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“The responsibility of regional 

state actors in the sectarianization 

of the Syrian crisis should not 

be overstated. Rather, it is the 

deeply sectarian character of the 

conflict that has imposed itself 

upon regional alignments 

and behaviors.”

November 18, 2013

The Reluctant Sectarianism of Foreign 

States in the Syrian Conflict 

Summary

•	 The Syrian conflict’sinternal dynamics have reshuffled regional alignments alongside unprecedentedly clear-cutsectarian dividing lines; this has often occurred against the preferences

of regionalstate actors − including Saudi Arabia and Iran.

•	 Foreign states have generally adopted expedient policiesthat followed sectarian patterns

for lack of alternatives.

•	 Iran bearssignificant responsibility for exacerbating the conflict’ssectarian character at the

regional level.

•	 There is no such“diplomatic shortcut”to regional appeasement; it isthe domestic Syrian

deadlock that must be broken in order to alleviate sectarian tensions acrossthe Middle East,

not the opposite.

Thomas Pierret

E-mail: thomas.pierret@ed.ac.uk

peaceBrieF162

Background

The sectariancharacterofthe Syrianconflictisoftenmischaracterizedashavingbeenfueledby regional

state actors exploitingsectarianismtoadvance regional agendas.Amore accurate characterizationisthat

the Syrianconflict’sinternaldynamicshave reshuffledregional alignments alongsideunprecedentedly

clear-cutsectariandividinglines andthatthishasoftenoccurredagainst thepreferencesofregionalstate

actors−includingSaudiArabia andIran.Thisisnottodeny thatregional actorssometimes contributedto

deepeningthe sectariancharacterofthe Syrianconflict.Whentheydidso,however, itwasgenerally as a

by-productof expedientpoliciesthatfollowedsectarianpatternsforlackof alternatives,butwerenotpart

of adeliberately sectarianagenda. Infact,outsideof Syria,wholeheartedexploitationofsectariansentimentsinrelationtothe conflicthasoftenbeenthepreserveofprivate actorsthat arenot constrainedby

raison d’état, inparticulartransnational Sunni(Salafi) andShianetworks..

The extreme level ofsectarian polarization that has been observed in Syria from early 2012 on was

largely the making of Syriansthemselves, and wasthe product, in particular, of a regime whose policies

have been characterized by decades of pro-Alawite favoritism in the army and security forces, manipulation ofthe minorities’existential fear with regard to the Sunni majority, and deliberate radicalization

of Sunnisthrough massive and indiscriminate violence.Thus, itisillusory to seek the causes of (and

possible solutionsto)sectarian radicalization in Syria in the strategies of external actors.

Two distinctsectarian coalitions are currently opposing each otherin the regional crisisthat

centers around Syria: on the one hand, a pro-Assad Shia axis, i.e. Iran, Maliki’sIraq, Lebanon’s Shia

parties and Shia foreign fighters; on the other hand, an anti-Assad Sunni axis, i.e. Saudi Arabia,Qatar,
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

The Reluctant Sectarianism of Foreign States in the Syrian Conflict 

page 2 • PB 162 • November 18, 2013

Turkey,Jordan,the Lebanese and Iraqi Sunni oppositions, and non-state Sunnireligious and militant

transnational networks.The homogeneous nature ofthese alignmentsis not a cause, butrather a

consequence ofthe Syrian crisis. Indeed, ofthe three mostimportantstate supporters ofthe Syrian

opposition in the region,thatis, Saudi Arabia,Qatar, andTurkey, only the first one was pursuing a

distinctly“Sunni”foreign policy before 2011, as bothQatar andTurkey used to have excellentrelations

with Syria and Iran atthattime.The same could be said forthe PalestinianHamas, which has gradually

distanced itself from Damascus andTehran overthe lasttwo years.Of course,the pre-2011 anti-Iranian

axis(Saudi Arabia, Egypt,Jordan) was homogeneously Sunni, but none of its components behaved

according to a clearsectarian pattern when the crisis erupted in Syria, because sectarian logics were

often superseded by alternative calculations.

Because of its unrelenting effortsto preserveAlawite rule in Syria, and because of its mobilization of

Shia militias acrossthe region in support oftheAssad regime, Iran bears a significantresponsibility for

exacerbating the conflict’ssectarian character − notso much inside Syria, where sectarianism is deeply

ingrained anyway, butrather atthe regional level.To a certain extent, however,thisran counterto the

intentions(and interests) ofTehran, whose foreign policy has always been ambivalentin itsrelation to

sectarianism.On the one hand,the Islamic Republic has constantly tried to portray itself as a non-sectarian actorin orderto maximize its appeal among the region’s predominantly Sunni populations.On the

other hand, Iran’sregionalstrategy has acquired a distinctly sectarian flavor because Shia networks have

proved to be its mostreliable vehicles of influence, most notably in Lebanon and Iraq, and because of

Tehran’s partnership withAssad’sAlawite regime, initially a mere alliance de revers against Saddam’s

Iraq.This ambivalence explains why although Iran is now helpingAssad to fight a sectarian war against

the Sunni insurgency, it hasrefrained from officially embracing a sectarian narrative ofthe conflict.

The Syrian civil warsaw the Islamic Republic crossing a new threshold in itssectarian approach to

regional politics, namely,the mobilization of foreign Shia fightersin orderto support Assad’stroops. In

particular,the LebaneseHezbollah’s decisive contribution to the capture of al-Qusayr by the regime in

June 2013 brought anti-Shia resentment acrossthe Muslim world to unprecedented levels. However,

Tehran’s decision to recruitsectarian militias was a lastresort, long-resisted move that was not dictated

by some inherentsectarian drive. Instead, it was aimed at addressing a problem stemming from the

Syrian conflict’ssectarian nature,thatis,the regime’s growing lack of manpower.The recruitment of

foreign Shia fighters was only one aspect of a broader attempt atreinforcing loyalistforcesthrough

the establishment(often along sectarian patterns) of various domestic and foreign militias.1

Throughoutthe Syrian crisis, SaudiArabia hasfollowed an opposite course:starting from a more

openly sectarian stance than that of Iran, Riyadh surprisingly emerged, until a very recentreorientation,

asthe chiefsupporter ofthe mostsecularsegment ofthe opposition.

Overthe past decades, SaudiArabia has encouraged anti-Shia propaganda in the region on atleast

three occasions: in the 1980s, in orderto curtailthe appeal ofthe Iranian revolution; after 2003, in order

to counterthe rise of Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria; 2 after 2011, as a divide-and-rule

strategy aimed at preventing the revolutionary wave from reachingGulfsocieties. 3However,the

Saudi monarchy does not need to manipulate sectarian sentimentsin orderto convince itssubjects of

the merits ofsupporting the Syrian opposition, a stance that has elicited virtually no opposition among

Saudisubjects. In fact, Riyadh perceivesthe exacerbation ofsectarianism as a result ofthe brutalization

ofthe Syrian conflict as a threat because itstimulatesIslamic activism atthe domestic level.Thisis

something Saudi authorities do not want, asshown by their crackdown on the recruitment of volunteer

fighters and on private fund-raising initiativesforthe Syrian rebels. 4 The reasonsforthisreluctance are

many:the Saudirulers want(but have failed)to preventthe emergence of a new generation of Saudi

jihadi militants,they fearthe possible spread ofrevolutionary ideasinside the country, and they have

already been criticized for“not doing enough”to supportthe Syrians.
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

The Reluctant Sectarianism of Foreign States in the Syrian Conflict 

page 3 • PB 162 • November 18, 2013

Concernsfor domestic stability, and more particularly distrust of political Islamic movements

(including politicized Salafis), also encouraged SaudiArabia (as well asJordan, after months of

hesitation due to fear of Syrian retaliation and of political change in the region)to supportthe least

Islamist, and generally leastsectarian,segments ofthe opposition.Among the opposition abroad,

Riyadh tried to counterbalance the influence ofthe Muslim Brotherhood by supporting a coalition

of former Baathists(RiyadHijab, Mustafa al-Asad),secularintellectuals(led by Christian opposition

leader Michel Kilo),tribal chiefs(Ahmad al-Jarba), and secular-leaning representatives ofthe Free

SyrianArmy (Luay Miqdad).

On the ground, SaudiArabia favored initiatives aimed at organizing the insurgency underthe

aegis of defector officers, among the leastreligious component ofthe rebel leadership.Asrecently as

lastAugust, Riyadh’s alliesin the opposition putforward a projectto establish“SyrianNationalArmy”

explicitly aimed at countering the spread of“extremistideas”among the military opposition toAssad.

5 In the absence of meaningfulWestern intervention in the conflict,therefore, Saudi and Jordanian

supportfor moderate rebel unitsremained the only obstacle to the rise oftheir more radical (and

sectarian) counterparts.Thissituation only changed in the very last days of September 2013, when

the Saudis backed the establishment oftwo new Salafi coalitions(theArmy of Islam inDamascus and

theArmy ofthe SunnisinDeir ez-Zor).That was, however, an expedient move driven by the need to

set up a counterweightto radical jihadi groupslike theNusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and

Sham.The latter’sinfluence had just dramatically increased atthe expense ofthe Free SyrianArmy,

whose pro-Western stance lost much of its currency following the cancellation of announcedU.S.

airstrikes againstthe regime earlierthat month.6

The involvement of other pro-opposition state actorsin the conflict has attimesfollowed a

sectarian pattern, butit was never as part of an overallsectarian strategy.Qatar andTurkey initially

did their bestto saveAssad from his own obstinacy by offering to broker a reasonable deal with

the opposition. In itssubsequentsupportforthe latter,Doha hastried to maximize itsinfluence by

cultivating partners of various obediences, from moderate Islamistslike the Muslim Brotherhood to

secular figureslike Suhayr al-Atassi.Atthe military level,Qatar hasshown much lessreluctance to

back Islamist brigadesthan SaudiArabia, but notforideologicalreasons.The Emirate rather adopted

an opportunistic approach consisting in supporting groupsthat had already asserted their credibility

on the ground, and, asimportantly, were not under Saudi influence.Turkey hasturned a blind eye

on the activities ofJihadis on its border, butin the sole purpose of putting military pressure on the

PKK.Asforthe recently overthrown Egyptian government of Mohammed Morsi, it purely and simply

refrained from supporting the Syrian opposition as a result of itsrapprochement with Iran.Only two

weeks before itsfall did Morsi change course in a desperate attempt at garnering domestic support.

Conclusion

The responsibility of regionalstate actorsin the“sectarianization”of the Syrian crisisshould not

be overstated. Rather, it isthe deeply sectarian character of the conflict that hasimposed itself

upon regional alignments and behaviors. Even overtly sectarian moves,such asIran’s decision

to send foreign Shia volunteersinto Syria, were the product of a domestic Syrian situation that

hasleft Tehran with little room for non-sectarian patterns of intervention. Moreover, on the other

side of the conflict, Saudi Arabia long resisted the temptation to support the most blatantly

sectarian elements of the opposition.

Exaggerating the responsibility ofregional actorsin the worsening ofthe conflict’ssectarian

character may be tempting forWestern governments: first, because such a view obscuresthe role

theirownshortcomingshaveplayedinthedeteriorationofthe situationinSyria;second,because it
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The Reluctant Sectarianism of Foreign States in the Syrian Conflict 

page 4 • PB 162 • November 18, 2013

gives credibility todiplomatic (versusmilitary)optionsby suggestingthatpressuringregionalstate actors,

andparticularlyWesternalliesis key tothe attenuationofsectariantensionsinSyria andthe regionat

large.There isnosuch“diplomatic shortcut”toregional appeasement; itisthedomestic Syriandeadlock

thatmustbebrokeninordertoalleviate sectariantensions acrosstheMiddle East,nottheopposite.

Notes

1.	 Aron Lund,“Gangs of Latakia:The Militiafication oftheAssad Regime,”Syria Comment,July 23, 2013,

http://tinyurl.com/olanm2z.

2.	 Thomas Pierret,“Karbala in theUmayyad Mosque: Sunnite Panic atthe“Shiitization”of Syria in

the 2000s,”in Brigitte Maréchal and Sami Zemni (eds.), The Dynamics of Sunni-Shia Relationships. 

Doctrine, Transnationalism, Intellectuals and the Media (London:Hurst, 2013), 99-116.

3.	 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf : Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t(Stanford:

StanfordUniversity Press, 2013).

4. Al-Safir (Beirut), May 29, 2012, http://bit.ly/16LIzDr; The National (AbuDhabi),April 7, 2012.

5. AFP,August 15, 2013;Thomas Pierret,“External Support and the Syrian Insurgency,”Foreign Policy 

Blog − The Middle East Channel,August 9, 2013, http://tinyurl.com/m6o8tfx.

6.	 “SaudiArabia boosts Salafistrivalsto alQaeda in Syria,”Reuters,October 1, 2013, http://tinyurl.com/

kbbwfhe.

About This Brief

Thomas Pierret is a lecturer in 

Contemporary Islam at the University of Edinburgh. He has written 

on the issue of sectarianism and 

the role of Islamic forces in the 

Syrian revolution, and is the author 

of Religion and State in Syria and 

The Sunni Ulama from Coup to 

Revolution (Cambridge University 

Press, 2013).” This Peace Brief is 

one in a five-part USIP series on 

sectarianism in the Middle East.