Air University

AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Integrated Defense

Lessons Learned from

Joint Base Balad

Joseph A. Milner

Colonel, USAF

Research Paper 2012-3

Air Force Research Institute

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112–6026
ii

Published by Air University Press in 2013

Disclaimer

The analysis, opinions, and conclusions either expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Air Force Research Institute papers and other scholarly Air 

University studies provide independent analysis and constructive discussion on issues important to Air Force commanders, staffs, and other decision makers. Each paper 

can also be a valuable tool for defining further research. 

These studies are available electronically or in print via the 

AU Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil/papers.asp.
iii

Contents

List of Illustrations v

Executive Summary vii

About the Author xi

Introduction and Methodology 1

Historical Context 2

Interservice Agreements 5

Doctrine Development 6

Integrated Defense—Organizing for Success 9

The Situation 10

The Organization 11

332nd Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron 

Operations 13

532nd Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron 

Operations 15

Entry Control Point Operations 16

Force Protection Patrols 18

Outside-the-Wire Patrol Mission Planning

 Techniques 18

Tactical Security Element Operations 21

Unique Relationships 22

Joint Intelligence Support Element 23

The Threat—Vietnam-Iraq Comparison 29

Deterring Attacks on Joint Base Balad—Quantitative 

Analyses 34

Data Analyses 34

Examining the Effectiveness of Deterring

Attacks on Joint Base Balad 36

Analytical Difficulties in Analyzing the Joint 

Base Balad Defense 37
iv

Lessons Learned 39

Training 40

Joint or Command Lines 43

Equipment 44

Conclusion—Future Implications 46

Notes 47

Abbreviations 51

Bibliography 55
v

Illustrations

1 Map of Iraq displaying Joint Base Balad 10

2 JBB with named areas of interest depicted

around the installation 11

3 ESFG organizational chart 12

4 332nd ESFG OTW patrol CONOPS development 20

5 332nd ESFG notional example of a dismounted

patrol plan in PowerPoint 21

6 Attack comparison between JBB (2004–10)

and Vietnam theater air bases (1966–72) 30

7 Number of rounds fired per attack in Vietnam 31

8 JBB attack data by rounds fired per attack 32

9 Median monthly attacks and attack intervals

on Joint Base Balad 35

10 Increasing insurgent miss distance as

captured by the warning system 36

11 Power law (number=450*[days]

-1.087) of

deterred attack intervals 38

12 Medians give stable attack interval

trends and averages give increasing

errors of attack intervals 39
vi
vii

Executive Summary

Air and space power is most vulnerable on the ground. 

Thus, force protection is an integral part of air and 

space power employment.

—AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

Since the inception of airpower, airmen have struggled with 

the dilemma of how to protect the capability to fly, fight, and 

win. When aircraft are removed from their natural environment 

of the air and returned to their bases, they become vulnerable, 

like any bird of prey in its nest. Base defense—defending one’s 

air assets on the ground—is one of the least understood operational aspects of airpower. The current US Air Force (USAF) 

strategy for defending air bases is integrated defense (ID)—

formerly known as air base defense or air base ground defense. 

This study examines the first full implementation of ID in a 

combat environment to evaluate the effectiveness of the new 

strategy in actual operations. The research question is What 

can be learned from the ID experience? and to take this further, 

What are important considerations for future operations?

The US Air Force historically considered threats outside the 

air base perimeter to be the responsibility of either sister services 

or host nation forces. Vietnam and the first Gulf War demonstrated that these organizations may not have sufficient forces 

to perform exterior air base defense missions effectively or may 

be willing to accept risks air base commanders deem unacceptable. As a result, the Air Force began evaluating its strategy 

and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for defending air 

bases and developed ID, publishing AF Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-10.1, Integrated Base Defense, in 

2004 and AF Policy Directive (AFPD) 31-1, Integrated Defense, 

in 2007.1 This concept called for the “application of active and 

passive defense measures, employed across the legally defined 

ground dimension of the operational environment, to mitigate 

potential risks and defeat adversary threats to Air Force operations.”2 The ID operational approach is a new way of thinking 

that shifts security operations from a compliance-based model 

to a capabilities-based construct and emphasizes ground 
viii

intelligence-collection efforts in the operational environment. 

ID is designed to become a “fundamental battle competency 

for all Airmen, whether garrison or deployed.”3 ID applies a 

systems approach to defending air bases as well as a collaborative 

base defense operation with joint, combined, host nation, and 

local civil authorities.

The first operational test of ID came in 2008 when the Air 

Force was designated the base operating support–integrator 

(BOS-I) for Joint Base Balad (JBB)—formerly known as Logistics Support Area (LSA) Anaconda and Balad Air Base. This 

gave the Air Force responsibility for defending the base and its 

assigned joint forces, including the conduct of counter-indirectfire (IDF) operations outside the base perimeter.4 Insurgents 

successfully interrupted and impeded operations with over 400 

attacks in 2006 alone. The base defense strategy prior to 2008 

was reactive in nature, chasing the IDF shooters after attacks 

or employing counter–battery fire against the incoming fire’s 

point of origin, which provided limited success in significantly 

reducing the number of attacks or deterring the insurgents.

As BOS-I the Air Force took a different approach and committed Airmen to an exterior base defense role in the largest 

combat deployment of security forces (SF) since the Vietnam 

War. The new strategy called for moving from reactive to proactive 

operations facilitated by committing intelligence analysts to 

ground defense intelligence and overlaying residual air assets 

in a systematic way to map the human terrain “outside the 

wire” (OTW) and outside the base defense perimeter. This increased the amount and quality of the intelligence and information available, allowing directed, proactive patrolling by security 

forces. This freed the local US Army battlespace owners’ (BSO) 

forces to conduct enhanced counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and key leader engagements within the Balad area. This 

synergy laid the groundwork for an integrated COIN plan that 

took advantage of the joint military, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations’ efforts in the Salah ad Din province. 

This “all of government” approach to COIN integration significantly increased the security of Balad.5

The net result of the implementation of ID was an observed 

drop of 75 percent in the number of attacks overall and a continuous increase in the miss distance when attacks occurred. 
ix

Miss distances also doubled, producing a 75 percent reduction 

in effectiveness of attacks. The combination of the increasing 

miss distance and the decreasing number of attacks resulted 

in an enemy combined loss of effectiveness of over 90 percent. 

The defense of JBB produced similar results to the overall Iraq 

War decline in attacks. This evidence is consistent with deterring attacks, according to previously developed deterrence theory, 

and suggests that deterrence theory may be as applicable for 

ID operations as it was for Iraq COIN operations. The difficulty 

in analyzing situations resulting from the irregular nature of 

the attacks on JBB required more-advanced analyses techniques to reveal the true nature of the ID success. 

The success at JBB validates the ID concept and demonstrates the application of lessons learned from previous conflicts. These lessons include the need to provide dedicated and 

integrated ground intelligence and unity of command to base 

defense forces and to account for the enhanced effects of joint 

operations. These lessons did not come without a major effort 

to overcome three significant barriers in implementation: foremost, ambiguity at the most senior levels of AF leadership as to 

who was responsible for protection beyond the base perimeter 

resulting from a “roles and missions” conflict in the joint community on the definition of “defensive operations” and a lack of 

understanding of ID concepts. The second barrier involved the 

AF not fully embracing the requirements nor adapting the 

training and equipping of security forces to meet the operational requirements of ID. Once leaders accepted the need to 

send forces off base to stop the threat, they realized USAF 

forces had neither the training nor the equipment to conduct 

such missions. The third major barrier required adapting Air 

Force logistical processes to allow acquisition of specialized 

ground combat equipment, which is either identical or compatible with that of its joint partners. This equipment is neither in 

the current inventory nor does the Air Force logistics system 

have parts available for a repair/sustainment capability once 

equipment is acquired.

Plans are underway to address and correct some of the barriers that have been identified in the lessons learned. Headquarters AF/Force Protection (HAF/A7S) developed a master 

action plan to continually strengthen and improve AF security 
x

forces. One important goal is to optimize the training lifecycle 

and incorporate lessons learned into the current education 

courses. The lessons learned will modernize education courses 

to ensure that AF personnel arrive in-theater already trained to 

conduct ID. Another goal is to standardize the requirements 

process by incorporating integrated efforts with the Air Force 

Logistics (HAF/A4L) Combat Airmen initiative for procurement 

of ground-combat vehicles and equipment. The remaining objective is to educate Air Force leadership on ID and the threat mitigation requirement to extend operations into the base outer 

security zone as far as the effective range of adversary weapons.

The threat against USAF aircraft on the ground will not 

change. Despite many more attacks, the lessons learned at JBB 

cost less overall compared to Vietnam because there were far 

fewer casualties. Any effort to reduce the risks even further cannot be successful without leadership support and an understanding of the role the USAF must take in its own defense.

Notes

1. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 31-1, Integrated Defense, 7 July 2007 

(incorporating change 1, 22 April 2009), http://www.af.mil/shared/media

/epubs/AFPD31-1.pdf. 

2. Ibid., 2.

3. Ibid.

4. SSgt Don Branum, “Balad Airmen Look Back: 2008 in Review,” 332nd 

AEW Joint Base Balad, Iraq, 1 January 2009, http://www.balad.afcent

.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123129950.

5. Maj Gen Craig A. Franklin, interview by author, 22 December 2010, 

JBB. 
xi

About the Author

Col Joseph A. “Joe” Milner is the commander, 42nd Mission 

Support Group, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, where he is responsible 

for providing community support for 12,500 military and civilian 

employees associated with Air University, the 42nd Air Base Wing, 

the 908th Airlift Wing, and more than 40 tenant units at Maxwell 

AFB and Gunter Annex. His 2,250-person group provides contracting, security, fire protection, air traffic control and systems 

maintenance, personnel and information management, environmental restoration, logistics readiness and transportation management, grounds maintenance, and services for 45,000 military 

members, civilian employees, retirees, and family members. 

Colonel Milner was born in 1964 in Atlanta, Georgia. He graduated from high school in Columbia, South Carolina, and enlisted 

in the US Air Force as a security specialist. He was selected in 

1984 to attend the Air Force Academy Preparatory School and 

entered the Academy in 1985, earning a bachelor of science degree in 1989. He also earned a Masters of Criminal Justice degree 

from the University of South Carolina in 1995 and completed 

Squadron Officer School (1996), Air Command and Staff College 

(2003), and Air War College (2006, by correspondence), earning 

the Masters of Military Operational Art degree from ACSC. Immediately prior to his current assignment, Colonel Milner was a 

National Defense Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses in 

Washington, DC.

In previous assignments, Colonel Milner has served as a flight 

commander, operations officer, executive officer, action officer at 

the major command and Air Staff levels, squadron commander, 

and deputy group commander, primarily in security forces 

squadrons. His career includes a tour from September 2007 to 

November 2008 as chief of force protection for the Ministry of 

Interior Transition Team in Baghdad, Iraq. His decorations include the Airman’s Medal, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service 

Medal with five oak leaf clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal 

with two oak leaf clusters, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, AF 

Outstanding Unit Award with two oak leaf clusters, and AF Organizational Excellence Award. He is married to the former 

Kimberly Zaiger of Colorado Springs, Colorado; they have two 

daughters, Jessica and Sarah, and a son, Andrew.

1

Introduction and Methodology

The US Air Force is the world’s preeminent air, space, and 

cyberspace force. Its mission is to fly, fight, and win, and it does 

this better than any other air force in the world. Since the inception of airpower, airmen have struggled with the dilemma of how 

to protect their capability to fly, fight, and win when their aircraft are removed from their natural environment of the air and 

returned to the ground, where they become vulnerable like any 

bird of prey. Air Force basic doctrine states, “Air and space power 

is most vulnerable on the ground. Thus, force protection is an 

integral part of air and space power employment.”1 While the 

USAF recognizes the threat, base defense—defending one’s air 

assets on the ground—is one of the least understood operational 

aspects of airpower. The current Air Force strategy for defending 

air bases is integrated defense (ID)—formerly known as air base 

defense or air base ground defense.

This study looks at the period between September 2008 and 

June 2010 when the Air Force took on the base operating support integration (BOS-I) mission at Joint Base Balad (JBB). Operation Desert Safeside saw a scope of operations not seen by a 

single USAF security forces unit since the Vietnam War. During 

this period over 900 Air Force security forces personnel were 

deployed in one unit, charged with the defense of JBB. These 

men and women focused on ground combat operations “outside the wire” (OTW), while simultaneously synchronizing air 

and ground forces into the Army’s counterinsurgency and stability campaign. This study examines the first full implementation of ID in a combat environment to evaluate the effectiveness 

of the strategy in actual operations, learn from that experience, 

and provide considerations for future operations.

The methodology employed for this study began with an evaluation of all the historical data on previous air base defense 

operations to frame the context from which the current operations originated. The review then focused more narrowly on 

actual operations at JBB and evaluation of the attack data collected from 2004 through 2010, concluding in an analysis of 

the after action reviews and lessons learned to determine any 

future applications.
2

Specifics of the methodology include a review of historical 

documentation of attacks on air bases. The primary historical 

references were Roger Fox’s Air Base Defense in the Republic of 

Vietnam, Alan Vick’s Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, and Alan Vick 

and David Shlapak’s Check Six Begins on the Ground. A review 

of current joint and Air Force doctrine followed the historical 

review to determine the institutional concept for ID and its application. Further research into current databases for the US 

Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps pulled all applicable air 

base defensive lessons learned into a consolidated forum for 

evaluation. These lessons provided names of the primary individuals involved with application of ID at JBB and similar operations within the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of 

responsibility (AOR). This information made it possible to conduct interviews with key players from JBB, ranging from staff 

members at CENTCOM to various Army and AF commanders 

on the ground during that time period.

This compilation of data provided a framework to understand 

the operation as it unfolded at JBB. This understanding was 

matched against the raw attack data meticulously maintained 

by the joint intelligence support element (JISE) from 2004 

through 2010. The level of detail provided in this data enabled 

an advanced statistical evaluation of the effectiveness of ID in 

a combat environment. Results of the statistical analysis, interviews, and consolidated lessons learned form the basis for 

the key lessons learned and future implications.

Historical Context

To understand ID, one must understand the historical context which led the USAF to develop this strategy and doctrine. 

Since the beginning of flight and the evolution of airpower as a 

significant and vital part of US armed forces, airpower has 

caused important changes to US strategies and tactics. World 

War I was primarily fought as a set-piece battle within the fixed 

lines of trench warfare.2 Airpower was first used for reconnaissance, then light bombing or strafing, and finally, through 

evolving air-to-air capability, to deny aerial operations to the 

enemy. Allied and enemy units operated from bases behind 

massive complexes of trench lines that rarely shifted more than 
3

a few hundred meters. As a result, air bases enjoyed almost 

absolute security from attack by conventional ground forces.3

In World War II, the Nazis unleashed a new mode of mobile 

warfare called blitzkrieg. This “lightning war” relied on sudden 

attacks by land and air to overwhelm opposing forces. As the 

German army swept across Europe, it often used paratroops 

and airborne forces to seize or destroy Allied air bases and 

other vital rear-area installations. During the spring of 1940, 

the seizure of air bases in this manner sped the Nazi conquest 

of France, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands.4

By mid 1941, one could theorize with some assurance on the 

role of air base security in the Second World War. Clearly, airpower would be crucial to the war’s outcome. Nevertheless, airpower was firmly bound to bases, which were vulnerable, 

lucrative priority targets. The enemy could attack an air base 

to achieve one (sometimes both) of two very different objectives: 

It might destroy aircraft, facilities, and materiel to deny them to 

the defenders, or seize the base essentially intact and convert 

it for its own use. Lastly, air bases were nothing more than 

large fields. They were not defendable for long if the surrounding land area and/or airspace fell to the enemy.5

The German seizure of Maleme and the occupation of Crete 

in May 1941 led Prime Minister Winston Churchill to review 

British air base defense policy. In a scathing memorandum of 

29 June 1941 to the secretary of state for air and the chief of 

the air staff, the prime minister cataloged the shortcomings of 

the Royal Air Force (RAF) and ordered them corrected. 

Churchill flatly declared he would no longer tolerate a half 

million RAF personnel without a combat role. All airmen were 

to be armed and trained, ready “to fight and die in defence of 

their airfields; . . . every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-ground men, and not the abode of uniformed civilians 

in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers.”6

In the Pacific, the island-hopping campaign focused on and 

utilized airfield seizures, combined with their geographic positions, to drive battles. If an island did not have a usable airfield, Allied forces deemed it unimportant and starved out its 

defenders. Everything that did not support the goal of an invasion of Japan was bypassed. Bypassing operations represented 

the majority of the actions in World War II, where large maneuver 
4

forces of regiment, division, or even corps strength conducted offensive and defensive operations involving seizing and maintaining airfields.

One major exception to this generality was the British special 

air service in Africa. Their small band conducted raids against 

the Afrika Korps and Italian airfields, resulting in 367 Axis aircraft plus tons of munitions, fuel, spare engines, and maintenance facilities destroyed in a two-year period.7 Of 44 specific 

raids, only five involved greater than a seven-person team, with 

34 of the raids conducted by five-person teams. The smaller 

team footprint was ideal for avoiding detection. The key to their 

success was exploiting organizational seams, where Luftwaffe 

base defense units conducted interior defense and general reararea security belonged to the Afrika Korps.

8 While very successful, the conduct of the war overall did not make this methodology 

the norm but provided a glimpse of future conflicts, beginning in 

Vietnam and continuing through today.

The Korean War did not see an immediate use of these smallunit tactics against airfields, though the capability certainly 

existed. Air Force security police began an aggressive buildup 

of personnel, expanding from 10,000 in July 1950 to 39,000 in 

December 1951. Due to a lack of external threats, AF security 

forces primarily focused on interior security, pilferage, trespassing, and theft within the base perimeter. While 32,000 to 

35,000 North Korean guerrillas operated in United Nations 

territory during the war, they ignored the air bases as a target. 

The Far East Air Forces (FEAF) assessed and documented its 

experience in a summary report at the end of the war in July 

1953. The FEAF report cited no air base attacks by guerrillas 

or other irregular forces and no aircraft lost or damaged by 

such actions. When enemy forces broke through and air bases 

were overrun or threatened, it was clearly the Army’s responsibility to respond rather than local base security forces.9

The lack of a threat was fortunate, since the Air Force went 

into the Korean War without an air base defense policy or doctrine. A lack of doctrine and minimal policies continued until 

the Vietnam War and provided an exploitable condition for the 

Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA). To understand how this happened, this study examined the development of interservice agreements and joint doctrine.
5

Interservice Agreements 

Two years after World War II ended, the National Security Act 

of 1947 established the US Air Force as an independent department equal to the Army and the Navy. A 1947 Army–Air Force 

agreement stated that “each department will be responsible for 

the security of its own installations.”10 Security meant those 

“measures taken by a command to protect itself,” including 

“measures against air, mechanized, and chemical attacks.”11

The first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, held a conference in March 1948 with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Key West 

to define service responsibilities and missions. An important 

function common to all the services was base defense—the 

responsibility “to develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases.”12 As defined by the joint dictionary, an Air Force 

base is a facility “for which the Air Force has operating responsibility, together with interior lines of communication and minimum surrounding area required for local security (Normally 

not greater than an area of 20 square miles).”13

The Air Force found this to be a gray area, since the agreement made no specific mention of an Air Force ground combat 

mission for base defense. In contrast, the Army’s key responsibility was “to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.”14 Similarly, 

the Navy and Marine Corps were “to seize and defend advanced 

naval bases and to conduct such land operations as may be 

essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”15 Nowhere 

did the agreement assign the Air Force the mission of defending 

its own air bases. It also neglected to define how base defense 

(common to all services) would tie in with area defense (chiefly 

an Army duty).16 This lack of clarity in the joint doctrine resulted in the Air Force entering the Korean War with no clear 

policy or tactical doctrine for air base ground defense. The Air 

Force published Air Force Regulation (AFR) 355-4, Local Ground 

Defense of Air Force Installations, on 3 March 1953, which defined 

local ground defense as “all measures taken by the local Air 

Force installation commander to deny hostile forces access to 

the area encompassing all buildings, equipment, facilities, 

landing fields, dispersal areas, and adjacent terrain” from 

which the (air base) installation could be neutralized.17
6

Doctrine Development

The most lucid statement of prevailing Air Force base defense 

rationale appeared in the October 1952 edition of Strategic Air 

Command (SAC) Manual 205-2. It rejected the notion that the 

USAF ground defense mission conflicted with Army functions, 

because self-defense is an inherent responsibility of all commanders. Moreover, normal Army campaign strategy and tactics for defending land areas inevitably left small areas or points 

open to attack by small enemy forces. Because the Army is an 

offensive force, its doctrine contemplates taking the defensive 

in a given area only to reach an offensive decision elsewhere. 

While the Army’s limited and temporary defensive role might be 

inconsistent with, or even coincide accidentally with a primary 

USAF self-defensive mission at specific air base locations, the 

Army was not expected to divert its primary mission to confine 

its operations to the defense of Air Force elements.18

Conversely, SAC officials recognized that success for the Air 

Force mission might require point defense of elements that the 

Army could not afford to protect. Further, as joint defense plans 

would most likely rely on distant troops, air installations would 

be vulnerable to surprise attacks pending their arrival. Moreover, these defensive forces might not come at all if an overriding 

Army offensive mission developed at a decisive moment. Hence, 

the SAC rationale held that ground defense must inescapably 

remain an organic USAF function.19

This view, unfortunately, died in the intervening years between 

the Korean and Vietnam wars as a result of reduced defense 

resources, a new national security strategy, and revised intelligence estimates. These factors, coupled with an inconsistency

between the actual combat threat to air bases in Korea and that 

envisioned in AFR 355-4, led to a contradiction that deeply eroded 

the regulation’s credibility.

During the Eisenhower administration, a new national security 

strategy led to a revision of air base defense concepts. The containment of communism would be achieved by “brinksmanship” diplomacy, backed by a public promise that the United 

States would resort to massive nuclear retaliation if its vital 

interests were imperiled. This policy did not envision further 

US involvement in limited wars like the one in Korea. It assumed 
7

that a future conflict would be decided by an immediate

exchange of nuclear strikes during a short period followed by 

exploitation by the victor to end the war. Reflecting this new 

strategy, intelligence estimates calculated that any action 

would probably include attacks by clandestine teams of highly 

trained agents against US nuclear strike installations. Overt, 

large-scale ground assaults were deemed unlikely.20

Based upon this assertion, the Air Staff conducted a study in 

1957 that resulted in the replacement of AFR 355-4 with AFR 

205-5, The Internal Installation Security Program. This program 

centered on protecting critical weapons systems, equipment, 

materiel, and facilities from sabotage. It applied solely to bases 

with combat or combat-support missions and centered on personnel circulation control. A 24-hour backup capability was 

supplied by small, mobile, sabotage-alert teams of air police. 

The emergency reserve was comprised of off-duty air police or 

other qualified base personnel. Essentially, the entire system 

was manned solely by air police; a fundamental feature, considering the failures to implement the original AFR 355-4 concept, which pulled personnel from all specialties not directly 

conducting flying operations. This shift in USAF base defense 

policy revoked the concept of limited ground combat capability 

for defense against an overt external threat. In its stead, the Air 

Force adopted a concept that called for an expanded interior 

guard system to counter a covert threat from within. To cope 

with a threat that exceeded this security capability, the study 

concluded that “the base must be garrisoned by friendly ground 

forces or evacuation . . . must be accomplished.”21

It was with this mind-set that the United States entered the 

Vietnam War. At the beginning of the war, when the United 

States was in the combat advisory phase, air base security did 

not actively consider the impact of insurgency warfare in base 

defense. It overlooked the need to prepare indigenous forces to 

defend its own air bases and to develop an organic USAF counterinsurgency ground defense capability. Instead, the Army of the 

Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was charged with the perimeter and 

exterior defense of USAF core operating locations at DaNang, Bien 

Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut Air Bases from 1961 to 1964. Throughout this early period, the VC/NVA chose to ignore the air bases, 
8

thus base defense capabilities were untested, weaknesses were 

hidden, and the importance of air base defense obscured.22

This practice continued throughout the Vietnam War, with 

USAF security responsibility ending at the perimeter,23 and 

within that perimeter, restricted to USAF resources. The only 

notable variation between air bases was the determination of 

the service or force responsible for the area defense mission 

from the perimeter out into the surrounding countryside from 

which indirect fire (IDF) could affect a base. The seams allowed 

by this arrangement resulted in the VC/NVA turning their attention to air bases on 31 October 1964 with the launch of a 

70-round stand-off attack on Bien Hoa. It was the first of over 

475 attacks on the 10 major air bases in Vietnam over the next 

10 years. The attacks destroyed 99 US and South Vietnamese 

aircraft and damaged another 1,170.24

Following the Vietnam War, despite lessons learned that 

underscored the seams created and the conflicts in the different 

mission sets (offensive versus defensive), the Army and Air 

Force continued to use the AFR 205-5 model and formally 

signed Joint Service Agreement (JSA) 8 in 1985. JSA 8 made 

the Army “responsible for providing forces for air base ground 

defense operations outside the boundaries of designated USAF 

bases and installations.”25 But JSA 8 was never implemented 

nor fully developed. While the prescribed joint working group 

met at least four times, they agreed that “the principles to be 

set forth in pending JCS Pub 3-10, Doctrine for Rear Area 

Operations, would provide the doctrinal guidance for all subsequent publications.”26 Pub 3-10, published in 1992, made 

the joint forces commander (JFC) responsible for installation 

defense regardless of service affiliation. Forces are dedicated to 

base defense according to the JFC’s priorities and are controlled by the installation commander. Operation Desert Storm 

quickly showed this agreement was not workable for the same 

reasons it did not work in Vietnam, namely that an offensive 

Army does not have the resources nor the inclination to dedicate resources to a defensive fight in the rear area. Even though 

joint doctrine and the JSA agreement differed, the JSA was not 

rescinded until 1995. Unfortunately, neither Army nor Air 

Force staff members could find the actual abrogation package, 

and many key leaders in both services continued to expect 
9

Army support to defend air bases at the beginning of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. A second formal abrogation package was agreed 

to and completed by both services in 2005. Once the abrogation of JSA 8 was complete, a better way emerged for the alignment of joint doctrine and implementation of the current doctrine of integrated base defense.

In 2006, Brig Gen Robert Holmes, former director of AF 

security forces and force protection wrote, “Land-component 

maneuver forces will be stretched thin for the foreseeable future, 

so the Air Force must invest in its capabilities to securely reject 

combat air and now ground power.”27 The Air Force announced 

“integrated defense” as its new strategy for defending air bases 

in 2007. ID calls for the “application of active and passive defense 

measures, employed across the legally defined ground dimension of the operational environment, to mitigate potential risks 

and defeat adversary threats to Air Force operations.”28 It calls 

for a new way of thinking that shifts from a compliance-based 

model of security to a capabilities-based construct. ID utilizes 

a collaborative base defense operation model that integrates 

joint and combined partners, ground intelligence collection 

efforts, and a systems approach to defending air bases.

Integrated Defense—Organizing for Success

The successful implementation of ID was essential to the protection of Joint Base Balad as Operation Iraqi Freedom progressed. In 2006, sectarian violence escalated to a point where 

commanders on the ground convinced civilian leaders in Washington of the need for additional forces. At the same time, escalating attacks against coalition forces across the nation forced the 

services to evaluate both the combat and combat-support functions each provided, with an eye toward how expanded or surge 

operations might impact each service’s ability to operate successfully in Iraq. Army and AF leadership began to discuss which service would be responsible for base operating support–integration 

(BOS-I) for Balad AB/LSA Anaconda. The actual 2007–08 “surge” 

followed shortly, with the addition of 30,000 American forces into 

Iraq and a subsequent increase in patrols and kinetic operations. 

This period allowed the AF to plan for and assume BOS-I for Balad 
10

AB/LSA Anaconda, which was renamed Joint Base Balad, or 

JBB, in November 2008.

The Situation

JBB is strategically centered in Iraq to provide interdiction and 

around-the-clock close air support operations. The F-16s, A-10s, 

and Army Apaches stationed there could move anywhere in the 

country in minutes.

Figure 1. Map of Iraq displaying Joint Base Balad (represented by the 

red dot)
11

JBB is located in the Salah ad Din Province, southeast of the 

provincial capital of Samarra and 65 kilometers (km), or 40 miles, 

north of Baghdad. It is in the fertile Tigris River Basin, with numerous farms and groves in the local area. Approximately 120,000 

people live in this area, making concealment of the insurgent population easier, as well as complicating counterbattery fires.

Figure 2. JBB with named areas of interest depicted around the installation

When the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing became the BOS-I in 

November 2008, Air Force security forces (SF) were charged with 

the defense of Iraq’s only named joint base out to 8 km from the 

base boundary. To achieve ID, JBB organized its base defense assets under the 332nd Expeditionary Security Forces Group. The 

332nd ESFG was activated on 24 July 2008 and marked the first 

time the Air Force deployed more than 900 Airmen within a single 

unit to defend an air base in combat since the Vietnam conflict.29

The Organization

The 332nd ESFG was comprised of three distinct elements—

two expeditionary security force squadrons, the 332nd ESFS 
12

and the 532nd ESFS, and a robust staff element. The 332nd 

ESFS was tasked with perimeter and interior security for JBB. 

The 532nd ESFS was tasked with exterior security, to include 

entry control points to the base, exterior patrols, and tactical 

security elements escorting local Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) agents in their OTW missions. Both units 

utilized a combined force of AF security forces and private security to accomplish their mission. To support these two squadrons, the 332nd ESFG staff conducted standard group functions along with incorporating several enhanced operations 

such as 24/7 operations for both the joint defense operations 

center (JDOC), counter–rocket artillery mortars (C-RAM), and 

JISE-Balad. Figure 3 is an organizational breakout of the unit 

as it looked in July 2010.30

332 ESFG Organizational Chart

332 ESFG (Col)

332 ESFS/CC (Maj) 532 ESFS/CC (Lt Col) ESFG STAFF

CEM (CMSgt) CD (Lt Col)

S1

S2

S3

S4

S1

S2

S3

S4

ECP

FPP

A1

JISE-B (A2)

JDOC (A3)

A4

A5

A6

Defense

Flightline Security

C-RAM Battery

TSE

Towers

Air Provost

Figure 3. ESFG organizational chart

The defense force commander (DFC) synchronized all ID 

operations through the JDOC, collocated with the local Army 

battlespace owner’s (BSO) tactical operations center. The JDOC, 
13

by virtue of both its physical composition and the vast suite of 

technologies, was the DFC’s integrated command and control 

hub as well as a true joint collaborative environment. Just under 

$500 million in technologies provided a 360-degree security sensor 

and video system capable of viewing the surrounding 12 miles 

beyond the base boundary. The JDOC, operated by Airmen and 

Soldiers, was the central nervous system of the defense scheme. 

The JDOC directed and integrated all security systems in the 

overall defense of Joint Base Balad; this included all physical 

security subsystems (detection, delay, and response) both inside 

and outside the wire. The JDOC also served as the tactical integrator 

of both intelligence and the BSO’s effects guidance to drive the 

base defense effort. The JDOC helped develop joint command 

relationships, fully integrating the joint and combined forces 

into a comprehensive defensive operation for JBB.31

332nd Expeditionary Security Forces

Squadron Operations

The mission of the 332nd ESFS was to protect personnel and 

resources in an expeditionary environment with an emphasis 

on defending the base from a complex attack at the wire or 

within the installation. To accomplish this mission, the 332nd 

integrated nearly 400 private security company guards into its 

defense posture. Private security guards manned perimeter 

towers and internal posts located outside highly populated areas 

such as morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) facilities, base 

exchanges, the hospital, and other areas where 50 or more personnel gathered on a regular basis. The presence of the contract guards relieved US forces to accomplish other essential 

wartime duties.32

Normally, the 332nd ESFS manned only half the perimeter 

towers on a random rotation; however, tower manning increased 

to 100 percent during reduced visibility or in response to a 

significant change in threat. Initially, the wing relied on all tenant 

units to provide “troop to task” manpower for the increased 

tower posts, a process normally requiring up to four-plus hours 

to complete. To better protect the base, the 332nd ESFS added 
14

the 100 percent requirement to the private security company 

contract, and the process shortened to less than 60 minutes.33

In addition to integrating the private security contractor 

force, the unit based its entire scheme of maneuver around the 

principles of effects-based, rather than compliance-based, security. The 332nd ESFS defensive scheme allowed the threat to 

dictate security posture and procedures. The unit recognized 

that the success of an ID plan relies significantly on the forces 

assigned to an installation, especially in a deployed environment. It is paramount for the owner/user of a resource to secure 

it and to be able to identify, detect, and deter hostilities prior to 

the enemy reaching his objective. This concept required a targeted 

owner/user campaign so that all US forces understood the 

concept, ultimately allowing SF to deploy their forces in a way 

that would engage the enemy further away from the resources.34

Air provost services, such as law enforcement patrols, building checks, and traffic enforcement, are a necessity for the 

safety of all war fighters at a deployed location. The air provost 

was more than law enforcement; it also included police services 

during special events. Large United Service Organizations 

(USO), Armed Forces Entertainment, and MWR functions are 

common occurrences to raise the morale at any deployed location; with 26 events in 2009, JBB was no exception. The 332nd 

ESFS developed security plans with all SF assets, including 

military working dogs (MWD) and the 532nd ESFS. While 

MWDs routinely checked all cargo for the event, the 532nd 

ESFS generated additional patrol coverage outside the installation perimeter nearest the event venue. The 332nd ESFS also 

provided a personal security detail to escort distinguished visitors 

and established close-in event security.35

A special mission set within the 332nd ESFS was the fly-away 

security (FAS) teams. FAS teams provided security for C-130s 

transiting locations within Iraq as well as Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, 

Yemen, and the Horn of Africa. Thirteen personnel (a Ravencertified program manager and 12 FAS team members) were 

assigned to this unique mission. Each member was trained for 

both ground security and flight deck denial operations. FAS 

teams also conducted force protection airfield assessments of 

locations throughout the AOR and provided their airfield 

security recommendations to the director of mobility forces.36
15

The final mission set within the 332nd ESFS was the Balad 

Expeditionary Antiterrorism Strike Team (BEAST). The BEAST 

provided a special capability to fight inside-the-wire (ITW) 

threats such as foreign intelligence service, terrorist, and criminal 

threats. The BEAST increased the unit’s ability to mitigate ITW 

threats exponentially as a dedicated unit unhampered by other 

air provost duties, such as traffic control or minor incident 

responses. During its first three months of operation, the 

BEAST screened over 11,000 third-country nationals and local 

nationals (TCN/LN) and conducted more than 800 random 

antiterrorism measures (RAM). In addition to randomly 

screening workers at the workplace, the BEAST conducted 

health and welfare inspections (HWI) in workers’ “mancamps.” Before the BEAST, the 332nd ESFS conducted one or 

two HWIs a month. With the BEAST, the unit conducted up to 

six HWIs each month.37

Technology was critical to the success of 332nd ESFS operations. With the largest enhanced tactical automated security 

system (eTASS) in the Department of Defense, the unit could 

monitor and immediately assess events at both the base perimeter 

and the restricted area fence lines. The eTASS operators monitored 

the 21-km-long perimeter and the 16-km restricted boundary with 

nearly 550 sensors supported by nine wide-area surveillance 

thermal imagers, 12 long-range thermal imagers, two super-longrange thermal imagers, 13 handheld monitors, eight closed-circuit 

TVs, and eight man-portable surveillance and target acquisition 

radars. All of these systems provided immediate visual assessment 

throughout the interior and exterior of the installation.38

532nd Expeditionary Security Forces

Squadron Operations

The 532nd Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron was 

charged with three primary missions: screen everyone and 

everything entering the base through the entry control points 

(ECP); conduct combat patrols off the installation to disrupt 

and deter IDF attacks and the placement of improvised explosive 

devices (IED) along supply routes; and provide tactical security 

elements (TSE) in support of AFOSI operations. The 532 ESFS 
16

directly contributed to the BSO’s counterintelligence (COIN) 

campaign plan through its interaction with the local population, 

intelligence collection against high-value individuals, and deterrence effect in the base security zone (BSZ).

39

Entry Control Point Operations

Overseeing the entire entry control point operations was an 

officer in charge (OIC), two assistant OICs, a noncommissioned 

officer in charge (NCOIC) of ECP operations, and an NCOIC at 

each ECP. Although each ECP had a different mission set, they 

had very similar structures for posts and responsibilities. For 

example, each ECP maintained an internal response force (IRF) 

to respond to any suspicious activity or possible threat, conduct RAMs, and provide oversight for pedestrian and vehicle 

searches. Additionally, each ECP had manned towers to monitor 

assigned fields of fire, provide over watch for IRF patrols, 

identify possible threats, and provide information to the ECP 

command post.40

Iraqi Vehicle and Pedestrian Screener (IVPS). Bringing 

the local population into the defense of the base as the initial 

point of contact for Iraqis coming to JBB was a phenomenal 

success. It brought business opportunities to the local area 

and included the local populace in the overall effort to secure 

and defend their country. The IVPS contractor was required to 

inspect all non-coalition pedestrian and vehicle traffic at designated checkpoints outside the ECP. The objective was to prevent vehicle-borne improvised explosive device/suicide-vest 

improvised explosive device (VBIED/SVIED) attacks and put 

an “Iraqi face” on the security team to reduce the need for an 

escalation of force.41

The contract required that all newly hired guards be Iraqi 

citizens of at least 21 years of age who normally resided within 

15 km of JBB and represented no less than 80 percent of the 

labor force from the area in and around JBB. The workforce 

was representative of the local community with respect to religious and tribal percentages as closely as possible to the actual 

social composition around the installation. Although IVPS 

guards were not allowed access to the base, as a condition of 

employment each guard was subjected to the same screening 
17

process and entered into the biometrics automated toolset 

(BATS) just as they would had they installation access.42

Since implementation in 2009, the installation’s entry control point outermost security has been airtight, with zero bombs 

on base. In harm’s way daily, IVPS guards were the initial 

detectors of any contraband or explosives someone might attempt to smuggle onto the base. Their dedication to the base 

and the security of the land immediately outside of JBB was 

instrumental in the overall success of the security on JBB.43

Private Security Contract (PSC). The private security contract at JBB provided critical manpower to the 332nd ESFG—

over half of the entry control point section—serving as vehicle 

searchers and in other static posts such as the badging offices 

at each of the three ECPs.44 PSC guards worked tower observation posts, traffic control points, and armed escorts. They were 

also trained and operated the mobile vehicle and cargo inspection system (MVACIS), rail vehicle and cargo inspection system 

(RVACIS), and WT-101 and conducted physical searches of 

personnel and vehicles prior to their entry to JBB. They were 

armed and subject to the same use of force and rules of engagement (ROE) as US forces.45

Entry Control Point Technology. Technology significantly 

enhanced ECP operations, but also required a dedicated force 

to maintain. Through the use of contracts funded by US Air 

Forces Central (AFCENT), field service representatives kept the 

equipment operational. Listed below are several systems installed at each of the ECPs to provide a thorough—and redundant—

inspection and screening capability.46

• Blue force tracker (BFT) rapid aerostat initial deployment 

(RAID): employed a variety of sensor suites—electro-optical/

infrared (EO/IR) sensors, radar, and flash and acoustic 

detectors—to provide elevated persistent surveillance (EPS)

• MVACIS/RVACIS

• Z-Backscatter X-ray van (ZBV)
18

• Ruggedized detection imaging module (RDIM): employed 

the same patented Z-Backscatter technology as the ZBV in 

a stationary capacity

• WT-101 or Rapiscan Secure 1000®: enabled operators to 

easily identify concealed threat and contraband items on 

personnel, detecting both organic (e.g., solid and liquid 

explosives, narcotics, ceramic weapons) and inorganic 

(e.g., metal) materials.

• BATS: automated personnel enrollment and tracking system 

for all locally issued badge holders.

• Ion scan: physical trace detection system to detect explosive 

residue on skin, clothing, parcels, bags, cargo, vehicles, and 

other surfaces.

Force Protection Patrols

For many years, SF have organized, equipped, trained, and executed operations in an environment outside the base. Since the 

start of the war on terror, much of what we knew about air base 

defense came from preexisting manuals, journals, and regulations, but much has changed, often overnight. The greatest 

change is the need for expansion and coordination with joint, 

coalition, and combined forces. With little background or training, the average SF unit will now be asked to train and fight alongside or with joint partners like the US Army. Additionally the 

USAF must do the same with host nation forces like those of the 

Iraqi army and Iraqi police. Fostering relationships with sister 

services and coalition partners is a prerequisite to conducting 

operations OTW. With respect to the Army, they are normally the 

battlespace owner, and they can/will decide when/how SF will fit 

into the strategic and tactical picture. The USAF must learn how 

the Army and other services conduct operations.47

Outside-the-Wire Patrol Mission Planning Techniques

Concepts of operation (CONOPS) are developed to outline BSZ 

missions mirroring an operation order but in a shorter digital format. The Army has adopted the use of PowerPoint for CONOPS, 
19

and the BSO requires it prior to any movement in the BSZ. 

CONOPS are developed through:

First, determine mission: counter-indirect fire (C-IDF), terrain denial, counter-IED (C-IED), intelligence-driven operations, patrol densities (pattern or trend setting), priorities intelligence requirements (PIR), BSO direction, or other outside 

agency requirements, such as engineers, other coalition forces 

(CF), Iraqi army or Iraqi police (IA/IP).

Second, compare to synchronization matrix (synch matrix), 

normally done 14 days in advance of when actual missions will 

occur, to marry or deconflict timelines in conjunction with various 

support assets (RPA, other aerial platforms) and the BSO.

Third, coordinate synch matrix with BSO, expeditionary operations, security forces, civil engineers groups, intelligence nodes 

(Battalion S-2, company HCTs, CIST, OSI), and other CF in the 

BSZ or host nation partners (IA/IP).

Fourth, after approval of the force protection patrol officer in 

charge (FPP/OIC), the planning/building stages begin for the 

CONOPS. The FPP/OIC, patrol master, and mission planning cell 

(MPC) begin constructing the mission CONOPS four days out. 

Squad leaders receive warning orders for the upcoming mission. 

The CONOPS are forwarded to the BSO for situational awareness 

and final deconfliction, and then finally sent to the squad leaders 

for mission execution. The length of time to produce CONOPS is 

determined locally by BSO directives, operational tempo, mission 

load, mission sensitivity, and the number of teams available.48

Sand tables and operation orders have long been the proven 

and effective way to plan and execute in a wide range of conflicts 

and operations. Today, in OTW operations at JBB, time is the essence of success in many fights. Often technology can hinder or 

help us. The mission planning process for OTW missions has 

evolved significantly from its inception in 2008; the ID CONOPS is 

a new way of doing business.49

The mission is broken down into PowerPoint slide formats, 

using various types of imagery. Traditional Army symbols are 

staked down to an electronic visual of the scheme of maneuver, 

summarizing the five-paragraph format into a slideshow. The 

benefit is that once it is completed, it can be tailored for any 

day-to-day clearing operation or specific named operation that 

garners multiple coordinations from other agencies.50
20

332 ESFG Organizational Chart

332 ESFG (Col)

332 ESFS/CC (Maj) 532 ESFS/CC (Lt Col) ESFG STAFF

CEM (CMSgt) CD (Lt Col)

S1

S2

S3

S4

S1

S2

S3

S4

ECP

FPP

A1

JISE-B (A2)

JDOC (A3)

A4

A5

A6

Defense

Flightline Security

C-RAM Battery

TSE

Towers

Air Provost

Figure 4. 332nd ESFG OTW patrol CONOPS development

ID CONOPS is developed from many sources. First, it must 

be placed on the BSO synch matrix to schedule operations, 

taking into account the BSO’s battle plans, enemy threat windows, aerial assets available, joint intelligence requirements, 

patrol densities, and current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of the adversary. The ID CONOPS has a section 

within the organization called the mission planning cell. The 

MPC is comprised of the traditional patrol master with a couple 

of trained and seasoned Airmen to assist in the scheduling, 

plan development, and CONOPS construction for OTW squads. 

The MPC executes the previously mentioned CONOPS process 

through specific and direct guidance of the force protection officer in charge. The FPP/OIC dictates the flow and direction of 

operations, meets with intelligence organizations, and coordinates with joint, coalition, and host nation forces to provide the 

mission purpose and guidance. Essentially, the FPP/OIC states 

the mission parameters and intent. The MPC executes 
21

based on this information to provide solid, actionable CONOPS 

to meet the higher commands’ directives.51

1930 - SP ABA

1930 - 2015 – Area Reconnaissance

2015- 2045 – Mounted LP/OP

2100 - 2210 – Dismounted Patrol

- Dismount at CP1, from PL “RED” to PL “BLUE” to

PL “GREEN”

- Re -mount vehicles at CP 1

2210 - 2300 – Area Reconnaissance

2300 – RP ABA

NOTIONAL EXAMPLE:

Dismounted Patrol in NAI ## Timeline

2

VDO/VPU GRID COORD

C

N

ABU THOMAS RD

PL GREEN 

1 S F 4 1

CP GRID COORD

1

2

PL BLUE

PL RED

Figure 5. 332nd ESFG notional example of a dismounted patrol planin 

PowerPoint

Tactical Security Element Operations

A TSE is a security forces team, approximately squad sized, 

tasked to perform mobile and static tactical security operations 

in support of AFOSI’s counterterrorist operations (CTO) missions. These missions primarily consist of routine combat 

mounted patrols between the main operating base (MOB) and 

off-base (objective) locations.52

Two squads of TSEs were assigned to the 532nd ESFS under 

the tactical control (TACON) of the commander, Expeditionary 

Detachment 2411, AFOSI. The 532nd ESFS was responsible 

for the administrative and day-to-day support of the TSEs, 

while the AFOSI detachment commander directed their missions. It was critical for the commander to provide a mission 

brief and establish expectations for the TSEs. The relationship 
22

and communications chain needs to be strong between the 

detachment commander and SF commander to achieve maximum results. All teams had the capability to shoot, move, and 

communicate at a high level of proficiency in daytime, low-light, 

or black-out conditions in any type of terrain/weather condition. When TSEs move in the battlespace independent of but 

coordinated with the BSO, they abide by theater and local guidance, including the numbers and types of vehicles required for 

OTW operations.53

The TSE patrol leader (PL) controlled the security mission, to 

include directing mounted operations to and from the objective 

as well as combat operations if the patrol came under attack. 

The PL had the authority to terminate OTW missions for tactical 

or other unforeseen security reasons in the event of a valid 

specific threat. The AFOSI lead agent on each mission directed 

AFOSI agents and linguist actions during the planned AFOSIspecific activity, while the TSE PL directed all security movements. The final decision authority on all tactical security operations rested with the TSE PL.54

Unique Relationships

Several unique relationships provided a doctrinally sound, 

joint defense structure to the 332nd ESFG, beginning with the 

tactical control of the C-RAM joint intercept battery (JIB) under 

the DFC. An Army air defense artillery battery commander was 

responsible to the DFC for the eight guns and seven radar systems employed to provide sense, warn, and intercept capability 

as well as operational control of the 66 Soldiers and 64 Sailors 

assigned to the battery. Several improvement initiatives resulted in a system performance record unmatched in Iraq: a 

90-percent sense and warn rate that gave personnel a chance 

to take cover before IDF impacts and a 164-percent increase in 

intercepts in 2009. C-RAM was a unique defense against enemy 

IDF attacks and as a localized warning to populated areas of 

the base. Placing C-RAM under tactical command of the DFC 

ensured the best possible integration of its capabilities into the 

overall physical security and force-protection architecture of 

JBB and the counter-IDF plan.55
23

Another unique joint relationship was the force protection 

patrol’s relationship with the BSO. Once the patrols exited the 

base perimeter, or “broke wire,” they were TACON to the BSO. 

To produce effects in the battlespace, the defense force commander and his Airmen partnered with the local Army BSO, 

who had operational responsibility for the terrain surrounding 

JBB and for developing and executing a campaign plan within 

this geographic area. Per the BSO construct, personnel transiting through a BSO’s area were required to comply with their 

commander’s intent for the battlespace, as well as adhere to 

Army tactical command and control protocols, mission-planning 

requirements, and scheme of maneuver. Compliance with their 

guidance to generate the desired effects demanded a synchronized 

and coordinated effort between Air Force and Army ground forces 

defending the air base.56

To the BSO, JBB’s base defense was one of an extensive list 

of operational mission tasks within the operational environment. The BSO had responsibility for a large geographic area 

far beyond the IDF threat ring affecting the air base—specifically, 

more than 3,000 square kilometers, far more than the 243 

square kilometers encompassing the JBB standoff-attack 

threat area. It is easy to see how a BSO’s capabilities could become stretched and how external force protection of an air base 

could be relegated to a lower priority, especially if other highpriority targets were also located within their AO.57

Unlike other SF groups, the 332nd ESFG staff played a significant role in defense force operations through the director of 

operations (A3)—the force integrator. The A3 bridged the natural 

fault lines expected in both joint and combined operations as 

the (1) primary BSO liaison to synchronize Air Force ground 

operations, (2) integrator of air assets in support of base defense and counter-IDF missions, and (3) creator of intelligencedriven integrated defense operations through the JISE.58

Joint Intelligence Support Element 

Unlike operations in Vietnam, JBB employed dedicated intelligence assets for base defense under the A2/JISE. In Vietnam, 

Air Force intelligence assets focused on air operations and provided little ground intelligence support to base defenders—a 
24

situation that resulted in losses that would be unacceptable in 

the current war. The JISE, a dedicated, 22-person, groundfocused, force-protection intelligence organization was established at JBB to remedy this historical shortfall. The JISE was 

comprised of four components: an intelligence collection cell, 

an atmospherics collection cell, an all-source cell, and finally, 

the direct liaison cell with the 532nd ESFS off-base patrols.59

The intelligence collection cell included specialists in the 

human intelligence, signals intelligence, and geospatial intelligence disciplines. These specialists not only answered analysts’ 

and operators’ requests for information, but because of their 

expertise, each became proactive in seeking tailored products 

and reports from national and theater intelligence agencies, 

using a “smart pull” concept to prevent becoming deluged with 

data of marginal utility to the mission at hand.60

In a second cell, three Iraqi-American linguists scoured the 

Arab media for reports relevant to the JBB environs, translated 

documents recovered by ground patrols, and, perhaps most significantly, operated a 24/7 tip line—a phone service that Iraqi 

locals could call into from off base, where and when they felt 

most secure, to report on insurgents operating in their villages 

or attacking the air base from their property. Although uncorroborated, tip-line callers sometimes offered the first indications 

of impending attacks or the first attribution after the fact.61

The JISE’s third component was an all-source fusion cell, 

where data from the collection effort was absorbed, combined, 

analyzed, and turned into knowledge about the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. This fusion cell examined every small 

arms, IED, and IDF attack to determine which TTPs were new, 

which insurgent cell conducted an attack, what areas each cell 

operated in, and what activity patterns would enable air and 

ground forces to maneuver inside the enemy’s decision cycle—

that is, that holy grail of intelligence known as predictive battlespace awareness.62

The final cell in the JISE was the direct liaison to the OTW 

Gryphon unit, the 532nd ESFS “Lions.” These JISE members 

not only delivered the relevant analytic products meant to keep 

the Lions from being surprised in the battlespace; they armed 

each patrol with knowledge of the networks and their players, 

many of whom would be in regular, deliberate contact with the 
25

Lions. This liaison cell gave many patrols specific essential elements of information to collect during their interactions with 

the local populace while identifying particular fields to sweep 

and to occupy, forcing the insurgents to fire from less-familiar 

territory with less-practiced escape routes. Robust ground intelligence operations enabled Army and Air Force ground forces to 

defend JBB through proactive deterrent patrols at the point of 

IDF origination.63

The BSO leveraged this intelligence analysis and capacity in 

combination with his own intelligence staff. This synchronized 

effort supported an intelligence fusion designed to drive defense operations in the BSZ. Intelligence is traditionally based 

on the analyses of historical trends, which leads to a defense 

posture that responds after attacks occur. In this paradigm, 

ground forces are no more than “shot responders” in a counterIDF fight, sweeping for the enemy in the location from which 

they fired the IDF round. This does produce short-term results 

but at a tremendous expenditure of energy and resources. To 

attain predictive battlespace awareness and lead to proactive 

operations, the JISE needed foreknowledge and the ability to 

shape operations based on predictions of the actions insurgents would likely take in the future.64

The JISE enabled an intelligence-driven targeting process 

that allowed Air Force security forces to shift from a reactive 

posture to proactive operations. To obtain any lasting effects 

requires dominance of the human terrain within and outside 

an installation as well as understanding the relationships 

among key groups, tribes, and individuals. This requirement 

drove Airmen to study and gain insights into the violent extremist networks operating in the area and to actively participate in mapping and pressuring these networks through a constant presence. Airmen closed the intelligence gap between 

themselves and the enemy network by actively feeding the intelligence cycle as they gathered information from relationships 

they established in the battlespace.65

Actively leveraging organic air assets directly enabled an enhanced base defense. Through the standard air tasking order 

and collection-management processes, the JISE obtained regular 

Global Hawk and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System (JSTARS) geospatial products as well as nationally derived 
26

intelligence products delivered through the combined air operations center’s forward-deployed Air Force National Tactical Integration Cell. While useful, these planned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets were dwarfed by 

contributions of the expeditionary operations group and Army 

aviation units, both fixed and rotary wing, assigned to JBB, 

who delivered countless hours of “residual” ISR. The JISE produced and executed a comprehensive collection plan garnering 

the most value from both planned and residual airborne assets.66

The JISE became a synergistic body effective at pulling together disparate units to reach a commonly desired end state: 

protecting JBB from IDF attacks. Pilots and air planners welcomed the opportunity to fly residual ISR to protect the base, 

utilizing any remaining fuel and loiter time after completing 

their primary mission. Members of the operations group intelligence cell logged hundreds of hours following insurgent leaders 

to meetings, and Army aviation units loitered at a distance, 

capturing imagery of insurgents’ other patterns of life. The 

JISE orchestrated a collection plan, piecing together the returning aircraft into persistent ISR 15 to 60 minutes at a time—

the average length of time that a residual asset could make itself available for local ISR efforts. The JISE collection 

coordinator produced a daily collection plan known as the “residual deck.” For each target, the collection plan included specific elements of information meant to enable JISE analysts to 

fill gaps in their knowledge of the target, its activities, and insurgent networks.67

Security forces Airmen proved critical to the success of the 

JISE’s intelligence collection strategy. Given the nature of the 

Iraqi insurgency, successful ISR operations included groundbased collection by patrols coming into close contact with highvalue individuals and the populace surrounding them. Like the 

airborne collection plan, the ground-based plan began by 

determining tasks suited to the Air Force patrols. In each 

neighborhood, Army and Air Force patrols conversed with locals to determine the identities of individuals with whom they 

were speaking, their occupations, and how they felt about topics such as their security situation and government services. 

By identifying the occupants of various houses and obtaining 

grid coordinates for each dwelling, patrols literally mapped the 
27

human terrain surrounding JBB. JISE analysts recorded each 

individual, using the data to build a picture of the human terrain. While traditional intelligence sources enabled security 

forces to narrow down the location of a high-value individual 

within a block of five to ten houses, Airmen and Soldiers on the 

ground easily pinpointed the exact residence and its occupants 

simply by asking locals to provide information about the individual of interest.68

Air-Ground Integration. Although not immediately obvious, the evolution of the residual air campaign demonstrates a 

need for effective linkages between ground and air forces. With 

a wide variety of aircraft platforms with variable operating 

times in the air, air-smart ground forces must understand the 

value of dominating the battle space in three dimensions and 

be able to leverage every capability provided—ranging from 

minutes to hours. With only one to three FPPs available in the 

BSZ at any given time covering 60,000 acres of battlespace, 

airpower is essential for countering the disadvantages that the 

terrain poses to ground forces.69

The terrain itself also contributes to the complexity of the 

problem set. The terrain around JBB is in the vicinity of the 

Tigris River and consists of fertile agrarian lands by Iraqi standards. The rural communities and agriculture are fueled by 

intricate systems of canals that compartmentalize the battlespace 

with very few direct routes to anywhere. The surrounding area 

hosts an impressive variety of crops and vegetation that provide an endless number of hiding places and alternatives to 

insurgents seeking to attack US forces or JBB. Isolated fields 

and vineyards worked by commuter farmers offer a witnessfree environment for determined insurgents. The confusing lattice of canal roads are designed to support smaller local traffic 

and farm stock, not armored combat patrols. With each hour of 

continuous rain, trafficable routes quickly become mired and 

impassable, making large chunks of the battlespace isolated 

and inaccessible. The disadvantages of this environment offer 

corresponding advantages to the adversary that can be countered 

by airpower.70

It’s not cliché to say squad leaders had to be taught to think 

on the fly. A variety of air assets with a host of uses, many 

platform-specific, required a unique form of education. Airmen 
28

needed to understand the capabilities of available assets and 

how they contribute to the ground fight. Army aviation units 

taught Airmen their AGI TTPs for linkup and communication in 

the battlespace to direct rotary-wing assets for patrol oversight 

and route/objective reconnaissance. Over 300 Airmen were 

trained on MOVER71 use, giving them the ability to direct ISR 

assets and kinetic platforms and an unprecedented level of situational awareness. Such capabilities brought the C-IDF fight 

to new heights, enabling the transition from merely “POO responders” to hunters who could, in effect, track shooters to 

their doorsteps. As the USAF’s “air IQ” increased, its air-minded 

operations became preemptive in nature and allowed it to track 

and interdict munitions prior to final emplacement at the attack location.72

The security environment, regardless of the operation’s current name, has transitioned from COIN to stability operations. 

Iraqi rule of law became an operational imperative. The requirement for prosecution-based targeting led to the primacy of ISRbased platforms with a persistent presence and collection 

capability crucial to building solid cases for convictions in 

an Iraqi court of law.73

Battlespace Owner Integration. Joint and combined partnerships in today’s battlespace are very complex, and BSOs 

were responsible for synchronizing all friendly forces in their 

area of operations, which included conducting kinetic and nonkinetic actions, maintaining situational awareness of all forces, 

and controlling fire-support coordination measures. BSOs leveraged the capabilities of all coalition, host nation, and other 

partner units, including nonmilitary entities, such as the Department of State’s provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Their accomplishments 

proved that, if properly synchronized, such mutually supporting operations create a symbiotic relationship and unity of 

effort, ultimately yielding a more efficient use of resources. US 

Joint Forces Command noted that the BSOs were learning to 

take advantage of all available operational enablers: “Many 

joint players . . . operate in the battlespace owners’ areas of 

operation. . . . Battlespace owners are becoming increasingly 

more comfortable with these ‘non-assigned’ players in their 

battlespace.”74
29

At JBB, Airmen learned to leverage both kinetic and nonkinetic assets and operations to support the BSO’s COIN and 

stability campaign plans. The wing hosted biweekly COIN and 

civil-engagement synchronization meetings to integrate the 

various campaign plans from the Army BSO, Air Force, Department of State PRTs, and other NGO partners at JBB. The BSO 

embraced efforts from the Air Force and other partner units as 

a means of realizing overall campaign objectives along three 

lines of operations: security, economic development, and governance. No fewer than five times per week, the COIN engagement team met to improve coordination and information sharing. Those meetings included a review of intelligence operations, 

operations synchronization, targeting, the BSO’s weekly effects 

summary, and numerous synchronization meetings at the 

field-grade and company-grade-officer levels. The meetings resulted in support such as ISR data on the locations of highvalue individuals, sweeps over IDF hot spots, aerial monitoring 

of security for Iraqi election polls, and aerial shows of force with 

F-16s over terrain from which IDF attacks frequently originated.75

The Threat—Vietnam-Iraq Comparison

In both Vietnam and Iraq, IDF weapons were the number one 

threat to air bases because attacks from a distance increased 

survival. Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces attacked 10 

American air bases in Vietnam 475 times between 1964 and 

1973, primarily with IDF, destroying 99 and damaging 1,170 

US and South Vietnamese aircraft.76 In contrast, JBB alone 

came under IDF attack more frequently than all 10 US air 

bases in Southeast Asia combined during a similar number of 

years (see fig. 6). Insurgents attacked JBB 1,965 times from 

2004 to 2010 resulting in no aircraft losses and only a few aircraft damaged; furthermore, only 50 percent of the rounds fired 

actually landed on the base.77

Both VC/NVA and Iraqi insurgents sought similar objectives—

to inflict casualties, to undermine public support, and to disrupt air operations. These objectives were more definitively 

achieved in Vietnam than in Iraq because of the damage and 

the casualties that incurred, but both operations were successful in disrupting air operations.
30

0

200

400

600

1966 vs. 1967 vs. 2004 2005 1968 vs. 

2006 1969 vs. 

2007 1970 vs. 

2008 1971 vs. 

2009 1972 vs. 

2010

Frequency of Attacks on JBB (Red) vs. Attacks 

on All Vietnam Theater US Air Bases (Blue)

All USAF Air Bases in Vietnam and Thailand JBB Only

Figure 6. Attack comparison between JBB (2004–10) and Vietnam theater 

air bases (1966–72). (Vietnam data from Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, 

69; and JBB data derived from Urban, 10 February 2011 event database.)

The terrain for both conflicts favored the insurgents, and most 

attacks at JBB originated from lush farmland, trees, and vineyards 

surrounding the base. The proximity of populated villages and 

towns adjacent to the air base perimeters in both Vietnam and Iraq 

gave cover to the enemy to conduct his operations. Alan Vick noted 

in the 1995 RAND research study entitled Snakes in the Eagle’s 

Nest that “the standoff threat, particularly from rockets, proved 

troublesome through the end of the Vietnam War. Given the nature 

of the conflict and the terrain, there was no perfect countermeasure to this threat.”78

There were also numerous differences: trained soldiers or insurgents in Vietnam were capable of hitting targets consistently, while 

at JBB it was a more diverse group, including well-trained former 

Baathists, disenfranchised tribes who formed militia, and unskilled 

attackers who simply fired on the base to make money. Because 

this group did not have specific training and incentive to destroy 

targets, over 50 percent of the IDF fired at JBB did not even land 

within the perimeter boundary.79
31

While less frequent, the attacks in Vietnam were more effective 

at disabling and disrupting air operations. Between 1964 and 

1973, Vietcong and NVA forces attacked the 10 bases only 475 

times, but the attacks were much more intense and included 

multiple launches of IDF with over 250 attacks with five or more 

rounds, 164 attacks with 10 or more rounds, and eight attacks 

with 80 or more rounds fired.80 Attack intensity was a major difference at JBB because the largest attack was only 16 rounds. 

Figures 7 and 8 describe the number of rounds fired per attack 

in both Vietnam and Iraq.

1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

1967

1966

1965

1964

1-5

6-10

11-20

21-30

31-40

41-50

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81+

Figure 7. Number of rounds fired per attack in Vietnam

The difference was the effect of firing multiple rounds in one 

attack; in Vietnam they destroyed 99 US and South Vietnamese 

aircraft and damaged 1,170 aircraft along with multiple facilities, fuels, munitions, and so forth. Conversely, no aircraft were 

destroyed in all the attacks on JBB, and only a few were damaged, 
32

with no major facilities damaged or destroyed.81 A major difference 

in JBB was better attack warning from counterfire systems.

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11+

Figure 8. JBB attack data by rounds fired per attack

Vietnam-era base defense and base defense at JBB also differed significantly in terms of the complexity of attacks. Vietnam attacks proved more effective because enemy forces had 

more freedom of movement, enabling them to mass fires and 

conduct simultaneous ground attacks due to the inability of air 

base defenders to effectively patrol around their installations. 

Vietnam theater air bases endured not only IDF attacks but 

also 29 sapper attacks, during which forces attempted to penetrate the bases to destroy aircraft and key defenses.82 Eight of 

those attacks utilized IDF as a diversion for base defense forces, 

thereby screening attackers during ground assaults.83 Unlike 

in Vietnam, sapper attacks did not materialize in Iraq because 

they are highly complex, synchronized operations requiring a 

more organized, disciplined, and trained military force.

Also unlike in Vietnam, the 2008 US-Iraq security agreement 

substantially altered the rules of engagement by making defense operations a “law enforcement fight.” This change obligated US forces to build criminal cases with supporting evidence.84 The ROE limited options for defending the air base but 

bolstered the larger strategic effort to support Iraqi rule-of-law 
33

programs. It also had the added benefit of making Iraqi police 

and courts the centerpieces of long-term Iraqi success. By requiring the Iraqi police to handle all cases against alleged insurgents and process them through their court system, the 

ROE promoted a more-favorable image of US Airmen, casting 

them as partners in upholding the Iraqi rule of law and dispelling the image of an occupying force disrespectful of local 

authority. As such, Soldiers, Air Force security forces, Airmen 

with the AFOSI, and pilots from both services testified in Iraqi 

courts, resulting in successful criminal prosecutions under 

Iraqi law.85

Commenting on the US-Iraq security agreement of 2008, MG 

Mike Milano, USA, pointed out that “what we and the Iraqis are 

striving for is a condition known as police primacy. . . . Under 

police primacy, the Iraqi police forces have primary responsibility 

for internal security, under civilian control, in accordance with 

the Iraqi constitution and consistent with the rule of law.”86

JBB, therefore, initiated further cooperative partnering with 

the Iraqi police and built a local police substation to further 

improve cooperation. US Soldiers and Airmen worked alongside Iraqi police, often conducting joint and combined patrols 

and operations and, with local support, improved intelligence.

Integrated defense operations in Iraq forced insurgents to 

hurry their attacks because of new technologies that eliminated 

most of the tactical loiter time needed to amass their fires. Attackers feared being either targeted by ground patrols or videotaped by air platforms.87 Good security at JBB’s entry control 

points and perimeter drove the enemy to IDF attacks to minimize losses. Indirect fire attacks successfully disrupted US 

operations temporarily, as each attack required personnel at 

the installation to take cover and clear the terrain of unexploded ordnance prior to returning to normal operations. JBB’s 

counter-IDF strategy focused on deterring and disrupting attacks to prevent the enemy from mounting attacks and improving accuracy for maximum effect. As a result, enemy IDF 

attacks were short in duration, performed hurriedly, and inaccurate from unprepared firing positions with far fewer 

casualties and material damage.
34

Deterring Attacks on Joint Base Balad—

Quantitative Analyses

The concept of deterrence against irregular criminals and terrorists was first developed in the Western Hemisphere for the 

prosecution of conflicts against drug traffickers and insurgents.

88 For example, with deterrence analyses in place, US interdiction coordinator ADM Robert Kramek convinced President Clinton 

to approve the use of lethal force against drug-trafficking aircraft 

flying from Peru to Colombia in 1995.89 Interviews with drug 

traffickers determined several key factors in their willingness to 

conduct trafficking operations in the face of countertrafficking 

operations. The fraction of effectiveness (P) of shooting down 

trafficker aircraft was observed to be proportional to the interdiction (I) rate below a critical threshold, but above the critical 

threshold (2 to 4 percent lethal effectiveness) to be inversely proportional to the interdiction rate: P(I) ≈ I-1. The key is to find the 

critical threshold from incomplete data. The condition for deterring attackers can be demonstrated by a power law that is inversely 

proportional to the tactics and actions taken by AF security. In 

deterring attacks on Joint Base Balad by insurgents, intervals 

between attacks should increase at a rate that is inversely proportional to a power law with a -1 exponent. The analyses research question is Did the defense of Joint Base Balad demonstrate a successful deterrence of insurgent attacks?

Data Analyses

 Raw operational data was obtained from the 332nd ESFG/

JISE and contained about 3,000 records (of which about 3 percent were false alarms), and most attacks were conducted using 

IDF weapons, principally mortars and rockets. The broad characteristics of the data showed that the preponderance of attacks were single, lower risk attacks with a few higher risk 

multiple, coordinated attacks. While the tactics and operational concepts will be discussed elsewhere in this study, this 

analysis examines what can be learned from quantitative techniques consistent with this data. The attack data begins in May 

2004 and ends in early 2011.

Figure 9 shows the median monthly attacks on Joint Base Balad 

and the increasing intervals between insurgent attacks. There are 
35

five operational periods distinguishable in the data, and these 

periods are consistent with the following attack phases:

1. Initial attacks against a newly established base

2. Insurgent reinforcement, below the critical threshold, and 

undeterred behavior

3. Beginnings of effective defensive operations above threshold for deterrence

4. Continuation of deterrence phase against the insurgents

5. Consolidation phase, initiative achieved, deterrence 

increases effectiveness

The bottom half of figure 9 shows the raw attack interval data 

(dots), which is a linear, increasing-interval median trend line of 

about fourfold improvement, and a 60-day median90 moving average indicator. Arithmetic averages are very unstable and lead to 

erroneous conclusions, as will be discussed at the end of this 

section—a limitation of power law distributions.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

May-04

Oct-04

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Sep-07Feb-08

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ht no m/skcatt af o#

Medianquarterlymonthly attacks

0

1

2

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4

nee wt ebsl avr et nI nai de M

attacks(days)

1

2 3

4

5

Figure 9. Median monthly attacks and attack intervals on Joint Base Balad
36

Examining the Effectiveness of Deterring Attacks on 

Joint Base Balad

The first factor for assessing insurgent effectiveness in attacking the base consists of declining attacks. There is a second factor; the number and intervals of attacks because of the 

decreasing accuracy of attacks. Because the effectiveness of 

“area” weapons to cause damage scales as the square of the 

miss distance, doubling the miss distance decreases damage 

by about 75 percent. Because the warning system was able to 

estimate miss distance, this data was available.

Figure 10 shows the same operational periods and captures 

the increasing miss distance as the insurgents are more and 

more deterred.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Nov-03

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M

e

dian

Monthly

Miss

Distanc

e in

K

m

3

4

5

1

2

Doublingthe missdistance reduces

potentialdamage 75%

Figure 10. Increasing insurgent miss distance as captured by the warning 

system

The last phase of our analysis examines the power law behavior of the intervals between attacks. Larger and larger times 

between indirect attacks are evidence of deterrence. If the exponent is about -1, then the enemy is deterred. Computational 
37

difficulties arise from -1 slopes of power laws since the average 

of a sample can be calculated but does not represent any good 

measure of the average of the true situation.

 91 Very large, seemingly random variations of the average metrics cast great doubt 

on them as useful indicators.

In these analyses, all of the conditions necessary to demonstrate deterrence were present. The evidence of deterred attacks after mid 2007 suggests that the increase in kinetic operations during the 2007 surge initially deterred the insurgents, 

but they quickly adapted their methodology to the new environment, and attacks were on the rise upon deployment of the 

332nd ESFG. Evidence suggests that a near-optimum strategy 

was employed by AF security forces that made insurgents alter 

their behaviors significantly and reversed the trend of insurgent activity. In operational terms, SFs gained the initiative 

against insurgents using force-multiplier deterrence techniques to enhance their effectiveness and reduce overall costs 

of defense.

Analytical Difficulties in Analyzing the Joint Base Balad 

Defense

AF security forces used standard analysis techniques to evaluate the data they gathered on attacks and the effectiveness of 

attacks. These standard techniques included averaging events 

each month to try to understand what was effective. Standard 

analyses did not yield a clear picture of the attack situation because the convergence of small samples means is not a guaranteed or even good indicator of success. Means, or averages, significantly overestimate enemy capabilities, and they do so in a 

random and unpredictable way. Analytical problems of this type 

were first pointed out involving the drug war in 1997, where the 

conditions for convergence, the Pareto-Levy conditions, were 

used to understand these analytical difficulties. 92

In this paper, analyses of events, intervals of attacks, and 

miss distances were all performed using medians because the 

median always converges for unknown distributions. In the 

JBB analysis, intervals of attack events demonstrate power law 

exponent of -1 in figure 11, and that suggests that averages do 

not converge.93 While monthly averages can be computed in 
38

the SF standard analyses, these averages have little accuracy 

in evaluating effectiveness. Using standard analysis techniques 

took much longer to assess effectiveness of the ID strategy, 

where the median result is much more obvious. Figure 12 compares the median result and the errors occurring if an average 

is used. Average errors are very large (-30 percent to 150 percent) and grow larger as the data samples become smaller as 

success is occurring. The fluctuations are observed to be random and solely dependent on the random sequence of the attacks. Such behaviors hide the true situation, and these problems are fundamental to making assessments of irregular 

conflicts.

1

10

100

1000

10,000

1 10 100

Days between attacks

Number of attacks 

Figure 11. Power law (number=450*[days]-1.087) of deterred attack intervals
39

May-04

Oct-04

Mar-05

Aug-05

Jan-06

Jun-06

Nov-06

Apr-07

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0

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attacks (days) -40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

130%

140%

150%

Averages exhibit random 

and growing errors

Medians more stable

Average error (%)

Figure 12. Medians give stable attack interval trends and averages give 

increasing errors of attack intervals (bottom figure)

Lessons Learned

To evaluate the many lessons learned in conducting the C-IDF 

and C-IED missions at JBB, numerous interviews were conducted with key leaders, the after action reports of the units on 

the ground from the various services lessons learned databases 

were reviewed and cross-referenced with lessons learned in historical documents from Vietnam and earlier conflicts. Lessons 

learned fell into three primary areas: training, joint or command 

lines, and equipment. They are presented in this chapter in an 

observation and recommendation format to provide a summary 
40

forum as seen from the personnel who were on the ground at the 

time of the operations. Since the most critical of the lessons 

learned came from training, they are listed first.

Training

Observation. Integrated defense has not been sufficiently 

taught and adopted throughout the USAF. This impacts the 

willingness of AF leaders to accept the inclusiveness of all Airmen in the defense of an air base and to go OTW to project the 

base security zone into the enemy’s threat rings. No Airmen 

outside of security forces at JBB had any defense responsibilities, even if it was their own compound or sector, and there was 

resistance to taking on security responsibilities within all other 

organizations on the base. If ID is to be truly transformational, all 

Airmen must play a role, even if only a secondary support role.

Recommendation. Educate Air Force leaders at all levels on 

the integrated defense construct, and ensure all Airmen have a 

clearly articulated role in defending a portion of the base from 

penetration, sabotage, or direct attack. The Air Force must live 

up to the ID directive’s intent that “every Airman shall receive 

initial and recurring combat skills training geared toward defending themselves and integrating into defense operations 

while garrison and deployed.”94 This is not a call to transform 

Airmen into infantrymen, but rather to train them to the level 

where they can defend themselves if required.

Observation. Predeployment and home station training limitations hamper the combat capability of security forces and increase 

risk in the expeditionary environment. Predeployment communications, BSO integration, current technology utilization/

integration, and COIN integration training for SF personnel 

were inadequate. Specifically, regional training centers (RTC)

trained different personnel on blue force tracker separate from 

radios, even though operationally it was standard operating 

procedure (SOP) to have the same person operating BFT and 

radios. All personnel had a basic knowledge of how to operate 

the radios but not how to setup or configure them. The RTC did 

not train personnel on any “non-AF” systems (e.g., the RT1523E or ASIP radio), which accounted for the majority of systems 

operated in the AOR. Additionally, security forces did not train 
41

leaders on the concept of a BSO or how to integrate and synchronize ground combat operations with the BSO. Today’s SF 

leader training continues to use paper maps, grease pencils, 

and standard telephones rather than the requisite battlefield 

technology (i.e., BFT, aerial video feeds, Army standard 

CONOPS, etc.). Additionally, the training does not cover COIN 

principles, joint concepts of operations, or the intelligencedriven targeting needed to be effective in today’s joint ID operation.

Recommendation. Modernize SF courses to include the latest 

technology, and ensure trainers include coordination with the 

ground BSO and combined partners as part of the practical 

exercise scenarios and examinations so that security force 

leaders will understand how the BSO operates in support of the 

theater commander’s objectives.

Observation. The different predeployment training standards for security forces Airmen limit the flexibility of commanders in-theatre. For example, 332nd ESFS had 199 SF 

personnel dedicated to base security operations who were prohibited from deploying OTW because they did not attend the 

45-day air security operations (ASO) training course. Likewise, 

security forces personnel tasked to conduct tactical security 

element (TSE) missions and fly-away security missions also attend specialized training. A consequence of leveraging specific 

training for specific mission sets is that the USAF cannot provide full-spectrum support to installation commanders, thereby 

limiting defense force commanders’ capability and losing credibility with joint component commanders.

Recommendation. All deploying SF members should be 

trained to one standard and be capable of supporting the mission regardless of location.

Observation. Currently, there are three separate training and 

certification programs for fly-away security (Raven, DAGR, and 

FAST). Often, the type of training is major command (MAJCOM)–

specific, although the security forces fly on the same aircraft.

Recommendation. Create one standard for fly-away security 

elements, regardless of the MAJCOM, and only include unique 

training requirements not already part of the SF training plan.

Observation. Most intelligence personnel assigned to the 

JISE have little to no ground combat intelligence training. This 

is a repeat observation from Vietnam.
42

Recommendation. Send all intelligence personnel deploying 

to a JISE position through FP intelligence formal training unit 

prior to deployment.

Observation. Airmen deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan noted 

the utility of the Combat Lifesaver (CLS) course.

Recommendation. The CLS course prepares participants for 

medical emergencies under stressful combat conditions and 

should be strongly considered for all Airmen likely to face 

ground combat.

Observation. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Irregular 

Warfare, addresses COIN from an aircraft-centric perspective 

and fails to consider the need to synchronize nonkinetic COIN 

activities within a ground COIN campaign plan. SF nonkinetic 

COIN efforts range from a combat patrol conducting key leader 

engagements with local security forces to providing emergency 

medical treatment at base entry control points.

Recommendation. Develop doctrine to bring the Air Force in 

line with joint service guidance on COIN and stability operations, including aspects of nonkinetic activities. In addition, 

develop and cultivate training courses at multiple levels for 

wing, group, squadron, and tactical elements to instill the understanding that decisions at each level can have significant effects across the battlespace. Training will also provide greater 

understanding and synchronization with a BSO’s campaign 

plan, as well as information operations messaging.

Observation. Nearly half of the MWD handlers did not know 

lifesaving steps for the dogs.

Recommendation. Include MWD lifesaver in predeployment 

training for all handlers.

Observation. Medical support played a major role in civil 

affairs/counterinsurgency operations. Typically, Air Force 

medics providing medical care to Iraqi civilians were not trained 

to operate OTW as a fire team member.

Recommendation. If this type of operation is repeated, aggressive and early coordination with the medical community 

will be needed to gain support for OTW missions.

Observation. The current Air Force lessons learned feedback loop ensures that all RTCs have the most up-to-date tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
43

Recommendation. The Air Force Lessons Learned Center and 

Air Force Security Forces Center must set up active or recurring 

protocols for amassing and applying lessons learned from current operations and rapidly disseminate and implement them 

across the SF career field and regional training centers. Training 

must be readily adaptive to new technology and battlefield realities. This process proved effective with the Air Education and 

Training Command (AETC) Basic Combat Convoy Course.

Joint or Command Lines

Observation. Organizing for the mission by combining functional communities in an expeditionary integrated base defense 

group provides unity of command and is crucial to effective ID 

in the theater of operations. This is a repeat observation from 

Vietnam. Specifically, teaming installation force protection 

contributors and integrating with joint, combined, host nation, 

and interagency partners build synergy and result in seamless 

security for the installation. In addition, C-RAMs proved to be 

highly effective against IDF threats, as they provided the ability 

to warn personnel of incoming threats. The system provided a 

localized warning to populated areas of the base within a 1,000-

foot diameter of the projected point of impact (POI). The localized 

warning allowed areas outside the POI to continued operations 

unimpeded.

Recommendation. Implement and solidify the use of all base 

defense assets under the DFC into integrated defense doctrine. 

This will ensure the best possible integration of all capabilities 

into the overall physical security and force protection architecture of the base.

Observation. The 332nd ESFG employed the JISE, a robust 

organic intelligence capability led and staffed by Air Force ISR 

professionals and contractors. The JISE enabled the BSO and 

Air Force ground forces to defend JBB through proactive, deterrent patrols to counter IDF attacks.

Recommendation. The Air Force must codify the JISE construct into the integrated base defense doctrine and organizational structures to provide the same type of successful intelligence capability during any deployed base defense operation.
44

Observation. Incorporating dedicated, organic remotely piloted vehicles and residual air assets into ID operations proved 

to be key to the 332nd ESFG combat effectiveness.

Recommendation. Rewrite Air Force doctrine with respect 

to integrated defense operations to bridge the natural fault 

lines between air and ground operations in joint or combined 

operations. These roles include, but are not limited to, air integration in support of base defense/counter-IDF and intelligencedriven operations.

Equipment

Observation. Many of the systems and equipment operated 

in the ground combat mission set are Army systems. This 

means parts in the supply system are not coded for AF procurement. Examples of equipment not available for AF procurement in the supply system are FBCB2/BFT and all associated parts, VIC-3 intercom (standard for HMMWVs in AOR), 

jamming systems, and so forth.

Recommendation. For systems and equipment consistently 

used by AF ground combat units, make the necessary parts 

available in the supply system for AF procurement.

Observation. Air Force tactical vehicles lacked appropriate 

government furnished equipment (GFE), objective gunner protection kit–turret (OGPK-turret), and gunner restraint systems 

(GRS), which resulted in mission delays/stoppage for OTW operations. Neither M-1116s nor mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles arrived equipped with the proper communications equipment. Additionally, neither vehicle (M-1116 

nor MRAP) arrived with a Rhino device. A lack of properly 

equipped tactical vehicles is a repeat observation from Vietnam.

Recommendation. Identify OTW vehicle requirements 

through Army Central or applicable land component commander prior to establishment of an OTW mission.

Observation. Communications equipment must be compatible within the AF and with sister services. Specifically, the AF 

utilized VHF land mobile radios (LMR), while the Army utilized 

UHF LMRs; neither is compatible with the other. Units with 

parallel or similar mission sets (flight-line security forces and 

law enforcement/provost marshal) had different radios, so they 
45

could not communicate directly if responding to the same incident. This is a repeat observation from Vietnam and most operations since Vietnam.

Recommendation. Move to a single frequency range for 

LMRs in the AOR for all services or install a cross-band capability to enable VHF LMRs to talk to UHF LMRs and vice-versa. 

Ensure that all radios operate using the same cryptographic 

encoding to ensure compatibility.

Observation. PRC-152 radios operating in single-channel 

ground and airborne radio systems (VHF), line-of-sight mode 

work incredibly well. The capability to preprogram channels on 

multiple net-IDs and the ease of programming and configuring 

the radios were great benefits. PRC-148 radios are fine if only 

one net-ID is being used (extremely rare); however, they are 

cumbersome to reprogram on the run while wearing full battle 

attire.

Recommendation. Push to replace PRC-148 radios with 

PRC-152s for AFCENT SF personnel. Maintain PRC-117 manpack radios for long-range communications during dismounted 

operations.

Observation. Radio headsets are needed for dismounted operations. Headsets were provided by AFCENT for vehicle radio 

and intercom systems but were not compatible with the personal radios (PRC-148, PRC-152) used during dismounted operations. Giving operators the capability to communicate via 

radio with air assets (e.g., helicopters, close air support) and 

inter- and intra-squads without having to leave the shooting 

position to key up or speak into the radio increases their tactical advantage on the ground.

Recommendation. Identify and field a standard headset for 

mounted and dismounted operations (plug-and-play).

Observation. Not enough emphasis is placed on intercom 

systems. Currently, several intercom systems are being used in 

the AOR, and none operate the same. VIC-3 is more of an Army 

standard, but they are moving to TOCNET. TOCNET and VIC-3 

are combined in the AF-standard MRAP. The Harris intercom 

system is installed in some AF HMMWVs. RTCs and home units 

train on multiple radio systems but not on intercom systems. 

The majority of the radio frequency communications challenges 

centered on intercom issues (often a training issue).
46

Recommendation. Establish a standard intercom system 

for each type of vehicle. Ensure that all personnel (not just retraining organizations) get adequate training on each specific 

system.

Observation. The Navy electronic warfare officer (EWO) request for forces position went unfilled in September 2009, creating a critical void in operational capabilities. The 532nd ESFS 

filled and trained the unsourced EWO request with an SF Airman in the squadron to ensure mission continuance, but at a 

reduced capability. The counter-radio-controlled electronic 

warfare (CREW) improvised explosive device systems require 

daily maintenance, and operators require continuous training. 

Due to a lack of formalized training, Airmen assigned to EWO 

duties were largely self-taught and relied heavily on OJT from 

Army EWOs on JBB (who received extensive training prior to 

deployment) to meet the job’s demanding requirements.

Recommendation. Air Force security forces LOGDET planners must ensure deployable SF units. Units performing OTW 

operations provide a fully trained EWO to ensure Air Force personnel maximum protection from IED threats.

Conclusion––Future Implications

Competing priorities of ground commanders made committing 

Air Force ground combat capability to protect US air bases an 

operational necessity. The joint partners at JBB fully integrated 

their limited base defense assets to meet the adversary and limit 

any defensive seams insurgents might exploit. They did so through 

multiple levels of information sharing that gave base defenders a 

common operating picture through shared intelligence.

Air Force leaders should learn the important lessons from 

the JBB defense model, since asymmetric threats to air operations likely will increase in the future. The 1995 RAND study 

on air base defense predicted that 

[air base] opponents might pursue three different objectives with these [future] attacks: (1) destroy high-value assets critical to USAF operations, (2) 

temporarily suppress sortie generation at a critical moment in a crisis or 

conflict, or (3) create a “strategic event”—an incident as decisive politically as 

loss of a major battle is military or operationally—that could reduce US public and/or leadership support for the ongoing military operation.95
47

The lessons learned in defending Joint Base Balad have 

highlighted capabilities and integrated defense strengths that 

the US Air Force can contribute to defend against asymmetric 

threats. The Air Force must continue to refine its ID approach, 

train leaders who understand and embrace the ground BSO 

concept, and develop leaders who can readily participate in 

joint operations in COIN and stability-operation environments. 

The Air Force must codify the operational lessons of JBB’s integrated defense into organizational and operational constructs 

that it can apply to current and future base defense operations.

The JBB defense model has proven that the USAF can ensure its place on the battlefield as a true joint and combined 

partner by defending not only its own air assets and war fighters 

but also those of the joint team. The USAF’s commitment to the 

force protection of JBB has proven critical in deterring insurgents and diminishing the effects of indirect fire on air operations. By sending Airmen out to meet the enemy on the ground 

and in the air, the Air Force has enjoyed greater security and 

freedom of movement to support its own air operations and 

BOS-I base defense responsibilities.

At JBB, Air Force leaders at all levels embraced the ID concept and searched for ways to support the BSO’s COIN campaign plan because it paid dividends to the installation’s defense, ensuring the conduct of air operations in a more secure 

and stable environment. The outcome of this operation speaks 

volumes about what the USAF can achieve with its joint and 

combined partners when it is effectively integrated and positioned to bring its integrated defense capabilities to bear in 

support of the joint fight. Base defense experiences in Iraq demand a fresh look at the role the Air Force plays in defending 

its assets as well as those of the joint force.

Notes

1. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, http://www.dtic

.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1.pdf.

2. Opponents engage each other in fixed formations, as in defending a 

well-defined location.

3. Cyril B. Falls, The First World War (London: Longmans, 1960), xvii–xviii.
48

4. CWO Howard D. Williams, “Basic Military Training in the AAF, 1939–

1944,” Army Air Force History Study 49 (Washington: AAF History Office, 

1946), 2.

5. Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961–1973

(Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 3.

6. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 3: The Great Alliance 

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 776–77.

7. Alan J. Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on 

Air Bases (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 16, http://www.rand.org/pubs/

monograph_reports/MR553/.

8. Ibid.

9. Fox, Air Base Defense, 7.

10.“Army/Air Force Agreement,” Agreements as to the Initial Implementation 

of the National Security Act of 1947 (15 September 1947), 36.

11. WDTM 20-205, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 18 January 1944.

12. Joint Army Air Force Bulletin 13, Functions of the Armed Forces and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 May 1948.

13. AFP 5-1-1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, 

June 1950.

14. Joint Army Air Force Bulletin 13.

15. Ibid.

16. Fox, Air Base Defense, 4.

17. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 355-4, Local Ground Defense of Air Force 

Installations, 3 March 1953.

18. Fox, Air Base Defense, 6.

19. Ibid.

20. “Estimate of the Capabilities of Subversive Elements to Deter or Obstruct, by Ground Action, the Accomplishment of the USAF Mission,” OSI, 20 

April 1956; and “Estimate of Soviet Capabilities to Carry out Guerrilla-Type 

Ground Tactics against USAF Installations in the ZI, NEAC, and AAC,” Director of Intelligence, 25 September 1956.

21. “The U.S. Army Provost Marshal, Local Ground Defense of Air 

Bases,” Staff Study, May 1957, 11.

22. Fox, Air Base Defense, 12.

23. An exception late in the Vietnam War was the provision of C-47 mini-gunships assigned to numerous bases to provide fire support outside the base.

24. Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, 16.

25. Package BLUE XOS_F.041118.1, “Validating the Abrogation of Joint 

Service Agreement 8,” HQ USAF.

26. “Joint Air Base Ground Defense Working Group Minutes,” January 1990.

27. Brig Gen Robert H. “Bob” Holmes et al., “The Air Force’s New Ground War: 

Ensuring Projection of Air and Space Power through Expeditionary Operations,” 

Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 51, http://www.airpower.ay

.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/Fal06.pdf.

28. AFPD 31-1, Integrated Defense.

29. Col David C. Ptak et al., “Lessons Learned: Integrated Defense at Joint 

Base Balad,” July 2010 (unpublished as of 1 June 2011), 1.
49

30. Ibid., 5–6.

31. Ibid., 5.

32. Ibid., 24.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 24–25.

36. Ibid., 25.

37. Ibid., 26.

38. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 29.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., 31.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., 32.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 33–34.

47. Ibid., 38.

48. Ibid., 39.

49. Ibid., 40.

50. Ibid., 41.

51. Ibid., 42.

52. Ibid., 45.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., 45–46.

55. Ibid., 19.

56. Lt Col Shannon W. Caudill et al., “Defending the Joint Force: Lessons 

Learned from Joint Base Balad,” Air and Space Power Journal 25, no.1 (Spring 

2011): 97, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/2011/2011

-1/2011_1.pdf.

57. Ibid.

58. Ptak et al, Lessons Learned, 14.

59. Ibid., 8.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 8–9.

64. Caudill et al., “Defending the Joint Force,” 93.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., 94.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ptak et al, Lessons Learned, 17.

70. Ibid.

71. MOVER is a generic system name referring to integration of ISR and 

forces (e.g., PRIME MOVER, PAVE MOVER, etc.) 

72. Ptak et al, Lessons Learned, 17.
50

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid., 18.

75. Ibid.

76. Fox, Air Base Defense.

77. Maj William Urban, 332nd Expeditionary Security Forces Group, 

Joint Intelligence Support Element, 10 February 2011—current database of 

attack events.

78. Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, 16.

79. Col Anthony M. Packard (332nd ESFG, JISE), interview by author, 10 

January 2011.

80. Fox, Air Base Defense, appendix.

81. Urban, 10 February 2011 event database.

82. Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, 90.

83. Ibid.

84. “Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of 

Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during their Temporary Presence in Iraq,” 17 November 

2008 (made official on 14 December 2008), http://iraq.usembassy.gov/

media/2010-irc-pdfs/us-iraq_security_agreement_ena.pdf.

85. Armand Cucciniello, “Iraq Proves Fertile Ground for Rule of Law Programs,” 18 March 2008, Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, 

http://iraq.usembassy.gov/prt_news_03182008.html.

86. “Police Primacy and Rule of Law in Iraq Dominate Press Conference,” 

Press Release no. 090619-01, Multinational Security Transition CommandIraq, Public Affairs Office, Phoenix Base, 19 June 2009, Operation New 

Dawn, official Web site of United States Forces-Iraq, http://www.usf-iraq

.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=26970&Itemid=128. 

87. Packard, interview.

88. Barry Crane, Deterrence Effects of Operation Frontier Shield, Institute 

for Defense Analyses (IDA) Paper P-3460 (Alexandria, VA: IDA, 1999).

89. R. Anthony, “A Calibrated Model of the Psychology of Deterrence,” 

UNODC Bulletin on Narcotics, Illicit Drug Markets 61, nos. 1–2 (2004): 49.

90. Only a median is advisable as a stable indicator; similar averages were 

very unpredictable with large increasing fluctuations from –20 percent to as 

much as 130 percent. These fluctuations were not related to event changes. 

91. The validity of a sample average when exponent increase is near –1 to 

a true average does not meet the convergence test for sums and higher statistical moments of the central limit theorem. In our analyses, medians converge and are used as stable indicators.

92. Barry Crane and A. R. Rivolo, An Empirical Examination of Counterdrug Interdiction Program Effectiveness, IDA Paper P-3219 (Alexandria, VA: 

Institute for Defense Analyses, January 1997), II-6–9, fig. II-4, describes the 

Pareto-Levy tails of power law distributions.

93. If the power law is –2, then standard deviations and variances also do 

not converge, and standard regression theory fails.

94. AFPD 31-1, Integrated Defense. 

95. Vick, Snakes in the Eagles Nest.
51

Abbreviations

AB/LSA air base/logistics support area

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AF Air Force

AFCENT United States Air Forces Central

Command

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFPD Air Force policy directive

AFR Air Force regulation

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and

procedures

AGI advanced geospatial intelligence

AOR area of responsibility

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

ASO air security operations

BATS biometrics automated toolset

BEAST Balad Expeditionary Antiterrorism

Strike Team

BFT blue force tracker

BOS-I base operating support-integrator

BSO battlespace owner; base security

operations

BSZ base security zone

CCTV closed-circuit television

CENTCOM US Central Command

CF coalition forces

C-IDF counter–indirect fire

C-IED counter–improvised explosive device

CLS Combat Lifesaver course

COIN counterinsurgency

CONOPS concept of operations

C-RAM counter–rocket artillery mortar

CTO counterterrorist operations

DAGR defense advanced GPS receiver

DFC defense forces commander

ECP entry control point

EO/IR electro-optical/infrared

EPS elevated persistence surveillance

ESFG Expeditionary Security Forces Group
52

ESFS Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron

eTASS enhanced tactical automated security

system

EWO electronic warfare officer

FAST fly-away security team

FEAF Far East Air Forces

FP force protection

FPP/OIC force protection patrol officer in charge

GFE government furnished equipment

GRS gunner restraint systems

HAF/A7S Headquarters Air Force/Force Protection

HUMINT human intelligence

HWI health and welfare inspections

IA/IP Iraqi army/Iraqi police

ID integrated defense

IDF indirect fire

IED improvised explosive device

IRF internal response forces

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

ITW inside the wire

IVPS Iraqi vehicle & pedestrian screener

JBB Joint Base Balad

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDOC joint defense operations center

JFC joint forces commander

JIB joint intercept battery

JISE joint intelligence support element

JISE-B Joint Intelligence Support Element–Balad

JSA joint service agreement

LMR land mobile radio

LN local national

LOGDET logistics detail

MAJCOM major command

MOB main operating base

MPC mission planning cell

MRAP mine-resistant, ambush-protected

MVACIS mobile vehicle and cargo inspection

system

MWD military working dog
53

MWR morale, welfare, and recreation

NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge

NGO nongovernmental organization

OGPK objective gunner protection kit

OIC officer in charge

OTW outside the wire

OSI Office of Special Investigations

PIR priority intelligence requirements

PL patrol leader

POI point of impact

PSC private security contract

RAF Royal Air Force

RAID rapid aerostat initial deployment

RDIM ruggedized detection imaging module

ROE rules of engagement

RTC regional training center

RVACIS rail vehicle and cargo inspection system

SAC Strategic Air Command

SF security forces

SVIED suicide vest improvised explosive device

TACON tactical control

TCN third country national

TOCNET tactical operations center intercommunications system

TSE tactical security element

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

USAF United States Air Force

VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

VC/NVA Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army

ZBV Z-backscatter van

55

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Integrated Defense

Lessons Learned from Joint Base Balad

Commander and President, Air University

Lt Gen David S. Fadok, USAF

Director, Air Force Research Institute

Gen John Shaud, USAF, Retired, PhD

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Jerry L. Gantt

Copy Editor

Sherry Terrell

Cover Art and Book Design

Daniel Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Nedra Looney

Print Preparation and

Distribution

Diane Clark