UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4100

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JOSE ANGEL GUERRERO GALINDO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:11-cr-00124-NCT-2)

Submitted: March 20, 2013 Decided: April 3, 2013

Before AGEE, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN, 

Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra Jane 

Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jose Guerrero Galindo pled guilty pursuant to a 

written plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute cocaine 

hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006) and 

possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 2 (2006). 

On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal but questioning the reasonableness 

of Galindo’s sentence. Galindo filed a pro se supplemental 

brief, alleging generally that his due process rights were 

violated because he was not provided with Spanish language 

materials and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Finding 

no error, we affirm.

We review sentences for reasonableness “under a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). This review entails 

appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining 

procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district 

court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines 

range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an 

appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
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factors, selected a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, 

and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-51. 

Galindo’s appellate counsel first questions whether 

Galindo’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. Specifically, 

counsel questions whether the district court erred by applying a 

leadership enhancement pursuant to United States Sentencing 

Guidelines “USSG” § 3B1.1(a) (2011), an enhancement for 

operating a drug house pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12), by 

attributing fifty kilograms of cocaine to Galindo, and by 

failing to adequately consider and explain the application to 

Galindo of the statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). Upon careful review of the record, we find no 

procedural error.

If a sentence is free of significant procedural error, 

we then review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into 

account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51. “When rendering a sentence, the district court must make an 

individualized assessment based on the facts presented,” United 

States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and emphasis omitted), and must “adequately 

explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate 

review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall, 

552 U.S. at 50. If the sentence is within the properly 

calculated Guidelines range, this court applies a presumption on 
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appeal that the sentence is substantively reasonable. United 

States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Such a presumption is rebutted only if the defendant shows “that 

the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) 

factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 

(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of 

the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to Galindo’s

within Guidelines sentence, we conclude that the sentence 

selected was not substantively infirm.

In his pro se supplemental brief Galindo contends that 

his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was not 

provided with Spanish-language documentation or Spanish-language 

legal materials. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 

466 (1969) (holding that, if a plea is not “voluntary and 

knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is 

therefore void”). Because Galindo did not bring these concerns 

to the attention of the district court, we review for plain 

error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) 

(holding that unpreserved error is to be reviewed under the 

plain error standard). We conclude that the record demonstrates 

that the district court did not commit plain error by accepting 

Galindo’s plea. Galindo stated that he understood the 

proceedings, participated meaningfully in the Rule 11 hearing, 

and ultimately admitted his guilt. See United States v. Rubio, 
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677 F.3d 1257, 1260-62 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that the 

defendant could not establish that her plea was involuntary on 

the basis of a Spanish language barrier when the record 

indicated that she had understood proceedings).*

Finally, Galindo contends that he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel. Claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel are generally not cognizable on direct 

appeal unless the record clearly demonstrates ineffectiveness. 

United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006); 

see also United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 

1997) (“[I]t is well settled that a claim of ineffective 

assistance should be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the 

district court rather than on direct appeal, unless the record 

conclusively shows ineffective assistance.”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Upon review of the record, we conclude that it 

does not conclusively show that Galindo’s counsel was 

ineffective, and accordingly decline to consider this issue on 

direct appeal.

 * Galindo also raises numerous questions inviting this court 

to go beyond the scope of an Anders review and determine the 

legality of the warrant against him, the evidentiary chain of 

custody, and whether drug residue was present on his clothing, 

among others. We conclude that these contentions are moot in 

light of Galindo’s guilty plea, and that no plain error 

connected with any of Galindo’s contentions appears on the face 

of the record.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Galindo, in writing, of the right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Galindo requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Galindo.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED