### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 466 -CR

K yle Al e xa nde r F ar r ar , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 368TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 04-2 24- K3 68, H ONO RAB LE BURT CARNES, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ky le Al e xan de r F arr ar a

pp e a ls h is c on vic tio n b y a jur y fo r a g g ra

vate d se xua l a ssa

ult of a c hild. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 22.021 ( West S upp. 2006). The jur y assessed a

ppellant’s punishment at twenty -four y ear s’ conf

inement, and the trial court sente nced him ac cording ly . I n five points of error , appellant c laims that he rec eived inef fec tive assistance of counse l, and that the trial court e rre d in denying his motion for new trial without a hear ing, in f ailing to suppre ss his written state me nt, and in fa ili ng to m a ke fi nd ing s o f f a c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw r e g ard ingthe a dmi ssi bil ity of his written statement. F inding these contentio n s wi t h o u t merit, we a ffirm the judg ment of conviction.
F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND

The c omplainant, C.W ., was nin e y ears old at the time of the a lleg ed off ense a nd eleve n y ear s old when she testified a t trial. She testified that on October 31, 2003, afte r attending2

a chur ch par

ty , she went to bed at approximately 9:00 p.m. Her pare nts had invi ted s ever al frie nds over to their home to play

volley ball. L ater

that night, a

ppellant, a f

riend of the family

who had be en invited to play

volley ball, enter ed the house t o use t he bathroom. He then e ntere d C.W .’s bedr oom and appr oache d her be d. Appellant knelt down nex t to C.W .’s bed, plac ed his hand unde rneath her pa jama s and

un de rw e ar, and

be g an r ub bin g he r g e nit a ls w ithhis ha nd . H e ins e rt e d h is f

ing e r i nto C.W. ’s va g ina , hur

tin g he r w ithhis sh arp na ils . A ft e r w hat se e me d li ke a lon g tim e , a

bo ut “ tw e nty minutes,” she rolled ove r, and appellant l eft. Testifying that she was “sca red,” C.W . did not report the incident that nig ht. C.W .’s par ents, Dar la and Ira H od ges , an d an other witness testified that appellant left the g ame and was inside the house for about fiftee n or twenty minutes. Appellant was the la st p e rs on

to l e a ve a t a

bo ut 1 :30 a .m. Th e ne xt mor

nin g , C. W. r e po rt e d a

pp e lla nt’ s c on du c t to he r mot

he r. Mr
. and

Mr s. H o d g e s c o n t a c t e d

t h e W i l l i a m s o nC o u n t y S h e r i f f ’ s O f f i c e an d m e tw i t h D e t e c t i v e P e t e H u g h e y. Al on g wi th D e te c tiv e Hu g he y , Mr. and Mr s. Ho dg e s to ok

C.W. to b e e xami ne d b y

a se xua l a ssa

ult
nurse e x aminer, Robin J aff ers. During the examination, Jaffer s observe d and then testified at trial t h a tt h e l a

b i a m i n o r a o f C
. W
. ’ s v a g i n a

w e r e r e d , i r

r i t a t e d , an d

s c r a t c h e d
. A c c o r d i n g t o Ja f fe rs , C.W .’s injuries wer e consistent with C.W.’s report of se x ual assault by digital pe netration. J aff

ers opined at trial that the injuries w ere the re sult of friction and r ubbing, a nd n ot of a momentar

y tou c hin g . C. W. w a s sc ratc he d, ha d p a in, and wa s e xpe ri e nc inganxie ty and fe ar o f a pp e lla nt. After the examination, Hughe y asked Mr . and Mrs. Hodg es to come ba ck t o the sh e ri ff ’s of fi c e to p la c e re c or de d te le ph on e c a lls to a pp e lla nt. I n th e con ve rs a tio n w ithDa rl a Ho dg e s, a pp e lla nt a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he we nt i nto C.W. ’s be dr oo m and that, if he did any thi ng , it3

was “ by acc ident.” Darla Hodge s ref err ed to the t elephone calls i n her testimony , but they wer e not offe red into evide nce by

the State or a dmitted as evidenc e at tria l. Be cause the content of Hug hey ’s later te lephone c all to appellant, which w as admitted into evidenc e, indica t es t h at appellant was
e xp e c ti n g h is c a ll , th e p arti e s a g r e e d to a ll o w D ar la

H o d g e s to r e f

e r to th e c a ll to p r o v id e th e c o n te xt fo r t he la te r c a ll b e tw e e n H ug he y and a pp e lla nt. On Novembe r 2, 2003, Hug hey called ap p el l ant and r equeste d an intervie w. Appellant agr eed to c ome in for a n interview that same day . Hug hey rec orded both his telephone call to appellant and the interview with an audiotape re corde r. At the c onclusion of the intervie w, appellant g ave a

written statement a cknowled gi n g sexual contact with C.W. Appellant was later
arr e ste d a nd ind ic te d in

tw o c ounts fo r a g g ra

va te d s e x ual a ssa

ult by int e nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly causingthe pene tration of C.W.’s sex ual org an by his finge r and a

lesser inc luded off

en s e of ind e c e nc y wi th a c hil d b y c on ta c t. T he jur

y fo un d a pp e lla nt guil ty of a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult
. AN AL YSI S I n overla pping points of e rror , a

p p e ll a nt contends that (i) the trial court e rre d in failing to s up pr e ss h is w ri tte n s ta te me nt a nd in fa ili ng to fi le fi nd ing s of fa c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw, (i i) his trial counsel provided ineffe ctive assist ance , and (iii ) the trial c ourt abused its discre tion in deny ing ap p el l an t ’s m o t i o nfo r a n ew t ri al an d d o i n g s o wi t h o u ta h ea ri n g.I n setting f orth the issues pre sented on a ppeal, a ppellant asser

ts in his fourth point of error, 1 “The trial court e rre d in denying Mr . Fa rra r’s Mot ion to Suppress his written statement as involunt ary . ” A s fo rm u l at edb y ap p el l an t , t h e i s s u e d o es n o tch al l en ge ap p el l an t ’s t ap e- re co rded oral state me nt. I n a

rgume nt i n h is b ri e f, ho we ve r, a pp e lla nt cha ll enges th e mot ion to s up pr e ss h is
“ state me nts ,” a sse rt ingthat he “ fi le d a pr e -t ri a l Mo tio n to Sup pr e ss his wr itt e n s ta te me nt w itha ud io re c or ding a s h a vin g be e n p ro vid e d invo lun tari ly .” I n h is f if th p oin t of

e rr or , a pp e lla nt e xpre ssl y challeng es the fa ilure of the tr ial court to make finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law a s to “the a dmi ssi bil ity

of the ob je c te d to wr itt e n c on fe ssi on in t his c ase. ” W hethe r a

pp e lla nt s e e ks to challeng e only

the written stateme nt in his fourth point or both t h e wr i t ten and tape -re corde d oral statements, his challeng e is r ender ed moot be cause at trial he failed to objec t to the admission of the tape- rec orded statement when it was offere d and, ther efor e, fa iled to preser ve er ror. We will thus c on fi ne our d isc us sio n to the a dmi ssi on of the wr itt e n s ta te me nt. 4 Fai lure to Supp re

ss A pp e lla nt’ s Sta te ment I n h is f ourt h p oin t of

err or , a pp e lla nt c la ims that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto
s u p p r e s s h i s w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t b e c a u s e i t w a s n o tv o l u n t ar

y. Ap pe lla

nt f ile d a mot ion to s up pr e ss 1 his statement based on the Four th, Fifth, Six th, and Four

tee n t h Amendments to the United States Constit ut i o n ; Article I , section 10, of the T exas Const itution; and ar ticle 38.22 of the Te x as Code of Criminal Procedur e. See U.S. Const. amends. I V–VI , XIV; Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 10; Tex. C ode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 ( West 2005). He also c laims that the statemen t , improperly obtained duri n g anin te r

r o g a ti o n , w a s in a d mi s s ib le u n d e r arti c le 3 8
. 2 3 o f

th e T e xa s Co d e o f

Cr im in al Procedur e. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.23 (West 2005).

The trial c ourt conduc ted a he aringon the m otion to suppress. Se e id . art. 28.01(6) (We st 2 00 6) ; se e als o id . a rt . 3 8. 22 ; Jack

son v. De nno , 378 U.S. 368, 380 (1964). T h e r ecor d ref lects that on November 1, 2003, afte r C.W.’s outcry to her mother w as re ported to the Willi amson County Sheriff’ s Offic e, De tective Hug hey co n tacted a

ppellant by

telephone. H ug hey

identified himself an d to ld a

p p e ll an t, “ I n e e d to ta lk w it h y o u . ” A p p e ll an t a g r e e d to me e t H u g h e y a t theSee M iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 5 sh e ri ff ’s of fi c e that a ft e rn oo n. Ap pe lla nt arr ive d a t the sh e ri ff

’s of fi c e a t a pp ro xima te ly

2:0 0 p .m. Hug hey escor ted appe llant to his office, a dvising him that the interview was be ing r ec o rd ed on audiotape a

nd that “y ou’re fre e to leave , that y ou’re not under arre st.” Appellant a cknowledg ed that he un de rs too d. Hughe y

did no t a dv ise a

pp e lla nt o f h is Miranda wa

rn ing s. Whe n H ug he y

tol d 2

a pp e lla nt t hat th e se xua l a ssa

ult nurs e e xami ne r h a d f

ound inj ur ie s to C.W. and

“ no w i s th e tim e to g e t y our stu ff str a ig hte ne d ou t,” a pp e lla nt re sp on de d, “ Th a t’ s on e of the re a so ns Iwa

nte d to ta lk t o y ou bad.” Appellant told Hug hey that on Hallowee n Day he went “out to drink with people at work.” They

went to a “ couple diff

ere nt pl ac es , ” an d t h en went to the Hodg eses’ home at about mid nig ht to pla

y vo lle y ba ll. Af te r pla y ing vo lle y

ba ll “ fo r a wh ile ,” a

pp e lla nt we nt int o th e ho us e to
say he llo to C .W. and to g ive he r a hu g . Ap pe lla nt e xpla ine d that he ha d be e n f ri e nd s w iththe fa

mil y f o r a l o n g t i m e . H e t o l d H u g h e y t h a t h e d i d n o t“ d o an yt h i n g ” an d

t h a t“ I d o n o tr e c a l l an y w a y I
c ou ld h a ve ” be c a

us e “ Iwa s n ot i n th e re lon g .” He tol d Hu g he y that in a te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio n w ith D ar l a H o d ges h e e n co u ra gedh er t o t es tt h e gi rl b ec au s e h e d i d n o tt h i n k i two u l d s h o w a n y

t h i n g. When Hug hey

advised the a

ppellant that C.W
. had a “fr esh injury ,” “she’ s red,” and “she ha s a tea r,” appellant sa id that he just went in to wake he r up and te ll her g oodby e:
She was ba lled up, so Iwent in and—I went to g o chec k her ag ain, s it next to the bed, and I was—I didn’t mean to at fir st. Iwas touchingher the re be cause it wa s dark a nd Idid n’ t kn owwh e re Iwa s g ra bb ing , a nd fo r s ome re a so n I jus t—I tho ug ht ab ou t it for a second, the n Istopped. And she didn’t sit up and tell me by e and Ididn’t know wh a t to do a ft e r t

hat. I c an’ t be lie ve Idid

that.6

Appellant denie d sticking his fing er i n s i d e C .W. and said he touche d her “ not long at all.” He
e xpla ine d: “ Th e n I

jus t st art e d to uc hin g he r fo r a s e c on d, the n I sto pp e d b e c a

us e Ire a lize d w hat I was doing and I

couldn’t believe Iwas doing it.” Hug hey then aske d app el l an t to provide a w ritten statement. Appe llant ga ve and signe d a wr itten statement ac knowledg ing that he was not unde r ar rest and that the st at ement wa s voluntary . The stateme nt on its face r ecited: “ Iunderstand I am not under a

rre st or being detained ag ainst my

will and am fre e to le ave at any time. I volunteer the following information and know that it may be us e d f

or wh a te ve r p ur

po se it m ay

se rv e .” I n th e state ment , app ella nt a lso
a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he ha d r e a d th e state me nt a nd a ff ir me d th a t th e fa c ts w e re c or re c t. I n a pre trial hea

ring on the motion to suppress appellant’s state ment, Hug hey testified that he ma de no pr omi se s to app e lla nt an d tha t at no time duri ng the int e rv ie w d id a pp e lla nt r e qu e st to leave or

manifest an intent to lea

ve. At the conclusion of the intervie w, appe llant asked that he not be ar rested a t work if he was going to be ar rested. T he intervie w lasted a pproxi mately

one hour, and appe llant left at the c onclusion of the intervie w.

Appellant testified at the suppr e s s io n h e a r in g th a t h e rec eived a

call fr om the detec tive
and a g re e d to mee t with the of fi c e r “b e c a

us e I wa nte d to let him kn ow , y ou kn ow , exac tly wh a t di d and did not transpire that night.” Appellant acknow ledg ed that he wa s not placed unde r ar rest and that he wa s told and knew that he was fr ee to lea ve at a ny time. At the beg inning of the interview , the offic er w as “la id back” and appe llant was “te llin g h i m m y story , and eve ry

thing wa s fine.” Halfw ay throug h the i nterview , appellant testified, he wa s “basica lly throug h.” He “wa

nted to g et up,” and he “made a motion to ge t up.” Appellant state d that Hug hey put his hands on appellant’s7

wrist, pulled his chair c loser to a ppellant, and “the n started in on me a g ain.” Appe llant said that he signe d the statement be cause he wa s fee ling sorr y for himself a

nd he thoug ht it was his “only way
ou t.” Ap pe lla

nt t e sti fi e d th a t H ug he y

tol d h im w hat to pu t in

the state me nt a

nd that it wa s n ot a voluntary statement g iven of his own fr ee w ill. Appellant stated that he is not a forc eful pe rson and does not handl e conf

rontation well. In the following colloquy , appellant state d that the detec tive instructed him to add a phr ase to the state ment, and he me rely complied: Q [Detective]: Did y ou do any thing the f

irst time y ou went in? A [Appellant]: No. Q [D e te c ti v e ]: Wel l, ju s t to u c h o n it th a t y o u went in the first a nd y ou

just—y ou did hug he r, rig ht, and did say hi to her? A [Appellant]: Yea h. Q [Detective]: Okay
. I ’m not taking that awa y from y ou, Kyle. I believe that y ou c ar e . O k ay ? F o r h e r s a k e , b e s u r e th a t y o u p u t in there that y ou took y our fing er a nd y ou touched he r vag inal are a. A [Appellant]: (Inaudible.) Q [De te c tiv e ]: L e t me se e wh a t y ou ’r e wr iti ng . “ Whe n I did , I a c c ide nta lly touched her,” w here ? See, it doesn’t explain where . “[B]ut continued for

a sec ond and immediately stopped.” I t’s not saying w here y ou touched he r. All ri g ht, y ou touched he r wh e r e ? I w an t to ma

k e s u r e th a t’ s c le ar . O k ay . Then wha t ha pp e ne d? All r ig ht, le t me make sure that I un de rs tand . A ll y ou did was rub, a

nd if y our fing er w ent insi d e, i t was a n a c c ide nt? A [App e lla

nt]: Ye s.8

To the ph ra se “ Whe n I

did Ia c c ie ndtly

[sic ] tou c he d h e r, ” a

pp e lla nt a dd e d, “ on he r pr ivate pa rt wi th my fi ng e r. ” Ap pe lla

nt t e sti fi e d th at he wa s ju st t e lli ngHu g he y wh a t he wa

nte d to he ar a

nd that, beca use appe llant was the only person that “ they

wer e g oing a fter,” he “w as d one.” T he off icer ’s testimony contra dicted appe llant’s testimony . At the conclusion of the suppression hea ring , the trial court ove rruled the motion and found that the statement had bee n fre ely and voluntarily

g iven and
was a dmissibl e in evidenc e.

I n a s u p p re s s i o n h ear ing, the trial court is the sole trie r of f act a nd judge of the
cre dibilit y of t he witnesses a nd the weig ht to be g iven their testimony
. Ro me ro v . S tat e , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The trial c ourt may acc ept or re

ject an y o r al l o f a w itness’s testimony or evide nce of

fer ed. Al v arad o v . S tat e , 8 5 3 S
. W
. 2 d 1 7 , 2 3 ( T e x . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 3 )
. In
re vie wi ngthe tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on , w e do no t e ng a g e in o ur ow n f a c tua l re vie w; we de te rm ine on ly whether the re cord suppor

ts the trial court’s f

indings. Ro me ro , 800 S.W .2d at 543. We are not at liberty t o d i s turb supported finding s of fa ct abse nt an abuse of discre tion. Can tu v . S tat e , 817 S.W. 2d 74 , 7 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Me e k v . S tat e , 790 S.W .2d 618, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We shall not defer

mere ly to the trial court’ s findings rega rd i n g the historical fa cts but also to the trial court’ s conclusions reg ardingthe leg al signific ance of those fa cts that turn on an e valuation of
cr ed i b i l i ty

and deme anor. J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 68 S.W .3d 644, 652-53 (Te x . Crim. App. 2002); State v. Carter , 91 5 S. W.2 d 5 01 , 5 04 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Du bo se v . S tat e , 915 S.W .2d 493, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We will normally addre ss onl y t h e q uestion of whethe r the trial c ourt improperly

applied the law

to the fac ts. Johnson , 6 8 S. W.3 d at 65 2- 53 ; Ro me ro , 800 S.W .2d at 543. I f the trial c ourt’s dec ision is correc t on any theory of the lawapplicable to the case , it will be9

sustained eve n though the trial court may have g iven the wr ong rea son for its ruling
. Os b o u r n v. Sta te , 9 2 S. W.3 d 5 31 , 5 38 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Ro me ro , 80 0 S. W.2 d at 54 3; Cal low ay v . S tat e , 743 S.W .2d 645, 651-52 (Te x . Crim. App. 1988).

We mu s t d e te r

mi n e f r o m t h e f a c ts w h e th e r

th e tr ia l c o u rt a

b u s e d it s d is c r e ti o n . We fi rs t de te rm ine wh e the r a pp e lla nt w a s in c us tod y and su bje c t t o cus to di a l in te rr og a tio n. B e c a us e Hug hey advised a ppellant that he did not believe appellant wa s telling the whole truth and appe llant beg an to cr

y as he r esponded to Hug hey ’s questioning , appellant c ontends t h at hi s will was overbor ne and that he was phy sically preve nted from leaving when Hug hey moved his chair c loser to a pp e lla nt a nd he ld h is w ri st. Ap pe lla

nt a sse rt s that he we nt f

ro m “ be ingfr e e to l e a ve , to be ingin custody .” Hug hey ’s testimony at trial disputed that there was c oerc ion or compulsion. I f a n inve sti g a tio n is no t a t an accu sator ia l or c us tod ia l st a g e , a

pe rs on ’s F if

th Am e ndme nt r ig hts have no t y e t c ome int o p lay , a nd the vo lun tari ne ss o f t

he wa ive r o f t

ho se ri g hts is not im plicated. Me lto n v . S tat e , 790 S.W. 2d 32 2, 32 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). Vo lun tari ne ss i s an is sue onl y if the confession was obtained while t he speaker was i n custody
. Id .; W hit e v . S tat e , 874 S.W .2d 229, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] ), pet. dism’d , 8 90 S.W. 2d 69 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1994). Miranda and ar ticle 38.22 apply

only to sta t em en t s m ad e as a r esult of custodial interrog ation. Ro dr igu e

z v . S tat e , 93 9 S.W. 2d 21 1, 21 5 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 97 , no pe t.)
. Thus , if a p p e ll ant’s stateme nt did not st em from a custodial interrog ation, neither Miranda n o r a rt i cl e 3 8 .22 require s its suppression. Se e id . at 21 5; Mo rri s v . S tat e , 8 97 S.W. 2d 52 8, 53 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 1995, no pet.).10 “‘Custodial interrog ation’ is questioning initiated by law enf orce ment office rs af

ter
a person has been taken into custody or otherw ise deprive d of his fre edom in any signific ant way .” Cannon v . S

tat e , 691 S.W .2d 664, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). I n deter mining whe ther a

n individual was in custody , the cour t must ex amine all the c ircumst an ces sur rounding the interrog ation, but “the ultimate inquiry is simpl y whether there [was] a ‘f

ormal ar rest or r estraint on fre edom of moveme nt’ of the de g ree associate d wit h a formal a rre st.” Calif

ornia v. Behe ler , 4 6 3 U. S
. 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 2 5 (1 9 8 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Oregon v . Mathiason , 4 29 U. S. 4 92 , 4 95 (1 97 7) ); se e als o Me e k v . S tat e , 79 0 S
. W
. 2d 618, 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Questioning a suspect at the police st ati on does not, by itself, constitute custody
. Do wth itt v . S tat e , 931 S.W .2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). But a police interrog ation that beg ins as a noncustodial interrog ation may become custodial during the cour se of the inter view. Id
. Although c ourts have disc ussed fa ctors that may be re levant to the inquiry , including (1) pr obable c ause to a

rre st; (2) focus of

the investig ation; ( 3) subjective intent of the police; a nd (4) subjective bel ief of the defe ndant, Mee k , 7 90 S.W. 2d a t 62 1- 22 ; Melton , 790 S.W .2d at 326; Tur ne r v . S tat e , 685 S.W .2d 38, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), these four fac tors have g iven way to the more fle x ible “re asonable person” test. S e e U n it e d S ta te s v . B e n g iv e n ga , 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.), cert. de nied , 488 U.S. 924 (1988).

I n Sta ns bu ry

v . Ca lif or nia , 511 U.S. 318 (1994), the Supreme Court established the
ru le s f or de te rm ini ngwh e the r a

pe rs on be ingqu e sti one d b y

law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs is h e ld i n custody and thus entitled to Miranda war nings. The Court made clea r that the initial determination of custody

depends on the objective c ircumstance s of the interr og ation, not on the subjective view s11

harbor ed by either the interrog ating office r or the pe rson beingquestioned. Id
. at 323-24. Thus, the office r’s subjec tive view that the individual under questioning is a suspe ct, if undisclosed, doe s not bear upon the questi on whether an indi vidual is in custody for the pur

pose of Miranda
. Id . at 324. The Court further noted t hat focus of t he investi g ation alone does not constitute custody
. Id . I n light of the re asonable person test, an office r’s knowledg e and belief may bear upon the Miranda custody issue if they are convey ed to the individual being questioned, but eve n a cle ar state ment by an off icer that the per son under inter rog ation is the prime suspect is no t in itself disposit ive of the c ustody issue, for some suspe cts are fre e to come and g o until the police decide to make an a rre st. Id . at 325. Whether we apply

the four- fac tor test or t he re asonable person test of Sta ns bu ry , th e re su lt h e re is the same. See, e .g. , Do wth itt , 931 S.W .2d at 254-55.

I n the ins tant ca se , ap pe lla nt ac c e pte d the inv itatio n or re qu e st of a de te c tiv e to c ome to his of fi c e re g ard ing an ong oin g inv e sti g a tio n. I f t he c ir c ums tanc e s sh owthat an in div idu a l a c ts upon the invitation or reque st of a law e nforc ement of fi ce r and there a

re no thre ats, express or implied, that he will be forcibly taken, then that person is not in custody for the pur

poses of Miranda
. An de rso n v . S

tat e , 932 S.W .2d 502, 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. de nied , 521 U.S. 1122 (1997). I n the tape- rec orded interview, appellant expressed his de sire to ta lk to the office r a n d s t ra i g hten things out be cause , he explained, he ha d done nothing wrong . Appellant urg es that the interr og ation that was a dmittedly

noncustodial at the outset bec ame c ustodial w hen Hug hey place d his hand on appellant’ s wrist and moved his cha ir closer to appellant in the small offic e. I t is the pr ov inc e of the tr ia l cou rt , as the fa c t- fi nd e r in the he ari ngon the mot ion

to
su pp re ss, to e va luate the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s and

de te rm ine wh e the r t

he a dmi tte dly12

no nc us tod ia l in te rv ie w b e c a me c us tod ia l in natur e . The tr ia l ju dg e he ard the wi tne sse s a

nd wa s in the best position to judge their cre dibilit y and the weig ht to be g iven their testimony . The trial c ourt expressly found that the wr itten statement was not the pr oduct of a custodial interrog ation. Ba sed
on the testimony at the hear ing, the trial court could have rea sonably conclude d that Hu gh ey ’s interac tion with appellant would not ha ve cause d a rea sonable person to believe that his fr eedom of movement was r estraine d to the extent that he believed he was no longe r free to leave a s the offic er had advise d him at the beg inning of the interview . That appe llant committed his statement to writing on a pre -printed f

orm containing lang uag e informing appe llant that he was not in custody and wa s fre e to leave at the time he made h is written statement supports this conclusion. Appellant neve r asked to lea

ve. That appellant re cog nized he was fr ee to lea ve is clea r fr om h i s q u es t i o n to the office r as to whe ther he should go a head a nd quit his j ob, as well as his re quest that he not be
arr ested at his job, and his state ment that he would need to take a “we ek or so vacation.” This was in respons e t o t h e o ffice r’s stateme nt, “You’r e g onna g et up and wa lk out of here . I ’m not g onna say t h at t h er e’ s n o t something g onna come out of this and Ithink y ou know that, okay ? ” The interview e nded with Hug hey asking appellant, “ Ready to get o u t o f h ere? ” to which a ppellant responde d, “Ye ah.”

Be cause we aff

ord almost total defe renc e to the trial court’ s determinations, and our
re vie w o f t

he re c or d s up po rt s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ru li ng, we ho ld that th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in deny

ing a ppellant’s motion to suppress. We overrule appellant’ s fourth point of er ror.13

Fin dings of Fact an d Conclu sions of Law

Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l cou rt fa ile d to ent e r fi nd ing s as re qu ir e d by art ic le 38.22, section 6 , o f t h e T exas Code of Criminal Procedure
. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 38.22, § 6. When the voluntariness of a statement is challeng ed, a tri al co u rt is require d to make finding s with reg ard to its determination. Id .; Ur ias v . S tat e , 155 S.W .3d 141, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Such finding s are mandatory even w hen ther e is no objection at trial. Urias , 155 S.W .3d at 142. A trial cour

t will be found to have complied with ar ticle 38.22, sec tion 6, if the court dictate s its fi nd ing s and

c on c lus ion s to the c ourt re po rt e r a nd tho se fi nd ing s a

re ma de pa

rt of the a pp e llate
rec ord. M

u r p h yv . S t a te , 11 2 S .W .3 d 5 92 , 6 01 -0 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); Pa rr v . S tat e , 658 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). As the Dallas c ourt of appe als explained: Finding s need not be made with minute spec ificity as t o ev ery alleg ed and hy pothetical possibility

for phy sical or menta l coer cion, but need only be suff icient to provide the a

ppellate c ourt and the pa

rties with a basis upon which to review the tr ia l c ourt ’s a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he law t o th e fa c ts.
Nic ho ls v . S

tat e , 810 S.W .2d 829, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pe t. ref’ d). After a hear ing on appellant’ s motion to suppress, the tr ial court de nied the motion
and ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s:
Ifind the statement wa s voluntary . I n fa ct , i t ’s kind of a c lassic patter n of an individual that comes down and be lieves they ’re g oing to ta lk the ir way out of it and by simple persistence telling them that you don’t believe the m. Idon’t understa nd the ps y c ho log y be hin d it, bu t it ha pp e ns a g a in and a g a in. Pe op le br e a k d ow n a nd te ll them the truth under those circ umstances. So the motion to suppress is denied.14

The district cour

t’s fi n d ings make spec ific re fer ence to fac ts adduce d throug h testimony at the hear ing a nd events on the audiotape. We hold that these findings were recited into t he re cord a nd, althoug h a close issue, are sufficien t l y detailed to comply

with the require ments of ar ticle 38.22, section 6. See M

urphy , 1 12 S.W. 3d

a t 60 1- 02 ; Nic ho ls , 810 S.W .2d at 831. We overr ule appe llant’s fifth point of err or. Ineffe ctive Assistance of Counsel

I n h is f ir st p oin t of

e rr or , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s h is tr ial c ouns e l w a s c on sti tut ion a lly ineffe ctive for f

ailure ( i) to challeng e ce rtain evide nce, ( ii) to investigate fully and intervie w one of the per sons present at the Hodg eses’ home on the ni g ht in question, and (iii) to obtain the ser vices of an ex pert to assist him in evaluating the nurse’ s examination report and in pre paringhis defense
.

The leg al principles that g overn c laims of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel wer e set out by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S
. 6 6 8 (1 984). “A n ineffe ctive assistance claim has two co m p o n ents : A petitioner must show that counsel’s pe rfor mance was defic ient, and that the deficienc y prejudice d the def

ense.” W igg ins v . S

mi th , 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Strickland , 466 U. S. at 68 7) . T o e sta bli shde fi c ie nt p e rf

or manc e , th e de fe nd ant m

us t demonstrate that his attorney ’s re prese ntation “fe ll be low an objective standard of re asonable ness.” Strickland , 466 U. S. at 688
. Court s hav e de c lin e d to art ic ulate sp e c if ic g uid e lin e s f

or a pp ro pr ia te
a tto rn e y c on du c t, e mph a sizi ngins te a d th a t th e pr oper me a sure of pe rf or manc e “ re ma ins sim

ply
rea sonablenes s under pr evailing profe ssional norms.” W iggins , 5 39 U. S. at 52 1. I n a dd iti on to defic ient perf

ormanc e, the appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney ’s def

iciency , the re sult of the trial would have be en diffe rent. Ton g v . S tat e , 25 S.W .3d 707,15

712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Under this standar d, a cla imant must prove that counsel’s repr esentation so undermined t he prope r func tioning of the adver sarial pr ocess that the tr ial cannot be re lied on as havingproduce d a just result. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687.

Our re view of c ounsel’s re prese ntation is highl y d eferential; we indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s c onduct fa lls withi n a wide r ang e of r easona ble re prese ntation. Id . at 68 9; Tong , 25 S.W .3d at 712. When assessing appellant’ s claims, we presume counsel’s actions and decisions wer e re asonably profe ssional and wer e motivated by sound trial strateg y . J ac k so n v . S tat e , 8 7 7 S
. W
. 2 d

7 6 8 , 7 7 1 -7 2 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 4 ). T h i s C o u rt wi l l n o ts ec o n d -gu es s t h ro u gh hindsight the strateg y

of counse l a

t tr ial, nor will the fac t that another attorney might have pursued a diffe rent c ourse support a finding of ineff

ectivene ss. Strickland , 46 6 at 68 9- 90 ; Bl ott v . S tat e , 588 S.W .2d 588, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). That another attorne y , including a ppellant’s counse l on appea l, might have pursued a differ ent course of action does not nece ssarily indicate inef

fec tive assistance
. Mi nie l v . S

tat e , 8 31 S.W. 2d

31 0, 32 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ); Ha rn e r v . S tat e , 99 7 S. W.2 d 6 95 , 7 04 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 19 99 , n o p e t.) . A ny

a lle g a tio n o f i ne ff

e c tiv e ne ss m

us t be firmly founded in the r ecor d, and the r ecor d must affirmatively dem o n s t ra t e t he alleg ed ineffe ctiveness. Tho mp so n v . S tat e , 9 S.W. 3d

80 8, 81 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Mc Fa rla nd v . S tat e , 928 S.W .2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

Ap pe lla nt f ir st urg e s th a t hi s c ouns e l w a s d e fi c ie nt i n f a ili ng to mov e to s up pr e ss appellant’ s statements to Darl a an d I ra H odg es whe n they place d calls to him following the e vent
a t is su e . H e ur g e s th a t the c ou ple a c te d und e r t

he dir e c tio n o f t

he State and

e lic ite d th e state me nts by threat and coe rcion an d t h at h e was prec luded from de veloping this evidence beca use the trialThe discussion occur red in the contex t of a motion in limine which does not appe ar in the 3 rec ord. 16 c ourt de nie d h is m oti on

fo r n e w tri a l w ith ou t a

he ari ng . B e c a

us e the re c or din g s w e re no t in evidenc e, the State responds that appellant is unable to show pre judice. The State also asser ts that
a p p e ll an t f a il e d to r a is e th is c la im in h is mo ti o n f o r n e w tr ia l an d , th e r e f

o r e , f a il e d to p r e s e n t a n adequate re cord on w hich this Court may evaluate his trial counsel’s a ctions. At the be g inn ing of

the tr ia l, the State rec ited on the rec ord that there wer e telephone

3
c a lls be tw e e n a

pp e lla nt and bo th Da

rl a and I ra Ho dg e s: “ [W]e dis c us se d that on tho se ph on e c a lls there are things that a

re e x tremely

detrimental to the de fenda nt as well as th i n gs t h at could be culpatory [si c] to the defenda

nt.” The pa

rties ag ree d that they would not proffe r the re cording s, but they would ref

ere nce the calls to show ho w Hu gh ey came to ask the questions he did in the interview. The S t at e agr eed to “ make c lear that he didn’t conf

ess in those tapes.” Appellant’s counsel a lerted the court that, if the State a llows “specif ics” to come into e vidence that are harmful to his client, he might seek to play the entire rec ording s. He then sug g ested that the c ourt “e x clude the ta pe s in the ir e nti re ty , and no bo dy c an re fe r to the m.” Ne ith e r p art y ma de a mot ion a t th a t ti me
re l at i n g t o t h e telephone tapes, a nd the cour

t did not rule on the admissibili ty of the re corde d
conver sations. The cour

t concluded:
Ic an’ t make an e vid e nti ary ru lin g un til the iss ue is br ou g ht up . I t so un ds lik e bo th of y ou wa nt t o avo id h a vin g the m c ome in. B ut i t a lso so un ds lik e e ith e r sid e c ou ld kn oc k a ro un d e no ug h, if

the y op e n e no ug h d oo rs , th a t th e y do c ome in. We’ ll j us t have to p lay

it b y e ar a nd se e wh a t ha

pp e ns .17 During opening argument, the State ref err ed to statements appe llant made duringthe
rec orded te lephone c onversation with Darla Hodg es in response to h er char acte rization of C.W .’s
acc usation that appellant touche d C.W . The State a rg ued: “[C.W .] i s telling me you touched he r.” H e say s, “Well, if Idid, it mus t have be en an a c c ide nt. I do n’ t thin k I did . No, Idid n’ t. I do n’ t r e me mbe r t

hat. I f K —it mus t have be en bec ause I

was drinking
. No, I didn’t do it. I didn’t do it. I wouldn’t have done that. Well, if she say s Idid it, I did it.”
Th e re wa s n o o bje c tio n to the argume nt.

At tr ia l, b oth

Hu g he y and Da rl a Ho dg e s re fe re nc e d he r te le ph on e c a lls to a pp e lla nt. Hug hey testified that he a sked Da rla Hodg es to place a ca ll to appellant and ask him about C.W.’s
acc usation. Hug hey

testified t hat appe llant, in response to Da rla Hodg es’s que stioning, told her that he wa s not sure, that may

be he did, but if he did, it was an a ccide nt and that he did not mean to touch her. B ased on that conver satio n , Hu gh ey called appellant to re quest an intervie w. Dar la Hodg es then testified that appe llant told her that “if he did it, it was by acc ident” and that may be “he had had something to drink.” At that point, appellant’s counsel asked to approa ch the be nch, advising the
c ourt that:
Your Honor , we ha

ve the motion in limi ne re g ardingthese tape s, and the que stion was how muc h wi l l b e— y o u r Honor, w e discussed the motion in l imine reg arding these tape s prior to g etting into them. Now, we both understood that a little bit of the testimony is goingto be fine. But if they ’re g oing to g et into e very littl e bit of proState stuff t hat’s going to happen. I don’t see a way without being able to play all the ta pe s. Ido n’ t w a

nt t o h a ve to do t

hat. B ut my

un de rs tand ingis that w e ’r e g oin g to lim it i t to he ne ve r out

ri g ht sa id h e did

it. B ut h e ma de so me state me nts that w ou ld have c or ro bo rate d th e sto ry , s uc h a s h e we nt i n th e ro om. He wo ke he r up . He sa id g ood n i gh t
. I ’m okay

with that stuff. But if w e start g etting into the intoxi cation issues, then that’s pre

judicial leaningtoward it happe ned.18

Th e State a g re e d to limit t e sti mony a bo ut t he c on ve rs a tio ns e xce pt t o “ make c le ar t hat [a pp e lla nt]
never came out a

nd admitted.” Def

ense counsel ag ree d, concludingthat “[w]e might just be we’ve g ot to play

the tapes, but we ’ll see how f ar it g oes.” D arla

Hodg es then testified: Q [St a te ]: No w, in a ll fa ir ne ss, he ne ve r c a me ou t and sa id that he d id thi s? A [D. Hodg es]: No. Q [Sta te ]: Ne ve r c on fe sse d o r a dmi tted to y ou th at he had a c tua lly g on e in and—he w ent in but not that he had ac tually touched he r private are a? A [D . H od g e s]: He r p ri vate are a , r ig ht. Q [S tate]: I t was only , “I f I did, it was an ac cident.”? A [D . H od g e s]: Ye s.
I ra Ho dg es di d no t te sti fy

c on c e rn ingany

re c or de d te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio n h e ha d w itha pp e lla nt. None of the re cording s of t elephone conver sations betwee n appellant a nd Dar la and Ira H odg es we re of fe re d o r a dmi tte d a s e vid e nc e a t tr ia l.

Appellant did not raise this cla im of ineffe ctiveness in his motion for new t ri al. A claim of inef

fec tive assistance may

be prope rly

raised on dir ect a

ppeal only

if the appe llate re cord is d e ve lop e d s uf

fi c ie ntl y to al low thi s Cour

t to e va luate the re a so nin g be hin d tri a l c ouns e l’ s a c tio ns . Mo or e v . S

tat e , 140 S.W .3d 72 0 , 7 2 8 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref ’d). Abse nt evidence of counsel ’ s r e a s o n s f

o r th e c h a ll e n g e d

c o n d u c t, w e w il l n o t c o n c lu d e th e c h a ll e n g e d c o n duct constituted defic ient perf

ormanc e unless the c onduct was so outra g eous that no compe tent attorney would have e ng ag ed in it. Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 57 S.W.3 d 4 36 , 4 40 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); Thompson ,19

9 S.W .3d at 814. On this rec ord, we ca n n o t co nclude that c ounsel’s ac tions with reg ard to the
rec orded te lephone c onversations between appellant and Mr. and Mrs. H odg es we re de ficient. The ref ere nced te stimony

conce rning portions of the re corde d telephone c onversa t i o ns provided little, if any , benef

it to the St ate in support of its ca se. I t merely provided a

context for other testimony and
wa s c on sis te nt w itha

pp e lla nt’ s d e fe ns e st rat e g y

of a c c ide nt a

nd la c k o f i nte nt. Whe n d e fe ns e
c ouns e l ob

je c te d, the State a g re e d to lim it t e sti mony and e lic ite d te sti mony

he lpf ul t o th e de fe ns e
and c on sis te nt w ith

the de fe ns e str a te g y . De fe ns e c ouns e l r e se rv e d th e ri g ht t o p lay the ta pe s in the ir entirety , b u t u lt im a te ly , th e ta p e s w e r e n o t p la

y e d f o r th e ju r y an d d o n o t a

p p e ar in th e rec ord. Al tho ug h a

pp e lla nt c omp la ins on

a pp e a l th a t th e State a g reed that the ta pe s w e re “ e xtre me ly de tr ime nta l” to a

pp e lla nt a nd that t hey “de ta il d e va statin g e xtra ne ou s o ff

e ns e s, sp e c if

ic a lly Mr. Fa rra r’s ‘pr ior sexual assault case ,’ as w el l as ‘fig hting incide nts and scre aming matches be tw e e n h im a

nd [his g ir lf ri e nd ],’ ” thi s e vid e nc e wa s n e ith e r o ff e re d n or a dmi tte d at tr ia l. I t is unlikely that the tapes would have been suppressed. Moreove r, ap pellant
a dv anc e s n o g ro un d o n w hic h th e ta pe s w ou ld h a ve be e n s up pr e ssed a nd , th erefo re , f a ils to d e mo n s tr a te th e r e s u lt

o f th e s u p p r e s s io nh e ar in g w o u ld

h a v e b e e nd if

f e r e n t. A s w it

h th e la te r statements g iven by

appellant, he was not in custody when he had the c onversations with Mr. and Mrs. Hodg es, and he had not be en char g ed with any offe nse. Se e Ce bu la v . S tat e , 828 S.W .2d 234, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1992, pet. re f’d) (audiotape re co rdi ng of telephone
conver sation betwe en d efendant and c o-def endant a dmissibl e bec ause, at the time of the
conver sation, defe ndant was not in custody and had not be en for

mally char g ed with the off

ense)
. The a ct of re cordingthe conver sations w as leg al beca use Mr. and Mrs. Hodg es we re a war e of a ndSee Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 16.02( c)( 3)(A) (West Supp. 2006) (provid ing a s aff irmative 4 defe nse to unlawful inter ception of communication that person who is a par ty to the communication has g iven prior c onsent to interce ption). 20 co n s en t edt o t h e r ec o rd i n g. Even apar t from appe llant’s failure (i) to provide a rec ord upon which 4 this Court could evaluate whether counsel’s conduct was de ficient with re spect to the re cording s and (ii) to show prejudice , we c annot say that counsel’s c onduct re g arding t h e tape -re corde d
c on ve rs a tio ns fe ll b e low

an o bje c tiv e sta

nd ard of re a so na

ble ne ss o r t

hat th e re su lt o f t

he tr ia l w ou ld have be en diffe rent. See Strick land , 466 U.S. at 687-88. Al so un de r t

he ru br ic of his c ouns e l’ s in e ff

e c tiv e ne ss a

nd fa ilure to mov e to s up pr e ss the telephone rec ording s, appellant urg es that his statement g iven to Hu gh ey should have be en
su pp re sse d b e c a

us e it w a s th e pr od

uc t of and ta int e d by the a lle g e d il le g a l te le ph on e c a lls fr om D a rl a and Ira Hodg es. Be cause we ha ve found that the rec ording s were not introduced into evidenc e, ar e
no t pa rt of the re c or d, and

we re no t il le g a l, w e c on c lud e tha t th is c on te nti on

is w ith ou t me ri t. Appellant also urg es that his counsel wa s deficie nt beca use he f ailed to r equest a

jury instruction on the voluntariness of a ppellant’s st atement. As we ha ve also a ddresse d, appellant ur g es that hi s st a te me nt w a s in vo lun tary and wa s g ive n w hil e he wa s in c us tod y . H is c ouns e l mo ve d to
su pp re ss t he state me nt o n thi s g ro un d, bu t did no t se e k a jur y ins tr uc tio n to a dv ise the jur

y that, i f it believed or had a rea sonable doubt that the evidence was obtained il leg ally , the jury shall disreg ard the evidenc e. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc
. Ann. art. 38.23(a)
. The State responds that appellant wa s not entitled to an art i cl e 3 8
. 23 instruction as to the voluntariness of his ora l confe ssion because , when the r ecor ding of

his oral statement wa s offe red at trial, his counsel said “no objection.” And,21

the State ar g ues, app el l ant suffe red no pr ejudice f rom the fa ilure of his counse l to request an ins tr uc tio n c on c e rn inghis wr itt e n s ta te me nt.

That his counsel stated that he had “ no objection” to the of fer of t he oral statement does not a ddress whether counsel was there by defic ient. The que stion remains whethe r counse l’s conduct wa s deficie nt beca use he f ail ed to reque st a jury

instruction on voluntariness. Appellant does not separ ately

challe n ge on appeal the f ailure of the trial cour

t to give a

jury instruction on voluntariness. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.22, § 6.

Gene rally , when evidenc e from any source raises a defe nsive issue and the de fenda nt p r o p e r l y r e qu e s t s a

j u r y c h ar g e o n t h a t i s s u e , t h e t r i a l c o u rtm u s ts u b m i tt h e i s s u e t o t h e j u r y. Mu niz v . S tat e , 8 5 1 S
. W
. 2 d

2 3 8 , 2 5 4 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Mo or e v . S tat e , 574 S.W .2d 12 2, 12 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 78 ))
. Th e tr ia l cou rt mus t the n instru c t the jur y to d isr e g ard

ill e g a lly obtained evide nce if

the def endant r aises a f

act issue c oncer

ning the manner

in which the evide nce was obtained and requests the instruction. Tho ma s v . S tat e , 723 S.W .2d 696, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The e vidence raising the issue may be strong , weak, cont ra d i ct ed , unimpeache d, or
u n b elievable
. Mu niz , 8 5 1 S
. W
. 2 d at 2 5 4 (c i t i n g Sa nd

e rs v . S tat e , 7 0 7 S
. W
. 2 d

7 8 , 8 0 ( T e x. C r i m. App. 1986 ) )
. A rti c le 3 8
. 2 3 ( a ) p r o v id e s th a t i nan y c a s e w h e r e a

p arty r a is e s anis s u e r eg arding wh e the r e vid e nc e wa s ob ta ine d in vio la tio n o f t

he laws of

Te xas o r t

he Un ite d St a te s, the jur

y sh a ll be ins tr uc te d tha t if it be lie ve s, or ha s a re a so na ble do ub t, that the e vid e nc e wa s o bta ine d b e c a us e of such a violation, then the jury

shall disreg ard a

ny such evide nce . T ex . Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art . 3 8. 23 (a ); see also Miniel , 831 S.W .2d at 316.22 Be fore an ins truction is require d, howeve r, some evide nce must be pr esente d to the jury that raises the voluntariness issue. B u t l e r v . Stat e , 872 S.W .2d 227, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 94 ). “ On ly

wh e n s ome e vid e nc e is p re se nte d th a t a c on fe ssi on

is no t voluntary

is the matter put in issue.” Miniel , 831 S.W .2d at 317 (e mphasis added) . Thus, we must deter mine whether

any evidenc e wa s prese nted to the jury which shows the conf

ession was not voluntary , thus trigg ering counsel’s oblig ation to reque st the instruction.

Appellant ar g ues that the voluntarine ss issue was prope rly rai s ed whe n the taperec orded inter

view and the transcr ipt of the interview wer e admitted into e vidence
. He then r elies
on his counsel’s closing arg ument and the State’s rebuttal arg ument to support the require ment of
an instruction on voluntariness. But a revie w of the e vidence admitted does not reve al any evidenc e that appellant’ s statement was involuntary . Appellant neither t es t ified at trial nor called a ny witnesses on the issue of the voluntariness of his statement. Hu gh ey t es t i fi ed that there wa s no
c oe rc ive c on du c t to ind

uc e the state me nt, that he did no t make the de fe nd ant any pr omi se s to g e t hi m to give or write a

statement, and that the statement was a product of t he defenda nt’s fre e will. On
cross-e x am in a ti o n , H u g h e y te s ti f ie d th a t a p p e ll an t’ s d e me an o r

c h an g e d d u r in g th e in te r

v ie w . He
was c alm at the beg inning, but appe llant was cr y ing a nd upset by

the end of

the i nterview . Hug hey testified that the office was small and that at one point he moved close r to the def endant a nd “patted him, held onto his arm.” Hug hey explained that he was “ trying to m ake him under stand and fe el comforta ble” be cause he wa s “sitting ther e cr y ing, sob b i n g. ” Hug hey testified, “That’s when I
m o v edi nan d

p at t edh i m , ‘It’ s o k ay . ’” An d t h e ap p el l an tap p ea re d

t o ac ce p tt h e c o m fo rt i n g.23 No evidenc e wa s prese nted that raised an issue as to whe ther a ppellant’s stateme nt
wa s in vo lun tary . A s w e have a lr e a dy dis c us se d, it w a s n ot e rr or to d e ny a pp e lla nt’s motio n to suppress the state ment beca use he w as not in custody
. Having revie wed the rec ord, we find nothing showing that the issue of the state ment’s voluntariness was raised befor e the jury , and the r equeste d jury instruction was t here fore not require d. See B utler , 8 72 S.W. 2d a t 23 6- 37 ; Miniel , 831 S.W .2d
a t 31 7. Ac c or din g ly , be c a us e the iss ue wa s n ot r a ise d b y the e vid e nc e , c ouns e l w a s n ot d e fi c ie nt i n failing to reque st the j ury

instruction. Se e Ro be rso n v . S tat e , 852 S.W .2d 508, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (f inding c ounsel’s failure t o reque st jury instruction was not defic ient wher e def endant wa s not entitled to inst ruction).

Appellant also a

rg ues that his counsel fa iled to conduct an inde pendent f actua l investigation. W hen addr essing the spec ific question of c ounsel’s dut y to investigate the fa cts and interview or

call potential witnesses, the Supreme Court advises that courts must “conduc t an objective r eview of

[counsel’s] performanc e, mea s u re d for ‘ rea sonablene ss under pre vailing profe ssional norms,’ which includes a contex t-depe ndent consideration of the c halleng ed conduc t
a s s e e n‘ f r o m c o u n s e l’ s p e r s p e c ti v e a t t h e time.’ ” W

iggins , 5 3 9 U. S
. at 5 2 3 (q u o t i n g Strickland , 46 6 U .S. a t 68 9) . In o the r w or ds , th e re a so na ble ne ss o f a

n atto rn e y ’s pr e tr ia l in ve st igat ion int o po ssi ble e xcu lpator

y e vid e nc e and wi tne sse s d e pe nd s u po n th e fa c ts k

no wn by or a va ila ble to counsel at the time he made the decision whe ther to c o n d u ct furthe r investig ation, interview pote ntial witnesses, or c all them to testify
. See Strick land , 466 U.S. at 689-90. I n this case, the issue th at co u n s el fa iled to conduct an a dequate and indepe ndent fac tual investigation was raise d in a ppellant’s motion for new tria l. Specifica lly , appellant ur g es that24

his counsel fa iled to investigate the prese nce of Alex S tone at the Hodg eses’ residenc e on the nig ht of the offe nse. An investigator for appellant’ s appellate counsel sea rche d court re cords a

nd found an indictment that char g ed Stone w ith se x ual assault of a child in Ma y 2004. The indictment wa s filed in Aug ust 2004, and Stone was placed on defe rre d adjudication and c ommunity supervision on J une 2, 2005. S t o n e’ s n ame was included on the State’ s witness list on December 1, 2004, along wi th t we nty -f ive oth e r w itn e sse s. Stone was known to appellant. I n his audiotaped stateme nt to Hughe y , appellant descr ibed ar

riving at the Hod ges es ’ h o u s e late on H allowee n night. The Hodg eses we re pla y ing volley ball with another c ouple. Another individual, Michelle, left w h e n a p p e ll a nt a rrived. A ppellant then told Hug hey

that “anothe r kid showed up,” who “has a l o t of drugproblems, ca uses a lot of mischief.” T he following exchang e occ urre d betwee n appellant a nd the detec tive:
A [A p p e l l an t ]: Th e on ly thi n g a f t e r n o w t h i n k i n ga

b o u ti tt h a tA l e x c a me over, w hich I

don’t even want to g o down that route. Imean that’s—I mean, I know he’ s not a g reat kid, he ’s had a lot of problems, but—but may

be Alex beca

use he was in the house, and we didn’t think about this l as t night a bout Alex being there . We totally

forg ot beca

use h e s h o wed up late in the d ay
— o r i nt h e e v en i n g. Q [D e te c tiv e ]: An d th is i s th is o the r guy y ou ’r e ta lki nga

bo ut? A [App e lla

nt]: Ye s. Q [D e te c ti v e ]: A le x? A [App e lla

nt]: Th a t’ s h is n a me , A le x. Ido n’ t kn owwh a t hi s la st n a me is. Q [De te c tiv e ]: She ’s no t sa y ing Al e x, Ky

le
. She ’s sa

y ing y our name . She is sa y i n g t h e w h o l e e n t i r e s t o r y m a t c h i n g i d e n t i c a l t o y o u r s. I dentical to y our st ory about going in and g iving he r a hugand25 all the things, you know, and a ll that stuff. All but rig ht to the p o i n tab o u tt h e t o u ch i n g. Although the Stat e l i s t ed Stone as a possible witness, it did not call him as a w itness. That Stone was on de fer

red a djudication was not admissible evidenc e g ener ally and could not have be en used to impeach Stone if he had testified. See Tex. R. Evi d. 404(b). Even if the evide nce w as re levant or admissible, appe llant does not show that the re sult of his trial would have bee n differ ent. C.W., wh o k ne w a pp e lla nt, te sti fi e d th a t a

pp e lla nt w a s th e on e wh o e nte re d h er roo m on the nig ht i n question and touche d her g enitals. As Hug hey observe d in the transcr ipt ex cer pt, appellant admitted to Hug hey

that he ente re d C
. W
. ’s room and touched her on “her private pa

rt” with his fing er. Ap pe lla nt’ s id e nti ty

a s th e pe rp e tr a tor

of the a ssa ult wa s n ot i n q

ue sti on ; a t is su e wa s h is i nte nt. L ike w is e , a

p p e ll an t’ s c la im

th at h is c o u n s e l w a s d e f ic ie n t i nf

a il in g to s e e k

the service s of an e x pert witness to examine t h e re port prepa red by Nurse Jaffe rs documenting her examination of C.W . is without m erit. B eca use t he diag ram of the injury depicted a

red linea r abra sion and the nar

rative por

tion of the repor

t describe d the injury

as an a brasion, an injury consistent with rubbing , appellant ur g ed in his motion for ne w trial that the diag ram wa s inconsistent wi th t he na rr a tiv e po rt ion
. At tr ia l, Jaf fe rs te sti fi e d th a t sh e do c ume nte d a lin e ar a br a sio n, wh ic h is
a scr atch or

a scr ape, on C.W.’s labia minora “ at t he 12:00 position which would be the top.” She descr ibed “whe re tra

uma broke t h e t i s s u e apart with pressur e, and it split.” She also found “g ener alized redne ss an d i rr i t at ion to the labia minora” from “1:00 to 11:00.” The testimony established that ther e we re abra sions a nd also “the cut” inside the fema le sexual org an. Appe llant ha s n ot s ho wn

that th e re is any inc on sis te nc y or “ dis c re pa nc y” or that tr ia l c ouns e l’ s fa ilure to o bta in26

an expert prejudice d him in any way . Even a

part fr om Nurse Jaffe rs’s testimony , C.W . descr ibed the assault and identified appellant, a nd appellant’ s statement to Hug hey trac ked C.W.’s description
o f t h e a s s a u l t , e x c e p ta s t o d

u r a t i o nan d

i n t e n s i t y. A re view of the rec ord sho ws that counsel’s pe rfor mance was re asonable under preva iling prof

essional norms, and he adher ed to a sound strateg y that any touching was a ccide ntal and tha t ap p ell ant lacke d intent. Counsel on appeal doe s not urg e that ther e wa s an abse nce of a sound trial strateg y . See, e .g. , Bo ne v . S tat e , 77 S.W .3d 828, 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (re fusing to reve rse on a

ppellant’s cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e o f co u n sel in the absenc e of e vidence explaining counse l’s decisions). F rom this recor d, it is reasonable t o co n cl u d e that there we re le g iti ma te and

pr of e ssi on a lly so un d r e a so ns fo r t

ri a l c ouns e l’ s c on du c t. A pp e lla nt h a s f a ile d to prese nt any evidenc e to rebut the presumption that his counsel’s actions confor med with sound trial strateg y . See Strick

land , 4 66 U. S. at 68 9. I f c ouns e l’ s c on du c t w a s d e fi c ie nt i n a ny re sp e c t, appellant has not stated how any defic iency prejudice d his defe nse. Se e id . at 69 1- 92 . We ov e rr ule appellant’ s first point of err or.
Motion for New Trial

I n his second a

nd third points of error , appellant c ontends that the trial cour t abused its discretion in denying appellant’s moti on for new t rial and doing so without a hea ring . As g rounds fo r t he mot ion , a

pp e lla nt c la ime d th a t he wa s d e pr ive d o f t he e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l be c a

us e (i ) h is tri a l c ouns e l di d no t con du c t an a de qu a te ind e pe nd e nt p re tr ia l in ve sti g a tio n a nd the Sta te fa iled to di scl ose e xcu lpator y inf or ma tio n to a

pp e lla nt a nd (i i) tr ia l c ouns e l di d n ot c on su lt w ith ind e pe nd e nt e xpe rt

wi tne sse s nec e ssa

ry to pr ov ide an e ff

e c tiv e de fe ns e , in c lud inga me nta l he a lth27

profe ssional to prepar e evide nce of temporar y insanity or a me dical prof

essional to revie w the re port p r e p ar e d b y th e n u r s e w h o e xa mi n e d

C. W. As a pre liminary

matter, we first discuss whether appellant’ s motion for new trial wa s proper ly befor e the tria l court. Appellant filed his f irst motion for new trial on J uly 22, 2005. The
rec ord does not re flec t that appellant eve r pre sented that motion to the trial cour t. A second motion
wa s ti me ly

fi le d o n Augus t 22, 200 5, and wa s o ve rr

ule d b y op e ratio n o f l aw. Ap pe lla nt atta c he d to this second motion fo r newtrial a “ cer tificate of prese ntation” stating that “On this 22nd day of Aug ust, 2005, the Defe ndant’s Motion for Ne w Trial wa s prese nted to the trial court within ten ( 10) da y s of fi lin g .” Un de r c ouns e l’ s un ve ri fi e d s ig natur e on the pa g e is a

ha nd wr itt e n n otatio n o f a

name with the followin g i d entifying inf ormation under the name: “c ourt administrator, 368th District Court, Aug ust 22, 2005.” The c ourt’s docket s h ee t does not ref lect the f iling of e ither motion for new tria l or that either motion was broug ht to the attention of t he trial c ourt afte r filing . Be cause the motions were e vidently

overr uled by operation of law, there is no order de ny ing e ither motion. Rule 21 of the Te x as Rules of Appe l l at e Procedur e g overns ne w trials in criminal
case s. Tex. R . App. P. 21. Rule 21.4(a) provides that a defenda nt may file a motion for new trial “bef ore, but no late r than 30 day s after , the date w hen the tria l court imposes or suspends sente nce in open cour

t.” Id
. 21.4(a)
. The rec ord in this case r efle cts a timely filing w hich is not disputed by the State. I t is not sufficient that a motion for new trial was f

iled in a timely

fashion with the cler k of the trial c ourt. Re

y es v . S tat e , 8 49 S.W. 2d

81 2, 81 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ). I t mu st a lso be presented or broug ht to the t rial j udg e’s attention in a timely way . Car

ra nz a v . S tat e , 960 S.W .2d28

76, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Rule 21.6 require s that a mot ion for new t rial be prese nted t o the tr ia l c ourt

wi thi n te n d ay s a ft e r i t is fi le d, unles s th e tr ial c ourt g ra nts pe rm iss ion

fo r l a te pr e se ntatio n. Te x. R. Ap p. P. 21. 6. F a ilure to pr e se nt the mot ion to the jud g e wi thi n th e tim e lim its results in the motion being ove rruled by operation of law 75 day s after sentenc ing. Ca rranz a , 960 S.W .2d at 79.

Finding the wor d “pre sent” to be “ somewhat ambiguous” and re sorting to e x tratext ual source s, the court of criminal appe als d et er m i n ed that the purpose or objec t sought to be obtained by this re quirement “is to put the trial court on a ctual notice that a def endant de sires the trial court to take some ac tion on the motion for new trial such a s a ruling or a he aringon it.” Car ra nz a , 96 0 S. W.2 d at 78 . T he re c or d mu st s ho w the mov ant f or a ne w tri a l su sta ine d th e burd e n o f a c tua lly deliveringthe motion to the trial court or otherwise br oug ht the motion to t he attention or a ctual notice of the trial court. Id . at 79. The prese ntment must result in actual notice to the c ourt and may be evide nced by the judge ’s signature or notation on a proposed or der or

by a hea ring date se t on the docket. Id . at 79-80.

Texas courts have g ener ally held that the mer e filing of a moti on for ne w trial is not
su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w “ pr e se ntm e nt” a s re qu ir e d by the ru le ; the re c or d mu st s ho w the mov ant a c tua lly delivere d the motion to the trial court or otherwise broug ht it to the attention or ac tual notice of the trial court. See, e .g. , Lon go ria v . S tat e , 1 5 4 S
. W
. 3d 747, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 20 04 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; He rn an de z v . S tat e , 84 S.W .3d 26, 31 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. re f’d) ; Gu mp e rt v . S

tat e , 48 S.W .3d 450, 458-59 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. re f’d) . I n Hernande z , the Texarkana

court he ld that a notation by defe nse counse l on the motion that he had disc ussed theHigginbotham v. Collateral Protection, Inc. , 859 S.W .2d 487, 490 (Tex. App.—Houston 5 [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied)
. 29 motio n wi t h court pe rsonnel wa s not sufficient proof of pre sentation. The Te x arka na cour t distinguished D a n i e l

s v . S t ate , 63 S.W .3d 67 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, no pet.), whic h addre ssed the issue of suf ficient “ prese ntment,” and he ld it sufficient when the rec ord contained a docket e ntry

ref lecting “Motion for Ne w Tr i al wa s prese nted to the Court.” B ased on this docke t entry , the Fou rt ee n t h C o u rt of Appe als in Da nie ls held that the trial c ourt had the r equire d actua l notice of the motion and the defe ndant had f ulfilled his obligation under rule 21.6. Danie ls , 63 S.W .3d at 69. B ut the same c ourt conc luded that a docket entry stating “Mo. for Ne w Trial f iled” was not sufficie nt to show presentment. Lon go ria , 154 S.W .3d at 762. The c ourt observe d that the key differ ence betwee n the Lon go ria and Da nie ls case s was that in Lon go ria the docket state ment ref lected that the motion was “filed,” while the docke t entry in Da nie ls stated that the motion “wa s prese nted to the Court.” Id . I n both case s, unlike the instant case , docket e nt ri es exis ted that ref ere nced the motion for new tria l.

Two cour ts of appea ls have he ld that the prese ntment require ment ca n b e met by pr e se ntm e nt to the c ourt

c oo rd inator

wh o a c ts a s a

n “ a g e nt f

or the tr ia l c ourt ” in the pursuit of 5 judicial economy

and ef ficienc y . Bu tle r v . S

tat e , 6 S.W .3d 636, 641 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 19 99 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Es tre lla v . S tat e , 8 2 S. W.3 d 4 83 , 4 85-86 (Tex . App .— San A nto nio 20 02 , p e t. d i s m ’d ) ( fo l l o wi n g Bu tle r) . I n Butler , the court abate d the appea l a nd rema nded the c ause to the tria l court for the limited purpose of holding an evide ntiary hear ing to determine the fac ts surrounding the pre sentment. Butler , 6 S.W .3d at 638. On remand, the trial cour t entere d finding s of fa ct that30

(i) counse l timely

filed the mot i o n , (i i ) counsel infor med the cour

t coordinator of

the filing of the motion and asked that it be set for hear ing, (iii) the motion was set for a hear ing on a

date c erta in and was then r esche duled as “ approve d by Court,” and (iv) a hear ing was held on whether ther e had be en
a timely prese ntment. Id
. Ba sed on these facts, t he cour t of appe als held that appe llant satisfied the prese ntment require ment by prese nting the motion to the court c oordinator. Id . at 641. L ikewise, in Es tre lla , the def

endant f iled a motion a

nd prese nted it to the court coordinator, who then filled out the “c ase se tting for

m” and se t a hea

ring date. The court of ap p ea l s co n cluded that the tr ial court
err ed in f inding that Estrella failed to satisfy the pre sentment requir ement. Es tre lla , 82 S.W .3d at 486. I n the absence of a record show ing that the motion was prese nted to the trial cour t, the court’s
or de r d e nyingthe mot ion fo r a ne w tri a l i s su ff

ic ie nt t o p re su me that th e mot ion wa s p re se nte d to the t ri al co u rt
. Mu sg

ro v e v . S tat e , 9 60 S.W. 2d

74 , 7 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); Sc ag gs v . S tat e , 18 S.W .3d 277, 282 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref ’d). Her e, ther e is nothing in th e re co rd t o substantiate that the trial c ourt had “ actua l notice” of appellant’ s motions for new trial. The h an d wr i tten notation by court pe rsonnel on the Certificate of Prese ntation, even if it wa s intended to be a signature, is unverified a nd contains no indication of the a ction taken. The c ertificate contains only the unilatera l assertion by counsel that
on the same date the motion wa s filed, Aug ust 22, 2005, the motion wa s “pre sented to the trial c ourt within ten day s of filing.” The cer tificate was attache d to the motion, and the handwr itten notation is also dated August 22. I t does not contain an a cknowledg ment of pre sentment to the judge —or theGene rally , docket she ets are not evidence
. Ro dr igu e z v . S tat e , 8 3 4 S. W. 2 d 592, 595 6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] ), pet. gr anted i n part & ref’d in part; remande d in part on other grounds , 8 44 S.W. 2d

74 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). Ho we ve r, “ [a] do c ke t e ntr y may su pp ly fa c ts i n cer tain situations, but i t cannot be use d to contradic t or preva il over a f inal judicial order .” N-S-W Cor p. v . S ne ll , 561 S.W .2d 798, 799 (Tex. 1977) (interna l citation omitt ed). 31 c ourt c oo rd inator

—a nd ne ith e r t he fi lin g no r t

he pr e se ntm e nt i s r e fe re nc ed on th e do c ke t sh e e t. 6 Be cause the re cord doe s not contain an a cknowledg ment of pre sentment to the trial cour t and the docke t sheet does not show the f iling of the motion or presentment , we hold that appellant did not timely

“pre sent” the motion for new t rial t o the trial cour t as requir ed under

rule 21. See Te x. R. A

pp . P. 21 ; Hernande

z , 84 S.W .3d at 31. But e ven assuming appellant’ s motion for new t r ial was prope rly

prese nted to the trial
c ourt , w e ho ld that the mot ion and a ff ida vit s, e ve n if as su me d to be tru e , we re no t suf fi c ie nt t o e nti tle appellant to a he aringor to g rant a ppellant a ne w trial. T h e r ig h t to a h e ar in g o n a mo ti o n f o r n e w tr ia l is n o t a

n a b s o lute rig ht. S

ee, e .g. , Rey es , 8 4 9 S
. W
. 2 d a t 81 5; Moo re v . S tat e , 4 S.W .3d 269, 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, no pet.). We reviewa trial c ourt’s re fusal to hold an evide ntiary hear ing on a

motion for new trial und er an abuse- of-discr etion standard. Rey es , 8 49 S.W. 2d a t 81 6. A tri a l c ourt

a bu se s it s discretion in fa iling to hold a hea ring when a

defe nd an t p re s ents a motion for ne w trial raising matters not deter

minable from the r ecor d. Ho lde n v . S tat e , N o. PD- 16 99 -0 5, 20 06 Te x. Cr im. Ap p. L EX I S 18 17 , at *4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. Se pt. 20 , 2 00 6) ; Kin g v . S tat e , 29 S.W .3d 556, 569 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Rey es , 849 S.W .2d at 815-16. We do not substit ute our judg ment for that of the trial court; rathe r, we de cide whe ther the tria l court’s de cision was ar bitrary or unre asonable
. A trial cour

t abuses its discr etion in de ny ing a motion for new trial only when no rea sonable view32

of the re cord c ould support the trial court’ s ruling. Holden , 2006 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1817, at *5 n.6 (citing Le wis v . S

tat e , 911 S.W .2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). The motion must be acc ompanied by aff idavits specific ally

showing the g rounds for relief
. King , 29 S.W.3 d at 5 69 ; J or da n v . S tat e , 883 S.W .2d 664, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). But a trial c ourt may rule ba sed on sworn ple ading s and af fidavits without oral testimony ; live testimony is not required. Holden , 20 06 Te x. Cr im. Ap p. L EX I S 18 17 , at *8 -9 ; Ri v e ra v . S tat e , 89 S.W .3d 55, 58 n.9 (Tex
. C ri m . Ap p . 2002). While the aff idavits are not r equire d to refle ct eve ry argument leg ally require d to e stablish r elief, the motion or aff idavits must show rea sonable g rounds exist for holding that suc h reli ef co u l d b e granted. Jordan , 8 83 S.W. 2d a t 66 5. An

a ff ida vit that is conclusory

or that is unsupported by fac t s i s n o t s u ff

icient to put the trial court on notice that reasonable g rounds for r elief e x ist. Bu e rg e r v . S tat e , 6 0 S. W. 3 d

3 5 8 , 3 6 3 ( T e x. A p p .—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. re f’d) . The purpose of the he aringis for a de fenda nt to ful ly

develop the issues raised in a

motion for new tria l. Jordan , 883 S.W .2d at 665. I n support of his motion, appellant attache d aff idavits from Kip Fa

rra r, appe llant’s bro t h er , and Te resa

Fa rra r, appe llant’s mother. In their af fidavits, they

aver red that appellant had
an “ unus ua l sty le of

c omm un ic a tio n” or a “ c omm

un ic a tio n dis or de r” that fr e qu e ntl y c a us e d p e op le to misunder stand what appellant told them. Another witness aver red g ener ally that she was a fr iend of the fa mil y and that she wa s aw are a pp e lla nt ha d a lea

rn ing dis a bil ity
. Ap pe lla

nt al so a tta c he d h is own af fidavit denying that he was g uilty of the conduct of which he wa s acc used, stating that he had encounte red A lex S tone at the c ounty jail after h i s co n v i ct i o n and that Stone “star ted to act ve ry fu nn y .” With re sp e c t to his state me nt, a pp e lla nt cl a ime d tha t he “ re a lly ha d n o c ho ic e ” bu t to ta lk33

with Hug hey

beca use he f elt that it was an orde r whe n Hug hey told him, “I need to talk to y ou.” The
a ff ida vit s a lso se t f

or th i ll w ill be tw e e n th e fa

mil ie s and

pr ior c on ta c ts b e tw e e n a

pp e lla nt a nd Da rl a Hodg es, the g ener al nature of which ha d been r aised at trial. Appellant included the a ffidavits of a n i n v es t i gat o r d es cr i b i n g Al ex S t o n e’ s c r i m i n a l b ac k gro u n d an d a r egi s t er edn u rs e d es cr i b i n g a purported disc repa

ncy betwee n Nurse J aff

ers’ s char acte rization of C.W .’s injuries and the depiction of the injury

on a diag ram a ccompa

ny ing he r r ep o rt
. Al s o appende d to the motion were two unexecuted draf

ts of aff idavits submitted by appellate counsel on behalf of appe llant’s trial counsel sh ow ingthat he re fu se d to sig n th e a ff ida vit s. Ap pe lla nt argue s that he wa s e nti tle d to a he ari ngbe c a

us e the State fa ile d to dis c los e evidenc e that Alex Stone, who appea red on the S tate’s witness list, was on defe rre d adjudication for the offe nse of se x ual assault of a child and that this e vidence was de terminable f rom fac ts outside the exist ing tr ial rec ord. B ut Alex S tone was not c alled by the State to testify as a witness, and
a pp e lla nt d oe s n ot s ho w h owthi s te sti mony wa s r e le va

nt o r t hat it wa s no t kn ow n to him duri nghis tr ia l. Th e re c or d is cle ar that Stone wa s kno wn to ap pe lla nt. Ap pe lla

nt f ir st m e nti on e d St on e in h is inte r v ie w w it h H u g h e y . I nan y

e v e n t, id e n ti ty

w a s n o t at i s s u e . C. W. te s ti f ie d th a t a p p e ll a nt committed the offe nse, and appe llant acknowle dg ed some a spects of the conduct, e ven as he claimed it wa s an acc ident. There was ample evidenc e that appellant was the perpe trator of the offe nse. The admission of evidenc e showing that another person at the residenc e on the night of the offe nse wa s on defe rred adjudication for a similar ty

pe of of fense would not have led to a differ ent re sult at appellant’ s trial. I n addition, for the r easons we have pr eviously discu ssed, appe llant has not prese nted a thre shold showing that his counse l provided ineff ective a ssistance or that any alleg ed34

defic iency

prejudice d the def

ense suf ficient t o t ri g g er the require ment for a hear ing on that issue. Th e a f f id a v it s d o n o t r is e to th e thr e s h o ld n e c e s s ar y to o v e r c o me th e p r e s u mp ti o n of ef fec tive assistance
. Appellant has not asser ted a rea sonable ground in his motion for ne w trial that ca nnot be dete rmined fr om the rec ord. We conclude that the t rial court did not abuse its discretion in failing t o h o l d a h ea ri n g. Mo re ov e r, the mot ion and a ff ida vit s we re no t su ff

ic ie nt to g ra

nt a pp e lla nt a ne w tri a l. Ap pe lla nt e ith e r c omp la ins a

bo ut ma tte rs that he c ou ld— and did —o bje c t to a t tr ia l, o r h e su g g e sts that evidenc e wa s fabr i ca ted without expl aining why he could not have known of these alleg ed fabr ications at trial. F or example, an a ffidavit wa s submitt ed by a cor rec tions officer

who dated Dar la Hodg es for

about t wo y ear s from 1996 to 1998. He a verr ed that she w as “ba d news” and that sh e wa s d a tin g ano the r p oli c e of fi c e r w he n s he wa s d a tin g him , a nd that, on on e oc c a sio n, the y bo th showed up at her a

partment at the same time. Da rla Hodge s acc used t he off icer of hitting he r and causinga bruise to he r ey e. Althoug h char g es were filed ag ainst him, they wer e later

dismiss ed. The
o ff i ce r a l s o av erre d

t h at h e kn ew t h at Da rl a Ho d ges h ad b ee n m o l es t ed b y h er s t ep fa t h er . Al t h o u gh he told appellant he would testify , he neve r hea rd fr om appellant’s attorney . Appella n t ’s brother
aver red that appellant told him that a couple of months before Hallowee n, appellant ha d been at the H o d g e s e s ’ h o u s e t a k i n g a s h o w e r an d D ar l a c l i mb e d i n t o t h e s h o w e r

w i t h h i m . S h e “ p r o b a

b l y” beca me ma d

w h e n “ th e y d id n ’ t d o a n y

th in g an d h e g o t o u t. ” T h e p r io r r e lati o n s h ip b e tw een appellant a

nd Dar la Hodges was t he subj ect of ong oing disc ussions at trial, was dete rminable fr om the re cord at trial, and did not provide suff icient g rounds to g rant a

ppellant a ne w trial.35 We conclude that the t rial court was not re quired to hold an e videntiary hear ing on appellant’ s motion for new trial, a nd that the trial cour

t did not abuse its discr etion in denying the motion.
CO NC LU SION

Havingoverr

uled appe llant’s points of err or, we aff irm the j udg ment of convic tion.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med Filed: Nove mber 10, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh