About the Report

This report examines the determinants of religious tolerance 

in Pakistan, particularly among Shias and Sunnis and the 

role that religious authorities may play in reducing sectarian 

prejudice. It draws insights from surveys conducted in Punjab 

and Quetta, Balochistan, between January and April 2014, as 

well as interviews conducted by the authors in Islamabad with 

religious leaders and experts on Shia-Sunni relations. 

About the Authors

Michael Kalin is currently a PhD candidate in political science 

at Yale University. He has held positions as a political 

analyst with the Government of Canada’s Privy Council Office, 

political officer with the Canadian embassy in Afghanistan, 

and program manager with the International Organization 

for Migration. He holds degrees from Oxford University and 

McGill University. Niloufer Siddiqui is a PhD candidate in 

political science at Yale University. She previously worked in 

Pakistan for the International Organization for Migration 

and the International Crisis Group. She holds an MA from

 the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies and a BA from Haverford College. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 354 October 2014

© 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 1

Understanding the Roots of Sunni-Shia Conflict 3

Sectarian Conflict and the Promotion of Tolerance 4

Religious Authority and the Sunni-Shia Divide 5

Engaging Religious Clerics 6

A Survey of Sunni-Shia Tolerance 6

Can Religious Clerics Promote Sectarian Tolerance? 9

Recommendations 9

Michael Kalin and Niloufer Siddiqui 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Religious Authority 

and the Promotion of 

Sectarian Tolerance in 

Pakistan

Summary

• Sunni-Shia tensions have been a recurrent problem in Pakistan for more than three decades, 

with the Shia minority suffering the brunt of the recent violence. 

• Sectarian identity has become politicized as a result of domestic and international factors. 

Historical case studies and interviews suggest that sectarian networks are usually local but 

are often bolstered by transnational religious communities and can be highly responsive to 

international events. 

• Surveys conducted in Punjab province and Quetta, Balochistan—regions that have experienced high levels of sectarian violence—indicate that Shia respondents consistently agree 

with statements in favor of sectarian tolerance at higher rates than Sunnis. Troublingly, a 

majority of Sunni respondents in Quetta expressed disagreement with a variety of messages 

of sectarian tolerance. 

• Interviews with religious scholars and clerics, government authorities, and civil society 

activists reveal a widespread perception that clerical authorities have key roles to play in 

promoting tolerance. Identifying the specific religious authorities best suited to play this role 

is challenging, however, particularly because of the relatively decentralized nature of religious 

authority in Sunni Islam. Our survey results imply that clerics who are not already widely 

known in Pakistan are unlikely to successfully change public opinion.

Introduction

Pakistan has the world’s largest share of Muslims after Indonesia and the world’s largest share 

of Shias after Iran.1 Although precise figures are unavailable, it is estimated that Sunnis 
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354

comprise 80 to 85 percent of Pakistan’s population, with Shias making up around 10 to 15 

percent of the total remainder.2 As the Sunni-Shia divide has become politicized throughout 

much of the world, the same has happened in Pakistan—often with lethal consequences 

borne disproportionally by the Shia minority.

Although estimates of the number killed or injured in sectarian attacks vary depending on 

the source, all statistics indicate that sectarian violence in Pakistan remains a problem today. 

For example, the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) reports that 658 individuals were 

killed in sectarian attacks in 2013 alone.3 And in the first six months of 2014, the South Asia 

Terrorism Portal (SATP) identified 51 distinct sectarian attacks in the country, in which 140 

individuals were killed and 198 injured.

Violence motivated by sectarianism has taken many forms in Pakistan. Prominent representatives from each sect have been victims in tit-for-tat targeted killings. One group has launched 

armed attacks against another group’s mosques and schools. Funerals and religious processions 

have been bombed, as have popular venues in neighborhoods demographically dominated by 

a certain sect. While the perpetrators are typically activists affiliated with militant organizations, because sectarian affiliations are ubiquitous and deeply felt, in the words of one expert, 

“this kind of violence has the potential to involve large swathes of the population and spur 

radicalization.” 4 A 2013 Pew Research Center report found that almost two in three Pakistanis 

surveyed considered Sunni-Shia tensions in their country to be a “very big” or “moderately big 

problem” facing the nation.5

For fragile states, uncovering the roots of violent ethnic or sectarian conflict is a major 

concern because counteracting such tendencies helps maintain political stability and security. In recent years, sectarian tensions in Pakistan have played out in a national context 

where the writ of the state is facing a broader and more concerted challenge from militants 

who justify their actions on the basis of a claim to Islamic legitimacy. Groups that recruit 

and organize around sectarian hatred link to and support groups that target the Pakistani 

state. Sectarian organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have strong ties with 

the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella organization responsible for much of the 

violence in Pakistan today, and several former LeJ leaders have assumed important positions within the TTP’s ranks.6 The challenge of promoting sectarian tolerance is thus longstanding, highly sensitive, and crucial not only in its own right but also because of how it 

addresses the way intolerance shapes and feeds off of other forms of political violence in 

Pakistan today. 

Together with the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion—an affiliate of Gallup International 

in Pakistan—the authors of this report carried out a survey of 1,580 men in Punjab province 

and 800 in Quetta city in Balochistan between January and April 2014. The former survey 

employed a variety of techniques to oversample Shias in order to more precisely assess their 

beliefs, resulting in a sample of 498 Shias and 1,077 Sunnis, and used a random sampling procedure to yield a representative sample in Quetta.7 This survey is the first of its kind to directly 

address issues of sectarian harmony. We focused on measuring tolerance along three dimensions, gauging respondents’ acceptance of political representation for and social intermingling 

with members of the other sect, as well as the strength of group loyalties in the face of communal violence. These data help us understand predictors of sectarian tolerance and assess 

the potential influence of Islamic religious authorities in preserving harmony between Shias 

and Sunnis. This report draws extensively from that work to provide guidance to policymakers 

in dealing with sectarian tensions in Pakistan. 

In this report, we review the recent history of sectarian relations in Pakistan and emerging research from social psychology and political science on ethnic conflict and prejudice. We 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, 

Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. 

Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, 

University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, 

School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center 

for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV 

• Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John 

A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council 

on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, 

Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

 • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • 

Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Chuck Hagel, 

Secretary of Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, 

U.S. Army; President, National Defense University
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354 3

explain the important role that religious authority has occupied in the development of Islam 

as well as the Pakistani government’s efforts to involve Islamic clerics in the promotion of 

tolerance. We then present our survey methodology and findings before concluding with a 

list of recommendations drawn from our research. 

Understanding the Roots of Sunni-Shia Conflict in Pakistan 

Sunni-Shia relations in Pakistan remained largely peaceful until the late 1970s. Not only were 

Sunni-Shia relations nonviolent, they were also not particularly important when it came to 

politics. In the words of one expert, “Until the late 1970s, much of the Shi’i political activity in Pakistan lacked discernable signs of religious inspiration.” 8 This began to change in 

the early 1980s as then military dictator Zia ul-Haq implemented a nationwide Islamization 

policy, which privileged particular schools of extremist Sunni thought and began to polarize 

Sunni-Shia relations. Zia’s regime reformed the constitution extensively, entrenching orthodox 

interpretations of Sunni Islam, which alienated both Shias and Barelvis.9 Such reforms included 

an ordinance to enforce zakat (religious tax), which allowed for the automatic deduction of this 

tithe from personal bank accounts, contradicting Shia jurisprudence.10 Islamic parties, such as 

the Jamaat-e-Islami, which had assisted the army in bringing down Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali 

Bhutto, were allowed to extend their influence into the bureaucracy and institutions of public 

education in exchange for supporting the military. 

Zia’s reforms followed in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79. Sectarianism in 

the country became one of several arenas in a broader geopolitical competition between the 

governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran for influence in Pakistan. The anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, 

supported and financed by both the United States and Saudi Arabia, further fueled this proxy 

war. This funding stream strengthened and armed Sunni groups on the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border and established a network of madaris (religious schools) following the Deobandi and 

Ahl-e-Hadith subsects of Sunni Islam throughout the country. In turn, Iran provided funding 

to Pakistani Shia clerics who had returned from studying in Najaf and Qom to establish their 

own religious seminaries in Punjab.11

Punjab province—home to over half of Pakistan’s population—became home to several 

sectarian organizations and militant groups that continue to operate in various forms today. 

In 1985, a group of Sunni clerics in Jhang district, led by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, formed the 

anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The group operated as a political party, achieving 

some success in Punjab elections, but was involved in militant attacks as well. In response, 

the Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP), a Shia extremist group, was formed to defend the 

Shia community and allegedly carried out a number of retaliatory killings. 

General Pervez Musharraf banned both the SSP and SMP in 2001–02. However, the SSP was 

reestablished under a new name, first as the Millat-i-Islamia Pakistan in 2003 and subsequently 

as the Ahle-Sunnat Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ). The ASWJ contested elections in 2013, despite the 

organization’s formally banned status.12 A militant offshoot of SSP that had formed in 1996, 

the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—the Army of Jhangvi—is viewed as responsible for much of the sectarian violence occurring in Pakistan today and is said to form an integral part of the TTP.13 Such 

extremist groups consider Shias, as well as such subsects of Sunni Islam as Barelvis, as infidels 

deserving of death. The current ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), has 

been accused of turning a blind eye to ASWJ activities in exchange for help securing votes. 

During a by-election campaign for a provincial assembly seat in Jhang in 2010, then Punjab law 

minister Rana Sanaullah visited a madrasa affiliated with the ASWJ and was seen campaigning 

alongside its leader, Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi.14 
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354

According to data from media reports by the SATP since 1988, while the number of sectarian 

incidents has ebbed and flowed, the last five years have seen levels of violence average almost 

one hundred incidents per year. The rate is below the peak years of the early 1990s, but the 

incidents themselves have become increasingly dangerous, with an average of more than one 

thousand people killed or injured in sectarian attacks every year from 2009 to 2013, which is 

three times the annual rate during the 1990s (see figure 1). 

Though cities such as Quetta and Karachi have suffered relatively more than others in 

recent years, sectarian clashes have taken place in many parts of Pakistan. Some of the most 

deadly attacks have been those targeting the Hazara Shia community that lives primarily 

in Balochistan. An ethnic minority in both Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan, and 

overwhelmingly Shia, the Hazara are especially vulnerable targets for groups such as the 

LeJ. Human Rights Watch estimates that “of Shias killed across Pakistan in 2012, around a 

quarter of the victims were Quetta Hazaras. In 2013, a little under half of those killed were 

from that community.” 15 Many Hazara have relocated to other parts of Pakistan or sought 

asylum abroad. 

Sectarian Conflict and the Promotion of Tolerance: Emerging Research

Sectarian violence can be thought of as a particular form of ethnic conflict, where conflict 

is motivated at least in part by the ascriptive identities—identities inherited by birth—of 

those involved. To understand and treat the causes of ethnic violence, many social scientists 

have studied the origins of attitudes about group prejudice. The research can be divided 

broadly into two distinct categories.16 On the one hand, microlevel behavioral research 

focuses on prejudice as the property of individuals, seeking to explain why people harbor 

negative beliefs toward certain groups and how these beliefs manifest themselves in opinion 

and behavior. On the other hand, macrolevel research privileges structural and institutional factors over individual cognitive processes. It is possible that individual attitudes 

and behaviors are the products of social dynamics at more aggregate levels, such as the 

institutional incentives generated in political or economic competition.

Though some find the link between prejudiced beliefs and prejudiced behavior to be 

tenuous, emerging research in social psychology suggests that social norms—defined as 

socially shared definitions of the way people behave or should behave—can powerfully 

Figure 1. Number Killed or Injured in Sectarian Attacks in Pakistan, 1989–2013

0

500

1000

1500

2000

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)

Trend Actual

1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013

Incidents have become increasingly 

dangerous, with an average of more 

than one thousand people killed or 

injured in sectarian attacks every 

year from 2009 to 2013, which is 

three times the annual rate 

during the 1990s.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354 5

affect the determinants of individual behavior.17 These findings point to a psychological 

model of conflict reduction that prioritizes the targeting of social norms over personal beliefs 

to reduce prejudicial behavior over time. Among societal actors who can affect social norms, 

religious leaders traditionally have been crucial in defining the limits of acceptable behavior. 

In the context of sectarian relations in Pakistan, Shia and Sunni leaders arguably can play an 

especially important role in reducing tensions and engaging in peacebuilding work between 

the two communities. 

Religious Authority and the Sunni-Shia Divide 

Evaluating the potential role of Islamic religious leaders in promoting tolerance gets to the 

heart of the central divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims since shortly after the death of 

the Prophet Muhammad: legitimate religious authority. While the sectarian violence that 

has gripped Pakistan is not simply the unleashing of ancient religious hatreds, understanding these differing views on religious authority can be an important step in devising effective public engagement strategies. 

The Shia-Sunni split originated in a dispute over who should lead the Muslim community 

following the Prophet’s death in 632 CE. Shiism in its oldest and most literal sense upholds 

a privileged status of leadership for the family of Muhammad. Today it continues to place 

supreme authority in clerics situated at the apex of a formal religious hierarchy. Such clerics 

are considered models for reference and emulation (marja-e-taqlid) on all aspects of religious 

law and practice.18 By contrast, Sunni tradition has held that authority should fall to the 

person deemed by the elite of the community to be most capable. With fewer institutionalized mechanisms compelling believers to follow the teachings of a particular cleric, however, 

Sunni religious authority has become more fragmented, with those lacking formal religious 

accreditation often able to win significant followings.19

The institutionalization of a hierarchic clerical authority in Shia Islam has had important 

political effects. The highest-ranking Twelver Shia marja, Ali al-Sistani, is widely regarded 

as one of the most important powerbrokers in contemporary Iraq. Relying on a network of 

loyal clerics, Sistani has issued far-ranging and politically consequential edicts, including 

those urging the Shia of Iraq to restrain from unjustifiable retaliation against the Sunni 

community, first in early 2006 following the destruction of the Shia Al-Askari Mosque in 

Samarra, and again in 2014 in the wake of the capture of Iraqi territory by the Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Such actions have prompted some scholars to argue explicitly that 

Shia religious leaders are better equipped than their Sunni counterparts to contribute to 

conflict resolution.20 

Although the historical consolidation of Shia religious institutions occurred far from the 

Shia communities in South Asia, since the 1978–79 Islamic revolution in Iran, the doctrine 

of velayat-e faqih—which gives the Shia clergy the right to rule under a leading jurist versed 

in sharia law—has gained influence among many previously politically quiescent Pakistani 

Shias. According to one expert, “Shiism in Pakistan became more centralized, more clericalist, more Iranianized, and more integrated with the international Shia community.” 21 This 

may overstate the degree of consolidation within the Pakistani Shia community; Hassan 

Abbas distinguishes between traditionalist Shia clergy who remained allied with the Iraqi 

marja and modern reformers embodied by the pro-Iranian Imamia Students Organization 

(ISO).22 But it nonetheless points to the sense of confidence Pakistani Shia gained after the 

Iranian Revolution. Interviews conducted in Pakistan further indicate that Shia clerics today 

continue to believe that they have wide-ranging influence over their followers in religious, personal, and political matters, including a special role to play in reducing sectarian tensions.23
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354

Engaging Religious Clerics: Efforts at Promoting Tolerance in Pakistan

In a PIPS survey in 2008–09, 55 percent of the 1,600 respondents believed that religious 

scholars and clerics were serving Pakistani society and Islam better than political and military 

leadership and academics or intellectuals.24 In a Pew survey in 2013, 54 percent of Pakistan 

Muslims said that religious leaders should have at least some influence in politics.25 For their 

part, many religious clergy and authorities across the sectarian divide consider playing a role in 

politics to be a religious obligation. This set of findings led PIPS to organize a national seminar 

in June 2011 that brought together 46 scholars of different Islamic traditions to “discuss the 

role of religious scholars in promotion of peaceful and tolerant religious/sectarian narratives 

in Pakistani society and to develop an understanding of appropriate ways to create a constituency for peace by engaging religious scholars.” 26

The above suggests that, despite the aforementioned religious fragmentation—particularly 

among Sunni—that limits their institutional authority, religious clerics and scholars may be 

uniquely positioned to influence people’s beliefs about social norms, especially to counter 

extremist ideologies that may confuse public opinion in the name of religion. Through their 

sermons at mosques and imambargahs or in their pedagogical role in religious seminaries, clerics have a regular platform through which to espouse tolerant messages. In Pakistan, where 

religious authorities often hold important political posts as well, this influence may be all the 

more significant. In December 2013, leaders of the Sunni Barelvi and Ahl-e-Hadith sects and 

Shia Ahl-e-Tashih sect signed a nine-point code of conduct in the presence of government 

officials in an effort to ease tensions between the two sides.27 In June 2014, the Pakistan 

Ulama Council also issued a statement saying that no Islamic sect could be declared infidel. 

Efforts such as these by religious clerics should be encouraged. 

The Pakistan state has also made some effort to engage clerics in promoting intersectarian and interfaith relations. In April 2014, the Ministry of Planning, Development and 

Reform hosted a roundtable conference on interfaith harmony, the first in a series aiming to 

bring together clerics from a variety of religious traditions. Finally, there have been grassroots 

efforts to combat sectarian intolerance through cross-sectarian religious forums. In 2013, 

local businessman Zahid Iqbal established a sect-free mosque in Islamabad where everyone is 

encouraged to “start praying together—in whichever way they like—under the same roof.” 28 

These initiatives show that there are local Pakistanis actively confronting sectarian intolerance 

and working to promote peaceful coexistence. 

A Survey of Sunni-Shia Tolerance 

Are Sunnis and Shias equally likely to endorse statements promoting tolerance of the other 

sect? What characteristics do more tolerant individuals have in common? How can clerical 

leaders promote communal harmony between the two religious communities? Because the 

Pakistani state does not collect data on sectarian affiliation, no statistical information exists 

pertaining to the distribution of sects across provinces or across districts within each province.

Therefore, to identify and interview sufficient numbers of Shias as well as Sunnis, we designed 

a survey sampling strategy to randomly select respondents within the vicinity of Shia and 

Sunni houses of worship across urban and rural districts in Punjab province.29 In Balochistan, 

the ongoing security situation made it necessary to constrain our activities to Quetta, where 

we carried out a representative survey. The surveys allow us to construct a representative 

demographic profile of two distinct populations: Shias and Sunnis across Punjab living within 

the vicinity of Shia and Sunni houses of worship, and a representative sample of Quetta, the 

capital of the province of Balochistan. 

In a Pew survey in 2013, 

54 percent of Pakistan Muslims said 

that religious leaders should have 

at least some influencein politics.

For their part, manyreligious clergy 

and authorities across the sectarian 

divide consider playing a role in 

politics to be a religious obligation. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354 7

The surveys asked a series of questions intended to gauge respondents’ tolerance of the 

sect other than the one they belonged to. We were particularly interested in measuring agreement with three concepts: sectarian political representation (“To what extent do you believe 

that a politician of a different sect can represent your concerns or solve the problems you and 

your community face?”), sectarian social distance (“To what extent do you agree with the 

statement that parents should not punish their children for marrying members of different 

sects, and that Sunnis should be free to marry a Shia and Shia free to marry Sunni?”), and 

sectarian allegiance and violence initiation (“To what extent do you agree with the statement 

that, if violence arises between Shia and Sunni communities, you should support the other sect 

if your group initiated the violence?”). 

We measured agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating complete disagreement with the statement and 7 indicating complete agreement. Thus, higher numbers 

indicated greater tolerance. In addition, we asked respondents about their views concerning a 

third religious group, the Ahmadi community, widely ostracized by mainstream Pakistani society and living in virtual hiding.30 In particular, we asked whether respondents believed that 

the Ahmadi community should be encouraged to participate in public life, whether Ahmadis 

should be provided economic and educational opportunities, and whether respondents would 

oppose an Ahmadi moving in next door.

The survey questions permit the emergence of a detailed profile of respondents, offering 

individual-level data on personal religiosity, political attitudes, income levels, education, 

exposure to outside cultures, and personal experiences with violence. Some of the results 

aligned with expectation, particularly in light of the sensitive nature of questions on faith and 

Figure 2. Survey Responses from Sunnis and Shias on Sectarian Tolerance

Punjab Quetta, Balochistan

Non-Sectarian Political 

Representation

n=1580 n=800

Distribution of Survey Responses on Sectarian Tolerance

Sunni

Shia

Sunni

Shia

Sunni

Shia

Sunni

Shia

Sunni

Shia

Sunni

Shia

Tolerating Sectarian

Intermarriage

Supporting the Other

Sect in the Event 

One’s Own is the 

Violent Aggressor

percent percent

Total Disagreement Total Agreement
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354

politics and the context of local sectarian hostilities. Shia respondents consistently endorsed 

statements favoring tolerance at higher rates than Sunni respondents. The generally elevated 

levels of Shia agreement relative to Sunnis perhaps indicates that Shias’ minority status in Pakistan has made them especially sensitive to both the dangers of intolerance and the benefits 

of sectarian harmony. 

In Punjab, roughly six in ten Shia respondents expressed some level of agreement (5 or above 

on the Likert scale) with statements about nonsectarian political representation, openness to 

sectarian intermarriage, and support to the other side in the event that one’s own community initiates sectarian violence. By contrast, among the Punjabi Sunnis interviewed, overall agreement 

with any of these statements never went beyond 40 percent, although between 15 and 20 percent were neutral (4 on the Likert scale). Sunni respondents expressed pronounced disagreement 

on the question of sectarian intermarriage, with roughly one in three Sunnis surveyed indicating 

total disagreement (1 on the Likert scale). 

Among respondents from Quetta, total agreement with any of the statements was generally rare.31 Shia respondents again expressed overall levels of agreement with our statements 

in higher proportions than Sunnis. There was general Shia disagreement with the notion of 

sectarian intermarriage, but most Shias expressed some level of agreement with statements on 

nonsectarian political representation and supporting the other side if the Shia community initiated sectarian violence. Results for Sunni respondents in Quetta were troubling. A majority of 

Sunni respondents in Quetta expressed some level of disagreement with all of our statements on 

sectarian tolerance, with pronounced disagreement on sectarian intermarriage and the question 

of supporting the other side in the case of Sunni-initiated violence. 

Shias in both Quetta and Punjab were also more likely to express tolerant views of 

Ahmadis than Sunnis, believing that they deserved both to be more greatly represented in 

the public sphere and to have economic and educational opportunities provided to them. 

There were no statistically significant differences between Sunnis and Shias when it came 

to accepting Ahmadis as neighbors. Also, both Sunni and Shia respondents in Balochistan 

were more supportive of greater Ahmadi representation in public life and economic and 

educational opportunities than their counterparts in Punjab. For example, 68 percent of 

Sunnis surveyed in Punjab did not support greater Ahmadi representation in public life (3 or 

below on the Likert scale), while only 35 percent of Sunnis in Balochistan held this opinion. 

Going beyond the sectarian divide, other patterns are noticeable.32 Even accounting 

for other factors, such as education, sectarian identity, and personal religiosity,33 high 

income levels are associated with greater tolerance of sectarian intermarriage. Surprisingly, 

high-income individuals were less open to the proposition that politicians of another sect 

could represent their interests and were less likely to hold their own sect accountable if it 

perpetrated violence. In Quetta, highly educated individuals were more likely to agree with 

messages of tolerance, while there was no difference among more- or less-educated respondents in Punjab. Attending religious seminaries was not a predictor of tolerance. Individuals 

who attended Islamic madrasas were no more or less likely to express agreement with the 

messages than others in the sample. In Punjab, religious and less religious individuals did 

not report statistically significant differences in attitudes. In Quetta, among Sunnis, religious 

observance was associated with stronger endorsements of our tolerance statements; among 

Shias, we observed the opposite effect. 

The more concerned an individual was with extremist religious groups operating in 

society, the more likely he was to express tolerant sectarian views. This was consistent in 

both Punjab and Quetta. In Punjab, those who said that most or all of their friends were 

members of a different sect were also significantly more likely to express agreement with 

our statements of tolerance. 

The more concerned an individual 

was with extremist religious groups 

operating in society, the more likely 

he was to express tolerant sectarian 

views. This was consistent in both 

Punjab and Quetta.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354 9

Strong regional variation was observed in Punjab province, where belief in messages of tolerance varied greatly from district to district. Local conditions are worthy of much further study, 

but preliminary statistical analysis suggests that district-wide measures of education and violent 

incidents are not significant predictors of survey respondents’ answers. 

Can Religious Clerics Promote Sectarian Tolerance?

Are Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan more likely to agree with tolerance statements if a religious 

cleric endorses them? Do clerics affiliated with the government have more or less sway than 

those clerics who are considered politically unaffiliated or nonpartisan? 

We embedded an experiment within our survey to measure an endorsement effect by religious clerics. We randomly selected some survey respondents to receive the same statements of 

tolerance given to other respondents, but also with the endorsement of a generic Islamic clerical authority. In some versions of our survey we varied the sectarian identity of the cleric—as 

Shia or Sunni—as well as cues indicating affiliation with the Pakistani government.34 Contrary 

to expectations that co-sectarian clerical endorsements would generally be more effective 

than cross-sectarian endorsements and that nonpartisan cues would be more effective than 

partisan cues in prompting respondents to agree with our tolerance statements, we observed 

no statistically significant effect in any direction. Also, neither Sunni nor Shia respondents were 

more likely to express agreement with the messages of tolerance when they were attributed to 

religious clerics. 

There are several possible reasons why our embedded experiment did not yield statistically 

significant results. In reality, Islamic authorities in Punjab and Quetta may simply not have the 

ability to influence the general public’s views on sectarian relations and respond to—rather than 

actively shape—the views of those around them. Given the qualitative studies and interviews 

that we conducted, however, we deem this unlikely. Research routinely suggests that Islamic 

authorities, and particularly Shia clerics, exert significant influence in defining what is and is 

not legitimate religious activity. It is likely, however, that such authority is highly personalized 

and that these authorities are most effective in influencing the views of their direct followers. 

Hence, a religious cleric whom people do not know may not be able to influence opinions, even 

if the cleric has impressive qualifications or affiliations. A third explanation for our results is that 

the constraints of our survey limited the realism of our experimental treatment. Due to ethical 

considerations, the identities of the clerics used in the endorsements were hypothetical, with 

respondents debriefed following the survey. Within these limitations, we had expected that any 

statistically significant effect would represent a weak approximation of the real-world effect of an 

endorsement by a living and well-regarded Islamic cleric. Although we did not observe evidence 

to suggest that the endorsements of clerical authorities causes people to agree with statements 

of tolerance at higher rates than those who received such statements without the endorsement, 

we believe this remains a topic worthy of continued study. 

Recommendations

Holding intolerant opinions about another group of people does not necessarily lead to committing acts of violence against them, but popular opinion can constrain the range of feasible 

policy interventions, particularly in Pakistan today, to protect minority groups. In this study, 

where significant proportions of the Sunni majority disagreed with pro-tolerance statements 

on sectarianism, this issue is of particular gravity. The questions of how to understand the 

formation of popular opinion and influence it on questions of tolerance remain open. 
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354

In designing policy interventions, however, there are several sound options, and this report 

offers the following conclusions and recommendations:

• There are Pakistanis promoting peaceful coexistence between Sunnis and Shias at 

governmental and nongovernmental levels. Some are formally recognized religious 

authorities. Others lack significant credentials and organizational support. They 

should be encouraged and presented opportunities to engage on this issue at both 

official and grassroots levels. Further research should focus on studying the effects 

of these real-world activists to determine what types of messages are most effective 

at shaping individual beliefs. 

• Changing attitudes on tolerance in the short term is difficult, but emerging research 

suggests that this may be alleviated if policy interventions focus less on changing 

particular beliefs about other groups and more on changing the norms that govern 

the behaviors used to express such beliefs. Given their prominent social roles in 

defining acceptable behavior, Islamic clerics could be among elites especially 

well suited to shaping such norms in general and norms concerning Sunni-Shia 

interactions in particular. 

• There is also widespread sentiment in Pakistan that Islamic clerics have an 

especially important role to play in promoting tolerance. Many different kinds of 

policy interventions are available, and each should be carefully examined in detail. 

Some clerics have spoken in public conferences. Others have helped draft codes of 

conduct to guide the behavior of their followers in respecting members of other 

sectarian communities. 

• Care must be taken to identify authorities with actual influence. Religious networks 

are often highly personal and localized, existing beyond traditional centers of 

learning. Our survey results indicate that clerics who are unknown are almost 

certain to be ineffective. This makes designing and coordinating large-scale policy 

interventions challenging. Careful piloting is therefore crucial. Additional research to 

understand how ordinary Pakistanis, and Muslims in general, select which religious 

authorities to follow might contribute to our understanding of Muslim religiosity and 

potential influence networks. 

• Some commonly held beliefs about the factors linked with holding intolerant 

attitudes—such as attending religious seminaries in Pakistan and being less 

educated—were not borne out by our survey and should be reexamined. More 

detailed research attempting to discern how curriculum, pedagogy, and peer beliefs 

affect individual beliefs regarding sectarian tolerance might contribute to a fuller 

understanding of the consequences of religious instruction. 

• Sectarian violence in Pakistan cannot be divorced from an evolving political context 

that has witnessed the passing of laws that discriminate on the basis of religion and 

that have gradually redefined the notion of national identity along an increasingly 

sectarian basis. Efforts must be devoted to initiating a broader national dialogue 

to sensitize Pakistanis, including clerics, on the contributions that members of 

minority communities have made to Pakistan. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 354 11

Notes

1. Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” October 2009, 

available at www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population (accessed September 19, 

2014). See also CIA World Factbook, “Field Listing: Religions,” available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/

the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html (accessed September 19, 2014). More recently, Pew has estimated India as 

having more Muslims than Pakistan. See Pew Research, “Table: Religious Composition by Country, in Numbers,” 

December 18, 2012, available at www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/table-religious-composition-by-country-innumbers (accessed September 19, 2014). 

2. Pakistan retains small Hindu and Christian minorities as well. 

3. The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) numbers those killed in sectarian attacks in 2013 at 525, while the Human 

Rights Commission of Pakistan estimates that 687 were killed. See SATP, “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: 1989–

2014,” available at www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm (accessed September 

19, 2014); Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, “State of Human Rights in 2013,” available at www.hrcp-web.

org/hrcpweb/report14/AR2013.pdf (accessed September 19, 2014). 

4. Huma Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat?” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 

Oslo, August 9, 2012.

5. Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Spring 2013, available at www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/01/spring2013-survey/ (accessed September 19, 2014).

6. Basharat Peer, “The Shiite Murders: Pakistan’s Army of Jhangvi,” The New Yorker, March 9, 2013. See also Office 

of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, available at 

www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm#LJ (accessed September 19, 2014).

7. This is an oversample because the population percentage of Shias is estimated to be approximately 10 to 15 

percent, while Shias constitute 31.6 percent of our Punjab sample. 

8. Mumtaz Ahmad, “Shi‘i Political Activism in Pakistan,” Studies in Contemporary Islam 5, no. 1–2 (Spring and 

Fall 2003), 57. 

9. Members of a subsect of Sunni Islam.

10. Khaled Ahmed, Sectarian War: Pakistan’s Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East (Karachi: Oxford 

University Press Pakistan, 2012).

11. International Crisis Group, “Islamic Parties in Pakistan,” Asia Report no. 216, December 12, 2011. 

12. Amir Mir, “55 Charged Terrorists Allowed to Contest Polls,” The News International (Pakistan), April 24, 2013. 

13. Peer, “The Shiite Murders.” 

14. Amir Mir, “Punjab Govt May Not Act Against LeJ PML-N Has Seat Adjustments with Defunct SSP,” The News 

International (Pakistan), February 22, 2013.

15. Madeeha Syed, “Pakistan: A State of Siege,” Dawn, January 27, 2014. 

16. Donald P. Green and Rachel L. Seher, “What Role Does Prejudice Play in Ethnic Conflict?” Annual Review of Political 

Science 6 (2003), 509–31.

17. E.L. Paluck, “Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda,” Journal 

of Personality and Social Psychology 96, no. 3 (2009), 574–87.

18. In this report, when we refer to Shia Islam in Pakistan, we invariably mean Twelver Shiism, to which the vast 

majority of Pakistani Shia adhere. 

19. While we highlight that religious authority in Shia Islam is more institutionalized relative to Sunni Islam, these 

differences are not absolute. Clerics with relatively wide-ranging authority can be found in Sunni Islam, while 

there are well-known clerics among Pakistani Shias who lack formal training or status.

20. Nader Hashemi, “Religious Leaders, Sectarianism, and the Sunni-Shi’a Divide,” in Between Terror and Tolerance,

ed. Timothy D. Sisk (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011).

21. Mumtaz Ahmad, “Shi’i Political Activism in Pakistan,” Studies in Contemporary Islam 5, no. 1–2 (Spring and Fall 

2003), 64. 

22. Hassan Abbas, “Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 

2010; see also Maleeha Lodhi, “Pakistan’s Shia Movement: An Interview with Arif Hussaini,” Third World Quarterly 

10, no. 2 (April 1988), 806–17. 

23. Interviews, Islamabad, December 2013. 

24. When the Pew Global Attitudes project asked Pakistanis to assess the positive or negative influence of various 

institutions and individuals on Pakistan, they found slightly different results. The entity that the largest 

percentage of Pakistanis assessed as having a positive influence was the military, followed by religious leaders, 

the media, and the court system. Lower percentages of Pakistanis ascribed positive influence to the national 

government, the police, and President Zardari. See Pew Global Attitudes Survey. 

25. Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project, April 30, 2013.

26. Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Engaging Religious Scholars for Promotion of Peace (Islamabad: 

PIPS, 2012). 

27. M. Zulqernain, “Pakistan’s Shias, Sunnis Frame Code of Conduct,” Outlook India, December 3, 2013. 

28. Mubashir Zaidi, “Pakistan’s First Sect-Free Mosque Calls for End to Discrimination,” Dawn, July 19, 2013. Iqbal, as 

imam, indicated that he did not ask about sectarian affiliations among those who attend the mosque. Interview, 

Islamabad, December 2013.

29. We administered the survey among an additional four hundred Shias chosen through a screening process (we 

identified the sectarian identity of the respondent prior to administering the complete survey) also within the 

vicinity of imambargahs.

30. Adherents of an Islamic religious movement founded at the end of the nineteenth century, Ahmadis consider 

themselves Muslim and believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was sent by God to continue and revitalize the 

teachings of Prophet Mohammed. Pakistan has the largest Ahmadi community in the world, but Ahmadis have 

faced longstanding and state-sponsored repression. In 1974, the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto amended 
the constitution of Pakistan to declare Ahmadis “non-Muslims” and passed laws restricting their freedom of 

association and assembly. A decade later Pakistani authorities issued an ordinance making it a felony for Ahmadis 

to call themselves Muslim or in any way attempt to “act” as Muslims, for example by claiming to be Muslim on 

passports or national identification cards. As religious violence has increased throughout the country, Ahmadis 

have been targeted despite their efforts to maintain a low profile.

31. Overall disagreement by both groups surveyed in Quetta was more pronounced compared to Punjab. Although 

suggestive and worthy of future study, we caution against drawing strong conclusions from this simple 

aggregate comparison, as the sampling methodology differs between surveys and therefore represents profiles 

of distinct populations. 

32. These correlations were determined using multiple regression analysis to estimate the relationship between 

various demographic and social variables and our measures of sectarian tolerance. The regression framework is 

one of the most commonly used tools in social science and can help clarify these relationships by allowing us to 

explicitly control for, or hold constant, many factors that simultaneously affect the outcome variable of tolerance. 

All claims of statistical significance result from two-sided tests for at least the 90 percent level.

33. The concept of religiosity was measured by taking into account how often respondents indicated that they 

prayed, fasted during Ramadan, and attended mosque for prayers. 

34. In Quetta, sample size dictated that all religious endorsements were by nominally Sunni clerics.

Of Related Interest

• Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam by Qamar-ul Huda (USIP Press, 2010) 

• Sunni-Shia Relations After the Iraq War by Fanar Haddad (Peace Brief, November 2013)

• Averting Hell on Earth: Religion and the Prevention of Genocide by Susan Hayward (Special 

Report, September 2010)

• Religion and Peacebuilding by Susan Hayward (Special Report, August 2012)

• Abrahamic Alternatives to War: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives on Just Peacemaking 

by Susan Thistlethwaite and Glen Stassen (Special Report, October 2008)

• Religion in World Affairs: Its Role in Conflict and Peace by David Smock (Special Report, February 2008)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-273-7

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

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