49–006 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 114–83 

NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION ADVANCEMENT 

ACT OF 2015 

APRIL 17, 2015.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. MCCAUL, from the Committee on Homeland Security, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 1731] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred the 

bill (H.R. 1731) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to enhance multi-directional sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks and strengthen privacy and civil liberties protections, and 

for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably 

thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as 

amended do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 15 

Background and Need for Legislation .................................................................... 15 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 17 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 18 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 21 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 23 

New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures ............. 23 

Congressional Budget Office Estimate ................................................................... 23 

Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives .................................... 25 

Duplicative Federal Programs ................................................................................ 25 

Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits ... 25 

Federal Mandates Statement ................................................................................. 25 

Preemption Clarification ......................................................................................... 25 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings ..................................................................... 26 


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Advisory Committee Statement .............................................................................. 26 

Applicability to Legislative Branch ........................................................................ 26 

Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation ...................................................... 26 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 36 

Additional Views ...................................................................................................... 61 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act 

of 2015’’. 

SEC. 2. NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION CENTER. 

(a) DEFINITIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of the second section 226 of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 148; relating to the National Cybersecurity and 

Communications Integration Center) is amended— 

(A) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(B) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; 

and’’; and 

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: 

‘‘(5) the term ‘cyber threat indicator’ means technical information that is necessary to describe or identify— 

‘‘(A) a method for probing, monitoring, maintaining, or establishing network awareness of an information system for the purpose of discerning 

technical vulnerabilities of such information system, if such method is 

known or reasonably suspected of being associated with a known or suspected cybersecurity risk, including communications that reasonably appear 

to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering technical information related 

to a cybersecurity risk; 

‘‘(B) a method for defeating a technical or security control of an information system; 

‘‘(C) a technical vulnerability, including anomalous technical behavior 

that may become a vulnerability; 

‘‘(D) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an information 

system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to inadvertently enable the defeat of a technical or operational control; 

‘‘(E) a method for unauthorized remote identification of, access to, or use 

of an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or 

transiting an information system that is known or reasonably suspected of 

being associated with a known or suspected cybersecurity risk; 

‘‘(F) the actual or potential harm caused by a cybersecurity risk, including 

a description of the information exfiltrated as a result of a particular cybersecurity risk; 

‘‘(G) any other attribute of a cybersecurity risk that cannot be used to 

identify specific persons reasonably believed to be unrelated to such cybersecurity risk, if disclosure of such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by 

law; or 

‘‘(H) any combination of subparagraphs (A) through (G); 

‘‘(6) the term ‘cybersecurity purpose’ means the purpose of protecting an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an 

information system from a cybersecurity risk or incident; 

‘‘(7)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term ‘defensive measure’ 

means an action, device, procedure, signature, technique, or other measure applied to an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, 

or transiting an information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a 

known or suspected cybersecurity risk or incident, or any attribute of hardware, 

software, process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the defeat of a security control; 

‘‘(B) such term does not include a measure that destroys, renders unusable, 

or substantially harms an information system or data on an information system 

not belonging to— 

‘‘(i) the non-Federal entity, not including a State, local, or tribal government, operating such measure; or 

‘‘(ii) another Federal entity or non-Federal entity that is authorized to 

provide consent and has provided such consent to the non-Federal entity referred to in clause (i); 


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‘‘(8) the term ‘network awareness’ means to scan, identify, acquire, monitor, 

log, or analyze information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system; 

‘‘(9)(A) the term ‘private entity’ means a non-Federal entity that is an individual or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or non-profit entity, including an officer, 

employee, or agent thereof; 

‘‘(B) such term includes a component of a State, local, or tribal government 

performing electric utility services; 

‘‘(10) the term ‘security control’ means the management, operational, and 

technical controls used to protect against an unauthorized effort to adversely affect the confidentially, integrity, or availability of an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system; 

and 

‘‘(11) the term ‘sharing’ means providing, receiving, and disseminating.’’. 

(b) AMENDMENT.—Subparagraph (B) of subsection (d)(1) of such second section 

226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is amended— 

(1) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘and local’’ and inserting ‘‘, local, and tribal’’; 

(2) in clause (ii)— 

(A) by inserting ‘‘, including information sharing and analysis centers’’ before the semicolon; and 

(B) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(3) in clause (iii), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

(4) by adding at the end the following new clause: 

‘‘(iv) private entities.’’. 

SEC. 3. INFORMATION SHARING STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES. 

The second section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 148; relating to the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center) is 

amended— 

(1) in subsection (c)— 

(A) in paragraph (1)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘a Federal civilian interface’’ and inserting ‘‘the lead 

Federal civilian interface’’; and 

(ii) by striking ‘‘cybersecurity risks,’’ and inserting ‘‘cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks,’’; 

(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘cybersecurity risks’’ and inserting 

‘‘cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks,’’; 

(C) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ‘‘cybersecurity risks’’ and inserting 

‘‘cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks,’’; 

(D) in paragraph (6)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘cybersecurity risks’’ and inserting ‘‘cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks,’’; and 

(ii) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(E) in paragraph (7)— 

(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

(iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: 

‘‘(C) sharing cyber threat indicators and defensive measures;’’; and 

(F) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs 

‘‘(8) engaging with international partners, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, to— 

‘‘(A) collaborate on cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents; and 

‘‘(B) enhance the security and resilience of global cybersecurity; 

‘‘(9) sharing cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and other information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents with Federal and non-Federal 

entities, including across sectors of critical infrastructure and with State and 

major urban area fusion centers, as appropriate; 

‘‘(10) promptly notifying the Secretary and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs of the Senate of any significant violations of the policies and procedures specified in subsection (i)(6)(A); 

‘‘(11) promptly notifying non-Federal entities that have shared cyber threat 

indicators or defensive measures that are known or determined to be in error 

or in contravention of the requirements of this section; and 

‘‘(12) participating, as appropriate, in exercises run by the Department’s National Exercise Program.’’; 


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(2) in subsection (d)— 

(A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(B) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (J); and 

(C) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new subparagraphs: 

‘‘(E) an entity that collaborates with State and local governments on cybersecurity risks and incidents, and has entered into a voluntary information sharing relationship with the Center; 

‘‘(F) a United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team that coordinates information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents, proactively 

and collaboratively addresses cybersecurity risks and incidents to the 

United States, collaboratively responds to cybersecurity risks and incidents, 

provides technical assistance, upon request, to information system owners 

and operators, and shares cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, 

analysis, or information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents in a 

timely manner; 

‘‘(G) the Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team 

that— 

‘‘(i) coordinates with industrial control systems owners and operators; 

‘‘(ii) provides training, upon request, to Federal entities and non-Federal entities on industrial control systems cybersecurity; 

‘‘(iii) collaboratively addresses cybersecurity risks and incidents to industrial control systems; 

‘‘(iv) provides technical assistance, upon request, to Federal entities 

and non-Federal entities relating to industrial control systems cybersecurity; and 

‘‘(v) shares cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, or information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents of industrial control 

systems in a timely fashion; 

‘‘(H) a National Coordinating Center for Communications that coordinates 

the protection, response, and recovery of emergency communications; 

‘‘(I) an entity that coordinates with small and medium-sized businesses; 

and’’; 

(3) in subsection (e)— 

(A) in paragraph (1)— 

(i) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and’’ before ‘‘information’’; 

(ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ‘‘cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and’’ before ‘‘information’’; 

(iii) in subparagraph (F), by striking ‘‘cybersecurity risks’’ and inserting ‘‘cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks,’’; 

(iv) in subparagraph (F), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(v) in subparagraph (G), by striking ‘‘cybersecurity risks’’ and inserting ‘‘cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks,’’; 

and 

(vi) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(H) the Center ensures that it shares information relating to cybersecurity risks and incidents with small and medium-sized businesses, as appropriate; and 

‘‘(I) the Center designates an agency contact for non-Federal entities;’’; 

(B) in paragraph (2)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘cybersecurity risks’’ and inserting ‘‘cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks,’’; and 

(ii) by inserting ‘‘or disclosure’’ before the semicolon at the end; and 

(C) in paragraph (3), by inserting before the period at the end the following: ‘‘, including by working with the Chief Privacy Officer appointed 

under section 222 to ensure that the Center follows the policies and procedures specified in subsection (i)(6)(A)’’; and 

(4) by adding at the end the following new subsections: 

‘‘(g) RAPID AUTOMATED SHARING.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 

Protection, in coordination with industry and other stakeholders, shall develop 

capabilities making use of existing information technology industry standards 

and best practices, as appropriate, that support and rapidly advance the development, adoption, and implementation of automated mechanisms for the timely 

sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures to and from the Center and with each Federal agency designated as the ‘Sector Specific Agency’ for 

each critical infrastructure sector in accordance with subsection (h). 

‘‘(2) BIANNUAL REPORT.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 


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House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a biannual report on the status and progress 

of the development of the capability described in paragraph (1). Such reports 

shall be required until such capability is fully implemented. 

‘‘(h) SECTOR SPECIFIC AGENCIES.—The Secretary, in collaboration with the relevant critical infrastructure sector and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall recognize the Federal agency designated as of March 25, 2015, as the 

‘Sector Specific Agency’ for each critical infrastructure sector designated in the Department’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan. If the designated Sector Specific 

Agency for a particular critical infrastructure sector is the Department, for purposes 

of this section, the Secretary is deemed to be the head of such Sector Specific Agency and shall carry out this section. The Secretary, in coordination with the heads 

of each such Sector Specific Agency, shall— 

‘‘(1) support the security and resilience actives of the relevant critical infrastructure sector in accordance with this section; 

‘‘(2) provide institutional knowledge, specialized expertise, and technical assistance upon request to the relevant critical infrastructure sector; and 

‘‘(3) support the timely sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with the relevant critical infrastructure sector with the Center in accordance with this section. 

‘‘(i) VOLUNTARY INFORMATION SHARING PROCEDURES.— 

‘‘(1) PROCEDURES.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The Center may enter into a voluntary information 

sharing relationship with any consenting non-Federal entity for the sharing 

of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for cybersecurity purposes in accordance with this section. Nothing in this section may be construed to require any non-Federal entity to enter into any such information 

sharing relationship with the Center or any other entity. The Center may 

terminate a voluntary information sharing relationship under this subsection if the Center determines that the non-Federal entity with which the 

Center has entered into such a relationship has, after repeated notice, repeatedly violated the terms of this subsection. 

‘‘(B) NATIONAL SECURITY.—The Secretary may decline to enter into a voluntary information sharing relationship under this subsection if the Secretary determines that such is appropriate for national security. 

‘‘(2) VOLUNTARY INFORMATION SHARING RELATIONSHIPS.—A voluntary information sharing relationship under this subsection may be characterized as an 

agreement described in this paragraph. 

‘‘(A) STANDARD AGREEMENT.—For the use of a non-Federal entity, the 

Center shall make available a standard agreement, consistent with this section, on the Department’s website. 

‘‘(B) NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.—At the request of a non-Federal entity, 

and if determined appropriate by the Center, the Department shall negotiate a non-standard agreement, consistent with this section. 

‘‘(C) EXISTING AGREEMENTS.—An agreement between the Center and a 

non-Federal entity that is entered into before the date of the enactment of 

this section, or such an agreement that is in effect before such date, shall 

be deemed in compliance with the requirements of this subsection, notwithstanding any other provision or requirement of this subsection. An agreement under this subsection shall include the relevant privacy protections as 

in effect under the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement for 

Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Collaboration, as of December 31, 

2014. Nothing in this subsection may be construed to require a non-Federal 

entity to enter into either a standard or negotiated agreement to be in compliance with this subsection. 

‘‘(3) INFORMATION SHARING AUTHORIZATION.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a non-Federal entity may, for cybersecurity purposes, share cyber threat indicators or defensive measures obtained on its own information system, or on an information system of another Federal entity or non-Federal entity, upon written consent of such 

other Federal entity or non-Federal entity or an authorized representative 

of such other Federal entity or non-Federal entity in accordance with this 

section with— 

‘‘(i) another non-Federal entity; or 

‘‘(ii) the Center, as provided in this section. 

‘‘(B) LAWFUL RESTRICTION.—A non-Federal entity receiving a cyber threat 

indicator or defensive measure from another Federal entity or non-Federal 

entity shall comply with otherwise lawful restrictions placed on the sharing 


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or use of such cyber threat indicator or defensive measure by the sharing 

Federal entity or non-Federal entity. 

‘‘(C) REMOVAL OF INFORMATION UNRELATED TO CYBERSECURITY RISKS OR

INCIDENTS.—Federal entities and non-Federal entities shall, prior to such 

sharing, take reasonable efforts to remove information that can be used to 

identify specific persons and is reasonably believed at the time of sharing 

to be unrelated to a cybersecurity risks or incident and to safeguard information that can be used to identify specific persons from unintended disclosure or unauthorized access or acquisition. 

‘‘(D) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to— 

‘‘(i) limit or modify an existing information sharing relationship; 

‘‘(ii) prohibit a new information sharing relationship; 

‘‘(iii) require a new information sharing relationship between any 

non-Federal entity and a Federal entity; 

‘‘(iv) limit otherwise lawful activity; or 

‘‘(v) in any manner impact or modify procedures in existence as of the 

date of the enactment of this section for reporting known or suspected 

criminal activity to appropriate law enforcement authorities or for participating voluntarily or under legal requirement in an investigation. 

‘‘(E) COORDINATED VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE.—The Under Secretary for 

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, in coordination with industry 

and other stakeholders, shall develop, publish, and adhere to policies and 

procedures for coordinating vulnerability disclosures, to the extent practicable, consistent with international standards in the information technology industry. 

‘‘(4) NETWORK AWARENESS AUTHORIZATION.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a nonFederal entity, not including a State, local, or tribal government, may, for 

cybersecurity purposes, conduct network awareness of— 

‘‘(i) an information system of such non-Federal entity to protect the 

rights or property of such non-Federal entity; 

‘‘(ii) an information system of another non-Federal entity, upon written consent of such other non-Federal entity for conducting such network awareness to protect the rights or property of such other non-Federal entity; 

‘‘(iii) an information system of a Federal entity, upon written consent 

of an authorized representative of such Federal entity for conducting 

such network awareness to protect the rights or property of such Federal entity; or 

‘‘(iv) information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system described in this subparagraph. 

‘‘(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to— 

‘‘(i) authorize conducting network awareness of an information system, or the use of any information obtained through such conducting 

of network awareness, other than as provided in this section; or 

‘‘(ii) limit otherwise lawful activity. 

‘‘(5) DEFENSIVE MEASURE AUTHORIZATION.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a non-Federal entity, not including a 

State, local, or tribal government, may, for cybersecurity purposes, operate 

a defensive measure that is applied to— 

‘‘(i) an information system of such non-Federal entity to protect the 

rights or property of such non-Federal entity; 

‘‘(ii) an information system of another non-Federal entity upon written consent of such other non-Federal entity for operation of such defensive measure to protect the rights or property of such other non-Federal entity; 

‘‘(iii) an information system of a Federal entity upon written consent 

of an authorized representative of such Federal entity for operation of 

such defensive measure to protect the rights or property of such Federal entity; or 

‘‘(iv) information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system described in this subparagraph. 

‘‘(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to— 

‘‘(i) authorize the use of a defensive measure other than as provided 

in this section; or 


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‘‘(ii) limit otherwise lawful activity. 

‘‘(6) PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTIONS.— ‘‘(A) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.— ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection shall, in coordination with the Chief Privacy Officer and the Chief Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department, establish and annually review policies and procedures governing 

the receipt, retention, use, and disclosure of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information related to cybersecurity risks and 

incidents shared with the Center in accordance with this section. Such 

policies and procedures shall apply only to the Department, consistent 

with the need to protect information systems from cybersecurity risks 

and incidents and mitigate cybersecurity risks and incidents in a timely 

manner, and shall— 

‘‘(I) be consistent with the Department’s Fair Information Practice Principles developed pursuant to section 552a of title 5, United 

States Code (commonly referred to as the ‘Privacy Act of 1974’ or 

the ‘Privacy Act’), and subject to the Secretary’s authority under 

subsection (a)(2) of section 222 of this Act; 

‘‘(II) reasonably limit, to the greatest extent practicable, the receipt, retention, use, and disclosure of cyber threat indicators and 

defensive measures associated with specific persons that is not necessary, for cybersecurity purposes, to protect a network or information system from cybersecurity risks or mitigate cybersecurity risks 

and incidents in a timely manner; 

‘‘(III) minimize any impact on privacy and civil liberties; 

‘‘(IV) provide data integrity through the prompt removal and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names and personal information 

that is unrelated to the cybersecurity risk or incident information 

shared and retained by the Center in accordance with this section; 

‘‘(V) include requirements to safeguard cyber threat indicators 

and defensive measures retained by the Center, including information that is proprietary or business-sensitive that may be used to 

identify specific persons from unauthorized access or acquisition; 

‘‘(VI) protect the confidentiality of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures associated with specific persons to the greatest 

extent practicable; and 

‘‘(VII) ensure all relevant constitutional, legal, and privacy protections are observed. 

‘‘(ii) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 days after the 

date of the enactment of this section and annually thereafter, the Chief 

Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of 

the Department, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties 

Oversight Board (established pursuant to section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 

2000ee)), shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs of the Senate the policies and procedures 

governing the sharing of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, 

and information related to cybsersecurity risks and incidents described 

in clause (i) of subparagraph (A). 

‘‘(iii) PUBLIC NOTICE AND ACCESS.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, in consultation with the Chief Privacy Officer and the Chief Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer of the 

Department, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (established pursuant to section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee)), shall ensure there 

is public notice of, and access to, the policies and procedures governing 

the sharing of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents. 

‘‘(iv) CONSULTATION.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection when establishing policies and procedures to 

support privacy and civil liberties may consult with the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

‘‘(B) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Chief Privacy Officer of the Department, on 

an ongoing basis, shall— 

‘‘(i) monitor the implementation of the policies and procedures governing the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures 

established pursuant to clause (i) of subparagraph (A); 


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‘‘(ii) regularly review and update privacy impact assessments, as appropriate, to ensure all relevant constitutional, legal, and privacy protections are being followed; 

‘‘(iii) work with the Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection to carry out paragraphs (10) and (11) of subsection 

(c); 

‘‘(iv) annually submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that contains a review 

of the effectiveness of such policies and procedures to protect privacy 

and civil liberties; and 

‘‘(v) ensure there are appropriate sanctions in place for officers, employees, or agents of the Department who intentionally or willfully conduct activities under this section in an unauthorized manner. 

‘‘(C) INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT.—The Inspector General of the Department, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 

and the Inspector General of each Federal agency that receives cyber threat 

indicators or defensive measures shared with the Center under this section, 

shall, not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this subsection and periodically thereafter submit to the Committee on Homeland 

Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report containing a review of the use of cybersecurity risk information shared with the Center, 

including the following: 

‘‘(i) A report on the receipt, use, and dissemination of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures that have been shared with Federal 

entities under this section. 

‘‘(ii) Information on the use by the Center of such information for a 

purpose other than a cybersecurity purpose. 

‘‘(iii) A review of the type of information shared with the Center 

under this section. 

‘‘(iv) A review of the actions taken by the Center based on such information. 

‘‘(v) The appropriate metrics that exist to determine the impact, if 

any, on privacy and civil liberties as a result of the sharing of such information with the Center. 

‘‘(vi) A list of other Federal agencies receiving such information. 

‘‘(vii) A review of the sharing of such information within the Federal 

Government to identify inappropriate stove piping of such information. 

‘‘(viii) Any recommendations of the Inspector General of the Department for improvements or modifications to information sharing under 

this section. 

‘‘(D) PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS REPORT.—The Chief Privacy 

Officer and the Chief Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 

the Inspector General of the Department, and the senior privacy and civil 

liberties officer of each Federal agency that receives cyber threat indicators 

and defensive measures shared with the Center under this section, shall biennially submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the privacy and civil liberties impact of the activities under this 

paragraph. Each such report shall include any recommendations the Chief 

Privacy Officer and the Chief Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer of the 

Department consider appropriate to minimize or mitigate the privacy and 

civil liberties impact of the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive 

measures under this section. 

‘‘(E) FORM.—Each report required under paragraphs (C) and (D) shall be 

submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 

‘‘(7) USES AND PROTECTION OF INFORMATION.— 

‘‘(A) NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES.—A non-Federal entity, not including a State, 

local, or tribal government, that shares cyber threat indicators or defensive 

measures through the Center or otherwise under this section— 

‘‘(i) may use, retain, or further disclose such cyber threat indicators 

or defensive measures solely for cybersecurity purposes; 

‘‘(ii) shall, prior to such sharing, take reasonable efforts to remove information that can be used to identify specific persons and is reasonably believed at the time of sharing to be unrelated to a cybersecurity 

risk or incident, and to safeguard information that can be used to identify specific persons from unintended disclosure or unauthorized access 

or acquisition; 


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‘‘(iii) shall comply with appropriate restrictions that a Federal entity 

or non-Federal entity places on the subsequent disclosure or retention 

of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures that it discloses to 

other Federal entities or non-Federal entities; 

‘‘(iv) shall be deemed to have voluntarily shared such cyber threat indicators or defensive measures; 

‘‘(v) shall implement and utilize a security control to protect against 

unauthorized access to or acquisition of such cyber threat indicators or 

defensive measures; and 

‘‘(vi) may not use such information to gain an unfair competitive advantage to the detriment of any non-Federal entity. 

‘‘(B) FEDERAL ENTITIES.— ‘‘(i) USES OF INFORMATION.—A Federal entity that receives cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures shared through the Center or 

otherwise under this section from another Federal entity or a non-Federal entity— 

‘‘(I) may use, retain, or further disclose such cyber threat indicators or defensive measures solely for cybersecurity purposes; 

‘‘(II) shall, prior to such sharing, take reasonable efforts to remove information that can be used to identify specific persons and 

is reasonably believed at the time of sharing to be unrelated to a 

cybersecurity risk or incident, and to safeguard information that 

can be used to identify specific persons from unintended disclosure 

or unauthorized access or acquisition; 

‘‘(III) shall be deemed to have voluntarily shared such cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures; 

‘‘(IV) shall implement and utilize a security control to protect 

against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such cyber threat 

indicators or defensive measures; and 

‘‘(V) may not use such cyber threat indicators or defensive measures to engage in surveillance or other collection activities for the 

purpose of tracking an individual’s personally identifiable information. 

‘‘(ii) PROTECTIONS FOR INFORMATION.—The cyber threat indicators 

and defensive measures referred to in clause (i)— 

‘‘(I) are exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, 

United States Code, and withheld, without discretion, from the 

public under subsection (b)(3)(B) of such section; 

‘‘(II) may not be used by the Federal Government for regulatory 

purposes; 

‘‘(III) may not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or 

protection provided by law, including trade secret protection; 

‘‘(IV) shall be considered the commercial, financial, and proprietary information of the non-Federal entity referred to in clause (i) 

when so designated by such non-Federal entity; and 

‘‘(V) may not be subject to a rule of any Federal entity or any 

judicial doctrine regarding ex parte communications with a decisionmaking official. 

‘‘(C) STATE, LOCAL, OR TRIBAL GOVERNMENT.— 

‘‘(i) USES OF INFORMATION.—A State, local, or tribal government that 

receives cyber threat indicators or defensive measures from the Center 

from a Federal entity or a non-Federal entity— 

‘‘(I) may use, retain, or further disclose such cyber threat indicators or defensive measures solely for cybersecurity purposes; 

‘‘(II) shall, prior to such sharing, take reasonable efforts to remove information that can be used to identify specific persons and 

is reasonably believed at the time of sharing to be unrelated to a 

cybersecurity risk or incident, and to safeguard information that 

can be used to identify specific persons from unintended disclosure 

or unauthorized access or acquisition; 

‘‘(III) shall consider such information the commercial, financial, 

and proprietary information of such Federal entity or non-Federal 

entity if so designated by such Federal entity or non-Federal entity; 

‘‘(IV) shall be deemed to have voluntarily shared such cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures; and 

‘‘(V) shall implement and utilize a security control to protect 

against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such cyber threat 

indicators or defensive measures. 


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‘‘(ii) PROTECTIONS FOR INFORMATION.—The cyber threat indicators 

and defensive measures referred to in clause (i)— 

‘‘(I) shall be exempt from disclosure under any State, local, or 

tribal law or regulation that requires public disclosure of information or records by a public or quasi-public entity; and 

‘‘(II) may not be used by any State, local, or tribal government 

to regulate a lawful activity of a non-Federal entity. 

‘‘(8) LIABILITY EXEMPTIONS.— 

‘‘(A) NETWORK AWARENESS.—No cause of action shall lie or be maintained 

in any court, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, against any nonFederal entity that, for cybersecurity purposes, conducts network awareness 

under paragraph (4), if such network awareness is conducted in accordance 

with such paragraph and this section. 

‘‘(B) INFORMATION SHARING.—No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, against 

any non-Federal entity that, for cybersecurity purposes, shares cyber threat 

indicators or defensive measures under paragraph (3), or fails to act based 

on such sharing, if such sharing is conducted in accordance with such paragraph and this section. 

‘‘(C) WILLFUL MISCONDUCT.— 

‘‘(i) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed to— 

‘‘(I) require dismissal of a cause of action against a non-Federal 

entity that has engaged in willful misconduct in the course of conducting activities authorized by this section; or 

‘‘(II) undermine or limit the availability of otherwise applicable 

common law or statutory defenses. 

‘‘(ii) PROOF OF WILLFUL MISCONDUCT.—In any action claiming that 

subparagraph (A) or (B) does not apply due to willful misconduct described in clause (i), the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving by 

clear and convincing evidence the willful misconduct by each non-Federal entity subject to such claim and that such willful misconduct proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. 

‘‘(iii) WILLFUL MISCONDUCT DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term 

‘willful misconduct’ means an act or omission that is taken— 

‘‘(I) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; 

‘‘(II) knowingly without legal or factual justification; and 

‘‘(III) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as 

to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit. 

‘‘(D) EXCLUSION.—The term ‘non-Federal entity’ as used in this paragraph 

shall not include a State, local, or tribal government. 

‘‘(9) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE

USE AND PROTECTION OF VOLUNTARILY SHARED INFORMATION.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If a department or agency of the Federal Government 

intentionally or willfully violates the restrictions specified in paragraph (3), 

(6), or (7)(B) on the use and protection of voluntarily shared cyber threat 

indicators or defensive measures, or any other provision of this section, the 

Federal Government shall be liable to a person injured by such violation 

in an amount equal to the sum of— 

‘‘(i) the actual damages sustained by such person as a result of such 

violation or $1,000, whichever is greater; and 

‘‘(ii) reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court and other 

litigation costs reasonably occurred in any case under this subsection 

in which the complainant has substantially prevailed. 

‘‘(B) VENUE.—An action to enforce liability under this subsection may be 

brought in the district court of the United States in— 

‘‘(i) the district in which the complainant resides; 

‘‘(ii) the district in which the principal place of business of the complainant is located; 

‘‘(iii) the district in which the department or agency of the Federal 

Government that disclosed the information is located; or 

‘‘(iv) the District of Columbia. 

‘‘(C) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—No action shall lie under this subsection 

unless such action is commenced not later than two years after the date of 

the violation of any restriction specified in paragraph (3), (6), or 7(B), or 

any other provision of this section, that is the basis for such action. 

‘‘(D) EXCLUSIVE CAUSE OF ACTION.—A cause of action under this subsection shall be the exclusive means available to a complainant seeking a 


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remedy for a violation of any restriction specified in paragraph (3), (6), or 

7(B) or any other provision of this section. 

‘‘(10) ANTI-TRUST EXEMPTION.— ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (C), it shall not 

be considered a violation of any provision of antitrust laws for two or more 

non-Federal entities to share a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure, 

or assistance relating to the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of a cybersecurity risk or incident, for cybersecurity purposes under this Act. 

‘‘(B) APPLICABILITY.—Subparagraph (A) shall apply only to information 

that is shared or assistance that is provided in order to assist with— 

‘‘(i) facilitating the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of a cybersecurity risk or incident to an information system or information that 

is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system; or 

‘‘(ii) communicating or disclosing a cyber threat indicator or defensive 

measure to help prevent, investigate, or mitigate the effect of a cybersecurity risk or incident to an information system or information that is 

stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system. 

‘‘(C) PROHIBITED CONDUCT.—Nothing in this section may be construed to 

permit price-fixing, allocating a market between competitors, monopolizing 

or attempting to monopolize a market, or exchanges of price or cost information, customer lists, or information regarding future competitive planning. 

‘‘(11) CONSTRUCTION AND PREEMPTION.— 

‘‘(A) OTHERWISE LAWFUL DISCLOSURES.—Nothing in this section may be 

construed to limit or prohibit otherwise lawful disclosures of communications, records, or other information, including reporting of known or suspected criminal activity or participating voluntarily or under legal requirement in an investigation, by a non-Federal to any other non-Federal entity 

or Federal entity under this section. 

‘‘(B) WHISTLE BLOWER PROTECTIONS.—Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit or limit the disclosure of information protected under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats), section 7211 

of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress), section 

1034 of title 10, United States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by 

members of the military), section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 

(50 U.S.C. 3234) (governing disclosure by employees of elements of the intelligence community), or any similar provision of Federal or State law. 

‘‘(C) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.—Nothing in this section may be construed to affect any requirement under any other provision of law for a nonFederal entity to provide information to a Federal entity. 

‘‘(D) PRESERVATION OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS.—Nothing 

in this section may be construed to— 

‘‘(i) amend, repeal, or supersede any current or future contractual 

agreement, terms of service agreement, or other contractual relationship between any non-Federal entities, or between any non-Federal entity and a Federal entity; or 

‘‘(ii) abrogate trade secret or intellectual property rights of any nonFederal entity or Federal entity. 

‘‘(E) ANTI-TASKING RESTRICTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed to permit a Federal entity to— 

‘‘(i) require a non-Federal entity to provide information to a Federal 

entity; 

‘‘(ii) condition the sharing of cyber threat indicators or defensive 

measures with a non-Federal entity on such non-Federal entity’s provision of cyber threat indicators or defensive measures to a Federal entity; or 

‘‘(iii) condition the award of any Federal grant, contract, or purchase 

on the sharing of cyber threat indicators or defensive measures with a 

Federal entity. 

‘‘(F) NO LIABILITY FOR NON-PARTICIPATION.—Nothing in this section may 

be construed to subject any non-Federal entity to liability for choosing to 

not engage in the voluntary activities authorized under this section. 

‘‘(G) USE AND RETENTION OF INFORMATION.—Nothing in this section may 

be construed to authorize, or to modify any existing authority of, a department or agency of the Federal Government to retain or use any information 

shared under this section for any use other than permitted in this section. 

‘‘(H) VOLUNTARY SHARING.—Nothing in this section may be construed to 

restrict or condition a non-Federal entity from sharing, for cybersecurity 


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purposes, cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, or information related to cybersecurity risks or incidents with any other non-Federal entity, 

and nothing in this section may be construed as requiring any non-Federal 

entity to share cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, or information 

related to cybersecurity risks or incidents with the Center. 

‘‘(I) FEDERAL PREEMPTION.—This section supersedes any statute or other 

provision of law of a State or political subdivision of a State that restricts 

or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under this section. 

‘‘(j) DIRECT REPORTING.—The Secretary shall develop policies and procedures for 

direct reporting to the Secretary by the Director of the Center regarding significant 

cybersecurity risks and incidents. 

‘‘(k) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Secretary shall build upon existing 

mechanisms to promote a national awareness effort to educate the general public 

on the importance of securing information systems. 

‘‘(l) REPORTS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.—Not later than 180 days after the 

date of the enactment of this subsection and periodically thereafter, the Secretary 

of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the range of efforts underway to bolster 

cybersecurity collaboration with relevant international partners in accordance with 

subsection (c)(8). 

‘‘(m) OUTREACH.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 

subsection, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and 

Infrastructure Protection, shall— 

‘‘(1) disseminate to the public information about how to voluntarily share 

cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with the Center; and 

‘‘(2) enhance outreach to critical infrastructure owners and operators for purposes of such sharing.’’. 

SEC. 4. INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATIONS. 

Section 212 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 131) is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (5)— 

(A) in subparagraph (A)— 

(i) by inserting ‘‘information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents and’’ after ‘‘critical infrastructure information’’; and 

(ii) by striking ‘‘related to critical infrastructure’’ and inserting ‘‘related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, critical infrastructure, and’’; 

(B) in subparagraph (B)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘disclosing critical infrastructure information’’ and inserting ‘‘disclosing cybersecurity risks, incidents, and critical infrastructure information’’; and 

(ii) by striking ‘‘related to critical infrastructure or’’ and inserting ‘‘related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, critical infrastructure, or’’ and 

(C) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘disseminating critical infrastructure 

information’’ and inserting ‘‘disseminating cybersecurity risks, incidents, 

and critical infrastructure information’’; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 

‘‘(8) CYBERSECURITY RISK; INCIDENT.—The terms ‘cybersecurity risk’ and ‘incident’ have the meanings given such terms in the second section 226 (relating 

to the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center).’’. 

SEC. 5. STREAMLINING OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ORGANIZATION. 

(a) CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.—The National Protection 

and Programs Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security shall, after the 

date of the enactment of this Act, be known and designated as the ‘‘Cybersecurity 

and Infrastructure Protection’’. Any reference to the National Protection and Programs Directorate of the Department in any law, regulation, map, document, record, 

or other paper of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection of the Department. 

(b) SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 103 of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113) is amended— 

(A) in paragraph (1)— 

(i) by amending subparagraph (H) to read as follows: 

‘‘(H) An Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection.’’; and 

(ii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: 

‘‘(K) A Deputy Under Secretary for Cybersecurity. 

‘‘(L) A Deputy Under Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.’’; and 


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(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 

‘‘(3) DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARIES.—The Deputy Under Secretaries referred to 

in subparagraphs (K) and (L) of paragraph (1) shall be appointed by the President without the advice and consent of the Senate.’’. 

(2) CONTINUATION IN OFFICE.—The individuals who hold the positions referred 

in subparagraphs (H), (K), and (L) of paragraph (1) of section 103(a) the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as amended and added by paragraph (1) of this subsection) as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to hold such 

positions. 

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

the Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security 

of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the feasibility of becoming an operational component, including an analysis of alternatives, and if a determination is 

rendered that becoming an operational component is the best option for achieving 

the mission of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, a legislative proposal 

and implementation plan for becoming such an operational component. Such report 

shall also include plans to more effectively carry out the cybersecurity mission of 

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, including expediting information sharing agreements. 

SEC. 6. CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE PLANS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 227 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 149) 

is amended— 

(1) in the heading, by striking ‘‘PLAN’’ and inserting ‘‘PLANS’’; 

(2) by striking ‘‘The Under Secretary appointed under section 103(a)(1)(H) 

shall’’ and inserting the following: 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection shall’’; and 

(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection: 

‘‘(b) UPDATES TO THE CYBER INCIDENT ANNEX TO THE NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK.—The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal 

departments and agencies, and in accordance with the National Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan required under subsection (a), shall regularly update, maintain, 

and exercise the Cyber Incident Annex to the National Response Framework of the 

Department.’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 is amended by amending the item relating to section 227 to read as follows: 

‘‘Sec. 227. Cyber incident response plans.’’. 

SEC. 7. SECURITY AND RESILIENCY OF PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS; CYBERSECURITY 

AWARENESS CAMPAIGN. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle C of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 

U.S.C. 141 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new sections: 

‘‘SEC. 230. SECURITY AND RESILIENCY OF PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS. 

‘‘The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, in coordination with the Office of Emergency Communications of the Department, shall assess and evaluate consequence, vulnerability, and threat information regarding 

cyber incidents to public safety communications to help facilitate continuous improvements to the security and resiliency of such communications. 

‘‘SEC. 231. CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS CAMPAIGN. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection shall develop and implement an ongoing and comprehensive cybersecurity 

awareness campaign regarding cybersecurity risks and voluntary best practices for 

mitigating and responding to such risks. Such campaign shall, at a minimum, publish and disseminate, on an ongoing basis, the following: 

‘‘(1) Public service announcements targeted at improving awareness among 

State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, academia, and stakeholders in specific audiences, including the elderly, students, small businesses, 

members of the Armed Forces, and veterans. 

‘‘(2) Vendor and technology-neutral voluntary best practices information. 

‘‘(b) CONSULTATION.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 

Protection shall consult with a wide range of stakeholders in government, industry, 

academia, and the non-profit community in carrying out this section.’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 226 (relating to 

cybersecurity recruitment and retention) the following new items: 


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‘‘Sec. 230. Security and resiliency of public safety communications. 

‘‘Sec. 231. Cybersecurity awareness campaign.’’. 

SEC. 8. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. 

(a) STRATEGIC PLAN; PUBLIC-PRIVATE CONSORTIUMS.—Title III of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 181 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 

following new section: 

‘‘SEC. 318. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, 

shall submit to Congress a strategic plan to guide the overall direction of Federal 

physical security and cybersecurity technology research and development efforts for 

protecting critical infrastructure, including against all threats. Such plan shall be 

updated and submitted to Congress every two years. 

‘‘(b) CONTENTS OF PLAN.—The strategic plan, including biennial updates, required 

under subsection (a) shall include the following: 

‘‘(1) An identification of critical infrastructure security risks and any associated security technology gaps, that are developed following— 

‘‘(A) consultation with stakeholders, including critical infrastructure Sector Coordinating Councils; and 

‘‘(B) performance by the Department of a risk and gap analysis that considers information received in such consultations. 

‘‘(2) A set of critical infrastructure security technology needs that— 

‘‘(A) is prioritized based on the risks and gaps identified under paragraph 

(1); 

‘‘(B) emphasizes research and development of technologies that need to be 

accelerated due to rapidly evolving threats or rapidly advancing infrastructure technology; and 

‘‘(C) includes research, development, and acquisition roadmaps with clearly defined objectives, goals, and measures. 

‘‘(3) An identification of laboratories, facilities, modeling, and simulation capabilities that will be required to support the research, development, demonstration, testing, evaluation, and acquisition of the security technologies described 

in paragraph (2). 

‘‘(4) An identification of current and planned programmatic initiatives for fostering the rapid advancement and deployment of security technologies for critical infrastructure protection, including a consideration of opportunities for public-private partnerships, intragovernment collaboration, university centers of excellence, and national laboratory technology transfer. 

‘‘(5) A description of progress made with respect to each critical infrastructure 

security risk, associated security technology gap, and critical infrastructure 

technology need identified in the preceding strategic plan required under subsection (a). 

‘‘(c) COORDINATION.—In carrying out this section, the Under Secretary for Science 

and Technology shall coordinate with the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate. 

‘‘(d) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the Under Secretary for Science 

and Technology shall consult with— 

‘‘(1) critical infrastructure Sector Coordinating Councils; 

‘‘(2) to the extent practicable, subject matter experts on critical infrastructure 

protection from universities, colleges, national laboratories, and private industry; 

‘‘(3) the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies that conduct research and development relating to critical infrastructure protection; and 

‘‘(4) State, local, and tribal governments, as appropriate.’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 317 the following 

new item: 

‘‘Sec. 318. Research and development strategy for critical infrastructure protection.’’. 

SEC. 9. REPORT ON REDUCING CYBERSECURITY RISKS IN DHS DATA CENTERS. 

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the feasibility of the Department of Homeland Security creating an environment for the reduction in cybersecurity risks in 

Department data centers, including by increasing compartmentalization between 

systems, and providing a mix of security controls between such compartments. 


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SEC. 10. ASSESSMENT. 

Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 

Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that contains an assessment of the 

implementation by the Secretary of Homeland Security of this Act and the amendments made by this Act and, to the extent practicable, findings regarding increases 

in the sharing of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information relating to cybersecurity risks and incidents at the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center and throughout the United States. 

SEC. 11. CONSULTATION. 

The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection shall 

produce a report on the feasibility of creating a risk-informed prioritization plan 

should multiple critical infrastructures experience cyber incidents simultaneously. 

SEC. 12. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. 

The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security shall review the 

operations of the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 

and the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) 

to assess the capacity to provide technical assistance to non-Federal entities and to 

adequately respond to potential increases in requests for technical assistance. 

SEC. 13. PROHIBITION ON NEW REGULATORY AUTHORITY. 

Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act may be construed to 

grant the Secretary of Homeland Security any authority to promulgate regulations 

or set standards relating to the cybersecurity of non-Federal entities, not including 

State, local, and tribal governments, that was not in effect on the day before the 

date of the enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 14. SUNSET. 

Any requirements for reports required by this Act or the amendments made by 

this Act shall terminate on the date that is seven years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 15. PROHIBITION ON NEW FUNDING. 

No funds are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act and the amendments made by this Act. This Act and such amendments shall be carried out using 

amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for such purposes. 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The purpose of H.R. 1731 is to amend the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 to enhance multi-directional sharing of information related 

to cybersecurity risks, while strengthening privacy and civil liberties protections, in order to help secure the nation’s cyber networks and critical infrastructure against attacks. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Despite the growing acknowledgement and understanding of the 

threat, the U.S. economy and private citizens continue to sustain 

damage from cyber attacks. The destructive attack on Sony Pictures attributed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and 

breaches at health insurance providers Anthem and Blue Cross, 

which compromised sensitive medical records of millions of Americans, are the latest and most prominent examples of intrusions 

that occur daily, targeting critical infrastructure and business, and 

victimizing private citizens. 

The Department of Homeland Security (Department) estimates 

that it received nearly 100,000 cyber incident reports, detected 

64,000 major vulnerabilities, issued nearly 12,000 alerts or warnings, and responded to 115 major cyber incidents last year alone. 

It is important to note that these numbers only capture the information reported to the Department. It is fair to say these statistics 

under-represent the full scope of cyber attacks in the U.S. MoreVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:44 Apr 18, 2015 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR083.XXX HR083

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1 Katie Zezima, ‘‘Obama Signs Executive Order on Sharing Cybersecurity Threat Information’’, Washington Post, February 12, 2015, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 

blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/02/12/obama-to-sign-executive-order-on-cybersecurity-threats/ 2 Ibid 

over, they do not account for threat reporting to other Federal 

agencies, or incidents that went unreported by the private sector 

and the public. Still, these numbers provide a powerful illustration 

of the malicious nature and the persistence of the threats to America’s public and private networks, further demonstrating why legislation to help enhance our awareness of the threat through multidirectional information sharing is urgently needed. 

At a summit on cybersecurity convened at Stanford University on 

February 13, 2015, President Obama said that cyberattacks are 

one of the Nation’s most pressing national security, economic and 

safety issues. He remarked that they are, ‘‘hurting American companies and costing American jobs.’’ In his speech, the President 

said that ‘‘there is only one way to defend America from these 

cyber threats, and that is through government and industry working together, sharing information as true partners.’’ 

While the President’s Executive Order ‘‘Promoting Private Sector 

Cybersecurity Information Sharing’’ was a positive step forward, focusing attention on the need for action, Mastercard Chief Executive 

Officer Ajay Banga rightly concluded, ‘‘We need a real legislative 

solution. An executive action can only take you so far.’’1 Mr. Banga 

also expressed his support for information sharing commenting, 

‘‘Rather than fight this in individualized groups, there’s some merit 

in joining hands and doing it together.’’2 This statement aligns 

with the goals industry has articulated to the Committee while 

drafting this legislation. 

The National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 

(NCPA Act) will support the Department in its mission to secure 

cyberspace by facilitating cooperation between the Federal government and the private sector. While there have been many reasons 

for the lack of cyber threat information sharing in the past, this 

gap must be addressed to stop criminals, terrorists, and nation 

states from exploiting our Nation’s sensitive intellectual property 

and personal data. One way to foster greater sharing of timely 

cyber threat information is to create a mechanism for the sharing 

of threat information with privacy protections and legal ‘‘safe harbors’’ in which companies can exchange technical data. 

The NCPA Act builds on the progress made in the 113th Congress. The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 codified 

the Department’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) to facilitate multi-directional information 

sharing between the Federal Government and the private sector. 

As the lead civilian interface for sharing cyber threat information 

with the government, the NCCIC is uniquely positioned as a sharing hub to integrate information from multiple sources, and use it 

to provide government agencies and the private sector with actionable information to recognize, prevent and mitigate harm from 

cyber attacks. 

As codified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the NCCIC is 

overseen by the Department’s Privacy Office, which is the government’s first statutorily established office with a mandate to protect 

civil rights and liberties. In order to prevent personal information 


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from inadvertently being shared, the NCPA Act ensures that private information is scrubbed twice: first by the entity sharing the 

information with the NCCIC, and then again by the NCCIC after 

it is received. These built-in privacy controls at the Department are 

important factors that make the Department the logical choice for 

an interface to facilitate cyber information sharing and explain why 

privacy advocates have expressed support for the NCCIC’s role as 

the lead civilian information-sharing portal. 

The NCPA Act authorizes entities to engage in the voluntary exchange of cyber threat information and to conduct network awareness and defensive measures on their own systems. The Act provides liability protections for private entities that conduct network 

awareness or voluntary shame technical cyber threat information 

with the another private entity or the NCCIC. Thus, the NCPA Act 

creates a critical ‘‘safe harbor’’ for private entities, encouraging 

their participation and cooperation. 

In sum, this much-needed Act will help improve the situational 

awareness of the government and the private sector to ensure that 

private networks, including critical infrastructure networks, remain reliable and resilient, thereby enhancing the Nation’s economic security and safety of the American public. 

HEARINGS

No hearings were held on H.R. 1731. However, the Committee 

held the following oversight hearings. 

On February 12, 2015, the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies held a hearing 

entitled ‘‘Emerging Threats and Technologies to Protect the Homeland.’’ The Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. Andy 

Ozment, Assistant Secretary, Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Dr. Huban Gowadia, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Joseph Martin, Acting Director, Homeland Security Enterprise and First Responders Group, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. William 

Noonan, Deputy Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Investigative 

Division, Cyber Operations Branch, United States Secret Service, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Mr. William Painter, 

Analyst, Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 

On February 25, 2015, the Committee held a hearing entitled 

‘‘Examining the President’s Cybersecurity Information Sharing Proposal.’’ The Committee received testimony from Hon. Suzanne 

Spaulding, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Dr. Phyllis 

Schneck, Deputy Under Secretary, Cybersecurity and Communications, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Dr. Eric Fischer, Senior Specialist, 

Science and Technology, Congressional Research Service, Library of 

Congress. 

On March 4, 2015, the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies held a hearing entitled ‘‘Industry Perspectives on the President’s Cybersecurity Information Sharing Proposal.’’ The Subcommittee received testimony 


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from Mr. Matthew J. Eggers, Senior Director, National Security 

and Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Ms. 

Mary Ellen Callahan, Jenner & Block and the Former Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Gregory 

T. Garcia, Executive Director, Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council; and Dr. Martin Libicki, The RAND Corporation. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

The Committee met on April 14, 2015, to consider H.R. 1731, and 

ordered the measure to be reported to the House with a favorable 

recommendation, as amended, by voice vote. The Committee took 

the following actions: 

The Committee agreed to H.R. 1731, amended, by voice vote. 

The following amendments were offered: 

An amendment offered by MR. ROGERS of Alabama (#1) was 

AGREED TO by voice vote. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, in the proposed subsection (i)(3), add at the end a new Subparagraph 

entitled ‘‘(E) Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR. THOMPSON of Mississippi (#2) was 

AGREED TO by voice vote. 

Redesignate section 8 as section 9. 

Insert after section 7 a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 8. Assessment.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR. THOMPSON of Mississippi (#3) was 

NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 10 yeas and 15 nays (Roll 

Call Vote No. 12). 

Redesignate section 8 as section 9. 

Insert after section 7 a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 8. Sunset.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR. RICHMOND (#4) was NOT AGREED 

TO by a recorded vote of 11 yeas and 16 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 

13). 

In section 3 of the bill, in the proposed subsection (i) of the second section 226 

of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, insert a new paragraph entitled ‘‘(8) Liability Exemptions.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR. RICHMOND (#5) was NOT AGREED 

TO by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 17 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 

14). 

In section 3 of the bill, in the proposed subsection (i)(8) of the second section 226 

of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, strike ‘‘or in good faith fails to act based 

on such sharing,’’. 

In section 3 of the bill, in the proposed subsection (i)(8) of the second section 226 

of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, add at the end the a new subparagraph 

entitled ‘‘(E) Rule of Construction.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR. RICHMOND (#6) was AGREED TO by 

voice vote, 

Page 11, line 19, strike ‘‘and’’. 

Page 11, line 20, strike ‘‘(iv)’’ and insert ‘‘(v)’’. 

Page 11, beginning line 20, insert the following: 

(iv) in subparagraph (F), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

Page 11, line 23, insert ‘‘and’’ after the semicolon. 

Page 11, beginning line 24, insert the following: 

(vi) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(H) the Center ensures that it shares information relating to cybersecurity 

risks and incidents with small and medium-sized businesses, as appropriate;’’. 


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An amendment offered by MR. RICHMOND (#7) was NOT AGREED 

TO by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 17 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 

15). 

In section 3 of the bill, in the proposed Subsection (i)(9)(C) of the second section 

226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, insert ‘‘the discovery of’’ before ‘‘the 

date of the violation’’. 

An amendment offered by MR. PERRY (#8) was AGREED TO by 

voice vote. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, add at the end a new clause entitled ‘‘(j) Direct Reporting.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR. KATKO (#9) was AGREED TO by 

voice vote, 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, add at the end a new clause entitled ‘‘(j) Additional Responsibilities.’’ 

An en bloc amendment offered by MR. KEATING (#10) was AGREED 

TO by voice vote. 

Consisting of the following amendments: 

An amendment : Redesignate section 8 as section 9. 

Insert after section 7 a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 8. Technical Assistance.’’ 

An amendment : In section 3(4) of the bill, amending the second section 226 of 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002, add at the end a new clause entitled ‘‘(j) Reports on International Cooperation. 

An en bloc amendment offered by MS. MCSALLY (#11) was 

AGREED TO by voice vote. 

Consisting of the following amendments: 

An amendment: In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, in subsection (c), in the proposed paragraph (9), 

insert ‘‘and with State and major urban area fusion centers, as appropriate’’ before the semicolon at the end. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, in subsection (c), in the proposed paragraph (10), strike ‘‘and’’ at the 

end. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, in subsection (c), in the proposed paragraph (11), strike the period 

at the end and insert a semicolon. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, in subsection (c), add at the end the following: 

‘‘(12) participating, as appropriate, in exercises run by the Department’s National 

Exercise Program; and 

‘‘(13) assessing and evaluating consequence, vulnerability, and threat information 

regarding cyber incidents in coordination with the Office of Emergency Communications of the Department to help facilitate continuous improvements to the security and resiliency of public safety communications.’’ 

An amendment: Redesignate section 8 as section 9. 

Insert after section 7 a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 8. Cyber Incident Response 

Plans.’’ 

An amendment offered by MRS. WATSON COLEMAN (#12) was 

AGREED TO by voice vote. 

Redesignate section 8 as section 9. 

Insert after section 7 a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 8. Cybersecurity Awareness 

Campaign.’’ 

An en bloc amendment offered by MS. JACKSON LEE (#13) was 

AGREED TO by voice vote. 

Consisting of the following amendments: 

An amendment: Redesignate section 8 as section 9.Insert after section 7 a new 

section entitled ‘‘Sec. 8. Consultation.’’ 

An amendment: Page 10, line 16, after ‘‘defensive measures: insert ‘‘, analysis’’. 


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An amendment: In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, in the proposed subsection (i)(6)(A), add at the 

end a new clause entitled ‘‘(iv) Consultation.’’ 

An amendment: Page 11, line 19, insert ‘‘, and by striking ‘and’ at the end’’ before 

the semicolon. 

Page 11, line 23, insert ‘‘, by inserting ‘and’ after the semicolon at the end’’ before 

the semicolon. 

Page 11, beginning line 24, insert the following: 

(V) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ‘‘(H) an agency contact 

for nongovernment entities;’’. 

An amendment offered by MR. RATCLIFFE (#14) was AGREED TO 

by voice vote. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section of 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, in the proposed subsection (i)(8(A), strike ‘‘in good faith’’. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, in the proposed subsection (i)(8)(B), strike ‘‘in good faith’’ each place 

it appears. 

An amendment offered by MR. RATCLIFFE (#15) was AGREED TO 

by voice vote. 

In section 2 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, in the proposed subsection (i)(7)(B)(i), in subclause (III), strike ‘‘and’’ 

at the end. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, in the proposed subsection (i)(7)(B)(i), in subclause (IV) strike the period at the end and insert ‘‘: and’’. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, in the proposed subsection (i)(7)(B)(i), add at the end the following; 

‘‘(V) may not be used to engage in surveillance or other collection activities for 

the purpose of tracking an individual’s personally identifiable information.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR. RATCLIFFE (#16) was AGREED TO 

by voice vote. 

Redesignate section 8 as section 9. 

Insert after section 7 a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 8. Critical Infrastructure Protection Research and Development.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR. PAYNE (#17) was AGREED TO by 

voice vote. 

In section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, add at the end a new clause entitled ‘‘(j) Outreach.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR. HURD of Texas (#18) was AGREED 

TO by voice vote. 

Page 9, line 14, strike ‘‘(I) and insert ‘‘(J)’’. 

Page 11, line 7, strike ‘‘and’’. 

Page 11, beginning line 8, insert the following: 

‘‘(I) an entity that coordinates with small and medium sized businesses; and’’. 

An en bloc amendment offered by Mr. Langevin (#19); was 

AGREED TO by voice vote. 

Consisting of the following amendments: 

An amendment: in section 3 of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, in the proposed subsection (i)(1)(A), in the third 

sentence, strike ‘‘and intentionally’’. 

An amendment: In section 3(4) of the bill, amending the second section 226 of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, amend the proposed subsection (g)(1) with a new 

subsection entitled (1) In General.’’ 

An amendment offered by MR, LOUDERMILK (#20) was AGREED 

TO by voice vote. 

Redesignate section 8 as section 9. 

Insert after section 7 a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 8. Sunset.’’ 


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COMMITTEE VOTES

Clause 3(b) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. 

An amendment offered by MR. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI (#3) 

was NOT AGREED TO, by a recorded vote of 10 yeas and 15 nays 

(Roll Call Vote No. 12). The vote was as follows: 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

ROLL CALL NO. 12 

H.R. 1731 

Representative Yea Nay Representative Yea Nay 

Mr. McCaul, 

Chair.

X Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, 

Ranking Member.

X 

Mr. Smith of Texas ........................ Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California 

Mr. King of New York .................... X Ms. Jackson Lee ........................... X 

Mr. Rogers of Alabama ................. X Mr. Langevin ................................. X 

Mrs. Miller of Michigan ................. X Mr. Higgins ................................... X 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina ...... Mr. Richmond ............................... X 

Mr. Marino ..................................... Mr. Keating ...................................

Mr. Meehan .................................... X Mr. Payne ...................................... X 

Mr. Barletta ................................... X Mr. Vela ........................................ X 

Mr. Perry ........................................ X Mrs. Watson Coleman .................. X 

Mr. Clawson of Florida .................. X Miss Rice ...................................... X 

Mr. Katko ....................................... X Mrs. Torres .................................... X 

Mr. Hurd of Texas .......................... X 

Mr. Carter of Georgia .................... X 

Mr. Walker ..................................... X 

Mr. Loudermilk ............................... X 

Ms. McSally ................................... X 

Mr. Ratcliffe .................................. X 

Vote Total: 10 15 

An amendment offered by MR. RICHMOND (#4) was NOT 

AGREED TO, by a recorded vote of 11 yeas and 16 nays (Roll Call 

Vote No. 13). The vote was as follows: 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

ROLL CALL NO. 13 

H.R. 1731 

Representative Yea Nay Representative Yea Nay 

Mr. McCaul, Chair ......................... X Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, 

Ranking Member.

X 

Mr. Smith of Texas ........................ X Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California 

Mr. King of New York .................... X Ms. Jackson Lee ........................... X 

Mr. Rogers of Alabama ................. X Mr. Langevin ................................. X 

Mrs. Miller of Michigan ................. X Mr. Higgins ................................... X 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina ...... Mr. Richmond ............................... X 

Mr. Marino ..................................... Mr. Keating ................................... X 

Mr. Meehan .................................... X Mr. Payne ...................................... X 


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Representative Yea Nay Representative Yea Nay 

Mr. Barletta ................................... X Mr. Vela ........................................ X 

Mr. Perry ........................................ X Mrs. Watson Coleman .................. X 

Mr. Clawson of Florida .................. X Miss Rice ...................................... X 

Mr. Katko ....................................... X Mrs. Torres .................................... X 

Mr. Hurd of Texas .......................... X 

Mr. Carter of Georgia .................... X 

Mr. Walker ..................................... X 

Mr. Loudermilk ............................... X 

Ms. McSally ................................... X 

Mr. Ratcliffe .................................. X 

Vote Total: 11 16 

An amendment offered by MR. RICHMOND (#5) was NOT 

AGREED TO, by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 17 nays (Roll Call 

Vote No. 14). The vote was as follows: 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

ROLL CALL NO. 14 

H.R. 1731 

Representative Yea Nay Representative Yea Nay 

Mr. McCaul, Chair ......................... X Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, 

Ranking Member.

X 

Mr. Smith of Texas ........................ X Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California X 

Mr. King of New York .................... X Ms. Jackson Lee ........................... X 

Mr. Rogers of Alabama ................. X Mr. Langevin ................................. X 

Mrs. Miller of Michigan ................. X Mr. Higgins ................................... X 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina ...... Mr. Richmond ............................... X 

Mr. Marino ..................................... X Mr. Keating ................................... X 

Mr. Meehan .................................... X Mr. Payne ...................................... X 

Mr. Barletta ................................... X Mr. Vela ........................................ X 

Mr. Perry ........................................ X Mrs. Watson Coleman .................. X 

Mr. Clawson of Florida .................. X Miss Rice ...................................... X 

Mr. Katko ....................................... X Mrs. Torres .................................... X 

Mr. Hurd of Texas .......................... X 

Mr. Carter of Georgia .................... X 

Mr. Walker ..................................... X 

Mr. Loudermilk ............................... X 

Ms. McSally ................................... X 

Mr. Ratcliffe .................................. X 

Vote Total: 12 17 

An amendment offered by MR. RICHMOND (#7) was NOT 

AGREED TO, by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 17 nays (Roll Call 

Vote No. 15). The vote was as follows: 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

ROLL CALL NO. 15 

H.R. 1731 


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Representative Yea Nay Representative Yea Nay 

Mr. McCaul, Chair ......................... X Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, 

Ranking Member.

X 

Mr. Smith of Texas ........................ X Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California X 

Mr. King of New York .................... X Ms. Jackson Lee ........................... X 

Mr. Rogers of Alabama ................. X Mr. Langevin ................................. X 

Mrs. Miller of Michigan ................. X Mr. Higgins ................................... X 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina ...... Mr. Richmond ............................... X 

Mr. Marino ..................................... X Mr. Keating ................................... X 

Mr. Meehan .................................... X Mr. Payne ...................................... X 

Mr. Barletta ................................... X Mr. Vela ........................................ X 

Mr. Perry ........................................ X Mrs. Watson Coleman .................. X 

Mr. Clawson of Florida .................. X Miss Rice ...................................... X 

Mr. Katko ....................................... X Mrs. Torres .................................... X 

Mr. Hurd of Texas .......................... X 

Mr. Carter of Georgia .................... X 

Mr. Walker ..................................... X 

Mr. Loudermilk ............................... X 

Ms. McSally ................................... X 

Mr. Ratcliffe .................................. X 

Vote Total: 12 17 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee has held oversight hearings and 

made findings that are reflected in this report. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX

EXPENDITURES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee finds that H.R. 1731, the 

National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, would 

result in no new or increased budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by 

the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, April 16, 2015. 

Hon. MICHAEL MCCAUL, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1731, the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason Wheelock. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL, 

Director. 


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Enclosure. 

H.R. 1731—National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 

2015 

H.R. 1731 would largely codify the role of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center of the Department 

of Homeland Security in exchanging information about cyber 

threats with other federal agencies and nonfederal entities. The 

legislation also would require that certain additional procedures be 

followed when that information is shared, such as checking for and 

expunging personal information. Finally, the bill would require several reports to the Congress on cybersecurity information sharing. 

CBO anticipates that approximately 20 additional personnel would 

be needed to administer the new aspects of the program, prepare 

the required reports, and manage the exchange of information. 

Based on information from the Department of Homeland Security, 

the Office of Management and Budget, and other cybersecurity experts, CBO estimates that the requirements imposed by H.R. 1731 

would cost approximately $20 million over the 2016–2020 period, 

assuming appropriation of the estimated amounts. 

H.R. 1731 would make the government liable if an agency or department violates privacy and civil liberty guidelines and restrictions on the use of information required by the bill. While such liability could result in additional direct spending, CBO does not 

have sufficient basis to estimate the type or frequency of violations 

or the budgetary effect that might occur if the legislation was enacted. Because the bill could affect direct spending, pay-as-you-go 

procedures apply. H.R. 1731 would not affect revenues. 

H.R. 1731 would impose intergovernmental and private-sector 

mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

(UMRA), by extending civil and criminal liability protection to cybersecurity providers and other entities that monitor, share, or use 

information on cyber threats. Doing so would prevent public and 

private entities from seeking compensation for damages from those 

protected entities for sharing or using cybersecurity information. 

The bill also would impose additional intergovernmental mandates 

on state and local governments by preempting disclosure and liability laws and by preempting any laws that restrict the cybersecurity 

monitoring, sharing, and countermeasure activities authorized by 

the bill. Because of uncertainty about the number of cases that 

would be limited and any foregone compensation that would result 

from compensatory damages that might otherwise go to private-sector entities, CBO cannot determine whether the costs of the mandate would exceed the annual thresholds established in UMRA for 

private-sector mandates ($154 million in 2015, adjusted annually 

for inflation). The amount of cybersecurity information shared by 

state, local, and tribal governments is much smaller than that 

shared by the private sector, and public entities are much less likely to bring lawsuits as plaintiffs in such cases. Consequently, CBO 

estimates that the aggregate costs of the mandates on public entities would fall below the threshold for intergovernmental mandates 

($77 million in 2015, adjusted annually for inflation). 

On April 13, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 

1560 as ordered reported by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on March 26, 2015, and on April 14, 2015, 


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CBO transmitted a cost estimate for S. 754 as reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 17, 2015. Both bills 

are similar to H.R. 1731, but each contains provisions not included 

in H.R. 1731 that would allow the government to use information 

shared by nonfederal entities in investigating and prosecuting certain violent crimes. In addition, H.R. 1560 contains a provision not 

included in H.R. 1731 that would establish a National Cyber 

Threat Intelligence Integration Center. Differences in the estimated costs of these bills reflect differences in the legislative language. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jason Wheelock. The 

estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director for 

Budget Analysis. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 1731 contains the following general performance goals and objectives, including outcome related goals and 

objectives authorized. 

H.R. 1731 seeks to enhance multi-directional sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks, while also strengthening privacy 

and civil liberties protections, in order to help secure the nation’s 

cyber networks and critical infrastructure against attacks. The legislation requires a number of reports to Congress from the Department, the Department’s Privacy Officer, and the Department’s Office of Inspector General that will provide insight to Congress on 

the scope of information sharing, the NCCIC’s role in facilitating 

cyber information sharing, and any privacy and civil liberties concerns that have been raised as a result of this effort. 

DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Pursuant to clause 3(c) of Rule XIII, the Committee finds that 

H.R. 1731 does not contain any provision that establishes or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another Federal program. 

CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED

TARIFF BENEFITS

In compliance with Rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in 

clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of the Rule XXI. 

FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 

pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 

PREEMPTION CLARIFICATION

In compliance with section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act 

of 1974, requiring the report of any Committee on a bill or joint 

resolution to include a statement on the extent to which the bill or 

joint resolution is intended to preempt State, local, or Tribal law, 


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the Committee finds that H.R. 1731 does preempt all State, local, 

or Tribal law that restricts or otherwise expressly regulates an activity that is authorized under this legislation with respect to a 

Federal civilian cybersecurity information sharing program. 

DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULE MAKINGS

The Committee estimates that H.R. 1731 would require no directed rule makings. 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. 

APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the 

terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or 

accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short Title. 

This section provides that the bill may be cited as the ‘‘National 

Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015.’’ 

Section 2. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center. 

This section amends subsection (a) of the second section 226 (6 

U.S. Code 148) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding 

definitions of terms used in the bill, including: ‘‘cyber threat indicator’’, ‘‘cybersecurity purpose’’, ‘‘defensive measure’’, ‘‘network 

awareness’’, ‘‘private entity’’, ‘‘security control’’, and ‘‘sharing’’. 

Section 3. Information Sharing Structure and Process. 

This section amends subsection (a) of the second section 226 of 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 as described below. 

Amendments to the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center. 

This section amends the functions of the NCCIC. It designates 

the NCCIC as the ‘‘lead Federal civilian interface’’ for multi-directional and cross-sector information sharing related to cybersecurity. 

It also adds cyber threat indicators and defensive measures to 

the types of technical threat data that the NCCIC will collect, analyze, and share to provide enhanced situational awareness to Federal, non-Federal and private entities. It directs the NCCIC to 

share information relating to cybersecurity risks and incidents with 

small and medium-sized businesses, as appropriate. The Committee believes that the NCCIC should strive to partner with small 

and medium-sized businesses for cybersecurity risks and incidents, 

and seeks to emphasize this in the legislation. 

It directs the NCCIC to promptly notify the Secretary of Homeland Security (the Secretary) and Congress of any significant violations of information sharing policies and procedures, and promptly 


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notify non-Federal entities that have shared information that is 

known or determined to be in error. The Committee understands 

that certain entities have pre-existing relationships with other Federal civilian portals representing their specific critical infrastructure sectors, and those entities will be able to maintain those relationships for information sharing related to cybersecurity. As the 

lead civilian interface for sharing cyber threat information with the 

Government, the NCCIC is uniquely positioned as a sharing hub 

to integrate information from multiple sources, and use the information to Government Agencies and the private sector with actionable information to recognize and stop attacks before harm is done. 

The Committee believes that the NCCIC should coordinate with 

other Federal civilian portals to ensure that it receives and shares 

relevant cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. 

This section directs the NCCIC to engage with international 

partners on cybersecurity, and expands the composition of the 

NCCIC to include an entity to collaborate with state and local governments; the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to coordinate information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents 

and provide technical assistance; the Industrial Control System 

Cyber Emergency Response Team to coordinate with industrial 

control systems owners and operators; and the National Coordinating Center for Communications to coordinate the resilience and 

recovery of national security emergency communications. The Committee recognizes that the entities described above play a critical 

role in the Department’s ability to execute its cybersecurity mission, and seeks to codify their functions and statutory roles within 

the NCCIC in this section. 

H.R. 1731 amends second section 226, the provisions of which are 

described below: 

(g) Rapid Automated Sharing. 

This subsection requires the Under Secretary for Cybersecurity 

and Infrastructure Protection, in coordination with industry and 

other stakeholders, to develop an automated capability for the 

timely sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. 

It also directs the NCCIC to develop the capability to share cyber 

threat indicators and defensive measures with each Federal Agency 

designated as the ‘Sector Specific Agency’ (SSA) for each critical infrastructure sector in as close to real time as practicable. It directs 

the Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection to submit a biannual report to the appropriate congressional 

committees on the progress of developing this capability. The Committee believes that it is critical for the Department to develop an 

automated system and supporting processes for the NCCIC to disseminate cyber threat indicators and defensive measures in a timely manner. The Committee recognizes that timely sharing is compatible with reasonable efforts at minimization, particularly if the 

information shared is cyber threat indicator information. 

(h) Sector Specific Agencies 

This subsection directs the Secretary to recognize the SSA for 

each critical infrastructure sector based on the Department’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan as of March 25, 2015. It directs the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of each SSA, to 


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support the security and resilience activities of the specific sectors, 

provide institutional knowledge and expertise, and support timely 

sharing of information. The Committee believes that SSAs play a 

central role in cybersecurity information sharing within their respective sector and wants to ensure that the NCCIC has the procedures and capabilities in place to facilitate information sharing 

with each SSA. 

(i) Voluntary Information Sharing Procedures 

Subsection (i) outlines the information sharing procedures and 

permits the NCCIC to enter into voluntary information sharing relationships with any consenting non-Federal entity for the sharing 

of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for cybersecurity 

purposes. To prevent personal information from inadvertently 

being shared, the non-Federal entity sharing the information is required to remove all personal information unrelated to the cybersecurity risk before sharing with the NCCIC or other non-Federal entities. This subsection outlines the information sharing agreements, 

authorizations, civil liberty and information protections, and antitrust exemption of these relationships. 

The Committee believes that sharing cybersecurity information is 

a voluntary decision. In order to encourage the sharing of cybersecurity information to secure the nation’s cyber networks and critical infrastructure against attacks, the Committee believes that 

any non-Federal entity can voluntarily enter into an information 

sharing relationship with the NCCIC. This relationship is dependent on adherence to information protection and privacy and civil 

liberties protections, in return for receiving a legal ‘‘safe harbor’’ for 

appropriately sharing technical data about cyber threat indicators 

and defensive measures. The Committee believes technical data to 

mean the specific composition, or the ‘‘bits and bytes,’’ that make 

up cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. 

(2) Agreements 

Subsection (i)(2) allows the Center to utilize standard and negotiated agreements as the types of agreements that non-Federal entities may enter into with the NCCIC for the purposes of this Act. 

However, it makes clear that agreements are not limited to just 

these types, and pre-existing agreements between the NCCIC and 

the non-Federal entity will be in compliance with this section. 

The Committee believes that there are various ways to structure 

agreements, with the primary types being standard and negotiated 

agreements. The Department should develop a standard template 

that will inform entities on the expectations and requirements of 

sharing cybersecurity information with the NCCIC. It may turn out 

that, in some cases, standardized terms of use agreements will suffice. However, for those entities that have specific requirements, 

they should be able to negotiate with the Department on specific 

terms, so long as foundational privacy protections are maintained. 

Due to the fact information sharing under this Act is a voluntary 

activity, the Committee also recognizes that an entity may not feel 

the need to have any agreement with the NCCIC, but may still 

want to share cybersecurity information. 


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(3) Information Sharing Authorization 

Subsection (i)(3) authorizes a non-Federal entity to share cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures obtained from its own information system or, with written consent, from an information 

system of another Federal or non-Federal entity, with another nonFederal entity and the NCCIC for cybersecurity purposes. It requires that recipients of this information comply with lawful restrictions on sharing or use. It also requires a recipient of information from another Federal or non-Federal entity to comply with 

lawful restrictions placed on the information by the sharing Federal or non-Federal entity. 

This subsection also requires the Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, in coordination with industry 

and other stakeholders to develop and adhere to policies and procedures for coordinating vulnerability disclosures, to the extent practicable, with international standards in the information technology 

industry. 

The Committee believes that in order to facilitate robust information sharing, non-Federal entities need the right to place lawful restrictions on the use of the technical data they are sharing, and 

that these restrictions must be respected by the recipients of the 

information. 

This subsection also requires a non-Federal entity to take reasonable efforts to remove information that could be used to identify 

specific persons reasonably believed at the time of sharing to be 

unrelated to a cybersecurity threat, and safeguard information that 

can be used to identify specific persons from unintended disclosure 

and unauthorized access or acquisition. 

The Committee’s intent in this section is to specifically forbid 

non-Federal entities from sharing data that has not had personal 

information unrelated to the cybersecurity risk removed by the 

non-Federal entity prior to sharing. Additionally, the NCCIC is required to review the same cybersecurity threat indicator or defensive measure information and destroy any personal information unrelated to the cybersecurity risk prior to sharing with any other 

Federal or non-Federal entity. 

The purpose of this legislation is to secure the nation’s cyber networks and private citizen’s sensitive digital information. The Committee believes that in order to ensure that privacy is protected 

when cyber security information is shared, and to build trust in 

this effort, the public must feel confident that companies and the 

government have robust controls in place to remove any specific 

personal information not related to the cyber attack, and safeguard 

it from unintended disclosure and unauthorized use or acquisition. 

(4) Network Awareness Authorization 

Subsection (i)(4) authorizes a non-Federal entity, not including a 

State, local, or Tribal government, to conduct network awareness 

of its own information system, or the information system of another 

non-Federal or Federal entity with written consent, for cybersecurity purposes. 

(5) Defensive Measure Authorization 

Subsection (i)(5) authorizes a non-Federal entity, not including a 

State, local, or Tribal government, to conduct network awareness 


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defensive measure that is applied only to its own information system, or the information system of another non-Federal or Federal 

entity with written consent, for cybersecurity purposes. 

The Committee does not intend the language of the Act to authorize a private company to ‘‘hack’’ (knowingly access a protected 

computer without authorization, or to intentionally access a protected computer to cause damage) the computer of another entity. 

The intent is only to authorize the use of defensive measures— 

not countermeasures. This authorization does not allow a measure 

that destroys, renders unusable, or substantially harms an information system not belonging to that company without authorization. 

(6) Privacy and Civil Liberties Protections 

Subsection (i)(6) requires the Under Secretary in coordination 

with the Chief Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and 

Civil Liberties at the Department to establish and annually review 

policies and procedures for the Department that govern the receipt, 

retention, use, and disclosure of cyber threat indicators and information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents. 

This subsection requires that certain policies and procedures to 

minimize any impact on privacy and civil liberties should be established consistent with the need to protect information systems 

from, and conduct mitigation of, cybersecurity risks and incidents 

in a timely manner. 

The subsection requires the Chief Privacy Officer to submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees, no later than 180 

days after enactment of this Act, that describes the policies and 

procedures governing the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. The subsection also requires the Chief Privacy 

Officer to monitor the implementation of these policies and procedures, and regularly review and update privacy impact assessments to ensure all relevant constitutional, legal, and privacy protections are being followed. The subsection further requires the 

Chief Privacy Officer to submit an annual report to Congress on 

the effectiveness of these policies and procedures, ensuring appropriate sanctions are in place for employees, agents, and contractors 

of the Department who intentionally or willfully conduct unauthorized activities under this section. 

Additionally, the subsection requires the Undersecretary to ensure that a public notice is made of the policies and procedures 

governing the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive 

measures. 

This subsection requires the Department’s Office of the Inspector 

General (DHS OIG) to submit a report to Congress within two 

years of enactment of this Act and periodically thereafter that includes a review of the type of information shared with NCCIC, the 

use of any information and actions taken by NCCIC, and the impact, if any, of sharing of such information on privacy and civil liberties. 

This subsection requires that the Department’s Chief Privacy Officer and Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties also submit a 

report to Congress within two years of enactment of this Act that 

assesses the impact on privacy and civil liberties of the information 

sharing activities under this section. The report shall include apVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:44 Apr 18, 2015 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR083.XXX HR083

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propriate recommendations to minimize or mitigate the impact of 

the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures 

under this section. 

The Committee believes that this legislation strengthens the 

NCCIC’s position as the trusted partner for industry and the public 

by setting forth robust privacy protections and civil liberties standards. To ensure the appropriate protection of individual privacy 

and civil liberties, the Department’s Privacy and Civil Rights and 

Civil Liberties Offices will monitor the NCCIC as it carries out its 

functions. The Committee believes that the required reports in this 

subsection will assist the Department in defining the policies and 

procedures for the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive 

measures with the NCCIC, and provide Congress with assessments 

on the impact to privacy and civil liberties of this information sharing. 

The Committee believes that privacy is further reinforced by requiring non-Federal entities to remove personal information unrelated to a cybersecurity risk or incident before sharing with the 

NCCIC or other non-Federal entities, and further requiring the 

NCCIC to destroy any personal information that is unrelated to the 

cybersecurity risk or incident before further sharing with other 

Federal entities or non-Federal entities. 

(7) Uses and Protection of Information 

This subsection sets forth the roles and responsibilities for nonFederal entities, Federal entities, and State, Tribal, and local governments for using and protecting information shared through the 

NCCIC or otherwise. 

Non-Federal Entities 

Subsection (i)(7) permits a non-Federal entity that shares cybersecurity information with the NCCIC, or another non-Federal entity, to use, retain, or disclose those cyber threat indicators and defensive measures solely for cybersecurity purposes. It requires nonFederal entities to remove information that could be used to identify specific persons reasonably believed at the time of sharing to 

be unrelated to a cybersecurity threat and safeguard information 

that can be used to identify specific persons prior to sharing the information. Non-Federal entities must comply with appropriate restrictions placed on the subsequent disclosure or retention of cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures by a Federal or non-Federal entity. This subsection further stipulates that information 

shared with the NCCIC will be deemed to have been voluntarily 

shared. This subsection requires that a non-Federal entity implements and utilizes a security control to protect against unauthorized access to or acquisition of cyber threat indicators or defensive 

measures, and it prohibits the use of such cyber security information to gain an unfair or competitive advantage over any non-Federal entity. 

Federal Entities 

This subsection permits Federal entities that receive cyber threat 

indicators or defensive measures to use, retain, or further disclose 

this information solely for cybersecurity purposes. This subsection 

requires Federal entities to take reasonable to efforts to remove inVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:44 Apr 18, 2015 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR083.XXX HR083

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formation that could be used to identify specific persons reasonably 

believed at the time of sharing to be unrelated to a cybersecurity 

threat and safeguard information that can be used to identify specific persons prior to sharing the information. This subsection further stipulates that information shared with the NCCIC will be 

deemed to have been voluntarily shared. This subsection requires 

that a Federal entity implements and utilizes a security control to 

protect against unauthorized access to or acquisition of cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures. 

The cybersecurity information is exempt from disclosure under 

the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S. Code 552, or nonFederal disclosure laws and withheld, without discretion, from the 

public under 5 U.S. Code 552(3)B). This subsection allows a Federal or non-Federal entity to designate information shared with the 

Center as commercial, financial, and proprietary information. The 

information shared is prohibited from being used for regulatory 

purposes, and may not constitute a waiver of applicable privileges 

or protections provided by law, including trade secret protections. 

The information is also not subject to judicial doctrine or rules of 

federal entities regarding ex parte communications. 

The Committee believes that in order to encourage entities, particularly businesses, to voluntarily share cybersecurity information 

with the NCCIC, the information shared must be exempt from disclosure laws including FOIA, and be prohibited from being used for 

regulatory purposes. The Committee believes that it is also within 

the right of the entity sharing the information to put certain restrictions on how the information maybe used or further shared, as 

articulated in the legislation. 

The Committee intends this to be a private sector-driven program. The government itself will not conduct any network monitoring. The NCCIC is simply a repository, a hub, for threat information that is identified by private entities and voluntarily shared 

with the government. 

The sole purpose of the activities codified in this legislation is to 

prevent cyber attacks—e.g. the stealing of credit card numbers; the 

shutting down of infrastructure, like a power grid; the shutting 

down of a network—not to collect evidence to prosecute crimes. 

State, Tribal, or Local Government 

This subsection permits State, Tribal or local governments that 

receive cyber threat indicators or defensive measures to use, retain, 

or further disclose this information solely for cybersecurity purposes. It requires prior to sharing that reasonable efforts be made 

to remove information that could be used to identify specific persons reasonably believed to be unrelated to a cybersecurity threat 

and safeguard information that can be used to identify specific persons prior to sharing the information. This subsection allows a Federal or non-Federal entity to designate information shared with the 

Center as commercial, financial, and proprietary information. This 

subsection further stipulates that information shared with the 

NCCIC will be deemed to have been voluntarily shared. This subsection requires that a State, Tribal or local government implement 

and utilize security controls to protect against unauthorized access 

to or acquisition of cyber threat indicators or defensive measures. 

This subsection states that cybersecurity information is exempt 


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from disclosure under State, Tribal or local disclosure laws, and 

may not be used to regulate the lawful activity of a non-Federal entity. 

The Committee believes it is important to re-emphasize that 

prior to sharing entities remove information that can be used to 

identity specific persons and is reasonably believed at the time of 

sharing to be unrelated to a cybersecurity risk or incident. Cybersecurity information that is shared with the NCCIC would then be 

reviewed again prior to the NCCIC sharing it with another entity, 

to ensure that personal information is removed. 

In this section, the Committee expressly states that cyber threat 

indicators and defensive measures may not be used to track individuals for purposes of surveillance. Again, the purpose of this legislation is to help prevent and respond to cyber attacks—not to surveil individuals, or collect evidence to prosecute crimes. 

(8) Liability Exemptions 

Subsection (i)(8) provides that no cause of action shall lie or be 

maintained in any court, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, against any non-Federal entity that conducts network 

awareness or shares cyber threat indicators or defensive measures, 

for cybersecurity purposes, in accordance with paragraphs (4) and 

(3), respectively, and the other provisions in section 3 of the bill. 

This subsection also provides liability protection for a non-Federal 

entity that fails to act upon shared cyber threat indicators or defensive measures. 

However, non-Federal entities do not receive liability protection 

for egregious actions that rise to the level of willful misconduct. 

Willful misconduct is defined in the subsection as an act or omission that is taken intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose, 

knowingly without legal or factual justification, and in disregard of 

a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit. If a plaintiff files suit 

claiming willful misconduct by a non-Federal entity, the plaintiff 

must prove willful misconduct by clear and convincing evidence 

and establish that the non-Federal entity’s willful misconduct 

proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. 

As used in this paragraph, the term ‘‘non-Federal entity’’ does 

not include a State, local, or tribal government. 

This language was developed in coordination with the House Judiciary Committee, which provided standard language for liability 

exemptions for all House-generated cybersecurity related information sharing bills. 

(9) Federal Government Liability for Violations of Restrictions on the Use and Protection of Voluntarily Shared Information 

Subsection (i)(9) provides a clear path for injured persons to sue 

a Federal government department or agency for an intentional or 

willful violation of the uses and protections of voluntarily shared 

cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, or cybersecurity information as laid out in subsections (i)(3), (i)6), and (i)(7)(B), and any 

other applicable provisions of section 3. This subsection further 

provides for statutory damages for such a violation, venue selection 


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for an action under this provision, and the statute of limitations for 

bringing such an action. 

(10) Anti-Trust Exemption 

This subsection exempts non-Federal entities from violations of 

U.S. antitrust law for sharing cybersecurity information, or providing assistance for cybersecurity purposes, provided that the action is taken to assist with preventing, investigating, or mitigating 

a cybersecurity risk or incident. This subsection makes it clear that 

the exemption cannot be utilized for monopolistic activities such as 

price-fixing, or sharing of price or cost information, customer lists, 

or information regarding future planning. 

(11) Construction and Preemption 

Subsection (i)(11) contains a number of construction and preemption provisions that address the scope of the Act. Specifically, the 

provisions address otherwise lawful disclosures and preserve whistleblower protections. Nothing in the Act should be construed to affect any requirements under other provisions of law for non-Federal entities providing information to Federal entities. The provisions preserve existing contractual obligations and rights. They 

also prohibit the Federal government from requiring non-Federal 

entities to provide it with cybersecurity related information as a 

condition for the award of a grant, contract or purchase agreement. 

This subsection reiterates that any sharing of cybersecurity information under this legislation is purely voluntary, and that nonFederal entities are not subject to liability for choosing not to engage in such voluntary information sharing activities. This subsection also does not authorize or modify any existing Federal authority to retain and use cybersecurity information shared under 

the bill for purposes other than those permitted in this Act. This 

legislation also supersedes any provision of state or local law that 

may restrict or otherwise expressly regulate an activity authorized 

under this Act. 

Section 4. Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations. 

This section amends Section 212 of the Homeland Security Act 

to broaden the functions of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) to include cybersecurity risk and incident information beyond that pertaining to critical infrastructure. This 

section also adds references to the definitions of ‘cybersecurity risk’ 

and ‘incident’ as they relate to the NCCIC in the second section 

226 of the Homeland Security Act. 

The Committee believes that ISAOs have an important role to 

play in facilitating information sharing going forward and has 

clarified their functions as defined in the Homeland Security Act. 

The Committee, on a bipartisan basis, views ISAOs, including 

ISACs as tools to expand voluntary information sharing. 

Section 5. Streamlining of Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Organization. 

This section renames The National Protection and Programs Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security, the ‘‘Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Directorate’’. It requires the Secretary to submit a report to Congress on the feasibility of making 


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the Cybersecurity and Communications Office an operational component of the Department. The Committee is pleased that this legislation elevates the role of the NCCIC to a direct report to the Assistant Secretary of Cybersecurity and Communications within the 

Department. The Committee believes this re-organization aligns 

with its goals to reduce the bureaucracy that has stifled the 

NCCIC’s growth to date. 

Nothing in this section should be construed to alter the mission 

or reporting structure of the Office of Emergency Communications. 

Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 571, the Director of the Office of Emergency 

Communications reports to the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications. The Department shall submit any proposed changes to this reporting structure to the Committee for review and approval. 

Section 6. Cyber Incident Response Plans. 

This section requires the Secretary, in coordination with the 

heads of other Federal departments and agencies to update, maintain, and exercise the Cyber Incident Annex to the National Response Framework of the Department. 

Section 7. Security and Resiliency of Public Safety Communications; Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign. 

This section requires the NCCIC, in coordination with the Office 

of Emergency Communications, to assess the effects of cyber incidents on public safety communications. 

This section also requires the Under Secretary for Cybersecurity 

and Infrastructure Protection to develop and implement a cybersecurity awareness campaign regarding cybersecurity risks and voluntary best practices for mitigating and responding to cybersecurity risks. 

The Committee has observed the perceived inadequacy of the Department’s current cybersecurity awareness campaign, STOP. 

THINK. CONNECT.TM While the Department and a coalition of 

private companies, non-profits and government organizations developed and coordinated this message, purported to help all digital 

citizens stay safer and more secure online, the Committee feels 

there needs to be a renewed effort to use and target more widely 

used media and public knowledge bases. 

The Committee believes that the Department should put out effective Public Service announcements, widely advertised web sites, 

apps, written collateral, social media, and other creative sources to 

help folks understand that many simple measures will improve 

their cyber security protection posture. The Committee believes 

that the Department should be offering specific information, not 

just slogans, and advising where to get information along with 

technology-neutral best practices, and working with a wide range 

of stakeholders to get it done. Such measures include simple steps 

like: improving password management; enabling firewall protection; installing anti-virus and anti-spam protection; installing software updates; and refrain from opening links and attachments 

from unknown and untrusted senders. 


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Section 8. Critical Infrastructure Protection Research and Development. 

This section requires the Secretary, acting through the Under 

Secretary for Science and Technology, to submit a strategic plan to 

Congress within 180 days for guiding the direction of Federal physical security and cybersecurity technology research and development efforts for protecting critical infrastructure against all 

threats. 

Section 9. Report on Reducing Cybersecurity Risks in DHS Data 

Centers. 

This section requires the Secretary to submit a report to Congress on the feasibility of the Department creating an environment 

for the reduction of cybersecurity risks at the Department’s data 

centers. 

Section 10. Assessment. 

This section requires the Comptroller General of the United 

States to submit a report to Congress assessing the implementation 

of this Act no later than two years after the date of enactment of 

this Act. 

Section 11. Consultation. 

This section requires the Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and 

Infrastructure Protection to produce a report on the feasibility of 

creating a risk-informed plan should multiple critical infrastructure 

sectors experience cyber incidents simultaneously. 

Section 12. Technical Assistance. 

This section requires the Inspector General of the Department to 

review the operations of the United States Computer Emergency 

Readiness Team (US-CERT) and the Industrial Control Systems 

Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) to assess their capacity to provide technical assistance to non-Federal entities. 

Section 13. Prohibition on New Regulatory Authority. 

This section clarifies that nothing in this Act shall be construed 

to grant the Secretary any authority to promulgate regulations or 

set standards relating to the cybersecurity of non-Federal entities, 

not including State, local, or Tribal governments. 

Section 14. Sunset. 

This section requires that any reporting requirements required 

by this Act terminate seven years after the date of enactment of 

this Act. 

Section 15. Prohibition on New Funding. 

This section states that no new funds are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:44 Apr 18, 2015 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR083.XXX HR083

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ted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, 

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Homeland Security Act of 2002’’. 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as 

follows: 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE II—INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

* * * * * * * 

Subtitle C—Information Security 

* * * * * * * 

øSec. 227. Cyber incident response plan.¿ 

Sec. 227. Cyber incident response plans. 

* * * * * * * 

Sec. 230. Security and resiliency of public safety communications. 

Sec. 231. Cybersecurity awareness campaign. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE III—SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

* * * * * * * 

Sec. 318. Research and development strategy for critical infrastructure protection. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE I—DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 103. OTHER OFFICERS. 

(a) DEPUTY SECRETARY; UNDER SECRETARIES.—(1) IN GENERAL.— 

Except as provided under paragraph (2), there are the following officers, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate: 

(A) A Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, who shall be 

the Secretary’s first assistant for purposes of subchapter III of 

chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code. 

(B) An Under Secretary for Science and Technology. 

(C) An Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security. 

(D) An Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

(E) A Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 

Services. 

(F) An Under Secretary for Management. 

(G) A Director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement. 

ø(H) An Under Secretary responsible for overseeing critical 

infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department.¿ 


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(H) An Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection. 

(I) Not more than 12 Assistant Secretaries. 

(J) A General Counsel, who shall be the chief legal officer of 

the Department. 

(K) A Deputy Under Secretary for Cybersecurity. 

(L) A Deputy Under Secretary for Infrastructure Protection. 

(2) ASSISTANT SECRETARIES.—If any of the Assistant Secretaries referred to under paragraph (1)(I) is designated to be the 

Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, the Assistant Secretary 

for Legislative Affairs, or the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, that Assistant Secretary shall be appointed by the President without the advice and consent of the Senate. 

(3) DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARIES.—The Deputy Under Secretaries referred to in subparagraphs (K) and (L) of paragraph (1) 

shall be appointed by the President without the advice and consent of the Senate. 

(b) INSPECTOR GENERAL.—There shall be in the Department an 

Office of Inspector General and an Inspector General at the head 

of such office, as provided in the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 

U.S.C. App.). 

(c) COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD.—To assist the Secretary 

in the performance of the Secretary’s functions, there is a Commandant of the Coast Guard, who shall be appointed as provided 

in section 44 of title 14, United States Code, and who shall report 

directly to the Secretary. In addition to such duties as may be provided in this Act and as assigned to the Commandant by the Secretary, the duties of the Commandant shall include those required 

by section 2 of title 14, United States Code. 

(d) OTHER OFFICERS.—To assist the Secretary in the performance 

of the Secretary’s functions, there are the following officers, appointed by the President: 

(1) A Director of the Secret Service. 

(2) A Chief Information Officer. 

(3) An Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. 

(4) A Director for Domestic Nuclear Detection. 

(f) PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS.—Subject to the provisions of this Act, every officer of the Department shall perform the 

functions specified by law for the official’s office or prescribed by 

the Secretary. 

(e) CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER.—There shall be in the Department 

a Chief Financial Officer, as provided in chapter 9 of title 31, 

United States Code. 

TITLE II—INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

* * * * * * * 


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Subtitle B—Critical Infrastructure 

Information 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 212. DEFINITIONS. 

In this subtitle: 

(1) AGENCY.—The term ‘‘agency’’ has the meaning given it in 

section 551 of title 5, United States Code. 

(2) COVERED FEDERAL AGENCY.—The term ‘‘covered Federal 

agency’’ means the Department of Homeland Security. 

(3) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘critical infrastructure information’’ means information not customarily in the public domain and related to the security of critical 

infrastructure or protected systems— 

(A) actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of, or incapacitation of critical infrastructure or protected systems by either physical or computer-based attack or other similar conduct (including the 

misuse of or unauthorized access to all types of communications and data transmission systems) that violates 

Federal, State, or local law, harms interstate commerce of 

the United States, or threatens public health or safety; 

(B) the ability of any critical infrastructure or protected 

system to resist such interference, compromise, or incapacitation, including any planned or past assessment, projection, or estimate of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or a protected system, including security testing, 

risk evaluation thereto, risk management planning, or risk 

audit; or 

(C) any planned or past operational problem or solution 

regarding critical infrastructure or protected systems, including repair, recovery, reconstruction, insurance, or continuity, to the extent it is related to such interference, 

compromise, or incapacitation. 

(4) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PROGRAM.—The 

term ‘‘critical infrastructure protection program’’ means any 

component or bureau of a covered Federal agency that has 

been designated by the President or any agency head to receive 

critical infrastructure information. 

(5) INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION.—The 

term ‘‘Information Sharing and Analysis Organization’’ means 

any formal or informal entity or collaboration created or employed by public or private sector organizations, for purposes 

of— 

(A) gathering and analyzing critical infrastructure information information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents and in order to better understand security problems 

and interdependencies ørelated to critical infrastructure¿ 

related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, critical infrastructure, and and protected systems, so as to ensure the availability, integrity, and reliability thereof; 

(B) communicating or ødisclosing critical infrastructure 

information¿ disclosing cybersecurity risks, incidents, and 

critical infrastructure information to help prevent, detect, 


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mitigate, or recover from the effects of a interference, compromise, or a incapacitation problem ørelated to critical infrastructure or¿ related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, 

critical infrastructure, or protected systems; and 

(C) voluntarily ødisseminating critical infrastructure information¿ disseminating cybersecurity risks, incidents, 

and critical infrastructure information to its members, 

State, local, and Federal Governments, or any other entities that may be of assistance in carrying out the purposes 

specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B). 

(6) PROTECTED SYSTEM.—The term ‘‘protected system’’— 

(A) means any service, physical or computer-based system, process, or procedure that directly or indirectly affects 

the viability of a facility of critical infrastructure; and 

(B) includes any physical or computer-based system, including a computer, computer system, computer or communications network, or any component hardware or element 

thereof, software program, processing instructions, or information or data in transmission or storage therein, irrespective of the medium of transmission or storage. 

(7) VOLUNTARY.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘voluntary’’, in the case of 

any submittal of critical infrastructure information to a 

covered Federal agency, means the submittal thereof in 

the absence of such agency’s exercise of legal authority to 

compel access to or submission of such information and 

may be accomplished by a single entity or an Information 

Sharing and Analysis Organization on behalf of itself or its 

members. 

(B) EXCLUSIONS.—The term ‘‘voluntary’’— 

(i) in the case of any action brought under the securities laws as is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47))— 

(I) does not include information or statements 

contained in any documents or materials filed 

with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or 

with Federal banking regulators, pursuant to section 12(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(15 U.S.C. 781(I)); and 

(II) with respect to the submittal of critical infrastructure information, does not include any disclosure or writing that when made accompanied 

the solicitation of an offer or a sale of securities; 

and 

(ii) does not include information or statements submitted or relied upon as a basis for making licensing 

or permitting determinations, or during regulatory 

proceedings. 

(8) CYBERSECURITY RISK; INCIDENT.—The terms ‘‘cybersecurity risk’’ and ‘‘incident’’ have the meanings given such terms in 

the second section 226 (relating to the National Cybersecurity 

and Communications Integration Center). 

* * * * * * * 


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Subtitle C—Information Security 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 226. NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION CENTER. 

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

(1) the term ‘‘cybersecurity risk’’ means threats to and 

vulnerabilities of information or information systems and any 

related consequences caused by or resulting from unauthorized 

access, use, disclosure, degradation, disruption, modification, or 

destruction of information or information systems, including 

such related consequences caused by an act of terrorism; 

(2) the term ‘‘incident’’ means an occurrence that— 

(A) actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful 

authority, the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of 

information on an information system; or 

(B) constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of law, security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies; 

(3) the term ‘‘information sharing and analysis organization’’ 

has the meaning given that term in section 212(5); øand¿ 

(4) the term ‘‘information system’’ has the meaning given 

that term in section 3502(8) of title 44, United States Codeø.¿; 

and 

(5) the term ‘‘cyber threat indicator’’ means technical information that is necessary to describe or identify— 

(A) a method for probing, monitoring, maintaining, or establishing network awareness of an information system for 

the purpose of discerning technical vulnerabilities of such 

information system, if such method is known or reasonably 

suspected of being associated with a known or suspected cybersecurity risk, including communications that reasonably 

appear to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering technical information related to a cybersecurity risk; 

(B) a method for defeating a technical or security control 

of an information system; 

(C) a technical vulnerability, including anomalous technical behavior that may become a vulnerability; 

(D) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to 

an information system or information that is stored on, 

processed by, or transiting an information system to inadvertently enable the defeat of a technical or operational control; 

(E) a method for unauthorized remote identification of, 

access to, or use of an information system or information 

that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information 

system that is known or reasonably suspected of being associated with a known or suspected cybersecurity risk; 

(F) the actual or potential harm caused by a cybersecurity risk, including a description of the information 

exfiltrated as a result of a particular cybersecurity risk; 

(G) any other attribute of a cybersecurity risk that cannot 

be used to identify specific persons reasonably believed to be 


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42 

unrelated to such cybersecurity risk, if disclosure of such 

attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law; or 

(H) any combination of subparagraphs (A) through (G); 

(6) the term ‘‘cybersecurity purpose’’ means the purpose of protecting an information system or information that is stored on, 

processed by, or transiting an information system from a cybersecurity risk or incident; 

(7)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term ‘‘defensive measure’’ means an action, device, procedure, signature, 

technique, or other measure applied to an information system 

or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an 

information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a known 

or suspected cybersecurity risk or incident, or any attribute of 

hardware, software, process, or procedure that could enable or 

facilitate the defeat of a security control; 

(B) such term does not include a measure that destroys, renders unusable, or substantially harms an information system or 

data on an information system not belonging to— 

(i) the non-Federal entity, not including a State, local, or 

tribal government, operating such measure; or 

(ii) another Federal entity or non-Federal entity that is 

authorized to provide consent and has provided such consent to the non-Federal entity referred to in clause (i); 

(8) the term ‘‘network awareness’’ means to scan, identify, acquire, monitor, log, or analyze information that is stored on, 

processed by, or transiting an information system; 

(9)(A) the term ‘‘private entity’’ means a non-Federal entity 

that is an individual or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or non-profit entity, including an officer, employee, or 

agent thereof; 

(B) such term includes a component of a State, local, or tribal 

government performing electric utility services; 

(10) the term ‘‘security control’’ means the management, operational, and technical controls used to protect against an unauthorized effort to adversely affect the confidentially, integrity, or 

availability of an information system or information that is 

stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system; 

and 

(11) the term ‘‘sharing’’ means providing, receiving, and disseminating. 

(b) CENTER.—There is in the Department a national cybersecurity and communications integration center (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Center’’) to carry out certain responsibilities of the 

Under Secretary appointed under section 103(a)(1)(H). 

(c) FUNCTIONS.—The cybersecurity functions of the Center shall 

include— 

(1) being øa Federal civilian interface¿ the lead Federal civilian interface for the multi-directional and cross-sector sharing 

of information related to øcybersecurity risks,¿ cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks, incidents, 

analysis, and warnings for Federal and non-Federal entities; 

(2) providing shared situational awareness to enable realtime, integrated, and operational actions across the Federal 


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43 

Government and non-Federal entities to address cybersecurity 

risks and incidents to Federal and non-Federal entities; 

(3) coordinating the sharing of information related to øcybersecurity risks¿ cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks, and incidents across the Federal Government; 

(4) facilitating cross-sector coordination to address cybersecurity risks and incidents, including cybersecurity risks and incidents that may be related or could have consequential impacts 

across multiple sectors; 

(5)(A) conducting integration and analysis, including crosssector integration and analysis, of øcybersecurity risks¿ cyber 

threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks, and 

incidents; and 

(B) sharing the analysis conducted under subparagraph (A) 

with Federal and non-Federal entities; 

(6) upon request, providing timely technical assistance, risk 

management support, and incident response capabilities to 

Federal and non-Federal entities with respect to øcybersecurity 

risks¿ cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity 

risks, and incidents, which may include attribution, mitigation, 

and remediation; øand¿ 

(7) providing information and recommendations on security 

and resilience measures to Federal and non-Federal entities, 

including information and recommendations to— 

(A) facilitate information security; øand¿ 

(B) strengthen information systems against cybersecurity risks and incidentsø.¿; and 

(C) sharing cyber threat indicators and defensive measures; 

(8) engaging with international partners, in consultation with 

other appropriate agencies, to— 

(A) collaborate on cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents; and 

(B) enhance the security and resilience of global cybersecurity; 

(9) sharing cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and 

other information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents 

with Federal and non-Federal entities, including across sectors 

of critical infrastructure and with State and major urban area 

fusion centers, as appropriate; 

(10) promptly notifying the Secretary and the Committee on 

Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 

the Senate of any significant violations of the policies and procedures specified in subsection (i)(6)(A); 

(11) promptly notifying non-Federal entities that have shared 

cyber threat indicators or defensive measures that are known or 

determined to be in error or in contravention of the requirements of this section; and 

(12) participating, as appropriate, in exercises run by the Department’s National Exercise Program. 

(d) COMPOSITION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Center shall be composed of— 


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(A) appropriate representatives of Federal entities, such 

as— 

(i) sector-specific agencies; 

(ii) civilian and law enforcement agencies; and 

(iii) elements of the intelligence community, as that 

term is defined under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)); 

(B) appropriate representatives of non-Federal entities, 

such as— 

(i) State øand local¿, local, and tribal governments; 

(ii) information sharing and analysis organizations, including information sharing and analysis centers; 

øand¿ 

(iii) owners and operators of critical information systems; 

(iv) private entities. 

(C) components within the Center that carry out cybersecurity and communications activities; 

(D) a designated Federal official for operational coordination with and across each sector; øand¿ 

(E) an entity that collaborates with State and local governments on cybersecurity risks and incidents, and has entered into a voluntary information sharing relationship 

with the Center; 

(F) a United States Computer Emergency Readiness 

Team that coordinates information related to cybersecurity 

risks and incidents, proactively and collaboratively addresses cybersecurity risks and incidents to the United 

States, collaboratively responds to cybersecurity risks and 

incidents, provides technical assistance, upon request, to information system owners and operators, and shares cyber 

threat indicators, defensive measures, analysis, or information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents in a timely 

manner; 

(G) the Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team that— 

(i) coordinates with industrial control systems owners and operators; 

(ii) provides training, upon request, to Federal entities and non-Federal entities on industrial control systems cybersecurity; 

(iii) collaboratively addresses cybersecurity risks and 

incidents to industrial control systems; 

(iv) provides technical assistance, upon request, to 

Federal entities and non-Federal entities relating to industrial control systems cybersecurity; and 

(v) shares cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, or information related to cybersecurity risks and 

incidents of industrial control systems in a timely fashion; 

(H) a National Coordinating Center for Communications 

that coordinates the protection, response, and recovery of 

emergency communications; 

(I) an entity that coordinates with small and mediumsized businesses; and 


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45 

ø(E)¿ (J) other appropriate representatives or entities, 

as determined by the Secretary. 

(2) INCIDENTS.—In the event of an incident, during exigent 

circumstances the Secretary may grant a Federal or non-Federal entity immediate temporary access to the Center. 

(e) PRINCIPLES.—In carrying out the functions under subsection 

(c), the Center shall ensure— 

(1) to the extent practicable, that— 

(A) timely, actionable, and relevant cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, and analysis is shared; 

(B) when appropriate, cyber threat indicators, defensive 

measures, and information related to cybersecurity risks, 

incidents, and analysis is integrated with other relevant 

information and tailored to the specific characteristics of a 

sector; 

(C) activities are prioritized and conducted based on the 

level of risk; 

(D) industry sector-specific, academic, and national laboratory expertise is sought and receives appropriate consideration; 

(E) continuous, collaborative, and inclusive coordination 

occurs— 

(i) across sectors; and 

(ii) with— 

(I) sector coordinating councils; 

(II) information sharing and analysis organizations; and 

(III) other appropriate non-Federal partners; 

(F) as appropriate, the Center works to develop and use 

mechanisms for sharing information related to øcybersecurity risks¿ cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks, and incidents that are technology-neutral, interoperable, real-time, cost-effective, and resilient; 

øand¿ 

(G) the Center works with other agencies to reduce unnecessarily duplicative sharing of information related to 

øcybersecurity risks¿ cyber threat indicators, defensive 

measures, cybersecurity risks, and incidents; 

(H) the Center ensures that it shares information relating 

to cybersecurity risks and incidents with small and medium-sized businesses, as appropriate; and 

(I) the Center designates an agency contact for non-Federal entities; 

(2) that information related to øcybersecurity risks¿ cyber 

threat indicators, defensive measures, cybersecurity risks, and 

incidents is appropriately safeguarded against unauthorized 

access or disclosure; and 

(3) that activities conducted by the Center comply with all 

policies, regulations, and laws that protect the privacy and civil 

liberties of United States persons, including by working with 

the Chief Privacy Officer appointed under section 222 to ensure 

that the Center follows the policies and procedures specified in 

subsection (i)(6)(A). 

(f) NO RIGHT OR BENEFIT.— 


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(1) IN GENERAL.—The provision of assistance or information 

to, and inclusion in the Center of, governmental or private entities under this section shall be at the sole and unreviewable 

discretion of the Under Secretary appointed under section 

103(a)(1)(H). 

(2) CERTAIN ASSISTANCE OR INFORMATION.—The provision of 

certain assistance or information to, or inclusion in the Center 

of, one governmental or private entity pursuant to this section 

shall not create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, 

to similar assistance or information for any other governmental or private entity. 

(g) RAPID AUTOMATED SHARING.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and 

Infrastructure Protection, in coordination with industry and 

other stakeholders, shall develop capabilities making use of existing information technology industry standards and best practices, as appropriate, that support and rapidly advance the development, adoption, and implementation of automated mechanisms for the timely sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures to and from the Center and with each Federal 

agency designated as the ‘‘Sector Specific Agency’’ for each critical infrastructure sector in accordance with subsection (h). 

(2) BIANNUAL REPORT.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives 

and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs of the Senate a biannual report on the status and 

progress of the development of the capability described in paragraph (1). Such reports shall be required until such capability 

is fully implemented. 

(h) SECTOR SPECIFIC AGENCIES.—The Secretary, in collaboration 

with the relevant critical infrastructure sector and the heads of 

other appropriate Federal agencies, shall recognize the Federal 

agency designated as of March 25, 2015, as the ‘‘Sector Specific 

Agency’’ for each critical infrastructure sector designated in the Department’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan. If the designated Sector Specific Agency for a particular critical infrastructure sector is the Department, for purposes of this section, the Secretary is deemed to be the head of such Sector Specific Agency and 

shall carry out this section. The Secretary, in coordination with the 

heads of each such Sector Specific Agency, shall— 

(1) support the security and resilience actives of the relevant 

critical infrastructure sector in accordance with this section; 

(2) provide institutional knowledge, specialized expertise, and 

technical assistance upon request to the relevant critical infrastructure sector; and 

(3) support the timely sharing of cyber threat indicators and 

defensive measures with the relevant critical infrastructure sector with the Center in accordance with this section. 

(i) VOLUNTARY INFORMATION SHARING PROCEDURES.— (1) PROCEDURES.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The Center may enter into a voluntary 

information sharing relationship with any consenting nonFederal entity for the sharing of cyber threat indicators and 

defensive measures for cybersecurity purposes in accordance 


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47 

with this section. Nothing in this section may be construed 

to require any non-Federal entity to enter into any such information sharing relationship with the Center or any other 

entity. The Center may terminate a voluntary information 

sharing relationship under this subsection if the Center determines that the non-Federal entity with which the Center 

has entered into such a relationship has, after repeated notice, repeatedly violated the terms of this subsection. 

(B) NATIONAL SECURITY.—The Secretary may decline to 

enter into a voluntary information sharing relationship 

under this subsection if the Secretary determines that such 

is appropriate for national security. 

(2) VOLUNTARY INFORMATION SHARING RELATIONSHIPS.—A 

voluntary information sharing relationship under this subsection may be characterized as an agreement described in this 

paragraph. 

(A) STANDARD AGREEMENT.—For the use of a non-Federal 

entity, the Center shall make available a standard agreement, consistent with this section, on the Department’s 

website. 

(B) NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.—At the request of a nonFederal entity, and if determined appropriate by the Center, the Department shall negotiate a non-standard agreement, consistent with this section. 

(C) EXISTING AGREEMENTS.—An agreement between the 

Center and a non-Federal entity that is entered into before 

the date of the enactment of this section, or such an agreement that is in effect before such date, shall be deemed in 

compliance with the requirements of this subsection, notwithstanding any other provision or requirement of this 

subsection. An agreement under this subsection shall include the relevant privacy protections as in effect under the 

Cooperative Research and Development Agreement for Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Collaboration, as of 

December 31, 2014. Nothing in this subsection may be construed to require a non-Federal entity to enter into either a 

standard or negotiated agreement to be in compliance with 

this subsection. 

(3) INFORMATION SHARING AUTHORIZATION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph 

(B), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a nonFederal entity may, for cybersecurity purposes, share cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures obtained on its own 

information system, or on an information system of another 

Federal entity or non-Federal entity, upon written consent 

of such other Federal entity or non-Federal entity or an authorized representative of such other Federal entity or nonFederal entity in accordance with this section with— 

(i) another non-Federal entity; or 

(ii) the Center, as provided in this section. 

(B) LAWFUL RESTRICTION.—A non-Federal entity receiving a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure from another Federal entity or non-Federal entity shall comply 

with otherwise lawful restrictions placed on the sharing or 


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use of such cyber threat indicator or defensive measure by 

the sharing Federal entity or non-Federal entity. 

(C) REMOVAL OF INFORMATION UNRELATED TO CYBERSECURITY RISKS OR INCIDENTS.—Federal entities and nonFederal entities shall, prior to such sharing, take reasonable efforts to remove information that can be used to identify specific persons and is reasonably believed at the time 

of sharing to be unrelated to a cybersecurity risks or incident and to safeguard information that can be used to 

identify specific persons from unintended disclosure or unauthorized access or acquisition. 

(D) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph 

may be construed to— 

(i) limit or modify an existing information sharing 

relationship; 

(ii) prohibit a new information sharing relationship; 

(iii) require a new information sharing relationship 

between any non-Federal entity and a Federal entity; 

(iv) limit otherwise lawful activity; or 

(v) in any manner impact or modify procedures in 

existence as of the date of the enactment of this section 

for reporting known or suspected criminal activity to 

appropriate law enforcement authorities or for participating voluntarily or under legal requirement in an investigation. 

(E) COORDINATED VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE.—The 

Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, in coordination with industry and other stakeholders, shall develop, publish, and adhere to policies and 

procedures for coordinating vulnerability disclosures, to the 

extent practicable, consistent with international standards 

in the information technology industry. 

(4) NETWORK AWARENESS AUTHORIZATION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of 

law, a non-Federal entity, not including a State, local, or 

tribal government, may, for cybersecurity purposes, conduct 

network awareness of— 

(i) an information system of such non-Federal entity 

to protect the rights or property of such non-Federal entity; 

(ii) an information system of another non-Federal entity, upon written consent of such other non-Federal entity for conducting such network awareness to protect 

the rights or property of such other non-Federal entity; 

(iii) an information system of a Federal entity, upon 

written consent of an authorized representative of such 

Federal entity for conducting such network awareness 

to protect the rights or property of such Federal entity; 

or 

(iv) information that is stored on, processed by, or 

transiting an information system described in this subparagraph. 

(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph 

may be construed to— 


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(i) authorize conducting network awareness of an information system, or the use of any information obtained through such conducting of network awareness, 

other than as provided in this section; or 

(ii) limit otherwise lawful activity. 

(5) DEFENSIVE MEASURE AUTHORIZATION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph 

(B) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a nonFederal entity, not including a State, local, or tribal government, may, for cybersecurity purposes, operate a defensive measure that is applied to— 

(i) an information system of such non-Federal entity 

to protect the rights or property of such non-Federal entity; 

(ii) an information system of another non-Federal entity upon written consent of such other non-Federal entity for operation of such defensive measure to protect 

the rights or property of such other non-Federal entity; 

(iii) an information system of a Federal entity upon 

written consent of an authorized representative of such 

Federal entity for operation of such defensive measure 

to protect the rights or property of such Federal entity; 

or 

(iv) information that is stored on, processed by, or 

transiting an information system described in this subparagraph. 

(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph 

may be construed to— 

(i) authorize the use of a defensive measure other 

than as provided in this section; or 

(ii) limit otherwise lawful activity. 

(6) PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTIONS.— 

(A) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.— 

(i) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection shall, in coordination with the Chief Privacy Officer and the Chief Civil 

Rights and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department, 

establish and annually review policies and procedures 

governing the receipt, retention, use, and disclosure of 

cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents 

shared with the Center in accordance with this section. 

Such policies and procedures shall apply only to the 

Department, consistent with the need to protect information systems from cybersecurity risks and incidents 

and mitigate cybersecurity risks and incidents in a 

timely manner, and shall— 

(I) be consistent with the Department’s Fair Information Practice Principles developed pursuant 

to section 552a of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Privacy Act of 1974’’ or 

the ‘‘Privacy Act’’), and subject to the Secretary’s 

authority under subsection (a)(2) of section 222 of 

this Act; 


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(II) reasonably limit, to the greatest extent practicable, the receipt, retention, use, and disclosure of 

cyber threat indicators and defensive measures associated with specific persons that is not necessary, 

for cybersecurity purposes, to protect a network or 

information system from cybersecurity risks or 

mitigate cybersecurity risks and incidents in a 

timely manner; 

(III) minimize any impact on privacy and civil 

liberties; 

(IV) provide data integrity through the prompt 

removal and destruction of obsolete or erroneous 

names and personal information that is unrelated 

to the cybersecurity risk or incident information 

shared and retained by the Center in accordance 

with this section; 

(V) include requirements to safeguard cyber 

threat indicators and defensive measures retained 

by the Center, including information that is proprietary or business-sensitive that may be used to 

identify specific persons from unauthorized access 

or acquisition; 

(VI) protect the confidentiality of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures associated with 

specific persons to the greatest extent practicable; 

and 

(VII) ensure all relevant constitutional, legal, 

and privacy protections are observed. 

(ii) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 

days after the date of the enactment of this section and 

annually thereafter, the Chief Privacy Officer and the 

Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil 

Liberties Oversight Board (established pursuant to section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee)), shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate 

the policies and procedures governing the sharing of 

cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information related to cybsersecurity risks and incidents described in clause (i) of subparagraph (A). 

(iii) PUBLIC NOTICE AND ACCESS.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, 

in consultation with the Chief Privacy Officer and the 

Chief Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (established pursuant to section 1061 of 

the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee)), shall ensure there is public 

notice of, and access to, the policies and procedures 

governing the sharing of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information related to cybersecurity 

risks and incidents. 


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(iv) CONSULTATION.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection when establishing policies and procedures to support privacy and 

civil liberties may consult with the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology. 

(B) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Chief Privacy Officer of the 

Department, on an ongoing basis, shall— 

(i) monitor the implementation of the policies and 

procedures governing the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures established pursuant to 

clause (i) of subparagraph (A); 

(ii) regularly review and update privacy impact assessments, as appropriate, to ensure all relevant constitutional, legal, and privacy protections are being followed; 

(iii) work with the Under Secretary for Cybersecurity 

and Infrastructure Protection to carry out paragraphs 

(10) and (11) of subsection (c); 

(iv) annually submit to the Committee on Homeland 

Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that contains a review of 

the effectiveness of such policies and procedures to protect privacy and civil liberties; and 

(v) ensure there are appropriate sanctions in place 

for officers, employees, or agents of the Department 

who intentionally or willfully conduct activities under 

this section in an unauthorized manner. 

(C) INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT.—The Inspector General 

of the Department, in consultation with the Privacy and 

Civil Liberties Oversight Board and the Inspector General 

of each Federal agency that receives cyber threat indicators 

or defensive measures shared with the Center under this 

section, shall, not later than two years after the date of the 

enactment of this subsection and periodically thereafter 

submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report 

containing a review of the use of cybersecurity risk information shared with the Center, including the following: 

(i) A report on the receipt, use, and dissemination of 

cyber threat indicators and defensive measures that 

have been shared with Federal entities under this section. 

(ii) Information on the use by the Center of such information for a purpose other than a cybersecurity purpose. 

(iii) A review of the type of information shared with 

the Center under this section. 

(iv) A review of the actions taken by the Center based 

on such information. 

(v) The appropriate metrics that exist to determine 

the impact, if any, on privacy and civil liberties as a 

result of the sharing of such information with the Center. 


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(vi) A list of other Federal agencies receiving such information. 

(vii) A review of the sharing of such information 

within the Federal Government to identify inappropriate stove piping of such information. 

(viii) Any recommendations of the Inspector General 

of the Department for improvements or modifications to 

information sharing under this section. 

(D) PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS REPORT.— The Chief Privacy Officer and the Chief Civil Rights and 

Civil Liberties Officer of the Department, in consultation 

with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the 

Inspector General of the Department, and the senior privacy and civil liberties officer of each Federal agency that 

receives cyber threat indicators and defensive measures 

shared with the Center under this section, shall biennially 

submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 

assessing the privacy and civil liberties impact of the activities under this paragraph. Each such report shall include 

any recommendations the Chief Privacy Officer and the 

Chief Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department consider appropriate to minimize or mitigate the privacy and civil liberties impact of the sharing of cyber threat 

indicators and defensive measures under this section. 

(E) FORM.—Each report required under paragraphs (C) 

and (D) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

include a classified annex. 

(7) USES AND PROTECTION OF INFORMATION.— (A) NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES.—A non-Federal entity, not 

including a State, local, or tribal government, that shares 

cyber threat indicators or defensive measures through the 

Center or otherwise under this section— 

(i) may use, retain, or further disclose such cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures solely for cybersecurity purposes; 

(ii) shall, prior to such sharing, take reasonable efforts to remove information that can be used to identify 

specific persons and is reasonably believed at the time 

of sharing to be unrelated to a cybersecurity risk or incident, and to safeguard information that can be used 

to identify specific persons from unintended disclosure 

or unauthorized access or acquisition; 

(iii) shall comply with appropriate restrictions that a 

Federal entity or non-Federal entity places on the subsequent disclosure or retention of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures that it discloses to other 

Federal entities or non-Federal entities; 

(iv) shall be deemed to have voluntarily shared such 

cyber threat indicators or defensive measures; 

(v) shall implement and utilize a security control to 

protect against unauthorized access to or acquisition of 

such cyber threat indicators or defensive measures; and 

(vi) may not use such information to gain an unfair 

competitive advantage to the detriment of any non-Federal entity. 


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(B) FEDERAL ENTITIES.— (i) USES OF INFORMATION.—A Federal entity that receives cyber threat indicators or defensive measures 

shared through the Center or otherwise under this section from another Federal entity or a non-Federal entity— 

(I) may use, retain, or further disclose such cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures solely for 

cybersecurity purposes; 

(II) shall, prior to such sharing, take reasonable 

efforts to remove information that can be used to 

identify specific persons and is reasonably believed 

at the time of sharing to be unrelated to a cybersecurity risk or incident, and to safeguard information that can be used to identify specific persons 

from unintended disclosure or unauthorized access 

or acquisition; 

(III) shall be deemed to have voluntarily shared 

such cyber threat indicators or defensive measures; 

(IV) shall implement and utilize a security control to protect against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such cyber threat indicators or defensive measures; and 

(V) may not use such cyber threat indicators or 

defensive measures to engage in surveillance or 

other collection activities for the purpose of tracking an individual’s personally identifiable information. 

(ii) PROTECTIONS FOR INFORMATION.—The cyber 

threat indicators and defensive measures referred to in 

clause (i)— 

(I) are exempt from disclosure under section 552 

of title 5, United States Code, and withheld, without discretion, from the public under subsection 

(b)(3)(B) of such section; 

(II) may not be used by the Federal Government 

for regulatory purposes; 

(III) may not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection provided by law, including trade secret protection; 

(IV) shall be considered the commercial, financial, and proprietary information of the non-Federal entity referred to in clause (i) when so designated by such non-Federal entity; and 

(V) may not be subject to a rule of any Federal 

entity or any judicial doctrine regarding ex parte 

communications with a decisionmaking official. 

(C) STATE, LOCAL, OR TRIBAL GOVERNMENT.— 

(i) USES OF INFORMATION.—A State, local, or tribal 

government that receives cyber threat indicators or defensive measures from the Center from a Federal entity 

or a non-Federal entity— 

(I) may use, retain, or further disclose such cyber 

threat indicators or defensive measures solely for 

cybersecurity purposes; 


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54 

(II) shall, prior to such sharing, take reasonable 

efforts to remove information that can be used to 

identify specific persons and is reasonably believed 

at the time of sharing to be unrelated to a cybersecurity risk or incident, and to safeguard information that can be used to identify specific persons 

from unintended disclosure or unauthorized access 

or acquisition; 

(III) shall consider such information the commercial, financial, and proprietary information of 

such Federal entity or non-Federal entity if so designated by such Federal entity or non-Federal entity; 

(IV) shall be deemed to have voluntarily shared 

such cyber threat indicators or defensive measures; 

and 

(V) shall implement and utilize a security control to protect against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such cyber threat indicators or defensive measures. 

(ii) PROTECTIONS FOR INFORMATION.—The cyber 

threat indicators and defensive measures referred to in 

clause (i)— 

(I) shall be exempt from disclosure under any 

State, local, or tribal law or regulation that requires public disclosure of information or records 

by a public or quasi-public entity; and 

(II) may not be used by any State, local, or tribal 

government to regulate a lawful activity of a nonFederal entity. 

(8) LIABILITY EXEMPTIONS.— (A) NETWORK AWARENESS.—No cause of action shall lie 

or be maintained in any court, and such action shall be 

promptly dismissed, against any non-Federal entity that, 

for cybersecurity purposes, conducts network awareness 

under paragraph (4), if such network awareness is conducted in accordance with such paragraph and this section. 

(B) INFORMATION SHARING.—No cause of action shall lie 

or be maintained in any court, and such action shall be 

promptly dismissed, against any non-Federal entity that, 

for cybersecurity purposes, shares cyber threat indicators or 

defensive measures under paragraph (3), or fails to act 

based on such sharing, if such sharing is conducted in accordance with such paragraph and this section. 

(C) WILLFUL MISCONDUCT.— 

(i) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section 

may be construed to— 

(I) require dismissal of a cause of action against 

a non-Federal entity that has engaged in willful 

misconduct in the course of conducting activities 

authorized by this section; or 

(II) undermine or limit the availability of otherwise applicable common law or statutory defenses. 

(ii) PROOF OF WILLFUL MISCONDUCT.—In any action 

claiming that subparagraph (A) or (B) does not apply 


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due to willful misconduct described in clause (i), the 

plaintiff shall have the burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence the willful misconduct by each 

non-Federal entity subject to such claim and that such 

willful misconduct proximately caused injury to the 

plaintiff. 

(iii) WILLFUL MISCONDUCT DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘willful misconduct’’ means an act or 

omission that is taken— 

(I) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; 

(II) knowingly without legal or factual justification; and 

(III) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that 

is so great as to make it highly probable that the 

harm will outweigh the benefit. 

(D) EXCLUSION.—The term ‘‘non-Federal entity’’ as used 

in this paragraph shall not include a State, local, or tribal 

government. 

(9) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE AND PROTECTION OF VOLUNTARILY

SHARED INFORMATION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—If a department or agency of the Federal Government intentionally or willfully violates the restrictions specified in paragraph (3), (6), or (7)(B) on the 

use and protection of voluntarily shared cyber threat indicators or defensive measures, or any other provision of this 

section, the Federal Government shall be liable to a person 

injured by such violation in an amount equal to the sum 

of— 

(i) the actual damages sustained by such person as 

a result of such violation or $1,000, whichever is greater; and 

(ii) reasonable attorney fees as determined by the 

court and other litigation costs reasonably occurred in 

any case under this subsection in which the complainant has substantially prevailed. 

(B) VENUE.—An action to enforce liability under this subsection may be brought in the district court of the United 

States in— 

(i) the district in which the complainant resides; 

(ii) the district in which the principal place of business of the complainant is located; 

(iii) the district in which the department or agency 

of the Federal Government that disclosed the information is located; or 

(iv) the District of Columbia. 

(C) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—No action shall lie under 

this subsection unless such action is commenced not later 

than two years after the date of the violation of any restriction specified in paragraph (3), (6), or 7(B), or any other 

provision of this section, that is the basis for such action. 

(D) EXCLUSIVE CAUSE OF ACTION.—A cause of action 

under this subsection shall be the exclusive means available to a complainant seeking a remedy for a violation of 


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56 

any restriction specified in paragraph (3), (6), or 7(B) or 

any other provision of this section. 

(10) ANTI-TRUST EXEMPTION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph 

(C), it shall not be considered a violation of any provision 

of antitrust laws for two or more non-Federal entities to 

share a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure, or assistance relating to the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of a cybersecurity risk or incident, for cybersecurity 

purposes under this Act. 

(B) APPLICABILITY.—Subparagraph (A) shall apply only 

to information that is shared or assistance that is provided 

in order to assist with— 

(i) facilitating the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of a cybersecurity risk or incident to an information system or information that is stored on, processed 

by, or transiting an information system; or 

(ii) communicating or disclosing a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure to help prevent, investigate, 

or mitigate the effect of a cybersecurity risk or incident 

to an information system or information that is stored 

on, processed by, or transiting an information system. 

(C) PROHIBITED CONDUCT.—Nothing in this section may 

be construed to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between competitors, monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a market, or exchanges of price or cost information, 

customer lists, or information regarding future competitive 

planning. 

(11) CONSTRUCTION AND PREEMPTION.— 

(A) OTHERWISE LAWFUL DISCLOSURES.—Nothing in this 

section may be construed to limit or prohibit otherwise lawful disclosures of communications, records, or other information, including reporting of known or suspected criminal 

activity or participating voluntarily or under legal requirement in an investigation, by a non-Federal to any other 

non-Federal entity or Federal entity under this section. 

(B) WHISTLE BLOWER PROTECTIONS.—Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit or limit the disclosure of 

information protected under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, 

United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, 

waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats), section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress), section 1034 of title 10, United States 

Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the 

military), section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 

(50 U.S.C. 3234) (governing disclosure by employees of elements of the intelligence community), or any similar provision of Federal or State law. 

(C) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.—Nothing in this section may be construed to affect any requirement under any 

other provision of law for a non-Federal entity to provide 

information to a Federal entity. 

(D) PRESERVATION OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS AND

RIGHTS.—Nothing in this section may be construed to— 


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(i) amend, repeal, or supersede any current or future 

contractual agreement, terms of service agreement, or 

other contractual relationship between any non-Federal 

entities, or between any non-Federal entity and a Federal entity; or 

(ii) abrogate trade secret or intellectual property 

rights of any non-Federal entity or Federal entity. 

(E) ANTI-TASKING RESTRICTION.—Nothing in this section 

may be construed to permit a Federal entity to— 

(i) require a non-Federal entity to provide information to a Federal entity; 

(ii) condition the sharing of cyber threat indicators 

or defensive measures with a non-Federal entity on 

such non-Federal entity’s provision of cyber threat indicators or defensive measures to a Federal entity; or 

(iii) condition the award of any Federal grant, contract, or purchase on the sharing of cyber threat indicators or defensive measures with a Federal entity. 

(F) NO LIABILITY FOR NON-PARTICIPATION.—Nothing in 

this section may be construed to subject any non-Federal 

entity to liability for choosing to not engage in the voluntary activities authorized under this section. 

(G) USE AND RETENTION OF INFORMATION.—Nothing in 

this section may be construed to authorize, or to modify any 

existing authority of, a department or agency of the Federal 

Government to retain or use any information shared under 

this section for any use other than permitted in this section. 

(H) VOLUNTARY SHARING.—Nothing in this section may 

be construed to restrict or condition a non-Federal entity 

from sharing, for cybersecurity purposes, cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, or information related to cybersecurity risks or incidents with any other non-Federal entity, and nothing in this section may be construed as requiring any non-Federal entity to share cyber threat indicators, 

defensive measures, or information related to cybersecurity 

risks or incidents with the Center. 

(I) FEDERAL PREEMPTION.—This section supersedes any 

statute or other provision of law of a State or political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under this section. 

(j) DIRECT REPORTING.—The Secretary shall develop policies and 

procedures for direct reporting to the Secretary by the Director of the 

Center regarding significant cybersecurity risks and incidents. 

(k) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Secretary shall build 

upon existing mechanisms to promote a national awareness effort to 

educate the general public on the importance of securing information systems. 

(l) REPORTS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.—Not later than 

180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection and periodically thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit 

to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs of the Senate a report on the range of efforts underway to 

bolster cybersecurity collaboration with relevant international partners in accordance with subsection (c)(8). 


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58 

(m) OUTREACH.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary, acting through the Under 

Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, shall— 

(1) disseminate to the public information about how to voluntarily share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures 

with the Center; and 

(2) enhance outreach to critical infrastructure owners and operators for purposes of such sharing. 

SEC. 227. CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE øPLAN¿ PLANS. 

øThe Under Secretary appointed under section 103(a)(1)(H) 

shall¿ (a) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and 

Infrastructure Protection shall, in coordination with appropriate 

Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, 

sector coordinating councils, information sharing and analysis organizations (as defined in section 212(5)), owners and operators of 

critical infrastructure, and other appropriate entities and individuals, develop, regularly update, maintain, and exercise adaptable 

cyber incident response plans to address cybersecurity risks (as defined in section 226) to critical infrastructure. 

(b) UPDATES TO THE CYBER INCIDENT ANNEX TO THE NATIONAL

RESPONSE FRAMEWORK.—The Secretary, in coordination with the 

heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, and 

in accordance with the National Cybersecurity Incident Response 

Plan required under subsection (a), shall regularly update, maintain, and exercise the Cyber Incident Annex to the National Response Framework of the Department. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 230. SECURITY AND RESILIENCY OF PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS. 

The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 

Center, in coordination with the Office of Emergency Communications of the Department, shall assess and evaluate consequence, vulnerability, and threat information regarding cyber incidents to public safety communications to help facilitate continuous improvements to the security and resiliency of such communications. 

SEC. 231. CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS CAMPAIGN. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection shall develop and implement an ongoing and 

comprehensive cybersecurity awareness campaign regarding cybersecurity risks and voluntary best practices for mitigating and responding to such risks. Such campaign shall, at a minimum, publish and disseminate, on an ongoing basis, the following: 

(1) Public service announcements targeted at improving 

awareness among State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, academia, and stakeholders in specific audiences, 

including the elderly, students, small businesses, members of 

the Armed Forces, and veterans. 

(2) Vendor and technology-neutral voluntary best practices information. 

(b) CONSULTATION.—The Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and 

Infrastructure Protection shall consult with a wide range of stakeVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:44 Apr 18, 2015 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6603 E:\HR\OC\HR083.XXX HR083

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holders in government, industry, academia, and the non-profit community in carrying out this section. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE III—SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 318. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall submit to Congress a strategic plan to guide the overall direction of Federal physical security 

and cybersecurity technology research and development efforts for 

protecting critical infrastructure, including against all threats. Such 

plan shall be updated and submitted to Congress every two years. 

(b) CONTENTS OF PLAN.—The strategic plan, including biennial 

updates, required under subsection (a) shall include the following: 

(1) An identification of critical infrastructure security risks 

and any associated security technology gaps, that are developed 

following— 

(A) consultation with stakeholders, including critical infrastructure Sector Coordinating Councils; and 

(B) performance by the Department of a risk and gap 

analysis that considers information received in such consultations. 

(2) A set of critical infrastructure security technology needs 

that— 

(A) is prioritized based on the risks and gaps identified 

under paragraph (1); 

(B) emphasizes research and development of technologies 

that need to be accelerated due to rapidly evolving threats 

or rapidly advancing infrastructure technology; and 

(C) includes research, development, and acquisition roadmaps with clearly defined objectives, goals, and measures. 

(3) An identification of laboratories, facilities, modeling, and 

simulation capabilities that will be required to support the research, development, demonstration, testing, evaluation, and acquisition of the security technologies described in paragraph (2). 

(4) An identification of current and planned programmatic 

initiatives for fostering the rapid advancement and deployment 

of security technologies for critical infrastructure protection, including a consideration of opportunities for public-private partnerships, intragovernment collaboration, university centers of 

excellence, and national laboratory technology transfer. 

(5) A description of progress made with respect to each critical infrastructure security risk, associated security technology 

gap, and critical infrastructure technology need identified in the 

preceding strategic plan required under subsection (a). 

(c) COORDINATION.—In carrying out this section, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology shall coordinate with the Under 

Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate. 


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(d) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology shall consult with— 

(1) critical infrastructure Sector Coordinating Councils; 

(2) to the extent practicable, subject matter experts on critical 

infrastructure protection from universities, colleges, national 

laboratories, and private industry; 

(3) the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies that conduct research and development relating to critical 

infrastructure protection; and 

(4) State, local, and tribal governments, as appropriate. 

* * * * * * * 


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(61) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

On behalf of Committee on Homeland Security Democrats, I submit the following additional views on H.R. 1731, the ‘‘National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015,’’ as amended. 

Improving cyber information sharing is a top legislative priority 

for Committee on Homeland Security Democrats for the 114th Congress. H.R. 1731 is the product of months of bipartisan stakeholder 

discussions with private sector stakeholders, including representatives from critical infrastructure sectors, technology companies, privacy organizations, as well as Federal stakeholders, most especially 

the Department of Homeland Security. Committee Democrats support efforts to bolster information sharing with the Department 

and agree with President Obama about the need for targeted liability protection to address addressing what some in industry have 

identified as a major barrier to sharing cyber threat information— 

the risk that sharing such information would expose companies to 

legal liability. Committee Democrats are disappointed that while 

the Majority worked collaboratively with us on the bulk of this legislation, when it came time to crafting liability protection language, 

Democrats were shut out. The liability protection provision that 

was negotiated between Chairman Michael McCaul and House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte is unduly complicated 

and runs the risk of directly or inadvertently providing liability relief to entities that act negligently as lawsuits would only be allowed for ‘‘willful misconduct.’’ It also may incentivize companies to 

not act on timely cyber threat information as it explicitly immunizes a non-Federal entity who ‘‘in good faith fails to act’’ on cyber 

information against lawsuits. This approach is counter to the fundamental goal of the Act—to provide companies with timely information to act and protect their networks and the information 

stored on them. 

Although Committee Democrats are disappointed with the liability protection provision in H.R. 1731, Committee Democrats are 

pleased that our efforts to bolster the privacy provisions in the underlying bill were largely successful; however, it is worth noting 

that bipartisan discussions continue with privacy stakeholders 

about further refinements, as this measure moves to the Full 

House. 

In general, we are pleased that H.R. 1731, as amended, limits 

the sharing and allowable uses for cyber threat information to 

‘‘solely for cybersecurity purposes,’’ requires participating non-Federal entities and the National Cybersecurity and Communications 

Integration Center (NCCIC) to remove unrelated information that 

identifies persons from cyber threat data (minimization), and 

builds in privacy protections and oversight at all levels of the 

NCCIC operation. 


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62 

Committee Democrats are disappointed that amendments offered 

by Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies (CIPST) Subcommittee Ranking Member Cedric Richmond 

to improve the liability protection language were rejected at the 

Full Committee markup. They would have streamlined the language in key respects. Also rejected was an amendment that I offered to sunset this Act after five years to allow for the Committee 

to make adjustments to the law based on oversight findings. 

Committee Democrats are pleased, however that twelve amendments offered by Committee Democrats were accepted. Two amendments that we would like to highlight in particular would seek to 

bolster the reach of this bill to Main Street America and every U.S. 

household. 

The first was offered by CIPST Ranking Member Richmond. It 

directed DHS to bolster outreach to small and medium-size business, and to help ensure that Main Street businesses get the attention and assistance they need. Most small and medium-size businesses do not have the resources to focus on cyber threats but by 

requiring DHS to amplify its efforts with respect to small and medium-size businesses specifically regarding cyber security, we can 

help Main Street America participate, ensuring that informationsharing, on the larger scale, adds to the cyber security of a broad 

array of businesses all across our nation. 

The second was offered by Oversight and Management Efficiency 

Subcommittee Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman. It directs 

DHS to begin a concerted and sustained campaign to raise national 

awareness about cybersecurity. The campaign is to include public 

service announcements, widely advertised web sites, Apps, written 

collateral; social media; and other creative sources to help Americans understand that many simple measures will improve their 

cyber security protection posture. Such measures include simple 

steps like: improving password management; enabling firewall protection; installing anti-virus and anti-spam protection; installing 

software updates; ‘‘know your sender’’ and refrain from opening 

links and attachments from unknown and untrusted senders. 

As we work to enhance information sharing about cyber threats, 

it is important to keep in mind that as much as 80 percent of exploitable vulnerabilities in cyberspace are a direct result of poor, or 

no cyber hygiene and software vulnerabilities. The American people 

must be made more aware about the basic fundamentals of cybersecurity. 

Sincerely, 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, 

Ranking Member. 

Æ 


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