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RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL CHEATING AND THE

ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSES

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(Serial No. 113–238)

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

(Serial No. 113–132)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 10, 2014

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the

Committee on Armed Services

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

COLIN BOSSE AND ERIC SMITH, Clerks 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control and 

International Security, U.S. Department of State ............................................ 2

The Honorable Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, 

U.S. Department of Defense ................................................................................ 10

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Rose Gottemoeller: Prepared statement ...................................... 4

The Honorable Brian McKeon: Prepared statement ............................................. 12

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 48

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 49

Written responses to questions submitted for the record by members of the 

subcommittees ...................................................................................................... 50

(1)

RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL CHEATING AND 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSES 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces is convened. 

This hearing is a continuation of the Russians’ arms control to 

bring us up to date. I would recall and remind all committee members that there was a classified briefing yesterday on this issue. We 

have this public briefing today, and there will be another classified 

briefing after this public hearing this afternoon. The classified 

briefing I found alarming, and that is why we have the witnesses 

here this morning, or this afternoon. 

The Chair, with the agreement of Mr. Rogers, will dispense with 

all opening statements of members. Without objection, all of the 

members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length of limitation 

in the rules. 

I will introduce our two witnesses, allow them to give their statements. Then we will recess for votes and come back for questions. 

That will be the format of this joint committee hearing. 

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller is the Under Secretary for Arms Control 

and International Security at the U.S. Department of State. Mrs. 

Gottemoeller also served as the Assistant Secretary of State for the 

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, and was the 

chief U.S. negotiator in the New START treaty with Russia. 

Mr. Brian McKeon is the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for 

Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. Mr. McKeon also served 

on the National Security Council staff and as Deputy National Security Advisor to the Vice President. 

Ms. Gottemoeller, we will start with you. 

I would request that the witnesses try to keep their statements 

to 5 minutes. 

You are recognized. 

2

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, 

UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairmen Poe and Rogers, Ranking Members Sherman and Cooper, distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs and 

Armed Services Committees, thank you for hosting this hearing 

today, for having me here today. 

Today I want to seek about three things: Why arms control 

agreements with Russia continue to be an important tool to enhance the security of the United States, our allies, and partners; 

the seriousness with which the administration takes compliance 

with arms control agreements; and U.S. efforts to ensure Russian 

compliance with its arms control obligations. 

As has been recognized for 4 decades, verifiable arms control 

agreements can enhance the security of the United States, our allies, and our partners. The Obama administration has continued 

the longstanding bipartisan approach to arms control with Russia 

that had its origins in the days of the cold war. The administrations of President Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were the 

architects of many of our most successful and enduring arms control efforts. 

That said, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, increasingly 

confrontational posture, and violations of the INF and CFE treaties 

have undermined trust and must be addressed. While diplomacy 

between the United States and Russia continues, no one can ignore 

that Russia’s actions have undermined the very principles upon 

which cooperation is built. 

Further, as we consider arms control priorities this year or in 

any year, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and 

partners at every step of the way. Our security and defense, as well 

as that of our allies and partners, is nonnegotiable. We will only 

support arms control agreements that advance our national security interests. 

I will cite the New START example as one such. Since New 

START entered into force in 2011, the United States has inspected, 

with boots on the ground, Russian nuclear weapons facilities 70 

times. Moreover, the United States and Russian Federation have 

exchanged more than 7,500 notifications on one another’s nuclear 

forces in the past 4 years. These notifications provide predictability 

by enabling the tracking of strategic offensive arms from location 

to location, giving advance notice of upcoming of ballistic missile 

test launches, and providing updates of changes in the status of 

systems covered by the treaty. 

In the realm of conventional arms control, the United States and 

our allies have been using arms control and confidence-building 

mechanisms in an effort to promote stability in Europe, provide 

transparency on Russia’s provocative actions in and around 

Ukraine, and assure our allies and partners in the face of Russian 

aggression. 

We believe that arms control mechanisms have great importance 

not only in providing insight and transparency into Russian actions 

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tribute to greater transparency and stability in the Euro-Atlantic 

region. 

I want to underscore, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, that our 

NATO allies and other partners in Europe are strong supporters of 

arms control and confidence-building mechanisms. And they count 

on our active participation and leadership of these efforts. 

Now let me turn very quickly to INF. 

In July of this year, as you know, the United States announced 

its determination that Russia was in violation of its IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty obligations not to posses, produce, or 

flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability 

of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. We take this violation extremely seriously. 

The INF Treaty, negotiated and ratified during the Reagan administration, eliminated an entire class of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. The 

INF Treaty benefits the security of the United States, our allies, 

and the Russian Federation, and the United States is committed to 

the continued viability of the INF Treaty. 

We have been steadily raising our concerns with Russia regarding violation of the INF Treaty and have, since July, held seniorlevel bilateral discussions, with the aim of returning Russia to 

verifiable compliance with its treaty obligations. 

In addition to these diplomatic efforts, we are actively reviewing 

potential economic measures in response to Russia’s violation, and 

the United States is assessing options in the military sphere to ensure that Russia will not gain a significant military advantage 

from its violation of the INF Treaty. 

My colleague, Brian McKeon, will speak further about that. 

In sum, for more than 40 years, arms control has been a tool that 

has contributed substantially to the national security interests of 

the United States, providing predictability and stability to us and 

to the global community. As owners of more than 90 percent of the 

nuclear global stockpile, the United States and Russia continue to 

have a special responsibility in this regard. 

We will continue to pursue arms control and nonproliferation 

tools along with effective verification, because they are the best 

path that we can take to effectively limit and reduce nuclear 

threats and prevent such weapons from proliferating to other nation-states or falling into the hands of extremists bent on causing 

colossal destruction. 

Thank you for your partnership in this effort, and I look forward 

to answering your questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller follows:]

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Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes Mr. McKeon for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BRIAN MCKEON, PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much, sir. 

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, 

Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the two subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity today. 

I will try not to repeat what Under Secretary Gottemoeller has 

told you. In addressing the issues outlined in your letter of invitation, I would point you to my full statement for the record. Let me 

highlight a few key points. 

When implemented fully by all parties, arms control agreements 

advance U.S. national security interests. The United States is 

made safer and more secure by such agreements. The administration closely monitors compliance of other states-parties to arms 

control treaties and agreements, including that of the Russian Federation. And, as required by law, we report this assessment to the 

Congress. 

Through this effort, the Obama administration has determined 

that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under 

the INF Treaty. We reported this violation in the arms control compliance report issued in 2014, and we have briefed you regularly 

on our concerns about Russia’s actions and discussed it with our 

allies and partners. 

We believe the INF Treaty contributes not only to U.S. and Russian security but also to that of our allies and partners. For that 

reason, Russian possession, development, or deployment of a weapons system in violation of the treaty will not be ignored. 

Our objective from the very beginning has been to preserve the 

viability of the INF Treaty and convince Russia to come back into 

compliance with its obligations under it. Our approach to this issue 

has been multipronged, beginning with engaging Russia diplomatically while discussing other potential measures in coordination 

with allies. 

We have engaged the Russian Federation in diplomatic channels 

since 2013, including senior-level discussions in Moscow in September of this year. Unfortunately, Russia has not been forthcoming with any information, nor has it acknowledged the existence of a noncompliant cruise missile. Instead, the Russian side 

has chosen to accuse the United States of violating its obligations 

under the INF Treaty. 

In our view, all of Russia’s claims are categorically unfounded. 

The United States has been and remains in compliance with all of 

its obligations under the INF Treaty. In our September meeting in 

Moscow, we fully addressed each of Russia’s concerns, providing 

Russian officials with detailed explanations and treaty-based reasons as to how U.S. actions comply with our obligations. These 

Russian claims, we believe, are meant to divert attention from its 

own violation. 

As a result of Russia’s actions, the Joint Staff has conducted a 

military assessment of the threat were Russia to deploy an INF 

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Pacific region. This assessment has led us to review a broad range 

of military response options and consider the effect each option 

could have on convincing Russian leadership to return to compliance with the INF Treaty as well as countering the capability of 

a Russian INF Treaty-prohibited system. 

We do not want to find ourselves engaged in an escalatory cycle 

of action and reaction. However, Russia’s lack of meaningful engagement on this issue, if it persists, will ultimately require the 

United States to take actions to protect its interests and security, 

along with those of its allies and partners. Those actions will make 

Russia less secure. 

We now have a significant challenge ahead of us. We hope the 

Russia Federation will remember why the Soviet Union signed the 

INF Treaty in the first place. By agreeing to that treaty, the 

United States and the Soviet Union ensured that both parties benefited from the removal of weapons systems that posed a real and 

credible threat to European security. 

As I noted at the outset, the United States takes treaty compliance very seriously. The ramifications of Russia’s actions and our 

response affect more than just one arms control agreement; they affect our ability to pursue future arms control and nonproliferation 

regimes. Such a violation threatens our security and the collective 

security of many allies and partners. This violation will not go unanswered, because there is too much at stake. 

We look forward to keeping you informed on this matter as the 

situation develops. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and we look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]

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Mr. POE. I thank the statements of the witnesses. 

As previously stated, the subcommittees will be in recess until 15 

minutes after the last vote in a series of three votes. The first series—or the first vote in the series is taking place now. 

So the subcommittees are adjourned. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. POE. The subcommittees will come to order. 

The Chair will recognize himself for 5 minutes. 

If I understand your testimony correctly, the Russians are in violation of this treaty. My question is, are the Russians in violation 

of any other arms control treaties besides the INF? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We do consider the Russians to be in violation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. 

Mr. POE. Is it correct to say that the Russians are in violation, 

are not complying with the eight other arms control treaties besides this one? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, in some cases, we are working on compliance issues with them. In the case of the Open Skies Treaty, for 

example, we have had some concerns about their compliance with 

the Open Skies Treaty, but we are working, and in some cases successfully working, to resolve some of our concerns. 

In other cases, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, we 

have been unable to determine whether current activities that they 

have going on would not be in compliance with the treaty. And in 

some cases——

Mr. POE. Excuse me. Let me ask you this question. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Are they in violation or not in compliance with eight 

other arms control treaties? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I believe that is not quite correct, because some we have determined that they are in violation, actually 

in violation of the treaty, and in some cases there are some issues 

that we are working with them on to determine their compliance. 

Mr. POE. Does not being in compliance mean the same as violation? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, I will just give you an example, sir. 

We have for each of the treaties and agreements an implementation body for that treaty or agreement. In the case of the New 

START treaty, it is called the Bilateral Consultative Commission. 

And when issues come up in an inspection, we may have a difference with the Russians, but we try to sit down and work out 

that difference. In the latest session of the BCC, we were able to 

work out some differences with the Russians about their inspection 

approaches. 

So it takes some time and it takes some work to figure out 

whether they are actually in violation of a treaty. 

Mr. POE. So does ‘‘violation’’ and ‘‘noncompliance’’ mean different 

things? That is really my question. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. ‘‘Violation’’ and ‘‘noncompliance’’ mean the 

same thing. I was just making the point that, in each of the treaties and agreements, if we went through them one by one, I could 

tell you, you know, in some cases——

Mr. POE. So——

25

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. We are working——

Mr. POE [continuing]. Let’s go back to my question. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. On issues. 

Mr. POE. I am sorry. I want to get this straight. ‘‘Noncompliance’’ 

and ‘‘violation’’ do mean the same thing. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Correct, sir. 

Mr. POE. So are the Russians in violation and are not in compliance with eight other treaties? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, they are not in compliance or in violation with the INF Treaty and the CFE Treaty. In certain other 

cases, we have concerns that we are working with them on. 

Mr. POE. So is it ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ as far as eight treaties? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I do not believe the number is eight, sir. It 

is ‘‘no’’ for eight treaties. 

Mr. POE. If the Russians are in violation of the INF Treaty—and 

you have testified that they are in violation—the United States has 

options. One of those options is to withdraw from the INF Treaty; 

is that correct? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. That is correct. And, in fact, the United 

States has a right to withdraw in any event. It is one of the articles 

of the treaty. We always put that in for national security purposes, 

a country may choose to withdraw from a treaty. 

Mr. POE. And what is the United States position on—what is our 

position today on withdrawing from the INF Treaty? We know they 

are in violation. Are we going to withdraw from the treaty? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Our view is that it is in the national security interests of the United States and of our allies and partners 

to remain in the INF Treaty and to work to bring Russia back into 

full compliance with the treaty. 

Mr. POE. How long are we going to give the Russians to come 

back to the fold, so to speak? A month? A year? Ten years? When 

are we going to make the decision, you have had enough time to 

come into compliance after you are in clear violation, this is the 

day of reckoning? How long are we going to give them to come into 

compliance? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I can’t tell you exactly. We have a diplomatic effort going on. 

I can give you two historical examples. In the case of the ABM 

Treaty, the Reagan administration and the Bush administration 

worked with the Soviets diplomatically for 5 years before they were 

able to bring the Russians back into compliance with that treaty. 

In the case of the CFE Treaty, the Bush administration, George 

W. Bush administration, and the Obama administration also 

worked for 5 years. And, in that case, we did not bring the Russians back into compliance with the treaty. We declared countermeasures, and, basically, we have now put in place countermeasures against the Russians with regard to the—with regard to 

the CFE Treaty. 

Mr. POE. Two more questions. 

It is my understanding that we first detected Russian violations 

of the INF Treaty in 2008. If I do my math correctly, that is 6 

years. 

I am no expert in arms, but I would think the Russians would 

lather up with the idea that they are in violation, continue to be 

26

in violation, and we are just going to keep postponing a decision 

to withdraw from the treaty. 

What other options do we have besides withdrawing from the 

treaty? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, if I may, I just wanted to say that in 

2008 we did not actually know that the Russians were in violation 

of the INF Treaty. It took some time to determine that fact. This 

is an issue that——

Mr. POE. But others of us believed it to be in 2008. 

Without arguing over the timeframe, what other options do we 

have besides withdrawing from the treaty? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I will just say that we will be happy to talk 

about that matter in closed session, so—but we have a number of 

options. I have pointed to them already. One has been to, you 

know, declare countermeasures. That is something we did in the 

case of the CFE Treaty. 

We also, I will say, right at the moment, have a kind of threepronged approach in place for dealing with this matter. We are 

continuing to pursue it diplomatically. We have economic countermeasures that we are looking at. And we are also—and my colleague Brian McKeon can talk in more detail about this—we are 

looking at military measures that we may wish to take. 

So we are, in fact, pursuing our own national policy in this regard. And if you are talking about in the realm of legal and treaty 

work, then we have other options such as countermeasures that 

can be pursued. 

Mr. POE. Is Russia deploying or preparing to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I don’t know. But we are very, very 

alert to statements that have been made by certain experts on the 

Russian side about deploying capable aircraft, dual-capable aircraft, such as backfire and missile systems that would also be dualcapable. And we have spoken to the Russians about this and expressed our concern about any option of reintroducing nuclear 

weapons into Crimea. 

Mr. POE. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to first thank the witnesses, Ms. Gottemoeller and Mr. 

McKeon, for their service to the country. 

I worry that Congress doesn’t make your job any easier. In fact, 

sometimes it is a nuisance to deal with the legislative branch, but 

nonetheless we are here. 

I think we all agree that the Russians have cheated on this treaty. The question is, what do we do about it? 

I am worried, Mr. Chairman, that at least the public portion of 

this hearing is doing more of a service to the Russians than it is 

to our own people. It is easy for us to saber-rattle up here and look 

tough and look strong, but I worry that, you know, authoritarian 

countries like Russia do not have hearings like this; they do not 

show their hand. And we should be doing what we can to fight 

back intelligently, not for domestic political consumption. 

Oil, perhaps, might be our most powerful weapon. You know, the 

ruble has tumbled in recent weeks due to the low oil prices. Most 

27

Americans are rejoicing that oil is, what, about $66 a barrel now. 

You know, we have some folks in our own country who like highpriced oil. And I am not against our energy-producing regions, but 

oil as a weapon is a pretty powerful thing. Cheap oil also helps to 

stabilize Iran, countries like that. 

So, somehow or another, we need to figure out what would be the 

most effective thing. This isn’t easy, as I have just pointed out with 

some geographical disparities within our own country. I am hoping 

that we as Americans don’t get readdicted to foreign oil. We are 

truly blessed right now to have found so much oil in our own country and to be able to drive oil prices down. I love seeing OPEC in 

disarray. But we have some folks in our country who love highpriced oil. 

So, now, oil is just one of the weapons. There are many others. 

I actually think the thing that would scare Vladimir Putin the 

most would be if we lifted defense sequestration. And I look forward to the new Republican majority helping us do that. 

In order to do that, we probably are going to have to find either 

spending cuts, which would be my first choice, or revenue somewhere. And that would be an opportunity to show, for example, 

that—perhaps the chairman might not be aware, being from the 

Foreign Affairs Committee, not Defense—that just to maintain our 

current nuclear stockpile, just maintenance, not improvement, 

takes $350 billion over the next 10 years. That is a lot of money. 

And right now we have difficulty forecasting where that money 

is going to come from. And for a Nation that didn’t even pay for 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but borrowed much of it from 

China, that doesn’t make us look strong. 

So there are opportunities here for America to really be strong 

and to have an intelligent response to Mr. Putin and others who 

are warmongering with their violations of the INF Treaty. But let’s 

not beat up on our own diplomats. Let’s not beat up on our own 

Defense Department officials. 

You know, sometimes—and I venture to say that each one of us, 

when you know that your opponent has grievous flaws, as some of 

us have discovered in our own elections, those aren’t necessarily 

disclosed immediately; sometimes you wait until the final debate—

perhaps to give the administration the benefit of the doubt. They 

thought it was a more strategic opportunity to reveal this and the 

time was more appropriate. 

But we, as Americans, should all be on the same team. We 

should be unified in our response, an intelligent response, to these 

treaty violations by Russia. So I would hope, Mr. Chairman, in 

both the public portion of the hearing and the private portion of the 

hearing that we can have a first-rate strategic response to these 

treaty violations. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McKeon, what is our strategy for responding to Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty? And by that I want to know, what are 

the ends we are seeking to achieve? And how do we expect to see 

that happen? 

28

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, our strategy has two potential 

ends. 

First, we seek to convince Russia to return to compliance, as 

Under Secretary Gottemoeller has said, because we believe that 

preserving the treaty is in our mutual security interests. 

If Russia does not return to compliance, our end will be to ensure 

that Russia gains no significant military advantage from its violation. 

Mr. ROGERS. What timeline do you have in mind? 

Mr. MCKEON. I can’t give you a timeline, sir, as the Under Secretary said. We are taking a hard look at it. 

I can say more about this in response to your question, if you will 

permit me. 

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly. I want you to be brief, please. I have 

some questions for Ms. Gottemoeller. 

Mr. MCKEON. Understood. 

The ways and means of our strategy address both of these ends. 

As I said in my statement, we continue to remind Russia why we 

signed this treaty in the first place. As Rose has said, we have got 

a range of options—diplomatic, economic, political—that we could 

impose on Russia that would impose significant costs on them for 

its violations. 

The military responses would aim to negate any advantage Russia might gain from deploying an INF-prohibited system. And all 

of these would be designed to make us more secure. 

The range of options we are looking at in the military sphere fall 

into three broad categories: Active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles; counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. 

or allied forces. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Ms. Gottemoeller, has Russia deployed a ground-launched cruise 

missile violating the INF? Or do they have the capability to do 

that? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, we have seen them developing a 

ground-launched cruise missile that is in violation of the INF Treaty. They certainly have the capability to deploy it, we would judge. 

Mr. ROGERS. And is there a difference between deployment and 

this limited operational capability? And describe it for us, please. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I believe this is something that we 

might want to take up in more detail in our closed session. We will 

have some additional assistance from our technical staff at that 

time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

How many times have you discussed Russia’s INF violations with 

your counterparts since the compliance report came out? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Since the compliance report came out, I 

would have to count up exactly, but it is in the range of a dozen 

times. 

Mr. ROGERS. To what end? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, I will say that the Russians have said 

quite clearly to us that they believe that the INF Treaty is in their 

29

national security interests and that they do not intend to withdraw 

from the treaty now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do they say why they are not in compliance, then? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. They don’t acknowledge, sir, that they are 

not in compliance with the treaty. And that has been one of the 

core issues that we have had to wrestle with them about at the 

present time. They say that they are in complete compliance with 

the INF Treaty. 

Mr. ROGERS. And your response? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. My response is to repeat to them that we 

have grave concerns about a ground-launched cruise missile that 

they have tested to intermediate range. And we have given them 

some certain key pieces of information to convey to them our understanding of the program. But up to this point, as I said, they 

have not acknowledged the missile. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now, you and Mr. McKeon have stated that you 

can’t state that there is a timeline or you can’t tell us what your 

timeline is. This has got to come to a close soon. Otherwise, the 

Russians have no reason to believe there are any consequences for 

violating this treaty or the other seven treaties that they are violating. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I think we have been really clear with 

them about the implications of their violation of the treaty. And, 

in fact, I have said to my counterparts that we do not want to go 

down the road of putting in place the kind of countermeasures that 

would, you know, raise the kinds of threats that existed in Europe 

back at the time that INF was first agreed. And, as Brian McKeon 

said, we hope the Russians will remember the reasons for which 

they signed up to the INF Treaty in the first place. It was——

Mr. ROGERS. At any point——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. To deal with certain threats. 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. Do you anticipate giving them a dropdead date? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, that is something that will have to be 

determined in the context of a discussion, you know, with my 

bosses. And it will also have to be determined talking with our 

interagency colleagues. 

But I want to really stress that this does not mean that we are 

doing nothing. We——

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, it does. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. Are preparing for——

Mr. ROGERS. It really does, Ms. Gottemoeller. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. We are preparing for any options here or 

any possibilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. At some point, you have to recognize that there are 

no consequences when you do nothing. And we are doing nothing. 

And it has been going on long enough. 

I would be much more reassured if you or Mr. McKeon could say, 

‘‘Yes, sir, they have by December 31, 2015, or it is over,’’ or something. But just to keep saying, we are working on it, you know, we 

are trying, that could go on forever. And that is one of the reasons 

they are in Crimea right now. 

I am sorry. My time is up. 

30

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, both Secretaries, for being before us. 

My question is, with respect to the determination of Russia being 

in noncompliance, why did it take over 2 years to figure that out? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Part of that, ma’am, has to do with the way 

the interagency process goes forward. 

We have a number of inputs that go into that process, one of 

which, of course, is information that comes from our intelligence 

agencies and their analyses. Then, in the case of this particular 

violation, we also had a diplomatic effort going on, again, to try to 

clarify the matter with the Russian Federation and work with 

them on it. 

And after that process had been going on for some time, then we 

had our compliance process, which is, again, an interagency activity that puts together the Defense Department, the ICE, the State 

Department, Energy Department, to look very carefully at all aspects of the situation, because it is a very serious matter to call a 

country in violation of a treaty. 

So that is why it takes some time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And did the administration, during any of this 

time, withhold any information from the Congress with respect to 

this? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. No, ma’am. We briefed the Congress regularly throughout this period. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Has Russia responded satisfactorily to the demands that we have made, with respect to the INF compliance? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. We have been very concerned, Ms. Sanchez, 

that, in fact, they have not acknowledged the violation. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. They continue to say, there is no violation, we are 

in compliance. So you are sort of——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. At a standstill with respect to that? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, I will put it more succinctly. They 

have not acknowledged the missile. They have not acknowledged 

the missile. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Back in the 1980s, how long did it take the USSR 

to come back into compliance with the ABM Treaty once the USSR 

had violated that treaty? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. The Reagan administration and the Bush 

administration worked on this. The Soviet Union was declared in 

noncompliance in 1987. After 5 years of discussion and negotiation, 

the Russians acknowledged their violation in 1991. Came back into 

compliance, with the elimination of that radar over the period of 

time it took to dismantle it, but 1992. So it was a 5-year process. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, during that time, did the administration continue to engage with the Russians on that issue and others? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes, ma’am. During that time, in fact, the 

Reagan administration negotiated the INF Treaty, and we continued in full compliance with all the treaties and agreements that we 

had in place at that time, including implementing the SALT II 

Treaty, which was not ratified at that point but which we had politically agreed to implement with the Soviets. 

31

Ms. SANCHEZ. So, as I recall, when President Reagan submitted 

the report with respect to noncompliance, he stated that better 

verification and better compliance provisions would help finding effective ways to ensure compliance is central to the process. 

Is this still an ongoing challenge? Should we be investing more 

in verification? Where is it that we can do a better job so that it 

is not a 2-year process before we figure out what the heck is going 

on? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Ma’am, I think the most important thing is 

national technical means and having very capable national technical means. And this is——

Ms. SANCHEZ. And what does that mean? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. That means our own capabilities like satellites, overhead satellites, radar systems, and systems that we 

have full control of. Of course, it is nice when you have on-site inspection, as we do with New START. That is a very good situation. 

But, in other treaties and agreements, we do not have on-site inspection. And the on-site inspection regime of the INF Treaty 

ended in 2001. 

So I think that the most important thing is strong investment in 

our national technical means and preservation of those capabilities 

and, indeed, expansion of those capabilities. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, in the current—as you look at the current 

budgets that we have, are we doing that? Or have we sort of just 

stepped and expected to be doing this verification and compliance 

issue with what we have? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Ma’am, again, this area is not wholly in my, 

you know, budget job jar, so to say. So I think it would make sense 

to take up this point in our closed session, where we will have a 

broader group of experts to talk about it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. I appreciate your help. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. 

Ms. Gottemoeller, I guess I should ask you for some diplomatic 

immunity here for the rather pointed nature of some of my questions. 

You were the key architect for the New START treaty, and, 

under your negotiation and your arms control expertise, for the 

first time the United States reduced our strategic nuclear potential 

while Russia was gaining the opportunity to increase theirs. 

And all this time, of course, Russia was cheating on the INF 

Treaty. And you knew about that, and you didn’t say anything. 

And it really concerns me, in that any negotiations that we have 

with Iran or any treaty that we have with them, I don’t see how, 

in light of that, that they would have any reticence to cheat on 

such an agreement. 

And now Russia is building a series of first-strike weapons, including its new cruise missile, the submarine, the Severodvinsk 

class, with the long-range land-attack cruise missile, not to mention its Club-K cruise missile system, and that is one that kind of 

frightens me significantly. I have a picture of it here, and I wish 

32

everyone could take a look at that, where it might be for sale to 

the right bidder from Russia. And, of course, it is designed to be 

hidden aboard container cargo ships. 

So my question to you is: Why is Russia preparing this variety 

of first-strike capabilities, and how do these capabilities promote 

stability? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, if I may right off the bat be straight 

with you, as well, we did not believe that the Russians were violating the INF Treaty during the period when New START was 

being negotiated and during the period when it was being considered for ratification, the advice and consent of the Senate for ratification of the treaty. We only became concerned about it later. 

Again, this is a topic we can discuss in detail in closed session, 

and I will be happy to do so, but I did want to be straight with 

you at the outset about that. 

Now, when we negotiated the New START treaty, we realized 

that, in fact, the Russians were experiencing a mass obsolescence 

of their Soviet-era systems and that they would be modernizing, as 

we are now embarking on modernization ourselves. There is a little 

bit of a phase issue here of modernization programs taking place 

at different times. 

I will stress that one of our concerns in negotiating and putting 

into place the New START treaty was to ensure that there were 

certain central limits on what the Russian Federation could deploy. 

Mr. FRANKS. But I guess my question to you is, why do you think 

they are preparing this variety of first-strike capabilities? And how 

does that contribute to any stability between our countries? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I think partially, sir, it is tradition for the 

Russian Federation to heavily rely on their ICBM forces. They are 

a large ground-based power, a large land power, and they have traditionally historically depended on highly accurate ICBM systems. 

I will say——

Mr. FRANKS. This is more in the area of cruise missiles, I mean, 

things that are outside our agreement. 

Let me shift gears. They are offering this Club-K system at arms 

sales around the world. I mean, you can find it on the Internet. 

And what are the consequences to Russia for selling such systems? And do we have any consequences in mind for them doing 

that? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. We have always been concerned about the 

sale of high-technology weapons systems freely around the world. 

We have a whole range of export control regimes that deal with 

that, some of them multilateral in nature. And we do clearly express our concerns about these kinds of things. 

Mr. FRANKS. But given their profound danger, is our response 

limited to expressing our concerns? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I am not—no, I am not familiar with this 

particular system and the sales record that the Russians may have 

had, so we will be prepared to get you more information on that 

if you are interested. 

The last point I wanted to make about their ICBM forces is the 

central limits of New START really are so small by comparison 

with the historical numbers that the Russians really do not have 

the opportunity for a strike capability that would be, you know, a 

33

decapitating first strike or something like that. It is just not possible with the lower numbers. And that is why we do emphasize 

that these kinds of treaties are beneficial for strategic stability. 

Mr. FRANKS. As far as their decapitating first-strike capability, 

that is something we should talk about in the closed session, because there might be some issues to take on that front. 

Mr. McKeon, if I could, to try to squeeze it in under my time 

here, how is DoD responding to the rise in Russian first-strike capability development and planning? 

Mr. MCKEON. If I could, sir, briefly on the Club-K, I am no expert on it, and we will get you more information, but I don’t believe 

they have sold it yet. They have been showing it off at arms 

shows——

Mr. FRANKS. Just the arms shows, yeah. 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes. 

Mr. FRANKS. But it doesn’t encourage me that——

Mr. MCKEON. No, it is not a great sign. I am not trying to downplay the concern that you have. I just don’t think it has been sold 

yet to—they are marketing it at arms shows. 

As I said, sir, earlier in response to Chairman Rogers, we are 

looking at a number of possible countermeasures in the military 

sphere, ranging from reactive defense to counterforce to countervailing defense measures. I don’t want to get into the specifics because we are still working through various options, but we have a 

broad range of options, some of which would be compliant with the 

INF Treaty, some of which would not be, that we would be able to 

recommend to our leadership if a decision were taken to go down 

that path. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the ranking member of the TNT 

committee, Mr. Sherman from California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

What are the military benefits to the Russians of the violations 

we are accusing them of? If they developed and deployed these intermediate-range missiles, would that enhance their ability to 

threaten our European allies? Or do they already have enough 

ICBMs to deal with both whatever they would want to do off the 

European continent but also on the European continent, as well? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, it has been a fact from the outset that 

an ICBM, an intermediate-range target could be handled by an 

intercontinental-range system. That is just a fact——

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. That has been well understood, 

in fact, since the INF Treaty and before. So our view is that the 

Russians have adequate capability to handle issues around their 

periphery. 

They actually argue, again, among their expert community that 

the targets in Eurasia are the ones that concern them most, not 

necessarily emphasis on NATO and the European allies but targets 

across Asia, as well. 

But this is a good question for the Russians, because it is not—

you know, we don’t see a need for the system, quite honestly. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So they are spending a lot of money at what now 

is tough economic times for them to develop, in violation of their 

34

treaty obligations, a basically duplicative system that will allow 

them to do that which their ICBMs could already do in both Europe and Asia. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes, sir. That is our point of view. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Now, the treaty provides for a special Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Special Verification Commission. Have we invoked that formal provision, and do we plan to? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, we wanted to drive this issue to a higher level, and, in fact, I believe since I briefed this group the last 

time, we have had President Obama writing to President Putin. We 

have also had my boss, Secretary Kerry, but also Secretary Hagel 

and Chairman Dempsey all speaking to their counterparts at a 

high level about our grave concern in this matter, as well as I continue my diplomacy in this arena. 

So we really wanted to drive it to a high level and not have it 

being handled in the more or less routine channels of the SVC. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So we haven’t convened this special commission 

because we wanted to do something even more formal and more 

powerful. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Correct, sir. That is the idea, to have a very, 

very strong spotlight shown on the measures, on the issue. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What does Russia get from this treaty? They 

claim we violate it. They themselves are violating it. We pulled out 

of the ABM Treaty. They could solve a lot of diplomatic problems 

by just pulling out of this treaty. What benefit do they get from our 

compliance with the treaty? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I think it is the same benefit, sir, that they 

got when they signed up to the treaty back in the late 1980s—that 

is, this treaty, by banning the deployment of intermediate-range 

nuclear systems, addresses the treat of a short-warning, very shortwarning attack on critical strategic targets such as strategic command and control. So the benefits to the Russians are the same as 

they always were in terms of the military benefits. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And from that standpoint, they benefit more than 

we do. Since the days of missiles in Cuba, the Russians have never 

been able to use that short-range, short-warning against us. And 

yet, if this treaty were to fall apart, NATO would have that capacity against their most sensitive assets, correct? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, sir, I don’t want to jump out ahead of 

my DoD colleagues in terms of what precisely would be the countermeasures. Mr. McKeon might want to talk to that. But——

Mr. SHERMAN. Why don’t we ask him to——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. If I may, I just want to stress 

that we are talking about here ground-launched cruise missiles in 

this case, and I think that is the important thing. The Russians 

have sea-based capabilities and air-based capabilities that can also 

threaten CONUS, of course. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. McKeon? 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, we don’t have ground-launched cruise missiles 

in Europe now, obviously, because they are prohibited by the treaty, but that would obviously be one option to explore, some kind 

of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Yeah. The point I was making is I think Russia 

has more to lose if this treaty falls apart than we do because we 

35

have land-based facilities within between 500 kilometers and 5,500 

kilometers of their most sensitive sites; they do not have land bases 

within that range of our sites. 

And, with that, I will yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here. 

I want to disagree first, Mr. McKeon, with a comment you made. 

You said that arms control is the most important tool we have for 

national security. I just want to put a footnote to that: Of course, 

China, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan have not been part of the reduction of the nuclear threat to the United States. 

Ms. Gottemoeller, you very frequently in your testimony here 

said, ‘‘That would be best answered in closed session.’’ Well, let me 

just tell you, as I begin to ask you these questions, that will not 

be an acceptable answer to my questions. I have sat here, and 

there is not one person that has asked you anything that is classified that you can’t answer. And although you may choose it would 

be best to answer it in closed session, this is an open session, the 

questions we ask are open, and they are questions that you have 

responsibility to answer for both the American public and to Congress. So I will not be accepting that the best answer would be in 

closed session. I accept your best answer here. 

We are going to return back to the issue of Russia violating or 

not being clearly in compliance with its treaties. Chairman Poe had 

asked if it was not in compliance with as many as eight. You identified that they were not in compliance with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, the INF, and that they were not in 

compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, CFE. That is two. 

You then said to him that there were others, but you didn’t specify what those others—and it doesn’t require closed session for you 

to specify those because it is not classified. So I would like to ask 

you, in what others is Russia violating or not clearly in compliance 

besides those two? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. We have long been concerned about their 

Soviet-era programs of chemical weapons and biological weapons. 

And so we have continued to express great concern about those——

Mr. TURNER. So is Russia violating or not clearly in compliance 

with the Biological Weapons Convention, BWC, or the Chemical 

Weapons Convention, CWC? Your answer is? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. We are continuing to press them on providing us information about those two——

Mr. TURNER. Are they——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. Programs. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. In compliance with those two treaties? 

You know the answer. Provide the answer. It is not classified. If 

you have concerns—you either can or cannot testify before us that 

they are in compliance. 

Are they in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, 

BWC? Yes or no? Yes or no? Not classified. Clearly within your 

realm. Clearly within something that is public consumption and 

36

certainly is something for oversight for Congress. Are they in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, your scope of your 

employment, BWC? Are they? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. With regard to the Soviet-era programs, 

no——

Mr. TURNER. Great. Okay. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. We have problems. 

Mr. TURNER. So we have three from you now. 

The next one that you mentioned was the Chemical Weapons 

Convention, CWC. Are they in compliance with the Chemical 

Weapons Convention, CWC? Yes or no? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. With regard to the Soviet-era programs, no, 

but——

Mr. TURNER. Okay. So that is four. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. Sir, if I may——

Mr. TURNER. We are clicking along here. New START Treaty, are 

they in compliance or not in compliance? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Yes what? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes, they are in compliance. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Great. Thanks. 

Okay. Let’s see—nope, that is an acronym. The Treaty on Open 

Skies, compliance or not in compliance? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. They are in compliance with the Open Skies 

Treaty, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. The moratorium on nuclear testing, are they in 

compliance or not in compliance, Ms. Gottemoeller? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. The moratorium on nuclear testing, yes, we 

believe they are in compliance with their moratorium. But you do 

realize, sir, that this is not a legally binding treaty. It is, you 

know—essentially, it is a political——

Mr. TURNER. It is one within the realm of responsibility of your 

employment, is it not? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Correct. 

Mr. TURNER. Great. That is why I wanted an answer from you. 

The Vienna Convention? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. The Vienna Document, sir? 

Mr. TURNER. Compliance or not compliance? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. They are in compliance with the Vienna 

Document. 

Again, these are politically binding commitments. They are confidence-building measures. And, again, we have some concerns with 

how they have implemented certain aspects of the Vienna Document. 

Mr. TURNER. But your concerns are not that they are violating 

it? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Our concern is that they are not——

Mr. TURNER. It would have to be they are violating it, right? I 

mean, you don’t have concerns that maybe they are just, you know, 

not fully committed to it. It is either they are complying or not 

complying. You have concerns as to whether or not they are not 

complying, right? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Correct. We——

Mr. TURNER. Great. 

37

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Okay. 

Mr. TURNER. So we will count that in the category of ‘‘maybe.’’

The Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, compliance or 

not compliance? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. The Missile Technology Control Regime we 

believe that they are essentially in compliance with, but I will say 

that, again——

Mr. TURNER. The Budapest Memorandum? I think we can both 

kind of guess what your answer should be on that one. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I definitely agree with you on that one, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. And that would be? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. They are not in compliance with——

Mr. TURNER. Great. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. The Budapest Memorandum. 

Mr. TURNER. All right. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. But, again, let me stress that this is a political——

Mr. TURNER. All right. One, two, three, four, five. Okay, so there 

are five, at least, you would tell us openly that they are violating. 

When you said to Chairman Poe that there were others, are 

there others besides the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces, INF; the Biological Weapons Convention, BWC; the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC; the Treaty on Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe, CFE; the Budapest Memorandum that you believe they are violating? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. No. 

Mr. TURNER. Are there others? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I do not, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. So you say there are no others? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I do not at the moment recall any others. 

Mr. TURNER. ‘‘Do not recall.’’ I mean, this is your professional responsibility to recall. This is not like, you know, Mr. Gruber coming 

here and saying, ‘‘I just suddenly don’t remember what I was talking about.’’ I mean, this is your responsibility. 

Are there others, or are there not? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. No, sir, there are none others that I know 

of. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, 

Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To our witnesses, in particular Deputy Under Secretary McKeon, 

what are the risks for national security if the U.S. withdraws from 

the INF or from New START as a response to Russian INF violations? 

Mr. MCKEON. Well, in terms of the INF Treaty, sir, the primary 

risk is greater instability in Europe if the Russians were to deploy 

this noncompliance system in significant numbers. 

In terms of withdrawal from New START, right now there are 

central limits under the treaty on strategic systems. They come 

into effect in early 2018 and then last for 3 years after that. So if 

we were to withdraw from the treaty, there would be no limitations 

on Russian strategic systems and we would lose the verification regime of that treaty, including the on-site inspections. 

38

So, over time, we would continue to have less and less knowledge 

of Russian strategic systems, which would make the Joint Chiefs 

nervous, and there would be no limitations on their strategic systems, which we don’t think would be to our benefit. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, in your assessment, does arms control support 

national security? And if so, how? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes, sir, it does. And I believe in my statement I 

said it is an important element, not the most important element, 

of national security. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Under Secretary Gottemoeller, why did the U.S. 

not simply withdraw from the ABM Treaty in the 1980s? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. As I understood, sir, there was a view at the 

time, again, that it contributed to strategic stability, and there was, 

I think, a good record of discussions on what was going on with the 

Krasnoyarsk radar at that time. But the treaty was seen as being 

important to the balance between strategic offensive and defensive 

forces at that time. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Was diplomacy successful in that instance? And 

how? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. In the end, yes, diplomacy was successful. 

It was a long and difficult discussion with the Soviet Union to 

begin with and then the Russian Federation, but the Russian Federation did end up dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar and returning to full compliance with the ABM Treaty. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Given the what appear to be significant violations 

of the INF Treaty, should the U.S. withdraw from INF? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. My view, sir, is that we should not in any 

way take steps that would essentially give the Russians a bye in 

this matter. If we withdrew from the INF Treaty, it would legalize 

the illegal actions they are taking now, and I don’t think that is 

in our interest to do so. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. All right. 

Under Secretary Gottemoeller, Secretary McKeon, the Defense 

Science Board concluded in a January 2014 report that, I quote, 

‘‘monitoring for proliferation should be a top national security objective but one for which the Nation is not yet organized or fully 

equipped.’’

Do you agree? And what are State and DoD doing to address this 

deficiency? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, perhaps I will allow Mr. McKeon to answer that. I gave my version of views on that to Mrs. Sanchez. 

So, Brian, would you like to add anything? 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, I am not familiar with that particular report. 

I think, as a general matter, we would agree that we can make 

more investments in verification technologies. And you will have 

some folks from the IC in the closed session, and they could probably speak with a little more detail about some of their deficiencies 

and investments we ought to be making. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Since I still have some time, Secretary Gottemoeller, in answering some of the previous questions of my colleague on Russia’s compliance or noncompliance on several treaties, you weren’t fully able 

to finish your answers. Do you want to add to that and complete 

your answers where you weren’t fully able to do so? 

39

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you, sir. 

I think the important point is that there are two treaties, the 

INF Treaty and the CFE Treaty, where we are fully concerned 

about violation of the treaty by the Russian Federation. 

In some of the areas we were discussing, like the Chemical 

Weapons Convention, I always like to stress that we don’t want to 

throw out the baby with the bathwater. The Russians continue to 

eliminate their Soviet-era holdings, and I just gave a speech in The 

Hague last week noting the intensified efforts by the Russians to 

get rid of their chemical weapons from the Soviet era. 

So, although we have concerns about the Soviet-era programs 

and that they haven’t given us all the data that they may have 

with regard to those programs, we are satisfied that they are intensively working to eliminate the huge stock of chemical weapons 

that they have from that era. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. My time has expired, but thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Colorado. 

Mr. POE. Colorado. I am sorry. Did I insult Colorado or Ohio? 

Mr. LAMBORN. No, they are both great States. 

Mr. McKeon, is Russia deploying or preparing to deploy tactical 

nuclear weapons in Crimea? 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, I don’t know the answer to that. We have not 

seen that, but we are watching it closely. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Are there not open-source reports that such is the 

case? 

Mr. MCKEON. We have seen some of those open-source reports, 

but I don’t think we have seen—and we could get into it in the 

closed session—I don’t think we have seen that actually occurring. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, maybe we can talk more about that 

later. 

Ms. Gottemoeller, what is the position of the Department of 

State concerning a moratorium on testing of kinetic energy antisatellite weapons? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, we have looked at that option as a perhaps diplomatic option that we would like to pursue, but we are 

not placing any emphasis on it at this time. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. I might come back to you in a second on 

this. I want to see what DoD thinks about that. 

Mr. McKeon, does DoD have a position on such an action that 

we just discussed? 

Mr. MCKEON. I apologize, sir. I was consulting my colleagues on 

another issue, and I didn’t hear your question. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Anything concerning a moratorium, with 

our country and any others, on not testing, so as not to test, kinetic 

energy antisatellite weapons or methods? 

Mr. MCKEON. I will confess I am only in the Department 4 

months. I don’t believe we are pursing or considering a moratorium 

of that kind. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

My concern is that there may have been discussion about that 

by some folks in the Department of State that was done unilaterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:49 Feb 11, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\121014\91846 SHIRL
40

ally without talking to DoD, because DoD would be, I think, less 

receptive to such a thing, knowing more about what is really at 

stake. 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, it is a big government, and there are lots of 

people and lots of layers, and there may be people in different departments who have talked about it, but I don’t believe that is the 

position of the United States Government at this time. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

And back to you, that is not a U.S. Government position? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. That is correct, sir. 

And I did want to emphasize, I mentioned a moment ago that 

there had been some discussions and consideration of it, and these 

were fully interagency discussions. I do want to underscore that 

there were opportunities to fully discuss and consider pros and 

cons and so forth on an interagency basis. And so there shouldn’t 

be a sense that this was, you know, something that was being pursued unilaterally by the U.S. Department of State. 

But, as I said, we are not placing an emphasis on pursuing it at 

this time. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, good, because I would be very concerned if 

Department of State was pursuing something without talking to 

the folks at Department of Defense. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, my experience is that simply doesn’t 

work. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. We are all in agreement on that. 

Mr. MCKEON. Yeah. Sir, if I might add, I will speak to my own 

newness in the Department, and I have certainly not heard any 

discussion of this issue. I didn’t mean to say that——

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

Mr. MCKEON [continuing]. People in State were not coordinating 

with DoD. I just have not——

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

Mr. MCKEON [continuing]. Seen that in my short time. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you for that. 

Now, changing subjects, if I am not mistaken, Ms. Gottemoeller, 

you said earlier that INF weapons that the Russians would be pursuing in violation of the INF, you know, cruise missiles between 

500 and 5,000 kilometers——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Uh-huh. 

Mr. LAMBORN [continuing]. Would be only duplicative of what 

they already have a capability of doing with strategic missiles. Is 

that——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. That is our understanding, sir, and our view 

as to why this is a redundant kind of capability. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, with that in mind, that seems to contradict 

what General Breedlove has said, the commander of our European 

forces. In an April news report, he said, ‘‘A weapons capability that 

violates the INF that is introduced into the greater European 

landmass is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with. It 

can’t go unanswered.’’

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I agree with that, sir, absolutely, particularly in the context that this is a weapon that has been banned for, 

you know, decades at this point. There are many reasons on the 

political and the military front that we must respond to it. 

41

Mr. LAMBORN. So when you use the word ‘‘duplicative,’’ you are 

not in any way slighting that capability, which someone might assume. You are saying this is a very serious matter. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Absolutely. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Because ‘‘duplicative’’ means, oh, is it really 

that big of a deal? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, again, my colleague from the Defense 

Department may wish to speak to this, but the only point I was 

saying is that we have known from the time that the ban was put 

in place in the late 1980s that if a country wished to use an ICBM, 

an intermediate-range system, in a depressed trajectory or a lofted 

trajectory, it could do so, and it would have the same kind of potential against intermediate-range targets in that kind of use. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And, lastly, you do agree with General Breedlove, 

this must be dealt with? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Absolutely, sir. Yes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gottemoeller, you were asked a series of questions 

about the various treaties and agreements, and you were compelled 

to answer ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ which is usually a way we use to try to 

trap people. 

Would you please, for the record, provide the additional information that this committee needs to fully understand the answers to 

your question? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes, sir. I will be happy to do that. Thank 

you for the opportunity. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think he went through seven or maybe eight 

different treaties and agreements. I am sure the record would help 

you remember all of them. 

I personally dislike that kind of activity because it does not fully 

inform us about some very complex matters. I will take that up 

with Mr. Turner when I have him outside this room. And I wish 

he were here. It is just something we shouldn’t be doing. We should 

get full answers if we really want to understand. 

I do have a series of questions. I suspect most of them are going 

to have to come in a closed session. But a lot of this is more about 

Europe than it is about the United States. What is the NATO position on all of these matters? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I will begin. Perhaps my colleague would 

like to comment, as well. 

Our NATO allies have been very, very committed to arms control 

treaties and agreements as a way to enhance security and stability 

not only in Europe but also beyond. And they count on our leadership in trying to develop and continue to strengthen these regimes. 

And so we have briefed them regularly on our very grave concern 

with regard to Russian noncompliance in this case. They have been 

very concerned about it, but they have been very supportive of our 

efforts to bring the Russians back into compliance with the treaty. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are they suggesting that we bail out of the treaty? 

42

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. By no means, sir. Quite the opposite. They 

are very keen to ensure that we work in every way we can to bring 

Russia back into compliance with the treaty. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. McKeon, is that the view of the Department 

of Defense also? 

Mr. MCKEON. It is, sir. 

And what I might add is that, although the NATO states are not 

parties to the treaty—it was originally a treaty between us and the 

USSR and now the successor states of the USSR—they are great 

beneficiaries of the treaty. So they are quite interested in it remaining in force. 

And, as the Under Secretary has said, we have kept them extensively briefed. After we went to Moscow in September, she briefed 

them by videoconference, the North Atlantic Council, on our efforts. 

And we have been working with them on their own intelligence and 

military assessment. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. 

I think you may have answered this once before, but does the Department of Defense hold the position that we should remain with 

the INF Treaty? 

Mr. MCKEON. It is the position of the Department and of the administration that we should continue to be in the treaty and seek 

to bring the Russians back into compliance at this time. But we are 

planning for other options to push them back into the treaty or if 

the day should come that we don’t want to be in the treaty any 

longer. 

But, yes, for the time being, it is the position of the administration we should stay in the treaty. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. It is my understanding that the principal 

issue is the delivery system or systems. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCKEON. That is correct. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Are they attempting to develop a new nuclear weapon or enhance an existing nuclear weapon? 

Mr. MCKEON. I think we should save that for the closed session, 

sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I had expected that answer. 

I think I will yield back at this point and await a closed session. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from California. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your service to the country. 

Ms. Gottemoeller, is there a difference in our ability to detect an 

ICBM versus a GLCM? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, they are different kinds of systems. An 

intercontinental ballistic missile——

Mr. PERRY. I know what they are. I am just asking——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yeah. 

Mr. PERRY. So isn’t there a strategic advantage then, wouldn’t 

Russia have a strategic advantage to have that delivery system 

that was undetectable by us because it—you know, it runs across 

the ground. I mean, by the time you see it, it is past you. Isn’t that 

a strategic capability? 

43

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I would say that it offers some, you know, 

capability to the Russians. Clearly, they have not had intermediate-range systems up to this point. 

Mr. PERRY. Some? It offers a lot. We can’t do anything about it. 

Once it is launched——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. But they have had a number of very capable 

both air-breathing systems, cruise missile systems, and intercontinental—the ballistic system——

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. For many, many years now. 

And so, in terms of the increment of new capability, that is, I 

think, what we have to be concerned about. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. This is a big step. 

Ma’am, I heard you say earlier that we hoped that they weren’t 

going to embark on this. And with all due respect, I see this as, 

you know, they hope—or we hope—we hoped they wouldn’t go into 

Ukraine, and we hoped they wouldn’t shut off the gas valve, and 

we hoped a lot of things, but they took action, and we continue to 

hope. 

And another thing you said, that they didn’t acknowledge the 

violation. Do we require them to acknowledge the violation before 

we act? I mean, if you are lying about something—like, right now 

they are saying, ‘‘We are not in Ukraine.’’ Do we require them to 

acknowledge the violation? Is that——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, sir, I worked with them for over a 

year in the diplomatic realm to really see what we could do in the 

diplomatic realm to get them back into treaty compliance before we 

declared them in noncompliance last July, before we declared this 

violation. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. So we do, of course, do everything that we 

need to do——

Mr. PERRY. I understand we do everything——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. We do everything that we need to do, including working on the diplomatic, economic, and military front, to 

put in place the policies that we need to have to counter this violation. 

Mr. PERRY. And I would agree with you that diplomacy is preferable. But timing and the time that it takes also is a factor here, 

because other things are occurring while we are talking, and that 

is a concern. 

And I am concerned that we are counting on them to be the good 

actors, when they have a storied and longstanding history of violating and lying and obfuscating. And it concerns me that we just 

continue to go on. 

That having been said, do you believe that further unilateral disarmament by the United States is a correct response at any level? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, such unilateral reductions are not on 

the table. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. But we have heard that the President has discussed that, is considering that, might consider that, and I just 

want you on the record. You would agree that that is not an appropriate response at this time? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. As I said, sir, they are not on the table. 

44

Mr. PERRY. Okay. And you agree that it is not a correct response? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, you know that I have people above my 

pay grade——

Mr. PERRY. Sure. But I am asking you. I get it. I am asking you, 

as the subject-matter expert that the Nation is depending on, you, 

what is your response? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I am happy to tell you that such unilateral reductions are not on the table, and I think that is the correct——

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So you are not——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. Response. 

Mr. PERRY. I understand. You are not going to answer. 

Do you believe that the U.S. has violated our obligations regarding any of these agreements that have so far been stated, seven or 

eight of them? Have we materially violated any of them? I know 

Russia accuses us. They accuse a lot of things. But do you believe 

we have violated any of them? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, if you take a look at our compliance report, we determined that we are in full compliance with all of the 

treaties and agreements. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So is America safer and more secure if we 

abide by the treaty and Russia continues to cheat? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I think the important word here, sir, is ‘‘vigilance,’’ that we have to recognize when there are problems in compliance, when there are actual violations, we have to be very vigilant and we have to deal with them. We cannot be taken by surprise. But I think, in general, yes, they continue to provide for mutual stability, predictability, and security. 

Mr. PERRY. With all due respect—and I agree that vigilance is 

important, diplomacy is important. But we are talking about nuclear weapons being placed around places that are of vital interest 

to the United States and the world, and there is no margin for 

error. 

With that in mind, what would you suggest is the appropriate 

role for Congress in responding to this situation, as it appears that 

the administration cannot or will not respond timely? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, sir, I would say that the importance 

of your oversight can never be overstated. We have an open——

Mr. PERRY. We understand the importance, but what——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. We have an open hearing here today. 

Mr. PERRY. What would you suggest would be our correct response to safeguard our Nation and the world in our treaty obligations? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, sir, I do want to emphasize that we 

do take action in this matter, we have taken action in this matter, 

and we will continue to take action in this matter. And we appreciate your partnership in supporting our efforts. 

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. 

Bridenstine, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

45

And I would like to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I 

think he is hitting on a critically important point about imposing 

unilateral commitments on ourselves. 

And it opens up, I think, an important philosophical question for 

you, Mrs. Gottemoeller. If we were to comply with the INF and 

they were to continue violating the INF, do we have a treaty at all? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I think one thing that is important to recall, 

sir, is that there are a number of countries who are parties to this 

treaty, 11 countries in addition to the Russian Federation and the 

United States. And so it is an entire treaty system that extends 

across Eurasia. 

So I think in our efforts—and I mentioned this earlier—it is very 

important to continue to press the Russians to come back into compliance with the treaty. If somehow we left the treaty, then it 

would essentially be giving them a free ride to do whatever they 

well pleased. So I think it is important to say that they are in violation, that there is a problem, you know, they are not abiding by 

their treaty commitments, and not give them a free ride. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So if we were to pull out of the INF, earlier 

you mentioned that that would make legal their illegal actions; is 

that correct? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Correct. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So currently they are in violation of the law. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Correct. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And that is going to supposedly encourage 

them to get back in compliance with the law. 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I think if international law means anything 

to the Russian Federation, they should be considering that matter. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. What did international law have to say about 

the invasion and occupation of South Ossetia, for example? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, I said in the outset of my remarks, of 

my testimony——

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Real quick, what did——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. That we are gravely concerned 

about——

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. What did international law say about the invasion and occupation of Abkhazia? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. We are very concerned about——

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. What did international law say about the invasion and occupation of Crimea? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. We are very concerned——

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. At what point——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. About all those matters. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. At what point does the international law mean 

anything as long as we continue to allow them to violate international law? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I think, sir, that the important thing is that 

the structure of international law provides for global security and 

stability overall. And because there are violations out there—and 

in the case of Crimea, you pointed to this very strong example, you 

know, on the current scene, that Russia has violated the territorial 

integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine by coming into Crimea and 

by, you know, bringing their troops into eastern Ukraine, as well. 

46

But that doesn’t mean, you know, that we do away with the 

OSCE principles or the U.N. charter. The system of law, it is important to maintain it in place——

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So do you personally believe——

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER [continuing]. As a way to go after countries 

that then violate. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Let’s say we have a bilateral commitment with 

Russia, a bilateral commitment, and they are in violation, the question is, do we continue to impose unilateral commitment upon ourselves that hinder us but enable them to continue to progress? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I think the important thing, sir——

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Just ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ do you think we should do 

that? Philosophically, do you think we should impose commitments 

upon ourself that hinder our ability while they are continuing to 

progress? 

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. In this case, the answer is ‘‘yes’’ to stay 

within the treaty and then to look at what countermeasures we 

have available—Mr. McKeon already mentioned we have a number 

of military countermeasures—that stay within the realm of the 

treaty. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

So I have 11⁄2 minutes left. Mr. McKeon, we are talking about 

cruise missiles here. What type of ability do we have as a Nation 

militarily to provide early warning to our friends and allies in Europe that these missiles may be engaged? 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, we could talk in more detail in closed session 

about our military capabilities in Europe. I don’t want to advertise 

for the Russians what capabilities we have in Europe. 

Obviously, with short- or intermediate-range missiles closer to 

Europe’s and NATO’s borders, it leads to shorter warning time, and 

you have to have adequate sensors to have point defense. 

So we have some capabilities. I don’t want to overstate what 

those are. 

Mr. PERRY. And then, as far as the ability to hold at risk targets, 

do we have that ability? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Roger that. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

This concludes the open session of these two subcommittees. The 

subcommittees will recess to 2212 for a classified briefing, and we 

will continue in 10 minutes, 4:05, as the clock on the courtroom 

wall, to quote a phrase. 

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittees recessed, to reconvene in closed session at 4:05 p.m. the same day.] 

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