PEACEW RKS

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING 

AFGHANISTAN’S TRANSITION

William A. Byrd, Gary Milante, 

and Kenneth Anye

[ [

COMPARISONS WITH INTERNATIONAL 

POSTCONFLICT EXPERIENCE
Cover photo: David Kerrigan

The views expressed in this report are those of the 

authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the 

views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 87. First published 2013.

eISBN: 978-1-60127-183-9

© 2013 by the United States Institute of Peace

ABOUT THE REPORT

There is far too little cross-country learning going into 

strategic thinking, analysis, and institutional and policy 

work regarding countries attempting to transition out of 

conflict, and Afghanistan is no exception. This report, 

which relates closely to the U.S. Institute of Peace’s 

broader analytical work on the current transition in 

Afghanistan, is intended to help remedy that deficiency. 

It draws on analysis and findings presented in their 

entirety in “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 

2014-Quantitative and Indicator-Wise International 

Comparisons,” a background paper for the World Bank 

study Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 

2014 (coauthored by Richard Hogg, Claudia Nassif, 

Camilo Gomez Osorio, William Byrd, and Andrew Beath; 

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013). Comments 

on an earlier version of this report by Richard Hogg are 

gratefully acknowledged, as well as comments on the 

current version by Scott Smith and Andrew Wilder. The 

views, findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed 

in this report are entirely those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Institute of Peace 

or the World Bank, its affiliated organizations, its executive 

directors, or the governments they represent.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

William A. Byrd is a senior expert at the U.S. Institute 

of Peace. Gary Milante is a senior economist in the 

Operations Policy and Country Services Group, The 

World Bank. Kenneth Anye is an operations officer, also 

with the Operations Policy and Country Services Group, 

The World Bank. 
PEACEWORKS • JUNE 2013 • NO. 87

CONTENTS

[The lack of progress in political consolidation and building 

political institutions and stability . . . is worrisome and 

may well affect the prospects for success of the transition 

process as a whole.]

Conceptual and Methodological Approach ... 5

Comparisons of Transitions ... 7

Quantitative Economic Patterns ... 8

Aid Levels, Trends, and Economic Effects of Declines ... 10

Governance, Political, and Other Indicators ... 14

Social Indicators .... 17

Afghanistan’s Current Situation in International Perspective ... 19

Th emes and Lessons for Afghanistan’s Transition ... 23

Broader Observations and Areas for Further Research ... 26

USIP.ORG 3

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

Summary

■ Afghanistan faces its upcoming security and political transition with both strengths and 

weaknesses following uneven progress since the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001. 

■ Among Afghanistan’s strengths is its economic performance—including high growth, relatively low infl ation, and solid public fi nancial management—and the priority is to maintain 

progress in these areas and protect gains. 

■ Among Afghanistan’s weaknesses is its recent performance in the areas of governance and 

rule of law, which has been poor and shows no signs of improvement. Political consolidation and stability are crucial for Afghanistan’s transition to succeed. 

■ Health and education have been improving from very low levels in 2001, but Afghanistan 

will continue to play catch-up for quite some time to come.

■ Aid dependence in Afghanistan has been uniquely high, and large declines during transition will have signifi cant consequences. 

■ Th is paper draws its conclusions from systematic comparisons of Afghanistan’s experience 

with those of other countries that have emerged from confl ict. Th e paper’s “event study” 

approach brings out patterns and possible lessons that can inform thinking, analysis, and 

policy for Afghanistan’s current transition and beyond, bearing in mind that any recommendations must be grounded thoroughly in the context of Afghanistan’s history and 

current situation.

■ Th e analysis in this paper can be taken forward by updating it as information for more 

years becomes available, including more variables, performing sensitivity analyses, and 

applying the comparative methodology to other countries undergoing transitions from 

confl ict. 

USIP.ORG 5

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

A postconfl ict country’s prospects for development depend on how it transitions out of confl ict. 

Cross-country empirical work suggests that countries emerging from civil war face a substantial 

risk of reverting back to confl ict within fi ve to ten years; many countries do, but some do not. 

Each country’s postconfl ict transition experience is diff erent, with its own unique characteristics, 

and the international environment, which infl uences countries’ choices, also diff ers across countries and changes over time. Th us, general lessons from international experience with postconfl ict 

transitions should be derived cautiously. Moreover, transplanting analyses, policies, and instruments directly from one country to another is likely to prove disastrous. Grounding analyses and 

recommendations for a country in a deep and holistic understanding of that country’s context 

is essential. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is far too little cross-country learning going into 

strategic thinking, analysis, and institutional and policy work regarding countries attempting to 

transition out of confl ict. Th ere are also far too many examples of reinventing the wheel, or mechanical applications of best-practice models from textbooks or other countries, untailored to the 

recipient country’s context.1 Some initiatives show a lack of awareness of what has worked and 

not worked in other countries emerging from confl ict. 

Cross-country learning, combined thoughtfully with a thorough understanding of a country’s 

current reality and history, can improve the chances that development eff orts will succeed even 

in very challenging situations. In this report, we examine the experiences of selected low-income 

countries as they attempted to move out of violent confl ict, with an eye toward informing current 

policies in Afghanistan. We review a set of quantitative indicators across a group of countries 

selected for general comparability with Afghanistan, taking an event study approach—that is, 

evaluating trends in economic, social, and governance data from each country based on the time 

elapsed from a distinct transition-initiating event.2 Our analysis then situates Afghanistan within 

international experience from two perspectives: trends in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban 

government and change of regime in late 2001 and conditions in Afghanistan at present, using 

the most recent available data, as it embarks on its current transition. We conclude by distilling 

key themes and lessons that may be particularly relevant for Afghanistan and putting forward 

some broader observations and suggestions for further research. Our approach is innovative in 

that it does not rely on large-sample cross-country regressions at one extreme or individual cases 

at the other; combining elements of both, it is intended to be neither faceless nor idiosyncratic, 

and it is hoped that the methodology developed here will be useful for Afghanistan and other 

countries undergoing transition.

Conceptual and Methodological Approach

We defi ne three clusters of low-income countries emerging from confl ict to compare with Afghanistan by fi rst examining country characteristics and experiences to ensure broad similarities 

and then creating clusters according to socioeconomic development as measured by the Human 

Development Index (HDI) and the government stability indicator of the International Country 

Risk Guide (ICRG). Under the event study approach, we align countries’ experiences with one 

another by identifying for each of them a peace agreement, ceasefi re, or other event that ended, 

or at least largely ended, a confl ict, allowing us to designate a single transition initiation year—referred to as year zero—in which the country could be said to be beginning to emerge from confl ict. Th is allows us to analyze trends after year zero across countries through graphs and statistical 

comparisons. We use a fi fteen-year time horizon to provide a medium-term perspective, enabling 

us to evaluate country experiences and assess their performances.
6 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

Th e exercise3 begins with fi fty-nine country experiences based on analysis conducted for the 

2011 World Development Report (WDR),4 which includes countries that experienced periods of fragility or violence between 1978 and 2010. We remove twelve cases from consideration 

because the countries are either very small or very large. Another eight countries are eliminated 

for study due to their experiencing little or negligible violence. A further requirement that comparator countries be landlocked, resource-poor, or both—like Afghanistan—omits another nine 

cases.5 We remove two more countries with imprecise transition moments (necessary to establish 

a year zero) and four other countries that were not low-income at the beginning of transition. 

Th is fi ltering process results in a set of twenty-four comparator countries. Of these, we include 

fi ve country experiences with recent transition moments—a year zero in 2003 or later—in the 

analysis, but care should be taken in interpreting patterns and trends in these countries, since it is 

still relatively early to measure performance and success. 

We cluster the twenty-four countries using two measures: progress on HDI and, where there 

are insuffi cient data from HDI to assess development progress, the ICRG measure of government stability to separate countries that have seen some progress from those that have not. We 

fi rst order the countries according to their average annual improvement on HDI, either for the 

fi fteen years after year zero or for the period of time for which data are available if less than fi fteen 

years. Based on HDI progress, countries are then broken into strong performers, middle performers, and weak performers. Countries with insuffi cient HDI data are categorized as weak performers, excepting three countries with strong showings for ICRG government stability, which are put 

in the middle performers’ category. Table 1 shows the fi nal breakdown. 

We review the clusters of comparator countries according to trends and levels for various 

data and indicators, including key economic variables, basic social indicators, and a number 

of indicators on governance, rule of law, government eff ectiveness, and political variables (see 

table 2). Our choice of indicators was constrained by data availability for comparator countries 

and especially for Afghanistan.6

Th e event study methodology raises a conceptual question about Afghanistan, since there 

is an important diff erence between the current transition in the country and how transition 

has been defi ned, viewed, and identifi ed for most other countries. For the comparator countries and in the 2011 WDR, transition is seen as a medium- to long-term process initiated 

by a transition event that ends or largely ends an ongoing confl ict. During the transition 

period, countries try to move away from protracted cycles of violence and onto a path of 

stability and sustained development. In this regard, Afghanistan underwent a major transition—which most observers at the time saw as a postconfl ict transition—starting with the 

fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, and there was real progress toward what looked like 

sustainable stability and economic development in the years immediately following. Looking back, it seems clear that there was a genuine window of opportunity for Afghanistan 

after 2001, but the trajectory since 2005 or 2006 has become less promising in a number of 

ways.7

 Afghanistan now faces major changes of a diff erent nature—though they are also being called a transition—involving the transfer of security responsibilities from international 

military forces to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and reductions in aid, as well 

as a political change with the 2014 presidential election. A reconciliation process that leads 

to a peace agreement with the Taliban or a durable cessation of hostilities would be akin to 

the transition initiation events identifi ed for comparator countries. In the absence of such a 

process, however, Afghanistan’s current transition may turn out to be rather diff erent from 

conventionally defi ned transitions.
USIP.ORG 7

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

Comparisons of Transitions

Figures 1 and 2, 4 and 5, and 8 through 14 below show all data points for each of the selected variables for 

all comparator countries and Afghanistan. Each figure has four quadrants. Data for Afghanistan appear in 

the top-left quadrant, the strongly performing cluster of comparator countries in the top-right quadrant, 

middle performers in the bottom-left quadrant, and weak performers in the bottom-right quadrant. The 

variable under scrutiny appears on the vertical axes. The horizontal axes show the time elapsed from each 

country’s year zero. The linear trend, average annual level of the variable concerned—or in some figures, the 

median level—and one or two other summary statistics in some cases are shown as lines in each quadrant. 

These statistics are based on the observations available for each year and hence may be distorted due to 

missing data for some countries in some years—for example, if a country’s level is quite different from the 

cluster average for a certain indicator and has data available for only the first several years of transition.8

Table 1. Comparator Countries 

Country Year zero Precipitating event

Strong performers

Cambodia

Lao PDR

Liberia

Mali

Mozambique

Nicaragua

Rwanda

Tajikistan

Uganda

Vietnam

Middle performers

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Ethiopia

Guinea

Nepal

Niger

Weak performers

Central African Republic

Chad

Côte d’Ivoire

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Eritrea

Guinea-Bissau

Haiti

Zimbabwe

1991

1998

2003

1992

1992

1990

1994

1997

1986

1986

1987

2000

1994

1984

2006

1993

1986

1990

2003

2003

1993

1991

2006

1988

Paris peace agreement

Elections and new economic mechanism

Peace deal after end of Taylor regime

First multiparty elections

Rome peace accord

Elections

Transition after genocide

Ceasefi re

Regime change to Museveni

Doi Moi reforms

Regime change to Compaore

Transitional government

Elections

Regime change to Conté

New government after ceasefi re

Constitution and elections

New constitution

Regime change to Déby

Linas-Marcoussis Accord

Peace agreement

Independence

Elections

Elections

ZANU-PF formed

Source: William Byrd, Gary Milante, and Kenneth Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 

2014—Quantitative and Indicator-Wise International Comparisons,” December 2012, background paper 

for the World Bank study Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 2014 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 

2013), tables 1 and 2.
8 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

Quantitative Economic Patterns

Strongly performing comparator countries generally had higher average per capita GDP growth 

than middle performers, while weak performers on average had negative growth in average per 

capita GDP (fi gure 1).9 Since 2002, Afghanistan’s economic growth has been very rapid, much 

faster than the average for strongly performing comparator countries and higher than virtually all 

individual comparator countries.10 Afghanistan’s economic performance would have been more 

than adequate for success if other elements of transition had progressed reasonably well.

Afghanistan also has maintained control over infl ation (fi gure 2), following damaging hyperinfl ation in the 1990s. Th e country implemented a highly successful currency reform and made 

good progress subsequently in bringing infl ation down despite global food and energy price 

shocks and supply blockages in neighboring countries, which exacerbated Afghanistan’s infl ation 

volatility. Th ere seems to be little relation between transition performance and infl ation, however. 

Table 2. Variables and Indicators for Comparative Analysis

Variable/indicator Source of data

Economic and aid 

Average GDP per capita

Average annual per capita GDP growth

Infl ation

Aid as percentage of gross national income (GNI)

Technical assistance aid as percentage of GNI

Government consumption

Agriculture as percentage of GDP

Services as percentage of GDP

Industry as percentage of GDP

Political

Political stability

Voice and accountability

Military in politics

Civil liberties/political rights

Governance and government effectiveness

Government effectiveness

Rule of law

Control of corruption

Regulatory quality

Law and order

Bureaucratic quality

Social

Life expectancy

Mortality rate of children under age fi ve

Primary school enrollment (total, boys, girls)

WDI

WDI

WDI

OECD

OECD

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WGI

WGI

ICRG

Freedom House composite

WGI

WGI

WGI

WGI

ICRG

ICRG

WDI

WDI 

WDI

ICRG = International Country Risk Guide. OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. WDI = World Development Indicators. WGI = Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” table 3.
USIP.ORG 9

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

Many strong performers had high infl ation in the early years of transition, although infl ation rates 

in several of them declined over time, while middle performers had the lowest infl ation on average. Nevertheless, avoiding very high infl ation, which Afghanistan has accomplished, is an obvious 

prerequisite for a sound economy with good growth and employment prospects.

Regarding the broad structure of the economy, middle and especially strong performers demonstrated substantial developmental structural change during transition, with the share of agriculture in total GDP declining on average and the shares of both industry and services rising; poor 

performers on the other hand saw a rising share of agriculture, stagnating industry, and a declining share of services.11 Th e broad direction of structural change for Afghanistan has been similar 

to that in the strong performers’ cluster, but the magnitude of the shift has been more toward 

services and less toward industry, with the share of agriculture declining fairly rapidly. As fi gure 3 

shows, whereas the structure of the Afghan economy in 2002 was broadly similar to that of the 

strong performers’ cluster on average in the initial year of transition, by 2010 (the ninth year of 

its post-2001 transition) Afghanistan had a higher share of services and a lower share of industry 

than did the strong performers’ cluster on average in the fi fteenth year of their transitions.

Revenue mobilization is a core government function and basic indicator of state building, but 

systematic internationally comparable data are not available for government revenue. However, the 

impressive growth of Afghanistan’s domestic revenue—starting from a very low base and reaching 

Note: Year zero is the base year, with GDP per capita indexed to 100. For Afghanistan, 2002 is the base year since

comparable data are not available for 2001 (Afghanistan’s year zero).

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 5, based on World Development Indicators.

 Figure 1. Growth Performance (average per capita real GDP growth)
10 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

around 10 percent of GDP in recent years—means that revenue performance has been comparatively good, although revenue remains lower as a share of GDP than the average for low-income 

countries. Similarly, comparable public expenditure data are not suffi ciently available, but we reviewed government consumption as a share of GDP as a possible partial proxy for the size of 

government and its expenditures.12 Afghanistan’s government consumption, at around 10 percent 

of GDP, has been close to the average for the strong performers’ group and below the averages for 

other performance groups. Th ere has been a very slight upward trend in Afghanistan, in contrast 

with slight downward trends on average for all three performance groups of comparator countries, 

but the diff erences are small. However, these data do not fully refl ect the large amount of donorfi nanced off -budget expenditure in Afghanistan, much of which is for consumption. Accounting 

for this, total public consumption in Afghanistan is much higher than in comparator countries.

Aid Levels, Trends, and Economic Effects of Declines

Many postconfl ict and confl ict-aff ected countries receive substantial amounts of aid, so it is important to review patterns and trends for this variable. Based on defi nitions and data from the 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), trends in total aid as a 

share of gross national income (GNI) on average have moved downward for all three clusters of 

comparator countries, though at diff erent rates. Strong performers on average had initially higher 

Note: For inflation, GDP deflator at year zero is indexed to 100 (for Afghanistan 2002 since information for 2001 is

not available); indexed price levels are shown with log scale.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 6, based on World Development Indicators.

Figure 2. Control of Infl ation
USIP.ORG 11

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

Note: Strong performers’ cluster average for year 15 includes a smaller number of countries, since not all countries

are more than 15 years into their transition or have 15 years of data; on the other hand, a few countries do not have

year zero data so the initial sample is not complete, either.

Figure 3. Structural Change in Economy (percent of GDP)

aid as a percentage of GNI than countries in the other performance categories, but they saw more 

rapid declines over the transition period, refl ecting in part their more rapid GDP growth (see 

fi gure 4). Except in 2001, Afghanistan has been more aid-dependent than the averages for all 

comparator groups. Contrary to international experience—and worrisome for sustainability—aid 

dependency in Afghanistan has increased, and based on OECD data, the aid-to-GNI ratio has 

approached 50 percent—extremely high compared to virtually all comparator countries. Moreover, estimates of aid to Afghanistan compiled by World Bank staff (shown as a share of GNI in 

fi gure 4) are considerably higher than the OECD data, largely because these estimates include 

ANSF assistance. Th e fi gure shows these estimates as a share of GNI up to 2008, but estimates 

for more recent years are even higher, reaching around the equivalent of GDP. Th us Afghanistan 

has become an extreme outlier in aid dependency.

To shed light on concerns that Afghanistan is overly dependent on unsustainable external 

technical assistance, fi gure 5 shows available data on technical assistance, or TA (based on the 

OECD defi nition of technical cooperation), as a percentage of GNI. With only a couple of 

exceptions, TA has been below 5 percent of GNI for strongly performing comparators, and the 

ratio tends to be even lower for middle and weak performers. Not surprisingly, trends have been 

broadly similar to those for total aid, with the rate of decline in the TA-to-GNI ratio being 
12 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

somewhat more rapid for strong performers. In Afghanistan, by contrast, there has been a modest upward trend amid wide fl uctuations and levels above 5 percent of GNI in all but two years. 

Moreover, actual levels of TA funding must be substantially higher than the OECD data would 

indicate, given the much higher estimates by World Bank staff of total aid to Afghanistan, which 

cannot be broken down between TA and other components of aid.

Overall, the international comparisons indicate that a signifi cant degree of aid dependence at the beginning of transition need not be a bar to sustained progress in transition (see 

fi gure 4). However, Afghanistan currently exhibits an extreme and virtually unprecedented level 

of aid dependence.

A related issue is the eff ect of large and, in some cases, sudden drops in aid on postconfl ict and 

confl ict-aff ected countries. Aid volatility in general has been a problem for developing countries, 

as aid has tended to be more volatile than other sources of revenue and fi nancing. Given postconfl ict and confl ict-aff ected countries’ often greater dependence on aid and weaker institutions, aid 

volatility and aid shocks—in the form of sudden, sharp declines—can be highly problematic. Aid 

disbursements have tended to be even more volatile in postconfl ict countries and fragile states than 

in other low-income developing countries.13 Moreover, recent research suggests that negative aid 

shocks are associated with a higher probability of entering confl ict—more than doubling that risk 

for the average country.14 Despite these fi ndings, there is little evidence that aid volatility has fallen 

in recent years.15

Turning to other examples of highly aid-dependent postconfl ict countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a relatively small middle-income country, received very substantial aid in the year or 

two immediately after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, peaking at 57 percent 

of GNI in that year. Th ereafter aid declined by a large but steady margin to around one-seventh 

of its peak level as a share of GNI within seven years (see fi gure 6) and later dropped by another 

two thirds. Over the same period, economic growth substantially declined from initially very high 

levels—refl ecting the postconfl ict economic revival—but did not turn negative even in terms of 

average per capita real GDP growth. Moreover, growth subsequently revived to healthy levels 

after the decline in aid ended.

Bosnia’s experience with declining aid may appear to give hope that the anticipated drop in aid 

to Afghanistan will not lead to economic collapse. But many of the relatively positive aspects of the 

situation in Bosnia may not pertain to Afghanistan. Th e post-2001 economic boom in Afghanistan 

may not be so vigorous ten years out, unless a peace agreement with the Taliban insurgency emerges 

that brings positive economic consequences with it. Aid to Afghanistan may be more volatile than aid 

to Bosnia was, and moreover, Afghanistan’s aid has built up over time and has already been extraordinarily high as a share of GDP for a number of years—increasing the risk that the economy has become more adapted to and dependent on it. Much aid to Afghanistan is for ongoing (and expanding) 

programs rather than onetime activities, and therefore sharp declines may be more disruptive. Finally, 

given the enormous amount of aid to Afghanistan and its less favorable situation than Bosnia’s, other 

fi nancial infl ows may have less ability to substitute for aid, especially in the short run.

Timor-Leste also received high levels of postconfl ict aid. As fi gure 7 shows, aid in the fi rst 

three years of independence was around 70 percent of GNI, after which there was a rapid but 

steady decline to around 10 percent of GNI over a period of fi ve years.16 However, average per 

capita real GDP growth, which dipped sharply into negative territory in 2001 at the time of 

peak aid, gradually improved as aid declined rapidly and maintained signifi cant positive levels 

of growth after aid had reached 10 percent of GNI. Although comparable data from the World 

Development Indicators (WDI) were not available for Kosovo until very recently, information 
USIP.ORG 13

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

from other sources suggests that the major decline in aid as a share of economic activity there also 

did not have a signifi cant adverse eff ect on growth. 

Other examples among the low-income countries in the comparator set also suggest that the 

adverse eff ect of declining levels of aid on economic growth need not be great. In Mozambique, 

a strongly performing comparator country, aid was equivalent to 60 to 80 percent of GNI during 

the fi rst three years of transition but declined sharply to less than 30 percent over two years and 

remained between 20 and 30 percent for the remainder of the fi fteen-year transition period under 

consideration. Real per capita GDP, however, maintained an average annual growth rate of over 

4 percent and, if anything, slightly accelerated after the sharp decline in aid.

At the other end of the performance spectrum, in Guinea-Bissau, a weakly performing comparator, aid fl uctuated widely—between 23 and 79 percent of GNI, peaking in the third year of 

transition. Average annual per capita GDP growth in the country has been generally negative, but 

there is no discernible relation between the level of aid and the rate of economic growth or decline. In Eritrea, another weakly performing comparator country, aid started low, grew larger amid 

fl uctuations from the eighth to the twelfth year of transition (in the range of 30 to 54 percent of 

GNI), and then declined sharply to 9 to 12 percent of GNI in the thirteenth to fi fteenth years of 

transition. Again there is no discernible relation between these large fl uctuations in aid and the 

Note: OECD data cover between 2001 and 2010; World Bank Afghanistan Country Team estimates cover between 

2002 and 2010. Country Team estimates for aid as percentage of GNI in 2007 (101.3 percent) and 2010 (103.8 percent) 

are off the chart.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 7, based on OECD statistics on aid; World Bank

Afghanistan Country Team estimates for total aid to Afghanistan; WDI data on GNI.

Figure 4. Aid Dependency (percent of GNI)
14 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

annual growth of average per capita GDP—which was negative from the ninth year onward but, 

if anything, slightly less negative during the fi nal three years of transition.

Th ere are, however, prominent cases of a sharp cutoff in aid, often for geopolitical reasons, wreaking havoc on the recipient country. Th e adverse eff ect on the economy tends to be secondary to the 

disastrous consequences for a country’s fi scal position, security sector (if that was externally funded), 

regime stability due to political economy implications and disruption of various interest groups, and 

more generally in terms of precipitating confl ict (including most directly through disintegration of security forces). Th e cutoff of aid to Somalia during its civil war in the late 1980s resulted in a worst-case 

outcome. Th e army collapsed due to lack of pay and other funding, deserters and units joined warring 

militias, and state collapse accelerated. Th e abrupt cutoff of Soviet aid to the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan precipitated that government’s collapse and the subsequent destructive civil war.17

Governance, Political, and Other Indicators

Given the nature of qualitative and perceptions-based indicators and what they are trying to 

measure, the pitfalls of constructing index-based variables,18 and issues associated with surveys of 

expert opinions, the conclusions we draw from them need to be treated with particular caution. 

As perceptions are involved in setting ratings—often foreign perceptions—they can be subject 

Note: OECD data for technical assistance based on category of technical cooperation 2002–08; Country team

estimates for technical assistance are not available.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 8, based on OECD statistics on Technical

Cooperation and WDI data on GNI.

Figure 5. Reliance on Technical Assistance (percent of GNI)
USIP.ORG 15

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

to a number of biases, including whether or not a country gets greater attention in the media as 

well as changing trends in opinion. Widespread international perceptions of improvements in 

Afghanistan after 2001 gave way to increasing pessimism in the latter part of the decade. Evaluating trends may be more reliable than comparing levels of ratings across countries. Even with these 

caveats, where diff erences in indicators are striking across the diff erent performance groups, there 

can be greater confi dence that they are meaningful.

Restoring security and the rule of law are seen as critically important elements of transition, and there is a clear upward trend in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) rule of 

law measure for strongly performing comparator countries (fi gure 8). Rates of improvement are 

on average slower for the other two performance clusters. In the weak performers’ cluster, most 

countries saw declines or at best stagnation.19 Th e middle performers do about as well in rule of 

law indicators as strong performers on average, but this is attributable to high ratings for a single 

country, Ethiopia. For Afghanistan, both levels and trends for the rule of law indicator are strikingly poor, with the country starting out at one of the lowest levels of any comparator and further 

declining since 2002. Only a few other countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

(DRC) and, briefl y, Guinea-Bissau, are even close to Afghanistan in this regard.

In controlling corruption (also as measured by WGI), no striking trends over time are evident 

on average for any performance group (see fi gure 9). Levels of this indicator are slightly lower on 

average for the poor performers’ cluster, but the diff erence is small. Some countries show signifi -

cant trends of improvement or deterioration, but such variability can be seen in all three clusters. 

Afghanistan is signifi cantly below the averages for all comparator groups in this indicator—in 

fact, below all but a couple of observations for any countries—and has exhibited a declining trend 

with some ups and downs.

Trends in the WGI government eff ectiveness indicator (fi gure 10) show a clear upward direction 

with some fl uctuations for the strong performers’ cluster. For middle performers, there is no clear trend, 

and for weak performers, there is a slight downward trend that masks signifi cant declines for a number 

of individual countries. In other words, the trends for this indicator are associated with clear diff erences in performance during postconfl ict transition. For Afghanistan, the indicator fi rst rose and then 

declined, starting and ending well below the averages for all comparator groups and below nearly all 

country observations beyond a year or two after transition initiation excepting the DRC. Afghanistan’s 

performance puts it near the bottom of the poor performers’ group.

Source: World Development Indicators

Figure 6. Aid and Growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1994–2008
16 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

However, it seems unlikely that overall government eff ectiveness in Afghanistan in 2010 was 

worse than in 2003 or 2004, when government functions were just beginning to be restored. Th is 

suggests that trends over time—and the negative reversal starting in 2005 in particular—may be 

more reliable for such perception-based indicators than absolute levels. Moreover, the negative 

trends contrast with evidence of steady progress in improving concrete elements of government 

eff ectiveness in Afghanistan, such as public fi nancial management and eff ective service delivery 

through national programs, most notably health care and rural community development. Th e indicator may not be fully capturing such improvements, perhaps because they are not widely known, 

but it does seem to capture perceptions of government ineff ectiveness in other respects, as well 

as refl ecting the limited reach of government in parts of the country due to worsening insecurity.

Th e political stability indicator (also WGI) increased substantially for the strong performers’ 

cluster and also, on average, for the other two clusters, although in both of the latter there are a 

number of examples of declines, particularly in the latter part of the fi fteen-year transition period 

(fi gure 11). For Afghanistan, the indicator started out at a fairly low level and has progressively 

declined to below any other individual country-year observation, except for a couple of observations for the DRC. As with the government eff ectiveness indicator, trends in the political stability 

indicator are worrisome. While such patterns need to be interpreted with caution—for example, 

the expanding Taliban insurgency, and not only political issues on the non-Taliban side, may have 

been a factor in this indicator’s deterioration—the trends in comparator countries and the decline 

in Afghanistan suggest that it refl ects serious political problems carrying risks of instability. In 

this light, the political dimensions of transition and political strategy in Afghanistan cannot be 

neglected or downplayed.

Recognizing that indicators of democracy may be less reliable than other indicators, fi gure 12 

shows trends and patterns for the Freedom House Composite Score regarding civil liberties and 

political rights. All three comparator clusters show improving trends—represented by a downward 

movement in the indicator—with strong and especially middle performers moving somewhat faster 

than weak performers. However, this indicator is characterized by wide diff erences across countries 

(especially among strong performers), persistence of ratings often over considerable periods of time, 

and step changes; so average trends must be interpreted cautiously. Afghanistan saw a sharp improvement after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, further improvements through 2005, and signifi -

cant deterioration in 2008 and 2010. In 2010, Afghanistan’s rating was less “free” than the averages 

Source: World Development Indicators

Figure 7. Aid and Growth in Timor-Leste, 2000–2010

The negative trends 

contrast with evidence 

of steady progress in 

improving concrete 

elements of government 

effectiveness in 

Afghanistan, such as 

public fi nancial 

management and 

effective service delivery.
USIP.ORG 17

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

for all three comparator clusters, although several countries in each cluster had weaker ratings than 

Afghanistan—more so, and for more countries, in the strong performers’ cluster. Th us patterns of 

international experience are ambiguous, with no clear messages for or about Afghanistan.20

Social Indicators

Social indicators are extremely important measures of development and a government’s ability to 

provide eff ective social services. Th e comparative analysis is applied to three key social indicators: 

life expectancy, the mortality rate for children under the age of fi ve, and total primary school enrollment rate for boys and girls. Th is refl ects a focus on key social outcomes21 as well as limitations 

on the data available for Afghanistan and some comparator countries for other indicators. 

Life expectancy increased signifi cantly for strong and middle performers on average and declined for weak performers (see fi gure 13), though trends in some individual countries diff er 

from the overall cluster trends.22 Mozambique, in the strong performers’ cluster, had declining 

life expectancy during most of its transition period after an initial rise, while Eritrea, in the poor 

performers’ cluster, had steadily rising life expectancy. As in the strong and middle performer 

groups, life expectancy in Afghanistan has been improving steadily, but since it started from a 

very low base, at forty-eight years it remains well below the average for all comparator groups and 

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 16, based on Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Figure 8. Rule of Law (WGI) 

As in the strong and 

middle performer 

groups, life expectancy 

in Afghanistan has been 

improving steadily, but 

it started from a very 

low base.
18 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

below most individual comparator countries except for some sub-Saharan African countries devastated by HIV/AIDS. Th us, while the trend in Afghanistan has been similar to that of strongly 

performing comparators, in absolute terms, life expectancy there remains low.23

Th e under-fi ve mortality rate declined moderately for middle performers and more signifi -

cantly for strong performers. Th e average mortality rate actually rose on average among poor performers (see fi gure 14), though this is partially due to Haiti’s inclusion in the data; Haiti is an 

outlier, and its transition started only recently. Th ere is great variation in the level of this important 

social indicator across countries within each cluster, though trends for the strong and middle performers moved uniformly in the downward direction, an exceptional fi nding among all variables 

and indicators studied in this paper. Such uniformity was not evident among weak performers: 

Many improved, but some saw stagnating or rising child mortality. Afghanistan has seen a steady 

decline in the under-fi ve mortality rate, similar to the average trend for the strong performers cluster. Moreover, approaching one hundred deaths for every one thousand live births, Afghanistan’s 

estimated rate is similar to the average for strong performers. However, data for this indicator tend 

to be unreliable, so trends need to be interpreted with caution.

Th e striking feature of trends in net primary school enrollment is that, with very few exceptions, there are steady increases in total, boys’, and girls’ net primary enrollment ratios throughout 

transition.24 Hence, for the vast majority of comparator countries, success or failure in transition 

is not linked to increasing primary school enrollments. Th is should not be taken as an argument 

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 14, based on Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Figure 9. Control of Corruption (WGI) 
USIP.ORG 19

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

against prioritizing primary education, for which there are sound development justifi cations. But 

investing in and expanding primary education should not be seen as a major factor in a postconfl ict 

transition performance—certainly not by itself—for sharply increasing prospects for success. Th is 

fi nding is broadly consistent with an observation from the Human Security Report Project, based 

on multicountry studies and econometric analyses, that during many confl ict periods, educational 

outcomes actually improve on average.25

Data on net primary school enrollment ratios for Afghanistan are limited and not strictly comparable to those in the dataset for comparator countries, but it is well known that Afghanistan has made 

major progress in expanding primary education since 2001. Th e estimated net primary school enrollment ratios in Afghanistan of 68 percent overall in 2010 and 55 percent for girls refl ect a dramatic 

expansion of primary education during the previous decade, especially for girls, whose education was 

publicly forbidden and very limited in practice under the Taliban regime. Moreover, the fi gures for 

Afghanistan, though likely overstated, are not dramatically outside the range of levels seen across 

comparator countries, although well below those of strong performers.

Afghanistan’s Current Situation in International Perspective

Turning to Afghanistan’s situation at the beginning of its 2011–14 transition from an international comparative perspective, the country’s performance as measured by key economic variables 

during the past decade has been impressive (fi gure 15).26 Its average per capita GDP has grown in 

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 15, based on Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Figure 10. Government Eff ectiveness (WGI)

Net primary school 

enrollment ratios ... refl ect 

a dramatic expansion of 

primary education during 

the previous decade.
20 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

real terms at twice the average rate seen in strongly performing comparator countries, and its level 

has reached around the average level for strongly performing comparators, even though some of 

those countries started out with per capita GDP levels far higher than Afghanistan’s. Infl ation in 

Afghanistan has been signifi cantly lower than the average among strong performers, although 

the diff erence is slightly less in comparison with the weak performers’ cluster, and middle performers actually had somewhat lower infl ation than Afghanistan.27

In key social indicators, Afghanistan started out from a very poor base but has progressed 

signifi cantly since 2001, refl ecting large investments in social services as well as rapid economic 

growth (fi gure 15). Nevertheless, bridging the seven-year gap in life expectancy between Afghanistan and the strongly performing comparators will take a long time—perhaps twenty or 

twenty-fi ve years if the rate of increase seen in the past decade continues. On the other hand, the 

mortality rate for children under the age of fi ve in Afghanistan has dropped sharply and is already 

substantially lower than the average for strongly performing comparators.28

With Afghanistan’s deteriorating political stability (according to the WGI political stability 

indicator), the gap between it and the strong performers’ cluster has increased substantially since 

2001 and is quite large (fi gure 16). It would be even larger if we compared it with the end points 

of transition of the strong performers’ group. Th e gap is all the more striking since comparators in 

all three performance clusters generally saw improvements in political stability during transition. 

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 17, based on Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Figure 11. Political Stability (WGI)
USIP.ORG 21

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

So the deterioration in political stability in Afghanistan is obviously a serious concern and needs 

to be reversed.

Th e rule of law (WGI) also has deteriorated steadily in Afghanistan, and the gap compared with 

strong performers during their transitions has become quite large (fi gure 16). As noted earlier, it can 

be questioned whether the rule of law in Afghanistan really declined in the years immediately after 

2001, but based on other information as well, there is no question that the situation currently is highly 

problematic in many parts of the country. Th e substantial upward trend for strong performers regarding the rule of law suggests that it is associated with success during transition.29

Voice and accountability (WGI) in Afghanistan remained steady or improved slightly for a 

number of years but then deteriorated in 2008 and especially in 2009 to a rating lower than in 

most comparators (fi gure 16). However, trends in this variable are not very clear or signifi cantly 

diff erent across comparators, and unlike political stability and rule of law, Afghanistan’s ratings 

(except to some extent in 2009) are within the range seen in all three comparator clusters.

Afghanistan’s government eff ectiveness indicator (WGI) improved sharply in 2003 and 

2004 but declined to slightly below its 2002 level by 2008 and 2009. Th is is lower than all 

strong and middle performers among comparator countries in the latter part of their transition 

periods, and there is a large gap with the strong performers overall (fi gure 16). However, the 

Note: The Freedom House composite score of political rights and civil liberties is an inverted 1 to 7 point scale,

where 1 is most free and 7 is not free; thus, a downward trend reflects an increase in freedom.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 13, based on Freedom House composite score of

political rights and civil liberties.

Figure 12. Political Liberties and Civil Rights (Freedom House Composite Score)
22 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

progress Afghanistan achieved between 2002 and 2004 suggests that the gap could be narrowed 

substantially within a few years if the deterioration can be reversed. Also, as noted earlier, this 

indicator may not fully capture improvements in concrete elements of government eff ectiveness 

that have occurred since 2001.

Survey and other evidence has indicated that corruption is a very serious problem in Afghanistan, so it is not surprising that Afghanistan’s rating for control of corruption (WGI) has deteriorated amid fl uctuations and is well below the average levels of all three clusters of comparator 

countries, in particular strong performers (fi gure 16). However, as there is no clear trend overall 

in this variable for comparator countries or clusters during transition, the indicator does not shed 

much light on the level of corruption, the degree of damage corruption has caused during the 

transition process, or its infl uence on the prospects for success. Regulatory quality (WGI) has improved somewhat in Afghanistan but remains well below the average during transition for strong 

performing comparators (fi gure 16). At the rate of progress observed from 2002 to 2009, it would 

take Afghanistan seventeen years to reach the strong performers’ cluster average.

Table 3 summarizes where Afghanistan currently stands in relation to the strong performers’ 

cluster of comparator countries. Having seen mixed and uneven performance across the diff erent 

indicators over the past decade, Afghanistan faces its upcoming transition with both strengths 

and weaknesses, with questions about preserving gains made in some areas and narrowing the 

wide gaps seen in others.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 24, based on Worldwide Development Indicators.

Figure 13. Life Expectancy (years at birth)
USIP.ORG 23

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

Themes and Lessons for Afghanistan’s Transition

Our analysis suggests several possible lessons that can inform policy recommendations for Afghanistan’s current transition and beyond. As emphasized earlier, lessons from international experience must be thoroughly grounded in an understanding of Afghanistan’s current context and 

the environment and constraints that the country faces. Keeping this in mind, this section distills 

some themes that seem particularly relevant for Afghanistan and its current transition. 

■ Afghanistan faces transition with both strengths and weaknesses, following uneven progress since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. In some respects, the country’s performance 

has been unusually good, even compared with countries that managed to achieve strong 

recoveries and successful transitions after confl ict. Afghanistan has seen high economic 

growth, relatively low infl ation, solid public fi nancial management, and some eff ective 

national programs providing basic services. Maintaining progress in these areas and protecting the gains made, which will be at risk during transition, should be a priority. In other 

respects, there has been signifi cant progress, but the gap with strongly performing comparator countries remains very large due to the low baseline Afghanistan started from in 2001. 

Th is is the case for social indicators such as life expectancy. In other areas, especially governance and political variables, Afghanistan’s performance in recent years has been poor, and 

the gap with strongly performing comparators is very large and growing. Th e deterioration 

Figure 14. Mortality Rate of Children under Age Five (deaths per thousand)

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figure 23, based on World Development Indicators.

In some respects, the 

country’s performance 

has been unusually good, 

even compared with 

countries that managed 

to achieve strong 

recoveries and successful 

transitions after confl ict.
24 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

in political stability, rule of law, and government eff ectiveness needs to be reversed. Finally, 

aid dependence in Afghanistan has been almost uniquely high among comparators, and the 

anticipated large decline in external resources fl owing into Afghanistan can be expected to 

have signifi cant consequences. 

■ Afghanistan will face the challenge of maintaining robust economic growth during and 

beyond transition. Th e key question is whether growth can be maintained at robust (even if 

somewhat lower) levels with better employment generation in a declining aid environment—and likely with continuing confl ict and insecurity in parts of the country. 

International experience clearly demonstrates that robust economic growth is associated 

with successful transitions and poor economic growth with weak performance during 

transition. Causation can fl ow both ways, but economic growth and associated employment 

generation is an important ingredient of a successful transition. 

■ Th e gap between Afghanistan and other countries in key social indicators remains large. 

Afghanistan has made substantial progress, but the country started from a very low base in 

2001—among the worst in the world. As strong performers have continued to improve 

during their transitions, Afghanistan will be keep playing catch-up in this respect for some 

time to come.

■ Abrupt cutoff s or sudden sharp reductions of aid could be highly problematic for 

Afghanistan. A review of other countries’ experiences suggests that the adverse economic 

eff ects of declining aid can be much less than expected based on the sheer amount of aid at 

peak levels. But aid volatility is a problem for developing counties, particularly those that are 

fragile and aff ected by confl ict. International experience and Afghanistan’s history—notably 

in 1991 and 1992—suggest that Afghanistan’s fi scal, political economy, and political and 

security situations are vulnerable to large, sudden drops in aid. Th is is especially true of the 

support for Afghanistan’s large security forces, which can become ineff ective or turn against 

the government if they are not funded or paid. Limiting the fl uctuations of aid to 

Afghanistan, programming steady reductions in aid rather than sharp drops, and improving 

the quality of aid—including by channeling more of it through the government budget 

directly and via the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund—would mitigate the risks 

associated with declining aid. 

■ Afghanistan’s deteriorating governance and rule of law indicators are a concern.

Qualitative, perceptions-based indicators need to be interpreted with caution. But for 

government eff ectiveness and rule of law, they tell a clear story: progressively declining 

ratings for Afghanistan compared with substantially increasing ratings for most strongly 

performing comparator countries and stagnation, declines, or slower improvements for 

middle and especially weak performers. Th ese trends—combined with the central message 

of the 2011 World Development Report about the crucial importance of citizen security 

and justice, as well as other evidence about the importance of strong institutions not only 

for development but also for mitigating confl ict risks—suggest that Afghanistan is starting 

its upcoming transition in a problematic position. 

■ Political consolidation and improved political stability is crucial. Afghanistan is starting 

its current transition in a weak position, with a declining and very low rating for political 

stability. Th e country faces disputes between the executive and legislative branches, uncertainties over prospects for peace negotiations with the Taliban insurgency, limited progress 

Programming steady 

reductions rather than 

sharp drops would 

mitigate the risks 

associated with 

declining aid.
USIP.ORG 25

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

in political normalization, and issues and risks associated with the 2014–15 election cycle, 

which will occur as international forces complete their transfer of security responsibilities to 

the Afghan government. Th e lack of progress in political consolidation and building political institutions and stability following completion of the process mandated by the 2001 

Bonn Agreement in 2004–05 is worrisome and may well aff ect the prospects for success of 

the transition process as a whole. 

Th is paper has only scratched the surface of the richness and diversity of international experience with postconfl ict and confl ict-aff ected transitions and how it can inform policy in 

Afghanistan. While caution, selectivity, and adaptation to Afghanistan’s situation and context 

are essential, a number of the lessons put forward are relevant to Afghanistan’s current transition. 

It is necessary to acknowledge the disadvantages and risks that Afghanistan faces so they can be 

managed better, mitigated, and possibly converted into opportunities. Avoiding excessive optimism or undue pessimism, there is a need for more informed, holistic, consistent, and strategic 

policies oriented also toward the period beyond 2014.

Note: GDP per capita for Afghanistan is latest available;

for comparators, the average for entire period. For GDP

growth and inflation, Aghanistan is the average for

period data available; for comparators, the average for

all countries during transition.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, "Afghanistan in

Transition," figure 1 and annex table A. 1.

Note: Data for Afghanistan are most recent available;

data for comparators are average of all observations

during transition period.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, "Afghanistan in

Transition," figure 2 and annex table A.1.

Figure 15. Gaps in Key Economic and Social Variables
26 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

Broader Observations and Areas for Further Research

Our analysis represents a fi rst exploration that can and should be taken forward in the future. 

Promising areas for further research include updating both international and Afghanistan-specifi c data as information for more years becomes available; adding more variables to the comparative analysis for which suffi cient data are, or subsequently become, available; conducting sensitivity analyses to assess the extent to which broad patterns and trends are aff ected by variations in 

the underlying parameters, assumptions, and classifi cations; and applying the methodological 

framework to other countries undergoing transitions from confl ict. 

Th e database for the empirical research conducted in this paper is a moving target. Th e World 

Development Indicators—the source of most of the quantitative data used in the international 

comparisons—are frequently updated, and past data are retroactively adjusted as corrections are 

made or earlier estimates are revised. For Afghanistan, such retroactive changes have been most 

prominent for social indicators such as life expectancy and the under-fi ve mortality rate, making it challenging to appropriately situate Afghanistan within broader international experience.30

Retroactive revisions do not occur for perceptions-based qualitative indicators, but information 

for new years as they elapse can signifi cantly aff ect trends, given that there are less than a dozen 

data points for Afghanistan since 2001. All this means that updating Afghanistan-specifi c and, 

to a lesser extent, international data (for those countries with less than fi fteen years transition 

experience) potentially could aff ect some of the fi ndings. It would be worthwhile to update the 

present analysis perhaps in a year or two.

Figure 16. Gaps in Political Variables, Rule of Law, and Governance Indicators

Note: Data for Afghanistan are most recent available;

data for comparators are the average of all observations

during transition period.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, "Afghanistan in

Transition," figure 4 and annex table A.1.

Note: Data for Afghanistan are most recent available;

data for comparators are the average of all observations

during transition period.

Source: Byrd, Milante, and Anye, "Afghanistan in

Transition," figure 3 and annex table A. 1.
USIP.ORG 27

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

Table 3. Afghanistan’s Performance and Current Status Relative to Strong Performers Cluster

Variable/ 

indicator

Afghanistan 

trend

Trend of strong 

performers Current gap Comments

No gap or small gap with comparators

Real average 

per capita GDP 

growth

Very rapid Rapid None Growth in Afghanistan has been faster than in virtually all 

comparators; need to maintain robust growth even if at 

somewhat lower rates 

Average per 

capita real GDP 

level

Rising sharply Rising None Continuing growth—especially employment growth—

and avoiding recession will be key

Infl ation (GDP 

defl ator)

Very low Not so low None Need to maintain good performance in controlling 

infl ation during transition

Government 

consumption

Flat Flat Not signifi cant Government consumption for Afghanistan substantially 

higher due to external budget

Mortality rate of 

children under 

age fi ve

Improving from 

low base

Gradually 

improving

None Data issues for Afghanistan important to maintain and 

build on progress

Intermediate gap or mixed pattern

Structure of 

economy

Rapid change Rapid change See comment Afghan structural change appears to a large extent aiddriven; need for new growth drivers

Voice and 

accountability

Steady then 

deteriorating

Modest 

improvements

Large Recent decline for Afghanistan worrisome, but trends 

in comparators mixed during transition and not sharply 

upward

Civil liberties 

and political 

rights

Improving then 

deteriorating

Small positive 

trend but levels 

vary greatly 

Small but growing Recent deterioration is worrisome, and if it continues will 

place Afghanistan well below most comparators

Regulatory 

quality

Improving 

somewhat

Improving Large Further improvements needed, as this may be a factor in 

facilitating private sector growth

Life expectancy Improving from 

low base

Improving Large It will take Afghanistan a long time to catch up to 

average level of strong performers

Primary 

enrollment ratio

Improving from 

very low base

Improving Large Afghanistan still behind, but trends in this indicator 

not closely associated with success of transition in 

comparators

Large or very large gap

Aid as 

percentage of 

GNI

Rising, extremely 

high

Falling steadily 

over time

Extremely Large Declining aid during transition will have serious effects; 

large, abrupt fall would be much worse

Technical 

assistance (TA) 

as percentage 

of GNI

Fluctuating and 

> 5 percent of 

GNI

Fluctuating at 

lower levels

Very large TA will also decline; need to improve quality of TA and 

transition to core government capacity

Political stability Deteriorating Improving Very large Afghanistan’s poor performance relative to most 

comparators (in all clusters) underlines the seriousness of 

the political stability issue

Rule of law Deteriorating Improving Large Reinforces widespread concerns about worsening rule of 

law in Afghanistan; adverse trends need to be reversed

Government 

effectiveness

Declining after 

initial rise

Improving Large Declining trend is worrisome and needs to be reversed, 

will be challenging with falling aid

Control of 

corruption

Low and declining Higher, variable 

across countries

Large Corruption in Afghanistan very serious, but much 

variation across countries (including strong performers) 

and no clear trends
28 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

Expanding the list of variables in the comparative analysis is another promising way forward. 

While the data requirements are substantial—that is, suffi cient information to cover most comparator countries’ fi fteen-year transition periods as well as the country subjected to the comparative 

analysis—it would be worthwhile to include additional quantitative and qualitative perceptionsbased variables to explore their patterns and associations. Some international databases, particularly those with survey-based qualitative indicators, do not cover Afghanistan at all, which was a 

major constraint for this paper. Th is may become less of a problem in the future and would not be 

an issue for work on other countries already included in these databases. 

While we consider our methodology, assumptions, and classifi cations to be fairly robust, sensitivity analyses could be conducted to ascertain whether and to what extent the results may change 

with diff erent choices for certain elements of the study for which we have exercised a degree of discretion. For some countries, an element of judgment is involved in choosing its year zero—when 

the country began its transition out from confl ict—so it might be useful to check whether any of 

the broad patterns and fi ndings change with alternative choices for year zero for those countries. It 

may also be useful to change the classifi cation groups, perhaps from three in the current approach 

to two: that is, strong performers and weak performers. While the Human Development Index 

seems the most appropriate variable to measure individual countries’ overall performance during 

transition, it may be useful to explore alternative secondary performance indicators for countries 

that do not have suffi cient HDI data to assess performance. Finally, it may be worthwhile to 

explore whether the vintage of countries’ transitions—for example, whether a transition started 

around the end of the Cold War or later—aff ects fi ndings and patterns.

Th e comparative methodology developed in this paper could certainly be applied to countries 

other than Afghanistan; however, the fi ltering process to generate a list of relevant comparator 

countries would need to be modifi ed to be suitable for the selected country. Other countries initiating transitions away from confl ict may not face the conceptual issues that Afghanistan’s 2001 

transition creates, given the country’s subsequent history and the current security-focused and 

political transition. By the same token, another country may not have the prior transition initiation 

and decade of transition performance that, for Afghanistan, could be compared with international 

patterns and trends. In these cases, comparison at time of transition initiation with diff erent clusters of comparator countries at the beginning, middle, and end of their transitions would be the 

primary mode of analysis. 

We close with a few broader observations. First, we envisage our approach as a fl exible tool 

and one among several—including the fi ndings of large-sample econometric studies, qualitative 

comparisons with individual countries based on case studies of experience, and reference to the 

specifi c history of the country under study. When diff erent modes of analysis present a consistent 

picture, the robustness of fi ndings is enhanced. Second, and related, the methodology, analysis, 

and fi ndings presented in this paper should be seen as a work in progress and subject to further 

development and improvements. Possible avenues forward have been discussed in this section; 

others may emerge during further experimentation. Th ird, even though some of the patterns and 

associations found in the comparative analysis are striking, they do not necessarily imply causation in any direction or illuminate whether a common factor may be infl uencing both transition 

performance and the variable concerned. Fourth, the fi ndings in this paper need to be interpreted 

in the context of Afghanistan’s current situation; they should not be understood in the abstract 

or ahistorically. Finally, it is hoped that this paper will generate interest in conducting further 

research, using this methodology, on diff erent countries in transition.
USIP.ORG 29

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION

Notes

 1. There are some important exceptions however. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), an effort inspired 

by the Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia, went through a period of design adaptation to make 

it suitable for the Afghanistan context. The extra time was well spent, and NSP is one of the small number 

of highly successful development programs in Afghanistan. 

 2. See William Byrd, Gary Milante, and Kenneth Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 

2014—Quantitative and Indicator-Wise International Comparisons,” December 2012, background paper 

for the World Bank study Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 

2013), figures 5–27 for detailed figures comparing Afghanistan with the different clusters of comparator 

countries, and the annex of the same paper for comparative data in tabular form.

 3. Documented fully in Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” 5–6, and tables 1 and 2.

 4. See World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC: 

World Bank, 2011).

 5. Although the Democratic Republic of the Congo has substantial underground mineral resources, it is kept 

on the list of comparators because much of its resource wealth is scattered and not easily accessible.

 6. See all observations for all three comparator clusters presented graphically and briefly discussed in Byrd, 

Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figures 5–27, which also presents data for Afghanistan 

where available.

 7. For a discussion of changing trends and missed windows of opportunity in the years immediately after 

2001, see William Byrd, “Responding to Afghanistan’s Development Challenge: An Assessment of 

Experience During 2002–2007 and Issues and Priorities for the Future,” World Bank South Asia Region 

PREM Working Paper Series no. SASPR-11, Washington, DC, October 2007.

 8. We took this approach because removing all countries with any missing data would have drastically reduced 

the number of observations, making any patterns and associations derived less meaningful and discarding 

possibly valuable information on countries with some observations but not a complete set of data. 

 9. This association between average per capita GDP growth and performance as measured by HDI is not 

surprising since economic growth is a component of HDI. However, this relationship does underline the 

importance of economic growth both in HDI and in transition performance 

10. This very rapid overall economic growth has been achieved despite significant year-to-year fluctuations 

and, in the initial years after 2001, included a large element of recovery from the protracted conflict.

11. See Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figures 10–12.

12. Ibid., figure 9 for the available data and a brief discussion.

13. The coefficient of variation of annual real official development assistance (ODA) disbursements in subSaharan African countries from 1998 to 2007 averaged 0.65 for postconflict countries, 0.62 for other fragile 

states, and 0.39 for nonfragile, non-postconflict countries; see James K. Boyce and Shepard Forman, 

“Financing Peace: International and National Resources for Postconflict Countries and Fragile States,” 

background paper for World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC: 

World Bank, 2011), table 1, 37. The World Development Report itself (see box 6.7, 195) argues that the volatility of aid tends to increase the longer a country has been in conflict, faced high homicides, or been fragile.

14. Richard A. Nielsen, Michael G. Findley, Zachary S. Davis, Tara Candland, and Daniel L. Nielson, 

“Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science, 55, no. 2 

(April 2011), 219–232.

15. See AleŠ Bulíř and A. Javier Hamann, “Volatility of Development Aid: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?” 

working paper no. WP/06/65, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, June 26, 2006.

16. Figure 7 only covers the period since Timor-Leste became independent; very substantial international aid 

was provided for several years before this. 

17. See William Byrd, “Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond,” U.S. 

Institute of Peace Special Report no. 314, Washington, DC, 9.

18. See, e.g., Francisco Gutiérrez, Diana Buitrago, Andrea González, and Camila Lozano, Measuring Poor 

State Performance: Problems, Perspectives and Paths Ahead (London: London School of Economics Crisis 

States Research Centre, 2011), and Javier Fabra Mata and Sebastian Ziaja, Users’ Guide on Measuring 

Fragility (Bonn: German Development Institute and UNDP, 2009).

19. In this case, the modest upward trend on average for weak performers is a result of some countries with 

lower levels for this indicator having early data available, whereas other countries with higher (but declining) levels have data only for later years in their transition. Given missing data, the trend lines for this and 

other indicators may not fully capture the average of trends for individual countries during the full fifteenyear period of transition.
30 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 87

20. Certain other indicators are presented and described in Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” 

but not in this paper. Some indicators offer no significant differences among countries, and some trends are 

difficult to interpret, while for some indicators data are not available for Afghanistan.

21. In education, the appropriate outcome indicator is the literacy rate, but this changes slowly over time and may 

be subject to wide differences in definition and measurement, which limits comparability. Thus we use the 

net primary school enrollment ratio, recognizing that this also faces some data issues.

22. The declining trend for the poor performers’ cluster may have been accentuated by the changing sample: 

Some countries with higher life expectancy than the cluster average have data only for the first couple of years, 

for example.

23. A recent survey indicates a sharply higher life expectancy of sixty-four years, or around sixty-one years if some 

reporting issues are adjusted for (see Afghan Public Health Institute and Central Statistics Organization of 

Afghanistan, Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010, published in 2011). However, concerns have been expressed 

about the validity of these findings, particularly because of problems and shortcomings of fieldwork in the 

current security environment in many parts of Afghanistan. Moreover, this new estimate has not been 

accompanied by information on past trends and levels, rendering it impossible to use in the quantitative 

comparisons in figure 11. Further developments with respect to this survey will need to be monitored.

24. See Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” figures 25–27 for international data on net primary enrollment ratios. 

25. See Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2012: Sexual Violence, Education, and War: Beyond 

the Mainstream Narrative (Vancouver: Human Security Press, 2012). Those findings, as well as the patterns 

of primary education trends during transition brought out in this paper, suggest that a global trend of increasing primary education may offset country-specific associations with conflict or postconflict transition 

performance. 

26. Only selected variables and indicators are discussed here; data are shown from several perspectives for all three 

performance-based clusters in Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” annex. In the charts 

discussed below, with few exceptions, Afghanistan in the most recent year for which data are available is 

compared with the average level of the corresponding indicator for the strongly performing comparators’ 

cluster during the entire period of transition, not at the end point (for which data for only a limited number 

of countries are available). Out of the ten countries in the strong performers’ cluster, for many indicators—

particularly those that are more qualitative—observations for the fifteenth year are available for only five 

countries. As the strong performers’ cluster is characterized by general improvements in most performance 

indicators over the fifteen-year transition period, using the averages for the entire period rather than for the 

end point tends to understate the gap that Afghanistan would need to bridge in order to reach the average 

performance level of this cluster at the end point of transition. 

27. See Byrd, Milante, and Anye, “Afghanistan in Transition,” annex table A.2.

28. It should be kept in mind, however, that the worldwide trend of declining under-five mortality rates means 

that Afghanistan’s level may reflect global advances not apparent in the data for other countries where transitions started fifteen or more years ago.

29. However, there are some examples in the other clusters of improvements in rule of law despite weaker overall 

transition performance.

30. In fact, Afghanistan’s trends for the two indicators changed from significant improvement over time to nearstagnation and then back to steady improvement during the period while this study was conducted due to 

revisions of WDI estimates for earlier years. Since individual annual observations were not based on separate 

data points but on interpolation among a very small number of estimates, their reliability further suffers and 

should not be considered as very high.
 5

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Chairman of the Board: J. Robinson West

Vice Chairman: George E. Moose

President: Jim Marshall

Executive Vice President: Kristin Lord

Chief Financial Officer: Michael Graham

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • 

George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George 

Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant 

to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. 

Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, 

American University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy 

Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. Khan, 

President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, N.Y. • Jeremy 

A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy 

Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Kathleen Hicks, Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. 

Army; President, National Defense University • Jim Marshall, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
2 Looking for Justice UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE • 2301 CONSTITUTION AVE. NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20037 • USIP.ORG 

Following uneven progress since the downfall of the Taliban 

regime in 2001, Afghanistan faces its upcoming security and 

political transition with an encouraging economic performance but serious governance challenges. This report 

systematically compares Afghanistan’s experience with 

those of other countries that have emerged from conflict 

to bring out patterns and possible lessons that can 

inform thinking, analysis, and policy for Afghanistan’s current transition and beyond.

Related Links 

■ Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, Deborah Isser, 

ed. (USIP Press, 2011)

■ The Future of Afghanistan ed. J. Alexander Thier (USIP Press, 2009)

■ Justifying the Means: Afghan Perceptions of Electoral Processes by Noah 

Coburn and Anna Larson (Special Report, February 2013)

■ Police Transition in Afghanistan by Donald J. Planty and Robert M. Perito 

(Special Report, February 2013)

■ Political Economy and Conflict Dimensions of Afghanistan’s Mineral Resources: 

A Preliminary Exploration by William Byrd (Peace Brief, December 2012)

■ Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond by 

William Byrd (Special Report, September 2012)

■ Myths and Misconceptions in the Afghan Transition by Shahmahmood 

Miakhel and Noah Coburn (Peace Brief, April 2012)

PEACEWORKS • JUNE 2013 • NO. 87