NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of

HEIDI L. NICKEL, Petitioner/Appellee, 

v.

CHRISTOPHER K. POTTER, Respondent/Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0685 FC 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2010-052126 

The Honorable John Christian Rea, Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Heidi L. Nickel, Cave Creek

Petitioner/Appellee

Sullivan Law Office PLLC, Mesa

By Dianne Nicole Sullivan

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

FILED 1-11-2022
NICKEL v. POTTER

Decision of the Court

2 

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Christopher K. Potter (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s 

judgment and orders denying his petition to enforce parenting time with

his two children and granting Heidi L. Nickel’s (“Mother”) petition to 

modify legal decision making, parenting time, and child support. Father 

argues the court failed to specifically tie its findings to the best-interests 

factors enumerated in Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 25-

403(A) and that the court’s findings were unsupported by the evidence. He 

asks that we remand for the superior court to make more detailed findings

consistent with § 25-403. We conclude the court’s findings are adequate to 

satisfy the statutory requirements and are supported by the record. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Mother were married in 2000 and divorced in 

2010. They have two children—a daughter, who turned eighteen years old

in 2021, and a son, born in 2007. In 2011, the parties stipulated to joint legal 

decision-making and equal parenting time. In July 2019, the court adopted 

the parties’ stipulation to amend the parenting plan, but to leave in place 

shared decision making and parenting time. 

¶3 In December 2019, Father petitioned to enforce parenting 

time, alleging that beginning in October 2019, Mother had unilaterally 

stopped all parenting time between him and the children. 

¶4 Mother also petitioned to modify, seeking sole legal decisionmaking, designation as the primary residential parent (with Father to 

receive limited supervised parenting time), and child support. Mother 

asserted that Father had recently been arrested, remained incarcerated for 

one week, and was out on bail while his case was pending.1 Mother further 

asserted that multiple orders of protection had been taken out against 

Father. 

1 Based on a June 2017 dispute with a former girlfriend, Father had 

been charged with stalking, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2923, in Maricopa 

County Superior Court Case No. CR2019-150559. In September 2020, he 

pled guilty to attempted stalking, a class six undesignated felony and 

domestic violence offense, and the court placed him on supervised 

probation for two years.
NICKEL v. POTTER

Decision of the Court

3 

¶5 The petitions were consolidated, and the parties agreed to the 

appointment of a Court-Appointed Advisor (“CAA”) before trial. The 

CAA prepared a pretrial report based in part on interviews of Mother, 

Father, and the parties’ two children.

¶6 In July 2020, the superior court held an evidentiary hearing

on the petitions. Mother, Father, the CAA, and other witnesses testified. 

After taking the matter under advisement, the court issued a judgment in 

September 2020. In the judgment, the court summarized the evidence 

presented, made findings, then denied Father’s petition to enforce 

parenting time and awarded Mother sole legal decision-making authority. 

The court ordered that Father’s sole contact with the older child be in a 

therapeutic setting, but only after consideration of the child’s desires and 

the opinion of her therapist. The court also reduced Father’s parenting time 

with the younger child to supervised visitation for “at least four hours 

every other Saturday.” Finally, the court ordered Father to pay monthly 

child support for the two children.

¶7 Mother moved to amend the judgment, requesting the court 

make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors the court had 

considered and the reasons for which the court’s decisions were in the best 

interests of the children pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403. Specifically, Mother 

requested the court make its findings “in a format that matches the typical 

A.R.S. § 25-403 format to remove any shadow of uncertainty from this 

judgment.” Father responded that he did not object to Mother’s motion.

Nonetheless, the court denied the motion. 

¶8 We have jurisdiction over Father’s timely appeal under 

Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(2) 

and 12-120.21(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶9 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion when it 

denied his petition to enforce and granted Mother’s petition to modify. 

Father maintains the court’s findings are both inadequate to satisfy the 

requirements of A.R.S. § 25-403(B) and unsupported by the evidence.

I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶10 We review the superior court’s legal decision-making and 

parenting time rulings for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Diezsi, 

201 Ariz. 524, 525, ¶ 3 (App. 2002). In making such determinations, whether 

originally or on petition for modification, the court must consider the best 
NICKEL v. POTTER

Decision of the Court

4 

interests of the children, and in doing so, “shall consider all factors that are 

relevant to the child[ren]’s physical and emotional well-being, including” 

those factors found in A.R.S. § 25-403(A). Further, A.R.S. § 25-403(B) 

requires that, “[i]n a contested legal decision-making or parenting time 

case, the court shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant 

factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the 

child[ren].” 

II. The Merits

¶11 As the parties recognize, this court has previously found 

findings inadequate and held that the superior court abused its discretion 

when it failed to make findings pursuant to § 25-403. See Reid v. Reid, 222 

Ariz. 204, 207, ¶¶ 12-13 (App. 2009); Diezsi, 201 Ariz. at 526, ¶ 5; see also 

Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 421-22, ¶¶ 9-12 (App. 2003) (holding that 

the court abused its discretion in changing the primary residential parent 

and altering the parenting time schedule without making required findings 

on the record in a contested custody case brought under the relocation 

statute, A.R.S. § 25-408); Downs v. Scheffler, 206 Ariz. 496, 501, ¶ 19 (App.

2003) (holding that the court’s findings were insufficient as a matter of law 

and remanding for findings under A.R.S. § 25-403). 

¶12 However, “[n]o principles are better settled in Arizona than, 

first, that the duty of a reviewing court begins and ends with the inquiry 

whether the trial court had before it evidence which might reasonably 

support its action viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

findings, and, second, that the reviewing court will not weigh conflicting 

evidence on appeal.” O’Hair v. O’Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 240 (1973) (citations 

omitted). 

¶13 Here, Father concedes that the court’s judgment “arguably 

contained an [unenumerated] analysis of the [§ 25-]403 factors,” and we 

conclude the court’s findings, although not individually referenced in 

conjunction with A.R.S. § 25-403, nonetheless satisfy the statutory 

requirement of making specific findings regarding the reasons why its 

decision was in the children’s best interests. See Owen, 206 Ariz. at 421-22, 

¶¶ 11-12. 

¶14 Unlike the courts in the aforementioned cases, the court here

made a series of detailed findings and gave explanations for its judgment. 

It is clear from the record that several subsections of A.R.S. § 25-403 were 

inapplicable to the court’s analysis, including subsections (A)(9) through 

(A)(11), and that the court found the evidence did not support a finding of 
NICKEL v. POTTER

Decision of the Court

5 

domestic violence or child abuse or that either parent had intentionally 

misled the court, see A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(7)-(8). Further, where the evidence 

regarding a particular factor was disputed or not clearly neutral, the 

findings detail how the factor was considered. The court acknowledged 

“evidence that Mother has contributed to the children’s estrangement from 

Father,” which supports a finding in favor of Father as to subsection (A)(6) 

(“[w]hich parent is more likely to allow the child[ren] frequent, meaningful 

and continuing contact with the other parent”), but the court expressly 

considered that factor “minor.” 

¶15 Finally, the court’s findings make clear the central factors it 

considered were subsections (A)(1) through (A)(5), and that it heavily 

weighted subsection (A)(4) (“the wishes of the child[ren]”).2 Moreover, 

unlike in Reid, the court’s findings in this case are not cursory, nor do they 

accept or reject an evaluator’s recommendation without explanation. See

222 Ariz. at 207, ¶ 13. Instead, the court’s findings are sufficiently detailed

to comply with the statutory requirements and to allow us to meaningfully 

review its decisions regarding the parties’ petitions. It is possible here to 

determine which facts and findings apply to which factors, and unlike Hart 

v. Hart, 220 Ariz. 183, 186-87, ¶ 13 (App. 2009), this is not a case where a 

detailed weighing of the statutory factors “may have yielded a different 

outcome.” Accordingly, it would serve no purpose to remand for further 

findings here because the court has already recited the findings on which 

its judgment is based.

¶16 Father nonetheless argues that the court’s findings were 

unsupported by the record, in part because the court found Mother to be 

generally “credible” despite that Father pointed out instances in which she

previously had recanted statements made to the police or otherwise 

provided false statements, and in part because Father provided 

controverting evidence, including evidence showing the CAA had 

concluded that at least some of Father’s anger toward Mother was 

“justified.” Read as a whole, Father’s arguments constitute a request that 

we reweigh the evidence, something we will not do. See O’Hair, 109 Ariz. 

2 Subsections (A)(1) through (A)(5) include: (1) “The past, present and 

potential future relationship between the parent and the child”; (2) “The 

interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parent or 

parents, the child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly 

affect the child’s best interest”; (3) “The child’s adjustment to home, school 

and community”; (4) “If the child is of suitable age and maturity, the wishes 

of the child as to legal decision-making and parenting time”; and (5) “The 

mental and physical health of all individuals involved.” 
NICKEL v. POTTER

Decision of the Court

6 

at 240. Further, we disagree with Father that the court abdicated its 

responsibility to use its independent judgment, in contravention of In re 

Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273-74, ¶ 14 (App. 2013), and DePasquale v. 

Superior Court (Thrasher), 181 Ariz. 333, 336 (App. 1995), by quoting the 

older child’s counselor when making its findings. 

¶17 Although the better practice would be to follow the general 

template provided by § 25-403, the superior court’s findings here are 

adequate to provide a baseline on which Father (or Mother) might file a 

future petition for modification, and on which the court could assess the 

merits of such a petition. On this record, the court did not abuse its 

discretion when it denied Father’s petition to enforce and granted Mother’s 

petition to modify. 

III. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

¶18 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees. Mother, 

however, is not represented by an attorney. Father requests fees under 

A.R.S. § 25-324, but neither side has been unreasonable in its positions on 

appeal and the parties appear to have relatively equivalent financial 

resources. Thus, in our discretion, we decline to award attorneys’ fees on 

appeal to either party. We award taxable costs on appeal to Mother upon

compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

CONCLUSION

¶19 The superior court’s judgment is affirmed.