J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

QURON MCLEAN 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1659 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003636-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

QURON MCLEAN 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1660 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003637-2020

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JUNE 21, 2022

In these related appeals, Appellant Quron McLean appeals from the 

judgments of sentence entered following his convictions at trial court dockets

CP-51-CR-0003636-2020 (3636-2020) and CP-51-CR-0003637-2020 (3637-

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 2 -

2020). Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

failed to consider mitigating factors and imposed an excessive sentence. We 

affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of 

these cases as follows:

[Appellant] was arrested on April 8, 2020, following an altercation

between himself and Kenya Anderson [(Complainant)]. 

Specifically, on April 2, 2020, [Appellant] went to the home of 

Complainant, where she lives with the two sons she shares with 

[Appellant], a five-year-old, and [a] two-year-old [(S.M.)].

[Appellant] and Complainant began arguing about things 

Complainant saw on [Appellant’s] cell phone and about money 

[Appellant] owed her. During this argument, [Appellant] hit 

Complainant in the chest with a closed fist. Complainant then told 

their five-year-old son to call the police. [Appellant] continued 

pushing, shoving, and punching Complainant. Complainant

attempted to restrain [Appellant] until the police arrived, but 

[Appellant] freed himself and began breaking items in her home, 

including the microwave, coffee table, and television. S.M. ran

towards [Appellant], [and Appellant] pushed S.M. away, and S.M. 

cut his foot on a piece of broken glass. [Appellant] then fled the 

home. 

On June 29, 2021, [Appellant] entered an open guilty plea to the 

following charges on docket [3636-2020]: criminal mischief as a 

summary offense, terroristic threats as a misdemeanor in the first 

degree, simple assault as a misdemeanor in the second degree, 

and recklessly endangering another person [(REAP)], as a 

misdemeanor in the second degree.[1] [Appellant] also entered 

an open guilty plea to the charge of endangering the welfare of a 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3304(a)(4), 2706(a)(1), 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 3 -

child [(EWOC)],

[2] as a felony in the third degree on docket [3637-

2020].

[3]

[Appellant] requested, and the Commonwealth agreed, to waive 

a presentence investigation and report and proceed directly to 

sentencing on both dockets at that hearing.

Trial Ct. Op., 9/27/21, at 1-2 (formatting altered). 

At docket 3636-2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of 

eighteen to thirty-six months of incarceration, followed by two years of 

probation for terroristic threats, and a term of twelve to twenty-four months 

of incarceration for simple assault. N.T., 6/29/21, at 37. The trial court 

imposed no further penalty with respect to REAP and criminal mischief. Id. 

At docket 3637-2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of eighteen 

to thirty-six months of incarceration, followed by two years of probation for 

EWOC. Id. at 38-39. The trial court ordered the sentences at both dockets 

to run concurrently resulting in an aggregate sentence of eighteen to thirtysix months of incarceration, followed by two years of probation. Id. at 40-41.

Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions that the trial court denied

on July 12, 2021. On August 9, 2021, Appellant filed timely notices of appeal

at trial court dockets 3636-2020 and 3637-2020. Both the trial court and 

Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).

3 A charge of persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a), was 

charged initially and then nolle prossed after Complainant admitted that she 

lied to police about Appellant possessing a firearm. Trial Ct. Op., 9/27/21, at 

5.
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 4 -

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Is the sentence imposed unduly harsh and excessive under the 

circumstances of this case?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.4

Appellant’s issue presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (“A challenge to an alleged excessive sentence is a challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence.”). It is well settled that

[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s 

jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question 

that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some 

citations omitted and formatting altered). “A substantial question exists only 

when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

____________________________________________

4

In these related cases, although Appellant filed separate notices of appeal 

and separate appellate briefs, the briefs are nearly identical. Appellant 

presented the same issue in each brief, and the issue and corresponding 

argument appear on the same pages in each brief. Accordingly, we refer to 

Appellant’s brief in the singular.
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 5 -

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Id. (citation omitted).

The record reveals that Appellant preserved his sentencing issues in the

post-sentence motions, filed timely appeals, and included a Pa.R.Crim.P. 

2119(f) statement in his brief. See id. In his Rule 2119(f) statement, 

Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and imposed an 

excessive sentence without considering mitigating factors and Appellant’s 

individual circumstances. Appellant’s Brief at 20.

This Court has held that an appellant’s claim that his sentence is 

excessive, in conjunction with an assertion that the trial court failed to 

consider mitigating factors, raises a substantial question for review. 

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Accordingly, we proceed to address the merits of Appellant’s issue.

We review challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing bearing 

in mind the following principles:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en 

banc) (citations omitted and formatting altered). When the trial court imposes 

a sentence that is within the Sentencing Guidelines, the appellant must 
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 6 -

demonstrate that the sentence is clearly unreasonable. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(c)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1134-35

(Pa. Super. 2009) (explaining that a sentence within the Sentencing 

Guidelines is presumed to be reasonable).

In support of his claim that the sentence was excessive and that the 

trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, Appellant contends that trial 

court did not consider Appellant’s remorse, his employment history and 

support for his family, and that no one suffered an injury requiring medical 

attention. Appellant’s Brief at 32. Further, Appellant claims that the trial 

court abused its discretion in imposing an aggravated-range sentence for 

terroristic threats. Id. at 33. Appellant notes that the trial court relied on the 

fact that Appellant’s children were present as an aggravating factor and 

imposed an aggravated-range sentence for terroristic threats. Id. On this 

basis, Appellant concludes that his criminal behavior was “essentially double 

counted” when he received an aggravated-range sentence for terroristic 

threats because he had already been charged with the separate crime of 

EWOC with respect to his child, S.M. Id.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant’s arguments are belied by 

the record. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. The Commonwealth notes that 

Appellant received one aggravated-range sentence for terroristic threats and 

standard-range sentences for simple assault and EWOC. Id. at 8-10. 

Additionally, the Commonwealth points out that the trial court did consider 

mitigating factors and ordered Appellant to serve all of the sentences 
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 7 -

concurrently. Id. at 7. The Commonwealth asserts that although Appellant 

claims that the trial court failed to consider mitigation, Appellant is, in fact,

arguing that the trial court did not weigh certain factors more heavily in his 

favor. Id. at 9. Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that there is no merit to 

Appellant’s claim that the trial court “double counted” sentencing factors. Id.

at 9-10. 

After review, we conclude that Appellant is due no relief. It is 

undisputed that on the charges of simple assault and EWOC, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant in the standard range of the Sentencing Guidelines. See

Appellant’s Brief at 24; see also N.T. 6/29/21, at 20-41; 204 Pa. Code § 

303.16(a)). Similarly, there is no dispute that on the charge of terroristic 

threats, the trial court imposed a sentence in the aggravated range.5 

As noted above, sentences that fall within the Sentencing Guidelines are

presumed to be reasonable. See Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1134-35. Moreover, 

the trial court summarized the altercation leading to the charges and explained 

as follows:

In reaching its decision to impose a sentence in the aggravated 

range for terroristic threats, this court heard argument from 

counsel for [Appellant] and [Appellant’s] allocution and considered 

[Appellant’s] positive relationships with his five children, the 

mothers of his other children, his willingness to accept 

____________________________________________

5 For Appellant’s conviction on the charge of terroristic threats, the Sentencing 

Guidelines provided a standard range minimum sentence of between six and 

sixteen months, plus or minus three months. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a). 

As stated, the trial court imposed a sentence of one and one-half to three 

years of incarceration, followed by two years of probation, resulting in a 

sentence in the aggravated range of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. 
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 8 -

responsibility, his successful employment history, and 

Complainant’s own role in the altercation and subsequent 

credibility concerns.[FN3] This court also heard argument from the 

Commonwealth and an impact statement prepared by 

Complainant and considered the continued impact of the 

altercation on Complainant and her children, the history of 

domestic violence between [Appellant] and Complainant, and 

[Appellant’s] continued contact with Complainant throughout the 

pendency of this case both himself and through family members. 

Ultimately, this court reasonably found that the presence of the 

couple’s two young children during the altercation was sufficient 

reason to impose a sentence in the aggravated range, and [the 

court] explained this decision on the record. See [N.T., 6/29/21] 

at 45-46 (“the deciding factor on whether to keep you in county 

or put you upstate is the fact that your children were there, and I

will tell you that and I will be very clear. I look at that as an 

aggravating factor”). This court’s imposition of a sentence in the 

aggravated range for this offense, based primarily on the presence

of [Appellant’s] minor children during the altercation, was 

reasonable and not a manifest abuse of discretion.

[FN3] The Commonwealth informed this court on the record 

that they would [nolle prosse] the § 6105 charge because

Complainant admitted that she lied when she informed 

police that Defendant had a firearm. [N.T., 6/29/21] at 9.

Trial Ct. Op., 9/27/21, at 5-6 (some formatting altered). Additionally, the trial 

court reiterated that it imposed standard-range sentences for EWOC and 

simple assault, see N.T., 6/29/21, at 36-37, and it concluded that Appellant 

failed to identify any basis for finding that the standard-range sentences in 

this case were unreasonable. Trial Ct. Op., 9/27/21, at 5-7.

Contrary to Appellant’s claims of error, the trial court clearly considered 

Appellant’s apology, along with Appellant’s family responsibilities and 

employment history, in addition to Complainant’s credibility. The trial court 

then balanced those factors with Appellant’s criminal history, history of 
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 9 -

domestic violence, and the facts of the crimes, which included that these 

events occurred in the presence of Appellant’s and Complainant’s children. 

See id.; see also N.T., 6/29/21, at 36-37. On this record, we conclude that 

the trial court considered the relevant mitigating factors and aptly provided 

its rationale for Appellant’s sentences. Additionally, we agree with the trial 

court that aside from Appellant’s boilerplate allegation that the trial court 

failed to consider mitigation, Appellant has failed to establish that the 

sentences were unreasonable. Rather, we agree with the Commonwealth’s 

conclusion that the crux of Appellant’s argument is that the trial court did not 

weigh certain factors more heavily in Appellant’s favor. See Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 9. However, the trial court was not required to afford the mitigating 

factors as much weight as Appellant would have liked. See Commonwealth 

v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009). Additionally, this Court will 

not “re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of 

the sentencing court.” Id.

Regarding Appellant’s claim that the trial court “double counted” S.M.’s 

presence as a sentencing factor, the assertion is meritless. Generally, the trial 

court may not “double count” factors already considered by the Sentencing 

Guidelines. Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 732 (Pa. Super. 

2000). However, the court must consider both the particular circumstances 

of the offense and the defendant’s character. Commonwealth v. Moury, 

992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010). Courts are permitted to use prior 

criminal history and factors included in the guidelines to supplement other 
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 10 -

sentencing information. Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 

(Pa. Super. 2006). Here, aside from a bald allegation, Appellant provides no 

argument or authority for his contention that the children’s presence was 

“double counted” as a sentencing factor. As recited above, Appellant was 

charged with and pleaded guilty to separate crimes at separate dockets 

including where one of his children, S.M., was the victim of EWOC, and 

Complainant was the victim of terroristic threats. The trial court sentenced 

Appellant separately on these crimes and concluded that because Appellant 

made terroristic threats while S.M. was present and directed these threats to 

Complainant, who is S.M.’s mother, the child’s presence was an aggravating 

factor on the terroristic threats count. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/27/21, at 5-6; see 

also N.T., 6/29/21, at 36-37. We conclude that there was no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court imposing an aggravated-range sentence for 

terroristic threats in addition to sentencing Appellant on the separate charge 

of EWOC. Appellant’s claim of “double counting” is meritless. 

For the reasons set forth above, Appellant is entitled to no relief. The 

record reflects that the trial court considered the Sentencing Guidelines, 

appropriate sentencing factors, circumstances of the crimes, and mitigating 

evidence. See N.T., 6/29/21, at 36-37. The trial court also ordered that 

Appellant’s sentences were to be served concurrently. Id. at 40. Additionally, 

the trial court provided its considerations and rationale for the sentences, and 

it thoroughly explained its reasoning for imposing an aggravated-range 

sentence for terroristic threats. See id. at 36-40; see also Trial Ct. Op., 
J-A09010-22

J-A09011-22

- 11 -

9/27/21, at 5-6. On this record, we conclude that there was no abuse of 

discretion in the sentences imposed. See Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/21/2022