i

Assessing Military Benefits of S&T Investments in 

Micro Autonomous Systems Utilizing a Gedanken 

Experiment

Albert Sciarretta, Joseph Mait, Richard Chait, Elizabeth Redden, and Jordan Willcox

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

January 2011
ii

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials.

Albert Sciarretta is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) Center 

for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) and president of Carbon Niter Sulfur 

(CNS) Technologies, Inc. He received MS degrees in operations research and mechanical 

engineering from Stanford University and a BS degree in general engineering from the U.S. 

Military Academy.

Joseph N. Mait, PhD, is a Senior Technical Researcher at the U.S. Army Research Laboratory 

(ARL). He is the Cooperative Agreement Manager of the Collaborative Technology Alliance 

(CTA) on Micro-Autonomous Systems and Technology (MAST). Dr. Mait received his PhD and 

MS degrees in electrical engineering from Georgia Tech, and his BS degree in electrical 

engineering from the University of Virginia.

Richard Chait, PhD, is a Distinguished Research Fellow at CTNSP. He was previously Chief 

Scientist, Army Material Command, and Director, Army Research and Laboratory Management. 

Dr. Chait received his PhD in solid state science from Syracuse University and a BS degree from 

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

Elizabeth S. Redden, PhD, has been the Chief of the ARL Human Research and Engineering 

Directorate's (HRED's) Ft. Benning Field Element since 1982, focusing on human factors 

engineering for warfighting systems. She served as the Army Technology Objective Manager 

for Situational Understanding and currently serves as the U.S. National Lead for The Technical 

Cooperative Program (TTCP) Human Resources and Performance Group (HUM) 15 Land Panel. 

She received a PhD in organizational analysis from Auburn University, an MBA from Columbus 

State University, and MS and BS degrees in psychology from Valdosta State University.

Jordan Willcox served as a Research Assistant at CTNSP until the completion of his MA degree 

in Security Studies from Georgetown University in 2009. He is currently employed in social 

science and simulation-related research, analysis, and validation tasks as an employee of System 

of Systems Analytics, Inc. His prior experience in research, policy writing, and database design 

was performed at the Nixon Center and the Organization for American States.

Acknowledgements The authors wish to acknowledge Dr. Thomas Killion, Army Science and 

Technology Executive; Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Director of CTNSP; and Dr. Michael Baranick, 

Senior Research Fellow at CTNSP, for their support of this effort. We thank Mr. Dan Turner 

and Mr. Rodger Pettitt, HRED Field Element, Fort Benning, GA, for their technical support and 

for organizing this event. We thank Mr. Michael Kennedy, Robotics Lead, Maneuver Battle 

Lab, Fort Benning, GA, for his technical support and participation. We thank the members of 

the MAST CTA for their participation. Finally, and by far not least, we thank the Warfighters 

who participated in the event; especially Sergeant First Class (SFC) David J. Chappelle, SFC 

Troy A. Jensen, and SFC Rodney D. Pittman, who were instrumental in soliciting participants 

and providing the small unit urban warfare tutorials and training.
iii

Executive Summary

In a Defense and Technology Paper (DTP) entitled “A Methodology for Assessing the Military 

Benefits of Science and Technology Investments,”1 the National Defense University (NDU) 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) presented a variety of approaches 

for deriving the return on investment – in terms of warfighting capabilities – for Army science 

and technology (S&T) efforts. As a follow-up to the methodology study that generated the DTP, 

the CTNSP wished to demonstrate parts of the methodology in the evaluation of an actual Army 

S&T effort. The Army Research Laboratory's (ARL's) Micro-Autonomous Systems and 

Technology (MAST) Collaborative Technology Alliance (CTA)2 program was chosen to 

demonstrate the utility of the methodology because it offers significant future capabilities for our 

Army, provides a set of very robust present-day technical challenges, and offers a significant 

assessment challenge since it is focused on basic research. 

The MAST CTA demonstration focused on the components of the methodology that relate to 

modeling and simulation. It was conducted as a Gedanken Experiment (thought experiment) to 

test hypotheses because the micro-autonomous robotic systems are only conceptual at this time. 

It explored the potential operational benefits of the MAST technologies by attempting to prove 

or disprove hypotheses using the thoughts of subject matter experts (SMEs) rather than 

experimental data derived from brassboard, breadboard, prototype, or fielded systems. Similar 

types of experiments have been carried out under names like Technology Wargame, Army 

Transformation Wargame, etc. Within these low fidelity simulations, participants provide SME 

feedback as they step through the use of the technologies in the planning and execution cycles of 

various warfighting mission scenarios, taking into account various topics, capabilities, 

constraints, and trade-offs. In demonstrating the applicability of the cost-benefit methodology, 

the Gedanken Experiment provided the MAST CTA Cooperative Agreement Manager (CAM)

with Warfighter insights which proved to be useful for design considerations and future trade-off 

analyses. As hoped for in a cost-benefit analysis effort, it aided the MAST CTA CAM in 

developing his investment strategy.

The Gedanken Experiment activity was a three day event at Fort Benning, GA. The first day of 

the event was devoted to exposing the MAST CTA personnel (the CAM and MAST technical 

performers) to small unit operations (how dismounted infantry fire teams and squads clear rooms 

and buildings) and providing them an overview of the three scripted experiment scenarios. This 

exposure included hands-on experience in clearing rooms at a Fort Benning training site. During 

the second and third days, nine of the MAST CTA personnel and two separate groups of 

Warfighters participated in the Gedanken Experiment and follow-on survey activities in a 

classroom environment. For the experiment, the moderator used MS PowerPoint presentations

of the scenarios to guide the participants through their discussions. At the end of each day, ARL 

Human Research and Engineering Directorate (HRED) Fort Benning Field Element personnel 

conducted a survey. An analysis of the discussions and survey data was conducted by the 

CTNSP personnel, the MAST CTA CAM, and HRED personnel.

 1 Albert Sciarretta, Richard Chait, Joseph Mait, and Jordan Willcox, A Methodology for Assessing the Military 

Benefits of Science and Technology Investments, Defense & Technology Paper 55 (Washington, D.C.: Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy, September 2008).

2 A program description is available online at <http://www.arl.army.mil/www/default.cfm?Action=93&Page=332>.
iv

The overall effort was a successful endeavor for the MAST CTA. The MAST CTA personnel 

gained much from their exposure to small unit urban operations, including the first day's 

classroom tutorial and the hands-on training experience at an urban dismounted infantry training 

site. Their involvement in the Gedanken Experiments on the second and third day:

• Exposed them to Warfighter operational thought processes and concerns

• Exposed them to Warfighter tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), which generated 

ideas on how MAST systems might be integrated into small unit urban operations

• Utilized their subject matter expertise to answer the technical/capability questions of the 

Warfighter participants

In addition, the Warfighter participants gained insights on what the Army's science and 

technology community is trying to do for them. 

Many technical and operational topics are highlighted in this paper. The following were of most 

benefit to the MAST CTA CAM:

• The Warfighters' highest capability priorities were information fidelity (including 

sensing), mobility, and stealth. In this case, stealth is more of a camouflage or blending 

in with the surroundings and reducing noise; as opposed to reductions in visual, 

electromagnetic, and radar signatures.

• For most areas, the platoon level leaders and the squad level leaders agreed on uses and 

needs. There were some notable differences, especially in the area of information fidelity 

(platoon level leaders wanted more all the time), real-time feedback (platoon level leaders 

were willing to trade fidelity for real-time feedback), command and control (C2) of the 

systems (during mission execution, squad level leaders wanted hands off, while platoon 

level leaders wanted squads to maintain operational control), and overall control (squad 

level leaders wanted a hierarchy of control and maintenance at platoon level, while 

platoon level leaders saw all control and maintenance at the squad level). 

• For TTP, novel ideas for deployment were discussed and concerns for C2 kept arising. 

With respect to C2, a need was identified for an easy-to-use Warfighter-MAST systems 

interface that supports Warfighter-machine interactions, enhances Warfighter situational 

awareness, and allows for changes in operational control during the execution of a 

mission.

• Additionally for C2, there is a need for scalable interfaces that provide differing views of 

C2 for platoon level leaders and squad level leaders, or the differing needs for levels of 

information fidelity during an operation. For example, platforms can best be exploited 

for intelligence gathering to aid in planning but use should be limited during actual 

combat. To accommodate these differences, multiple MAST designs may be needed 

along with scalable levels of autonomy among an ensemble of MAST systems of varying 

types, so that autonomy levels can be increased or decreased based upon the mission 

phase. For example, when the MAST technology is immature and autonomous behavior 

is not very predictable, it may be best to scale down autonomy during a firefight. 
v

• Although lethal capabilities were discussed, there appeared to be more of an interest in 

non-lethal capabilities to support deception and diversion during offensive operations and 

to possibly reduce the number of civilian casualties, especially in hostage situations. For 

the MAST CTA CAM, this was an unforeseen beneficial warfighting capability that is 

potentially doable for micro autonomous systems.

The most important benefit for the MAST CTA CAM was his use of the Warfighters' 

perspectives to assess the benefits of design approaches. For example, platforms can be best 

exploited for intelligence gathering to aid in planning but should not be used when the potential 

for combat operations is high. For cultural reasons (i.e., military culture) and the immaturity of 

the technology, Warfighters should not be teamed with autonomous platforms during a firefight. 

This single perspective has helped MAST CTA CAM keep the researchers focused on a well 

defined design approach.

The MAST CTA CAM acknowledged that not only did the Gedanken Experiment output

influence his leadership of MAST, but as ARL defines its strategic vision in autonomous 

platforms of all sizes and shapes, it has also provided him supporting information to debate with 

other researchers in the lab about the reasonableness of promoting room clearing by autonomous 

platforms. He believes he has successfully argued that this is not a good application to consider, 

at least not until the technology has matured and Warfighters trust the capabilities of such 

platforms.

The overall experience was very beneficial to all participants in the exercise. It is highly 

recommended that the MAST CTA keep a close working relationship with Warfighters, 

especially those involved with developing TTP and assessing Warfighter-machine interfaces at 

Fort Benning, GA.
vi
vii

Table of Contents

Background..................................................................................................................................... 1

Importance of Robotic Systems.................................................................................................. 1

The MAST CTA ......................................................................................................................... 2

Functional and Operational Capabilities and Constraints........................................................... 2

Conduct of the Gedanken Experiment............................................................................................ 3

Concept of Operations ................................................................................................................ 4

Procedure Rules...................................................................................................................... 6

Data Collection ............................................................................................................................... 6

General Questions....................................................................................................................... 6

During Each Scenario ............................................................................................................. 6

After Each Scenario ................................................................................................................ 7

Surveys........................................................................................................................................ 7

Findings........................................................................................................................................... 9

Exposure of MAST Personnel to Warfighting Operations......................................................... 9

Scenario Discussions ................................................................................................................ 10

Assessment of Survey Information........................................................................................... 14

End-of-the-Day Discussions..................................................................................................... 18

Summary and Noted Benefits....................................................................................................... 18

Appendix A. Offensive Scenario ................................................................................................. 21

Appendix B. Defensive Scenario................................................................................................. 28

Appendix C. Stabilization Operation Scenario............................................................................ 29

Appendix D. Demographics of Participants ................................................................................ 33

Appendix E. Results of Survey for System Evaluation ............................................................... 37

Appendix F. Acronyms................................................................................................................ 46
viii
1

Background

In a Defense and Technology Paper (DTP) entitled “A Methodology for Assessing the Military 

Benefits of Science and Technology Investments,”3 the National Defense University (NDU) 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) presented a variety of approaches 

for deriving the return on investment – in terms of warfighting capabilities – for Army science 

and technology (S&T) efforts. As a follow-up to the methodology study that generated the DTP, 

the CTNSP wished to demonstrate parts of the methodology in the evaluation of an actual Army 

S&T effort. The Army Research Laboratory's (ARL's) Micro-Autonomous Systems and 

Technology (MAST) Collaborative Technology Alliance (CTA)4 program was chosen to 

demonstrate the utility of the methodology because it offers significant future capabilities for our 

Army, provides a set of very robust present-day technical challenges, and offers a significant 

assessment challenge since it is focused on basic research. 

The MAST CTA demonstration focused on the components of the methodology that relate to 

modeling and simulation. It was conducted as a Gedanken Experiment (thought experiment) to 

test hypotheses because the micro-autonomous robotic systems are only conceptual at this time. 

It explored the potential operational benefits of the MAST technologies by attempting to prove 

or disprove hypotheses using the thoughts of subject matter experts (SMEs) rather than 

experimental data derived from brassboard, breadboard, prototype, or fielded systems. Similar 

types of experiments have been carried out under names like Technology Wargame, Army 

Transformation Wargame, etc. Within these low fidelity simulations, participants provide SME 

feedback as they step through the use of the technologies in the planning and execution cycles of 

various warfighting mission scenarios, taking into account various topics, capabilities, 

constraints, and trade-offs. In demonstrating the applicability of the cost-benefit methodology, 

the Gedanken Experiment provided the MAST CTA Cooperative Agreement Manager (CAM) 

with Warfighter insights which proved to be useful for design considerations and future trade-off 

analyses. As hoped for in a cost-benefit analysis effort, it aided the MAST CTA CAM in 

developing his investment strategy.

Importance of Robotic Systems

The Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom Operations have demonstrated the value of robotic 

platforms, both aerial and ground, that are remotely tele-operated. Robotic platforms extend the 

Warfighter's senses and reach and have been used as sensors, communication devices, and, in some 

instances, weapons platforms. Within complex terrain, like caves, mountains, or urban 

environments, these platforms provide operational capabilities to the Warfighter that would 

otherwise be costly, impossible, or deadly to achieve with humans. Future enhancements to 

warfighting capabilities require a reduction in platform size and the cohesive operation of 

multiple platforms that operate with little or no direct human supervision and can support 

personnel operating in a variety of dangerous environments.

 3 Albert Sciarretta, Richard Chait, Joseph Mait, and Jordan Willcox, A Methodology for Assessing the Military 

Benefits of Science and Technology Investments, Defense & Technology Paper 55 (Washington, D.C.: Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy, September 2008). 4 A program description is available online at <http://www.arl.army.mil/www/default.cfm?Action=93&Page=332>.
2

Figure 1. Air and ground MAST systems working with a

relatively larger SUGV (right hand side of the picture)

The MAST CTA

The Army established the MAST CTA in February 2008 to address these future capabilities for 

autonomous platforms at its corporate laboratory, the Army Research Laboratory. The objective of 

the MAST CTA is to enhance tactical situational awareness in urban and complex terrain by 

enabling the autonomous operation of a collaborative ensemble of multifunctional, mobile 

micro-systems. See Figure 1 for a conceptual view of an operational use (detecting explosives in 

a cave) of MAST systems teamed with a small unmanned ground vehicle (SUGV).

One goal of the MAST CTA is to 

advance fundamental S&T in 

several key areas of robotics 

including small-scale 

aeromechanics and ambulation; 

propulsion; sensing, processing, 

and communications; navigation 

and control; micro devices and 

integration; platform packaging; 

and systems architectures. The 

approach is to consider the 

interplay among all elements, as 

opposed to each element 

independently.

To achieve this goal, radical 

design and engineering 

methodologies are required in which system-level performance, maneuvering, and functional

adaptability are emphasized over the optimization of individual functions. The Gedanken 

Experiment proved to be a beneficial tool for guiding the design of actual platforms.

Functional and Operational Capabilities and Constraints

As stated, the vision of the MAST CTA is to enhance tactical situational awareness in urban and 

complex terrain. The impact and interplay among conflicting requirements on the MAST technical 

issues are so complex that investigating a single issue in isolation of the others will not generate an 

efficient and operationally effective ensemble of micro systems. For example, solutions for 

processing, communications, and mobility that are satisfactory for large systems do not scale when 

platforms are reduced to the size considered in the MAST CTA (i.e., palm-sized or smaller). 

Considering that platform size and weight limit available power over the duration of a mission, the 

largest percentage of available power is utilized for mobility. The limited power, in turn, constrains 

the bandwidth of intra-platform communications (i.e., between sensors and processors and between

processors and transmitters), as well as the bandwidth of inter-platform communications. Limited 

communications further impact the ability of the micro-robotic systems to collectively sense, 

understand, and respond coherently as a group. The Gedanken Experiment technique provided a 

potential methodology to address design trade-offs such as these. 

For example, one scenario considered for the potential application of small platforms included 

room-by-room searches, with MAST systems moving autonomously with a dismounted infantry 
3

squad. The Warfighters desired capabilities that would allow the MAST systems to provide 

indications of the presence of opposing force (OPFOR) personnel, threat munitions, or both. 

They stated that either an infrared image or a simple graphic indicator would be adequate. They 

clarified that the duration of operations (i.e., flight) in each room may be minutes; and to clear 

the building could take a half hour or more. Thus, sensing and duration of flight are critical 

functions for these platforms. 

However, further analysis is still needed to determine the sensing fidelity and resolution, and the

minimum flight duration required to ensure an effective mission. Sensors that can generate high 

fidelity, high resolution information require more power than low performance sensors and, as 

mentioned above, power is a limited resource. Thus, a trade-off between sensor performance and 

platform power is driven by mission effectiveness. Other system design considerations include 

maneuverability, obstacle avoidance, degree of human-system interface, and whether or not images 

will be transmitted in real time or viewed upon return of the micro autonomous system to the 

operator.

The Gedanken Experiment effort addressed these capability and constraint issues, and the findings 

were beneficial to the MAST CTA technical personnel. 

Conduct of the Gedanken Experiment

In the early phases of the MAST CTA, technical personnel were asked to consider the 

capabilities required to achieve tactical situational awareness in urban and complex terrain in 

three different scenarios: small unit search within an intact building for OPFOR threats, perimeter 

defense of a special operations unit, and small unit search of a demolished building or a cave for 

potential threats. The Gedanken Experiment addressed three closely related scenarios that covered 

platoon-level urban operations:

− Offensive operation (see Appendix A). The scenario begins with the platoon planning the 

operation. The dismounted infantry platoon is tasked to clear two separate buildings, 

which are known meeting locations for the local insurgent forces. The platoon initiates 

the action by conducting an assault from the southwest corner of a town to seize 

Objectives (OBJs) Homer (building A) and Bart (building B). Support-by-fire positions 

(SBFs) are established to cover the entrances to the buildings and to prevent a 

counterattack by insurgents from OBJ Bart while OBJ Homer is being taken. The 

platoon is asked to use its organic SUGVs to establish observation points (OPs) to cover 

the rear exits of OBJ Bart. Initial reconnaissance of buildings and rooms is accomplished

using SUGVs and smaller MAST systems. The primary task during this clearing 

operation is to identify and neutralize (capture or kill) all insurgents located within the 

objectives, while minimizing the number of civilian casualties. 

− Defensive operation (see Appendix B). This is a very brief scenario. The dismounted 

infantry platoon conducts the offensive operation discussed above. Once OBJ Homer is 

cleared, the platoon receives a report that an additional ten to twenty insurgents are 

moving into the area. The company commander orders the platoon to take up defensive 

positions and await further orders. 
4

Figure 2. Tutorial by SFC David J. Chappelle

− Stabilization operation (see Appendix C). An improvised explosive device (IED) 

explosion occurs in a large city and snipers are shooting at emergency responders. A 

reaction force (a U.S. infantry company augmented with a platoon made up of local 

nationals) is sent to secure the area and neutralize the snipers. Along the way the reaction 

force has to identify and deal with obstacles (crowded market, protestors, etc.). Once at 

the IED scene, the reaction force discovers that in addition to the snipers, local civilians 

may have been abducted and are being detained by insurgents. The reaction force 

receives additional orders to work with local police forces to verify the abduction, then 

locate and free the civilians. 

The topics and approaches were designed to highlight capability needs and identify technical and 

operational constraints.

Within the Gedanken Experiment, Warfighters assisted in defining the needs and uses for MAST 

systems – i.e., system design needs; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). As discussed in 

DTP 55, follow-on, higher fidelity modeling and simulation research and experimentation could 

further refine these findings. Following each Gedanken Experiment, the participants were also 

surveyed to solicit their prioritization of capability needs for MAST systems. This prioritization 

was useful in determining the value of benefits and formulating MAST design approaches. 

The ARL Human Research and Engineering Directorate (HRED) Fort Benning Field Element 

and the U.S. Army Maneuver Center5

Concept of Operations

Battle Laboratory assisted with coordinating the event at 

Fort Benning, GA, reviewing the scenarios, and providing warfighting subject matter expertise 

when needed. Additionally, they assisted with roundtable discussion. Finally, the HRED team 

designed, conducted, and consolidated the information acquired from surveys provided to the 

experiment participants at the end of each day. The consolidated feedback is in Appendices D 

and E.

The Gedanken Experiment activity was a 

three day event at Fort Benning, GA. The 

first day of the event was devoted to 

exposing the MAST CTA personnel to 

small unit operations (how dismounted 

infantry fire teams and squads clear rooms 

and buildings) and providing them an 

overview of the three scripted experiment 

scenarios. The second and third days 

were devoted to the conduct of the 

experiment, the conduct of surveys, and 

end-of-the-day general and technical 

discussions.

 5 Formerly the U.S. Army Infantry Center. The name changed to accommodate the transition and integration of the 

U.S. Army Armor School to Fort Benning, GA. The U.S. Armor School was at Fort Knox, KY.
5

Figure 3. Two MAST CTA personnel beginning to clear a room

There were nine civilians from the MAST CTA effort, including representatives from ARL, 

Georgia Tech, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Maryland, the 

University of Michigan, the University of New Mexico, and the University of Pennsylvania. On 

the first day, they received a classroom tutorial on small unit urban operations (Figure 2) as well 

as a trip to a small unit urban training site. At the site, they were divided into infantry fire teams 

of four personnel; each person was provided a helmet, body armor, and a rifle; and they were 

asked to clear rooms in training structures (Figure 3). 

Later, back in a classroom, the

moderator for the Gedanken 

Experiment discussions 

conducted a walk-through of the 

scenarios, to provide the MAST 

CTA personnel insights on TTP 

and familiarize them with military 

terminology that would be 

discussed in the scenarios or 

possibly brought up by the 

Warfighter participants. The 

reasons for including the MAST 

CTA personnel as participants 

were:

- Expose them to Warfighter 

operational environments, thought 

processes, and concerns

- Expose them to Warfighter TTP to generate ideas on how MAST systems might be 

integrated into small unit urban operations

- Utilize their subject matter expertise during the Gedanken Experiment to answer the 

technical and capability questions of the Warfighter participants

The second and third days of the event focused on the Gedanken Experiments. Each day began 

with the CAM of the MAST CTA providing an overview of the MAST technology efforts to the 

participants. The HRED personnel had solicited Warfighter participants who had experience 

with urban operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, and some experience with or knowledge of the use 

of robots in small unit operations. Participants for the second day included seven Warfighters 

with recent Squad Leader6 and Fire Team Leader7 experience, and the nine MAST CTA 

civilians. On the third day, there were eight Warfighters with Platoon Leader8 and Platoon 

Sergeant9 experience and the same nine civilians. Detailed demographic data for all participants 

can be found in Appendix D.

 6 Normally a staff sergeant and leads two Fire Teams, see Table 1, Appendix A. 7 Normally a sergeant and leads three Warfighters, see Table 1, Appendix A. 8 Normally an officer with the rank of second lieutenant and leads the entire platoon, see Table 1, Appendix A. 9 Normally a sergeant first class and assists the platoon leader with leading the whole platoon, see Table 1, Appendix 

A.
6

During the experiment, the moderator discussed the offensive, defensive, and stability operations 

scenarios, asking general and scenario specific questions, and solicited input on TTP, the 

importance of envisioned design characteristics, and other desired capabilities. These 

deliberations included a step-by-step breakdown of each scenario and how the MAST CTA 

technologies might be used. Following the scenario discussions, the participants completed 

surveys which asked them to rate the importance of various MAST system capabilities and 

functions. The detailed survey output is in Appendix E and is discussed in the "Findings" 

section of this document. Each day ended with final operations-related discussions with the 

Warfighters, followed by technical discussions without the Warfighters.

During the second and third days, time was also allotted for Fort Benning HRED and Battle Lab 

personnel to discuss their recent research efforts related to robotic systems with the MAST CTA 

personnel. These discussions did not include the Warfighters.

The Gedanken Experiment and the survey activities were held in a classroom environment. In 

the classroom, the moderator used MS PowerPoint presentations to guide the participants 

through their discussions. During the Gedanken Experiment, all those in the classroom other

than the moderator and the participants were considered observers. 

Procedure Rules

At the beginning of each day the moderator discussed a list of rules for conducting discussions. 

These rules recognized the importance of academic freedom in speech – so all discussion points 

were non-attribution. In addition, these rules helped control discussions, focused on the views of 

the participants, and limited the amount of observer participation.

Data Collection

During the Gedanken Experiment, data was collected in three primary forms:

− Notes from general discussions. These notes addressed discussions immediately before 

and after the scenarios, as well as discussions during presentations by the Director, 

MAST CTA; the Chief, HRED Fort Benning Field Element; and the representative from 

the Maneuver Center Battle Lab

− Notes covering scenario discussions; specifically the answers to the general questions in 

the "General Questions" section and the scenario specific questions, as in Appendix A

− Surveys at the end of each day

In addition to notes taken by the identified note takers, notes were also collected from 

participants and observers who voluntarily provided them.

General Questions

Before each scenario, participants and observers were asked if they had any general questions 

they wished to address before initiating the scenarios.

During Each Scenario

After each step of a scenario mission, the participants were asked the following general 

questions:
7

− How should MAST systems be employed?

 When

 Outside/in buildings

 Special TTP

− Presentation of intelligence

 Real time, delayed, etc.

 Visual, audible, etc.

 Fidelity of information (image, detectability, location, etc.)

− Any difference for day versus night operations?

− How much situational awareness (SA) is needed?

 Location of MAST systems

 Orientation of MAST systems

 Location of items of interest

 Identification of items of interest

 Understanding of activity being viewed

− How should the MAST systems be controlled?

− What is important?

 Duration of flight 

 Ability to transmit information

 Ability to return with downloadable information

 Type of information (humans, inanimate objects, military equipment, etc.)

 Importance of sensors (visual, II, thermal, magnetic, seismic, acoustic, etc.)

 Fidelity of information

 Warfighter-Machine Interface (how much autonomy)

 Obstacle avoidance

 Fly, walk, or both

 Crawl up walls

 Stealth (type: visual, audible, electromagnetic)

After Each Scenario

After a scenario, the participants and observers were asked the following questions:

− For this specific scenario, what are the most important capabilities provided by the 

MAST systems?

− What capabilities are not important?

− What TTP need to be established?

− Who should control the MAST systems?

− Other comments?

Surveys

Each day of the Gedanken Experiment, at the end of the last scenario, the participants were given 

two surveys to fill out. As seen in the Appendices D and E, the responders are in three groups:

− Group A: eight platoon leaders and platoon sergeants (second Gedanken Experiment)

− Group B: seven squad leaders and fire team leaders (first Gedanken Experiment)

− Group C: nine civilians who participated in both experiments. [Note: The nine civilians 

were given the surveys only once.]
8

The first was a demographic survey, asking about military occupational specialties10 (MOSs), 

rank, current duty position, time in service, military education, experience in combat, experience 

with robotic systems, computer experience, and assessment of infantry skills. A compilation of 

the information is in Appendix D.

The second survey, in Appendix E, is a compilation of the information gathered from questions 

focused on MAST systems. It was hoped that after having almost a full day of discussions about 

MAST systems and how they could be used in various scenarios, the informed feedback of the 

participants could be used to better prioritize the importance of MAST system capabilities and 

functions. 

Copies of the individual surveys are not included in this paper. However, the consolidated 

output can be found in Appendix E. The MAST system survey had three major components. In 

the first component (Section A), the participants were asked to use a scale from 1 (No 

Experience) to 7 (Expert) to rate the importance of levels of ability for the following ten 

capability areas:

− Ability to Sense

− Information Fidelity

− Information Latency

− Single Task/Mission Duration

− Total Operational Time Before Recharge 

− Mobility

− System Command and Control (C2) Echelon

− Level of Autonomy

− Stealth

− Physical Specification

For example, for "Information Latency," abilities were associated with various levels of 

transmission latency as well as an ability to return with downloadable information. As seen on 

the third page of Appendix A, a few clarifying comments were provided with this feedback. 

In the second component (Section B), as seen on the fourth page of Appendix A, participants 

were asked to rank in order from 10 (best) to 1 (worst) the same 10 capabilities identified in the 

first component. No ties were allowed.

In the final component (Sections C through G), participants were asked to provide textual 

comments on the following topics:

− What TTP need to be established for use of MAST systems?

− List three things you liked about the concept of MAST systems.

− List three things you believe can be improved in the MAST system design/capabilities.

 10 Military personnel are categorized in their assigned job by a military occupational specialty (MOS). Each MOS is

labeled with a short alphanumerical code, which consists of a two-digit number appended by letter. Related MOSs 

are grouped together by Career Management Fields (CMF). For example, an enlisted Soldier with MOS 11B works 

as an infantryman, and is part of CMF 11 (the CMF for infantry). An infantry officer is MOS 11A.
9

− List up to three things you would like the MAST systems to do that were not discussed.

− Additional comments.

The comments associated with Sections C through G are listed with their appropriate topics in

the fourth through ninth pages of Appendix A.

Findings

The Gedanken Experiment proved to be of great benefit to the CAM of the MAST CTA and his 

personnel. As stated by the CAM:

Not only has this influenced my leadership of MAST, but as ARL defines its 

strategic vision in autonomous platforms of all sizes and shapes, I have debated 

with other researchers in the lab about the reasonableness of promoting room 

clearing by autonomous platforms. I believe I have argued the point successfully 

that this is NOT a good application to consider, at least not until the technology 

has matured and soldiers trust the capabilities of such platforms.

Much information was gained in terms of design needs, capability needs, potential benefits, and 

concerns about misuse. In addition, the exposure of the MAST personnel to warfighting 

operations also provided a very useful "early user" interaction with materiel developers. Rather 

than provide a very tedious listing of all deliberations during the scenario discussions, this 

section will discuss the most interesting information. 

Exposure of MAST Personnel to Warfighting Operations

As previously discussed, the MAST personnel were exposed to warfighting operations prior to 

the Gedanken Experiment in the following mediums: 

− Classroom tutorial on small unit urban operations, specifically the clearing of rooms and 

buildings

− On site, hands-on training experience of donning a helmet, body armor, and a rifle; and 

physically clearing rooms in Fort Benning training structures

− Classroom reviews of the Gedanken Experiment scenarios and basic introduction to TTP 

and military terminology

These three mediums significantly enhanced their understanding of potential uses of MAST 

systems in small unit urban operations. Additionally, it prepared them for their "participation" in

the follow-on Gedanken Experiments over the next two days. They might have received 

significantly less benefit from their participation in the Gedanken Experiments without this oneday preparatory education. 

This preparatory experience exposed participants to small unit urban operations, especially in 

terms of the speed of operations, complexity of movements, competing activities that may take 

the Warfighter's attention away from the MAST systems, limited amount of Warfighter-system 

interface time, and an early awareness of the potential significance of various functional 

capabilities. Most importantly, during the Gedanken Experiments, it provided them a level of 

military awareness that validated them as participants alongside the attending Warfighters. 
10

Scenario Discussions

This discussion of observations and findings from the Gedanken Experiments is in no particular 

order or priority. The information is believed to be of value to the development of the MAST 

systems. The discussions primarily focus on the Warfighter feedback. The civilian participants 

(i.e., members of the MAST CTA and NDU) asked many questions of the Warfighters, but they 

themselves did not provide information discussed in this section. The civilian participants' 

feedback is addressed in the next section, which assesses the survey responses. 

Differing Perspectives. In general, both groups were relatively conservative in identifying 

capability needs; however, platoon leaders and platoon sergeants were more conservative, 

especially when it came to the functions for which squad leaders and platoon leaders are 

responsible. Squad leaders were more imaginative (i.e., providing the MAST systems flash-bang 

capabilities for noisy diversionary activities in another part of a building, providing MAST 

systems non-lethal capabilities to neutralize insurgents while minimizing civilian casualties) and 

would be willing to take on more risk with respect to a function. Platoon leaders, given their 

responsibility for the entire mission, were less prone to venture outside doctrine without being 

prodded.

Impact on Momentum. Squad leaders and fire team leaders were mostly concerned about 

maintaining momentum (more commonly called operations tempo (OPTEMPO)

11

among 

military personnel) once an operation had begun. They did not want any diversions and had no 

desire to control platforms or look at displays when it came to kicking down doors, clearing 

rooms, and getting into firefights. As a side note, caution should be taken with this perception 

about OPTEMPO by Warfighters who have not had the opportunity to use detailed actionable 

information. One of the findings in an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-sponsored 

Smart Sensor Web (SSW) experiment at Fort Benning, in 2002, was that dismounted infantry 

platoons (blue forces) were willing to give up OPTEMPO in exchange for "actionable 

information"12 provided by the SSW system.13 Prior to the SSW experiment, it was believed that 

speed of action (high rate OPTEMPO) would compensate for lack of situational awareness14

 11 Tempo is a musical term meaning the speed at which a piece is played. OPTEMPO is short for "operations 

tempo" which is accepted among military personnel as a measure of the pace of an operation or operations.

about adversaries (red forces), thus hopefully catching the red forces off-guard before they can 

react. It was observed and discussed in SSW after action reviews that when red force 

information was available, the blue forces could slow down and use their enhanced situational 

awareness to execute deliberate plans and enhance the survivability of the blue force. 

12 Actionable information is information that can be acted upon, leads to action, or starts a chain of events and 

reaction. Actionable information provides an initial basis point for hypothesis building. It is the strongest building 

block of the decision-making process. 13 The SSW system provided the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, each squad leader, and each fire team leader a 

wearable computer with touch-screen wrist display. The computer was linked to a network of sensors (non-imaging, 

imaging, and streaming video) and databases (maps, room displays) of an urban environment (the Fort Benning 

McKenna Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) site). Enemy actions triggered sensors which provided 

real-time feeds of information to the SSW system users. Two of the authors, Mr. Albert Sciarretta and Dr. Elizabeth 

Redden, played key roles in the design, execution, and assessment of findings of the SSW experiment. 14 A textbook definition of situational awareness is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of 

time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. In the 

Gedanken Experiment, the participants wanted a better understanding of the location of civilians, adversaries, and 

weapons, as well as the actions and possible intentions of adversaries. 
11

Surveillance Needs. All platoon personnel wanted a perching capability (i.e., on the roof of a 

building or on a window sill) to provide persistent surveillance for 24–48 hours prior to 

operation. Soldiers felt that persistent surveillance and reconnaissance for mission planning 

support were more important capabilities than making the MAST systems lethal or even 

providing real-time information during the mission execution, including firefights. 

For deployment, the Warfighters suggested a much simpler means for deployment than had been 

considered by the MAST CTA. For example, one suggestion was dropping the MAST systems 

while on patrol two days prior to a known operation. Another suggestion was to use them as 

removable hood ornaments on military vehicles, which provides Warfighters with capabilities 

while on mounted and dismounted operations.

Surveillance data, especially imagery for mapping rooms and identifying people, was desired for 

planning, execution, and after action reviews. In addition, the Warfighters provided many 

applications for acoustic sensor data. For example, they wanted both a portable and mobile 

version of an acoustic sniper detection system. Another suggested application was for acoustic 

sensing and guidance, in which MAST platforms could lead platoon members or other platforms 

to noisy rooms or provide access to OPFOR conversations. For this latter capability to be useful, 

though, Warfighters felt it required an organic translation capability or at least ability to transmit 

to a receiving station had the required translators.

With regard to surveillance data, the need for information fidelity was discussed. Figure 4 is a 

very simplistic depiction of the desires for information fidelity by both the platoon level 

leadership (platoon leaders and platoon sergeants) and the squad level leadership (squad leaders 

and fire team leaders) during three stages of an operation: mission planning, initiation of actions, 

and mission execution. Both the platoon level and squad level leaders wanted high fidelity 

information during the planning phase of a mission. Once the mission is executed, however, 

they were willing to accept a lower level of fidelity. That is, they want to know as much as 

possible about a situation prior to execution but, once the mission is under way, the simpler the 

sensory information, the better, i.e., instead of streaming video of the inside of a room, a simple 

alarm that merely indicates the presence of a human would be acceptable. During all phases of 

an operation, the platoon level leaders wanted more information and they wanted it in real time. 

They were willing to trade fidelity for real-time collection.
12

Figure 4. Comparison of views relative to information fidelity and C2

Command and Control. From a C2 perspective, as depicted in Figure 4, the views of the 

platoon level and squad level leaders was quite different. Squad level leaders wanted control of 

the MAST systems prior to execution but, during execution, did not want to be bothered with C2 

issues. Momentum was their key concern. On the other hand, platoon level leaders wanted 

MAST systems to perform autonomous surveillance but, during mission execution, they felt 

human control of the platforms was essential to respond to fast moving chaotic events. The 

platoon level leaders also felt that squad leaders should be the ones in control, giving them an 

added advantage. However, this contradicts the squad level leaders' desire to have no 

distractions during room clearing operations, especially with regard to C2 of the MAST systems. 

This distinction highlights the need for tailored performance and tailored information flows to 

platoon level and squad level leaders. Also, there should be some consideration here about the 

relationship of OPTEMPO and gaining situational awareness, as described earlier with regard to 

the findings of the OSD SSW experiment. Perhaps the squad level leaders might change their 

opinions in a more advanced experiment with prototype systems. 

In the Gedanken Experiment, all platoon personnel indicated a strong desire to keep assets and 

information organic with limited links back to company or higher level of command. They felt 

doing so would limit micromanagement. In addition, for C2 and maintenance ("care and 

feeding"), squad leaders and fire team leaders wanted an individual at the platoon level (i.e., a 

robotics non-commissioned officer (NCO) equivalent to a squad leader in rank) to maintain and 

control the MAST systems assigned to the platoon. This robotics NCO may come to fruition 

with current plans to provide SUGVs, perhaps as many as three, to infantry platoons. However, 

it is unclear if the robotics NCO will be able to single-handedly maintain and control the SUGVs 

as well as a large number of MAST systems (unknown at this time, but may be in the 10’s for 

each squad). The squad leaders and fire team leaders believed that if the robotics NCO 

controlled and maintained the MAST systems, then for conduct of a mission, the MAST systems 

could be placed under operational control (OPCON)15

 15 Operational control (OPCON) allows for the command and control of subordinate forces, but does not require 

their care, feeding, administration, discipline, internal organization, or training. In this case, the robotics NCO 

would provide the maintenance and other administrative needs of the MAST systems.

of the squad leaders. 
13

Stealth. For stealth, the participants were more interested in camouflage, rather than dampening 

noise or creating visual transparencies. Warfighters believed the MAST systems should be like 

transformers (the toys). When perched, they should look like a rock, part of a roof or wall, or a 

local bug, not a piece of U.S. military equipment. When mobility is required, inanimate objects 

should transform into a bug. 

Survivability. Survivability of the MAST systems was also discussed. In addition to physical 

survivability, there was also a concern for operating in an environment with electromagnetic 

interference whether that interference came from intentional adversary jammers, unintentional 

local equipment, or from friendly force systems (especially, counter IED systems).

Non-Lethal Capabilities. Non-lethal capabilities were also of interest to the participants; 

particularly, flash-bang or electric shock. The Warfighters were intrigued by the ability to use 

this non-lethal capability. For deception or diversion, the Warfighters wanted to send the nonlethal equipped MASTs to a secondary target (i.e., to a room that is not the primary target) to 

make noise or create havoc, thus making an adversary believe the secondary target is the primary 

objective of the mission. They also believed that the use of an electric shock capability could 

minimize casualties among innocent civilians, especially in hostage situations.

Ability to Learn. Learning was a unique capability squad level leaders wanted the MAST 

systems to have. Given that their troops will need to train with the platforms, squad level leaders 

felt the ability to recognize human behaviors would reduce the burden on troops. In addition, 

squad level leaders wanted the capability for learned behaviors from one set of MAST systems to 

be "pushed" to all platforms in a manner similar to how commercial software companies push 

updates. In this way, learning is transmitted throughout the MAST collective.

Warfighter-Machine Interfaces. There were many discussions among all participants about 

the ability of the Warfighters to interface with the MAST systems. C2 has been addressed above 

in terms of OPCON, but there is still an issue of how one would actually interact with single or 

multiple MAST systems. Also, Warfighters were concerned that when many MAST systems are 

employed in a mission area, it would be difficult to know which MAST is which and which 

camera is providing the information. This drives a need for MAST systems to have some 

capability to self locate and requires a greater need to present that self-location information, as 

well as sensor data, to operators in a way that it enhances situational awareness and does not 

reduce mission effectiveness.

Additional Observations

• In general, the Warfighters were able to comprehend the advantages of small and 

intelligent platforms. However, it appeared to the observers in the room that the 

advantages of a collaborative ensemble were harder for the Warfighters to appreciate. 

This may be due to the fact that the discussions of collaboration were at a more detailed 

technical level. For example, it was discussed that a collaborative ensemble of platforms 

can provide various geometric perspectives that allow the MAST systems to triangulate 

on acoustic and electro-magnetic radiation (visible, thermal, or radio frequency). The 
14

Warfighters were less interested in how this is accomplished technically than they were 

in the function of locating, for example, acoustic sources (i.e., conversations or gun 

shots).

• Both groups of leaders felt that small unmanned ground vehicles (i.e., the current SUGV) 

may be disadvantaged in offensive operations. They felt the platforms were too large and 

noisy, which might cause the platoon to lose its element of surprise and may have some 

mobility issues. They preferred smaller, stealthier, more mobile platforms, and the 

MAST systems appeared to meet their preference.

Most of the discussion time in the experiment was focused on the offensive operation (the first 

scenario). The Warfighters spent a relatively small amount of time discussing applications in 

other operations.

• Defensive Operations. Use the MAST systems in perimeter security, as early warning 

devices (trip wires). Perimeter security could also be useful in offensive operations.

• Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. Use the MAST systems for situational 

awareness (i.e., to look for a 2nd IED triggerman after first responders arrive on the scene 

of an initial EID explosion). Again, they may be useful in perimeter security, though the 

multitude of civilians and emergency responders might create a significant amount of 

clutter for MAST sensors and processors.

• Caves and Underground Tunnels. Use MAST systems to keep Warfighters out of harm's 

way. This drives a need for MAST system operations in the dark.

• Medical Operations. Squad level leaders, in particular, wanted to use the MAST systems 

to provide triage (i.e., an autonomous Star Trek medical tricorder16

Assessment of Survey Information

), whereas platoon 

level leaders wanted the platforms to provide security for medics. The platoon level 

leaders were less willing to use MAST systems in support of medical operations; they 

preferred human intervention.

The following is a discussion of the survey information in Appendix E, Sections A through G. 

The format for the survey is discussed in the "Surveys" section.

Section A. In a review of the consolidated feedback for Section A, the three groups of 

responders were numerically close for most of the survey responses. Of note is how well the 

nine civilians (Group C), primarily MAST CTA personnel, aligned themselves with the two 

groups of Warfighters (Groups A (Platoon Leaders and Sergeants) and B (Squad Leaders and 

Fire Team Leaders)). This was mostly true in responses in Section A, which sought feedback on 

the importance of ten capability areas: ability to sense, information fidelity, information latency, 

 16 A multifunction, handheld sensing, processing, and storage device used for scanning, data analysis, and 

recording data.
15

single task/mission duration, total operational time before recharge, mobility, system C2 echelon, 

level of autonomy, stealth, and physical specifications.

All numerical grades in Appendix E are averages of all responders in each group. All three 

groups agreed that almost all topic areas were at least "average" (grade of 4), with a 

preponderance of the grades being 5 (slightly above average) to 7 (expert). Some topics actually 

had an average of 7.00 from Groups A, B, and/or C, which verifies that all members of the group 

believed the topic was most important. Given the discussions during the experiment, none of the 

high grades are surprises. The highest graded topic areas, which support many of the 

observations in the Scenario Discussions section above, were:

• Ability to Sense: Q517

• Ability to Sense: Q6. Other: humans (Group C). Same as above.

. Friendly/enemy military personnel (Group A). During the 

experiment, there was much discussion about the need to identify people (friendly and 

enemy). Also, the typical missions assigned to dismounted infantry platoons are to seek 

out dismounted personnel. So this high grade was not unexpected. 

• Information Latency: Q12. Ability to transmit information instantaneously (Group B). 

Warfighters in the thick of a fight (the members of Group B) want to immediately know 

when the situation is changing, so it makes sense that they would want information 

transmitted instantaneously. This same topic was also rated highly by Group A (average 

of 6.75) and Group C (average of 6.67).

• Single Task/Mission Duration: Q21. Duration up to 48 (mean) hours (Group B). All 

three groups rated this high, with duration times (Group A: mean of 12.5 hours; Group C: 

mean of 34 hours) much higher than the highest survey time of "Duration up to 2 hours." 

A need that kept surfacing during the experiment was using the MAST systems to 

provide persistent surveillance many hours before the execution of a mission. This would 

drive the duration time up much beyond 2 hours.

• Mobility: Q32. Ability to keep up with squad movement (Group A). Since the platoon 

leadership wants to keep abreast of mission status and would not want the MAST systems 

to slow down the OPTEMPO, it makes sense that they would rate this high. It would also 

make sense for all members of Group B to want the MAST systems to keep up with 

them. Group B did provide this capability area a high score (average of 6.00 for this 

question) and it also ranks high in Section B (discussed below). Perhaps it was not a 

perfect score because some squad leaders expressed the desire for the MAST systems to 

"stay out of their way" once the fighting started. 

• Stealth: Q50. Other type of stealth (write in of "camouflage") (Groups B and C). Group 

A was also high, with an average of 6.67. In terms of camouflage, the groups wanted the 

MAST systems to blend in with the local area, perhaps looking like a piece of a building, 

a local insect, or a piece of typical trash.

Of particular interest are the few topics that had notably diverse grades. In particular, for Q16 

(Ability to return with downloadable information), Group A had an average grade of 6.50, while 

Groups B and C had averages of 3.00 and 3.56 respectively. The platoon leadership would want 

 17 The term "Q5" does not refer to Question #5, but rather to item #5 in Section A. In this case, Q5 is under the 

grouping "Ability to Sense": and it is "Friendly/Enemy military personnel." This is similar for all other references to 

Q# - e.g., Q31 is under the grouping "Mobility" and it is "Ability to keep up with squad movement."
16

downloadable detailed information (to include images) for a few reasons: 1) to obtain early 

detailed information to support mission planning, 2) to support "after action reviews" of a 

mission, and 3) to use the mission to populate operations and intelligence databases and tools 

(i.e., the Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR)18 system).

Another notable difference was in the mobility area. For all of the questions, Groups A and B 

scored the importance high, but for three questions (Q31, Ability to do all mobility maneuvers 

listed above; Q32, Ability to keep up with the squad movement; and Q33, Ability to keep up 

ahead of squad), Group C was somewhat lower. Perhaps this difference can be attributed to the 

wishful desires of the military personnel as opposed to the "reality" of what the MAST personnel

know can be accomplished.

One final question (Q44, System is tele-operated and all decisions are made by the operator) was 

rated relatively high by Group A (average of 5.88) while Groups B and C had averages of 4.57 

and 3.63, respectively. This may be attributed to the need of the platoon leadership to want to 

maintain control of the MAST systems while Group B doesn't want to be bothered with them 

once the fighting starts and Group C desires to achieve the technical challenge of autonomous 

actions.

Section B. Since all capabilities were ranked relatively high in Section A, it is difficult to use 

the information to prioritize the efforts of the MAST program. Section B, on the other hand, 

provided more clarity since it asked the three groups to rank order the ten capability areas from 1 

to 10, with no ties.

For Group A, the platoon leadership gave high rankings (average of 7.00 and above) to 

information fidelity (7.71), mobility (7.00), and stealth (7.00), with mobility having the smallest 

standard deviation (1.83) of all ten areas. These three areas are supportive of the platoon 

leadership's desires. First, information fidelity supports the need to acquire actionable 

information for mission planning and execution. Mobility is important to get the MAST systems 

in the right place at the right time and to not slow down the execution of the operation. Finally, 

stealth is important to ensure that the enemy is not alerted to an impending action or the direction 

of an executed action. Group A also gave low scores (average of 3.00 or lower) to single 

task/mission duration (3.00) and physical specification (2.71). The platoon leadership must plan 

for the execution of multiple tasks within a single mission, as well as the possibility of 

immediately transitioning to newly assigned, follow-on missions. Perhaps the area of physical 

specification was rated low because it is not focused on a tactical capability like the other nine 

capability areas.

For Group B, high marks were given to the same three areas as Group A, but with notably higher 

averages: information fidelity (8.71), stealth (7.57), and mobility (7.50), with the lowest standard 

deviation of 1.11 aligned with information fidelity. Although stealth was slightly higher than 

mobility, they were virtually equal, as in Group A. Group B is closer to the fight. Its members 

 18 TIGR is a multimedia reporting system for Warfighters at the patrol level, allowing users to collect and share 

information to improve situational awareness and to facilitate collaboration and information analysis among junior 

officers and non-commissioned officers. It is similar to popular social networking tools found on the Internet today, 

but it operates on a classified network.
17

are the Warfighters who would have to move to the objective and kick down the doors to rooms. 

To them, actionable information means knowing, before they enter a room, who might have a 

weapon and where those people may be in the room, so information fidelity is very important to 

them. Squad members are also more concerned about the MAST systems keeping up with them 

and not giving away their intentions. Group B gave low scores to system C2 echelon (2.83) and 

physical specification (2.83). A few of Group B's members stated that the C2 and maintenance 

of the MAST systems should be at the platoon level, with a platoon robotics NCO. This may 

have influenced this score. Additionally, C2 is inherently more of a concern at the platoon and 

squad levels than at the fire team level, so perhaps that has some influence as well. As with 

Group A, the low score of physical specification may be likewise attributed to the fact that it is 

not a tactical capability area. 

Group C's ratings were a little different than Groups A and B. Group C's highest scores (highest 

to lowest) went to stealth (8.89), ability to sense (8.56), and mobility (7.88). On average, these 

scores are much higher than Groups A and B. Also, for all ten capability areas, Group C had 

relatively smaller standard deviations, with eight less than 2.00. In addition to the high marks for 

stealth, ability to sense, and mobility being attributed to Warfighter discussions over the two 

days, they might also be attributed to their associated technical challenges. Low scores were 

given to system C2 echelon (2.25) and physical specifications (1.88). These scores are probably 

low for similar reasons described in Group B. 

Since MAST systems will depend heavily on "level of autonomy," it is interesting that it 

received slightly less than average scores from Group A (4.71) and Group B (4.83), and not the 

highest score from Group C (6.83). It is not certain why Groups A and B were so low. Perhaps 

it was assumed that the other critical high-score capability areas would readily have autonomy. 

Similarly, with respect to physical specifications, autonomy does not sound like a warfighting 

capability area. Finally, it may have been due to a lack of understanding of or appreciation for 

autonomous behavior versus semi-autonomous behavior or even tele-operation. For Group C, its 

members were probably swayed by the discussions of the Warfighters – which is a tribute to the 

Gedanken Experiment process.

Sections C through G. The comments provided by the participants to the topics of Sections C 

through G are quite varied and interesting. They are listed in detail in Appendix E for review. 

Some interesting points are:

• Section C. It appears to be difficult to assess TTP needs within a Gedanken Experiment, 

where system capabilities are merely speculations. TTP development should keep pace 

with the technical development of the MAST systems. Some worthwhile feedback was 

provided with respect to C2, but the Warfighters gave little information that would assist 

in system design. On the other hand, it appears that Group C developed an appreciation 

for TTP in the tutorials, hands-on training, and the experiment that will greatly benefit 

them in their development of the MAST systems.

• Section D. There was significant feedback from all three groups on what is liked about 

the MAST system concept. Among the groups, recurring feedback included sensing 

(including early warning and local security), mobility, size, and keeping Warfighters out 

of harm's way.
18

• Section E. There wasn't as much feedback from Groups A and B on recommended 

improvements. Ideas included enhancing sensors (including audible sensing on systems 

and controllers), adding lethal capabilities, and being tamper-proof. Group C had 

significant feedback, which may again be a tribute to experiment. 

• Section F. For topics that were not discussed, Groups A and B feedback included IEDs, 

identification between friend and foe, lethality, and don't consider replacing Warfighters 

with MAST systems. As in the topics above, Group C had a significant amount of

feedback.

• Section G. For additional comments, the Warfighters saw value in the effort and wanted 

the capabilities much sooner than the 20 years discussed for this particular effort. They 

also appreciated participating in the experiment. Group C saw a need for spiral 

development of the system, to get capabilities out to the Warfighters at a faster pace.

In summary, the survey provided some useful information. Priority of effort appears to be 

information fidelity (and sensing), mobility, and stealth (perhaps as simple as camouflage). To 

achieve the tasks inherent with the feedback, there is obviously an implied need for autonomous, 

or at least semi-autonomous, behavior. Additionally, the Gedanken Experiment appeared to be 

of benefit to all participants, especially the MAST personnel in Group C. 

End-of-the-Day Discussions

At the end of each day, the floor was open to general discussions. Most of the discussions 

addressed topics already identified above. However, a few additional topics were raised. Two 

topics addressed policy and political or cultural advantages. Operational time was a third topic.

From a policy perspective, it was felt that directives and regulations needed to be considered to 

control the misuse and abuse of MAST systems. For example, MAST systems should not be 

used during free time in robot gladiator competitions. Additionally, they should not be used to 

invade an individual's privacy or to conduct outright theft.

From a political or cultural advantage, the question was raised as to how the MAST systems 

could contribute to winning hearts and minds of the local civilians. Intuitively, the capabilities 

offered by MAST platforms could support enhancements to the irregular warfare (IW) line of 

operation (LOO) of security. They could reduce U.S. force offensive exchanges, thus 

minimizing casualties in the native civilian populace. This advantage could be enhanced by 

using MAST systems to improve "surgical strike" outcomes, minimize false alarms, and better 

identify friend or foe. There were no recommendations as to how MAST systems could be used 

in support of other IW LOOs (i.e., governance, rule of law, and economic development).

As far as operational time was concerned, the participants equated this to battery life. Short-term 

battery life is adequate for raid functions – door breach, deception, short-term surveillance. 

Long-term battery life would be really useful for persistent surveillance, and 24 to 48 hours of 

battery life would be ideal in a lot of situations.

Summary and Noted Benefits

The overall effort was a successful endeavor for the MAST CTA. The MAST CTA personnel

gained much from their exposure to small unit urban operations, including the first day's 
19

classroom tutorial and the hands-on training experience at an urban dismounted infantry training 

site. Their involvement in the Gedanken Experiments on the second and third day:

• Exposed them to Warfighter operational thought processes and concerns

• Exposed them to Warfighter TTP, which generated ideas on how MAST systems might 

be integrated into small unit urban operations

• Utilized their subject matter expertise to answer the technical/capability questions of the 

Warfighter participants

In addition, the Warfighter participants gained insights on what the Army's science and 

technology community is trying to do for them. They greatly appreciated the opportunity to 

participate in the exercise. It was interesting to note that the younger Warfighter participants 

were less inhibited by doctrine and more willing to be imaginative in terms of capabilities and 

use. 

Many technical and operational topics are highlighted in this paper, and can't all be summarized 

here. The following were of most benefit to the MAST CTA CAM:

• The Warfighters' highest capability priorities were information fidelity (including 

sensing), mobility, and stealth. In this case, stealth is more of a camouflage or blending 

in with the surroundings and reducing noise, as opposed to reductions in visual, 

electromagnetic, and radar signatures.

• For most areas, the platoon level leaders and the squad level leaders agreed on uses and 

needs. There were some notable differences, especially in the area of information fidelity 

(platoon level leaders wanted more all the time), real-time feedback (platoon level leaders 

were willing to trade fidelity for real-time feedback), C2 of the systems (during mission 

execution, squad level leaders wanted hands off, while platoon level leaders wanted 

squads to maintain operational control), and overall control (squad level leaders wanted a 

hierarchy of control and maintenance at platoon level, while platoon level leaders saw all 

control and maintenance at the squad level). 

• For TTP, novel ideas for deployment were discussed and concerns for C2 kept arising. 

With respect to C2, there is a need for an easy-to-use Warfighter-MAST systems 

interface that supports Warfighter-machine interactions, enhances Warfighter situational 

awareness, and allows for changes in operational control during the execution of a 

mission.

• Additionally for C2, there is a need for scalable interfaces that provide differing views of 

C2 for platoon level leaders and squad level leaders, or the differing needs for levels of 

information fidelity during an operation. For example, platforms can best be exploited 

for intelligence gathering to aid in planning but use should be limited during actual 

combat. To accommodate these differences, multiple MAST designs may be needed 

along with scalable levels of autonomy among an ensemble of MAST systems of varying 

types, so that autonomy levels can be increased or decreased based upon the mission 
20

phase. For example, when the MAST technology is immature and autonomous behavior 

is not very predictable, it may be best to scale down autonomy during a firefight. 

• Although lethal capabilities were discussed, there appeared to be more of an interest in 

non-lethal capabilities to support deception and diversion during offensive operations and 

to possibly reduce the number of civilian casualties, especially in hostage situations. For 

the MAST CTA CAM, this was an unforeseen beneficial warfighting capability that is 

potentially doable for micro autonomous systems.

The most important benefit for the MAST CTA CAM was his use of the Warfighters'

perspectives to assess the benefits of design approaches. For example, platforms can be best 

exploited for intelligence gathering to aid in planning but should not be used when the potential 

for combat operations is high. For cultural reasons (i.e., military culture) and the immaturity of 

the technology, Warfighters should not be teamed with autonomous platforms during a firefight. 

This single perspective has helped MAST CTA CAM keep the researchers focused on a well 

defined design approach.

The MAST CTA CAM acknowledged that not only did the Gedanken Experiment output

influence his leadership of MAST; but as ARL defines its strategic vision in autonomous 

platforms of all sizes and shapes, it has also provided him supporting information to debate with 

other researchers in the lab about the reasonableness of promoting room clearing by autonomous 

platforms. He believes he has successfully argued that this is not a good application to consider, 

at least not until the technology has matured and Warfighters trust the capabilities of such 

platforms.

The overall experience was very beneficial to all participants in the exercise. It is highly 

recommended that the MAST CTA keep a close working relationship with Warfighters, 

especially those involved with developing TTP and assessing Warfighter-machine interfaces at 

Fort Benning, GA.
21

Appendix A. Offensive Scenario

Urban Operations with Small Combat Units Equipped 

with Micro Autonomous Robotic/Autonomous Systems

Situation

A Small Combat Unit (SCU) has been given the task to clear two buildings in a small urban area, 

known to be meeting locations for local insurgent forces. 

Intelligence Information

Physical Environment

The setting for this scenario is in the northeast section of a small urban town during the hours of 

darkness. The roads are paved and unpaved. The buildings vary in height and shape. Primarily, 

the buildings consist of one or two stories, and there are multiple rooms per floor. A layout of 

the mission area is depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Physical Environment

Building A is believed to be a single residence with about 5 rooms. Building B is a multi-family 

building that has three separate residences. The number of rooms per residence is not known. 

The northern residence (R1) has access to its roof.
22

Enemy and Civilian Situation

Current intelligence reports identify Building A and Building B’s Residences R1 and R2 being 

occupied with both insurgents and neutral civilians. Building B’s R3 is occupied with at least 

neutral civilians. 

The leader of the insurgent forces is suspected to be located in one of the buildings. The exact 

number of insurgents located in each building is unknown; however, it is suspected that there 

could be two (2) to ten (10) insurgents within Building A and five (5) to fifteen (15) insurgents in 

Building B. 

A depiction of a possible insurgent and civilian situation in Buildings A & B is in Figure 6.

Scenario Details

Enemy-Civilian Situation

= Insurgent

= Local Civilian

= Insurgent OP 

(possible marksman)

Figure 6. Possible Insurgent and Civilian Situation

Aerial intelligence assets have also identified as many as three insurgent OPs on the roofs of tall 

buildings. The latest information on the location of the insurgent OPs was used to plot the 

locations (identified as red triangles) in Figure 6. These OPs may also be trained marksmen. It 

is unlikely that the OPs will open fire. Their primary objective is to alert the insurgent leader of 

the presence of U.S. forces. However, it is possible that the insurgent leader may order them to 

open fire. 

Since the operation takes place at night, it is possible that the insurgents could be unaware of the 

platoon’s approach; however; it should be assumed that the OPs will alert the insurgent leader. 

The insurgents have very few night vision devices, and they are probably assigned to the OPs.
23

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reports that the insurgents are here for a meeting of multiple

insurgent cells. Therefore, it is possible that other cell personnel might be arriving during the 

course of the night.

Once the insurgents know that Blue Forces are patrolling in the vicinity of their meeting 

locations, their most likely course of action is to establish defensive positions within the 

buildings to protect their leader. It is also possible that some of the insurgents will defy their 

leader’s orders and run; therefore, it is important for the platoon to observe the rear of the 

buildings to prevent insurgents from running.

The local civilian population in this portion of the town fears the insurgent leader and typically 

remains indoors during hours of darkness. While there is not an enforced curfew, the local 

populace knows that the insurgents typically conduct meetings and emplace IEDs during the 

hours of darkness. Therefore, they have made it a practice to remain indoors at night. It is 

possible for neutral civilians to be outdoors. Most likely civilians are in Buildings A and B. It is 

important that Blue Forces properly identify their targets prior to engaging.

Blue Forces

An SCU, which is a conceptual dismounted infantry platoon for this mission, is organized as 

depicted in Table 1. 

Asst M240 MG 

Gnr

Rifleman Rifleman Rifleman

Grenadier Grenadier Grenadier M240 MG Gnr

Asst Javelin 

Gnr

M249 Gnr M249 Gnr M249 Gnr

Fire Tm Ldr B Fire Tm Ldr B Fire Tm Ldr B Javelin Gnr

Asst M240 MG 

Gnr

Rifleman Rifleman Rifleman

Plt Medic Grenadier Grenadier Grenadier M240 MG Gnr SUGV3

Asst Javelin SUGV2

Gnr

RATELO M249 Gnr M249 Gnr M249 Gnr

Plt Sgt Fire Tm Ldr A Fire Tm Ldr A Fire Tm Ldr A Javelin Gnr SUGV1

Plt Ldr Sqd Ldr Sqd Ldr Sqd Ldr Sqd Ldr Robotics NCO

Robotics 

Section

Weapons 

1st Squad 2nd Squad 3rd Squad Squad

Headquarters

Section

Table 1. Small Combat Unit

Note 1: Asst = Assistant

Gnr = Gunner

Ldr = Leader

MG = Machine Gun

Plt = Platoon 

Sgt = Sergeant

Sqd = Squad

Tm = Team

RATELO = Radio-Telephone 

Operator

SUGV = Small Unmanned 

Ground Vehicle
24

Note 2. There is no current doctrine or published organizational structure for the inclusion of 

micro unmanned and autonomous systems (UAS) in an SCU. It is assumed that the participants 

in the Gedanken Experiment will provide insights on the organizational structure and use of 

micro UAS. A possible structure for assigning micro UAS is depicted in Table 2 – with the 

micro UAS identified as the ARL MAST systems (in red text).

Note 3: This assignment of MAST systems is just a simple recommendation made by the author 

of the scenario. It is unknown if squad leaders would realistically have MAST systems, since 

their duties and responsibilities will most likely be focused on commanding and controlling the 

squad and not on maneuvering MAST systems and maintaining them. The squad leader may be 

directing the use of the MAST systems. As an analogy, squad leaders carry rifles and not 

equipment with higher fire power (i.e., machine guns (MGs) and grenade launchers). The 

participants of the Gedanken Experiment will be solicited for recommendations on the 

assignment of MAST systems.

 y

Asst M240 MG 

Gnr

Rifleman 

w/MAST(s)

Rifleman 

w/MAST(s)

Rifleman 

w/MAST(s)

Grenadier Grenadier Grenadier M240 MG Gnr

Asst Javelin 

Gnr

M249 Gnr M249 Gnr M249 Gnr

Fire Tm Ldr B Fire Tm Ldr B Fire Tm Ldr B Javelin Gnr

Asst M240 MG 

Gnr

Rifleman 

w/MAST(s)

Rifleman 

w/MAST(s)

Rifleman 

w/MAST(s)

SUGV3 

w/MAST(s)

Plt Medic Grenadier Grenadier Grenadier M240 MG Gnr

SUGV2 

w/MAST(s)

Asst Javelin 

Gnr

RATELO M249 Gnr M249 Gnr M249 Gnr

SUGV1 

w/MAST(s)

Plt Sgt Fire Tm Ldr A Fire Tm Ldr A Fire Tm Ldr A Javelin Gnr

Sqd Ldr Robotics NCO

w/MAST(s)

Sqd Ldr

w/MAST(s)

Sqd Ldr

w/MAST(s)

Sqd Ldr

w/MAST(s)

Plt Ldr

Robotics 

Section

Weapons 

1st Squad 2nd Squad 3rd Squad Squad

Headquarters

Section

 Table 2. Potential Small Combat Unit Organization with MAST systems

Mission

The SCU is to clear Buildings A and B, known meeting locations for the local insurgent forces. 

The SCU will 

− Conduct an assault from the southwest corner of the town to OBJs Homer (building A) 

and Bart (building B)

− Establish SBF positions covering the entrances to the buildings and prevent a 

counterattack by insurgents from OBJ Bart (building B) while OBJ Homer is being taken

− Establish OPs covering the rear exits of OBJ Bart (building B)
25

− Conduct initial reconnaissance of buildings/rooms using SUGVs and MAST systems

− Neutralize insurgents

The primary task during this clearing operation is to identify and neutralize (capture or kill) all 

insurgents located within the objectives, while minimizing the number of civilian casualties.

Initial Blue Positions and Control Graphics

The initial location of the Blue Forces and the Control Graphics are depicted in Figure 7. The 

initial location of the Weapons Squad is not depicted. 

1st Squad and 2nd Squad will be assaulting OBJ Homer. 3rd Squad will be kept in reserve. On 

order, once Homer is taken, 3rd Squad will initiate its assault on OBJ Bart.

= Member of SCU

OBJ Homer

Rte Red OBJ Bart

Rte White

Rte Gold

Rte Black

= Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV)

Rte Grey

1st Sqd

2nd Sqd 3rd Sqd

Rte Blue

Figure 7. Initial Blue Locations and Control Graphics

Phase I – OBJ Homer 

Step 1: Initiation of the Assault

Initially, the Robotics NCO will operate all three SUGVs moving them down three separate 

routes to set up OPs. All three SUGVs will move at the same time.

− SUGV1 (with 1st Squad) will move north along Route Red to set up an OP to identify 

insurgent activity moving in from the northwest or exiting OBJ Homer.

− SUGV2 (with 2nd Squad) will move along Route White to set up an OP to identify 

insurgent activity on the south side of or exiting from OBJ Homer.
26

− SUGV3 (with 3rd Squad) will move along Route Gold to set up an OP to identify any 

insurgent activity moving in from the east or exiting OBJ Bart. 

Specific Question:

How should the Robotics NCO use the MAST systems?

Step 2: Once the SUGVs are in place and the area is clear, 1st Squad will move along Route Red 

and 2nd Squad will move along Route White. 3rd Squad will initially remain in reserve.

Step 3: Once 1st and 2nd Squads are in location, SUGVs 1 and 2 will move toward OBJ Homer to 

begin a reconnaissance of the exterior of the building. 

Specific Questions: 

Are MAST systems used here?

If so, how?

What type: ground and/or air? 

What about the insurgent OPs?

Step 4: Once 1st and 2nd Squads are in position, the Weapons Squad will set up a MG and Javelin 

in an SBF position (depicted as small, dashed-line figure with two arrows) northwest of OBJ 

Homer and a MG and Javelin in the southwest of OBJ Homer. Based on the activity in OBJ 

Bart, the Weapons Squad will be prepared to move east to alternate SBF positions.

Specific Questions: 

Does the Weapons Squad need MAST systems?

If so, how will they be used?

Step 5: Once the exterior of OBJ Homer is clear, 2nd Squad will move to OBJ Homer and begin 

to clear. 1st Squad will provide local security and assist with clearing OBJ Homer as necessary.

Specific Questions: 

What should be the priority of use of MAST systems?

Assume the SUGVs and the MAST systems are used to determine if there are any insurgents or 

civilians located in the building. 

Specific Questions: 

If humans are detected, what actions are taken? 

What are the TTP? 

Must the humans be identified as insurgents or neutrals? 

If insurgents are identified, how should the information be used?

Step 6: Complete the clearing of OBJ Homer.

Phase 2 – OBJ Bart

Once OBJ Homer is clear:

− SUGV1 will move along Route Black to set up a secondary OP

− SUGV2 will move along Route Grey to set up a secondary OP
27

− 1st Squad will move half way down Route Black to the vicinity of the SBF position

− 2nd Squad will move down Route Grey to vicinity of the SBF position

− 3rd Squad will move along Route Gold to prepare to secure the southern and eastern ends 

of OBJ Bart

− The Weapons Squad will move due east to set up 4 separate SBF positions

Once all are in position, 3rd Squad will move forward to begin clearing the southernmost 

residence of OBJ Bart. Once that is clear, it will move to clear the next residence. Finally the 

northernmost residence will be cleared by a combination of 2nd and 3rd Squads.

NOTE 1: As done in OBJ Homer, walk through the steps of this clearing operation, asking 

questions similar to those identified in clearing OBJ Homer.

NOTE 2: The clearing of the roof needs to be discussed.

Once OBJ Bart is cleared, this scenario is completed.

Scenario Excursions: 

1. Insurgents attempt to escape from OBJs Homer and/or Bart

2. SUGVs 1 and 2 break down or are neutralized by the insurgents and only MAST systems are 

working

3. Windy conditions outside, so flying MAST systems may be difficult to control – if they can 

fly at all.
28

Appendix B. Defensive Scenario

Urban Operations with Small Combat Units Equipped with Micro Autonomous Systems

Situation

The SCU conducts the offensive operation discussed in Appendix A. Once 

OBJ Homer is cleared, the platoon receives a report that an additional ten (10) to twenty (20) 

insurgents are moving into the area. The company commander orders the platoon to take up 

defensive positions and await further orders. The rest of the company is moving to the platoon 

area of operation to conduct company level operations.

Mission

The platoon establishes a defensive position

Specific Questions:

How will the MAST systems be used to support this specific task?

If fighting ensues, how are the MAST systems used?
29

Appendix C. Stabilization Operation Scenario

Summary of the Scenario

An IED explosion occurs in a large city and snipers are shooting at emergency responders. A 

reaction force (a U.S. infantry company augmented with a platoon made up of local nationals) is 

sent to secure the area and neutralize the snipers. Along the way the reaction force has to identify 

and deal with obstacles (crowded market, protestors, etc.). Once at the IED scene, the reaction 

force discovers that in addition to the snipers, local civilians may have been abducted and are 

being detained by insurgents. The reaction force receives additional orders to work with local 

police forces to verify the abduction, then locate and free the civilians. 

Background Discussion

Some of the unique characteristics of stabilization operations are:

− Rules of Engagement (ROEs) are far more restrictive than in major combat operations so 

as to minimize “media opportunities” and prevent collateral damage. This severely 

constrains the use of large caliber munitions and perhaps armed robotic systems. There 

may be an impact on interactions of robotic systems with humans. Movement of robotic 

systems into homes/rooms may be considered an infringement on privacy.

− The Warfighter is more a “dismounted policeman” than a mounted or dismounted 

warrior. Within a city, tanks and armored fighting vehicles are often parked in motor 

pools and crews and squads are assigned to dismounted patrols.

− Maneuver operations are highly restricted since armored vehicles may damage streets, 

homes, automobiles, etc. Additionally, streets are often cluttered with day-to-day 

activities that should not be interrupted with military operations. Finally, units are 

assigned to static bases.

− There is much more background clutter in the form of radio transmissions, lights, 

pedestrians, civilian automobiles, and other interferences that degrade the performance of 

military communications, sensors, and human sensing. For example, numerous lights at 

night interfere with the performance of night vision goggles. Electromagnetic emissions 

may interfere with intra-/inter-robotic communications.

− The air space is very complex, due to the much greater use of manned and unmanned 

military and civilian aircraft, as well as the occasional use of non-line-of-sight munitions. 

It is very difficult to deconflict the airspace, which often deters the use of unmanned 

aerial systems by battalion and below forces.

− The probability of Warfighters interacting with civilians is high so there is a much greater 

requirement for Warfighters to understand the local populace in terms of language and 

culture. 

− There is a much greater concern for coordinating diplomatic, information operations, 

military, and economic (DIME) actions and their effects on political, military, economic, 

social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems. 

 
30

Stabilization Operations with Small Combat Units Equipped with Micro Autonomous 

Systems

General Situation

The United States has recently completed combat operations in a foreign country and has 

transitioned to stabilization and reconstruction operations. Formation of a new 

government is underway, as well as the development of its military and police forces. 

U.S. stabilization forces have been positioned throughout the country in static, battalionsize bases and have been using peacekeeping, cooperative activities, and coercive actions

to maintain order in cities and provide security for U.S.-sponsored reconstruction 

operations in their assigned sectors. U.S. funded reconstruction operations are primarily 

focused on repairing or upgrading the utilities and transportation infrastructure. All 

stabilization missions are coordinated and conducted with the participation of the local 

national military and police forces, as well as non-Department of Defense (non-DoD)

U.S. entities. 

Insurgent activities continue to plague U.S. and local government efforts to rebuild the 

country. Current intelligence indicates there are three major insurgent factions: 

− Non-state actor terrorist organizations comprised of a combination of local 

nationals and foreign insurgents who have infiltrated the country in question. 

− Ethnic/religious militant groups. These ethnic/religious factions are closely 

related in terms of ancestry and beliefs. However, they believe that a few sharp 

differences exist that justify violence toward each other. Local national police 

and military forces are often established with a predominance of one 

ethnic/religious group or another. 

− Criminal groups. These groups attempt to use violence to ensure money is 

provided to them in the form of contracts, grants, management fees, and even 

illegal payments. 

All three insurgent factions use a combination of IEDs, snipers, and small paramilitary 

forces to promote violence.

Specific Situation. An IED has exploded in a market place. Local emergency responders have 

arrived; but triage, medical, utility restoration, and clean-up efforts are being hindered by at least 

two snipers. A U.S. reaction force (an infantry company, about 160 personnel), augmented with 

a local national infantry platoon (about 40 personnel) and U.S. medical personnel, is tasked to 

move to the scene to help restore order and assist with medical needs. The infantry company 

commander and platoon leaders are to make contact with the local police force upon arrival and 

coordinate efforts with them. The attack occurred mid-afternoon when the market place is 

extremely crowded with pedestrians, automobiles, and street vendors. The market place has oneto five-story commercial stores on either side of the street and is frequented primarily by one of 

the warring religious groups. This may be an issue since the augmented infantry platoon is 

representative of the opposing religious group. Additionally, there have been reports of civilians 

gathering in large groups in nearby neighborhoods to protest the attack. Historically, these 

gatherings become violent when they come in contact with opposing religious groups. Soon 

after arriving at the scene, the company commander receives unconfirmed reports from locals 

that an additional complication may have arisen. It has been reported that a local official 
31

traveled to the scene to view the area, and while there, he and his driver were abducted by the 

insurgents. It is suspected he and his driver are being kept against their will somewhere in a 

block of residential housing adjacent to the scene of the IED attack. The local neighborhood 

buildings surrounding the market place are comprised mostly of one to two story residential 

homes closely packed together. After reporting this information to the battalion commander, the 

company commander is ordered to work with local police to resolve this new problem. Efforts 

are prioritized in the following order: locate and neutralize the snipers; secure and support 

humanitarian assistance at the IED incident; verify the reported abduction; if the abduction 

occurred, find and assist local forces in recovering the official and his driver. Some of these 

actions can occur simultaneously. Note that this is the Three Block War19 scenario.

Mission Steps: To accomplish this mission the augmented U.S. infantry company must 

accomplish the following activities: 

Step 1: Plan operations. Static (prior to movement) as well as dynamic (en-route) planning and 

replanning. Assessment of the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). 

Integration of available military assets, non-U.S. assets, unmanned systems (robots and sensors), 

latest terrain/feature data, and PMESII systems. Battlespace awareness, course-of-action 

analysis, mission selection, and mission rehearsal.

Step 2: Move to IED scene. While en-route, protestors begin to gather in a road that is part of the 

planned route for the reaction force. The situation at the IED site changes—insurgents abduct a 

local official and his driver. Abduction is seen by locals, but because of the confusion with 

dealing with casualties, fires, and building damage, this information is not reported to proper 

officials.

Step 3: Secure the area. The reaction force arrives on the scene. Perimeter security is 

established using a combination of vehicles, dismounted personnel, sensors, and unmanned

ground and air systems. Ad-hoc traffic control points are established. Civilians’ identities are 

checked against databases. 

Step 4: Locate, identify, and neutralize the snipers. Using a combination of HUMINT, signal 

intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), urban terrain analysis systems, and 

historical data, identify likely and known sniper locations. Sniper location systems are used to 

locate the sniper when shots are fired on the reaction force. Once identified, non-linear tactics 

and networked weapons systems are used to neutralize the sniper. While the reaction force is 

accomplishing this task, a second sniper opens fire and the reaction team adjusts to neutralize 

this additional sniper.

Step 5: Assist with medical needs. While military actions are taking place against the snipers, 

assistance is being provided at the scene of the IED attack. Military personnel assist local 

emergency responders with their duties. Because of the devastation, additional U.S. emergency 

responders are brought to the area. The local commander must be able to coordinate 

 19 The Three Block War was conceived by General Charles Krulak to describe how the full spectrum of war could 

be faced simultaneously by Warfighters in lower echelon units. In three adjacent city blocks, Warfighters may be 

required to conduct full-scale military action, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian relief.
32

humanitarian assistance being provided by his personnel, the newly arrived U.S. personnel, and

the local emergency responders while neutralizing the snipers and setting up perimeter security. 

Additionally, in these situations, U.S. personnel have to consider personal medical safety, since 

in addition to the dangers of military attacks, there may be situations where local civilians may 

be afflicted with a contagious disease. 

Step 6: Verify, locate, and assist with freeing the detained civilians. Once the sniper situation is 

under control, the company commander has to respond to a new order to verify, locate, and assist 

with freeing the detained local official and his driver. The activity within this scenario repeats 

many of the activities mentioned above—plan the operation, move to the area of operations, 

secure the area, and then assist with the detained civilians. The major difference from the 

“neutralize the sniper” activity is that here the local security forces lead and execute the effort 

with U.S. military forces in a supporting role and subordinate to the C2 of the local security force 

leader, who is a policeman. It is hoped that military actions will be kept to a minimum. If 

military actions are needed, the military commander should minimize collateral damage by using 

actionable information such as the location of the building and room holding the detained 

civilians and their abductors, as well as their approximate location and physical orientation 

within the room.

Step 7: Treat and evacuate casualties. Medical attention is provided to U.S. casualties as they 

occurred during the mission. Triage and life-saving actions were taken, as needed. Casualties 

needing evacuation are moved back to aid stations as rapidly as possible. Assessment of air 

evacuation must take into account urban structures which may be too high and close together for 

helicopters to get near the company’s area of operation.

Step 8: Consolidate forces. After operations are completed and the situation is fully under 

control by local police and medical personnel, the company commander is ordered to consolidate 

his forces. This requires rapid assessment of the location and activities of all personnel and 

equipment (i.e., unmanned systems) involved with humanitarian assistance, perimeter security, 

sniper neutralization, and freeing the detained civilians. All assets (i.e., sensors and unmanned 

systems) must be retrieved.

Step 9: Depart the area. In planning an evacuation route, the company commander must work 

closely with battalion headquarters to assess routes in the same fashion as the initial planning and 

movement tasks above.

Note: Through each of the above steps, participants are asked questions similar to those in the 

offensive scenario.
33

Appendix D. Demographics of Participants

GROUP/SAMPLE SIZE:

A – Platoon Sergeant (PLT SGT) / Platoon Leader (PLT LDR) = 8

B – Team Leader (TM LDR) / Squad Leader (SQD LDR) = 7

C – Civilian = 9

A B C

MOS NA

- 11A (Infantry Officer) 4 -

- 11B (Infantryman) 3 6

- 19D (Cavalry Scout) 1 1

RANK - - NA

- Captain (CPT)* 4 -

- Sergeant (SGT) - 1

- Staff Sergeant (SSG) - 4

- Sergeant First Class (SFC) 4 2

* PLT LDR as a Lieutenant

DUTY POSITION NA

The following were of most 

benefit to the MAST CTA 

CAM:Drill SGT

- 5

‒S3 (Operations) 1 -

‒NCOIC 1 1

‒PLT SGT 1 -

‒PSG/GNR 1 -

‒Ranger Instructor 1 -

‒Student 1 -

‒TM LDR - 1

‒No Response 2 -

1. How long have you served in the military? (Months)

MEAN RESPONSE

A B C

133 88 NA
34

2. What was the last military professional development course you completed?

A B C

AIT - - NA

PLDC - - NA

BNCOC - 5 NA

ANCOC 4 1 NA

IOBC 2 - NA

IOAC - - NA

ICCC - - NA

Other: - - NA

‒ IMLC 1 - NA

‒ ITAS/ABIC 1 - NA

‒ DRILL SGT SCH - 1 NA

3. Do you have combat or stabilization operations experience? If yes, what was the location, 

duty position, and length of stay?

A B C

Yes 8 7 1

No 0 0 5

NR 0 0 3

Comments No. of Responses

A

Afghanistan – platoon sergeant – 4 months 1

Baghdad – platoon sergeant, 50 cal machine gunner – 16 months. On the division 

MTT team (gunner)

1

Baghdad – MTT XO – 9 months 1

Baghdad – battle captain – 15 months 1

Baghdad – platoon leader – 9 months 1

Baghdad – battalion S1 – 12 months 1

Bosnia – squad leader – 8 months 1

Iraq – section commander and intelligence (S2) advisor – 12 months 1

Iraq – platoon leader (mechanized infantry) – 7 months 1

Iraq – weapon squad leader – 15 months 1

Iraq – 12 months 1

Iraq – 5 months 1

Iraq – 13 months 1

Kosovo – 7 months 1

Iraq – 13 months 1

Transition team advisor – 12 months 1

Assistant team leader on a national police transition team. 1
35

Comments No. of Responses

B

Afghanistan - .50 cal gunner, team leaders – 6 months 1

Afghanistan – scout squad leader – 16 months

Iraq – driver/team leaders – 12 months 1

Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan – team leader – 2 years 1

Iraq – squad leader – 6 months 1

Iraq – squad leader – 13 months 1

Iraq – squad leader – 12 months 1

Iraq – team leader – 12 months 1

Iraq – rifle team leader – 12 months 1

OIF – MTT advisor, team leader 1

C

NA

4. Do you have experience using robotic vehicles in military operations?

A B C

No 5 6 4

Yes 3 1 2

NR 0 0 3

A

MARCBOTS in IED reduction ops. 1

B

Robots that detect IEDs. 1

5. Using the scale below, please rate your level of experience with the following computer 

software and computer related activities.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

No experience Below 

average

Slightly below 

average

Average Slightly above 

average

Above 

average 

Expert

MEAN RESPONSE

A B C

a. Microsoft Windows 98, 2000, XP, etc. 3.75 4.79 6.71

b. Computer based games 3.87 4.00 5.14

c. Army digital systems (e.g. FBCB220) 4.13 4.21 1.33

d. I would self rate my computer skills as: 3.75 4.21 6.43

 20 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) is a C2 platform that tracks the location of forces.
36

6. Self-rating of Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA) related to Infantry duties. Please use 

the scale below to rate the following skills.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

No experience Below 

average

Slightly below 

average

Average Slightly above 

average

Above 

average 

Expert

MEAN RESPONSE

A B C

a. Knowledge of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). 5.88 5.79 1.71

b. Knowledge of map reading and orientation in field setting. 6.00 6.07 3.29

c. Knowledge of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 

acquisition procedures.

5.50 5.93 1.43

d. Knowledge relating to communications equipment and 

communications procedures.

4.88 5.36 2.14

e. Communication skills (ability to use communications

equipment and face-to-face communications to enhance mission 

accomplishment).

5.38 5.64 2.43
37

Appendix E. Results of Survey for System Evaluation

GROUP/SAMPLE SIZE:

A – PLT SGT / PLT LDR = 8

B – TM LDR / SQD LDR = 7

C – Civilian = 9

A. Using the scale below, please rate what you feel would be the importance of the following 

items.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

No experience Below 

average

Slightly below 

average

Average Slightly above 

average

Above 

average 

Expert

MEAN RESPONSE

A B C

Ability to Sense:

1. Inanimate nonmilitary objects 5.63 5.17 5.13

2. IEDs 7.00 6.71 6.56

3. Weapons 6.75 6.71 6.56

4. Civilians 6.00 5.71 5.78

5. Friendly/Enemy military personnel 7.00 6.57 6.33

6. Other 6.00 6.00 7.00

Information fidelity

7. Ability to see actual images and discern details concerning the 

images such as facial expressions

5.13 5.14 5.33

8. Ability identify targets (i.e., friend, civilian, or foe; M16 weapon

versus AK47 weapon)

6.50 6.43 6.00

9. Ability to recognition targets (i.e., human is present, weapon is 

present)

6.63 6.57 6.67

10. Ability to classify information into categories (i.e., man, 

machine, inanimate objects, etc.)

5.75 6.00 6.33

11. Ability to detect targets (i.e., something is in that room) 6.63 6.29 6.22

Information Latency

12. Ability to transmit information instantaneously 6.75 7.00 6.67

13. Ability to transmit information with a 5 to 10 second latency 6.25 5.00 5.11

14. Ability to transmit information with a 10 to 30 second latency 5.88 4.29 4.67

15. Ability to transmit information with a 30 second to 1 minute 

latency

5.50 4.00 4.33

16. Ability to return with downloadable information 6.50 3.00 3.56
38

(cont) MEAN RESPONSE

A B C

Single Task/Mission Duration

17. Duration up to 15 minutes 5.25 4.50 5.67

18. Duration up to 30 minutes 5.71 4.67 5.78

19. Duration up to 1 hour 6.00 4.83 5.56

20. Duration up to 2 hours 6.29 5.50 5.67

21. Duration up to ______ hours 6.67 7.00 6.29

Total Operational Time Before “Recharge”

22. Up to 15 minutes 5.00 4.20 4.88

23. Up to 30 minutes 5.43 4.40 4.88

24. Up to 1 hour 5.75 4.60 5.25

25. Up to 2 hours 6.38 4.80 5.63

26. Up to __________ hours 6.86 6.86 6.17

Mobility

27. Ability to fly 6.86 6.71 6.38

28. Ability to crawl 6.43 6.57 6.50

29. Ability to climb walls 6.57 6.57 6.37

30. Ability to maneuver through rubble 6.86 6.86 6.00

31. Ability to do all mobility maneuvers listed above 6.88 6.71 5.13

32. Ability to keep up with squad movement 7.00 6.00 5.38

33. Ability to keep up ahead of squad 6.63 6.29 5.13

System Command & Control (C2) Echelon

34. Ability to C2 the system from the squad 6.50 6.43 6.00

35. Ability to C2 the system from the platoon 6.25 5.86 5.71

36. Ability to C2 the system from the company 6.13 5.57 4.86

37. Ability to give directions to the system controller from the 

squad

6.88 6.17 6.71

38. Ability to give directions to the system controller from the 

platoon

6.50 5.33 6.14

39. Ability to give directions to the system controller from the 

company

5.88 5.08 5.86

Level of Autonomy 

40. Completely autonomous system (i.e., system makes decisions 

concerning which direction to turn, what altitude to fly, which 

room to enter based upon predetermined rules)

5.38 5.71 5.38

41. System is given instructions concerning the intent of the leader 

and then it makes decisions on how to carry out the instructions

6.50 6.29 6.25

42. System is given waypoints and goes to those waypoints but 

makes decisions concerning how to get to the waypoints in the 

most efficient way (i.e., obstacle avoidance)

6.50 6.14 6.38
39

(cont) MEAN RESPONSE

A B C

43. System is given waypoints but alerts the operator concerning 

any problems that arise to ask for further instruction

6.75 6.43 5.50

44. System is tele-operated and all decisions are made by the 

operator

5.88 4.57 3.63

Stealth

45. Audible stealth 6.88 6.57 6.75

46. Visual stealth (day) 6.75 6.43 6.75

47. Visual stealth (night) 6.88 6.00 6.13

48. Electromagnetic stealth 6.57 6.14 4.38

49. Thermal stealth 6.38 5.86 4.50

50. Other type of stealth: 6.67 7.00 7.00

Physical Specifications

51. Lightweight 6.75 6.57 6.57

52. Small Size 6.63 6.57 6.43

53. Accomplish task with one platform 6.13 5.57 5.29

54. Accomplish task with multiple platforms 5.63 6.86 6.00

Comments No. of Comments

A

Q21: as long as possible. 1

Q21: 12.5 hrs (mean) 4

Q26: as long as possible. 1

Q26: 14 hrs (mean) 5

B

Q21: 48 hrs (mean) 7

Q26: 49 hrs (mean) 7

Q50: Camouflage. 1

C

Q1: for obstacle avoidance. 2

Q6: humans. 1

Q12: show instant transmit on demand. 1

Q21: 34 hrs (mean) 7

Q26: 36 hrs (mean) 7
40

B. Please rank order the following characteristics in terms of which ones are the MOST

important capabilities needed by the MAST systems. Place a 1 next to the most important 

characteristic, a “2” next to the second most important characteristic, etc. There should be no 

ties.

MAST CTA: 10 = best, 1 = worst

Capability

Plt leaders T/S leaders Civilians

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

Ability to sense 5.86 3.24 5.50 3.27 8.56 2.13

Information fidelity 7.71 2.50 8.71 1.11 6.25 1.91

Information latency 6.86 2.54 6.57 3.31 6.00 1.07

Single task/mission duration 3.00 1.91 4.33 3.01 4.38 1.69

Total operational time before recharge 5.71 3.04 5.83 2.48 3.75 1.28

Mobility 7.00 1.83 7.50 1.87 7.88 1.36

System command & control echelon 4.43 2.94 2.83 1.72 2.25 1.98

Level of autonomy 4.71 2.21 4.83 2.32 6.38 2.07

Stealth 7.00 2.58 7.57 2.07 8.89 1.96

Physical specification 2.71 2.21 2.83 2.23 1.88 1.36

C. What TTP need to be established for use of MAST systems?

Comments No. of Comments

A

TTP change as the battlefield does. To say what would be a good TTP without 

working with the equipment itself is something I would not push just yet.

1

How to deploy them. 2

How to operate in MOUT environment. 1

What happens when you encounter IEDs? 1

Who operates MAST systems? 1

Depends on the capabilities of MAST and type of unit. 1

Use of the system in a given unit. This could vary from who operates them to when 

to use them or not use them.

1

B

Can only be determined once system is finalized and integrated into military tactical 

doctrine and practice.

1

System needs to be put into an exercise before you are able to build TTP around it. 2

Should be controlled by squad leader. 1

C

Rehearsal protocols. 1
41

Comments No. of Comments

Command and information processing. 1

Optimal configuration/selection of systems for typical situations. 1

Use before a mission to obtain intelligence (Intel). 1

TTP likely cannot be undertaken until MAST is demonstrated. 1

Use during big clearing, if at all. 1

Non-specific recon. 1 

Guidelines regarding who has access to them, who has control of them, and who 

sees information obtained by them.

1

The level of control of the system. 1

D. List three things you liked about the concept of a MAST system.

A

Size. 3

Small unit control. 1

Communication enhancement. 1

Capabilities. 1

Ability to detect IEDs. 1

Ability to maneuver. 1

Ability to detect personnel. 1

Able to use as reconnaissance. 2

Multiple purpose sensor. 1

Early warning. 2

Prevents Soldiers from unnecessary risks. 1

Ability to provide source of security. 1

Real time feed. 1

Ability to provide an enhanced situational environment. 1

Ability to provide another platform for information. 1

B

The idea is great. 1

Maneuverability. 1

Has no human weakness/errors. 1

It can see and hear what I can’t. 1

More surveillance. 1

Recon abilities. 2

Have eyes on prior to mission. 1

Small, lightweight. 1

Size of the systems. 1

Able to move anywhere. 1

Ability to help secure areas without jeopardizing Soldiers’ lives. 1

Level of technology. 1

A step in the future of tomorrow’s warfare. 1

Capabilities of the systems. 1
42

Comments No. of Comments

Helps save lives. 1

Will help with Intel and Intel gathering, pre-mission planning, and AAR. 1

Help to put us on an offensive mode more than a defensive mode. 1

Ability for new things to be generated. 1

C

Provides current information. 1

Better Intel before mission. 2

Provide perimeter security. 1

Easy to deploy. 1

Ability to be pre-deployed. 1

Minimal weight. 2

Small sizes provide indoor navigation ability. 1

Autonomy. 1

Flexibility. 1

Mobility. 1

Stealth. 4

Cost. 1

Little effort to use. 1

Mobility of sensors. 1

Negate some missions that are deemed unnecessary from Intel. 1

Has the potential to help squad-level teams. 2

Can significantly enhance situational awareness and be used to determine when an 

operation is not necessary (i.e., there is no target in the building) which seems to be 

a great problem. 

1

Information available down to a low level (i.e., squad/fire team). 1

Persistent surveillance. 1

E. List three things you believe can be improved in the MAST system designs/capabilities.

A

I think we are on the right track so I have nothing to add. 1

Ability to hear. 1

Lethal capability. 1

Long-range capabilities. 1

Relay communications over long distances. 1

Stealth. 1

Sights. 1

Ability to attach hearing devices on individuals. 1

Mobility. 1

Detect explosives. 1
43

Comments No. of Comments

Move through jungle environment. 1

Weapon system. 1

Speed. 1

Size. 1

B

Design so that enemy can’t turn it around and use it on us. 1

Interface. 1

Time to get into play. 1

Realistic employment. 1

Ability of life of battery duration. 1

Multiple sensors, day sight, night vision sight, thermal sight, audible sensors, and RF 

sensors on multiple platforms.

1

C

Focus on human-system interface. 1

Must be tamper-proof or self-destruct. 1

Find ways to keep them from alerting the enemy. 1

Enemy should learn to defeat them. 1

Baby step oriented objectives. 1

Focus on 3–5 types of systems after 3 years. 1

Behaviors/swarming. 1

Stealth. 1

Duration. 1

Autonomy. 1

Command user interface/switching over control. 1

Sensor fusion and information presentation to Soldiers. 1

Information fidelity to the Warfighter will determine whether it is ever used. 2

There seems to be a great many scenarios driving the research, but all require 

significantly different capabilities. 

1

It is not clear whether sensing can be interpreted and helpful during battle (i.e., if the 

camera view is bad). This needs to be addressed.

1

Sensors available. 1

HMI. 1

F. List up to three things you would like the MAST system to do that were not discussed.

A

I think we hit all the key areas. 1

Detect/destroy IEDs. 1

Distinguish between friend/foe. 1
44

Comments No. of Comments

B

Contain explosive devices. 1

Ability to self-detonate. 1

Solar powered. 1

Ability to detect moods. 1

Communicate verbally. 1

To deploy and redeploy by itself. 1

To understand this is a tool; it can’t replace boots on the ground. 1

C

Fully controlled options; no autonomy. 1

Provide light in caves. 1

Provide maps of caves, etc. (automatic map generation). 1

Drop payload and leave. 1

Morphing from one system to another. 1

Combining systems into a large one (transformers). 1

Set it up to turn off after a given time and only turn on again when given a 

“password” so they can’t be used by the bad guys.

1

Immobilize bad guys before we get there. 1

Fusion of information into a global database that can be accessed at multiple levels. 1

Ability to penetrate a building without explicit control, i.e., finding windows, etc., 

automatically.

1

Amount of training. 1

Quantity of MAST assets required to make a difference. 1

How system can evolve as new technologies/threats emerge. 1

G. Additional Comments:

A

We need this now, not 20 years from now. This is a very good program; please 

don’t let it die.

1

I hope that in the future the MAST system will give us the ultimate edge to win on 

the battlefield.

1

B

Great idea and hope it comes out sooner than 20 years. 1

Awesome design and great people working on project. 1

Really enjoyed classes and the experience. Thank you for your time and giving us 

“green suiters” the time to help with the design and capabilities.

1

Outstanding concept; however, the greatest problem will be the people creating it. 

OPSEC ... maybe this should be developed and used only by top members of the 

NSA, CIA, special operations forces with a minimum TOP SECRET security 

clearance.

1

These ideas are crazy as hell, but I like it. Keep it up. 1
45

Comments No. of Comments

C

There may need to be a fundamental change in SOP as MAST systems get adopted. 1

Need to discuss level of learning. 1

Need to consider heterogeneous in terms of size, level of mobility, and operating 

time.

1

Baby steps are critical to developing a systems capability over a long period of time. 1

Spiral development is probably best approach. 1
46

Appendix F. Acronyms

Acronym Definition

ARL Army Research Laboratory

ASST Assistant

C2 Command and Control

CAM Cooperative Agreement Manager

CPT Captain

CTA Collaborative Technology Alliance

CTNSP Center for Technology and National Security Policy

DIME Diplomatic, Information Operations, Military, and Economic

DoD Department of Defense

DTP Defense and Technology Paper

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below

GNR Gunner

HRED Human Research and Engineering Development

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

IW Irregular Warfare

KSA Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities

LDR Leader

LOO Line of Operation

MAST Micro-Autonomous Systems and Technology

METT-T Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, and Time Available

MG Machine Gun

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NDU National Defense University

OBJ Objective

OP Observation Post

OPCON Operational Control

OPFOR Opposing Force

OPTEMPO Operations Tempo

OSD Office of Secretary of Defense

PLT Platoon

PMESII Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure

RATELO Radio-Telephone Operator 

ROE Rule of Engagement

S&T Science and Technology

SA Situational Awareness

SBF Support by Fire

SCU Small Combat Unit
47

SFC Sergeant First Class

SGT Sergeant

SIGINT Signal Intelligence

SQD Squad

SME Subject Matter Expert

SSG Staff Sergeant

SSW Smart Sensor Web

SUGV Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle

TIGR Tactical Ground Reporting

TM Team

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UAS Unmanned and Autonomous Systems