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64–724 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 111–905 

PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT OF AGENCY CAPTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT 

AND THE COURTS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

AUGUST 3, 2010 

Serial No. J–111–105 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRIAN A. BENZCOWSKI, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island, Chairman 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

STEPHEN C.N. LILLEY, Democratic Chief Counsel 

MATTHEW S. MINER, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 50 

Franken, Hon. Al, a U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota .......................... 3 

Kaufman, Hon. Edward E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ............ 4 

Whitehouse, Hon. Sheldon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ...... 1 

WITNESSES 

Bagley, Nicholas, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 

School, Ann Arbor, Michigan .............................................................................. 6 

Shapiro, Sidney, Associate Dean for Research and Development, Wake Forest 

University School of Law, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and Member 

Scholar, Vice-President, Center for Progressive Reform ................................... 8 

Troy, Tevi D., Ph.D., Visiting Senior Fellow, The Hudson Institute, Silver 

Spring, Maryland ................................................................................................. 9 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Babcock, Hope M., Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, Washington, DC, 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 34

Bagley, Nicholas, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 

School, Ann Arbor, Michigan, statement ........................................................... 38 

Carpenter, Daniel, Allie S. Freed Professor of Government, Director, Center 

for American Political Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, letter ............................................................................................................ 46 

Consumers Union, Ellen Bloom, Director, Federal Policy and Washington, 

Office; and Ami V. Gadhia, Policy Counsel, Washington, DC, letter ............... 48 

Earthjustice, Joan Mulhern, senior Legislative Counsel, Washington, DC, letter .......................................................................................................................... 52 

Logan, David A., Dean & Professor of Law, Roger Williams University, Bristol, Rhode Island, letter ....................................................................................... 54 

Shapiro, Sidney, Associate Dean for Research and Development, Wake Forest 

University School of Law, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and Member 

Scholar, Vice-President, Center for Progressive Reform ................................... 56 

Snape, William J., III, Senior Counsel, Center for Biological Diversity, American University’s Washington College of Law, Washington, DC, statement ... 72 

Troy, Tevi D., Ph.D., Visiting Senior Fellow, The Hudson Institute, Silver 

Spring, Maryland ................................................................................................. 74 

Wagner, Wendy E., Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor, University of 

Texas School of Law, statement .......................................................................... 77 

(1) 

PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT OF AGENCY CAPTURE 

TUESDAY, AUGUST 3, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT

AND THE COURTS, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 

room SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sheldon 

Whitehouse, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Whitehouse, Kaufman, and Franken. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. The hearing of the Subcommittee will 

come to order. We will be proceeding without the Ranking Member. 

He has responsibilities elsewhere because of the Kagan nomination 

coming to the floor this morning and because of an appointment he 

has at the White House as well. So it is a scheduling conflict that 

is unavoidable. But I am delighted that the witnesses are here. 

I have a brief statement I would like to make, and then the witnesses will be sworn. If other Senators have arrived, we will give 

them an opportunity to make a similar opening statement, and 

then we will get to your testimony, which is the order of the day. 

Over the last 50 years, Congress has passed critical pieces of legislation to protect the public interest—laws that protect the water 

that Americans drink and the air we breathe, ensure the safety of 

the cars we drive and the medications we take, and require the fair 

and open trading of the stocks and mutual funds Americans invest 

in to finance retirement or our children’s education. 

In these and other areas, Congress has tasked an alphabet soup 

of regulatory agencies with the responsibility of administering the 

policies established by Congress through rulemaking, adjudication, 

and enforcement. As a result, regulatory agencies have vast and 

vital responsibilities to Congress and the American people. It is, 

thus, a vast and vital consequence that regulatory agencies retain 

their integrity, that they serve the public interest, and fulfill the 

missions defined by Congress. 

Our administrative state has grown more complex than anything 

that our Founding Fathers foresaw. The fundamental principle is 

that the administrative agencies must further the policies crafted 

2 

by Congress. But beyond that, the genius of the Framers of our 

Constitution at crafting checks and balances in Government was 

never applied to our modern administrative state. Here we are on 

our own. 

It is often not in the economic interests of regulated industries 

to support the mission Congress has defined. Regulations that protect the public interest rather than the special interests do not always go down well with industry. Industries often have incentives 

to co-opt and to control regulatory agencies. Observably, time and 

time again, industries have acquired undue influence over regulatory agencies that exist to serve all Americans. Surreptitiously 

and stealthily, industries have sought to control regulatory agencies, to capture agencies. Sadly, industries too often have succeeded, turning agencies away from the public interest to the service of narrow corporate interests. 

We have seen the disasters that can ensue when an agency has 

been captured, from MMS, whose failures and shocking behavior 

led to the horrors of the oil spill in the Gulf, to the SEC, asleep 

at the switch as financial services companies created exotic and irresponsible financial products that took our economy to the brink 

of disaster. 

These are the fruits of regulatory capture: the revolving door, deliberate inattention, industry control, often outright corruption. It 

is a poisonous tree indeed. 

This threat of agency capture is by no means a novel concept. As 

I have described previously on the floor, from Woodrow Wilson in 

1913 through Marver Bernstein, the first dean of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton in 1955, to the Nobel Prize-winning economist George Stigler, to the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal 

this year, Americans from across the political spectrum have recognized the continuing danger of agency capture. 

At bottom, agency capture is a threat to democratic Government. 

We the people pass laws through a democratic and open process. 

Powerful interests, nonetheless, want a second secret bite at the 

apple. They want to capture the regulatory agencies that enforce 

those laws so that they can blunt their effects, turning laws passed 

to protect the public interest into policies and procedures that protect industry interests. 

In America we pride ourselves on open government. It is perhaps 

one of our signature contributions to government around the world. 

Unfortunately, however, agency capture is a deed that is done 

quietly and in the dark. The tentacles of industry intrude stealthily 

into the agencies. The agencies are often obscure, and there is a 

conspiracy of silence that surrounds agency capture. 

Agency capture is also systemic. That is why it has been in the 

canon of economics and administrative law for nearly a hundred 

years. It is endemic and recurring because the institutional pressure of industry on the regulator is relentless. 

Clearly, we in Congress must meet our constitutional obligation 

of oversight of the executive branch. We must work to stamp out 

agency capture whenever and wherever we find it. But ultimately 

protecting the public against the systemic, relentless, and institutional pressure will require a systemic and institutional counterpressure. 

3 

Episodic scandals and recurring disasters are no way to go 

through life. If the financial meltdown and the gulf disaster are not 

education enough about the perils of agency capture, the real 

harms that our country and our fellow citizens can suffer, then 

shame on us. 

I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony and to working with 

my colleagues to protect the integrity of our administrative agencies against the threat of capture. 

Senator Franken, would you care to make an opening statement? 

STATEMENT OF HON. AL FRANKEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 

Senator FRANKEN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your focus 

on this subject and for calling this hearing. I look forward to the 

testimony of the three gentlemen. 

I did not prepare an opening statement, but I was re-reading 

something that I had actually written about in 2003 that kind of 

spoke to this subject, and particularly on the Bush administration, 

and I think Dr. Troy has worked for that administration and is 

going to be speaking to the issue of agency capture. It was about 

the Interior Department, and I wrote about a number of people 

who had been appointed to the Department. 

Mark Rey was appointed as Under Secretary of Agriculture for 

Natural Resources and Environment and put in charge of regulating forests, and he had previously lobbied for polluters of forests. 

Bennett Raley was appointed to be the Interior Secretary for 

Water and Science, and he was put in charge of water, and previously he had lobbied for polluters of water. 

Rebecca Watson had been appointed Assistant Secretary of the 

Interior for Lands and Mineral Management, and she was put in 

charge of land that contains minerals, and she had previously been 

a lobbyist for polluters of land that contains minerals. 

Cam Toohey was made Special Assistant to the Secretary of the 

Interior for Alaska and was put in charge of Alaska and had previously lobbied for polluters of Alaska. 

Patricia Lynn Scarlett was appointed Assistant Secretary of the 

Interior for Policy Management and Budget, and she was in charge 

of Government regulations and had previously lobbied for polluters 

of pretty much everything. 

Steven Griles, who had been appointed Deputy Secretary of the 

Interior, I believe went to prison for some time. 

It seemed to me that during the Bush administration there 

seemed to be agency capture of a certain type, which is having people who did not necessarily believe in the regulation of the industries that they were regulating put into position to regulate those 

industries and that these had been actually lobbyists for those industries before they were put in. 

I also remember the agency FEMA, and there was this guy that 

we all remember, Michael Brown, who had been put in charge of 

FEMA and had been put in charge I think because the guy right 

before him, Allbaugh, had been his college roommate, and Michael 

Brown’s previous job had been supervising the judges of Arabian 

horses. 

4 

I think that the reason that Brownie was given the job was not 

just that he had lost his job because he had been insufficiently able 

to supervise the judging of the horses, but that he was there to 

make sure that the previous head of FEMA would be getting contracts from FEMA, because he started a lobbying firm. And sure 

enough, when Katrina happened, not only did Mr. Brown not do a 

very good—not do a ‘‘heck of a job,’’ but many FEMA contracts 

went where they were intended to go. And I think this is a kind 

of cronyism that was special, not unique to the Bush administration but led to a kind of agency capture that was pretty remarkable. 

So I look forward to hearing all the different, more subtle kinds 

of agency capture than the very, very obvious ones that I have just 

discussed. And I am looking forward to the testimony of all the witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Senator Kaufman, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, and, Mr. Chairman, I want to tell 

you, I cannot tell you how much I appreciate you holding this hearing. There is a lot of confusion out there, and it is not a matter 

of whether we have regulations or not. We have to have regulations. No one has come up with a plan that I have ever read that 

would have the Congress of the United States writing laws that immediately people had to adhere to. And one of the things that has 

made this Government work is that we have regulators, people who 

can spend every day dealing with the incredible, complex problems 

we have. 

Many times in the debate today it is almost like, well, we are 

going to do away with the regulators; we are going to do away with 

regulation. That is not an option, and I do not know any serious 

thinker on either side of the political divide or the ideological divide that believes that we can do away with regulators and do 

away with regulations. Yet much of the debate is formed that way. 

So what we are trying to do is figure out how do we have better 

regulators and better regulations? And some of us have the view— 

and I think it was an ideological difference that I think was truly 

felt by a number of people in the past administration—that we just 

do not need as much regulation, that, you know, there is too much 

regulation and Government is too big, it encompasses too much, 

and we just have—you know, I would say the folks by and large 

on this side of the aisle have a difference of view on that. And we 

can talk about that and how that worked and how it did not work 

in the past, and I think Senator Franken has done a good job of 

laying out some of the ugly things that happened when you have 

an administration that just does not believe we should have regulation and, therefore, has no commitment to it. 

The more pervasive problem, I think, which goes from administration to administration, is the one that we have all read about 

for 30, 40, 50 years, and that is the idea of the iron triangle or the 

fact that what happens is the regulators get too closely involved 

with the administration and with the interest groups. And, clearly, 

5 

that has been around for a while, and that is good grist for discussion, and I think it raises a problem. It is a little like Madison 10, 

you know, where interest groups—freedom is to interest groups as 

oxygen is to fire. I mean, this is something—we are not going to— 

I put this in the category of things like cutting grass. Unless you 

want asphalt over your front lawn, every 2 weeks in the summertime you are going to have to cut grass, and we are going to have 

to cut this grass. 

I think what is great about what Senator Whitehouse has done 

to pull this together is this is just one of a whole series of problems 

that have to do with regulation. It is not whether you have a view 

about regulation that is ideological and whether we should have it 

or not or how permissive we can be based on an overall Government policy. It is a little bit, but not really, the kind of iron triangle problem. This is a very specific point which—it is a revolving 

door. It is the lack of oversight. It is a lack of clear rules, and definitely it is a lack of conflicted—it is a fact we have conflicted regulators. 

So I think what is great about this discussion today is, OK, let 

us decide we are going to have regulation and we are going to have 

regulators. We are going to decide that it is going to be the policy 

of the Government that we do the very, very, very best job we can 

in regulation. We have some revolving door problems of our own in 

the Congress, and there are revolving door problems in the administration. But what we are going to focus on today is kind of how 

do you get regulators that are going to be able to make the best 

decision and not be conflicted. I mean, I think that is really what 

we are coming to. How do you allow good people who are smart to 

sit together and have a discussion where one is not representing 

A Interest Group and one is not representing B Interest Group and 

one is not representing C Interest Group, because either that is 

where they came to, that is where they are going to be going afterwards, that is where they have a bond. 

So I am really looking forward to the three witnesses today on 

what they have written, and I am really interested in seeing where 

we can go in order to make this better. This is really an incredibly 

important problem that we have to overcome if we are going to 

have successful Government, as all of us want, Republicans and 

Democrats, and most of all what the American people want. So I 

want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Senator Kaufman. Thank 

you for joining us. 

If I could ask the witnesses to stand and be sworn. Do you swear 

that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the 

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. BAGLEY. I do. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I do. 

Dr. TROY. I do. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. I will just go right across the line. The 

first witness will be Professor Nicholas Bagley. He is an assistant 

professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School where 

he researches administrative law, regulatory theory, and health 

law. His article ‘‘Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,’’ 

which he co-authored with Richard Revesz, was selected as the best 

6 

article in the field in 2006 by the American Bar Association’s Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. Professor 

Bagley received his B.A. from Yale University and a J.D. from the 

New York University School of Law. He clerked for Judge David 

S. Tatel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 

and Justice John Paul Stevens on the United States Supreme 

Court. He also served as an attorney on the appellate staff in the 

Civil Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. We welcome him 

and appreciate his testimony. 

Professor Bagley. Could you put your microphone on? 

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS BAGLEY, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR 

OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, ANN 

ARBOR, MICHIGAN 

Mr. BAGLEY. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, 

it is an honor to testify before you today about agency capture. 

In principle, agency capture is a simple concept: We say an agency is ‘‘captured’’ when it caters to narrow, private interests at the 

expense of the public welfare. As my testimony will explore, however, agency capture is, in practice, quite a bit more complicated 

than that. 

The linchpin to understanding agency capture is the insight that 

industry groups will generally have enormous organizational advantages over the dispersed and apathetic public when it comes to 

lobbying Federal agencies. With some regularity, industry groups 

can exploit that organizational advantage to pressure regulators to 

attend to their private interests at the expense of the public interest. 

For example, Federal agencies must of necessity cooperate with 

the entities that they regulate in order to procure needed information, compliance, political support, and guidance. And sometimes 

that cooperation can slip into capture. Agency officials might get 

distorted information from the industries they regulate; they might 

want to avoid the political or legal firestorm that would engulf 

their agency if they targeted a powerful interest group; or they 

might just start to see the world the way that industry sees it. 

The revolving door between agencies and the industries that they 

regulate can also lead to capture. Agency officials often come from 

the private sector and may plan on returning once they have completed their stints as government employees. They may, therefore, 

share a common perspective with industry and may be reluctant to 

jeopardize the prospect of securing future employment. 

These examples only scratch the surface of the myriad ways that 

industry groups can capture Federal agencies. And as the financial 

meltdown and the gulf oil spill both vividly demonstrate, the capture problem is real and it is of deep concern. 

But a cautionary word is in order. While agency capture offers 

a compelling story about how some agencies operate some of the 

time, it is only a crude stereotype about agency behavior. Some 

agencies succumb to interest group pressure, but others, most others, resist it admirably. Federal agencies are complicated places, 

and no one story about how they operate will ring true all of the 

time. 

7 

Capture is also tricky because it is often very hard, if not impossible, to reliably identify. Although industry-agency contacts will 

occasionally be inappropriate enough on their face to suggest capture, most of the time they will involve altogether innocuous meetings, phone calls, and e- mails. And even if the agency has shown 

some sensitivity to the industry, that alone does not suggest that 

the agency has discarded the public interest. The crucial question 

is whether the agency would have more zealously performed its duties in the absence of pressure from the regulated interests, and 

most of the time it is going to be impossible to know the answer 

to that question to a certainty. 

Further complicating matters, there is no consensus about exactly what agency capture is. For most academics, it means the dynamic whereby well-organized industry groups exert undue influence over agency decisionmakers to the detriment of the public. 

But for others, it is a broader concept. That encompasses an agency’s perceived responsiveness to any outside agenda, however public regarding that agenda might be. For still others, capture is just 

shorthand for generic disapproval of agency behavior. 

I do not mean by any of this to invite complacency. Agency capture is a recurring and urgent problem for the regulatory state. But 

because capture looks so different from one agency to the next, because it is difficult to reliably identify capture when it occurs, and 

because capture means different things to different people, no single silver bullet will eliminate agency capture. The job will instead 

require sensitivity to the particular bureaucratic and political context in which it arises. 

We may also have greater success eliminating the conditions that 

allow capture to flourish than addressing capture after it has taken 

hold. Promising legislative remedies include carefully reviewing the 

sources and adequacy of agency funding, ensuring that agencies 

have not been tasked with conflicting missions, and enhancing the 

prestige of public employment in an effort to shut the revolving 

door. 

In the final estimation, however, eliminating agency capture will 

require political vigilance. Vested interests that capture agencies 

are also quite capable of influencing politicians, and it will take 

more than a modicum of political courage to press for lasting 

change at some of our most beleaguered agencies. I hope that this 

hearing reflects a renewed commitment to addressing agency capture across the regulatory state. 

Thank you again for allowing me to testify today, and I would 

be happy to answer any questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bagley follows:] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Professor Bagley. We very 

much appreciate your testimony. 

Our next witness is Sidney Shapiro. He is the University Distinguished Chair in Law at Wake Forest University and the vicepresident of the Center for Progressive Reform. He is the author 

of numerous books and articles, including ‘‘The People’s Agents and 

the Battle to Protect the American Public,’’ and two law school 

textbooks on regulatory law and practice and administrative law. 

In addition to his scholarly work, Professor Shapiro has served as 

8 

a consultant to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

and the Administrative Conference of the United States. 

Professor Shapiro, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF SIDNEY SHAPIRO, ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY 

SCHOOL OF LAW, WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA, AND 

MEMBER SCHOLAR, VICE-PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the 

Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to share with you 

my views on understanding the threat of agency capture and its relationship to protecting the public interest. 

The type of capture that receives the most attention is when an 

agency fails to protect the public and the environment because administrators friendly to industry block new regulatory efforts or do 

not enforce the laws and regulations then in effect. The situation 

at MMS, as Senator Whitehouse has pointed out, is a good example 

of this form of capture. 

Capture can also occur from an imbalance in representation. This 

occurs when industry representatives regularly appear before an 

agency offering detailed comments and criticisms, while the agency 

seldom, if ever, hears from public interest groups or members of 

the public. A number of empirical studies revealed this imbalance 

is significant. The studies are described in my written testimony. 

In one, a study of 39 controversial and technical, complex air pollutant rules, industry averaged 77.5 percent of the total comments 

while public interest groups averaged only 5 percent of the comments. In fact, public interest groups file comments for only 46 percent of the total number of rulemakings. 

The final form of capture receives less attention, but it is no less 

effective in preventing reasonable regulation than the other forms 

of capture. This is sabotage capture. It occurs when regulatory critics create roadblocks that slow or prevent regulation, even in administrations that seek to protect the public and the environment. 

Because this capture is subtle and difficult for the public to perceive, it constituents a kind of sophisticated sabotage of the regulatory process. 

The two most prominent forms of sabotage capture today are the 

de-funding of the regulatory agencies and the politicization of rulemaking by the White House. In my written testimony, I give examples of each problem. Allow me to mention one related to funding. 

OSHA took more than 10 years to update its regulatory standard 

on cranes and derricks, even though the agency, employers, employees, and Members of Congress all agreed for that period what 

needed to be done. 

If Congress is to reduce capture, it is more likely that agencies 

can fulfill its intention to protect people and the environment. I 

have four suggestions as to what Congress might do. 

First, Congress cannot count on the administrative law system to 

ensure the accountability of regulatory agencies. Public interest 

groups lack the resources to match up with industry in terms of advocacy before agencies and the courts. Likewise, they are often not 

9 

in a good position to call Congress’ attention to capture. It is, therefore, up to Congress to institute more systematic oversight. 

Second, one reason for the de-funding of the regulatory agencies 

is that Congress has failed to study the impacts of funding cuts on 

the agencies. Without this information, Congress is not in a position to consider what tradeoffs are involved when agencies lack the 

resources they need and whether re-funding them is a higher priority than other items in the budget. But, frankly, regulatory agencies are such a small part of the discretionary budget that modest 

increases in funding would not affect the budget or the deficit in 

any significant way. 

Third, the deterioration of regulatory government has gone relatively unnoticed because Congress lacks good means for measuring the performance of regulatory agencies. Congress should, 

therefore, require the development of positive metrics or measurements of agency performance that would alert Congress and the 

public when health and safety agencies have been captured. 

Finally, the Congressional dialog over funding would be improved if agencies were required to make it clear how much money 

it would take to actually implement their mandates. Such true-up 

estimates would focus on the resources Government itself would 

need to do the work that Congress expects it to do. 

In conclusion, the problem of capture is persistent, suggesting it 

is not easily remedies. In the 1970s, the Senate undertook a major 

study of Federal regulation. A similar effort focused on capture, 

and including the consideration of such new ideas as positive 

metrics and true-up budgets may be in order. The study could also 

consider the costs of delay when agencies, because of a lack of 

funding, are unable to protect the public and the environment. The 

newly reformed Administrative Conference of the United States 

could be tasked with assisting Congress in this investigation. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shapiro appears as a submissions for the record.] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Thank you very much, Professor Shapiro. We really appreciate you being here and lending your expertise to this inquiry. 

Our final witness is Dr. Tevi Troy. He is a Visiting Senior Fellow 

at the Hudson Institute, a Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute, 

and a writer and consultant on health care and domestic policy. 

From 2007 to 2009, Dr. Troy was the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services where we worked together through our common interest on advancing health information technology. Before going to HHS, Dr. Troy served as Deputy 

Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy. He also has worked 

in both chambers of Congress. He holds a Ph.D. in American civilization from the University of Texas, and we welcome him here 

today. Dr. Troy. 

STATEMENT OF TEVI D. TROY, PH.D., VISITING SENIOR FELLOW, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND 

Dr. TROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members 

of the Committee, for this opportunity to come and provide insight 

into the question of influence on the regulatory process. I ask with 

10 

your permission, Mr. Chairman, that my entire written testimony 

be placed in the record. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Yes, the full written testimony of all the 

witnesses will be in the record. 

Dr. TROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My name is Tevi Troy, as you said, and I am a Fellow at the 

Hudson Institute and former Deputy Secretary at the Department 

of Health and Human Services, and as you mentioned, while I was 

at HHS, I had the pleasure and opportunity to work with you on 

advancing health information technology, which I appreciated, and 

I appreciate your dedication to the subject. 

Capture theory, about which we are here to speak today, I think 

speaks to a real phenomenon, which is the mix of human nature 

and human incentives with increased Government power and authority and increasing Government influence. And it makes sense, 

as laid out in public choice theory, that when you have people with 

more skin in the game, people who are affected more by regulations, they will make more attempts to influence the process. They 

have more incentive to do so. They will put more resources into it. 

But I think it is important to remember in this context that this 

theory applies to more than just industry and that there are multiple countervailing interests that I saw in my time in Government 

that try and have an influence on the process. Unions, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, and public interest groups all 

have a say in the process, and that procedures that are in place 

to combat capture should address capture from any of the potential 

sources that can all get in the way of protecting and improving the 

public interest. 

And in terms of procedures and mechanisms in place to prevent 

capture, what I saw in my time in Government is obviously you 

have the APA, the Administrative Procedures Act, which is supposed to inject sunshine into the entire process. It gives specific 

amounts of times for regulations to be out there, for Notice of Proposed Rulemakings, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, et 

cetera, and also requirements about meetings with outside influences to be put in the record or in the Federal Register. We know 

the Obama administration has actually increased some of those requirements. Any meetings with lobbyists, whether they be from industry or outside, need to be made public, and the full transcripts 

need to be put in the record. And I think those are important 

mechanisms. 

I also want to put in a good word for the staff at OIRA, the Office 

of Information and Regulatory Affairs. They are the staffers at the 

Office of Management and Budget who have oversight over all the 

regulations, and they are very good at what they do, and they are 

by very nature designed to prevent capture because they do not 

work for the specific agencies that are doing the regulating. They 

do not work for the regulatory agencies. They work for OMB and 

they have overall oversight, and I think they are helpful in the 

process. 

Then obviously you have political appointees who are supposed 

to provide some oversight into the process as well and make sure 

that the public interest is being served. And then, of course, the career staffers. Now there is a lot of talk about the career staffers, 

11 

whether they are captured, whether they are beholden to industry. 

I know that in my time in Government, it was very rare that people thought that they were specifically beholden to industry, and 

you often have people speculating whether career staffers are either pro-Democratic or pro-Republic or pro-business or anti-business. But what I found in my time in Government is that career 

staffers do have a bias, and their bias is in favor of their own agency. This bias is designed to make them protect the interests and 

the prerogatives of their agency. Sometimes it means they may 

have a narrower view, and that is why the overarching view or the 

wider view of either the political officials or of the OIRA is important and helpful, but they do have their agency’s interest in mind. 

Of course, there is also external oversight. You have Congress, 

the Inspectors General, the GAO. And then another layer on top 

of that is the press, which is supposed to make sure that these 

problems are not taking place, and they will highlight it if there 

are problems, and believe me, you will hear about it, and they will 

do so with glee. 

In acting about this issue of capture, there are two things to 

watch out for. First, expertise is needed. You need to have people 

who know about the systems that they are regulating, and whether 

they come from industry or NGO’s or public interest groups or 

unions, they bring to Government preconceptions with them, but 

they also bring expertise. And it is their job and obligation, once 

inside, to drop the preconceptions, but also maintain the needed expertise. 

And then, last, I would say that regulatory capture is also potentially a two-way street, that sometimes you see in the FDA, for example, that the industry folks are so terrified of their regulators 

that they will not call out the agency even if it appears to overstep 

its bounds because they know that the agency has life-or-death 

power over their own industry and their own company. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I will just say that I found the system is not perfect, but there are also key actors, especially the staff 

at OIRA, who are aware of the flaws in the system and work very 

hard to try and make sure that we are not brought down by those 

flaws. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Troy appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Thank you very much, Dr. Troy. 

I am going to be here, obviously, until the end of the hearing, so 

I am going to yield shortly to Senator Kaufman. But I did want to 

open with one point. When we have a panel of witnesses—I have 

read carefully through all of your testimony, and I like to try to 

identify the places in which everybody seems to agree, and I found 

in your testimony six areas that I believe are areas of common 

agreement. 

The first is that this problem of agency capture is a widely accepted phenomenon, to quote Dr. Troy’s testimony just now, ‘‘a real 

phenomenon.’’ Professor Bagley cited, you know, Stigler, Huntington, Posner. There is a wide array of very prestigious names 

that for decades have accepted that this is, again to quote Dr. Troy, 

‘‘a real phenomenon.’’ 

12 

The second is that there is a lot at stake here for the regulated 

industries. This is a matter of millions, tens of millions, even hundreds of millions of dollars in some cases. 

The third point is that there is a mismatch out there, whether 

you describe it as an enormous organizational advantage, the way 

Professor Bagley did, or describe that certain actors do have greater interest and put more effort into the process, as Dr. Troy did. 

The fourth is that some of the mechanisms of administrative procedure lend themselves to abuse, and, therefore, the system can be 

gamed. 

The fifth is that regulatory capture is by its nature done in the 

dark and done as quietly as possible. No one plants a flag when 

they have captured an agency. In fact, they will do their utmost to 

deny it. 

And, finally, it is that the potential damage from agency capture, 

as MMS and the SEC have shown, can be huge, both in terms of 

the violation of Government principles, of openness, candor, and responsiveness to the electorate and all of that, but more to home in 

terms of the terrible potential outcomes that the gulf has seen and 

that families in Rhode Island and across the country have seen as 

the tsunami of misery that flowed out from the Wall Street meltdown, hit town after town, city after city, county after county. 

So I think that we actually have a certain amount of common 

agreement here despite the fact that we have a diverse panel of 

witnesses, and I just wanted to lay that out there. We can talk 

more about that when it is my time. 

I will yield now to Professor Kaufman—to Senator Kaufman. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. What a demotion. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. No, not really. 

I think that is excellent, presenting that, and it really is amazing 

when you start reading about this how unanimous it is about this 

is a great concern and how difficult it is to solve. 

Professor Bagley, you said that most agencies are able to resist 

capture admirably. Could you start and then each one of you give 

an example of one or two poster—what you think are kind of the 

poster children in agencies that were able to resist regulatory capture? 

Mr. BAGLEY. I can certainly speak in general terms. I think very 

few people believe that the Federal Trade Commission is a subject 

of capture. They have a professional staff. They take their jobs very 

seriously. 

I think that, generally speaking, EPA has not been subject to 

capture, although it has been clearly subject to political influence 

from the White House, but I think the staff there is—again, they 

are professional. They act with integrity. They care deeply about 

the values that their agency espouses. And I think like most Government officials, they do their jobs well. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Professor Shapiro. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. This is really going to sound like an academic answer, and I do not mean it to be. But first we have to decide on 

what we mean by capture, and I think I have a slightly different 

concept of capture than perhaps the other two speakers. 

13 

I agree with Dr. Troy that when a conservative President takes 

office, he or she is entitled to appoint administrators who reflect 

that President’s point of view. And so as a result, for some of us 

we see agency performance which is less robust than would be my 

personal political preference. But that is the way of the system. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, and I would like to say I totally agree 

with you on that. So what I would like to focus in on is, you know, 

just the—not the fact that there are differences in the rest, but an 

agency that you think, using your examples of regulatory capture, 

the three kinds, an agency that is pretty well, you know, fought it 

off. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, that is right. So what we are talking about 

are instances where the political administrators seek not to move 

the ball down the field, albeit in their particular policy way, but 

do not move the ball at all or toss it backwards. You know, to what 

extent can agencies resist that? And I think that of all the agencies 

EPA has been the most able to do that, and I think there are two 

reasons for it: that among the agencies we are talking about, although they are all short on funds, it is probably the best financed 

and has the biggest professional staff. And I think that both of 

those things go well towards its ability to fight off this because it 

has a dedicated staff who attempt to fight it off. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Troy. 

Dr. TROY. Yes, thank you for the excellent question, Senator. I 

would turn it around a little bit and say that for me to pick one 

agency would make it sound as if I think that the majority of the 

rest of them are—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. No, no. By the way—no, let me—— 

Dr. TROY [continuing]. Subject to capture, so I—I just want to 

make it clear that I—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Let me stipulate the fact that this is not—you 

are not saying that the rest of them are all bad. What I am trying 

to do is kind of get the good agencies I have had, because I am 

not—you know, I look at it and I see some agencies that I am not 

happy with, but I would really like—especially you, you have 

worked and so kind of—your view. No, by that I am not—I am stipulating the fact that these are just the shining stars, the 10s. 

There are loads of 9s out there, and 8s and 7s. But we are looking 

for the 10-pluses. 

Dr. TROY. Right. So that said, that I believe that most agencies 

do resist capture or at least have these countervailing forces that 

they are trying to prevent capture from any one place. But the 

FDA did a very good job. I know a lot of people criticize the FDA, 

and they get a lot of criticism from the industry, but also from Congress and also from the public interest groups. So they are sort of 

hit on all sides, but I think that they do a very good job of trying 

to resist capture and base their decisions on sound science and on 

the public health. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And so what is the reason—I mean, Professor 

Shapiro gave his reasons. Why do you think those agencies—and 

spread it out a little, just successful agencies. What is it about 

them? Is it the structure of the agency? Funding is part of it, and 

staff is part of it. I think part of it, too, would be how big your job 

14 

is. The Securities and Exchange Commission has a pretty big staff, 

but they have got a gigantic area that they are trying to cover, so 

it is kind of how—is that, Professor Shapiro, fair to say, that it is 

the staff, funding in relation to what the job is, right? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. It is also the adequacy of the regulatory statute, so 

some agencies I think are more easily captured because they are 

starting from a position that is, you know, 10 yards behind where 

they want to be, so they are more easily captured because it is 

harder to get stuff done. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I think I am going to stop now. My time is 

up, and I will come back again. Thank you very much. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Professor Bagley, former Chair of the FCC 

Reed Hunt—and this is while he was Chairman of the FCC—once 

said that FCC stood for ‘‘firmly captured by corporations.’’ Like Mr. 

Hunt, I am deeply concerned about agency capture at the FCC. 

In June, public interest groups criticized the FCC for keeping 

them out of critical meetings that the agency held with executives 

at AT&T, Verizon, the National Cable and Telecommunications Association, Google, and Skype to work out a compromise on net neutrality legislation. What is your advice to advocates who do not represent a media conglomerate or a trade association who would 

want to be in meetings like that one? 

Mr. BAGLEY. That is a good question, Senator. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. 

Mr. BAGLEY. I am not an expert on FCC practice, but I suspect 

that they should cultivate the kind of relationships that industry 

groups have cultivated over a long period of time with folk who 

work at the Commission. Obviously, they are going to be outmatched in that game in many respects. But it is only by being a 

consistent player and being diligent about efforts to bring your 

issues before the Commission that you are going to be successful. 

But I think the point that you are making is one that is largely 

intractable in the sense that these groups are going to be outmatched no matter what they do, and so it is really not up to them 

to help even the playing field. I think it is—— 

Senator FRANKEN. It is up to us? 

Mr. BAGLEY. I think it may have more to do with you. It may 

have more to do with the Commissioners and the FCC staff taking 

steps to ensure that the public interest is heard. But Congressional 

oversight is an enormous factor. 

Senator FRANKEN. Well, I want to follow up with the FCC on this 

and maybe do this for Dean Shapiro. 

Another piece of evidence that I think that the FCC has been 

captured by corporations that it is supposed to be regulating is the 

fact that it has accepted unrealistic promises from the corporations 

that it is regulating without setting up mechanisms for enforcing 

those promises. 

Now, I go back to when the FCC was going through renewing 

fin-syn, the financial syndication regulations which limited the 

number of shows, programs that networks could own. And I remember during those hearings all the networks promised that if 

fin-syn was discontinued or was allowed to expire, they would not 

use this to favor their own programming. And they made all kinds 

15 

of promises: ‘‘Why would we favor our own programming? We are 

in the business of ratings. Whatever the best shows are, those are 

the ones we are going to put on.’’ 

Well, as soon as fin-syn was rescinded, boom, the word went out 

to the creative community, ‘‘We are going to own the shows. And 

if you are an independent producer and you want a show on our 

network, you are going to have to give us ownership.’’ And everybody knows this. And yet the FCC did nothing, and we are seeing 

the same thing now in this proposed Comcast-NBC/Universal 

merger where they are promising all kinds of things, and I do not 

see any reason why anyone would expect that they would hold to 

those promises. 

Do you have any advice on how we can avoid the effects of this 

and how the FCC can avoid this or what we can do about this? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, if I had the solution, my books would sell better, but two things. 

First, the sort of classic administrative law solution to being excluded from the front end from the rulemaking is the opportunity, 

as Dr. Troy mentioned, to put evidence in the rulemaking record 

with which the agency has to deal and the courts will take a look 

at that evidence and see whether or not the agency has adequately 

dealt with it. 

As I mentioned in my testimony, the flaw there is that the public 

interest groups are often not well financed to even take that step, 

and there are lots of rulemakings where there are no comments 

whatsoever by the public interest community. 

Second, as you have put your finger on, as weak as the public 

interest groups may be many times in the rulemaking phase, their 

ability to monitor the enforcement phase, the actual implementation, is even weaker because there are no good administrative law 

solutions where they can come in and try to force the agency to actually implement what it has said it will do. 

So the best I can come up with is, again, to suggest that we need 

to develop over time some sort of metrics to measure the performance of agencies, and an important aspect of those metrics would 

be what they do on the enforcement side and whether or not they 

actually enforce the regulations as they are written. 

Senator FRANKEN. My time is up, but maybe we will get back to 

this because I want to get into the kind of—perhaps in the instance 

of a merger, that if it is allowed to go forward, the kind of rigorous 

conditions that can be placed on it and the setting up of mechanisms to enforce those conditions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Before I return to Senator Kaufman and 

Senator Franken for a second round, I would like to go back to my 

six postulates, if you will, where I think we have agreement. It is 

a real problem. There is a lot at stake for the regulated industries, 

lots of motive, one might say. Three, the organizational advantage, 

mismatch. Four, administrative procedure can, in fact, be gamed. 

Five, agency capture is inherently done surreptitiously and, therefore, evades accountability and notice. And, finally, as we have 

seen from both MMS and the SEC, the potential damage to regular 

families and ordinary people and the well-being of our country is 

often vast when there is a very significant regulatory failure. 

16 

So that is my hypothesis, that those six points are essentially undisputed by the panel. Professor Bagley? 

Mr. BAGLEY. That sounds right to me, Senator. I think that the 

core point that I would want to take away from our testimony 

today is that when you talk about agency capture, you are talking 

about a complex of problems whereby well-organized, well-heeled 

interest groups are likely to be able to bring a lot of pressure to 

bear on agencies under the cover of darkness. And there are a 

great many mechanisms that one might employ, depending on the 

agency and the bureaucratic and political realities on the ground. 

We will therefore want to be attentive to those differences as we 

look at different agencies. What works at the Department of the Interior may not work at the financial regulatory agencies. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Professor Shapiro. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I also agree with all of those and, in particular, No. 

6 about the potentiality of the damage. 

Going back to my OSHA example, for example, that is where 

OSHA took over 10 years to bring out this crane and derrick rule, 

which nobody opposed. In fact, it was the industry that petitioned 

the agency to try to update the rule. By OSHA’s own estimates, 

each year there are 89 crane-related deaths and 263 crane-related 

injuries each year. And OSHA has estimated the rule, which they 

finally adopted, would decrease that by 60 percent. So, in other 

words, for every year the rule sat on a desk, 53 people died and 

another 155 were injured unnecessarily. So it is not only the big 

things, the gulf oil spill that everybody recognizes, but it is agency 

by agency in these small details of not doing what Congress has 

expected the agency to do. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Dr. Troy. 

Dr. TROY. First—— 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Your microphone. 

Dr. TROY. First I will turn on the microphone. But, second, I 

would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for trying to bring synthesis, for trying to find points of agreement, because I think that 

is a very useful way to proceed, especially in our often hyper-partisan environment that we have today. And I would say—— 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Not around here. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. TROY. But I would say that I can have agreement with the 

six points, but I would have to make slight amendments to some 

of the points. 

So, for example, when you say it is a widely accepted phenomenon, I agree it is a widely accepted phenomenon that it is attempted. I do not agree that it is always successful. I would certainly agree that there is a lot at stake for everyone, not just—— 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Yes, and I would amend my point. 

There is a constant pressure to do it, but it is not always successful. 

Dr. TROY. Right. Third, in terms of the mismatch, the best way, 

I think, to describe the mismatch is not between industry and nonindustry actors so much as between interested and uninterested 

parties. I think that is where the real mismatch is. I think there 

are a whole bunch of groups, and I think your crane example is one 

where there are industry and non-industry forces that were interVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:17 Mar 16, 2011 Jkt 064724 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64724.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
17 

ested in the derrick/crane rule, but the public did not care at all. 

And so this larger notion of the public interest is not represented. 

I would be interested—— 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Let me challenge that briefly, because 

one of the witnesses—I am not sure if it is one of the present witnesses or one of the witnesses who filed written testimony that we 

will put in the record—made this point which I think is pertinent 

to the point that you are making and runs a little bit counter to 

the point that you are making. That is, that there is a difference 

between an interested industry and an interested non-industry 

actor, like an NGO or a public interest group; and that is, that the 

interested industry, if they can make sure that the regulator does 

things the way they want, can achieve very substantial results that 

are of immediate benefit, very often of immediate financial benefit 

to them. And it is a 100-percent proposition that the benefit that 

they get comes back to them in the form of real dollars, real cash, 

real value; and that the proposition is a little bit different for an 

NGO or another agency which is arguing on behalf of the public 

interest, because what any individual gets back is only their share 

of the larger public interest. 

And so there is an inherent mismatch in function between somebody who is arguing for a private interest and somebody who is arguing for a public interest in which they only share a small and 

proportionate piece. 

Dr. TROY. Sure, and I understand the point. But sometimes you 

have non-industry actors that have a financial stake in something. 

So, for example, if a labor union has a provision that they are 

pushing that will increase employment by members of their union, 

that is a financial stake that they have in the process. So I would 

say that it is wider than just—— 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. You would agree with the principle that 

where there is a direct financial stake, that creates a mismatch in 

terms of motivation, but that that direct financial stake is not necessarily always on the side of industry. 

Dr. TROY. Yes, I would agree with that. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. OK. Senator Kaufman. 

Dr. TROY. Can I finish the six points—— 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. OK. I have gone over my time, so why 

don’t we come back to it later and let Senator Kaufman proceed. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Why don’t you finish the six points? I think 

this is very helpful. 

Dr. TROY. OK. The mechanisms that lend themselves to abuse, 

I think in all of your six points you kind of laid out what you were 

talking about, and I was not sure exactly what you were referring 

to with respect to the mechanisms that lend themselves to abuse. 

With respect to capture in the dark, of course, all inappropriate 

behavior takes place in the dark. I am reminded of Abbie Hoffman, 

who had his list of the ten people who got away with it, and there 

were nine named people, and the No. 1 person who got away with 

it was the person you do not know about because you never heard 

about it. So, yes, of course, I would agree with that. 

Then the potential damage is vast. I agree with that, both for 

regulatory failure, as you were talking about, but also for poor regVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:17 Mar 16, 2011 Jkt 064724 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64724.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
18 

ulations that do not manage the problem correctly and could impose huge costs. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Professor Shapiro, you talked about the fact 

that it is hard for people to monitor what actually happens once 

the regulations have passed. This was a question I was going to 

ask in another—but it really fits right here. Isn’t that kind of Congressional oversight? I mean, isn’t a major thing that allows regulatory capture to occur—and I would like each one of you to—the 

fact that—or be successful or not successful depend on how much 

Congressional oversight you have of the regulated—of the regulatory body and how much is focused on trying to deal with potential regulatory capture? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Yes, of course. But Congress is also at a disadvantage to do oversight effectively. We have to know exactly what the 

agency has accomplished and has not accomplished. So if we had 

some sort of metrics, for example, if we knew that EPA is at 51 

percent of accomplishing its statutory responsibility to provide 

clean air, and if we monitored that for a number of years, and they 

are either not moving forward or, worse, we are moving backwards, 

that would put Congress in a much better position to say we need 

to look at that. 

Now, it does not tell you why they are not moving forward, but 

at least it tells you they are not moving forward. And there is a 

blizzard of statistics on the EPA Website. There are thousands of 

studies and statistics, and I do not think anyone can make any 

sense out of them. There are just too many, and it is too confusing, 

and I think we need to focus on something that tells not only Congress but the American public what is going on. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, but I think if you look at most of those, 

it is because people are looking at different ways. I am an engineer. 

I love the objective. I really do. I really love objective. But I find 

more and more when you are trying to do an oversight that the 

blizzard of statistics do not tell you what is happening. It is a subjective judgment you make as a Member of Congress with staff, 

with good staff, which we have and which committees have to look 

at that. 

But, Professor Bagley, what do you think in terms of the role of 

Congressional oversight in trying to assure that the regulations 

work for everybody? 

Mr. BAGLEY. I think if you examine capture where it occurs, it 

most often arises at those forgotten agencies, the ones that have no 

friend left either in Congress or in the public. And so the Consumer 

Protection Safety Commission is a notorious example of a captured 

agency. That is in part because it is very small, and although it has 

critical responsibilities for protecting consumers from products that 

might be defective, it has largely proven unable to match its industry counterparts. 

What is challenging about that, I think, is that, again, as I mentioned in my testimony, industry groups are also able to influence 

legislators. And so there are not going to be a lot of political gold 

stars for reforming some of those agencies. This is strictly a goodgovernment problem, which means it is a hard problem to resolve, 

especially in a hyper-partisan environment. But I do think it is 

worth expending a fair amount of political capital to weed out the 

19 

problem in an effort to protect the American public in the way that 

Congress, at the time that it enacted these statutes and created 

these commissions, intended. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. Dr. Troy. 

Dr. TROY. I think that the more attention that is paid to an agency, the less likely you are going to have this type of inappropriate 

behavior. I remember there was one time at HHS that there was 

a very obscure regulatory agency that came out with what was just 

a terrible regulation that nobody really knew about because it was 

such an obscure agency. The New York Times had a piece criticizing it, and then all of a sudden, people started paying a lot more 

attention, and we were able to correct the flaw, which would have 

actually harmed the goal of medical research. 

So I think that when more people are paying attention, you are 

apt to get better results. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I would propound a seventh agreement for 

the panel: Mr. Chairman, the fact that Congressional oversight is 

key in terms of keeping regulators on track and what they are 

doing. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. It will be added to the list. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. I now feel vindicated. 

Professor Shapiro, can you go back? In the crane incident, it 

sounded to me like that was just kind of bureaucratic arteriosclerosis as opposed to interest group. Was this something where 

the crane industry held it up? Or what do you think was the cause 

of the crane problem? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Funding. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Funding for the agency to go out and actually 

study what happened? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Yes—no. Just funding to get the work done. There 

are just not enough bodies at OSHA to do what they need to do. 

For a book I just completed, we did a study of the budgets of the 

five major regulatory agencies, which would include OSHA. And 

with the exception of FDA, which has received modest increases because the pharmaceutical industry pays fees for drug approvals, all 

of the five major agencies have approximately 50 percent of the 

largest budget that they ever had in real dollar terms because of 

inflation, and none of them have received significant budgetary 

support for about 20 years. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I think that gets back to your original point 

about an administrative mind-set on whether you should have regulation or not and how robust it would be. One of the things to do 

is just squeeze the agency so it does not have any money to do 

what its function is. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Yes. 

Senator KAUFMAN. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. First of all, I think when you were talking 

about the imbalance between the public interest and groups that 

are fighting for the public interest and private interests, was that 

from your testimony, your written testimony, Professor Bagley? 

Mr. BAGLEY. That is right. 

Senator FRANKEN. What I found interesting about your testimony was how nuanced all of this is and how sometimes we can 

20 

get—by painting things with a broad brush, we can miss things 

and kind of create stereotypes of capture that actually do not serve 

us very well. So I am really interested in how we in Congress can 

do the oversight and do it properly and—because it seems like we 

get captured, too. We get captured by the industries that sometimes you will have an industry in your State that provides a lot 

of jobs, and your job is to represent your State and the people who 

work in your State. So you, of course, will want to help that industry. And you will be working very closely with that industry. So a 

lot of this gets very, very subtle. 

I think you also talked about capturing sort of subcommittees 

that are directly responsible and how we have to watch out for 

that. 

What I really would like to ask you all is how—put yourself in 

our shoes. How would you advise Members of Congress, I guess 

Members of the Senate, to best address the oversight of agencies 

and to best address agency capture so that we can do our jobs properly? What advice do you have for us? 

Mr. BAGLEY. I have a few thoughts. I think an overall cautionary 

word is emphatically in order, which is this is going to be a tricky 

problem. I appreciated Senator Kaufman’s analogy to cutting the 

grass every 2 weeks. It is a kind of regulatory hygiene that has to 

take place. 

One option would be to take the oversight responsibility away 

from the subcommittees. For example, this Committee oversees 

regulatory bodies across the administrative state. You may not 

make friends on the relevant subcommittee, but if you have concerns about an agency, there are investigations that you can run, 

there are reports that you can write about failures. And that allows 

you to avoid some of the capture problems because the industry 

groups that you may not want to tick off are not going to be the 

same industry groups that the Subcommittee members do not want 

to tick off. And so it is possible that by having a Subcommittee that 

has less of a passion about the particular industry, you might be 

able to make some improvements. 

I mention in my testimony a few different possibilities. One is to 

focus on funding. That is a recurring theme that you are hearing 

today, which is that agencies have not been funded adequately, and 

the lack of funding can make it very difficult to attract good people. 

It can make it very difficult to retain good people. It can make it 

very difficult to fend off overtures from industry. 

Another meaningful reform you could look at is going through 

the Federal agencies and looking at how they are structured. There 

are some that have built-in pathologies, and I mention in my testimony how several of the financial regulatory agencies receive funding from the groups that they regulate. 

Senator FRANKEN. Right. 

Mr. BAGLEY. Which is a problem because the groups they regulate can shop around for the most attractive charter. 

Senator FRANKEN. There are two: the Office of Thrift Supervision 

and—— 

Mr. BAGLEY. Sure. You heard during the financial crisis that 

there were banks that were seeking to convert their charters from 

national banks to national thrifts because they thought that OTS 

21 

had a lighter hand. That is just—I mean, that is a fixable problem 

and the kind of problem that could be resolved by an oversight 

committee. 

Senator FRANKEN. I think we fixed it in the reform bill by eliminating—— 

Mr. BAGLEY. You eliminated OTS. There are still problems. 

Banks—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Kind of a competition between the two agencies to be more lenient in order to get—— 

Mr. BAGLEY. Right. There is still the remaining problem that 

banks can go from state to national charters, so there is still competition between regulators. But it is a step forward. 

There are lots of problems—there is a lot of low-hanging fruit in 

the regulatory state, and it will require some attention to detail. 

And, again, there are no political gold stars for this, but there are 

fixable problems that abound. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. If I could follow up on that, one of the 

puzzlements about this is that this regulatory capture phenomenon 

has been known about for 90 or so years. It has been all over the 

academic literature. It has been part of what I learned in law 

school, you know, years ago. We have seen over and over again instances of it happening. We have had these two huge catastrophes 

recently to our country that seem very likely to trace back to episodes of regulatory capture. And yet on our side, there do not seem 

to be much in the way of efforts to set up any kind of consistent 

institutional either counterpressure or assessment mechanism to 

push back a little bit against or shed light on what I think everybody concedes is a relentless, constant, surreptitious pressure that 

needs to be looked out for. 

Some of the testimony mentioned the Senate report that was 

done back in the 1970s, but other than that, this does not seem to 

be a very vibrant part of our debate around here. And when you 

look at the stakes and when you look at the catastrophic effects 

and when you look at the persistence of the problem, I am surprised that there has not been more work done on it. And you all 

have looked at it, you know, for a long time to varying degrees. 

If we were to look back and say, OK, what are the sort of 

foundational reports and documents and studies that have been 

done in Congress to, you know, sort of stand on the shoulders of 

giants, where do we begin? Where is the best work that has been 

done in the past to flesh this out and come up with ideas? Is there 

that history of Congressional effort and oversight that we could 

look back to? 

It does not sound like it. Professor Shapiro. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I think all this was done in disfavor about 10, 12 

years ago when Congress—more than that, I guess—de-funded the 

Administrative Conference of the United States. And I am very 

happy that Congress recently has re-funded the Administrative 

Conference of the United States. 

During the years they were up and operating, they really served 

as a kind of neutral think tank inside the Government. The Conference had a staff. It would hire law professors to do studies. The 

Conference itself was made up of perhaps 150 people from across 

Washington, leading lawyers, people from inside the Government, 

22 

and at least as I was able to watch it work, I think it was a pretty 

objective attempt to figure out what works and what does not work. 

And now that it is back, I think you can take advantage of it. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Is that why it got de-funded? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. It is not quite clear why it got de-funded, but it 

showed up one year in the House appropriations with zero funding, 

and the Senate did not put it back. Then the ABA, the American 

Bar Association, fought for a long time to get it re-funded, and it 

is now just beginning again. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Now, one of the themes that seems to 

have been developed also from all of you in your testimony is that 

in terms of whatever we wish to think about establishing in order 

to protect against or counter the pressure toward agency capture, 

it should not be something that is in the same agency as the one 

that is the target of the capture. 

Dr. Troy suggested that OMB might be a good location for the 

very reason that it is outside of the agency and is less vulnerable 

to being swept into whatever the politics are that have allowed the 

agency capture in the first place. 

Professor Shapiro, you have suggested the Administrative Conference, again, an outside entity. 

I do not know if you have spoken to this, Professor Bagley, but 

is this a common theme, that wherever we do this, it should be outside of the—if there is going to be an authority of some kind that 

has this task, it should be in a central location some place and can 

look across multiple agencies? 

Mr. BAGLEY. I would have two comments about that. The first is 

that some of the most compelling reports about agency capture that 

we have heard of come from Inspectors General. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. From the IGs, yes. 

Mr. BAGLEY. Which operate in sort of an ‘‘at the agency, but not 

at the agency’’ capacity. The IGs have the investigatory resources 

and the know-how to ferret out some of these very difficult problems to see. They also have relationships with staff members, so 

they actually can be pretty effective voices in this process. Putting 

the experts in a centralized location may insulate them from some 

pressure—— 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. But you will agree with me that Inspectors General vary from agency to agency in terms of their individual capability, their motivation, their willingness to tangle with 

the power structure. 

Mr. BAGLEY. That is absolutely true. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Some are great, some are pretty lousy. 

Mr. BAGLEY. That is exactly right. 

My concern with placing a super cop in OMB is just that to a 

hammer everything looks like a nail. And, in fact, a super cop may 

not have the kind of deep, fine-grained regulatory know-how to 

really get at the problem. 

One alternative is to create a super cop-type agency within OMB, 

but ensure that it is staffed, at least on a rotating basis, from the 

agencies that are the targets of high-profile investigations. So 

imagine for a moment that there was an agency within OMB that 

decided to look into sub-agencies within the Department of the Interior. Well, you would probably want a few people from Interior 

23 

to come on over for a little bit to tell you what the score is, how 

things work. 

You do not want to give the responsibility to a bunch of generalists, especially a bunch of generalist lawyers who do not know anything about anything and would have a very difficult time—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BAGLEY. Speaking as one. Who would have a very difficult 

time wrapping their hands around the problem. So we will want 

to be very attentive to ensuring that the kind of expertise necessary to find out if agency capture is occurring and address it 

where it exists. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Would a relationship between the central entity and the Inspector General of the agency be a good vehicle for getting that? 

Mr. BAGLEY. I think it could be. Again, as you caution, Inspectors 

General vary. Some are worthless, some are terrific. But you 

will—— 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. The worthless ones might pick up their 

socks a little bit if they felt that they had the central agency looking over their shoulder on this. 

Mr. BAGLEY. That could be. You can also imagine a model where 

the central agency would visit IGs offices and bring manpower, resources, staff, and hard thinking to these particular problems. It 

will require money. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. I am going to pick up where Professor Bagley 

is talking and ask Dr. Troy something, because you were talking 

just now about making sure that this entity that we are talking 

about would have expertise from the agencies they are investigating; and Dr. Troy talked about one of the—an area that I want 

to get at, which is kind of the revolving door, where you do need 

expertise in—let us say, there is a revolving door very often between defense contractors and the military, and you have people 

who are in procurement go to work for a contractor, and so you 

wonder whether while they are in procurement whether they are 

being extra nice to a contractor so that when they go to the contractor, will they get hired, and will they get hired at a very inflated salary? I mean, this is a real problem that we have. On the 

other hand, you need that expertise. That is a conundrum that I 

see, and I was wondering who here—and I will go to Dr. Troy first, 

if you have any thoughts about that in terms of how—there are 

cooling-off periods that we have. Are there any kinds of—what kind 

of thinking have you done about this kind of problem? 

Dr. TROY. Thank you, Senator. I agree that the cooling-off periods are very helpful. I think a lot of times Government officials 

who may think they have been nice to a certain industry, they 

leave and then they have a cooling-off period, and they realize that 

the industry may not want to talk to them anymore. So the coolingoff period can be very helpful. 

I know when I was leaving Government, the ethics rules were 

very strict that I could not talk to any prospective employers while 

I was still in Government, and I think that is a good rule. 

Also, when you are going back into Government, you are recused 

from dealing with anyone who has given you revenue, whether you 

24 

were employed by them full-time or were consulted or gave a 

speech to them or wrote an article for them or whatever, for at 

least a period of a year. So I think all of those are important tools. 

I also think that the OIG is one arrow in the overall quiver of 

ways to prevent capture, so OIRA, which I am not sure I would call 

it necessarily a super cop, but OIRA looks at each regulation from 

a more macro perspective. The OIG looks at personal malfeasance 

often, violations of ethics rules, and I think that is very important. 

ACUS, as Professor Shapiro was saying, is more of a think tank 

and has more of a generalist approach without looking at the specific regulations per se. So I think you want to have a lot of arrows 

in your quiver in trying to fight against capture. 

Senator FRANKEN. Professor Shapiro. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Thank you. I am not sure I am sanguine about 

OMB and its role as kind of an independent adviser to Congress. 

OIRA, because of its economic perspective, has a very narrow sort 

of way of looking at regulation, and there are some very good empirical studies out there showing by and large most of the time it 

opposes stringent regulation on economic grounds. 

So I am not sure they have as broad a perspective as Congress 

might want, but you have your—I mean, I think Congress ought 

to control that, and the GAO would seem to be a perfect vehicle for 

more monitoring, and it is within your control. It has a fabulous 

record of professionalism, and you can direct it, and that is where 

I would put it. 

To answer your question, Senator, it seems to me the revolving 

door most of the time involves senior managers who were political 

appointees, and perhaps the best defense against the revolving 

door is the career civil service, and they are not doing so well, partly because of funding cuts and other problems which have been 

well documented, and building up the career civil service, kind of 

speaking truth to power, I think is also a way of getting at it. 

Senator FRANKEN. I have got a little bit more time. Professor 

Bagley, I believe you also wrote about the cultures of agencies, and 

I was just wondering if you had any advice for creating a culture 

for the new director at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 

You are starting a new bureau there. How do you create the culture that you want? 

Mr. BAGLEY. You need a dynamic, energetic, thoughtful, passionate leader of the organization to get it off the ground. I think 

that is absolutely critical. 

Senator FRANKEN. I wonder who that could be. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Sorry. 

Mr. BAGLEY. I think it is important that the agency be given adequate funding to hire good people because that person certainly 

cannot do everything he or she needs to do without good people 

around on the ground. 

Really, it does come down, I think, to making sure that the agency receives the kind of political support from this body and from 

the House that it needs to get off the ground. The Consumer Product Safety Commission is a good analog, and the concern with the 

CPSC is that it just got forgotten. The real risk with a new consumer protection board in the financial sector, is that eventually, 

25 

2 or 3 years from now, we are going to be worrying about a different set of problems, and it is going to become politically not a 

worthwhile endeavor to oversee the agency carefully. 

Senator FRANKEN. I think it was deliberately set up with a funding stream for that very reason. 

Mr. BAGLEY. That is exactly right, and I think that protecting 

funding streams at other agencies that have been beleaguered is 

one way to resolve the capture problem. But making sure that the 

agency is adequately funded, well staffed, and staffed by a vibrant 

leader is extremely important. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Just to respond to what you said, Senator Franken, esprit de corps I think has a lot to do with it. You 

see wonderful esprit de corps in the military. Within the elite units 

of the military, you see it even more pronouncedly. I noticed it during my time at the Department of Justice. That is a group of individuals who take enormous pride in the institution that they serve, 

and one of the demonstrations of it was that episode that we heard 

about in this Committee, in the Judiciary Committee, when the 

President of the United States and the Vice President in the White 

House put immense pressure on the Department of Justice to approve the warrantless wiretapping program when Deputy Attorney 

General Comey and Attorney General Ashcroft had reached the determination that it was not, in fact, lawful. And that went to a 

face-to-face confrontation between the President and the Acting Attorney General in the White House and led to that bizarre scenario 

of the White House Counsel and Chief of Staff going to visit 

Ashcroft in the hospital as he was significantly disabled by his illness, and the head of the FBI and the Deputy Attorney General, 

Acting Attorney General, both racing with their lights on to the 

hospital with instructions called ahead by the FBI Director to his 

FBI agents guarding the Attorney General of the United States 

saying, ‘‘Don’t let the Attorney General of the United States be left 

alone with the White House Counsel and the White House Chief 

of Staff.’’ It was almost an episode from a country other than ours. 

Senator FRANKEN. Well, it looked like ‘‘The Godfather,’’ Michael 

moving his Dad. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Yes, but that kind of thing shows that 

intensity of esprit de corps and the fact that not only was Comey 

willing to step down if the pressure came on from the White House, 

but six or seven of the senior members of the Department of Justice were willing to resign with him to show that they simply are 

not—that ‘‘This is an organization that you do not mess with, Mr. 

President, and now you are messing with us.’’ That kind of a spirit 

I think is important to—— 

Senator FRANKEN. But if I may, I think we did see that Department later in that administration deteriorate to the point where 

they were doing some things—— 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. With the U.S. Attorneys. 

Senator FRANKEN. Yes. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. It is not bomb-proof, but I think esprit 

de corps matters. 

26 

I wanted to touch base on a couple of the things that, as you 

said, there are a whole bunch of different vehicles—I think everybody has said this—through which regulatory capture can take 

place. Some are pretty obvious and pretty obviously, you know, either unlawful or reprehensible or in violation of ethics rules: direct 

financial inducements to people, trips, travel, free meals, all that 

sort of stuff. You can get at a certain amount of that just through 

the ethics laws and reporting. It still happens. It is one device. But 

it has its own way of trying to stop it. 

Then you have got the revolving door problem, which is both revolving industry folks in and then for the folks who are in, holding 

out the inducement that they can revolve out to a cushy job in the 

industry. 

Then you have got the problem of the ability of a highly motivated and very wealthy participant in the process to simply swamp 

the regulatory process, just bury it, so that public sector enterprises that do not have those same resources and that have to 

spread their resources across a variety of issues simply cannot keep 

up, and they just get left behind by the sheer expenditure. 

Then you have got the sort of gentle cajoling of ‘‘If you do it my 

way, everything is going to be fine, and we can move on to something else. And if you do not, well, you know, we are going to take 

you to court and you are going to have to testify and there is going 

to be litigation and it is going to slow you down and people are 

going to complain. Do it my way. Let us just be nice about this.’’ 

That gets very hard to pick out because, frankly, that is very legitimate behavior, and you really have to sort of go into the motivation, into the mind of the person who is pursuing those strategies 

to determine whether there is an abuse of the process or a legitimate use of the process. 

Then there is the whole issue of political interference. Do you get 

your budget cut if the White House is mad at you because you are 

not playing along with their folks? Do you get your budget cut because Congress is mad at you because you are not playing along 

with their folks? Are you getting calls from the chief of staff giving 

you hell about what you are doing or encouraging you? Do you get 

flown home on Air Force One and get your picture taken with the 

President? You can put it on your desk and show how important 

a person you are if you go along with the program. 

I mean, there is just this whole array of threats and inducements, and it strikes me that trying to go at this problem by trying 

to identify all those different vectors for regulatory capture and 

manage each one of them on the input side may be very challenging and that you may want to look at the output side. Again, 

that creates its own measurement and metrics problems, but basically what is coming out of this agency? Is it really doing its job? 

Are you seeing continued casualties from cranes, you know, and 

look to the result that you are seeking, is that a good metric trying 

to bring to this equation? Or is it too vague, do you think? Professor Shapiro. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. No, it is not going to be easy. But at the moment 

we do not do it at all, so it is surprising what sometimes is basic 

level information, what that can reveal. And because we are not 

capturing that information in any kind of straightforward way and 

27 

making it accessible—this information, if we could come up with 

some decent metrics—and that would be hard. You could put it on 

the Web. Citizens could follow this. You know, is the thing going 

up or is it going down? And it would be misleading. I mean, there 

is no metric that is going to capture perfectly what is going on. But 

that would not be the aim. The aim would be to have some basic 

indicators that are at least accurate enough to suggest whether the 

agency is moving forward and trying, despite various hurdles, to do 

its job or whether it is not doing anything. And if we could tease 

out those metrics, I think that would be helpful. 

Mr. BAGLEY. I think looking at outputs is certainly important. 

That is what we care about. And if we were able to measure effectively whether those outputs were skewed by industry group pressure, we would care a lot about that. But I am a little skeptical 

that in every case we are going to be able to do that. 

And just as you would not try to figure out if somebody had committed a bank robbery by looking at just whether or not he had a 

big influx of cash, you would instead ask: What was he doing on 

the day of the bank robbery? You might want to look at the inputs. 

You might want to find out both parts of the story before you started casting stones about agency capture. 

I go back to a point that I made in my testimony, and I think 

to me it strikes me as a promising avenue, which is doing your utmost to eliminate the conditions in which capture can thrive as opposed to trying to put the genie back into the bottle once it comes 

out. And there are several techniques and approaches you can employ to do that. One is enhance the prestige of Government employment and enhancing the kind of esprit de corps that is an enormous bulwark against capture. You can look at the structural infirmities of agencies and their funding streams. And you can take 

steps to enhance the ethics restrictions and close the revolving 

door. 

But I am not sure why you would exclude anything from your examination of the problem. It is a multi-faceted problem. For one example, we first learned about the problems at MMS not because of 

outputs, although we had one very large output recently, but we 

first learned about the problem because of inputs and reports that 

arose out of Colorado about inappropriate contacts between oil industry and the people who were managing the leases. 

So we will want to think about all aspects of the problem as you 

move forward. It is a tough problem, and we do not want to artificially limit ourselves. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. But adding outcomes measurement, to 

the extent it—— 

Mr. BAGLEY. Absolutely. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE.—would be a valuable addition? 

Mr. BAGLEY. Sure. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Well, you were just mentioning esprit de 

corps, Professor Bagley, and when I made my impromptu opening 

statement, I talked about some things that happened during the— 

that I saw that happened during the Bush administration, where 

I think esprit de corps seemed to be hurt in a number of agencies. 

I talked about FEMA and what appeared to be—and I think it is 

28 

hard to argue with the perception that there was cronyism going 

on there. And to the extent that so many of the people that were 

selected to do regulation in the Interior Department were lobbyists 

who had come directly from the industries that they were now regulating, what is the effect of that kind of cronyism on the esprit 

de corps within an agency? 

Mr. BAGLEY. It can be devastating, as reports about the Civil 

Rights Division of the Department of Justice attested to. There 

were many, many members of that Division who felt like the mission of the agency had been distorted. There are many who disagreed with that assessment, but I definitely know that on the 

ground there was a loss of confidence and faith in the agency as 

an institution. This is troubling given that esprit de corps and the 

cohesiveness of an agency are important bulwarks against industry 

influence, against passivity, against sclerosis, against a host of 

well-known agency pathologies. We would certainly want to pay attention when, for whatever reason, an agency started to look sick, 

especially when the civil servants start revolting. You saw this at 

a number of agencies during the last administration, and that 

should be a canary in the coal mine for Congressional overseers. 

Senator FRANKEN. And why did that happen in the last administration? I mean, you were also talking about funding, and I think 

there was de-funding of certain agencies during that period. And 

is there—if an administration and the Congress have sort of an 

anti-regulatory bias and are assigning people to head—the political 

appointees to the agencies who really do not want the agency necessarily to do its job, what happens then to the esprit de corps in 

the agency and what happens to the effectiveness of the agency? 

I will ask that of Professor Shapiro and then of Dr. Troy. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Thank you, Senator. I guess I am going to disagree 

a little with Dr. Troy. He earlier described the staff as being biased 

toward the implementation of their statute, and to some extent 

that is true. I mean, if you go to work for EPA, you should be in 

favor of doing what EPA is supposed to do. But I think the empirical evidence shows by and large what is called neutral competence, 

that lawyers perform like lawyers and give candid advice to the political managers just in the way we would expect lawyers to do 

that, and scientists try to present the scientific evidence just as 

they have been taught to do when they get their Ph.D., which is 

to be as fair to the evidence as possible. 

So when you have a robust, effective career staff who were highly 

professionalized, then we get a kind of speaking truth to power 

that is a kind of protection against the revolving door and against 

political managers who would want to tilt the agency in a certain 

way because the staff is presenting them with evidence. 

Now, they may ignore the evidence, and if they do—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Didn’t we see scientific language change in 

that period? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Yes. 

Senator FRANKEN. And is that an anomaly, or is that something 

that has happened frequently in the past? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Fortunately, I think it was an anomaly, although 

it was—there were lots of examples of that, unfortunately, from the 

last administration. 

29 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. Dr. Troy, I will give you a chance to respond. 

Dr. TROY. First of all, I would like to just clarify what I was saying with Professor Shapiro. What I said is not that the career staff 

is biased toward the implementation of their statutes but toward 

the prerogatives of their agency and toward making sure that their 

agencies are not embarrassed. And to the extent that there is malfeasance in any administration or in any organization, I think that 

is harmful to the esprit de corps at an agency, and I think you in 

your remarks, Senator Franken, said that the problems of political 

appointees are not unique to any one administration, that sometimes you have bad actors. But overall I thought that the administration had very high standards for employing people, and generally the esprit de corps was very good. But when you do have 

problems like the ones that we have been talking about, malfeasance definitely can negatively impact the esprit de corps. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Thank you. 

There is one point I would like to come back to that Professor 

Shapiro made. I assume we will agree on some limitations around 

the point you made, but you said, in effect, that when a new President is elected, then there is an ability and a proper ability on the 

part of that President to bring their own political point of view, the 

one they were elected with, into the agency process. And I will concede that that is true, but I would also suggest that there is a floor 

below which that executive policymaking discretion cannot go. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Absolutely. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. And that that floor is one that is set by 

Congress when it passes a law and makes it the law of the United 

States of America that an agency shall or shall not take on a certain function, adhere to a certain standard, and so forth. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I agree completely. I think there is a world of difference to a conservative administrator at OSHA adopting regulations to protect workers that might not be quite as robust as, say, 

the unions want but still are well within the legality of the statute; 

and an administrator at OSHA who stalls regulation for the 2 or 

3 or 4 years that she or he is in office and nothing comes out; or 

an administrator who simply makes it impossible or very difficult 

for the agency to enforce the regulations that are then on the 

books. That is not a difference of policy. That is stonewalling. 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Well, if anybody would like another 

round, I am happy to accommodate my colleagues, but we are close 

to closing time, and I wanted to put a few things in the record. I 

want to in particular thank the witnesses. I think that each one 

of you has been very helpful and has brought an important perspective to this hearing. 

My personal feeling is that this problem of agency capture deserves a great deal more attention than it is presently getting, and 

that given the constant pressure of industry in particular, although 

not necessarily, on these agencies and the organizational power 

mismatch and the huge stakes both in the short run, if you could 

win with the agency, and even greater consequences if the agency’s 

failure results in a massive public catastrophe. We have known 

30 

about this for decades. It is a recurring problem. There is no consistent, institutional, thoroughgoing vehicle for counterpressure. 

And I view this as an opening hearing that has tried to raise the 

profile a little bit of this agency capture phenomenon, look into its 

elements and its nature, the sort of topography of the problem, and 

begin to learn our way around it with a view that in future hearings and in future legislative efforts we can try to build an apparatus in Government that allows for adequate counterpressure so 

that the bubble goes back to the center rather than being pushed 

way over by all the pressure coming from ordinarily the industry, 

but I take Dr. Troy’s point that it is not necessarily the industry. 

You know, I came out of a Foreign Service family, and I went to 

a lot of crummy and dangerous places as a kid, and the message 

that I took from that that my father and my mom were willing to 

take us there is that there is something more about this Government than just the convenience of, you know, the average American, that we stand for something. Everybody who serves in uniform in this country or has a family member serving in uniform 

understands that there is something that is extraordinarily important about the Government of the United States. 

If you look at our history, this is the Government of George 

Washington, of James Madison, of Thomas Jefferson. It is the Government that Abraham Lincoln served, that Theodore Roosevelt 

served, that Franklin Roosevelt served, that John F. Kennedy 

served. It is an institution on this planet that is probably the greatest force for good on the planet, probably the greatest force for good 

ever on the planet. And the notion that some industry or some 

other private entity with a special interest could creep its way into 

the very fabric of that Government and take an agency of that Government and turn it away from the service of the public, away from 

the service of the country, away from the best interests of the 

United States of America and co-opt it to become its servant is to 

me very, very deeply offensive. That is something that everyone in 

America should be concerned about, upset about. And we talk 

about zero tolerance in other contexts. There really ought to be 

zero tolerance for that. The Government of the United States of 

America ought to serve the United States of America, and so I am 

pretty highly motivated to try to at long last begin to craft a solution to this problem. And as I said in my opening statement, if the 

financial meltdown and the catastrophe that we have suffered 

across this country has not taught us something about the importance of protecting our agencies against regulatory capture, if what 

happened in the Gulf has not taught us something about that, my 

gosh, are we ever slow learners. 

And the fact that these two have gone off does not mean that 

that is the end of it. It does not mean that there are not other 

agencies just as co-opted as MMS was, just as co-opted as the Securities and Exchange Commission was, where it simply has not 

blown up yet. And so I think for us to be about our business of trying to get this right and prevent those next disasters from happening, where the constants are always there, the constants of the 

pressure, the constants of the superior ability of the insiders, the 

constants of the massive transfer of wealth that is possible from 

31 

successful agency capture, all of that does not go away. And we 

simply have to step up and be ready for it. 

As I said, this is an opening episode. I think the witnesses, each 

of you, have been extraordinarily helpful, and I really appreciate 

what you have done. 

I have a couple of things I would like to put in the record, if 

there is no objection. One is the statement of our colleague, Senator 

Feingold, who has put in a wonderful statement with a particular 

focus that has been developed a bit in this hearing, but that he focused more on, which is how this plays out in terms of our increasing reliance on Government contractors. He cites the Council of the 

Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency reporting recently 

that the total number of suspensions and debarments in fiscal year 

2008 was half the total from 5 years previously and that suspensions and disbarments had been steadily decreasing over the last 

5 years. So up in terms of the amount of Government contractors, 

up in terms of the money we spend on Government contractors, 

down in terms of suspension and debarments, which are at least 

one measure of whether we are looking at them. So I appreciate 

Senator Feingold’s statement, and that will be added to the record 

without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Wendy Wagner, who is the Worsham 

Centennial Professor at the University of Texas School of Law, has 

provided important testimony that has helped support what I mentioned earlier about the capacity for insider players to overwhelm 

agency procedure. She describes, ‘‘For example, because the agency 

must respond to all comments, administrative law allows stakeholders with time and energy which generally, but not always, consists primarily of regulated parties, to effectively capture the agency by controlling their agenda, the framing of problems, the supply 

of information, and the issues on which the agency will be held accountable in the courts. Indeed, as this form of informational capture becomes more prevalent, it increases the costs of a rulemaking 

to the extent that only the most expert insiders can follow and 

process the information relevant to agency decisions.’’ 

She goes on to say, ‘‘Aggressively gaming the system to raise the 

costs of participation ever higher will in many cases ensure the exclusion of agency watchdogs that lack the resources to continue to 

participate in the process.’’ And I thank Professor Wagner for her 

testimony, and that will be added to the record. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wagner appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Hope Babcock, who is a professor of law 

at the Georgetown University Law Center, teaching courses in environmental and natural resources law, has offered testimony: ‘‘If 

agencies allow themselves to become servants of the interests they 

are mandated to regulate, then their capacity to make balanced 

and broadly informed decisions is seriously compromised.’’ And she 

has some good suggestions on how to make the process more transparent so that particularly adjudicatory licensing hearings and 

their heavy resource burden on public protestants are not used to 

keep the public participants out. 

32 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Babcock appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. The Consumers Union has provided a 

helpful statement, particularly with respect to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, what they describe as an ‘‘agency with a revolving door of regulators who left the agency to work 

for Toyota in safety matters before the agency,’’ obviously relevant 

to the safety concerns we have seen recently about the Toyota automobiles. 

[The prepared statement of Consumers Union appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Professor William Snape has offered his 

statement from the Center for Biological Diversity at American 

University’s Washington College of Law. He notes, ‘‘A powerful 

combination of agency and industry rhetoric results in a deceiving 

mainstream ‘view’ that the agency behavior at issue is either desirable or inevitable until the bubble literally bursts; e.g., we must increase oil drilling for national security, or the market will self-correct any artificial inflation of stock, bond, or derivative price.’’ And 

he cites Judge Posner for some of his testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Snape appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. Roger Williams University, my home 

State law school, has a statement from Dean David Logan, who 

teaches administrative law and tort law and sees regulatory capture as a problem that takes away from adequate public decisionmaking. His phrase is that it leads to ‘‘serious corrosion of the regulatory system.’’ 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Logan appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. And, finally, Professor Daniel Carpenter 

at the Harvard University Center for American Political Studies— 

he is the director there and the Allie S. Freed Professor of Government—writes to say, ‘‘Let me say that I believe this issue to be one 

of the most vital policy issues of our times, perhaps the single most 

salient regulatory issue facing our Nation for the next 10 to 20 

years.’’ 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman WHITEHOUSE. So I thank all of them for participating 

in this hearing through their written testimony. Since this is an 

ongoing process, we will continue to be in touch with them, and I 

want to particularly thank Senator Kaufman, who has been called 

away to his responsibilities at the Armed Services Committee, and 

Senator Franken for participating in this. As observers of this 

Committee will have seen, they are two of the brightest and most 

thoughtful and most sort of trenchant in their thinking Members 

of the Senate. The fact that they chose to spend their day with us, 

their morning with us today I think has been very valuable and 

helpful and instructive. So, Senator Franken, thank you very 

much. 

The record of this hearing will remain open for one additional 

week for anybody who wishes to add anything to it. And, again, I 

thank our Ranking Member, Senator Sessions, for allowing us to 

33 

proceed in his absence. We understand perfectly that, given the 

nomination of your Supreme Court Justice’s successor, Professor 

Bagley, he has important work on the floor and an important meeting at the White House and, of course, it is perfectly understandable that he would be there rather than here. But he has been very 

courteous about working with us on the hearing and about allowing 

it to proceed in his absence, so I thank Senator Sessions as well. 

If there is no further business of the Subcommittee, we will 

stand adjourned. Thank you all very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Submissions for the record follow.] 

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