PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 21-1458

______________

JOHN DOE

Appellant

v.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 3-20-cv-04352)

District Judge: Honorable Brian R. Martinotti

______________

Argued November 10, 2021

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and MATEY, Circuit 

Judges

(Filed: March 31, 2022)
2

Michael P. Bowen [Argued]

Edward E. Shapiro

Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes LLP

55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor

New York, NY 10001

Counsel for Appellant

Stephen J. Kastenberg [Argued]

Ballard Spahr LLP

1735 Market Street, 51st Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599

Christopher Kelly

Cozen O’Connor

1650 Market Street

One Liberty Place, Suite 2800

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

MATEY, Circuit Judge.

There are two sides to every story. But a complaint need 

not tell both. John Doe’s Complaint plausibly tells his side,

alleging that Princeton discriminated on the basis of sex while 

investigating Title IX claims filed against him. Discovery

might not bear out Doe’s account, but he has satisfied his 

burden at this early stage. So we will vacate the District Court’s 
3

order dismissing the matter and remand for the rest of the story 

to develop.

I.

On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Umland v. PLANCO Fin. 

Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). Following that rule, 

we recount only the facts described in the Complaint.

A. The Beginning

John Doe and Jane Roe attended Princeton University

where, after meeting during the fall of their freshman year, they 

began a steady, and steadily volatile, relationship. Arguments, 

sometimes violent, were common. During their first summer 

vacation, for example, Roe scratched and grabbed Doe’s arm 

while traveling with Doe’s family. And in what became part of 

Princeton’s investigation, the couple’s penchant for physical 

altercations extended to intimacy, including “consensual 

choking.” (App. at 43.)1 Soon enough, bad went to worse and, 

1 Although associating violence with intimacy might 

seem a contradiction, we note publications describing the 

campus culture during this period. For example, a Princeton 

website states that in December 2017, the Office of the Dean 

of Undergraduate Students officially recognized “Princeton 

Plays” as “the only kink and BDSM community on campus.” 
4

when Roe informed Doe she was dating others, Doe called the 

whole thing off. Except, it turned out, Doe had also been 

unfaithful. A revelation that did not sit well with Roe, so she 

began spreading rumors about Doe on campus. One such 

accusation: that Roe ended the relationship because Doe was 

physically abusive. And she threatened Doe directly: “take a 

year off and nothing will happen to you.” (App. at 48.) 

B. Princeton Intervenes 

Concerned, Doe went to the Director of Student Life, 

Garrett Meggs. In an email, Doe complained that he was being 

harassed by his ex-girlfriend, who was “spreading false 

information.” (App. at 48.) Doe explained that he “simply” did 

not “feel safe” and Meggs recommended that Doe seek mental 

health services. (App. at 48.) He did not recommend that Doe 

file a Title IX complaint. 

Meanwhile, Roe met with Princeton’s Director of 

Gender Equity and Title IX Administration, Regan Crotty. Roe 

told Crotty that she was a victim of “Intimate Relationship 

Violence” under the Princeton Policy2and described certain

Interview with Princeton Plays, Ask the Sexpert (Feb. 28, 

2019), https://thesexpert.princeton.edu/2019/02/interviewwith-princeton-plays/; see also Ivy Truong, New BDSM club 

shows its members the ropes, The Daily Princetonian (Dec. 6, 

2017),

https://web.archive.org/web/20180811193926/http://www.dai

lyprincetonian.com/article/2017/12/princeton-plays. 

2 Princeton’s Rights, Rules, Responsibilities policy 

(“Princeton Policy”) defines “Intimate Relationship Violence” 
5

incidents of abuse by Doe. Roe explained that she was not 

interested in pursuing further action. But Crotty advised that 

Princeton wanted Roe to press charges against Doe. Soon after, 

when Doe began a new relationship, Roe agreed to Crotty’s 

suggestion, and approved an order (“Order”) prohibiting Doe 

and Roe from any contact. Still, on the day the Order issued, 

Roe approached Doe on a campus running trail, attempting to 

apologize. Doe notified Meggs of the incident, and the 

violation of the Order, and Princeton simply told Roe not to let 

it happen again.

A few months later, Roe notified Crotty that she would 

cooperate with Princeton’s inquiry. A formal notice was 

issued, and Princeton barred Doe—but not Roe—from campus 

during the investigation. Then, several months later, Doe

accidentally “liked” one of Roe’s social media posts, in

violation of the Order. Doe immediately self-reported the 

mistake but, unlike with Roe’s violation, Princeton launched

another disciplinary process that resulted in a reprimand and a 

written warning from a dean. 

C. The Investigation and Report

Princeton appointed a three-person panel (“Panel”) to 

investigate Roe’s allegations against Doe,

3

review the evidence 

as “[a]cts of violence, threat or intimidation that harm or injure 

a partner in a current or former intimate relationship.” (App. at 

118.) But cf. supra note 1.

3 Whether Doe engaged in Intimate Relationship 

Violence by: a) repeatedly grabbing and pinching Roe between 

September 2016 and March 2018, b) choking Roe in 
6

they gathered, weigh the testimony they allowed, and then 

decide whether the facts they found violated the Princeton 

Policy. At one of Doe’s meetings with the Panel, he mentioned

an interest in pursuing counterclaims against Roe. Unlike with 

Roe, who was urged to pursue an investigation, Princeton 

offered Doe no guidance. Later, when Doe formally asked the 

Panel to consider his claims, the Panel expanded its 

investigation.4

The Panel’s investigation culminated in a “Report”

finding evidence to support the incidents of physical abuse 

alleged by Roe,5 but nothing sufficient to confirm any of Doe’s

claims. Doe received a letter with the Panel’s punishment: 

expulsion from Princeton.6 Vindicated, Roe tweeted “my life 

is good again . . . worked out boy problems that were never real 

problems just things I created.” (App. at 56.)

D. The Federal Complaint

In April 2020, Doe filed a Complaint against Princeton 

alleging violations of Title IX, and state law claims for breach 

of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

September and October 2017, c) pulling Roe’s arm and 

pushing her to the ground in 2019, and d) threatening self-harm 

if Roe did not remain in a relationship with him.

4 Doe alleged that Roe scratched him multiple times, 

punched him, and elbowed him in the face.

5 The Panel found insufficient evidence that Doe linked 

the threat of self-harm to Roe remaining in a relationship with 

him. 

6 Doe appealed and the Panel’s decision was affirmed 

by a separate three-member faculty group.
7

fair dealing, and denial of due process. The District Court 

granted Princeton’s motion to dismiss all of Doe’s claims

without prejudice, offering Doe an opportunity to amend. See 

Doe v. Princeton Univ., 2021 WL 194806, at *12 (D.N.J. Jan 

20, 2021). Doe declined, so the District Court dismissed his

action with prejudice. Doe filed this timely appeal.

7 For the 

reasons below, we will vacate.

II.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. See 

Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“USciences”). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

That requires “plausibly suggesting” facts sufficient to “draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

557 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Our 

review must accept Doe’s factual allegations as true and 

consider those facts in the light most favorable to Doe. See 

USciences, 961 F.3d at 208, 210 n.3. But we “disregard legal 

conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action 

supported by mere conclusory statements.” Davis v. Wells 

Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016).

A. The Princeton Report 

7 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1367(a) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. Doe does not appeal the dismissal of his due process 

claim.
8

We note two complications that may arise when

evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6): whether a district 

court may consider documents outside of the pleadings and, if 

so, whether the district court may disregard the well-pleaded 

facts of a complaint in favor of facts in an external document.

Doe alleges that the District Court impermissibly credited

findings in the Report as true, despite his Complaint’s 

assertions to the contrary. These findings included the Report’s 

statements that “[t]he Panel found Jane credible,” there were

“significant concerns” with Doe’s credibility, and all other 

witnesses were “generally credible.” (App. at 13.)

Generally, “a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss 

may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re 

Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d 

Cir. 1997). But where a document is “integral to or explicitly 

relied upon in the complaint,” it “may be considered without 

converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary 

judgment” under Rule 56. USciences, 961 F.3d at 208 (quoting 

Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426). Because the Panel Report was

“integral to” and “explicitly relied upon in the [C]omplaint,” 

consideration is appropriate. But consideration only goes so 

far. When the truth of facts in an “integral” document are 

contested by the well-pleaded facts of a complaint, the facts in 

the complaint must prevail. 

To see why, start with Twombly and Iqbal. They direct 

courts to “accept[] as true” the factual assertions of a 

complaint. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This guidance remains

“even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts 

alleged is improbable and that a recovery is very remote and 

unlikely.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The proper 
9

place to resolve factual disputes is not on a motion to dismiss, 

but on a motion for summary judgment. See Flora v. Cnty. of 

Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175–76 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2015). 

We have held, for example, that “we may take judicial 

notice of another court’s opinion—not for the truth of the facts 

recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion.” S. Cross 

Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 

F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., 

Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 118–19 (3d Cir. 2019). So, too, with a 

public record, which may be considered “not for the truth of its 

contents, but rather as evidence of the information provided 

[that was relevant to the dispute].” Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. 

City of Philadelphia, Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 273 

n.11 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 

289 (3d Cir. 2000). Similarly, concessions by counsel may not 

be used in a motion to dismiss to decide disputed issues of 

material fact. See Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic 

Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2019). And 

neither may testimony given at a hearing. See Bruni v. City of 

Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2016). 

USciences reflects this approach. There, we accepted 

facts in the university’s Title IX investigator’s report as true 

when they were not disputed by the complaint. But not facts 

challenged by the plaintiff. For example, we credited the 

report’s assertion of how many drinks Doe and Roe consumed

on the relevant night. See 961 F.3d at 210. But where the 

complaint alleged that Doe and Roe “were comparably 

intoxicated [which] undermined [their] ability to give 

affirmative consent,” we did not rely on the report’s contrary 
10

assertion that “Doe . . . told the investigator that [the] sexual 

encounter . . . was mutually consensual.” Id. at 210 n.4.

8

Here, the District Court noted that the Panel’s 

“credibility determinations were supported by sufficient 

evidence.” (App. at 13.) That finding contradicted Doe’s

assertion that the Panel rendered “inconsistent credibility 

determinations.” (App. at 63, 85.) As a result, crediting the

Report’s assertion over the Complaint’s was improper. 

B. Title IX Claim

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 states 

that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 

from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 

to discrimination under any education program or activity 

receiving [f]ederal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 

That “bar[s] the imposition of university discipline when sex is 

a motivating factor in the decision to discipline.” USciences, 

8 Other circuit courts agree. See, e.g., Khoja v. Orexigen 

Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1014 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(“Although incorporation by reference generally permits 

courts to accept the truth of matters asserted in incorporated 

documents, we reiterate that it is improper to do so only to 

resolve factual disputes against the plaintiff’s well-pled 

allegations in the complaint.”); Otis v. Demarasse, 886 F.3d 

639, 647 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The district court . . . erred when it 

credited the content of the police report over [the plaintiff’s] 

denial.”); Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 

1134 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Ignoring, as we must at the pleading 

stage, the opinions and conclusions of [a document 

incorporated by reference].”).
11

961 F.3d at 209 (quoting Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 

53 (2d Cir. 2016)).

To state a claim under Title IX, Doe must allege facts 

that, if true, support a plausible inference that Princeton 

discriminated against him based on his sex. USciences, 961 

F.3d at 209. While Doe is “free to characterize [his] claims 

however [he] wish[es],” he alleges facts that mirror the

categories in USciences: 1) whether sex was a motivating 

factor in Princeton’s investigation and 2) whether Princeton 

yielded to external pressure when implementing and enforcing 

its policy against him. USciences, 961 F.3d at 209. And based 

on those facts, Doe has stated a plausible claim for relief.

1. Doe Plausibly Alleged that Sex was a Motivating 

Factor

Doe points to two incidents to allege that sex was a 

motivating factor in Princeton’s investigation: Roe’s report of 

misconduct was treated with greater urgency and seriousness 

than his own, and Roe’s violation of the Order produced only 

a mild University response.

9

i. Reported Misconduct

Begin with Doe’s argument that Princeton favored 

Roe’s initial report. He alleges that while Crotty encouraged 

Roe to file a formal Title IX complaint, Meggs steered Doe 

9 Doe also argues the Panel credited nearly all female 

witnesses but discredited nearly all male witnesses. As that 

point is raised in his brief, but not his Complaint, we do not 

consider this argument.
12

towards mental health services. The District Court found this 

insufficient because “Plaintiff does not allege he filed a 

complaint to trigger such an investigation.” (App. at 13.) That

might be a plausible and nondiscriminatory reason for treating 

Doe’s Complaint differently.10 But on a motion to dismiss, we 

must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d 

Cir. 2008). So while the District Court’s explanation is 

plausible, the “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, though “antimale bias is not the only plausible explanation for the 

university’s conduct, or even the most plausible[,] . . . 

alternative explanations are not fatal to Doe’s ability to survive 

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 

575, 587 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Schwake v. Ariz. Bd. of 

Regents, 967 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Sex 

discrimination need not be the only plausible explanation or 

even the most plausible explanation for a Title IX claim to 

proceed.”); Does 1-2 v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 999 F.3d 

571, 579 (8th Cir. 2021); Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 57.

Princeton replies that Doe’s allegation of mere “rumor 

spreading” went un-investigated because it did not violate the

Princeton Policy. That misses the mark. The Princeton Policy 

prohibits “harassment” and Doe’s Complaint alleges that he 

reported “that he was being harassed by his ex-girlfriend” and 

“simply” did not “feel safe.” (App. at 48, 108–09, 117–18.)

10 Even if a peculiar one, given that the Princeton Policy 

states that the “[l]ack of a formal complaint does not diminish 

the University’s obligation to respond to information 

suggestive of sex discrimination or sexual misconduct.” (App. 

at 114.)
13

And even if the conduct Doe alleged did not constitute 

“harassment,” the Princeton Policy also proscribes

“[u]nwelcome or inappropriate conduct that does not fall under 

other forms of sexual misconduct, but that is sexual and/or 

gender-based in nature.” (App. at 118.) Doe has plausibly 

alleged that he reported a violation that was not investigated by 

the University. And that, in turn, plausibly supports the 

inference that sex was a motivating factor in Princeton’s 

investigation. 

ii. Order Violations11

Next, Doe argues that Princeton’s response to violations 

of the Order suggests sex discrimination. The parties do not 

dispute that Roe’s intentional in-person contact was dismissed 

as minor, while Doe’s accidental “like” was met with formal 

disciplinary process. But the District Court relied on a brief 

submitted by Princeton—which asserted that Doe was treated 

differently because the “like” was not his first violation—to 

dismiss this fact. Doe’s Complaint omits this story entirely.

12

What to do?

11 The Panel Report references two orders, one called 

“No Contact” and one labeled “No Communication.” But the 

Complaint treats both as part of the same administrative 

response, and at this stage we accept that as true.

12 Princeton’s brief walks up to, but not over, the line in 

suggesting that Doe intentionally omitted this material fact 

from his Complaint. But a motion to dismiss is not the proper 

way to raise, let alone resolve that charge. Princeton may, of 

course, pursue this theory in a separate motion under Rule 11 

or 56.
14

First, a court reviewing a motion to dismiss must 

examine the plausibility of “allegations in the complaint.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual claims and assertions raised 

by a defendant are not part of that scrutiny. Otherwise, every 

motion to dismiss would become one for summary judgment, 

a step permitted only under the process outlined in Rule 12(d).

See Bruni, 824 F.3d at 361 (“[I]t is reversible error for a district 

court to convert a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . into a motion 

for summary judgment unless the court provides notice of its 

intention to convert the motion and allows an opportunity to 

submit materials admissible in a summary judgment 

proceeding or allows a hearing.” (quoting Rose v. Bartle, 871 

F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989))). Disregarding Doe’s wellpleaded facts in favor of those mentioned in Princeton’s brief

was erroneous. Second, even if it were permissible to consider 

the fact mentioned in Princeton’s brief, the District Court 

should not have found it dispositive. Though Princeton

suggests another explanation for why it treated the violations 

differently, anti-male bias is still a plausible explanation. And 

we must construe the facts in the light most favorable to Doe

at this stage. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233.

2. Doe Plausibly Alleged that Princeton Yielded to 

External Pressure

Doe also plausibly contends that, in implementing the 

Princeton Policy, the University succumbed to external 

pressure. Doe alleges that Princeton was “under tremendous 

pressure to respond aggressively and ‘over-correct’ by 

favoring protection of female accusers at the expense of 

finding male respondents guilty” after the Department of 

Education (“DoEd”) published its 2011 Dear Colleague Letter 

(“2011 DCL”), and the Office for Civil Rights launched a 
15

related investigation into Princeton’s Title IX processes. (App. 

at 77–79.) As others have noted, the 2011 DCL “ushered in a 

more rigorous approach to campus sexual misconduct 

allegations.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 668 (7th Cir. 

2019); see also Univ. of Minn., 999 F.3d at 578; Menaker v. 

Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 2019). The DoEd

“made clear that it took the letter and its enforcement very 

seriously.” Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 668. If schools did not 

comply, their “federal funding was at risk.” Id.; see also 

USciences, 961 F.3d at 213–14. 

That allegation is relevant because, while “pressure 

from DoEd and the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter cannot alone 

support a plausible claim of Title IX sex discrimination,” it 

factors into the total mix of information supporting a plausible 

Title IX discrimination claim. See USciences, 961 F.3d at 210.

When coupled with Doe’s allegations about Princeton’s 

selective handling of the misconduct reports and Order

violations, the Complaint states a plausible claim of sex 

discrimination. See id.; see also Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at

668–71; Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 

2018); Univ. of Minn., 999 F.3d at 578–79; Doe v. Regents of 

the Univ. of Cal., 23 F.4th 930, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2022).

For these reasons, Doe has suitably alleged plausible 

Title IX allegations and dismissing these claims was improper. 

C. State Law Claims

Doe also appeals the dismissal of his two state law 

claims: breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing. Both state viable causes of 

action.
16

1. Breach of Contract

Doe alleges that the University breached the Princeton 

Policy by failing to investigate in an “impartial and unbiased” 

manner. (App. at 89.) New Jersey courts do not describe “the 

relationship between a private university and its students . . . in 

pure contract or associational terms.” Mittra v. Univ. of Med. 

& Dentistry of N.J., 719 A.2d 693, 696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 

Div. 1998). Instead, “[t]he relationship is unique.” Napolitano 

v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. 

App. Div. 1982). Following that approach, New Jersey courts

“have warned against a rigid application of the law of contracts 

to students’ disciplinary proceedings.” Id. We consider that 

malleable standard by reviewing the circumstances giving rise 

to contract claims in educational settings. 

Start with cases involving private university dismissals

for poor academic performance. New Jersey courts have 

described their role as “limited,” Mittra, 719 A.2d at 697,

because of the “independence that should be accorded to a 

university to permit it to exercise properly educational 

responsibility,” Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 273. See also

Hernandez v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 971, 975 (N.J. 1997)

(“Assessing a student’s academic performance must be left to 

the sound judgment of the individual academic institution.”). 

As a result, New Jersey courts ask whether “the student [was]

afforded reasonable notice and a fair hearing in general 

conformity with the institution’s rules and regulations.” Mittra, 

719 A.2d at 694. And ultimately, a university must have 

“sufficient evidence” to expel. See Hernandez v. Don Bosco 
17

Preparatory High, 730 A.2d 365, 375 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 

Div. 1999). But Napolitano also distinguished between cases 

“involving academic standards” and those involving a 

“violation of [the] rules of conduct.” Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 

273. And no New Jersey court has directly addressed whether 

a student expelled from a private university for misconduct, 

rather than poor academic performance, may bring a state law 

contract claim.

But Don Bosco noted that, when adjudicating a 

dismissal for misconduct, courts should consider whether the 

school “follow[ed] its own established procedures for 

expulsion,” a standard much like that for academic dismissals 

from universities. 730 A.2d at 367. And because of the 

“harm[]” that “plac[ing] [a] child in academic limbo” may 

pose, B.S. v. Noor-Ul-Iman Sch., 2016 WL 4145921, at *6 

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 5, 2016) (per curiam), the 

school “must follow a procedure that is fundamentally fair,”

Don Bosco, 730 A.2d at 367. Don Bosco also distinguished 

between the rights of high school and university students 

because of the greater harms associated with expulsion from 

college. Id. at 375. The court explained that “[a] student at a 

private university, if expelled during the semester . . . loses 

academic credit for the entire semester” and “must complete 

applications for admission to another university in order to 

complete the expected degree,” while “[a]n expelled student in 

a private high school . . . may transfer immediately to the local 

public high school” and “will not lose credit for the semester.” 

Id. Given those added harms, “the procedural rights of a private 

university student will be more aggressively protected by the 

courts when compared to the procedural rights of an expelled 

student at a private high school.” Id. at 376. 
18

We need not outline all of the “more aggressive[]” 

protections that private university students retain under New 

Jersey law. It is enough to follow the direction of Don Bosco 

and hold that New Jersey law requires at least that the school 

“follow its own established procedures,” id. at 367, 376; see 

also Mittra, 719 A.2d at 694, and that those procedures be 

“fundamentally fair,” Don Bosco, 730 A.2d at 367, 376; see 

also Mittra, 719 A.2d at 694; Romeo v. Seton Hall Univ., 875 

A.2d 1043, 1045, 1048 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)

(applying Mittra standard to student’s claim that university 

breached contract by failing to recognize a student group).

Under that baseline standard, Doe plausibly alleges that

Princeton failed to adhere to its own disciplinary procedures in 

the Princeton Policy on proof and impartiality. First, the 

Princeton Policy guarantees that, after considering the “totality 

of the facts and circumstances,” (App. at 116), “[t]he 

investigative panel will . . . determine, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, whether [the] policy was violated,” (App. at 132).

A familiar standard, preponderance of the evidence requires 

proof by the “greater weight of the evidence.” See 

Preponderance of the Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 

ed. 2019). “[A] party proves a fact by a preponderance of the 

evidence when he proves that the fact’s existence is more likely 

than not.” Greenwich Collieries v. Dir., Off. of Workers’

Comp. Programs, 990 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1993). While the 

evidentiary showing need not be “overwhelming,” United 

States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 1983), a plaintiff 

may not prevail where the “evidence is closely balanced” or 

“inconclusive,” Syblis v. Att’y Gen., 763 F.3d 348, 357 (3d Cir. 

2014). 
19

Doe alleges that the Panel ignored that standard by 

disregarding evidence that tended to inculpate Roe and 

exculpate Doe. His Complaint notes that the Panel’s decision 

failed to “consider[] the entirety of the evidence with a neutral 

gaze,” “disregarded exculpatory evidence[,] and rendered 

inconsistent and skewed credibility determinations.” (App. at 

70.) Though the Report claims to apply the preponderance 

standard, we must credit the Complaint’s factual allegations. 

And “[f]rom these allegations, we draw the reasonable 

inference that [Princeton] failed” to follow its own procedures 

by assessing whether Roe’s allegations were true by a more

likely than not standard. USciences, 961 F.3d at 215.

Doe also alleges breaches of the Princeton Policy’s

promise that “[t]he panelists will . . . be impartial and 

unbiased.” (App. at 132.) Because the Princeton Policy does 

not define those terms, “we must construe [Princeton’s]

promise as a matter of contract interpretation.” USciences, 961 

F.3d at 212. Our focus is the parties’ intent expressed in their 

words, and “[w]e look to the dictionary definition[s] . . . for 

assistance in determining the plain meaning of th[ese]

undefined term[s].” Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 

765 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). “Partial” means

“inclined to favor one party more than the other.” See Partial, 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2014); see 

also Partial, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 

(“Unfairly supporting one person, group, or organization 

against another; predisposed to one side of an issue.”). And

“bias” or “biased” refers to “a settled and often prejudiced 

outlook.” See Bias, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2014); see also Bias, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 

ed. 2019) (“A mental inclination or tendency; prejudice; 

predilection.”). “We can glean from these definitions that the 
20

plain meaning of the term,” Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 360, 

“impartial” is one who does not favor one side or the other. 

And the “plain meaning” of the word “unbiased” is one without

a prejudice or inclination in favor of one party. 

Ordinary meanings in mind, Doe complains that the 

Panel “applied inconsistent standards to assess [Roe]’s and 

[Doe]’s credibility,” (App. at 64), “overlooked or minimized 

glaring and substantial factors that would tend to undermine 

[Roe]’s veracity . . . including . . . her motivations to lie,” 

(App. at 64), and “disregarded compelling exculpatory 

evidence which contradicted [Roe]’s allegations,” (App. at 68).

He also points to Princeton’s single investigator model,13

which he contends is “intrinsically flawed and incompatible 

with a fair investigation.” (Opening Br. at 40.) Taken as true, 

these facts suggest that Princeton failed to provide Doe the 

promised fair and impartial proceeding.

14 That is enough to 

ground Doe’s breach of contract claim. 

13 Under the single investigator model, a university

often “hires an outside attorney to serve as an investigator” and 

“then tasks the investigator with interviewing witnesses, 

gathering evidence, and determining the accused’s 

culpability.” USciences, 961 F.3d at 206. Princeton tasked a 

panel of three university employees with conducting the 

investigation.

14 We need not accept Doe’s suggestion that Princeton 

failed to follow a “fundamentally fair” procedure solely by 

omitting a live hearing. While the bright-line test Doe urges 

would provide precision, New Jersey courts have defined 

fundamental fairness contextually, focusing on the setting and 

circumstances. See Don Bosco, 730 A.2d at 376. So while 
21

2. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith 

and Fair Dealing 

Finally, the Complaint alleges that Princeton violated 

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In New Jersey, 

“[e]very contract contains an implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing.” Wade v. Kessler Inst., 798 A.2d 1251, 1259 

(N.J. 2002). The implied covenant prohibits either party from 

doing “anything which will have the effect of destroying or 

injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the 

contract.” Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 

587 (N.J. 1997). Relevant here, the covenant “allow[s] redress 

for the bad faith performance of an agreement.” Seidenberg v. 

Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1076 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 

2002). Doe plausibly alleges facts suggesting the University 

acted in bad faith. 

The Complaint states that Princeton “[s]ubject[ed] 

[Doe] to a discriminatory disciplinary process,” 

“[d]isregard[ed] exculpatory evidence for [Doe] and 

incriminating evidence against [Roe],” “constru[ed] all 

academic decisions and secondary school expulsions are 

subject to fewer procedural requirements, see Napolitano, 453 

A.2d at 274 (allegations of plagiarism); Overlook, 692 A.2d at 

975 (termination from medical residency program), nonacademic private university disciplinary matters warrant “more 

aggressive[] protect[ion].” Don Bosco, 730 A.2d at 376. But 

sketching all the “aggressive[] protect[ions]” that might be 

required is unnecessary where, as here, the total mix of 

procedures missing from Princeton’s investigation is sufficient 

to state a claim.
22

discrepancies and inconsistencies in [Roe’s] favor,” and 

“ignor[ed] evidence corroborative of [Doe’s] counter claims.” 

(App. at 91.) All sufficient, at this stage, to allege improper 

performance. The District Court read these allegations to share 

facts with Doe’s contract claims. But factual overlap is not 

fatal. While both claims share some events and circumstances, 

we “view[] the pleadings with liberality” at this stage, 

Seidenberg, 791 A.2d at 1080, and find they are not 

“redundant” of one another, Berlin Med. Assocs., P.A. v. CMI 

N.J. Operating Corp., 2006 WL 2162435, at *10 (N.J. Super. 

Ct. App. Div. Aug. 3, 2006) (per curiam).

15 So Doe has done 

enough to proceed.16

III.

Doe’s Complaint provides sufficient factual allegations 

to state a claim for relief under both Title IX and New Jersey 

state law. We will vacate and remand to the District Court for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

15 And even if they were, New Jersey courts “permit the 

pleading and pursuit of alternative and even inconsistent 

theories.” Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 926 A.2d 387, 

393 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). They prohibit only

double recovery. See id.; Kluczyk v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 847 

A.2d 23, 31–32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 

16 By contrast, an implied covenant claim arising from 

the Panel’s “contravention of the preponderance of the 

evidence standard” would fail because Doe pleads the same 

fact in support of his contract claim. (App. at 91, 89.)