IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0279

Filed May 25, 2022

IN THE INTEREST OF M.S. and A.S.,

Minor Children,

B.K., Father,

Appellant,

J.S., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Charles D. 

Fagan, District Associate Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights to their daughters. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Roberta J. Megel of State Public Defender Office, Council Bluffs, for 

appellant father.

Kyle J. McGinn of McGinn, Springer & Noethe, PLC, Council Bluffs, for 

appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Kristen Bracker of the Bracker Law Firm, Council Bluffs, attorney and 

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Badding, JJ.
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TABOR, Judge.

Jordan and Brian separately appeal the juvenile court order terminating their 

parental rights to two young daughters: M.S., born in 2019, and A.S., born in 2018. 

Brian argues the State did not offer clear and convincing evidence to support the 

grounds for termination.1 Jordan likewise disputes the State’s proof of the statutory 

grounds. She also argues the court abused its discretion in denying her motion to 

continue the permanency hearing, an argument the State interprets as a request 

to continue placement under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) (2021).

After examining the record, we find ample evidence to support termination 

of both parents’ rights and affirm the juvenile court’s order.2

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

The DHS started looking into the safety of M.S. and A.S. in July 2020 when 

police arrested Brian for assaulting Jordan.3 The young children witnessed the 

violence. Brian was ordered to have no contact with Jordan or the children. When 

 

1 Brian’s petition on appeal mentions in passing that the Department of Human 

Services (DHS) did not make reasonable efforts to reunite him with the children, 

termination is not in the children’s best interests, and he “just needs more time.” 

Those issues are insufficiently developed to address. Even in expedited appeals, 

the appellant must do more than offer conclusory statements. See Iowa Rs. App. 

P. 6.201(1)(d) (“The petition on appeal shall substantially comply with form 5 in 

rule 6.1401.”), .1401–Form 5 (“[S]tate what findings of fact or conclusions of law 

the district court made with which you disagree and why, generally referencing a 

particular part of the record, witnesses’ testimony, or exhibits that support your 

position on appeal . . . . General conclusions, such as ‘the trial court’s ruling is not

supported by law or the facts’ are not acceptable.”).

2 We review termination proceedings de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 

(Iowa 2022). We respect the juvenile court’s factual findings but are not required 

to adopt them. Id. The State must prove the grounds for termination by clear and 

convincing evidence. Id.

3 The DHS scrutiny was not new to the parents. They lost parental rights to three 

older children in 2017 and 2018. 
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the DHS could not locate the family, it closed its investigation. Then, in February 

2021, the DHS received reports that Brian was violating the no-contact order. 

Rather than remove the children, the DHS implemented a safety plan that required 

Jordan to move into her parents’ home with the children. But a few weeks later, 

Jordan took the girls and left her parents’ home without informing the DHS of her 

whereabouts. So the DHS placed the children in foster care. The court 

adjudicated M.S. and A.S. as children in need of assistance (CINA) in April 2021.4

Over the next ten months, neither parent met the DHS’s expectations for 

reunification. Jordan’s substance-abuse evaluation recommended intensive 

outpatient treatment. But she was twice discharged from treatment programs for 

lack of attendance. She was also inconsistent in drug testing. She entered 

inpatient treatment just eight days before the January 2022 termination trial. 

Jordan tried to address her experience as a domestic violence victim—starting, but 

not completing, a program called Journey Beyond Abuse. Although she denied 

having any contact with Brian, the DHS was concerned that Jordan maintained a 

relationship with him despite the history of abuse. Jordan did not maintain stable 

housing or employment. Her visits with the children were inconsistent and stopped 

after November 2021.

As for Brian, he pleaded guilty to domestic abuse assault in August 2021 

and was placed on probation. Throughout the proceedings, he failed to take any 

steps toward reunification. He did not stay in touch with the DHS. He did not 

participate in mental-health or substance-abuse treatment. He did not have any 

 

4 Neither parent attended either the removal hearing or the CINA adjudication 

hearing.
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visits with the children because of the no-contact order. And, despite a court order, 

he never completed the Iowa Domestic Abuse Program. By the time of the 

termination trial, he was in jail for violating his probation.

The juvenile court terminated the rights of both parents under Iowa Code 

section 232.116(1), paragraphs (e), (g), (h), and (l). They now appeal.

II. Analysis

A. Jordan’s Appeal

1. Delayed Permanency 

Jordan starts by arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

denying her motion to continue the permanency hearing set for early November 

2021. She moved in late October to postpone that hearing because she had 

“recently enrolled in a dual purpose inpatient Substance Abuse and Battered 

Women’s program at the Lydia House in Omaha, Nebraska.” Her motion asserted 

that the programming would help her reunify with the children and the court had 

more time before it was necessary to determine the permanency goal. She also 

advised that she did not know the duration of the inpatient program. The court 

denied the motion, reasoning “this case has been open for eight months and 

parents have had ample opportunity to participate in services but have failed to do 

so.” After the permanency hearing, the court directed the State to file a termination 

petition.

Now Jordan contends that the court had four more months under Iowa Code 

section 232.104 to hold a permanency hearing and the “expedited” hearing 

disregarded her acceptance into the treatment program. Denying the continuance, 

in her view, ensured that she would not be ready to resume care of the children. 
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She speculates that the State could not have met its burden to terminate under 

section 232.116, paragraphs (e) and (h) if the court had continued the permanency 

hearing. 

The State defends the timing of the permanency hearing, noting it was free 

to seek termination, if the grounds were met, after six months for these children 

who were younger than four years. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). The State 

also reads Jordan’s argument as a request for continued placement of the children. 

See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). Under that provision, the court may delay 

permanency if it determines the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of 

the extension. 

Like the State, we view Jordan’s argument less as contesting the denial of 

her motion to continue the permanency hearing and more as challenging the 

court’s refusal to defer the permanency decision. Rather than a free-standing 

result, the court’s denial of the motion to continue the permanency hearing “is 

subsumed in the final termination order.” See In re T.R., 705 N.W.2d 6, 11 (Iowa 

2005). The court’s decision to terminate parental rights rather than defer 

permanency is supported by the record. Jordan’s pursuit of treatment was 

admirable, but her belated effort did not instill confidence that she would become 

a safe parent in six months, after years of involvement with the DHS. See In re

A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 93 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (considering “uncertainty about

parent’s sobriety”).

2. Statutory Grounds

Jordan next argues the State did not offer clear and convincing evidence to 

satisfy the elements of Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (g) and (l). But 
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she does not contest termination under paragraphs (e) and (h). So we can affirm 

on either of those grounds. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (holding 

even if only one ground is proven, the court may order termination). 

Although uncontested, we find the State offered sufficient proof under 

paragraph (h). The children are both under four years, they have been adjudicated 

as CINA, they have been removed from their mother's custody for more than six 

straight months, and—because she was just beginning treatment at the time of the 

termination hearing—they cannot be returned to her care at the present time. See

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h); see also In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014) 

(interpreting statutory language “at the present time” as the date of the termination 

hearing).

B. Brian’s Appeal

Brian contests all four statutory grounds for terminating his parental rights. 

As we did in Jordan’s case, we choose to affirm under paragraph (h). On that 

ground, he argues that the children could “eventually” be returned to his care. But 

the statute measures the parent’s readiness at the time of the hearing. See Iowa 

Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). Because 

of his domestic violence and his failure to comply with probation, Brian was not a 

safe or available parent for his children. The record supports termination of his 

parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.