MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2020	ME 128 Docket: Cum

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- 399 Argued September	15,	2020 Decided: November	3,	2020 Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. JOHN	D.	WILLIAMS
HUMPHREY,	J. [¶1] On	 an	 April	 night	 in	 2018,	 a	 deputy	 sheriff	 attempted	 to	 arrest John D.	Williams	on	drug	charges	outside	a	home	in	Norridgewock. Early	the following	 morning,	 the deputy	 sheriff’s body	 was	 found	 on	 the	 lawn	 of	 that home. Williams	now	appeals	from	the	judgment	of	conviction	entered	by	the court	 (Cumberland	 County, Mullen , J. )	 after	 a	 jury	 found	 him	 guilty	 of intentional	 or	 knowing	 murder of	 the	 deputy	 sheriff. See 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 201(1)(A)	(2020)

. Williams	raises	three	issu es	in	this	appeal	challenging	the court’s	admission	of	in

- court	demonstrations	of	the	possible	circumstances	of the	shooting , the	court’s	partial	denial	of a motion	to	suppress	statements he made	 to	 detectives	 after	 his	 arrest , and , finally, the	 court’s sentencing2 proceedings	and	the	length	of the sentence it	imposed .		We	affirm	the	judgment and	the	sentence

. I.		BACKGROUND
A. Facts [¶ 2 ] Viewing	 the	evidence	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	State,	 the jury	rationally	could	have	found	the	following	fac ts	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.
See State	v.	Ouellette ,	2019	ME	75,	¶	11,	208	A.3d	399

. [¶ 3 ] On	April	21,	2018,	Somerset	County Deputy Sheriff	Corporal	Eugene Cole and	another	deputy stopped Williams’s	car	because	they	saw	that	it	was being	 driven	 by	 his	 girlfriend,	 whose	 driving	 privileges	 they	 knew	 were suspended.		Williams	was	a	passenger	in	the	vehicle. Williams’s	girlfriend	was arrested	for	operating	a	vehicle	while	her	license	was	susp ended. The	deputies determined that Williams	could	not	drive	the	vehicle	from	the	scene	because	he appeared	 to	be	under	 the	influence	 of	drugs	and	 the	 vehicle’s	insurance had lapse d .		Williams	left	the	scene with	a	friend	who	arrived	to	pick	him	up

. [¶ 4 ] Arrangements	were	made	for	the	car	to	be	towed	from	the	scene. When	 illegal	 drugs	 were	 found	 during	 a	 subsequent	 search	 of	 the	 vehicle , a supervising	 officer	 authorized	 Corporal	 Cole	 and	 the	 other	 deputy	 to	 arrest Williams	on	drug	charges.3 [¶ 5 ] On	the	night	of	April	24,	2018,	Williams	was	using	drugs	at	a	friend’s house	when	he	asked	another	friend	to	drive	him	to	a	home	in	Norridgewock where	he	had	lived	 for	a	 period	 of	 time	when	he	was	growing	up

. Williams wanted	 to	 borrow	 the home owner’s	 car to	 transport	 some	 of	 his	 guns	 to	 a location	 in	 Old	 Town	 because	 he	 had to	 be	 in court	 in	 Massachusetts	 the following	day	and he wanted	to	make	sure	his	weapons	were	safe. The	friend agreed	to	drive Williams	to	Norridgewock

. [¶ 6 ] While	parked at the	home	in	Norridgewock,	Williams	and	his	friend

saw Corporal	Cole ’s	police	truck	slow	down	as	it	passed the	house. Williams removed	a	duffel	bag	containing	his	guns	from	the	trunk	of	his	friend’s	car	and placed them next	to the	vehicle	he	planned	to	bo rrow. The	friend	then	left. [¶ 7 ] Williams climbed the front	steps of	the	home	and	tried	to	enter,	but the	door	was	locked.		At	 that	point,	Corporal	Cole	approached	Williams	 from behind	 and	 asked	 if	 he	 was	 John	 Williams. Once	 W illiams	 confirmed	 his identity,	Corporal	Cole	told	Williams	that	he	was	under	arrest	and	attempted	to grab	his	wrist	to	take	him	into	custody.		Williams	pulled	away	and drew a	9mm pistol from his	waistband.		Corporal	Cole stepped back and	then slipped	and	fell on	a	grassy	slope.		Williams	shot Corporal	Cole once	in	the	right	side	of	the	neck at	close	range.4 [¶ 8 ] Williams	fled	in	Corporal	Cole’s	police	truck	and	drove	to a	nearby Cumberland	 Farms	 store,	 where	 he	 stole	 a	 bottle	 of	 water,	 cigaret tes,	 and	 a lighter.		The	store	clerk	called	9

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- 1 , and	the	dispatcher	notified	another	deputy to	respond	to	the	store. [¶ 9 ] After	Williams	left	the	store,	he	called a	friend	and	told	him that	he had	shot	Corporal	Cole.		Williams then asked his friend	t o	meet	him	on	Martin Stream	Road,	where	Williams	hid	the	police	truck	behind	a	house.		As	the	friend was	driving	to	meet	Williams,	he	saw a deputy sheriff at	the nearby Cumberland Farms	store	and	pulled	over	to	tell	him	that	the	person	who	shot	Corporal	Cole was	on	Martin	Stream	Road.		The	friend	then	continued	on	to	meet	Williams. [¶1 0 ] When	 the	 friend	arrived,	Williams	asked	if	he	could	use his car. The	friend	refu sed, and Williams	asked	to	borrow	his	cell	phone,	saying	that	he was	going	to	go	into	the	woods,	use	the	phone	to	make	a	confession,	and	then kill	himself.		The	friend	let	Williams	take	his	phone	and	then	dropped	him	off near	some	train	tracks	about	a	half

- mile	away	on	Martin	Stream	Road. [¶1 1 ] The	State	Police	Tactical	Team	was	called	in	to	locate	both	Corporal Cole	 and	 Williams.	 	 Based	 on the information	 that	 Williams’s	 friend had provided,	 team	 members	 located	 Corporal	 Cole’s	 police	 truck.	 	 Law enfor cement	also	set	up	a	command	post	at	a	fire	station	in	Norridgewock.		The5 fire	station	was	across	the	street	from	the house where	Corporal	Cole had	been shot. [¶1 2 ] In	 the	 morning	 hours	 of	 April	 25,	 2018,	 the	 owner	 of	 the Norridgewock house went	outside	and	saw a body	on	her	lawn.		She	screamed and	called	for	help,	attracting	the	attention	of	officers	at	the	fire	station,	who

came over and	saw	Corporal	Cole ’s	body,	with an	apparent	gunshot	wound	to the	neck.		Members	of	 the	State	Police	Evide nce	Response	Team arrived and found	a	bullet	and	casing	on	the	lawn	and	a	bulletproof	vest,	shotgun,	holster, and	a	backpack	containing	ammunition	in	a	car on	the	property

. [¶1 3 ] Corporal	Cole’s	body	was	 taken	 to	 the	State	Medical	Examiner’s Office

. An	 autopsy	 concluded	 that	 the	 cause	 of	 death	 was	 a	 close

- contact gunshot	wound	to	the	right	side	of	the	neck	below	the	ear	“which	perforated the	cervical	spinal	cord.” [¶1 4 ] Meanwhile,	a	manhunt	for	Williams was	underway .		On	April	28, 2018,	officers came	upon	a	remote	camp	in	the	area	of	Bear	Mountain	Road	and
set up	a	perimeter.		The	officers	heard	a	banging	noise	and	saw	Williams	come out	of	the	camp shirtless ,	carrying	a	clear	plastic	tote,	and	wearing	only	a	pair of	 long	 johns.	 	 Officers	 quickly surrounded	 Williams

. H e	 was	 taken	 to	 the ground	and	placed	under	arrest.6 [¶1 5 ] While placing handcuffs	on	Williams,	one	of	the	officers	punched Williams	in	the head “two	or	three	times”	when	it	appeared	that he was refusing
to	move his	right	hand

. 1 One	officer	pulled	down	Williams’s	long	johns	to	make sure	he	did	not	have	a	gun	in	his	waistband	and , observing	that	Williams	had defecated , removed	 the	 long	 johns. A photo was	 taken	 showing	 an	 officer pulling	Williams’s	head	up	by	his	hair while	he	wa s	lying	on	his	stomach.		The officers	then	reported	to	the	command	post	that	they	had	Williams	in	custody. [¶1 6 ] After	approximately	twenty minutes,	a	tactical	team	arrived	and walked Williams out	 of	 the	woods. 2 Williams remained	 naked	 and	 barefoot while	waiting	for	the	tactical	team	to arrive	and for	most	of	the ten
- minute walk, but he was	wrapped	in	a	blanket	before	exiting	the	woods.		Two	Major	Crimes Unit	detectives who met	Williams	near	the	edge	of	the	woods said they	would like	to	speak	with him , and	Williams	agreed.		The	detectives

— who had not been involved	in	the	arrest

— took	custody	of	Williams	from	the arresting officers	and walked	him	to	their	cruiser.

1 Williams	may	have	been	unable	to	physically	comply	with	the	officer’s	request	because	another officer	was	standing	on	Williams’s	right	hand.

2 While	 Williams	 was	 being	 escorted	 out	 of	 the	 woods,	 Evidence	 Response	 Team	 members searched	the	camp	and	fou nd	a	9mm	Ruger	handgun,	a	machine	pistol,	and	ammunition.		Although testing	 of	 the	 bullets	 recovered	 from	 the	 crime	 scene	 was	 inconclusive,	 the	 casing	 found	 near Corporal	Cole’s body	matched	the	Ruger	recovered	from	the	cabin.7 [¶1 7 ] The	 detectives	 drove	 Williams	 to	 the	 Waterville	 Police Department

. He	was	alert	and	responsive	to	the	detective’s	questions	about	his physical	condition,	reporting	that	while	he	was	not	injured , 3 he	was	cold and hungry,	and	his	hands	hurt. [¶1 8 ] The	detectives	brought	Williams	to	an	interrogation	room	at the
p olice d epartment,	where	he	was	examined	by	emergency	medical	personnel and	medically	cleared. The	detectives	then interview ed	Williams	and gave	him food,	water,	fruit	punch,	and	clothing. The	detectives began the	interview by read ing Williams	his Miranda rights and confirmed	that	he	understood	them

. A pproximately nine minutes after waiving	 his Miranda rights , Williams confessed to killing	Corporal	Cole. Later,	approximately	ninety	minutes	into	the
interview , Williams described	 and participated	 in	 a	 reenactment of	 the shooting with	the	detectives	and	other	officers

. B. Procedural	History [¶1 9 ] On	 April	 25,	 2018, Williams	 was	 charged	 by	 complaint	 with intentional	or	knowing	murder,	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	201(1)(A), and w ith	the	consent of	 the	parties,	 the	court	 ordered	 that	 the	case	be	 transferred	 from	Somerset

3 At	one	point	during	the drive	to	the	police	department,	Williams	stated,	“ T hey	did	a	number	on me,”	an	apparent	reference	to	the	officers	who	arrested	him	at	the	remote	campsite.8 County	 to	 Cumberland	 County	 on	 April	 30,	 2018.	 	 M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 21(b)(2)

. Later,	 o n June 7 , 2018, the	 Cumberland	 County	 Grand	 Jury	 handed	 down	 an indictment	charg ing	Williams	with	intentional	or	knowing	murder,	17

- A	M.R.S. § 201(1)(A).		Williams	pleaded	not	guilty. [¶ 20 ] On	August	27,	2018,	Williams	moved	 to	suppress	his	confession and	 other	 statements	 to	 the	 detectives,	 including	 the	 reenactment	 of	 the shooting,	arguing	that	they	were	not	voluntarily	given	because	he	was	fatigued, hungry,	suffering	from	drug	withdrawal,	a nd	fearful	for	his	safety	because	he had	been	“beat[en]	and	pummeled”	by	officers	during	his	arrest.		The	court	held hearings	 on	 Williams’s	 motion	 to	 suppress on February	 28 , March	 1,	 and April 8,	 2019.	 	 The	 court	 granted	 the	 motion	 in	 part , suppressing on ly (1) statements made by Williams later	 in	 the	 interview, (2) Williams’s participation	 in	 the	 reenactment	 of	 the	 shooting	 at	 the	 police	 station , and (3) the	statements Williams made	during	that	reenactment	and	afterward. 4 [¶ 2 1] A	six

- day	jury	trial	took	place	in	June	2019.		During	the	trial,	the court	allowed	the	State	to	introduce	expert	testimony	from	Investigator Larry

4 Specifically,	the	court	suppressed	the	reenactment	and	all	statements	made	after	the	1:28:47 mar k	of	the	video	admitted	at	the	suppression	hearing	as	State’s	Exhibit	2 , but	denied	the	motion	to suppress	as	to	Williams’s	statements	made	up	to	the	1:28:46	mark.		State’s	Exhibit	84,	admitted	at trial,	is	the	portion	of	the	video	that	was	not	suppressed.9 Morrill	of	the	Office	of	the	State	Fire	Marshal describing how	the	shooting	may have	occurred.		Based	on	Morr ill’s	testimony,	the	court permitted the	State	to conduct a courtroom reenactment of	 the	 shooting

. B efore the reenactment began ,	 the	 court gave a	 limiting	 instruction	 to	 the	 jury stating that	 the reenactment	only	represents	“the	State’s	version	of	the	eve nts , ”	that	it	should not	be	seen	as	“an	actual	re

- creation	of	the	crime,”	and	that	the	jury	is	free	to accept	or	reject	it	“in	whole	or	in	part.” [¶ 22 ] The	jury	returned	a	verdict	of	guilty	on	the	sole	count	of	intentional or	knowing	murder.		The	court imposed	a	sentence	of	life	imprisonment	after	a sentencing	 hearing	 and entered	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 on	 September	 12,
2019

. [¶ 23 ] Williams	 timely	 appe aled	 from	 the	 judgment	 of	 conviction, 15 M.R.S.	 §	2115	 (2020) ;	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(b)(1) , and	also	applied	 for	leave	 to appeal	 his	 sentence, 15	 M.R.S.	 §§	 2151 , 2153 (2020);	 M.R.	 App.	 P.	 20.	 	 The Sentence	Review	Panel	granted	Williams’s	application	 for	leave	 to appeal	his sentence	on	November	19,	2019. State	v.	Williams ,	No.	SRP

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- 398	(Me.	Sent. Rev.	Panel	Nov.	19,	2019); see	also 15	M.R.S.	§	2152	(2020) ;	M.R.	App.	P.	20(g), (h).10 II. DISCUSSION
A. In

- Court	Demonstration [¶ 24 ] Williams	 first	 argues	 that	 the court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 in permitting	the	State	to	introduce	an	in

- court	physical	reenactment	of	how	the shooting	may	have	occurred	based	on	the	testimony	of	Investigator	Morrill .		He contends	 that Morrill was	 not	 qualified	 as	 an	 expert	 to	 give	 an	 opin ion	 on shooting	 reconstruction or bloodstain	 pattern	 analysis and that the	 opinion itself	was	not	relevant. See M.R.	Evid.	702,	401.
1. Expert	Opinion	and	Relevance [¶ 25 ] We	review	“a	court’s	foundational	finding	that	expert	testimony	is sufficiently	 r eliable	 for	 clear	 error”	 and	 its	 ultimate	 decision	 on the admissibility	of	expert	opinion	 testimony	 for	an	abuse	of	discretion. State	v.
Maine ,	2017	ME	25, ¶	16 ,	155	A.3d	871 (quotation	marks	omitted).		Maine	Rule of	 Evidence	 702	 provides:	 “A	 witness	 who is	 qualified	 as	 an	 expert	 by knowledge,	skill,	experience,	training , or	education	may	testify	in	the	form	of	an opinion	or	otherwise	if	such	testimony	will	help	the	trier	of	fact	to	understand the	evidence	or	to	determine	a	fact	in	issue.”		To	be	admissibl e	under	Rule	702, expert	 testimony	 must	 be	 relevant	 and	 must “assist	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 in11 understanding	the	evidence	or	determining	a	fact	at	issue. ” State	v.	Burbank , 2019	ME	37,	¶	8,	204	A.3d	851	(quotation	marks	omitted). [¶ 26 ] Expert	 testimony	 is	 r elevant	 if	 the	 proponent ,	 among	 other requirements, “has	 presented	 a	 sufficient	 demonstration	 of	 reliability.” Id. Common	indicia	of	reliability	include “whether	an	expert’s	conclusion	has	been tailored	 to	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case,”	 “whether	 any	 other	 experts	 attest	 to	 the reliability	 of	 the	 testimony,”	 and	 “the	 nature	 of	 the	 expert’s	 qualifications.”
Maine ,	2017	ME	25,	¶ 17,	155	A.3d	871. [¶ 27 ] Investiga tor	Morrill	testified	in	great	detail	about	his	specialized training	 and	 experience	 in	 shooting	 reconstruction , trajectory	 analysis , and bloodstain	 pattern	 analysis

. He	 then	 testified	 as	 to	 his	 opinion	 of	 how	 the shooting	may	have	occurred	and	thoroughly explained	what	he	did	at	the	scene and	the	basis	for	his	opinion.		His	conclusions	were	drawn	from	the	facts	of	this

case , and	his	work	was	peer

- reviewed	by	longstanding	experts	in	the	field. S ee i d

. On	this	record,	we	conclude	that	the	court	did	not	clearly	err	in	finding	that Investigator	Morrill ’s	qualifications	in	shooting	reconstruction	were	sufficient for	him	to	testify	on	the	matter and	that	his	testimony	was	sufficiently	reliable and	would	be helpful	to	the	jury	“to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” M.R.	Evid.	702

. Further,	the	court	did	not	abuse	its	discretion	in12 admitting Investigator Morrill’s	testimony	after	finding	it	reliable. See	Maine , 2017	 ME	 25,	 ¶¶	 16

- 17, 155	 A.3d	 871. Finally,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 doubt	 that Investigator	M o rrill’s	opinion	was	relevant.		M.R.	Evid.	401.
2. Unfair	Surprise [¶ 28 ] Williams	 next	 argues	 that he	 was	 unfairly	 surprised,	 meaning prejudiced,	 by the in

- court reenactment	 of	 the	 shooting	 because	 he	was	 not shown	 the	 actual	 demonstration	 until	 the	 voir	 dire	 of	 Investigator	 Morrill during	trial. See M.R.	Evid.	403.		And,	in	line	with	this	argument,	he	contends that	 the	 trial	court	abused	its	discretion	in	denying his	motion	 for	a	mistrial based	on	th at unfair	surprise. [¶ 29 ] We	review	a	 trial	court’s	admission	of	evidence	over	a	Rule	403 objection	for	an	abuse	of	discretion. State	v.	Michaud ,	2017	ME	170,	¶	8,	168 A.3d	802 .		Rule	403	provides	that	even	relevan t	evidence	may	be	excluded	“if its	 probative	 value	 is	 substantially	 outweighed	 by	 a	 danger	 of	 .	 .	 .	 unfair prejudice,	confusing	the	issues,	misleading	the	jury,	undue	delay,	wasting	time, or	needlessly	presenting	cumulative	evidence.”		M.R.	Evid.	403. [¶ 30 ] I n - court	demonstrative	evidence	is	especially	persuasive , and we have	 held	 that	 a	 trial	 court	 should	 “carefully”	 exercise	 its	 discretion	 before allowing	 such evidence	 because	 it	 “ may	 convey	 an	 impression	 of	 objective13 reality	to	the	trier	[of	fact].” State	v.	Philbrick ,	436	A.2d	844,	859

- 60	(Me.	1981)

. In Philbrick ,	 we	 noted	 the	 dangers	 that	 demonstrative	 evidence,	 especially evidence	that	does	not	have	a	proper	scientific	foundation,	may	pose	to	a	jury:
S uch	 experimental	 demonstrative	 evidence	in	 the eyes	 of	jurors, because	 of	 its	 asserted	 foundation	 in	 scientific	 principle	 or technique,	carrie [s] such	an	inherent	objective	impact	that	it	could unduly	influence	the	jury	in	its	findings	of	the	underlying	necessary facts	 at	issue,	without	 adequate	 basic	 facts	 to	 sustain	 a	 scientific conclusion	.	.	.	.
Id. at	860. There ,	we	concluded	that	the	court erroneously	admitted	an	alleged expert’s	demonstration	of	the	shooting	because	it	had	not	been	shown	that	the demonstration	was	 substantially	 similar	 to	 the	 actual	 events	 of	 the	 shooting and	it	was	based	on	unreliable	scientific	methods. Id. at	859

- 60. [¶ 3 1] Here,	 the	 court	 determined	 that	 the	 demonstration	 was	 not unfairly	 prejudicial	and	did	not	waste	 time	 or	confuse	 the	issues. M.R.	Evid.
403

. To the	contrary,	the	court	reasoned	that Investigator Morrill’s	testimony and	the	demonstration	help ed clarify	and	tie	together	the	testimony	of	previous witnesses.		The	court	also	 found	 that	unlike	in Philbrick ,	 Investigator	Morrill was	qualified	to	present	his	opinion	and	the	report he	prepared that	served	as the	basis	for	the	demonstration	was	verifiabl e	and	scientifically	accurate. [¶ 32 ] Most	important ly ,	before	allowing	the	demonstration	to	proceed, the	court	instructed	the	jury	that	it	represented	“only	a	re

- creation	of	the	State’s14 version	of	the	events”	that	“should	in	no	way	be	viewed	as	an	actua l	re

- creation of	 the	 crime”	 and	 could	 “be	 accepted	 or	 rejected	 in	 whole	 or	 in	 [p]art.”	 	 In crafting	this	instruction,	the	court looked	to language	found	in Harris	v.	State , 13	P.3d	489 ,	496 (Okla.	Crim.	App.	2000),	which	in	 turn,	 relied	 on	a	limiting
instr uction	created	in Clark	v.	Cantrell ,	529	S.E.2d	528,	537	(S.C.	2000). [¶ 33 ] We commend	 the	 court’s	 use	 of th is language.	 	With	 respect	 to demonstrative	 or	 reenactment	 evidence, the	 court’s	 limiting	 instruction addresse d the	 major	 concern	 we	 expressed	 in Philbrick ,	 namely	 that	 such evidence	tends	to	be	highly	prejudicial	to	a	jury	by	“convey[ing]	an	impression of	 objective	 reality to	 the	 trier	 [of	 fact] .”	 	 436	 A.2d	 at	 859

. T he	 court’s instruction	 alleviated	 this	 danger	 b y	 making	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 demonstration only	 represented	 the	 State’s	 version	 of	 events	 and	 should	 not	 be	 seen	 as	 an actual	re

- creation	of	the	crime	as	it	occurred.		Therefore,	we	conclude	that	the trial	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in	 allowing	 the	 d emonstration	 to	 be presented	to	the	jury	over	Williams’s	Rule	403	objection.
3. Motion	for a Mistrial [¶ 34 ] Next,	 Williams	 contends

— also	 based	 on	 his	 claim	 that	 he	 was unfairly	 surprised	 by	 the	 State’s	 in

- court	 demonstration	 because	 he	 had	 no notice,	 un til	 the	 fourth	 day	 of	 trial,	 that	 the	 State	 would	 be	 re

- creating	 the15 shooting

— that	 the	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 in	 denying his motion	 for a mistrial

. 5 We	 review	 the	 denial	 of	 a	 motion	 for	 a	 mistrial	 for	 an	 abuse	 of discretion	 and	 “will	 overrule	 the	 denial	 of	 a	 mistrial	 only	 in	 the	 event	 of exceptionally	 prejudicial	 circumstances	 or	 prosecutorial	 bad	 faith.” State	 v. Logan ,	2014	ME	92,	¶	14,	97	A.3d	121 (quotation	marks	omitted).		“ A	motion for	a	mistrial	should	be	denied	except	in	the	rare	circumstance	that	the	trial	is unable	 to	 continue	 with	 a	 fair	 result	 and	 only	 a	 new	 trial	 will	 satisfy	 the interests	of	justice.” State	v.	Poblete ,	2010	ME	37,	¶	26, 993	A.2d	1104	(quoting State	v.	Bridges ,	2004	ME	102,	¶	11,	854	A.2d	855). [¶ 35 ] Notwithstanding Williams ’s conten tion, the	record	indicates	that , although Williams	saw	 the	State’s	physical	demonstration	of	 the	shooting	 for the	 first	 time	 on	 the	 fourth	 day	 of	 the	 trial, he had received	 a	 copy	 of Investigator	 Morrill’s	 report	 approximately	 five	 months	 before	 trial.	 	 That report	concluded	 that	 there	were	 two	p ossible	 scenarios	 or	explanations	 for Corporal	Cole ’s	positioning	at	the	time	he	was	shot,	which	was	consistent	with

5 Williams’s	motion	 for	a	mistrial	was	prompted	by	an	overnight	conversation	that	Williams’s attorney	had	with	an	expert	between	the	fourth	and	fifth	days	of	trial

. D uring that	conversation, the expert	purportedly	said that he	believed	that	the	State’s demonstration	was	inaccurate.		By	that	time, Williams	had	been	in	possession	of	Investigator	Morrill’s	report	and	conclusions	for	five	months, and it	is	unclear	why	he	waited	until	the	middle	of	trial	to	consult	with	his	expert.16 Investigator	Morrill’s	testimony 6 at	trial	and	with	the	demonstration	itself.		The record	 also	 suggests	 that	 before	 trial , the	 State had in formed	Williams	 of	its intent	 to	present	an	in

- court	physical	demonstration	of	 Investigator	Morrill’s conclusions	regarding	the	positions	of	the	shooter	and	the	victim. [¶ 36 ] Further, if	Williams	wanted	to	offer	expert	testimony	to	challenge the	 accurac y	 of	 the	 State’s	 demonstration , the State offered to join with Williams in	a	request	that	the	court hold	the	evidence	open	to	allow	Williams
to	 retain the expert with	 whom he had consulted after	 the	 State’s demonstration.	 	 Williams	 declined	 this	 offer	 for	 strategic	 reasons, however, because although Williams’s	expert apparently	disagreed	with	portions	of	the
in

- court	demonstration, the	expert agreed	with	many	of	Investigator	Morrill’s conclu sions	 regarding	 the proximity	 of	 the	 gun	 to	 Corporal	 Cole’s neck	 and Corporal	Cole’s position	on	the	ground. [¶ 37 ] In	 short,	 on	 this	 record,	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	 “exceptionally prejudicial	 circumstances	 or	 prosecutorial	 bad	 faith”	 that	 would	 provide grounds	 for	 overruling	 the	court’s	 denial	 of	Williams’s	motion	 for	 a	mistrial.

6 In	addition	to	being	consistent	with	his	pretrial	 report,	 Investigator	Morrill’s	testimony	was consistent	with,	and	 tied	together,	 the	already	overwhelming	evidence	against	Williams,	including the	physical	evidence	and	Williams’s	own	confession.		It	is	t herefore	unlikely that the	verdict	would have	been	different	if	the	demonstration had	been excluded.17 Logan ,	2014	ME	92,	¶	14,	97	A.3d	121 ( quotation	marks	omitted)

. Although Williams did	not	see the	physical	demonstration	of	the	shooting	until	the	fourth day	 of	 trial,	 the	 State had informed	 Williams	 of	 its	 intent	 to	 re

- create	 the shooting	during	trial , and	the	demonstration	itself	closely	tr acked	Investigator Morrill’s	testimony	as	well	as	his	report

. [¶ 38 ] Under	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 State’s	 demonstration	 did	 not unduly prejudic e Williams or	prevent	him from	receiving	a	fair	and	just	trial. See	Bridges ,	2004	ME	102,	¶	10,	854	A.2d	855 (“ The	court's	determination	of whether	 exposure	 to	 potentially	 prejudicial	 extraneous	 evidence	 would incurably	 taint	 the	 jury	 verdict	 or	 whether	 a	 curative	 instruction	 would adequately	 protect	 against	 consideration	 of	 the	 matter	 stands	 unless	 clearly

erron eous. ” (quotation	marks	omitted) ); see	also	State	v.	Frisbee ,	2016	ME	83, ¶	 29,	 140	 A.3d	 1230	 (“Ultimately,	 the	 decision	 on	 whether	 to	 grant	 a defendant's motion	for	a	mistrial	comes	back	to	the	core	principles	of	fairness and	justice;	the	relevant	questio n	for	the	trial	court	is	whether	the	trial	court	is confident	that	the	trial	can	proceed	to	a	fair	and	just	verdict	in	the	context	of the	proceedings	before	it.”). We	conclude	that	the	trial	court	did	not	abuse	its discretion	in	denying	Williams’s	motion for	a	mistrial.18 B. Motion	to	Suppress [¶ 39 ] The	 court	 concluded	 that	 all	 of	 Williams’s	 statements to	 the interviewing	detectives up	to	the	1:28:46	mark	on	the interrogation	video were voluntary	and	denied	the	motion	to	suppress	his	statements	up	to	that	point. The	 court	 granted	 the	 motion	 to	 suppress his statements made after the
1:28:46 mark along	with Williams’s	subsequent reenactment	of	the	shooting. [¶ 40 ] Williams	contends that	all	of	his	statements	to	the	detectives	were involuntary	 and	 should	 have	 been	 excluded.	 	 Williams’s	 voluntariness argument	is	in	two	parts:	First,	he	contends	that	the	court	“completely	ignored and	 dodged	 [his]	 argument	 regarding	 his	 reasonable	 fear	 b ased	 on	 his interactions	with	the	arrest	and	transport	teams.”		More	specifically, he argues that	his	treatment	by	the	arresting	officers	caused	him	to	fear	for	his	safety	and led	 him	 to	 believe	 that	 if	 he	 did	 not	 cooperate	 with	 police, including	 the detec tives, he	would	face	physical	retaliation.		Second,	Williams	contends	that his	fatigue,	hunger,	and	drug	withdrawal	affected	his	ability	to	knowingly	and voluntarily	waive	his	right	to	remain	silent	or	provide	voluntary	statements. [¶ 4 1] “ We	review	the denial	of	a	motion	to	suppress	for	clear	error	as	to factual	issues	and	de	novo	as	to	issues	of	law,	and	will	uphold	the	court’s	denial of	a	motion	to	suppress	if	any	reasonable	view	of	the	evidence	supports	the	trial19 court’s	decision.” State	v.	Ormsby , 2013	ME	88,	¶	 9,	81	A.3d	336 (quotation marks	omitted). [¶ 42 ] “A	 confession	 is	 admissible	 in	 evidence	 only	 if	 it	 was	 given voluntarily,	 and	 the	 State	 has	 the	 burden	 to	 prove	 voluntariness	 beyond	 a reasonable	doubt.” State	v.	Wiley ,	2013	ME	30,	¶	15,	61 A.3d	750 ; see	also State
v.	Rees ,	2000	ME	55,	¶	6,	748	A.2d	976

. “ The	voluntariness	requirement	gives effect	to	three	overlapping	but	conceptually	distinct	values:	(1)	it	discourages objectionable	 police	 practices;	 (2)	 it	 protects	 the	 mental	 freedom	 of the individual;	and	(3)	it	preserves	a	quality	of	fundamental	fairness	in	the	criminal justice	system. ” Wiley ,	2013	ME	30,	¶ 16,	61	A.3d	750	(quoting State	v.	Sawyer , 2001	ME	88,	¶	8,	772	A.2d	1173 ). [¶ 43 ] A	voluntary	confession	is	one	that	“results	from	the	free	choice	of a	rational	mind,	if	it	is	not	a	product	of	coercive	police	conduct,	and	if	under	all of	the	circumstances	its	admission	would	be	fundamentally	fair.” Wiley ,	2013 ME	30, ¶	16,	61	A.3d	750 (quotation	marks	omitted).		In	determining	whether a	confession	is	voluntary,	we	examine	the	totality	of	the	circumstances,	which includes	both	external	and	internal	factors,	such	as the	 details	 of	 the	 interrogation;	 duration	 of	 the	 interrogation; locatio n	 of	 the	 interrogation;	 whether	 the	 interrogation	 was custodial;	 the	 recitation	 of	 Miranda	 warnings;	 the	 number	 of officers	 involved;	 the	 persistence	 of	 the	 officers;	 police	 trickery;20 threats,	promises	or	inducements	made	to	the	defendant;	and	the defendan t’s	 age,	 physical	 and	 mental	 health,	 emotional	 stability, and	conduct. State	v.	Sawyer ,	2001	ME	88,	¶	9,	772	A.2d	1173 ; see , e.g. , State	v.	Mikulewicz , 462	A.2d	497,	501	(Me.	1983)

. [¶44]		Williams	first	argues	that	his	confession	was	not	voluntary	becau se the	use	 of	 force	by	 the	arresting	 officers	caused	him	 to	be	in	 “fear	 of	 further beating”	if	he	did	not	cooperate	with	the	detectives when	they	interviewed	him

. The	court	found	that	Williams had	been punched	by	an	arresting	officer	“at	a time	when	he	wa s	handcuffed	and	offering	no	significant	resistance , ” 7 and	that he	 had	 been	 held	 down,	 naked,	 on	 the	 ground	 for	 approximately	 twenty minutes	 before	 being	 escorted	 out	 of	 the	 woods. 8 Nevertheless,	 the	 court , informed	by Leon	v.	State ,	410	So.	2d	201	(Fla. Dist.	Ct.	App.	1982) ,	and Lyons	v. Oklahoma ,	322	U.S.	596	(1944) ,	determined	that	the	effect	on	Williams	of	the “initial	impropriety	by	law	enforcement”	in	the	woods	did	not	render	his	later confession	involuntary.

7 Although	Williams	suggests	that	he	defecated	on	himself because	of the	punches	inflicted	on	him during	his	arrest,	his	own	expert	witness	testified	tha t	it	was	not	plausible	that	fear	and	stress	caused him	to	defecate;	rather,	the	expert	testified,	it	was	far	more	likely	that	he	did	so	because	of	opiate withdrawal	and	gastrointestinal	symptoms.

8 The court also rejected	the	assertion	by	an	arresting	o fficer	that	pulling	Williams’s	head	up	by his	hair	had	been	necessary	to	confirm	his	identity.21 [¶ 45 ] In Lyons ,	police	obtained	an	ini tial,	involuntary	confession	from a defendant	using	coercive	interrogation	techniques	before	obtaining	a	second, voluntary	confession	from	the	defendant	later in the	day.		322	U.S.	at	598

- 601. The	 Court	 stated	 that	 “ [t]he	 question	 of	 whether	 those	 confess ions subsequently	given	are	themselves	voluntary	depends	on	the	inferences	as	to the	continuing	effect	of	the	coercive	practices	which	may	fairly	be	drawn	from the	surrounding	circumstances.” Id. at	602. Despite	the	initial	impropriety,	the Court	affirmed	 the	voluntariness	of	 the	defendant’s	second	confession. Id. at 605.		 In	 reaching	 that	conclusion,	 the	Court	noted	 that	 twelve	hours	elapsed between	 the	 two	 confessions	 and	 that	 the	 second	 confession was given	 to individuals	who had not engaged	in	 the initial,	coercive	interrogation. Id. at 604

- 05. [¶ 46 ] Similarly,	in Leon ,	the	District	Court	of	Appeal	of	Florida	concluded that	“ under	appropriate	circumstances,	the	effect	of	an	initial	impropriety,	eve n a	coercive	one,	in	securing	a	confession	may	be	removed	by	intervening	events, with	 the	 result	 that	 a	 subsequent	 statement	is	 rendered	 free	 of	 the	 primary taint	 and	 thus	 admissible	 into	 evidence	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 free	 and voluntary	act.” Leon ,	410 So.	2d	at	203 (quotation	marks	omitted) .		Under	the22 Florida	court’s	reasoning,	the	most	significant	factor	in	its	analysis	was	whether force	was	or	was	not inflicted	in	order	to	secure	the	defendant’s	confession. Id. [¶ 47 ] Here,	 the	 court	 found	 that	 the arresting	 officers ’	 treatment	 of Williams was	not for	the	purpose	of obtain ing his	confession. See	id. (collecting cases). Williams	was	not	asked	any	questions	about	the	crime	during	his	arrest and	transport	out	of	the woods , the	interrogation	itself	was	conducted	by	two detectives	who	were	not	present	in	the	woods	during	the	arrest , the arresting officers	had	no	further	interaction	with	Williams	after	he	was	handed	off	to	the detectives , and they were	 not	 present	 during the	 interrogation,	 which	 took place	at	 the	Waterville	Police	Department	away	 from	 the	scene	of	 the	arrest. Further,	the	interrogating	detectives did	not threate n , ma ke any	promises , or offer	any inducements to Williams , see	Wiley, 2013	ME	30,	¶¶ 18

- 30,	6 1	A.3d 750 , and	they gave	Williams Miranda warnings	before	questioning him

. [¶ 48 ] Thus,	we	conclude	that	the	trial	court	did	not	err	in	determining that	 under	 the	 totality	 of	 the	 circumstances,	 the inappropriate force used during	Williams’s	 arrest	 did	 not	 render	involuntary	 his	later	 confession	 and other	statements to	the	detectives

. See	Sawyer ,	2001	ME	88,	¶	9,	772	A.2d	1173; People	 v.	 Richardson ,	 917	 N.E.2d	 501,	 516

- 17	 (Ill.	 2009) (stating	 that	 in determining	 whether	 inci dental	 use	 of	 physical	 force	 renders	 a	 confession23 involuntary,	“[c]ourts	look	to	factors	such	as	gaps	in	time	between	the	use	of force	 and	 the	 confession,	 changed	 interrogators	 or	 location,	 and	 renewed Miranda warnings”); see	also Lyons ,	322	U.S. at 602

- 05 ; United	States	v.	Denton , 246	F.3d	784,	786

- 88	(6th	Cir.	2001)

. B ut	see United	States	v.	Jenkins ,	938	F.2d 934,	 939

- 40	 (9th	 Cir.	 1991) ; United	 States	 v.	 Gonzalez ,	 719	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 167,
181

- 83	(D.	Mass.	2010)

. [¶ 49 ] Turning	 to	Williams’s	 second contention	 regarding	 his	 physical condition	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 interrogation,	 the	 court	 did	 not	 clearly	 err	 in determining	that ,	at	least	up	to	the	1:28:46	mark	on	the	video, William s ’s	prior drug	use	or	withdrawal did	not actually	impair	his	physical	or	m ental	condition. We	 and	 other	courts	have	held	 that	addiction	 to,	use	 of,	 or	withdrawal	 from drugs	 do es not	 automatically	 render	 an	 otherwise	 voluntary	 confession involuntary. See State	v.	Ashe ,	425	A.2d	191,	193

- 94	(Me.	1981) ; see	also United
States	v. Palmer ,	203	F.3d	55,	61

- 62 (1st	Cir.	2000) ; People	v.	Johnson ,	168	Misc. 2d	 81,	 89	 (N.Y.	 1995)

. Rather,	 as	 we	 stated	 in Ashe , “[t]he	 particular circumstances	 of	 each	 case	 must	 be	 evaluated	 to	 determine	 whether	 a defendant ’ s	drug

- related	condition	made	him	incapable	of	acting	voluntarily, knowingly	and	intelligently.”		425	A.2d	at	194.24 [¶ 50 ] Here,	as	the	trial	court	found,	Williams	“appear[ed]	to	be	rational and	responded	to	questions	with	appropriate	answers,”	he	did	“no t	disclose	any bizarre,	psychotic,	or	drug

- induced	behavior,”	and he did not “ exhibit	any	fear or	resistance	to	speaking.”		Like	the	defendant	in Ashe, Williams	“appeared	lucid and	rational,	able	to	respond	coherently	to	questions,	and	able	to	engage	in	a narrative	 account	 of	 the	 events	 in	 question”	 while	 being	 questioned	 by the detectives

. See	i d. Prior	to	questioning	at	the	police	station,	Williams had	been examined	 by	 emergency	 medical	 personnel	 who	 concluded	 that	 he	 was “medically	clear,”	and	Williams	declined	their	offer	to	be	checked	out	further. [¶ 5 1] During	 the	 questioning,	 detectives	 provided	 Williams	 with	 a blanket,	clothing,	 food,	water,	and,	at Williams’s	specific	request,	 fruit	punch, because	 he	 was	 cold,	 hungry,	 and	 thirsty. Cf. State	 v.	 Blank ,	 955	 So.	 2d	 90,
106

- 08	 (La.	 2007) ; but	 see People	 v.	 Anderson ,	 364	 N.E.2d	 1318,	 1321	 (N.Y. 1977)

. Williams	 confessed	 early	 in	 the	 interview,	 and	 the	 u nsuppressed portion	of	the	interview	was	not	particularly	lengthy,	lasting	less	than	ninety
minutes. Cf. Berghuis	v.	Thompkins ,	560	U.S.	370,	386

- 87	(2010) (“It	is	true	that apparently	he	was	in	a	 straight

- backed	chair	 for	 three	hours,	but	 there	is	no
aut hority	for	the	proposition	that	an	interrogation	of	this	length	is	inherently coercive.”); Blank ,	955	So.	2d	at	105

- 06; Commonwealth	v.	Tucker ,	335	A.2d	704,25 708	 (Pa.	 1975)

. The	 detectives	 treated	 Williams	 well	 and	 were	 calm	 and respectful	 of	 him	 througho ut	 the	 interview,	 which	 Williams	 himself acknowledged. See	Blank ,	955	So.	2d	at	106

- 08

. [¶ 52 ] Finally,	up	until	the 1:28:46	mark , when	he repeatedly requested a	nap,	Williams	did	not ask to	stop	the	interview	at	any	point. See	i d. at	107

. Williams did	 not	 tell	 the	 officers	 that	 he	 was	 tired	 or	 needed	 a	 nap	 until approximately	 one	 hour	 and	 twenty

- seven	 minutes	 into	 the	 interview. See State	v.	Timmendequas ,	737	A.2d	55,	110	(N.J.	1999) (noting	that	the	“defendant never	indicated	 to	officers	 that	he	was	 too	 tired	or	hungry	 to	continue”)

. Up until	 that	point,	“there	was	no	evidence	 that	authorities	exploited	any	slowly mounting	 fatigue	 resulting	 from	 prolonged	 questioning,	 or	 that	 such	 f atigue occurred	 or	 played	 any	 role	 in	 defendant’s	 decision	 to	 confess.” People	 v. Williams ,	233	P.3d	1000,	1031	(Cal.	2010) (quotation	marks	omitted)

. B ut	cf. Spano	v.	New	York ,	360	U.S.	315,	321

- 24	(1959) (concluding	that	the	suspect’s will	 was	 overborn e	 by	 “slowly	 mounting	 fatigue”	 during	 an	 eight

- hour interrogation	 involving	 fifteen	 different	 questioners,	 during	 which	 the questioners	persisted	in	the	face	of	the	suspect’s	refusal	to	answer	on	the	advice of	 his	 attorney	 and	 refused	 his	 requests	 to	 conta ct	 his	 attorney)

. The	 court correctly	 found,	 however,	 that	 a fter	 the	 one

- hour

- and

- twenty
- minute	 mark,26 Williams’s	fatigue	and	weakness	reached	a	point	where	his	statements	were	no longer	voluntary. See State	v.	Kierstead ,	2015	ME	45,	¶¶	16

- 17,	114	A.3d	98 4

. [¶ 53 ] Considering	the	totality	of	the	circumstances,	we	conclude	that	the trial	 court	 did	 not	 err	 in	 denying	 Williams’s	 motion	 to	 suppress	 as	 to	 his confession	and	other	statements	made	up	until	the	1:28:46	mark	on	the	video. Ormsby ,	2013	ME	88,	¶ 2 9,	81	A.3d	336; Sawyer ,	2001	ME	88,	¶	9,	772	A.2d
1173.
C. Sentencing [¶ 54 ] Williams	 argues	 that	 “the	 sentencing	 court	 had	 pre

- determined [his]	 sentence	 in	 this	 matter[]	 before	 the	 sentencing	 hearing”	 and	 that	 “the [c]ourt	did	not	consider	any	of	[his] sentencing arguments	strongly	mitigating against	a	life	sentence,	since	the	[c]ourt	had	clearly	already	made	its	decision before	the	parties	even	presented	their	arguments.” [¶ 55 ]	 	 In	 sentencing	 a	 defendant	 after	 a	 conviction	 for	 murder,	 the sentencing	c ourt	employs	a	two

- step	sentencing	process. 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1602(2) (2020)

. First,	 the	 court	 must	 “determine	 a	 basic	 term	 of	 imprisonment	 by considering	the	particular	nature	and	seriousness	of	the	offense	as	committed.”
17

- A	M.R.S. §	1602(1)(A).		Then,	the	court	must	“determine	the	maximum	term of	imprisonment	 to	 be	imposed	 by	 considering	 all	 other	 relevant	 sentencing27 factors,	 both	 aggravating	 and	 mitigating,	 appropriate	 to	 the	 case.” Id. § 1602(1)(B). [¶ 5 6 ] We	“review	the	court’ s	determination	of	the	basic	sentence	on	the first	step	of	the	analysis	de	novo	 for	misapplication	of	law.” State	v.	Holland , 2012	 ME	 2,	 ¶	 38,	 34	 A.3d	 1130 .	 	 We	 also	 review	 “the	 sentencing	 court’s determination	 of	 the	 basic	 period	 of	 incarceration	 for	 mis application	 of sentencing	principles”	and	“for	an	abuse	of	the	court’s	sentencing	power.” State v.	Nichols ,	2013	ME	71,	¶	13,	72	A.3d	503 .		The	maximum	sentence	set	by	the court	is	reviewed	 for	an	abuse	of	discretion. See State	v.	Sweet ,	2000	ME	14, ¶ 15,	745	A.2d	368 .		Finally,	we	review	the	sentence	imposed	for	“disregard	of the	relevant	sentencing	factors	or	abuse	of	the	court’s	sentencing	power.” State v.	Koehler ,	2012	ME	93,	¶	32,	46	A.3d	1134

. [¶ 57 ] “A	person	convicted	of	the	crime	of	murder must	be	sentenced	to imprisonment	for	life	or	for	any	terms	of	years	that	is	not	less	than	25.” 17

- A M.R.S.	§	1603 (1) (2020) .		The	murder	of	a	law	enforcement	officer	while	in	the performance	of	his	or	her	duties	is	an	aggravating	circumstance	that	may	j ustify the imposition	of	a	life	sentence. State	v.	Shortsleeves ,	580	A.2d	145,	149

- 50 (Me.	1990)

.28 [¶ 58 ] In	 determining	 the	 basic	 sentence	 at	 step	 one,	 the	 court was mindful	 of its	 duty	 to	 “consider	 the	 particular	 nature	 and	 seriousness	 of	 the crime,”	we ighing	“the	convicted	person’s	conduct	against	other	more	heinous and	 less	 heinous	 possible	 ways	 of	 committing	 the	 crime.”	 	 The	 court	 also articulated	the	purposes	and	goals	of	sentencing	that	it	considered appropriate to	 the	 case .	 	 Finally,	 the	 court	 obse rved	 that	 the	 authorized	 range	 was imprisonment	for twenty
- five	years	to	life. State	v. Lord ,	2019	ME	82,	¶	2 5 ,	208 A.3d	781

. As	for	the	nature	and	seriousness	of	the	crime,	the	court	noted	that this	 was the murder	 of	 a	 police	 officer	 in	 the	 line	 of	 duty,	 an	 aggravating circumstance	according	to	our	precedent, see id. ¶¶	27

- 28,	30,	32; Shortsleeves , 580	A.2d	at	149

- 50,	and	that	Williams decided	to	“eliminate”	the	deputy	sheriff and	then shot Corporal	Cole in the	neck	at	close	range

. After look ing to	the	law s of Maine	and many	other	jurisdictions	to	aid	in	its	effort	to	place	this	crime	in context	and	 fashion	 a	basic	sentence	consistent	with	 those	imposed	in	 other jurisdictions ,	t he	court determined	that the	basic	sentence should	be sixty

- five years’	imprisonment. 9 [¶ 59 ] The	court	then	proceeded	to	step	two	and	considered	aggravating and	 mitigating	 factors	 to	 determine	 the	 maximum	 sentence.	 	 17

- A	 M.R.S.

9 Williams	does	not	argue	that	the	court	erred	in	setting	the	basic	sentence	at	sixty

- five	years.29 § 1602(1)(B); Lord ,	2019	ME	82,	¶¶	31

- 32,	208	A.3 d	781

. The	court	considered Williams’s	childhood	upbringing	and	drug	abuse	but	did	not	 find	 these	 to	be significant	 mitigating	 factors.	 	 The	 court	 found	 that	 the	 aggravating	 factors included	 the	 effect	 on Corporal	 Cole ’s family	 and	 the	 community ; Williams ’s criminal	 history ; the	 need	 to	 protect	 the	 public ; Williams’s	 “relative	 lack	 of

remorse ”; and	his	failure	to	take	responsibility	and	ownership	for	his	actions. The	 court	 concluded	 that	 “the	 aggravating	 factors	 greatly	 outweigh	 any mitigating	 factors ” an d	 “that	 the	 appropriate	 sentence	in	 this	case	 should	be and	is	life	in	prison.” [¶ 60 ] Contrary	to	Williams’s	contention,	nothing	in	the	record	suggests that	 the	 court	 had	 pre

- determined	 that	 Williams’s	 sentence	 would	 be	 life imprisonment.		The	court stated	that	“the	question	I	have	grappled	with	since the	verdict	was	whether	a	life	sentence	was	called	for	here,”	suggesting	that	the court	did	not	impose	a	life	sentence	lightly	and	arrived	at	 that	sentence only after weighing	 the	 appropriate	 factors.	 	 A lthough	Williams	 suggests	 that	 the court	failed	to	“listen	to	arguments	and	statements	from	witnesses	regarding mitigating	circumstances,”	the	court	did,	in	fact, consider	the	information	and30 statements	 from	 Williams,	 his	 mother,	 and	 his	 aunt. 10 There	 is	 s imply	 no support	in	the	record	for	Williams’s	contention	that	the	court disregarded his arguments	in	mitigation. 11 [¶ 6 1] The	court objectively	considered	and	rationally	weighed	all	of	the information	 and	 arguments	 and determined	 that in	 Williams’s	 case , the aggravating	factors greatly	outweighed those	in	mitigation

. See State	v.	Basu , 2005	ME	74,	¶	24,	875	A.2d	686 (observing	that	a	sentencing	court	is	in	a	better position	for	evaluating	the	offender’s	circumstances	and	has	wide	discretion	to weigh aggravating	and	mitigating	factors)

. We	conclude	that	the	court	did	not abuse	its	discretion	in	imposing	a	sentence	of	life	imprisonment. 12 Sweet ,	2000 ME	 14,	 ¶	 15,	 745	 A.2d	 368	 (stating	 that	 “the	 sentencing	 court	 is	 in	 a	 better

10 The	court	stated	that	it	had	reviewed	the	sentencing	mem oranda	and	statements	submitted before	the	hearing	more	than	once.

11 Williams	appears	to	believe	that	the	court’s	rejection	of	his	arguments	in	mitigation	is	the	same as	failing	to	consider	his	arguments	at	all.

12 The	most	closely	analogous	Maine	cas e	that	the	court	considered	as	part	of	its	analysis	was State	v.	Burdick ,	2001	ME	143,	¶¶	1

- 2,	6,	782	A.2d	319 ,	in	which	we	upheld	a	sentence	of	forty	years’ imprisonment	for	a	defendant	charged	with	the attempted	murder of	a	police	officer.		Although	the forty

- year	sentence	in Burdick is	significantly	shorter	than	the	life	sentence	imposed	here,	Burdick was	 fifty	 years	 old	 at	 the	 time	 of	 sentencing,	 rendering	 the	 forty

- year	 sentence	 a	 “de	 facto	 life sentence,” id. ¶	25,	and	although	he	shot	a	law	enforceme nt	officer	twice	in	the	chest	at	close	range, the	officer	was	wearing	a	bulletproof	vest	and	sustained	only	minor	injuries, id. ¶ 6.		Here,	the	victim died	as	the	result	of	an	act	described	by	the	court	as	Williams’s	decision	to	“execute	Corporal	Cole.” Taken	 together	with	other	aggravating	 factors	identified	by	 the	court ,	 t he	court	did	not	abuse	its discretion	in	imposing	a	life	sentence	instead	of	a	sentence	 for	a	term	of	years	as	in Burdick

. See Sweet ,	2000	ME	14,	¶ 15,	745	A.2d	368

.31 position to review	 aggrava ting	 and	 mitigating	 factors”); State	 v.	 Hewey ,	 622 A.2d	1151,	1155	(Me.	1993)	(stating	that	we	“accord	greater	deference	to	the weight	and	 effect	given	by	 the	court	 to	 those	 factors	peculiar	 to	a	particular offender	 in	 its	 determination	 of	 the	 offender’s	 m aximum	 period	 of incarceration”)

. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Verne	E.	Paradie,	Jr.,	Esq. (orally) ,	Paradie	&	Rabasco,	Lewiston,	for	appellant John D. Williams Aaron	 M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General , and	 Donald	W.	 Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen. (orally) ,	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Cumberland	County	Unified	Crimi nal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2018

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