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GEORGIA’S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION: HOW 

FREE AND FAIR HAS THE CAMPAIGN BEEN, AND 

HOW SHOULD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPOND? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 20, 2012 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 112–2–10] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Chairman 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, 

Co-Chairman 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

MICHAEL H. POSNER, Department of State 

MICHAEL C. CAMUN ̃ EZ, Department of Commerce 

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense 

[II] 
GEORGIA’S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION: 

HOW FREE AND FAIR HAS THE 

CAMPAIGN BEEN, AND HOW SHOULD 

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPOND? 

SEPTEMBER 20, 2012 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 1 

Hon. Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Sec. Thomas Melia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State .................................................................... 4 

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and 

Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, Heritage Foundation ........................................................................ 16 

Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli, Director, Center for Black Sea-Caspian Studies, School of International Service, American 

University ................................................................................. 18 

Dr. Archil Gegeshidze, Senior Fellow, Georgian Foundation 

for Strategic and International Studies ................................. 21 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith ................. 30 

Prepared statement of Sec. Thomas Melia ............................... 32 

Prepared statement of Dr. Ariel Cohen ..................................... 34 

Prepared statement of Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli .......................... 38 

[III] 

(1) 

GEORGIA’S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION: 

HOW FREE AND FAIR HAS THE 

CAMPAIGN BEEN, AND HOW SHOULD 

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPOND? 

September 20, 2012 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 12:30 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn 

House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. 

Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Sec. Thomas Melia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 

U.S. Department of State; Dr. Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow 

for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, 

Heritage Foundation; Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli, Director, Center for 

Black Sea-Caspian Studies, School of International Service, American University; and Dr. Archil Gegeshidze, Senior Fellow, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission will come to order. 

And good afternoon to everyone. Thank you for being here. 

I want to welcome all of you to our hearing on Georgia’s parliamentary elections, which is now only 11 days away. The campaign has brought Georgia to a crossroads. It is the most crucial 

event in Georgian democracy since the Rose Revolution of 2003. 

At that time, everyone will recall Georgians responded to a 

rigged election with a peaceful protest. It was a great moment in 

Georgian history, the first of the color revolutions. The Rose Revolution brought Mikhail Saakashvili—I’ve said it a million times— 

and his team of Western-oriented, modernizers into office. Hopes 

were high in Georgia that Saakashvili strengthened the state and 

launched many reforms. 

Russia’s 2008 invasion and occupation of the Georgian regions of 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia failed to topple the president, and our 
2 

country has strongly supported Georgian sovereignty. Vladimir 

Putin’s invasion was yet another revelation of his cynical brutality. 

As an aside, I would note that I was in Georgia in the days following that invasion working to affect the return of two girls— 

daughters of one of my constituents—and, as it turned out, several 

other young people who were caught behind Russian lines. And I 

was deeply impressed by the courage and the determination that 

I encountered in every Georgian that I met. 

That brings us to the present moment. Only a year ago, President Saakashvili’s ruling National Movement seemed poised to easily win the October 2012 parliamentary election over a fragmented 

opposition. But in October of 2011, a man by the name of 

Ivanishvili began to unite elements of the opposition into a new coalition that posed a serious challenge. 

Mr. Ivanishvili is a multibillionaire and thought to be a newcomer to politics—and though he was such a newcomer, he had 

vast resources. The government quickly stripped him of his citizenship, and the parliament passed campaign finance laws that limited the use of his assets. 

At the same time, the instruments of the state, budget, police 

and security services began to be deployed against the party and 

its supporters, though to what extent is a matter of dispute. Consequently, the election campaign has raised very serious questions 

about Mikheil Saakashvili’s reputation as a reformer. 

I’m sure we’ll hear from our witnesses to what degree his government has institutionalized genuine democratic governance as opposed to the appearance of it. I don’t mean to prejudge this question. It is a difficult one that our witnesses are outstandingly qualified to grapple with. 

But the main questions we’d like to hear our witnesses answer 

touch on the conduct of the campaign, specifically the opposition’s 

charges that the Georgian state has targeted Ivanishvili and his 

supporters through harassment, intimidation, beatings, selective 

enforcement of the law and violations of freedom of assembly and 

expression. 

If substantially true, that would be terribly sad. It would indicate 

that the Rose Revolution had gone bad. At the same time, 

Ivanishvili and his coalition have been targeted as working on behalf of Russia. The Georgian government sometimes seems to paint 

the conflict not as one between two political parties but between 

the Georgian state and its foreign enemies trying to subvert it. We 

certainly need to hear your thoughts on that as well. 

I do believe that members of this Commission will have open 

minds on all of these questions and that each of your testimonies 

will be an important aspect in informing Congress and our own 

government on the conduct of the Georgian election campaign, now 

in its last days. 

We are fortunate to have some outstanding witnesses who will 

speak to this, but before doing so, I’d like to now yield to my friend 

and colleague, Mr. Cohen, ranking member, for comments he might 

have. 
3 

HON. STEPHEN COHEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our panel and interested parties. 

I look forward to the testimony and the edification, for I will be 

traveling to Georgia with, I believe, Congressperson Kay Granger 

and Dreier to monitor the elections. I am certainly concerned about 

elections all over the world—including in my home city of Memphis, where they’re probably worse conducted than maybe they are 

in Georgia and other places. And maybe Georgia is going to be a 

great experience, and I’ll learn something to improve Memphis. But 

I look forward to observing and participating, and hope that the 

people of Georgia will have a free and fair election and elect the 

person who is, indeed, the winner of the contest. 

And with that, I yield back the remainder and just look forward 

to your testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. 

Before going to our first panelist, I’d like to point out, and would 

not want to fail to mention, the terrible scandal that broke yesterday in Georgia concerning gross abuses in prison. Videos have 

emerged that reveal the most horrifying of tortures, including the 

sadistic rape of men by prison officials. The Georgian minister of 

corrections has resigned. Individuals have been arrested, and the 

government has pledged to punish all those responsible and to uproot this problem. 

I welcome those actions and promises, but I also would note the 

statement made by the national security adviser who said, quote, 

‘‘We as a government made a grave mistake when we did not properly evaluate the signals coming from the ombudsman and other 

civil society groups about the systemic problem in the penitentiary 

system.’’ That is a telling admission. It’s precisely the systemic nature of this abuse that evokes the greatest concern because it 

raises questions about the nature of Georgia’s state’s relationship 

with its citizens. 

I’d like to now introduce our very distinguished first witness, 

Thomas Melia, who is the deputy assistant secretary of state, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. He is responsible for 

DRL’s work in Europe, including Russia and Central and South 

Asia, as well as worker rights issues worldwide. In addition to 

heading the head of U.S. delegation to several OSCE meetings, he 

is the U.S. co-chair of the Civil Society Working Group in the U.S.- 

Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission. 

Mr. Melia came to DRL in 2010 from Freedom House, where he 

was deputy executive director for five years. He had previously 

held posts at the National Democratic Institute and the Free Trade 

Union Institute at the AFL-CIO. He also has a Capitol Hill experience having served as senior elective assistant for foreign affairs 

policy for Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Secretary Melia has 

just recently returned from a visit to Georgia, so will provide, I 

think, some very fresh impressions as to what is going on there. 

Secretary, the floor is yours. 
4 

SEC. THOMAS MELIA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 

LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Cohen, for being here today 

and for this invitation. 

Before I get into the Georgia discussion, I just want to say how 

pleased we are to work on a daily basis with the Commission and 

the staff in advancing a shared agenda and promoting human 

rights and democratic values across the OSCE region. I will be 

going to Warsaw next week for the human dimension meeting and 

look forward to working with your staff and others there in this regard, as we have so often in the past. 

In this context of a shared, continued objective of strengthening 

democracy in the OSCE region and in advance of Georgia’s October 

first parliamentary elections, President Obama, Secretary Clinton 

and other senior U.S. officials have highlighted the importance of 

such a truly democratic electoral process for Georgia in our regular 

dialogues with the government—in our strategic dialogue, which 

means high-level meetings here and in Georgia; most recently at 

the highest level, when Secretary Clinton visited Georgia in June. 

Last week, President Obama and Secretary Clinton sent to Georgia an unusual interagency delegation that I was privileged to lead 

that included senior officials from the State Department, U.S. 

Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice 

and the Department of Defense to demonstrate that there’s a broad 

interest in these elections in Georgia, just as there is a very broad 

and deep relationship being built out between the United States 

and Georgia. 

Our delegation went to Georgia to highlight the importance of a 

democratic process that produces a parliament that reflects the will 

of the Georgian people. I was delighted that our newly arrived ambassador, Richard Norland, had just been confirmed and arrived, 

joined most of our meetings in his very first week in country. 

We met with a range of senior government officials, the prime 

minister and other ministers, election commission chairmen, the 

head of the special audit office as well as with political opposition, 

NGO election observers, journalists and others. 

The message that we conveyed privately in each of our meetings 

was identical, and also identical to what we’ve said in public: The 

United States supports the Georgian people’s aspirations for a free 

and democratic process. We do not favor any particular party or 

candidates, and the United States looks forward to close cooperation with whichever leaders the Georgian people choose. Conducting these imminent elections with integrity will be critical to 

helping Georgia advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. They will 

also be essential to a democratic transfer of power next year as the 

parliament elected in October will, at the start of the next presidential term, will select a new prime minister who will have enhanced powers under the constitutional revisions that will take 

place at the end of this president’s term, when President 

Saakashvili’s successor takes office. 

Domestic and international perceptions of fairness of the campaign environment, including adherence to the rule of law, media 

access and transparency and the impartial adjudication of election- 
5 

related disputes will be important indicators of Georgia’s democratic development. 

I would like to highlight today, as I did in Tbilisi last week, the 

importance of several fundamental principles that featured in all of 

our conversations in Georgia and all of which are essential for a 

meaningful electoral process. First and foremost is the importance 

of a level playing field. It is essential that the political environment 

is conducive to serious participation in the campaign by all the 

major parties on equal terms. We welcome some steps by the government—through the Interagency Task Force on Elections, most 

conspicuously—to address reports of politically motivated firings. 

For instance, they issued a statement early in the summer urging 

all government agencies to discontinue any layoffs until after the 

election. This for the stated purpose of removing the concern that, 

in downsizings currently underway in the Georgian government, 

that personnel associated with the political opposition would be disproportionately affected—that had been the concern, that it was 

people associated with the opposition that were disproportionately 

losing their jobs as teachers and government employees at all levels. While such reports of politically motivated firings have decreased recently since the IATF announcement, concerns remain 

regarding the levelness of the playing field, including some alleged 

harassment of certain activists for their participation in the opposition coalition, some reports of blurred boundaries between state institutions and the ruling party—for example, some public servants 

using government resources for campaign activities—and the alleged use of administrative resources particularly outside the capital, such as the use of public-service announcements that seem to 

be for the benefit of the ruling party. 

Nevertheless, although there have been some shortcomings, it is 

clear that, largely due to the substantial financial resources that 

have been available to the main opposition coalition, this is the 

most competitive election in Georgia’s history. 

The second principle is about rule of law and due process. In our 

meetings with the Georgian government and the various political 

parties, we stressed the importance of ensuring that the campaign 

and election laws are applied equally and transparently, and that 

all participants are held to the same high standards of conduct as 

spelled out in Georgian law. 

While almost every party, including the ruling United National 

Movement, has been penalized for campaign finance violations, the 

state audit office has devoted the most significant part of its attention to the opposition coalition, Georgian Dream. Although there 

are some anecdotal and substantial indications suggesting that 

Georgian Dream may well have spent substantial amounts of 

money in violation of the campaign finance laws, the lack of transparency in the state audit office’s procedures and due process deficiencies raise doubts about whether the law has been enforced 

equally vis-a`-vis all parties. That the recent director and deputy director of that state audit office last month became ruling party parliamentary candidates while the current director of the office is a 

former member of the ruling party member of parliament, this exacerbates the concerns about the partisan nature of the investigations being undertaken by the state audit office. 
6 

We recognize the challenges on all sides of complying with and 

enforcing a new set of campaign finance laws and urged the state 

audit office—we did meet with their new leadership—to emphasize 

transparency and due process as it continues to improve its work. 

We urged all the political parties to participate constructively, follow the law scrupulously and to pursue their political goals 

through the ballot box. 

The third principle is respect for fundamental freedoms, respect 

for peaceable protests and freedom of assembly as a hallmark of a 

democratic society, and the government holds a particular responsibility to protect and uphold those freedoms. We heard last week 

that the political parties we met have generally been able to travel 

the country, hold rallies and get their messages out to the voters 

with whom they meet. In our conversations, we also urged all parties to renounce violence and avoid provocations, especially on election day, election night, during and after the ballot counting and 

on the morning after. 

The fourth principle is equitable access to media. We applaud the 

electoral reforms enacted late last year that expanded the access 

of all parties on equal terms to the mass media during the 60-day 

campaign period. More recently, we were encouraged to see the implementation of the so-called must-carry legislation during the 

campaign period, and we strongly support its extension through the 

post-election complaints process and beyond. 

At present, however, the two nationwide broadcast television networks are distinctly pro-government—Rustavi 2 and Imedi—while 

two regional stations are mainly pro-opposition or at least consistently critical of the government—Maestro and Kavkasia. Continuing efforts to promote wider access to a diversity of opinions 

and media outlets would reflect fundamental values that democracies share. 

The fifth principle that we emphasized in our meetings is constructive engagement. We have every expectation now, based on 

both the opposition’s commitment to us that they reject the use of 

violence and the government’s commitment to us that its security 

forces will be scrupulously professional, that election day and its 

aftermath can unfold peacefully. We certainly hope this will be the 

case. After October 1, all parties will need to work together constructively in the new parliament to advance Georgia’s democratic 

and economic development. They should conduct their campaign in 

that spirit. 

Finally, we call on all participants to promote an electoral process that the Georgian people may judge as free and fair. We commend the work of the domestic and international observation 

groups, including principally the OSCE ODIHR mission that is currently in Georgia to help ensure the election process is transparent 

and consistent with international standards and reflects the will of 

the Georgian people. The pre-election situation is dynamic, and we 

are monitoring developments very closely. Your Commission’s attention to the upcoming election is helpful. 

Again, thank you for holding this hearing. We look forward to 

continuing to work with the Commission, and I’d be glad to answer 

questions. 
7 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your testimony—very comprehensive—and for the fine work you and the department are doing, not the least of which is trying to get both 

sides to absolutely commit to no violence day of and day after, especially day after, which is what I think we’re all most concerned 

about. 

So thank you for that. And you do believe those commitments are 

ironclad as much as they can be? 

Sec. MELIA. I believe they told them to us, and we will continue 

to reinforce the fact that we have all agreed on this. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you—you know, that video that did surface about the harsh treatment of inmates, could you comment on 

that? I mean, that seems to be a very dark insight that caught a 

lot of us by surprise, certainly me. 

Sec. MELIA. Well, let me make three quick points about these 

videos about mistreatment in the prison system. 

First is that I haven’t seen the videos, but the descriptions I’ve 

heard of them are pretty gruesome and horrific. And so we’re appalled by them. And our embassy has been engaged with the government and with others there in the hours—it’s just been since 

yesterday that this arose very intensively. 

Second is that it is not surprising. In our annual human rights 

report that we published this year about the calendar year 2011, 

we summarized in the executive summary three large problems. 

The first one is continuing abuse of people incarcerated in Georgian 

prisons. 

So this is an ongoing problem. It’s been clear to us for a while. 

We have raised it with the Georgian government, and it has been 

part of our—not only our most recent report, but for the last several years. 

Mr. SMITH. But this went beyond even what the report would indicate. Right? It seemed to me to be— 

Sec. MELIA. Videos always bring a new texture to allegations of 

abuse. And so it seems even more horrific than we had realized. 

But let me say that the initial response from the government 

seems to have been—what’s the right word—President Saakashvili 

has reacted quickly and I think in the right way to change the minister of the prison—the minister overseeing the prisons has been 

changed this morning. The new minister is the human rights ombudsman who has a sterling reputation in looking after these 

issues. He’s one of one of these that has raised the problem of conditions in prisons in the past. If he has—if he is given the power 

to clean up the act there, he really is empowered to take steps to 

improve the conditions of incarceration in Georgia’s prisons, this 

could be one of those moments that, you know, where a horrific incident leads to improvement in a system. 

The other thing that’s interesting is that, although there’s already been some back-and-forth between the parties about who’s 

responsible for leaking the video and whether—how real the problem is and so on, it’s worth noting that Mr. Ivanishvili, the lead 

of the opposition, also came out this morning in both a previously 

scheduled meeting with our ambassador and in a public statement—called for calm among his supporters, calling for them not 

to turn this into a reason for, you know, more public street action 
8 

in response to the government’s responsibility to maintain the prison system. 

So I think both President Saakashvili and Mr. Ivanishvili have, 

today, stepped up and done the right things, done the responsible 

things, as responsible people sometimes do in moments of crisis. 

Mr. SMITH. Are you convinced—one of your main points, obviously, was access to media. Does the opposition and the government, do they all have close to equal access or equal access? 

Sec. MELIA. Well, as I mentioned, there are a number of broadcast networks. There’s cable television. There’s online news services. It’s uneven in its—it has been uneven in its reach around the 

country. The two main national stations that have the most reach 

across the country tend to be pro-government, echo the government 

party’s views on things. The principal broadcast stations that are 

friendly to the opposition or at least critical of the government tend 

to be regional stations and don’t have the reach in the country. 

There is also cable television and other means. 

The must-carry legislation which had been urged upon the government and that we had urged that they adopt last spring, they 

did, so that all the different news providers have access to the 

cable networks of the others so that, at the moment, up and 

through election day, there is more diversity in the carrying of 

cable news and political discussion. 

The point I made in my testimony is that now that it’s been established that the basic cable infrastructure can be opened to the 

various political points of view, why stop it on election day? Why 

not continue it at least through the end of the official election process? The official election process, of course, doesn’t end on voting 

day. It ends when the results have been tabulated, when disputes 

have been resolved and when the elected officials assume their offices. That’s when, you know, the election monitor’s guidebooks tell 

you should conclude your observation. 

And so we think that, since there may likely be protests and 

complaints on the day after the election, that that process, which 

is part of the election process, should be accessible to all the viewers in Georgia as well. So we’ve urged that that be carried through 

at least through the immediate post-election, post-election day period and more generally. 

There is a question about whether the legislation that was enacted earlier in this year that facilitated that which did stipulate 

that this must-carry period would end on election day, whether 

that means that it must stop on election day or whether it could 

continue if the providers see fit. So we’re encouraging the providers 

to see fit to— 

Mr. SMITH. Are you satisfied that the mechanism for resolution 

of disputed ballots is up to, you know, standards that would be universally recognized? 

Sec. MELIA. Well, the system on paper—— 

Mr. SMITH. There will be disputes, obviously. 

Sec. MELIA. ——is the proper one. We met with the election commission chairman whose prior career has been as a CPA and auditor for major international firms. So he knows about lining up the 

numbers and tallying them accurately. And he’s approached his 

work, I think, in the spirit of a good CPA. 
9 

And they’ve set up systems, and one of the innovations in this 

election that wasn’t as true previously is that they will announce 

incremental election results as they come in from around the country in real time. And they will post them on their website, and they 

will make them available on screens that will be in the main hall 

of the election commission building. 

And those of us who have seen elections in the post-communist 

world over the years, that is one of the best practices so that—and 

one of the concerns in previous Georgian elections has been a bungling of election results. Prior election chairs had decided to kind 

of wait and, every hour or two, they would post election results. 

And that led to some suspicions that some finagling might be going 

on while the results were tabulated but not yet released. 

So what the chairman has committed to doing—and he says this 

is part of his publicly announced process—is there will just be a 

rolling emissions program where everything will be posted as soon 

as distribute-level election results come in. And that is the best 

practice. So it can work properly. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you three final questions, and then 

I’ll yield to Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. Ivanishvili’s citizenship, when it was revoked and reinstated 

through the constitution, what was our take on that at the time? 

And are we satisfied that—was it pressure that caused a reversal? 

Why did that happen? 

Secondly, with regards to the chamber of audit that targeted the 

Georgian Dream by imposing large fines, are those claims plausible? 

And finally, do you believe a sufficient number of election monitors are about to be deployed to ensure that, you know, when the 

judgment is made by the OSCE and others that it was free and 

fair—if that is their judgment—that there will have been enough 

coverage of the election balloting posts? 

Sec. MELIA. On the last point—let me go in reverse order. On the 

election observers, there will be a lot of election observers there. 

There’s a domestic network there, ISFED [International Federation 

Election Systems], that’s been trained and has operated through 

previous Georgian elections. They are up and running around the 

country. They’ve produced some preliminary reports on what they 

are hearing and seeing. 

The long-term observers from ODIHR are on the ground now. 

That mission is led by Nicolai Vulkanov, a Bulgarian, who previously was the number two in ODIHR for 10 years; I mean, has 

run election observer missions across the OSCE region. He’s as 

good as they come. I have a lot of confidence in his ability to manage all the political turmoil that will be around him and come up 

with as straight an assessment as is possible. 

So there will be—and there are a number of other—NDI and IRI 

have been deploying election missions and will have some there 

around election day. And there are a number of others sort of less 

famous perhaps but other NGO efforts that are underway to monitor the election process. So I think there will be a lot of information available and, you know, my view has always been the more 

observers, the better. They may not all agree with each other, but 

it’s the same principle as having—you know, more newspapers, the 
10 

better. You don’t learn all the same things from different newspapers in this town, for instance. But if you have multiple sources 

of information, you’re more likely to get closer to the truth. 

So I think there will be a lot of observers. We’ll have a lot of information between now and election day and on the morning after. 

Typically, the U.S. Government and the European Union wait until 

after the ODIHR and other major delegations offer their considered 

assessments, preliminary assessments on the afternoon after the 

election before we opine. We definitely want to wait to see what all 

the people on the ground say before we weigh in. That’s our general policy, and I think it will be respected here. 

There are other delegations from the OSCE parliamentary assembly, NATO parliamentary assembly and others that will be 

there. There will be a lot of observers. 

On the question of the citizenship for Bidzina Ivanishvili, that’s 

a complicated, torturous story. The way it’s played out is very unusual. I mean, a lot of things about the Georgian election and political process are distinct. And I think they have arrived at a place 

where he’s allowed to participate. He’s clearly become a major political force in Georgian politics. I don’t know that it’s helpful to 

comment on the circuitous route they got to get to this point, but 

he’s there. He’s in, and he can participate as he wants to. 

I’m sorry. The second— 

Mr. SMITH. Georgian Dream. 

Sec. MELIA. Oh, well—oh, the enforcement of the laws and the 

finance laws. Well, you know, the record is clear, when Ivanishvili 

announced that he was going to get involved in politics and 

launched Georgia Dream—just about a year ago now; in October, 

I think, last year—he represented a significant new element in 

Georgian politics. At about that time, soon after that, new campaign finance laws were enacted and new powers were signed to 

this state audit agency, the chamber of control. And it has been 

vigorously enforcing the campaign finance laws. 

The government officials and the audit office say that most of the 

money and, therefore, most of the potential problems in campaign 

finance, are associated with Georgian Dream. Therefore, it is natural that most of their investigation should focus on potential and 

real problems associated with their adherence to the campaign finance laws. 

Others say that it’s been selective implementation— 

Mr. SMITH. What do we say? 

Sec. MELIA. Well, it’s clear that—well, I’ll make two points. One 

is that it’s troubling that the leadership of this office—they were 

leading the office from last year from the turn of the year through 

the summer. The director and the deputy director turned up last 

month as parliamentary candidates for the government party. That 

creates a perception of lack of— disinterestedness in the process. 

The fact that the new chairman of the office is a former member 

of parliament for the government party adds to that disquiet. It 

might have been better to have a retired law professor or another 

CPA or somebody like that to do this kind of job. But it is what 

it is. So the way that the appointments were made to that agency 

have created a political cloud over its operation. The fact that it 
11 

has been very vigorously enforcing rulings and investigations mainly against the Georgian Dream speaks for itself, I think. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Ambassador—Secretary— 

Sec. MELIA. I haven’t become an ambassador yet. 

Mr. COHEN. Yeah; I realized that quickly. Mr. Secretary, I’m unfamiliar with the Georgian process. What type of equipment do 

they use to vote on? 

Sec. MELIA. That’s a good question. Paper ballots? Check the 

box? Count them up at the end of the day? 

Mr. COHEN. So what should an observer be looking for? 

Sec. MELIA. That might be a longer conversation we could have 

in your office if you like before you go. But generally, you know, 

there’s the environment around the voting booth. 

Mr. COHEN. Right. 

Sec. MELIA. I mean, if the voting booth is the epicenter of election day and, in the ideal scenario, an informed voter goes into a 

booth and, confident that his vote is secret, casts the ballot in the 

way he prefers, how do you get to that point? 

You get to that point through a series of reinforcing measures. 

How do you get the informed voter? That goes to the media question. Are the candidates and the political parties able to get their 

message out to all the voters they are trying to reach? Is the interested vote able to access all the information he wants about the 

choices before him? So the, you know, information environment 

leading up to election day is critical. 

Is the process fair? Will the votes be counted accurately? That 

goes to how the election commissions are appointed, who’s going to 

be— 

Mr. COHEN. All that is over and beyond what I will be able to 

observe in that day. 

Sec. MELIA. Right. 

Mr. COHEN. I mean, am I going to, you know—are they going to 

be taking votes out of their pocket and— 

Sec. MELIA. Well, among the allegations of potential ways in 

which the vote counting might be skewed are that people will be 

suborned or bribed or persuaded to take pictures on their cell 

phones of this ballots to prove that they marked them the correct 

way that somebody told them to, whether it’s their boss or their 

neighborhood, you know, block leader or whoever. 

There’s rumors afoot that, you know, people—there will be cameras, you know, monitoring people; that people will be given inducements to vote one way or the other. Some of that you might 

be able to see or hear about. Much of it you may not be able to 

see as a casual observer not speaking the local language. 

Mr. COHEN. Yeah. It’s going to be tough not speaking Georgian. 

I mean, I can speak with a drawl, but I don’t think that’ll work. 

Sec. MELIA. This is a different kind of Georgia. Yeah. 

Mr. COHEN. Yeah. 

Sec. MELIA. You can tell a lot though. You can tell a lot as an 

experienced political person yourself. You can walk into a polling 

place, and you can tell whether there’s an atmosphere of anxiousness, fear, concern. 
12 

Mr. COHEN. Do they have any rules about how many feet you 

have to be away from the ballot area with distribution of literature 

or wearing of paraphernalia in the voting— 

Sec. MELIA. They may well. I don’t know what the numbers are, 

but I’m sure that there’s specified. And that’ll be part of the briefing material that you would have if you’re part of the OSCE. 

Mr. COHEN. Yeah, there will be a briefing. And if you have any 

other information, I’d be interested. 

Sec. MELIA. There are issues about, for instance in this partial 

context, it’s perhaps more important than whether political party 

agents can be out in front of the polling place is where the police 

and other security forces might be. And this is one of the emerging 

things that we’re watching because we want to avoid a situation in 

which there’s some effort to provoke confrontations around the polling place. At some point in the recent past, some members of the 

opposition have said that they want to make sure their people are 

poised to defend the ballot from miscounting or otherwise. And that 

sounded like crowds might be gathering at polling places during 

the counting, and that might lead to some provocations with police 

or members of the other party. We did talk to the minister of interior that oversees the police, and we’ve urged them to be responsible in managing any crowds, any demonstrations that arise. And 

they’re alert to that. There have been political demonstrations in 

the past that have led to larger violence and larger confrontation. 

And so they’re aware of that. And some—you know, our government and some European governments are providing training on 

crowd management, riot control, things like that. 

Mr. COHEN. Do they have, like we have, the rights for both parties to have observers? 

Sec. MELIA. Mmm hmm. 

Mr. COHEN. They do have that. 

Sec. MELIA. They will be there. 

Mr. COHEN. And do both parties have the rights to be present to 

count the ballots? 

Sec. MELIA. Yep; they will be. And just to be clear, there’s at 

least three. There’s another major party that will be a significant 

player in the race, the Christian Democratic Movement. But the 

UNM and the Georgian Dream are the two larger ones consistently 

in the polling that’s been done. But this Christian Democratic 

Movement is not insignificant, either. 

Mr. COHEN. Has there been any polling that you have been privy 

to that you can discuss that gives you an indication of how the likely voters would vote? 

Sec. MELIA. There is—there’s a lot of polling that’s been going on, 

some of it by NDI and IRI, our American party institutes that are 

on the ground there. Each of the campaigns has commissioned polls 

and selectively publish them when they seem politically useful. 

There’s a—in this political environment, there’s a major discussion about how to allocate undecided voters or people who decline 

to express their preference. The various pollsters have adopted different techniques for allocating the undecided to, you know, make 

assumptions, you know, based on their political skills about where 

those voters might go on election day. So that has led to some com-
13 

peting narratives about where public opinion is in Georgia. So 

that’s all—there’s a lot of that publicly available that can be— 

Mr. COHEN. What are the NDI and IRI—the Republican polls 

say? 

Sec. MELIA. They have generally showed that the government 

party remains the most popular; that the Georgia Dream rose in 

popularity as the year went on. And the most recent ones that were 

published in August showed a dropping away of the Georgian 

Dream so that the gap between them and the government party 

was widening in the last month. 

Mr. COHEN. What is—what are the issues that have been raised 

in the campaign? 

Sec. MELIA. Well, the polling shows that what voters mostly care 

about—and this will not be surprising to you—is jobs and the economy. And the campaigns, in different ways, have spoken to that 

with their different plans. 

So that—you know, Georgia, like any other country these days, 

those are the major things that voters say they want the campaigns to speak to. And they have done that in their way. They’ve 

had their public debates, the public forums. As I said, the campaigns are able to get out and around, and they are campaigning. 

Mr. COHEN. And so the must-carry law—which I had not heard 

that term—from where I am from, I would think that would involve, you know, side arms. Fortunately, it’s not what it is. [Laughter.] Or photo ID, which is not such a wonderful—but what do they 

have to carry? I mean, is there a—is each station given equal time, 

each network, each broadcast or whatever or equal time to buy, 

equal opportunity? 

Sec. MELIA. I don’t think it’s—well, there’s campaign advertising. 

There’s purchased advertising space on billboards and radio and 

television. But there’s also—because of the generally aligned nature of the different networks, the question was whether they 

could—they would be obliged to carry other—the other camp’s 

version of the news and discussion shows. 

So I don’t think there’s a—again, maybe I’m—I don’t think 

there’s a financial implication to that. I think it’s just a requirement that they carry the other side’s— 

Mr. COHEN. And with the advertising, has one side—is it unlimited amount of TV and radio, or did these laws limit how much one 

could spend? 

Sec. MELIA. I can’t speak to the details of that. I’m sorry, Congressman. 

Mr. COHEN. And do you know what the ads are like? Are they, 

you know—the two sides—is it just we’ll get more jobs and we need 

more jobs? Or is it, Jane, you ignorant— 

Sec. MELIA. I did not see a sampling of the campaign advertisements, I confess. That’s a good question. If I were smarter, I would 

have done that last week. 

Mr. COHEN. Do you have any—the Georgia Dream—which I have 

to think about the American dream and that’s one of our lines. Is— 

do you have—give me some impression of what—if the Georgian 

Dream is successful in the election, what they would bring to a difference in the Georgian government and how that might affect our 

relations with Georgia. 
14 

Sec. MELIA. Most of the analysts of the campaign platforms that 

I have seen, including our embassy reporting, say that there are 

not significant differences in the way they describe what they 

would do for the economy, for the jobs and so on. 

Whether the Georgian Dream would adopt a notably different 

foreign policy or have a different kind of relationship with the 

United States, that’s a contested item. When I met with Mr. 

Ivanishvili at the start of last week, he spoke very passionately 

about his commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, to Georgia’s aspirations for NATO membership and E.U. membership, for a continuing strong relationship with the United States. 

So others will say that that represents some dissembling, that he 

would change Georgia’s foreign policy. But, you know, we have no 

way to know what that would mean in the end. We can’t predict 

what the foreign policy would be in a Georgia Dream-led parliament or government. 

What we know fundamentally is that we want a government that 

the Georgian people have elected. That’s been our focus in this 

process. It’s not our job to parse their stated or presumed policy inclinations down the road. That’s for the Georgian people to decide. 

Mr. COHEN. As I understand it, he—was he from Russia? 

Sec. MELIA. He’s a Georgian born, Georgian—well, citizen in the 

end and spent much of his adult life in Russia making his fortune. 

Mr. COHEN. In that area? How did he make his fortune? 

Sec. MELIA. Banking, money management, things like that. 

Mr. COHEN. Banking. The American dream. [Laughter.] 

Sec. MELIA. He left Russia a few years ago. He’s been living in 

Paris for a number of years before he returned to Georgia more full 

time essentially a year, year and a half ago. So he didn’t come 

straight from Russia is my point. He moved out of Russia six or 

eight years ago, went to Paris, France, and was there and then he 

came back to Georgia. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Just two brief questions to follow up or to conclude. 

Regarding cyber subversion by—of Georgian Dream and do we 

have any information as to who might have done that? What’s the 

origins of it? And secondly, with the Kavkaz 2012 military exercises, is that intended in any way to affect the outcome of the elections? 

Sec. MELIA. We’ve recently heard the concerned expressed about 

some cyberattacks on Georgian Dream computer sites and computers and so on. I don’t know the details of that. This has just recently come to my attention. And we’ve asked for more information— 

Mr. SMITH. Could you get that back to us too as you get that? 

Sec. MELIA. Sure, I can follow up—— 

Mr. SMITH. That will be very helpful. 

Sec. MELIA. ——in the days to come if we learn anything conclusive or interesting about that. 

So we’ve heard the allegation, but we don’t know what to make 

of it honestly. As for the Russian and CSTO military exercises, 

there is one under way in southern Russia to Georgia’s north and 

one under way in Armenia. My understanding is that the Kavkaz 

2012 Exercise, the principal one that’s happening in the Russian 
15 

Federation to the north, has been long planned. We certainly knew 

about it long ago. In fact, it was planned before the election date 

was clarified.You’re well familiar with the Georgia-Russia dynamic, 

but we have also encouraged the Russians and their partners in 

those military exercises to try to avoid anything that could be interpreted as provocative. We shall see. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there, Secretary, anything you want to add before 

we conclude? 

Sec. MELIA. No. Just that I’m glad that some members will be 

able to visit Georgia around the election. That will add to our collective wisdom, and we can revisit where we are in the days after 

that. And I would look forward to hearing your readout from your 

visit there. 

Georgians in the government and in the opposition are among 

the best friends the United States has anywhere in the world. And 

I think we’re reminded in the last week that we should cherish 

that. So we go into this with a strong sense of partnership with 

Georgia as a society and as a country and mindful of the important 

accomplishments of this government and, also, alert to some of the 

things we’d like them to be doing better going forward in strengthening their democratic systems and, as part of that, moving along 

that trajectory toward consolidation with NATO and E.U. and the 

Western alliance. 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary, thank you very much for your testimony. 

Sec. MELIA. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. I’d like to now welcome our second panel to the witness table, beginning with Dr. Archil Gegeshidze, who is a senior 

fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International 

Studies where he lectures on globalization and development as well 

as providing training in policy analysis at GFSIS. Prior to joining 

GFSIS, he was a Fulbright scholar at Stanford University. 

Dr. Gegeshidze worked for the Georgian government from 1992 

to 2000. During that time, he was assistant to the head of state on 

national security and chief foreign policy adviser to the president. 

We’ll then hear from Dr. Ariel Cohen, who is a senior research 

fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies and international energy 

policy in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at the Heritage Foundation. A commentator in 

great demand, he covers a wide range of issues including economic 

development and political reform in the former Soviet Republics, 

U.S. energy security, the global war on terrorism and the continuing conflict in the Middle East. 

Dr. Cohen’s book, ‘‘Russian Imperialism: Development in Crisis,’’ 

came out in 1996 as well as in 1998. He also co-authored and edited ‘‘Eurasia in Balance’’ in 2005, which focuses on the power shift 

in the region after the September 11th attacks. He has written 

nearly 500 articles and 25 book chapters. 

We’ll then hear thirdly from Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli, who is the 

director of the Center for Black Sea-Caspian Studies at the School 

of International Service at American University where he teaches 

classes on international economic policy and energy and security in 

Europe and Central Eurasia. 

He frequently speaks about the international relations in the 

Caucasus and the Central Asia political-economic developments, 
16 

energy security and country risk analysis. Dr. Tsereteli serves as 

the president of the America-Georgia Business Council and the 

president of the Georgian Association in the United States of America, USA. He is a board member of the American Friends of Georgia, the Georgian Reconstruction and Development Fund, the Business Initiative for Reforms in Georgia and the American Academy 

of Georgia. 

Dr. Tsereteli previously served as the economic counselor at the 

embassy of Georgia in Washington covering relationships with 

international financial institutions, U.S. assistance programs and 

business initiatives. Dr. Cohen, if you could proceed first. 

DR. ARIEL COHEN, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW FOR RUSSIAN 

AND EURASIAN STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 

POLICY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, the staff, for doing 

a terrific job day in and day out on a number of issues that I follow, including on Russia. 

Mr. Chairman, I am covering Georgia since ’93, so it’s almost 20 

years. I’ve been in the country many times, wrote a monograph 

about Russia-Georgia war. I’ve also been an election observer in 

Russia, Albania, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and other countries. So it 

is, indeed, an important election that we’re facing that will define 

not only who and how rules Georgia but, also, it will be crucial for 

U.S.-Georgian relations. 

Georgia is a geopolitical centerpiece in that part of the world. 

President Saakashvili developed a policy of Georgia building on the 

policies of his predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze, bringing Georgia 

away from the Russian sphere of influence and building a strong 

relationship with the United States. His challenger, the Georgia 

Dream Coalition head, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has deep ties 

to Russia. Ivanishvili built his 6.4 billion [dollar] fortune, as was 

mentioned before, in the opaque Russian business world, primarily 

in banking. And jokes aside, Russian banking is not the same as 

American banking. 

So this year, we found out that Mr. Ivanishvili sold the majority 

of his assets to business people who are directly and closely connected to the Kremlin. Transactions like that do not happen in 

Russia without an explicit approval and blessing from the Kremlin. 

The rhetoric of this campaign is far from courteous. The 

Ivanishvili-led opposition is not mincing words. Its leader called 

Saakashvili, quote, ‘‘son of a dog,’’ and quote, ‘‘professional liar,’’ 

unquote. In Russia and many neighboring countries, such language 

would earn the opposition leader a jail term or worse. Not in Georgia. 

In fact, recent media monitoring that was already discussed by 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Melia also found that the press coverage—printed press—is pro-opposition. When they did content 

analysis on photography, President Saakashvili came out with 

more negative coverage in terms of pictures, whereas radio was 

neutral and TV channels are polarized. As was mentioned, the national channels being more pro-government and three other channels being pro-opposition. 
17 

There are serious accusations against the government ruling 

party and the government practices. Georgia Dream accused 

United National Movement, led by Saakashvili, of abuse of office, 

firing supporters of Georgia Dream from their jobs and other transgressions. It also claims that a small group of cronies surrounding 

Saakashvili holds Georgia in an iron grip. If so, it is difficult to understand why IRI and NDI polls demonstrate about 20 percent lead 

for the UNM but 55 percent against Georgia Dream, 35 percent. 

And Georgia Dream is not lacking for money. 

So the electorate in these elections have a real choice. After all, 

the ruling party took Georgia through a disastrous war with Russia 

in 2008 and a deep economic crisis. Georgian voters may have had 

enough of perennially active Saakashvili who is currently moving 

the parliament to Kutaisi, second largest town in the country, and 

relocated Georgia Supreme Court in a coastal town of Batumi. But 

this is not what the poll data showed. 

In addition, speaking of poll data, the pollsters who work for the 

ruling party are accusing opposition of manipulating polling results 

projecting much higher numbers than the Western-funded polling. 

So what I see comparing to other places I did election observation and having been in Georgia not too long ago in summer is a 

highly competitive election which is an achievement in itself. Let’s 

not forget the Georgian political system as we see it is functioning 

only for nine years, and the Soviet rule ended 20 years ago. 

Horrible information came yesterday and day before, I believe, or 

yesterday and today about abuses in the Georgian prison system. 

The recent revelations of systemic torture horrified Georgians and 

foreigners alike. Such horrors should not be tolerated, especially in 

a country which aspires to integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

However, unfortunately, such despicable abuses happen everywhere. As we remember from our own Abu Ghraib scandal, in a 

number of U.S. prison systems recently in Alabama and Michigan 

where court settlements were reached involving hundreds of claimants, and in a country like Albania which is a NATO and E.U. candidate. 

It is encouraging that the Georgian leadership promised an impartial investigation leading to a comprehensive reform. We should 

not expect anything less than that. But looking broadly, by the 

standards of the former Soviet region, these are, as I said, highly 

competitive election with access not just to the media but also with 

reports of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of people attending rallies for the ruling party and for the opposition. 

The Georgia voters are informed and will have an opportunity to 

exercise their vote, and having election observers on the ground is 

extremely important and crucial. And I do have confidence in the 

ODIHR and OSCE observers doing their job. And we should wait 

for their reports. 

Unlike many countries where anti-American sentiment is rising—including Russia, Iran, Turkey—Georgia is truly different. 

President George W. Bush has a street named after him in the 

Georgian capital. Oil, gas, commodities and finished goods worth 

hundreds of millions of dollars move through Georgia on a daily 

basis. Its geopolitical role, alongside the Black Sea, is a budding oil 

and gas which Azerbaijan and the Caspian is crucial. [Unclear sen-
18 

tence] In case of a scenario, vis-a`-vis Iran, Georgia is also going to 

be geopolitically, very, very important. 

We heard about the maneuvers—the maneuvers by the Russians 

that led to the war in 2008 may create an intimidating effect if 

they occur before the elections as planned. 

We are at a determining point, and in the recent years, in this 

country, in this city, in this administration, focusing blindly on 

democratic process, excluding all other our national interest had 

become somewhat of a fashion. We’re seeing the results in the Middle East. 

The previous U.S. administration and the current one encouraged elections in Gaza that brought Hamas to power, encouraged 

the Muslim Brotherhood to contest seats in Egyptian parliament 

under the previous regime, encouraged the elections that brought 

the Muslim Brotherhood administration in Egypt with the results 

in the long term that may be severely detrimental for American national interests. 

Clearly, Georgia is no Egypt. Saakashvili is no Mubarak. Georgia, one hopes, would rise for the occasion and conduct elections 

with minimal violations, let alone violence. And let me quote the 

former assistant secretary of state and my boss, Kim Holmes, 

quote, ‘‘Free and fair elections are indispensable to democracy. You 

can’t have democracy without them, but neither can you have democracy without an even greater commitment to the values, institutions and customs that make it work.’’ And I believe that Georgia 

is in the process of creating these commitments to values, institutions and customs that make it work. 

As I said, the democracy in Georgia started 20 years ago when 

the Soviet Union collapsed. So far, observer missions from OSCE, 

IRI and NDI seem to report the elections are on track. We should 

expect their reports. We should definitely hold the current Georgian government’s feet to the fire expecting reasonably conducted 

elections by European standards. However, we should not face an 

either/or choice or focusing exclusively on elections or pursuing 

American interests. 

That’s a false choice. Mr. Chairman; hopefully, the U.S. can learn 

from our recent mistakes. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much. Dr. Tsereteli, if you would, 

proceed. 

DR. MAMUKA TSERETELI, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR BLACK 

SEA-CASPIAN STUDIES, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s an honor to be a witness on this 

Commission. I would like to submit my written statement that I 

also submitted for the record. Thank you. I think timing of this 

hearing couldn’t be more appropriate. The streets of Tbilisi as well 

as social media is filled with demands and facts reflecting on the 

developments related to prison abuse. Citizens of Georgia ask questions how something like that could be happening in the country 

that has European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, that is known for 

its tolerance and the cordial human relationships. 

Unfortunately, the videos only prove what was said many times 

by some people and, also, was reflected by the U.S. Department of 

State annual reports on human rights. I don’t think that we fully 
19 

appreciate here in this room the magnitude of events unfolding in 

Georgia at this point. 

Georgia’s prison system as well as its pre-trial detention mechanism is an important factor in Georgian political, economic and social life which impacts the daily lives of thousands of Georgians 

and their decisions about how they deal with the government as 

well as on how they approach elections. 

There is a failed state in Georgia. Some government officials assessed prison abuse as a systemic problem. And they are correct. 

But this is moral failure as well. 

Georgian society is shocked by the facts of abuse of power and 

maybe cover-up that involve high-level officials. It demands fullscale investigation. 

This abuse can only happen in an environment of unchecked and 

unbalanced power such as exists in Georgia today. This case increases importance of upcoming elections. 

I think it’s good news that, despite responding to this crisis and 

street events, both government as well as opposition called on 

calm. And the opposition, in particular, called against unplanned 

street events. 

Georgia made visible progress in creating functioning state entities in recent years reducing regulatory burdens, developing critical 

infrastructure and eliminating bribery and bureaucracy. These are 

distinct achievements, and the Georgian people as well as the government deserve credit for those achievements. 

But those achievements also raise the bar for expectations for 

Georgia. Georgia is facing difficult security challenges, but it can 

only meet those challenges if it has national consensus on major 

issues affecting the country. The Georgian population has expressed multiple times in referendums and polls its desire to join 

transatlantic and European security and economic institutions. 

Achieving those strategic objectives require internal stability, but 

stability can only be achieved if political process creates an environment of broader political representation in the government. 

Leaders all around the world, heads of state, international institutions, U.S. politicians, leadership of NATO, friends of Georgia see 

the upcoming election on October 1st as an important milestone in 

building Georgia’s democratic statehood. Many have called on 

Georgia to make certain that voters have an opportunity to express 

their free choice and, once they did it, to make sure that the results 

of elections are respected by all the participants of political process. 

In recent years, the Georgian political scene has been completely 

dominated by United National Movement of Georgia, or UNM, the 

party of President Saakashvili. The UNM has won constitutional 

majority in the parliamentary elections of May 2008 which has, de 

facto, created one-party rule in Georgia. In fact, Georgia has been 

ruled by UNM with no significant opposition since 2004. Moreover, 

developments after 2008 elections effectively eliminated debate and 

political collaboration from the Georgian scene. This has led to 

many harmful internal and external decisions by the Georgian 

leadership which has responded to criticism by frequently suppressing opposition with excessive force. One-party systems do not 

represent the electoral mood in Georgia. 
20 

I would focus very briefly on some of the things that, in my opinion, the United States Government should do in order to support 

free election process in Georgia and then, hopefully, we’ll have 

some questions and answers. 

I think U.S. should stay actively engaged in Georgia as an important observer and facilitate the development. Success of Georgia is 

essential for U.S. strategic interests in the broader Middle East 

and Central Asia region, but it’s also essential for stability—broader stability. 

I think U.S. should entertain frank, public discussion about the 

state of democracy in Georgia. Georgia has made some progress, 

and the current government has done good things for the country. 

But narrative that stresses Georgia’s liberal credentials need to be 

recast in light of some significant democratic shortfalls. Monitor 

closely unfolding details of the current prison crisis and investigation. 

I think the U.S. needs to establish strict conditions and benchmarks for the Georgian government to ensure the elections are 

held in a free environment. Election monitors from the U.S. Government will be very useful. U.S. needs to collaborate closely with 

the intergovernmental commission on election process violations. I 

think this Commission is doing positive job—positively contributing 

to the process. 

The U.S. should communicate to the Georgian leadership that if 

there are doubts about legitimacy of the elections, the U.S. will not 

recognize its results. Plan to hold another congressional hearing 

after the elections to review progress and announce this in advance 

to the elections. The U.S. needs to monitor developments after the 

election as well. The election process may not end by the night of 

October 1st. It is possible that the results of the election in several 

districts will be disputed and recounts may be requested. In order 

to avoid confrontation, it is important that there is a process of mediation through OSCE or other monitoring groups where the U.S. 

will be a participant. 

I think we need to mount—the United States needs to mount an 

effort to review the state of Georgia’s media ensuring access to alternative sources of information throughout the country. Insist on 

immediate release of satellite dishes confiscated by the government, advising any international representatives to the Georgian 

National Communication Commission, and then closely monitoring 

its operation will be positive steps. 

Georgia has potential to become a democratic state and fullfledged member of the transatlantic family of nations. Their potential needs to be accelerated and deepened. The upcoming elections 

need to be seen from that perspective. Proper conduct of elections 

will get Georgia closer to that goal. Mismanagement of the elections may throw Georgia back for several years or maybe even decades. 

In the—[light? inaudible]—of the challenge to Georgia, John 

Stanick [sp]—wrote it is magical place, Georgia, and it becomes 

dream like the moment you have left it. And the people are magic 

people. It is true that they have one of the richest and most beautiful countries in the world, and they live up to it. The Georgian 
21 

people are capable of deciding the right path for their future. Free 

and fair elections will give them that opportunity. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Doctor. We’ll now go to our last, Dr. 

Gegeshidze. 

DR. ARCHIL GEGESHIDZE, SENIOR FELLOW, GEORGIAN 

FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. Chairman, other members, professional staff, thank you very 

much for this wonderful opportunity to share with you some of my 

observations on the situation around elections in Georgia. Excuse 

my academic style of presenting since I come from academia and 

this is my very first time testifying before you. 

Well, I will start with a very short overview of the past—of the 

democratic transformation which Georgia has gone through, then 

I’ll try to characterize also shortly the state of affairs in and 

around the elections, what the electoral environment looks like. 

And then I’ll also try to share with you some my observations, but 

very general—not as specific as Dr. Tsereteli presented—some of 

my observation on what the West in everyone and the United 

States in particular should do in order to facilitate a free and fair 

election process in Georgia. 

The first point is that Georgia’s record of democratic transformation is controversial. On the one hand, the country is freer 

than the immediate neighborhood and demonstrates, at times, 

spectacular success at institutional modernization. The government 

was able to liberalize the economy, attract increased foreign direct 

investment, improve revenue collection, curb elements of smallscale corruption in the public services, streamline inefficient administration, legalize the shadow economy, reduce crime, provide 

uninterrupted energy supply and rebuild roads and other infrastructure. Among the most important and spectacular successes of 

the new government has been the overthrow of the autocratic leader of Adjara previously defined these central governments. 

On the other hand, the overall quality of democracy promotion 

raises concerns. Georgia’s political development since the Rose Revolution can be measured in various ways, but the Freedom House 

course indicates an obvious stagnation. What actually happened 

was that all power went to the executive body, and the legislative 

and judicial benches became their perfunctory appendages. Power 

and the political regime thus became associated with the president. 

Currently, political institutions that provide pluralism and competition are manipulated by the ruling elite for one reason, to 

maintain and expand political power. Critics of the government 

point at serious setbacks in terms of institutionalizing checks and 

balances, eventually leading to serious misconduct. 

Further, the existing constitution substantially weakens a legislative body, thus disabling it in its exercise of oversight functions. 

Also, as the executive dominates the political landscape, it increasingly coerces the judiciary, curbing its independence. Additionally, 

the state intervenes in the independence of the media and brutally 

abuses property rights. 

Georgian democracy has always been hostage to either security 

concerns or power struggle, and this continues over already 20 
22 

years. This is the reason why the Georgian reforms in the sphere 

of democratic transformation were either one-sided or inconclusive. 

While the emphasis during the reforms was put on strengthening 

the state, little attention was paid to building and strengthening 

democratic institutions and improving human rights. Independent 

judiciary, rule of law and media freedom are the most renowned 

cases of absence of will on the part of the government to reform. 

One of the recent examples of the inconclusive nature of reforms 

is Georgia’s penitentiary system which accommodates one of the 

highest per capita numbers of prisoners in the world. 

Apparently, the government preferred coercion and intimidation 

as a method of managing the overcrowded prisons over modern and 

civilized standards. The terrible videos we have seen last days 

prove widespread and systematic torture at the prisons. 

From a moral standpoint, it is a big shame for Georgia. From the 

political standpoint, both domestic and international, it may have 

far-reaching consequences for the government as well as the country and its image. None of the elections held since independence 

had been simultaneously free, fair and competitive. The cleanest of 

all is the—is considered the October 1990 elections—still Soviet 

Union—conducted with little violence during the campaign and no 

evidence of overt interference with the polls and which brought to 

power the nationalist and anti-communist political forces. 

Against this backdrop, the most disputed election since independence has been the presidential election in January 2008. Critics 

hold that Saakashvili had illegally used budgetary and administrative resources to secure victory with a narrow margin over the opposition candidate. Similar allegations were made about the unfairness of the general elections the same year. 

Although the international observer missions gave legitimacy to 

the outcome of both events, subsequent official reports admitted 

massive irregularities at all stages of the election process. 

This time around, the picture is mixed. On one hand, the preelectoral environment is competitive and pluralist. Also, there are 

some welcome novelties such as the new election code, intergovernmental commission that operates under the National Security 

Council, voters list verification commission must carry rules that 

obligate cable operators to carry TV channels with news programs 

during the campaign period, improved format of public debates on 

the national public TV, et cetera. 

On the other hand, some of these novelties are far from perfect. 

For example, must-carry rules have not been timely or properly enforced across the country. Not all recommendations by the Venice 

Commission have been incorporated in the election code. Also, the 

prisoners who have committed minor crimes were given electoral 

rights. However, in the light of the recent scandal over human 

rights abuse in the penitentiary system, serious doubts arise as to 

whether the inmates will be able to make free choice at the ballot 

boxes. 

Inversely, overwhelming majority of Georgians living outside the 

country who are perceived to be critical towards the government 

are practically deprived of the right and/or possibility to vote. 

While competitive and pluralist, the pre-electoral environment is 

too polarized. Reports, for example, from Transparency Inter-
23 

national, inform us about numerous cases of intimidation of opposition activities, physical reprisals against opposition supporters, detention and arrest on political grounds, selective use of legal resources against the opposition by imposing disproportional sanctions, pressure on businesses that support opposition, use of public 

resources for political and electoral process. 

Apparently, the dominant feature of the post-Rose Revolution period wherein the ruling party faced a fragmented opposition has 

made it relax and has taken it by surprise by Georgian Dream, the 

newly emerged opposition coalition. As the ruling party dominates 

at all levels of state governance, it is difficult to differentiate the 

governing political team’s activity from the electoral activity of the 

ruling party. Given the circumstances, the opposition coalition 

faces a state rather than the party as a competitor in the elections. 

The state portrays the Georgian Dream as an enemy of state by accusing of being Russia’s fifth column and a retrograde force aiming 

at sending Georgia back to dark and corrupt past. For most of the 

public, groundlessness of these accusations is obvious. Nobody believes. 

Meantime, witnessing all these twists and turns, the public remains deeply distrustful towards the electoral process, and this is 

the main disadvantage and deficiency of the electoral process. 

As Georgia remains a primary target of Western assistance, some 

argue that future assistance programs should be more carefully 

structured. It is believed that, with Georgia being the success story 

of Western democracy support, too big a share of the assistance 

package has gone to the government without requiring accountability on spending. Also, the strong political and financial support 

for Georgia’s democratic development after the Rose Revolution has 

backfired to some extent since it has not been backed up by clear 

benchmarks for reform. 

One such benchmark definitely is these elections. Fair assessment of the whole electoral process has a crucial importance for 

Georgia’s future development. Sadly, though, in the past, there 

have been instances of premature assessment by international observers that have paid lip service to Georgian democracy as well 

as to the West’s reputation in Georgia and the wider region. 

One of the most notorious cases has been a statement by a cochairman—coordinator of the short-term observation mission which 

said that the 2008 presidential elections in Georgia was a triumphant step of democracy. Given the extremely polarized environment, we need to avoid such statements and assessments. More so, 

the international arbiters—monitors need to change the criterion of 

evaluation and, instead of basing their judgment on the comparison 

with the past electoral process, they have to assess how far or how 

close those elections are from those in Western democracies. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

We do have a vote, so we do have to make our way to the floor 

in a couple of minutes. But that said, I’ll just ask a couple of questions and yield to Mr. Cohen who will ask a couple of questions. 

And I think your point about having a follow-up hearing is a 

good one. We will do that, and it will be done in a very timely manner. So thank you for that, Dr. Tsereteli. 
24 

Let me just ask a couple of questions. You know, the wealth 

issue which has arisen many times—and, Dr. Cohen, you mentioned it—$6.4 billion you’ve talked about. You know, even in this 

country, there’s been an ongoing fractious debate about how much 

an individual should spend, how much can be spent on a campaign. 

Part of it was settled in a Supreme Court case known as Buckley 

versus Valeo, and it’s pretty much unlimited by the individual candidate towards his or her campaign. 

In my own state, Senator Corzine spent over $60 million for a 

U.S. Senate seat. I mean, astronomical amount of money, but, you 

know, our laws allow that to happen. 

And I’m wondering if there is such a check and a balance on all 

that and, you know, both sides have valid points. Maybe you want 

to speak to the issue of having huge amounts of money and being 

able to essentially buy a campaign. But I know there are limits. So 

maybe you want to speak to that. Where will Ivanishvili take Georgia? I mean, Dr. Cohen, you seemed to speak most about that and 

cite a number of concerns. And I would appreciate it if you’d elaborate on that very quickly. 

And then what our overriding concern has to be is free and fair. 

Do you think this will be a free and fair election? Or are the checks 

and balances already baked into what will be an election in 11 

days? Or do you think we have reason to be deeply concerned? 

I wish I had more time. And Mr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I suspect that the biggest issue which I would like a response to 

is where you think the Georgian Dream would be—if they’re successful, where they would take the Georgian government different 

than where it’s been and what the relationship would be with Russia in terms of how that might affect relations with the West. 

And, also, the gentleman mentioned human rights and how you 

see human rights as being permitted by the present government 

and what differences might exist if the Georgian Dream were successful in their election. And what do you foresee for the election? 

Has it been—on the conditions to date as far as advertising, as far 

as enforcement of laws and restrictions that may have been imposed, has it been fair? 

Dr. COHEN. Gentlemen, excellent questions. All demonstrate your 

deep interest and expertise. 

Real quick, on the issue of personal wealth, let us make a comparison. Six point whatever billion dollars is more—if my calculations are correct—more than a half of Georgia’s GDP per annum. 

So it would not be comparison with Mitt Romney’s meager 250 million [dollars]—meager in comparison to Bidzina Ivanishvili. It 

won’t be a Ross Perot. It would be a guy or a gal with a pocket 

$7 trillion deep. People like this don’t exist on Planet Earth. 

And there is a culture of bypassing official channels of financing 

in case of Russian oligarch, which Mr. Ivanishvili, whether he 

holds Russian citizenship or not, comes from a political culture of 

oligarchs. There’s a modus operandi of cash. And, you know, if the 

Georgian government is successfully tracking that, good luck. If 

they don’t, then they can’t. 
25 

But I bet you dollars to donuts, you cannot think about this campaign only with official figures. Probably on both sides, but especially when you have one big, deep pocket. 

In terms of direction, I think this is a strategic question, and this 

is something I’m grappling with and not a lot is said about that. 

And that is that whether we like Saakashvili or not, he never studied in Russia—he studied in Ukraine and in Colombia—he spent 

his formative years in Georgia and in the United States. And he 

built his movement more or less in his image in terms of getting 

a lot of Western-trained people around him. 

Georgia Dream, on the other hand, has a Russian oligarch—a 

former Russian oligarch—as its head, has some first-rate diplomats—Ambassador Japaritza [sp], Ambassador Irakli Alasania— 

which I don’t doubt their professional quotas. But that movement 

also has components that are deeply nationalistic, traditionalist, 

embedded with the church. And the Georgian Church, parts of it, 

are embedded with the Russian Orthodox Church and, in some 

cases—[inaudible]—and anti-Semitic. 

So I do have concerns about that as well. And the rhetoric about 

distancing or slowing down the process of NATO integration was 

a signal. The rhetoric by Mr. Ivanishvili about opening Russian 

markets, getting closer to Russia are understandable because traditionally, for decades and centuries, Georgia did export fruit, wine— 

fruit, wine, mineral water—to Russia. 

But orientation is not the same as the United National Movement which is staunchly pro-European. They are aspiring to bring 

Georgia into the E.U. You and I can wonder why would you want 

to join the E.U. at this point, but that’s their choice. 

Human rights, clearly, there is a place for improvement as we 

witnessed in the prison scandal. I’m not a computer geek. I’m not 

a computer expert. I cannot tell you what is the significance of 

these recent accusations that they were planting malware on the 

computers. I think somebody needs to look into that. But in terms 

of human rights, there’s always, in every society, a place for improvement of individual rights of privacy, of penitentiary system. 

No question in my mind that things can be done better in Georgia. 

Mr. SMITH. To be totally fair to our other two distinguished witnesses, Mr. Cohen and I are going to have to leave in about two 

minutes. There’s only five minutes left on the vote. But we will 

leave this open. Michael Oakes will stand by. And then all of your 

comments will go not record, and then we’ll—without objection, 

we’ll do it that way because I want to hear from both of you. We 

both want to hear from both of you. So please proceed as long as 

you’d like. 

Dr. TSERETELI. First of all, accusations of Georgian church 

being—similar? Connected? [inaudible]—somehow to Russian 

church is absolutely wrong and false. And I just don’t want to go 

into that discussion. 

There are individuals who may be like individuals from the Georgian government, maybe like individuals from opposition maybe, 

but saying it to the entire church, which is most probably one of 

the bases of stability in Georgia for the last decades, I think, is 

very wrong. 
26 

About the wealth of Mr. Ivanishvili and money and politics, during the elections in 2010 in local elections, mayoral elections, Mr. 

Alisania spent about hundred times less than incumbent mayor of 

Tbilisi, Mr. Ugulava—hundred times. The difference was hundred 

times. 

So talking about money coming into politics sounds like not very 

relevant. Although I personally do not support large money coming 

into politics. So there is a limit of how much each party could 

spend. And I think government is very efficiently pursuing these 

limits to restrict money spending into Georgian politics. 

Onto the issue of future of Georgia. As my colleague and friend, 

Ariel, mentioned, Mr. Ivanishvili, from the time he announced his 

participation into politics, said that he’s relying—he’s basing his 

political group as a core group on Mr. Alisania’s free Democrats 

and the Republican Party who’s also known for its protestant credentials. 

So I think, by that, he expressed his [Protestant?] orientation 

from the beginning. And I—we may again have some people in his 

coalition, like in the government, who are willing to maybe change 

a little bit of the course of Georgia’s development. But I don’t see 

major challenges in terms of progress and orientation to Georgia. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, at the conclusion of Mr. 

Gegeshidze’s statement, the hearing will be adjourned. But again, 

this will all be on the record, and I thank you. 

Dr. GEGESHIDZE. OK. Thank you. 

All right. Well, regarding billions in the election campaign, yes, 

I also would not support big money participating and being used 

in the election—in the election process. But this is the given fact, 

the reality. 

And I think that Ivanishvili’s billions are less evil than the benefit which are the plurality and competitiveness that these elections do have compared to the situation wherein Ivanishvili 

wouldn’t have been because Georgia does need higher quality democracy, higher quality electoral process. We, at last, need to graduate the very first class of democracy such as electoral democracy 

because all our previous elections have been contested, and it’s already 20 years. 

But still the trust in the public towards elections are very weak, 

very low. And this is very bad for Georgia. And if not Ivanishvili’s 

appearance, then we would not have this competitiveness and, if 

you wish, certainly, intrigue in the process. 

Regarding Russia, well, going deeper into analysis with this Russian origin of a person who has made his fortunes there mean? I 

don’t know. How many American businessmen have made their fortune in Russia or Polish or Estonian or Belgian businessmen because Russia was a huge country in the ’90s, and everybody, if not 

lazy, would go there and make money. So this guy also made his 

money. 

But what about the Minister Bendukidze who also made his fortune in the ’90s but was brought back by this government as the 

minister of economy and not a single word against his Russian origin was ever mentioned by the government. Sorry? [Off mic exchange.] Yeah. Well, so I would consider this a very weak argu-
27 

ment, if it is at all an argument in this discourse. Human rights. 

Well, the elections are usually—and everywhere, both here and in 

Georgia—about politicians running for the seats in the government, 

promising and voters listening and believing or not believing. So I 

cannot judge to what extent the—Ivanishvili’s government, if it 

happens to come to power, will be more effective in observing 

human rights because I have not had a chance to test that. 

But if one assumes that the human rights record in today’s Georgia is very poor—very, very poor—and there are almost no improvement since the Rose Revolution, and the recent days have 

demonstrated again where are we standing in that regard, I would 

believe that at least that if Ivanishvili comes to power, human 

rights will be at least no worse than what they are today, if not 

better. 

Well, I think I’ll, to save our time, stop here. 

STAFFER. Ladies and gentlemen, as you’ve all heard, Chairman 

Smith and Congressman Cohen had to leave to go and vote. They 

will not be able to return. So we will adjourn this hearing. However, as the chairman said, he’s planning to hold another hearing 

after the election, and, of course, there will be a public notice about 

when that will be. In the meantime, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of our witnesses, and this hearing is adjourned. 

Thank you. 

(29) 

A P P E N D I X 
30 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Welcome to our hearing on Georgia’s parliamentary election, which is now only 

eleven days away. The campaign has brought Georgia to a crossroads; it is the most 

crucial event in Georgian democracy since the Rose Revolution of 2003. 

At that time, Georgians responded to a rigged election with a peaceful protest 

movement. It was a great moment in Georgian history, the first of the color revolutions. The Rose Revolution brought Mikheil Saakashvili and his team of westernoriented modernizers into office. Hopes were high in Georgia as Saakashvili 

strengthened the state and launched many reforms. 

Russia’s 2008 invasion and occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia failed to topple President Saakashvili, and our country has strongly 

supported Georgian sovereignty. Vladimir Putin’s invasion was yet another revelation of his cynical brutality. As an aside, I would note that I was in Georgia in the 

days following that invasion, working to effect the return of two girls—daughters 

of one of my constituents—caught behind Russian lines, and I was deeply impressed 

by the courage and determination I encountered in every Georgian I met. 

That brings us to the present moment. Only a year ago, President Saakashvili’s 

ruling National Movement seemed poised to easily win the October 2012 parliamentary election over a fragmented opposition. 

But in October 2011 Bidzina Ivanishvili began to unite elements of the opposition 

into a new coalition that posed a serious challenge. Mr. Ivanishvili is a multibillionare and though a newcomer to politics, has vast resources. Saakashvili’s government quickly stripped him of his citizenship and parliament passed campaign finance laws that limited the use of his assets. At the same time, the instruments 

of the state—budget, police, security services—began to be deployed against 

Ivanishvili’s party and its supporters, though to what extent is a matter of dispute. 

Consequently, the election campaign has raised questions about Mikheil 

Saakashvili’s reputation as a reformer. I’m sure we’ll hear from our witnesses to 

what degree his government has institutionalized genuine democratic governance as 

opposed to the appearance of it. I don’t mean to pre-judge this question; it’s a difficult one that our witnesses are outstandingly qualified to grapple with. 

But the main questions we’d like to hear our witnesses answer touch on the conduct of the campaign: specifically, the opposition’s charges that the Georgian state 

has targeted Ivanishvili and his supporters, through harassment, intimidation, beatings, selective enforcement of the law, and violations of freedoms of assembly and 

expression. If substantially true, that would be terribly sad; it would indicate that 

the Rose Revolution had gone bad. 

At the same time, Ivanishvili and his coalition have been tarred as working on 

behalf of Russia. The Georgian government sometimes seems to paint the conflict 

not as one between two political parties but between the Georgian state and its foreign enemies trying to subvert it. We certainly need to hear your thoughts as well 

on this. 

I believe the members of this commission have open minds on all these questions, 

and that your testimony will be important in informing Congress and our government on the conduct of the Georgian election campaign, now in its last days. We 

are fortunate to have been able to assemble such outstandingly qualified witnesses. 

At this point I would remind everyone joining us today, whether in the room or 

through Web case, that all parties in the political process have to behave responsibly. At the same time it is the responsibility of the government—which controls 

the apparatus of state—to create the conditions for a free and fair election. 

Before concluding, I cannot fail to mention the terrible scandal which broke yesterday in Georgia, concerning gross abuse in prison. Videos have emerged that reveal the most horrifying tortures, including the sadistic rape of men by prison officials. The Georgian minister of corrections has resigned, individuals have been arrested, and the government has pledged to punish all those responsible and uproot 

this problem. I welcome those actions and promises. But I also note the statement 

made by the national security advisor who said: ‘‘We as a government made a grave 

mistake when we did not properly evaluate the signals coming from the Ombudsman and other civil society groups about the systemic problems in the penitentiary 

system.’’ That is a telling admission. It is precisely the systemic nature of this abuse 
31 

that evokes the greatest concern because it raises questions about the nature of the 

Georgian state’s relationship with its citizens. 
32 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS MELIA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify on Georgia today. Before I 

do so, I would like to thank you, the other Members, and the professional staff of 

the Commission, for promoting implementation of OSCE commitments by all participating States. We appreciate your dedication and ongoing engagement. 

Mr. Chairman, in advance of Georgia’s October 1 parliamentary elections, the 

United States has been promoting a democratic electoral process diplomatically and 

through technical assistance. President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other senior 

U.S. officials in Washington and Tbilisi have highlighted the importance of such a 

democratic electoral process for Georgia. In my testimony today, I will focus on last 

week’s trip to Georgia of a senior interagency delegation I was privileged to lead. 

Last week, President Obama and Secretary Clinton sent to Georgia a senior interagency delegation including senior officials from the State Department, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. Our delegation went to Georgia to highlight the importance of a 

democratic electoral process that produces a parliament that reflects the will of the 

Georgian people. I was delighted that our newly arrived ambassador, Richard 

Norland, joined most of our meetings. We met with a range of senior government 

officials and political party leaders, including opposition parties. We urged the Government to implement Georgia’s election laws in a fair, impartial and transparent 

manner, and urged all political parties to fully participate in the process while abiding by the law. We also met with NGO election observers and media rights advocates. 

The message that we conveyed privately in each of our meetings was identical: 

the United States supports the Georgian people’s aspirations for a free and democratic process. We do not favor any particular party or candidates, and the United 

States looks forward to continued close cooperation with the leaders the Georgian 

people choose. 

The upcoming elections are critical to helping Georgia advance its Euro-Atlantic 

aspirations. They also will be essential to a democratic transfer of power next year, 

as the parliament elected in October will appoint a Prime Minister who will gain 

considerably strengthened powers pursuant to constitutional reforms that will take 

effect when President Saakashvili’s successor takes office. Domestic and international perceptions of fairness of the campaign environment, including adherence 

to the rule of law, media access, transparency, and the impartial adjudication of 

election-related disputes, will be important indicators of Georgia’s democratic development. 

The long term work of building a vibrant democracy does not begin and end on 

election day. I would like to highlight the importance of several principles that we 

featured in our conversations in Georgia, all of which are essential for a meaningful 

electoral process. 

First is the importance of a level playing field. It is essential that the political 

environment is conducive to the full participation in the campaign by all parties on 

equal terms. Although there have been some shortcomings, it is clear that there is 

a competitive campaign underway. We welcome steps by the government through 

the Inter-Agency Task Force on elections to address reports of politically motivated 

firings. While such reports have decreased recently, concerns remain regarding the 

levelness of the playing field, including alleged harassment of certain activists for 

their participation in the coalition, reports of blurred boundaries between state institutions and the ruling party, and the alleged use of administrative resources, particularly outside the capital. 

The second principle is about rule of law and due process. In our meetings with 

the Georgian government and the various political parties, we stressed the importance of ensuring that campaign and election laws are applied equally and transparently, and that all participants are held to the same high standards of conduct 

as spelled out in Georgian law. While almost every party, including the ruling 

United National Movement, has been penalized for campaign finance violations, the 

State Audit Office has devoted significant attention to the opposition coalition Georgian Dream. Although there are some anecdotal and circumstantial indications suggesting that Georgian Dream may have spent substantial sums of money in violation of the campaign finance laws, the lack of transparency in the State Audit Office’s procedures, and due process deficiencies, raise doubts about whether the law 

has been enforced equally. That the former director and deputy director of the State 

Audit Office are now ruling party parliamentary candidates, while the current director of the office is a former ruling party Member of Parliament, exacerbates these 

concerns. We recognize the challenges on all sides of complying with and enforcing 
33 

a new set of campaign finance laws and urged the State Audit Office to emphasize 

transparency and due process as it continues to improve its work. We urged all the 

political parties to participate constructively, follow the law scrupulously, and to 

pursue their political goals through the ballot box. 

The third principle is respect for fundamental freedoms. Respect for peaceful protests and freedom of assembly is a hallmark of a democratic society, and the government holds a responsibility to protect and uphold those freedoms. We heard last 

week that the political parties we met have been able to travel the country, hold 

rallies, and get their messages out to the voters with whom they meet. In our conversations we urged all parties to renounce violence and avoid provocations. 

The fourth principle is equitable access to media. We applaud the electoral reforms enacted late last year that expanded the access of all parties on equal terms 

to the mass media during the 60-day campaign. More recently, we were encouraged 

to see the implementation of the so-called ‘‘Must Carry’’ legislation during the campaign period and we strongly support its extension through the post-election complaints process and beyond. Continuing efforts to promote wider access to a diversity 

of opinions and media outlets would reflect fundamental values that democracies 

share. 

The fifth principle that we emphasized in our meetings is constructive engagement. We have every expectation, now, based on the opposition’s commitment to reject the use of violence and the government’s commitment to us that security forces 

will be scrupulously professional, that election day and its aftermath can unfold 

peacefully. We certainly hope this will be the case. After October 1, all parties will 

need to work together constructively in the new parliament to advance Georgia’s 

democratic and economic development. They should conduct their campaigns in that 

spirit. 

Finally, we call on all participants to promote an electoral process that the Georgian people judge as free and fair. We commend the work of the domestic and international observation groups, including principally the OSCE/ODIHR mission that in 

Georgia, to help ensure the election process is transparent and consistent with 

international standards and the results reflect the will of the Georgian people. 

The pre-election situation is dynamic and we are monitoring developments closely. 

Commission attention to the upcoming election is helpful. Again, thank you for holding this hearing. We look forward to continuing to work cooperatively with the Commission to advance internationally accepted human rights standards throughout the 

OSCE region. 

And with that I’d be happy to take your questions. 
34 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ARIEL COHEN, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW FOR RUS- SIAN AND EURASIAN STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, HERITAGE

FOUNDATION

Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, Secretary Melia, Ladies and Gentlemen: 

My name is Ariel Cohen. I am Senior Research Fellow, Russian and Eurasian 

Studies and International Energy Policy at The Heritage Foundation. The views I 

express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing 

any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. 

The forthcoming parliamentary elections in Georgia, which will take place on October 1, are crucial to U.S. interests in South Caucasus, Black Sea and the Caspian 

region. They are crucial because two powers—Russia and Iran—would like nothing 

better than to see President Mikheil Saakashvili and his party defeated. 

President Saakashvili’s principal challenger is the Georgia Dream coalition, headed by a billionaire named Bidzina Ivanishvili with deep ties to Russia. Ivanishvili 

built his $6.4 billion fortune in Russia’s opaque business world. This year, he safely 

sold his holdings to businesspeople that enjoy excellent ties with the Kremlin. Such 

highly sensitive business transactions never happen without the Kremlin’s blessing. 

In Russia, business is politics and politics is business—as some less fortunate denizens of the Russian business Olympus, such Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who has been 

in jail for 10 years, know well. 

While Saaskashvili is considered the most pro-American leader in the former Soviet Union—and perhaps one of the most pro-American the world—Ivanishvili has 

never criticized Vladimir Putin. He promised to restore relations with Russia, and 

to reopen Russian markets to Georgia wine, fruit and mineral water, after Russia 

punitively excluded Georgian imports. He even promised to return to Georgia territories Russia occupied in the war of 2008—a highly unlikely notion. Saakashvili has 

been working tirelessly to bring Georgia into NATO, while Ivanishvili and his people said that NATO enlargement will not be a priority. This is understandable if 

they want to prioritize relations with Moscow. 

The rhetoric of this campaign is far from courteous. The Ivanishvili-led opposition 

is not mincing words: its leader has called Saakashvili the ‘‘son of a dog’’ and ‘‘professional liar’’. In Russia and many neighboring countries, such language would 

earn the opposition leader a jail term—or worse. Not in Georgia. 

In fact, recent media monitoring report funded by the EU/UNDP found that President Saakashvili received more negative photo coverage in the Georgian newspapers; the print media was generally supportive of the opposition, while radio was 

neutral, and TV channels were polarized, with a somewhat more pro-government 

slant. 

Ivanishvili’s Georgia Dream coalition has accused the ruling United Democratic 

Movement, led by Saakashvili, of abuse of office, firing supporters of Georgia Dream 

from their jobs, and other transgressions. It has also claimed that small a group of 

cronies surrounding Saakashvili holds Georgia in an iron grip. If this is so, it is difficult to understand why the Georgian Dream trails the United Democratic Movement by 20 points: 35 percent to 55 percent according to one recent poll. 

After all, the ruling party took Georgia through a disastrous war and a deep economic crisis. Georgian voters may have had enough of the perennially active 

Saakashvili, who is currently moving the Parliament to Kutaisi, the country’s second largest town, and relocated Georgia’s Supreme Court to the coastal city of 

Batumi—but that is not what the poll data show. In addition, speaking of poll data, 

it appears that the opposition consistently manipulates their polling results, projecting higher numbers than independent polls commissioned by IRI and NDI suggest. 

Since 2003, Georgia has boldly progressed from a failed post-Soviet state to a 

growing, modern and more prosperous country. The current Georgian administration was successful in eradicating petty corruption and establishing an astonishing 

precedent in the Caucasus and the former Soviet space: Georgia is the only country 

in the region where officials practically do not take bribes. 

A successful police reform; an anti-corruption sweep; streamlining of government 

bureaucracy; rural electrification and gasification; and construction of roads; all 

make the ruling party still an attractive choice for Georgia. So does Saakashvili’s 

vision of Georgia integrating into Europe and NATO. 

Clearly, not everything is perfect. The recent revelations of systemic torture and 

abuse horrified Georgians and foreigners alike. Such horrors should not be tolerated, especially in a country, which aspires to integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions. However, unfortunately, such despicable abuses happen everywhere, as we remember from the Abu Ghraib scandal. 
35 

It is encouraging that President Saakashvili, Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili 

and other leaders took upon themselves to investigate, and the Minister responsible 

for jails had resigned immediately. All friends of Georgia, including in the U.S. will 

eagerly await the results of an impartial investigation and a comprehensive prison 

reform Mr. Saakashvili promised. 

What we see in Georgia is a real political process. The opposition-affiliated TV 

stations took a lead in exposing the prison scandal—and probably gained some political dividends in the process. Georgians are a very emotional people, who take their 

feelings very seriously. Some of the accusations sound dramatic. 

However, there are several daunting questions concerning these elections. First, 

why Mr. Ivanishvili decided to fight these elections not only in Tbilisi, not just in 

Kutaisi, Batumi, in Svaneti and Adjara—but around the world. He is he taking his 

message to Washington and Brussels, besmirching his President and his government. 

According to Washingon Post, Mr. Ivanishvili decided that it is important to spend a reported $300,000 a month on an A-team of the most expensive lobbyists in town. 

For what purpose? Isn’t the Obama Administration already imploring the 

Saakashvili Administration to ‘‘democratize’’ and not to ‘‘over-militarize’’ Georgian 

security, as one senior State Department official put it? 

The effective ban on supplying Georgia with defensive weapons systems, such as 

anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, even M-4 rifles, goes far enough to placate Mr. 

Obama’s Russian ‘‘reset’’ partners. Is further de-legitimization of the Saakashvili 

government in Washington by the opposition leader really necessary for the victory 

of Georgia Dream or for the future of U.S.-Georgian relations? 

Is this PR campaign by the opposition in Washington just an preliminary ‘‘artillery barrage’’ before Mr. Ivanishvili takes a million of his supporters to the streets, 

as he promised? Can the Russian army interfere to ‘‘restore order’’ in Georgia if 

massive street demonstrations occur and someone calls for Russian troops to march 

in? Will they? 

Hopefully not. 

What is at stake? These elections are crucial to the future of US-Georgian and 

US-Russian relations, as well as for the overall stability of the region. President 

Saakashvili has built upon the efforts of his predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze to 

extricate Georgia from the Russian sphere of influence and move it West. Russia 

does not like his approach at all. And it may not like Mr. Ivanishvili, if he ever 

comes to power in his country. Unless, of course, he is doing exactly what the Russians are telling him to do. Abandoning the dream of joining Europe and NATO, 

and joining the Moscow-led Eurasian Union—with Belarus and Kazakhstan—may 

be an approach much more palatable to—and perhaps dictated by the Kremlin. 

Under Saakashvili’s leadership, Georgia has become an important and close ally 

of the United States. Georgian soldiers have fought side by side with their American 

brethren in Iraq and Afghanistan. Georgia is a crucial transportation hub for the 

resupply and evacuation of ISAF and other American forces in Afghanistan. The 

country is the most pro-American in the former Soviet Union bar none: in its foreign 

affairs as well as in promoting democracy and economic freedom within its borders. 

Among Georgia’s neighbors, especially in Russia, Iran, Armenia, and Turkey, antiAmerican sentiments are growing. Just this past Tuesday, September 18, 2012, 

Moscow announced that it is shutting down US AID operations throughout Russia. 

So much for the hallowed ‘‘reset’’ policy. 

Georgia, however, is truly different. President George W. Bush has a street named 

after him in the Georgian capital. Oil, gas, commodities and finished good worth 

hundreds of millions of dollars move through Georgia on a daily basis. Georgia’s geopolitical role alongside the Black Sea and abutting oil- and gas rich Azerbaijan on 

the Caspian, is crucial. Georgia is an energy and transportation corridor that connects Central Asia and Azerbaijan with the Black Sea and ocean routes overseas— 

for oil, gas, and other commodities. It is a part of the ancient East-West corridor. 

It is also a part of a North-South axis, which Russia and Iran would love to control. 

Russia, Georgia’s most important neighbor, is unhappy with Georgia’s pro-American orientation. Moscow’s designs against Georgia are a threat to peace and democracy in the region, as its 2008 war with Georgia demonstrated. Moscow would like 

to threaten the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Oil Export Pipeline; as well as a planned 

TANAP gas pipeline via Turkey and the new railroad from Azerbaijan to Turkey. 

Russia’s current goals are to annex the Georgian territory it occupied during the 

2008 war to the secessionist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Moscow 

already controls. The United States and members of the European Union do not recognize the legitimacy of this occupation, as Secretary Clinton has repeatedly stated. 

Moscow would exacerbate ethno-religious conflicts in the region, including in 

Nagorno-Karabakh, a flashpoint of tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 
36 

seeks to re-establish its ‘‘sphere of privileged interests’’—speaking bluntly, a sphere 

of influence. 

If a pro-Russian regime is established in Georgia, it will bring the strategic BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzerum [Turkey] gas pipeline under Moscow’s control. It will allow Russia a land re-supply route for Armenia, its Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization ally, and, under a certain circumstances, a 

land bridge to Iran via Armenia. These scenarios are being actively discussed in the 

Russian media. 

Georgia is also an important in view of the rising threats of Iran’s nuclear program. Georgian airfields may play a role in a number of future scenarios involving 

Iran, thus rendering Georgia’s domestic politics vital to the success or failure of the 

West’s effort to prevent the Iranian regime from acquire nuclear weapons. If government sentiments inside Georgia were to change, such as through the rise of a proRussian government, the geopolitical picture in the South Caucasus and the Black 

Sea region would fundamentally change. 

Crucial Elections. The elections this year are therefore a determining point: will 

Georgia remains pro-American, pro-Western, and pro-democratic under President 

Saakashvili, or will it change its orientation under Bidzina Ivanishvili’s coalition. 

Do the Western countries realize this? 

While the Georgia Dream coalition attracted first rate diplomats, its component 

members often are anti-Western, xenophobic and anti-Semitic. Their foreign policy 

will be different than that of the current government. 

In recent years, blindly worshiping democratic process, especially elections, and 

disregarding American geopolitical goals has become somewhat of a fashion, including in this Administration. The U.S. vociferously supported elections in Gaza which 

brought Hamas to power despite the warnings from the Palestinian Authority and 

the Government of Israel. 

It cheered when The Muslim Brotherhood won contested seats in the Egyptian 

parliament during the Mubarak Administration. It urged the pro-American Egyptian rulers to quit quickly, disregarding the predictable outcomes for U.S. power and 

influence in the Middle East. As Kim Holmes, The Heritage Foundation Vice President and the former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations 

wrote, 

Egypt isn’t yet a democratic society. At best it’s ‘‘pre-democratic.’’ Its willingness 

to embrace elections may yet open up the political system to democracy. But 

it lacks the democratic values, institutions and customs that would ensure future elections are more than a choice between anti-democratic forces seeking to 

claim, or hold onto, power. 

Of course, Georgia is not Egypt and Saakashvili is not Mubarak. Georgia, one 

hopes, would rise for the occasion and conduct elections with minimal violations. 

Again, let me quote Kim Holmes: 

free and fair elections are indispensable to democracy. You can’t have democracy without them. But neither can you have democracy without an even greater commitment to the values, institutions and customs that make it work. 

However, let us not forget that this country’s democracy is only nine years old, 

and Soviet authoritarianism only 20 years ago it shed. Thus far, observer missions 

from OSCE, IRI and NDI seem to report that the elections are on track and we 

should calmly expect their reports. We should definitely hold the current Georgian 

Government feet to the fire, expecting reasonable conduct of elections by European 

standards. However, we should not face an either-or choice of focusing exclusively 

on elections, or pursuing American interests to the exclusion of our commitment to 

democratic values. 

Hopefully, the U.S. can learn from our own recent mistakes. 

llllllllllll 

The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization 

recognized as exempt under section 501[c][3] of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does 

it perform any government or other contract work. 

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United 

States. During 2011, it had nearly 700,000 individual, foundation, and corporate 

supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2011 income came from the following sources: Individuals = 78% Foundations = 17% Corporations = 5% 

The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 2% of its 2011 

income. The Heritage Foundation’s books are audited annually by the national ac-
37 

counting firm of McGladrey & Pullen. A list of major donors is available from The 

Heritage Foundation upon request. 

Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their 

own independent research. The views expressed are their own and do not reflect an 

institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees. 

Ariel Cohen, L.L.B., Ph.D., is a leading expert on Russia/Eurasia, Eastern Europe, 

and the Middle East, serves as a Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian 

Studies and International Energy Policy at the Heritage Foundation. 

Dr. Cohen frequently testifies before committees of the U.S. Congress, including the 

Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees, the House Armed Services Committee, the House Judiciary Committee and the Helsinki Commission. He regularly 

lectures at the request of U.S. Government institutions: the U.S. Department of State, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands and Training and Doctrine and 

Special Forces Commands of the U.S. armed services, the Central Intelligence Agency 

and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and also conducted White House briefings. He 

also directs high-level conferences on international security, energy, the rule of law, 

crime and corruption, and a variety of other issues. 

Dr. Cohen has published six books and monographs; 30 book chapters; and over 

500 articles in professional and popular media. He appears on CNN, NBC, CBS, 

FOX, C-SPAN, BBC-TV, Al Jazeera English, and all Russian and Ukrainian national TV networks. He was a commentator on a Voice of America weekly radio and 

TV show for eight years. Currently, he is a Contributing Editor to the National Interest and a blogger for the Voice of America. For eight years, he wrote commentary columns for United Press International, Middle East Times, and has extensively written 

as a guest columnist for the New York Times, International Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Times, EurasiaNet, and National Review Online. In Europe, Cohen’s analyses 

have appeared in Kommersant, Izvestiya, Hurriyet, the popular Russian website 

Ezhenedelny Zhurnal, and many others. 

Dr. Cohen is a member of the Expert Board of TREND News Agency [Baku], Editorial Board of Central Asia and the Caucasus [Stockholm], and is on the Boards 

of Advisors of the Institute for Analysis of Global Security [IAGS], Endowment for 

Middle East Truth, and Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is also a Member 

of the Council of Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies 

[London], the Valdai Club [Russia], and the American Council on Germany. 
38 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MAMUKA TSERETELI, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR BLACK

SEA-CASPIAN STUDIES, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Background 

Georgia is part of Europe, but it lies on Europe’s strategic borderland. What affects 

Georgia will ultimately be reflected in Europe. The Georgian population has expressed multiple times, in referendums and polls, its desire to join Trans-Atlantic 

and European security and economic institutions. Meanwhile Georgia is one of the 

largest contributors of troops to coalition forces in Afghanistan, serving in the areas 

with heavy insurgent activities and facing an increasing number of casualties. One 

need look only at Georgia’s volatile neighborhood to understand its centrality to 

many of today’s most pressing security questions. Europe and the United States 

should thus have a strong interest in the stability of Georgia, and they should encourage Georgia to build a robust liberal-democratic political system based on free 

markets within the context of unique and distinctive cultural heritage and traditions. 

Georgia made visible progress in creating functioning state entities, reducing regulatory burdens, developing critical infrastructure and eliminating bribery in bureaucracy. These are distinct achievements. The Georgian people and government 

deserve credit for those achievements. 

Russia’s occupation of Georgian territories, including areas very close to the capital 

Tbilisi, creates an oppressive environment, characterized by the constant threat of 

another military intervention that could undermine the stability of entire region. 

Georgia’s limited defense capabilities are no match for Russia’s power in the region, 

and the EU monitoring mission [EUMM] has very limited capability to ensure the 

security in the areas adjacent to Russian military units. The Russian invasion of 

Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated that Russia is willing to use force against its 

neighbors. At the same time, Russia’s military presence in the South Caucasus 

makes Russia itself less secure. 

The Russian factor has two important meanings-often in contradiction-for Georgia. 

First, the Russian threat is real, as this Russian leadership does not wish Georgia 

well, no matter who leads it. The probability of a future Russian military invasion 

is something every Georgian understands and has to live with. Second, because this 

reality is so strong in Georgia’s political culture, the threat of Russian intervention 

has become a powerful political instrument for influencing Georgia’s internal politics. Put another way, the Russian threat can be easily and powerfully manipulated 

for political gain by Georgia’s political actors. 

Internal stability is essential for Georgia’s security. Stability can only be achieved 

if the political process creates an environment of broader political representation in 

the government. Leaders all around the world-heads of states, international institutions, US politicians, leadership of NATO, friends of Georgia-see the upcoming election on October 1 as an important milestone in building Georgia’s democratic statehood. Many have called on Georgia to make certain that voters have an opportunity 

to express their free choice, and once that is achieved, to make sure that results 

of the elections are respected by the participants in the political process. 

Domestic Political Context Before 2012 

In recent years the Georgian political scene has been completely dominated by the 

United National Movement of Georgia, or UNM, that is the party of President 

Mikheil Saakasvili. The UNM has won a constitutional majority in the parliamentary elections of May 2008, which has de-facto created one party rule in Georgia. 

In fact, Georgia has been ruled by the UNM with no significant opposition since 

2004. Moreover developments after 2008 elections effectively eliminated debate and 

political collaboration from the Georgian scene. This has led to many harmful internal and external decisions by the Georgian leadership, which has responded to criticism by suppressing opposition with increasingly excessive force. 

In this context the recent release of shocking videos of torture and abuse of prisoners prove what was said many times by human rights organizations, and partly 

reflected by the US Department of State annual reports on human rights. Georgia’s 

prison system, as well as its pre-trial detention mechanism, is a potent factor in 

Georgian social and political life, which impacts the daily lives of thousands of Georgians and their decisions about how they deal with the government, as well as on 

how they approach elections. There is fear of state in Georgia. Some government 

officials assessed prison abuse case as ‘‘systemic problem’’. This is a moral failure 

as well. Georgian society is shocked by the facts of abuse of power, and maybe coverup that involved high level officials, and demands full scale investigation. These 

abuses can only happen in an environment of unchecked and unbalanced power, 
39 

such as what exists in Georgia today. This case increases importance of upcoming 

elections. 

In all previous elections in Georgia, incumbents have enjoyed the advantages of 

being able to employ the administrative tools of power, as well as greater financial 

resources. For example, during the 2010 mayoral elections in Capital city Tbilisi, 

the UNM candidate and incumbent spent 100 times more money [14 million Georgian lari, or about $8 million] then the oppositional candidate, who finished second 

in the race. After the elections of 2010, the handful of businesses who contributed 

to the opposition’s campaign were hit with large and unfair tax penalties, effectively 

driving them out of political process. 

One positive development during the 2010 election was establishment of the intergovernmental task force prior to the elections. The Task Force was assigned to detect and respond to all violations of electoral law. The work of Task force was 

praised by opposition as well and the model was reintroduced again for the upcoming elections. The Inter-Agency Commission [IAC] was established on May 18 as a 

temporary state body to pro-actively address allegations of election law violations. 

Current Pre-Election Dynamics 

In October of 2011 Mr. Bidzina Ivanishvili, billionaire and philanthropist, who also 

was major donor for the Georgian government since the 2003 Rose Revolution, decided to enter politics, where he began to consolidate almost the entire Georgian oppositional spectrum into the Georgian Dream political coalition. Georgia is a small 

country and in normal circumstances the magnitude of Mr. Ivanishvili’s wealth 

could be seen as distorting and damaging to the political process in the country. But 

in Georgia’s reality, it became the only way to recreate the competitive political 

process. 

In his first political statement, Mr. Ivanishvili announced that he was inviting proWestern political forces of Free Democrats, led by former Georgian Ambassador to 

the UN Irakli Alasania, and Republican Party, to become the core for his new political force. There is no doubt, that this opened space for many pro-Western politicians to compete in the 2012.Mr. Ivanishvili and members of his coalition have emphasized repeatedly that their goal is to change the existing government by political 

means, through parliamentary elections. 

Immediately after his decision to enter politics, the UNM-controlled parliament 

passed a new election finance law. Mr. Ivanishvili became the target of political and 

financial intimidation. He was fined multiple times by the UNM-dominated courts 

for alleged violations of election finance law, though little was actually proved. Fines 

reached such a level and generated such negative publicity that international monitors of the pre-election process issued strong criticisms for the responsible government agency. The Council of Europe [PACE] co-rapporteurs Michael Aastrup Jensen 

of Denmark and Boriss Cilevics of Latvia wrote in a statement on August 21 that 

the seizure of the Georgian Dream’s bank accounts and ‘‘the excessive and disproportionate fines levied by the State Audit Service effectively undermine normal 

political activity by an opposition party.’’ On August 22 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s pre-election observation mission, made up of OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s leadership, also expressed concerns over ‘‘disproportionate’’ and ‘‘harsh’’ penalties of Georgia’s judiciary system. OSCE PA representatives expressed hope that 

in the final weeks of the campaign ahead of the October 1 parliamentary elections 

the Georgian authorities would create ‘‘a level playing field for all parties’’. 

Following those statements visible changes emerged in the policies of State Audit 

Agency. Enforcement of the previous decisions were halted following recommendations of the Inter-Agency Commission [IAC]. IAC also stepped up its efforts to deal 

with violations of the campaign law by the supporters of the UNM. While polarization in the society and tensions between two major political groups is growing, the 

electoral environment from the point of view of fairness is showing some signs of 

improvement. 

Fundamental Problems for Elections: 

Use of administrative resources: There is no clear dividing line between the ruling 

party and the state. Resources of the state, as well as state employees are frequently used to support UNM’s pre-election efforts. This issue is mentioned by the 

OSCE’s observer mission’s interim report. 

Number of voters: There has been no population census in Georgia since 2002. Officially the number of voters stands at 3,621,256 [largest number of voters in Georgia 

in last twenty years], while the official number of Georgian citizens is about 4.4 million. These numbers are highly questionable. The number of Georgians who emigrate is growing, estimated to be around one million. As of today fewer than 50,000 
40 

people are eligible to vote in embassies and consulates of Georgia in different countries, which leaves a large number of eligible voters beyond the electoral process. 

According to expert assessments, Georgia cannot claim more than 3 million resident 

voters. The discrepancy between what is claimed and what is the more likely reality 

offers opportunities to manipulate the electoral process. 

Media Freedom: TV is the main source of information for greater majority of Georgians, but TV space is dominated by Government-controlled TV stations. Following 

recommendations of the international community and after implementation of the 

principle of Must Carry, 215,000 viewers received an opportunity to have access to 

alternative sources of information. Even after that, independent, not-government 

controlled media reaches only a limited [about 20-25%] portion of the electorate. The 

government is still holding tens of thousands of satellite dishes imported by independent TV station Maestro TV for distribution. 

What Shall the US Do? 

• Stay actively engaged in Georgia as an impartial observer and facilitator of the 

development. Success of Georgia is essential for the US strategic interests in 

the broader Middle East-Central Asia region. 

• Entertain a frank public discussion about the state of democracy in Georgia. 

Georgia has made some progress, and the current government has done some 

good things for the country, but the narrative that stresses Georgia’s liberal credentials needs to be recast in light of some significant democratic shortfalls. 

Monitor closely unfolding details of the current prison system crisis and investigation. 

• Establish strict conditions and benchmarks for the Georgian government to ensure that elections are held in a free environment. Election monitors from the 

U.S. Government would be useful. The US should communicate to the Georgian 

leadership that if there are doubts about the legitimacy of the elections the US 

will not recognize its results. Plan to hold another congressional hearing after 

the elections to review progress. And announce this in advance of the elections. 

• The US needs to monitor developments after the election as well. The election 

process may not end by the night of October 1. It is possible that the results 

of the elections in several districts will be disputed, and recounts may be requested. In order to avoid confrontation it is important that there is a process 

of mediation through OSCE or other monitoring groups, and the US participation in the process will significantly increase trust and confidence of the parties. 

• Mount a serious effort to review the state of Georgia’s media, ensuring access 

to the alternative sources of information throughout the entire country. Insist 

on the immediate release of satellite dishes confiscated by the government. Advising adding international representatives to the Georgian National Communication Commission, then closely monitoring its operations would be positive 

steps. 

Georgia has a potential to become democratic state, full-fledged member of the 

Trans-Atlantic family of nations. That potential needs to be accelerated and deepened. The up-coming elections need to be seen from that perspective. Proper conduct 

of elections will get Georgia closer to that goal. Mismanagement of the elections may 

throw Georgia back for years, or maybe even decades. 

In the 1940s, after travelling to Georgia John Steinbeck wrote: ‘‘It is a magical 

place, Georgia, and it becomes dream-like the moment you have left it. And the people are magic people. It is true that they have one of the richest and most beautiful 

countries in the world, and they live up to it’’. The Georgian people are capable of 

deciding the right path for their future. Free and fair elections will give them that 

opportunity. 

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