About the Report

This report is based on a series of roundtable discussions held 

in January 2014 in Islamabad and Lahore with Pakistani police 

officers from all parts of the country, attorneys, civil society 

representatives, journalists, and media personalities. The 

interviews and the report are part of a U.S. Institute of Peace 

(USIP) project begun in 2010 to increase Pakistan’s 

capacity to counter terrorism by highlighting initiatives 

undertaken by Pakistani police officers. 

About the Authors

Robert Perito is the executive director of the Perito Group, the 

former director of the Center for Security Sector Governance 

at the U.S. Institute of Peace, a senior U.S. foreign service 

officer, and former deputy executive secretary of the White 

House national security staff. Tariq Parvez is the former director 

general of Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency and former 

coordinator of the National Counter Terrorism Authority. In 

2004, Parvez received Pakistan’s third highest civilian award, 

the Sitara e Imtiaz, for his work in countering terrorism. A 

retired inspector general of the Police Service of Pakistan, 

Parvez now heads the Initiative for Public Security in Pakistan. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 351 August 2014

© 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

Colonial Past 2

Historic Role 3

Countering Terrorism 4

Priorities for Reform 5

Linking to Counterterrorism Efforts 8

Misdirection of Alternative Approaches 9

Conclusion and Recommendations 10

Robert Perito and Tariq Parvez

A Counterterrorism 

Role for Pakistan’s 

Police Stations

Summary

• Terrorism, secessionist insurgency, sectarian conflict, and ethnic turf wars have convulsed 

both Pakistan’s major cities and tribal areas along the Afghanistan border. The escalation in 

mega-urban centers in particular has increased the importance of the police in controlling 

the endemic violence. 

• The police station retains both its historic role as the symbol of government authority 

and its position as the basic law enforcement institution responsible for public order, law 

enforcement, and police services. Yet police stations and personnel are ill prepared and 

poorly equipped to meet the challenges of the country’s complex, urbanized, and increasingly 

violent society. 

• Pakistani police have found themselves on the front lines, and a growing number have given 

their lives to protect others in the struggle against terrorist and criminal groups. The need is 

now urgent to empower the police through a program of positive reform that would begin 

with modernizing police stations and reorienting and retraining their personnel. 

• An effective program for police station reform would begin with assigning primacy to the 

police for controlling terrorism. It would include developing new organizational structures, positions, and standard operating procedures to ensure that local police understand 

their enhanced role and mission. It would also include improving police-public relations 

and networking police stations into a national information-sharing network with antiterrorist agencies. 

• Creating high-profile specialized units appears to offer a quick fix to a complex and increasingly pervasive problem. The real solution, however, lies in empowering Pakistan’s police 

stations to protect their communities from criminal and extremist violence through modernization and reform. 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351

Introduction

In Pakistan, terrorism, secessionist insurgency, sectarian conflict, and ethnic turf wars have 

convulsed the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) along the Afghanistan border and 

had considerable impact on Karachi and other major cities. During the first six months of 

2014, eighty-seven Karachi police officers were killed in the line of duty, and 166 in all of 

2013.1 Their deaths made Karachi a microcosm of the problems the entire country faces. At 

least three thousand people died from terrorist violence in Pakistan in 2013.2 The escalation 

of such violence in mega-urban centers has highlighted the critical role of Pakistan’s police 

in law enforcement and maintaining public order. Despite the remarkable courage of individual officers who have given their lives to save others, Pakistan’s police have proven ill prepared and poorly equipped to deal with the challenge of rapidly escalating urban violence. 

This report is the second in a series on improving the capacity of the police to counter 

the rapid increase in terrorist violence in Pakistan. The first, “Empowering the Pakistan 

Police,” 3 dealt with the use of improved police-public relations as a tool in the battle against 

terrorism. This report extends the discussion of the role of the police in the community by 

focusing on the police station, the core institution in the organizational structure of policing in Pakistan. 

Colonial Past

The problems confronting the police in Pakistan relate to the country’s relatively recent 

colonial past. Under colonial-era regulations that largely remain in force, the FATA—the 

current base of terrorist operations—lies outside the authority of Pakistan’s provincial-level 

police forces.4 Under British rule, the FATA was administered through a system of indirect 

control that granted autonomy to local authorities. Maintenance of public order was left to 

tribal and paramilitary forces. Under the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), Pakistan’s 

police had no jurisdiction in the FATA. In 2011, the federal government adopted major 

amendments to the FCR that limited the arbitrary and coercive powers of the territorial 

administration. This vast area, which remains beyond the authority of provincially based 

police, is the responsibility of federal and local paramilitary forces. 

In the rest of Pakistan, policing is the purview of the country’s four provincial governments and the federal government in Islamabad, the nation’s capital. The underlying 

philosophy and the legal framework for these areas relates to the British colonial Police Act 

of 1861. Under the act, the police was the enforcement arm of the state’s bureaucracy, controlling the population through repression and fear. Despite efforts for reform, most notably 

the promulgation of the Police Order of 2002 during a period of military rule, the spirit of 

policing in Pakistan today reflects the authoritarian philosophy of the 1861 act. 

This approach is reflected in thana (police station) culture, a term used in Pakistan 

to describe a policing mindset that accepts such common abuses as demanding bribes 

for performing police services, illegal detention, and the use of force to obtain confessions.5 Police constables affect a military manner and answer to military-style discipline. 

Rank-and-file police officers have a reputation for being crude, abusive, and high-handed 

in their treatment of citizens. The police are generally feared but not respected. For the 

average citizen, seeking police assistance is considered potentially dangerous and often a 

last resort. Instead, thana culture serves the interests of the political elite, the wealthy, 

and those who can demand special treatment. Political interference with the police often 

results in transfers and the demand for bribes for promotions and attractive assignments. 

Politicians use the police to intimidate their opponents and to perform services, most 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, 

Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. 

Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, 

University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, 

School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center 

for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV 

• Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John 

A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council 

on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, 

Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

 • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • 

Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Chuck Hagel, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Kristin Lord, Acting President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351 3

importantly providing personal protection. In high-threat areas, a majority of the police 

may be deployed at any time on private security details for political officials, their families, 

and chief supporters. 

Providing Pakistan with the type of policing it requires, including against terrorism, 

requires the end of political interference in police administration and operations and the 

extension of greater authority to professional police leaders. The interference at the station 

house level has resulted in a situation where station house officers are transferred from their 

posts on average of every sixty to ninety days. Failure to provide security of tenure negates 

any possibility of effective leadership or fair accountability.6 Intervention by political elites to 

cancel investigations and obtain the release of prisoners undermines the functioning of the 

criminal justice system, lowers police morale, and damages the public image. Political interference in police matters is so common that it is spoken about openly and decried in the press.7

Historic Role 

As the British extended their control across Pakistan, they established police stations as 

symbols of their authority and a means of controlling the population. Police stations were 

large, fortress-like structures designed to impress and intimidate members of a rural, agrarian, and tribal society. Today Pakistan’s four provinces are home to 1,479 police stations and 

410,000 police.8 The police station retains its role as the symbol of government authority 

and its position as the basic institutional policing unit responsible for public order, law 

enforcement, and police services.9 It also retains responsibility for all aspects of police management and administrative functions. Pakistan has stayed with a model that provided a full 

range of police services to an individual agrarian community even though the environment 

surrounding the police station has changed. Pakistan has experienced rapid population 

growth and urbanization with the rise of megacities like Karachi and Lahore.10

Police stations built in the middle of farm land now are surrounded by crowded neighborhoods and squalid slums. The need to police a rapidly growing urban population has required 

establishing new police stations to provide a broader police presence. Many of the original 

imposing police stations remain, but time and a lack of maintenance have taken their toll. 

Most of the new stations have been opened in buildings built for other purposes, sometimes 

in commandeered private homes, or in makeshift structures.11 Working conditions for police 

are generally substandard. Many police stations lack electricity, water, and humane detention facilities. Inadequate facilities both have a negative impact on citizen perceptions of 

the police and lower police morale. 

Pakistan’s police stations are staffed by a police force normally recruited at two levels of 

service. At the senior ranks, the British police officers have been replaced by the national 

Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), an elite cadre recruited—along with other senior government employees—through a merit-based civil service examination. Appointments to the 

PSP are prestigious and sought after. PSP officers undergo common introductory training 

with their fellow civil servants followed by a course at the National Police Academy in 

Islamabad. In the enlisted ranks, assistant sub-inspectors are recruited in all provinces by 

provincial public service commissions, and constables by local police leadership boards. 

Direct hiring of constables creates opportunities for political patronage and corruption. 

Constables must have completed high school (ten years), but the quality of education is low, 

and constables may have difficulty reading and writing reports. Training for the lower ranks 

is largely a matter of drilling and other means of instilling discipline. Constables have limited 

opportunities for either promotion or transfer to more attractive locations. On duty fourteen 

hours a day, they are often outdoors manning roadblocks and guarding facilities. They live at 

Pakistan has stayed with a model 

that provided a full range of police 

services to an individual agrarian 

community even though the 

environment surrounding the police 

station has changed.
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351

the police station, often going months without a day off. Low pay and lack of opportunity 

for advancement create conditions for petty corruption and recruitment by political parties, 

criminal elements, and extremist groups. 

Shackled by this legacy, Pakistan’s provincial police organizations are ill prepared to play 

their current role in the battle to control the country’s spiraling levels of violence. Inadequate physical structures leave police officers vulnerable to attack. Police stations have 

neither blast resistant walls nor barriers to intercept car bombs. A significant percentage of 

police personnel are assigned in small groups to roadside check points, where they stand in 

the open and search vehicles with no protection. Police travel to duty stations on foot or in 

thin-skinned vans and open trucks that are easy targets for roadside explosives and drive-by 

attacks. Police stations have a limited collection of old, mismatched, and poorly maintained 

automatic weapons and side arms. Ammunition is inadequate to defend against a sustained 

attack. Helmets and body armor are in short supply. 

More important than shortfalls in facilities and equipment is that police stations remain 

focused on their traditional roles of controlling crime and maintaining order and have not 

accepted countering terrorism as part of their mission. In part, this is due to the prevailing view 

at the police station level that counterterrorism is the responsibility of specialized antiterrorist 

units. It is also due to the overwhelming increase in the demand for police services as a result of 

rapid urbanization and a related spike in burglaries and street crime. In Pakistan, first information 

reports (FIRs) are the forms used to record every crime reported to a police station and are the 

basis for crime statistics, case investigations, and record-keeping. In Lahore, an average police 

station may receive eighty FIRs a month, all requiring investigation and follow-up. Pakistan’s 

faltering judicial system and the breakdown in public services has left the police station as the 

place where citizens go to resolve commercial and domestic disputes. Officially described as 

“noncognizable offenses,” such complaints should be referred to the courts for action. In practice, 

however, police officers spend hours of their day mediating local disputes and resolving local 

problems to prevent them from escalating into violent conflicts.12

Notably, Pakistan has not followed the lead of Britain in restructuring its police organization to respond to the demands of policing urban environments. Pakistan has not adopted the 

Metropolitan Police Model,13 which elevates responsibility for local command, management, 

and administrative functions from the police station to the subdivision level, where a more 

senior assistant or deputy superintendent of police is responsible for coordinating the activities 

of a group of stations. This subdivision officer reports to one of several division commanders, 

superintendents, or senior superintendents, who in turn report to the senior police official in the 

city. In Britain, this model has improved police services, reduced duplication, and concentrated 

policy and management functions. This has allowed unnecessary stations to be closed and more 

personnel to be used more efficiently. Despite the urging of senior serving and retired police officials,14 Pakistan’s political leaders have shown no indication that they are prepared to reorganize 

the country’s police given its inherent disruptions at a time of national crisis. It is important, 

therefore, that reform programs concentrate on upgrading the existing system, which is based 

on the police station, as a more certain avenue to improving the capacity of the police to combat 

terrorist and criminal violence. 

Countering Terrorism 

That provincial governments have not sought to formally involve station house police has 

deprived Pakistan of potentially its most valuable instrument in controlling terrorism. International experience in countering terrorism has shown that the key to preventing violence 

against the state and its citizens is policing that establishes government legitimacy and 

Police stations remain focused on 

their traditional roles of controlling 

crime and maintaining order and 

have not accepted countering 

terrorism as part of their mission.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351 5

wins public support. In societies threatened by endemic violence, the responsibility for 

security should be entrusted to police deployed among the population. Police are the public 

face of the government. By performing their duties in a professional manner, police build 

support for the government they represent. Acts committed by terrorists are crimes, which 

are the responsibility of the police and the criminal justice system.15

Killing or capturing terrorists when they are engaged in terrorist acts is not an effective 

solution to insecurity. The solution is to identify would-be terrorists before they commit 

acts of violence using information provided by citizens to the police. To make this approach 

work effectively, the police must realize the importance of working with citizens. They must 

also adopt a citizen-oriented approach to policing. Police establish effective relations with 

the public by being available and easily accessible, by being responsive and acting promptly 

to requests for assistance from individuals, and by being fair and impartial, treating everyone professionally, respectfully, and empathetically. This approach is based on relationships, 

attitudes, and values. It requires neither advanced technical skills nor heavy weaponry. It 

does require that officers at all ranks understand that their role is to enlist the cooperation 

of the public in the struggle against insurgency, terrorism, and violent crime. Police cannot 

deal with these threats alone. They can succeed only when the public provides information 

on the location and the activities of criminals and insurgents. The goal is for police to arrest 

the terrorists in their sleep rather than to fight them in the streets.16

In its January 2014 report “Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan,” the International Crisis 

Group concluded that the provincial police should be given primacy in controlling terrorist, 

sectarian, and insurgent violence but that this would be impossible without fundamental 

police reform. The report noted that Pakistan’s megacities required sophisticated personnel 

and technical resources to track violent offenders and urged that provincial governments 

make modernization the focus of a law enforcement reform program. It also urged that 

governments ensure that the police are not hampered by political interference, inadequate 

resources, or a lack of institutional and operational autonomy.17 

To undertake such a reform program, provincial authorities should build on the advantages 

that accrue to the police station because of its position as the basic unit of law enforcement. 

Police stations enjoy a pervasive presence in all parts of the country, are integrated into the 

local community, and are the repository of historical information about local conditions, personalities, and criminal networks. Station house police conduct neighborhood patrols, man 

check points, conduct investigations that require interaction with the local population, and 

provide opportunities for the collection of information on the activities of suspect groups. 

Terrorists often commit crimes, such as kidnapping or burglary, to obtain money and materials for future attacks. Effective basic law enforcement by local police can remove would-be 

terrorists from the streets for ordinary crimes before they commit more serious offenses. As 

first responders to terrorist incidents, the local police are responsible for securing the crime 

scene and collecting evidence that is critical to determining responsibility for the attack. A 

comprehensive approach to countering terrorist, insurgent, separatist, and sectarian groups 

would begin by tapping the existing resources of the police station and its personnel. 

Priorities for Reform 

Reform by empowerment would require strategic antiterrorist plans that assigned primacy 

to the police and included the police station as a core component. Preparing such a plan 

would be a first step toward changing the currently isolated and stovepiped police culture 

in which counterterrorism is regarded as the responsibility of specialized units. Preparation 

would ensure that all policing units understand their responsibility to collect and analyze 

Terrorists often commit crimes, 

such as kidnapping or burglary, to 

obtain money and materials for 

future attacks. Effective basic law 

enforcement by local police can 

remove would-be terrorists from 

the streets for ordinary crimes 

before they commit more 

serious offenses.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351

information on suspect groups and individuals and to provide that information through 

established channels to higher authorities who collate the information and produce finished 

intelligence. At the same time, all policing units would be sensitized to be aware of activities that might indicate an individual’s membership in a terrorist group. Finally, preparation 

would require police at all levels to review the physical security of police facilities and to 

develop standard operating procedures for police response to terrorist incidents. This entire 

effort would be supported by an information campaign and in-service training courses to 

inform police personnel of their new roles and responsibilities. 

Physical Security 

At the station level, this reform process would begin with security assessments, hardened 

structures, and reconfigured public access to make police facilities of all types less vulnerable 

to terrorist attacks. This would be accompanied by providing adequate numbers of personal 

radios, sets of body armor, armored vehicles, and weapons to protect police officers and convince them that the reform was not another attempt, at their expense, to shift responsibility 

for dealing with the current crisis. Initial success for the reform effort would depend in part on 

overcoming the understandable reaction of police officers that they have heard this all before. 

In January 2014, the head of a police station in Sindh province was suspended for failing to 

follow orders after the terrorist death of a motorcycle patrolman. Provincial authorities had 

decreed that police were to be equipped with mobile phones, patrol in pairs, and wear body 

armor. The station house officer protested that his seventy personnel had only three mobile 

phones, one motorcycle, and six bulletproof jackets and that he could follow the new security 

procedures only if his station were properly equipped.18

Standard Operating Procedures

Concern for officer welfare and for improving police professionalism at the station level 

would require preparing, distributing, and training on a series of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for responding to terrorist incidents and defending against terrorist attacks. In 

an interview, a PSP officer described how he overcame his immediate fear after a car bomb 

blast and rushed to the scene only to realize he had no idea what he should do.19 Currently, 

few formal SOPs exist to guide station house police in assisting victims, ensuring access for 

emergency medical personnel, securing the blast scene, interviewing witnesses, and filing 

reports on terrorist incidents, nor are local police trained in first aid and life-saving techniques. Similarly, no station house SOPs have been established on police station security 

procedures or on responding to a direct terrorist attack. Such procedures would save lives 

and enable police station personnel to defend themselves until special rapid reaction units 

arrived. To be effective, new SOPs would have to be introduced through an information 

campaign that ensured that all police officers were familiar with the new procedures. Police 

personnel would also have to be trained, preferably through role play scenarios, on how to 

react according to the procedures in crisis situations. Such training is not currently provided. 

Indeed, rank-and-file police receive little or no in-service training to update their policing 

skills after they graduate from the basic training course. 

Improved Police-Public Relations

Improving the police station’s effectiveness in countering terrorism depends on improving 

police-community relations at the local level. New SOPs and training programs must replace 

the current authoritarian ethos of policing in Pakistan with an approach that engages the 

police and the community in a common effort to control terrorist and criminal violence. This 

approach is consistent with the one taken by police forces in the United States and western 

No station house standard operating 

procedures have been established 

on police station security 

procedures or on responding to a 

direct terrorist attack.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351 7

Europe that emphasizes basic law enforcement and community outreach. It should be based 

on SOPs and training programs to ensure that the police are responsive and treat community 

members with respect. Improved police-public relations results in greater public willingness 

to provide information on illegal activities and potential security threats.

Programs to improve police-public relations start with improving public access to police 

stations, including special access for women. Such efforts involve engaging the community 

in police work through programs like community watches and creating peace committees 

to mediate local disputes and to review and evaluate police performance. Improved public 

access, special treatment for women using female police officers, and community outreach 

programs are features of a few newly established model police stations in major cities. Many 

of these stations were modified based on technical advice and financial assistance from 

international (including U.S.) donors. The creation of these stations indicates a willingness 

on the part of provincial authorities to experiment with reforms. Absent a determination 

to invest provincial funding to replicate these innovations across the entire force, however, 

these model stations will remain isolated examples of future possibilities. 

Intelligence Collection

Despite the increased demand for police services, station house reporting procedures—

which are largely done by hand in large, leather-bound ledgers—have remained unchanged 

for decades. Computerized record-keeping and Internet communication between stations 

and headquarters remain limited to a handful of model stations in urban centers. Although 

peace committees that involve community members in resolving local disputes can be a 

mechanism for reporting suspicious activity to the police, only limited efforts have been 

made to sensitize police at the station house level to look for indications that terrorist 

groups might be present and preparing for local operations. There is also no effective 

means for higher police authorities to routinely provide terrorist-related information to 

police stations in a timely manner, let alone as actionable intelligence for the conduct of 

counterterrorist operations. 

Police stations need a new system for information collection and analysis and new personnel trained to perform these functions. Historically, police stations had a dedicated cell 

that conducted liaison with the village headman and watchman to collect information on 

local conditions, personalities, and activities that might pose a security threat. As Pakistan 

has become more urbanized, these roles have disappeared. The Police Rules of 1934 created 

a system of police station record-keeping with inspections by senior officers that continued 

until the 1970s. Given the proliferation of demands on the police and the frequent transfer of key personnel, this system fell into disuse. The 1997 National Counterterrorism Act 

provided procedures and authorities for police surveillance of suspected terrorists.20 The 

Fair Trial Act of February 2013 broadened those authorities to include wire taps and other 

types of electronic eavesdropping.21 These procedures generally are not followed and the 

authorities not used, however.22 Police at the station house level are often unaware of the 

details of the law, and countering terrorism has not yet been specifically prescribed as part 

of their duties. 

For the already overburdened officer in charge of a police station, counterterrorism would 

be an unwelcome addition to an already overwhelming set of responsibilities. Currently, 

station house police are responsible for controlling crime and maintaining public order, as 

well as for providing a growing list of police services. A PSP officer explained that recently 

he had been instructed by various political authorities to have his constables engage in a 

number of extraneous activities. These activities involved helping the electric company disconnect city residents who illegally tapped into power lines, dispensing the polio vaccine to 

children at police roadblocks, preventing overpricing in vegetable markets, and monitoring 

Only limited efforts have been made 

to sensitize police at the station 

house level to look for indications 

that terrorist groups might be 

present and preparing for 

local operations.
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351

kite flying to prevent fights over intentionally cut kite strings.23 Yet countering terrorism 

is an important national priority and should be one of the principal duties assigned to the 

station house officer and his subordinates. Counterterrorism awareness, the collection of 

information on terrorist groups, and the arrest and detention of terrorist suspects should 

be integrated into normal police work. This could be done by developing and institutionalizing new SOPs that reorder priorities and sensitize officers to be aware of terrorist-related 

behavior they encounter in conducting their regular duties.

In Pakistan, organized criminal involvement in kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and narcotics trafficking are directly related to funding the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and other terrorist 

groups.24 Police station detectives who investigate these crimes should be instructed to follow 

the money trail to the terrorists who benefit. New SOPs and related training of station house 

personnel would be required, but a relative small investment could pay real dividends. A PSP 

officer interviewed for this report described the positive response and immediate payoff of a 

one-week training course in terrorism awareness that he developed and delivered to constables 

in his district. The training boosted morale and energized trainees, who felt that they were 

taken seriously, were given new skills, and were assigned roles in dealing with the current 

national crisis. After the course, one of the trainees was told by a restaurant owner that every 

day a man purchased ten meals and took them to a house where it appeared no one lived. The 

constable investigated, police raided the house, and members of a terrorist cell were arrested.25

Formally integrating local police in the collection of terrorist-related intelligence would 

begin with systems used to record and track information. Current regulations require police 

stations to maintain twenty-five registers and make daily entries, usually by hand. This system 

is outdated and often ignored in busy urban stations. Efforts in some provinces to computerize 

police station record-keeping were abandoned short of completion. A new effort is needed to 

introduce a computer-based system of automated record-keeping that emphasizes collecting 

terrorism-relevant information. Databases created by this system should be linked electronically to all stations in the district, to higher headquarters, and to counterterrorism agencies. 

Record-keeping and information input needs to be standardized by incorporating templates 

to ensure that reports include all relevant information. This system could best be installed at 

police stations using small, dedicated units of computer literate personnel, including civilians 

who are not sworn police officers. Current efforts to recruit more assistant sub-inspectors with 

higher education could support this program. Model police stations in Islamabad and Lahore 

have computerized record-keeping and station administration, but the model stations are not 

linked to a larger network, so the utility of their database and other information is limited. 

Linking to Counterterrorism Efforts 

In Pakistan, provincial counterterrorism departments (CTDs) coordinate the collection, collation, 

and dissemination of terrorist-related intelligence and information from all sources, including 

the police. They also maintain watch lists of terrorist groups and carry out de-radicalization 

programs. Intelligence and information sharing between police stations and CTDs is done by 

printed communications that are distributed manually save at a few model stations that use 

fax machines. The system is slow and often results in the late arrival or loss of time-sensitive 

information in the glut of daily traffic between police stations and headquarters. This situation 

persists despite federal attempts to introduce new technologies designed to improve police 

performance and establish electronic connectivity between local police stations and provincial 

and national counterterrorism departments. 

At the national level, the Police Records and Office Management Information System 

was created to computerize police station record-keeping and create databases accessible 

to all levels of the police hierarchy. The Pakistan Automated Finger Printing Identification 

A new effort is needed to 

introduce a computer-based 

system of automated recordkeeping that emphasizes collecting 

terrorism-relevant information. 

Databases created by this system 

should be linked electronically 

to all stations in the district, 

to higher headquarters, and to 

counterterrorism agencies.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351 9

System, located in the Federal Investigation Agency in Islamabad, was envisioned as a 

national computerized database for fingerprints accessible from police stations, enabling 

quick identification of criminals, including terrorists. Unfortunately, these initiatives were 

not fully implemented because financial resources were inadequate and the police and political leadership inattentive. 

In Punjab, the provincial government is in the process of building the Punjab Police Integrated Command Control and Communications Center in Lahore. Once completed, the center 

should create connectivity between provincial police units, enhancing their capacity to 

exchange crime and terrorism-related information. The center and efforts like the computerization of interrogation reports produced by the new Punjab Counterterrorism Force could 

be emulated by other provinces to improve police ability to share information. Most critical, 

however, will be efforts to ensure that plans on paper are implemented in fact. 

Misdirection of Alternative Approaches

The government has responded to the current crisis with proposals for the creation of 

specialized counterterrorism forces in parallel to the existing police services. In Punjab, the 

country’s largest province and home base of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s ruling Pakistan 

Muslim League, the chief minister plans to establish a new counterterrorism force (CTF) that 

will be part of the provincial police CTD but staffed by military personnel on loan or on contract who will receive higher salaries than their police counterparts. The new CTF will have a 

budget six times larger than the current provincial police CTD, and its personnel will receive 

better training and equipment. The CTF will take at least two and a half years to become fully 

operational. PSP members protested an initial move to establish the CTF outside the police, 

prompting an eventual reconsideration of that part of the plan.26

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the government of opposition leader Imran Khan 

announced the creation of a new CTD that will employ 2,400 policemen, including 650 senior 

officers. The new force will operate separately from the regular police but will maintain 

seven of its own police stations in the capital and six stations throughout the province. CTD 

stations and the residence of its officers will be hardened against terrorist attacks. The CTD 

will have authority to collect intelligence, conduct investigations, and carry out counterterrorism operations. Members of the new force will receive higher salaries than their regular 

police counterparts. The provincial chief minister was reported to have ordered the removal 

of all bureaucratic obstacles so the new force could rapidly acquire proper facilities, armored 

vehicles, and equipment, presumably treatment different from that accorded to the regular 

police.27

Provincial police CTDs play an important role in centralizing expertise; collecting, analyzing, and disseminating CT information; and investigating and arresting terrorist suspects. 

Specialized rapid response units have a critical role in responding in hostage situations and 

in neutralizing armed groups. Specialized CT units, such as the Punjab Elite Police Force, have 

been trained by army commandos and already exist in every province. There is a downside, 

however, to concentrating on militarized special units that draw already scarce financial, 

material, and personnel resources away from the regular police, thus weakening the institution responsible for general law enforcement and creating invidious comparisons between 

the regular police and their more favored counterparts. 

Rather than sidelining the regular police, enhancing their capacity beginning at the station level offers an immediate and cost-effective means of countering terrorism and other 

types of violent crime. The idea that the current force can be bypassed in favor of specialized 

units and left in its current state runs real risks, particularly in maintaining the quality of 

the force. The demands of policing Pakistan’s increasingly sophisticated and complex society 
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351

requires greater across-the-board investment in the police rather than concentrating the 

expenditure of resources on special units with an important but limited role.

Conclusion and Recommendations

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Pakistan requires effective 

policing institutions, without which the path to stability, sustainable development and good 

governance will be impossible to achieve.” 28 This is particularly true in Pakistan’s megacities 

of Karachi and Lahore and throughout the country’s increasingly urbanized environment. 

Policing in urban areas requires a more modern, sophisticated, and community-oriented 

approach and greater technical resources than policing in rural areas. Unfortunately, the 

basic unit of policing and law enforcement in Pakistan—the police station—remains largely 

unchanged from the country’s colonial and agrarian past. This has left the country’s local police 

ill prepared for and largely divorced from playing an effective role in countering Pakistan’s high 

levels of terrorist and criminal violence. 

Expanding the involvement of the police station will not be easy. Pakistan’s police station 

(thana) culture has proven resistant to change. Political elites have vested interests in preventing reforms that would reduce their authority and obviate opportunities to exert influence and achieve illicit financial gains. The ideas discussed in this report, especially those 

related to improving police-public relations would begin to remove the most odious aspects 

of the thana culture. Involving the local police in the national struggle against terrorism 

by providing new procedures, training, and equipment would improve morale and upgrade 

the quality of policing overall. Improving the capacity of local police stations, including the 

assignment of better educated and more capable personnel, would positively impact police 

culture. A comprehensive reform of the police station is required to achieve stability, prosperity, and effective governance. 

This conclusion leads to the following recommendations: 

• The provincial civilian police should have primacy for countering terrorism, especially in 

Pakistan’s urban areas. Pakistan’s army has taken the lead in battling terrorist groups in 

the FATA, a sparsely populated mountainous area with ample space in which to conduct 

military operations. It would be inappropriate to deploy the army in Pakistan’s teeming 

cities. Urban security is normally the responsibility of the police. In Karachi, however, 

primacy for counterterrorism has been assigned to the Pakistan Rangers, a federal 

paramilitary force composed of military personnel. In 2013, the federal government 

gave the Rangers authority to shoot-to-kill terrorist suspects. The result has been 

a number of extrajudicial killings. Assigning the urban counterterrorism mission to 

military forces contributes to an escalation of violence, which would be mitigated by 

giving this responsibility to the police.29 

• The police station, which is the basic institution of law enforcement in Pakistan, should 

be given the mission and the resources to combat terrorism starting at the local level. 

Providing a key role to the police station in controlling terrorism begins with developing 

a series of SOPs that define the role of local police and equip them with the authorities 

and the direction to perform that task. New ways of doing the business of policing must 

be introduced through internal information campaigns and in-service training programs 

to ensure that the police understand their roles and posses the skills they will need 

going forward. New procedures and training must sensitize police officers to be aware 

of indications of terrorist activities and equip them to conduct effective surveillance 

and to perform their duties as first responders. It is critical that this training include 

Improving the capacity of local 

police stations, including the 

assignment of better educated and 

more capable personnel, would 

positively impact police culture.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 351 11

an emphasis on the role of police-community relations in combating terrorism. These 

internal actions must be accompanied by an outreach campaign to inform the public 

about this effort and to seek its cooperation.

• Police station record-keeping must be computerized and networked by introducing new 

requirements, procedures, equipment, and trained personnel. The creation of a national 

data collection effort on terrorist-related individuals and groups begins at the level 

of the police station with its responsibility for the collection of information on local 

conditions, events, and personalities. This is now done using an antiquated system 

of police registers incapable of efficiently storing and retrieving information related 

to combating terrorism and organized crime. Modernizing this system by introducing 

computers and employing computer-literate personnel is long overdue and would be 

required even if there were no terrorist threat. Once computerized reporting units are 

in place, they must be networked with other stations, with higher police headquarters, 

and with provincial and national antiterrorism agencies. This system also must be used 

to pass terrorist alerts and other information from the center to the periphery so that 

local police are informed in a timely manner about information they can use to conduct 

operations and build cases again local terrorists and criminal groups. 

• Provincial counterterrorism departments should be given an enhanced role in coordinating 

counterterrorism reporting and activities. Provincial CTDs already play an important role 

in providing expertise, collating, analyzing, and disseminating CT information and in 

investigating and arresting subjects. Expanding the CT authorities of police stations 

and enhancing their capacities would require comparable upgrades in authorities and 

capacities at the provincial level to the CTDs to play their role effectively. This would 

require strengthening the ability of the CTDs to develop and approve CT-related policies, 

procedures, and directives to coordinate CT-related information collection and direct 

CT operations. 

Achieving the goal of integrating the police station into Pakistan’s counterterrorism 

effort would use an existing resource that has been sidelined and ignored in favor of creating militarized special units that have failed to control the country’s escalating violence. 

Creating parallel high-profile specialized units appears to offer a quick-fix solution to a 

complex and increasingly pervasive problem. The real solution, however, lies in empowering 

Pakistan’s police stations to protect their communities from criminal and extremist violence 

through modernization and reform. 

Notes

1. “100 Police Officials Killed in Last 200 Days in Karachi,” Express Tribune, July 27, 2014, http://tribune.com.pk/

story/741774/100-police-officials-killed-in-last-200-days-in-karachi. 

2. Tim Craig, “Paradise Despoiled,” Washington Post, June 30, 2014.

3. Robert M. Perito and Tariq Parvez, “Empowering the Pakistan Police,” Special Report no. 322 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Institute of Peace, May 2013), www.usip.org/publications/empowering-the-pakistan-police.

4. Suhail Habib Tajik, “Counterterrorism Efforts of Law Enforcement Agencies in Pakistan,” in Pakistan’s 

Counterterrorism Challenge, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 111. 

5. Mohammad Ali Babakhel, “Police: An Isolated Force,” Dawn, January 24, 2013, www.dawn.com/2013/01/25/

police-an-isolated-force.

6. International Crisis Group (ICG), “Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan,” Asia Report no. 255 (Brussels: 

International Crisis Group, January 2014), 40, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/255-

policing-urban-violence-in-pakistan.pdf. 

7. Ejaz Haider, “On the Verge of Mutiny” The News, December 18, 2013, www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-

220798-On-the-verge-of-mutiny.

8. Tajik, “Counterterrorism Efforts,” 105.

9. Tariq Khosa, “Need to Rethink Policing,” Dawn, October 16, 2013, www.dawn.com/news/1049982. 
10. Michael Kugelman, ed., “Pakistan’s Runaway Urbanization” (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2014), 

www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/pakistans-runaway-urbanization.

11. “Twenty-Two Police Stations of Larkana District May Collapse Any Time,” Pakistan Press International, September 

23, 2013, www.ppinewsagency.com/138749/22-police-stations-of-larkana-district-may-collapse-any-time. 

12. PSP officers, interviews, Islamabad, January 27, 2014. 

13. Phil Willis, “Proposed Changes Within the Metropolitan Police Service,” Safer Sutton Partnership Service, 2012, 5, 

http://content.met.police.uk/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheadername1=Content-Type&blobheadername2=

Content-Disposition&blobheadervalue1=application%2Fpdf&blobheadervalue2=inline%3B+filename%3D%22741

%2F175%2FLocal+Policing+Model+Stakeholder+Engagement+Sutton.pdf%22&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs

&blobwhere=1283580031890&ssbinary=true.

14. ICG, “Policing Urban Violence,” 39.

15. David Bayley and Robert Perito, The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime (Boulder, CO: 

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 51.

16. Ibid., 84–86. 

17. ICG, “Policing Urban Violence,” 38–41. 

18. Faraz Khan, “Guard Down: Enough Works, Give Us Resources, Say Policemen,” Express Tribune, January 31, 2014, 5. 

19. PSP officer, interview, Lahore, January 31, 2014.

20. “The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997,” Federal Investigation Agency, Government of Pakistan, www.fia.gov.pk/ata.htm.

21. Fair Trail Act of February 2013, Senate of Pakistan, www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1361946120_543.pdf.

22. Ali Sultan, “Investigating Terror,” The News International, November 28, 2012, www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysNews-9-145391-Investigating-terror.

23. PSP officer, interview, Lahore, January 31, 2014.

24. Muhammad Amir Rana, “Choking Financing for Militants in Pakistan,” in Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Challenge, ed. 

Moeed Yusuf (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 149–68.

25. PSP officer, interview, Lahore, January 30, 2014. 

26. Muhammad Faisal Ali, “Counter Terrorism Force under IGP yet to be Notified,” Dawn, December 30, 2013, 

www.dawn.com/news/1077273/counter-terrorism-force-under-igp-yet-to-be-notified/print

27. Javed Aziz Khan, “KP Sets up Special Anti-Terrorism Force,” The News, November 19, 2013, www.thenews.com.

pk/Todays-News-2-215081-KP-sets-up-special-anti-terrorism-force.

28. UNODC, “Policing in Pakistan: An Overview of Institutions, Debates and Challenges” (Vienna: UN Office on Drugs 

and Crime, 2012), 1.

29. ICG, “Policing Urban Violence,” 23.

Of Related Interest

• Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance by C. Christine Fair and Peter 

Chalk (USIP Press, 2006)

• Empowering the Pakistan Police by Robert M. Perito and Tariq Parvez (Special Report, April 2013)

• Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, May 2012)

• Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces? by Shuja Nawaz (Special Report, November 2011)

• Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges by David Bayley and Robert 

M. Perito (Special Report, November 2011)

• Reforming Pakistan‘s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure: Is It Too Flawed to Fix? by Hassan 

Abbas (Special Report, February 2011)

• Fighting Corruption in Security Sector Reform by Robert M. Perito and Madeline Kristoff (Peace 

Brief, May 2010)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-233-1

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

United States 

Institute of Peace

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Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

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