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“Future efforts to integrate 

the north into a national framework for politics and security will 

only succeed to the extent to 

which they foster inclusion and 

representation of diverse 

northern populations.”

May 31, 2013

Crisis in Mali: Root Causes and Long-Term Solutions 

Summary

•	 The international focus on counterterrorism and regime change in Mali risks

obscuring the long-term political root causes of the current crisis.

•	 There is national consensusthat decentralization isthe key to enhancing the political power

of marginalized localities and improving security in the high-risk northern zone. 

•	 Prospectsforstrengthening the state and promoting national unity via decentralization

are coming under threat by an increasing politicization of ethnic divisions.

Hannah Armstrong

E-mail: rae.hannah@gmail.com

peaceBrieF149

Introduction

In 2012,struck with an ethnic insurgency, coup d’etat, and an al-Qaida-linked land grab within

months of one another, Mali descended into statelessness and lost control of two-thirds of its

territory with dizzying speed. Just one year later, territorial integrity is almost completely recovered

thanksto a French-led intervention that killed, detained, and dispersed the al-Qaida-linked radicals. 

Presidential elections are expected to restore legitimate state leadership assoon asJuly.

Do these stepsresolve the crisis? Even assuch immediate objectives may be in reach, it is

essential to understand the root causesin order to achieve solutionsfor the long term. 

In short, power and resources must be transferred from the centralized state to outlying territories,

where local actors attribute insecurity and underdevelopment to their lack of political agency. 

Decentralization is one long-term strategy to empower local collectivities, integrate northern fighters

into state security structures, and protect the fragile state against destabilizing blowback. The

rebellions of 1991 and 2012 almost immediately preceded military coupsin the capital of Bamako,

suggesting that the central government has as much to gain from democratizing northern regions as

do local collectivities. But any peacebuilding effort must be carefully considered, given the challengesthat ethnic tensions pose to the pursuit of a genuinely democratic national unity strategy.

The Quest for Decentralization

Mali inherited its centralized Jacobin state apparatusfrom French colonial rule, which lasted from

1892 until 1960. In the 1990s, after decades of dictatorship and rising political tensionsin the north,

the state embarked on a mission to transform itself by devolving power away from Bamako. The

immediate catalyst was northern rebels’demandsfor greater authority, but the policy was viewed

as a meansto strengthen the country’s overall political administration by giving each of the seven

regions more autonomy from the capital. In theory, local centers of power would improve representation and awareness of particular local needs, enhance legitimacy and efficiency in governance,

and strengthen security.
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Crisis in Mali: Root Causes and Long-Term Solutions 

page 2 • PB 149 • May 31, 2013

Decentralization was first enshrined as a national goal in the National Pact peace accord signed

by Bamako and Tuareg rebel factionsin 1992. With the 1991 Tamanrasset Peace Accord and 1992

National Pact, rebelsrenounced their independence claim in exchange for, among other provisions,

commitmentsto integrate ex-combatantsinto the armed forces and to create new local, regional,

and inter-regional administrative structures. “For the first time, governments were integrating the

safeguarding of cultural diversity as one of the founding principles of the democracy,”wrote Malian

anthropologist Naffet Keita, on the National Pact.1 Decentralization wasthe subject of popular

participation in political debate, resulting in the first democratic municipal electionsin 1999. After

decades of rule by the south and its military, these electionsin fact transferred power to local

northern candidates, in particular the Songhai and Tuaregs. 

But northern communitiesfelt that, despite noticeable improvementsin accessto healthcare

and education, decentralizing reforms were incompletely implemented. A 1997 USAID evaluation

identified scarcity of resources and bureaucratic resistance among central government ministries

as well asstate-appointed administrators as major obstaclesto implementation.2Structural

adjustment programs had weakened state planning capacity and boosted aid dependency.

“In reality, powerstayed asit had been before,”said Ibrahim agYoussef, a Tuareg professor from

Timbuktu who advised the United Nations Development Program coordinator on implementation of

the National Pact. He described a clientelistsystem where state-appointed prefects and sub-prefects

continued to steer local politics and stifle newly-created localstructures of representation. “All the

power isin the hands of the president: he distributes carrots, that’sit. So everyone wantsto be near

the one who is distributing the carrots,”he said. 

The Quest for Security Sector Reform 

Security reforms also accompanied the political project to decentralize. By 1999, the Malian military

had successfully integrated combatants and ex-rebel leadersinto top posts, making former rebels

responsible for maintaining security in the north despite deep-seated fearsthat training and arming

erstwhile rebels was not in itslong-term interest. By 2006, roughly 1,500 ex-combatants had been

integrated into military service, with 150 othersintegrated into civilservice. Although the 2012

rebellion triggered numerous defections, ex-rebel Colonels Elaji Gamou (Tuareg) and Abderrahman

Ould Meydou (Arab) remained loyal to the Malian government and are currently key figuresin

combating terrorist groups and mediating between northern and southern communities. Proving

that their fidelity to the Malian state supersedestribal and ethnic tiessets a paradigm for a new

generation of young fighters. 

But limited reformsto make the security sector more inclusive and representative failed to

prevent insecurity in northern Mali from skyrocketing. In fact, demilitarization of northern areas

associated with the National Pact enabled ex-combatantsto link up with cocaine traffickers

operating out of Guinea-Bissau. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)set up a base in the

secluded Tegharghar Mountains, from which it was able to launch hostage-taking operations and

work with local groups. By 2010, widespread evidence ofstate complicity with organized crime

and AQIM had undermined civilian confidence that the central government could be counted

on for protection.3

In 2011, Mali launched an ambitious donor-funded 50 million euro Special

Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali (PSPSDN) to create 11 new secure

development and governance centers atstrategic locationsin northern Mali, where security forces

would be stationed while infrastructure projects were carried out.4The goal wasto reassert the

state’ssecurity and administrative presence in a zone from which it had retreated, but local

populationsfelt excluded from the process and fearful of renewed militarization by a state they
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

Crisis in Mali: Root Causes and Long-Term Solutions 

page 3 • PB 149 • May 31, 2013

perceived as harmful and corrupt.5Future effortsto integrate the north into a national framework

for politics and security will only succeed to the extent to which they foster inclusion and representation of diverse northern populations.

Politicization of Ethnicities Threatens Peacebuilding Efforts

The apparentsecessionism of Tuareg insurgentsin 2012 wasin fact a negotiating tactic to press

for greater autonomy in managing their region, and a strategy to push for an eventual referendum. 

“We can be economically independent without cutting the territory in two. We want autonomy,

with our own government, our own ministers, our own budget,”Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) Cabinet member Nina Wallet Intalou said in an interview. 

Although Mali’sTuaregs have been described as“a nation without a state,”multiple tribal and

fractional faultlines and inter-ethnic rivalries preventthem from unifying behind a single coherentstrategy. The Malian state, like the French colonial authorities before it, employs a strategy of

exploiting inter- and intra-ethnic divisions of northern populations, a scheme it has deployed in three

northern rebellions priorto 2012, and one itislikely to make use of again.6The chiefrisk to peace

efforts and decentralization as a long-term politicalsolution isthe exploitation of ethnic ortribal divisions, which France, Mali, and the MNLA are all already engaging in to varying degrees. “The feeling

of belonging to differenttribesisreinforced instead of weakening, and the feeling of belonging to the

national community contracts,sometimesin a blood bath,”writes Keita, describing a rising trend of

ethnic communitarianism in Malithatruns counterto the power-sharing logic of decentralization.7

Despite failing to exercise military control over most of it, the MNLA hasrepeatedly laid claim

to the three northern regions of Mali, which it calls“Azawad.”The movement’s claimsto represent

all Azawadians are not to be taken seriously. Northern Mali is ethnically and culturally heterogeneous, a feature in which most northern and southern Malianstake pride; Tuaregs do not constitute an ethnic majority among the diverse population. 

The French-led intervention already showssigns of electrifying inter- and intra-ethnic divisions. 

France’sfast-moving offensive cleared all non-state militantsfrom Gao andTimbuktu but allowed a

specialstatusfor MNLA combatants who seized control of Kidal afterIslamists were forced to retreat. 

“Some French decision-makersthink the MNLA could be effective in defeating AQIM and liberating

the hostages,”one Malian ministersaid in an interview. Moussa ag Assarid,the MNLA spokesman in

Paris,said there was“coordination”between the MNLA and French forcesin Kidal.8“Isay thisfortoday,

asIsay itfortomorrow:theTuaregs, exceptforthose who letthemselves be indoctrinated by terrorist

groups which we firmly condemn, are ourfriends,”French defense ministerJean-YvesleDrian told

France 24.9Malians view the de facto specialstatus of Kidal,the only ofthe three northern power

centersinto which Malian soldiersstill have not entered, asinconsistent with France’sstated goal ofrestoring the country’sterritorial integrity, and as proof of French meddling. In the meantime,thanksto

the continued absence of both jihadi extremists and state forces,the MNLA has appointed a regional

governorfor Kidal and begun issuing drivers with papersfrom theirInternal SecurityDepartment, with

a stamp reading“The Azawad State: Unity, Freedom, Security.”10 Meanwhile, Malian soldiers,regaining

accessto the northern regions of Gao andTimbuktu, have perpetrated torture,summary executions,

and forced disappearances ofTuaregs and suspected Islamists.11

With the exception of the MNLA, which represents neither all northern Malians, nor many

Tuaregs, a strong will for national unity exists despite the complex and delicate tribal, ethnic, and

political landscape. Songhais, Arabs, and many Tuaregsfeel that the MNLA’s pursuit of negotiated

autonomy will fail to reflect this diversity. Any movesthat favor Tuareg hegemony, or hegemony
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Crisis in Mali: Root Causes and Long-Term Solutions 

page 4 • PB 149 • May 31, 2013

of certain Tuareg tribes, as a tactic for devolving power away from Bamako and granting autonomy

to northern regions will guarantee inter- and intra-ethnic conflict between Tuaregs, Arabs, and

Songhais, each of which has armed militias on the ground. 

Conclusion

Decentralizing governance and security sector reform in Mali over the past two decades has

made limited but real progress, which may be measured by the welcomed municipal elections and

emerging leadership of northern military units who remained loyal to the state during the outbreak

of last year’srebellion. The French-led intervention broke the grip of radical groups on the northern

territory but the continued existence of mainly Tuareg armed non-state actorsthreatens most

peacebuilding efforts. These groupsreflect the lack of local authority. Yet, at the same time,

empowering them as partnersin counterterrorism or recognizing them as political leaders of the

northern zone is not in the interest of long-term democratization, and could further politicize ethnic

divisions and jeopardize national unity.

Ultimately,the success of peacebuilding in Mali will depend upon the extentto which it achieves,

in the words of Keita, a“horizontal integration ofthe heterogeneous communities ofthe interior.”12 

Notes

1.	 Keita, N.,“Sanctuarisation de l’AQMI et les‘dires’de l’Etat dansl’espace Saharo-sahelien au Mali,”

(working paper), 2012.

2.	 Lippman, H. & Lewis, B.,“Democratic Decentralization in Mali: A Work in Progress,”CDIE

Impact Evaluation, 1998 No 2.

3.	 For a detailed, meticulous account of this: Lacher, W.,“Organized Crime and Conflict in the

Sahel-Sahara Region,”Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 13, 2012,

http://bit.ly/10yYjgB.

4.	 For more on the PSPSDN,see:Wing, S.,“Mali’s Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict,”

United StatesInstitute of Peace, April 2013, http://bit.ly/102SEJI.

5.	 Lacher, Ibid.

6.	 For a thorough tracing of colonial and state exploitations of tribal and fractional divisions,see

Gremont, C,“Touaregs et Arabes danslesforces armees coloniales et maliennes; une histoire

de trompe l’oeil,”IFRI Programme Afrique subsaharienne, 2010. 

7.	 Keita, Ibid.

8.	 “French troops enter last Islamiststronghold in northern Mali,”Reuters, January 30, 2013,

http://nbcnews.to/XQWZly.

9.	 «Le MNLA, un nouvel allié pour l’armée française » , Allemandou, S., France 24,January 23, 2013,

http://f24.my/XQXfki.

10.	 “Tuareg rebelsseek to stamp control on northern Mali,”Penney, J., Reuters, March 15, 2013,

http://reut.rs/XQXr39.

11.	 For more on this:“Mali: Prosecute Soldiersfor Abuses,”Human RightsWatch, February 21, 2013,

http://bit.ly/10z2FV4.

12.	 Keita, Ibid.

About This Brief

Hannah Armstrong researches 

politics and security in the SaharaSahel region as a fellow of the 

Institute of Current World Affairs. 

She has researched and reported 

on North Africa and the SaharaSahel region since 2006. She 

was based in Bamako, Mali, and 

has traveled widely throughout 

Mali, including the northern zone, 

during the turbulent past year 

when the country witnessed a 

Tuareg rebellion, coup d’etat, the 

loss of the north to al-Qaida-linked 

radicals, and a French-led military 

intervention. The views expressed 

in this brief do not necessarily express the views of the U.S. 

Institute of Peace, which does not 

take policy positions.