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UNITED STates institute of peace

“In the constrained budget 

environment faced by the 

United States and its NATO 

allies, it seems highly likely that 

money will follow the exit of 

troops from Afghanistan.”

June 5, 2014

Revisiting Chicago

The Critical Need To Maintain Support For 

Afghanistan’s National Security Forces Post-2014

William A. Byrd

E-mail: wbyrd@usip.org

peaceBrieF173

Summary

•	 Two years ago, the Chicago internationalsummit agreed on long-term targetsfor the size

of the Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF) and committed to continued international

financialsupport until 2024.

•	 Since then, the ANSF have taken over lead responsibility for Afghanistan’ssecurity and have

by most accounts performed well, taking substantial casualties but holding their own against

the Taliban. However, the ANSF still rely heavily on U.S. financial and logisticalsupport and

military“enablers”in such roles as airsupport, medevac and reconnaissance.

•	 The Afghan government’sfailure to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the

United States during the past eight months has coincided with, and undoubtedly contributed

to, declining politicalsupport for the international engagement in Afghanistan. Not only has

U.S. civilian aid in the current fiscal year been halved, but the White House recently announced

a complete U.S. troop pull-out by the end of 2016, except for“normal levels”to protect the

U.S. Embassy and oversee military assistance. That is close to a“zero option,”albeit in 2016

and not 2014.

•	 The announcement raisesserious questions about the staying power of internationalsecurity

funding (which would amount to billions of dollars per year into the early 2020sif the Chicago

commitments hold); management ofsecurity assistance; provision of logisticalsupport and

enablers; whether Afghanistan’s domestic revenues will grow fast enough to meet its own

ANSF funding commitments; and timing of any future ANSF reductionsin relation to possible

negotiations with the Taliban insurgency.

•	 The ANSF (especially the Afghan National Army, or ANA) waslargely a creation of the United

States, which has advocated for and endorsed its currentsize and cost. It would be irresponsible to create such a force and then turn around and undermine it.

The Chicago Summit

At the May 2012 Chicago NATOSummit on the Afghan National Security Forces, Afghanistan and

NATOcountries deploying troopsin the country agreed to continue providing support to the ANSF

over the decade following 2014.1 According to the Chicago communiqué, the future total ANSF size

would be 228,500—predominantly ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP)—with an estimated total
© USIP 2014 • All rights reserved.

Revisiting Chicago

page 2 • PB 173 • June 5, 2014

annual cost of $4.1 billion. Since the current ANSF force size is 352,000, the pace of a gradual managed force reduction to 228,500 will be“conditions-based”(e.g., if the security situation improves or

there is a peace agreement or cease-fire with the Taliban that warrantsforce reductions). Any reduction isto be decided by the Afghan government in consultation with the international community.

The communiqué also stated that the Afghan government’sinitial contribution to covering

security costs will be $500 million in 2015, and that it will take over the full financial burden for

ANSF by 2024. Thisimpliesthat the international community’s financialsupport for ANSF would

start at well over $3.6 billion per year (since the current force size exceedsthe long-term level) and

would remain in the billions of dollars annually into the early 2020s.2 It has been widely recognized

that long-term financial assistance will need to be accompanied by major logisticalsupport until

the ANSF becomesself-sufficient. Critical needs,such as airsupport, reconnaissance, intelligence

gathering and medevac, are currently being filled by international forces.

The Afghan government is making some progresstoward meeting itsinitial contribution target

for funding the ANSF. Domestic funding of the ANA and ANP reportedly was $369 million in 2013

and is budgeted at $386 million in 2014,3 and the Afghan government itself is also funding some

othersecurity spending.4

In June 2013 the ANSF took over the lead security role throughout the country, and their performance has met or exceeded expectations. They have largely held their own against the Taliban

insurgency but have taken substantial casualties—up to 400 per month,5 as Taliban attacks have

increased in number and lethality. Despite resulting concerns about the ANSF’s ability to cope over

the long run, it is clear that they are now fully engaged in the conflict.

The failure of the Afghan government to sign the BSA with the United States, which providesthe

legal foundation and parametersfor a continuing U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan after 2014,

has been very costly. The BSA had been negotiated and was expected to be signed before the end

of 2013, especially after a Loya Jirga (traditional assembly) endorsed the BSA and urged that it be

signed expeditiously. President Hamid Karzai neverthelessrefused to sign the BSA, though both

leading Afghan presidential candidates have indicated that they willsign it if elected.

The negative economic fallout from the BSA delay has probably worsened over time.6The

impact on security and the elections, fortunately, has been limited so far. But most worrisome, the

delay in signing the BSA has coincided with, and undoubtedly contributed to, declining political

support for the international engagement in Afghanistan—both in its civilian dimension (witness

the U.S. Congress’s halving of the U.S. Agency for International Development budget allocation

for Afghanistan in the current fiscal year) and in the military dimension (the May 27, 2014, White

House announcement that U.S. forcesthere will be completely withdrawn by the end of 20167).

While some adverse effects may disappear once the BSA isin place, the loss of American and other

international politicalsupport during this period will be difficult to reverse.

Key Issues Ahead

First isthe question of whether the long-term ANSF force size of 228,500 agreed at Chicago will

remain the target. Ifso, what will be the“glide path”to get there from the current 352,000 level? 

It would seem nonsensical to start reducing the size of the ANSF just asinternational forces are

completing their drawdown. Asthe Chicago communiqué notes, movement toward the long-term

targetshould be based on conditions on the ground. If and when it is decided to start reducing

the size of the ANSF, this could be accomplished by cutting down on new recruitment, allowing

the decline to occur through attrition. Atsome point the number of formations(and associated

fixed expenses) also would need to be cut to contain overhead costs. There may be other ways of
© USIP 2014 • All rights reserved.

Revisiting Chicago

page 3 • PB 173 • June 5, 2014

reducing costs, but they are likely to be marginal. Lowering ANSF salaries would not be advisable

in the short run, and a resort to low-cost conscription—used in peacetime prior to 1978 and

proposed at times by the Afghan government—would not work now.

Second, the schedule for a complete U.S. troop withdrawalseems problematic. The initial U.S.

residual force size of 9,800 isin line with expectations. However, what issupposed to follow seems

drastic and out ofsync with the Chicago commitments—specifically, the announced plan to halve

that number by the end of 2015, and to complete the drawdown by the end of 2016 to“normal”

levels of military personnel that report to the U.S. ambassador and provide Embassy protection

and a military assistance component. Indeed, this plan appearsto be close to the long-discussed

“zero option”; the only significant difference isthat it will be implemented in 2016 rather than

2014. Because the ANSF still rely extensively on logisticalsupport and military enablersfrom

U.S. forces and it is doubtful that all gaps can be filled within two years, how will those roles be

maintained after 2016?

Further, how can large international (mostly U.S.)security assistance—billions of dollars annually until the early 2020s, according to the Chicago commitments—be managed after 2016?

Without an international military presence, it is not clear whether creative use of U.S. civilian

government employees and numerous contractors could substitute. Such an approach would

raise its own security as well astechnical and other issues, including questions about the roles and

accountability of contractorsin such a situation. 

Politically, will financial assistance to Afghanistan’ssecurity sector have much staying power if

there are no residual international troops? In the constrained budget environment faced by the

United States and its NATO allies, itseems highly likely that money will follow the exit of troops

from Afghanistan. It is possible to envision large military aid with no foreign troop presence (such

as U.S. military assistance to Israel and Egypt), but that kind of arrangement, which only those

two countries benefit from, would require extraordinary efforts and more political will to sustain

long-term support to Afghanistan than has been evident recently.

The sequencing of ANSF force strength and financialsupport vis-a-vis possible reconciliation

with the Taliban is another important issue. While a durable cessation of hostilities with the Taliban

would permit large savingsin ANSF size and costs, premature reductions(and probably premature

exit of residual international military forces) might well make it more difficult to achieve a peace

settlement. Insurgents would be tempted to wait for a more favorable situation asthe ANSF

shrinks and international troopsleave over the next two years. Thus, continuing robustsupport for

the ANSF is an important part of a supportive environment for negotiations and reconciliation.

The Afghan government’s poor performance in mobilizing its own revenuesin recent years

givesrise to concerns about whether it can achieve its Chicago commitment to assume full

funding of the total ANSF cost by 2024. If the ANSF’slong-term targetsforsize and cost are not

changed, Afghan funding for the ANSF would need to increase by 26 percent per year on average.

Domestic revenue hasstagnated or grown slowly since 2011 and has declined as a share of gross

domestic product,so a top priority for the new Afghan administration will be to reverse thistrend

and restore more rapid revenue growth. Particularly if total domestic revenue growsslowly in

the future, there is also a seriousrisk that meeting ANSF funding commitments willsqueeze out

civilian spending, potentially damaging Afghanistan’s development and stability.

Finally, it must be remembered that the ANSF, and the ANA in particular, islargely a creation of

the United States. Not only wasthe design of the ANA heavily influenced by the United States, but

each increase in itssize was advocated by the U.S. government—often in spite of warningsthat it

would not be fiscally sustainable and would consequently need long-term international financial

support. It would be irresponsible to create the ANSF and then turn around and undermine it—
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Revisiting Chicago

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whether by quickly cutting force size,sharply reducing funding or due to an inability to provide

essential logistical and othersupport. The new U.S. troop drawdown schedule raisesserious

questionsin thisregard, and the Chicago commitments could be jeopardized as a result.

Notes

1.	 Press Communiqué, Chicago SummitDeclaration on Afghanistan (May 21, 2012). See www.nato.

diplo.de/contentblob/3530790/Daten/2338290/ChicagoSummitDeclarAFGDLD.pdf.

2.	 A plausible trajectory would be forthe Afghan government’s contribution to ANSF funding to

increase at a constantrate of around 26 percent per yearto grow from $500 million in 2015 to

$4.1 billion in 2024. Underthisscenario, international funding for ANSF would remain high for a

number of years, for example $2.8 billion in 2019 and nearly $2.5 billion in 2020.

3.	 See 1393National Budget Statement, Annex 1, p. 88: www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/

DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1393/1393_National_Budget_statement__final.pdf. See also

April 2014World Bank Afghanistan Economic Update: www-wds.worldbank.org/external/

default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/04/23/000456286_20140423092911/Rendered/PDF/

875740WP0Afgha00Box382171B00PUBLIC0.pdf.

4.	 TheNationalDirectorate of Security (Intelligence),the Presidential Protective Service and the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs are also included in the Afghan government’s definition ofthe security

sector.Theirtotal expenditure was $256 million in 2013 and has been budgeted at $293 million

for 2014, not broken down between domestic and foreign funding.

5.	 See MattWaldman,“Afghanistan:WarWithout End,”Chatham House, May 30, 2014, at www.

chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/14614.

6.	 William A. Byrd, Casey GarretJohnson and SanaullahTasal,“Compounding Uncertainty in

Afghanistan: Economic Consequences ofDelay in Signing the Bilateral Security Agreement”

(U.S. Institute of Peace, Peace Brief 166, February 4, 2014). See www.usip.org/publications/

compounding-uncertainty-in-afghanistan.

7.	 See www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/fact-sheet-bringing-us-war-afghanistan

-responsible-end.

About This Brief

William A. Byrd is a senior expert at 

the U.S. Institute of Peace. He is a 

development economist with long 

experience working on Afghanistan, 

and has published extensively on 

Afghanistan’s economy and other 

topics. This Peace Brief comprises part of his ongoing work on 

Afghanistan’s economic and security 

transition. The views expressed do 

not necessarily reflect those of the 

U.S. Institute of Peace, which does 

not take policy positions.