Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1706-CR-1417 | December 12, 2017 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. Burns

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Anthony Nelson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 12, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1706-CR-1417

Appeal from the Marion County 

Superior Court.

The Honorable Christina R. 

Klineman, Judge.

Trial Court Cause No.

49G17-1704-CM-12399

Friedlander, Senior Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1706-CR-1417 | December 12, 2017 Page 2 of 6

[1] Following a bench trial, Anthony Nelson was convicted of invasion of privacy

as a Class A misdemeanor.

1

The sole issue Nelson raises is whether sufficient 

evidence was presented to sustain his conviction. We affirm. 

[2] The facts most favorable to the judgment establish that Nelson is the father of 

K.N., who was twelve years old at the time the offense was committed. In May 

of 2016, K.N.’s maternal grandmother, Nelson’s former mother-in-law 

(hereinafter, “Grandmother”), filed a petition for guardianship of K.N. The 

guardianship hearing occurred in November of 2016, and the matter was taken 

under advisement.2 

[3] Also in November of 2016, Grandmother sought and received a protective 

order for K.N., and against Nelson, because of allegations that Nelson 

physically abused K.N. The protective order was served on Nelson by copy 

service on November 10, 2016, and by certified mail on November 19, 2016. 

The protective order (among other things) prohibited Nelson from “harassing, 

annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with 

[K.N.].” State’s Exhibit 4. Nelson, however, left voicemail messages on 

Grandmother’s phone, expressing his displeasure regarding the protective 

order. 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(1) (2016).

2 Grandmother’s petition for guardianship of K.N. was granted on December 22, 2016.
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[4] On November 28, 2016, after the protective order was issued and served, 

Grandmother called the police because Nelson had been texting her and calling 

her. On December 16, 2016, she called the police because Nelson had been at 

her mailbox. On December 27, 2016, Grandmother called the police because 

Nelson had again been texting and calling her. 

[5] On the night of December 31, 2016, K.N. was on her phone in her bedroom at 

Grandmother’s house when she heard a tapping sound on her window.

3 When 

she looked out of her window, she observed a hand holding a cellphone that 

showed a picture of her father’s mother on the cellphone screen. K.N. surmised 

that the person holding the cellphone must be her father. She immediately told 

her Grandmother about the incident. 

[6] On April 4, 2017, the State charged Nelson with Class A misdemeanor invasion 

of privacy. Following a bench trial held on June 7, 2017, the trial court found 

Nelson guilty as charged and sentenced Nelson to time served. Nelson now 

appeals. 

[7] Nelson argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove he 

committed invasion of privacy. According to Nelson, his conviction was based 

upon circumstantial evidence, “as there was no evidence that anyone saw him 

at [Grandmother’s] house on December 31, 2016,” and the circumstantial 

 

3 The record is unclear as to when K.N. began living with Grandmother but the record does establish that 

K.N. was living with Grandmother on December 31, 2016. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1706-CR-1417 | December 12, 2017 Page 4 of 6

evidence was “that of extreme bias demonstrated by [Grandmother].” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 7. The State maintains that Nelson’s argument on appeal is 

merely a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility 

of the witnesses. We agree and find sufficient evidence to support Nelson’s 

conviction.

[8] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative 

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is 

the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess 

witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether 

it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, 

when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, 

they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. 

Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence 

overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The 

evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn 

from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and 

quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be 

reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence 

presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012). Upon review, 

appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the 

witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 2002). A conviction may be 

supported by the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness or 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1706-CR-1417 | December 12, 2017 Page 5 of 6

by circumstantial evidence alone. McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528 (Ind.

2001).

[9] To convict Nelson of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, the State was 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally 

violated a protective order. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(1) (2016). In the charging 

information, the State specifically alleged that Nelson knowingly violated the 

protective order “by going to [K.N.’s] residence and/or looking [into] the 

window to contact her.” Appellant’s App. p. 14. 

[10] Nelson does not dispute that he had knowledge of the protective order. 

Grandmother testified at the bench trial that Nelson left voicemail messages on 

her phone in which he expressed his displeasure regarding the protective order, 

specifically: “[y]ou tryin’ [sic] to keep me away from my daughter,” and “[y]ou 

got a restraining order against me.” Tr. p. 7. On one occasion, Nelson was 

observed near Grandmother’s mailbox. 

[11] K.N. testified that on December 31, 2016, while the protective order was in 

place and while she was in the bedroom in the house where she lived, she heard 

a tapping sound on her bedroom window. When she looked out of the 

window, she saw a hand holding a cellphone. The screen on the cellphone 

displayed a picture of Nelson’s mother, K.N.’s paternal grandmother. 

Although K.N. could not see the individual who held the cellphone, she 

testified that she thought it was her father holding the phone because she 

“[didn’t] know who else would have the picture [of Nelson’s mother] on [the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1706-CR-1417 | December 12, 2017 Page 6 of 6

cellphone],” and “[w]ho else would come to the window like that.” Tr. pp. 31, 

33. 

[12] From the testimony presented at trial, the trial court could have reasonably 

inferred that Nelson was the individual holding the cellphone to K.N.’s window

and, thus, was in violation of the protective order. Nelson’s argument to the 

contrary effectively amounts to an invitation for this court to reweigh the 

evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we will not 

do. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435. The evidence was sufficient to prove that 

Nelson contacted K.N. in violation of the protective order.

[13] For the reasons stated above, we affirm Nelson’s conviction of invasion of 

privacy. 

[14] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.