[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10464

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL TYRONE YOUNG, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00088-JA-PRL-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10464

Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

On appeal, Michael Tyrone Young challenges his conviction 

for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress evidence and also that § 922(g)(1)’s 

prohibition on felons possessing firearms is unconstitutional. After 

careful consideration, we affirm.

I.

In the early hours of August 31, 2021, police officers Joseph 

Tussey and Jacob Zaino stopped Young in a common area of the 

Berkeley Pointe Apartments complex in Ocala, Florida. During the 

stop, officers saw that Young was carrying a firearm and learned 

that he had a felony conviction. The officers arrested Young who 

was charged with one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted 

felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In this section, we discuss 

the proceedings related to Young’s motion to suppress and then 

review the remainder of the proceedings in his criminal case.

A.

In the district court, Young moved to suppress evidence

from the stop, arguing that the officers had violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing 

on the motion to suppress.

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At the hearing, the government presented testimony from 

several law enforcement officers, including Tussey and Zaino, as 

well as from an employee of the company that managed the Berkeley Pointe apartment complex. These witnesses testified about the

complex as well as what happened during the stop.

We begin by reviewing the evidence introduced about the 

apartment complex. Berkeley Pointe, a public-housing complex in 

Ocala, is made up of 20 two-story apartment buildings arranged in 

a circle. Each building is assigned a number and holds eight apartments, four on the bottom floor (units A through D) and four on 

the top floor (units E through H). Each floor has an open-air 

breezeway with a staircase at each end.

The entire apartment complex is surrounded by a six-foot 

tall fence. There are gates for vehicles and pedestrians to enter and 

exit the complex. The vehicle gates often have mechanical problems. When one of these gates is broken, it is left open. Next to the 

vehicle gates is a pedestrian gate. The pedestrian gate is supposed 

to lock automatically so that only residents with key cards can use 

it to enter or leave the complex. But the lock on the pedestrian gate 

is often broken, meaning that anyone can use the gate to enter the 

complex. In addition to the vehicle and pedestrian gates, there is 

another way people regularly enter and exit the complex. At the 

back of the complex, there is a chain link fence, which is broken in 

numerous places. Residents and others often enter or exit the property through the broken portions of the chain link fence.

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At the suppression hearing, the government introduced evidence about the rules regarding guests at Berkeley Pointe. Individuals must apply to live at Berkeley Pointe. To be accepted as a resident, an applicant must pass a background check and also meet the 

income requirements for public housing. Before moving in, an applicant must sign a lease and agree to the community rules. These 

rules permit residents to host guests. But management must give 

approval for any guest who stays at the complex for longer than 72 

hours. In addition, any guest who stays longer than 14 consecutive 

days is considered an unauthorized occupant.

The government also presented testimony about the prevalence of crime at Berkeley Pointe. Officers testified that the complex was in a high crime area. Crimes that have occurred at the 

complex include assaults, batteries, and shootings, as well as drug 

and gang activity. To combat crime, the owners of Berkeley Pointe

asked Ocala police to patrol the complex. They have given police 

an access code for the vehicle gate so that officers can enter quickly 

in case of emergency. And they have authorized police to issue trespass warnings to individuals encountered inside the complex who 

were not authorized to be there.

In 2021, Ocala police officers were present at the Berkeley 

Pointe complex on a regular basis. Officers patrolled the complex 

approximately 50 times each day, during the day and at night. 

Some officers would drive through the complex in their police cars 

with their lights on to make their presence known. Other officers 

including Tussey, one of the officers who stopped Young, would

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patrol the complex on foot. Tussey preferred this approach because 

there were often people sitting near the vehicle gates who would 

alert others when a police officer entered the complex. To avoid 

detection, Tussey sometimes would enter by scaling the chain link 

fence in the back. 

At the suppression hearing, Tussey and Zaino testified about 

the events that led to Young’s arrest. At approximately 1:00 a.m. 

on August 31, Tussey was on patrol with Zaino, who had recently

joined the Ocala Police Department. Because they were not busy 

with emergency calls, Tussey decided they would patrol Berkeley 

Pointe. At that time, one of the vehicle gates was broken and had 

been left open. In addition, the pedestrian gate was broken and left 

open. But Tussey and Zaino entered the complex by scaling the 

chain link fence at the back of the complex.

As they approached one of the buildings, Tussey and Zaino

heard male voices coming from the lower floor of the building. The 

officersstood at the corner of the building and observed the breezeway through a one-inch gap between the downspout and the wall. 

Tussey and Zaino saw two Black men standing at the far end 

of the unlit breezeway. Tussey suspected that lightbulbs had been 

removed from the breezeway to conceal activity. While the officers were watching the men, they heard an object hit the concrete 

floor and saw one of the men retrieve the object. Tussey could not 

identify the object but noticed that it made a heavy sound. Zaino 

saw one of the men pick up the object and put it in his waistband. 

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That man, who turned out to be Young, walked down the 

breezeway toward where the officers were hidden. After Young 

walked past Apartment D, Tussey turned on his flashlight, rounded 

the corner, and identified himself as an officer. Young turned back 

toward Apartment D, which he had just walked by, and knocked 

on the door.

When Tussey announced himself, Young told Tussey that 

he lived in the apartment. Tussey, who had previously responded 

to calls at Apartment D, knew that Young did not live there. 

Around this time, Tussey’s body camera began to record the encounter. Tussey told Young that he was at Berkeley Pointe to 

“combat all of the shootings and things like that.” Doc. 36-2 at 1.1

Tussey mentioned that Young appeared a “little nervous.” Id. 

A young boy opened the door to Apartment D and greeted 

Young and Tussey. Young yelled “Mom” into the apartment and 

attempted to run inside. Id. Tussey asked Young to have someone 

who lived in the apartment vouch that he lived there.

Soon, an older white woman came to the door. Tussey 

asked the woman if she knew the name of the man who was standing at the door. The woman answered that she did not know the 

man. Tussey then observed Young gesturing to the woman and 

trying to tell her his name. A few second later, the woman identified the man as Mike. Tussey was unconvinced that the woman 

1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

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knew him. While Tussey was standing near Young, he smelled the

odor of marijuana on Young. 

Tussey placed Young in handcuffs, saying that he was going 

to detain him while he determined whether he lived in the apartment. By this time, a crowd, including a group from Apartment B, 

had gathered in the hallway. The group was yelling and complaining about Tussey’s detention of Young. Tussey responded that 

Young was being detained but probably was not going to jail. Tussey explained that the man was “in a time, in a place, in a manner 

not usual for law-abiding citizens” because he was in a “high crime 

area” and “knocking on a stranger’s door that doesn’t know him.”

Id. at 4. Tussey also said that the man had refused to identify himself. In fact, though, Tussey had not yet asked the man for his 

name. After Tussey made this comment, Young identified himself 

as Michael Young.

Young’s cousin, who was in the crowd, questioned why 

Young was being detained, asking Tussey, “What is your probable 

cause, sir?” Id. at 5. Tussey responded that he had detained Young 

for loitering and prowling. At this point, Tussey did not mention 

smelling marijuana.

Tussey continued to question Young, asking why he was 

acting nervous and what his connection was to the apartment complex. Young told Tussey that he was nervous because Tussey had 

scared him by jumping out from behind the corner. At one point, 

Young begged Tussey not to shoot him. Tussey responded that he 

was not going to shoot and asked Young to relax. Tussey explained 

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again that Young was detained because it was the middle of the 

night and he had knocked on someone’s apartment door who did 

not know him.

After Young had been detained for a few minutes, Tussey 

stated that Young smelled like marijuana and asked when he had

last smoked. Young responded that he had smoked marijuana 

about four hours earlier but did not have any marijuana on him. 

Tussey continued to press Young about his identity. Tussey

requested identification, but Young did not have any identification 

with him. Tussey then asked Young for his Instagram handle, 

which Young readily provided. Young also offered to provide his 

Facebook account information. Around this time, Young’s cousin 

yelled something about Rodney King. Tussey responded, “Man, 

Rodney King was like 50 years ago” and told him to, “let it go.” Id. 

at 9. Tussey then asked Young for his social security number, which 

Young provided. At Tussey’s direction, Zaino radioed other officers to verify Young’s identity.

After members of the crowd said that they knew Young, 

Tussey agreed to let Young go. But before he could release Young, 

Tussey said, he needed to search Young because Young smelled of 

marijuana. He asked Young, who was sitting on the ground, to 

stand up. Young insisted that he did not have anything on him and

would not stand up. At this point, a firearm fell from the waistband 

of Young’s pants to the ground. Approximately nine minutes 

passed from the moment when Tussey pulled out the handcuffs to 

detain Young to when the firearm fell.

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Upon seeing the weapon, Tussey asked Young whether he 

had a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Young responded that

the permit was in his house. Tussey then radioed other officers to 

check whether Young had a permit. That check revealed that 

Young did not have a permit to carry a concealed weapon and that 

he was a convicted felon. Tussey placed Young under arrest.

After reviewing Young’s rights, Tussey questioned him. 

Young explained that the gun was the item he had dropped before 

the officers appeared. Young also admitted that he smelled of marijuana.

At the evidentiary hearing, Young questioned Zaino about 

whether he smelled a marijuana odor. Zaino testified that he 

smelled marijuana during the encounter. But Zaino said that he 

could not pinpoint the smell to a particular person. 

Young also introduced evidence at the hearing showing that 

Tussey had previously given a false statement in connection with 

another investigation. In 2015, Tussey was part of a team that was 

executing a warrant to arrest a fugitive. Tussey’s police report 

stated that he had given a verbal warning before entering a hotel 

room where he believed the fugitive to be. But footage captured 

from Tussey’s body camera showed that he identified himself as a 

maintenance worker, not a law enforcement officer, when he entered the room. An internal investigation later found that Tussey 

made a false statement in an official report. Because of the false 

statement, the state ended up dropping some charges against the 

fugitive, Tussey was required to take 40 hours of unpaid leave, and 

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a state attorney recommended that Tussey wear a body camera 

when executing warrants. 

At the hearing, Young called one witness: Shawneeka 

Townsend, his girlfriend who lived in the Berkeley Pointe complex. Townsend testified that on August 31, Young was staying at 

her apartment. According to Townsend, Young sometimes stayed

at the apartment for more than three days at a time but never for 

more than 14 consecutive days.

After the evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny the motion to suppress. The 

magistrate judge began by considering whether Young had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the Berkeley Pointe complex such that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the officers were present inside the complex without 

a warrant. The magistrate judge assumed that Young was a resident or a guest at the complex but concluded that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the complex. The magistrate judge found that the complex was “not fully 

enclosed and secured from the public,” noting that anyone could 

access the complex through the pedestrian gate or by climbing over 

the damaged chain link fence. Doc. 46 at 10. Because the breezeway where the officers encountered Young was “open and accessible to . . . the public at large” and because the management of the 

complex had given police permission to routinely patrol the complex, the magistrate judge concluded that Young had no reasonable 

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expectation of privacy in the common areas of the complex. Id. at 

11.

The magistrate judge then considered whether a Fourth 

Amendment violation occurred during the officers’ interaction 

with Young. The magistrate judge determined that the officers’ initial interaction with Young did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because after seeing two men in the unlit breezeway late at 

night, the officers “were free to approach and ask questions.” Id.

But the analysis changed when Tussey detained Young to 

conduct a further investigation. The magistrate judge concluded 

that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because at the time 

that Young was detained, the officers had reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity. The magistrate judge explained that the officers 

briefly detained Young to conduct a further investigation after observing him in a darkened hallway late at night and seeing him drop 

and retrieve a heavy object that could have been a weapon. When 

the officers approached Young, he became nervous and attempted 

to enter Apartment D. Young then “ignored” Tussey’s questions 

about who lived in the apartment and instead called “Mom” or 

“Mama” into the apartment. Id. at 13. The magistrate judge found

that when the tenant of the apartment came out, she “initially did 

not know [Young’s] name” and changed her answer only “after 

Young mouthed something to her.” Id. The magistrate judge also 

noted that during this interaction, Tussey observed that Young 

smelled of marijuana. The magistrate judge concluded that these 

facts created reasonable suspicion that Young had committed the 

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Florida crime of loitering or prowling. Further, the odor of marijuana justified Young’s detention.

In making these findings, the magistrate judge credited Tussey’s testimony. The magistrate judge rejected Young’s argument 

that Tussey was not credible because of the previous incident when 

he had been disciplined for making a false report. In making this 

credibility determination, the magistrate judge noted that Tussey’s 

testimony about the stop was consistent with his body camera footage. Although Tussey’s statement that he could smell marijuana on 

Young was not corroborated by Zaino, the magistrate judge determined that it was consistent with Young’s admissions that he had 

smoked marijuana earlier that day and that he smelled of marijuana.

Young objected to the recommendation. The district court 

overruled the objection, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and denied the motion to suppress.

B.

After the district court denied the motion to suppress, 

Young agreed to a bench trial based on stipulated facts. The district 

court found Young guilty of possessing a firearm as a convicted 

felon. He was sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. This is Young’s appeal. 

II.

When we review the denial of a suppression motion, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, viewing the 

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evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United 

States v. Spivey, 861 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2017). We review de 

novo the district court’s application of the law to the facts. Id.

Although we generally review de novo the constitutionality 

of a statute, we review for plain error when a defendant raises his 

constitutional challenge to his statute of conviction for the first 

time on appeal. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 

2010). To show plain error, a defendant must establish (1) there was 

error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial 

rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. An error is plain only if it 

is contrary to a federal statute or on-point precedent from this 

Court or the United States Supreme Court. United States v. Hoffman, 

710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2013).

III.

Young raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the 

district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Second, 

he argues that the federal prohibition on felons possessing firearms 

is unconstitutional. We address each issue in turn.

A.

The Fourth Amendment secures the right of the people to 

be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and only those individuals with a legitimate expectation of 

privacy have standing to challenge the validity of a government 

search. United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998). 

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“The individual challenging the search bears the burdens of proof 

and persuasion.” Id.

Young argues on appeal that the officers violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights in two ways. First, he says that a constitutional 

violation occurred when the officers scaled the fence to access the 

common areas of the Berkeley Pointe complex because the officers 

did not have a warrant or permission from the complex’s management to enter through the back fence. Second, he arguesthat a constitutional violation occurred when the officers detained him and 

questioned him for approximately nine minutes before discovering 

that he had a gun. We address each issue in turn.

As to the first, Young says that a constitutional violation occurred when the officers climbed over the fence because he had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the 

Berkely Pointe complex where he was a guest. We disagree.

An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy if he 

has a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 

recognize as objectively reasonable. United States v. Miravalles, 

280 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2002). An occupant other than the 

owner or lessee of an apartment must “demonstrate a significant 

and current interest in the searched premises in order to establish 

an expectation of privacy.” United States v. Garcia, 741 F.2d 363, 366 

(11th Cir. 1984). An occupant’s status as an overnight guest generally bestows upon him an expectation of privacy in the premises. 

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1990). 

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This appeal calls on us to decide whether a guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy not in the apartment where he is 

visiting but instead in a common area in a multi-unit apartment

complex. We have held that there is no reasonable expectation of 

privacy in such a common area when it is inside a building that is 

locked but the lock is “undependable” or “inoperable.” See Miravalles, 280 F.3d at 1333. We have explained that to expect privacy in a

common area that is “open and accessible not only to all the many 

tenants and their visitors, to the landlord and all its employees, to 

workers of various types, and to delivery people of all kinds, but 

also to the public at large” is “not only unreasonable, but foolhardy.” Id.

We likewise conclude that Young did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the common areas of the apartment complex. It’s true that the Berkeley Pointe complex was surrounded by 

a fence and had gates. But the record reflects that at least one of the 

vehicle gates and the pedestrian gate were inoperable, meaning anyone could use them to access the complex. In addition, members 

of the public could accessthe complex’s common areas by climbing 

over the rear chain-link fence. Because the record reflects that anyone could access the complex’s common areas on August 31, we 

cannot say that Young had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the common areas. See id.2

2 Young also argues that a constitutional violation occurred when officers accessed the common area of the complex because they committed a trespass 

when they entered the property by hopping the chain link fence. Even 

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We now turn to Young’s second argument: that a Fourth 

Amendment violation occurred when the officers questioned him. 

To start, we conclude that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the officers initially spoke with Young. It is well established that “[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a 

policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.” 

United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

But the Fourth Amendment was implicated when, after 

speaking to the tenant in Apartment D, the officers briefly detained 

Young to conduct a further investigation because at that point a 

reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter. See United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 

2011). Under the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement officer 

may conduct a brief seizure or investigatory detention, known as a 

Terry stop,3 if (1) the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in, or is about to be involved in, criminal activity, 

and (2) the stop is “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 

which justified the interference in the first place.” Id.

To establish reasonable suspicion, there must be “a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make 

assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when officers commit a trespass, see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), we cannot say that any trespass occurred here because the management of the complex had given officers 

permission to enter the complex to patrol common areas.

3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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the intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest reasonable.” 

United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this inquiry, a court considers 

“the totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the officer 

had a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal 

wrongdoing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The officer 

must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the intrusion. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, after considering the totality of the circumstances, we 

conclude that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity when they detained Young.4 The officers had observed 

Young with another individual in the middle of the night in a darkened hallway of a high-crime area. They saw Young drop a heavy 

object that he then placed in his waistband. Young proceeded to 

walk by Apartment D. But when Tussey appeared, Young immediately turned around, knocked on the door of Apartment D, and 

tried to run inside, suggesting that he was trying to elude the officers. Young also told Tussey that he lived in Apartment D when he 

did not. And the officers observed that the tenant in the apartment 

did not know Young’s name until he mouthed it to her. On top of 

that, Tussey smelled the odor of marijuana on Young. Considering 

4 Young does not dispute that at this stage of the encounter he was subjected 

to a Terry stop but had not yet been placed under arrest. See United States v. 

Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (recognizing that an officer may perform a 

Terry stop to “detain [a] person briefly while attempting to obtain further information”).

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the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officers had 

a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Young was 

engaged in wrongdoing. Because the officers had reasonable suspicion, we hold that no constitutional violation occurred when the 

officers briefly detained Young to investigate further.

Young argues that in assessing whether there was reasonable suspicion we should not consider the fact that the tenant in 

Apartment D did not immediately recognize him because she later

stated that she knew him. We disagree. The magistrate judge’s factual findings, which the district court adopted, reflect that the tenant identified Young by name only after he mouthed something to 

her. Accordingly, in assessing whether there was reasonable suspicion, we may consider that the tenant initially stated that she did 

not know Young. 

Young also says that the district court clearly erred in crediting Tussey’s testimony, including about smelling marijuana on 

Young. Young points to, among other things, the incident when 

Tussey was disciplined for making a false statement in a police report. Certainly, this evidence shows that on another occasion Tussey made a false statement in connection with his police work. But 

we cannot say that this one instance compelled the district court to 

find Tussey’s testimony not credible, particularly given that his testimony about the incident with Young was generally consistent 

with the events captured by his body camera. See United States v. 

Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193, 1199 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that we must 

accept a district court’s credibility determination “unless it is 

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contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable 

on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

Young also challenges the scope of the detention, arguing 

that it was unreasonable for the officers to detain him for approximately nine minutes. When an officer conducts an investigative detention, the length of the detention must be limited in duration “to 

the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” United 

States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).

Here, the duration of the stop was reasonable. The record 

reflects that before finding the firearm, the officers detained Young 

for about nine minutes. During this time, they investigated why 

Young was present in the apartment complex in a high-crime area 

late at night while attempting to verify his identity and address as 

well as determine whether there was anyone in the Berkeley Pointe 

complex who could vouch for him. Accordingly, we reject Young’s 

argument that the detention was unreasonable in scope. See id.

(concluding that a detention of 14 minutes was “certainly not unreasonable on its face”).

B.

We now turn to Young’s challenge to the constitutionality 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which generally prohibits individuals with 

felony convictions from possessing firearms or ammunition. According to Young, this prohibition runs afoul of the Second Amendment, which states that: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 

to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 

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bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Because 

Young raises this argument for the first time on appeal, we review 

for plain error only.5 We conclude that he cannot demonstrate 

plain error.

To assess the constitutionality of the prohibition on felons 

possessing firearms, we begin with the Supreme Court’s decision 

in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Heller, the 

Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a District of 

Columbia law that barred the private possession of handguns in 

homes. Id. at 635. After considering both the text and history of the 

Second Amendment, the Court concluded that it conferred on an 

individual a right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 595. The Court ultimately held that the ban on handgun possession in the home 

5 Young argues that we should review this issue de novo even though he did 

not raise it below because he is making a constitutional challenge to the statute 

of his conviction. To support his position, he cites to the Supreme Court’s decision in Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018). In Class, the Supreme Court 

held that a defendant’s guilty plea did not waive his right to raise on appeal a 

Second Amendment challenge to the federal statute prohibiting possession of 

a firearm on the grounds of the United States Capitol. The Court explained 

that the plea did not waive the constitutional challenge because the “challenge 

[did] not in any way deny that [the defendant] engaged in the conduct to which 

he admitted” when he pleaded guilty. Id. at 183. But nothing in Class addressed 

whether such a constitutional claim is reviewed for plain error when a defendant raises it for the first time on appeal. We conclude that plain error review 

applies. See United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 828–29 & n.18 (11th Cir. 

2024) (explaining that plain error review applies to a “garden variety constitutional attack” that the defendant failed to raise in the district court); Wright, 

607 F.3d at 715.

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violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 635. But the Court 

acknowledged that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 

arms was “not unlimited,” emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on 

the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. at 626. 

Indeed, the Court labeled these restrictions as “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 627 n.26. 

After Heller, we considered a constitutional challenge to 

§ 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing firearms. See United 

States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2010). We rejected this 

challenge, holding that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the 

Second Amendment.” Id. at 771. We noted that Heller recognized 

that prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was a “presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Several years later, the Supreme Court considered a Second 

Amendment challenge to New York’s gun-licensing regime that 

limited when a law-abiding citizen could obtain a license to carry a 

firearm outside the home. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen 

597 U.S. 1, 11 (2022). The Court recognized that “the Second and 

Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a 

handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Id. at 10. The Court 

explained that to determine whether a restriction on firearms was 

constitutional, courts must begin by asking whether the firearm 

regulation at issue governs conduct that falls within the plain text 

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of the Second Amendment. Id. at 17. If the regulation does cover

such conduct, the court may uphold it only if the government “affirmatively prove[s] that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and 

bear arms.” Id. at 19. Bruen emphasized that Heller established the 

correct test for determining the constitutionality of gun restrictions. See id. at 39. And, like Heller, Bruen described Second 

Amendment rights as extending only to “law-abiding, responsible 

citizens.” Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Young challenges § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing firearms based on Bruen. He points out that his felony convictions arose from controlled substances offenses and argues that 

“our nation’s historical traditions do not support disarming people 

because of only nonviolent felony convictions.” Appellant’s Br. 61. 

Young cannot demonstrate plain error because he has not 

identified any on-point precedent from this Court or the United 

States Supreme Court holding that § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing firearms is unconstitutional. To the contrary, 

Young’s constitutional argument is foreclosed by precedent. After 

Bruen, we considered another Second Amendment challenge to 

§ 922(g)(1). See United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 

2024). We held that the challenge was foreclosed by Rozier, which 

“interpreted Heller as limiting the [Second Amendment] right to 

law-abiding and qualified individuals and as clearly excluding felons 

from those categories by referring to felon-in-possession bans as 

presumptively lawful.” Id. at 1293 (internal quotation marks 

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omitted). Although the defendant argued that Bruen abrogated our 

decision in Rozier, we observed that even in Bruen, the Supreme 

Court continued to describe the right to bear arms as extending 

only to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We thus concluded that Bruen did not abrogate 

Rozier. Because Rozier foreclosed a Second Amendment challenge 

to § 922(g)(1), we affirmed the defendant’s conviction. Id.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. 

Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024), does not change our analysis. In 

Rahimi, the Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to 

the federal statute that prohibits an individual who is subject to a 

domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm 

when the order includes a finding that he represents a credible 

threat to the safety of an intimate partner or a child of that partner 

or individual. See id. at 1898 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)). In Rahimi, 

the Court held that this firearm restriction was constitutional. And 

it once again declared that the prohibition on “the possession of 

firearms by ‘felons’ . . . [is] ‘presumptively lawful.’” Id. at 1902

(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627 n.26). 

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of 

the district court.

AFFIRMED.

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