United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LARRY G. JUNKER,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC., MARTECH 

MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2021-1649

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania in No. 2:13-cv-04606-

MSG, Judge Mitchell S. Goldberg.

______________________ 

Decided: February 10, 2022

______________________ 

JAMES D. PETRUZZI, The Petruzzi Law Firm, Houston, 

TX, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by 

LAURA MAUPIN, Maupin Redman, Livingston, TX.

 ALFRED W. ZAHER, I, Montgomery McCracken Walker 

& Rhoads LLP, Philadelphia, PA, argued for defendantsappellants. Also represented by JOSEPH MONAHAN. 

 ______________________ 

Before DYK, REYNA, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

Case: 21-1649 Document: 53 Page: 1 Filed: 02/10/2022
2 JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 

STOLL, Circuit Judge. 

Larry G. Junker, the named inventor of U.S. Design 

Patent No. D450,839, sued Medical Components, Inc. and 

Martech Medical Products, Inc. (collectively, “MedComp”) 

for infringement of the sole claim of the D’839 patent. The 

parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, debating whether a letter sent before the critical date was a commercial offer for sale of the claimed design, rendering the 

claim invalid under the on-sale bar, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 

The district court granted Mr. Junker’s motion for summary judgment of no invalidity under the on-sale bar. The 

district court thereafter held a bench trial on several remaining issues in the case, including MedComp’s remaining invalidity challenges, infringement, and damages. The 

court again ruled in Mr. Junker’s favor. The court rejected 

each of MedComp’s invalidity challenges, found that each 

of the accused products infringed the D’839 patent claim 

and that the infringement was willful, and awarded 

Mr. Junker $1,247,910 in damages under 35 U.S.C. § 289, 

which allows recovery of an infringer’s profits from sale of 

the infringing products. 

MedComp appeals the district court’s summary judgment of no invalidity under the on-sale bar, the judgment 

of infringement, and the damages award. For the reasons 

below, we agree with MedComp that the pre-critical date 

letter was a commercial offer for sale. Because there is no 

dispute that the claimed design was ready for patenting,

we reverse the district court’s summary judgment of no invalidity. We therefore do not reach the remaining issues 

on appeal. 

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JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 3

BACKGROUND

I 

The D’839 patent, at the heart of the dispute on appeal, 

is titled “Handle for Introducer Sheath,” and includes a single claim for “[t]he ornamental design for a handle for introducer sheath, as shown and described.” D’839 patent, 

claim. Figure 1 shows a perspective view of the claimed 

design (represented with solid lines):

Id. Fig. 1. Mr. Junker filed the application that led to the 

D’839 patent on February 7, 2000. Thus, the critical date

for analyzing the on-sale bar under § 102(b)1 is February 7, 

1999, one year before the filing date. 

1 Congress amended § 102 when it enacted the 

Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Pub. L. 

No. 112–29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011). However, because the application that led to the D’839 patent 

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4 JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 

A 

Mr. Junker started working in the medical device industry in the 1970s. In the late 1970s, Mr. Junker started 

his own company for purchasing and reselling catheter 

kits. These kits typically included a needle, syringe, guidewire, and introducer sheath that were used for inserting a 

catheter into the vein of a patient. Mr. Junker’s company 

also designed and manufactured some components in the 

kits, including the introducer sheath. In the mid-1980s, 

Mr. Junker began developing a new design for the introducer sheath based on his experience observing catheterinsertion procedures. Mr. Junker focused on the design for 

the introducer sheath’s handle, eventually settling on a 

handle with large, rounded Mickey-Mouse-shaped ears 

that made it easier for doctors to grasp the introducer 

sheath during catheter-insertion procedures. The handle 

was designed such that the sheath could be peeled apart 

into two pieces when removing the sheath while leaving 

the catheter in place in the patient’s body. These products 

are referred to as “peelable,” “peel-away,” or “tearaway” introducer sheaths. 

Mr. Junker, however, did not have the proper machinery to manufacture the product. He began reaching out to 

other companies to handle the actual manufacture of his 

new design. Eventually, in 1998, Mr. Junker developed a 

business relationship with James Eddings, the founder of 

a medical device company called Galt Medical. At their 

first meeting in August 1998, Mr. Junker and Mr. Eddings 

entered into a non-disclosure agreement (Mr. Junker on 

behalf of his company and Mr. Eddings on behalf of Galt), 

after which Mr. Junker told Mr. Eddings about his new design for the introducer sheath handle. The next month, in 

September 1998, Mr. Eddings informed Mr. Junker that 

was filed before March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA § 102 applies. 

See id. § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293. 

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JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 5

Galt could manufacture Mr. Junker’s product. Around this 

same time, Mr. Eddings also founded a new company, 

Xentek Medical, to develop, manufacture, and sell tearaway introducer sheath products. 

Over the course of the next several months, Mr. Junker 

and Mr. Eddings continued to discuss Mr. Junker’s new design. Mr. Eddings enlisted the help of an engineer, Richard 

Gillespie, to sketch out Mr. Junker’s proposed design. After some back and forth, Mr. Gillespie provided Mr. Junker 

with a sketch of the design. This sketch, however, was 

lacking the handles with Mickey Mouse ears that Mr. Junker had envisioned. In a fax dated December 16, 1998, 

Mr. Junker relayed his critiques of the sketch to Mr. Eddings, noting the absence of larger, rounded portions on the 

handle and providing a rough sketch of his design as he 

had imagined it. Mr. Eddings asked Mr. Gillespie to modify the sketch accordingly. In January 1999, Mr. Eddings’ 

company, Xentek, developed and provided to Mr. Junker a 

prototype of the product that included all of the features of 

his design, including (importantly) a handle with Mickey

Mouse ears. 

B 

In early January 1999, Mr. Eddings, through Xentek, 

began communicating with Boston Scientific Corporation

regarding a peelable introducer sheath product. In response to a request from Boston Scientific, on January 8, 

1999, Xentek sent Boston Scientific a letter detailing bulk 

pricing information for variously sized peelable introducer 

sheath products. The letter stated: 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this quotation for the Medi-Tech Peelable Sheath Set. 

When we first received this request for quotation 

we were under the mistaken impression that you 

wanted the exact configuration as the drawing that 

was provided which would have required extensive 

tooling expense. Subsequently, we have learned 

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6 JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 

that this is not the case and are pleased to submit 

this quotation for a product of our design.

. . . 

The principals of Xentek Medical have extensive 

experience in the design, development and manufacture of this type of medical device. If you should 

have any specific dimensional requirements this 

product could generally be tailored to your specifications.

J.A. 1572. 

The January 8, 1999 letter also included a price chart 

(shown below), and specified that the “prices are for shipment in bulk, non-sterile, FOB [free on board] Athens, 

Texas on a net 30-day basis”:

J.A. 1573. Mr. Eddings concluded the letter by noting his 

appreciation for “the opportunity to provide this quotation” 

and that he “look[ed] forward to discussing [Boston Scientific’s] requirements in person.” Id. 

Mr. Eddings sent additional letters to Boston Scientific 

in January and February 1999. 

II

In 2013, Mr. Junker sued MedComp, accusing four of 

MedComp’s products of infringing the claimed design. 

MedComp, in response, raised affirmative defenses of invalidity, unenforceability, and noninfringement and filed 

counterclaims seeking a declaratory judgment that the 

claimed design is invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed. 

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JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 7

Following several years of discovery, in 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on several 

issues, including, as relevant here, invalidity under the onsale bar. The crux of the parties’ disagreement was

whether the January 8, 1999 letter from Xentek to Boston 

Scientific—which was sent before the critical date—was a 

commercial offer for sale of a product embodying the 

claimed design. The district court held that it was not as a 

matter of law. See Junker v. Med. Components, Inc., CIVIL 

ACTION No. 13-4606, 2019 WL 109385, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 

Jan. 4, 2019). In so holding, the district court determined 

that the letter was a preliminary negotiation, not a definite 

offer. Id. The court specifically focused on the fact that the 

letter thrice uses the word “quotation” and concludes with 

an invitation to further discuss specific requirements. Id.

at *9–10. The district court acknowledged that the letter 

included numerous, specific, commercial terms (such as 

payment terms, shipment terms, and delivery conditions), 

supporting a conclusion that the letter was a commercial 

offer for sale. The court ultimately determined, however,

that the presence of these terms did not outweigh the other 

language in the letter suggesting that Xentek and Boston 

Scientific were engaged in preliminary negotiations. Id.

at *10. The district court accordingly granted Mr. Junker’s 

motion for summary judgment of no invalidity under the 

on-sale bar. 

The case then proceeded to trial on the remaining issues, namely MedComp’s remaining invalidity defenses, 

the questions of infringement and willfulness, and damages. As to invalidity, the district court determined that 

MedComp had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, invalidity of the claimed design based on any of its 

various asserted theories. Junker v. Med. Components, 

Inc., CIVIL ACTION No. 13-4606, 2021 WL 131340, at *1 

(E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2021). It also found that Mr. Junker had 

demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

each of the accused products infringed the claimed design, 

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8 JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 

and that the infringement was willful. Id. The district 

court awarded Mr. Junker $1,247,910 in disgorged profits 

under 35 U.S.C. § 289. Id. No enhanced damages were 

awarded in connection with the willfulness finding. 

MedComp appeals. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

I 

We begin and end with MedComp’s challenge to the 

district court’s summary judgment of no invalidity under 

the on-sale bar. We review the district court’s summary 

judgment under the law of the regional circuit, here the 

Third Circuit. See SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 

930 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “The Third Circuit 

reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying 

the same standard as the district court.” Id. (citing Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 257 

(3d Cir. 2012)). Summary judgment is appropriate when, 

drawing all justifiable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, 

there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 

(1986). 

II 

A patent claim is invalid under § 102(b) if “the invention was . . . on sale in this country, more than one year 

prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 

States.” Section 102(b)’s on-sale bar is triggered if, before 

the critical date, the claimed invention was both (1) the 

subject of a commercial offer for sale and (2) ready for patenting. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67–68 

(1998). “Whether the on-sale bar applies is a question of 

law based on underlying factual findings.” Meds. Co. 

v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en 

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JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 9

banc). We review the ultimate determination of whether a 

claim is invalid under the on-sale bar de novo. Id.

The material facts here are not in dispute. The parties 

agree that the January 8, 1999 letter speaks for itself. 

They also agree that the products described in the letter 

embody the claimed design. And they agree that the 

claimed design was ready for patenting. The question before us is therefore a simple one: Whether the January 8, 

1999 letter is a commercial offer for sale of the claimed design, or merely a quotation signaling the parties were engaged in preliminary negotiations. Because the facts are 

not disputed, we review the question of whether this particular communication constitutes a commercial offer for 

sale (a question of law) without deference. See In re Kollar, 

286 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., Linear 

Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1049–52 

(Fed. Cir. 2001). For the reasons below, we hold that the 

letter is a commercial offer for sale of the claimed design. 

In making this determination, we look to the specific 

facts and circumstances presented in this case, “apply[ing] 

traditional contract law principles” along the way. Merck 

& Cie v. Watson Lab’ys, Inc., 822 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (quoting Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 

299 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “Only an offer which 

rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale, one which 

the other party could make into a binding contract by simple acceptance (assuming consideration), constitutes an offer for sale under § 102(b).” Id. at 1351 (quoting Grp. One, 

Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1048 

(Fed. Cir. 2001)). To help guide our determination of 

whether a given communication rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale, we often rely on resources such as the 

Uniform Commercial Code, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and other similar treatises. See, e.g., Meds. Co., 

827 F.3d at 1375–76 (discussing Uniform Commercial 

Code); Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 

855 F.3d 1356, 1365 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing favorably 

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10 JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 

Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2013), Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), and Corbin on Contracts (1999)), 

aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). “In determining whether an 

offer [has been] made[,] relevant factors include the terms 

of any previous inquiry, the completeness of the terms of 

the suggested bargain, and the number of persons to whom 

a communication is addressed.” Restatement (Second) of 

Contracts § 26 cmt. c (1981). 

With this background in mind, we turn to the language 

in the January 8, 1999 letter. As stated on the face of the 

letter, Xentek was directly responding to a “request for 

quotation” from Boston Scientific, and the letter was addressed to Boston Scientific alone. J.A. 1572. This signals 

that the letter was not an unsolicited price quotation or invitation to negotiate, but rather a specific offer to Boston 

Scientific to take further action. See Restatement (Second) 

of Contracts § 26 cmt. c (explaining that a relevant factor 

for determining whether an offer is made is “the number of 

persons to whom a communication is addressed”). 

The letter also contains a number of necessary terms 

typical for a commercial contract. For instance, the letter 

specifies that the prices provided are for “shipment in bulk, 

non-sterile.” J.A. 1573. Thus, the letter provides specific 

delivery conditions—the product will be shipped in “bulk” 

and will be “non-sterile.” The letter further specifies that 

shipment will be “FOB Athens, Texas.” Id. FOB (which 

stands for free on board) is a standard commercial term 

used to allocate the risks and responsibilities of the buyer 

and seller with respect to delivery, payment, and loss of the 

product. See Free on Board, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019). The letter also provides a payment term, 

“net 30-day basis,” J.A. 1573, meaning that payment is due 

in full within 30 days of delivery. 

Finally, and importantly, Xentek’s letter specifies multiple different purchase options for its peelable sheath 

products. For example, the letter offers 5,000 sets of size 

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JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 11

4F-6F Medi-Tech Peelable Sheath at a price of $4.45 per 

set and offers discounted prices if the purchase quantity is 

increased (e.g., the price per set decreases to $4.25 for 

10,000 sets of the same size sheath, $4.05 for 25,000, and 

$3.95 for 50,000). The letter also offers Boston Scientific 

the option to purchase two additional sizes of Xentek’s 

Medi-Tech Peelable Sheath Set—7F-8F and 11F—with 

similarly discounted pricing as the purchase quantity increases. 

While the letter concludes with an invitation to further 

discuss Boston Scientific’s specific requirements in person, 

“expressing a desire to do business in the future does not 

negate the commercial character of the transaction then 

under discussion.” Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 

476 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The completeness of 

the relevant commercial sale terms in the letter itself signals that this letter was not merely an invitation to further 

negotiate, but rather multiple offers for sale, any one or 

more of which Boston Scientific could have simply accepted 

to bind the parties in a contract.2 

We have determined that communications with similarly complete and definite commercial terminology were

commercial offers for sale within the meaning of § 102(b). 

For example, in Merck, we disagreed with the district 

court’s determination that a certain fax did not rise to the 

level of a commercial offer for sale of the claimed invention. 

The fax specified a product, set forth the price of the product ($25,000 per kilogram), the location for delivery (the 

buyer’s research and development center), payment terms 

2 We also note that subsequent communications between Xentek and Boston Scientific after the critical date 

used the exact same commercial terms, providing some indication that these terms were definite, not in flux. See, 

e.g., J.A. 1577 (February 16, 1999 letter from Xentek to 

Boston Scientific). 

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12 JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 

(net 60 days), and the amount to be purchased (two kilograms, with the option to purchase additional product). 

822 F.3d at 1349. We explained that this was not just “an 

unsolicited price quote sent to numerous potential customers.” Id. at 1351 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts 

§ 26 cmt. c). Rather, the “fax was sent in direct response to 

[the buyer’s] request to purchase two kilograms” of the

product. Id. We also found it highly relevant that the fax 

“provid[ed] essential price, delivery, and payment terms.” 

Id. Because the fax “contained all the required elements to 

qualify as a commercial offer for sale,” we reversed the district court’s determination that the claims were not invalid 

under the on-sale bar. Id. at 1351, 1355. 

In a similar vein, in Cargill, we agreed with the district 

court that the relevant letter was a commercial offer for 

sale. That letter was sent to confirm a request for a certain 

amount of canola oil. 476 F.3d at 1369. The letter “explicitly set[] forth an amount of oil to be delivered . . . , at a 

specified unit price, and under a standard contract designation, FOB (free on board).” Id. We explained that this 

was “powerful evidence of a sales transaction,” id., and accordingly affirmed the district court’s summary judgment 

of invalidity under the on-sale bar. 

Here, as in Merck and Cargill, the letter—which specifies multiple sized products for sale, different bulk pricing 

options available for each product, payment terms (net 30-

day basis), and delivery terms and conditions (bulk shipment, non-sterile, FOB)—contains all the required elements to qualify as a commercial offer for sale. That is 

sufficient to invoke § 102(b)’s on-sale bar.

Mr. Junker argues that the letter omits essential 

terms—which size product is being purchased and in what 

quantity—and, therefore, the letter is not an offer that 

could be made into a binding contract by simple acceptance. Appellee’s Br. 15. We are not persuaded. The

standard Mr. Junker proposes—that the offer must specify 

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JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 13

the exact amount of product the buyer desires to qualify as 

an offer for sale—is too stringent. Under § 102(b), the 

question is merely whether there is an offer for sale. As 

explained above, the letter here offers for sale multiple

sizes of products with tiered pricing depending on the number of sets desired. That there were multiple offers does 

not mean that there was no offer to be accepted. And that 

the letter does not specify the exact amount Boston Scientific desires likewise does not mean that there is no offer to 

be accepted. Rather, the letter comprises multiple different offers that Boston Scientific could have accepted by

simply stating, for example, “We’ll take 5,000 sets of the 

4F-6F Medi-Tech Peelable Sheath” or “10,000 sets of the 

11F Medi-Tech Peelable Sheath.” 

Mr. Junker also argues, as the district court determined, that the January 8, 1999, letter was merely a price 

quotation inviting further negotiations, not a definite offer. 

Appellee’s Br. 15–16, 19. To be sure, the fact that the letter 

uses the word “quote” three times is an important fact supporting the district court’s conclusion that the letter is a 

quotation, not a definite offer. See Restatement (Second) 

of Contracts § 26 cmt. c. (“[T]he word ‘quote’ is commonly 

understood as inviting an offer rather than as making one, 

even when directed to a particular customer.”). This fact

makes the question before us closer than in either Merck or 

Cargill. “But just as the word ‘offer’ does not necessarily 

mean that an offer is intended, so the word ‘quote’ may be 

used in an offer.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26

cmt. c. While the precise label used for a given communication is relevant, it is not controlling. Rather, the terms 

of the communication must be considered in their entirety 

to determine whether an offer was intended, or if it was 

merely an invitation for an offer or further negotiations. A 

quotation typically leaves many terms necessary to a contract—such as place of delivery, payment terms, and the 

like—unexpressed. Corbin on Contracts § 2.5, at 157

(2018); accord Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 

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14 JUNKER v. MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 

cmt. c (explaining that a quote “may omit the quantity to 

be sold, time and place of delivery, terms of payment, and 

other terms”). Where, however, “the quotation . . . contains 

detailed terms,” as is the case here, “it may well be deemed 

an offer.” Corbin on Contracts § 2.5, at 161. For the reasons above, we conclude that the specificity and completeness of the commercial terms in the letter outweigh the 

three references to “quotation” and mention of possible future discussions. Taken as a whole, the overall language 

of the letter signals Xentek’s intent to make a commitment 

and invite Boston Scientific to act rather than merely negotiate. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we 

agree with MedComp that the January 8, 1999 letter was 

a commercial offer for sale of the claimed design. Because 

the parties do not dispute that the invention was ready for 

patenting, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment of no invalidity. The effect of our determination renders the sole claim of the D’839 patent invalid and we 

therefore need not reach MedComp’s remaining arguments 

on appeal. 

REVERSED

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