Vega v Metropolitan Tr. Auth.

2024 NY Slip Op 32949(U)

August 20, 2024

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Index No. 451813/2018

Judge: David B. Cohen

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York

State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.
451813/2018 VEGA, CARLOS vs. METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Motion No. 002 003

Page 1 of 13

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 

58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 99, 100, 103, 104, 

107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122

were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY .

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 

78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 88, 90, 92, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 106, 113, 116, 123, 124

were read on this motion to/for DISMISS .

In this Labor Law action, defendants/third-party plaintiffs Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority s/h/a Metropolitan Transit Authority (the MTA), the MTA Capital Construction 

Company (the MTACC) and Tutor Perini Corporation (Tutor Perini) (collectively movants) 

move: 1) pursuant to CPLR 3212 (mot. seq. 002), for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s 

claims against them pursuant to Labor Law §§ 200 (common-law negligence), 240(1), and 

241(6); and 2) for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 on their third-party claim for 

contractual indemnification against third-party defendant Rebar Steel Corporation (RSC). 

Plaintiff opposes the motion and cross-moves, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment 

on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: HON. DAVID B. COHEN PART 58

Justice 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 451813/2018

 MOTION DATE 12/12/2023

 MOTION SEQ. NO. 002 003

DECISION + ORDER ON 

MOTION

CARLOS VEGA,

 Plaintiff, 

- v -

METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, MTA CAPITAL 

CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, TUTOR PERINI 

CORPORATION,

 Defendants. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

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In motion sequence 003, RSC moves, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment 

dismissing the complaint, as well as the third-party claims asserted by the MTA, MTACC, and 

Tutor Perini against it for common-law and contractual indemnification and breach of contract. 

Plaintiff opposes the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from an incident on December 11, 2017 in which plaintiff, a laborer 

employed by RSC, was allegedly injured while loading bundles of rebar onto the bed of a truck 

at the Amityville Yard, located at 29-85 Northern Boulevard in Queens, New York (the yard). 

The yard, owned by the MTA and/or MTACC, was a staging area for materials being used for an 

MTA tunnel project. 

In April 2016, Tutor Perini was hired by the MTA and/or the MTACC to build caverns 

and tracks for the East Side Access Project connecting the Long Island Railroad to Grand Central 

Station (the project). That same month, Tutor Perini subcontracted with RSC to cut, bend and 

install reinforcing steel at the yard; the subcontract identified MTACC as owner of the project 

and Tutor Perini as the general contractor. Although plaintiff alleges in his statement of 

undisputed facts that “the MTA” owned the site and movants admitted same in their response, 

the only documentation submitted with the motions regarding the ownership of the site was the 

said subcontract. 

Paragraph 4 of the subcontract provided, inter alia, that RSC agreed

[t]o the fullest extent allowed by New York Law, to indemnify, defend and save 

harmless [the MTACC and Tutor Perini] and their officers, employees, consultants and 

agents from and against any and all claims, debts, demands, damages, judgments, awards, 

losses, liabilities, including but not limited to vicarious liability, interest, attorneys’ fees, 

costs and expenses of any kind at any time arising out of or in any way connected with 

[RSC’s] performance or failure to perform the Subcontract work, or the acts or omissions 

of [RSC]...except that this provision does not require that [RSC] indemnify [Tutor 

Perini] from loss, damage, expense, liability or other potential or incurred debt under this 

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provision caused by [Tutor Perini’s] negligence or willful misconduct or that [RSC] 

indemnify [the MTACC] from loss, damage, expense, liability or other potential or 

incurred debt under this provision caused by [the MTACC’s] negligence or willful 

misconduct.

Paragraph 5(D)(1) required RSC to procure insurance for the contractor and other parties 

set forth in exhibit B, and to provide labor to move materials inside the tunnels.

On July 25, 2019, plaintiff commenced the captioned action by filing a summons and 

complaint in Supreme Court, Bronx County, and the parties thereafter stipulated to move the 

venue of the action to New York County. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged claims for

common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1) and 241(6). The movants 

joined issue by filing an answer denying the allegations in the complaint and thereafter 

commenced a third-party action against RSC for, inter alia, common-law indemnification and 

contribution (first cause of action), contractual indemnification (second cause of action), and 

breach of contract for failure to provide insurance (fourth cause of action). RSC then filed an 

answer to the third-party complaint and counterclaimed against MTA, MTACC and Tutor 

A. Plaintiff’s 50-h Testimony

At his 50-h hearing, plaintiff testified that his work at the yard on the day of the incident 

was related to the project. Rebar was stored at the yard so that it could be bent into proper shape 

to be installed in the tunnel, and it could not be brought directly into the tunnel before it was 

bent. As of the time of the accident, plaintiff had spent about 3 weeks working in the tunnel and 

about 2 weeks working in the yard. 

At the time of the accident, plaintiff was standing on the bed of a flatbed truck, about five 

to six feet above the ground, while an RSC coworker lowered a bundle of rebar onto the truck 

bed with a forklift. As the rebar was lowered from a height of 20-25 feet, “it jumped up” and 

plaintiff’s right leg and foot became pinched between the rebar and the truck. As he tried to 

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move the rebar off of his leg, it moved and struck him in the chest, knocking him backwards off 

of the bed of the truck, and he fell to the ground. 

According to plaintiff, although rebar should be strapped with two metal cables and a tag 

line when being loaded, nylon straps were used instead, and since no tag line was available, he 

had to use his hand to guide the rebar onto the truck. He estimated that each bundle of rebar 

weighed between 320 and 810 pounds. 

B. Plaintiff’s Deposition Testimony

At his deposition, in addition to reiterating his 50-h testimony, plaintiff testified that at 

the time of the incident, the rebar, tied together with nylon straps, was loaded onto the truck 

using a forklift operated by an individual named Terrance, who was a steelworker and RSC’s 

yard foreman. No construction was being performed at the yard at the time. Plaintiff’s 

coworker, who was also on the bed of the truck, directed Terrance as to where and how the 

bundle should be set down. When Terrance lowered the rebar, it hit plaintiff in the ankle and 

chest and threw him from the bed of the truck. He could not avoid being struck by the rebar 

since he was standing against the cab of the truck.

C. Tutor Perini’s Deposition Testimony

Tutor Perini’s safety manager testified that the yard was a staging area for construction 

materials to be used at the project but that no construction was performed there. Plaintiff’s work 

was not directed by the MTA or Tutor Perini. 

D. RSC’s Deposition Testimony

RSC’s foreman, who did not witness the accident, testified that his duties included 

“run[ning] a crew of men to install rebar” and that plaintiff’s job was to load and unload trailers. 

At the yard, which was used as a storage and work area for all trades, RSC cut and bent rebar to 

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be installed in the tunnel. Although Tutor Perini had overall responsibility for safety at the yard 

and had stop work authority, plaintiff was supervised only by RSC forepersons.

II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION AND PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION (seq. 002)

A. Contentions

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s common-law negligence/Labor Law § 200 claims must 

be dismissed since they did not have the authority to control the activity which injured plaintiff. 

They observe that the forklift driver was an RSC employee and that RSC’s foreperson testified 

that plaintiff was directed only by RSC employees. 

Defendants further maintain that section 240(1) does not apply herein because no 

construction was being performed at the time and place of the accident; the rebar did not bounce 

but instead was lowered onto plaintiff’s ankle; a fall from a flatbed truck or an injury sustained 

loading or unloading a truck is not an elevation-related risk; and that using longer straps would 

not have prevented the incident since plaintiff was standing up against the cab of the flatbed 

without room to move. 

Defendants also contend that they are not liable pursuant to section 241(6) because no 

construction, excavation or demolition work was being performed where plaintiff was working. 

They assert that the Industrial Code sections they allegedly violated are inapplicable herein. 

Finally, defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on their third-party claim 

for contractual indemnification against RSC since they were not responsible in any way for the 

accident.

In opposition, plaintiff argues that dismissal of the section 200 claim must be denied 

since defendants, as owners and contractors, were responsible for the means and methods of his 

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work. Plaintiff also asserts that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their section 

241(6) claim because they violated section 23-6.2 of the Industrial Code. 

Plaintiff further asserts that defendants’ motion pursuant to section 240(1) must be 

denied, and that his motion for partial summary judgment on this claim should be granted. 

Specifically, plaintiff argues that the yard was a construction site within the scope of section 

240(1); he was engaged in the erection of a structure at the time of the incident; and he was 

injured by an improperly-secured object being lowered.

In reply, defendants argue that plaintiff’s common-law negligence and section 200 claims

must be dismissed since they neither had notice of any dangerous condition nor controlled the 

means and methods of the work which injured plaintiff. They also reiterate their argument that 

section 240(1) is inapplicable herein, and that section 241(6) is inapplicable because no 

construction was being performed at the site of the accident and there is no evidence that 

materials produced at the site of plaintiff’s accident were taken to the project site where they 

were used. 

In his reply, plaintiff argues that section 240(1) applies herein since the rebar was an 

improperly secured load and he was covered by the statute since the rebar he was loading was to 

be driven to a tunnel under construction across the street from the accident site.

B. Analysis

It is well-settled that section 240(1) applies where, as here, a load of material(s), due to 

its weight, is capable of generating significant force (see Grigoryan v 108 Chambers St. Owner, 

LLC, 204 AD3d 534 [1st Dept 2022]), and the safety device hoisting the material, here the rebar, 

“proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application 

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of the force of gravity to an object or person.” (Rivera v 95th & Third LLC, ___ AD3d ___ [1st 

Dept 2024]). 

Plaintiff demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on his crossmotion against defendants by establishing that he was injured when pinned against the cab of the 

truck and struck in the chest by an improperly hoisted or inadequately secured load of rebar 

weighing between approximately 300 and 800 pounds while working at the yard, which caused 

him to fall off the truck (see Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 268 [2001]; 

Hayek v Metro. Transp. Auth., 195 AD3d 568 [1st Dept 2021]). 

In McLean v Tishman Constr. Corp., cited by plaintiff, the plaintiff was injured when a 

metal beam being placed on a flatbed truck fell from the blades of a forklift, slamming the 

plaintiff’s foot and causing him to fall from the truck. As determined by the Appellate Division,

First Department, the plaintiff’s injuries “were the direct consequence of a failure to provide 

adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.” 

(144 AD3d 534, 534-535 [1st Dept 2016], quoting Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 

NY3d 599, 603 [2009]). 

Defendants argue that a four to five foot descent from a flatbed trailer does not fall within 

the scope of Labor Law section 240(1), relying on Toefer v Long Island Railroad, 4 NY3d 399 

(2005). However, that case is distinguishable since it did not involve a falling object. 

Defendants also rely on Cabezas v Consol. Edison, 296 AD2d 522 (2d Dept 2002) for the 

proposition that section 240(1) does not apply herein. In that case, which is also distinguishable, 

the plaintiff was unloading pipes from a flatbed truck while standing on the ground when one of 

the pipes being passed to him by a co-worker fell and injured him. The Appellate Division, 

Second Department reversed the grant of summary judgment to plaintiff pursuant to section 

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240(1) on the ground that no elevation risk existed simply because there was a height differential 

between the bed of the truck and the ground and that, although he was at a construction site, 

plaintiff was simply engaged in routine work not protected by the statute.

While defendants also contend that plaintiff is not protected by section 240(1) because he 

was not injured at a construction site, the application of section 240(1) is not limited to work 

performed at an actual construction site (see Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 464 [1998]). “The 

Court of Appeals has rejected an interpretation of Labor Law § 240 (1) that ‘would 

compartmentalize a plaintiff's activity and exclude from the statute's coverage preparatory work 

essential to the enumerated act’” (Saquicaray v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 171 AD3d 

416, 417 [1st Dept 2019], quoting Saint v Syracuse Supply Co., 25 NY3d 117, 125 [2015]).

“It is neither pragmatic nor consistent with the spirit of the statute to isolate the moment 

of injury and ignore the general context of the work.” (Mananghaya v Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. 

Ctr., 165 AD3d 117, 123 [1st Dept 2018] [citations omitted]). “Thus, even where the worker is 

engaged in a task that is ‘ancillary’ to work falling under one of the enumerated categories of 

covered work, he or she will be covered by the statute’s protections where his work is ‘an 

integral part’ of the larger project.” (Id., at 123 ([citations omitted]). 

Here, plaintiff was engaged in transporting rebar that had been bent to be installed in the 

tunnel. Moreover, the subcontract required his employer, RSC, to move materials inside the 

tunnel (see Saquicaray, 171 AD3d at 417, citing Prats v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 100 NY2d 

878, 881-882 [2003]). Thus, plaintiff demonstrates that he was engaged in work ancillary to 

construction in the tunnel. 

As plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on his section 240(1) claim against 

defendants is granted, there is no need to address the branch of defendants’ motion seeking to 

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dismiss the claim. Additionally, since defendants are liable to plaintiff pursuant to section 

240(1), it is unnecessary to address plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6)

(see Corleto v Henry Restoration Ltd., 206 AD3d 525, 526 [1st Dept 2022]). 

However, if addressed, the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence claims would be 

dismissed as plaintiff’s injury arose from the means and manner of his work, over which 

defendants exercised no supervision or control (see Cappabianca v Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 99 

AD3d 139, 143-144 [1st Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] [when 

injury is caused by manner and means of work, owner or general contractor is liable if it 

“actually exercised supervisory control over the injury-producing work”]).

As to plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on a violation of Industrial Code 

23-6.2, that section relates to material hoisting and the rigging, rope and chains used for material 

hoists. However, forklifts are specifically exempted (23-6.1[a]), unless they are being used as a 

substitute power source for hoisting and pulling materials with a rope (and not for their intended 

use) (see Rought v Price Chopper Operating Co., Inc., 73 AD3d 1414 [3d Dept 2010]). As there 

is no evidence that the forklift was being used as a substitute power source, defendants have met 

their burden of demonstrating that the Code section is inapplicable, and plaintiff raises no triable 

issue in opposition.

III. RSC’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (seq. 003)

RSC moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against defendants as well 

as the third-party claims against it for contribution and common-law and contractual 

indemnification. In support of its motion, RSC argues that plaintiff’s claim pursuant to section 

240(1) must be dismissed since he was not engaged in any activity protected by the statute and 

his fall from the truck was not a fall from an elevated work surface. It argues that plaintiff’s 

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section 241(6) claim must be dismissed because he failed to allege an applicable section of the 

Industrial Code, and the section 200 claim must be dismissed as against defendants because it 

was RSC, and not defendants, who supervised plaintiff’s work. 

Further, RSC maintains that defendants’ contribution and common-law indemnification 

and indemnification third-party claims must be dismissed because plaintiff did not sustain a 

“grave injury,” and that the breach of contract third-party claim for failure to procure insurance 

must be dismissed since it procured such insurance. 

In opposition, plaintiff argues that section 240(1) applies herein since he was injured 

while loading rebar to be used in the construction of the tunnel and the rebar had an 

insufficiently controlled descent. Plaintiff further maintains that defendants violated Industrial 

Code section 23-6.2, which sets forth requirements for material hoisting equipment, and that his 

section 200 claim cannot be dismissed since Tutor Perini controlled the means and methods of 

his work.

In reply, RSC reiterates its arguments, and also argues that section 23-6 of the Industrial 

Code is inapplicable to plaintiff’s accident as it specifically exempts forklifts and there is no 

indication that the forklift at issue was configured to be a multipurpose machine. 

Initially, RSC’s argument that defendants’ third-party claims against it are barred by 

Workers’ Compensation (WCL) section 11 is without merit. Under WCL section 11, an 

employer may be liable to third parties for contribution or indemnification where an employee 

suffers a “grave injury” or enters into a binding contractual indemnification agreement (see Noel 

v 336 East 95th Realty LLC, 209 AD3d 50 [1st Dept 2024]). 

Here, as RSC entered into a subcontract with Tutor Perini pursuant to which it was 

required to indemnify MTACC and Tutor Perini, the third-party claims against RSC are not 

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barred by the WCL. However, since the MTA was not a party to the contract, and absent 

evidence that plaintiff sustained a “grave injury”, RSC is entitled to dismissal of MTA’s thirdparty claims against it for contribution and common-law indemnification. 

As noted previously, paragraph 4 of the subcontract between Tutor Perini and RSC 

required RSC to indemnify MTACC and Tutor Perini for any vicarious liability incurred in 

connection with the project. Since MTACC and Tutor Perini are vicariously liable herein 

pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), paragraph 4 applies. 

Although RSC argues that Tutor Perini may have been negligent since it had 

responsibility for site safety and owned or rented the forklift involved in the accident, the 

evidence establishes that only RSC’s employees directed the means and methods of plaintiff’s 

work. (see Haynes v Boricua Vil. Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 170 AD3d 509 [1st Dept 2019]

[general responsibility for site safety does not rise to level of supervisory control required to 

impose liability on contractor for incident caused by means and methods of work]). 

Therefore, RSC must contractually indemnify MTACC and Tutor Perini for any damages 

arising from the alleged incident (see Ruisech v Structure Tone Inc., 208 AD3d 412 [1st Dept 

2022]). 

As discussed previously, defendants are entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law §§ 

241(6) and 200 and common-law negligence claims (supra, II.B.). 

Finally, paragraph 5(D)(1) of the subcontract required RSC to procure insurance for the 

contractor, Tutor Perini, and any other parties enumerated in exhibit B to the subcontract. 

However, no exhibit B to the subcontract was attached to the policy submitted with the motion. 

Moreover, page 11 of 14 of the subcontract, which may or may not address issues regarding 

insurance coverage, is not attached to the motion papers. Since RSC failed to establish as matter 

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of law that it procured liability insurance for all parties, the branch of its motion seeking 

dismissal of the fourth cause of action in the third-party complaint is denied. See Douglas v 

Roseland Dev. Assoc., LLC, 225 AD3d 467 (1st Dept 2024) (citation omitted). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that defendants’ motion for summary judgment and plaintiff’s cross-motion 

for partial summary judgment (seq. 002) is granted to the extent of:

(1) granting plaintiff partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim 

against defendants;

(2) granting defendants summary dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law §§ 241(6) and 

200 and common-law negligence claims against them, and those claims are severed and 

dismissed;

(3) granting defendants’ summary judgment on their third-party contractual 

indemnity claim against Rebar Steel Corporation; 

And is otherwise denied; it is further

ORDERED, that third-party defendant Rebar Steel Corporation’s motion for summary 

judgment (seq. 003) is decided as follows:

(1) granting summary dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law §§ 241(6) and 200 and 

common-law negligence claims against it, and those claims are severed and dismissed, and 

denying dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim;

(2) granting dismissal of defendant//third-party plaintiff Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority s/h/a Metropolitan Transit Authority’s third-party contribution and contractual and 

common-law indemnity claims against Rebar Steel Corporation; 

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(3) denying dismissal of defendants/third party plaintiffs MTA Capital Construction 

Company and Tutor Perini Corporation’s third-party claims for contribution and common-law 

and contractual indemnity; and

(4) denying dismissal of the third-party claim for failure to provide insurance; 

And it is further 

ORDERED, that the parties appear for a settlement/trial scheduling conference on 

November 20, 2024, at 10:00 a.m., at 71 Thomas Street, Rom 305, New York, New York.

8/20/2024

DATE DAVID B. COHEN, J.S.C.

CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

GRANTED DENIED X GRANTED IN PART OTHER

APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER

CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE

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