* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

APR 10 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

RICKEY LAVERN SHEPPARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LARRY DEAN LONG; BESSIE

KIRKPATRICK; C/O I CRENSHAW;

C/O II HOOD; C/O II MOODY;

JERRY STOCKLON, Counselor,

H Unit; JIMMY SHIPLEY, Senior

Case Manager H Unit; JOE ARDESE;

SHIRLEY LEEPER; RON WARD;

DOLORES RAMSEY; LARRY

FIELDS; KATHY WATERS;

- MCFARLIN, Counselor F Cellhouse;

EDDIE MORGAN,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-6183

(D.C. No. CIV-96-1296-T)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

-2-

Plaintiff-appellant Rickey Lavern Sheppard, an inmate in the custody of the

Oklahoma Department of Corrections, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that actions of prison officials violated his due process rights and the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.1 The district

court granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding they were entitled to

qualified immunity because plaintiff had failed to show their conduct violated an

established constitutional or statutory right. “We review de novo the district

court’s grant of qualified immunity on summary judgment, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d

1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997).

After he had filed his appellate brief, plaintiff wrote a letter to the Clerk of

this circuit dated November 3, 1997, stating that “[s]ince the last part of August,

approx., I have been placed in the cells with four(4) different known homosexuals

and three of them has aids . . . . They are actually using these inmates as aids

assissins [sic] by allowing them to house with other inmates and not telling them

they have aids.” Because we rarely consider issues on appeal that have not been

previously raised to the district court, see Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d
-3-

1061, 1063 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that such consideration will be forthcoming

only in cases of the most manifest error), and because even pro se litigants are

required to follow federal procedural rules, see Ogden v. San Juan County, 32

F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994), we will not consider the allegations in plaintiff’s

letter at this time. If plaintiff wishes to pursue this claim, he must first exhaust

prison administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); cf. Garrett v. Hawk,

127 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that after PLRA, exhaustion

requirement no longer applies only to state prisoners). After such exhaustion, he

may then be able to bring the claim in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Our review of the record presented below, the parties’ briefs, and the

opinions of the magistrate judge and the district court fails to reveal error in the

grant of summary judgment. We, therefore, affirm the entry of judgment for

defendants for substantially the reasons stated by the district court. 

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Carlos F. Lucero

Circuit Judge