[Cite as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Harvey, 133 Ohio St.3d 228, 2012-Ohio-4545.] 

TOLEDO BAR ASSOCIATION v. HARVEY. 

[Cite as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Harvey, 133 Ohio St.3d 228, 2012-Ohio-4545.] 

Attorney misconduct, including failing to act with reasonable diligence in 

representing a client and engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice—One-year suspension, stayed on conditions. 

(No. 2011-1760—Submitted February 7, 2012—Decided October 4, 2012.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-012. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, Beauregard Maximillion Harvey of Toledo, Ohio, 

Attorney Registration No. 0078717, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 

2005. On June 22, 2011, relator, Toledo Bar Association, filed a four-count 

amended complaint charging Harvey with multiple violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 

(requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 

1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the 

status of a matter), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that 

is prejudicial to the administration of justice). All but three of the charged 

violations arose from his alleged failure to timely file documents in 14 bankruptcy 

cases. 

{¶ 2} The parties submitted, and the panel and board adopted, 

stipulations of fact and misconduct with regard to Harvey’s handling of seven 

clients’ bankruptcy cases and one client’s small-claims case. The panel 

conducted a hearing, however, because Harvey denied having committed 

misconduct in the seven additional bankruptcy cases. In four of the seven 

contested cases, the panel and board found that Harvey had committed all the 
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charged violations; in the fifth case, they found that he had committed two of the 

charged violations; and with respect to the sixth and seventh cases, they found no 

misconduct. 

{¶ 3} Based upon these findings of misconduct, the panel and board 

recommend that we suspend Harvey for one year, with six months stayed on the 

conditions that he submit to monitored probation during the stayed suspension 

and that he commit no further misconduct. We adopt the board’s findings of fact 

and misconduct, but in light of the significant mitigating factors present in this 

case, we find that a one-year suspension fully stayed on the conditions that 

Harvey satisfactorily complete a one-year period of monitored probation and 

commit no further misconduct is the appropriate sanction. 

Misconduct

{¶ 4} Harvey stipulates to the fact that his failure to file required 

documents in seven client bankruptcy cases resulted in the closing of those cases 

without discharge. In addition, Harvey was once verbally admonished on the 

record and was twice sanctioned by the bankruptcy court for his failure to timely 

file documents. 

{¶ 5} Harvey testified that during the relevant time period, he did not 

monitor whether he was receiving these documents from his clients in time to 

meet the deadlines for filing them with the bankruptcy court. Instead, he relied on 

his clients to provide the documents to him in a timely fashion. And even when 

his clients did timely provide the forms to him, he sometimes failed to submit 

them to the bankruptcy court. Those are the cases in which Harvey stipulates to 

his misconduct. Harvey stipulated that this conduct resulted in the closing of 

bankruptcy cases initiated on behalf of clients Kreamer, Sittler, Krieger, Yglasias, 

Bowman, Gibson, and Richardson. 

{¶ 6} In seven bankruptcy cases, however, Harvey claimed that his 

clients were responsible for his failure to file documents. Specifically, he argued 
January Term, 2012 

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that these clients were at fault because they had not given him the documents even 

though they had been advised in both a packet of information he provided at the 

beginning of his representation and in a document they received directly from the 

bankruptcy court of the deadlines for filing the documents and the consequences 

for failing to timely file them. The panel, however, rejected that argument and 

placed the blame squarely on Harvey in four of the cases, finding that he violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), and 8.4(d) in the cases involving clients Fair, Elchert, 

Daughenbaugh, and Seiler. The panel noted that Harvey’s clients are laymen who 

had retained Harvey for his expertise, diligence, and competence. 

{¶ 7} With regard to the Freeman case, the panel found that Harvey had 

had difficulty communicating with the client because Freeman did not return 

telephone calls, and, therefore, the panel concluded that there was insufficient 

evidence to support a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3). But because Harvey 

had attended the first meeting of creditors with Freeman, the panel found that he 

should have discovered that the client had completed the required financialmanagement course and should have requested his certificate of completion. 

Therefore, the panel concluded that Harvey’s failure to obtain the certificate and 

timely file it with the court violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 and 8.4(d). 

{¶ 8} Regarding the sixth case, involving client Gunn, the panel found 

that Harvey did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), or 8.4(d), because the 

client had terminated his representation (though Harvey never filed a motion or 

notice of withdrawal with the court) and Harvey had assumed that she would file 

the certificate of completion of the required financial-management course herself. 

{¶ 9} In the seventh case, involving client Messenger, the panel found 

that the bankruptcy court had issued three separate show-cause orders due to the 

failure to timely file required documents. The client did not appear at the final 

show-cause hearing, and the court closed the case. The panel found that the 
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evidence was insufficient to establish that Harvey’s conduct in the Messenger 

case violated the rules as alleged by relator. 

{¶ 10} With respect to count four, the parties stipulated that Harvey had 

failed to file an answer to a counterclaim filed against a client in a small-claims 

action and that as a result, the defendant had obtained a default judgment against 

the client. Although Harvey later moved the court to vacate that judgment, 

neither he nor his client appeared at the scheduled hearing on the motion to 

vacate, and the default judgment remained in force. The parties stipulated, and 

the panel agreed, that this conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 and 1.4(a)(3). 

{¶ 11} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, as 

do we. 

Sanction 

{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 

sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final 

determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 

listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 

St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 

{¶ 13} As aggravating factors, the panel and board found that Harvey had 

engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, and, in some 

instances, had attempted to justify his missing filing deadlines by blaming his 

clients. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (d), and (g). They found the following 

factors to be mitigating: the absence of a prior disciplinary record, the absence of 

a dishonest or selfish motive, Harvey’s cooperative attitude toward the 

disciplinary proceedings, his stipulation to numerous violations, and his timely 

and good-faith effort to both rectify the consequences of his misconduct and alter 

his office practices to prevent future misconduct. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
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10(B)(2)(a), (b), (c), and (d). The panel and board noted that in most of the cases, 

Harvey had voluntarily paid the costs for reopening the bankruptcy cases that had 

been closed due to his failure to timely file documents and that he had charged no 

additional fee for his services. After relator began investigating this case, Harvey 

hired a paralegal and purchased a computer program to track his bankruptcy 

cases. These office changes make it easier for him to remind bankruptcy clients 

about impending deadlines. 

{¶ 14} Relying primarily upon Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Nance, 124 

Ohio St.3d 57, 2009-Ohio-5957, 918 N.E.2d 1000, relator argued before the panel 

that Harvey’s misconduct warrants a one-year suspension with six months stayed 

on conditions. In Nance, we imposed that sanction on an attorney who 

mistakenly represented to a bankruptcy court that he had paid the requisite filing 

fee in a case, failed to timely file required documents in two additional 

bankruptcy cases, and was found in contempt for failing to disgorge fees paid in 

each of those cases. Id. at ¶ 5-10. 

{¶ 15} Harvey argued that his case is different from Nance’s because he 

does not have a disciplinary record, he promptly paid the fees to refile his client’s 

bankruptcy cases and completed their cases, and he made Dickerson whole. 

Nance, in contrast, waited more than three years to comply with the bankruptcy 

court’s first disgorgement order, and his contempt fines remained outstanding at 

the time of his disciplinary hearing. Id. at ¶12, 16. 

{¶ 16} The panel and board adopted relator’s proposed sanction. Harvey 

filed objections to the board’s recommended sanction. He asserts that the 

sanction is too harsh and that the board erred in not giving mitigating weight to 

the events in his life at the time of the misconduct—his mother’s death and his 

protracted divorce. Relator, however, contends that these life events do not 

satisfy the stringent requirements of BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv) 

for a mitigating mental disability. 
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{¶ 17} We agree with relator’s contention that Harvey’s stress due to the 

sudden death of his mother at the age of 58 and his protracted divorce proceeding 

do not qualify as a mitigating mental disability. We note that in light of the fact 

that there are unique circumstances in each disciplinary case, BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B) directs the board to consider “all relevant factors,” including, but not 

limited to, the factors specifically enumerated in the rule. 

{¶ 18} On at least two occasions, we have accepted the board’s 

recommended sanction in cases in which the board considered stress as a factor in 

mitigation. In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fidler, 83 Ohio St.3d 396, 700 N.E.2d 323 

(1998), the panel received evidence that the respondent was under great personal 

stress at the time he committed two minor theft offenses. And in Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Spencer, 71 Ohio St.3d 316, 643 N.E.2d 1086 (1994), we adopted 

panel findings that the attorney’s in-laws had been living with him for about five 

months, refusing to work, and causing marital discord. While we do not accord 

evidence of stressful life events as much weight as evidence of a qualifying 

mental disability, they are, nonetheless, relevant factors that may be considered in 

determining the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s misconduct. 

{¶ 19} The primary purpose of the disciplinary process is not to punish 

the offender but to protect the public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust 

and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship. Disciplinary Counsel 

v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10. 

Harvey’s misconduct caused, at the very least, unnecessary aggravation and delay 

to his clients. But in light of the significant mitigating factors in this case—

including the stress caused by his divorce and the sudden death of his mother, but 

most importantly, Harvey’s efforts to remedy the effects of his mistakes and 

ensure that he does not make similar mistakes in the future—we believe that a 

one-year suspension, all stayed on the conditions that he commit no further 

misconduct and submit to a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance 
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with Gov.Bar R. V(9), with particular emphasis on the oversight of Harvey’s 

case-management system, will sufficiently protect the public. 

{¶ 20} Accordingly, Beauregard Maximillion Harvey is hereby suspended 

from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, but the suspension is stayed on the 

conditions that he commit no further misconduct and submit to a one-year period 

of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9). If Harvey fails to 

comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and he will serve 

the entire one-year suspension. Costs are taxed to Harvey. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL,

LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

Michael A. Bonfiglio, Bar Counsel; and Barry & Feit and Gordon R. 

Barry, for relator. 

Beauregard Maximillion Harvey, pro se. 

______________________