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© USIP 2014 • All rights reserved.

“Pakistan’s youth bulge is 

projected to persist for at 

least another three decades 

and can either be an asset 

or a liability for the country 

depending on how effectively 

this segment of the population is integrated into society.”

February 26, 2014

Youth Radicalization in Pakistan

Summary

•	 Pakistani leadersface serious domestic extremism challenges; more than 47,000 thousand

lives have been lost in terrorism-related violence in Pakistan over the past decade.

•	 Effective counter-radicalization processes must take into account Pakistan’slarge young adult

population (ages 15-29), which collectively accountsfor at least 30 percent of the overall

population.

•	 Youth radicalization in Pakistan can be understood asthe product of an exclusively Islamic

identity—meaning a majority of youth identify primarily through their religion over nationality—combined with a broader reactive movement comprised of militant, political and

missionary organizations.

•	 A variety of religious, political and militant organizations operating within Pakistan,some with

the tacit or active support of the state, have fostered an enabling environment for radicalization and at times violent action. Some groups provide forumsfor interaction and connections with more militant actors, while others carry out the whole range ofsocial, political and

violent activity.

•	 When radical groups can popularize an exclusive Islamic orsectarian identity, even nonviolent organizations can become connected or aligned with more radical organizations and

concepts.

•	 Confronting youth radicalization in Pakistan requires a holistic approach thatsupports political,social and educational alternativesto exclusionary Islamic identities, reducing the space

for groupsthat espouse violence in the name of an exclusive Islamic identity.

Introduction

Within the past decade, more than 47,000 people have been killed in terrorism-related violence in

Pakistan.1 Attacks by domestic terrorist organizations have implicationsfor physicalsecurity, but

they also impact the domestic social and political fabric. The surge in attacksin Pakistan has often

been attributed to external factors, particularly the conflict in neighboring Afghanistan or the

covert U.S. Predator drone campaign in Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, but most

violence is carried out by Pakistani militant actorstargeting their fellow citizens.

Despite the costs borne by Pakistani victims of terror,some segments of Pakistanisociety

continue to sympathize, justify or at times even directly support violence, providing an“enabling

Raheem ul Haque

E-mail: raheemhaque@fccollege.edu.pk

PEACEBRIEF167
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Youth Radicalization in Pakistan

page 2 • PB 167 • February 26, 2014

environment”within which militant groups and their affiliates are able to operate. Thissupport,

whether tacit or active, is particularly concerning when it is expressed by members of Pakistan’s

large young adult (ages 15-29) population, which collectively accountsfor 30 percent of the overall

population.2 Pakistan’s youth bulge is projected to persist for at least another three decades3 and

can either be an asset or a liability for the country depending on how effectively thissegment of

the population isintegrated into society. In either case, the youth population is bound to define

the future course of the country, which is currently mired in multiple crises.

Based in part on surveys and focus group interviews conducted in Lahore from late 2011 to

spring 2013 with a range of youth, this brief positsthat youth radicalization in Pakistan can be

understood asthe product of a closed Islamic identity combined with a broader reactive movement

comprised of militant, political and missionary organizations.4Asthe new national government led

by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif grapples with how to formulate a response to terrorism conducted

by extremist groups, it must contend with the domestic roots of the threat, a key component of

which will be to counter radicalization of the youth population at large.

Exclusive Islamic Identity and Youth Radicalization

Pakistan’sformation as a state specifically intended to represent the former British India’s Muslim

population and consciousstate-led‘Islamization’efforts under the dictatorship of former General

Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s, have encouraged the spread of individual exclusivist identities among

Pakistani youth and adults. These are furthered by political and religious groupsthatseek to define

themselvesin alignment with Islam and in opposition to all else, including indigenous culture.

In surveys of Lahori youth conducted for this piece and in other previousstudies, young

Pakistani respondents expressed high levels of identification with religious-based valuessystems.5

For example, in one survey 88 percent of educated youth in elite school institutionsstated that

religion wastheir primary identity and 50 percent considered their national identity to be dependent on their Islamic identity.6

In another countrywide survey, 75 percent identified themselves

as Muslims, as compared to just 14 percent as Pakistani,suggesting that their religiousidentity

wasfar more important than their nationality.7At the extremes, thisform of closed, homogenized

self-identity can increase youth propensity to radicalization, leading them to accept or at times

even justify violence conducted against other groupsin the name of Islam.

The “Enabling Environment” for Radicalization

Violent terrorist attacks are not the product of a single actor operating in isolation, but are instead

embedded in a largersocial and political milieu. Indeed, violent radicalization can be represented as

a pyramid, with the active terrorist at the top, the religious-political organizationsin the middle and

the missionary Islamic organizations at the bottom. Linkages between these three levels create an

“enabling environment”that enhance the means and opportunitiesto advance an Islamic identitybased social movement and, in effect, the radicalization of youth to potentially militant causes. 

These linkages can be categorized into three basic models: 

•	 the loosely-coupled model, where a shared space facilitates interaction between nominal sympathizers, supporters and militant actors. For example, a mosque or large congregations of missionary organizations, such as the Tableeghi Jamaat, allows for literatures

of all levels to be distributed, and political and militant activists have the opportunity to

interact with lower level sympathizers.
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Youth Radicalization in Pakistan

page 3 • PB 167 • February 26, 2014

•	 the bridge model, where one organization bridges the initial pool of sympathizers with

more militant organizations. As an example, the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) is a religiouspolitical party which acts as the political representative of the large Deobandi mosquemadrasa network, composed of various missionary organizations. It also acts both as an

ideological guide as well as a channel for youth volunteers to join Taliban militant actors.

During the 1990s, for example, the JUI-S faction led by Maulana Sami-ul Haq closed its

madrasa schools to allow students to participate in the Afghan civil war alongside the

Afghan Taliban. Similarly, the Jamaat-e-Islami both has a strong national student organization, the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba, and is connected with militant organizations such as

Hizbul-Mujahideen.8

•	 the encapsulating model, whereby an entire social network has been mobilized to form

a large organizational form, encapsulating all three levels of the pyramid. For example,

the Jamaat-ud-Dawa acts as a proselytizing actor with a network of mosques and

educational institutions, as well as a service oriented NGO; it has increasingly taken on a

political role through its messaging on culture and politics, while its militant role as the

banned Lashkar-e-Taiba has been well documented.

Though the methodology of missionary organizations may be peaceful, the acceptance of their

message increasesthe likelihood that youth will also accept the message of religious-political or

militant groups as being absolute.

For example, missionary organizationssuch asthe male-focusedTableeghiJamaat and the

female-oriented Al-Huda, which have the largest public reach, have the potential to increase youth

receptivenessto more radical groups by reinforcing messages of a primarily Islamic identity, through

the rejection of indigenous ethnic, national or tribal identities as well asforeign cultural and political

signifiers. By popularizing an exclusive Islamic orsectarian identity, they may contribute to alignment with more radical organizations, and the rejection of pluralistic politics.

Religious political partieslike Jamaat-e-Islami and the JUI have generally maintained a cordial relationship with the state and participated in the electoral political process, endorsing violent jihad only

in selectsituations,such as Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir or Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. Most

militant organizationssuch asthe Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi instead pick up

thisthread at the extremes, calling for youth to join in violent jihad. Militant jihad presents a call for

revolutionary action to achieve the same goals, a just Islamic order against an unjust and un-Islamic

system of governance at the domestic as well as at the globalscale against infidels and persecutors

of Muslims.While general goals are common, differencesin the understanding of a just Islamic order

and competition for power also leadsto sectarian violence against fellow Muslims and intra-Islamist

violence. The Pakistanistate has historically allowed ample space for many Islamist organizationsto

operate, recruit and mobilize support, including in some cases active militant and sectarian organizations. The Pakistani military’s historical practice ofselective support for certain militant actorsin order

to support regional policy objectivesin neighboring Afghanistan or India has helped build a resource

base for not just militant but also nonmilitant organizationsserving bridging or encapsulating roles.

Today, a vibrant free market of 232 religious organizations and militant groups exists within the

country; 100 of them have their headquartersin Punjab and 71 in Lahore alone.9 Some militant

groups operate openly in the country — establishing parallel educational or training institutions,

collecting or extorting financial donations, and distributing published materials and media. The

state’s education system also facilitatesthese groups, who are often able to fill a vacuum left open

by low levels of public education provision. The strength of these organizationsleadsto better

marketing and recruitment, enabling them to draw youth from lower ends of the radicalization

”pyramid”upward toward active militancy.
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Youth Radicalization in Pakistan

page 4 • PB 167 • February 26, 2014

Conclusion and Recommendations

In this assessment, youth radicalization in Pakistan emergesfrom the interlinking of an exclusively

Islamic identity, and a strong and unchecked Islamic identity-based social movement, which has

greater opportunitiesto promote its message and mobilize resources within the Pakistani political

and security framework.

Confronting youth radicalization in Pakistan requires a holistic approach that, in addition to police

actions against militant organizations, also supports political,social and educational alternativesto

this narrow Islamic identity. Only a comprehensive approach can disempower the groups espousing

violence in the name of a reactive Islamic identity.

Stepsin thisregard should include:

•	 Publicize and support alternative discourse and world view linked to an inclusive religious meaning in all public domains, including physical and virtual spaces. Strengthen

civil society initiatives to reform the education curriculum, and engage large media

house executives to support programming that covers inter-faith and inter-sectarian

harmony, tolerance, and diversity within the religious framework. Additionally, support

similar initiatives in social media, which is the single most important source of information for the youth. 

•	 Encourage the celebration of local cultural diversity and establish centers to ensure

youth participation in cultural activities, social clubs and professional and sports organizations. Currently most public schools, colleges and universities are bereft of student

unions, student clubs and extra-curricular activities. Lower cost private institutions

experience similar shortages, as do low-income communities where most youth do not

attend school. Art councils supporting literature, arts and music currently exist only in

large cities, and should be strengthened and expanded. Youth centers for low-income

communities and extracurricular activities for public educational institutions can be supported by nongovernmental organizations, private institutions and education leaders,

combining cultural activities and vocational skills.

•	 Promote greater inter-provincial, inter-national and inter-religious interaction among the

youth. Support civil society and inter-college youth-led initiatives through student clubs

that use inexpensive technology for regular interactive discussion among the youth of

different provinces, sects, religions and nationalities. Additionally, engage universities

and colleges to initiate courses on peace and conflict resolution while also bringing

together youth for interactive workshops. 

Because radicalization of Pakistani youth stemsfrom culturalsocialization in a strictly religionbound identity, a deradicalization strategy needsto focus on opening up the social identity by

strengthening other identity constituents.
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Youth Radicalization in Pakistan

page 5 • PB 167 • February 26, 2014

About This Brief

Based in part on USIP-supported 

surveys and focus group interviews 

conducted in Lahore, Pakistan from 

late 2011 to spring 2013 with a 

range of youth, author Raheem 

ul Haque provides a theoretical 

framework for understanding the 

process of youth radicalization in 

Pakistan. The author is a research 

fellow at the Forman Christian 

College Centre for Public Policy and 

Governance in Lahore, Pakistan; the 

views expressed here are his own. 

Notes

1.	 “Fatalitiesin Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2013,”South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi:

The Institute for Conflict Management.http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/

database/casualties.htm.

2.	 “Chapter 7: Population, Labour Force and Employment”references National Institute for

Population Studies, Pakistan Economic Survey, http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/

chapters_13/12-Population.pdf.

3.	 Ibid.

4.	 Moeed Yusuf,“A Society on the Precipice: Examining the Prospects of Youth Radicalization in

Pakistan,”in Reaping the Dividend, Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011, pages 76-112.

5.	 Raheem ulHaque,“Youth Radicalization in Punjab,”Framework forYouth Policy andDe-radicalization,

Centre for Public Policy andGovernance, forthcoming.

6.	 Ayesha Siddiqa, Red Hot Chilli PeppersIslam: IstheYouth in Elite Universitiesin Pakistan Radical?,

Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2010.

7.	 British Council, Pakistan: The Next Generation 2009, http://www.britishcouncil.pk/pakistanNext-Generation-Report.pdf, (accessed Dec 18, 2012).

8.	 TerroristOrganization Profile: Hizbul Mujahideen, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism

and Responsesto Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_

organization_profile.asp?id=52.

9.	 MohammadAmir Rana,“Evolution of militant groupsin Pakistan”, Conflict and Peace Studies,Volume

4,Number 2. www.san-pips.com/download.php?f=159.pdf , (Accessed onNovember 20, 2012).