AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

NO. 23 / NOVEMBER 2012

1

Islamic Militancy in Africa

By Terje Østebø

u The rise of Islamic militancy in parts of the Sahel and Horn of Africa poses growing threats to regional 

stability. The appeal of these militants stems from their ability to tap into and persuade marginalized 

communities, particularly youth, that their grievances can be rectified by the establishment of a more pure 

Islamist culture. 

u Despite breakthroughs, Islamic militants in Africa typically do not possess great military power and may 

not seek to govern at the state level. Rather, they tend to be homegrown phenomena, focused on local 

concerns.

u Islamic militant organizations in Africa generally only command the support of small minorities within 

Muslim communities. However, ill-considered interventions, especially those involving Western forces, can 

reinforce the militants’ narrative, thereby strengthening their credibility and recruitment.

HIGHLIGHTS

The seizure of more than half of Mali’s land area by 

Islamic militants, the growing violence of Boko Haram 

in northern Nigeria, and years of religious-inspired violence in Somalia have heightened attention on Islamic 

militancy in Africa. In the process, violent clashes between insurgent groups and governments in the Sahel 

and the Horn of Africa have increased, the armed capacity of militant organizations has expanded, terrorist 

attacks against civilians including suicide bombings 

have escalated, militants’ strict moral codes—enforced 

through stoning and amputation—have been imposed, 

sacred historical sites have been destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced. 

Militants’ ability to seize and control vast territory for 

extended periods of time has prolonged and obstructed 

the process of state-building in Somalia, while in Mali it 

has severed the northern from the southern half of the 

country and exacerbated a political impasse in Bamako. 

Protracted instability in parts of the Sahara-Sahel, furthermore, has the potential to ripple throughout the 

region. The prospect of the emergence of Islamic militancy and the escalation of tensions elsewhere on the 

continent is likewise a cause for concern. 

While the risks of escalation are significant, the 

gains of these Islamic militant groups are not attributable to their military strength. Rather, their expanded 

influence is just as much a symptom of fragile and 

complex political contexts. More generally, Islamic 

militancy in Africa today represents the intersection 

of broader trends in contemporary Islam and local circumstances. Responding to the challenge is all the 

more difficult in that very little is known about these 

often secretive Islamic groups, some of which have only 

recently emerged.
Dr. Terje Østebø is an Assistant Professor at the Center 

for African Studies and the Department of Religion, 

University of Florida. 

2

in Nigeria. The group was established around 2002 by 

Mohammed Yusuf, a self-educated activist, inspired 

by the Islamist Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria1

(MSSN), formed in 1954, and in particular Ibrahim al 

Zakzaki, as well as by the Salafi scholar Jafar Mahmoud 

Adam. Yusuf eventually embarked on his own ideological path, distinct from mainstream Islamists and Salafis 

in Nigeria. Yusuf was actively involved in the enforcement of the shari’a laws introduced in northern Nigeria 

in the early 2000s, yet soon felt that the process was 

too accommodating. While Boko Haram repeatedly 

clashed with Nigerian security forces in a low-intensity 

conflict beginning in 2003, the violence intensified, 

following a brief lull, after Yusuf was killed by Nigerian 

police in 2009. It gained worldwide attention with 

the suicide bombing of the United Nations’ Nigerian 

headquarters in Abuja in August 2011, which was 

followed by attacks on police stations and Christian 

churches in subsequent years. Boko Haram’s leadership 

structure since Yusuf’s death remains unclear, yet the 

group has demonstrated both the will and capacity to 

escalate its insurgent activities.

The two main Islamic militant movements operating in northern Mali are Ansar al Din (“Defenders 

of the Faith”) and Jama’at Tawhid Wal Jihad fi Garbi 

Afriqqiya (“Movement for Unity and Jihad in West 

Africa,” or MUJWA). Ansar al Din was formed at 

the end of 2011 by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Tuareg 

rebel leader, who is often described as a pragmatic 

opportunist. MUJWA was created around the same 

time but very little is known about the group except 

for its stated objectives of waging jihad in West Africa 

and that it seems to be heavily funded by drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. The rank and file are 

mostly Tuaregs, Mauritanian and Malian Arabs, as well 

as sympathizers from Nigeria and other Sahelian countries. Both Ansar al Din and MUJWA surfaced during 

fighting launched in January 2012 by the National 

Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a 

THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC MILITANCY 

IN AFRICA 

Islamic militancy is understood here as Muslim 

groups and movements that, based on religious preferences, seek to enforce religious, social, and political 

norms through violence. Religious preferences are in 

turn defined as scriptural-based interpretations viewed 

by the actors as authoritative. Islamic militancy is, in 

other words, different from Islamic movements that 

seek political change through nonviolent means or to 

promote reforms of a religious nature—through, for 

example, education and da’wa (proselytizing). It should 

also be noted that Islamic militancy reflects a minority 

perspective within the spectrum of Islamic ideologies.

Islamic militancy in Somalia first surfaced in the 

mid-1980s with the formation of al Itihad al Islamia 

(“Islamic Unity”), which expanded its military operations in the early 1990s. Al Itihad disappeared from the 

scene after 1996, yet its ideas and main actors continued to play roles in the highly diverse United Islamic 

Courts (UIC) movement that emerged in the mid2000s. In 2006, the UIC managed to secure control 

over Mogadishu for some months before being crushed 

by the Ethiopian intervention in December of that 

year. This subsequently gave rise to al Shabaab, which 

represented a new generation of Islamic militants ever 

more determined to use violent action to achieve their 

goals. In addition to waging a guerilla war that enabled 

it to gain control over large areas of southern Somalia, 

al Shabaab added suicide bombing to its repertoire. 

Several offensives by the African Union Mission in 

Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali government troops 

since 2011, later joined by Kenyan and Ethiopian 

forces, dramatically weakened al Shabaab’s capacity. 

Recent activities by the group popularly known as 

Boko Haram (Boko meaning “Western, secular education” in Hausa, and Haram meaning “sinful” in Arabic) 

have spurred renewed attention to Islamic militancy 

“...Islamic militancy reflects a 

minority perspective within the 

spectrum of Islamic ideologies”
3

nationalist and self-declared secular movement struggling for an independent Tuareg homeland. Previously 

fighting in loose association, the relationship between 

MNLA and the Islamic militants became increasingly 

strained in May 2012, with the latter outmaneuvering and, in some areas, clashing with the MNLA to 

assume control over strategic towns in northern Mali. 

There has been much speculation about internal disagreements between MUJWA, Ansar al Din, and the 

foreign-led and better known al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM). This may be due to ideological 

disagreements, personality clashes, ethnic differences, 

or the control over the extensive smuggling networks 

in the Sahel and Sahara. Accordingly, the military 

and political strength of the Sahelian Islamic militant 

groups and the viability of a coherent al Qaeda-like 

front in this region remain questionable.2

IDEOLOGICAL FEATURES

While political and socioeconomic factors are 

important, the very fact that these movements define 

themselves in religious terms makes it imperative to 

recognize their ideological content. Islamic militancy 

in Africa is part of a broader, global ideological current. In some cases, this includes links to like-minded 

organizations outside Africa. Unfortunately, the lack 

of thorough investigations of such connections often 

reduces the complexity of such ideological bonds to the 

diffuse notion of “global Islam.” In fact, contemporary 

Islam is characterized by increased doctrinal heterogeneity and fragmentation, which inevitably impact the 

on-the-ground actions of Islamic militants. Groups 

feature a high degree of selective interpretations of 

religious tenets, particular local appropriations, and a 

lack of ideological coherence that propel them on multiple potential trajectories that can be difficult to chart. 

Recognizing the variations, current Islamic militancy in Africa can best be characterized as Salafi 

militancy. Salafism is at the outset a religious movement—usually nonviolent—devoted to the struggle 

for religious purity, personal piety, and Islamic morality. This has largely centered on combating local 

cultural and Sufi elements in Islam. Since the 1980s, 

it has also actively resisted Western influences—seen 

as negatively affecting Muslims’ religiosity.3 Both al 

Shabaab and Boko Haram have their roots in Salafi 

movements that surfaced in Somalia and Nigeria in 

the 1970s. Salafism, together with Jama’at al Tabligh

(a worldwide nonviolent Islamic propagation movement), started making significant impacts in central 

and northern Mali in the early 1990s, represented by 

various Islamic NGOs, da’wa activities, and religious 

schools. The leader of Ansar al Din, Iyad Ag Ghali, 

became a Tabligh adherent in the early 2000s before 

gradually turning in a more militant direction. His stay 

in Saudi Arabia as a member of Mali’s diplomatic mission probably brought him into contact with militant 

Salafi teachings, which gradually shaped his jihadi 

thinking.4

Salafism has always had an ambiguous view of 

politics and political power. In general, it has held 

a rather xenophobic attitude, fearing that political 

engagement would compel Salafis to cooperate with 

secularists and non-Salafis, threatening their religious 

purity. While Salafis in principle favor the establishment of an Islamic state, their political ideology for 

doing so has not been well defined and they have instead usually devoted themselves to da’wa and teaching their religious precepts. The general argument is 

that Islamization of society from below would be the 

requisite precursor for establishing an Islamic political 

order. Such notions were clearly noticeable in Boko 

Haram’s early phase, as it was opposed to Western 

education and argued for severing any connections to 

the secular state. Emblematic of Salafi xenophobia, the 

group’s retreat to Kannamma in 2003, a small town 

on the border of Niger, represented a withdrawal from 

“defiled” space and a form of hijra (“refuge”) to maintain 

religious purity.5

In recent decades, trends within Salafism have 

increasingly called for the establishment of an Islamic 

political order to achieve its quest for religious purity. This is a result of growing influences from Mus-

“...contemporary Islam is 

characterized by increased doctrinal 

heterogeneity and fragmentation...”
4

lim Brotherhood ideology—particularly from Sayyid 

Qutb, one of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s main 

ideologues. His teachings, which emphasized political 

engagement, paved the way for further elaborations 

on the relationships between purity, armed struggle, 

and political power.6 These influences are clearly visible within al Shabaab, Sahelian militants, and Boko 

Haram. Specifically, there is the perception that Islam 

is threatened by contaminating forces, that religious 

purity is impossible to maintain under non-Islamic 

political systems, and that the use of violent force is the 

only recourse. However fragile, both al Shabaab and 

Malian militants have managed to secure territorial 

control toward this end. Through the establishment 

of strict regulations aimed at creating a pious environment, they have destroyed Sufi shrines and curbed 

“immoral” activities such as smoking, drinking alcohol, 

and chewing khat through the application of hudud

(“restriction”) penalties such as capital punishment, 

amputation, or flogging. Boko Haram, which has not 

managed to secure similar territorial control, advocates an identical program of politicized purity—to be 

imposed on all Nigerians regardless of religious affiliation. Parallel to the expansion of Salafism in Nigeria, 

a more assertive political Islamism was promoted by 

the MSSN. This movement was inspired by resurgent 

Islamist thinking during the 1970s and by the Iranian 

revolution in 1979, and gained much support among 

Nigeria’s Muslim youth. Neither the Salafis of this time 

nor the MSSN, however, were engaged in any form of 

organized violent political activism. 

A HOMEGROWN PHENOMENON

While African Islamic militancy remains interlinked with broader ideological currents, it is clear that 

circumstances in local contexts have been important 

catalysts for its emergence and trajectory. These are 

largely homegrown phenomena, wherein individual 

Islamic militant groups emerge and evolve from local 

concerns, are created and run by locally situated actors, 

and have an agenda that focuses on the immediate 

context. 

The Malian government’s failure to consistently 

invest and maintain a strong state presence in the 

north, for example, created an enabling environment 

for the expansion of Islamic militancy and the escalation of violence in this region. Notably, it was local 

militant Islamists, rather than AQIM, that were behind this escalation and routing of the government 

forces and MNLA. Similarly, indications are that these 

militant groups are more concerned with supplanting 

presumed corrupt regimes and establishing Islamic rule 

in the local contexts the militants control than waging 

a broad global jihad as advocated by AQIM. 

In the same way, the unique political history of 

Somalia remains important for understanding current 

developments. Years of authoritarian rule under Siad 

Barre produced democratic deficits and a weak civil 

society. As the country collapsed into civil war in the 

early 1990s, the door was wide open for a range of 

groups to continually fight one another in a scramble 

for power and resources. What few observers noticed 

was that Somalis responded to the violent havoc by 

flocking to their mosques, finding refuge in religion. 

This was an important precursor for the gradual politicization of Islam in Somalia. To varying degrees, both 

the UIC’s and al Shabaab’s struggle for the implementation of Islamic law was aimed at ending the anarchic 

violence and establishing political stability. 

Nigeria’s distinctive history is also relevant for 

understanding Boko Haram’s program. In particular 

is the legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate—established by 

Usman dan Fodio after his famous jihad in the early 

19th century—and the experience with British colonialism. The caliphate has on several occasions and in 

different manners been recognized as a source of pride 

and a historical reference point for those contesting the 

secular Nigerian state and arguing for the implementation of Islamic law. This was the case for Mohammed 

Yusuf’s involvement in instituting shari’a in Nigeria’s 

northern states in 2000. Boko Haram’s aversion to 

“in recent decades, trends within 

Salafism have increasingly called 

for the establishment of an Islamic 

political order to achieve its quest for 

religious purity”
5

Western education, moreover, is rooted in the colonial 

period when secular schools run by Christian missionaries emerged. Muslims in the north already had their 

structures of Islamic teaching and were reluctant to 

send their children to the new Christian schools. The 

fear that such secular education would lead students 

away from Islam is now being revived in Boko Haram’s 

calls for boycotts.

Another important and often overlooked factor is ethnicity. While the MNLA has an explicit 

ethno-nationalist identity, the other Islamic militant 

groups in Mali have their own ethnic constituencies, 

including Sahelian Arabs and Tuareg subclans. For 

instance, there are claims that ethnic boundaries are 

complicating relations between the Malian militants 

and the Algerian-dominated AQIM.7 The former’s 

objective of establishing an Islamic state may be less 

expansive and could remain confined within territories 

defined by ethnicity. Islamic militancy in Somalia is 

similarly connected to Somali nationalism, which in 

turn is related to regional politics. UIC’s high-profile 

declaration of jihad against Ethiopia in 2006 had a clear 

ethno-nationalist character, stating that “we will leave 

no stone unturned to integrate our Somali brothers in 

Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live 

with their ancestors in Somalia.”8 For al Shabaab, 

then, the notions of an Islamic state and the Somali 

nation dovetail and are perceived to be threatened by 

“infidel” neighboring powers. 

Indiscriminate action to combat Islamic militancy 

could also radicalize a local context and lead to escalation. Blanket labeling of all Islamic movements as 

militant coupled with unsophisticated and repressive 

measures risk generating a deeper discontent that could 

translate into violence. A recurrent problem has been 

that less democratic regimes, such as Ethiopia and 

Uganda, issue “anti-terror” legislation to crack down 

on a range of opposition groups. Meanwhile, Western 

attempts to combat terror have shown little understanding of local dynamics. If movements without 

any political agenda or any disposition for militant 

activism are targeted, local support for militancy could 

easily escalate. The broad-brush branding of UIC as 

an Islamic militant threat, leading to the Ethiopian 

intervention in 2006, was crucial for paving the way 

for the emergence of al Shabaab and for further radicalizing developments in Somalia. Therefore, responses 

to Islamic militancy in Somalia, Nigeria, and northern 

Mali or in other African contexts where the challenge 

is less advanced should be considered carefully so as not 

to exacerbate the situation. 

Conflicts also tend to take on a life of their own. 

Accordingly, repressive measures from political regimes 

or external actors could bring Islamic militants to fight 

for their very existence, intensifying violence. Such 

measures could, at the same time, serve to confirm 

views on the illegitimacy of the state, adding fuel to 

an insurgency fire. In the case of Boko Haram, the 

accelerating conflict with the Nigerian police and security forces has led to an expansion of Boko Haram’s 

objectives and tactics. The quest for revenge after the 

killing of Mohammed Yusuf and anger over the police’s 

alleged abuse of force in its dealings with Boko Haram 

members have been important drivers in the escalation 

of the conflict. 

RECRUITMENT AND GROWTH

The emergence of contemporary Islamic movements, both violent and nonviolent, has often been seen 

as a response to prevailing poverty, unemployment, and 

socioeconomic deprivation. While economic and social 

factors clearly are relevant, they remain insufficient for 

explaining such a complex phenomenon. While such 

organizations draw many of their members from among 

the poor, militant messages are typically rejected by the 

vast majority of the downtrodden. At the same time, 

Islamic militants attract some supporters from the middle 

class and the affluent, including professional organizations and study groups organized at universities. 

While the rank and file of Islamic militant movements may be socially mixed, a noticeable commonality is the strong presence of youth. This would at the 

“...it was local militant Islamists, 

rather than AQIM, that were behind 

this escalation...”
6

outset fit the thesis of socioeconomic deprivation, as 

youth constitute the demographic group suffering most 

from unemployment and bleak economic prospects. 

African youth, moreover, are not only marginalized 

economically, but often alienated from their cultural 

contexts and burdened by questions of identity and 

belonging. Contacts with Salafi or Islamist groups and 

exposure to charismatic leaders, such as Boko Haram’s 

Mohammed Yusuf, frame this alienation in religious 

terms, in which Islam is presented as the all encompassing, powerful, and only solution. Both local circumstances and global events are presented as evidence of 

a world threatening Islam and contradicting the will of 

God. In addition to being the only option for salvation, 

membership in Salafi or Islamist movements—whether 

militant and nonmilitant—also represents a source of 

empowerment. These groups may not bring an end 

to poverty or provide jobs, but they give disgruntled 

youth an alternative universal model for belonging and 

for social action in which disillusion is exchanged for 

dignity and marginalization with meaning. Moreover, 

the emphasis on purity and morality, coupled with 

the notion of an exclusive access to the truth, generates attitudes of superiority. This, in turn, produces 

rigid boundaries toward those on the opposite side. 

“Others” are seen both as threats to religious purity 

and as targets for expansionist activities. When such 

thinking is cultivated in tight-knit groups with strong 

leaders, the road to militancy and violence can easily 

be a short one. 

Local contextual factors are also significant for 

recruitment into Islamic militancy. Al Shabaab, for 

example, saw a dramatic increase of support during the 

Ethiopian intervention in 2006. Perceived as Somalia’s 

historical archenemy and framed within the region’s 

particular legacy of Christian-Muslim relations, the 

motives for the struggle against the “infidel” Ethiopians 

were thus a combination of nationalist and religious 

fervor. When the Ethiopians withdrew, recruitment to 

al Shabaab plunged. In northern Mali, the intertwining 

of Islamic militancy and illicit smuggling has produced 

a complicated mix of incentives.9 While details remain opaque, it is known that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, 

the emir of AQIM, has utilized smuggling revenues 

in the Sahel as a source of support for AQIM since 

the early 2000s. Smuggling, moreover, has long been 

an integrated part of the Sahel’s informal economy, 

involving disparate actors and motives, producing a 

situation where religious zeal fuses with the prospects 

for economic profit. 

GUIDING PRINCIPLES MOVING FORWARD

The most notable feature of Islamic militancy’s 

evolving role in Africa is these groups’ ability to take 

control over large expanses of territory. This provides 

them the operational space in which to implement 

their radical ideologies. While pressure on al Shabaab 

from AMISOM has reduced the movement’s capacity, 

the territorial expansion of Islamic militants in Mali 

poses serious far-reaching challenges. The risk for prolonged insecurity in this region, in turn, may provide a 

haven for a range of destabilizing elements. 

At the same time, maintaining control over large 

geographic areas, including towns and cities, represents 

a significant governance challenge for Islamic militants 

in both Somalia and Mali that they have not previously faced. While establishing control over large areas 

through the use of force may be achievable, it is another 

matter to manage such areas politically and to provide 

basic and sustainable services to the population—an 

important factor in the popular support of groups like 

Hezbollah and Hamas. In contrast, al Shabaab has only 

to a limited degree succeeded in this. The blocking of 

assistance for a famine-stricken population coupled 

with bans on smoking, watching TV, and, in particular, 

consuming khat have produced widespread resistance 

among the Somali population. Moreover, the determination of Ansar al Din, al Shabaab, and MUJWA 

“[Salafi movements] may not bring 

an end to poverty or provide jobs, 

but they give disgruntled youth 

an alternative universal model for 

belonging and for social action, in 

which disillusion is exchanged for 

dignity and marginalization with 

meaning”
7

to forcefully secure religious purity through literalist 

implementations of the shari’a could easily become 

counterproductive. In short, these militants are not 

operating with a deep base of popular support. The 

destruction of Sufi shrines, stoning of alleged adulterers, 

and punitive amputations have sparked protests in both 

Somalia and Mali and further reduced the militants’ 

scope to govern. 

In military terms, Islamic militancy in Africa 

does not constitute a major threat. Al Shabaab possibly commands a few thousand soldiers, Boko Haram 

may have a few hundred members, while the various 

militant groups in Mali probably count for less than a 

thousand each. However, the level of casualties, suffering, violations of human rights, and potential for 

escalation of violence make it imperative to address 

Islamic militancy in all its seriousness. The pertinent 

challenge in these advanced contexts is to identify 

measures that can both restore order in the short term 

as well as demonstrate sensitivity to local complexities. 

The overarching objective must be to prevent further 

radicalization of Muslim populations and to duly address concerns that may have produced militancy in 

the first place.

Better information. Much of the dialogue surrounding the risks posed by Islamic militants is shrouded by highly incomplete information. There is a need 

to gather in-depth knowledge and credible information 

on Islamic militant movements and the contexts in 

which they appear. This includes information regarding the rhetoric of Islamic militants and the local issues 

on which they are mobilizing support. This requires 

drawing on individuals with detailed local knowledge 

and long-term experience with a given context. It 

should entail analysis that captures more than the immediate security dimensions but integrates historical, 

political, economic, and sociocultural perspectives. 

The goal would be to gain nuanced and differentiated knowledge that identifies the prime instigators 

of violence and advances a deeper understanding of 

how militant movements intersect with critical issues 

pertinent to each given locality. 

Local engagement. Relevant to various contexts 

in Africa is the need to proactively engage local community leaders and religious authorities in conversations about pressing needs and concerns. Rather 

than branding all emerging demands as part of the 

“radicalization” of Islam, a range of voices need to be 

heard. Grievances borne from under-representation, 

marginalization, and alienation need to be acknowledged. This will often entail careful processes of confidence-building—between governments and Muslim 

groups—across religious divides and among different 

ethnicities. Local and national governments need to 

properly recognize such grievances and be prepared 

to pursue more inclusive policies that would enhance 

political participation and broaden citizens’ affinity 

with the state so as to deter the formation of militancy. 

As this obviously represents a tremendous challenge 

for fragile states and for those with weak democratic 

credentials, regional and international partners should 

sustainably and adeptly support such efforts. 

Open a dialogue with militants. However difficult, sustained efforts should be made to engage Islamic 

militants in dialogue in order to find peaceful solutions 

to ongoing conflicts. Militant movements are often 

internally diverse and could possibly follow a trajectory 

of moderation.10 The objective would be to identify 

such moderate elements and seek out avenues for negotiations that duly recognize the complexity of each 

context. This would obviously entail a delicate balance 

between holding militants accountable for crimes and 

violations of human rights and applying pragmatic approaches that could restore order and security. 

Targeted use of force and integrated engagement. 

The use of force in areas such as Somalia and Mali 

constitutes a major dilemma. While the involvement 

of regional actors, such as AMISOM, may be effective 

in the short run, the longer-term implications remain 

to be seen. Military intervention in the Sahel needs to 

be carefully considered, yet may be necessary to secure 

stability and prevent further escalation of the violence 

there. Preferably, military engagement would be undertaken by national authorities. However, in practical 

terms the governments in Somalia and Mali have been 

unable to provide an effective military response. This 

has pointed to the need for external involvement. 

Military action, however, needs to be accompanied by 

long-term political and economic engagement if it is 

to secure lasting peace and stability. This will require 
8

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the 

development of U.S. strategic policy toward Africa by providing highquality academic programs, undertaking policy-relevant research 

and analysis, and fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S. 

strategic priorities and African security issues. Toward these aims, 

the ACSS is committed to building networks of African, American, 

European, and international military and civilian leaders and 

articulating African perspective to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at 

http://www.africacenter.org.

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ISSN 2164-4047

being responsive to the pressing priorities of each locality so as to maintain popular support. The limited 

legitimacy of al Shabaab and the Malian militants may 

thus provide a potential advantage to such stabilization 

efforts. At the same time, genuine state-building efforts 

are required to secure local participation, facilitate real 

democratic institutions to hold local regimes accountable to the people, and deal with internal ethnic, social, 

and religious grievances.

NOTES

1 “The Popular Discourse of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi 

Counter-radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram,” 

Journal of Religion in Africa 42, no. 2 (2012). 

2 “General Thoughts on the Tuareg Rebellion and AQIM” 

The Moor Next Door, April 1, 2012, available at < http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2012/04/01/general-thoughts-onthe-tuareg-rebellion-and-aqim>. 

3 Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and 

Action,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, edited by Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009).

4 Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, “The War on Terror in 

a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front,” 

Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (2007).

5 David Cook, “Boko Haram: A Prognosis,” James Baker 

III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, December 2011.

6 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi 

Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006).

7 “Opportunities Taken in Mali: Ethnic Dimensions 

& Additional Explanations on the Emergence of MUJWA,” 

The Moor Next Door, April 12, 2012, available at <http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2012/04/10/ethnic-dimensionsadditional-explanations-on-the-emergence-of-mujwa>.

8 Mohammed Olad Hassan, “Islamic Leader Urges ‘Greater 

Somalia’,” Nazret.com, November 19, 2006, available at <http://

nazret.com/blog/index.php?title=ethiopia_islamic_leader_urges_

greater_so&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1>. 

9 Cédric Jourde, Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in 

the Sahel, ACSS Africa Security Brief No. 15 (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, September 2011).

10 Zachary Devlin-Foltz, Africa’s Fragile States: Empowering 

Extremists, Exporting Terrorism, ACSS Africa Security Brief No. 

6 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, August 

2010).