NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN ARMSTRONG; et al.,

Plaintiffs

- Appellees,

v. GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,

Defendants

- Appellants. No. 21

- 15614
D.C. No. 4:94

- cv - 02307

- CW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted September 21, 2022 San Francisco, California Before: GRABER, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Governor ( collectively, “Defendants”) appeal from an order in which the district court required Defendants to take certain steps to correct ongoing violations of disabled inmates’ rights in five California prisons. We address the merits of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

FEB 2 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Defendants’ claims in a p ublished opinion filed concurrently with this memorandum disposition. Here, we address Defendants’ challenges to the district court’s discovery and evidentiary rulings.
1. Defendants’ due process rights were not violated by the limitations that
the distri ct court placed on their ability to depose inmates. “Broad discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery, and its decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that denial of discovery results in a ctual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr. , 832 F.3d 1024, 1047 n.16 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sablan v. Dep’t of Fin. , 856 F.2d 1317, 132 1 (9th Cir. 19 8 8)) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. The district court permitted Defendants to conduct ten inmate depositions

— the default maximum number provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus a presumptively reasonable quantity . Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i). T he additional limitation that the district court placed on those depositions

— that Defendants proffer “some reason” for taking an inmate’s deposition

— was not unreasonable , particularly considering the fact that the disco very took place during the height of the C OVID

- 19 pandemic. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(B) (requiring a party to “obtain leave of court” before conducting a deposition “if the deponent is confined in prison”). In any event , Defendants have not show n that3

they were prejudiced by the district court’s limitations, given that they did not take advantage of all the depositions they were allowed

. 2. Defendants next contend that the district court improperly considered
evidence that Plaintiff

s submitted w ith their sur

- rebuttal. But “ we will not reverse” a district court’s evidentiary decision “unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.” Tan Lam v. City of Los Banos , 976 F.3d 986, 1004

– 05 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner , 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997)). That is not the case here, where the only challenged evidence on which the district court relied was data that Defendants had produced to Plaintiffs in the first instance. Moreover, Defendants take issue only with Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the data

— not the admission of the
data.
3. Finally, Defendants argue that the distr ict court improperly considered
inmate s’ declarations that were not signed by the inmates. We decline to consider
th at argument because it was not rais ed before the district court and, if it had been, the lack of signatures could have been remedied

. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt , 83 F.3d 1060, 106 3 (9th Cir. 1996) (“As a general rule, we will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” )

. AFFIRMED.