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UNITED STates institute of peace

© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

“Within fragile states, civilian 

protection, professional conduct, 

and accountability should be 

prioritized over the build-up of 

capacity and technical 

proficiency.”

April 23, 2013

Atrocity Prevention at the State Level

Security Sector Reform and Horizontal Equality

Summary

•	 Security Sector Reform (SSR) encompasses activities aimed at improving a country’s capacity to deliver justice and security in a transparent, accountable, and professional manner.

Horizontal equality strategiesinclude a broad range of policy measuresto increase actual and

perceived equity in the distribution of assets, income, and opportunity between groups.

•	 When properly implemented these structural measures may enhance state capacity to

prevent large-scale violence committed by non-state perpetrators while reducing the risk

thatstate actors become complicit in the atrocitiesthemselves. If poorly implemented these

reform efforts may reinforce existing patterns of political or economic competition and marginalization, increasing the risk of civil conflict and atrocities.

•	 The impact of domestic security sector reform and the promotion of horizontal equality

will depend on the desire of both regime and population to incorporate these measuresin

a comprehensive reform strategy. SSR practices particularly relevant to mitigate the risk of

mass violence include the assurance of civilian oversight and the promotion of individual

professionalism amongst uniformed personnel. Relevant development policy measures need

not only include redistribution mechanisms, but also consider employment and safety net

programsfor marginalized groups, reform to reduce corruption linked to identity, and efforts

to build national identity and transcend societal divisions.

•	 Including an atrocity prevention lensin national SSR campaigns and developmentstrategies

implies awareness of the localsources of risk and resilience, as well asthe potential utility

and constraints of reform activitiesin areas considered at risk of atrocities. At the same time,

effective risk assessments will identify the mostsalient inequalities and security challenges

experienced by potential victim groups.

Jonas Claes

E-mail: jclaes@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.1982

peaceBrieF144

Introduction

The primacy of domestic effortsto prevent mass atrocities within state bordersis a core tenet of

the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. At the 2005 U.N. World Summit, Heads of State and

Government unanimously affirmed that atrocity prevention begins at home, as each individual

state has a primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. Under this first pillar of the R2P principle,states are expected

to mitigate the risk of mass violence through structural reform effortsthat encourage inclusive

politics, tackle economic deprivation, or cultivate the rule of law. Recent U.N. General Assembly
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

Atrocity Prevention at the State Level

page 2 • PB 144 • April 23, 2013

dialogues on the Responsibility to Protect revealed that the focus on local and upstream prevention

initiativesis appealing given the wariness of intrusive R2P measures, in particular external coercion.

Structural upstream prevention isfrequently cited as a cost-effective approach to mitigate the risk of

R2P crimes, preferable to crisis management or reactive measures. If properly implemented, timely

reform will enhance the state capacity to prevent atrocities committed by non-state perpetrators

while reducing the risk thatstate actors become complicit in atrocitiesthemselves. The political

and operational utility of‘root cause’atrocity prevention, however, remains unclear, asthe structural

drivers of mass atrocities are poorly understood and the practice of R2P appears more amenable to

operational prevention, i.e. effortsthat addressthe immediate manifestation of atrocity situations.

This Brief examinesthe utility of two upstream prevention measuresthat fall under the primary

responsibility of the state:security sector reform (SSR) and the promotion of horizontal equality.

While recognizing the importance of external donor assistance, this assessment concentrates on

best practicesfor domestic strategy and implementation.

Atrocity Prevention through Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform (SSR) encompasses activities aimed at improving a country’s capacity to

deliver justice and security in a transparent, accountable, and professional manner.Originally aimed

at discouraging excessive military spending and supporting development efforts, SSR is now commonly identified as a reactive peacebuilding tool following its application in stabilization operations

in the 1990’s. SSR istypically conducted with donorsupport in post-conflictsettings and aimsto

transform relevant policies,structures, behaviors, and attitudes. Although frequently implemented

in environmentsthat recently experienced mass violence,security sector reform, like otherstructural

reform efforts, israrely considered as a tool for domestic atrocity prevention within itsspecialized

community of practitioners.

An effective SSR process may directly mitigate the risk of R2P crimes by controlling the means

to conduct an atrocity campaign and deterring instances of misconduct or abuse. SSR practices

particularly relevant to mitigate the risk of mass violence include the assurance of civilian

oversight, the promotion of individual professionalism among uniformed personnel, improving

relations between security forces and communities, and effortsto addressimpunity, corruption,

and the spread ofsmall arms. Domestic reform efforts are more likely attuned to local cultural

and political realities, and enhance long-term public trust in government institutions. Successful

examplesinclude the justice sector reform conducted by the Mongolian government in the 1990’s,

South Africa’s Defense Review Processfollowing the end of the Apartheid regime, and Indonesia’s

transition processto a civilian-controlled government. However, the lack of practical or theoretical

expertise in reforming countries may produce an exclusive focus on the strengthening of a homogenoussecurity force, leading to reduced accountability or transparency, internal destabilization, and security concernsin neighboring countries. Both in Burundi and the Democratic Republic

of the Congo, the security sector remains poorly integrated and continuesto endanger rather than

protect the civilian population in certain areas despite numerousreform efforts.

Security sector reform is more likely to yield results and reduce the risk of atrocities when initiated

by a legitimate government with comprehensive democratic reform plans or democratic institutions already in place. Capacity-building exercisesin authoritarian, fragile, or elite-captured regimes

frequently produce counter-productive results, assecurity actors exploit the capacity increase to

gain a tactical advantage over political adversaries or minority groups, apply repressive practices,

and further undermine democratic freedoms and transparency. Long-term SSR efforts occasionally

trigger a short-term backlash, as professionalized security forces appear weak or constrained in the
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

Atrocity Prevention at the State Level

page 3 • PB 144 • April 23, 2013

eyes of criminal actors, insurgents, and society as a whole, eroding confidence in the reform effort or

even triggering a return to unrestrained practices. A comprehensive and multisectoral reform effort,

however, can break the cycle ofsuppressing violence through indiscriminate force.

Within fragile states, civilian protection, professional conduct, and accountability should be

prioritized over the build-up of capacity and technical proficiency.Whether domestic reform requires

a reduction or increase in the size of the security apparatus,societal diversity should be reflected in

its new composition. Effective reform efforts will acknowledge the role of non-traditionalsecurity

or justice mechanisms, include a strengthening of civilian oversight or professionalstandards, and

prioritize the protection of civilians overstate security. The efficacy of vetting and human rights

training continuesto be the subject of debate. While a legal requirement, vetting alone isinsufficient

where there is a consistent pattern of abuse and inadequate information concerning the identity

of perpetrators. Similarly, human rightstraining may fail in its objective to prevent atrocitiesin the

absence of effective accountability mechanisms.While frequently excluded from domestic reform

initiatives, local civilsociety plays an instrumental role in representing the security needs of vulnerable populations and facilitating the implementation of reform agendasin remote areas.

Atrocity Prevention through Horizontal Equality

Horizontal equality strategiesinclude a broad range of political, economic, and social policy measuresto increase actual and perceived equity in the distribution of assets, income, and opportunity

between groups. Reports on past atrocities, analytical resources, and policy documentsfrequently

prioritize relative equality between identity-based groups as a structural objective to prevent mass

atrocities. The 2001 Report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

and the 2009 Genocide PreventionTask Force report both highlighted the importance of deprivation

and the inequitable distribution of power, resources, or opportunity as a root cause of deadly conflict.

Struggle for relative group gain presents an important risk factor asthe deprived party resortsto

extreme measuresto addressthe inequality, or the privileged group mobilizesits constituentsto

preserve an advantageous position.

Horizontal inequality isfrequently cited as a source of the atrocities committed in Nepal, while the

exclusive profitsfrom narcoticstrade received by the political elite in Guinea-Bissau arguably resulted

in a series of destabilizing events. However, analytical claims about the causal relation between horizontal inequalities and the risk of atrocitiesremain largely speculative.While horizontal inequalities

commonly appear, both in fragile and stable societies, mass atrocitiesremain a rare phenomenon.

Rather than a driver of conflict or atrocities, horizontal inequalitiesserve as a risk factor that may

increase the likeliness of mass violence, particularly when embedded in local narrative or manipulated by the political elite. Actual or perceived horizontal inequalities allow conflict entrepreneursto

mobilize ethnic, religious, political, or geographical community members around a subjective motive

and justify extreme violence against an identity-based or political group.

Relevant policy measures need not only include redistribution mechanisms, but also consider employment and safety net programsfor marginalized populations, as well as fiscal reform to enhance

transparency and equity. In addition to these economic orsocial measures horizontal inequalities can

be countered through anti-discriminatory initiatives, integrative policies aimed atstrengthening the

national identity, or effortsto dismantle rentsystems and reduce corruption linked to identity.

While thisis no easy task, even for a developed country, improvementsin horizontal equality may

lowerthe risk of mass violence by reducing the grievances caused by relative deprivation and creating

a culture of inclusion. Inclusive and legitimate governance offers all groups a stake in the institutional
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Atrocity Prevention at the State Level

page 4 • PB 144 • April 23, 2013

arrangement, including potential perpetrators, and increasesthe opportunity cost of violent action.

Successful examplesinclude theNew Economic Policy (NEP) in Malaysia, which effectively narrowed

the income and inequality gap, and the inclusive politics ofthe Chilean government post-Pinochet.

On the other hand,the lack of immediate tangible benefits may breed frustration; data on horizontal

equalities may not be readily available; measuresto close inequality gaps could undermine other

priorities; or a homogenous political elite may wish to preserve its dominant position.

As a development objective, the promotion of horizontal equality is not a common component

within domestic or international atrocity prevention strategies. The adoption of an‘atrocity prevention lens’in development policy issimilarly not a frequent practice. A focus on horizontal inequalities

should be incorporated in risk assessments by identifying the mostsalient inequalities experienced

by potential victim groups. At the same time, development practitioners ought to be aware of the

sources of risk and resilience in a given country, the utility ofstructural atrocity prevention measures,

and the potential risks associated with their policy and practice.

Conclusions

Theoretical findings and practical experience with structural prevention tools and the dynamics

preceding atrocity situationssuggest thatsecurity sector reform and horizontal equality measures

ought to be considered in domestic strategiesto prevent R2P crimes. Both structural reform efforts

can directly mitigate risk factors and strengthen the resilience ofstates as a complement to other

diplomatic, economic, or military measures. If properly implemented, SSR and horizontal equality

measures could encourage potential perpetratorsto realize their objectivesthrough non-violent

means and protect or empower vulnerable populations. The use of these‘technical’instruments,

however, hasimportant political ramifications. If poorly or hastily implemented, these reform efforts may create significantshort-term risks, asthe shifting power equilibrium creates new winners

and losers. Domestic reform may empower future perpetrators, increase the stakesfor warring

domestic actors, or trigger inter-state anxieties.

The impact of domestic security sector reform and the promotion of horizontal equality will

depend on the desire of both regime and population to incorporate these measures within a

comprehensive multi-sectoralstrategy. Both measuresrequire a domestic assessment of the social,

economic, and security challengesin the country prior to implementation involving independent

external expertise and localstakeholdersthatsupersede identity patterns. Domestic buy-in depends

on the awareness of reform incentives, including the prospect of political and economic stability.

Undertaking structural prevention effortsrequires perseverance and expectation management, with

little immediate benefitsto show.

Including an atrocity prevention lensin national SSR campaigns and developmentstrategies

implies awareness of the localsources of risk and resilience, as well asthe potential utility and

constraints associated with activitiesin areas considered at risk of atrocities. At the same time, risk

assessments need to identify the mostsalient inequalities and security challenges experienced by

potential victim groups.

About This Brief

About 25 policymakers, scholars, 

and nongovernmental organization 

(NGO) leaders participated in an 

input session organized by the 

U.S. Institute of Peace on April 2, 

2013. The participants analyzed 

the utility of internal security 

sector reform and the domestic 

promotion of horizontal equality 

for the prevention of mass atrocities or R2P crimes. This Peace 

Brief describes the key findings 

and conclusions from the working 

meeting, and serves as input for 

the U.N. Secretary-General’s report 

in advance of the U.N. General 

Assembly’s interactive dialogue 

this summer on the protection 

responsibilities of the State in 

accordance with the Responsibility 

to Protect principle.