Dissent to Order issued September 7, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-22-00156-CV

———————————

DEMETRA MOORE, Appellant

V.

DARRELL GENE CARDER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 164th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2020-23143

DISSENT TO ORDER

I must respectfully dissent. The underpinning of the majority’s disposition is 

Rule 4.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure—“No Notice of Judgment or 

Order of Appellate Court; Effect on Time to File Certain Documents.” Under this

rule, a court of appeals must grant additional time to file a motion for rehearing or 
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en banc reconsideration if the court finds that the party did not—until after the time 

expired for filing a motion for rehearing or en banc reconsideration—receive notice 

of the judgment or order in question from the court of appeals or acquire actual 

knowledge of the judgment or order. TEX. R. APP. P. 4.5(d). 

The court must also find that the motion invoking Rule 4.5 was timely filed. 

Id.

To be timely, a Rule 4.5 motion must be filed within 15 days “of the earliest 

date” that the party received notice of the judgment or order from the court of appeals 

or acquired actual knowledge of that judgment or order—but in no event more than 

90 days after the date of the judgment or order. Id. 4.5(b), (d); see Simon v. Dillard’s, 

Inc., 86 S.W.3d 798, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“The 

motion for extension [under Rule 4.5] must be filed within 15 days of the date the 

party received notice or acquired actual knowledge that judgment had been 

rendered.”).

As acknowledged by the majority, Moore states in her motion and 

accompanying affidavit that her appellate counsel received this Court’s notice of 

judgment by email on April 27, 2023. But, according to Moore, her counsel did not 

obtain actual knowledge of the contents of that notice email until July 7, 2023—the 

date this Court’s mandate issued—because her counsel “inadvertently overlooked” 

the April 27 email until that later date. Thus, “the earliest date” that Moore either 
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received notice of this Court’s judgment or obtained actual knowledge of the 

judgment was April 27, 2023.

Based on these admitted facts, and the plain language of Rule 4.5(b), Moore 

had to file her motion within 15 days of the “earliest” of these two dates—which 

was May 12, 2023. Moore, however, did not file her motion until July 17, 2023. 

The majority suggeststhat a Rule 4.5 motion is timely filed if it is filed “within 

90 days of the judgment.” That, however, disregards the rest of the words in the 

same sentence of Rule 4.5(b). TEX. R. APP. P. 4.5(b); see Huston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l 

Assoc., 359 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“[a

rule of procedure] must be read as a whole to ascertain its intent” and its clear 

language construed “according to its literal meaning”).

When the plain language of Rule 4.5(b) is read as a whole, it provides that the 

15-day deadline to timely file a Rule 4.5 motion is triggered by “the earliest date” 

that the party received notice of the judgment or order from the court of appeals or

acquired actual knowledge of the judgment or order1and that the motion must be 

filed within the required 90 days of the date of the decision of the court of appeals;

1

 See Simon v. Dillard’s, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 798, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2002, no pet.); see also Roy W. McDonald, Elaine A. Grafton Carlson, MCDONALD 

& CARLSON TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.6, “Effect of lack of notice or judgment or 

order” (2022). 
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even if that is sooner than 15 days of receiving notice or obtaining actual 

knowledge.2 This prevents the rule from being completely open-ended. 

Consequently, a Rule 4.5 motion must satisfy all of subsection (b) in order for 

it to be timely filed. 

Here, Moore’s motion fails to do so. Although Moore’s motion was filed 

within 90 days of the date of this Court’s judgment, it was filed over two months 

after the 15-day deadline had passed and is clearly untimely. As a result, this Court 

lacks authority as a matter of law to make any disposition here under the auspices of 

Rule 4.5. I therefore respectfully dissent and would deny Moore’s motions in all 

things. 

Terry Adams 

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Kelly and Goodman.

Chief Justice Adams, dissenting.

2

 For example, if the “earliest date” that a party received notice or acquired actual 

knowledge of a judgment or order was the 80th day after the date of the judgment 

or order, the Rule 4.5 motion would have to be filed within 10 days, by the 90th 

day. On the other hand, if that “earliest date” was more than 90 days after the date 

of the judgment, the rule would be inapplicable. See Nawar v. Thompson, No. 04-

17-00217-CV, 2017 WL 3270342, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.) 

(mem. op.) (citing Levit v. Adams, 850 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. 1993) (construing 

substantially similar language in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(4) and Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.2(a)(1)).