Filed 1/22/19; Certified for Publication 2/21/19 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

DEAN GRAFILO, as Director, etc., 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KAMYAR COHANSHOHET,

Defendant and Appellant;

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,

 Real Party in Interest and

 Respondent.

 B285193

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS169143)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Michelle Williams Court and Joseph R. Kalin, 

Judges. Reversed.

Fenton Law Group, Benjamin J. Fenton, Dennis E. Lee and 

Alexandra De Rivera for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gloria L. Castro, 

Assistant Attorney General, Judith L. Alvarado and Tan N. Tran 
2

Deputy Attorneys General for Real Party in Interest and 

Respondent, Medical Board of California.

_____________________________

Dr. Kamyar Cohanshohet appeals from the superior court’s 

order to produce the medical records of five of his patients in 

connection with an investigation into his prescription of 

controlled substances to these patients. Because the state has 

failed to demonstrate good cause to obtain these records, we 

reverse the order. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Investigation

In 2014, the Medical Board of California (the Board) 

received an anonymous complaint alleging Dr. Cohanshohet 

“prescribes huge quantities of narcotics to patients without giving 

exams, tests, x-rays or even bloodwork. A loved one went to this 

doctor and is now in rehab. Not once did this doctor examine 

him, look at charts. He only went by a complaint of pain and 

started prescribing narcotics at $400 a visit every two weeks. 

He is in partnership with a pharmacy in his building.” 

An investigator for the Board obtained a report from the 

Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System 

(CURES), a database maintained by the California Department 

of Justice. The CURES report for Dr. Cohanshohet shows the 

Schedule II, III, and IV controlled substances prescribed by him 

to patients between July 27, 2014 and July 27, 2015. 

Dr. Shoaib Naqvi works as a medical consultant for the 

Health Quality Investigation Unit of the Department of 

Consumer Affairs. He identified five patients who were 

prescribed dosages of opioids that were possibly in excess of the 
3

recommended amount. These five patients were notified of the 

investigation and asked to sign releases for their medical records. 

They refused. As a result, subpoenas duces tecum were served on 

June 30, 2016, for the medical records of patients C.B., L.P., 

M.D., C.S., and R.V. for the time period between July 27, 2014 

and July 27, 2015. The patients were informed when the 

subpoenas were issued and advised of their right to object. 

Dr. Cohanshohet refused to comply with the subpoena, asserting 

his patients’ right to privacy. 

The Petition 

The Board subsequently filed a petition in the superior 

court for an order compelling the production of the medical 

records requested and for Dr. Cohanshohet’s testimony. 

In support of its petition to compel compliance of the subpoenas, 

the Board submitted the declarations of its investigator and 

Dr. Naqvi. The investigator’s declaration sets forth the impetus 

for the Board’s investigation: an anonymous complaint that 

Dr. Cohanshohet overprescribed opioids to one patient without 

conducting an examination or screening of him or her. 

The anonymous complaint also alleged Dr. Cohanshohet was in 

partnership with the pharmacy in his building. The investigator 

further described the sequence of events leading to the petition, 

including obtaining the CURES report for Dr. Naqvi’s review, 

attempting to obtain consent from the patients, and 

Dr. Cohanshohet’s refusal to comply with the subpoenas. 

Dr. Naqvi documented his role and his conclusions from 

reviewing Dr. Cohanshohet’s CURES report. He explained he is 

tasked with reviewing questionable medical and surgical 

practices of physicians licensed by the Board. Thus, he 

maintains familiarity with the standard of medical practice in the 
4

state of California. Dr. Naqvi then in general terms explained 

the different classes of controlled substances, their potential for 

abuse, side effects, indicated use, and the standard of care for 

prescribing these substances. He also provided details of 11 

specific drugs prescribed by Dr. Cohanshohet, nine of which are 

used to treat pain. The remaining two are used to treat anxiety, 

insomnia, or muscle spasms and seizures. 

 Dr. Naqvi further explained that morphine is used as the 

basis for a comparison of pain treatments to determine if the 

patient’s opioid dosage is excessive. He stated that knowing the 

morphine equivalent dosing (MED) is useful to evaluate different 

types of opioids and to convert from one opioid to another. Opioid 

dosing may be considered excessive if the MED level exceeds 100 

mg per day. Dr. Naqvi noted an MED of greater than 100 mg per 

day “puts the patient at added risk for overdose and death.” The 

standard of care requires that the prescriber inform the patient of 

potential risks and benefits of the drug. The patient must then 

provide informed consent, including being notified that death is a 

potential risk, when opioid dosing exceeds 100 mg MED per day. 

Dr. Naqvi opined that good cause existed to believe that a 

violation of the Medical Practice Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2000, 

et seq.) may have been committed by Dr. Cohanshohet. Dr. 

Naqvi identified five patients who were prescribed controlled 

substances in a manner that appeared to deviate from the 

standard of care for prescribing these drugs. 

Patient C.B. regularly received 90–120 (20mg) oxycodone 

HCL tablets along with 30 (20 mg) oxymorphone HCL tablets and 

30 (10 mg) Valium tablets each month from July 27, 2014 to 

January 5, 2016. Based on this information, C.B. may have 

taken three tablets of oxycodone, one tablet of oxymorphone HCL, 
5

and one tablet of Valium a day, totaling at least 150 mg MED per 

day. Dr. Naqvi noted the sedative effects of opioids are further 

aggravated by the use of Valium, resulting in a combination that 

has a “very real possibility of sedation to the point of respiratory 

arrest.” He concluded a review of C.B.’s medical record is 

necessary to confirm that an appropriate examination was done 

before prescribing this medication regimen, that regular 

assessments of the efficacy and effects of the treatment regimen 

were conducted and documented, and that the appropriate 

monitoring measures were performed. 

Likewise, patient M.D. regularly received 90 (30 mg) 

oxycodone HCL tablets, 30 (4 mg) hydromorphone HCL tablets, 

30 (10 mg) Valium tablets, and 60 (350 mg) carisoprodal tablets 

(a muscle relaxant) each month from July 27, 2014 to July 27, 

2015. According to Dr. Naqvi, this would appear to indicate three 

tablets of oxycodone, one tablet of hydromorphone HCL, two 

tablets of carispotrodal, and one tablet of Valium were taken each 

day, resulting in at least 106 mg MED. This treatment regimen 

also presented the very real possibility of sedation to the point of 

respiratory arrest. 

Patient L.P. regularly received 20–220 (10 mg) hydrocodone 

bitartrate-acetaminophen with 30–45 (350 mg) carispotrodal each 

month during the relevant time period, indicating the patient 

took five tablets of hydrocodone bitartrate-acetaminophen and 

one or two tablets of carisoprodal daily. This combination 

appeared equivalent to a minimum of 75 mg MED. 

Patient C.S. received prescriptions for 60–120 (10 mg) 

OxyContin tablets, 120–240 (325 mg–10 mg) Norco tablets, and 

30–90 (10 mg) benzodiazepine or related drug (such as Valium, 

clonazepam, or temazepam, indicating 105–125 mg MED per day. 
6

Patient V.R. received 120–150 (15 mg–20 mg) oxycodone 

HCL tablets with 20–60 benzodiazepine or related drugs (Valium 

(10 mg), Ambien, or Zaleplon). This would indicate four to five 

tablets of Oxycodone and one tablet of Valium along with a 

sleeping pill per day, resulting in 60–75 mg MED. 

The prescriptions for L.P., C.S., and V.R. carried risks 

similar to those of patients C.B. and M.D. On this basis, 

Dr. Naqvi concluded these five patients may have received 

excessive amounts of opioids as compared to the recommended 

dosage. Dr. Naqvi explained the records are necessary to 

determine whether Dr. Cohanshohet performed an examination 

and screening of those patients, received informed consent, 

regularly assessed the efficacy and effects of the treatment 

regimen, and monitored those patients. 

The Opposition

Four of the five patients submitted declarations objecting to 

the petition. Dr. Cohanshohet also opposed the petition, 

asserting the Board lacked good cause to justify the intrusion into 

his patients’ privacy. He asserted in a declaration that he 

completed hundreds of hours of post-graduate training in pain 

management and palliative care and that some of his patients 

suffer from pain associated with acute injuries while others seek 

active cancer treatment, palliative care, or end-of-life care. 

In addition, he proffered the declaration of Dr. Jack Berger, 

a physician certified in anesthesiology and who teaches pain 

medicine and pain management at USC. Dr. Berger reviewed 

Dr. Naqvi’s declaration. He agreed that physicians who prescribe

controlled substances to treat pain are required to complete a 

medical history and physical examination, diagnose the problem, 

inform the patient of any risks, and write a treatment plan which 
7

states the objectives, proposed treatments, and justifications for 

the medications selected. He explained one of the primary 

functions of a pain management specialist is to monitor and 

guard against patient misuse and abuse of controlled substances 

such as opioids. 

However, Dr. Berger challenged Dr. Naqvi’s reliance on the 

CDC prescribing guidelines which were merely recommendations 

for primary care clinicians who are prescribing opioids for chronic 

pain outside of active cancer treatment, palliative care, and endof-life care. These guidelines were not in effect at the time the 

patients in question were treated. He further contested 

Dr. Naqvi’s conclusions as to each patient. Dr. Berger argued 

that a dosage greater than 100 mg MED does not automatically 

violate the standard of care, so long as the patient’s informed 

consent was obtained. He found there was no reason to suspect 

Dr. Cohanshohet failed to perform a proper examination, obtain 

informed consent, or review the risks and benefits of higher 

dosage opioid therapy with the patient. He also opined that 

nonopioid alternatives would have presented similar risk of 

serious side effects, like morbidity. 

The Order

The Hon. Joseph Kalin presided over the hearing on the 

Board’s petition. After argument, he stated he would take the 

matter under submission and issue a ruling in “the next day or 

two.” The Board served a notice of ruling a few weeks later 

indicating its petition had been granted, but no order was 

attached. Dr. Cohanshohet objected to the notice, arguing he 

received no communication from the trial court about its ruling. 

A different trial judge, the Hon. Michelle Williams Court, 

informed the parties at a later status conference that she spoke 
8

with Judge Kalin, and he confirmed he granted the petition. 

Dr. Cohanshohet timely appealed. 

Although Dr. Cohanshohet questions whether an order was 

ever issued, the parties are proceeding on the assumption a 

ruling was made. Indeed, the record is sufficient to demonstrate 

the superior court granted the petition and ordered Dr. 

Cohanshohet to produce the requested records. Therefore, 

we will treat the appeal as one from an appealable judgment. 

(Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 

51 Cal.4th 1, 11–13 [order compelling compliance with 

administrative subpoena is appealable final judgment].)

DISCUSSION

Dr. Cohanshohet contends the state’s interest in his 

patients’ medical records is insufficient to overcome their right to 

privacy. He argues the Board lacks authority to issue subpoenas 

for records of noncomplaining patients. In addition, the Board 

has failed to pursue less intrusive means of investigation. 

Finally, Dr. Cohanshohet argues the Board has failed to establish 

good cause for its investigation because the records sought have 

not been shown to be material or relevant to the investigation. 

We are not persuaded the Board has demonstrated good 

cause to require Dr. Cohanshohet to produce the five patients’ 

records. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order. In doing 

so, we need not address Dr. Cohanshohet’s other grounds for 

reversal. 

I. The Medical Board

The Board is a unit of the Department of Consumer 

Affairs.1 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 101, subd. (b).) It is tasked with 

 

1 Although the director of Consumer Affairs is the plaintiff 

and respondent in this matter, the Board is the real party in 
9

protecting the public against incompetent, impaired, or negligent 

physicians. To accomplish this task, the Board is authorized to 

investigate complaints from the public that a physician may be 

guilty of unprofessional conduct. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2220, 

subd. (a).) A physician may only prescribe controlled substances 

when he holds a good faith belief that it is required for a patient’s 

ailment, and only in a quantity and for a length of time that is 

reasonably necessary. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11210.) A violation 

of this provision constitutes unprofessional conduct (Bus. & Prof. 

Code, § 2238), and subjects the violator to disciplinary action by 

the Board (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2234).

The Board’s investigators have the status of peace officers 

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 160), and possess a wide range of 

investigative powers, such as the power to issue subpoenas for 

the appearance of a witness or for the production of documents 

(Gov. Code, § 11181, subds. (a) & (e)). The Board is authorized to 

issue a subpoena in “any inquiry [or] investigation” (Gov. Code, 

§ 11181, subd. (e)), and may do so for purely investigative 

purposes; it is not necessary that a formal accusation be on file or 

a formal adjudicative hearing be pending. (Arnett v. Dal Cielo 

(1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 8; Brovelli v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 

524, 528.) 

If a party refuses to comply with the administrative 

subpoena, the Board may petition the superior court for an 

order compelling compliance. (Gov. Code, §§ 11186–11187.) “If it 

appears to the court that the subpoena was regularly 

issued . . . by the head of the department, the court shall enter an 

order that the person appear before the officer named in the 

 

interest and we refer to it as the petitioner in this opinion rather 

than the Department of Consumer Affairs.
10

subpoena at the time and place fixed in the order and testify or 

produce and permit the inspection and copying of the required 

papers or other items described in subdivision (e) of Section 

11181 as required . . . . Upon failure to obey the order, the person 

shall be dealt with as for contempt of court.” (Gov. Code, 

§ 11188.)

II. Standard of Review 

The question of whether a subpoena meets the 

constitutional standards for enforcement is a question of law to 

be reviewed de novo. (Fett v. Medical Bd. of California (2016) 

245 Cal.App.4th 211, 216 (Fett); Millan v. Restaurant Enterprises 

Group, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 477, 485.) The superior court’s 

factual findings regarding whether the Board established good 

cause to intrude on the patients’ privacy rights are reviewed 

under the substantial evidence standard. (Fett, supra, 245 

Cal.App.4th at p. 216.)

III. Privacy Law in California

The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a 

right of privacy, which extends to their medical records. 

(Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) As one court put it: “The state of a 

person’s gastro-intestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy 

from unauthorized public or bureaucratic snooping as is that 

person’s bank account, the contents of his library or his 

membership in the NAACP.” (Board of Medical Quality 

Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 679 

(Gherardini).) 

In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 1, 35 (Hill), the California Supreme Court established a 

framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. 

The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally 
11

protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation 

of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion 

that is serious. (Id. at pp. 35–37.) The party seeking information 

may raise in response whatever legitimate and important 

countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party 

seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve 

the same interests or protective measures that would diminish 

the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing 

considerations. (Id. at pp. 37–40.) 

Additionally, good cause is required to be shown when the 

state seeks to invade an individual’s privacy rights through an 

administrative subpoena seeking his or her medical records. 

(Gherardini, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 681; Wood v. Superior 

Court (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1141–1143 (Wood).)2 Good 

cause “ ‘calls for a factual exposition of a reasonable ground for 

the sought order.’ ” (Gherardini, supra, at p. 681 quoting Waters 

v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 885, 893.) 

In Wood, the Board issued administrative subpoenas for 

the medical records of 52 patients under the care of two different 

physicians because it suspected the physicians were overprescribing certain Schedule II drugs. In support of the 

subpoenas, the Board submitted declarations from its 

investigators that stated they had obtained copies of the two 

 

2 The Supreme Court disapproved Wood and Gherardini to 

the extent they hold that a compelling interest must always be 

shown when an individual’s privacy rights are implicated, rather 

than employ a balancing analysis under Hill. (Williams v. 

Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 556–557, fn. 8.) Because the 

high court did not overrule Wood and Gherardini on any other 

ground, we continue to rely on these cases for their good cause 

analysis and for other propositions.
12

doctors’ Schedule II drug prescriptions from various pharmacies. 

One investigator reported a pharmacist had told her he believed 

a particular patient was receiving an excessive dose of Demerol. 

The Board’s medical consultant opined that there existed a 

“ ‘definite possibility of excessive prescribing of controlled drug 

substances’ ” and that the medical records should be obtained to 

determine whether appropriate medical conditions existed to 

warrant the prescriptions. (Wood, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 1142.)

The court concluded the Board’s showing was insufficient to 

warrant a demand for the complete medical records of the 

patients, because it included records of medical issues unrelated 

to the prescription of the controlled substances. (Wood, supra,

166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1149.) The court further stated, “Here we 

have some facts about the prescriptions and the conclusions of 

board personnel that they are suspicious but no mediating facts 

revealing why the conclusion is warranted. The board has made 

no evidentiary showing of how often physicians similarly-situated 

to petitioners might prescribe these drugs. Alternatively, the 

board has made no showing of the likelihood that the 

prescriptions could have been properly issued, given what is 

known of the circumstances of issuance. Absent this information 

the trial court has no means by which to gauge the likelihood 

that the records sought will reveal physician misconduct. 

Without this there can be no independent judicial assessment of 

good cause. The judicial function of assessing cause [citation] 

cannot be abdicated by deferring to the bare conclusions of board 

personnel.” (Id. at p. 1150, italics omitted.)

In Bearman v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 463 

(Bearman), a doctor prescribed marijuana to his patient to treat 
13

migraines and attention deficit disorder. The doctor provided the 

patient with a letter certifying the patient was under his medical 

care and, having evaluated the medical risks and benefits of 

cannabis use with the patient, the doctor approved his use of 

cannabis for the relief of pain and nausea of migraines and 

decreasing the frequency and intensity. The doctor further stated 

the approval for medicinal cannabis would not require a repeat 

visit until November or December 2001, effectively providing an 

expiration date for the prescription. (Id. at p. 467.)

On April 10, 2001, park rangers discovered pipes and 

marijuana among the patient’s possessions. The patient 

presented the letter to the rangers. Believing the doctor was 

possibly violating the law and medical ethics by exceeding his 

scope of practice, one of the park rangers sent a copy of the letter 

to the Board and asked for “ ‘appropriate actions.’ ” (Bearman, 

supra, at pp. 467–468.) An investigation was initiated and the 

Board issued an administrative subpoena for the patient’s 

records after the patient refused to consent to the disclosure. 

(Id. at p. 468.) 

The trial court granted the Board’s petition to compel 

compliance, but on appeal, the court found an absence of good 

cause for disclosure of the patient’s records. The court concluded 

the supporting declarations by the Board “are nothing more than 

speculations, unsupported suspicions, and conclusory statements 

drawn solely from [the doctor’s] letter to [his patient] and the 

simple fact he recommended the use of marijuana.” (Bearman, 

supra, at p. 471.) There were no facts suggesting the doctor was 

negligent in his patient’s treatment, or that he prescribed 

marijuana for improper reasons. (Ibid.)
14

Similarly, in Gherardini, the investigator’s declaration was 

insufficient because it “set[] forth no facts, no showing of 

relevance or materiality of the medical records of these five 

specified patients to the general charge of gross negligence and/or 

incompetence of the licensee-doctor.” (Gherardini, supra, 93 

Cal.App.3d at p. 681.) 

By contrast, the court in Cross v. Superior Court (2017) 11 

Cal.App.5th 305 (Cross) found good cause for an order compelling 

compliance with subpoenas for the medical records of three 

patients. There, the Board subpoenaed a psychiatrist’s patient 

records to investigate an allegation that she improperly 

prescribed controlled substances to three people. (Id. at p. 310.) 

The psychiatrist refused to produce the records, invoking the 

psychotherapist-patient privilege and the patients’ right to 

privacy. (Ibid.)

The Department of Consumer Affairs filed a petition to 

compel compliance with the subpoenas, which was granted. 

On appeal, the court concluded the patients had a state 

constitutional right to privacy that protects information 

contained in their medical records. (Cross, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th

at p. 325.) Nevertheless, it found compelling the state’s interest 

in investigating whether a doctor prescribed excessive or 

improper amounts of controlled substances. (Id. at p. 327.) 

The court found unpersuasive the psychiatrist’s contention 

that there was no compelling interest in her particular case 

because the facts and declarations relied upon by the Board did

not justify its investigation. (Cross, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 328.) Specifically, the psychiatrist argued the Board’s expert 

was not competent to demonstrate it had good cause to 

investigate her prescribing practices because the expert was an 
15

internist rather than a specialist in psychiatry. The court found 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion to conclude the Board’s 

expert was qualified to competently render an opinion on the 

subject. (Id. at p. 327.) 

Good cause was shown where the Board’s medical 

consultant “opined on the nature and properties of the drugs 

prescribed, their potential complications, and the precautions 

that should be taken by a physician who prescribes the 

medications.” (Cross, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 327.) In 

particular, the Board’s expert believed the three patients in 

question, all women who were likely postmenopausal, may be at 

increased risk for coronary artery disease complications, which 

could be exacerbated by use of the prescribed stimulants. (Id. at 

p. 315.) The psychiatrist also prescribed high doses of Adderall, a 

drug predominately used to treat attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder (ADHD) and narcolepsy. The psychiatrist prescribed 

Adderall to one patient at a dosage level that was three times the 

maximum recommended dosage for treatment of ADHD and in 

excess of the recommended dosage for treatment of narcolepsy. 

(Id. at pp. 312–313.) 

Good cause was further shown by the investigator’s 

declaration that one of the purported patients denied she was 

ever treated by the psychiatrist. Additionally, the psychiatrist 

had been disciplined by the Texas Medical Board for improperly 

prescribing sleep medication to a close family member. (Cross,

supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 328.) 
16

IV. The Board Has Failed to Demonstrate Good Cause

Dr. Cohanshohet challenges the basis for the subpoenas, 

contending good cause is lacking to order compliance of the 

subpoenas. We agree the Board has failed to demonstrate good 

cause. 

Applying the guidance provided by Wood, Bearman, and 

Cross, we conclude Dr. Naqvi’s declaration is insufficient to show 

good cause to compel compliance of the subpoenas at issue. Good 

cause requires something more than the mere fact that a 

specialist in pain medication prescribed doses slightly greater 

than 100 MED to three patients and two others received 

prescriptions for drugs which, used in combination, resulted in 

increased sedative effects. 

As in Bearman, there are no facts suggesting Dr. 

Cohanshohet was negligent in treating his patients or that he 

prescribed controlled substances without meeting the standard of 

care. Given that Dr. Cohanshohet is a pain management 

specialist who sometimes treats patients seeking active cancer 

treatment, palliative care, and end-of-life care, it is reasonable to 

assume at least some of his patients would require treatment for 

pain that would exceed the recommended dose. Indeed, there is 

no indication how many patients Dr. Cohanshohet treats in total 

and what percentage the five patients at issue comprise that 

total. 

As in Wood, the Board has made no evidentiary showing of 

how often similarly-situated physicians who specialize in pain 

treatment might prescribe these drugs. Neither has the Board 

made any showing of the likelihood that the prescriptions could 

have been properly issued, given what is known of Dr. 

Cohanshohet’s practice. Instead, Dr. Berger identified instances 
17

where his prescribing patterns would have been appropriate. 

Specifically, Dr. Berger indicated that the CDC’s prescribing 

recommendations, relied upon by Dr. Naqvi, do not apply in cases 

involving “active cancer treatment, palliative care, and end-of-life 

care.” Dr. Naqvi failed to discuss these circumstances in his 

declaration.

This is in contrast to the supporting evidence in Cross, 

which provided much greater detail as to why the drugs 

prescribed posed a greater risk to the three patients identified as 

opposed to a patient who was not a postmenopausal woman. 

In addition, one of the patients in Cross received doses that 

equaled three times the maximum recommended dose. Another 

patient denied she had been treated by the psychiatrist and the 

psychiatrist had been previously disciplined by the Texas Medical 

Board for improper prescription practices. (Cross, supra, 11 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 312–315.) Cross presented a much greater 

showing of good cause to compel compliance of the subpoenas.

The Attorney General contends the consumer complaint, 

“which alleged the exact concerns identified in Dr. Naqvi’s 

declaration,” provides the additional evidence necessary to 

constitute good cause. We are not persuaded an anonymous 

complaint which provides scant detail, particularly about who 

and when the prescriptions were written, constitutes substantial 

evidence of good cause. Indeed, we are skeptical the complaint 

bolsters Dr. Naqvi’s suspicions, given that Dr. Naqvi was induced 

to look through the CURES report for improper prescriptions of 

opioids because of the complaint. Thus, it may be the case that 

Dr. Naqvi looked through the CURES report to justify the 

allegations in the anonymous complaint. 
18

DISPOSITION

The order to comply with the challenged subpoenas is 

reversed and the trial court is directed to issue a new order 

denying the petition. Dr. Cohanshohet is awarded his costs on 

appeal.

BIGELOW, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

STRATTON, J.
Filed 2/21/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

DEAN GRAFILO, as Director, etc., 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KAMYAR COHANSHOHET,

Defendant and Appellant;

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,

 Real Party in Interest and

 Respondent.

 B285193

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS169143)

 ORDER CERTIFYING 

 PUBLICATION 

 

 [No change in the judgment]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above entitled matter was filed on 

January 22, 2019, was not certified for publication in the Official 

Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion should 

be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

____________________________________________________________

BIGELOW, P. J. GRIMES, J. STRATTON, J.