18-325

Singh v. Barr

BIA

Christensen, IJ

A205 429 327

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 11th 4 day of December, two thousand twenty.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

8 DENNY CHIN,

9 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 DALJIT SINGH,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 18-325

17 NAC

18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Daljit Singh, pro se, S. Richmond 

24 Hill, NY.

25

26 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

27 Attorney General; Jessica A. 

28 Dawgert, Senior Litigation 

29 Counsel, Jacob A. Bashyrov, Trial 

30 Attorney, Office of Immigration 
2

1 Litigation, United States 

2 Department of Justice, Washington, 

3 DC.

4

5

6

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

10 is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.

11 Petitioner Daljit Singh, a native and citizen of India, 

12 seeks review of a January 23, 2018, decision of the BIA 

13 affirming a May 29, 2015, decision of an Immigration Judge 

14 (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

15 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Daljit

16 Singh, No. A205 429 327 (B.I.A. Jan 23, 2018), aff’g No. A205 

17 429 327 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 29, 2015). We assume the 

18 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 

19 history in this case.

20 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed

21 both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions. See Wangchuck v. 

22 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We 

23 dismiss the petition as to asylum. An alien is ineligible 

24 for asylum “unless the alien demonstrates by clear and 

25 convincing evidence that the application has been filed 
3

1 within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the 

2 United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Our jurisdiction 

3 to review the agency’s findings regarding the timeliness of 

4 an asylum application is limited to “constitutional claims or 

5 questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see id.

6 § 1158(a)(3). The agency’s determination that Singh was not 

7 credible as to his date of entry into the United States is 

8 based on fact-finding and not subject to review. See Xiao 

9 Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 333 (2d Cir. 

10 2006) (adverse credibility determinations are factual

11 findings). 

12 We deny the petition as to withholding of removal and 

13 CAT relief because the adverse credibility determination is 

14 supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. 

15 § 1252(b)(4); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d 

16 Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination under 

17 substantial evidence standard). “Considering the totality 

18 of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of 

19 fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, 

20 candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, . . . 

21 the consistency between the applicant’s . . . written and 

22 oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each 
4

1 statement, the consistency of such statements with other 

2 evidence of record . . . and any inaccuracies or falsehoods 

3 in such statements, without regard to whether an 

4 inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of 

5 the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 

6 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 

7 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the 

8 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 

9 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin 

10 v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei 

11 Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Singh alleged that he was attacked in 

12 1990 and 2009 and arrested in 2010 on account of his support 

13 for the Akali Dal Mann Party (“Mann Party”). We find 

14 substantial evidence for the adverse credibility 

15 determination given Singh’s lack of knowledge about his 

16 party, inconsistencies between his testimony and documentary 

17 evidence regarding the first attack, inconsistencies within 

18 his documentary evidence, and a lack of corroboration. 

19 The IJ reasonably relied on Singh’s lack of familiarity 

20 and inability to provide basic information about the Mann 

21 Party, particularly as some of the information he was 

22 unfamiliar with at the hearing was included in his 
5

1 application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (allowing 

2 fact-finder to rely on “demeanor, candor, or 

3 responsiveness”); Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 

4 2006) (explaining, in context of religious persecution claim, 

5 that lack of doctrinal knowledge may render a claim suspect 

6 where the record indicates that the applicant should have 

7 such knowledge). 

8 The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies 

9 between Singh’s testimony and documentary evidence about his

10 1990 attack. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh 

11 testified that he was 23 or 24 at the time of that attack, 

12 but he submitted identity documents showing he would have 

13 been only 13 years old at that time. Moreover, Singh 

14 testified that he did not know his assailants but his 

15 application reported that his uncles, who belonged to a rival 

16 political party, were responsible. The IJ was not required 

17 to credit Singh’s explanation that he had not seen his uncles, 

18 as he mentioned them in his application. See Majidi v. 

19 Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2015) (“A petitioner must 

20 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his 

21 inconsistent statements to secure relief, he must demonstrate 
6

1 that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit 

2 his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

3 The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistences in 

4 Singh’s documentary evidence. See 8 U.S.C. 

5 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 

6 (allowing fact-finder to rely on even “collateral or 

7 ancillary” inconsistencies so long as the “totality of the 

8 circumstances supports the adverse credibility 

9 determination). Singh’s identity documents used differing

10 spellings of his name, and his age on his election card 

11 conflicted with his birthdate on his birth certificate and

12 driver’s license. 

13 The agency also reasonably concluded that Singh failed 

14 to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating 

15 evidence. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her 

16 testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of 

17 corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to 

18 rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 

19 question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 

20 2007). The agency properly afforded diminished weight to his 

21 documentary evidence because it contained inconsistencies 

22 (identity documents), did not corroborate specific incidents 
7

1 of past harm and the author was unavailable for cross2 examination (Mann Party letter), and were not contemporaneous 

3 (Mann Party membership card). See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 

4 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We defer to the agency’s 

5 determination of the weight afforded to an alien’s 

6 documentary evidence.”); see also In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 

7 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (letters from alien’s friends 

8 and family were insufficient to provide substantial support 

9 for alien’s claims because they were from interested 

10 witnesses not subject to cross-examination), overruled on 

11 other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 133–

12 38 (2d Cir. 2012). Singh also failed to provide reasonably 

13 available corroborating evidence: he testified that he had 

14 medical evidence of treatment after the 1990 attack, but he 

15 did not produce it; and he did not provide letters from any 

16 family members, including form his father with whom he was 

17 allegedly attacked in 2009 and who helped him gather 

18 documentation for his application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) 

19 (stating that a court may not reverse a finding that evidence 

20 is available unless a fact-finder would be compelled to find 

21 it unavailable); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d 

22 Cir. 2009) (“[T]he alien bears the ultimate burden of 
8

1 introducing [corroborating] evidence without prompting from 

2 the IJ.”). Moreover, none of Singh’s documents corroborated 

3 the alleged attacks or arrest that formed the basis for his 

4 claim. 

5 Although we decline to rely on Singh’s omission from his 

6 application of his assertion that he reported his attacks to 

7 the police, see Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78, 82, the 

8 inconsistencies and corroboration issues discussed above 

9 provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility 

10 determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia 

11 Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Gurung v. Barr, 929 F.3d 56, 62 (2d 

12 Cir. 2019) (noting that remand to the agency is futile 

13 “whenever the reviewing panel is confident that the agency 

14 would reach the same result upon a reconsideration cleansed 

15 of errors”). The adverse credibility determination is 

16 dispositive of withholding of removal and CAT relief because 

17 both forms of relief are based on the same discredited factual 

18 predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d 

19 Cir. 2006). 

20 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

21 DISMISSED in part as to asylum and DENIED in remaining part 
9

1 as to withholding of removal and CAT relief. All pending 

2 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

3 FOR THE COURT: 

4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

5 Clerk of Court