United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • Fax. 202.429.6063

UNITED STates institute of peace

© USIP 2014 • All rights reserved.

“Overall, the piecemeal 

approach targeting different 

armed groups in different programs at different 

times has not worked.”

March 7, 2014

Reintegrating Armed Groups 

in Afghanistan

Deedee Derksen

E-mail: deedeederksen@gmail.com

peaceBrieF168

Lessons from the Past

Summary

•	 A piecemeal approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan,

with four DDR programssince 2001 each targeting specific groups, has yielded limited results,

mostly due to an extremely adverse political environment.

•	 Comprehensive DDR is unlikely to work without a settlement that includes all armed groups.

•	 The success ofsuch a deal would in turn hinge on the successful reintegration of commanders

and fighters.

•	 Sequencing DDR in the conventional way may not work; reintegration might better precede

disarmament.

Introduction

Discussing DDR in Afghanistan mightseem incongruous as fighting rages between government

forces and a potent insurgency. Indeed, with international forces drawing down and presidential

electionsscheduled for April introducing further uncertainty, there are more Afghans arming than

disarming.

This may change, however.While a deal with the Taliban currently appearsremote, were the new

government to succeed in forging one, itssustainability would hinge on the reintegration of tens

of thousands of fighters. If international funding for the Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF)

declines, those soldiers and police laid off would need to find alternative livelihoods—no small

challenge given the state of the economy. Reduced international funding toward Afghan security

spending after 2014 could also leave thousands of members of the Afghan Public Protection Force

(APPF) and private security companiesjobless. In these scenarios,DDR would again become a priority.

Whatlessons do past programs—in Afghanistan and elsewhere—hold forfuture efforts?

Past DDR Programs 

DDR has been central to international engagement in Afghanistan since 2001. Four main programs

have each aimed to demobilize specific groups. The first DDR program (usually simply called DDR)

wasinitiated in 2003. It targeted the Afghan Military Forces(AMF), the anti-Taliban alliance that had
© USIP 2014 • All rights reserved.

Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan

page 2 • PB 168 • March 7, 2014

helped the U.S.-led coalition oust the Taliban in 2001, and which consisted mainly of former jihadi

networksthat had fought the Sovietsin the 1980s and then each other in the 1990s. DDR was

followed by the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups(DIAG) program in 2005, asthe threat posed

by such groups—some of them AMF remnants—became evident. The next two effortstargeted

insurgents: the Program Tahkim Sulh (Strengthening Peace Program, or PTS) began in 2005 and

ended in 2010 with the start of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which is

ongoing.

Disarming Friends? DDR and DIAG 

The first DDR program took place as anti-Taliban powerbrokersjockeyed for positionsin the new

Afghan government. Many were reluctant to demobilize their militias, particularly if they believed

that others were not doing so. In the south and southeast, American arming and funding of local

armed groupsto fight against the Taliban and al-Qaida and to guard bases and reconstruction

works undermined DDR. The second program, DIAG, took place asthe insurgency gathered pace

in 2005, and with it effortsto expand the ANSF and informal anti-Taliban militias—the latter being

institutionalized in village defense programs.

On paper, DDR disbanded the AMF structure, which had provided a temporary umbrella for the

former jihadi armed groups. Butstrongmen with connectionsto political leadersin Kabul or the

international military forces were able to stay armed: by integrating their militias wholesale into

the ANSF, particularly the Afghan National Police; by joining village defense programs; by forming

private security companies; or by seeking informal fundsfrom the government or international

forcesto fight insurgents. Most armed networks now depend heavily on foreign funding for

military contracting and the provision ofsecurity to ISAF facilities and convoys. At the same time,

some maintain contacts with insurgents—perhaps unsurprisingly, given that many commanders

have switched allegiancesseveral times over the course of the long Afghan war. Some use international reconstruction money to pay off the Taliban.1

Disarming Enemies? The PTS and APRP 

Reintegration programsfor Taliban mid-level commanders and their fighters began in 2005. The

PTS and APRP programs have, however, had even lessimpact on Taliban networksthan DDR and

DIAG had on the former AMF networks. The United States and its alliessaw the reintegration

programs as part of a military campaign aimed at weakening the insurgency and (in the case of

the APRP) forcing it to negotiate, rather than part of a wider reconciliation process.

Thus, neither the PTS nor the APRP formed part of a politicalstrategy including talks with

insurgent leaders. True, from 2010 onwards Taliban leaders were formally approached, with the

establishment of the Afghan High Peace Council and the public initiation of U.S.-led contacts. But

neither of these developmentsled to meaningful talksthat might have encouraged Taliban leaders

to disarm. Without this consent, mid-level commanders were reluctant to join DDR programs, due

either to loyalty or to the risk of assassination by their former comrades. Of the 7,168 participants

many are not genuine Taliban but criminals or members ofself-defense groups. Few signed up

from the south and the southeast, the heartlands of the insurgency.2

In contrast to the demilitarization programs, the kill-capture campaigns against the Taliban,

launched with the U.S. military surge in 2009, did have an impact. But they tended to fragment

insurgent groups, which will further complicate any future DDR.
© USIP 2014 • All rights reserved.

Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan

page 3 • PB 168 • March 7, 2014

The Future of DIAG and the APRP 

DIAG currently functions as a cell within the Ministry of Interior. The outgoing Afghan government

is also considering whether to integrate the APRP, which currently has a separate institutional

structure, into regular government ministries. While thisintegration would be cheaper, community

development projectsimplemented by ministries generally take too long to fit within the short

timelinesrequired by reintegration programs.3

The APRP infrastructure—whether integrated into regular government ministries or not—could

serve to demobilize fightersif the political context changes. International funding for the APRP

officially endsin 2015. Some officials express concern that in the event of a settlement with the

Taliban, no infrastructure will be in place to help demilitarize tens of thousands of fighters. The

integration of insurgentsinto state structures could be complicated, too, by the downsizing of the

ANSF and by the fact that few insurgents are professionally trained.4

Dwindling funding for the ANSF might require reducing itsstrength dramatically. (Currently,

estimates of the ANSF vary between some 345,000 and 352,000 members—excluding the village

defense program Afghan Local Police—but at the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago it was agreed

with Afghanistan to cut to 228,500 and that number could decrease further.) High attrition rates

might help downsize the regular army and police. But fewer of the around 25,000 Afghan Local

Police would leave voluntarily, and without payment many will turn to criminality.5 Private security

companies have officially been disbanded and replaced by the state-run APPF, but many still

operate and will lose military contracts asinternational troops withdraw.6 Recent pressreports

suggest that the government will also disband the 17,000-strong APPF and fold it into the ANP. 7

The government could also consider using the APRP infrastructure to reintegrate non-insurgent

armed groups—in reality it is already doing so.

Lessons from Past Programs

Earlier DDR programs claimed to incorporate lessonsfrom their predecessors, but in reality many

“technical”shortcomingsrecurred across programs. Mapping of armed groups wasinsufficient, labor

market assessments were inadequate and not enough attention was paid to reintegration. Also, few

incentives were offered to mid-level commanders, though the APRP aimsto addressthisissue.

The main reason DDR hasfallen short in Afghanistan, however, is not flawsin the programs

but an extremely adverse political context. Without a peace agreement including all parties and

providing a framework for DDR, without broad trust in the post-Taliban political order and without

security guarantees, many commanders were inevitably reluctant to disarm. Anti-Taliban commanders could avoid disarmament by exploiting their linksto Kabul powerbrokers or international

forces. Insurgentstargeted by the last two programs would not demobilize unless permitted by

their leaders; yet the programs were implemented without a strategy to secure that.

Overall, the piecemeal approach targeting different armed groupsin different programs at

different times has not worked. There are also questions over what DDR can accomplish in a rural

population that is heavily armed at the individual and household level and islikely to remain so (and

where porous borders mean thatsmall arms collected as part of DDR can be replenished easily).

In thislight, lessonsfrom previous programsinclude:

•	 A political settlement is probably a prerequisite for DDR: Without a peace deal that

includes the Taliban leadership, the Haqqanis, Hizb-i-Islami and the main former Northern Alliance factions it is unlikely that any DDR program will yield major results.
© USIP 2014 • All rights reserved.

Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan

page 4 • PB 168 • March 7, 2014

•	 Include all the main armed groups: Powerbrokers are unlikely to surrender their militias and weapons if their rivals do not. Forging an agreement of all factions on DDR will

be extremely difficult, given their increasing fragmentation. There will be many spoilers

and some will probably enjoy outside backing. But at the least, the most influential factions on both the government and the insurgent sides need to back a program.

•	 Understand the politics and personalities: The success of renewed DDR depends

in part on knowing who should be targeted and what they should be offered. Many

commanders have switched allegiances several times over the course of more than three

decades of war and have ties to multiple networks. Who stands to benefit and who to

lose from DDR? 8

•	 Include binding provisions: Demilitarization across the world has tended to work

better if a peace deal includes binding provisions on it. For armed groups, DDR is interwoven with many other negotiation topics, like reordering the security sector and the

sensitive question of how to deal with grave human rights violations.

•	 Look after mid-level commanders: They also have much to lose from peace (local

power, prestige, narcotics income). Many are linked to powerful figures in the region,

and will retain ties to their former fighters they could easily remobilize. Winning their

support by, for example, offering attractive opportunities for reintegration, is crucial.

•	 Many thousands of foot soldiers will need jobs: After decades of war the enormous

number of men whose main skill is to fight and who can access guns but not jobs

presents a huge challenge and could undermine the implementation of any peace

agreement.

•	 Conventional DDR may not work: Afghanistan experts question whether disarmament is feasible in the foreseeable future. Some propose a gradual approach, starting by

locking away heavy weapons. Reintegration might better come before disarmament and

demobilization, reversing the conventional sequence.9 Supporting armed groups in their

integration into politics, security forces or civil society is arguably the most important

element of DDR. If there is a political settlement, translating national power-sharing into

local arrangements that give the main local actors access to power and resources will be

crucial. 

•	 Define national ownership: A new DDR effort would have to be Afghan-led, with foreign funding and possibly United Nations support. But the factionalization of the Afghan

government along patronage lines means that one group may control DDR and use

programs for its own ends. A state-centred approach might also deter former insurgents

from participating.10
© USIP 2014 • All rights reserved.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, D.C. 20037

Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan

page 5 • PB 168 • March 7, 2014

About This Brief

Deedee Derksen is a writer and 

researcher. After working for years 

in Afghanistan as correspondent 

for the Dutch newspaper de 

Volkskrant, she is pursuing a PhD 

at the War Studies Department of 

King’s College London, where she 

is examining the impact of DDR 

efforts on commander networks in 

Afghanistan. She has also authored 

papers for USIP and the Peace 

Research Institute Oslo on reintegration efforts in Afghanistan and has 

been an adviser at the Afghanistan 

Analysts Network. This Peace Brief 

examines the potential for DDR in 

Afghanistan of insurgents and other 

illegal armed groups and, in the 

event of cuts in government forces, 

soldiers and police made redundant. 

It draws on lessons from the past to 

provide recommendations for any 

future efforts. It is based on some 

150 interviews in Kabul and the 

provinces with former and current 

Afghan and international officials 

and experts, Taliban commanders 

and fighters, members of illegal 

armed groups and elders. A longer 

USIP report in spring 2014 will 

present the full findings. 

Notes

1.	 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2013. 

2.	 Department of Defense,“Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan,”

Report to Congress, November 2013, p 27. Deedee Derksen,“Impact or illusion? Reintegration

under the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program,”Peace Brief, United StatesInstitute

of Peace, September 22, 2011. Interviews with current and former Taliban commanders and

sympathizersin Helmand in Spring and Summer 2013.

3.	 Afghanistan Peace & Reintegration Program, Mid Term Evaluation Report, February 19, 2013,

unpublished report.

4.	 Skype interview with Michael Semple, October 11, 2013.

5.	 Interview with Major-General Ali Shah Ahmadzai, Kabul, November 6, 2013.

6.	 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Report to the United States Congress,

October 30, 2013, p 10. Matthieu Aikins,“Contracting the commanders: Transition and the

Political Economy of Afghanistan’s Private Security Industry,”(NewYork University: Center on

International Cooperation), October 2012.

7.	 Nathan Hodge,“Afghanistan to Disband Crucial Guard Force,”Wall Street Journal Online, March

4, 2014.

8.	 Skype interview with Afghanistan expert, November 18, 2013.

9.	 Interviews with Antonio Giustozzi, London, December 19, 2013; Mark Sedra, October 11, 2013,

Skype; Michael Semple, October 11, 2013, Skype; Alex Strick van Linschoten, October 18, 2013,

Skype; Steve Brooking, October 8, 2013, Skype; Skype interviews with former DDR and DIAG

officials, November and December 2013.

10.	 See Veronique Dudouet, HansJ. Giessmann and Katrin Planta,“From Combatantsto Peacebuilders: a Case for Inclusive, Participatory and Holistic Security Transitions,”Policy Report (Berlin:

Berghof Foundation), 2012, pp 18, 20.