Plaintiff’s Complaint named as the De fenda nt the then-Commissioner of Social 1 Security , J o Anne B . Ba

rnhar t. As Ms. Bar

nhart wa s sued in her of

ficial c apac ity , the Court has substitut ed the c urre nt Comm issioner of Social Secur ity , Michae l J . Astrue, a s the Def endant pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 25(d)
. DEENA H ARTL I

NE, Plaintiff,
v. MI CHAEL

J . ASTRUE, Commi ssioner of S o c i a l S e c ur i ty, De fe nd ant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 06-219 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (Mar ch 31, 2009) Plaintiff Deena

Har tline bring s this action seekingrevie w of De fenda nt’s final administrative dec ision denying he r cla im for Disability Insuranc e B enef

its (“DI B” ) and Supplemental Security

Income B enef

its (“SSI B” ) pursua

nt to 42 U.S.C . § 405(g ). Pending befor e the Court ar e Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reve rsal and D efe ndant’s Motion for J udg ment of Aff

irmance . After

revie wingthe Parties’ br iefs, the a dminist rative r ecor d, and the rele vant ca se law, the Court shall DENY [7] Plaintiff’s Motion for J udg ment of Rever sal and GRANT [10] Def

endant’ s Motion for J udg ment of Aff irmance , for the r easons that f ollow. 1 I. BACKG ROUND A. Le

ga l F ra me wor k an d Pro c e du ra l H

istor y P l a i n t i f f D e e n a H art l i n e p e t i t i o n e d

th e S o c i a l S e c ur i ty

A dm i n i s tr at i o nf

o r D IB an d S S IB pursuant to Titles I Iand XVI of the Social Sec urity

Act on Jul y

21, 1998. See Pl.’s Mot. at 1. To2

qualify for SSI B a

nd DI B, a claimant must demonstrate a n “inability

to eng ag e in any

substantial g ainful ac tivity

by rea son of any

medically

deter minable phy sical or menta l impairment,”
c ou ple d w ithan in a

bil ity to “ e ng a g e in a

ny oth e r k ind

of su bs tanti a l g a inf

ul w or k whic h e xists in the natio na l e c on omy .” 42 U. S.C. § 4 23 (d )( 1) -( 2) ; see id. § 1 38 2c (a )( 3) . B y satis fy ingbo th conditions, a claimant is “disable d” for purposes of the Social Security Act. To de cide whe ther a
c la ima nt h a s p ro ve n s he is d isa

ble d, the AL J must

us e a fi ve -s te p s e qu e nti a l ana ly sis . 2 0 C. F .R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps re quire a deter mination of (1) c urre nt work ac tivity ; (2)
sever ity of the impairments; (3) whether the impairment mee ts or equals a listed impairment; (4) if the impairment pre vents claimant fr om doing pa st work; (5) if the impairment preve nts her fr om d oin goth e r w or

k u po n c on sid e ratio n o f t

he c la ima nt’ s r e sid ua l f un c tio na l c a

pa c ity (“RF C”). Id
. Plaintiff is a 41-y ear -old fema le re sident of Washington, D.C. See P l
. ’s M o t . at2
. A h i gh school g raduate who attende d colleg e for one y ear , Plaintiff worked a s a danc er, w aitress a nd office secr etar

y for a cab c ompany

befor e her

impairments alleg edly

rende red he r unable to work from May 22, 1997, until J anuar

y 2002. Id. ; Administ rative Rec ord (“ A.R.”) at 84, 351, 366-70. In her a pplication for DI B a

nd SSI B, Plaintiff a lleg ed that her disabiliti es included low ba ck pain, legpain, depr ession, anxiety and bipolar disorde r. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2; A.R. at 17. Pla int if f’ s c la ims we re ini tia lly

de nie d. A. R. at 49 , 5 3; see id. at 33 (“ [y ]our ov e ra ll medical c ondition does cause some restric tions. However , there are still some ty pes of wor

k y ou
c an p e rf or m” ); id. at 35 (“ [w] e re alize that y our condition preve nts y ou from doingthe ty pe of work that you have done in the past, but it does not prevent you from doingless demanding
wo rk ”)
. Fo l l o wi n g th i s d en i al , P l ai n t i ff re qu es t eda h ea ri n g b ef

o re an Ad m i n i s tra t i v e LawJ u d gePur su ant t o 2 0 C. F .R. §§ 40 4. 15 20 and 41 6. 92 0, the AL J note d th at “ [i]f the c la ima int is 2 perf orming substantial ga inful work, she is not disabled.” Id. at 17. For rea sons he did not articulate, howeve r, the AL J “ele cted to proc eed w ith the five-step se quential eva luation.” Id. The Court shall there fore addre ss the same. 3 (“A L J ”). Id. at 56. That he aringoccur red on Aug ust 8, 2000. Id. at 347. I n a dec ision dated November

22, 2000, the AL J denied Plaintiff’s r equeste d benef its. Id. at 39-48. Plaintiff soug ht revie w of this decision by the Appea ls Council. Id. at 71 . O n M arc h 2 6, 20 04 , th e Ap pe a ls Council remande d the ca se to the AL J with instructions to reevaluate Plaintiff’s claim in light of additional medical e vidence and issue a ne w dec ision. Id. at 77 (“ This evidence relates to the
se ve ri ty of the c la ima

nt’ s a ff e c tiv e dis or de r a

nd ly mph od e ma

in h e r l e g s a

nd may su g g e st
sever ity g reater than the Administrative L aw Judge found. This evidenc e should be a ddresse d and eva luated.”) . Acc ording ly , a sec ond hear ing be fore the AL J was he ld on October 13, 2004. Id. at 364. Plaintiff was re prese nted by counsel, a

nd Kathlee n S. Sampeck, a voc ational expert (“V E”), te stified. Id. at 364. On Fe bruar

y 28, 2005, the AL J issued a dec ision that ag ain denied Plaintiff’ s claim for be ne fi ts. A. R. at 16 -2 4. At Ste p O ne , th e AL J note d th at Pla int if f h a d b e e n e ng a g e d in signific ant g ainful ac tivity since 2002. Id. at 17 ; see id. at 369; Pl.’s Mot. at 2 n.1. At S tep

2 Two, he de termined that the me dical evide nce e stablished that Plaintiff suffer ed fr om “a ‘ sever e’ phy sical impairment as a

result of “ ly

mphedema a

nd deg ener ative joint disease” and a “ ‘seve re’
m e n t a l i mp a i r

m e n tata l l t i m e s r e l e v an tt o th i s d e c i s i o n . ” A
. R
. at1 8
. A tS t e p T h r e e , th e A LJ deter mined that Plaintiff’s impairments wer e not “manif ested at a degree of seve rity which
satis fi e [d]” any

of the L ist ing s o f Impa ir

me nts at App e nd ix 1, S ub pa rt P, N o. 4 ( 20 C.F .R § 404.1520(d)) . A.R. at 18. Wit h reg ard to Plaintiff’s phy sical condition, the AL J found no4

e vid e nc e that sh ow e d “ sh e is una ble to e ff e c tiv e ly ambu late or

pe rf or m f ine and g ro ss movements eff

ectively as def ined by L istings 1.02A/B ” nor e vidence of “doc umented ner ve root compre ssion, spinal arac hnoiditis , or lumbar spinal stenosis to the degree require d by L isting 1.04.” Id. In evaluating Plaintiff’s menta l impairment, the AL J found that “none of the functional limitation categ ories ar e manife sted at a de g ree which satisfie[d]” L istings 12.04 or 12.08. Id. Specifica lly , the AL J found that Plaintiff’s impairment re sulted in no more than moderate limitation on her “ac tiviti es of da ily living,” “ social func tioning,” “ conce ntration, persistenc e and pa ce,” and that no evide nce show ed a “ deter ioration or dec ompensation in work or work- like settings.” Id. at 19. At Step Four, the AL J found that Plaintiff’s past re levant wor k “would be pr eclude d g iven her curr ent level of

restric tion.” Id. at 21. At Step Five, the AL J deter mined, “base d upon th e c l ai m an t ’s re s i d

u al fu n ct i o n al cap ac i ty , th at“s h e i s cap ab l e o f p er fo rm i n g a s i gn i fi ca n tra n ge of lig ht work . . . .” Id. at 22. See ge nerally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967. Findingthe VE’s testimony cre dible as to the ava ilability of jobs that fit within the above limitations in t he
e c on omy , th e AL J con c lud e d th at “ [the c la ima nt] i s c a pa ble of makin ga su c c e ssf ul a dju stm e nt t o
wo rk that e xists in s ig nif

ic ant n umb e rs in t

he natio na l e c on omy . Afi nd ingof ‘n ot d isa ble d’ is the re fo re re a c he d w ith in t he fr ame wo rk

of Me dic a l- Vo c atio na l Ru le 20 2. 20 .” A. R. at 23. Plaintiff sought re view of this dec ision by the Appea ls Council. Id. at 12. On De cembe r 8, 2005, the Appea ls Council upheld the decision of the AL J , finding no basis for grantingthe re quest for revie w. Id. at 7. Havingexhausted her a dminist rative r emedies, Plaintiff ha s broug ht this actionThe Court notes that ther e is some inconsistency in the rec ords as to whe ther Plaintiff 3 se e ks c ur re nt d isa bil ity be ne fi ts o r b e ne fi ts f

or a c los e d p e ri od

of un e mpl oy

me nt. Ac c or din gto the Complaint, “Plainti ff c an no long er e ng ag e in her past rele vant work or

any other substantial g ainful ac tivity .” Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 5. Pl aintiff, howe ver, c urre ntly works full-time as a

phone operator for a

cab c ompany , and has be en employ ed in such c apac ity since January

2002. A.R. at 367-69. F urthermor e, at the most re cent a dminist rative he aring , counsel for the Plaintiff indicated that “ this is a case f or a c losed period of

disability benef its . . . when Claimant was unemploy ed.” A .R. at 385. Counsel further e x plained that “she is manag ing to do wor k, althoug h somewhat a ccommodate d” and that the work would proba bly qualify as substantial g ainful employ

ment “espe cially

g iven the leng th of time she’s held he r cur rent e mploy

ment.” Id. Th e Court

ne ve rt he le ss n e e d n ot r e so lve thi s d isc re pa nc y ba se d o n it s r e so lut ion

of the pa rt ie s’ mot ion s. 5 seekingjudicial revie w. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. 3 B. Ev ide nc e Con tai ne d in theAd mi nis tra tiv e Re c or

d The AL J evaluated Plaintiff' s condition based on evide nce inc luding va rious medical
rec ords (both phy sical and me ntal health re cords) and the testimony of Plaintiff and the V E duringthe administrative hea ringin this case. The Court rec ounts below the most releva nt portions of the administrative re cord.

1. Phy sical He alth Records On J uly 23, 1997, Plaintiff beg an a se ries of hospital visits for her lower ba ck pain. See A.R. at 145; 188. Plainti ff indicated duringthese visits that her bac k pain, which ha d been a
re c ur ri ngpr ob le m f

or the pa st s e ve ra l y e ars , w a s tr ig g e re d whe n s he e ng a g e d in ho us e ho ld chore s such as wa shing the dishes and moppingthe floor. Id. at 188. Whil e the e x aminations
re ve a le d “ te nd e rn e ss o n e ith e r s ide of the sp ine ,” the re c or ds ind ic ate d th at Pla int if f w a s “ [a]b le to bend forw ard & straig hten.” Id. On July 15 , 1 99 7, Pla int if

f b e g an a se ri e s o f v isi ts i n
connec tion with swelling and le sions on her leg s and fe et. Id. at 173-86. Plaintiff wa s diag nosedThe re cord a lso indicates that the AL J , as we ll as the Plaintiff’s psy chiatrist, Dr. Ma rk 4 Publicker, M.D., cha

rac terized the swellingin Plainti ff’ s leg s as “ly mphedema.” Id. at 18; 144- 47. 6 wi th e de ma

and c e llu lit is, and

pr e sc ri be d me dic atio n f

or the se c on dit ion s. Id. at 144; 173-186. 4 Plaintiff continued re ceivingtreatment and medication for these c onditions t hroug h J uly 21, 2000. Id. at 301-34. A n umb e r o f p hy sic ians e xami ne d Pl a int if f a nd e va luate d h e r m e dic a l hi sto ry in
c onne c tio n w ithon g oin gtr e atme nt a nd he r d isa bil ity c la ims . O n Augus t 4, 19 98 , D r. He nr y R. Her bert, M.D., a

n occupa tional medicine spec ialist, ex amined Plaintiff. Id. at 143-45. Dr
. Her bert noted that Plainti ff r etained “ complete r ang e of motion of her lower e x tremities” and that the “[r]ang e of motion of the ba ck is compromised in that she c an only bringher ha

nds to the level of he r knee s.” Id. at 144. Dr. H erbe rt indicated that Plainti ff “ is not able to perf orm a job wh ic h w ou ld r e qu ir e e xten de d p e ri od s o f s tand ingor wa lki ng , [th ou g h] sh e a

pp e ars to b e a

ble to perf orm sedenta

ry work with no lifting, pushing , pulling or c arr ying mor e than 10 lb.” Id. at 143. On Novembe r 6, 1998, R.S. Kadian, M.D., a state ag ency

phy sician, eva luated Plaintiff’s
me dic a l hi sto ry

to d e te rm ine he r p hy sic a l r e sid ua l f un c tio n c a

pa c ity (“ RF C” ). Withre g ard

to specific exertional limi tations, Dr. Kadia n deter mined that Plaintiff could occa sionally lift 10 pounds, fre quently

lift less than 10 pounds, stand or walk f or at lea st 2 hours in an 8-hour workda y , sit for a total of a

bout 6 hours in an 8-hour w orkday and eng ag e in an unlimited amount of pu sh ingand

pu lli ng . A .R. at 22 0. In h is r e po rt , D r. Ka dia n r e du c e d Pl a int if

f’ s RF C to “sede ntary” bec ause of

the pain in her

leg s and bac k and her

inability to stand and wa lk for pr olo ng e d p e ri od s o f t ime . A .R. at 22 5. Dr . K a dia n in dic ate d th at “ [n]o f

ur the r r e du c tio n in RFC or findingof total disability is supported by

objective medic al finding s.” Id.7

On J uly 7, 1999, Dr. De v Chhabra, M.D ., a state a g ency medical c onsultant, ex amined the Plaintiff and orde red a

n x -ra y of her spine. Id. at 217-18. Dr . Chhabra r eporte d that the x-ray showed “ mild DJ D [deg ener ative joint disease] . . . and mild scoliosis.” Id. at 217. Dr. Chhabr a conclude d that “the patient can sit, stand and wa lk with [ a] normal g ait, and has a history of bipolar disorder . The sy

mptoms are under

control with medication.” Id. at 218. On May 9, 2000, Dr. Mar

tin H. Stein, M.D., who was treating Plaintiff for her a ffe ctive disorder, r efe rre d her to Ka iser Medic al bec ause of “at lea st 50-100 scratch induced sc ars on e ach leg. . . .and ce llulit is on her lef t shin.” Id. at 291. Dr. Stein also indicate d that he wa s “treating her a g g ressively

for he r obsessive pickingwhich may be the or igin of

her infe ction.” Id. at 292. Plaintiff subsequently

rec eived a

ntibioti cs for

the lesions on her le g s, and, on May 12, 2000, and ag ain on May

15, 2000, her doc tor noted that Plaintiff’s condition was improving
. See id. at 308- 9. On J une 6, 2000, af

ter a visit wit h Plaintiff, Dr. Stein repor ted that “[h]er leg s are no longe r ery thematous. She rema ins in treatment with Kaiser . . . . She repor

ts her pickingon her skin has decr ease d.” Id. at 293.

2. Mental He alth Records The re cords indicate that seve ral menta l health spec ialists have eva luated Plaintiff during the per iod of alleg ed disability
. See id. at 139-72; 198-215; 227-58; 269-95. Plaintiff visited Dr. Mark Pub lic ke r, M. D. , a

ps y c hiatr ist , at le a st o nc e e ve ry six mo nth s f

ro m Ma rc h 1 1, 19 96 , to Fe bruar y 11, 1999, and kept in “w eekly telephone c ontact” w ith him during this time. Id. at 232; see id. at 139-72. Ac cordingto the rec ords, one pur pose of these visits was to evaluate how Plaintiff was re sponding to pre scribed me dications for a nx iety and bipolar disorde r. See id. at 139-72. On Oc tober 22, 1998, Dr . Publicker re ported that Plaintiff wa s “stable on klonapin f orA G AF ratin gbe tw e e n 7 1 a nd 80 re fl e c ts “ no mor e tha

n s light i mpa ir

me nt i n s oc ia l, 5 occupational or school funtioning .” De f.’s Mot. at 14 n.8 (c iting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Me ntal Disorder s, Fourth Ed., A m. Psy ch. Assoc., p. 32)
. A GAF ratingof 41 to 50 is assessed to re flec t “serious sy mptoms (e.g ., suicidal 6 ideation, seve re obse ssional rituals, freque nt shoplifting) or a ny sever e impairment in social fu nc tio nin g(e .g ., no fr ie nd s, un a ble to k e e p a

job ). ” De f. ’s Mo t. at 17 n. 10 (c iti ngDi a g no sti c and Statistical Manual of Me ntal Disorder s, Fourth Ed., A m. Psy ch. Assoc., p. 32) ; Pl.’s Mot . at 7 n.2. 8 panic,” “ca lm, . . . org anized, unpressure d, [wit h] no t houg ht proce ss disturbance.” Id. at 142. Duringthis evaluation, he a lso indicated that the Plaintiff’s Globa l Assessment of F unction (“G AF” ) wa s 75, the hig hest it had bee n duringthe past twelve months. A.R. at 142. 5 On Octobe r 28, 1998, Dr. Ca rlos Hec ker, M.D., a

psy chiatrist, eva luated the Plaintiff. Id. at 198-201. Dr . Hec ker r eporte d that Plaintiff crie d intermittently

duringthe session . . . . She was f ully oriented a

nd had e sse nti a lly

an inta c t r e c e nt a

nd re mot e me mor

y . A t ti me s, it w a s d if

fi c ult fo r h e r t o conce ntrate a

nd she appe are d to be distracte d. Her mood was distinctly

sad and her a ffe ct re sponded ac cording ly . She had no psychotic proc ess including hallucinations and de lusions. Her insight wa s fair a nd her judg ment was fa ir as we ll. He r i nte lli g e nc e a

pp e are d to be ave ra g e . T he re we re no unus ua l ma nn e ri sms of spee ch and be havior. Id. at 200. Acc ordingto Dr. He cker ’s re port, Plaintiff indicated that he r “de pression ha[d] improved g reatly ” bec ause of medication pre scribed ove r the pa st two y ear s. Id. at 198. Additionally , Dr. He cker

indicated that the Plaintiff’ s Global Assessment of F unction (“G AF” ) was 50. A.R. at 200.

6 On Novembe r 2, 1998, Tar as J. C erke vitch, Ph.D., a psy cholog ist, evaluated Plaintiff’s file and c ompleted a psychiatric revie w technique form. Id. at 202-215. Dr . Cerkevitch’ s form ind ic ate s th at Pla int if

f’ s me nta l im

pa ir me nts we re se ve re , b ut t

hat th e y we re no t se ve re e no ug h to meet or e qual a listed impairment. Id. at 209. Specifica lly , Dr. Cer kevitch’s r eport indicated thatA G AF ratin gbe tw e e n 6 1 a nd 70 ind ic ate s th at a

patie nt i s su ff

e ri ngfr om “ so me mil d 7 sy mptoms (e.g ., depre ssed mood and mild insomni a)” or “some dif ficulty in social, occ upational or sc ho ol f un c tio nin g(e .g ., oc c a sio na l tr ua nc y , o r t he ft wi thi n th e ho us e ho ld) , b ut g e ne ra lly functioningpretty

well and ha s some meaning ful interper sonal relationships.” Def.’s Mot. at 14 n.9 (citingDiag nostic and Statistical Manual of Me ntal Disorder s, Fourth Ed., A m. Psy ch. Assoc., p. 32). 9 Plaintiff: (1) experienc ed a “ Slight” “Re striction of Activities of Da ily L iving,” (2) showe d “Moder ate” “Diff

iculties in Maintaining Social F unctioning,” (3) “ Often” exhibi ted “De ficienc ies of Conce ntration, Persistence or Pace ,” and ( 4) “N ever ” suff ere d from “E pisodes of De terioration or Dec ompensation in Work or Work-L ike Settings.” Id. at 209. See ge nerally 20 C.F .R. Pt. 40 4, Sub pt. P, App . 1 , § § 1 2. 04 , 1 2. 08 (r e qu ir inga fi nd ingof

“ mark e d” dif

fi c ult ie s or “r epeated” e pisodes of dete rioration bef ore a disability deter mination). Acc ording ly , Dr. Cerkevitch c onducted a

mental RFC (“ MRFC”) a ssessment based on Plaintiff’s a ffe ctive and persona lity

disorders. SeeA. R. at 20 2, 21 1. Ac c or din gto D r. Ce rk e vit c h’ s MRF C a sse ssm e nt, Pla int if f w a s “ Mo de rate ly

L imi te d” in t e n o f t

he tw e nty lis te d me nta l a c tiv iti e s, but “ Ma rk e dly L imited” in none of the c ateg ories. Id. at 211-12. In summary , Dr. Cer kevitch re ports that Plaintiff had “e noug h MFRC to understand, re call . . . & persist on simple tasks,” “c an ada pt . . . to most environments and ca n maintain social intera ction in low demand envir onments. . . .” Id. at 213. On

F e br ua ry 11 , 1 99 9, Dr . Pu

bli c ke r e xami ne d Pl a int if f, and ind ic ate d in

his pr og re ss notes that her bipolar

disorder w as “in re mission” and that her G AF w as 65. Id. at 139. 7 Subsequently , Dr. Publicker f illed out an evaluation, in the form of a c hecklist, reg arding Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder , and cha rac terized her c ondition differe ntly than he ha d previously
. See id. at 232-34. Ac cordingto this checklist, Plainti ff’ s condition resulted in a “ [m ]arkedDr. Stein indicated that Plainti ff suff ere d from anhe donia, sleep disturba nce, 8 py sc ho mot or

a g itatio n o r r e tard atio n, de c re a se d e ne rgy , f e e lin g s o f guil t or

wo rt hle ssn e ss, dif fi c ult y c on c e ntr atin gor

thi nk ing , th ou g hts of

su ic ide , h a llu c inatio ns , d e lus ion s o r p ara no id thi nk ing , hy

pe ra c tiv ity , p re ssu

re of sp e e c h, fl ig ht o f i de a s, e a sy dis tr a c tib ili ty , invo lve me nt i n activities that have a hig h probability of painful c onsequenc es which a re not re cog nized. Id. at 229-230. Dr. Stein did not indicate whe ther or not Plaintiff suff ere d from appe tite disturbance with chang e in weight. Id. at 229. 10 restric tion of daily

living,” “ [m ]arked diffic ulties in maintaining social f unctioning,” “[d] efic iencies of

conce ntration, persistenc e or pa ce” and “[r]epeated episodes of deter ioration or decompe nsation in work or wor k-like setting s.” Id. at 234. Dr. Publicker added that Plainti ff had an “ [i ]m paire d ability to maintain employ

ment.” Id. In the comment sec tion of the evaluation, Dr. Publicker re marke d that Plaintiff has “ha s adher ed to medication manag ement.” Id. Simi larly , on J anuar y 28, 2000, Plaintiff visit ed Dr . Stein, who subsequently filled out
e va luatio ns of

Pla int if f’ s me nta l st atus , h e r a

bil ity to d o w or

k- re late d a c tiv iti e s, and

he r r e sp on se to medications. Id. at 227-31; 285-87. Dr . Stein’s report shows that he examined Plainti ff e very other we ek since November 2, 1999. Id. at 22 9. On

the me nta l a sse ssm e nt c he c kli st, Dr . St e in i n d i c at e d th atP l a i n t i f

f s u f f e r e d f r o ma l l b u to n e o f

th e th i rt e e nl i s t e d

s ymp t o m s . A d d i t i o n a l l y,

8 Dr. Stein’s che cklist indicates that these sy mptoms caused a ma

rked r estriction of a ctivities of daily living, mar

ked diffic ulties in maintaining social f unctioning, de ficienc ies of conc entration, persistenc e or pa ce a

nd repe ated e pisodes of dete rioration or de compensation in work or worklike settings. Id. at 23 1. De sc ri bin gPla int if f a s a “ [m]ult ipr ob le m patie nt, ” Dr . St e in’ s d ia g no sis included, “[p]osttraumatic stre ss disorder, OCD, De pression, Mig raine , [and] seizure disorder .” Id. at 229-31. F inally , Dr. Stein conc luded, “[s] he is not employ able.” Id. at 23 1 ( e mph a sis in orig inal). On a

chec klist designed to r ate a patient’s ability

to perfor m or adjust to work-r elated11

activities, Dr. Stein indicated the lowest possible level, “Poor/None ” for eac h of the 15 listed abilities. Id. at 227-28. In response to the form’s r equest to “[d]escribe a ny limit ations and include the medic al/clinical finding s that support the above assessments,” D r. Stein responde d that Plaintiff “[h] as post traumatic stre ss disorder, seizures a nd inability

to scree n out stress.” Id.
at 22 8. Withre g ard

to P la int if

f’ s r e sp on se to m e dic atio n, Dr . St e in’ s r e po rt no te s, “ sh e is a

bit
more at ease with effe x or and pr ozac. Other s have note d she is doing be tter. She is less impulsi ve
and le ss d ri ve n. She a

pp re c iate s th e c ha

ng e wi th t he me dic atio n. She state s sh e is s c ra tc hin gle ss than bef ore a nd more a war e of the scratching .” Id. at 285. 3. Tr ans c ri pt o f t

he Ad min ist rativ e He ari ng s in

Th is C a se Plaintiff testified at two administrative hea ring s, once on Aug ust 8, 2000, and once on October 13, 2004. Id. at 347-86. At the f irst hear ing, Plaintiff testified that she was a rec overing heroin a ddict, curr ently

enrolled in a

methadone tr eatment pr og ram. Id. at 353-55. She indicated that sh e did

no t f re qu e ntl y le ave he r h ome , e xce pt t o s e e he r p syc hiatr ist , atte nd tw ic e -w e e kly Alcoholics Anony

mous meeting s and visit the methadone c linic. Id. Plaintiff testified that she
wa l k edwi thth e a i d

o f aca n e, an d

th ath er n ei ghb o rs as s i s t edh er

wi thco o k i n g, cl ea n i n g, shopping a

nd transportation. Id. at 352. Duringthe first hea ring , the AL J asked the VE if he could identify

any jobs in the national economy that a hy pothetical per son who had the same ag e, education and work e x perie nce a s the Plaintiff could perf orm. Id. at 358-59. Spec ifically , the AL J ask e d th e VE to c on sid e r s ome on e wh o h a d “ the c a pa c ity to d o li g ht w or

k uns kil le d w ith limit ed g ener al public contac t.” Id. The VE te stified that such a pe rson could be e mploy ed as a n inspector or

a binder y worke r helpe r. Id. at 359. At the sec ond hear ing, mor e than f our y ear s later, Plaintiff indicated that she was12

curr ently employ ed full-time as a

phone oper ator. Id. at 367. She testified that she c ooked for herse lf, and that he r roommate did the c leaningand shopping . Plaintiff indicated that she now attended A lcoholics Anony mous meeting s three times a wee k. Id. at 367-69. Though she had no
c ane wi th h e r o n th e da

y of the he ari ng , Pl a int if

f i nd ic ate d th at sh e so me tim e s u se d a c ane to h e lp her w alk. Id. at 369. Plaintiff testified that she ha d continued takingmedication and r ece iving thera py for he r pain a

nd depre ssion. Id. When asked if this had made a diffe renc e, she responde d, “[i] t helps.” Id. at 36 9. Pla int if f t e sti fi e d th at be c a

us e of he r b a c k p a in, sh e c ou ld only sit for one hour a

t her c urre nt job before havingto ge t up and walk a round. Id. at 371. When asked by

counsel how he r depr ession aff ects he r, Plaintiff said, “[d]epression is crippling at times.” Id. at 372. When asked if she g ot alongwell with others, Plaintiff said, “[w]ell, Ig et along , beca

use that’s surviva l to me. And Ig et alongif it suits me to g et along .” Id. at 376. Duringthe hea

ring , the AL J asked the VE if she c ould identify any jobs in the national economy that a hy pothetical per son who had the same ag e, educ ation and wor k experience as the Plaintiff could perf

orm. Id. at 381. Specific ally , the AL J asked the VE to consider someone who had “the capa city

to perfor m light work unskilled with a sit, stand option.” Id. The VE te stified that such a pe rson could be e mploy ed as a router or dispatch cle rk, off

ice he lper or non- postal mail clerk. Id. II. LEGAL STANDARD

“ In a dis a bil ity pr oc e e din g , th e AL J ‘ha s th e po we r a nd the duty to i nv e sti g ate fu lly

a ll matters in issue, and to deve lop the compre hensive re cord r equire d for a fair de termination of disability .’” Simms v. Sullivan , 8 7 7 F. 2 d 1 0 4 7 , 1 0 5 0 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 8 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Diabo v. Sec ’y of HEW , 627 F.2d 278, 281 ( D.C. Cir. 1980)). The Socia l Security Act def ines “disability ” as a

n13

“ ina bil ity to e ng a g e in a

ny su bs tanti a l g a inf

ul a c tiv ity by re a so n o f a

ny me dic a lly

de te rm ina

ble phy sical or menta l impairment which ca n be expected to r esult in death or whic h has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)( 1)(A) (2004). Inability to eng ag e in substantial g ainful ac tivity not only includes the ind ivi du a l’ s in a

bil ity to d o h is p re vio us wo rk , b ut r e qu ir e s a s w e ll a n in a bil ity , “ c on sid e ri nghis ag e, educ ation, and wor

k experience , [t o] enga g e in any other kind of substantial g ainful work wh ic h e xists in t

he natio na l e c on omy , r e g ard le ss o f whe the r s uc h w or k e xists in t

he imm e diate
are a in which he lives, or whethe r a spe cific job va canc y exis ts for him, or whethe r he w ould be hired if he applied for

work.” Id. at § 4 23 (d )( 2) (A ). In ma kin gthi s d e te rm inatio n, the AL J is to
c on sid e r ( 1) me dic a l data and fi nd ing s, (2 ) e xpe rt

me dic a l op ini on s, (3 ) s ub je c tiv e c omp la int s, and (4) the plaintiff’s a g e, educ ation, and wor k history ; however , “[t] he expert opinions of a treating phy sician ar e bindingon the fa ct finder unless contra dicted by

substantial evidence to the contra ry .” Davis v. H

eck ler , 566 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (D.D .C. 1983) (citingcase s). A cour t will not di sturb the deter mination of the Commis sioner if it is based on substantial evidence in the rec ord and the corr ect a pplication of the re levant leg al standar ds. 42 U. S.C. §§ 40 5( g ), 13 83 (c ); Bu tle r v . B ar nh ar t , 353 F.3d 992, 999 ( D.C. Cir. 2004). Substantial
e vid e nc e me ans “ su c h r e le va nt e vid e nc e a s a

re a so na ble min d mi g ht a c c e pt a s a de qu ate to support a conc lusion.” Richardson v. Pe rales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (c itation omit ted). Whil e a sc int ill a of e vid e nti ary

su pp or t is ins uf fi c ie nt, the te st c an b e satis fi e d b y “ so me thi ngle ss than a pr eponder ance of the e vidence .” Fla. Mun. Power Agenc y v. F ERC , 315 F.3d 362, 365- 66 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In revie wingan administrative de cision, a cour t may not determine the weig ht of the e vidence , nor substitute its j udg ment for that of the Secr etar

y if her de cision is based on14

substantial evidence
. Butler , 3 53 F .3 d at 99 9; Hays v . Sullivan , 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 ( 4th Cir. 1990). Instead, the r eviewingcourt must car efully scrutinize the entire r ecor d to determine wh e the r t he Se c re tary , a c tin gthr ou g h th e AL J, ha s a na ly zed a ll the e vid e nc e and

ha s su ff ic ie ntl y explained the weig ht he has g iven to obviously probative material. Id . “B eca use the broa d purposes of the Social Security Act re quire a

liberal c onstruction in favor of disability , the cour

t must view the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the claimant.” Martin v. Apfel , 1 18 F. S u p p . 2 d 9 , 1 3 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Da v is v . S ha lal a , 862 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D .C. 1994)). Th e re vie wi ngc ourt

mus t a lso de te rm ine wh e the r c re dib le e vid e nc e wa s p ro pe rl y considere d. Id. (c i t i n g Dionne v. H eck ler , 585 F. Supp. 1055 (D.Me . 1984)). The AL J ’s final de c isi on mus t c on ta in “ a

state me nt o f f

ind ing s a nd c on c lus ion s, and

the re a so ns or

the ba sis there for, on a ll material issues of fa ct, law, or discretion pre sented on the r ecor d.” 5 U.S.C. § 55 7( c ). I mpo rt antl y , a

n A L J cann ot m e re ly

dis re g ard e vid e nc e wh ic h d oe s n ot s up po rt his conclusion. Dionne , 5 85 F . Su pp . at 10 60 . Are vie wi ngc ourt sh ou ld n ot b e le ft

g ue ssi nga s to ho w the AL J eva luate d p ro bativ e mate ri a l, a nd it i s r e ve rs ibl e e rr or

fo r a n A L J to f

a il i n h is written dec ision to ex plain sufficie ntly the weight he has g iven to cer tain probative items of evidenc e. Ma rti n , 1 1 8 F. S u p p . 2 d at1 3 (c i t i n g Da v is , 862 F. Supp. at 2). III . D ISC USS ION Plaintiff argues that the AL J ’s dec ision should be rever sed, or in the a lternative r emande d to the Social Security

Administration for a ne w hea ring , and make s three a

rguments in support of these re quests. First, she a rgues that the AL J failed to prope rly evaluate Plaintiff’s RFC. See Pl.’s Mot. at 3-12. Second, she a rgues that the AL J err ed by posing a hy pothetical question for the VE’s a

naly sis that inaccur ately

char acte rized Plainti ff’ s RFC. Id. at 12-14. F inally , Plaintiff15

argues that the AL J failed to c onsider the opinion of Plaintiff’s tre atingphy sician. Id. at 14-19. Def endant disputes Plaintiff’s cha rac terization of the AL J ’s opinion, assertingthat it was supported by

substantial evidence
. Se e ge ne ra lly Def .’s Mot. A. TheRe

sid ua l F un c tio na l Ca

pa c ity ( “RFC”) An aly

sis To make a

deter mination under steps F our and F ive of the disability analy sis, which involve an inquiry

into the claimant’s ability to return to past wor

k and a de termination of whether future e mploy

ment of any

varie ty is possibl e, see20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920, the AL J must eng ag e in a r esidual func tional capa city (“RF C”) ana ly sis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; SS R 96-8p, Policy Inte rpretation Ruling T itles II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial C laims , 1 99 6 WL 37 41 84 at *2 (S .S. A. July 2, 19 96 ). An

RF C is

“ an a dmi nis tr ativ e a sse ssm e nt o f t he e xtent to wh ic h a

n in div idu a l’ s me dic a lly

de te rm ina

ble impairment(s), includingany related sy

mptoms, such as pain, may cause phy sical or menta l limit ations or re strictions that may aff ect his or he r ca

pacity to do work-r elated phy sical or mental ac tiviti es.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL374184 at *2. The A L J must ex plain how he considere d and re solved ambiguities in the recor d with reg ard to the ultimate RFC de cision. Butler , 353 F.3d at 1000. Plaintiff raises thre e main ar g uments challeng ing the AL J ’s RFC ana ly sis. First, she argues that the AL J was re quired to, but did not, perfor m a func tion-by -func tion assessment of Plaintiff’s ability

to work, and inc lude a na rrative discussion of how the evide nce suppor ted the AL J ’s RFC conc lusion. P l.’s Mot. at 3-7. Second, she argues that the AL J ignor ed evide nce reg ardingthe extent of Plainti ff’ s mental impairments. Id. at 7-10. F inally , she ar g ues that the AL J failed to e ng ag e in a de tailed assessment of Plaintiff’s capa city

to perfor m the mentalSSR96-8p spec ifically instructs the AL J to consider the f unctions in paragraphs ( b), (c ), 9 an d (d ) o f 2 0 C
. F. R
. § 4 1 6
. 9 4 5 , wh i ch i n cl u d e p h y s i ca l ab i l i t i es (s i t t i n g, s t an d i n g, wa l k i n g, lifting, c arr

ying, pushing , pulling, or othe r phy sical func tions including manipulative or postura l functions), menta l abilities (understanding , reme mbering , car rying out instructions, re sponding appropr iately

to supervision, coworke rs, and wor k pressure s in a work se tting), a nd other a biliti es aff ecte d by impairments (includingspecific ally , impairments of vision). 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. 16 demands of w ork. Id. at 10-12. The Court finds that the AL J perf ormed a sufficie nt function-by -func tion assessment of Plaintiff’s exertional and non-e x ertional a biliti es as we ll as sufficient na rrative in support thereof
. Plaintiff is corre ct that SSR96-8p re quires the AL J to first assess a c laimant’s “wor k-re lated abilities on a function-by -func tion basis” and instructs that “[o]nl y afte r that may

RFC be expressed in terms of e x ertional leve ls of work . . . .” SSR96-8p, 1996 WL374184 at *1. 9 Howeve r, SSR 96-8p also provides “[w]hen there is no alleg ation of a phy sical or menta l limit ation or re striction of a spec ific func tional capa city , and no information in the case r ecor d that there is such a limitation or restriction, the adjudica tor must consider the individual to have no limit ation or re striction with respec t to that functional ca pacity .” Id. The Court finds that the AL J perf ormed a sufficie nt function-by -func tion assessment of all functions for which the re cord inc luded evidenc e of limitations. The AL J ’s conc lusion reg ardingPlaintiff’s phy sical RFC stated: In s e tti ngthe c la ima

nt’ s r e sid ua l f un c tio na l c a

pa c ity , th e un de rs ig ne d h a s a lso considere d any

medical opinions, which a re state ments from ac cepta ble medica l so ur c e s, wh ic h r e fl e c t ju dg me nts a bo ut t he natur e and

se ve ri ty of the imp a ir

me nts and re sulting limitations . . . . No treating or examining phy sician has plac ed any perma nent phy sical re strictions on the claimant . . . . While it i s noted that the state ag ency

medical e x perts below limited the cla imant to sedentary exertion . . ., Iam per suaded by

the over all rec ord that she r etains the re sidual functional c a pa c ity fo r l ig ht w or

k, lif tin gand /or c arr yingup to t

we nty po un ds oc c a sio na lly and ten pounds fr equently . Ido aff ord the c laimant a sit/stand option with reg ard to her c omplaints of persistent bac k pain and diff iculty with standing/wa lking due17

to t he sw e lli ngin h e r l e g s. Ho we ve r, Ido no t f ind fu rt he r p hy sic a l li mit atio n to be wa rra nted g iven the opinion of Dr. Chha bra that the claimant ca

n sit /st and /w a lk w ithno rm a l g a it .
. . . O nly “ mil d” joi nt d ise a se and

sc oli os is i s noted on the x-ray

and neur ologic al examination is non-focal. She ha s had ver y limit ed conse rvative tre atment for pa in complaints and has not under g one fur ther e va luatio n o r w or

ku p o f h e r p a in s y

mpt oms , s uc h a s p hy sic a l th e ra py or pa in manag ement. She also re ports that she re turned to work thr ee year s ag o. Medication appear s to be eff ective in c ontrolling he r pain sy mptoms and she continues to work f

ull tim e. A.R. at 21. Plaintiff contends that the AL J failed to set f orth any rationale as to how the e vidence supports eac h of his conclusions. Pl.’s Mot. at 6-7. Howeve r, eve n a cur sory g lance at the passag e above reve als that the AL J considere d Dr. Chhabr a’s e x amination and Plaintiff’s re turn to her job whe n assessingPlaintiff’s ability to perfor m light work, a

nd considere d her swe lling and bac k pain when a ffor ding he r the sit/stand option. Th e AL J’s o pin ion

a lso c on sid e re d Pl a int if

f’ s me nta l im

pa ir me nts in a

na ly zinghe r RF C. The AL J ’s opinion stated: Wit h reg ard to he r psychiatric sy mptoms, t he re cord doe s not show continuing tr e atme nt s inc e 20 00 and sh e re po rt s c ur

re nt e ff e c tiv e ne ss o f p syc ho tr op ic me dic atio n. She re po rt s so me c on tin ue d p ro ble ms d e a lin gwi th p a st a bu se iss ue s, but su bje c tiv e ly no te s th at sh e g e ts a lon gwe ll w ithoth e rs . Sh e re po rt s p ro ble ms with focus and in de alingwith stress, but as noted, it appea rs that she is ca

pable of fu lly c arr yingout he r c ur

re nt j ob dutie s w ith out si g nif ic ant d if fi c ult y . Sh e is a lso capa ble of indepe ndently

car ing f or her basic da ily

needs. While the state a g ency psy cholog ical expert [Dr. Cerke vitch] assessed numerous “ moderate” limitations a s n ote d in

Exhi bit 4F , I fi nd tha t th e c la ima

nt r e ta ins the re sid

ua l me nta l c a

pa c ity to car ry out simpl e wor

k-re lated tasks with limited ge nera l public contact. I reje ct th e ess ent ial ly

“di sab li ng” ass ess men ts con tai nedin th e reco rd at Ex hi bi ts 7F, 8F, 9F, a s these asse ssments are not we ll-supported by objective f

indings a nd/or treatment rec ords and a

ppear to overly rely on the claimant’ s subjective complaints. A.R. at 21. The AL J also stressed that he did not fully cre dit the testimony

conce rningPlaintiff’s
su bje c tiv e c omp la int s:18

In revie wingthe testimony Ifind the cr edibility

of the c laimant’s subjective complaints (and a lleg edly related func tional limi tations) to be only fair at best. Whil e I acc ept that the cla imant has limit ations from her phy sical and me ntal condition, Ido not acc ept that such limitations are of ‘ disabling’ sever ity as a lle g e d. As no te d, the c la ima nt r e po rt s th at sh e is c ur

re ntl y e mpl oye d o n a

fu ll time basis as a tele phone oper ator . . . Per he r re ports, she re mains capa ble of car ing f or her basic ne eds and note s eff ectivene ss of medication in alleviating he r phy sical pain sy

mptoms and psy chiatric sy mptoms as well. Appare ntly , her sy mptoms are ade quately

controlled with trea

tment/medication as evide nced by her a bility to eng ag e in full-time work. A ccor dingly , full cre dibilit y is not a ff or de d to the c la ima

nt’ s su bje c tiv e state me nts , e sp e c ia lly wi th r e g a rd to ‘disabling ’ impairment, and I am per suaded that Ihave a dequate ly acc ounted for th e c l a i m an t ’ s l i m i t at i o n s i n. . . h e r r e s i d u a l f un c t i o n a l c a

p a c i ty. A.R. 21. Ba sed on the AL J ’s opinion, and par ticularly the passag es quoted at leng th above, the Court finds that the AL J identified inconsistencie s in the rec ord and e x plained how he arr ived at his conclusions. The AL J acknow ledg ed the a ssessments of Dr. Stein and D r. Publicker a nd the conclusion in these r eports that Plaintiff was not e mploy able, A.R. 239, a nd that she had a

n impaired a

bility to maintain employ

ment, id. at 23 4. Ne ve rt

he le ss, the AL J found

tha t th e se conclusions wer e not well-suppor ted by the evidenc e (a

nd testimony) in the re cord. And
a lt h o u g hPl a inti f

f a s s e rts th at t

h e A L J “ p r o v id e d

n o e xp la n ati o no r r ati o n a le f

o r ign o r in gth e [] lim itatio ns ” c on ta ine d w ith in D r. Ce rk e vit c h’ s r e po rt , a re vie w o f t

he AL J’s o pin ion

re ve a ls otherwise. Pl.’s Mot. at 8. It is manifest that the AL J considere d these limitations, but s ituated them within the context of P laintiff’s subseque nt succe ss with psy chotropic me dication and ability to return to wor

k. P lai nt if f nex t co nt end s t hatth e AL J “igno red p ert in entevi den ce” i n co nduct in g the R FC
ana ly sis , f

oc us ingon

the re po rt s o f D r. Ce rk e vit c h a nd Dr . H e c kle r. Pl. ’s Mo t. at 7. With respe ct to Dr. Cer

kevitch, Plaintiff simply

paints an inac curate picture of the AL J ’s re liance onPlaintiff quotes ext ensively from ca ses holding that contradic tory medical e vidence 10 cannot be ignor ed by

the AL J
. See P l
. ’s M o t . at8 -9 (qu o t i n g Butler , 3 53 F .3 d at 10 02 ; See v

. W as hingto n M

e tro . Transit

Auth. , 36 F.3d 375. 384 ( 4 Cir. 1994)). In this case, howe ver, the th Court finds that the AL J ’s RFC ana ly sis thoroughly considere d all probative e vidence and resolved a

mbiguities or c ontradictions wher e they exis ted, re nderingthese c ases inapposite. 19 Dr. Cer kevitch’s a ssessment. Reg ardingthe seve rity of Plaintiff’s limitations, Dr. Cerkevitch noted that Plaintiff “has e noug h MFRC to understand, re call . . . & persist on simple tasks . . . [and] can a dapt . . . to most environments and ca n maintain social intera ction in low demand environments . . . .” While Plaintiff argues that the AL J ignor ed this assessment, it is clear from the AL J ’s finding s that he expressly relied upon D r. Cerke vitch’s assessment of Plaintiff’s limit ations and incorpor ated them into his RFC assessment. Wit h respe ct Dr. H eckle r, Plaintiff asser ts that the AL J ignor ed Dr . Hec ker’ s diag nosis of dy sthy mic disorder, r ecur

rent major de pressive e pisodes, and asse ssment of Plaintiff’s GAF at 50 . Wh ile the AL J did n ot s pe c if ic a lly inc or po ra te the fi nd ing s o f D r. He c ke r i nto his op ini on , it is not appare nt to the Court how the repor t of Dr. He cker

“cle arly contra dicted” the AL J ’s conclusions as Plaintiff asse rts. Pl.’s Mot. at 9. Dr. Hec ker’ s repor t, like the other menta l evaluations contained within the rec ord, indicate d that Plaintiff had seve re me ntal impairments. B ut whil e Dr . H e c ke r’ s r e po rt ind ic ate d th at Pla int if

f s uf fe re d f ro m se ve re de pr e ssi on , it

a lso noted that this depression “ha d improved g reatly ” with medication and treatment. A.R. at 198. This is entirely

consistent with the AL J ’s findingthat “the c laimant has had ‘ sever e’ me ntal imp a ir me nt at a ll t ime s r e le va

nt t o th is d e c isi on ,” but th at “ he r s y mpt oms are a de qu ate ly controlled with treatment/medication . . . .” Id. at 18, 21. 10 Plaintiff also argues that the AL J failed to e ng ag e in the “mor e deta iled” asse ssment of the Pla int if

f’ s me nta l li mit atio ns a s r e qu ir e d b y SSR 9 6- 8p . Pl .’ s Mo t. at 11 ; seeSSR96-8p,20

1996 WL374184 at *2. Specific ally , Plaintiff contends that the AL J “cumulate d [si c] the Pla int if f’ s me nta l im

pa ir me nts int o a

le ss- de ta ile d c on c lus ion

tha t th e Pla int if

f w a s li mit e d to simple tasks with li mited public contact.” Pl.’s Mot. at 11-12. Upon revie wingthe AL J ’s opinion, the Court finds that the AL J eng ag ed in a suff icient assessment of

the re levant evide nce in the rec ord. SeeA.R. at 19. In reg ard to Plaintiff’s a ctivities of daily living, the AL J noted,

“ [s]he is a lso c a

pa ble of ind e pe nd e ntl y

c ari ngfo r h e r b a sic da ily ne e ds .” Withre sp e c t to Pla int if f’ s so c ia l f

un c tio nin g , th e AL J pointe d o ut t hat Pla int if

f “ su bje c tiv e ly no te s th at sh e g e ts alongwell with others.” With respec t to her conc entration, persistence and pac e, the AL J noted that it “appea

rs that she is ca

pable of fully car rying out he r cur

rent job duties without significa nt difficulty .” Plaintiff is corre ct that the AL J did not specifica lly list t he wor

k-re lated func tions itemiz ed on Dr . Cerkevitch’ s Mental Residual Func tional Capacity Assessment. SeeA.R. at 211-12. Plaintiff does not, howeve r, cite a ny case supporting the supposition t hat an AL J ’s opinion mustinclude such a n itemiz ation. The AL J specific ally incorporated Dr. Cer

kevitch’s mental RFC assessment in his opinion. Id. at 21 (“ [T] he state a g ency psy cholog ical expert assessed nume rous “moder ate” limit ations.”). The Court notes that none of Plaintiff’s f unctions in Dr. Cerke vitch’s assessment we re de emed “ marke dly limit ed.” Id. at 211-12. F urthermor e, g iven Plaintiff’s re turn to full-time employ ment subsequent to Dr. Cer kevitch’s e valuation, the AL J was justified in not perf orming an itemized evaluation of Plaintiff’s w ork-r elated a biliti es. He r a bil ity to p e rf or m w or k- re late d ta sk s w a s ma de e vid e nt t o th e AL J fr om h e r a bil ity to
ma int a in a

job fo r a pp ro ximate ly

thr e e y e ars .21

B. TheALJ ’s Hy

po the tic al Q ue

sti on to t heVo c ati on al E

x pe rt The Commissioner bear s the burden unde r Step Five of the disability analy sis to show that there are other jobs ava ilable in the national ec onomy that can be perf

ormed by an individual with the claimant’s impairme nts. Brown v. Bowen , 794 F.2d 703, 706 ( D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) , 416.920(f) ). In this case, the A L J relied in pa rt on the testimony

of the VE, which the AL J found to be c redible. A .R. at 22. Plainti ff now disputes the substanc e of the h y p o th e t i c a l qu e s t i o np o s e d b y th e A L J: Assume a hy

pothetical per son who has the same ag e, educ ation, and wor k experience as the [Plainti ff], and who ha s the ca pacity to perfor m light work unskilled with a sit/s tand option. Can y ou identify any jobs that such a hy po the tic a l pe rs on

c an p e rf or m on a su sta ine d b a sis and

wh ic h jo bs e xist in s i g n i f i c an tnu mb e r s i nth e n at i o n a l e c o n o m y? A.R. 381. Plainti ff a

rgues that this question failed to incorpor ate the r estrictions and limitations ide nti fi e d b y

Dr . H e c ke r a

nd Dr . Ce rk e vit c h in

tw o w ay s: ( 1) the qu e sti on did no t e xpre ssl y incorpora te Plaintiff’s “ne ed for

limit ed g ener al public contac t” and ( 2) the que stion did not incorpora te a “ limit ation to simpl e wor k-re lated tasks.” Pl.’s Mot. at 12-14. The Court finds
ne ith e r a rgume nt t o b e me ri tor iou s. Plaintiff’s first argument fails bec ause–a s Defe ndant explains and Plainti ff doe s not dispute–the jobs list ed by the VE (r outer, off

ice he lper, a

nd non-postal mail cler

k) do not require signific ant public contac t. SeeDef .’s Mot. at 11 (re lying on the Dictionary of Occ upational Titl es published by

the Depa rtment of L abor) . Thus, it appear s that the VE may have incorpora ted this lim itation into her response ba sed on her observations at the administrative h ea ri n g, A. R
. 3 8 1 (“ [ t ] h e r ec o rdwi l l re fl ec tth atth i s VE h as b ee np re s en tth e e n t i re p ro ce ed i n gs today”), a nd her r eview of

the Plaintiff’s administrative folde r, id. (“Q : Did y ou revie w thePlaintiff’s argument is also unpersuasive beca use the AL J expressly

incorporated the 11
“ lim ite d g e ne ra l pu

bli c c on ta c t” lim itatio n into h is hy po the tic a l du

ri ngPla int if

f’ s f ir st a dmi nis tr ativ e he ari ng , a

nd the VE ’s re sp on se ind ic ate d th at th e re we re job s th at e xiste d in signific ant numbers in the national economy despite a limited g ener al public contac t restriction. A.R. at 358-59. Th e Court

no te s th at Pla int if

f c ite s se ve ra l c a se s th at st and fo r t he pr op os iti on

tha t a 12 “re sponse to a fatally

defe ctive question ca

nnot constitute substantial evidence .” Pl.’s Mot. at 12- 13. Plaintiff fails to draw a ny fac tual compar isons to these case s, or to otherwise indicate how they might be of

use to the Court in the prese nt case . Be cause the Court finds substantial evidenc e that the AL J ’s hy pothetical ac curately

ref lected Plaintiff’ s impairments, the Court finds the ca ses cited by

Plaintiff to be inapposite. 22 [P laintiff’s] ex hibit folder prior to this hear ing? A: Yes.”). Equa lly problematic f

or Plaintiff’s argument is that there is also substantial evidenc e in the re cord that supports the AL J ’s deter mination no t to i nc lud e a

sp e c if ic re fe re nc e to t

his lim itatio n in

his hy po the tic a l. M os t notably , Plaintiff conce ded that she ha d been e mploy ed as a phone oper ator since 2002, which the AL J noted “would involve de alingwith individuals over the phone.” A.R. at 19. Plaintiff also testified that she g ets alongwith others, id. at 376, and a repor t from the dire ctor of he r psy chother apy

g roup noted that “ she has a lso become a n asset to other me mbers of the g roup, throug h support and positive fee dback.” Id. at 327. Plaintiff’s second a rgument conce rningthe 11 AL J ’s omission of “simple work-r elated ta sks” from his hy pothetical question is even f arthe r
a fi e ld b e c a

us e the AL J’s hy

po the tic a l did

inc or po ra te the ne e d f

or a job re qu ir ingon ly

sim ple tasks when he asked the VE to consider only “lig ht work unskilled.” SeeDef .’s Mot. at 12. Plaintiff does not argue that the jobs listed by the VE in re sponse to the AL J ’s hy pothetical question require more than simple wor k-re lated tasks. Ac cording ly , the Court finds that the AL J ’s hy pothetical ac curately

descr ibed Plaintiff’s condition and that the AL J proper ly relied
u p o nth e V E ’ s r e s p o n s e r e g ar d i n gth e av a i l a b i l i ty o f j o b s av a i l a

b l e i nth e n at i o n a l e c o n o m y. 12For example, Dr. Publicker’ s repor t of Fe bruar

y 11, 1999 indicates that Plaintiff’s 13 bipolar disorder

was “ in remission” and that she ha d “no thoug ht proce ss disturbance.” A.R. at 139. These me dical obser vations do not support Dr. Publicker’s subse quent re port that Plaintiff had an “ [i ]m paire d ability to maintain employ

ment.” Id. at 234. 23 C. W

eight of Medical Opinions Plaintiff argues that the AL J err ed in fa iling to ac cord c ontrolling we ight, or any consideration whatsoever , to the opinions of Plainti ff’ s treatingphy sicians. See Pl.’s Mot. at 14- 15. Def endants a rgue that the opinions of tre atingphy sicians wer e thoroug hly considere d, but that th os e c on c lus ion s uns up po rt e d b y ob je c tiv e me dic a l f

ind ing s w e re pr op e rl y

a c c or de d le ss than controllingweig ht. See Def .’s Mot. at 13-17. Plaintiff’s argument that the medica l opinions of Dr. Stein and Dr. Publicker wer e i gn o re d i s wi th o u tm er i t . T h e A L J co n s i d er edan d ex p l i ci t l y

re j ec t edth e “ es s en t i al l y

‘d i s ab l i n g’
a sse ssm e nts c on ta ine d in

the re c or d at E xhibi ts 7 F , 8 F , 9 F , a s th e se a sse ssm e nts [we re ] not we llsupported by

objective f

indings a nd/or treatment rec ords and a ppear [ed] to overly

rely on the claimant’s subjec tive complaints.” A.R. at 21. Althoug h Plaintiff is corre ct that this circuit has adopted a “tre atingphy sician” r

ule wher eby

the “r eports of tre atingphy sicians must be ac corde d substantial weig ht,” wher e, as he re, a treating phy sician’s opinion is contradic ted by substantial
e vid e nc e , it

is not binding on the A L J
. W

ill iam s v . S

ha lal a , 997 F.2d 1494, 1498 ( D.C. Cir. 1993). In the pre sent ca se, there are inconsistencies be tween the objective medic al finding s and Dr. Stein and Dr . Publicker’s c onclusions that Plainti ff wa s unable to work. Def .’s Mot. at 13- 13 14. Fur thermore , as De fenda

nt corre ctly

points out, t he conc lusions rejecte d by the AL J wer e not
me dic a l op ini on s, but c on c lus ion s r e g ard ingPla int if f’ s a bil ity or ina bil ity to w or k. Ac c or din gto Social Security

Ag ency regulations, “[a] statement by a medica l source that y ou are ‘disabled’ or24

‘unable to work’ doe s not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.” 20 C.F .R. §§ 404.1527(e) (1), 4165.927( e)( 1). Reg ardingthe medica l opinions of Dr. Stein, Dr. Publicker a nd other doc tors, Plaintiff cites no spec ific mental impairments that the A L J failed to c onsider or w eig h. Instead, Plaintiff argues g ener ally

that “[e]ach . . . phy sician[] deter mined that the Plaintiff’s mental impairment
wa s mo re lim iti ngtha

n th e Ad min istra tiv e L aw Jud g e fo un d. ” Pl. ’s Mo t. at 15 . T he re is substantial evidence in the rec ord, most notably from Dr . Stein and Dr. Publicker, to support the AL J ’s deter

mination that Pl aintiff wa s adequately controlling her sy

mptoms wit h the help of medication. SeeA.R. at 142 (cha rac terizing Plaintiff as “ stable on klonapin for panic” ), id. at 285 (“[S] he is a bit more at ease with effe x or and pr ozac. Other s have note d she is doing be tter. She is less impul sive and less drive n. She appre ciates the chang e with the medication.”). At bottom, the AL J acknow ledg ed all of the medical opinions in the rec ord, explained why he viewed c erta in evidence as more c redible tha n other e vidence , and ade quately explained why

he did not give “ controlling weig ht” to the essentially “disabling ” asse ssments of Dr. Stein and Dr
. Publicker. Finally , Plaintiff argues that “c ontrolling we ight” must be g iven to treating phy sicians under SSR 96-2p. Plainti ff f ails, howeve r, to establish that the opinions of Dr. Stein and Dr
. Publicker qualify

for c onsideration under

this provision. Acc ordingto SS R 96-2p, which Plaintiff quotes, “[i] t is an err or to g ive an opinion controllingweig ht simpl y beca use it is the opinion of a trea

ting sourc e if it is not well-supported by medically

acc eptable c linical and laboratory

diag nostic techniques or

if it is inconsist ent with the other substantial e vidence in the
case rec ord.” SSR96-2p 1996 WL374188 *2. Be cause the AL J found that the opinions of Dr.25

Stein and Dr. Publicker w ere not “well-suppor ted by objective f

indings a nd/or treatment rec ords
and a pp e ar[e d] to ov e rl y

re ly on the c la ima

nt’ s su bje c tiv e c omp la int s, ” he wa s ju sti fi e d in
a c c or din gthe m le ss w e ig ht i n h is a na ly sis
. IV : C ON CL USI ON Ba sed on the for eg oing r eview of the re levant law a

nd the administrative re cord, the Court finds that the Administrative L aw Judge applied the c orre ct leg al standar ds and re lied on substantial evidence when he denied Plaintiff’s c laims for Disability Income B enef

its and Supplemental Security

Income B enef

its. The Court shall DENY [7] Plaintiff’s Motion for Judg me nt o f R e ve rs a l and GR AN T [1 0] D e fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n f or Judg me nt o f A ff

ir manc e . T his
case shall be dismissed in its entirety . An appr opriate O rder acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Date: Ma rch 31, 2009 /s/ CO LLEEN K OLLA R- K OTEL LY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge