This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0106 Robert David Stoneburner, petitioner, Appellant,

vs. Commissioner of Public Safety, Respondent. Filed August 8, 2016 Affirmed Stauber, Judge Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CV-15-4852 Robert David Stoneburner, Ston eburner Law Office, Paynesv ille, Minnesota (attorney pro se) Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, Cory Beth Monnens, A ssistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Johnson, Pres iding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N STAUBER , Judge Appellant challenges the district court’ s order sustaining the revocation of his driving privileges, arguing that the police of ficer did not have a reasonable, articulable2 suspicion of criminal activity to support an investigatory stop and that his constitutional rights were violated by a warran tless blood test. We affirm. FACTS On March 21, 2015, Cold Spring-Richmond police o fficer Christi Hoffman, who had more than twelve years of law-enforcemen t experience, was on patrol in the city of Richmond. Hoffman was traveling eastbo und when she noticed a westbound car on Highway 23 that she estimated was trave ling over the posted 50 -mile-per-hour speed limit. Hoffman activated her squad car radar unit to confirm her visual observation. The target car was about one-half mile away at that point, which is within the radar-unit range. The radar unit showed speeds of 62, 61, and 60, atwhich point she locked the display, confirming her visual estimate of speed. Hoffman stopped the car, which was driven by appellant Robe rt David Stoneburner. When Hoffman approached Stoneburner’s car, she saw an open beer can on the console. Stoneburner was unable to perform a series of field sobriety tests, and a preliminary breath test showed a 0.119 al cohol concentration. Hoffman arrested Stoneburner and transported him to the Cold Spring police station, where she read him the implied-consent advisory. After consultin g with an attorney, St oneburner agreed to take a blood test, the results of which showed an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.08 percent. Stoneburner requested a contested implied- consent hearing solely on the issue of whether the stop was valid. Stoneburner challe nged Hoffman’s ability to make a visual estimate of speed, but he primarily asserted th at the radar device had not been properly3 calibrated because Hoffman testified that she performed only a limited internal calibration test, and not an external calibration measurement. The district court sustained Stoneburner’s license revocation, conclu ding that Hoffman had a reasonable and articulable basis for stopping Stoneburner’s ca r based on her visual observation of speed. The district court wrote, “Whether or not Officer Hoffman’s radar was precisely accurate that night, her visual observation alone wa s enough to justify a stop of [Stoneburner’s] vehicle under Minnesota law.” Stoneburner moved for amended findi ngs or a new trial, and, for the first time, argued that the warrantless blood draw was an unconstitutional search under this court’s opinion in State v. Trahan , 870 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. App. 2015), review granted (Minn. Nov. 25, 2015). The district court denied Stoneburner’s motion without commenting on the constitutional issue raised in his motion. This appeal followed. D E C I S I O N I. Both the United States and Minneso ta Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. But a police officer is permitted to make a limited investig atory stop of a motor vehicle if the officer has a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particul ar person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Anderson , 683 N.W.2d 818, 822-23 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). Even a minor violation of traffi c law will support an investigatory stop. Wilkes v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 777 N.W.2d 239, 243 (Minn. App. 2010). We review the district court’s decision regarding an inves tigatory stop de novo a nd consider the totality4 of the circumstances to dete rmine whether a police officer had a reasonable basis for justifying the stop. Knapp v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 610 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 2000); State v. Britton , 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Britton , 604 N.W.2d at 87. Stoneburner argues that the radar eviden ce did not provide a particularized and objective basis for the stop because Hoffman did not comply with Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 10(a) (2014). This sec tion states that “[i]n any pros ecution in which the rate of speed of a motor vehicle is relevant” radar ev idence is admissible if (1) the officer has been trained to operate the device; (2) the officer can describe how the device was set up and operated; (3) there was only minimal inte rference or distortion in the surrounding environment; and (4) the device was subject to testing by an external method that is accurate and reliable. Id. Stoneburner argues that Hoffman did not testify about a reliable external testing mechanism and, th erefore, she had no particularized and objective basis for the stop. But the district court based its order su staining Stoneburner’s license revocation primarily on Hoffman’s visu al estimate of speed, not on the radar reading. The district court relied on Ho ffman’s training and her 12 years of lawenforcement experience. Minnesota courts have approved the us e of visual speed estimation when the witness has an opportunity to observe the subject vehicl e and has experience with estimating the speed of moving vehicles, pa rticularly when the witness, like Hoffman, has years of law-enforcement experience and training. See State v. Ali , 679 N.W.2d 359, 367 (Minn. App. 2004); Frank v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 384 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Minn.5 App. 1986) (stating that the “factual basis fo r a routine traffic stop is minimal, and a traffic violation need not even occur,” a nd reversing suppression of evidence after investigatory stop based on an estimation of speed). Stoneburner argues that Minnesota cour ts have reversed speeding convictions when the radar operator had not externally calibrated the radar unit on the date of the offense. See, e.g., State v. Gerdes , 291 Minn. 353, 359, 191 N.W.2d 428, 432 (1971) (setting forth standards for use of radar units that include external calibration tests). But the issue here is not whether the state or the commissioner can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stoneburner was ex ceeding the speed limit prior to the stop; the issue is whether Hoffman had a “particularized a nd objective basis fo r suspecting” that Stoneburner was violating the law. Wilkes , 777 N.W.2d at 243. “The factual basis required to justify an investig ative seizure is minimal.” State v. Klamar , 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012). An officer mustbe able to show that the stop is not a “product of mere whim, capric e, or idle curiosity.” Id. (quotation omitted). Hoffman testified to specific facts that led her to conc lude that Stoneburner was violating the law: she visually observed a car that appeared to be exceeding the speed limit; she had received training in estimating the speed of moving vehicles; and her radar unit, even if not properly calibrated, confirmed her visual observation. The district court found that Hoffman was a credible witn ess. Because these facts provided a basis for a brief investigatory stop, the district court did not err by determin ing that the stop was lawful.6 II. Stoneburner challenges the constitutionality of the warrantless blood draw, relying on this court’s decision in Trahan . In Trahan , this court concluded that “[w]hen a warrantless search of a driver’s blood wo uld not have been constitutional under an exception to the warrant requirement, charging the driver with violating [the test-refusal statute], for refusing to submit to a blood te st, implicates a fund amental right.” 870 N.W.2d

. at 398. But in Trahan , the defendant had refused te sting and was charged with the crime of test-refusal. Here, Stoneburner consented to a blood test, and consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Brooks , 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013). Trahan is not applicable when a defend ant has consented to testing, and Stoneburner does not argue that his consen t was invalid, not voluntary, or coerced. Affirmed.