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OVERSIGHT OF THE DHS HEADQUARTERS 

PROJECT AT ST. ELIZABETHS: IMPACT ON 

THE TAXPAYER 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 19, 2014 

Serial No. 113–87 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

CURTIS CLAWSON, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY

VACANCY

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN O’HARA, Acting Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana, Vice Chair 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (Ex Officio) 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

RYAN CONSAUL, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DEBORAH JORDAN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of South Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Ron Barber, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

WITNESSES

Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

Mr. Chris Cummiskey, Acting Under Secretary, Management Directorate, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

Mr. Norman Dong, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S. General 

Services Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Ron Barber, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 

Statement of Paul A. Schneider, Former Deputy Secretary, Department 

of Homeland Security ....................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for David C. Maurer ............................. 39 

Question From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Chris Cummiskey ............................. 41 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Chris 

Cummiskey ........................................................................................................... 41 

Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Norman Dong ................................. 42 

Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Norman Dong ........ 42 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE DHS HEADQUARTERS 

PROJECT AT ST. ELIZABETHS: IMPACT ON 

THE TAXPAYER 

Friday, September 19, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Duncan, Barber, and Payne. 

Also present: Representative Norton. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to 

order. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony regarding 

the Department of Homeland Security’s consolidation project at St. 

Elizabeths. I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Since 2006 the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, and 

General Services Administration, GSA, have spent over a billion 

taxpayer dollars to build a consolidated DHS Headquarters on the 

St. Elizabeths campus in Southeast Washington, DC. St. Elizabeths 

is a National historic landmark that was originally founded in 1852 

as the Government Hospital for the Insane. 

The purpose of the new headquarters was to consolidate DHS 

leadership and operations to improve efficiency. Unfortunately, as 

shown by a Government Accountability Office, GAO, report that 

was released today, the project has become a monument to mismanagement. 

DHS and GSA spent 3 years planning for the project before 1 

ounce of concrete was poured. Finally, in 2009, DHS and GSA commenced with construction. DHS and GSA received over a billion 

dollars with the help of the stimulus act. In classic big-Government 

style, the bill, intended to help lift America out of the great recession, provided funding for cushy new offices for Washington bureaucrats. 

When I say cushy, I am not exaggerating. As our subcommittee 

Majority staff report from earlier this year showed, the Coast 

Guard’s new headquarters features courtyards built with Brazilian 

Ipe wood, one of the hardest woods in the world, eco-friendly green 

roofing, and rain-water flush toilets. These examples illustrate the 
2 

lack of effective management and oversight of this multibillion-dollar project. 

GAO’s report lays out in great detail how the St. Elizabeths 

project has been devoid of leadership and proper management for 

years. In recent years DHS failed to identify the $4.5 billion project 

as a major acquisition program within the Department. Such a designation would have brought with it more program oversight. DHS 

simply can’t afford to neglect its oversight responsibilities. 

A recent and glaring example of this is a recent inspector general 

report that showed CBP wasting millions of dollars on lavish housing for employees in Ajo, Arizona. If DHS instilled greater accountability and stricter oversight among its components, millions of dollars in taxpayer dollars could have been saved or put to better use. 

Does the fact that these are buildings at St. Elizabeths make a 

difference and not a Coast Guard ship, a CBP helicopter, or a TSA 

body scanner? As a result DHS did not require St. Elizabeths to receive the same oversight as other acquisition programs with comparable cost. While doing so may not have solved the problems for 

the project, they could have given Congress and DHS senior leadership greater visibility on where the program stood. 

This mismanagement is exactly why the Senate needs to pass 

H.R. 4228, the DHS Acquisition Accountability and Efficiency Act, 

which Mr. Barber, the Ranking Member, and I wrote to increase 

discipline in DHS acquisitions and ultimately save taxpayer dollars. 

GAO also found that DHS and GSA’s cost and schedule estimates 

aren’t worth the paper they are printed on. GAO’s report shows 

that the estimates failed to fully comport with any leading capital 

decision-making practices. Not a one. Consequently, GAO found 

DHS and GSA’s cost and schedule estimates for St. Elizabeths were 

unreliable and overly optimistic. 

It is not a surprise to discover that there has been a wild swing 

in the estimates since the program has moved forward. In 2007 

GSA estimated that the project would be fully complete by 2016 at 

a cost of $3.2 billion and projected a savings of $743 million by 

moving employees from leased to owned space. The latest estimates 

put completion of the project 10 years later, at 2026, and at a cost 

of $4.5 billion, and reduced savings to $532 million. The truth is 

DHS and GSA don’t have any idea how much St. Elizabeths will 

cost or when it can be finished. 

This is an astounding finding for a program prepared to spend 

$4.5 billion in taxpayer funds. This lack of basic management, 

knowing when a project will be done and how much it will cost, is 

a leadership malpractice. Would any of you sitting at the witness 

table be willing to commit to building a house with your own 

money without knowing what it would cost or when it will be done? 

The answer is no. Yet you expect the American taxpayer to agree 

to such an ultimatum with St. Elizabeths. 

Up until recently DHS and GSA have wanted to continue the 

course. If you haven’t noticed, this Nation is drowning in debt. It 

has more than doubled from the $8 trillion to over $17 trillion since 

planning for St. Elizabeths began. Who knows how far in the hole 

we will be when it is scheduled for completion in 2026. We have 

serious homeland security priorities that need our attention, such 
3 

as threats from ISIS and Syrian foreign fighters, foreign fighter 

flow, dealing with the illegal alien crisis on the Southwest Border, 

and I could go on and on. 

We have had hearings this week in this committee that pointed 

to where our emphasis needs to be at this time. I commend GAO 

for its report in shining a light on the mismanagement of St. Elizabeths. Congress should heed GAO’s recommendation that no new 

funding be appropriated until DHS and GSA get their act together. 

I hope to hear DHS and GSA explain what they plan to do to make 

this project achievable and affordable, or if that is even possible at 

this point. 

[The statement of Chairman Duncan follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN

SEPTEMBER 19, 2014 

Since 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and General Services 

Administration (GSA) have spent over a billion taxpayer dollars to build a consolidated DHS Headquarters on the St. Elizabeths campus in Southeast Washington, 

DC. St. Elizabeths is a National historic landmark that was originally founded in 

1852 as the Government Hospital for the Insane. The purpose of the new headquarters was to consolidate DHS leadership and operations to improve efficiency. 

Unfortunately, as shown by a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that 

was released today, the project has become a monument to mismanagement. 

DHS and GSA spent 3 years planning for the project before 1 ounce of concrete 

was poured. Finally, in 2009, DHS and GSA commenced with construction. DHS 

and GSA received over $1 billion with the help of the ‘‘Stimulus Act.’’ In classic bigGovernment style, the bill intended to help lift America out of the ‘‘Great Recession’’ 

provided funding for cushy new offices for Washington bureaucrats. And when I say 

cushy, I’m not exaggerating. As our subcommittee Majority staff report from earlier 

this year showed, the Coast Guard’s new headquarters features courtyards built 

with Brazilian Ipe wood—one of the hardest woods in the world—eco-friendly green 

roofing and rainwater toilets. These examples illustrate the lack of effective management and oversight of this multibillion-dollar project. 

GAO’s report lays out in great detail how the St. Elizabeths project has been devoid of leadership and proper management for years. In recent years, DHS failed 

to identify the $4.5 billion project as a major acquisition program within the Department. Such a designation would have brought with it more program oversight. DHS 

simply can’t afford to neglect its oversight responsibilities. A recent and glaring example of this is a recent inspector general report that showed CBP wasting millions 

of dollars on lavish housing for employees in Ajo, Arizona. Had DHS instilled greater accountability and stricter oversight among its components, millions of taxpayer 

dollars could have been saved or put to better use. 

Does the fact that these are buildings at St. Elizabeths make a difference and not 

a Coast Guard ship, CBP helicopter, or TSA body scanner? As a result, DHS did 

not require St. Elizabeths to receive the same oversight as other acquisition programs with comparable costs. While doing so may not have solved the problems for 

the project, it could have given Congress and DHS senior leadership greater visibility on where the program stood. This mismanagement is exactly why the Senate 

needs to pass H.R. 4228—the DHS Acquisition Accountability and Efficiency Act, 

which Mr. Barber and I wrote to increase discipline in DHS acquisitions and save 

taxpayer dollars. 

GAO also found that DHS and GSA’s cost and schedule estimates aren’t worth 

the paper they’re printed on. GAO’s report shows that the estimates failed to fully 

comport with any leading capital decision-making practices. Not a one. Consequently, GAO found DHS and GSA’s cost and schedule estimates for St. Elizabeths were unreliable and overly optimistic. It’s not a surprise to discover that 

there’s been a wild swing in the estimates since the program has moved forward. 

In 2007, GSA estimated that the project would be fully complete by 2016 at a cost 

of $3.2 billion and projected a savings of $743 million by moving employees from 

leased to owned space. The latest estimates put completion of the project at 2026 

at a cost of $4.5 billion and reduced savings to $532 million. The truth is that DHS 

and GSA don’t have any idea how much St. Elizabeths will cost or when it could 

be finished. 
4 

This is an astounding finding for a program prepared to spend $4.5 billion in taxpayer funds. This lack of basic management—knowing when a project will be done 

and how much it will cost—is leadership malpractice. Would any of you sitting at 

the witness table be willing to commit to building a house with your own money 

without knowing what it will cost or when it will be done? The answer is: No. Yet, 

you expect the American taxpayer to agree to such an ultimatum at St. Elizabeths. 

Up until recently, DHS and GSA have wanted to continue the course. If you 

haven’t noticed, this Nation is drowning in debt; it’s more than doubled from $8 trillion to over $17 trillion since planning for St. Elizabeths began. Who knows how 

far in the hole we will be when it’s scheduled for completion in 2026? And we have 

serious homeland security priorities that need our attention, such as threats from 

ISIS and Syrian foreign fighters, the illegal alien crisis on the Southwest Border, 

and I could go on. I commend GAO for its report and shining a light on the mismanagement of St. Elizabeths. Congress should heed GAO’s recommendation that 

no new funding be appropriated until DHS and GSA get their act together. I hope 

to hear DHS and GSA explain what they plan to do to make this project achievable 

and affordable or if that’s even possible at this point. 
5 
6 

* The information has been retained in committee files and is available at http:// 

hsgac.senate.gov/download/carper-report. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I will now recognize the Ranking Member of the 

subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Barber, for any 

statement that he may have. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses for being with us this morning. Before I give my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I have some additional business to conduct 

with your approval. I ask unanimous consent for the gentlelady 

from the District of Columbia to sit in for the purpose of receiving 

testimony and questioning. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. BARBER. Additionally, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for the report, ‘‘Security and Savings: The Importance of Consolidating the Department of Homeland Security’s Headquarters at 

St. Elizabeths,’’ by Senator Tom Carper, to be inserted into the 

record. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Without objection, so ordered.* 

Mr. BARBER. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous consent for the testimony from former Under Secretary for Management Paul A. Schneider to be inserted into the record. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 

STATEMENT OF PAUL A. SCHNEIDER, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY

SEPTEMBER 19, 2014 

Thank you Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the subcommittee. It’s a pleasure to submit this testimony on this very important subject. 

It has been approximately 5 years since I have left office as the deputy secretary 

of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) having first served as the 

under secretary for management. Since that time, I have been consulting for the 
7 

U.S. Government (except for DHS); am a principal in The Chertoff Group which is 

a company that provides consulting, security, and merger and acquisition (M&A) advisory services for clients in the security, defense, intelligence, and Government 

services industries around the world. I also currently serve on several boards and 

advisory groups, including chairman of the Board of Directors of the Applied Science 

Foundation for Homeland Security, chairman of the AFCEA Homeland Security 

Committee, the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences and Engineering; and a STRATCOM advisory board for the replacement of the OHIO ballistic 

missile submarine. 

Since leaving my position at DHS, I have had the opportunity to observe the 

changing and challenging environment and assess its impact on DHS operations 

and those of the homeland security enterprise. Based on my observations, former 

position and years of experience, I am here today to provide my views about the 

importance of consolidating DHS facilities at St. Elizabeths (St. Es). 

THE ENVIRONMENT

The homeland security strategic environment is constantly evolving, and while we 

have made significant progress, threats from terrorism continue to persist. Today’s 

threats are not limited to any one individual or group, are not defined or contained 

by international borders, and are not limited to any single ideology. Terrorist tactics 

can be as simple as a home-made bomb and as sophisticated as a biological threat 

or a coordinated cyber attack. In addition, broader strategic trends such as the dramatic spread of internet and mobile technologies around the world and the growing 

relevance of non-state actors on the world stage suggest new opportunities and challenges that must be accounted for in our current and longer-term homeland security 

strategic planning. 

Another defining characteristic of our strategic environment is the tightening fiscal environment. It is increasingly important to define clear priorities, develop and 

assess viable alternatives, and make well-informed decisions involving difficult 

trade-offs. DHS has made substantial progress in this regard, particularly with respect to establishing a strategic foundation for National homeland security efforts, 

refining our strategic and policy analysis capabilities and approaches, and improving strategic alignment through focused management tools and processes. Together, 

these improvements have positioned DHS to effectively address today’s security environment while ensuring that we are sufficiently flexible, agile, and capable in the 

face of emerging threats and risks. 

QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW (QHSR)

Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 directed the 

Department to begin conducting quadrennial reviews in 2009 and every 4 years 

thereafter. The QHSR was a critical first step in the process of examining and addressing fundamental strategic issues that concern homeland security, and establishing an enduring strategic foundation. 

As the first review of its kind for DHS, the 2010 QHSR clarified the conceptual 

underpinnings of homeland security, described the security environment and the 

Nation’s homeland security interests, identified the critical homeland security enterprise missions, and outlined the principal goals and essential objectives necessary 

for success in those missions. 

The 2014 QHSR provides the updated strategy and planning foundation that positions DHS to effectively address the emerging strategic challenges the country faces. 

First, the QHSR clarifies the conceptual underpinnings of homeland security. In 

defining homeland security as the intersection of evolving threats and hazards with 

traditional Governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration. The QHSR emphasizes the importance of eliminating traditional stovepipes to achieving success 

in homeland security. The QHSR also establishes the idea of the homeland security 

enterprise which refers to the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-Governmental, and private-sector partners—as well as individuals, families, and communities—to maintain critical homeland security capabilities. Each of these conceptual elements has infused all aspects 

strategy and planning. 

Second, the QHSR takes a comprehensive approach to threats by expanding the 

focus of homeland security to specifically address high-consequence weapons of mass 

destruction, global violent extremism, mass cyber-attacks, intrusions, and disruptions, pandemics and natural disasters, and illegal trafficking and related 

transnational crime. 
8 

Third, the QHSR adopted a mission structure designed to endure across inevitable 

changes in the security environment. The missions are to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our borders, enforce our immigration laws, safeguard and secure cyber space, enhance resilience to disasters, and provide critical 

support to economic and National security. Because tomorrow’s security environment will not necessarily look like today’s security environment, the missions provide a durable framework to effectively address whatever risks and threats may 

emerge over time. 

MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE

The Department faces significant management and programmatic challenges. 

When it was created it was the largest Government reorganization in more than 50 

years, involving over 180,000 employees and a budget of more than $40 billion. This 

effort required the integration of 22 different agencies with different missions, 

value, cultures, and protocols into a single, unified Department focused on the critical and pressing mission of securing the Nation. Now there are approximately 

240,000 people. 

Since its formation each Secretary has worked to integrate the various component 

elements and maximize efficiency, while still keeping the homeland safe and secure. 

Successful transformations of this sort—even ones less formidable—often take a 

long time to achieve. DHS must organize around missions, rather than legacy bureaucracies, and it must find ways to resolve old disconnects in its systems. In short, 

the Department must operate as ‘‘One DHS,’’ a unified Department. 

Secretary Johnson has developed a strong Strategic Plan to face these challenges 

and to succeed. His April 2014 memo, ‘‘Strengthening the Department Unity of Effort’’ outlines major management initiatives that are key to the management component that is essential to effectively execute the operational initiatives in the QHSR. 

It continues along the path to improve operations as ‘‘One DHS’’. 

The consolidation of DHS activities at St. Es is an essential element of this transformation and key to the success of several DHS management initiatives. 

CONSOLIDATED HEADQUARTERS

DHS’s mission demands an integrated approach, yet the Department’s legacy facilities are dispersed in more than 50 locations and 7.1 million Gross Square Feet 

(GSQF) of office space throughout the National Capital Region (NCR). This data 

may be slightly inaccurate because it is based on my recollection of the situation 

prior to the United States Coast Guard move. This dispersal adversely impacts critical communication, coordination, and cooperation across the Department. Consolidating executive leadership in a secure setting with sufficient office space for policy, 

management, operational coordination, and command-and-control capabilities at the 

St. Elizabeths (St. Es) West Campus is vital to the long-term success of the Department. The Department also needs to reduce the total number of locations that house 

DHS components in the NCR to as few as possible in order to lower overall costs. 

Without Federal construction at St. Es, DHS will continue to be housed in over 

50 NCR locations. The St. Es development will result in a $1 billion Net Present 

Value (NPV) savings over a 30-year period by consolidating private- and public-sector lease agreements. I believe that these estimates that I worked with at the time 

should be reasonably accurate today. 

There are several practical aspects of this matter that I have personally lived 

through and are as relevant today as they were then. 

First, the physical condition of the current DHS Headquarters at Nebraska Ave 

(called the NAC) is deplorable. In my previous appearances before the Congress I 

have referred to it as ‘‘Dump’’. It is. The decrepit nature of the physical plant was 

terrible and in need of constant major maintenance. Maintenance frequently required repeated tearing up the roads and major disruption at the NAC. It was a 

death spiral, constantly spending money to preserve the old and outdated. Also, several of the operational components were housed in facilities outside the NAC that 

were inadequate and the habitability was poor. 

Second, the space and conditions for a professional workforce was terrible. People 

crammed into spaces one half or less than the minimum standard by any comparison is unsatisfactory at best. This had an additional flaw in that there was very 

little open space, hence no flexibility. So, when special task force or teams were required to be formed, the buildings and spaces were not modular and could not be 

rapidly reconfigured to accommodate the specific mission teams that were required 

to be established. 

Third, actions were taken by previous Congresses to prevent DHS from improving 

critical operational facilities at the NAC by creating a temporary consolidated oper-
9 

ations center, were not allowed (in effect by disapproving financial reprogramming) 

because the Department would be moving to a consolidated headquarters at St. Es 

where there would be an integrated operations center. While I found this action unconscionable, I understood it. In my time at the Department, the operations center 

size was significantly inadequate, the IT technology practically obsolete, and the environment was operational limiting to equipment operational requirements and 

hence its ability for reliable operations was severely impacted. A major consideration in the design of the St. Es campus was the establishment of the integrated 

operations center; specifically to exercise the required leadership and direction of 

the operations. The failure to accomplish this is unacceptable from a security standpoint. 

Fourth, the wide-spread dispersal of the operational component’s key leadership 

made leadership and command and control very difficult. Trying to gather the operational leadership in times where joint operations are required to focus on emergent 

crises is near impossible given the current geographic dispersal. In this regard, 

what is often overlooked by those outside the Department is that DHS is a huge 

operational law enforcement organization. Co-location of the leadership to exercise 

direction of operations is an essential aspect of good command and control. It would 

be unthinkable for any law enforcement organization of substantially less size to be 

forced to operate in a manner similar to the current DHS layout, yet it is tolerated 

and accepted for DHS which was established to provide enhanced and integrated 

security operations to protect the homeland. This is not a mere dollars issue. Failure 

to enable the consolidation is operational limiting. 

Fifth, in the D.C. area, if there is an emergency homeland security event, the activity dispersal will essentially preclude assembling the leadership because the 

major traffic disruption that will probably result will make movement across the 

city impossible. 

Sixth, the many leases and rents for DHS organizations outside of the District of 

Columbia. While in office I was frequently asked by Members and staff why can’t 

you consolidate disparate DHS activity locations across the country. Practically we 

started to do that where it made sense and where timing of expired leases could 

be synchronized to avoid penalties. In all these discussions I expressed my concern 

that while these efforts were important, they were indeed very minor compared to 

the challenges and opportunities faced in the District of Columbia. 

Seventh, the consolidation of mission support functions that cannot be accommodated at St. Es also has the potential to achieve comparable cost avoidances through 

co-location of similar functions, elimination of redundancies, and economize shared 

services. It was always recognized that there were efficiencies that could be 

achieved in consolidating several of these ‘‘back room’’ functions, mostly administrative that were more site-independent than operationally-focused and co-location required. Our plan was simple—co-locate the operational leadership and then look to 

consolidate the back room functions. That plan made sense in 2009 and it makes 

sense today. 

This effort will right-size the real estate portfolio resulting in DHS having 70 percent of its offices in less costly yet more secure Government-owned space. 

Consolidating facilities will increase efficiency, enhance communication, and foster 

a ‘‘One DHS’’ culture that will optimize Department-wide prevention and response 

capability. I strongly request that the Congress support this effort by authorizing 

and appropriating funding for completing the DHS consolidation at St. Elizabeths 

West Campus and efficient realignment of off-campus locations. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you for your leadership and your continued support of the Department of 

Homeland Security and its important programs and your efforts in shaping the future and success of DHS. I sincerely appreciate this opportunity to submit this testimony for the record in support of the consolidation of DHS activities at St. Es. 

Mr. BARBER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

convening this hearing this morning. You will recall that you and 

I went out to St. Elizabeths several months ago to see what was 

going on and what was in progress, and at that time none of the 

buildings were completed. We were still waiting for the first one to 

be opened and occupied. That has now happened with the Coast 

Guard moving from the Navy Yard into St. Elizabeths. I have not 

been out there since, but I hope when we return to pay another 

visit to see what other progress has been made. 
10 

As we know, the Department of Homeland Security is composed 

of 22 sometimes called legacy agencies, making it the third-largest 

department in the Federal Government. It has, I believe, one of the 

most important missions of any Federal agency, and that is to keep 

Americans safe and to protect the homeland. This is an enormous 

challenge and responsibility from securing our borders to counterterrorism and cybersecurity. 

In 2006, former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff introduced a 

plan to consolidate the Department’s senior leadership across all 22 

component agencies into one headquarters, as opposed to operating 

out of 50 different locations around the Nation’s Capital Region. In 

the consolidated headquarters, the Department would be in one location and could more quickly coordinate and respond to a crisis. 

As we know, St. Elizabeths Hospital in Southeast Washington was 

chosen as the site for this consolidation plan. 

The original master plan for converting St. Elizabeths into a 

DHS Headquarters called for a coordinated construction schedule 

that would be divided into three phases, and it was supposed to 

cost $3.45 billion with the project being completed by 2015, next 

year. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out, the project 

is now expected to exceed costs of $4.5 billion. It is now expected 

to be completed in 2026. That is a $1 billion increase in cost projections and 11 years overdue. 

There are several issues, as we know, behind the costs and the 

delays that St. Elizabeths is experiencing, and I am looking forward to an opportunity today to explore further those issues and 

those delays. 

First, the GAO found that in managing this project the Department of Homeland Security and the General Services Administration did not fully conform with leading capital decision-making 

practices. The GAO also found that DHS and GSA have not conducted an assessment of current needs and capability gaps, nor 

have they prioritized alternative designs that would help adapt St. 

Elizabeths’ consolidation plan to meet the current fiscal environment. 

Another issue that has plagued St. Elizabeths is a funding gap 

that began in the first year after the first phase of construction. In 

fiscal 2006 President Bush requested almost $38 million to begin 

the first phase of construction specifically for consolidating the 

Coast Guard at St. Elizabeths and to upgrade St. Elizabeths’ West 

Campus infrastructure, and Congress fully funded this request. 

However, in fiscal year 2007, when President Bush requested 

roughly $360 million for St. Elizabeths, Congress only appropriated 

about $6 million, creating a significant funding gap. The funding 

gap has widened over the years and has contributed to project 

delays and to cost inflations. 

As Ranking Member of this subcommittee, I am committed to 

working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to ensure 

that the Department spends taxpayer money wisely. We have to be 

good fiscal agents. The Department must have the resources it 

needs to fulfill its mission, but we will not and should not write 

them a blank check. They must accord to best practices and have 

plans in place that enable them to adapt to the current fiscal and 

legislative climate. 
11 

Let me just digress for a moment, Mr. Chairman, to point out 

that this is not just an issue at St. Elizabeths. Recently, there was 

a report that showed in my State, in the district next door, another 

cost overrun in an inexplicable building project, building houses for 

Border Patrol Agents and their families in a small community 

called Ajo. It used to be a mining town. It is now essentially a retirement community. The home values in Ajo are about $88,000 on 

the average. What did DHS spend with GSA to build those homes? 

Almost $700,000 per home, building homes that were larger than 

were needed for agents whose families were living in Tucson and 

other cities who were not likely to occupy the larger premises. 

Earlier this year we heard another GAO report that pointed out 

a $24 million boondoggle, I might say, which was an effort to upgrade the IT system for DHS. That plan was never implemented 

because the implementation or the proposal was not appropriate to 

the need. 

So today’s hearing will obviously focus on St. Elizabeths, but I 

think we have to be concerned about a broader problem, and that 

is how does this third-largest Federal agency manage the money 

that the taxpayers give to us and we to them to fund the agency’s 

mission? I also look forward to hearing from GSA and DHS about 

why the consolidation plan is important to protecting our homeland 

and whether or not one location is financially more practical than 

the Department’s current leasing system. 

Let me, Mr. Chairman, close with this remark. I have been very 

impressed, as I think we have on both sides of the aisle in this 

committee, with Secretary Johnson’s commitment to transparency 

and accountability. I understand that he will be looking at these 

issues very seriously and I believe he will take action. I look forward to his action being one that is good for the taxpayer and gets 

these projects done on time and on budget. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Barber follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER RON BARBER

SEPTEMBER 19, 2014 

The Department of Homeland Security is made up of 22 legacy agencies, making 

it the third-largest department in the Federal Government. DHS has one of the 

most important missions of our Government—to keep Americans safe. This is an 

enormous challenge and responsibility, from securing our borders, to counterterrorism and cybersecurity. In 2006, former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff introduced a plan to consolidate the Department’s senior leadership—across all 22 component agencies—into one headquarters. 

As opposed to operating out of 50 different locations around the National Capital 

Region, in a consolidated headquarters the Department would be in one location and 

could quickly coordinate and respond to a crisis. 

As we know, the site selected for this consolidation plan was St. Elizabeths Hospital in Southeast Washington. The original master plan for St. Elizabeths called 

for a coordinated construction schedule to be divided into three phases and to cost 

$3.45 billion, with the project being completed by 2015. 

Unfortunately, the project is now expected to cost $4.5 billion and is not expected 

to be completed until 2026. There are several issues behind the costs and delay at 

St. Elizabeths that I am hoping we can explore further through today’s hearing. 

First, the Government Accountability Office found that in managing this project 

the Department of Homeland Security and the General Services Administration did 

not fully conform with leading capital decision-making practices. The GAO also 

found that DHS and GSA have not conducted an assessment of current needs and 
12 

capability gaps, nor have they prioritized alternative designs that would help adapt 

the St. Elizabeths consolidation plan to meet the current fiscal environment. 

Another issue that has plagued St. Elizabeths is a funding gap that began in just 

a year after the first phase of construction. In fiscal year 2006, President Bush requested almost $38 million to begin the first phase of construction, specifically for 

consolidating the Coast Guard at St. Elizabeths and to upgrade St. Elizabeths West 

Campus infrastructure. Congress fully funded this request. However, in fiscal year 2007, when President Bush requested roughly $360 mil- lion for St. Elizabeths, Congress only appropriated around $6 million. The funding 

gap has widened over the years and has contributed to project delays and to cost 

inflations. 

As Ranking Member of this subcommittee, I am committed to working with my 

colleagues on both sides of the aisle to ensure that the Department spends taxpayer 

dollars wisely. The Department must have the resources they need to fulfill their 

mission but we will not write them a blank check. They must accord to best practices and have plans in place that enable them to adapt to the current fiscal and 

legislative climate. 

Today’s hearing should provide an opportunity to hear from GAO regarding its 

analysis of the St. Elizabeths project and its recommendations to GSA and DHS. 

I also look forward to hearing from GSA and DHS about why the consolidation plan 

is important to protecting our homeland and whether or not one location is financially more practical than the Department’s current leasing system. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

SEPTEMBER 19, 2014 

Since the Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002, its core components have been dispersed in more than 50 locations throughout the National Capital Region. This separation adversely affects the need for cohesive communication, 

coordination, and cooperation across the Department component agencies as the Department seeks to fulfill its mission. 

At a time when we face a dynamic threat picture and realize a natural disaster 

could occur in any area of the country, it is inconceivable that the Department of 

Homeland Security does not have a consolidated headquarters where the Secretary 

can meet with the component heads instantaneously. 

Secretary Johnson has indicated his vision to unify the Department, and Members 

of this committee have vocally supported him; however, we must recognize that having the Department spread throughout the National Capital Region has a negative 

impact on the Secretary’s vision. Former Secretary Chertoff presented the plan to 

have a single, unified headquarters that houses the Secretary, senior Department 

leadership, and component heads at the St. Elizabeths West campus in southeast 

DC. 

I was a vocal supporter of the DHS consolidation plan when it was first presented. 

At that time, I expressed my concerns about the Department and its track record 

of taking on large-scale procurement projects. I also asked DHS and GSA to make 

sure that small and minority businesses were a part of the fabric of this consolidation. DHS and GSA completed the first phase of the three-phase consolidation 

project on time and on budget. 

However, Phase II and III of the consolidation project have been stalled. According to the Government Accountability Office, St. Elizabeths lacks reliable cost and 

schedule estimating practices. However, we must look at what DHS and GSA have 

to work with. The DHS consolidation plan has never been has not received full funding for the headquarters consolidation since the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funding was appropriated in fiscal years 2009 to 2010 which allowed for the U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters to be completed during Phase I of the 

construction. 

As we are here to look at GAO and its audit, we must recognize everyone’s responsibility in this matter. GSA serves as the broker, developer, and property manager for the headquarters consolidation. However, Congressional appropriation of 

funding of St. Elizabeths continues to be uncertain as the House’s fiscal year 2015 

Financial Service and General Government Appropriations bill zeroed out funding 

for GSA. 
13 

How can we expect the Department to have a consolidated headquarters if we do 

not give them money to build it? Mr. Chairman, as we are here to examine waste, 

fraud, and abuse—let’s keep some common-sense and figures in mind—if the consolidation project was completed, the Federal Government would own the space. 

Sixty-nine percent of the commercial leases for DHS will expire between fiscal years 

2016 and 2020. 

The headquarters consolidation is $4.5 billion, DHS would spend upwards of $5.2 

billion, or approximately $700 million more over the next 30 years to continue leasing space in the National Capital Region. St. Elizabeths will cost the Department 

more up-front, but over time, the headquarters consolidation will pay for itself as 

its tenant costs will only be competed once. In an era where we daily speak about 

waste, fraud, and abuse, we should be vigilant and understand the costs of this 

project and take steps to fund it. 

Mr. DUNCAN. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of 

witnesses before us today on this important topic. Let me remind 

the witnesses that their entire written statement will appear in the 

record. I will introduce each of you first and then I will recognize 

you individually for your testimony. 

Our first witness is Mr. David Maurer. He became the director 

in the Government Accountability Office, GAO, Homeland Security 

and Justice team in 2009, where he leads GAO’s work reviewing 

DHS and DOJ management issues. His work recently covers DHS 

management integration, nuclear smuggling, research and development at DHS, DOJ grant management, crowding in the Federal 

prison system, and counterterrorism staffing vacancies at the FBI. 

The second witness is Mr. Chris Cummiskey. He was appointed 

acting under secretary for management at DHS earlier this year. 

Mr. Cummiskey oversees Management Directorate’s programs, 

processes, and personnel through the six line business chiefs. The 

director is responsible for Department-wide management and operations. Mr. Cummiskey also serves as the chief acquisition officer, 

overseeing $19 billion in acquisition programs and overseeing the 

Department’s headquarter consolidation project at St. Elizabeths. 

Prior to his appointment to this position, he served as deputy 

under secretary for management and chief of staff for the Management Directorate. 

Our third witness is Mr. Norman Dong. He serves as the commissioner of the Public Buildings Service for the USGSA. Through 

this position, Mr. Dong leads one of the largest and most diversified public real estate portfolios in the world, managing Nationwide assets, design, construction, leasing, building management, 

and disposal of Federal building space. Prior to joining GSA, Mr. 

Dong was acting controller at the Office of Management and Budget. 

I want to thank all of you gentlemen for being here today. I will 

now recognize Mr. Maurer to testify. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE 

Mr. MAURER. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here 

today to discuss the findings from our review of DHS Headquarters 

consolidation at the St. Elizabeths campus here in the District of 

Columbia. 
14 

This is not a new issue. Seven years ago we issued a report expressing concerns about the future of the project. We recommended, among other things, that GSA and DHS develop a comprehensive cost analysis and comparison of alternatives. Both DHS 

and GSA said a dispersed DHS Headquarters was unacceptable 

and did not see the need to further refine estimates or consider alternatives. That proved to be a missed opportunity. So here we are 

today, costs have grown, schedules have slipped, and we are now, 

under current plans, 12 years away from project completion. 

Now, it is important to recognize that GAO has no position on 

whether DHS should consolidate its headquarters at St. Elizabeths. 

That is a policy call. Congress will ultimately decide what to fund 

and when to fund it. Our report being issued today is designed to 

help inform those decisions. 

We do think it is critically important for DHS and GSA to update 

plans, adapt to a change in circumstances, and apply leading practices. Our work found significant problems in the current plans and 

cost and schedule estimates. 

DHS and GSA issued the current plans in a series of documents 

from 2006 through 2009. Unfortunately, these plans are frozen in 

time. A lot has changed. Congress has provided $1.6 billion less in 

funding than requested. DHS’ footprint in the National Capital Region has grown over 20 percent. Standards for telework and average space per worker have changed. DHS and GSA need to update 

their plans to reflect these realities. 

More fundamentally, it is worth taking an updated look at alternative approaches to headquarters consolidation to ensure building 

out St. Elizabeths is the best, most cost-efficient option for meeting 

DHS’ needs. That would include reviewing, among other things, 

DHS’ current National Capital Region leasing portfolio. 

We also reviewed the current cost estimates for the project and 

found that they are unreliable because, at best, they only partially 

conform to leading practices. For example, DHS and GSA have not 

regularly updated their estimates and have optimistically assumed 

future cost growth no greater than the rate of inflation. We also 

found that the project schedule only minimally conforms to leading 

practices. Among other things, it does not fully account for when 

labor, material, and equipment will be needed and has not been 

fully updated since 2008. 

GSA contends their leading practices don’t apply to large-scale 

construction projects like St. Elizabeths. We think they do. In fact, 

GSA was involved in developing our leading practices. They are 

recognized and required by OMB and have been used to assess several construction projects at a wide variety of Federal agencies. But 

to be fair, at GSA’s request, we did additional work looking at their 

compliance with their own standards for cost and schedule. We 

found that all too often GSA did not comply with its own rules. 

For example, GSA guidance requires projects to develop a lifecycle cost estimate that includes the cost to build and operate the 

facility. However, the St. Elizabeths cost estimate only includes the 

cost to build, not the cost of repair, operations, and maintenance. 

GSA guidance calls for developing an approved baseline schedule 

to allow comparison between planned and actual time frames. We 
15 

1GAO, Federal Real Property: DHS and GSA Need to Strengthen the Management of DHS 

Headquarters Consolidation, GAO–14–648 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2014). 2GSA, the landlord for the civilian Federal Government, acquires space on behalf of the Federal Government through new construction and leasing, and acts as a caretaker for Federal 

properties across the country. As such, GSA had the responsibility to select the specific site for 

a new, consolidated DHS Headquarters facility, based on DHS needs and requirements. 3The National Capital Region is composed of the District of Columbia and nearby jurisdictions 

in Maryland and Virginia. 4The St. Elizabeths campus is a National Historic Landmark and a former Federally-run hospital for the mentally ill. 

found no evidence of a schedule baseline document to help measure 

performance of the project. 

We have recommendations in our report to strengthen the management of this project, and I am pleased that DHS and GSA agree 

with them and will be updating their plans, improving their oversight, and enhancing their cost and schedule estimates. That is a 

big improvement over 7 years ago. It will help enhance the overall 

management of this large, complex project and provide Congress 

better information to inform future decisions. 

In closing, Congress needs a clearer road map for the St. Elizabeths project. You need to know how long it will take, how much 

it will cost, and how it will ultimately benefit the taxpayers. Our 

report concludes that Congress should consider making future 

funding for St. Elizabeths contingent on DHS and GSA answering 

those questions. Implementing our recommendations will better position both organizations to do just that. 

That concludes my opening remarks. Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER

SEPTEMBER 19, 2014 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today 

to discuss our report, which is being released today, on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Headquarters consolidation project at St. Elizabeths Campus 

in Washington, DC.1 The $4.5 billion construction project, managed by DHS and the 

General Services Administration (GSA),2 is the centerpiece of DHS’s larger effort to 

manage and consolidate its workforce of over 20,000 in the National Capital Region 

(NCR).3 As conceived in 2006, the Federally-owned St. Elizabeths site was designed 

to consolidate DHS’s executive leadership, operational management, and other personnel at one secure location rather than at multiple locations throughout the 

Washington, DC, metropolitan area.4 Specifically, DHS envisioned moving about 

14,000 staff to the new headquarters facility and housing its remaining personnel 

in other consolidated spaces across the region. With a current projected completion 

date of 2026, the St. Elizabeths project is intended to provide DHS a secure facility 

to allow for more efficient incident management response and command-and-control 

operations, and also provide long-term cost savings by reducing reliance on leased 

space. 

My testimony is based on and summarizes the key findings of our report issued 

today, on DHS and GSA efforts to manage the DHS headquarter consolidation 

project. My statement will address the extent to which DHS and GSA have: (1) Developed DHS Headquarters consolidation plans in accordance with leading capital 

decision-making practices and (2) estimated the costs and schedules of the DHS 

Headquarters consolidation project at St. Elizabeths in a manner that is consistent 

with leading practices. To do our work we compared DHS and GSA capital planning 

efforts against applicable leading practices in capital decision making and interviewed DHS and GSA officials responsible for the planning and management of the 
16 

5GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making; GAO/AIMD–99–32 

(Washington, DC: Dec. 1, 1998) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Capital Programming Guide, Supplement to OMB Circular A–11 (Washington, DC: July 2014). 6GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO–09–3SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 2, 2009) and GAO Schedule 

Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, GAO–12–120G (Washington, DC: May 

2012). 7GAO–14–648. 

8Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135. 

9Departmental offices encompass core management and policy functions, among other things. 

The seven core DHS operating components headquartered in the NCR are U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Secret Service, 

and Transportation Security Administration. 10 Congress, OMB, and GAO have all identified the need for effective capital decision making 

among Federal agencies. OMB’s Capital Programming Guide, along with GAO’s Executive 

Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making provides detailed guidance to Federal 

agencies on leading practices for the four phases of capital programming—planning, budgeting, 

acquiring, and managing capital assets. These practices are, in part, intended to provide a disciplined approach or process to help Federal agencies effectively plan and procure assets to 

achieve the maximum return on investment. 

DHS Headquarters consolidation.5 We also compared DHS and GSA documents on 

the estimated cost and schedule for the St. Elizabeths project with GAO cost- and 

schedule-estimating leading practices and relevant GSA guidance.6 More detailed 

information on the scope and methodology can be found in our published report.7

The work upon which this statement is based was conducted in accordance with 

generally accepted Government auditing standards. 

BACKGROUND

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 combined 22 Federal agencies specializing in 

various missions under DHS.8 Numerous Departmental offices and seven key operating components are headquartered in the NCR.9 When DHS was formed, the 

headquarters functions of its various components were not physically consolidated, 

but instead were dispersed across the NCR in accordance with their history. As of 

July 2014, DHS employees were located in 94 buildings and 50 locations, accounting 

for approximately 9 million gross square feet of Government-owned and -leased office space. 

DHS began planning the consolidation of its headquarters in 2005. According to 

DHS, increased colocation and consolidation were critical to: (1) Improve mission effectiveness, (2) create a unified DHS organization, (3) increase organizational efficiency, (4) size the real estate portfolio accurately to fit the mission of DHS, and 

(5) reduce real estate occupancy costs. Between 2006 and 2009, DHS and GSA developed a number of capital planning documents to guide the DHS Headquarters 

consolidation process. For example, DHS’s National Capital Region Housing Master 

Plan identified a requirement for approximately 4.5 million square feet of office 

space on a secure campus. In addition, DHS’s 2007 Consolidated Headquarters Collocation Plan summarized component functional requirements and the projected 

number of seats needed on- and off-campus for NCR Headquarters personnel. 

From fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2014, the St. Elizabeths consolidation 

project had received $494.8 million through DHS appropriations and $1.1 billion 

through GSA appropriations, for a total of over $1.5 billion. However, from fiscal 

year 2009—when construction began—through the time of the fiscal year 2014 appropriation, the gap between requested and received funding was over $1.6 billion. 

According to DHS and GSA officials, this gap created cost escalations of over $1 billion and schedule delays of over 10 years. 

DHS AND GSA CONSOLIDATION PLANS DID NOT FULLY CONFORM WITH LEADING CAPITAL

DECISION-MAKING PRACTICES

In our September 2014 report, we found that DHS and GSA planning for the DHS 

Headquarters consolidation did not fully conform with leading capital decision-making practices intended to help agencies effectively plan and procure assets.10 Specifically, we found that DHS and GSA had not conducted a comprehensive assessment 

of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and prioritized alternatives 

that would help officials adapt consolidation plans to changing conditions and address funding issues as reflected in leading practices. DHS and GSA officials reported that they had taken some initial actions that may facilitate consolidation 

planning in a manner consistent with leading practices. For example, DHS has an 

overall goal of reducing the square footage allotted per employee across the Depart-
17 

11Telework is a work arrangement in which employees perform all or a portion of their work 

at an alternative work site, such as from home or a telework center. Hoteling allows allow employees to work at multiple sites and use nondedicated, nonpermanent workspaces assigned for 

use by reservation on an as-needed basis. 12GAO/AIMD–99–32 and OMB Capital Programming Guide. 13DHS reviews its acquisition portfolio annually and designates programs as major acquisitions based on DHS investment thresholds. Generally, programs that incur costs greater than 

$300 million over the life cycle of the program are considered major acquisitions. In 2014, DHS 

changed the name of the Major Acquisition Oversight List to the Master Acquisition Oversight 

List to more accurately distinguish between the Department’s major (Level 1 and 2) and nonmajor (Level 3) acquisitions and non-acquisition activities included in the list. 

ment in accordance with current workplace standards, such as standards for 

telework and hoteling.11 DHS and GSA officials acknowledged that new workplace 

standards could create a number of new development options to consider, as the new 

standards would allow for more staff to occupy the current space at St. Elizabeths 

than previously anticipated. DHS and GSA officials also reported analyzing different 

leasing options that could affect consolidation efforts. However, we found that the 

consolidation plans, which were finalized between 2006 and 2009, had not been updated to reflect these actions. 

In addition, we found that current funding for the St. Elizabeths project had not 

aligned with what DHS and GSA initially planned. According to DHS and GSA officials, the funding gap between what DHS and GSA requested and what was received from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, was over $1.6 billion. According to these 

officials, this gap created cost escalations of over $1 billion and schedule delays of 

over 10 years relative to original estimates. These delays have posed challenges for 

DHS in terms of its current leasing portfolio. Specifically, DHS’s long-term leasing 

portfolio was developed based on the original expected completion date for St. Elizabeths development in 2016. According to DHS leasing data, 52 percent of DHS’s current NCR leases will expire in 2014 and 2015, accounting for almost 39 percent of 

its usable square feet. However, we found that DHS and GSA had not conducted 

a comprehensive assessment of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and prioritized alternatives that would help officials adapt consolidation plans 

to changing conditions and address funding issues, as reflected in leading practices 

for capital decision making.12 DHS and GSA reported that they have begun to work 

together to consider changes to the DHS Headquarters consolidation plans, but they 

had not announced when new plans will be issued. Furthermore, because final documentation of agency deliberations or analyses had not yet been developed, it was 

unclear if any new plans would be informed by an updated comprehensive needs assessment and capability gap analysis as called for by leading capital decision-making practices. Therefore, in our September 2014 report, we recommended that DHS 

and GSA conduct: (1) A comprehensive needs assessment and gap analysis of current and needed capabilities that takes into consideration changing conditions, and 

(2) an alternatives analysis that identifies the costs and benefits of leasing and construction alternatives for the remainder of the project and prioritizes options to account for funding instability. DHS and GSA concurred with these recommendations 

and stated that their forthcoming draft St. Elizabeths Enhanced Consolidation Plan 

would contain these analyses. 

Finally, we found that DHS had not consistently applied its major acquisition 

guidance for reviewing and approving the headquarters consolidation project. Specifically, we found that DHS had guidelines in place to provide senior management 

the opportunity to review and approve its major projects, but DHS had not consistently applied these guidelines to its efforts to work with GSA to plan and implement 

headquarters consolidation. DHS had designated the headquarters consolidation 

project as a major acquisition in some years but not in others. In 2010 and 2011, 

DHS identified the headquarters consolidation project as a major acquisition and included the project on DHS’s Major Acquisitions Oversight List.13 Thus, the project 

was subject to the oversight and management policies and procedures established 

in DHS major acquisition guidance; however, the project did not comply with major 

acquisition requirements as outlined by DHS guidelines. For example, we found that 

the project had not produced any of the required key acquisition documents requiring Department-level approval, such as life-cycle cost estimates and an acquisition 

program baseline, among others. In 2012, the project as a whole was dropped from 

the list. In 2013 and 2014, DHS included the information technology (IT) acquisition 

portion of the project on the list, but not the entire project. DHS officials explained 

that they considered the St. Elizabeths project to be more of a GSA acquisition than 

a DHS acquisition because GSA owns the site and the majority of building construction is funded through GSA appropriations. We recognize that GSA has responsibility for managing contracts associated with the headquarters consolidation project. 
18 

14GAO–09–3SP and GAO–12–120G. For both the cost and schedule estimates, our analysis 

focused on how well DHS and GSA met each of the four characteristics based on our assessment 

of conformance to the leading practices associated with that characteristic. We then arrayed the 

extent to which DHS and GSA cost and schedule estimates conformed with the four characteristics of each using five rating categories—fully meets, substantially meets, partially meets, minimally meets, or does not meet. 15GAO–09–3SP. 

However, a variety of factors, including the overall cost, scope, and visibility of the 

project, as well as the overall importance of the project in the context of DHS’s mission, make the consolidation project a viable candidate for consideration as a major 

acquisition. By not consistently applying this review process to headquarters consolidation, we concluded that DHS management risked losing insight into the 

progress of the St. Elizabeths project, as well as how the project fits in with its overall acquisitions portfolio. Thus, in our September 2014 report, we recommended that 

the Secretary of Homeland Security designate the headquarters consolidation program a major acquisition, consistent with DHS acquisition policy, and apply DHS 

acquisition policy requirements. DHS concurred with the recommendation. 

DHS AND GSA COST AND SCHEDULE ESTIMATES FOR THE ST. ELIZABETHS PROJECT DID

NOT REFLECT LEADING PRACTICES

In our September 2014 report, we found that DHS and GSA cost and schedule 

estimates for the headquarters consolidation project at St. Elizabeths did not conform or only minimally or partially conformed with leading estimating practices, 

and were therefore unreliable.14 Furthermore, we found that in some areas, the cost 

and schedule estimates did not fully conform with GSA guidance relevant to developing estimates. 

Cost Estimates 

We found that DHS and GSA cost estimates for the headquarters consolidation 

project at St. Elizabeths did not reflect leading practices, which rendered the estimates unreliable. For example, we found that the 2013 cost estimate—the most recent available—did not include: (1) A life-cycle cost analysis of the project, including 

the cost of repair, operations, and maintenance; (2) was not regularly updated to reflect significant changes to the program including actual costs; and (3) did not include an independent estimate to assist in tracking the budget. In addition, a sensitivity analysis had not been performed to assess the reasonableness of the cost estimate. We have previously reported that a reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any program.15 Specifically, we have found that such an estimate provides 

the basis for informed investment decision making, realistic budget formulation and 

program resourcing, meaningful progress measurement, pro-active course correction 

when warranted, and accountability for results. Accordingly, we concluded that DHS 

and GSA would benefit from maintaining current and well-documented estimates of 

project costs at St. Elizabeths—even if project funding is not fully secured—and 

these estimates should encompass the full life-cycle of the program and be independently assessed. 

Schedule Estimates 

In addition, we found that the 2008 and 2013 schedule estimates did not include 

all activities for both the Government and its contractors necessary to accomplish 

the project’s objectives and did not include schedule baseline documents to help 

measure performance as reflected in leading practices and GSA guidance. For the 

2008 schedule estimate, we also found that resources (such as labor, materials, and 

equipment) were not accounted for and a risk assessment had not been conducted 

to predict a level of confidence in the project’s completion date. In addition, we found 

the 2013 schedule estimate was unreliable because, among other things, it was incomplete in that it did not provide details needed to understand the sequence of 

events, including work to be performed in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. 

We concluded that developing cost and schedule estimates consistent with leading 

practices could promote greater transparency and provide decision makers needed 

information about the St. Elizabeths project and the larger DHS Headquarters consolidation effort. However, in commenting on our analysis of St. Elizabeths cost and 

schedule estimates, DHS and GSA officials said that it would be difficult or impossible to create reliable estimates that encompass the scope of the entire St. Elizabeths project. Officials said that given the complex, multi-phase nature of the overall development effort, specific estimates are created for smaller individual projects, 

but not for the campus project as a whole. Therefore, in their view, leading estimating practices and GSA guidance cannot reasonably be applied to the high-level 
19 

projections developed for the total cost and completion date of the entire St. Elizabeths project. GSA stated that the higher-level, milestone schedule currently being 

used to manage the program is more flexible than the detailed schedule GAO proposes, and has proven effective even with the highly-variable funding provided for 

the project. 

We found in our September 2014 report, however, that this high-level schedule 

was not sufficiently defined to effectively manage the program. For example, our review showed that the schedule did not contain detailed schedule activities that include current Government, contractor, and applicable subcontractor effort. Specifically, the activities shown in the schedule only address high-level agency square 

footage segments, security, utilities, landscape, and road improvements. While we 

understand the need to keep future effort contained in high-level planning packages, 

in accordance with leading practices, near-term work occurring in fiscal years 2014 

and 2015 should have more detailed information. We recognize the challenges of developing reliable cost and schedule estimates for a large-scale, multi-phase project 

like St. Elizabeths, particularly given its unstable funding history and that incorporating GAO’s cost- and schedule-estimating leading practices may involve additional costs. However, unless DHS and GSA invest in these practices, Congress risks 

making funding decisions and DHS and GSA management risk making resource allocation decisions without the benefit that a robust analysis of levels of risk, uncertainty, and confidence provides. As a result, in our September 2014 report, we recommended that, after revising the DHS Headquarters consolidation plans, DHS and 

GSA develop revised cost and schedule estimates for the remaining portions of the 

consolidation project that conform to GSA guidance and leading practices for cost 

and schedule estimation, including an independent evaluation of the estimates. DHS 

and GSA concurred with the recommendation. 

In our September 2014 report, we also stated that Congress should consider making future funding for the St. Elizabeths project contingent upon DHS and GSA developing a revised headquarters consolidation plan, for the remainder of the project, 

that conforms with leading practices and that: (1) Recognizes changes in workplace 

standards, (2) identifies which components are to be colocated at St. Elizabeths and 

in leased and owned space throughout the NCR, and (3) develops and provides reliable cost and schedule estimates. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared 

statement. I look forward to responding to any questions that you may have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Maurer. 

The Chairman will now recognize Mr. Cummiskey to testify for 

5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CHRIS CUMMISKEY, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY, MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. CUMMISKEY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member Barber, Members of the committee. Thank you so much 

for the opportunity to join you this morning. As was indicated, my 

name is Chris Cummiskey. I am the acting under secretary for 

management and chief acquisition officer for the Department. It is 

an opportunity today to share the dais here with Mr. Dong and Mr. 

Maurer, two gentlemen for which I have utmost respect who have 

made significant contributions to this project and others. 

I appreciate the Chairman and the Ranking Member’s efforts certainly around 4228 and other efforts to strengthen acquisition oversight at the Department. We support those efforts and hope that 

that will pass shortly. I wanted to draw your attention to just a 

couple of points about the track record of success in the development of St. Elizabeths to date in Phase I, the Coast Guard Headquarters. I also want to assert that through the program of record 

that we have put on the table taxpayers will save money and will 

foster greater unity of efforts at the Department. 

I have to be honest with you. When I arrived at the Department 

as part as Secretary Napolitano’s team in 2009 as a former State 
20 

senator and member of the Appropriations Committee there in that 

State, I had a fair amount of skepticism as to what we had inherited from Secretary Chertoff and his team, but it didn’t take long 

to understand exactly what they were talking about. I think that 

is reflected in former Deputy Secretary Schneider’s comments in 

that the essential value of this project is the consolidation of the 

50 locations across the Department down to something lower than 

10, which I think is a critical part of this. 

To frame the discussion today, I think it is also important to understand the respective roles and the responsibilities between DHS 

as a tenant agency and GSA as a landlord. Our role at the Department is to establish program requirements while our partners at 

GSA manage the property development itself. In fact, the bulk of 

the funding does go to GSA, and in fiscal year 2014 our share of 

the money that was appropriated by Congress is $35 million. Our 

request in fiscal year 2015 is $57 million. 

I would just like to make three simple points. The first thing I 

want to draw your attention to is the record of success in what we 

delivered with the Coast Guard Headquarters at St. Elizabeths. 

That project, for the portions that were funded by Congress, came 

in on time and on budget for the moneys that Chairman Duncan 

articulated. When we receive consistent funding, we can deliver on 

time and on budget. We have accomplished that and we believe 

that can be accomplished through the remainder of the phases. 

Second, I want to highlight the benefits to the U.S. taxpayer of 

continued consolidation of the DHS footprint. In the 2013 review 

of GSA high-value leases, GAO noted the timing is ripe for targeted 

investments to take the Department out of long-term, high-value 

commercial leases and into efficient Federally-owned space and 

lower long-term costs. With 69 percent of DHS’ Headquarters and 

component leases in the NCR expiring between fiscal year 2016 

and fiscal year 2020, the Department will pay for those replacements regardless of the future of St. Elizabeths funding. By consolidating our operations at St. Elizabeths, the 30-year present 

value cost of Federal construction is nearly $700 million less than 

commercial leasing as reported by GSA, in their fiscal year 2015 

prospectus submission, indicates. 

Third, headquarters consolidation enhances the Unity of Effort 

that Secretary Johnson has so articulately depicted at DHS. A key 

focus for the Secretary has been to bring together the disparate 

components that are spread across the NCR, and after 6 years at 

the Department I have seen first-hand what it means when you are 

in a crisis situation and your component heads are scattered across 

the National Capital Region. 

One of the things that this project brings to bear is the centralization of The National Operations Center, which Secretary 

Chertoff and Deputy Secretary Schneider and so many of my 

former colleagues have articulated is essential to the commandand-control structure of the Department. 

Finally, I just want to indicate that in the GAO findings, we concur with those findings. As the chief acquisition officer, this week 

I issued an acquisition decision memorandum which codifies that 

the portions of the project that are under our purview, as I indicated in 2014, that is $35 million, and the request in 2015 is $57 
21 

1GAO 13–744; Federal Real Property: Greater Transparency and Strategic Focus Needed for 

High-Value GSA Leases; September 2013, page 4. 

million, will be subject to the Acquisition Review Board process. We 

can’t take Mr. Dong’s acquisitions and apply them to our process, 

but we will do it for the portions that we oversee. 

Finally, let me just say that my experience has been there is no 

finer project management team than Chris Mills at DHS and 

Shapour Ebadi at the GSA. These are individuals that know how 

to deliver projects. They have done it with Phase I at the Coast 

Guard. They will continue to do it with support from the Congress. 

I am just pleased to be here to say, yeah, we have got programs 

across the DHS portfolio that are troubled. I do not view this as 

one of them. I stand ready to answer questions for the Members. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cummiskey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRIS CUMMISKEY

SEPTEMBER 19, 2014 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the committee, good 

morning. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the DHS Consolidated Headquarters at St. Elizabeths. I am Chris Cummiskey, acting under secretary for management for the Department of Homeland Security. My responsibilities include the 

management of the Department’s facilities and property. I am pleased to appear before this committee with my colleagues from the General Services Administration 

and Government Accountability Office to discuss the development of St. Elizabeths 

and the DHS Headquarters Consolidation plan. Greater consolidation of DHS facilities provides tangible benefits to taxpayers and the Department. 

In the DHS National Capital Region Housing Master Plan, submitted to the Congress in 2006 in cooperation with GSA, Secretary Chertoff stated that the program 

was necessary to secure and strengthen DHS operations by unifying our core headquarters with those of our components and to yield more effective management. 

Today, Secretary Johnson remains focused on robust cross-component Unity of Effort and a culture of savings to minimize waste, eliminate duplication, and focus 

scarce resources on mission execution. The Department continues to support consolidation of our headquarters facilities and St. Elizabeths is part of that program. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in a 2013 review of GSA 

High-Value Leases (Report 13–744), that as agencies work to shrink their footprints 

through implementation of flexible workplace strategies and increased efficiencies, 

there are opportunities to make targeted investments out of high-value commercial 

leases and into efficient Federal space that will result in lower long-term costs to 

the taxpayer. The Department agrees with this GAO assessment and notes that it 

forms the foundation of the DHS Headquarters Consolidation Plan. St. Elizabeths 

is Federal space and was retained by GSA specifically for agencies with high security requirements. It is an anchor property already, housing the U.S. Coast Guard’s 

Headquarters. 

To frame the discussion of DHS Headquarters consolidation efforts, it is important 

to understand the respective roles and responsibilities between tenant agencies, 

such as DHS and GSA. In GAO Report 13–744, GSA’s lead role in housing civilian 

agencies is noted as follows: 

. . . Within the vast portfolio of government owned and leased assets, GSA plays 

the role of broker and property manager to many civilian agencies of the U.S. 

government... 1

As a tenant agency, the Department of Homeland Security’s role is to establish 

programmatic requirements; to budget for and fund tenant responsible items; to 

maintain a close partnership and monitor GSA’s use of DHS funds; to validate that 

GSA managed design and construction meets the operational and program requirements for DHS; and to coordinate with GSA and all stakeholders throughout the 

process. Property development activities are managed by GSA in accordance with 

GSA policies, under GSA supervision, and under applicable statutes. The Department fully cooperates with GSA but does not exercise acquisition oversight nor di-
22 

rect supervisory control over GSA housing or procurement decisions. DHS is an active participant in tenant improvement decisions. 

The original DHS Headquarters Consolidation plan, as developed by GSA in coordination with DHS, OMB, and Congress, proposed to complete the full development of St. Elizabeths in 2016 based on the start of construction funding in 2009. 

This plan was developed in conjunction with a comprehensive 3.5-year Master Plan, 

environmental impact statement, and historic preservation review process. Following the Master Plan approval, GSA completed the U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters relocation to St. Elizabeths on-time and on-budget for the portions of the 

project funded by the Congress. This was a commendable achievement given that 

GSA was not fully funded for all planned building and infrastructure development 

to support the U.S. Coast Guard relocation. 

Unfortunately the original plan has not been appropriated the requested funding 

necessary to carry it out. As a result, in 2013 GSA and DHS developed a revised 

construction baseline to reflect the funding reduction in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal 

year 2012 and reduced annual development segments to more fiscally manageable 

levels that extended construction out to 2026. The schedule extension increased the 

estimate of future construction, due to inflation-only adjustments (no change in requirements) to $4.5 billion. Although inflation increased the estimate for future 

work, consolidation into Federal space still provides the Department long-term financial benefits over leasing according to GSA’s analysis. 

With the revised construction baseline in place, GSA and DHS began updating the 

Headquarters Consolidation plan in the fall of 2013 to address the on-going changes 

in workplace design and flexible workplace strategies that have gained broad acceptance over the last several years. In fact, the Management Directorate’s Office of the 

Chief Readiness Support Officer adopted these strategies within their own office by 

implementing a pilot program to reduce office space by 50 percent and save over 

$1 million in annual rent costs. DHS and GSA are applying the lessons learned 

from this pilot program to update the DHS Headquarters Consolidation plan. The 

revised plan will result in lower costs and a shortened time frame if funded by the 

Congress, while accommodating greater utilization and more employees assigned to 

the campus within the Master Plan seat limitations. 

The Department has made a commitment through the Freeze the Footprint initiative to increase space utilization from the current figure of about 210 Useable 

Square Feet (USF) per person of office space, to 150 USF. These actions will reduce 

costs and improve space efficiency in the future and apply to the St. Elizabeths development. 

An additional important note is that 69 percent of DHS Headquarters and component leases in the National Capital Region will expire between fiscal year 2016 and 

fiscal year 2020. DHS tenant costs will be incurred with these lease replacements, 

regardless of future decisions on St. Elizabeths funding. As the commercial leases 

expire, they must be re-competed. These are not discretionary investments. These 

are ‘‘must pay’’ requirements. Without headquarters consolidation efforts for the 

DHS and component headquarters portfolio, we will perpetuate the status quo of 

dispersed locations and a long-term increased lease costs over housing components 

in fewer locations and at Federal space on the St. Elizabeths campus. 

DHS strives to capitalize Unity of Effort opportunities that allow us to remain focused on our core mission—to protect the homeland. We look forward to further engagement with this committee regarding the DHS Headquarters Consolidation program. 

In closing, I would like to assure this committee that DHS is working hard to remain a good steward of the taxpayers’ money by managing our real estate portfolio, 

both Government-owned and -leased, in a cost-effective manner. The men and 

women who work tirelessly to protect the homeland deserve and require adequate 

facilities to support and execute their mission. 

Thank you very much. I would be pleased to answer any questions the committee 

may have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

Commissioner Dong. 

STATEMENT OF NORMAN DONG, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC 

BUILDINGS SERVICE, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. DONG. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member 

Barber, and Members of the subcommittee. My name is Norman 
23 

Dong, and I am the commissioner of GSA’s Public Buildings Service. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the on-going consolidation 

of DHS Headquarters at St. Elizabeths. I would like to make three 

points this morning. 

First, St. Elizabeths is a critical element in GSA’s effort to consolidate Government real estate and to reduce overhead costs. By 

consolidating DHS facilities across the National Capital Region we 

can reduce future real estate costs, enhance mission effectiveness, 

and redevelop an underutilized asset already in the Federal portfolio. 

This project allows to us shift more than 50 DHS leases across 

the National Capital Region to a Federally-owned campus at St. 

Elizabeths. As GAO has noted, long-term leasing is often far more 

expensive than Government ownership, especially when it comes to 

unique requirements like what we see for DHS. In the case of St. 

Es, the 30-year present value cost of leasing would be nearly $700 

million more expensive than construction. This translates into an 

annual savings of more than $35 million. 

With this project we are also able to house more people in less 

space. When the entire project is complete, St. Es will provide 

14,000 seats for DHS employees on any given day. By adopting 

flexible workplace strategies like telework and desk sharing, DHS 

can accommodate even more employees in these seats. GSA is 

working with DHS on an updated housing strategy to maximize 

space utilization at St. Elizabeths and to achieve even greater cost 

savings for the Department. 

Second, as GAO has noted, funding uncertainty has created serious challenges for the St. Elizabeths project. Piecemeal funding has 

extended the project’s schedule and added cost. Congress appropriated resources for the project at a level far below the President’s 

request in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012. Without stable 

funding, we will see more delays and more cost increases. 

When the project began in 2006 we anticipated completion in 2016 at a total cost to the Government of $3.4 billion. Without 

funding, however, GSA and DHS had to revise the project strategy 

to reflect smaller, more affordable segments over a longer period of 

time. This had the effect of pushing the time line for completion 

out to 2026. With an extended schedule the project cost is now estimated at $4.5 billion. These costs increase due to inflation for construction costs as well as the cost of demobilization and remobilization of equipment and labor. Accelerating the remaining project 

schedule could reduce these additional costs. 

Third, GSA and DHS have developed a strong record of success 

in project delivery at St. Elizabeths. We delivered Phase I of the 

DHS Headquarters project on time and on budget. Ultimately the 

success of this project will be judged by our actual results. We delivered Phase I, a new headquarters building for the Coast Guard, 

on time and on budget. In August 2013 the Coast Guard moved 

into a headquarters building that can accommodate 3,700 personnel. We eliminated five leases and moved nearly 1 million 

square feet of leased space to Federal ownership. The successful 

implementation of the Coast Guard Headquarters is an important 

step towards having a unified, consolidated, and secure headquarters for the Department. 
24 

We are now beginning work on the next phase. Congress pro- vided $155 million in fiscal year 2014 for adaptive reuse of the historic Center Building, and I am pleased to announce that we will 

be awarding the contract for this work by the end of September. 

Our budget request for fiscal year 2015 includes $250 million to 

complete infrastructure and renovation necessary to fully occupy 

the Center Building complex. 

Looking beyond our budget request, GSA is identifying other potential sources of funding to support this project. For example, with 

our Federal Triangle South project we are looking to exchange our 

Regional Office Building, as well as the vacant Cotton Annex, for 

additional construction services at St. Es. While we are pleased 

with our project execution, there are also opportunities to improve 

project delivery. We are working with DHS to enhance the master 

plan for St. Es, which will further improve space utilization and 

create even greater savings. 

As we have seen from past experience, when Congress provides 

resources for a construction project GSA has a strong record of delivering these projects on-time and on-budget. Our work with our 

Coast Guard Headquarters is a perfect example and we plan to 

build on this initial momentum. The funding Congress has provided in fiscal year 2014, along with our fiscal year 2015 budget 

request, will allow us to continue forward progress on this essential 

project. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I am 

happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dong follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN DONG

SEPTEMBER 19, 2014 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the 

subcommittee. My name is Norman Dong, and I am the commissioner of the U.S. 

General Services Administration’s Public Buildings Service. Thank you for inviting 

me to discuss the on-going consolidation of the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Headquarters components at St. Elizabeths in Washington, DC. 

GSA’s mission is to deliver the best value in real estate, acquisition, and technology services to Government and the American people. To meet this mission, GSA 

is working with agencies across the Federal Government to reduce space requirements, improve space utilization, reduce real estate costs, and deliver better space 

that allows our Federal partners to better achieve their missions. 

I’d like to make three points today. First, the development of a consolidated DHS 

Headquarters at St. Elizabeths is a critical piece of GSA’s broader effort to consolidate Government real estate and reduce overhead costs across Government. Second, 

GSA and DHS have developed a strong record of success in project delivery at St. 

Elizabeths. GSA and DHS delivered Phase I of the DHS Headquarters project ontime and on-budget. Third, as the Government Accountability Office correctly notes, 

funding uncertainty has created serious challenges for St. Elizabeths, increasing 

costs and forcing GSA and DHS to extend the project delivery schedule. 

OPPORTUNITIES FOR SAVINGS WITH A CONSOLIDATED DHS HEADQUARTERS

As a part of the administration’s Freeze the Footprint initiative, GSA is helping 

our partner Federal agencies minimize overhead costs and make more efficient use 

of the Government’s real property assets. We are working with agencies to reduce 

space requirements and shrink real estate footprints, reducing building’s operating 

costs through energy-efficient retrofits and ‘‘smart building’’ technology, and 

leveraging partnerships with the private sector to deliver better, more efficient 

space to meet agency mission needs. 
25 

1See Capital Financing: Alternative Approaches to Budgeting for Federal Real Property (GAO– 

14–239) and Federal Buildings Fund: Improved Transparency and Long-term Plan Needed to 

Clarify Capital Funding Priorities (GAO–12–646). 

The St. Elizabeths project represents an opportunity to help achieve these important goals. By consolidating DHS Headquarters, we can reduce future real estate 

costs, enhance mission effectiveness through co-location, and redevelop an underutilized asset already in the Federal portfolio. 

Consolidating DHS Headquarters operations in one location will eliminate more 

than 50 DHS leases, shifting millions of square feet of leased space to a Federallyowned campus. As GAO has noted, long-term leasing is typically far more expensive 

than Government ownership, especially when it comes to unique Governmental requirements like those that are required at St. Elizabeths. In the case of St. Elizabeths, the 30-year present value cost of construction is $698 million less than leasing. This results in an annual savings of more than $35 million. 

Additionally, we are generating additional savings by housing more people in less 

space. When the entire project is complete, St. Elizabeths will provide space for 

14,000 seats. Through implementation of flexible workplace strategies, these 14,000 

seats can be leveraged to accommodate many more employees, and GSA is currently 

working with DHS on this updated approach. 

At the same time, co-location will facilitate an effective response in case of a National emergency, optimize internal coordination and communication, and foster a 

cohesive culture among the many agencies that now make up the Department. 

ON-TIME, ON-BUDGET DELIVERY OF PHASE I OF ST. ELIZABETHS

Ultimately, the success of the St. Elizabeths project will be judged by its results. 

Project delivery at St. Elizabeths thus far has been a success. 

GSA and DHS have successfully delivered Phase I of the project, construction of 

the new Douglas A. Munro Coast Guard Headquarters Building. This state-of-theart facility will use sustainable technologies to drop energy use to more than 30 percent below industry standards and cut water usage by nearly 50 percent. Additionally, this phase included perimeter security, the renovation of several historic buildings, infrastructure improvements throughout the campus, and a 2,000-car parking 

garage. We completed Phase I on-time and on-budget, and in the process, eliminated 

five leases and moved nearly 1 million square feet of space to Federal ownership. 

As a result, the Coast Guard completed its move to a building on the St. Elizabeths 

campus that can accommodate 3,700 personnel in 2013. 

We are now beginning work on the next phase of the DHS Consolidation. Congress provided $155 million in fiscal year 2014 for adaptive reuse of the historic 

Center Building. GSA’s fiscal year 2015 budget request includes $250 million to 

complete needed infrastructure and renovate buildings adjoining the Center Building. This funding will allow DHS to fully occupy the Center Building Complex. 

In addition to GSA’s annual budget requests, we are seeking alternative mechanisms for project delivery. GSA is leveraging the value of other properties in our 

portfolio to expedite delivery of the St. Elizabeths campus. Specifically, as a part of 

our Federal Triangle South project, we are engaging the private sector to exchange 

GSA’s Regional Office Building and the vacant Cotton Annex for construction services that may include renovations of historic buildings at the St. Elizabeths campus. 

THE IMPACTS OF CUTS IN FUNDING ON PROJECT COSTS AND SCHEDULE

Of course, funding constraints have had a considerable impact on the St. Elizabeths project, much like the rest of the Federal real estate portfolio. As GAO has 

noted many times, uncertainty in funding and limited access to the Federal Buildings Fund create a serious challenge for the management of real property.1

For St. Elizabeths, piecemeal funding of project phases have resulted in an extended schedule and eliminated additional opportunities to reduce costs through 

sharing resources and infrastructure among phases. Congress appropriated resources for the project at a level far below the President’s budget request in fiscal 

years 2011 and 2012. In the absence of stable funding, the schedule for project completion will face delays, and costs increase with delays. 

You can see the effect of funding constraints on the Center Building. In fiscal year 

2011, GSA’s budget request included $381 million to continue the project, including 

for the renovation of the Center Building. Congress cut GSA’s new construction 

budget request that year by 92 percent, and we were only able to allocate $30 million to St. Elizabeths. Since that time, the cost of completing the Center Building 

has increased by $17 million. 
26 

When we began the St. Elizabeths project in 2006, the project was scheduled for 

completion in 2016 at a total Government cost of $3.4 billion. Due to funding cuts, 

GSA and DHS had to revise the project strategy resulting in smaller segments over 

a longer period that are more manageable in this environment. This has pushed the 

project time line for completion out to 2026, and, largely due to inflation over that 

period of time, the total estimated project cost is now $4.5 billion. Accelerating the 

remaining project schedule could reduce these additional costs. 

GSA appreciates GAO’s recommendations that Congress consider alternative 

budget structures that allow for greater consistency in funding and project planning. 

Until GSA has full and consistent access to the Federal Buildings Fund, we will continue to see cost increases and schedule delays for long-term, multi-phase Government construction projects. St. Elizabeths is no exception. 

INCORPORATING GAO RECOMMENDATIONS INTO ON-GOING PROJECT PLANNING AND

EXECUTION

While we are very pleased with our execution of the St. Elizabeths project thus 

far, GSA recognizes and appreciates that there are always opportunities to improve 

project delivery. GAO has recommended that we conduct a comprehensive needs assessment and alternatives analysis to identify the costs and benefits of construction 

and leasing project delivery methods. We have already begun this assessment, and 

will develop an alternatives analysis that further improves efficiency and savings. 

We are working with DHS to improve processes and reduce costs by decreasing the 

footprint, reexamining certain requirements, and integrating the efficient use of 

leased space based on a review of DHS leases throughout the National Capital Region. 

We will update cost and schedule estimates as we continue this work, and appreciate the chance to potentially incorporate practices recommended by GAO. Not all 

of GAO’s cited procedures and reviews apply in the context of real estate construction. Some recommended practices are better suited to weapons systems, spacecraft, 

aircraft carriers, and software systems. However, we agree with GAO that quantifying risk and uncertainty are important considerations in this funding environment, and we will incorporate these considerations moving forward. We are working 

closely with DHS, and together, we are happy to update this committee as we finalize this plan. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about our on-going work 

to consolidate DHS Headquarters components at St. Elizabeths. I welcome the opportunity to discuss GSA’s commitment to shrinking the Federal Government’s real 

property footprint and consolidating out of costly leases. I am happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Commissioner Dong. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning. 

I think as a Nation we can be penny-wise and pound-foolish. I 

think this is a project that exemplifies that in a lot of ways. I heard 

the term ‘‘on-time and on-budget’’ numerous times from two witnesses in regard to the Coast Guard facility. Well, on-time and onbudget is really a misstatement because you don’t have an access 

road that was originally planned. You had reduced transportation 

infrastructure within the facility. You changed the excavation plan 

there on the hillside, which is ultimately going to cost more taxpayer dollars down the road. Originally it was planned to excavate 

the complete hillside for future components. You decided only to do 

part of that. So, sure, you can reduce the budget going forward to 

be on-time and on-budget. So I just think that is misleading the 

American taxpayer. 

I think it is very clear that we are not seeing leading capital decision-making practices happen. I think Congress has a strong responsibility to the taxpayers to make sure that their money is 

spent appropriately at a time when we are almost $18 trillion in 

debt, and you look back at when this project was originally put on 
27 

the drawing board and originally funded in the stimulus package 

we weren’t $18 trillion in debt. We need to prioritize where we 

spend our taxpayer dollars. 

Several years ago, then-Secretary Janet Napolitano said that she 

would rather have money to complete building a National security 

cutter for the Coast Guard, support the Secret Service in its activities, and sustain our efforts at the border than have a new building. Given the threat posed by ISIS, the illegal alien crisis in our 

Southern Border, specifically the Rio Grande Valley, but really all 

across the Southern Border, the cyber attacks that we heard over 

and over this week in the committee hearing, both from the FBI 

and from Secretary Johnson, cyber attacks by the Chinese and others, other threats, isn’t the world more dangerous than when this 

statement was made? I would say that it is based on the emerging 

threats. 

We also heard this week from Secretary Johnson that he has the 

ability, he has a board room, he has a board table, and he can 

bring the leadership team together to communicate and that he 

does regularly. We have a morale issue in the Department of 

Homeland Security, turf wars and components that were originally 

stand-alone components now that are part of the broader DHS. 

My dad ran a textile mill his whole career. He would walk the 

plant floor every morning talking with the folks that were opening 

the cotton bales, the card room that were breaking up those fibers, 

and the spinning room, and the weaving room, and the napping operation, and the finishing operation, not talking to his supervisor, 

talking to the individuals that were running the machinery of the 

organization to find out what was really happening on the ground. 

I think it is important that the supervisors within those various 

components actually spend time within their agencies. If we have 

this facility—and this is just me being rhetorical, I guess—but if 

you moved the leadership team away from the normal operations, 

are you not going to see even less of a positive morale in the components? 

So I think Americans would love to see us redirect some of these 

resources to more border security, more fencing, more electronic 

components. I am very concerned that we have an aging Coast 

Guard cutter fleet and we need new ships. I could expand that to 

the Department of Defense and the reduction of surface ships, the 

need to replenish the fuel in a reactor in an aircraft carrier. 

I say all that in the context that we are $18 trillion in debt and 

one day the lender is going to come calling. We continue to have 

deficit spending in this country. At what point in time do we drop 

back and punt? At what point in time do we make a real resolve 

to pass an acquisition reform bill that puts the right accountability 

practices in place? 

Secretary Johnson has been someone that is in favor of acquisition reform. He wants to do it in-house. I appreciate his position, 

he is the Secretary. But I am also accountable to the taxpayers of 

the United States of America, and I think an acquisition reform bill 

that gives Congress more oversight and puts some parameters in 

place for you guys that are spending those tax dollars is very important. 
28 

So taking what I said earlier from Secretary Napolitano, GAO reported that DHS officials said it would be illogical to develop anything beyond a generalized milestone schedule. Generalized milestone schedule, that is what leads to cost overruns and delays. 

The Secretary this week said in the committee hearing that they 

look at the number of OTMs that come across the border. They 

don’t have a good idea of that total number. They look at it in a 

broad sense. I don’t care whether you look at it in a broad sense 

or a narrow sense, Americans realize that we don’t know who is in 

our country. 

I think if you look at a generalized milestone schedule then 

Americans realize you don’t know how much money you are spending and you don’t know when this project is going to be completed. 

I think that, I go back to an opening statement, if you were going 

to build a house, you are going to sit down with the contractor, you 

are going to have a good idea of what those costs are. There are 

going to be some unexpected costs, we may run into some rock 

digging the foundation, you may change and want different kind of 

shingles. But you are going to have that understanding and you 

are going to know it is going to take X number of months to build 

that house. You are going to have a good understanding. 

I don’t believe the American taxpayer has a good understanding 

about the St. Elizabeths project. As much as we may want it in the 

District of Columbia, as much as we may think we might need it 

as a Nation, I think we have an obligation to the American taxpayer to tell them how their money is going to be spent. I think 

we also have an obligation to the American taxpayer to sometimes 

drop back and reevaluate. I think that is what we are trying to do: 

Drop back, reevaluate priorities, look at where we have spent 

money wisely and unwisely. 

When you look at the hardest wood in America when you could 

have brought a different component for the decking. When you 

have rain-wash flush toilets, that is a political agenda driving the 

spending of taxpayer dollars. We could have saved money using 

normal—normal—plumbing. 

Mr. Cummiskey, is that your position, that we should continue 

to operate under a generalized milestone schedule? 

Mr. CUMMISKEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You make a lot of salient points and I think it makes sense. 

I would answer it this way. Your analogy of constructing a house 

I think makes a lot of sense as well. But if I am building a house, 

and I build the frame, and then I wait 4 years to complete the facility, there is going to be a change in the cost and in the time frame 

associated with that. That is what happening with St. Elizabeths. 

The Congress, through appropriate funds as well as ARRA funding, 

funded the first phase. The GSA has built the infrastructure on the 

campus to support Phases II and III. So you are going to have 

changes in that over time. 

To answer your question directly, I think that we have gone 

through the industry-accepted practices, and I think I would defer 

to GSA on this, in terms of planning a facility, and that is what 

you are seeing with the Coast Guard facility. That came in, in a 

position of the planning assessment that is consistent with what 

the industry and the standards accept. 
29 

So I would certainly defer to GSA, but I think that in terms of 

Phases II and III we have changed away from that because we 

have had to move to usable segments. We are not looking at Phase 

II the way it was in the master plan. We are saying, okay, the footprint is in place now, we are going to change the requirements in 

terms of square footage from 210 square feet down to 150, we are 

making the adjustments over time that GAO has required us to do, 

and I think that that planning envelope makes a lot of sense. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Let me ask you this. Two-thousand-eight 

saw a financial downturn in this country. This project was kicked 

off with stimulus funds, one-time dollars, with a continual funding 

stream. I keep hearing about the lack of funding from Congress. 

But we were operating from 2009 to today with the understanding 

that we are still in an economic downturn, that budgets are 

crimped all across Government spending. 

Do you ever walk out on the Mall behind the Capitol? Have you 

ever spent time walking out on the Mall? Washington is a great 

city, right? I do it. Have you found that tree, that money tree, because I hadn’t found it yet. It is not out there. The money that we 

are talking about is coming from the American taxpayers and they 

expect us to be a little more frugal and wise with the dollars we 

are spending. 

So operating in that environment, understanding that from 2008 

to today we are still in an economic downturn, the great recession 

that hadn’t really improved dramatically, we have got to make 

smart decisions. So Congress didn’t fund this. Congress doesn’t 

have the money to fund it. The tree isn’t out in the backyard. 

We are trying to make smart decisions with the money allocated 

to us. I came to Congress to reduce Government spending to try to 

reduce the deficit and live within our means because that is what 

moms and dads and businesses have to do all across this great 

land. Government shouldn’t continue to operate in deficit spending 

and run up debt. That is not fair to the American taxpayers. It is 

not fair to my little boys, 19, 16, and 13, that are going to be future 

taxpayers of this country. Just because we are in the Government 

doesn’t mean we continue to spend money like it grows on that tree 

in the backyard. 

I am going to have some additional questions. We are going to 

be here for a little while. We don’t have a whole lot of Member participation, so I look forward to a second round of questioning. But 

I am over time, so I am going to yield to the Ranking Member and 

then come back. Thanks. 

Mr. BARBER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the things that the Chairman and I tried to do and hopefully will happen with the passage of the Acquisition Accountability 

and Efficiency Act for DHS was to make sure that the money that 

we give on behalf of the people we represent, the taxpayers of this 

country, is spent wisely, with full accountability. It also means that 

in the end the Department will spend its money prudently and on 

the right priorities. Let me tell you what one of my biggest priorities is and has yet to be resolved. 

Representing, as I do, one of nine border districts, I am very concerned that we have yet to deal with the border security issue that 

plagues the people I represent every single day. If you know, as 
30 

you do, Mr. Cummiskey, you know Arizona well, east of Douglas 

all the way to the State line with New Mexico is wide-open territory. The drug cartels basically own that territory. In the Tucson 

Sector, which includes my district and the adjoining district, we account for 47 percent—47 percent—of the drugs seized along the 

Southwest Border, and that has been going on for many years. We 

have to stop this flow of drugs carried by people who are prone to 

violence, heavily armed. 

The people I represent want to know from me when I go home, 

what is the Department doing to deploy its resources to address 

that problem? While I know these are different pockets of money, 

it is a really tough question to answer when they say to me, how 

is it possible that the consolidation of a headquarters for DHS has 

cost so much more than was originally intended or projected? How 

is it possible that we are going to be 11 or 12 years late? Tough 

question. I don’t have a good answer for them because from where 

they see it, it is all one department’s money. They want answers 

and they deserve them. 

I also am concerned about how it is we treat in every way possible, by pay and in terms of morale, the men and women who are 

on the border, at the border trying to secure the homeland, the 

Border Patrol Agents, those who are manning the ports of entry. 

The ports of entry need more staff. We are opening a new port, expanded port in Nogales, Mariposa, don’t have enough staff for that. 

Last year we avoided—very narrowly avoided—furloughing hundreds of Border Patrol Agents. Currently Border Patrol Agents are 

wondering, what is the certainty of their pay going forward? These 

issues create problems for our security and create problems for the 

men and women that we have asked to protect the homeland. Yes, 

we understand because we delve into it here that these are separate sections of an appropriation process. 

But I have to say, it is really hard for people back home to understand how it is possible that the Department spends thousands 

of dollars it shouldn’t in Ajo for homes, wastes $24 million on an 

IT program that doesn’t work, and now is over-budget in consolidation. 

So I hope that through the study that has been given and the 

recommendations that have been made we can correct, take this 

ship, the course of this ship, and bring it back under control. 

I want to ask Mr. Maurer a question or two about the GAO 

study. Given the size and complexity of the Department’s headquarters consolidation, how long will it take, do you believe, for 

DHS and GSA to implement the best practices, including cost and 

schedule estimates, and an evaluation of alternatives contained in 

the GAO’s report? The second part of that question is: Once the Department has implemented these practices how long would it take, 

do you believe, for the Department—or should it take for the Department—to complete the St. Elizabeths consolidation project? 

Mr. MAURER. Thank you for the question. I think that DHS and 

GSA are well-positioned to take action on our recommendations 

and implement them in relatively short order. They have established plans, although they are outdated. They have an established 

track record in doing work at St. Elizabeths. They have processes 

in place that should allow them to implement our recommenda-
31 

tions. We are not asking them to do an awful lot more than they 

have already done, but they do have to up their game to better 

manage the overall project and the implementation of the St. Elizabeths effort. 

In terms of how long it would take to complete the project after 

implementing our recommendations, that is really a function of 

how much money Congress provides and when those funds are provided. That, in turn, is going to depend, I think in large part, on 

how responsive DHS and GSA are in responding to our recommendations, implementing leading practices, and updating our 

plans. 

Mr. BARBER. Let me continue, Mr. Maurer, with you on a different aspect of this issue. The GAO report discusses the Federal 

Government’s evolution regarding workplace standards and it 

states that the Department’s, DHS’s, demand for office space would 

or could decrease by almost 800,000 square feet, or from 4.5 million 

to 3.7 million if the new standards were adopted. Does the GAO 

report account for DHS’ secure space requirements? 

Mr. MAURER. Yeah, our assessment was looking at the original 

plan, which called for 4.5 million square feet within the St. Elizabeths campus. That includes the amount of spaces necessary for secure work stations and work processes. So our analysis would also 

include that as well. 

Mr. BARBER. Well, let me ask Mr. Cummiskey next, but before 

I do, I just want to say it is great to have a fellow Arizonian in 

the House. Your reputation in our State was exemplary as a State 

legislator, as the chief information officer for the Governor, and 

your work was recognized by the National Governors Association 

for its creatively and innovation. I am really happy to have you 

here today and in this position at DHS. Your abilities and skills 

are well-proven and I think you will apply that talent to this very 

important undertaking. 

My question, Mr. Cummiskey, or Secretary is, GAO has stated 

that Congress should consider withholding funds for the St. Elizabeths project until the Department and GSA develop a revised 

headquarters consolidation plan that conforms with GAO leading 

practices. 

Could you just expand? You said you have agreed with the recommendation. Could you expand on what the Department will do 

to implement that recommendation? 

Mr. CUMMISKEY. Sure. Certainly. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Barber, thank you for the kind words. It is great to be here. 

One of the things we have tried to do, we work closely with GAO 

on a regular basis, and so they have telegraphed and we have entered into both interviews with all of the personnel associated with 

the project, as well as with GAO, as they went through the process 

of making the recommendations. So we saw this coming for some 

months, and so we have worked closely with GAO to make sure 

that our planning processes are aligned with what we thought the 

recommendations might be. 

So what you will see in concert with the fiscal year 2016 submission after the first of the year is an updated or enhanced project 

plan which takes into account what Mr. Maurer has been describing, what GSA has been doing internally to up its game, as has 
32 

been indicated, to take account of Freeze the Footprint and other 

changes in the environment that have led us to look at this longterm project in a way that is more conducive to what the Chairman 

has indicated, smart, efficient, and delivering for the taxpayer. So 

we anticipate that it won’t be much of a lift to comply with what 

Mr. Maurer is indicating. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you for that. Let me ask you a second question. If it should turn out that the Department’s plan for consolidation at St. Elizabeths is abandoned, what is the Department’s alternative plan, and how much would that cost compared with consolidation at St. Elizabeths? 

Mr. CUMMISKEY. Thank you, Congressman. Essentially what we 

found in the assessment from GSA, as well as our chief financial 

officer, is that in the resourcing decisions that the Chairman was 

alluding to, we would love to be in a position to redirect additional 

funds to National security cutters, ICE detention beds, all sorts of 

other prioritizations for both Secretary Johnson and the administration. The difficulty we have with the top line is that that is not 

moving. 

So what happens is that in the analysis that we have done we 

are going to end up spending about the same amount of money 

over the same horizon for lease consolidation, additional tenant improvements as we would spend as a Department on St. Elizabeths 

in the relocation and consolidation. 

So I would like to say today that we had money that we could 

redirect to other priorities. Certainly, Secretaries Napolitano and 

Johnson both were under that pressure to deliver. But the reality 

is, even with the consolidation plans that we would pivot to, it is 

unlikely that we would spend any less than what we were spending 

with the proposed plan. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, if I might, just one last question—or two actually—for Mr. Dong, Commissioner Dong. 

When will the updated plan for the Department’s headquarters 

consolidation be released by GSA and DHS? Second, as the DHS 

consolidation project is delayed, if it was delayed, or has it been delayed already, what is the estimated cost to GSA of having to renegotiate current leases? 

Mr. DONG. As we work with DHS on the enhanced master plan 

for St. Elizabeths, our expectation is that we will be submitting 

that to the Congress at the same time that we submit the fiscal 

year 2016 budget request. 

In terms of the cost of short-term extensions that would result 

from the project being delayed, we are currently working with DHS 

right now to quantify that impact, and we will be happy to share 

the results with this committee. 

Mr. BARBER. I actually do have one other question for you, Mr. 

Dong, and that is, what would GSA’s obligations be at St. Elizabeths if the project were halted? Would, for example, the Coast 

Guard continue to operate there? Could other Federal entities move 

into that space? What would happen, in other words, if we said, no 

more money, let’s stay with the current plan of leasing buildings 

across the capital? 
33 

Mr. DONG. We estimate that the on-going costs associated with 

DHS, if there were no additional consolidation at St. Elizabeths, 

would be about $132 million each year. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman will now recognize a guest to the committee, Ms. 

Norton, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, and I appreciate your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Maurer, I note as you began your report, and I am quoting 

here, you say, ‘‘With a current projected completion date of 2026, 

the St. Elizabeths project is intended to provide DHS a secure facility to allow for more efficient incident management response and 

command-and-control operations and also provide long-term savings by reducing reliance on leased space.’’ 

As a predicate to this question for you, Mr. Maurer, let me ask 

Mr. Cummiskey or Mr. Dong, during the construction of the Coast 

Guard, the U.S. Coast Guard, were there any change requirements 

that resulted in greater costs over the annual inflation adjustments 

while you were putting that building up, or did it go up as expected 

without any such additional funds requested? 

Mr. DONG. Once the project was funded we were able to deliver 

on time and on budget. There were no change requests or changes 

that drove the cost higher. 

Ms. NORTON. Yeah, well, that is an indication of a certain 

amount of efficiency on the part of GAO and DHS when it had the 

money. The money was provided, or a great deal of the money was 

provided for the Department, for the U.S. Coast Guard. 

I want to ask Mr. Maurer, whether using the U.S. Coast Guard 

as a marker, that is the building that is up, that was delivered on 

time from the outset of construction once the money was available 

to the agencies. Isn’t that some indication that had the agencies 

had the funds for the rest of the construction they would have been 

at least as efficient as they were with respect to the Coast Guard 

building that went up on-time and on-budget? If you can use any 

marker, isn’t that the marker you have to use? 

Mr. MAURER. That is certainly an indication of what they have 

been able to do in the past. Certainly they also had to descope 

some of the work that was originally planned under Phase I to 

match the amount of funds that they received from the Congress. 

But going forward, we remain concerned about their current position or their current lack of compliance with leading practices for 

cost estimation and schedule estimation. That creates additional 

risk that future build-out at St. Elizabeths will be at increased risk 

of going longer than planned and costing more than planned. So 

that is why we really think it is important for them to implement 

our recommendations on leading practices, for GSA and DHS to follow their own policies and guidelines, and to update their plans accordingly. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. 

Now, how many times, Mr. Cummiskey or Mr. Dong or both of 

you, has the agency received its full budget request at the beginning of the fiscal year the way you had it for the U.S. Coast Guard? 

How many times have you received your full budget request? 
34 

Mr. DONG. There is a significant gap between what GSA had requested in the President’s budget request versus what was actually—— 

Ms. NORTON. I didn’t ask you that. I didn’t ask you about the 

gap. I asked you how many times have either of you received your 

budget request at the beginning of the fiscal year? 

Mr. DONG. I don’t think ever. 

Ms. NORTON. How has that affected capital planning for that 

project? 

Mr. DONG. Without having funding certainty, it is very difficult 

to scope out the entire project and to get into the details that would 

allow you to have a specific schedule. Once we do get funding we 

are able to do a very detailed project schedule, just as GAO has 

pointed out. 

Ms. NORTON. So you have had to engage in short-term leases. 

Would you explain what the disadvantage of short-term leases are 

when you have to have short-term leases? How many short-term 

leases do you have? How many leases do you expect to come up and 

have to be renewed across the region? 

Mr. DONG. We have far too many short-term extensions on the 

leases for DHS components because of the delay in this project, because funding has not materialized. What we see is—— 

Ms. NORTON. How many leases are going to become due, let us 

say, next year that you will have to then either renew or do shortterm leases? 

Mr. DONG. We can provide you with the specifics there. 

Ms. NORTON. I think that is very important to do. Since, of 

course, you have this delay, when a lease becomes due, do you have 

to do a long-term lease? Do you do a short-term lease? How much 

more expensive is a short-term lease than a long-term lease? 

Mr. DONG. If we know that the agency is not going to be in that 

space for an extended period of time because of a plan to move elsewhere, we will do a short-term extension. But what we have seen 

and what we discussed with the T&I Committee several months 

ago, when we focused on leasing, is that any time you are in holdover or extension, you are paying, on average, about 20 percent 

more than you should. 

Ms. NORTON. Could you clarify this? Is it not the case that the 

basic infrastructure for the entire consolidation is in place and in 

the ground? What would happen to it if we simply abandoned the 

project? 

Mr. DONG. We have a lot of the infrastructure in place. As I mentioned before, the carrying cost of that is about $132 million each 

year. The fiscal year 2015 budget request actually goes further in 

terms of completing the infrastructure work in terms of the Malcolm X Boulevard and the 295 access road. So those are important 

investments that we need to make to ensure the full viability of the 

St. Elizabeths program. 

Ms. NORTON. I realize I am over time. If I could note for the 

record, Mr. Chairman, that the original cost was to be $4.5 billion, 

but the leases, so far as we can tell, for the space now will cost $5.2 

billion over 30 years. So finishing the project would virtually pay 

for itself, rather than allowing these expensive leases to go forward. 
35 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

We have got time for a few more questions for another round. I 

was on a rant earlier because, I am not mad about this project, I 

am not upset, I am sad when I see taxpayer dollars spent in a way 

that I may not agree with. 

So, anyway, let me just ask a couple of questions. The GAO reports shows the DHS failed to conduct proper oversight over St. 

Elizabeths project. That is the fact. Specifically, DHS never consistently identified St. Es as a major acquisition program, even though 

DHS alone plans to spend almost $2 billion in taxpayer funds on 

the headquarters. So $2 billion dollars, but it is not a major acquisition program. 

Mr. Cummiskey, can you explain your rationale to Members of 

this committee why DHS failed to take the simple step of identifying St. Es as a major acquisition program? 

Mr. CUMMISKEY. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

The reason that that was the case, as I indicated in the opening 

statement, that the bulk of the funding goes to GSA. Using 2014 

and 2015 as examples, our request in fiscal year 2014 is $35 million. So comparatively it is a smaller amount than what we would 

normally see in acquisition oversight. That is not to say that we 

haven’t been overseeing our portion of it. But in the same fiscal 

year, in 2014, the $155 million that went to GSA for the construction of the next piece of this isn’t in our purview. So we are overseeing the portion that we have and making sure that there is accountability. 

As I indicated, I have issued an acquisition decision memorandum this week that, based on the GAO recommendation, going 

forward we will subject it to the same rigor as the Acquisition Review Board process does for any major acquisition, even though the 

dollar figures tend to be smaller comparatively to what we usually 

would consider. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Thank you. 

We toured the facility last year, Members of the committee did. 

I looked at it from the eyes of a developer, as I have renovated and 

developed property in my private-sector life. So, Mr. Dong, I understand some of the challenges of taking an existing building and developing it for a 21st Century business practice or use. Could you 

explain the enormity of the challenge with this historic preservation and why did DHS and GSA proceed knowing the huge challenge that lay ahead of them instead of picking a more manageable 

site? 

Mr. DONG. When we were considering the question of site selection we considered a number of factors that focused on the ability 

to support DHS, its mission, and its operational requirements. We 

looked at having a site that was large enough to support the magnitude of employees that would be consolidated from across the National Capital Region into that site. We looked at a site that would 

be able to accommodate level 5 security. We also wanted a site that 

had proximity to the White House and to the Congress. We also 

wanted a site that had access to transportation and major roadways. 
36 

* The information has been retained in committee files and is available at http:// 

homeland.house.gov/press-release/duncan-releases-majority-staff-report-efficiency-constructiondhs-s-new-headquarters. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Proximity to the White House, is that what I heard 

you say? 

Mr. DONG. Being able to be close to Washington, to the center 

Washington. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Wow. If you needed to get to the White House rapidly, even driving with security and lights flashing and all that 

from that site to the White House it is going to take you a while. 

Probably going to get in a helicopter a lot quicker to get to the 

White House. 

So having that dynamic in play, site selection, looking at a vacant tract of land in Virginia and starting from scratch probably 

would have made just as much sense, because you are still going 

to have to get in a helicopter and fly to the White House for a rapid 

face-to-face. 

Wow. Okay. So I am thinking about the next question. I am 

going to just stop right there. 

Mr. Barber, do you have any further questions? 

Mr. BARBER. No. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit 

to the record the Majority staff committee report from January 

2014 on the rising cost and delays in construction of new DHS 

Headquarters at St. Elizabeths. 

No objection, so ordered.* 

I want to thank the panelists for being here. I want to thank the 

committee. This is an issue that is going to be here. We have put 

some slides up, I think, of what the site looked like. I think we 

have delved into the GAO report. I am going to ask the committee 

to read the report. I want to commend the GAO for its efforts in 

putting that together. I thank the staff for delving through this and 

really staying on top of this. 

I want to urge the Department, Mr. Cummiskey, to continue 

with acquisition reform management. Hopefully, we can get the 

Senate to pass a bill that will give us some more tools, tools for 

you and tools for us. We want to work in concert with you to make 

sure we are effective on spending taxpayer dollars, make sure that 

we have the appropriate oversight, and to make sure that we are 

accountable. 

Mr. Schneider had a letter, former Bush administrator or appointee. But, you know what, he is not accountable to the taxpayers. It is easy to sit on the sideline and say, you can do this 

or you could do that better or this is why this necessary. But when 

you were accountable to the taxpayer and the voters, then it is a 

little different on this side of the fence. I think we are doing the 

appropriate oversight and I think that is what this committee was 

designed to do. I want to thank the committee for their efforts. 

I really do hate that we ended our work in the House yesterday 

and that many Members left, because I think we had a lot of Members that were interested in this hearing, but they also have some 

things to do back home. Mr. Hudson from North Carolina would 

have been here this morning, but he is at the doctor not feeling 

well. So we wish him a speedy recovery. 
37 

Thank you, gentlemen. Committee Members may have some additional questions for you, and those will be submitted. We ask that 

you will provide the answers to us and respond to those in writing. 

So without objection, the subcommittee will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(39) 

1GAO, Federal Real Property: DHS and GSA Need to Strengthen the Management of DHS 

Headquarters Consolidation, GAO–14–648 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2014). 2See leading practices at: GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices 

for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO–09–3SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 2, 

2009) and GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, GAO–12–120G 

(Washington, DC: May 2012). The methodology outlined in these guides is a compilation of best 

practices that Federal estimating organizations and industry use to develop and maintain reliable cost and schedule estimates throughout the life of a Government acquisition program. The 

leading practices were developed in conjunction with Government and industry experts in the 

estimating community. By default, these guides also serve as guiding principles for our auditors 

to evaluate the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of Government programs. 3GAO–14–648. 

4GAO–14–648. 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN FOR DAVID C. MAURER

Question 1a. The GAO report notes that the St. Elizabeths cost estimate was overly optimistic and the schedule is unreliable. 

Do you think it’s appropriate for Congress to appropriate funds for St. Elizabeths 

without credible and reliable information on how many taxpayer dollars will be ultimately spent on the project? 

Answer. High-quality, reliable cost and schedule estimates are critical to the success of a major program such as the consolidation project at St. Elizabeths. Such 

estimates provide the basis for informed investment decision making, realistic budget formulation and program resourcing, meaningful progress measurement, 

proactive course correction when warranted, accountability for results, and for the 

expenditure of taxpayer dollars. We recommended in September 2014 that Congress 

consider making future funding for the St. Elizabeths project contingent upon the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and General Services Administration 

(GSA) developing a revised headquarters consolidation plan that includes the development and submission of reliable cost and schedule estimates, among other 

things.1 We found that DHS and GSA cost and schedule estimates for the headquarters consolidation project at St. Elizabeths do not or only minimally or partially 

conform with leading estimating practices, and are therefore unreliable.2 For example, we found that the 2013 cost estimate—the most recent available—was not regularly updated to reflect significant changes to the program including actual costs 

and did not include an independent estimate. In addition, we found that the 2008 

and 2013 schedule estimates did not include all activities for both the Government 

and its contractors necessary to accomplish the project’s objectives.3

Question 1b. Did DHS and GSA simply lack the expertise to accurately assess the 

costs and schedule or was the plan to downplay the cost and schedule risks of St. 

Elizabeths to ensure the project moved forward? 

Answer. We believe that DHS and GSA officials have the capability to implement 

our September 2014 recommendation to develop more reliable cost and schedule estimates for the remaining portions of the St. Elizabeths project that conform to GSA 

guidance and leading practices.4 DHS and GSA concurred with this recommendation, which also stated that the estimates should be revised before moving forward 

with additional funding requests for the DHS Headquarters consolidation project. 

Until DHS and GSA develop reliable cost and schedule estimates, the project is at 

greater risk of potential cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. 

Question 2a. DHS clearly disagreed with GAO’s criteria for leading practices in 

capital planning and cost and schedule estimating used to evaluate the management 

of St. Elizabeths. 

Please explain why these leading practices are applicable to DHS and GSA. 

Answer. The $4.5 billion construction project at St. Elizabeths, in conjunction with 

the larger effort to consolidate DHS Headquarters personnel in the Washington, DC 
40 

5GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making, GAO/AIMD–99–32 

(Washington, DC: December 1998). To produce this guide, we conducted extensive research to 

identify leading practices in capital decision making used by State and local governments and 

private-sector organizations. Specifically, based on interviews and documentation obtained from 

site visits to leading organizations, we identified innovative practices used by individual organizations as well as approaches and elements that were common across organizations. The leading 

organizations in our study reviewed a draft of this guide and verified that the case study examples are an accurate representation of their practices. 6See for example GAO, Architect of the Capitol: Incorporating All Leading Practices Could Improve Accuracy and Credibility of Projects’ Cost Estimates, GAO–14–333 (Washington, DC: Mar. 

25, 2014); VA Construction: VA Is Working to Improve Initial Project Cost Estimates, but Should 

Analyze Cost and Schedule Risks, GAO–10–189 (Washington, DC: Dec. 14, 2009); and Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: New Plutonium Research Facility at Los Alamos May Not 

Meet All Mission Needs, GAO–12–337 (Washington, DC: Mar. 26, 2012). 7See GSA Order 4210.1: CFO P Cost Estimation Policy Handbook, June 27, 2007. The GSA 

Chief Financial Officer initiated this cost estimation policy in response to a GAO recommendation contained in GAO, Telecommunications: GSA Has Accumulated Adequate Funding for Transition to New Contracts, but Needs Cost Estimation Policy, GAO–07–268 (Washington, DC: Feb. 

23, 2007). Specifically, GSA concurred with a recommendation to establish a policy for cost estimation efforts that reflects leading practices by requiring that estimates be: Comprehensive, 

well-documented, accurate, and validated. 8See for example GAO, Checked Baggage Screening: TSA Has Deployed Optimal Systems at 

the Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost Estimates, GAO–12–266 

(Washington, DC: April 27, 2012). 9GAO–14–648. 

10GAO–14–648. 

area, is a major capital project that requires sound capital planning and reliable 

cost and schedule estimating by DHS and GSA. Congress, the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB), and GAO have all identified the need for effective capital decision making among Federal agencies. GAO developed its Executive Guide: Leading 

Practices in Capital Decision-Making to provide detailed guidance to Federal agencies on leading practices for the four phases of capital programming—planning, 

budgeting, acquiring, and managing capital assets—assets such as the development 

of the St. Elizabeths campus. These practices are, in part, intended to provide a disciplined approach or process to help Federal agencies effectively plan and procure 

assets to achieve the maximum return on investment.5

In addition, we have applied our leading cost and schedule estimation practices 

in past work involving Federal construction projects similar to the St. Elizabeths 

project at other Federal agencies.6 The leading practices were developed in conjunction with numerous stakeholders from Government and the private sector, including 

DHS and GSA. Furthermore, GSA acknowledged the value of our leading cost estimation practices in 2007 and issued an order to apply the principles to all cost estimates prepared in every GSA project, process, or organization.7 DHS has also applied the leading practices as guidelines for assessing its own programs.8 We concluded that developing cost and schedule estimates consistent with leading practices 

could promote greater transparency and provide decision makers needed information about the St. Elizabeths project and the larger DHS Headquarters consolidation 

effort.9

Question 2b. Why does DHS and GSA think that Government-wide leading practices should not apply to St. Elizabeths? 

Answer. DHS and GSA agreed with our September 2014 recommendations on the 

importance of conforming with Government-wide leading practices throughout future phases of the St. Elizabeths project.10 However, in its formal comments on the 

report DHS expressed concern that the report was overly focused on ‘‘leading practices’’ as opposed to being more outcome- and results-oriented. We believe that applying the Government-wide leading practices on capital decision making and cost/ 

schedule estimation cited in our report would better position DHS and GSA to manage the St. Elizabeths project and help ensure better outcomes and results. DHS 

also stated that GSA, in concert with DHS, has already conducted sufficient analysis to support the leading practices in our report. We disagree, and as we noted 

in the report, cost, and schedule estimates for the project were deficient in several 

areas, including comprehensiveness, accuracy, and credibility. 

In its formal comments on the draft report, GSA stated that several of the leading 

practices we identified are better-suited to non-real estate investments such as 

weapons systems, spacecraft, aircraft carriers, and software systems. We disagree 

with this as well. As stated in our report and noted above, we have applied our leading cost and schedule estimation practices in past work involving Federal construction projects, and the leading practices were developed in conjunction with numerous stakeholders from Government and the private sector including DHS and 
41 

11GAO–14–648. 12OMB, Capital Programming Guide, Supplement to OMB Circular A–11, (Washington, DC: 

July 2014) and GAO–09–3SP. 

GSA.11 In addition, OMB’s Capital Programming Guide, a supplement to OMB Circular A–11, states that Federal agencies must develop sound cost estimates based 

on the GAO Cost-Estimating Guide.12

QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN FOR CHRIS CUMMISKEY

Question. The GAO report says that ‘‘DHS and GSA have not conducted a comprehensive assessment of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and 

prioritized alternatives.’’ 

With the time frame for completion of 2026 and price tag of $4.5 billion at a minimum, it seems based on GAO’s work that St. Elizabeths, as originally envisioned, 

is unachievable. What is DHS’s back-up plan? What are DHS and GSA considering 

to get this project back on track and save taxpayer dollars? 

Answer. With the updated Consolidation Plan currently under review by the administration, DHS and GSA are identifying opportunities to reduce both scope and 

projected cost in recognition of the changing workplace design standards, the constrained Federal budget environment, and the administration’s commitment to reduce the Federal real property portfolio through the ‘‘Freeze the Footprint’’ initiative. 

All of the work funded by the Congress and completed to date has been delivered 

on-time and on-budget. There have been no cost over-runs for funded construction. 

The General Services Administration (GSA) was required to de-scope certain portions of funded construction contracts to create sufficient capital to complete critical 

infrastructure that was not funded in 2011 and 2012 to support Phase I occupancy. 

These actions were fully coordinated and the operational impacts were mitigated 

through a cooperative effort among GSA and the DHS/United States Coast Guard 

(USCG) team. 

From the Master Plan development up though the completion of Phase I, the Department prohibited requirements changes to allow GSA to effectively manage cost, 

schedule, and performance. 

In their recent testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) acknowledged that while the program did not 

adhere to their ‘‘Leading Practices,’’ published in 1998, the Phase I performance was 

‘‘effective.’’ 

Another step taken to further maximize consolidation is the GSA and DHS collaboration to update the Headquarters Consolidation Plan to address the on-going 

changes in workplace design and flexible workplace strategies. The DHS Office of 

the Chief Readiness Support Officer, which manages DHS real property requirements, adopted these strategies and executed a pilot to reduce their office space by 

50%, saving over $1 million annually in rent. The lessons learned from this pilot 

are being implemented as we consolidate space across the country. We anticipate 

that our final Headquarters Consolidation Plan will significantly reduce space requirements and accommodate more employees than the original plan through the 

use of flexible workplace strategies. The plan is currently under administration review and will be shared with Congress no later than the submission of the President’s fiscal year 2016 budget. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR CHRIS CUMMISKEY

Question 1. How many locations does the Department occupy in the National Capital Region, and how much of this office space is Federally-owned as opposed to 

being commercially leased? 

Answer. The Department occupies 50 HQ locations in the National Capital Region, including 6 Federally-owned and 44 leased locations as of November 1, 2014. 

Question 2. What will GSA and DHS do with the Federally-owned space at the 

current facility on Nebraska Avenue if the Department vacates it? 

Answer. GSA and DHS are planning to continue utilizing this property as part 

of the Headquarters Consolidation effort. Significant investments have been funded 

by Congress to improve the infrastructure of the NAC. In addition, several buildings 

have been renovated, including special space construction for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). 

Accordingly, our plan seeks to continue to leverage the benefits of occupying Federal space for long-term mission specific needs at lower total ownership costs over 

leasing. 
42 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN FOR NORMAN DONG

Question 1. The GAO report says that ‘‘DHS and GSA have not conducted a comprehensive assessment of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and 

prioritized alternatives.’’ 

With the time frame for completion of 2026 and price tag of $4.5 billion at a minimum, it seems based on GAO’s work that St. Elizabeths, as originally envisioned, 

is unachievable. What is DHS’s back-up plan? What are DHS and GSA considering 

to get this project back on track and save taxpayer dollars? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the General Services 

Administration (GSA) are working together to consolidate the FDA at the Government-owned White Oak site in Montgomery County, Maryland. Are there lessons 

learned from GSA’s White Oak experience that can be applied to the St. Elizabeths 

campus? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. To what extent has GSA thoughtfully considered exploring public-private partnerships to help complete/fund the St. Elizabeths campus? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4a. GSA has authorities under Section 585 for lease-to-own agreements 

and under Section 412 for grand lease/lease back agreements. The authorities are 

hardly ever used especially in recent years. 

To what extent has GSA considered using Section 585 and 412 authorities at St. 

Elizabeths? Are there disincentives for using these authorities? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4b. Do you support changing the budget scoring rules to allow for longterm investments in Federal real estate? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR NORMAN DONG

Question. GSA uses the Automated Prospectus System, or TAPS analysis to make 

decisions regarding leasing and options for new construction. However, both DHS 

and GSA have acknowledged that TAPS is not best-suited for the headquarters consolidation. 

What other types of analysis have been conducted to make a business case for the 

new consolidation plan that DHS and GSA are developing, and what did the analysis indicate? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

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