alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2013344EN.01003701.xml

| 23.11.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 344/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.11.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 344/37

---

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 5 September 2013 — ClientEarth v Council of the European Union, Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of Finland, Kingdom of Sweden

(Case C-573/11 P) (1)

1

(Appeals - Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union - Representation by a lawyer who is not a third party - Action for annulment manifestly inadmissible - Grounds of the appeal manifestly unfounded)

2013/C 344/64

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Appellant: ClientEarth (represented by: P. Kirch, avocat)

Appellant:

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union (represented by: C. Fekete and B. Driessen, acting as Agents), Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of Finland, Kingdom of Sweden

Other parties to the proceedings:

Re:

Re:

Appeal against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 September 2011 in Case T-452/10 ClientEarth v Council, by which the General Court dismissed as manifestly inadmissible an action seeking the annulment of the decision of the Council of 26 July 2010 refusing to allow the applicant full access to an opinion drafted by the Council Legal Service (document No 6865/09) regarding a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning public access to documents of the European Parliament, of the Council and of the Commission — Representation by a lawyer who is not a third party

ClientEarth

Council

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The appeal is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The appeal is dismissed.

| 2. | ClientEarth shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ClientEarth shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 39, 11.2.2012.

1

---
### SUBCHAPTER IV—INSECT INFESTATIONS AND RELATED DISEASES
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Aurizon Mines Ltd. (the Company) is filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, its annual report on Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 (the Report).

I, David P. Hall, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant to section 906 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that,to the best of my knowledge:

(i)

the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii)

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ David P. Hall

David P. Hall
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer

March 31, 2006
Note about the Redesignation Substitute Reports

The Redesignation Substitute Reports for the Houston-Galveston-Brazoria 1997 Eight-Hour

Ozone Standard Nonattainment Area and the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) One-Hour and 1997 Eight-Hour Ozone Standard Nonattainment Areas were originally submitted to EPA on August 18, 2015. Subsequent minor revisions and/or correc tions were made to the reports. The final report for DFW was submitted by email on October 21, 2015.
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed February 9, 2016.

________________

No. 3D16- 292

Lower Tribunal No. 16 -37

________________



### Dan Simmons,

Petitioner,

vs.



### Marydell Guevara, etc., et al.,

Repondents.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction

– Habeas Corpus.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Natasha Baker-Bradley, Assistant

Public Defender, for petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant Attorney

General

, for respondents.

Before WELLS, LAGOA and SCALES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.Based on the State’s admirable confession of error, we grant the Petitioner’s

emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus, and order the immediate release of

Petitioner on his own recognizance as required by Rule 3.134(1), Fla. Rules of

Crim. Proc.

Petitioner was arrested on January 1, 2016 for burglary of an occupied

dwelling and domestic battery via strangulation. Petitioner was held without bond,

pending the filing of charges.

On February 3, 2016, the 33 rd day of Petitioner’s detention, the State moved

for an extension of time to file an information pursuant to Rule 3.134(2). In

response, the trial court amended Petitioner’s “no bond” status to a $10,000 bond

and placed Petitioner on house arrest.

Petitioner objected to those terms, arguing that, since the State had not

articulated good cause for an extension as required by Rule 3.134(2), Rule

3.134(1) required Petitioner to be released on his own recognizance.

While not entirely clear from the record, it seems the trial court believed that

the scheduling of an adversary preliminary hearing pursuant to Rule 3.133 could

relieve the State from its obligation to either file an information within 33 days of

Petitioner’s arrest or show good cause why an extension was required.

On February 8, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking emergency

habeas relief. We ordered the State to respond on an expedited basis. In its

2response, the State concedes that, pursuant to Rule 3.134, the trial court erred in

conflating Rule 3.133’s preliminary hearing provisions with Rule 3.134’s

requirements and that the State has not demonstrated good cause for an extension

under Rule 3.134.

Therefore, we grant the petition and order that Petitioner be immediately

released on his own recognizance as required by Rule 3.134.

3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 THAT WERE
FILED WITH THE COMPANY'S REPORT ON FORM 10-QSB AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001101359
<NAME> CEDER GROVE MARKETING, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                            1
<CASH>                                     0
<SECURITIES>                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                              0
<ALLOWANCES>                               0
<INVENTORY>                                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           0
<PP&E>                                     0
<DEPRECIATION>                             0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      0
<BONDS>                                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      0
<PREFERRED>                                0
<COMMON>                                   1
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               0
<SALES>                                    0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           0
<CGS>                                      0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                           0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            0
<INCOME-TAX>                               0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        0
<DISCONTINUED>                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            0
<CHANGES>                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                               0
<EPS-BASIC>                                0
<EPS-DILUTED>                              0


</TABLE>
### SUBCHAPTER I—FACILITIES FOR WATER STORAGE AND UTILIZATION
#### Kenneth F. Abbey et al., Appellants, v Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Respondent.

[824 NYS2d 838]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Harold L. Galloway, J.), entered December 20, 2005. The order granted defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second amended complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that they were discharged from their employment with defendant as the result of unlawful age discrimination. Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second amended complaint. With respect to the first cause of action, alleging intentional discrimination, defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating the absence of proof that plaintiffs were discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, by offering “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for [its] challenged actions, [and by demonstrating] the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether [its] explanations were pretextual” *(Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind,*3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; *see generally Ferrante v American Lung Assn.,*90 NY2d 623, 629-630 [1997]). Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs may maintain the second cause of action, alleging age discrimination based upon a theory of disparate impact *(cf. Bohlke v General Elec. Co.,*293 AD2d 198, 200-201 [2002], *lv dismissed*98 NY2d 693 [2002]), we conclude that defendant met its initial burden by establishing that, contrary to plaintiffs’ allegations, its restructuring and workforce reduction did not have a disproportionate impact on employees over 40, and plaintiffs failed to raise “an inference that the [termination of their employment] cannot be justified by any explanation other than age discrimination” *(Mete v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities,*21 AD3d 288, 297 [2005]). Present—Kehoe, J.P., Martoche, Centra, Green and Pine, JJ.
### SUBCHAPTER CXLVI—PISTONE-BLACK MOUNTAIN NATIONAL CONSERVATION AREA
Bank Holding 

Company

Size Interconnectedness Substitutability Complexity CrossJurisdictional 

Activity

2013 SCORE (percent)

Total exposuressystem assetsIntrafinancial system liabilitiesIntrafinancial outstandingSecurities Payments activitycustodyAssets under activityUnderwriting derivativesAmount of OTC and AFS securitiesAdjusted trading Level 3 assetsForeign claimsliabilitiescross-jurisdictional Total

Weight (percent) 20 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 10 10

JPMorgan Chase & Co. 3,570 422 544 599 321,458 21,320 508 68,004 446 69 693 674 5.05

Citigroup Inc. 2,895 421 513 596 300,783 11,096 331 59,472 130 46 839 742 4.27

Bank of America Corp. 2,696 294 220 489 83,705 136 390 54,887 203 32 387 246 3.06

Wells Fargo & Co. 1,961 110 129 508 28,761 2,400 86 4,880 128 37 70 130 1.72

Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1,518 337 107 310 9,585 866 371 50,355 138 43 347 319 2.48

Morgan Stanley 1,283 535 182 231 9,812 1,369 262 43,611 316 23 353 470 2.60

U.S. Bancorp 525 11 22 139 6,918 959 17 106 13 4 3 34 0.35

PNC Financial Services 425 18 13 68 2,004 161 10 252 26 11 5 2 0.30

Bank of New York Mellon Corp. 410 79 230 61 166,279 23,590 6 1,158 39 0 87 164 1.50

HSBC N.A. Holdings Inc. 406 36 55 50 1,061 43 49 5,194 40 4 43 1 0.38

State Street Corp. 345 30 209 43 59,122 20,411 - 1,141 54 8 47 125 1.48

Capital One Financial Corp. 336 14 2 94 914 3 2 63 16 4 9 2 0.19

TD Bank U.S. 277 15 5 8 2,393 10 - 151 18 2 35 1 0.14

SunTrust Banks, Inc. 229 3 1 50 644 64 11 183 15 3 2 2 0.14

BB&T Corp. 212 1 10 69 972 35 6 59 4 2 1 1 0.12

American Express Co. 177 7 37 162 144 - - 42 4 - 30 20 0.17

Fifth Third Bancorp 174 4 9 38 1,187 240 5 64 7 0 4 1 0.10

BMO Financial Corp. 163 16 1 26 5,245 257 8 22 11 0 7 6 0.12

Ally Financial Inc. 153 6 17 108 290 - - 62 9 0 2 2 0.11

UnionBanCal Corp. 146 10 6 20 1,058 120 - 64 8 2 2 3 0.09

RBS Citizens Financial Group, Inc. 146 4 4 1 2,816 7 - 43 1 0 2 1 0.05

Regions Financial Corp. 146 1 7 27 755 22 45 74 5 0 1 0 0.11

Northern Trust Corp. 142 44 12 16 32,997 5,576 - 255 12 0 28 51 0.49

Key Corp. 134 6 1 26 984 82 5 62 2 3 2 0 0.08

M&T Bank Corp. 105 2 5 22 1,594 101 26 21 1 0 0 0 0.08

Bancwest Corp. 103 1 8 12 443 3 - 16 1 0 1 1 0.04

BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. 101 4 2 13 199 3 80 18 1 0 1 2 0.12

Santander Holdings USA, Inc. 98 4 0 12 24 - - 18 12 0 4 1 0.05

Comerica Inc. 98 8 4 17 246 53 1 21 2 0 2 2 0.05

Discover Financial Services 96 7 0 74 321 - - 12 1 0 0 0 0.06

Zions Bancorp. 75 3 3 11 437 3 0 3 3 1 0 2 0.04

Huntington Bancshares Inc. 65 2 0 16 303 80 1 8 3 1 1 - 0.04

Deutsche Bank Trust Corp. 64 20 26 12 58,495 - - 14 0 0 4 0 0.20

* Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Sources: Company Y-15 reports, OFR analysis

BCBS Systemic Importance Indicators Reported by Large U.S. Bank Holding Companies ($ billions)*
132

100b

99

99

99

0504

0504

63

0507

65

67

104a

135

95

95

93 85

85

85

050126T

110

83

126

0507a

050117

050124

050124

050124

050115b

050118

Gulch

Road

Long Gulch Rd

121

82a

Horse

Creek Rd

Creek Rd

91b

050122

0507

76

050115a

66

65b

050110

58

050117

050111

65

61

62b

63

97

100

79

050120

050109a

103a

62

0507a

89

050113

050118a

0507

59

050122

050112a

050112a

60

81

82b

0506

050122

81

62a

81

050115

050119a

10

0506

88

64

131

85

0502

050115b

57

0507a

86

82

72b

58

109

75

84

80

106

0503

91

96

98

050112a

70

77

83

96a

050119

0506

56

74

115

111

050119b

94a

050110a

105

87

91

73

90

68

050114

050117

110

0506

0507a

82a

83

050119

0503

68

72a

113

100d

103

050117

050112

0504

75

0502 050109

75

050118

050121

050109

95

78

112

119

0503

0501

15c

0507a

100c

75a

050115c

050109

62a

71

137

129

050118

103

050125

114

82b

94

100a

050112

123

0503

93

050115a

100

85

120

050112a

0502

67

118

050124

83a

0503a

85 050115

050124

105a

85

59

050116

134

107

0503

103

124

85a

95

122

90

050126T

83

103

050122

91b

104

0503a

128

133

0506

130

136

126

125

83

Little Prickly Pear Road

Blossburg Road

Marysville Road

Empire

Ophir Creek Road

LaSalle Gulch

Marsh Creek Rd

Little Prickly Pear Rd

Duffy Lan

Lost

Gravelly Range Road

Lake Road

Empire Creek Road

Little Prickly Pear Rd

Empire Creek Rd

Long

Marsh Creek Rd

Southfork Rd

Ottawa Gulch Rd

Little Prickly Pear Rd

Marysville

RoundtopMountain Bald

Butte

Trinity

Hill

Empire

Mine

Helena

National Forest

Helena

National Forest

Missoula

Field Office

Mount

Belmont

Drumlummon Hill

Edward

Mountain

Thompson Flats

Greenhorn

Mountain

Township 12 North

Township 11 North

Range 6 

West

Range 5 

West

6

1

31

36

Township 12 North

Range 6 West

Range 5 West

6

1

Range 7 West

Range 6 West

6 1

Township 12 North

Township 11 North

Range 7 West

Range 6 West

6 1

36 31
Helena

National Forest

Helena

National Forest

Helena

National Forest

Elkhorn

Mountains

Big Belt Mountains

Beartooth

Wildlife

Management Area

Beaverhead/Deerlodge

National Forest

Butte

Boulder

Helena

Townsend

ThreeForks

Jefferson

County

Broadwater

County

Lewis & Clark

County

Gallatin

County

Silver Bow

County

Canyon

Ferry

Reservoir

Lincoln

Whitehall

Radersburg

Range 9 W. Range 7 W. Range 5 W. Range 3 W.

Township

14 N.

Township

12 N.

Township

10 N.

Township

8 N.

Township

6 N.

Range 1 W.

Range 1 E.

Township12 N.

Township10 N.

Township8 N.

Elk Park

Pipestone

Limestone

Hills

Sleeping

Giant

Marysville

Scratchgravel

Hills

Whitet

ail Basin

Range 9 W.

Range 7 W.

Range 3 E.

Limestone

Hills

Toston

Wickes

Boulder

Montana City

SpokaneButte

Mount

Belmont

Bull

Whitehall Area Mountain

Potential Wind Energy

Development Site

Corridor

229-254

Corridor

229-254

Corridor

229-254

Corridor

229-254

Corridor

51-205

Corridor

51-205

Corridor

51-204

Corridor

51-204

Corridor

51-204

Corridor

51-204

Corridor

51-204
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Viasystems Group, Inc. (the “Company”) for the quarter ended September 30, 2010 (the “Report”) filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Gerald G. Sax, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:
 
 The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 /s/ Gerald G. Sax
 Gerald G. Sax
 Chief Financial Officer
 (Principal Financial Officer)
 November 9, 2010
#### THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. WILLIAM R. FORRESTER, Appellant

Criminal No. 15-A

District Court of Guam Appellate Division

September 15, 1958

*387
      *Counsel for Appellee:*Louis A. Otto, Jr., *Attorney General;*Leon D. Flores, *Island Attorney;*Richard D. Magee, *Deputy Island Attorney*

*Counsel for Appellant:*Turner & Novak, *Attorneys-at-Law*

Before FURBER, *Chief Justice,*High Court of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; TOOMIN, *Associate Justice,*High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; SHRIVER, *United States Judge,*District Court of Guam

PER CURIAM

OPINION

The appellant was convicted in the Island Court of Guam of the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. No serious attempt was made to show that the appellant did not commit the offense. The objections raised are purely procedural. We hold that there is nothing in the record to show that the defendant was denied any rights which would prevent him from having a fair and impartial trial. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
(No. 32206.

#### The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, *vs.*Allan Stringer, Plaintiff in Error.

*Opinion filed March 20, 1952.*

*569Allan Stringer, *pro se.*

Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John S. Boyle, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (John T. Gallagher, Rudolph L. Janega, Arthur F. Manning, and William J. McGah, Jr., all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Justice Fulton

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff in error, Allan Stringer, appearing *pro se,*seeks by writ of error to reverse a judgment and sentence against him entered in the criminal court of Cook County. He was indicted in two separate and distinct cases for the crime of armed robbery. The cause is submitted on the common-law record.

On -the trial he was represented by counsel of his own choosing. He waived trial by jury and the cause was tried before the court. In each case he was convicted and sentenced to the Illinois State Penitentiary for a term of not less than three years nor more than twenty years, the last sentence to run consecutively to the first. A bill of exceptions bearing the numbers of both cases was approved and filed in the trial court but was not included in the record submitted here.

The errors assigned are:

(1) It was error for the trial court to overrule the motion of the plaintiff in error for the issuance of *subpoena duces tecum.*

*570This motion was made during the pendency of a motion to vacate judgment and sentence. The matters contained in the motion for a *subpoena duces tecum*were wholly unrelated to the hearing then before the court and were properly disregarded by the trial judge when he denied the motion to vacate the judgment and sentence.

(2) The denial of his petition to vacate the judgment and sentence and to grant a new trial.

(3) The attitude of the trial court towards the accused was prejudicial.

(5) The sworn affidavits of witnesses presented to rebut the testimony of the complainants constituted *prima facie*evidence in favor of defendant and raised a reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt.

The common-law record affords no basis for the determination of the above three alleged errors in the absence of a bill of exceptions. *People*v. *Sweeney,*409 Ill. 223.

(4) The sentence of three years to twenty years for robbery (armed) is erroneous since the statutory penalty for robbery is one year to twenty years.

There is no merit to this assignment of error. Section 246 of Division I of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 501,) provides that every person found guilty of armed robbery shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term of years not less than one year or for life. Section 3 of the Sentence and Parole Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 80,) provides, “The minimum limit fixed by the court may be greater but shall not be less than the minimum term provided by law for the offense and the maximum limit fixed by the court may be less but shall not be greater than the maximum term provided by law therefor.”

The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*
#### The Third Avenue Savings Bank *vs.*Dimock and others.

1. - Leave will not be granted to file a supplemental answer by way of amendment, to set up a defence which, will not tend to promote the ends of justice.

2. A defence to a bill for foreclosure, that the complainants, in making the loan to secure which their mortgage was given, were acting *ultra vires,*is an unconscionable one, which this court will not extend its indulgence to admit.

*27On bill to foreclose. Application on part of the owners of the equity of redemption in the mortgaged premises, and the holder of a second mortgage, to file supplemental answers by way of amendment.

*Mr. W. J. Magie*and *Mr. W. H. Vredenburgh,*for the application.

*Messrs. McCarter*and *Keen,*contra.

The Chancellor.

The defendants, Helen W. Dimock and her husband, mortgagors and owners of the equity of redemption, and P. *W.*Butterfield, holder of a second mortgage, ask leave to file supplemental answers by way of amendment. They claim to have discovered, since filing their respective answers, that by force of certain statutes of New York the complainants, in making the loan of $100,000, to secure which their mortgage was given, were acting *ultra vires,*and they apply for permission to set up this defence by amendment. These defendants have already had the indulgence of the court in extending the time for putting in their answers.

Applications like the present are not favored in this court. Lord Eldon, in *Edwards v. McLeay, 2 Ves. & Bea.*256, says, they are “ always granted with great difficulty, where an addition is to be put upon the record prejudicial to the plaintiff.” Judge Story, in *Smith*v. *Babcock,*3 *Sumner*584, says : “ I deem it indispensable for the purposes of the administration of public justice, to hold to a strict course against allowing parties, upon afterthoughts and new suggestions, and new aspects of a cause, to change the posture of a case from that on which they deliberately chose, originally, to present it to the court.” In *Huffman*v. *Hummer, 2 C. E. Green*271, this court says: “ An application to amend an answer is addressed to the discretion of the court. In mere matters of form, clerical mistakes, or verbal inaccuracies, great indul*28gence is shown in allowing amendments, even in sworn answers. But application to amend in material facts, or to change essentially the grounds taken in the original answer, are granted with great caution, 'and only where it is manifest that the purposes of substantial justice require it.” The ends of justice will not be promoted by granting the application. The defence is one which this court will not extend its indulgence to admit. It is unconscionable, both as to the defendants Dimock and wife, to whom the loan was made, and as to Butterfield, whose mortgage was taken with full notice of the existence of the complainants’ encumbrance.

The motion is denied.