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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MONT v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

No. 17–8995. Argued February 26, 2019—Decided June 3, 2019 

Petitioner Mont was released from federal prison in 2012 and began a 

5-year term of supervised release that was scheduled to end on 

March 6, 2017. On June 1, 2016, he was arrested on state drug trafficking charges and has been in state custody since that time. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to state charges. He then admitted 

in a filing in Federal District Court that he violated his supervisedrelease conditions by virtue of the new state convictions, and he requested a hearing. The District Court scheduled a hearing for November, but later rescheduled it several times to allow the state court 

to first sentence Mont. On March 21, 2017, Mont was sentenced to 

six years’ imprisonment, and his roughly 10 months of pretrial custody were credited as time served. On March 30, the District Court issued a warrant for Mont and set a supervised-release hearing. Mont 

then challenged the District Court’s jurisdiction on the ground that 

his supervised release had been set to expire on March 6. The District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. §3583(i) 

based on a summons it had issued in November 2016. It then revoked Mont’s supervised release and ordered him to serve an additional 42 months’ imprisonment to run consecutive to his state sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds, holding 

that Mont’s supervised-release period was tolled under §3624(e),

which provides that a “term of supervised release does not run during

any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a

conviction for a . . . crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of 

less than 30 consecutive days.” Because the roughly 10 months of 

pretrial custody was “in connection with [Mont’s] conviction” and 

therefore tolled the period of supervised release, the court concluded

that there was ample time left on Mont’s term of supervised release 
 

 

2 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

when the March warrant issued. 

Held: Pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new conviction is “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction” and thus tolls

the supervised-release term under §3624(e), even if the court must 

make the tolling calculation after learning whether the time will be

credited. Pp. 6–13. 

(a) The text of §3624(e) compels this reading. First, dictionary definitions of the term “imprison,” both now and at the time Congress 

created supervised release, may very well encompass pretrial detention, and Mont has not pressed any serious argument to the contrary. 

Second, the phrase “in connection with a conviction” encompasses a 

period of pretrial detention for which a defendant receives credit 

against the sentence ultimately imposed. “In connection with” can 

bear a “broad interpretation,” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 

Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S. 71, 85, but the outer bounds need not be determined here, as pretrial incarceration is directly tied to the conviction when it is credited toward the new sentence. This reading is 

buttressed by the fact that Congress, like most States, instructs 

courts calculating a term of imprisonment to credit pretrial detention

as time served on a subsequent conviction. See §3585(b)(1). Third, 

the text undeniably requires courts to retrospectively calculate 

whether a period of pretrial detention should toll a period of supervised release by including the 30-day minimum. The statute does not 

require courts to make a tolling determination as soon as a defendant

is arrested on new charges or to continually reassess the tolling calculation throughout the pretrial-detention period. Its 30-day minimum-incarceration threshold contemplates the opposite. Pp. 6–8.

(b) The statutory context also supports this reading. First, 

§3624(e) provides that supervised release “runs concurrently” with 

“probation or supervised release or parole for another offense,” but

excludes periods of “imprison[ment]” served “in connection with a 

conviction.” This juxtaposition reinforces the fact that prison time is

“not interchangeable” with supervised release, United States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59, and furthers the statutory design of “successful[ly] transition[ing]” a defendant from “prison to liberty,” Johnson 

v. United States, 529 U. S. 694, 708–709. Second, it would be an exceedingly odd construction of the statute to give a defendant the 

windfall of satisfying a new sentence of imprisonment and an old sentence of supervised release with the same period of pretrial detention.

Supervised release is a form of punishment prescribed along with a 

term of imprisonment as part of the same sentence. And Congress

denies defendants credit for time served if the detention time has already “been credited against another sentence.” §3585(b). Pp. 8–10.

(c) Mont’s argument that the statute’s present tense forbids any 
 

 

 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Syllabus 

backward looking tolling analysis confuses the rule with a court’s 

analysis of whether that rule was satisfied. The present-tense phrasing does not address whether a judge must be able to make a supervised-release determination at any given time. Moreover, any uncertainty about whether supervised release is tolled matters little from 

either the court’s or the defendant’s perspective. As for the court, the 

defendant need not be supervised when he is held in custody; as for 

the defendant, there is nothing unfair about not knowing during pretrial detention whether he is also under supervised release. Pp. 10– 

12. 

723 Fed. Appx. 325, affirmed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and GINSBURG, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, 

J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, 

JJ., joined. 
 

 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 17–8995 

JASON J. MONT, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[June 3, 2019]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case requires the Court to decide whether a convicted criminal’s period of supervised release is tolled—in 

effect, paused—during his pretrial detention for a new

criminal offense. Specifically, the question is whether that 

pretrial detention qualifies as “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime.” 

18 U. S. C. §3624(e). Given the text and statutory context 

of §3624(e), we conclude that if the court’s later imposed 

sentence credits the period of pretrial detention as time

served for the new offense, then the pretrial detention also

tolls the supervised-release period. 

I 

A 

In 2004, petitioner Jason Mont began distributing cocaine and crack cocaine in northern Ohio. After substantial drug sales to a confidential informant and a search of 

his home that uncovered handguns and $2,700 in cash, a 

federal grand jury indicted Mont for multiple drug and 

firearm offenses. He later pleaded guilty to conspiring to 

possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and to possessing

a firearm and ammunition after having been convicted of a 
 

2 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

felony. See 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1) (2000 ed.); 21 U. S. C.

§§841(a)(1), 846 (2000 ed.). 

The District Court sentenced Mont to 120 months’ imprisonment, later reduced to 84 months, to be followed by 

5 years of supervised release. Mont was released from 

federal prison on March 6, 2012, and his supervised release was “slated to end on March 6, 2017.” 723 Fed. 

Appx. 325, 326 (CA6 2018); see 18 U. S. C. §3624(e) (a

“term of supervised release commences on the day the 

person is released from imprisonment”). Among other

standard conditions, Mont’s supervised release required 

that he “not commit another federal, state, or local crime,” 

“not illegally possess a controlled substance,” and “refrain 

from any unlawful use of a controlled substance.” Judgment in No. 4:05–cr–00229 (ND Ohio), Doc. 37, p. 111. 

Mont did not succeed on supervised release. In March 

2015, an Ohio grand jury charged him with two counts of

marijuana trafficking in a sealed indictment. Mont was 

arrested and released on bond while awaiting trial for 

those charges. Things only got worse from there. In 

October 2015, Mont tested positive for cocaine and oxycodone during a routine drug test conducted as part of his 

supervised release. But Mont’s probation officer did not 

immediately report these violations to the District Court; 

instead, the officer referred him for additional substanceabuse counseling. Mont proceeded to test positive in five 

more random drug tests over the next few months. He 

also used an “‘unknown’ liquid to try to pass two subsequent drug tests.” 723 Fed. Appx., at 326. In January 2016, Mont’s probation officer finally reported the 

supervised-release violations, including Mont’s use of drugs 

and attempts to adulterate his urine samples. The violation 

report also informed the District Court about the pending

state charges and the anticipated trial date of March 2016 

in state court. The District Court declined to issue an 

arrest warrant at that time, but it asked to “‘be notified of 
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

the resolution of the state charges.’” Ibid.; see 18 U. S. C. 

§3606 (explaining that the District Court “may issue a 

warrant for the arrest” of the releasee for “violation of a 

condition of release”).

On June 1, 2016, approximately four years and three

months into his 5-year term of supervised release, Mont 

was arrested again on new state charges of trafficking in

cocaine, and his bond was revoked on the earlier marijuanatrafficking charges. He was incarcerated in the Mahoning County Jail and has remained in state custody

since that date. Mont’s probation officer filed a report 

with the District Court stating that he had violated the 

terms of his release based on these new state offenses. 

The officer later advised the court that because Mont’s 

incarceration rendered him unavailable for supervision,

the Probation Office was “toll[ing]” his federal supervision. 

App. 21. The officer promised to keep the court apprised 

of the pending state charges and stated that, if Mont were 

convicted, the officer would ask the court to take action at 

that time. 

In October 2016, Mont entered into plea agreements

with state prosecutors in exchange for a predetermined 

6-year sentence. The state trial court accepted Mont’s guilty 

pleas on October 6, 2016, and set the cases for sentencing

in December 2016. 

Three weeks later, Mont filed a written admission in the 

District Court “acknowledg[ing]” that he had violated his 

conditions of supervised release “by virtue of his conviction 

following guilty pleas to certain felony offenses” in state 

court. Record in No. 4:05–cr–00229 (ND Ohio), Doc. 92, 

p. 419. Even though he had yet to be sentenced for the state 

offenses, Mont sought a hearing on the supervised-release

violations at the court’s “earliest convenience.” Ibid. The 

court initially scheduled a hearing for November 9, 2016,

but then, over Mont’s objection, rescheduled the hearing 

several times to allow for “the conclusion of the State 
 

 

4 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

sentencing.” App. 8; 723 Fed. Appx., at 327. 

On March 21, 2017, Mont was sentenced in state 

court to six years’ imprisonment. The judge “credited the

roughly ten months that Mont had already been incarcerated

pending a disposition as time served.” Id., at 327. The 

District Court issued a warrant on March 30, 2017, and 

ultimately set a supervised-release hearing for June 28,

2017. 

B 

Two days before that hearing, Mont challenged the

jurisdiction of the District Court based on the fact that his

supervised release had initially been set to expire on 

March 6, 2017. The court concluded that it had authority

to supervise Mont, revoked his supervised release, and

ordered him to serve an additional 42 months’ imprisonment to run consecutive to his state sentence. The court 

held that it retained jurisdiction to revoke the release 

under 18 U. S. C. §3583(i), which preserves, for a “reasonably necessary” period of time, the court’s power to adjudicate violations and revoke a term of supervised release

after the term has expired “if, before its expiration, a 

warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an 

allegation of such a violation.” The court further held that 

it retained authority to revoke Mont’s term of supervised 

release because it gave “notice by way of a summons” on 

November 1, 2016, when it originally scheduled the hearing. App. 22. The court also concluded that the delay

between the guilty pleas in October 2016 and the hearing 

date in June 2017 was “reasonably necessary.” Id., at 24. 

The Sixth Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds. The 

court could find no evidence in the record that a summons 

had issued within the meaning of §3583(i). 723 Fed. 

Appx., at 329, n. 5. But because Circuit precedent provided an alternative basis for affirmance, the court did not 

further consider the Government’s argument that the 
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

District Court retained jurisdiction under §3583(i). Instead, the court held that Mont’s supervised-release period

was tolled while he was held in pretrial detention in state

custody under §3624(e), which provides: 

“(e) Supervision After Release.— . . . The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is

released from imprisonment and runs concurrently 

with any Federal, State, or local term of probation or 

supervised release or parole for another offense to 

which the person is subject or becomes subject during

the term of supervised release. A term of supervised

release does not run during any period in which the 

person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction 

for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive 

days.” (Emphasis added.) 

Relying on Circuit precedent, the Sixth Circuit explained that when a defendant is convicted of the offense 

for which he was held in pretrial detention for longer than

30 days and “‘his pretrial detention is credited as time

served toward his sentence, then the pretrial detention is

“in connection with” a conviction and tolls the period of

supervised release under §3624.’” Id., at 328 (quoting 

United States v. Goins, 516 F. 3d 416, 417 (2008)). Because Mont’s term of supervised release had been tolled

between June 2016 and March 2017, there was ample

time left on his supervised-release term when the warrant 

issued on March 30, 2017. 

The Courts of Appeals disagree on whether §3624(e) 

tolls supervised release for periods of pretrial detention 

lasting longer than 30 days when that incarceration is 

later credited as time served on a conviction. Compare 

United States v. Ide, 624 F. 3d 666, 667 (CA4 2010)

(supervised-release period tolls); United States v. MolinaGazca, 571 F. 3d 470, 474 (CA5 2009) (same); United 
 

6 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

States v. Johnson, 581 F. 3d 1310, 1312–1313 (CA11 2009) 

(same); Goins, supra, at 417 (same), with United States v. 

Marsh, 829 F. 3d 705, 709 (CADC 2016) (supervisedrelease period does not toll); United States v. MoralesAlejo, 193 F. 3d 1102, 1106 (CA9 1999) (same). We granted 

certiorari to resolve this split of authority. 586 U. S. 

___ (2018). 

II 

We hold that pretrial detention later credited as time 

served for a new conviction is “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction” and thus tolls the supervisedrelease term under §3624(e). This is so even if the court 

must make the tolling calculation after learning whether 

the time will be credited. In our view, this reading is

compelled by the text and statutory context of §3624(e). 

A 

Section 3624(e) provides for tolling when a person “is

imprisoned in connection with a conviction.” This phrase,

sensibly read, includes pretrial detention credited toward

another sentence for a new conviction. 

First, the definition of “is imprisoned” may well include 

pretrial detention. Both now and at the time Congress

created supervised release, see §212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1999–

2000, the term “imprison” has meant “[t]o put in a prison,”

“to incarcerate,” “[t]o confine a person, or restrain his 

liberty, in any way.” Black’s Law Dictionary 681 (5th ed. 

1979); 5 Oxford English Dictionary 113 (1933); accord,

Black’s Law Dictionary 875 (10th ed. 2014). These definitions encompass pretrial detention, and, despite the dissent’s reliance on a narrower definition, post, at 5–7 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.), even Mont has not pressed any 

serious argument to the contrary. As the Sixth Circuit 

previously recognized, if imprisonment referred only to

“confinement that is the result of a penalty or sentence, 
 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

then the phrase ‘in connection with a conviction’ [would]

becom[e] entirely superfluous.” Goins, supra, at 421. 

Second, the phrase “in connection with a conviction” 

encompasses a period of pretrial detention for which a 

defendant receives credit against the sentence ultimately

imposed. The Court has often recognized that “in connection with” can bear a “broad interpretation.” Merrill 

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S. 71, 

85 (2006) (interpreting “in connection with the purchase or 

sale” broadly in the context of §10(b) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b)); see, e.g., United 

States v. American Union Transport, Inc., 327 U. S. 437, 

443 (1946) (describing the phrase “in connection with” in

the Shipping Act, 1916, 39 Stat. 728, as “broad and general”). The Court has also recognized that “ ‘in connection 

with’ is essentially indeterminate because connections,

like relations, stop nowhere.” Maracich v. Spears, 570 

U. S. 48, 59 (2013) (quotation altered). Here, however, we 

need not consider the outer bounds of the term “in connection with,” as pretrial incarceration is directly tied to the 

conviction when it is credited toward the new sentence. 

The judgment of the state court stated as much, crediting

the pretrial detention that Mont served while awaiting

trial and sentencing for his crimes against his ultimate 

sentence for those same crimes. 

This reading of “imprison[ment] in connection with a

conviction” is buttressed by the fact that Congress, like 

most States, instructs courts calculating a term of imprisonment to credit pretrial detention as time served on a 

subsequent conviction. See 18 U. S. C. §3585(b)(1); Tr. of

Oral Arg. 54 (statement of the Assistant Solicitor General 

representing that the same rule applies in 45 States and 

the District of Columbia). Thus, it makes sense that the 

phrase “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction”

would include pretrial detention later credited as time 

served, especially since both provisions were passed as 
 

8 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See §212(a)(2), 

98 Stat. 2008–2009. If Congress intended a narrower 

interpretation, it could have easily used narrower language, such as “after a conviction” or “following a conviction.” See e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, §209(d)(4), 98 

Stat. 1987 (adding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

46(h), allowing courts to direct forfeiture of property “after 

conviction of the offense charged” (emphasis added)). We 

cannot override Congress’ choice to employ the more capacious phrase “in connection with.”

Third, the text undeniably requires courts to retrospectively calculate whether a period of pretrial detention 

should toll a period of supervised release. Whereas 

§3624(e) instructs courts precisely when the supervisedrelease clock begins—“on the day the person is released”—

the statute does not require courts to make a tolling determination as soon as a defendant is arrested on new 

charges or to continually reassess the tolling calculation 

throughout the period of his pretrial detention. Congress

contemplated the opposite by including a minimumincarceration threshold: tolling occurs “unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” 

§3624(e). This calculation must be made after either 

release from custody or entry of judgment; there is no way 

for a court to know on day 5 of a defendant’s pretrial

detention whether the period of custody will extend beyond 30 days. Thus, at least some uncertainty as to 

whether supervised release is tolled is built into §3624(e) 

by legislative design. This fact confirms that courts 

should make the tolling calculation upon the defendant’s

release from custody or upon entry of judgment. 

B 

The statutory context also supports our reading. Supervised release is “a form of postconfinement monitoring”

that permits a defendant a kind of conditional liberty by 
 

 

 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

allowing him to serve part of his sentence outside of 

prison. Johnson v. United States, 529 U. S. 694, 697 (2000).

Recognizing that Congress provided for supervised release 

to facilitate a “transition to community life,” we have

declined to offset a term of supervised release by the

amount of excess time a defendant spent in prison after 

two of his convictions were declared invalid. United States 

v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59–60 (2000). As we explained:

“The objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled 

if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of 

supervised release” because “[s]upervised release has no 

statutory function until confinement ends.” Id., at 59. 

This understanding of supervised release informs our 

reading of the tolling provision.

Consider §3624(e) itself. The sentence preceding the

one at issue here specifies that supervised release “runs 

concurrently” with “probation or supervised release or 

parole for another offense.” §3624(e) (emphasis added). 

But the next sentence (the one at issue here) excludes

periods of “imprison[ment]” served “in connection with a 

conviction.” The juxtaposition of these two sentences 

reinforces the fact that prison time is “not interchangeable” with supervised release. Id., at 59. Permitting a

period of probation or parole to count toward supervised

release but excluding a period of incarceration furthers the

statutory design of “successful[ly] transition[ing]” a defendant from “prison to liberty.” Johnson, supra, at 708– 

709. Allowing pretrial detention credited toward another 

sentence to toll the period of supervised release is consistent with that design. Cf. A. Scalia & B. Garner, 

Reading Law 167 (2012) (explaining that “the whole-text 

canon” requires consideration of “the entire text, in view of

its structure” and “logical relation of its many parts”).

Second, it would be an exceedingly odd construction of

the statute to give a defendant the windfall of satisfying a 

new sentence of imprisonment and an old sentence of 
 

10 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

supervised release with the same period of pretrial detention. Supervised release is a form of punishment that

Congress prescribes along with a term of imprisonment as

part of the same sentence. See generally §3583. And 

Congress denies defendants credit for time served if the 

detention time has already “been credited against another 

sentence.” §3585(b). Yet Mont’s reading of §3624(e) would 

deprive the Government of its lawfully imposed sentence

of supervised release while the defendant is serving a 

separate sentence of incarceration—one often imposed by

a different sovereign. Under our view, in contrast, time in 

pretrial detention constitutes supervised release only if

the charges against the defendant are dismissed or the 

defendant is acquitted. This ensures that the defendant is 

not faulted for conduct he might not have committed,

while otherwise giving full effect to the lawful judgment

previously imposed on the defendant.1 

C 

In response to these points, Mont follows the D. C.

Circuit in arguing that the present tense of the statute 

(“‘is imprisoned’”) forbids any backward looking tolling 

analysis. See Marsh, 829 F. 3d, at 709. Mont contends 

that, when a defendant is held in pretrial detention, a 

court cannot say at that moment that he “is imprisoned in

connection with a conviction.” He relies on the Dictionary

Act, which provides that “[i]n determining the meaning of

any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise[,] words used in the present tense include the future 

—————— 

1Our reading leaves intact a district court’s ability to preserve its 

authority by issuing an arrest warrant or summons under §3583(i)

based on the conduct at issue in the new charges, irrespective of whether 

the defendant is later convicted or acquitted of those offenses. But 

preserving jurisdiction through §3583(i) is not a prerequisite to a court 

maintaining authority under §3624(e), nor does it impact the tolling 

calculation under §3624(e). 
 

 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

as well as the present.” 1 U. S. C. §1. 

Mont’s argument confuses the rule (“any period in which

the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction”)

with a court’s analysis of whether that rule was satisfied.

Of course, the determination whether supervised release 

has been tolled cannot be made at the exact moment when 

the defendant is held in pretrial detention. Rather, the 

court must await the outcome of those separate proceedings before it will know whether “imprison[ment]” is tied 

to a conviction. But the statute does not require the court

to make a contemporaneous assessment. Quite the opposite: As discussed, the statute undeniably contemplates 

that there will be uncertainty about the status of supervised release when a defendant has been held for a short 

period of time and it is unclear whether the imprisonment 

will exceed 30 days. There is no reason the statute would 

preclude postponing calculation just because the custody

period extends beyond 30 days. Once the court makes the 

calculation, it will determine whether the relevant period 

ultimately qualified as a period “in which the person is 

imprisoned in connection with a conviction” for 30 or more

days. In short, the present-tense phrasing of the statute 

does not address whether a judge must be able to make a

supervised-release determination at any given time. 

Moreover, any uncertainty about whether supervised 

release is tolled matters little from either the court’s or the 

defendant’s perspective. As for the court, the defendant 

need not be supervised when he is held in custody, so it 

does not strike us as “odd” to make a delayed determination concerning tolling. Marsh, supra, at 710. The court 

need not monitor the defendant’s progress in transitioning 

back into the community because the defendant is not in 

the community. And if the court is concerned about losing

authority over the defendant because of an impending

conclusion to supervised release, it can simply issue a 

summons or warrant under §3583(i) for alleged violations. 
 

 

12 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

As for the defendant, there is nothing unfair about not

knowing during pretrial detention whether he is also

subject to court supervision. The answer to that question 

cannot meaningfully influence his behavior. A defendant 

in custody will be unable to comply with many ordinary

conditions of supervised release intended to reacclimate 

him to society—for example, making restitution payments, 

attending substance-abuse counseling, meeting curfews, or

participating in job training. The rules he can “comply”

with are generally mandated by virtue of being in prison—

for example, no new offenses or use of drugs. See 

§§3563(a)–(b) (listing mandatory and discretionary conditions). In this case, Mont’s supervised-release conditions 

required that he “work regularly at a lawful occupation”

and “support his . . . dependants and meet other family 

responsibilities.” Judgment in No. 4:05–cr–00229 (ND 

Ohio), Doc. 37, at 111. Mont could not fulfill these conditions while sitting in an Ohio jail, and his probation officer 

correctly deemed him “unavailable for supervision.”2 

App. 21. 

III 

Applying §3624(e) to Mont, the pretrial-detention period 

tolled his supervised release beginning in June 2016. 

Mont therefore had about nine months remaining on his 

term of supervised release when the District Court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to an 

—————— 

2Although a defendant in pretrial detention is unable to be supervised, it does not necessarily follow that the defendant will be punished

by his inability to comply with the terms of his supervised release if the

detention period is not later credited as time served for a conviction. In 

that circumstance, the district court may always modify the terms of 

his supervision. See 18 U. S. C. §3583(e)(2). And, as the Government 

explained at oral argument, modification of supervised release may not 

be necessary to the extent that “the defendant can’t be deemed to have 

been required to” comply with the terms of supervised release while in

custody. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. 
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

additional 42 months’ imprisonment. And because 

§3624(e) independently tolled the supervised-release

period, it is immaterial whether the District Court could

have issued a summons or warrant under §3583(i) to

preserve its authority. 

* * * 

In light of the statutory text and context of §3624(e), 

pretrial detention qualifies as “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction” if a later imposed sentence credits

that detention as time served for the new offense. Such 

pretrial detention tolls the supervised-release period, even 

though the District Court may need to make the tolling 

determination after the conviction. Accordingly, we affirm 

the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. 

It is so ordered. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 17–8995 

JASON J. MONT, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[June 3, 2019]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER, 

JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting. 

A term of supervised release is tolled when an offender 

“is imprisoned in connection with a conviction.” 18 

U. S. C. §3624(e). The question before the Court is whether 

pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new 

offense has this tolling effect. The Court concludes that it 

does, but it reaches that result by adopting a backwardlooking approach at odds with the statute’s language and 

by reading the terms “imprisoned” and “in connection 

with” in unnatural isolation. Because I cannot agree that 

a person “is imprisoned in connection with a conviction”

before any conviction has occurred, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

A 

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 empowers a court to

impose a term of supervised release following imprisonment. See 18 U. S. C. §§3583(a), (b). 

The clock starts running on a supervised release term

when the offender exits the jailhouse doors. §3624(e).

During the term, offenders are bound to follow courtimposed conditions. Some apply to all supervised release 

terms, such as a requirement to refrain from committing

other crimes. §3583(d). Others apply only at a sentencing 

court’s discretion, such as a condition that the offender 
 

2 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

allow visits from a probation officer. See §3563(b)(16); 

§3583(d). The probation officer, in turn, is tasked with 

monitoring and seeking to improve the offender’s “conduct 

and condition” and reporting to the sentencing court,

among other duties. §3603. During the supervised release 

term, the court has the power to change its conditions and

to extend the term if less than the maximum term was 

previously imposed. §3583(e)(2). If an offender violates 

any of the conditions of release, the court can revoke supervised release and require the person to serve all or part

of the supervised release term in prison, without giving

credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision. §3583(e)(3). 

In the normal course, a supervised release term ends 

after the term specified by the district court. But, crucially, 

the term “does not run during any period in which the 

person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a 

Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is

for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” §3624(e). In 

other words, certain periods of “imprisonment” postpone

the expiration of the supervised release term.

A district court’s revocation power generally lasts only

as long as the supervised release term. If the court issues 

a warrant or summons for an alleged violation before the 

term expires, however, the court’s revocation power can

extend for a “reasonably necessary” period beyond the 

term’s expiration. §3583(i). 

B 

Though the mechanics of supervised release tolling may 

seem arcane, these calculations can have weighty consequences. For petitioner Jason Mont, tolling enabled a

court to order an additional 31⁄2 years of federal imprisonment after he serves his current state sentence. 

Mont was convicted in 2005 for federal drug and gun 

crimes. The District Court sentenced him to prison time 
 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

and to five years of supervised release. In 2012, Mont was 

released from prison and his supervised release term 

began. Left to run its course, the term would have ended 

on March 6, 2017.1 

Mont’s time on supervised release did not go well. In 

January 2016, his probation officer informed the District 

Court that Mont had failed two drug tests and tried to 

pass two further drug tests by using an “‘unknown’” liquid. 723 Fed. Appx. 325, 326 (CA6 2018). The officer 

noted that Mont also had been charged with state marijuanatrafficking offenses. Upon learning of these alleged 

violations of the supervised release conditions, the District

Court could have issued a warrant for Mont’s arrest, but it 

did not do so at that time. 

On June 1, 2016, Mont was arrested on a new state 

indictment for trafficking cocaine, and the State took him 

into custody. The probation officer reported the arrest to 

the District Court, but the record does not reflect any

action by the court in response. After several months in 

custody, Mont pleaded guilty to certain of the state charges.

He also admitted to the District Court that he had violated 

the terms of his supervised release, and he requested a

hearing. The District Court set a November hearing to

consider his alleged supervised release violation, but 

continuances delayed that hearing. Months more passed 

as Mont, still detained, awaited sentencing. In the meantime, the original end date of his federal supervised release term—March 6, 2017—came and went. On March 

21, 2017, the state court sentenced Mont to six years in

prison and retroactively credited the approximately 10

months he had spent in pretrial detention toward his 

sentence. 

—————— 

1 I accept the dates as given in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, although 

that opinion notes some immaterial discrepancies in the record. See 

723 Fed. Appx. 325, 326, nn. 1–2 (2018). 
 

 

4 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

At that point, Mont’s probation officer reported Mont’s

state convictions and sentences to the Federal District 

Court, which—after its many earlier opportunities—

finally issued a warrant for Mont’s arrest on March 30,

2017. Mont objected, claiming that the court had no power 

to issue the warrant because his supervised release term 

had expired on March 6. The District Court rejected that

contention and sentenced Mont to 42 months in prison, to

run consecutively to his state sentence.2 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

affirmed. In its view, the District Court had jurisdiction to

revoke Mont’s supervised release because his pretrial

detention triggered the tolling provision in §3624(e) and 

thus shifted back the end date of his supervised release 

term. The Sixth Circuit construed the tolling provision to 

apply to Mont’s detention because his state-court indictment ultimately led to a conviction and Mont subsequently 

received credit for the period of detention as time served 

for that conviction. 

II 

The majority errs by affirming the Sixth Circuit’s construction of the tolling statute. Most naturally read, a 

person “is imprisoned in connection with a conviction” only

while he or she serves a prison term after a conviction. 

The statute does not allow for tolling when an offender is 

in pretrial detention and a conviction is no more than a

possibility.

The first clue to the meaning of §3624(e) is its presenttense construction. In normal usage, no one would say 

—————— 

2The District Court held that it had jurisdiction because of a summons it issued on November 1, 2016, which would have given the court 

power to sanction a supervised release violation even after the term 

expired. See 18 U. S. C. §3583(i). The Sixth Circuit did not affirm on 

this ground, however, because it “failed to detect any . . . evidence in 

the record” of a November 2016 summons. 723 Fed. Appx., at 329, n. 5. 
 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

that a person “is imprisoned in connection with a conviction” before any conviction has occurred, because the 

phrase would convey something that is not yet—and, 

indeed, may never be—true: that the detention has the 

requisite connection to a conviction. After all, many detained individuals are never convicted because they ultimately are acquitted or have their cases dismissed.3 Until 

a conviction happens, it is impossible to tell whether any 

given pretrial detention is “connect[ed] with” a conviction 

or not. 

Reading the phrase “is imprisoned” to require a realtime assessment of the character of a conviction does not 

just match the colloquial sense of the phrase; it also gives 

meaning to the tense of the words Congress chose. The 

Court generally “look[s] to Congress’ choice of verb tense 

to ascertain a statute’s temporal reach.” Carr v. United 

States, 560 U. S. 438, 448 (2010). Doing so abides by the 

Dictionary Act, which provides that “words used in the 

present tense include the future as well as the present” 

absent contextual clues to the contrary, 1 U. S. C. §1, and 

thus “the present tense generally does not include the 

past,” Carr, 560 U. S., at 448. Applying this presumption 

here leads to the straightforward result that the phrase “is 

imprisoned” does not mean “was imprisoned.” Adhering to 

the present-tense framework of the statute, then, pretrial

detention does not meet the statutory definition, no matter 

what later happens. 

The other language in §3624(e)—“imprisoned in connection with a conviction”—confirms this result. Had Con-

—————— 

3See Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, T. Cohen & B. Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants

in State Courts; State Court Processing Statistics, 1990–2004, p. 7 (Nov. 

2007) (roughly one in five defendants held in pretrial detention for 

state felony charges conclude their cases without a conviction), 

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf (as last visited May 30,

2019). 
 

 

 

6 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

gress wanted to toll supervised release during pretrial

confinement, it could have chosen an alternative to the 

word “imprisoned” that more readily conveys that intent, 

such as “confined” or “detained.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 362 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “confinement” as “the 

quality, state, or condition of being imprisoned or restrained”); id., at 543 (defining “detention” as “[t]he act or

an instance of holding a person in custody; confinement or 

compulsory delay”). Instead, Congress selected a word—

“imprisoned”—that is most naturally understood in context to mean postconviction incarceration. 

Congress regularly uses the word “imprisoned” (or

“imprisonment”) to refer to a prison term following a 

conviction. The United States Code is littered with statutes providing that an individual shall be “imprisoned”

following a conviction for a specific offense. See, e.g., 18 

U. S. C. §§1832, 2199, 2344. Congress also classifies

crimes as felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions based on 

“the maximum term of imprisonment authorized.” 

§3559(a). And even in the Sentencing Reform Act itself,

which added the tolling provision at issue, Congress used

the word “imprisonment” to refer to incarceration after a 

conviction. See §3582(a) (describing the factors courts

consider when imposing “a term of imprisonment”);

§3582(b) (referring to “a sentence to imprisonment”);

§3582(c)(1)(B) (discussing when courts may “modify an 

imposed term of imprisonment”).

This Court also has previously equated the word “imprisonment” with a “prison term” or a “sentence”—phrases

that imply post-trial detention. See Tapia v. United 

States, 564 U. S. 319, 327 (2011) (referring in passing to

“imprisonment” as a “prison term”); Barber v. Thomas, 

560 U. S. 474, 484 (2010) (“[T]erm of imprisonment” can 

refer “to the sentence that the judge imposes” or “the time

that the prisoner actually serves” of such a sentence); see 

also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[N]o 
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

person may be imprisoned for any offense . . . unless he 

was represented by counsel at his trial”). 

To be sure, dictionary definitions of the word “imprison”

sweep more broadly than just post-trial incarceration. See 

ante, at 6. But the word “imprisoned” does not appear in

this statute in isolation; Congress referred to imprisonment “in connection with a conviction.” As part of that 

phrase and given its usual meaning, the word “imprisoned” is best read as referring to the state of an individual

serving time following a conviction. 

The present tense of the statute and the phrase “imprisoned in connection with a conviction” thus lead to the 

same conclusion: Pretrial detention does not toll supervised release.4 

III 

The majority justifies a contrary interpretation of the

tolling provision only by jettisoning the present-tense view 

of the statute and affording snippets of text broader meaning than they merit in context.

The majority’s first error is its conclusion that courts

can take a wait-and-see approach to tolling. If a conviction ultimately materializes and a court credits the offender’s pretrial custody toward the resulting sentence,

the majority reasons, then the pretrial detention retroactively will toll supervised release. If not, then there will 

be no tolling. See ante, at 6–8. The offender’s supervised 

—————— 

4 I note that rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s contrary interpretation of 

the statute would not necessarily resolve this case in Mont’s favor. The 

Government views Mont’s guilty plea as a “conviction” and thus argues 

that his supervised release should, at the least, have been tolled during 

the five months he was detained between his plea and sentencing. See 

Brief for United States 39–44. Because the Sixth Circuit did not 

directly address whether a guilty plea constitutes a “conviction,” the 

appropriate course would be to remand to the Sixth Circuit to consider 

this argument in the first instance. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 

U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). 
 

 

 

 

8 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

release status thus will be uncertain until the court calculates tolling either “upon the defendant’s release from 

custody or upon entry of judgment.” Ante, at 8. 

The majority’s retrospective approach cannot be squared 

with the language of §3624(e). Because Congress phrased

the provision in the present tense, the statute calls for a 

contemporaneous assessment of whether a person “is

imprisoned” with the requisite connection to a conviction. 

The majority erroneously shifts the statute’s frame of 

reference from that present-tense assessment (what is) to 

a backward-looking review (what was or what has been).5 

The majority’s textual argument hinges on what the 

majority perceives to be an advantage of the retrospective

approach: It accounts for the fact that the statute provides

for tolling only if a period of imprisonment lasts longer 

than 30 days. §3624(e). According to the majority, the 30-

day provision shows Congress’ expectation that courts look 

backwards when evaluating whether tolling is appropriate. If Congress anticipated such an analysis as to the 

length of the detention, the majority implies, surely it

provided more generally for backward-looking review of 

the relationship between the detention and any ensuing 

conviction. See ante, at 8. 

This argument, however, assumes a problem of the 

majority’s own making. The 30-day minimum creates no 

anomalies if the statute is read to toll supervised release 

only during detention following a conviction. Under that 

—————— 

5Although Congress did not use a phrase like “was imprisoned” or 

“has been imprisoned” in this provision, it did employ such formulations in several other tolling provisions. See 38 U. S. C. §3103(b)(3)

(eligibility period “shall not run” during any period in which a veteran

“was . . . prevented” from accessing a rehabilitation program); §3031(b)

(time period “shall not run” during a period in which an individual “had

not met” a discharge requirement); 29 U. S. C. §1854(f) (statute of 

limitations for a federal claim “shall be tolled” for the period in which a

related state-law claim “was pending”). 
 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

more natural reading, courts in most cases will not be left

in the dark about the length of a period of detention or its 

relationship to a conviction; the conviction and sentence 

of imprisonment at the time imposed will answer both 

questions.6 

Under the majority’s approach, however, this language 

creates a dilemma. Unlike a term of imprisonment following a conviction, the duration of pretrial confinement is 

uncertain at its outset. Thus if (as the majority contends)

Congress meant to toll such periods of detention, the 30-

day limitation means that every single time a person on

supervised release enters detention, it will be unclear for

up to a month whether the supervised release term is 

being tolled or not. See ante, at 8 (conceding that there

will be “no way for a court to know on day 5 of a defendant’s pretrial detention whether the period of custody will 

extend beyond 30 days”). If pretrial detention lasts longer

than 30 days, the uncertainty will continue until a judgment of conviction is entered and credit for pretrial detention is computed.

But the difficulties inherent in predicting how long

pretrial detention will last (and whether that detention 

eventually will turn out to have any connection to a conviction, see supra, at 4–5, and n. 3) most naturally compel

the conclusion that Congress never intended to force district courts to grapple with them in the first place. These 

uncertainties generally would not arise—and courts thus 

would not need to rely on hindsight—if the Court were to 

—————— 

6The Government gestures to some uncertainties inherent in predicting the length of imprisonment even following a conviction, such as the 

presence of indeterminate sentencing schemes and the possibility that

a determinate sentence can be shortened or interrupted temporarily. 

See Brief for United States 34–35 (citing 18 U. S. C. §§3621(e)(2)(B), 

3622). However, these provisions in no way suggest that a court 

regularly would find itself unsure whether a prisoner’s sentence will 

extend past 30 days. 
 

10 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

adopt Mont’s reading. Yet the majority instead takes as a

given that the statute tolls supervised release during

pretrial detention, and then uses the uncertainties inherent in that process to justify a backward-looking analysis. 

The majority’s error is compounded by the centerpiece of

its textual analysis, which relies on artificially isolating 

the terms “imprisoned” and “in connection with.” The 

majority says that imprisonment is a term so capacious as

to encompass pretrial detention, ante, at 6–7, and that the 

phrase “in connection with” sweeps broadly enough to

include pretrial detention that is ultimately credited to a 

new sentence, ante, at 7. 

Whether or not these phrases independently have the

far-reaching meaning that the majority ascribes to them—

a conclusion that is by no means inevitable—the terms are 

still limited by their relationship to each other and by the 

present-tense framework of the statute. Individual 

phrases must not be taken “‘in a vacuum,’” because doing 

so overrides the “‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Jackson, ante, 

at ___ (slip op., at 5) (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of 

Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989)). As discussed, in the 

context of a phrase referring to conviction, the term “imprisoned” most naturally means imprisonment following a 

conviction. Supra, at 5–7. And seen from the point at 

which a person is detained and awaiting a verdict, his

confinement is not “in connection with” a conviction that 

has not happened and may never occur. 

IV 

The majority’s approach has the further flaw of treating

tolling as the only meaningful avenue to preserve a district court’s revocation power when an offender is detained 

pretrial. But the statute already provides a way for a 
 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

court to extend its revocation power: If a court issues a 

warrant or summons while the supervised release term is

running, that action triggers an extension of the court’s 

revocation authority “beyond” the supervised release term 

“for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication” 

of the matters that led to the warrant or summons. See 

§3583(i).

In this very case, the District Court had at least three 

opportunities to issue a warrant prior to the expiration of 

Mont’s original supervised release term. Mont’s probation

officer notified the District Court of Mont’s potential supervised release violations in January 2016, more than a 

year before Mont’s supervised release was set to expire.

723 Fed. Appx. 325, 326 (CA6 2018). In June 2016, the 

probation officer alerted the District Court to Mont’s 

arrest. Ibid. And in October 2016, Mont filed a written 

admission with the District Court that he had violated 

supervised release. Id., at 326–327. The District Court 

was empowered at each step of this process to issue a 

warrant. Indeed, the court apparently intended to do just

that after Mont’s written admission, though the Sixth

Circuit later found that there was no evidence of such a 

warrant in the record. See id., at 329, n. 5. 

In sum, the delayed revocation process provides a

straightforward, and statutorily prescribed, path for district courts to decide which charges are significant enough

to justify a warrant and thus to extend the court’s revocation power. The majority’s overly broad reading of the 

tolling provision is thus unnecessary as well as a distortion of the clear statutory text. 

V 

Lacking a strong textual basis for its backward-looking 

analysis, the majority is left to rely on intuitions about 

how best to fulfill the statute’s purpose.

To begin with, the majority emphasizes that supervised 
 

12 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

release and incarceration have different aims. See ante, at 

8–10. True enough. The Court has explained that supervised release is intended “to assist individuals in their 

transition to community life,” and as a result is not “interchangeable” with periods of incarceration. United States 

v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 58–60 (2000). But the goals of 

supervised release can be fulfilled to some degree even

when an offender is detained. Cf. Burns v. United States, 

287 U. S. 216, 223 (1932) (noting that a probationer is still 

“subject to the conditions of ” probation “even in jail”). 

Offenders on supervised release may well be able to comply with several mandatory conditions of supervised release while detained, such as submitting to a DNA sample 

or taking drug tests. See §3583(d). And probation officers

have experience coordinating with correctional facilities in

the prerelease context. See §3624(c)(3) (providing that the 

probation system “shall, to the extent practicable, offer 

assistance to a prisoner during prerelease custody”). 

Even if an offender’s detention does make it meaningfully 

harder to fulfill the goals of supervised release, moreover, 

the majority’s reading permits the same incongruities.

Under the majority’s interpretation, supervised release 

continues to run for offenders who are confined pretrial for 

less than 30 days and for those who are detained pretrial

but are later acquitted or released after charges are

dropped. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34.7 At best, the majority 

—————— 

7 Imagine two offenders on supervised release and detained pending 

trial on similar charges who receive precisely the same supervision 

during their detention. One ultimately is convicted and the other’s 

charges are dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Today’s 

decision means that the detention time for the convicted person will not 

count toward his or her supervised release term, even though the 

detention of the other person—who was detained for similar conduct 

and received the same monitoring and supervision—will count down

the supervised release clock. The better practice is to read the statute 

on its plain terms and rely on a district court’s power to clarify any 

ambiguity in its authority by issuing a warrant when an alleged super-
 

 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 13 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

offers a half-a-loaf policy rationale that cannot justify 

departing from the best reading of the statute’s text.

The majority also invokes the general principle against

double-counting sentences, see, e.g., §3585(b), and objects

that Mont’s reading of the statute would give defendants a

“windfall.” Ante, at 9–10. This argument, however, fails 

to recognize the distinct character of pretrial detention.

Its purpose is to ensure that an alleged offender attends 

trial and is incapacitated if he or she is a danger to the 

community, not to punish the offender for a conviction. 

See United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F. 3d 1102, 1105 

(CA9 1999) (citing §3142(c); United States v. Salerno, 481 

U. S. 739, 748 (1987)). A State or the Federal Government 

may later choose to credit an equivalent period of time

toward a new sentence, but that credit does not retroactively transform the character of the detention itself into 

“imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction,” 

§3624(e)—particularly in the context of this present-tense 

statute. 

In any event, the majority’s approach creates a serious 

risk of unfairness. Offenders in pretrial detention will

have no notice of whether they are bound by the terms of

supervised release. This effectively compels all offenders

to comply with the terms of their release, even though only

some will ultimately get credit for that compliance, because otherwise they risk being charged with a violation if 

their supervised release term is not tolled.8 Although the

majority indicates that offenders generally will comply 

with the terms of their release simply by following prison 

rules, the range of supervised release conditions is too 

—————— 

vised release violation is sufficiently serious. See §3583(i). 8The majority suggests that offenders will not necessarily face punishment for a failure to comply with supervision conditions while in

detention. Ante, at 12, n. 2. Given the consequences of revocation, 

however, offenders may well be unwilling to take that chance. See 

supra, at 2; §3583(e)(3). 
 

14 MONT v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

broad to guarantee complete overlap with prison directives. See, e.g., Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 

N. Y. U. L. Rev. 958, 1012–1013 (2013) (describing mandatory condition of cooperating in DNA collection and special

conditions of taking prescribed medications and undergoing periodic polygraph testing). Altogether, I am not 

nearly as sanguine as the majority that the uncertainty 

created by the majority’s expansive tolling rule “matters

little from either the court’s or the defendant’s perspective.” Ante, at 11. 

* * * 

The Court errs by treating Mont’s pretrial detention as 

tolling his supervised release term. Because its approach 

misconstrues the operative text and fosters needless uncertainty and unfairness, I respectfully dissent.