences, the government and the 

population – and the former really has two factions. Ahmadinejad’s 

alarming rhetoric may or may not represent the full position of the Iranian 

government, since the supreme leader of the country is the religious 

leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, himself a hard-liner, but perhaps not 

always in consonance with his president. The population of Iran is 

reasonably open and proud of its country, but is not as anti-West as its 

leadership. As such, it represents a potential audience, or target, for a 

strategic communication campaign.

 Themes and delivery 

methods are almost moot if the only audience is a 68-year-old stroke 

victim with an out-sized sense of entitlement.

14

Despite being brutally put down, the protesters demonstrated 

information flowed in and out of Iran. And Iranians have had access to 

the internet for some years, although the Iranian government maintains the 

capability of blocking or slowing access, as it did earlier this year.

 Further, the typical man on the 

street in Iran has more access to the outside by far than do the people of 

North Korea. For example, the 2009 election uprisings in Iran were 

broadcast around the world thanks to the protesters’ access to Twitter.

15 

Methods of reaching the population are there, and the Iranian people seem 

to be willing to take risks to reach the outside world. 
Estes

363

The United States and allies appear to be using all of the strategic 

communication avenues open to them: attempting to drive a wedge 

between the population and the government, trying to separate the two 

factions of government, isolating the country through diplomatic pressure 

and sanctions, engaging directly with leadership, and making direct 

demands. Perhaps the most likely avenue for success is a popular uprising 

similar to 1979, but in reverse – against the theocracy. But such a shifting 

of the tectonic plates in Persia will undoubtedly come well after 

acquisition of Iranian nuclear weapons, leaving the world left to deter their 

use, not their development.

Communication and Deterring Terrorist WMD Use

Deterring a terrorist organization from acquiring or using WMDs 

is quite another matter. Brian Jenkins of RAND says we have already 

failed in one sense in deterrence: two out of five people in the United 

States consider it likely a terrorist organization will detonate a nuclear 

weapon on our soil in the foreseeable future. This, despite as far as we 

know, no terrorist organization has a nuclear weapon, nor does it presently 

appear to have the means or material to build one. 

Yet Jenkins makes the case al-Qaeda or some other organization 

already is a terrorist nuclear power since, as Alfred Hitchcock put it, "The 

terror is not in the bang, only in the anticipation of it."16

Prudence dictates one assumes this worst case when trying to 

prevent the unimaginable from happening. But Lewis Dunn of SAIC 

postulates possession may not be the whole story since a detonation of a 

nuclear weapon by a terrorist organization could be perceived as so 

horrible as to be damaging to the terrorist's cause, or the weapon could be 

deemed too valuable as a tool of blackmail to be expended.

 That may be, but 

many believe if a terrorist organization is able to obtain a nuclear weapon, 

it will not be at all deterrable, and if it can find a way to employ it, it will

do so. 

17 Brian 

Jenkins would support this latter possibility. Still, as Admiral Richard 

Mies, former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, says in Jenkins’ 

book, "How do you deter or dissuade someone whose reward is in the 

'afterlife?'"18
Estes

364

The short answer is you probably don’t, in the current 

environment. People who kill thousands at once by flying airplanes into 

buildings are unlikely to hesitate to detonate a nuclear weapon if they have 

one. Neither are terrorists who are willing to make their final act on this 

earth a suicide bombing. 

Three avenues are open to us to stop this potential game-changer. 

First is to marshal all of our intelligence and law enforcement capability, 

and that of our allies, to stop terrorists or terrorist smuggling networks 

from obtaining the material to make a bomb or from getting a complete 

weapon itself. A subset of this approach is to ensure all weapons and 

materials are first known and then secured. The knowing and securing 

become more difficult the farther one removes himself from the first 

world. 

The second method, and this is strategic communication, is to 

encourage, to demand, the nations of the world band together to isolate 

those who would traffic these sorts of materials and particularly to isolate 

those who would use the weapons. And that demand needs to be specific 

about actions the United States will take against a country or organization 

that, willingly or otherwise, supports nuclear terror. This means of 

deterring WMD use by terrorists threatens those that supply and support 

their WMD efforts. This deterrence is directed at supporters rather than 

the possibly undeterrable terrorists. 

The third way is to change the environment. This does not imply 

appeasing terrorists. Rather it is a sincere campaign of confidence 

building, of maintaining the moral high ground (or regaining it if one 

believes the United States is somewhere below the peak at the moment) 

and of understanding what other cultures are hearing as it communicates.

It means leadership and persuading the countries of the world to follow the 

United States because they see it in their own best interest to cooperate

because they want to, not just because our country is rich and powerful. 

Rather, a U.S. strategic communications plan to deter war, escalation and 

WMD proliferation must show the United States leadership and military 

capability is in the best interests of all its allies and most of the world 

community and, hence, worthy of their support. 
Estes

365

U.S. Nuclear Posture and the Nonproliferation Regime

As the United States continues to nudge, pull, threaten and 

otherwise exert influence on the rest of the world with regard to the 

nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, it must be able to look those other 

countries directly in the eye and say, "This is our position on 

nonproliferation, here's how we are reducing our arsenal and making the 

world safer, and here is how we are posturing the remainder of our forces 

to maximize deterrence, while minimizing the potential that these weapons 

will ever be used again." If the United States, the only country to ever use 

nuclear weapons, can make that case for the moral high ground, the United 

States will be effectively using strategic communication.

To berate other countries on nuclear programs without first clearly 

explaining why the United States has the moral authority to do so is a 

tricky business at best. The United States does have that authority, but in 

past years it has not made a good case for it in the theater of world 

opinion, choosing instead to assume the other players simply will 

understand because of who we are. But our audience wants to know, 

among other things, how the United States intends to carry out its 

obligations under Article VI of the NPT which states:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations 

in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 

arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on 

general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 

control.”19

At the same time, our allies around the world need to be reassured 

the nuclear umbrella the United States has extended over them since 

World War II will be there as its arsenal decreases and its posture is 

reduced. And our adversaries should know whether or not the United 

States will possess sufficient retaliatory capability in the future to make 

any WMD attack futile on their part. They must also be convinced by 

U.S. words and deeds, in a coordinated strategic communication package, 

that the U.S. leadership has the will to use military force to punish any 

attacker who strikes at them.

In this world where there is a natural tension between nuclear 

posture and nonproliferation, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 
Estes

366

combined with the Prague speech the preceding year, the new START

treaty, the Global Nuclear Summit, and the five-year review of the 

Nonproliferation Treaty, does a good job of laying out that case for the 

high ground. The policy taken as a whole allows for a continuing, but 

reducing, nuclear arsenals, with an ultimate goal of zero nuclear weapons 

in the world. But at the same time it acknowledges the realpolitik of 

current times: as long as adversaries have nuclear weapons, the United 

States must have a strong posture for deterrence (including the 

continuation of the nuclear triad of bombers, submarine launched missiles 

and ICBMs), as well as for security guarantees.

The 2010 NPR shores up the NPT regime by foreswearing use of 

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries in compliance with the 

treaty, while leaving extant the possibility of first use if necessary against 

threatening or attacking nuclear states. Then it moves on to state publicly 

our largest threat to security is terrorists with nuclear weapons, and we are 

moving in cooperation with the countries of the world to shut off any 

access to nuclear materials or weapons within four years. Pretty clear and 

credible stuff.

If the United States is to have a consistent policy regarding how to 

deter proliferation by nuclear wannabes, it needs to explain why it treats 

some states differently than others. For example, it needs to better explain 

its seemingly turning a blind eye to Israel’s nuclear weapons program 

while demanding other states adhere to the NPT. Also, it needs to develop 

a convincing rationale to the world as to why it rewards India with trade 

that supports its nuclear power industry while India remains outside the 

NPT and ignores the call to a ban. These are tough issues for the United 

States, but ones with valid policy explanations. Any part of a coherent 

nuclear strategic communication plan should address the exceptions and 

others as they arise, and fully explain why the allowances made for the 

Indias and Israels of the world do not apply to Iran and North Korea, or 

any other questionable state that chooses to start a nuclear weapons 

program. 

Finally, a word on the goal of total nuclear disarmament. The 

approach the United States has chosen in recent years is the only rational 

one available. That is, to work with Russia to reduce the arsenals of both 

countries while still maintaining enough weapons to deter the other, to 

offer security guarantees to each side’s allies, and to offer an 
Estes

367

overwhelming counter to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. The 

goal of going to zero is morally correct, since clearly so long as such 

weapons exist, the world faces the risk of devastation from nuclear wars. 

But as long as opposing sides have them, and as long as rogue 

states see these weapons as the great equalizer, the United States cannot 

go to zero. There is no deterrence value in going to zero in an attempt to 

show leadership; such a move would be perceived by other nations as 

weakness. That is not to say over time world arsenals could not be 

reduced to the point zero is on the horizon. 

But in the near-to-medium term, no such possibility exists, and our 

strategic communication plan should say so. Further it would ease the 

U.S. task of getting world-wide support for its nuclear nonproliferation 

programs and goal if the United States better explained the exceptions for 

Israel and India. Its strategic communications effort on behalf of deterring 

WMD proliferation would be strengthened if a case for such inconsistency 

could be more effectively communicated. 

Communicating the Nuclear-Use Threshold

Taking the moral high ground and having others follow the United 

States depends on having a very high and very credible nuclear-use 

threshold. The world must know the U.S. does not consider a nuclear 

weapon “just another weapon” in its warfighting tool box. It must avoid 

situations such as experienced in Central Europe during the Cold War 

where first use of nuclear weapons was almost an expected choice to blunt 

the attack of the superior numbers of the Warsaw Pact. 

The U.S. leadership can’t think in terms of using nuclear 

penetrators because our conventional weapons don’t dig deep enough. It 

must not revert to the thinking of some in the past that using nuclear 

weapons as a radioactive barrier in North Korea (MacArthur) or against 

the communists in North Vietnam (Goldwater) is an acceptable 

warfighting doctrine. The dividing line between nuclear weapons and 

conventional weapons should be a yawning chasm. Those with a finger 

on the nuclear trigger should realize going nuclear is not just the next step 

in weapons escalation, and to cross that abyss has extraordinary security 

and moral implications. The only possible warfighting use of nuclear 
Estes

368

weapons should be when our back is against the wall, survival is at stake 

and there are no other options.

To put ourselves in that position, the United States must maintain a 

superior conventional force that can take on all potential adversaries, and 

one that can work its will without having to resort to nuclear weapons. 

Sixty-five years after the fire-bombings and destruction of Dresden and 

Tokyo, world opinion and self-restraint also place restraints on 

conventional efforts from causing too many civilian casualties or the 

euphemistic collateral damage. 

Such restrictions militate for the ultimate in precision weapons, 

which the United States currently possesses, but should ensure it 

maintains. In 1984, Freeman Dyson, a noted physicist, actually made a 

case that precision guided munitions (PGMs) could obviate the need for 

nuclear weapons altogether.20

Part of a strong conventional force must be a limited defense 

against ballistic missiles launched from the likes of North Korea or Iran, 

or from larger powers that accidentally launch a single or a very low 

number of missiles. The United States approaches that capability now, 

although some newer systems have been significantly reduced in scope by 

the Obama administration.

 Dyson was about 20 years ahead of his 

time, but the capability of the United States is not far removed from that 

ideal today, particularly with regard to smaller states. As a result, 

President Obama seemed comfortable in foreswearing the use of nuclear 

weapons against the small NPT states and rightly so. 

21

To leave ourselves uncovered against small attacks would be the 

height of irresponsibility and abandoning the Missile Defense Treaty of 

1972 was the only route to conventional insurance against those attacks. 

During the Cold War under that treaty, each side was limited to one local 

system, and many restrictions were placed on testing. Both sides relied on 

MAD as insurance against a missile attack – not much of a defense. As 

Casper Weinberger said in a speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy in the 

early 1990s, MAD put the United States in a position that in order “to be 

perfectly invulnerable, we needed to be perfectly vulnerable.” 

 

Having a high nuclear threshold allows the nuclear strategic 

communication plan of the United States to be credible and having an 

invincible conventional force permits a high nuclear threshold. The 

United States should never put itself in a position of making threats it 
Estes

369

would never carry out and threatening to use nuclear weapons when vital 

national interests are not at stake falls into that category.22

The other side of the coin, however, is a potential adversary must 

first believe there is a threshold beyond which the United States would use 

nuclear weapons against it, and to be effective, the threshold should be just 

a bit elusive or ambiguous.

 

Conclusions

As the United States struggles with its role as the only superpower 

left on the face of the earth, it has a set of dynamics to consider. Does it 

exert influence from a position of pure power, or must it be the moral 

leader of the world? Should it attempt to shape the nations of the world or 

learn to live with them as they are – but nudging a bit around the edges to 

ensure a safer planet? Does it lead or does it revert to a form of 

isolationism, eschewing the benefits of potential coalitions in its actions?

How the United States responds to those challenges is the task and 

essence of strategic communication, and the answers must be credible. 

Because without credibility, positions taken by the United States will have 

no deterrent effect, particularly with those states that either possess 

nuclear weapons or would like to have them. 

President Obama has taken a clear stance with his Nuclear Posture 

Review in 2010 and the speech in Prague in 2009. The policy is one of 

engagement with the nations of the world, and in concert with the new 

START treaty and the NPT review, one that clearly strives to balance its 

strength through its nuclear posture with a desire to eventually see a world 

without nuclear weapons. At the same time it takes a pragmatic approach, 

realizing nuclear weapons are necessary in the foreseeable future to use as 

a deterrence tool.

With this stance, the President has taken strides toward an effective 

strategic communication campaign, a campaign crucial to deterrence. 

First, the President has realized the importance of such a campaign and the 

importance of his own role in demonstrating to the world the vision of the 

United States. And that the vision is not a public relations campaign 

delegated to someone in the State Department. It is the vision the 

administration wishes to project for this country, the vision on which 
Estes

370

policies should be based, and one he and the top officials of this nation 

should constantly shape. This vision and its supporting policies should 

aim the country at the moral high ground, toward building confidence in 

its leadership. 

The United States, the only country to ever use nuclear weapons 

against another, should continue to demonstrate it is a good steward of its 

decreasing arsenal and a tough but reliable ally that can be counted on to 

use that arsenal as a deterrent for the good of the world. It should 

demonstrate it angers slowly, it has an extremely high threshold for the 

use of nuclear weapons, but there is a limit to its patience. 

Further, in this post Cold War age, the focus of United States

deterrence should be on rogue states such as Iran and North Korea that 

issue threats to their neighbors, but at the same time it should not let its 

guard down too much against past adversaries. And it should continue to 

marshal the forces of the rational world to isolate these rogue states and 

those that would join them, and to isolate terrorist organizations and their 

possible attempts to acquire nuclear materials or weapons, since the latter 

are not likely to be deterred in their use should they ever get their hands on 

a weapon.

Words matter. Actions matter. Allies and partners matter. Pulling 

all three together effectively and communicating a coherent, tough, and 

credible vision and message to adversaries and allies is the essence of 

deterrence, and of strategic communication. Strategic communication can 

have no higher calling than to prevent a nuclear war or terrorist attack.

Notes
Estes

371

 

1 Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Pravda (July 20, 1963). 2 Speech delivered by President Barrack Obama, Prague, the Czech Republic (April 5, 2009).

3 Strategic communication is a general term, the application of which, obviously, is not limited to the United States. 

However, for the purposes of this discussion, the focus of strategic deterrence will be on the positions of the United 

States – unless specifically mentioned otherwise. 4 Hoagland, Jim, "President Obama's farsighted nuclear strategy," Washington Post (April 18, 2010). 5 Nuclear Posture Review Report (April 2010), Department of Defense, Washington, DC., p. ix.

6 Since ICBMs and SLBMs can reach their targets in a scant 30 minutes, each side had an incentive to launch a 

retaliatory attack inside that window to avoid losing that asset which itself was probably targeted in a mass attack. 

In modern times, the United States has been considering a conventional ICBM to deliver a "bolt from the blue" to 

terrorist locations and other time-sensitive targets around the world, but has hesitated to put such a weapon in the 

inventory for this same reason. A launch of a conventional ICBM would look like a strategic, and possibly nuclear, 

launch to Russia or China, and would require extensive communication and pre-briefing to avoid misinterpretation. 7 Dr. Robert Butterworth quoting Fred Ikle, "Out of Balance,” Aerospace Power Journal (Fall 2001).

8 Kennedy, Robert, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Norton, New York, 1969), 124.

9 Ibid., 126.

10 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 17, 2002). 11 Toward a National Counterproliferation Strategic Communication Plan, USAF Counterproliferation Center, 

(Dec. 2007). 12 Estes, Richard. A Message Not Yet Sent: Using Strategic Communications to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, USAF Counterproliferation Center Future Warfare Series No. 35, (July 2006).

13 Testimony of L. Gordon Flake, executive director of the Mansfield Foundation, before the Subcommittee on Asia 

and Pacific, House Committee on International Relations, (April 2004). 14 Interview with Charles Lutes, director of Counterproliferation, National Security Council, (March 2010).

15 Fathi, Nazila, Iran Disrupts Internet Service Ahead of Protests, New York Times (Feb. 10, 2010).

16 Jenkins, Brian Michael, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?, Prometheus Books, Amherst, N.Y. (2008), 26

17 Lewis A. Dunn, Can al-Qaeda be Deterred From Using Nuclear Weapons?, Center for the Study of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper 3, National University Press, Washington, DC (July 2005).

18 Jenkins, ob cit, 277.

19 The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Article VI (March 5, 1970).

20 Dyson, Freeman, Weapons and Hope, New York (1984). 21 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, Department of Defense (Feb. 2010). 22 Interview with Dr. Mitchell Reiss, Vice Provost, College of William and Mary (March 2010). Dr. Reiss is the 

former director of Policy Planning at the State Department, a policy advisor to presidential candidate Mitt Romney, 

and has been chosen as the next president of Washington College in Chestertown, Md.
CHAPTER 13

A Nation’s Resilience as a Deterrence Factor

Patrick Ellis

For most Berliners, New Year’s Eve 1988 was the holiday finale 

similar to the many eves since the wall, separating East from West, was 

built. Unfortunately, the ushering in of the fresh year held no real clues 

the world was about to change and by the end of that year the wall would 

collapse. Like a door hinge that sets a new direction for the door, a new 

course was set in the geopolitical world, a harbinger of the massive 

changes to come. The phantom of the old epoch passed away and a new 

era was on the horizon. Historians call periods like this a hinge of history. 

Hence, when historians write about this period the narrative may 

very well begin with the fall of the wall and end with the collapse of the 

World Trade Center buildings. Between those two events the world was 

transformed from a Cold War paradigm to a more connected globalized 

paradigm. Consequently, with these changes came new actors who would 

create new challenges for the United States. Traditional forms of 

deterrence were set on notice as being less effective against newer nonstate actors trying to procure weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This 

hinge of change would recast our understanding of our adversaries and the 

deterrence efforts against them.

In the Director of National Intelligence’s February 2010 Annual 

Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Director Dennis 

Blair, states, “Traditionally WMD use by most nation states has been 

constrained by deterrence and diplomacy, but these constraints may be of 

less utility in preventing the use of mass-effect weapons by terrorist 

groups.”1

He further states “the time when only a few states had access to the 

most dangerous technologies is over. Technologies, often dual-use, 

circulate easily in our globalized economy, as do the personnel with 

scientific expertise who design and use them. It is difficult for the United 

States and its partners to track efforts to acquire WMD components and 

production technologies that are widely available.”2 This new threat 
Ellis

373

forces us to reexamine deterrence theories and to develop new means to 

influence adversaries. This essay is put forth to help stimulate a dialogue 

on how national resilience might be an affective support to deterrence 

efforts.

Deterrence

Deterrence has been defined as “the actions of a state or group of 

states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict 

by the threat of retaliation. Deterrence should credibly demonstrate to an 

adversary the costs of an attack would be too great and would outweigh 

any potential gains.”3

Fortunately, no nuclear weapons have been used since World War 

II. This can be mainly attributed to rational leaders who steered away 

from armed conflict rather than see their nations disappear in a nuclear

exchange. However, we have entered into a new era of non-state actors, 

rational or not, who seem willing to use nuclear weapons as an act of 

coercion or terror if they were to acquire them. The key task is still the 

same, “persuading a potential enemy that he should, in his own interest, 

avoid certain courses of activity...”

 The destructive power of nuclear weapons makes 

retaliatory power absolute.

4

Recent events continue to highlight the terror threat to the United 

States. On Dec. 25, 2009, Northwest Airlines Flight 253 left Amsterdam 

Airport, in the Netherlands, on its way to Detroit. On its final descent, 20 

minutes before landing, a young Muslim Nigerian passenger tried to set 

off a plastic bag of explosives sown into his underwear. He was subdued 

by other passengers who brought this al-Qaeda motivated operation to an 

end. Then most recently, on May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad, born in 

Pakistan, but naturalized as an American citizen, attempted to detonate a 

car bomb in Times Square. Reported to have been trained in bombmaking in Pakistan he was caught trying to take a flight to Dubai, United 

Arab Emirates. 

 But terrorists present a new 

dilemma. How do you deter an enemy with no known return address? 

Fortunately these attempts failed; but they do show terrorists will 

continue to try to attack us, and their weapons will evolve. We must also 

not lose sight that the crown jewel of terror weapons will continue to be 
Ellis

374

weapons of mass destructions, in particular nuclear and biological. So how 

do we deter these new terror threats and their possible use of WMDs? 

To maximize deterrent effects on an adversary, it is likely that we 

should follow a dual strategy of deterrence by denial and by retaliations 

combined with positive outcome for good behavior. First, let the 

adversary know we can deny them the benefits they seek to obtain from an 

attack. Second, let them know the cost resulting from an attack will be too 

high for them. Third, encourage restraint by letting them know that not to 

attack would be better for them.5 To be effective these three tasks must be 

unified as one effort at all level of our government’s diplomatic, 

intelligence, military and economic (DIME) actions. 

Affecting the Decision-Making Calculus

If deterrence is in the eye of the beholder and all deterrence 

activities are calculated to persuade opponents not to attack us by 

influencing their decision matrix,6 how do we go about influencing that 

calculus? What must we focus on? As previously mentioned, we should 

center our attention on the three “essentials” that affect their perception 

and decision-making process: “(1) The benefits of a course of action; (2) 

The costs of a course of action; and (3) The consequences of restraint (i.e., 

costs and benefits of not taking the course of action we seek to deter).”7

Taking these same essentials, Brad Roberts distills them further 

and says, “Deterrence, like other tools of influence, is a strategy for 

creating disincentives in an adversary’s mind to courses of action he might 

otherwise adopt.” Creating these disincentives takes great effort, and 

grafted into the body of those disincentives must be a message that asserts 

our ability to withstand any attack. He continues, “Sometimes those 

disincentives already exist...Sometimes the primary goal of an influence 

strategy might be simply to reinforce those existing restraints.”8

We must also understand that anything we do could affect the 

targeting dynamics of adversary planners. Roberts, referring to a quote by 

Robert Anthony, says, “Even suicide terrorists are willing to delay their 

attack until they are convinced that they have a ‘good’ chance of 

success.”9 Witnessing these types of operational changes points to how 
Ellis

375

decision-makers might modify their targets, as they become harder, and 

look for easier ones that offer more success. 

This idea is further pressed by two RAND analysts, Andrew R. 

Morral and Brian A. Jackson, in their study Understanding the Role of 

Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security. They believe “determined 

terrorists—both as individuals and organizations—may be willing to risk 

everything to achieve their objectives, [however] they do not wish to 

waste their own lives or other resources on missions that are doomed to 

fail or unlikely to achieve their intended results.”10

“Many terrorist groups,” according to Morral and Jackson, “may 

be averse to engaging in operations when the likely outcomes are 

shrouded by significant sources of uncertainty.”11

As early as the 1960s governmental thinkers pointed toward the 

necessity of fostering public resiliency, the ability to spring back after an 

attack, in our national fabric. This resiliency was to be manifested as a 

result of civil defense (CD) efforts. Thus, in the late 1960s research was 

begun by the Hudson Institute on behalf of the Department of the Army’s 

Office of Civil Defense.

Thus, we can increase 

our deterrent capability if we communicated the message to our 

adversaries that to attack would mean a high chance for failure. One 

method for discouraging attacks is to build public resiliency so terrorist 

acts do not unduly bother or change the everyday life of the country. 

Resilience can take the “terror” out of terrorist actions by not rewarding 

such behavior. 

When completed in 1967, the report titled Crisis Civil Defense and 

Deterrence, authored by Frederick Rockett, made the following comments 

about the Soviet Unions and People’s Republic of China’s capability to 

withstand a nuclear exchange with the United States. The issue was 

survival based on Civil Defense capabilities. Rockett said, “Nuclear 

deterrence is a central element in the military policy of the United States. 

The credibility of this deterrence has depended primarily upon our ability 

to wreak immense destruction. If an opponent believes that he can reduce 

his vulnerability, this may affect his assessment of the credibility of our 

nuclear deterrent. Perhaps a future crisis will demonstrate the potential 

effectiveness of emergency CD measures. This could profoundly affect 

military policies and planning in many countries.”12 In particular Russia

and China come to mind.
Ellis

376

Rockett continues by saying, “Although there is no reliable way of 

determining what crisis CD actions could be taken and completed 

successfully, it may not be unreasonable to assume that under crisis 

conditions a significant reduction in vulnerability is possible. It may even 

be that during a crisis emergency, civil defense activities would be deemed 

more effective than either bomber or missile defenses for reducing 

vulnerability.”13

In the author’s view a robust civil defense could sway an 

aggressor’s use of nuclear weapons because he would not have the desired 

effects. “If a crisis demonstrated that the vulnerability of an opponent had 

been reduced due to effective CD measures, our ability to deter his hostile 

actions might suffer.”

 

14

During the Cold War the Soviets spent large amounts of their 

capital building a robust CD system. The issue was not if it was effective 

or not, but how it made us perceive the strategic situation. 

Rockett’s analyses goes a step further and points out what could 

happen if CD is mutually robust among all affected parties. He says, “If 

most countries can protect themselves better than had previously been 

believed, then a mutual deterrence suffers, for war is less costly for both 

sides.”15

Thus far, our discussion has alluded to the notion that in 

conjunction with a capability to inflict great overt damage, to modify an 

aggressor’s will, a perceived ability to withstand an attack could likewise 

have a persuading effect on a potential attacker’s decision-making 

calculus. This later idea falls into the category known as deterrence by 

denial. 

Deterrence by Denial

Deterrence by denial is a posture in which enemy “operations are 

discouraged because... [their expected] payoffs or success rates appear too 

low”16 for the effort and risks undertaken. A nation “perceived as well 

prepared to prevent, defeat, and mitigate the consequences of aggression, 

may deter an adversary from attempting a WMD attack.”17

No doubt, if attackers abort an attack because they perceive their 

efforts will incur no benefit, or even fail, they have been deterred and
Ellis

377

denied the profit from a successful attack. So a central aspect of deterrence

by denial is getting into the mind of an adversary and influencing them to 

discount the benefits of an attack. 

Morral and Jackson, who focus primarily on security 

countermeasures, as a means for deterrence by denial, believe the way to 

do this is by exploiting the large degree of uncertainty associated with 

terror operations. They think “understanding the sources of these 

uncertainties for terrorist planners can aid in the design of effective 

security countermeasures. If attackers are sensitive to uncertainty, 

security interventions might be valuable even if their only effect is to 

increase the width of the error bar around the outcome and cost of an 

operation without necessarily changing the average expected payoffs or 

costs of the operation.”18

One tool available to influence adversary uncertainty is strategic 

communication that Brad Roberts says “has a role to play in enhancing the 

performance of deterrence by denial. Its function is not to lend credibility, 

but to lend doubt. Those targets potentially amenable to deterrence by 

denial include foot soldiers, professionals, and leaders.” For example, 

Roberts writes, “If their WMD assets are few, they are unlikely to risk 

them in unviable operations.”19

Resilience efforts can enhance a nation’s deterrence by denial

efforts by affecting the terrorist decision calculus, dissuading the terrorist 

use of weapons of mass destruction. Countries that appear to be able to 

withstand and recover quickly from terror attacks stand a greater chance of 

not being attacked. 

Resilience

In 1998, Osama bin Laden’s “World Islamic Front” fatwa laid out 

his intent for America: “We -- with Allah's help -- call on every Muslim 

who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah's 

order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and 

whenever they find it.”20 Initially viewed as just empty threats, this 

became all too real as numerous attacks by al-Qaeda against Americans 

outside the Unites States began occurring, culminating in the devastating 

attacks of Sept. 11. 
Ellis

378

A country that pursues resiliency in all forms makes itself more 

durable and less vulnerable to shocks from natural disasters or terrorism. 

Resilient publics are less prone to panic and over-reaction. Resilient 

publics are not so easily terrorized. Resilient publics can regroup rapidly 

and do not require ultra-costly counter-measures to reassure them. 

Resilient public do not abandon public transport just because a bus or train 

or plane is attacked.

But, what is resilience? And how do you make a nation more 

resilient? Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines resilience as “the

capability of a strained body to recover its size and shape after 

deformation caused especially by compressive stress.”21 Webster's 

Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) defines resilience as “the act of 

recovering, springing back, or rebounding.”22 The Collaborative 

International Dictionary of English defines resilience as the “power or 

inherent property of returning to the form from which a substance is bent, 

stretched, compressed, or twisted...The power or ability to recover 

quickly from a setback, depression, illness, overwork or other 

adversity.”23

Specifically, resilience has a more definite definition given by the 

Department of Homeland Security that defines resilience, in its National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan, as “the ability to resist, absorb, recover 

from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a change in conditions.”24 In 

his article “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,” 

T.D. O’Rourke points out that “definitions vary slight, but they all link the 

concept of resilience to recovery after physical stress.”25

A definition more relevant to our discussion is from Karl Weick 

and Kathleen Sutcliffe in their book Managing the Unexpected: Resilient 

Performance in an Age of Uncertainty. They say “resilience is the 

‘capability of a system to maintain its function and structure in the face of 

internal and external changes and to degrade gracefully when it must.’ 

Resilience occurs when the system continues to operate despite failures in 

some of its parts.”26

This idea of resiliency applied to the material world looks 

something like this. Metals made more resilient to withstand the pressures 

and strains of physics are less likely to fail at the most critical moment. So 

aircraft designed to withstand the forces of gravity and wind dynamics at 

high speeds are more resilient and will less likely fail in midflight. 
Ellis

379

Likewise, a nation that is more resilient could have the ability to rebound, 

after a terror attack, in ways unexpected to a terrorist’s anticipate desire. 

Brian Jackson, in his RAND paper Marrying Prevention and Resiliency 

Balancing Approaches to an Uncertain Terrorist Threat, says “the 

definition of resilience differs somewhat in the literature but generally 

includes measures that make it possible for key infrastructures, economic 

activities, and other parts of society to rapidly ‘bounce back’ after a 

disruption.”27

This ability to “bounce back” is what many resiliency promoters 

want to see fostered by national education and training programs. Stephen 

Flynn in his book The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation

thinks “America needs to make building national resiliency from within as 

important a public policy imperative as confronting dangers from 

without.” Flynn also believes a “society that can match its strength to 

deliver a punch with the means to take one makes an unattractive 

target.”28 Stewart Baker, the assistant secretary for Policy, Department of 

Homeland Security, echoing Flynn’s thoughts, told the United States 

House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security that “we must 

make every effort to prevent an attack, but we must do more. As a nation, 

we must be able to withstand a blow and then bounce back. That’s 

resilience.”29

Ever since Sept. 11, homeland security practitioners have been 

working hard to shore up old infrastructures while trying to protect 

vulnerable systems from attack. But the United States is a target rich 

environment and protecting everything is virtually impossible. As Dr. 

James Jay Carafano of the Heritage Foundation points out, it “is 

impossible to protect every target, and a strategy predicated on protection 

is bound to fall short. The enemy will find something else to attack.”30

In contrast, resiliency promises something much more achievable 

and important: sustaining society amid known threats and unexpected 

disasters. Indeed, the more complex the society and the more robust the 

nature of its civil society, the more it should adopt a strategy of 

resilience.”

 

He further adds as the lists of critical infrastructures grow, they become 

harder to protect. “If everything is critical, nothing is critical... 

31 We cannot protect everything, and other means must be 

pursued to help offset our vulnerabilities. Building resilience into our way 

of life is one way of doing this. 
Ellis

380

Inevitably, we will be tested. Natural and technological disasters 

will continue to test our ability to function as a people and country. 

According to Weick and Sutcliffe, “unexpected events often audit our 

resilience. They affect how much we stretch without breaking and then 

how well we recover. Some of those audits are mild. But others are 

brutal.”32

So how do we rebuild resilience into our national fabric to make us 

more able to “bounce back” from terror attacks and other crises? There 

are at least three ways a nation can be made more resilient. The old adage

says, “A cord of three strands is not easily broken.” No doubt the sailors 

of old, when “ships were made of wood and men of iron,” knew a multistrand rope, woven together, was much stronger and more reliable in the 

middle of a wicked storm than a single strand of rope. Likewise, there are 

three strands that, when woven together, would make us more resilient to 

terror attacks, giving us more robust deterrence by denial capability. 

These three strands are tested and resilient leadership, defended physical 

infrastructure and prepared populations. 

Times of great danger and uncertainty often reveal the kind of 

leadership we have, whether strong or weak. For a nation to survive it 

must have strong leadership to recover from a devastating event. 

Consequently, the first strand is “resilient leadership.” Leaders at all 

levels of government and society must be resilient themselves to be able to 

help encourage the population to hang in there, remain calm and tough, 

and to be brave. Leaders must be an example of hope, telling others that 

we will come through this as long as we hold on and have courage. 

Resilient leaders can inspire a people and a nation to “bounce back” and 

demonstrate by example how to do it well. 

The second strand is ensuring that critical infrastructures are made 

more resistant to failure and attacks. Much work has been done in this 

area since the Sept. 11 attacks to shore up vulnerabilities of our physical 

infrastructure by improving protection of things like power grids, 

communication networks, and financial systems, but much more needs to 

be done. 

The third and final strand is to understand how to make the general 

population more tough-minded and resilient. A population’s resilience is 

especially crucial for a nation’s ability to withstand the effects of terror 

attacks as well as natural and technological disasters.
Ellis

381

When these three strands are woven together in meaningful ways, 

they optimize a nation’s ability to rebound. This, if appreciated, should 

have a deterring affect on would-be attackers. Resiliency, articulates Dr.

Carafano, “is about building strong, cohesive societies that can prevail 

against many challenges, from the heartless whims of Mother Nature to 

the malicious acts of terrorists.”33 A more robust resilient leadership, 

infrastructure and population provide an unseen shield of strength and 

recovery capability.

Resilient Leadership

First of all, resilient leaders are not so easy to find, but are 

important to have and to develop. Good leadership strengthens 

communities, and, as T.D. O’Rourke says, “is a critical factor in 

promoting resilient communities.... and also the least predictable.”34

In their book The Secrets of Resilient Leadership: When Failure is 

Not an Option, George Everly, Douglas Strouse and George Everly III 

state the “mystery of resilient leadership is revealed, not in the best of 

times, but in the worst of times – in times of crisis, even during times of 

initial defeat.”

 So 

what does resilient leadership look like? What are the qualities of a 

resilient leader and how are they made? And what happens when leaders 

fail at being resilient? 

35 They point out getting back on your feet requires 

resilience, and “adversity, especially on a large scale, requires 

leadership.”36

Normally, a resilient leader is one who has had to become resilient 

through many trials. Adversity is the tool that tries and reveals leaders, 

and, I might add, builds leaders. Hardship was their teacher. Resilient 

leaders do not become so overnight. Well-known leadership expert 

Warren Bennis says, “The leaders I met, whatever walk of life they were 

from, whatever institutions they were presiding over, always referred back 

to the same failure - something that happened to them that was personally 

difficult, even traumatic, something that made them feel that desperate 

sense of hitting bottom - as something they thought was almost a 

 When bad things happen we naturally look for strong 

leaders to guide us to safety.
Ellis

382

necessity. It's as if at that moment the iron entered their soul; that moment 

created the resilience that leaders need.”37

Resilient leaders offer their communities hope and encouragement

during turbulent times. They offer a form of stability that helps the 

community to hold together. Some call it adaptive capacity or hardiness. 

The “one competence,” notes Warren Bennis, “that I now realize is 

absolutely essential for leaders – the key competence – is adaptive 

capacity. Adaptive capacity is what allows leaders to respond quickly and 

intelligently to relentless change....Adaptive capacity is made up of many 

things, including resilience or what psychologist calls ‘hardiness.’”38

In their article “To Build Resilience: Leader Influence on Mental 

Hardiness,” National Defense University authors Bartone, Barry and 

Armstrong point out leaders who are resilient, or have what they term 

“hardiness,” can become a source of great encouragement during 

challenging times. They believe leaders “by their example, as well as by 

the explanations they give to the group, they encourage others to interpret 

stressful events as interesting challenges that can be met.”39 Authors 

Everly, Strouse and Everly III, affirm this idea and say resilient leadership 

“is that set of leadership qualities that motivates and inspires others during 

crisis. It includes those actions that help others adapt to, or rebound from, 

adversity.”40

We can deduce from these comments resilient leaders can lead thru 

hard times because they themselves have overcome adversity in their own 

experiences. They may also be better positioned to radiate hope and 

encouragement that enables others to bear the burden of adversity. But as 

there is great praise to bestow on such leaders who lead well in dangerous 

and difficult times there is also criticism for those who fail to do so.

Hurricane Katrina was “a story of human failure, more specifically 

a failure of leadership to act in a strong, decisive manner at a time when 

such strength was desperately needed.”41 This comment speaks to the 

results of missing leadership. When a leader is perceived as weak, and 

unable or unwilling to lead, the blow back can often result in the loss of 

their moral authority and even their political office. Such leaders, 

perceived as non-resilient or negligible in protecting their people, lose 

credibility. We have all witnessed past crises where leaders who failed to 

take measures within their means, to safeguard their communities, invited 

severe criticism.
Ellis

383

Arjen Boin and Paul’t Hart in their article “Public Leadership in 

Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?” speaks about a modern situation 

that has created a more volatile hypersensitive environment for leaders 

during crises. They point out that the “aftermath of today’s crises tends to 

be as intense and contentious as the acute crisis periods are, with leaders 

put under pressure by streams of informal investigations, proactive 

journalism, insurance claims, and juridical (including criminal) 

proceedings against them. Leadership in the face of this sort of adversity 

is, in short, precarious.”42

Boin and Hart further posit that this modern occurrence creates a 

predicament even for those leaders who do it right. They cite German 

sociologist Ulrich Beck who points out we live in a “risk society” which 

makes health and safety issues the focal point for all political matters. 

This “risk society” then creates a difficult situation for leaders. The public 

expects leaders to be able to take care of and prevent all kinds of 

emergency situations.43 When they fail, they are greatly chastised. This 

creates, in their thinking, a “social-psychological and political climate 

[that] makes it very hard—perhaps even impossible—for leaders to 

emerge from crises unscathed.”44

Therefore, negative blow back for real or perceived negligence on 

the part of leaders and their administrations can have serious 

consequences. These consequences can be at the national level, in the eyes 

of our allies, and or in our inability to deter our enemies. This will happen 

for sure at the public level. For if the public thinks their government is 

responding inappropriately, “that government may lose legitimacy. This in 

turn, may lead to increased anxiety, panic, and other forms of destructive 

behavior that can undermine the stability of civil society.”45

Because of the potential for blow back from decisions and actions 

taken, leaders must always be aware of their actions and potential results. 

For leaders to avoid blow back and become more resilient they need to be 

mindful of what could happen, how they would respond before an event, 

and what they will say and do during an event. According to Weick and 

Sutcliffe, to “be resilient is to be mindful about errors that have already 

occurred and to correct them before they worsen and cause more serious 

harm.”

 But what 

happens to leaders who lead well, make difficult decisions and still bring 

on criticism? What must they do? 

46 One way to develop this kind of mindfulness is to learn from 
Ellis

384

others who have had to lead in difficult environments. 

Resilient leaders must often take unpopular actions or make 

difficult decisions. This often requires the ability to act courageously in 

ways that may be politically difficult, but are the right thing to do. For 

Everly, Strouse and Everly III, “resilient leadership is the courage to act, 

the willingness to take responsibility for decisions regardless of outcome, 

and the ability to engender trust and fidelity through a consistent pattern of 

acting with integrity.”47

Resilient leaders must also help to build systems that connect 

people together. Leaders who desire to build resiliency into their 

communities and nation must consider how to develop social networks 

that can be called upon during crisis and disasters. Everly, Strouse and 

Everly III have noted in their research that “the single most powerful 

predictor of the ability to withstand and rebound from adversity is the 

perceived support of others.”48 This means leaders must continually strive 

to create a resilient culture. A culture that creates social networks of 

“shared identity, group cohesion and mutual support.”49

Leaders play a key role in communicating resiliency by both word 

and deed. Their actions must focus on building infrastructures and 

associated organizations that help their people become more resilient. 

Leaders must help make their communities believe they are resilient. 

Resiliency’s “decisive advantage is its psychological influence on civil 

society....The most resilient societies are the ones that believe they are 

resilient.”50

To better understand this kind of leadership we need to look at real 

examples. Let’s look at two historical leaders and one contemporary: 

Abraham Lincoln, Winston Churchill and Rudy Giuliani. 

 Good leadership helps others believe. 

Abraham Lincoln 

Abraham Lincoln is one of America’s most celebrated U.S. 

presidents, with an overwhelming appeal not only to Americans, but also 

to people around the globe. However, during the early years of the 

American Civil War he was under constant pressure from the unfolding 

national trauma and also from personal family loss. His lack of popularity 

in the southern secessionist states led to their breaking away from the 
Ellis

385

Union and eventually war. And throughout both terms of his 

administration he had the great burden of leading the nation through four 

bloody years of rebellion. Yet, in spite of all these unbearable pressures 

he was a resilient leader.

In September 1859, a year before being elected president when 

Lincoln was only known to most Americans as an up-and-coming 

Republican politician, he gave a speech to the Wisconsin State 

Agricultural Society in Milwaukee that ended with a sentiment that 

revealed his attitude toward adversity and his strength to get through 

difficult situations. Always the master communicator he said, "An Eastern 

monarch once charged his wise men to invent him a sentence, to be ever in 

view, and which should be true and appropriate in all times and situations. 

They presented him the words: ‘And this, too, shall pass away.’ How 

much it expresses! How chastening in the hour of pride! -- How consoling 

in the depths of affliction! ‘And this, too, shall pass away.’"51

Lincoln also was able to grieve with the families who had lost sons 

in the war. His own son William “Willie” Lincoln died from sickness 

during his first term in the White House. It was a devastating event in his 

life. But through this event he was able to console a nation. Elizbeth 

Keckley, a dressmaker for Mrs. Lincoln, witnessed his grief. "Mr. Lincoln 

came in. I never saw a man so bowed down with grief...he buried his head 

in his hands, and his tall frame convulsed with emotion. His grief 

unnerved him, and made him a weak, passive child. I did not dream that 

his rugged nature could be so moved.”

 Lincoln 

used this kind of understanding to help guide a young nation through four 

terrible years of warfare and division on the hope and vision that “this, 

too, shall pass,” and the nation would once again be whole. 

52 However, he was not a passive 

weak child, as U.S. Army Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, in 

his article “Leadership in a Time of Crisis,” says, “Lincoln’s anguish only 

made him a stronger leader. His tragic loss gave him a perspective on 

empathy....a strength born through adversity.”53

His own loss paved the way for him to grieve for many others. 

Several years later he would write a letter to a grieving mother who had 

lost five of her sons in combat. In a letter to Mrs. Bixby of Boston, Mass.,

in November 1864, Lincoln wrote, “I feel how weak and fruitless must be 

any word of mine which should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a 

loss so overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from tendering you the 
Ellis

386

consolation that may be found in the thanks of the republic they died to 

save.”54

Lincoln’s resilience as a leader can be best summed up by Donald 

Phillips in his book Lincoln on Leadership: Executive Strategies for Tough 

Times. “It was Abraham Lincoln who, during the most difficult period in 

the nation’s history, almost single-handedly preserved the American 

concept of government. Had he not been the leader that he was, secession 

in 1860 could have led to further partitioning of the country into an 

infinite number of smaller, separate pieces, some retaining slavery, some 

not.... Abraham Lincoln was the essence of leadership.”

 It was his ability to empathize and encourage people with hope of 

better days and knowledge their sacrifices were not in vain, that helped to 

inculcate resilience into the population’s will to fight on.

55

Winston Churchill

Winston Churchill is another example of resilient leadership. In 

1940, as the German Wehrmacht pummeled allied forces in France, 

Winston Churchill gave his famous “We Shall Fight on the Beaches” 

speech to the House of Commons which set forth and stirred the national 

will to fight back against all odds and not cave in. 

This voice of resilient leadership helped create a resilient nation. 

Churchill told his people that, 

I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if 

nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, 

as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once 

again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm 

of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary 

for years, if necessary alone.... whatever the cost may be, 

we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing 

grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we 

shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.56

It was such speeches that helped to inspire a nation to fight and 

withstand the viciousness of war. 
Ellis

387

The early days of World War II severely tested the British people. 

Nightly bombings, threats of invasion and German U-boats sinking allied 

ships put a great strain on the British nation. In spite of this, the British 

people’s mottoes were “business as usual" and "London can take it,” who 

according to radio newsman Edward R. Murrow was their act of defiance 

towards the Germans.57

Toward the end of 1940, while the Blitz raged, the British 

government produced a film called “London Can Take It.” Narrated by an 

American journalist, it spoke of the strength and resiliency of the British 

people and their resolve to fight and survive. As the film rolls the narrator 

says, 

There is nothing but determination, confidence and high 

courage among the people of Churchill’s island....It is true 

the Nazis will be over again tomorrow night and the night 

after that and every night. They will drop thousands of 

bombs and they’ll destroy hundreds of buildings and they’ll 

kill thousands of people. But a bomb has its limitations. It 

can only destroy buildings and kill people. It cannot kill the 

unconquerable spirit and courage of the people of London. 

London can take it!58

Yes, most cynics today would scoff at the terms of unconquerable 

spirit and courage, but in November 1940 when their world was literally 

being bombed back to nothing, those words rang true, and men and 

women like Winston Churchill were able to give an example of resiliency 

to their people. 

Rudy Giuliani

Rudy Giuliani also knows what resilient leadership looks like. He 

ought to, for on Sept. 11 and the days following he was the face of New 

York, and his ability to bounce back while confronted with many 

difficulties encouraged others to hang on. What did Giuliani do that 

demonstrated resiliency?

For starters, Giuliani and his N.Y.C. team saw the need to build 
Ellis

388

resiliency into their response systems as demonstrated by their extensive 

preparations before Sept. 11. They had foresight about possible future 

threats and took actions to meet those threats. Giuliani said, “One reason 

New York City was able to withstand the Sept. 11 attack was that we were 

prepared to meet 21st century security threats...We drilled and planned for 

various threats.... And while we didn’t anticipate the specific scenario of 

Sept. 11, the constant practice, and the relentless follow-up from actual 

emergencies, certainly helped in its aftermath.”59

Another demonstration of resiliency was when in the midst of all 

the chaos and death he “was able to galvanize emergency operations” 

despite severe loss of emergency response personnel and command and 

control capabilities.

All the work done to 

help the city respond to catastrophic emergencies gave it the necessary 

capacity to spring back. 

60

Not only did New York City spring back after being tested, but so 

did its mayor. “Giuliani’s Zivilkourage,” According to Arjen Boin and 

Paul’t Hart, “the first days of the World Trade Center tragedy propelled 

him back into the folk-hero status he once had enjoyed when taking the 

mayoral office on the wings of his crime-fighting reputation; gone was his 

image as a weary politician wounded by scandal.”

 Not only were the buildings and people down, but 

valuable first responders and their leaders, charged for the protection of 

citizens and maintaining order in chaos, were now themselves victims all 

in a matter of hours. Any community that suffered a similar catastrophe 

proportional to its size would be devastated for decades. 

61 Business author Tom 

Peters writes of Giuliani's courage to be visible: Rudy "showed up" when 

it really mattered on Sept. 11. As one individual put it, he went from 

being a lame duck, philandering husband to being Time magazine's "Man 

of the Year" in 111 days. How? Not through any "strategy, well-thoughtout or otherwise. But by showing his face. By standing as the 

embodiment of Manhattan's indomitable spirit.”62

Whether you like him or not, you cannot call him a coward

because when it counted most he showed up. And Giuliani’s pro-active 

nature did not start on Sept. 11, but years earlier. He himself says, "While 

mayor, I made it my policy to see with my own eyes the scene of every 

crisis so I could evaluate it firsthand.”63

When he was there at ground zero, he demonstrated something else 

those New Yorkers and people everywhere needed to see - a leader 
Ellis

389

leading with composure and control. He points out leaders “have to 

control their emotions under pressure. Much of your ability to get people 

to do what they have to do is going to depend on what they perceive when 

they look at you and listen to you. They need to see someone who is 

stronger than they are, but human, too."64 Giuliani says he would “ask the 

people of New York City to do everything that they can to cooperate, not 

to be frightened.”65

Giuliani was also seen everywhere, like a Churchill, visiting 

dangerous areas. He says “there was a method to my day on Sept. 11. I 

couldn’t tell people, ‘be brave,’ unless I was willing to walk the streets, or 

not to panic over anthrax unless I was willing to go to the places where it 

was suspected. That is what the optimism of leadership is about. Once the 

leader gives up, then everybody else gives up, and there’s no hope.”66

Compare that with Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco’s response, 

during Hurricane Katrina, who had a problem inspiring and leading. Time

magazine’s article “4 Places Where the System Broke Down,” had this to 

say about Gov. Blanco, “No one would mistake Blanco, 62, for Rudy 

Giuliani. In the first week after the storm hit, she came across as dazed and 

unsteady.”67 According to John Magginnis, a newspaper publisher in 

Louisiana, “Blanco is not an inspiring speaker and appeared ‘rattled’ on 

TV after seeing her devastated state....She's an empathetic, nurturing kind 

of person," he says. "Maybe she is not the towering tower of strength that 

some people would hope or expect to see."68 She was counseled by 

General Honore who met with her regularly to “present a tougher face to 

the public.”69

On Sept. 10, 2005, CNN Security Watch’s “Lessons of Hurricane 

Katrina,”70 aired. This program focused on the failure of resilient 

leadership, or none at all, during the disaster. Of those doing interviews 

for the program, Candy Crowley, CNN correspondent, points out that 

what was missing during this disaster was “a strong guiding hand in times 

of tragedy.” Crowley goes on and says, “In the uncertainty of Sept. 11 the 

surest thing was his honor, the mayor, Rudy Giuliani, tough, 

uncompromising, fully competent.”71 She points to this common picture 

of a lack of a central guiding leader in response to a great tragedy, for 

“many reasons foreseeable and not, Katrina is a different story. It lacks a 

leading man or lady.”72

David Gergen, former presidential adviser, said, “We want 
Ellis

390

somebody to fill the screen and tell us what to do, and go for it - someone 

who's decisive. And Rudy Giuliani had all of those qualities. They were 

almost Churchillian.”73 Adding to this notion, Mike Deaver, former 

Reagan adviser, explains the need people have for a leader to help them 

deal with great disasters. He said one “of the things that's needed in a 

situation like this is for somebody to sit down with, us and tell us and 

reassure us, and help us sort of fathom it and tell us that it's going to be all 

right eventually. That hasn't happened. That's sort of the leadership 

quotient that we haven't seen yet.”74

Candy Crowley’s comparison of Giuliani with former Louisiana 

Gov. Blanco boils down to this: Giuliani had better command of details of 

what was going on and that steadied a hurting city. By contrast Blanco 

seemed faltering about fundamental things, such as water in the city being 

just lake or canal water instead of possible toxic soup from hazardous 

materials.75 Crowley says, “Giuliani brought calm to chaos and poetry to 

the unspeakable.... The truth is the story of Katrina has many heroes. 

What it's lacked is a leader.”76

Resilient Infrastructures

For thousands of years most people lived on farms or in 

communities where they were required to be self-reliant. People produced 

most of their own goods and services to survive and by necessity were 

more resilient to life’s difficulties. However, this all changed as we 

became more interconnected and interdependent on others for our daily 

livelihoods.

With the merger of new technologies to facilitate modernization 

we became coupled into an intricate network of complex associations. 

“Our society and modern way of life depend on a complex system of 

critical infrastructures”77 was how the 2003 National Strategy for the 

Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets framed our 

current state. Six years later the National Infrastructure Protection Plan

expressed, “Protecting and ensuring the continuity of the critical 

infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) of the United States is essential to 

the Nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way 

of life.”78
Ellis

391

Our way of life has become wholly dependent on technologies and 

the reliability of the infrastructures they spawned. As a consequence we 

have become less self sufficient, hence, less resilient.

Most modern developed nations have infrastructures that basically 

revolve around three functions: (1) Production and delivery of essential 

goods and services (agriculture, food and water, public health, energy, 

transportation, banking and finance, chemical manufacturing, and postal 

and shipping); (2) Interconnectivity and operability (financial, information 

and telecommunication systems); and (3) Public safety and security 

(government institutions that provide security, defense, and emergency 

services such as fire and police).

79

The “concept of a “lifeline system,” according to T.D. O’Rourke,

“was developed to evaluate the performance of large, geographically 

distributed networks during earthquakes, hurricanes and other hazardous 

natural events. Lifelines are grouped into six principal systems: electric 

power, gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation, waste 

disposal, and water supply.”

 Another way to understand these three 

functions is to look at them as lifeline systems.

80 O’Rourke concludes “because lifelines are 

intimately linked to the economic well-being, security and social fabric of 

a community, the initial strength and rapid recovery of lifelines are closely 

related to community resilience.”81

Ownership of these lifelines or infrastructures varies from country 

to country. Some countries provide for the entire major infrastructures. 

Others are a mixture of private and public ownership. In the United 

States, private industry owns and operates about 85 percent of the critical 

infrastructures.82

For most of America’s history, we have been fortunate not to have 

large invading forces threatening us as has happened in other parts of the 

world. Two large oceans have protected our homeland, but now that has 

changed. Advanced technologies and communications have not only 

changed our boundaries, but have also created what Boin and Hart call the 

“modern crisis,” requiring new methods of protection. According to them 

this “modern crisis” is the result “of several modernization processes —

globalization, deregulation, information and communication technology, 

 These are further broken down into specific kinds of 

infrastructure systems. These systems of interconnected and often 

seamless networks have also become the most vulnerable to perturbations 

and must be made more resilient.
Ellis

392

developments and technological advances, to name but a few. These 

advances promote a close-knit world that is, nonetheless, susceptible to 

shocks from a single crisis. Comparatively slight mishaps within these

massive and intricate infrastructures can sometimes create problems in 

unforeseen ways.”83

As separate infrastructures develop, they often connect to other 

infrastructures for support or to provide support. New technologies create 

new infrastructures, which interconnect to the older ones. This growth 

creates a density of systems, which has never been seen before. As 

infrastructures go from the local to global connectedness, so does the 

density and creates a dense global medium. This makes our systems less 

resilient and more vulnerable to disturbances. The 2009 National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan alludes to this by saying critical 

infrastructures are “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so 

vital to the United States that the incapacitation or destruction of such 

systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national security, 

national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of 

those matters.”84

As we rely more on technology and associated networks we have 

become more aware of their vulnerability. Often the weaknesses in these 

networks are unveiled when they fail during major accidents or disasters. 

This was the case with Hurricane Katrina. According to Lt. Gen. H. 

Steven Blum, then chief of the National Guard Bureau, when referencing 

the Mississippi region which took the brunt of the hurricane’s force, the 

affected region was “plunged back 200 years, to a time when there were 

no cell phones, no television or radio, and no electricity. I saw antebellum 

homes that had withstood 150 years of storms on the Gulf Coast, and all 

that was left was their foundations and a few steps. The rest was gone. 

Gone.”85

The destruction of key support systems in the region resulted in the 

loss of homes, jobs, commercial enterprises and life-support kinds of 

functions. The disruption to regional networks also hampered military 

responses. “Perhaps the single greatest impediment to a faster military 

response to Katrina was the nearly total destruction of the communication 

network in the entire Gulf Coast region. Land lines, cell phone towers and 

electric power lines were all down.”

 

86 Events such as Hurricane Katrina
Ellis

393

revealed the vulnerabilities of current infrastructures and the cascading 

affects that result. This destruction sent a ripple through the United States.

Think about physics where it takes less force to agitate a solid 

medium. In effect it’s like throwing a rock in a pool of water and 

watching the ripples move away from the disturbed area. The denser the 

pond the smaller the rock needed to affect it. A very dense infrastructure 

with all of its connections and levels of interconnectivity would act in a 

similar way and not be unaffected. 

Indeed the two most recent events in the last decade which 

demonstrate what happens when the technological system is disturbed are 

Sept. 11 and Hurricane Katrina. The former caused the nations entire airtraffic system to shut down sending shock waves throughout the world 

web of air-route connections. The latter shut down an entire city and 

petroleum and other industrial systems feeding a nation and world. 

But if you think that is old news a more recent event has 

demonstrated the vulnerability of our globally interconnected system. In 

April 2010 one of Iceland’s volcanoes erupted and spewed ash all across 

the European skies. The effects were drastic. According to USA Today, 

The eruption...is causing massive dislocation across 

Europe. By late Sunday [April 18], more than 63,000 

flights had been canceled in 23 European countries, stifling 

the lifeblood of the continent's economy. Because few 

planes are flying, travelers can't travel, machinery parts 

can't get to factories, food sellers can't transport their 

goods, and businesses are finding business increasingly 

difficult to conduct. The economic ripples are being felt 

worldwide. In the USA, air carriers canceled 310 flights to 

and from Europe on Sunday, according to the Air Transport 

Association, which represents most major U.S. airlines. 

Because of the volcano, Kenya's hothouse flowers — 

responsible for 20 percent of that African nation's exports 

— are rotting in warehouses rather than winging their way 

to Europe.87

These kinds of events should be eye-openers, shedding light on the 

fragileness of our globalized interconnected systems. Failures in any of 
Ellis

394

the infrastructures due to natural disasters or technological failures could 

be replicated deliberately by terrorists to create similar consequences, 

possibly by using the effects of WMDs. An attack on any one of these 

webs could have a ripple or cascading effect felt around the world. 

Terrorists understand these new infrastructures currently define not 

only how people live, but also how they will operate in the world. 

Consequently, this infrastructure damage or takeover could become 

lucrative lightning rods for gaining public and national attention. So any 

infrastructure vulnerability could be exploited asymmetrically against us. 

The 2009 Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan

highlights this and maintains that terror attacks, using parts of the CIKR, 

could cause direct or indirect impacts, resulting “in large-scale human 

casualties, property destruction, economic disruption and mission failure, 

and also significantly damage national morale and public confidence.”88

Because of the aforementioned natural disaster and terrorist threats 

a lot of effort and thought has gone into learning more about infrastructure 

fragility and survivability. After the Sept. 11 attacks new strategies and 

policies emerged to improve security of the American homeland.

The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) interprets 

infrastructure resilience as “the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or 

duration of disruptive events.” To be effective we have to be able to 

“anticipate, absorb, adapt to and/or rapidly recover”89 from these kinds of 

events. The U.S. National Strategy for the Protection of Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Assets identified over 18 systems, networks and 

assets90 deemed extremely valuable for “life as we know it.” The 2006 

version says “among our most important defensive efforts is the protection 

of critical infrastructures and key resources....These are systems and 

assets so vital that their destruction or incapacitation would have a 

debilitating effect on the security of our Nation.”91 Later, the Homeland 

Security’s 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan emphasized the 

overarching goal is to “build a safer, more secure, and more resilient 

America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing or mitigating the effects of 

deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements 

of our nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources."92

In April 2010, the Obama administration put forth its Homeland 

Security guiding principle, “Promote the Resiliency of our Physical and 

Social Infrastructure.” It focuses more on specific infrastructure concerns 
Ellis

395

and states, “Ensuring the resilience of our critical infrastructure is vital to 

homeland security. Working with the private sector and government 

partners at all levels will develop an effective, holistic, critical 

infrastructure protection and resiliency plan that centers on investments in 

business, technology, civil society, government and education. We will 

invest in our nation's most pressing short and long-term infrastructure 

needs.”93

Then in May 2010, the Obama administration released its National 

Security Strategy (NSS). In general, this document lays out the major 

strategic concerns of the United States and the plan to address them. 

Resilience was brought front stage in the section called “Strengthen 

Security and Resilience at Home.” The administration recognizes not 

every threat can be stopped and resilience must be a key measure. 

“We...recognize that we will not be able to deter or prevent every single 

threat. That is why we must also enhance our resilience — the ability to 

adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand and rapidly 

recover from disruption.”94

The NSS proposes five overarching objectives to create a more 

resilient homeland. One objective called “Enhance Security at Home” 

specifically deals with infrastructures. It put forward new initiative for 

protecting and reducing infrastructure vulnerabilities “at our borders, ports 

and airports, and to enhance overall air, maritime, transportation, and 

space and cyber security.”95 Of key interest is the “global systems that 

carry people, goods, and data around the globe [which] also facilitate the 

movement of dangerous people, goods, and data.” “Within these systems 

of transportation and transaction, there are key nodes—for example, points 

of origin and transfer, or border crossings—that represent opportunities for 

exploitation and interdiction.”96

Thus, the overall strategy is to work with partners at all levels 

domestically and abroad to make these systems more resilient. This is a 

tall order in a world of diverse interest, capabilities, resources and the 

complexity of systems which are not fully understood. Challenges and 

problems notwithstanding, building resilience into our systems, and 

correcting resilience deficiencies are paramount.

When it comes to terrorism, we recognized our own brittleness 

after Sept. 11. And most would agree with Dr. James Carafano that 

“strengthening most critical components of infrastructure or essential 
Ellis

396

systems prevents terrorists from exploiting a society’s vulnerabilities and 

dealing blows that could cripple it. Decentralizing and reducing the 

brittleness of necessary global and national systems demonstrates to 

terrorists the futility of attacking those systems — and thus deters.”97

The bottom line is when infrastructures are resilient to attacks 

terrorists may not want to waste their limited advantage and resources on a 

potentially failed mission.

Resilient Populations

On March 4, 1933, the newly elected president of the United 

States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, facing the chief justice took his oath of

office. In his first inaugural address, broadcasted across the nation by 

radio, he set a nation at ease with words of encouragement. In the midst 

of a great depression he spoke to the people, 

This is preeminently the time to speak the truth, the whole 

truth, frankly and boldly. Nor need we shrink from 

honestly facing conditions in our country today. This 

great Nation will endure as it has endured, will revive and 

will prosper. So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief 

that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself — 

nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes 

needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. In every

dark hour of our national life a leadership of frankness and 

vigor has met with that understanding and support of the 

people themselves which is essential to victory.98

In his address he spoke to the people’s sense of resiliency and their 

ability to bounce back in spite of hardships. Likewise, today we are 

confronted by new threats, and old kinds of disasters, that require 

Americans to once again dig deep inside for the resilience to withstand the 

current and future challenges to our way of life. 

The United States by the very nature of its size and constitutional 

freedoms creates a more permissive environment for terrorist operations 

than in more dictatorial countries. Those responsible for protection cannot 
Ellis

397

possibly provide an effective defense of all the potential targets. 

Therefore, many cannot be protected and are left vulnerable to attack. 

Consequently, a “focus on resilience has value in part because it forces us 

to acknowledge the limits of government capability.... No government can 

respond as quickly and as creatively as individuals concerned with the 

well-being of their families, their businesses and their communities. That 

is the source of our resilience as a country.”99

An enemy’s willingness to attack is often influenced by his sense 

of the possibilities of operational success. If he senses a greater chance for 

failure, he may be dissuaded from conducting the operation in the first 

place. And if a population fails to react in a way satisfying to terrorist 

purposes he may well cease from such operations. How a population 

reacts to terrorist attacks could directly influence terrorist operations. If 

the people are able to continue on in their daily lives and recover well 

from the events of an attack, they are “resilient.” If they fail to recover 

well and if they respond in ways that negatively affects a nation’s ability 

to govern and or changes our value systems they could be characterized as 

malleable, breakable and exploitable.

 If this analysis is correct, 

the American public must become more resilient to better handle 

unforeseen events. 

A report on Israel’s ability to bounce back and weather attacks, 

states, “Victory on the home front depends on national resilience. 

National resilience is the capacity to recover from a crisis without 

breaking the social fabric or compromising core human and national 

values. Israel’s national resilience may turn into a strategic asset and even 

enhance Israel’s deterrence.”100

This renewed focus on population resilience was drastically 

brought forward by the effects of Katrina and its aftermath. Before 

Katrina there was a strong focus on protecting critical infrastructures. 

After Katrina the focus moved toward making communities resilient.101 

To help make diverse communities more resilient requires the national 

government to give them kinds of support only it is capable of providing. 

“At the end of the day,” says Steward Baker, “building a resilient 

homeland requires us to trust our citizens. We must inform them – and 

trust them to inform others. We must equip them with the right tools and 

technologies – and trust them to use those tools to help themselves and 

others.”102
Ellis

398

The kinds of support governments need to give are vast. The 

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction gives examples of 

the kinds of support needed. They focused on the “before and after” of a 

terrorist nuclear attack. Needs included “educating the general public in 

advance about nuclear effects and about how individuals should respond 

would facilitate response efforts and save many more lives. Important 

technical, legal, and regulatory issues of long-term recovery and 

restoration initiatives... need to be addressed.”103

So what does a resilient population look like? How do people 

react to threats that affect every aspect of their lives? And when we are 

attacked how do we bounce back? Hopefully, the answer to these 

questions can in a very real way present a clear message to future 

terrorists. You can attack us, hurt us, but you can’t destroy us, and we will 

bounce back and come after you. This ability to bounce back sends a clear 

message when communicated by word and deed and could be a deterring 

factor vis-à-vis future attackers. “Don’t thread on me” because I will 

survive and continue on. Moreover, such attacks will galvanize our 

counter-terror operations against you.

 However, government 

support cannot guarantee greater population resilience. It can help, but 

population resilience also means individual resilience.

One concept of resilience, previously mentioned, is the notion of 

“hardiness.” One NDU study on the subject states, “Conceptually, 

hardiness was originally seen as a personality trait or style that distinguishes people who remain healthy under stress from those who 

develop symptoms and health problems. Hardy persons have a high sense 

of life and work commitment and a greater expectation of control and are 

more open to change and challenges in life. They tend to interpret stressful 

and painful experiences as a normal aspect of existence.”104

This need for hardiness, to survive difficult situations, has been 

part of human history especially in times of war when civilizations often 

break down. During World War II, “the British, the Germans and the 

Russians proved resilient because they summoned the will to prevail and 

persevere through hardship; the acumen to organize delivery of needed 

goods and services; and the wherewithal to maintain an organized civil 

structure....Keeping the heartbeat of the nation going amid adversity is the 

very definition of resiliency, and national will is the key element in 

accomplishing this goal.”105
Ellis

399

How do you develop hardiness in populations? According to 

Bartone, Barry and Armstrong, “Hardiness levels can be increased as a 

result of experiences and training. So it is better to think about hardiness 

not as an immutable trait, but rather as a generalized style of functioning 

that continues to be shaped by experience and social context.”106 They 

continue by explaining how a person’s attitude and the way he sees life or 

frame experiences help determine the level of his hardiness or resilience to 

unforeseen events. “The power of hardiness to mitigate stressful 

experiences is related to the positive interpretations or framings of such 

experiences the hardy person typically makes.”107

Dr. (Lt Col) Michael Kindt, a U.S. Air Force psychologist, in his 

monograph Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks: Unlearned 

Lessons from Military and Civilian Experience, illustrates two different 

experiences after two separate attacks. He observed the American 

response to the Sept. 11 attacks and juxtaposed it to the British public’s 

response to its July 8, 2005, London terror attacks. He says after the 

attacks America went into a “circle the wagons” mentality and grounded 

all air traffic and increased security in all areas. The result slowed travel 

to a crawl, from which took months to recover, at a great economic price. 

However, across the Atlantic after the London bombing attacks, mass 

traffic moved that very afternoon of the attacks even though people were 

still in shock. People would continue the following days to take the same 

modes of transportation that had been attacked. According to Dr. Kindt 

the difference between the two responses was resilience.108

He points out England’s ability to bounce back after the London 

attacks was in part due to its history of having to cope with previous 

attacks. “Resilience to trauma is increased by a number of factors, which 

include preparation for the trauma, perceived ability to cope with trauma, 

and, perhaps most important, experience of successful recovery to past 

trauma. Clearly, London has had more experience dealing with the effects 

of bombing than the United States.”109

Dr. Kindt’s research concluded with ways populations can increase 

their resilience. First, he says, “One key to the development of resilience is 

having had the experience of being faced with responsibility in a threat or 

crisis and successfully managing that crisis.”

 Kindt referred to German bombing 

campaign of World War II, and later with the Irish Republican Army 

bombing campaigns. 

110 As people embrace very 
Ellis

400

difficult situations and pass through them successfully, they build up 

capacity to deal with future trials.

Further, high “resilience to stress is the combination of a positive 

individual perspective, strong social connectedness and effective problem 

solving skills, all of which allow an individual to cope positively with 

traumatic events such as a terror attack.”111

In addition, taking decisive action can increase resilience which “is 

a way of reducing the anxiety of indecision. By taking action, individuals 

can focus on the action at hand, rather than feeling stuck in uncertainty.’112

Moreover, we need to keep “things in perspective....As individuals 

improve their ability to look at the big picture of events they can better 

direct their actions and moderate emotional reactions.”113 A part of this is 

developing the ability to “avoid seeing crises as too large to be managed, 

and by beginning to break down a crisis into more manageable pieces.”114

Finally, and most important, is the “ability to reach out to provide 

support to and receive support from others in times of stress. This ability 

to affiliate with others during crisis or stress then appears to not only help 

individuals cope with a crisis, but on a large scale enables groups to avoid 

panic behavior.”115

Conclusions

A resilient nation possesses deterrence by denial effects if it can 

introduce doubt about operational success into the calculations of a 

terrorist leader and thus deter an attack. Therefore, the previous analysis 

leads to six conclusions on resilience and deterrence.

First, as a nation we should continue to announce our efforts at 

making the country more resilient. The more our adversaries are made to

see us as a harder target, the more their decisions will be affected. “Our 

future deterrence success will be a function of how well we bring all our 

capabilities and resources to bear to achieve decisive influence over 

adversary decision-making.”116

Second, for us to ensure our resilience efforts are understood by 

the attended audience, terrorist decision-makers, we need to have a robust 

strategic communication effort. This effort must constitute all facets of 

the U.S. government “through the use of coordinated programs, plans, 
Ellis

401

themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all 

elements of national power.”117

Third, our message cannot be just propaganda, but must be 

fundamentally true or appear as such. Resiliency must be a national effort 

to shore up our systems with the ability to withstand attacks from terrorist 

or nature. Our systems must have the following three abilities to be 

resilient: “(1) the ability to absorb strain and preserve functioning despite 

the presence of adversity... (2) An ability to recover or bounce back from 

untoward events...and (3) An ability to learn and grow from previous 

episodes of resilient action.”118 In other words we require robustness, 

redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity to bounce back after being 

challenged.

119

Fourth, and more specifically, one of the most devastating attacks 

against the United States would be from a nuclear detonation. Therefore, 

we need a capability to recover from a nuclear terror attack. Bartone, 

Barry and Armstrong believe the “United States currently lacks a robust 

nuclear consequence management capability, although important efforts 

are under way to enhance preparedness. A robust consequence 

management capability could save lives, facilitate restoration of critical 

functions, better contain social and political impacts, and more effectively 

manage the larger international security repercussions. 

Nuclear consequence management is feasible.”120

Fifth, there should be national- and local-level discussions on what 

a resilient nation is and how it can have a deterring affect. Resiliency 

should be a national priority, and the United States should establish “a 

positive, consistent, national message which says ‘we as American people 

are all vital parts of a team, each with our own critical roles, working 

together to prepare to ultimately defeat terrorism.’”121

Finally, we should make resilience a part of our educational 

efforts. “Resilience requires public concern about disasters and the 

operation of critical infrastructure, which, in turn, requires public 

education.... Public education also involves media coverage via 

newspapers and television.... Risk communication is also important to 

public awareness.”122

Following that terrible day in September, Mayor Giuliani spoke 

words that indicated we as a nation were going to get through this dark 

time and gave hope to those who needed it. He said, "I am an optimist by 
Ellis

402

nature. I think things will get better, that the good people of America and 

New York City will overcome any challenge thrown our way. So in the 

face of this overwhelming disaster, standing amid 16 acres of smoldering 

ruins, I felt a mixture of disbelief and confidence... that Americans would 

rise to this challenge."123

Notes
Ellis

403

 

1 Dennis Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence, (Feb. 2, 2010), 12 (accessed May 14, 2010),

http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf. 2 Ibid.

3 WMD 411 Glossary, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, Produced by the Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies (accessed March 5, 2010), http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/glossary.html#d. 4 Brad Roberts, Deterrence and WMD Terrorism: Calibrating its Potential Contributions to Risk Reduction, IDA 

Paper P-4231 (Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Va., June 2007), 6-7. Originally found in Thomas 

Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 9, and Thomas Schelling, 

“Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring, 1982), 72. 5 Director, Plans and Policy United States Strategic Command, (USSTRATCOM), Deterrence Operations Joint 

Operating Concept, Version 2.0, United States Strategic Command, Director Plans and Policy, Offutt AFB, Omaha, 

Neb., Office of Primary Responsibility (December 2006), www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare, 24-25. 6 USSTRATCOM, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 3. 7 Ibid., 5.

8 Roberts, Deterrence and WMD Terrorism, 26. 9 Ibid., 10.

10 Andrew R. Morral and Brian A. Jackson, Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security, 

Occasional Paper 231, Homeland Security Program, RAND Corporation , Project supported by a RAND Investment 

in People & Ideas (2009), 2. 11 Ibid., 10. 12 Frederick C. Rockett, Crisis Civil Defense and Deterrence. HI-777/2-RR. Hudson Institute, Inc., Croton-onHudson: New York (April14, 1967), iv.

13 Ibid., vi. 14 Ibid., vii. 15 Ibid. 16 Morral and Jackson, Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security, 7. 17 Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Are We Prepared? Four WMD Crises That Could 

Transform U.S. Security, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. (June 2009), 104. 18 Morral and Jackson, Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security, 10.

19 Roberts, Deterrence and WMD Terrorism, 31-32. 20 Osama bin Laden, “World Islamic Front Statement,” Jihad against Jews and Crusaders (Feb. 23, 1998), 

http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm; also can be found in Bruce Lawrence’s (editor) book 

Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, 61. The following statement from Osama bin Laden 

and his associates purports to be a religious ruling (fatwa) requiring the killing of Americans, both civilian and 

military.

21 Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary (accessed May 10, 2010), http://www.merriamwebster.com/netdict/resilience. 22 Dictionary.net (accessed May 10, 2010), http://www.dictionary.net/resilience. 23 Ibid. 24 National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to enhance protection and resiliency, Department of Homeland 

Security (2009), Glossary of Key Terms, 111.

25 T.D. O’Rourke, “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,” The BRIDGE (Linking Engineering 

and Society), National Academy of Engineering, Washington, DC, Volume 37, Number 1, (Spring 2007), 22-29, 

(accessed March 8, 2010), http://www.nae.edu/File.aspx?id=7405, 25. 26 Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of 

Uncertainty, John Wiley& Sons, Inc.: San Francisco, Calif. (2007), 69. 27 Brian A. Jackson, Marrying Prevention and Resiliency Balancing Approaches to an Uncertain Terrorist Threat,

Occasional Paper, Homeland Security, RAND Corporation (2008), 3, 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP236.pdf. 28 Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation, Random House: New York, (2007), xxi.
Ellis

404

 29 Stewart Baker, Statement for the Record, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of Homeland Security , 

Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, “The Resilient Homeland: 

Broadening the Homeland Security Strategy,” (May 6, 2008), 

http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080506102214-20293.pdf. 30 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., “Resiliency and Public–Private Partnerships to Enhance Homeland Security,” 

Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2150 (June 24, 2008), 

www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2150.cfm, 4. 31 Ibid. 32 Weick and Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected, 1. 33 Carafano, “Resiliency and Public–Private Partnerships to Enhance Homeland Security,” 7. 34 O’Rourke, “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,” 27. 35 Everly, George S., Jr., Strouse, Douglas A., and Everly, George S., III. The Secrets of Resilient Leadership: When 

Failure is Not an Option. DiaMedica Publishing: New York, N.Y. (2010), xiv. 36 Ibid., 1. 37 Warren Bennis, Quotes about Leadership (accessed March 5, 2010),

http://thinkexist.com/quotes/with/keyword/resilience/. Also found on the following sites: 

http://www.khabarexpress.com/Leadership_Warren-G.-Bennis-quotes.html, and

http://www.leadership-development-coaching.com/leadership-quotes.html. 38 Warren Bennis, On Becoming a Leader, Basic Books: New York, First Edition (1989, 2009), xxvi-xxvii.

39 Paul T. Bartone, Charles L. Barry, and Robert E. Armstrong, “To Build Resilience: Leader Influence on Mental 

Hardiness,” Defense Horizons, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University 

(Nov. 2009), 5. 40 George S. Everly Jr., Douglas A. Strouse, and George S. Everly III. The Secrets of Resilient Leadership: When 

Failure is Not an Option, DiaMedica Publishing: New York, N.Y. (2010), 3. 41 Ibid., 8. 42Arjen Boin and Paul’t Hart, “Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?,” Public Administration 

Review, (Sept./Oct. 2003), Volume. 63, No. 5, 544-553. 43 Ibid., 546. 44 Ibid. 45 Carafano, “Resiliency and Public–Private Partnerships to Enhance Homeland Security,” 3. 46 Weick and Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected, 68. 47 Everly, Strouse, Everly III, The Secrets of Resilient Leadership, 18. 48 Ibid., 95.

49 Ibid. 50 Carafano, “Resiliency and Public–Private Partnerships to Enhance Homeland Security,” 2 51 Abraham Lincoln, “Address before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society,” Milwaukee, Wis., (Sept. 30, 1859), 

Abraham Lincoln Online, Speeches and Writings (accessed May 14, 2010),

http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/fair.htm; Abraham Lincoln, “Address before the 

Wisconsin State Agricultural Society,” Milwaukee, Wisc., (Sept. 30, 1859), Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 

Volume 3. Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Digital Library Production 

Services (2001), 481-482, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/lincoln3; Collected works, The Abraham Lincoln 

Association, Springfield, Ill., Roy P. Basler, editor; Marion Dolores Pratt and Lloyd A. Dunlap, assistant editors. 

Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press (1953). 52 LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, “Leadership in a Time of Crisis,” Lincoln Lecture Series at the University of Saint 

Mary, Leavenworth, Kan. (Feb. 12, 2009), 4-5, (accessed from the following website on April 8, 2010), 

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/SelectedSpeeches/SaintMary.pdf. 53 Ibid. 54 Abraham Lincoln, “To Mrs. Lydia Bixby,” Milwaukee, Wis., (Sept. 30, 1859). Collected Works of Abraham 

Lincoln. Volume 8. Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865, Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan Digital Library 

Production Services (2001), 117, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/lincoln8. 

NOTE: The Complete Letter. “Executive Mansion, Washington, Nov 21, 1864, To Mrs. Bixby, Boston, Mass. Dear 

Madam, I have been shown in the files of the War Department a statement of the Adjutant-General of 

Massachusetts, that you are the mother of five (5) sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle. I feel how 
Ellis

405

 

weak and fruitless must be any word of mine which should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss so 

overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from tendering you the consolation that may be found in the thanks of the 

republic they died to save. I pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave 

you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours to have laid so costly 

a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom. Yours, very sincerely and respectfully, A Lincoln.” 55 Donald T. Phillips, Lincoln on Leadership: Executive Strategies for Tough Times (N.Y., Business Plus), 172-173. 56 Winston Churchill, “We Shall Fight on the Beaches” (June 4, 1940), House of Commons, 

http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/1940-finest-hour/128-we-shall-fighton-the-beaches. 57 “Part 8: England in the 20th Century, World War II,” Britannia, America’s Gateway to the British Isles, (accessed 

on April 2, 2010),

http://www.britannia.com/history/nar20hist4.html. Edward Murrow’s famous opening line preceding each 

broadcast from England into American households was “This is London Calling." 58 Produced by the British Government in October 1940, 'London Can Take It' is narrated by American journalist 

Quentin Reynolds and pays tribute to London, Ministry of Information Film – The London Blitz, http://www.southwales.police.uk/museum/worksheets/london2.pdf. 59 Giuliani, Rudolph W., “The Resilient Society: A blueprint for homeland security,” City Journal (Winter 2008), 

Vol. 18, No.1, http://www.city-journal.com/2008/18_1_homeland_security.html. 60 O’Rourke, “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,” 27. 61 Boin and Hart, “Public Leadership in Times of Crisis,” 544. 62 Jeff Janssen, “9/11 Leadership Lessons,” PR Intelligence Report

Volume 3, Issue 16, (Wednesday, Jan. 2, 2008), (accessed May 14, 2010), 

http://www.enewsbuilder.net/techimage/e_article000930036.cfm?x=b11,0,w. The article can also be found at 

“Team Captains Network” at

http://www.teamcaptainsnetwork.com/public/230.cfm. 63 Rudolph Giuliani, Leadership. New York: Hyperion, Miramax Books (2002), 4. 64 Janssen, “9/11 Leadership Lessons.” 65 CNN Security Watch, “Lessons of Hurricane Katrina,” transcript from Broadcast, CNN.Com (aired Sept. 10, 2005 

- 20:00 EST, (accessed on April 7, 2010), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/10/cp.01.html. 66 Giuliani, Leadership, pp. 297-298. 67 “4 Places Where the System Broke Down,” Time Magazine, Time.COM (Sunday, Sept. 11, 2005), (accessed on 

April 7, 2010),

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1103560-1,00.html. 68 Jill Lawrence, “Governors handle crisis in own ways,” USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2005), (accessed April 7, 2010), 

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-12-two-governors_x.htm. 69 CNN Security Watch, “Lessons of Hurricane Katrina.” 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77Department of Homeland Security (DHS), The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets (February 2003), 35, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Physical_Strategy.pdf. 78 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to enhance 

protection and resiliency, 2009, Glossary of Key Terms, 7. 79 DHS, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 6. Note: The 

ideas for the three functions come from this national strategy which discusses American systems; however, these 

systems are found in any developed and developing nation. 

80 O’Rourke, “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,” 23. 81 Ibid., 25. 82 DHS, The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 8.
Ellis

406

 83 Boin and Hart, “Public Leadership in Times of Crisis,” 545. 84DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 7 85 James Kitfield, “Poor communication slowed military’s hurricane response,” National Journal, GOVEXEC.com 

(Sept. 19, 2005), (copied on Sept. 21, 20005), www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=32263. 86 Ibid. 87 Elizabeth Weise, Dan Vergano, and Doyle Rice, “Icelandic volcano: The impact is broad, but could be worse,” 

USA Today (April 20, 2010), (accessed on June 4, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2010-04-19-

1Avolcano19_CV_N.htm. 88 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 7.

89 NIAC, Critical Infrastructure Resilience Final Report and Recommendations, National Infrastructure Advisory 

Council, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (Sept. 8, 2009), 8.

90The 18 CIKR sectors are: Agriculture and Food; Commercial Facilities; Dams; Energy; Information 

Technology; Postal and Shipping; Banking and Finance; Communications; Defense Industrial Base; Government 

Facilities; National Monuments and Icons; Transportation Systems; Chemical; Critical Manufacturing; Emergency

Services; Healthcare and Public Health; Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste; and Water. Table S-1: SectorSpecific Agencies and Assigned CIKR Sectors, the Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan: Partnering to enhance protection and resiliency (2009), 3.

91 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (September 2006), 13.

92 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 9.

93 The White House, Homeland Security, “Guiding Principles” (April 5, 2010), 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/homeland-security, NOTE: This infrastructure needs include:”modernizing our 

electrical grid; upgrading our highway, rail, maritime, and aviation infrastructure; enhancing security within our 

chemical and nuclear sectors; and safeguarding the public transportation systems that Americans use every day.”

94 The White House, National Security Strategy (May 2010), 18.

95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Carafano, “Resiliency and Public–Private Partnerships to Enhance Homeland Security,” 1.

98 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “First Inaugural Address” (Saturday, March 4, 1933), 

http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres49.html. 99 Stewart Baker, “The Resilient Homeland: Broadening the Homeland Security Strategy,” Statement for the 

Record, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of Homeland Security, Before the United States House of 

Representatives Committee on Homeland Security (May 6, 2008),

http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080506102214-20293.pdf. 100 “National Resilience’ Victory on the Home Front: A Conceptual Framework,” Executive Summary, The Reut 

Institute, Version A, Cheshvan 5769 (November 2008), 5. 101 O’Rourke, “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,” 25. 102 Baker, “The Resilient Homeland: Broadening the Homeland Security Strategy.” 103 Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Are We Prepared?, 101. 104 Bartone, Barry, and Armstrong, “To Build Resilience: Leader Influence on Mental Hardiness,” 4. 105 Carafano, “Resiliency and Public–Private Partnerships to Enhance Homeland Security,” 3. 106 Bartone, Barry, and Armstrong, “To Build Resilience: Leader Influence on Mental Hardiness,” 4. 107 Ibid., 5. 108 Michael T Kindt, Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks: Unlearned Lessons from Military and 

Civilian Experience. USAF Counterproliferation Center, Future Warfare Series, No.36, Maxwell Air Force Base, 

Alabama (Nov. 2006), 2.

109 Ibid. 110 Ibid., 5. 111 Ibid., 7. 112 Ibid., 8. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid., 9. 116 USSTRATCOM, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 56.
Ellis

407

 117 Ibid., p. 37. 118 Weick and Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected, 71.

119 O’Rourke, “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,” 25.

NOTE – O’Rourke explains the four “R” as “Robustness: the inherent strength or resistance in a system to withstand 

external demands without degradation or loss of functionality. Redundancy: system properties that allow for 

alternate options, choices, and substitutions under stress. Resourcefulness: the capacity to mobilize needed resources 

and services in emergencies.” And “rapidity: the speed with which disruption can be overcome and safety, services, 

and financial stability restored.” 

120 Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Are We Prepared?, 99. 121 Kindt, Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks, 27. 122 O’Rourke, “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,”26-27. c 123 Janssen, “9/11 Leadership Lessons.” 
 

CHAPTER 15 

Summary and Conclusions

Barry Schneider and Patrick Ellis

The purpose of a deterrence strategy as defined in this analysis is 

to dissuade an adversary from starting a war or escalating a conflict.1

The Latin word “deterre” means to frighten from or frighten 

away. Deterrence success, even if achieved, is hard to prove because you 

cannot know absolutely why a war or escalation was avoided. After all, 

the adversary might not have intended to attack or escalate a conflict in the 

first place. Unlike the natural sciences, history does not let you repeat the 

experiment and change the variables. On the other hand, it is very clear 

when deterrence has failed, obvious as soon as the war drums sound. 

And deterrence often does fail. As noted in our chapter on 

deterrence in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, in roughly a third of the inter-state 

wars of the 20th century, wars were begun by weaker states that attacked 

demonstrably stronger foes. In the majority of cases, superior might when 

recognized by the less powerful party creates a deterrent effect. Hence, 

the Roman motto “si vis pacem, para bellum” – if you wish for peace 

prepare for war. This is the thought behind the famous U.S. Strategic Air 

Command motto of “Peace is our profession.” Peace through strength 

works in many cases but, nevertheless, there are also a significant fraction 

of cases when states have launched a war despite significant comparative

military weakness.

An example was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed 

much of the U.S. pacific fleet in December 1941. However, at the time of 

the attack the Japanese GNP was about 10 percent of the United States 

GNP. A long war to the finish would inevitably favor the United States, a 

fact not lost on Admiral Yamamoto who planned the attack and explained 

the problem to the Japanese war leaders. They elected to gamble that the 

United States would stop short of a total war to the finish, and be willing 

to conclude a compromise peace leaving them in possession of all or much 

of their conquests. The Japanese leaders failed to understand the 
Schneider and Ellis 

409

determination in America to completely defeat them and insist on a near 

total surrender. Their risky Pacific War venture backfired and left Japan 

in ruins. 

Deterrence can fail for many reasons. Some leaders can be 

irrational, uninformed, misinformed, and reckless; gambling on adversary 

behavior, more focused on immediate gains than possible long term 

consequences, or driven to strike first because they calculate time is not on 

their side. Some are also willing to risk all in a war effort rather than give 

up their ambitions or honor as they define it. Deterrence efforts can at 

times fail to inhibit war escalation once the conflict has begun, as 

emotions often drive policy. Sometimes, as casualties mount,

determination hardens, and mission creep widens the commitment to 

winning, lessening the willingness to compromise and end the conflict. 

In this volume we look at deterrence strategy through three lenses: 

(1) Classic Cold War Deterrence Strategy, (2) Tailored Deterrence 

Strategy, and (3) Deterrence Strategy in specific Scenarios.

Classical Cold War Deterrence Strategy

The classical Cold War strategy of deterrence is most applicable 

when dealing with a rival state run by rational decision-makers who value 

their own power and survival over other objectives. An example of this 

kind of leadership is the Soviet high command during the October 1962 

Cuban Missile Crisis. Unlike the Cuban leaders like Fidel Castro and Che 

Guevara at the time, they were not willing to attack the United States 

because of the U.S. power to retaliate and devastate the U.S.S.R.. On the 

other hand the Cuban leaders were willing to become martyrs if it meant 

destroying the United States. Classic deterrence theory would not have 

worked against them in this case. 

The deterrence strategy that emerged in the United States in the 

Cold War had seven classic elements and appeared to work to help keep 

the Soviet Union from war with the West: 

• Having retaliatory forces capable of inflicting a level of damage 

considered unacceptable to the Soviet leadership;
Schneider and Ellis 

410

• Possessing a second strike capability that could survive a surprise 

attack;

• Having a will to use this nuclear force in a confrontation, if 

necessary; 

• Communicating the US had both the will and the capability 

described so the U.S. threat was credible; 

• Having an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system 

able to identify the origins of any attack, answering the “who did 

it?” question; 

• Having the capability to identify and strike a target set of highest 

value to the Soviet Union and its leaders. 

• Having a rational adversary leadership who preferred to live and 

stay in power rather than die in order to inflict destruction on the 

United States.

Both sides held the life of the other society in their hands. Both 

were a few minutes or hours away from nuclear oblivion. The U.S. SAC 

triad of nuclear bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs along with NATO nuclear 

and conventional forces deployed across from the Warsaw Pact in Europe 

was what we think kept the peace. The system worked, although it is a 

common judgment nuclear war was narrowly averted in the October 1962 

Cuban Missile Crisis.

One of the limits of classic Cold War theories of deterrence is the 

requirement to have a rational opponent, and one not attracted to 

martyrdom. There are a number of problems with this requirement. First, 

there may be different interpretations of rational behavior in a crisis. Poor 

signaling or poor reception of adversary signals can lead to 

misunderstandings, war and escalation. A lack of leader situational 

awareness can undermine deterrence as can imprecise or misleading 

communications. Further, some leaders may misread ambiguous signals or 

may miss them altogether. Adversaries may also see what they expect to 

see rather than what is intended by their rival’s words or actions. Or they 

may see only what they want to see rather than the reality of a situation. 

All this can lead to irrational actions, sometimes better seen in hindsight 

rather than in the heat of the moment of decision. 
Schneider and Ellis 

411

As Franklin Miller notes in the early years of the Cold War the 

message to the Soviet leadership was simple: “attack the United States or 

our allies, and we will immediately launch an all-out nuclear response 

against the Soviet homeland and on its forward deployed military forces 

using all elements of our nuclear arsenal. As noted, this was neither 

tailored nor subtle.”2

But the Kennedy administration began to take some first steps 

towards a more tailored deterrence in the early 1960s. Kennedy wanted 

options. He did not want to have to decide on doing nothing or to initiate 

thermonuclear war if the Soviet leadership decided to attack with its 

superior conventional forces. Some U.S. strategists were convinced that 

the Soviet leadership might consider risking limited conventional attacks 

against NATO’s less powerful conventional forces unless they were 

confronted with tailored and more believable (as opposed to all-out) U.S. 

and NATO nuclear responses. Thus, the administration introduced the 

“Flexible Response” policy.3

Later, during the Carter administration, the move toward a more 

tailored approach towards the Soviets was further refined when U.S. 

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown called for a Nuclear Targeting Policy 

Review leading to the countervailing strategy (Presidential Decision 59) 

based on the view “deterrence could only be achieved when the United 

States focused on what the Soviet leadership valued — and then 

threatened to destroy those assets if war occurred.”4

Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, U.S. strategic nuclear 

forces are still sized and postured to deter aggression by Russia. Between 

them, the two nuclear giants hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear 

weapons and Russian nuclear forces still pose the greatest existential 

threat to the United States. 

U.S. Force Structure and Deterrence: Alternative Postures 

Because the Russian arsenal retains an overwhelming destructive 

capacity, the U.S. Strategic Command still maintains a triad of strategic 

bombers, ICBMs, and fleet ballistic missile submarines to deter attacks. 

The New START Treaty signed and ratified in 2010 has now reduced 

those forces significantly but any new reductions beyond those limits will 
Schneider and Ellis 

412

pose new issues for deterrence and the U.S. force structure needed to 

maximize it. 

Kurt Guthe looked at the implications of a deeper-cut arms control 

regime and evaluated the pros and cons for deterrence of alternative U.S. 

strategic force structures. He compared three alternative force postures: 

(1) a strategic dyad made up of Bombers/SLBM forces, (2) a strategic 

dyad of ICBM/SLBM forces, and (3) the present strategic triad of air, land 

and sea forces. A fourth alternative is a triad made up of ICBMs based in 

silos and on mobile launchers, and a fleet ballistic missile force.5

The U.S. strategic nuclear force structure would have to change as 

a result of downsizing. So the question is what nuclear force structure 

should the United States adopt at lower force levels? 

Clearly the current triad of bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs has 

certain advantages over dyads forces, and perhaps over other triad 

configurations. Each leg of the triad contributes unique advantages. 

ICBMs are based on U.S. soil and an attack on them is an attack on the 

continental United States. Such an attack is guaranteed to trigger a 

massive U.S. retaliatory response and this fact should make any would-be 

attacker think twice. On the other hand, it is not so clear that this would 

be true if the United States lost a ballistic missile submarine on the high 

seas or a strategic bomber outside U.S. air space. ICBMs are also thought 

to have the most secure reliable and redundant command and control links 

to U.S. leaders of any element of the U.S. triad. Further, ICBMs are “fast 

fliers” capable of reaching targets at intercontinental ranges with high 

accuracy within 30 minutes of launch. An adversary military planner 

would likely try to destroy this land-based missile force first, since they 

can react the fastest and are extremely difficult to defend against once 

launched. 

Silo-based U.S. ICBMs are hardened forces that can survive all but 

the most accurate enemy missile attacks. Even if attacked accurately, a 

fraction of them are likely to survive because of the configuration and 

spacing of the silo-launchers would create so-called fratricide effects, 

whereby one enemy warhead’s detonation would destroy others aimed at 

adjacent U.S. targets. An adversary would be very unlikely to be able to 

destroy all U.S. ICBMs simultaneously and would have to attack those 

furthest away first to avoid fratricide effects of following incoming reentry 

vehicles. Otherwise an over-the-pole attack that struck the northernmost 
Schneider and Ellis 

413

rows of U.S. missile silos would send a wall of tons of dirt into the sky 

thereby blocking following adversary reentry vehicles from getting to their 

targets. 

This adversary “South-North Walk” through the missile fields 

would enable the northernmost U.S. ICBMs time to launch while the 

others were being attacked. Also, an adversary would want to strike the 

fast fliers of the United States first to prevent such a response or limit it. 

Thus, they would likely try to hit the ICBMs first, leaving a window of 

time for U.S. bombers to get airborne. Also an attack on all three legs of 

the triad will dilute the weapons that could otherwise be devoted to 

overwhelm a less diverse force.

The most survivable element of the triad is the SLBM forces at 

sea. Once submerged and sent out to deep water stations far at sea, the 

current submarine fleet is believed to be all but invisible and virtually 

undetectable. Moreover, like bombers, the fleet ballistic missile 

submarines can provide a 360 degree azimuth threat complicating enemy 

defenses and forcing them to spread their missile defenses around the 

entire defensive perimeter. Ballistic missile submarines also complement 

the other two legs of the triad by providing the most survivable launchers 

once deployed on the high seas. Positioned off an adversary coastline, the 

SLBM force could reach enemy targets in the least amount of time if 

given timely orders. These sea-borne forces are also good at signaling U.S. 

readiness if they are flushed from their home ports in a crisis. And, if 

sighted off an adversary coastline, they would convey a near and ominous 

threat that should bolster deterrence effects.

There are several deterrence advantages to maintaining a bomber 

leg to the retaliatory forces. Basing bombers at the end of runways during 

crises or sending some of them aloft at one time or another can signal 

readiness to strike back in more evident ways than by putting ICBMs and 

on-station submarines on alert. Bombers also can provide a 360 degree 

azimuth threat to enemies and are reusable and recallable. Bomber 

capability would also force a rival to spend large sums on air defense and 

divert such funds from missile defenses. Conversely, a bomber’s path to 

targets can be paved by ICBM and SLBM strikes against air defenses. So 

all legs of the strategic triad work synergistically, complicating the plans 

of any enemy commanders assigned the task of attempting to negate the 

U.S. capability to retaliate in case of war. Such combinations of sea-land-
Schneider and Ellis 

414

air launchers would checkmate any such plans and this is why U.S. 

military planners are opposed to converting the triad to a dyad that carries 

somewhat more risk Guthe argues that the present triad enhances our 

strategic force survivability, lethality, flexibility, visibility, and 

adaptability -- all the components needed for strong deterrence. He 

concludes any move from the present triad to a dyad would diminish U.S. 

strategic force survivability.6

Nevertheless, the trend in arms control negotiations is to negotiate 

ever smaller nuclear forces under SALT II, START, START II, SORT, 

and New START. Also, with the ending of the Cold War and the focus on 

the fighting of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a squeeze on U.S. 

defense resources that leads policy makers to consider nuclear force cuts 

for financial cost and nuclear nonproliferation reasons. Deeper cuts in 

allowed nuclear warhead and strategic delivery vehicle numbers will 

increase the pressure for either eliminating one leg of the strategic triad 

and/or changing the basing modes of some of the strategic force. 

 

One solution might be to eliminate bombers from the nuclear 

mission and then subdivide the ICBM force, keeping some in silos and 

deploying others on Hardened Mobile Launchers (HMLs). The 

Midgetman7 program of the late 1980s and early 1990s was already tested 

in this mode and might be a cost-effective way to complicate enemy 

targeting at lower force levels under any new deeper cut arms control 

regime. Further analysis is needed to evaluate the utility of fielding a triad 

of a mixed ICBM force, some in silos, and others on hardened mobile 

launchers, alongside SLBM aboard strategic submarines. At lower 

numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and warheads that basing mode 

begins to look attractive.8

Alternatively, the United States could move to a bomber/SLBM or 

a SLBM/ICBM dyad option. The downside of the first dyad is that with 

no ICBM problem to solve, an adversary could concentrate on defeating 

the submarine-bomber force. An anti-submarine warfare breakthrough 

coupled with improved air defenses could reduce the deterrent effect of 

such a dyad.

On the other hand, a SLBM-ICBM dyad presently seems like a 

guaranteed retaliatory capability, even without bombers in the mix, but 

such a dyad would be put into jeopardy if an adversary achieved a 

breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare and in their ballistic missile 
Schneider and Ellis 

415

defenses (BMD). Clearly if the adversary states did not have to build air 

defenses alongside their missile defenses, they could concentrate their 

resources on BMD improvements.

Extended Deterrence: What Is Required?

David Trachtenberg investigated the concept of extended deterrence and 

examines the question “How Much Capability Is Too Little?” This is an 

important question to ask since over 30 U.S. allies depend on the U.S. 

nuclear umbrella to protect them. Trachtenberg believes that extended 

nuclear deterrence has had a long and successful history and continues as a 

strong theme in U.S. security strategy. However, much has changed since 

the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991. The Cold War ended. 

New states have acquired and tested nuclear weapons – India, Pakistan 

and North Korea. Still others are attempting to acquire them, witness Iran. 

Non-State actors have pursued weapons of mass destruction capability – 

al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo. Further, the nuclear arsenal of the United 

States was progressively reduced under START, START II, SORT, and 

New START ceilings. Under the administration of President H.W. Bush, 

the U.S. tactical or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons have been removed 

from the inventory. 

Further, some may come to believe the United States is less serious 

deterring nuclear threats at a time when it has signaled less of a reliance on 

nuclear weapons and has set a long term goal of eliminating them 

altogether if others can be made to follow the U.S. lead. On the other 

hand, the Obama administration has embraced maintaining a strong 

retaliatory capability as long as other states are threaten with nuclear 

weapons, and supports extended deterrence as reflected in the 2010 

Nuclear Posture Review and through statements of senior leaders. 

Sending such mixed signals may cause some U.S. allies presently 

reliant on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to wonder if one day they should not 

begin to create a nuclear deterrent of their own rather than trust another 

power to shield them. Leaders of allied states might question whether any 

state would be willing to risk a nuclear war, and millions of casualties, on 

their behalf. The reality is that not all allies are of equal importance to the 

United States. An attack on some is guaranteed to be met with a U.S. 
Schneider and Ellis 

416

military response. An attack on some others might not so readily cause a 

U.S. response. Some allies are absolutely vital to the survival and 

prosperity of the United States, others are not. Some allies have U.S. 

armed forces on their territory. An aggressor attack that shed American 

blood would involve the United States immediately. 

Ironically the number of states wanting to be under the U.S. 

nuclear umbrella may increase at the same time the size of our nuclear 

forces, providing that umbrella, is decreasing. This thought of a declining 

U.S. deterrent might lead to a new wave of nuclear proliferation by states 

such as Turkey, Republic of Korea, Japan, and others. In a worst case, at 

some point a continued and much deeper U.S. nuclear force reduction 

could trigger a new nuclear breakout from the NPT regime. 

On the other hand, this threat may be exaggerated. The United 

States will long have the capacity for retaliation beyond what is needed. 

The real question is one of will. Does the adversary believe the U.S. 

government will act in a given contingency? That is the question, not U.S. 

retaliatory or war fighting capability. It is unclear just how many nuclear 

weapons the United States would need to convince a Kim Jong Il or 

Ayatollah Khamene’i that it would unwise to use nuclear weapons on a 

U.S. ally. The answer probably is very few. 

Clearly, a single nuclear weapon, or no more than a few nuclear 

weapons, has the capability to do absolutely catastrophic damage to 

smaller states. Indeed, the same might be said of very large states. Some 

smaller states are, as one observer has noted, close to being “one-bomb 

states.”9

And, although the United States has over 30 allies who seek 

protection under the nuclear umbrella that does not mean it must maintain 

anything like 30 times the weapons needed for deterrence. The same 

nuclear arsenal can be applied to all as needed for deterrence given the 

extremely unlikely event that more than one or two serious nuclear threats 

need be confronted at one time. Indeed, the first use of a nuclear weapon 

against an aggressor could trigger a surrender since that regime would 

know more nuclear strikes could be unleashed. It would be far better to 

cease combat before things escalated further.

A half dozen nuclear weapons could totally devastate a country 

like Iran, Syria or North Korea so it would be a long time before the U.S. 

nuclear arsenal was so depleted it could not be used to check or destroy 

the military capability of such rogue regimes. 
Schneider and Ellis 

417

Tailored Deterrence Strategy

Today’s world is different from the days of the Cold War. Our 

adversaries are different and more diverse, and the complexities in being 

able to influence each of them have gotten somewhat harder, especially 

when trying to deter non-state actors like al Qaeda. We cannot simply use 

the deterrence strategies used to deter Soviet Union in the Cold War 

against al-Qaeda, North Korea, Iran, Syria, China and others without 

making adjustments. Our potential adversaries have different strategies, 

personalities, cultures, languages, histories, views of rational behavior, 

and some have a different willingness to die for their cause. All are 

factors that must inform our approach to tailored deterrence strategies. 

As Jerrold Post points out, “In this post-Cold War era...it is clear 

that deterrence must be tailored and based on nuanced actor-specific 

behavioral models.” He would have us focus on adversary’s intentions as 

the “locus of decision making” and concludes “when it is a leader 

predominant society, such as Iraq under Saddam, and the leader is judged 

to not be deterrable, this calls for a tailored communications program 

designed to drive a wedge between the leader and his followers.” This 

strategy might also be employed against some of the factions within the 

Iranian leadership. 

It should be emphasized that each leadership of each country is 

different in personalities, governmental structure, regime goals, strategic 

culture, political and military history, internal and external threats they 

face, and in how they make and implement decisions. Each is different in 

its relations with the United States and the history of that relationship. 

Thus, the United States and its allies need to tailor and customize a unique 

deterrence strategy to maximize its dissuasive power against each of these 

potential adversary states.

When designing a tailored deterrence strategy, the U.S. and its 

allies need to get answers to a range of questions about adversary regimes, 

including: 

• Who makes decisions on war and peace issues for the regime? 

• What do the top leaders value most? How could we leverage that 

value to deter them?
Schneider and Ellis 

418

• What motivates these leaders most? Personal power? Regime 

survival? Ideology? Righting past wrongs? Religion? Desire for 

territorial expansion?

• What are these leaders like in personality, style, personal history 

and views? 

• How are they influenced by their strategic culture?

• Can they be influenced most by particular threats or 

accommodations? 

• Is there a predominant leader or is power shared? Who makes 

what kinds of decisions? Is decision-making centralized or 

dispersed? 

• What is the history of risk-taking by these leaders in the past?

• Are there leadership factions? Can their leadership be split?

• What U.S. actions and deterrence messages might work best with 

each faction?

• How are national security decisions made? What is the process of 

decision? 

• What influence does bureaucratic bargaining play in decisions? 

• What are the regime’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) and 

military doctrine?

• What are the influences of their culture and history on decisions 

made?

• What are their current foreign and defense policies?

• Who do they consider to be their domestic and international allies 

and rivals? 

• What military capabilities and vulnerabilities do they possess?

• What is their center of gravity? Can it be exploited to enhance 

deterrence? What are their pressure points on which to exert 

deterrence leverage?

• How do they implement decisions once top leaders have decided 

on a course? 

• What does their command and control system look like? Can it be 

interrupted? 

• What warnings and indicators do we have when they are preparing 

to use force?
Schneider and Ellis 

419

• How can we most effectively communicate with the rival regime? 

In the case of non-state actors, the United States needs a tailored 

deterrence policy capable of dissuading those aiding and abetting terrorist 

groups like al-Qaeda from assisting that organization from acquiring and 

employing weapons of mass destruction. It will be important to establish 

clear red lines that the United States and allies will not permit to be 

crossed. Potential aiders, abetters, and aggressors need to be clearly 

informed of these thresholds and must be made to understand the

extremely high costs in taking such actions. 

Building a history of credible responses to threats and having 

strategic communications that make crystal clear the costs of crossing 

those red lines should be part of the important work done to shore up 

deterrence in the post-Cold War.

In the case of leader predominant states such as Kim Jong Il’s

North Korea or the former Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein, a tailored 

deterrence approach is especially valuable. Where power is concentrated 

in just one or only a few persons, leadership profiles and personal histories 

are extremely important in discerning how to influence their decisions. 

Such tailored deterrence also becomes more important in crises than in 

day-to-day normal dealings with a rival regime since crisis decisions are 

often made at the highest levels in face-to-face groups in crises where time 

is short, stakes are high and there is often an element of surprise. 

Because of the high stakes in acute international crises, top 

national leaders are under pressure to get personally involved, cutting out 

the normal bureaucratic layers of decision. There is a greater tendency for 

individual decision-makers or small face-to-face top-level decision groups 

to make these urgent and important decisions. Precisely at such times, 

logic often wars with psycho-logic. At just such junctures psychological 

factors may interfere with clear thinking. Profiling and understanding the 

tendencies of rival leaders can help predict some of these crisis outcomes.

When dealing with regimes where power is more widely shared, 

especially when rival factions are discerned in ruling elite, it is still 

important to understand the participants and what faction they belong to. 

Here the emphasis might be placed on attempting to empower and 

influence the faction that is most likely to take the decision path that is in 

the best interest of the United States and its allies while also attempting to 
Schneider and Ellis 

420

avoid empowering the side bent on conflict or escalation. Hence, a 

sophisticated understanding of the cliques within ruling circles is a 

necessary element of a tailored deterrence posture vis-à-vis that state. 

Also, note that during crises, the dominant personality or views of a 

faction are magnified under stressful conditions. Those prone to 

aggressive actions tend to be even more aggressive in situations of duress 

and vice versa.

The United States leadership also needs to understand the 

difference in decision-making done in crises as opposed to normal times 

by the rival leadership. During acute international crises, the top leaders 

are more immediately involved in decisions and psychological factors and 

may have a greater role. Day-to-day decisions usually involve more 

bureaucratic politics, and things done through standard operating 

procedures (SOPs), and more players involved in policy and execution 

decisions. Thus, in this situation, a tailored deterrence policy should also 

include attempting to identify the normal time decision-processes of the 

regime, the wider range of bureaucratic players, and the SOPs followed as 

their elements interact and create outcomes. 

A tailored deterrence posture also requires us to understand the 

rival’s views of deterrence of the United States and its allies. If, as 

Saddam Hussein believed, the United States was a casualty adverse 

society and we would cut and run after a certain level of casualties, then 

such a ruler might be prone to take greater risks, thinking he could 

persuade us to retreat rather than finish the job if we were to go to war. 

Such adversarial thinking can possibly be reversed through a series of 

forceful and preparatory U.S. actions and statements counteracting the 

rival leader’s perceptions, especially if communicated in clear and 

unambiguous ways. 

As Jerrold Post recognizes, a “special dilemma is posed by 

transnational radical Islamist terrorism, many of whose members seek 

martyrdom.”10 He proposes that for: 

this challenging target, a four point program of tailored 

communications is proposed with the overall goal of reducing the 

ranks of terrorists by inhibiting potential terrorists from joining the 

group, producing dissension in the group, facilitating exit from the 

group, and reducing support for the group and delegitimizing its 
Schneider and Ellis 

421

leaders. Messages designed to inhibit the development and use of 

weapons of mass destruction is included in the suggested 

program.11

We must customize our deterrent strategies to match the 

adversaries we face and the scenarios in which we might confront them. 

Therefore, in the tailored deterrence part of this book our authors looked at 

different state and non-state actors as individual challenges, each to be 

dealt with uniquely. 

The tailored approach to deterrence12

Many obstacles can stand in the way of an effective tailored 

deterrence strategy. Intelligence may be lacking on rival leaderships. We 

may fail to understand their personalities, histories, culture, decision 

process, stakes and capabilities. The factions and policy splits among 

them on various issues may be poorly understood. Communication may 

be difficult between foes with different cultures, languages, experiences 

and problems. Communications can be difficult because a government 

has multiple audiences to persuade at the same time – the rival 

government, allies, the press, the public and other decision-makers. 

Effective communications to one audience may not play well with 

another. 

is particularly apt when 

confronting an adversary state or group that is significantly different from 

the United States in culture, values, perspectives, capabilities, goals, and 

willingness to suffer great losses to achieve their ends. Tailored 

deterrence is also very important when confronting a rival state or group 

led by a pre-dominant leader. Examples are Germany under Adolph 

Hitler, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, or North Korea under Kim Jong Il. 

Profiling the leader’s personality, personal and political history, and his 

strategic culture can provide insights in how to deal, deter and influence 

that regime. Of course, some leaders may be undeterrable. Hitler, 

Napoleon and Saddam Hussein were pre-disposed to violence and risktaking on a grand scale. 
Schneider and Ellis 

422

Tailored Deterrence of Iran

For at least two decades, the U.S. and allied governments have 

been concerned about the emerging nuclear program in Iran. As a state 

actor with a penchant to poke its finger into the eyes of western powers 

and especially the United States, Iran presents unique deterrence 

challenges.

Greg Giles points out that tailoring a deterrence strategy for Iran 

will not be easy because the Iran’s leaders presents a unique set of 

behaviors such as “intense factionalism, belief in conspiracy theories, 

apocalyptic messianism and superstitious reliance on fortune telling.”13 

Further, Iran is committed to spreading its radical Islamic revolution to 

other countries and believes the United States lacks the desire to stop it. 

Giles says these factors set the stage for U.S. and allied deterrence to fail 

and prevent future Iranian aggression.14

Nonetheless, Giles does believe deterrence failures could be 

minimized if U.S. governmental planners take four specific actions: 

 

• First, “recognize America’s track record of deterring the Islamic 

Republic since 1979 is rather poor, and they must understand why 

that has been the case.”15

• Second, “tailor deterrence strategy and tactics to Iran’s unique 

decision- making environment.”

 

16

• Third, rebuild the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats which will 

require a greater willingness to employ limited force against Iran 

even if it possesses nuclear weapons, while maintaining U.S. 

escalation dominance to discourage Iran from initiating nuclear 

use.17

• Fourth, “use simulations and exercises to explore various means by 

which a nuclear crisis with Tehran could be defused.” 

 

18

However, in the event all of these actions fail we should be 

prepared to use the full force of our military capability to limit Iranian 

adventurism and nuclear use. 
Schneider and Ellis 

423

Tailored Deterrence of North Korea

In addition to Iran, a second major rogue state problem is presented 

by North Korea. If matters were not already tenuous enough in Korea, the 

March 2010 North Korean sinking of the South Korean Navy’s ship 

Cheonin by torpedo, and, in November 2010, the North Korean artillery 

shelling on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Islands have escalated tensions 

between South and North Korea. 

How we deter North Korea WMD usage is a question examined by 

Bruce Bennett who believes North Korea poses a serious WMD threat. He 

argues North Korea is a failing state and will have incentives to use its 

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in future crises and conflicts. 

Bennett argues a deterrence strategy against the Pyongyang regime

first must be “based on a combination of their [U.S./ROK] capabilities for 

denial and punishment, both of which need to be increased.”19 Second, 

we must “focus on the internal threats the North Korean regime faces.”20 

They must be made to understand their society would come apart in any 

wartime environment and the regime would not survive in that case. 

Third, it is important to “convince North Korea its WMD use would often 

be thwarted by U.S./ROK denial capabilities.”21 Finally, the U.S. and 

“ROK should develop a strategy and plans for a ROK-led unification of 

Korea and use key elements of such a strategy to punish and deter North 

Korean provocations.”22

Bennett says to “prevent North Korean WMD use in provocations 

and limited attacks, the United States and the ROK must first work to 

resolve the ROK gaps in defenses against limited attacks.”23 If North 

Korea can be denied success in limited attacks, the U.S. and South Korean

deterrence effort will be strengthened.

Deterring Non-State Actors

Leaving the more easily understood deterring of states we now 

examine the difficulties and challenges of deterring non-state actors. 

Groups like al-Qaeda generally have no return addresses or traditional 

assets to hold hostage to reprisals. Thus, anyone planning deterrence 
Schneider and Ellis 

424

strategies must develop newer forms of tailored deterrence for each 

targeted group. Lewis Dunn discussed how to influence the terrorist 

WMD acquisition and use calculus and focused on a strategy directed 

towards two groups: the al-Qaeda core leadership around Osama BinLadin and their support group of aiders and abettors. Dunn points out 

these groups are susceptible to influence, although in various degrees. He 

suggests terrorist groups and their aiders and abettors might be persuaded 

not to acquire or employ weapons of mass destruction in attacks if they 

were convinced:

• such use was against the religious or ethical principles of the 

audience they were trying to recruit and influence;

• cheaper and more cost-effective means were available to achieve 

their ends; 

• technical difficulties of executing a successful WMD attack were 

too great; 

• WMD use would arouse more opposition than support for their 

cause;

• trying to acquire WMD capability involved too much danger and 

risk.

How does this apply to al-Qaeda’s core leadership, and associated 

aiders and abettors? Dunn points out that its leaders are not easily deterred 

from use by the argument that weapons of mass destruction are not 

justifiable and legitimate according to Islamic religious doctrine. Its

leaders have persuaded a few radical Islamic religious leaders to bless 

WMD use and to release fatwas sanctioning mass killings and WMD use 

against infidels.

According to Dunn a more favorable approach would be to 

convince that use of the weapon of mass destruction was not the most 

cost-effective means of achieving their ends, rather, other means are the 

smart to use options. 

Finally, there also might be a way to influence al-Qaeda leadership 

if they believe use of such weapons would alienate them from the greater 

Muslim world, and might not be the best use of their resources. 

Deterrence of al-Qaeda’s use of WMD might be strengthened by using all 
Schneider and Ellis 

425

strategic communication and partnership means to propagate and reinforce 

the view in the Muslim world that mass killings are outside the bounds of 

decent and respectable behavior.

Nuclear Attribution as Deterrence

Deterrence by the threat of punishment will fail if you do not know 

who to punish. It is hard to retaliate against assailants who leave no clue 

as to who they are. Thus, nuclear attribution is necessary to deter a rival 

equipped with nuclear weapons. An adversary state or group must know 

they will be targeted if they attack the United States or its allies. Should 

deterrence fail, then the United States needs to be able to attribute where 

that attack originated from. If it’s a nuclear weapon set off by a terrorist, 

we need to know who gave them the bomb. 

Nuclear forensics is the tool to help bring to light the likely 

perpetrators. The United States must let the world know that if a nuclear 

weapon, is used it has the ability to find out who did it and then send them 

a message to the return address. A strong nuclear attribution is central to 

this message. 

As Michael Miller has said, current attribution technology is 

developed, but is not foolproof. State and non-state actors would be more 

effectively deterred from nuclear weapons use if current U.S. capabilities 

were more widely known and if the post-blast evidence assessment 

process was more internationalized. 

What steps could be taken to improve nuclear attribution 

capabilities? First, an international capability must be created to examine 

post-blast attribution using assets from international groups that combat 

nuclear smuggling and work with nuclear forensics. Second, an effort 

should be initiated that strengthens the science of nuclear forensics and 

how the world views it. Third, international capabilities for post-blast 

attribution should be developed and tested that provide an accurate and 

unprejudiced analysis leading to the source of the bomb. Fourth, speedy 

and accurate attribution still requires careful and full investigation and the 

acquisition of the right resources, before the final conclusions can be 

reached on the sources of the nuclear materials used and possible 

perpetrators of the attack. At the same time, the United States and its allies 
Schneider and Ellis 

426

should continue to improve their databases of worldwide nuclear 

signatures. 

This nuclear attribution capability should be coupled with a 

strategic communications program telling the world that those unleashing 

nuclear attacks upon the United States and its allies will be identified and 

punished.24

Matching Deterrence Strategy to Specific Scenarios

The use of scenarios to help you think through deterrence at 

critical times and places can also inform U.S. and allied leaders about 

what actions to take and strategic communications to transmit to rivals 

during an ongoing crisis or conflict. 

In the hypothetical future Taiwan crisis described in this book, it is 

important to note how an asymmetry of interests can cause the side with 

the most commitment to winning to take riskier decisions even if the other 

side has the preponderance of military capability. The United States might 

have superior military capability in such a crisis but China might have a 

greater stake in the outcome, more zeal for victory and might be willing to 

take greater risks.

In the case study of Saddam Hussein and deterrence in the 1990-

1991 Gulf War, it is instructive to note that Hussein had a view of what 

would deter the United States from totally defeating him, 5,000 U.S. 

personnel killed in action. Likewise, U.S. leaders believed he would back 

out of Kuwait when faced with superior firepower. Both were wrong. 

The United States was prepared to incur far more casualties if necessary 

and Saddam was not willing to move because to retreat would pose a risk 

to his hold on power in Iraq. 

Case studies also bring new deterrence factors to the fore – such as 

the need to decide and communicate early and clearly to the adversary. It 

is important to clearly draw lines on the map that should not be crossed, 

warning the adversary what steps would trigger a war. The 1990-1991 

Gulf War case also indicated that the U.S. needed to send military 

capability early to Kuwait prior to the Iraqi invasion, even if just a trip 

wire force, if it wanted to convince Saddam Hussein not to start the 

invasion. 
Schneider and Ellis 

427

Several other deterrence lessons were discovered in the Gulf War 

case study of deterrence and Saddam Hussein. This was a case of serial 

deterrence steps. It shows the value of careful analysis of scenarios in 

identifying deterrence opportunities as the situation unfolds. Thus, 

scenarios help you to think through junctures in a scenario where war 

might be avoided or further escalation prevented. In the Gulf War case, 

had the United States better calculated the threat to its Middle East oil 

supplies if Kuwait were to fall to Iraq, it might have paid more attention to 

the border and oil dispute between Iraq and Kuwait prior to the Iraqi 

invasion. 

Had the United States anticipated the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, it 

might have drawn a line in the sand spelling out dire consequences for 

Iraq if it intervened and might have thus deterred the Iraqi invasion. Had 

it moved US forces into Kuwait prior to the invasion, the United States 

Government might have communicated better its will to use force, even if 

the US forces sent were only “tripwire” forces. 

With regard to deterring Iraq’s use of chemical and biological 

(CB) weapons it seems likely Saddam Hussein was deterred from using 

them because of a stern warning communicated to the Iraqi leadership by 

President H.W. Bush warning indirectly but clearly of a possible U.S. 

nuclear retaliation in that eventuality. Also, President H.W. Bush was 

deterred from occupying Iraq in 1991 by his estimates of the further costs 

that would entail in lives, treasure, alliance cohesion, domestic political 

support and pain of occupying and rebuilding a defeated country. 

Profiling leaders is important if we are to understand how to 

influence them. Saddam essentially made all major foreign and defense 

policy for Iraq and he was a risk taker. Indeed, as noted earlier, 

the Iraqi dictator took risks far beyond what Soviet leaders 

were willing to risk in the Cold War when confronted with 

overwhelming U.S. military power and a dedicated deterrent 

posture. The risk-taking and violent personality of the Iraqi 

leader, coupled with the mild deterrent signals the U.S. sent at 

the beginning of the Iraq-Kuwait confrontation, led Saddam 

Hussein to gamble on seizing an oil rich treasure that could bail 

him out of the financial problems caused by the huge costs of 

the Iran-Iraq war.25
Schneider and Ellis 

428

A study of possible flashpoints and escalation scenarios also can 

help decision-makers see the points where they will need to take forceful 

actions and send strong messages if they are to curtail crises and avoid 

later escalations.

Deterrence in a Future U.S. China Crisis over Taiwan

Even though the United States and China are each other’s best 

trading partners, there is a flashpoint that could one day trigger a military 

conflict, Taiwan. McCready argued that the asymmetrical interests of the 

United States and China might tilt the outcome and cause the Chinese 

leadership to escalate a crisis or conflict further than we might expect 

Misunderstandings and misperceptions unique to both countries

seem to center on national interest for each country. McCready believes 

that the “most dangerous misunderstanding is the belief, prevalent in both 

the U.S. and China, that the U.S. has no significant national interest at 

stake.”26

However, the problem is that for the past six decades the United 

States has been intentionally ambiguous as to what we would do if China 

invaded Taiwan. This has worked since China has not used force to take 

the island back, but it is questionable if this will continue to be the case in 

the future. 

 If this is the case then it’s imperative for the U.S. leadership to 

define why this commitment is important and clearly communicate it to 

the P.R.C. and to the U.S. public. 

McCready identified four areas of mutual misperception that need 

to be corrected at the top leadership levels of both countries in order for 

peace to be maintained over Taiwan’s status:

• First, “the nature of the national interest involved”27

• Second, “the level of commitment to that interest,”

must be 

clarified;

28

• Third, “the governmental decision-making process,” should be 

better understood;

should be 

clarified; 

29
Schneider and Ellis 

429

• Fourth, “the attitudes that drive each nation’s international 

behavior” must be more explicit30 

One serious misperception according to the Chinese is the 

American failure to understand the seriousness of their intent to regain 

Taiwan. That island nation has been a source of tension ever since the 

communist Chinese took over control of the mainland of China almost 60 

years ago. In China’s view “the island now became a symbol of the 

incompleteness of the communist victory in the civil war.”31 This fact 

must continuously be factored into any U.S. deterrence strategy. 

Deterrence at Near Zero or Zero Nuclear Weapons

President Obama in his 2009 Prague speech discussed an eventual 

goal of zero nuclear weapons if other nations could also be persuaded to 

follow that path. In the meantime, the President has indicated that the 

United States will maintain a nuclear deterrent capability to maintain the 

peace until such time as conditions are safe to move to zero nuclear 

weapons or near zero. Would a world of zero or near zero nuclear 

weapons make the world safer or more dangerous? Would this be a world 

of less conflict or would global zero make conventional combat more 

likely because it entailed less risk? Barry Blechman argues that complete 

or near total nuclear disarmament need not make conventional wars more 

likely.

As early as 1946, in the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, the United States, 

then the sole possessor of the nuclear bomb offered to give them up and 

advocated that nuclear weapons be banned. Truman wanted to avoid a 

world of nuclear weapons states. Still later, the United States pledged 

itself to general and complete nuclear disarmament in Article VI of the 

nuclear non–proliferation treaty (NPT). The reason is that U.S. and other 

world leaders feared a future world beset by nuclear wars and catastrophic 

casualties. In the view of those advocating global zero, they see it as the 

only means of preventing such a future. 

For those who claim that nuclear weapons are the deterrent to war 

and nuclear disarmament is a path to more rather than fewer wars, 

Blechman cites some examples where possession of nuclear weapons did 
Schneider and Ellis 

430

not deter attacks from states armed only with conventional arms. North 

Korea and China fought the nuclear-armed United States in the Korean 

War. Egypt and Syria attacked a nuclear Israel in 1973. Argentina 

attempted to take back the Falkland Islands from a nuclear United 

Kingdom, and North Vietnam fought a nuclear United States in the 

Vietnam War. Also terrorist attacks took place inside Russia, the United 

States, United Kingdom, India and Pakistan despite their nuclear weapons 

status. Obviously, nuclear weapons do not deter all conflict. Also, at least 

200 other conflicts took place among the non-nuclear weapons states in 

the 65 years of the nuclear era. The absence of nuclear weapons may or 

may not spur more conflicts – the evidence is mixed and unclear. 

In a world of zero or near zero nuclear weapons, air and missile 

defenses could play a much greater role in deterrence. If such defenses 

were prohibited or greatly limited, even small nuclear arsenals of perhaps 

100 nuclear weapons could inflict major damage on any aggressors and 

thus could be effective deterrents to war or escalation. Small nuclear 

arsenals would have to be protected and made more survivable by multiple 

basing modes probably relying more on defense of the deterrent, mobility 

and position location uncertainty to maintain their retaliatory capability. 

In a global zero world there would always be the possibility and 

problem of the clandestine cache, a regime that cheated and withheld some 

of its nuclear weapons for the time when others had disarmed. Obviously, 

verification of global zero would be a major problem, and the world is a 

big place. Also, any nation possessing nuclear weapons where others did 

not might gain a decisive nuclear advantage in a crisis confrontation. 

As the saying goes, “in the valley of the blind the one-eyed man is 

king.” Cheating and breakout and the responses to them would make a 

zero nuclear world possibly less safe than a world of small or large nuclear 

arsenals. If cheating and breakout were detected, the probability is an 

immediate return to the manufacture of new nuclear weapons by rivals of 

the cheating state. 

The absence of nuclear weapons, if even achieved and sustained, 

could remove the threat of nuclear war. However, for the foreseeable 

future global zero is a distant mountaintop vision and the world has only 

inched toward the “base camp” where we could see any reasonable path to 

the top. In between that base camp position are nine nuclear weapons 
Schneider and Ellis 

431

states run by very different people who do not seem inclined to give up 

their nuclear arsenals any time soon. 

Strategic Communications: a Key to Deterrence

Richard Estes discussed the key role of strategic communications 

in deterrence. He emphasizes how important it is for the United States to 

deliver a coordinated and effective strategic communications to convince 

the world that our deterrence pledges and threats are believable. To 

maximize our influence, all departments and divisions of our government 

need to speak with one convincing voice to our allies that we will defend 

them and to our adversaries that aggression will be met with 

overwhelming force. Moreover, our words must be matched by our 

capabilities and actions. 

It would appear that the United States government has to reconcile 

two contrary ideas. First it must communicate to potential rivals that U.S. 

nuclear forces will retaliate in kind if nuclear weapons are used against it 

or its allies. Second, and at the same time, the U.S. government is also 

trying to move the world toward non-use of nuclear weapons, reduction of 

existing nuclear forces, and to the eventual abandonment of nuclear 

weapons worldwide if it can be done safely and by all parties. To 

communicate this dual message to the world requires a solid strategic 

communications campaign. 

Estes stresses that for this strategic communication campaign to be 

effective it must have a vision that consist of certain elements:

• First, the vision and message begins with the U.S. President. 

Whoever is in this position must tell the world the vision of the 

United States, a vision that our deterrent is credible and secure. 

• Second, this vision should be consistent across the administration. 

• Third, it must be solid enough that policies are based on the vision 

and message, but have the flexibility that allows the President and 

other top officials to be able to shape the vision. 

• Fourth, the vision and its associated policies should always aim for 

the moral high ground that helps build confidence in its leadership. 
Schneider and Ellis 

432

• Fifth, this campaign should continue to promote the United States 

as a good steward of its own decreasing nuclear weapons arsenal 

while showing faithful commitment to its allies who rely on the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

• Sixth, it should have an element that heralds the very high 

threshold the U.S. has on use of nuclear weapons, but also that this 

threshold has limits and could be reached in very critical cases, 

triggering a U.S. nuclear response. 

• Seventh, the vision and message should have an element that 

communicates our focus on rogue nations who would use their 

emerging nuclear programs to bully their neighbors, but also 

indicating that we still have an eye on past adversaries. 

• Eighth, any message the U.S. sends should work to compel rational 

leaders of other nations to help in preventing rogue nations and 

terrorist from obtaining nuclear material and weapons. 

• Ninth, “words matter. Actions matter. Allies and partners matter. 

Pulling all three together effectively and communicating a 

coherent, tough, and credible message to adversaries and allies is 

the essence of deterrence, and of strategic communication.”32 

Implications of Resilience for Deterrence Success

A very different aspect of deterrence deals with a nation’s ability 

to absorb an attack and bounce back. This is a form of deterrence by 

denial. If adversaries know that any attack they plan might be deflected or 

may serve to provoke more than to injure, they may not conduct it at all. 

Deterrence begins in the mind of the adversary and that leadership may 

decide it is not cost-effective to attack a target known for its resiliency. It 

may not be deemed worth the great effort it takes to plan and conduct an 

operation, wasting resources, if the plan entails a high probability of 

failure. 

For a nation to develop resiliency they must strengthen in three key 

spheres: leadership, infrastructure, and population. The United States 

should strive to build resiliency to make it appear to our rivals as a harder 

much more difficult target. Once we have: (1) trained our leaders to cope 

better through national and regional exercises and study of future options, 
Schneider and Ellis 

433

(2) erected greater protections of our critical infrastructures and key 

national assets, and (3) have organized, trained and equipped our public to 

cope better with future crises, then the United States will be in a better

position to absorb a punishing attack and bounce back, minimize losses, 

and win, making such an attack a move the rivals will ultimately regret. 

However, for deterrence of such attacks to succeed, preparations 

must be mated with strategic communications that let the adversary know 

that their attacks will backfire. Resiliency must be developed and then 

advertised and this message must be based on fact and not just 

propaganda. The U.S. schools and educational system may be the best 

medium for helping to prepare the U.S. public to be resilient against 

natural or man-made catastrophic events.

Where Do We Go From Here?

This study of deterrence focused on three approaches to 

understanding deterrence. Classical Cold War deterrence principles will 

probably be relevant in most state-to-state relationships but what worked 

in the U.S.-Soviet relationship may not fully work against every other 

rival state or coalition. Added to this approach, not replacing it, should be 

an attempt to tailor the U.S. deterrent posture to rival regimes based on a 

more precise understanding of such enemy leaders and their regimes. A 

third approach, one that can supplement but not replace the other two, is 

one based on analysis of influence or decision points in an ongoing or 

contemplated scenario to discern at what junctures what actions and 

communications may be required to deter war or further escalation of an 

ongoing conflict. Mating the elements of classic deterrence with a nuanced 

understanding of the enemy and combining those two approaches with 

detailed scenario analysis can give U.S. and allied leaders the analytic 

tools to craft an effective deterrent capability against rival states. 

 This is only part of the approach to deterring a WMD attack since 

terrorists and insurgents have now shown an interest in WMD capability 

and may be more prone to use it since they are harder to find and retaliate 

against. The program for deterring and preventing WMD terrorism will be 

improved with improved strategic communication to the Islamic world, 

better WMD attribution capabilities, more effective defenses and 
Schneider and Ellis 

434

programs for building U.S. and allied public resilience. Finally, deterrence 

will be best facilitated by letting aiders and abettors of such terrorists 

know they will be identified and become targets of our retaliation if WMD 

is used and if they were found to be part of the chain of custody from the 

source to the terrorist group. 

There are many means to thin out the WMD threat. The United 

States employs three such programs: nonproliferation to prevent 

proliferation of WMD to adversaries, counterproliferation to use military 

means to offset such capabilities where they exist, and consequence 

management capabilities to survive, recover, fight and win despite such 

attacks. 

At the heart of the counterproliferation program is deterrence of 

war and escalation of war. This program promises an adversary that an 

attack on the United States or an allied state will be catastrophically 

counterproductive. Moreover, U.S. and allied active and passive defenses 

as well as offensive capabilities can help prevent some of the harm 

intended from happening even if a rival strikes. 

It is well that there is a rebirth of thinking about the deterrence 

mission for the combination of deterrence-by-punishment and deterrenceby-denial of enemy success are the strongest U.S. and allied tools 

available for keeping the peace.

Notes
Schneider and Ellis 

435

 

1 This volume does not discuss deterrence of WMD proliferation. Instead the focus is on deterrence of military 

conflict or escalation of such conflict.

2 Miller, Franklin, “Chapter 3 - Tailoring U.S. Strategic Deterrence Effects on Russia,” p. 43 3 Ibid, p. 44

4 Ibid, p. 48 5 Lt. Col. Marc A. Peterson, “The New Triad,” Professional Studies Paper, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, 

Alabama, (Dec. 10, 2010).

6 Guthe, Kurt, “Chapter 11 - Deterrence, the Triad, and Possible Dyads.” 7 The Midgetman, MGM-134, was developed in the 1980s for the U.S. Air Force. It was a three stage solid-fueled 

small mobile ICBM seated on a Hardened Mobile Launcher. Designed to use a “cold launch” method for lift-off it 

would augment the existing Minuteman and Peacekeeper missile systems. The program was terminated in 1992 as 

the Cold War ended. See http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-134.htm 8 Peterson, “The New Triad.” 9 Statement of Anthony Cordesman of CSIS about most states in the Middle East.

10 Post, Jerrold, “Chapter 2- Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries: A Key Requirement for Tailored 

Deterrence,” p. 37

11 Ibid, pp. 37-38 12 As the May 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy states “we will draw on diplomacy, development, and 

international norms and institutions to help resolve disagreements, prevent conflict, and maintain peace, mitigating 

where possible the need for the use of force. This means credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments with 

tailored approaches to deterrence and ensuring the U.S. military continues to have the necessary capabilities across 

all domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyber.” 13 Giles, Greg, “Chapter 5- Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use,” p. 151 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid, p. 152. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

19 Bennett, Bruce, “Chapter 6 - Deterring North Korea from Employment of WMD in Future Korean Conflicts and 

Crises,” p.191.

20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Miller, Michael, “Chapter 14 – Nuclear Attribution as Deterrence,” pp. 451-452. 25 Schneider, Barry, “Chapter 7 - Deterrence & Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the 1990-1991 Gulf War,” p. 241. 26 McCready, Douglas, “Chapter 4 -Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait,” p.63. 27 Ibid, p. 66. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid, p. 62. 32 Estes, Richard, “Chapter 12 - The Role of Strategic Communications in Deterrence: Lesson from History,” p. 380.
 

CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Bruce W. Bennett is a senior defense analyst at the RAND 

Corporation; the research leader for strategy, force planning and 

counterproliferation within RAND's International Security and Defense 

Policy Center; and a professor of policy analysis in the Pardee RAND 

Graduate School (PRGS). Dr. Bennett works on military strategies, 

including deterrence, and the forces required by those strategies. Much of 

his work deals with the potential operational and strategic implications of 

chemical, biological and nuclear threats against the United States, 

Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. He has performed research for the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Republic of Korea (ROK ) Army, 

the ROK /U.S. Combined Forces Command, and the U.S. Pacific

Command. He has also facilitated many war games focused on possible 

conflict in Korea and elsewhere. He regularly writes on Korean security 

issues, and has visited the region some 75 times. Dr. Bennett received a 

B.S. in economics from the California Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. 

in policy analysis from PRGS.

Dr. Barry M. Blechman is the co-founder of the Stimson Center and a 

distinguished fellow focused on nuclear disarmament. He was chair of 

Stimson's board from 1989 to 2007. Blechman has nearly 50 years of 

distinguished service in national security, in both the public and private 

sectors. He is an expert on political and military policies, military strategy, 

and defense budgets and industries. Blechman has worked in the 

Departments of State and Defense, and at the Office of Management and 

Budget. Among other boards and commissions, Blechman served on the 

Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States 

(1998-99), the Defense Policy Board (2002-06), the mayor's Bioterrorism 

Preparedness and Response Program Advisory Committee in the District 

of Columbia (2004-06), and the Department of State Advisory Committee 

on Transformational Diplomacy (2005-08). Blechman founded DFI 

International Inc., a research consultancy, in 1984 and served as its CEO 

until 2007. Blechman holds a Ph.D. in international relations from 

Georgetown University, has taught at several universities, and has written 

extensively on national security issues. His most recent publications are 
Contributors

437

Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty and National Perspectives on 

Nuclear Disarmament. Both volumes, which he co-edited with Alexander 

Bollfrass, were published by Stimson in 2010. 

Dr. Lewis A. Dunn is a Senior Vice President of Science Applications 

International Corporation (SAIC). At SAIC, he has been responsible for 

many U.S. government-sponsored projects on issues such as proliferation 

prevention; future threat reduction and arms control initiatives; responses 

to WMD terrorism threats; and deterrence planning and requirements. Dr. 

Dunn recently concluded a major project on the roles of Cooperative 

Security activities—from strategic dialogue through Joint studies and 

analyses, to revamp arms control negotiations and agreements—in 

transforming the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China strategic relationships. He 

was called on by various U.S. government organizations to provide advice 

on preparations for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. 

From 1983-1987, Dr. Dunn served as the assistant director of the U.S. 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was also the ambassador to 

the 1985 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the 

1987 U.N. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Conference. Dr. Dunn 

serves as an expert advisor on the Congressional Commission on the U.S. 

Strategic Posture and is on the Editorial Board of the Nonproliferation 

Review. Dr. Dunn’s most recent publications include articles 

entitled “Why Has the American Homeland Not Been Attacked Again?” 

(co-authored with Dallas Boyd and James Scouras) in The Washington 

Quarterly and “The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 

An Assessment,” in The Nonproliferation Review. He received his Ph.D. 

in political science from the University of Chicago and is a member of the 

International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign 

Relations.

Mr. Richard H. Estes is Associate Director of the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center and Principal of Estes Consulting. Mr. Estes 

has focused his efforts for the Center in Washington, DC from his office in 

Williamsburg since 2001. A command pilot, he retired from the Air Force 

as a colonel in 2000 with over 30 years of wide-ranging service including 

operational, command and staff assignments at various levels. His final 

assignment was as the Defense and Air Attaché to the Kingdom of 
Contributors

438

Morocco. He served also on the faculty of the Air War College as Director 

of Regional Studies and Deputy Department Chairman, Joint Force 

Employment. He is a graduate in residence of the Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces and Air Command and Staff College, has a Bachelor of 

Arts from Methodist University, and holds a Master of Arts in 

Government and Public Administration from the University of South 

Carolina. He has published several articles and monographs. An expert in 

public diplomacy, his most recent published works are “A Message Not 

Yet Sent: Using Strategic Communications to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Threats” and “Toward a National Counterproliferation 

Strategic Communication Plan.” He lectures frequently on strategic 

communications and missile defense. 

Mr. Patrick Ellis is a WMD/Homeland Security analyst at the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center located on Maxwell AFB. He specializes in 

WMD terrorism, homeland security and disaster/emergency management 

issues. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from University of Maryland 

in Asian studies/government and politics, a Master of Public 

Administration degree from the University of Oklahoma, and a Master’s 

degree in International Relations. He completed specialized courses at the 

Defense Nuclear Weapons School, U.S. Army Chemical School and 

USAF Special Operations School. Mr. Ellis has developed and taught 

WMD and Asymmetric Warfare related topics for the Air Force Institute 

of Technology, Senior NCO Academy, and the Ira C. Eaker College for 

Professional Development’s Air Force Incident Management course. As 

an Air War College faculty member he has taught elective courses such as 

Asymmetric Warfare Issues, International Rivals and WMD Issues for the 

USAF. He is currently the course director for a two term Nuclear Threats, 

Countermeasures and Enterprise research elective. His other interests are 

the study of globalization, the undeveloped world, irregular warfare and 

homeland security. He co-authored with Randall J. Larsen a chapter titled 

“Securing the Homeland: The First Decade,” found in the book Avoiding 

the Abyss: Progress, Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the 

WMD Threat, published by Praeger Security International, 2006. 

Mr. Gregory F. Giles is a Senior Director with Science Applications 

International Corporation (SAIC), where he advises U.S. government 
Contributors

439

decision makers on issues pertaining to Iran, nonproliferation, and 

deterrence. He has published widely and testified before Congress on 

these subjects and is a regular guest lecturer at the U.S. Air Force and 

Army War Colleges. Since the early-1990s, Mr. Giles has been providing 

various USG Departments, Agencies, and Military Commands with expert 

analysis of Iranian decision-making dynamics and how best to harness all 

elements of US national power to influence them. In this regard, he has 

developed an in-depth profile of the Iranian regime and how it weighs 

costs, benefits, and the consequences of restraint. He was the featured 

speaker on Iran at a recent symposium on tailored deterrence at the NATO

Defense College, Rome. Mr. Giles is also advising USG clients on Iran’s 

nuclear negotiating goals, strategies, and tactics. In this regard, he has 

assessed Iran’s motives to pursue nuclear weapons, characterized the 

stance of top leaders on the nuclear issue, anticipated actual Iranian 

nuclear moves, and postulated likely Iranian reactions to various US 

courses of action. He recently assessed the risk of Iran’s emergence as a 

nuclear supplier. Prior to joining SAIC, Mr. Giles worked as a staff 

assistant in the British House of Commons, the United Nations General 

Assembly, and the U.S. House and Senate. Mr. Giles has a Bachelor’s 

degree in international studies and political science from Dickinson 

College and a Master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia 

University. 

Mr. Kurt Guthe is the Director of Strategic Studies at the National 

Institute for Public Policy. Before rejoining NIPP in 2005, he was a senior 

analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. During 

leave from CSBA, he contributed to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and 

served in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Forces Policy. In 1992, during a one-year leave of absence from National 

Institute, Mr. Guthe served on the staff of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. 

From 1981-1984, Mr. Guthe was on the senior professional staff of the 

Hudson Institute. From 1978-1981, he was a member of the research staff 

of the System Planning Corporation. 

Dr. Douglas McCready is a retired Army Reserve Chaplain. He is a 

supervisory chaplain in Pennsylvania’s Department of Public Welfare. He 

is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, with degrees in 
Contributors

440

international relations and Chinese studies. He has a Ph.D. from Temple 

University in religious studies and was an Army Senior Service College 

Fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has taught at 

Temple University, Alvernia University and Holy Family University. He 

is the author of two books and has written on military subjects for the 

Army’s Strategic Studies Institute, Military Review, Political Theology, 

Studies in Christian Ethics and the Journal of Military Ethics.

Mr. Franklin C. Miller is a Principal of The Scowcroft Group, an 

international consulting firm based in Washington, DC. Mr. Miller

served 31 years in the U.S. government, including 22 years serving under 

seven Secretaries in a series of progressively senior positions in the 

Department of Defense and four years as a Special Assistant to President 

George W. Bush and as Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms 

Control on the National Security Council staff. Following his retirement 

from government in 2005, Mr. Miller joined The Cohen Group, where he 

served for five years, first as a Vice President and later as a Senior 

Counselor. For his service, Mr. Miller was awarded the Defense 

Department's highest civilian award, the Defense Distinguished Civilian 

Service Medal, five times, and has received similar high-level awards 

from the Department of State, the Department of the Navy, the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Nuclear Security Administration 

and the Defense Intelligence Agency. In addition, Mr. Miller has been 

awarded the Norwegian Royal Order of Merit (Grand Officer) and the 

French Legion of Honor (Officer). In December 2006 he was awarded an 

honorary knighthood -- a Knight Commander of the Order of the British 

Empire (KBE) -- by Queen Elizabeth II in recognition of his many 

contributions to U.S.-UK relations during his decades of government 

service. Mr. Miller currently serves on the Defense Policy Board, the U.S.-

European Command Advisory Board, and the U.S. Strategic Command

Advisory Group. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and 

a Director of the Atlantic Council of the United States. He serves on the 

Board of Directors of EADS-North America, the Charles Stark Draper 

Laboratory, and History Associates Incorporated. Mr. Miller received his 

BA (Phi Beta Kappa) from Williams College in 1972. He received an 

MPA from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School in 1977. 
Contributors

441

Dr. Jerrold M. Post is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and 

International Affairs, and Director of the Political Psychology Program at 

the George Washington University. He came to the George Washington 

University after a 21-year career at the CIA, where he was the founding 

director of the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political 

Behavior. He received the Intelligence Medal of Merit in 1979. Among 

his extensive publications are Leaders and Their Followers in a 

Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior (2004), and The 

Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to alQaeda (2007). 

Mr. David J. Trachtenberg is an independent consultant in national 

security affairs and serves as President and Chief Executive Officer of 

Shortwaver Consulting, LLC. He has more than 30 years of public policy 

experience in the private sector and the Executive and Legislative 

branches of government. From 2005-2007 he was Vice President of CACI 

International and Division Manager of the Strategic Analysis Division at 

CACI-NSR, Inc. From 2003-2005 he was Senior Vice President for 

Homeland Security and Senior Vice President for Corporate Support at 

National Security Research, Inc. From 2001-2003, Mr. Trachtenberg was 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Policy, where his office initiated successful efforts to restructure NATO, 

develop the Proliferation Security Initiative, and foster closer relationships 

with Russia and the former Soviet states. During this time he served 

concurrently as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces 

Policy, overseeing the office that led the development of the Nuclear 

Posture Review and the New Triad concept, and provided policy rationale 

leading to the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and deployment of an 

initial national missile defense capability. In this capacity, he led 

interagency delegations to discuss missile defense cooperation with the 

Russian Federation. For his service Mr. Trachtenberg was awarded the 

Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the 

highest honorary award presented by DoD to private citizens. From 1995-

2001, Mr. Trachtenberg was a senior professional staff member on the 

House Armed Services Committee (HASC), where he developed 

Committee positions and provided policy oversight of export control and 

technology transfer issues, peacekeeping, terrorism, nuclear weapons and 
Contributors

442

arms control, missile defense, non-proliferation, and cooperative threat 

reduction with the former Soviet Union. Prior to his work on the HASC 

staff, Mr. Trachtenberg was a member of the technical staff of The 

Analytical Sciences Corporation, a consultant to the President’s General 

Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, Senior Defense 

Analyst for the Committee on the Present Danger, and a research associate 

with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. Trachtenberg received 

an A.B. degree in International Relations from the University of Southern 

California and a Master of Science degree in Foreign Service from 

Georgetown University. He is widely published and has served on various 

advisory boards, including task forces of the Defense Science Board. 

Dr. Barry R. Schneider is the Director of the USAF Counterproliferation

Center (CPC) at Maxwell AFB, and is also a Professor of International 

Relations at the Air War College. Dr. Schneider specializes in WMD 

counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues as well as the profiles of 

adversary leaders and their strategic cultures. He is the author of Future 

War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC 

Proliferation Threats (Praeger, 1999); Editor, Middle East Security Issues, 

In the Shadow of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation (CPC, 

1999); and contributor to and co-editor of Know Thy Enemy II (CPC, 

2007); The World’s Most Threatening Terrorist Networks and Criminal 

Gangs (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Avoiding the Abyss: Progress, 

Shortfalls and the Way Ahead in Combating WMD (CPC, 2005; Praeger, 

2006); Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their 

Strategic Cultures (CPC, 2003), The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm 

(CPC, 2002), Pulling back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and 

Countering Nuclear Threats (Frank Cass Ltd., 1998), Battlefield of the 

Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues (Air University Press, 1998), 

Missiles for the Nineties: ICBMs and Strategic Policy (Westview, 1984), 

and Current Issues in U.S. Defense Policy (Praeger, 1976). He has served 

as a Foreign Affairs Officer (GS-14) and Public Affairs Officer (GS-15) at 

the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as a Congressional 

staffer on arms control and defense issues, and was a Senior Defense 

Analyst at The Harris Group and the National Institute for Public Policy. 

He has taught at the Air War College since 1993. As a faculty member he 

has taught Air War College core courses of instruction and elective 
Contributors

443

courses such as International Rivals, Homeland Security Issues, 

International Flashpoints, Counterproliferation Issues, 21st Century

Warfare Issues, and CBW Issues for the USAF. He has taught at five other 

colleges and universities, and has a Ph.D. in Political Science from 

Columbia University.