*

  After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See

FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted August 29, 2007*

Decided March 13, 2008

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐1440    

MARSHA B. BREWER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

WISCONSIN BOARD OF BAR

EXAMINERS, et. al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin.

No. 04 C 694

William C. Griesbach,

Judge.

O R D E R

Marsha Brewer, who has a mental disability, is a graduate of the University of

Wisconsin Law School who disclosed in her application for admission to the Wisconsin Bar

that the Social Security Administration had certified her as disabled.  The Wisconsin Board

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐1440   Page 2

of Bar Examiners (“the Board”) inquired further, and learned that Brewer receives Social

Security disability benefits in part because of chronic depression and fatigue, for which she

currently receives no treatment or medication.  Responding to a request from the Board,

Brewer authorized the release of her medical records, but her doctors had not retained

them.  The Board directed Brewer to undergo and pay for a $2,000 psychological evaluation,

which she refused to do.  Brewer offered instead to provide affidavits from former

employers and law‐school professors who could attest to her fitness to practice law, but the

Board rejected this alternative.  The Board declined to act on her application, and as a result

Brewer—temporarily, as we will see—lost her chance to be admitted to the bar without

having to pass a bar examination, a privilege of graduates of Wisconsin law schools, known

as “diploma privilege.”

Brewer sued the state, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Board, and various persons

in their official and individual capacities (collectively, “the Board”), asserting violations of

her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, as well as claims under Title II of

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131‐12134, and the Vocational

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701‐718.  The district judge

dismissed all of her claims except for those seeking injunctive relief under the ADA

(specifically, restoration of her diploma privilege and review of her bar application without

the need for a psychological evaluation).  These claims survived a motion for summary

judgment.  Faced with the prospect of a trial, the Board promised Brewer that if she

reapplied for admission she would retain her diploma privilege and would not be required

to undergo a psychological evaluation.  Because Brewer received all that she had sought by

these claims for injunctive relief, the district court dismissed them as moot.  Brewer appeals

the dismissals, including the dismissal of her claims for damages.

We can dispose quickly of Brewer’s § 1983 claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the Constitution, as well as the § 1985 claims, all of which depend on

constitutional violations, see Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, 488 n.3 (7th Cir. 2003).  Brewer

alleged that in requesting a psychological evaluation and access to her medical records the

Board violated her Fourth Amendment rights.  But a psychological evaluation is not a

“search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Greenawalt v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 587,

589‐90 (7th Cir. 2005).  Anyway the Board did not obtain the records.  

Brewer’s allegation that the Board deprived her of a property right and liberty

interest in pursuing her chosen profession also fails.  Any constitutional interest that she

may have in pursuing her desired profession is “subject to reasonable government

regulation.”  Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292 (1999).  Her receiving disability benefits

signifies that the federal government considers her unable to pursue gainful employment,

see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 6678, 672 (7th Cir. 2001), and it was
No. 07‐1440   Page 3

reasonable for the Board therefore to require a psychological fitness evaluation of her before

licensing her to practice law.  Brewer’s desire for a speedy and routine approval of her

application did not establish a property interest.  See Schroeder v. City of Chi., 927 F.2d 957,

959 (7th Cir. 1991); Scott v. Vill. of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338, 339 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Bd. of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).  

Brewer’s claim that the Board’s request for a psychological evaluation violated her

right to equal protection also fails.  The Board is to license only persons “whose record of

conduct justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts and others with respect to the

professional duties owed to them.”  Wis. Admin. Code BA § 6.01.   Given Brewer’s disabling

mental‐health condition, the Board’s request for a psychological evaluation was rationally

related to its interest in ensuring that only competent persons are admitted to practice law

in Wisconsin.  See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366‐67 (2001);

Martin‐Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33, 36 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).  

The district court rejected Brewer’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act

on the ground that the Board was immune from suit because the Act does not abrogate state

immunity for claims challenging attorney‐licensing practices.  Brewer cites Tennessee v. Lane,

541 U.S. 509 (2004), but it holds only that in enacting the ADA, Congress had identified a

history and pattern of unconstitutional discrimination against the disabled with respect to

their fundamental right of access to the courts,  541 U.S. at 522‐29, and by doing so had

validly abrogated state immunity for such claims.  Id. at 533‐34.  Brewer does not argue that

Congress has ever identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional discrimination

against the disabled in the administration of attorney‐licensing schemes.  It has not.  See

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368‐69; Roe v. Johnson, 334 F. Supp. 2d 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Brewer’s

ADA claims against individual defendants in their individual capacity must fail because the

Act authorizes suits only against public entities, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131‐12133; United States v.

Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006); Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000).

As for Brewer’s Rehabilitation Act claims, she presented no competent evidence that

the Board receives federal assistance, as is required under the Rehabilitation Act.  See 29

U.S.C. § 794(b); Schroeder, 927 F.2d at 962.  Brewer cannot proceed against any of the

individual defendants in their personal capacities because the Act authorizes suits only

against public entities.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, 794a; Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of Northwest Ind.,

104 F.3d 116, 119‐20 (7th Cir. 1997).

Finally, the Board has offered all of the relief the courts could provide for Brewer,

and, as a pro se litigant, she cannot represent other bar applicants in this appeal.  See Malone

v. Nielson, 474 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures

Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2003).  She insists that her injury is “capable of repetition,

yet evading review,” but we disagree because she has made no showing that the Board is
No. 07‐1440   Page 4

likely to renege on its promise to her.  See Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 745 (7th Cir.

2005); In re Estab’t Inspection of Caterpillar Inc., 55 F.3d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED.