IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 56734-2-II

Respondent,

v.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

DEAN ERVIN PHILLIPS, 

Appellant.

PRICE, J. — Dean E. Phillips appeals his conviction for second degree extortion. Phillips 

argues his charging documents were defective because they did not include all of the essential

elements of the crime. Phillips also argues the State committed several acts of prosecutorial 

misconduct. Phillips raises additional grounds for review in a statement of additional grounds

(SAG). 

The State responds that the charging documents included all of the necessary elements, but 

concedes that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct and that Phillips should receive 

a new trial. 

We hold that the State’s charging documents were not defective. We also determine that 

Phillips is not entitled to any relief based on his SAG. However, we accept the State’s concession 

regarding prosecutorial misconduct, reverse the conviction, and remand for a new trial.

1

 

 

1 Phillips represented himself throughout his trial. He asserts error to this pro se representation, 

alleging he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. He also 

challenges the imposition of community custody supervision fees. Because Phillips’ attorney 

status and any potential payment of community custody supervision fees will be addressed on 

remand at a new trial, we do not reach these issues. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

June 21, 2023
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FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2021, Phillips was pulled over by Sergeant Patricia Finch2for having expired 

tabs on his car. Phillips did not initially provide Sergeant Finch with his name or driver’s license. 

Sergeant Finch requested additional units to the scene, and around the time additional officers 

arrived, Phillips provided Sergeant Finch with his passport. Using the passport, Sergeant Finch 

determined Phillips was driving with a suspended license. When informed that he was under 

arrest, Phillips refused to leave his car. Phillips was physically removed from the car and arrested

for driving with a suspended license and obstructing a law enforcement officer. 

A few weeks later, Sergeant Finch received two letters from Phillips, accusing Finch of 

committing crimes against him. The second letter, dated April 12, 2021, stated that Sergeant Finch 

could “cure [the] claim by paying [Phillips] five hundred thousand dollars,” and gave Sergeant 

Finch three days to respond to the letter. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 99. 

Sergeant Finch reported the letters to her superiors. As a result of an investigation by 

Detective Timothy O’Dell, Phillips was arrested for a second time and charged with second degree 

extortion. 

II. PHILLIPS’ CHALLENGE TO CHARGING DOCUMENTS

On October 26, 2021, Phillips, representing himself pro se, alleged that the State’s charging 

documents failed to adequately identify the conduct that constituted a wrongful threat. Phillips 

claimed the charging documents were vague and his only threat was one of litigation. 

 

2 Sergeant Finch worked for the City of Centralia Police Department.
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On November 24, 2021, the State filed an amended information.3 In this amended 

information, the State charged Phillips with second degree extortion based on RCW 9A.56.130. 

The amended information stated, 

On or about and between the 25th day of March, 2021 through the 16th day of 

April, 2021, . . . the above-named defendant, by means of a threat to accuse any 

person to wit: Office[r] Patricia Finch, of a crime, or cause criminal charges to be 

instituted against said person, and/or to do any other act which is intended to harm 

substantially the person threatened with respect to her financial condition, did 

knowingly attempt to obtain or did obtain property or services from the owner 

thereof[.]

CP at 50. 

III. PHILLIPS’ TRIAL 

The case proceeded to a jury trial with Phillips continuing to represent himself pro se. 

A. STATE’S OPENING STATEMENT

During opening statements, the State began by discussing Phillips’ traffic stop. The 

prosecutor described Sergeant Finch as “a mother, a wife. Just doing her job.” Verbatim Rep. of 

Proc. (VRP) (Dec. 2, 2021) at 117. Phillips did not object to this statement. 

B. DETECTIVE O’DELL’S TESTIMONY

The State called Detective O’Dell to testify. The prosecutor asked Detective O’Dell 

questions about Phillips’ letters to Sergeant Finch and what Detective O’Dell gleaned from the 

letters: 

 

3 The November 24, 2021, document was entitled “Second Amended Information.” CP at 50. 

Although two previous informations were filed (the initial “Information” filed on April 19, 2021 

(CP at 1), and an “Amended Information” filed on May 7, 2021 (CP at 7)), Phillips appears to 

focus his argument on the Second Amended Information. 
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Q. Okay. Let’s a take a look at Exhibit No. 2; now, is there anything in that letter 

that causes you concern as well?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Tell me what.

A. Based on the account that she gave me and then my review of the letter, there 

appeared to be a pretty clear, what we’d call an “extortion” in the letter.

Q. All right. And let me put that on the screen --

MR. PHILLIPS: I object to the last comment, by the way.

THE COURT: Objection is overruled.

VRP (Dec. 2, 2021) at 141. The prosecutor continued, asking Detective O’Dell questions about 

his conclusions after conversing with Sergeant Finch:

Q. And in your discussions with Patricia Finch, what conclusions did you reach?

A. The letter appeared to be an extortion of Sergeant Finch.

MR. PHILLIPS: Objection. Making legal determinations.

THE COURT: I’ll sustain that objection.

MR. PHILLIPS: Okay.

Q. What was the extortion part of this?

A. The extortion part would be if you don’t pay X amount of dollars, you will be 

charged with the crimes that were listed. 

Q. Or accused of a crime, correct?

A. Correct. Accused.

VRP (Dec. 2, 2021) at 143. 

C. EXCLUSION OF MEDICAL RECORDS

Phillips testified in his own defense. During his direct examination, Phillips attempted to 

enter into evidence medical records from his time in custody after his extortion arrest. Phillips 

was type 1 diabetic, and the jail records included Phillips’ blood glucose levels during his time in 
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custody. The records showed that Phillips’ blood glucose levels (milligrams per deciliter) while 

he was in jail were in the high 100’s four times, over 200 eleven times, and over 300 sixteen times. 

The prosecutor objected to the admission of the jail medical records, arguing that they were 

not relevant to Phillips’ original traffic stop for expired tabs. Phillips responded that a previous 

arrest had caused a diabetic emergency and that law enforcement should have been aware of it. 

Phillips claimed the jail medical records were evidence he was diabetic and his life was in danger 

whenever he was in custody, which were justifications for his letters to Sergeant Finch. The trial 

court determined the evidence was not relevant and denied admission of the jail medical records. 

Without the benefit of jail medical records, Phillips continued with his testimony and 

explained to the jury that a normal blood glucose is 100 milligrams per deciliter. He then claimed 

that when he is in custody, his blood glucose would rise to over double and triple normal levels. 

Phillips expressed to the jury that going into custody put his life in danger and that he wrote letters 

to Sergeant Finch because he wanted to “create a dialogue” to avoid that risk to his life. VRP 

(Dec. 3, 2021) at 211. 

D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 

Following testimony, the trial court and the parties discussed jury instructions. The trial 

court adopted the State’s proposed jury instruction 5, which discussed the elements for a second 

degree extortion conviction. It stated: 

To convict the defendant of the crime of extortion in the second degree, each of the 

following three elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 

(1) That on or about and in between March 25, 2021 and April 16, 2021, the 

defendant knowingly obtained or attempted to obtain property or services of 

another by a wrongful threat;
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(2) That such threat communicated, directly or indirectly, an intent

 (a) to accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted 

against any person or

 (b) to do any act that is intended to harm substantially the person threatened or 

another with respect to her financial condition;

and

(3) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington.

CP at 68 (emphasis added). 

E. CLOSING ARGUMENTS AND VERDICT

During the State’s closing arguments, the State raised the issue of Phillips’ alleged diabetes 

and the lack of evidence about any medical issues while in custody. The prosecutor argued: 

He wants you to believe, oh, poor me, I get put in jail, my diabetes acts up, and I'm 

in danger because they put me in jail; therefore, they should just let me go.

That’s not how it works. The jail has doctors. We have no evidence from the 

defense that, you know, he had -- we don't have anything medical from him; there’s 

no doctors’ reports, anything like that to substantiate that.

VRP (Dec. 3, 2021) at 257-58 (emphasis added). Phillips, still acting pro se, did not object to this 

statement. 

The jury found Phillips guilty of second degree extortion. Phillips appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. “WRONGFUL” ELEMENT INCLUDED IN CHARGING DOCUMENTS

Phillips argues that the State’s amended information was insufficient because it did not 

include the essential element that Phillips had made a wrongful threat. We disagree. 

Under the Sixth Amendment and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution, 

charging documents must include all of the essential elements of the charged crime. State v. Pry, 

194 Wn.2d 745, 751, 452 P.3d 536 (2019). “ ‘An essential element is one whose specification is 
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necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior charged.’ ” State v. Zillyette, 178 Wn.2d 

153, 158, 307 P.3d 712 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ward,

148 Wn.2d 803, 811, 64 P.3d 640 (2003)). The purpose of including all essential elements in the 

charging documents is to inform the defendant of the nature of the alleged crime and to allow them 

to prepare their case. Id. at 158-59. 

The standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of a charging document depends 

on the timing of the challenge. State v. Ralph, 85 Wn. App. 82, 84, 930 P.2d 1235 (1997). When 

a defendant challenged the sufficiency of the information at or before his trial, we construe the 

language of the charging document strictly. State v. Phillips, 98 Wn. App. 936, 940, 991 P.2d 

1195 (2000). But if the defendant moved to dismiss based on the charging document being 

insufficient after the State could no longer amend the information, we construe the information 

liberally in favor of validity. Id. at 940, 942-43. If a charging document is determined to be 

constitutionally defective, “[t]he proper remedy . . . is dismissal without prejudice to the State 

refiling the information.” State v. Simon, 120 Wn.2d 196, 199, 840 P.2d 172 (1992).

The crime of extortion in the second degree requires the defendant to have committed 

“extortion by means of a wrongful threat as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(28) (d) through (j).”

RCW 9A.56.130. These “wrongful threats” are communications of the intent to:

(d) [] accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against

any person; or

. . . .

(j) [] do any other act which is intended to harm substantially the person threatened 

or another with respect to his or her health, safety, business, financial condition, or 

personal relationships[.]

RCW 9A.04.110(28)(d), (j). 
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Phillips claims he challenged the amended information as failing to include the element of 

a wrongful threat to the trial court. Assuming his challenge to the trial court was sufficient to 

support strict construction of the amended information,4 Phillips’ challenge still fails. 

The amended information stated that Phillips “threat[ened] to accuse any person . . . of a 

crime, or cause criminal charges to be instituted against said person, and/or [acted with intent] to 

harm substantially the person threatened with respect to her financial condition[.]” CP at 50 

(emphasis added). Although the amended information did not specifically include the words 

“wrongful threat,” it explicitly included the examples of threats listed as “wrongful” in the second 

degree extortion statute. And these were the exact wrongful threats alleged at Phillips’ trial. 

Moreover, jury instruction 5 mirrored the language of the amended information by 

instructing that Phillips’ wrongful threat must have threatened to accuse Sergeant Finch of a crime 

or to act with intent to harm her financial condition. By including that language, the amended 

information fully informed Phillips of the nature of the crime with which he was charged. Because 

the amended information contained the specific ways that Phillips’ threat was alleged to be 

wrongful, Phillips’ claim fails. 

II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Phillips argues that multiple acts by the State at his trial constitute prosecutorial 

misconduct. He points to (1) the exclusion of the jail medical records and subsequent assertion at 

 

4 Phillips emphasizes that he made several different pro se challenges to the charging documents 

before the trial court, but none was clearly based on the argument he makes on appeal—the absence 

of the element of a wrongful threat. Nevertheless, because the State does not directly challenge 

whether Phillips’ arguments below raised the same issue he argues on appeal, we do not further 

address it. 
No. 56734-2-II

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closing argument that Phillips did not have medical evidence to support his arguments, (2) the 

questioning of Detective O’Dell, and (3) the arguably irrelevant characterization of Sergeant 

Finch.

5

 The State concedes that each of these instances was improper and that Phillips should 

receive a new trial as a result. We accept the State’s concession and remand for a new trial. 

A. PROSECUTOR’S ACTIONS WERE IMPROPER

The defendant has the burden to show the prosecutor’s conduct was both improper and 

prejudicial in the context of the entire record and the circumstances at trial. State v. Thorgerson, 

172 Wn.2d 438, 442, 258 P.3d 43 (2011). Addressing the three alleged instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct in turn, we first determine whether they were improper prior to addressing the issue 

of prejudice. 

1. Exclusion of Medical Records and Subsequent Closing Argument

Phillips argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by arguing during closing 

that Phillips’ claims about his medical issues in custody were unsubstantiated by any evidence

when the State had previously succeeded in getting Phillips’ jail medical records excluded from 

trial. The State concedes that the prosecutor’s argument in closing was improper. And we agree.

Here, Phillips claimed he suffered medical complications from his diabetes when he had 

previously been in custody prior to his arrest by Sergeant Finch. Phillips alleged that his fear of 

 

5 Phillips also identifies another instance he alleges was prosecutorial misconduct—related to jury 

instruction 8. During trial, Sergeant Finch testified that she arrested Phillips because he committed 

a misdemeanor by failing to identify himself during the traffic stop. The State proposed, and the 

trial court gave, jury instruction 8 related to this issue. The State now concedes the jury instruction 

was inaccurate. But even if the jury instruction 8 was inaccurate and improper, Phillips does not 

explain how this supports an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct when it was the trial court’s

instruction, not the prosecutor’s. See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 

809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (this court will not consider issues that are not supported by argument).
No. 56734-2-II

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suffering further medical complications was the reason that he decided to write his letters to 

Sergeant Finch. Phillips attempted to introduce jail medical records showing that when he was in 

custody, his blood sugar was regularly elevated to over two and three times normal, healthy levels. 

The prosecutor successfully persuaded the trial court to exclude these jail medical records. 

But then, during closing arguments, the prosecutor cast doubt on Phillips’ assertions that 

he experiences medical complications from his diabetes while in custody. Notwithstanding the 

existence of the excluded jail medical records that, at least arguably, supported Phillips’ 

arguments, the prosecutor stated, 

He wants you to believe, oh, poor me, I get put in jail, my diabetes acts up, and I'm 

in danger because they put me in jail; therefore, they should just let me go. . . . We 

have no evidence from the defense that, you know, he had -- we don't have anything 

medical from him; there's no doctors’ reports, anything like that to substantiate that.

VRP (Dec. 3, 2021) at 257-58.

As the State concedes, the prosecutor’s assertion that there was no medical evidence, in 

this context, was wholly improper. 

2. Questioning of Detective O’Dell

Phillips next argues that the prosecutor’s questioning of Detective O’Dell elicited improper 

opinion testimony. The State concedes this questioning was improper. And we agree.

Generally, a witness may not opine during testimony on the defendant’s guilt. State v. 

King, 167 Wn.2d 324, 331, 219 P.3d 642 (2009). When analyzing whether there was 

impermissible opinion testimony, we consider five factors: 

“(1) the type of witnesses involved, (2) the specific nature of the testimony, (3) the 

nature of the charges, (4) the type of defense, and (5) the other evidence before the 

trier of fact.”
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Id. at 332-33 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 928, 

155 P.3d 125 (2007)). And police officers’ testimony may carry a “ ‘special aura of reliability’ ” 

and therefore be especially prejudicial to a defendant. Id.at 331 (quoting Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 

928). 

Here, the prosecutor first asked Detective O’Dell the general question of what conclusion 

he reached after speaking to Sergeant Finch about Phillips’ letters. Detective O’Dell responded 

that the letter “appeared to be an extortion of Sergeant Finch.” VRP (Dec. 2, 2021) at 143. Phillips 

objected to Detective O’Dell’s comment, and the trial court sustained the objection. 

But rather than ending this line of questioning, the prosecutor continued on, asking, “What 

was the extortion part of this?” VRP (Dec. 2, 2021) at 143. Detective O’Dell responded that “the 

extortion part” was that Phillips threatened to accuse Sergeant Finch of crimes if she did not pay 

him the requested dollar amount. VRP (Dec. 2, 2021) at 143. 

By linking his personal conclusion of guilt to the charged crime of extortion, Detective 

O’Dell’s testimony was an improper opinion. And his law enforcement position likely gave his 

testimony a “special aura of reliability” to the jury. 

Especially given the prosecutor solicited this testimony after Phillips’ initial objection was 

sustained by the trial court, such questioning was improper.6 

3. Irrelevant Characterization of Sergeant Finch

Phillips also argues that the State committed misconduct when talking about Sergeant 

Finch during opening statements, specifically stating she was “ ‘a mother, a wife,’ ” who was 

 

6 The State concedes that this instance of improper questioning action was prejudicial and, by 

itself, warrants reversal of Phillips’ conviction. 
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“ ‘[j]ust doing her job.’ ” Br. of Appellant at 46 (quoting VRP (Dec. 2, 2021) at 117). The State 

concedes this statement was improper. And we agree.

The State cannot encourage a jury to convict a defendant based upon emotion, rather than 

the evidence presented, by appealing to the passions of the jury. State v. Berube, 171 Wn. App. 

103, 118-19, 286 P.3d 402 (2012), review denied, 178 Wn.2d 1002 (2013). “ ‘A trial in which 

irrelevant and inflammatory material is introduced, which has a natural tendency to prejudice the 

jury against the accused, is not a fair trial.’ ” Id. at 119 (quoting State v. Miles, 73 Wn.2d 67, 70, 

436 P.2d 198 (1968)).

Here, the prosecutor’s characterization of Sergeant Finch was not relevant to either her role 

as a law enforcement officer or her status as the alleged victim in this case; it was likely designed 

to appeal to the passions of the jury. As conceded by the State, this irrelevant characterization of 

Sergeant Finch was improper.

B. IMPROPER EVENTS RESULTED IN CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE

We next consider whether these three instances of improper conduct by the State unfairly 

prejudiced Phillips. Phillips argues that all these instances cumulatively prejudiced him 

sufficiently to warrant a new trial. The State concedes Phillips should receive a new trial. And 

we agree.

The standard of review to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced depends on 

whether the defendant objected to the conduct during the trial. See State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 

741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). “If the defendant objected at trial, the defendant must show that 

the prosecutor’s misconduct resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the 

jury’s verdict.” Id. 
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“If the defendant did not object at trial, the defendant is deemed to have waived any error, 

unless the prosecutor’s misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not 

have cured the resulting prejudice.” Id. at 760-61. Under this heightened standard, the defendant 

must show both that a curative instruction would not have obviated the prejudicial effect on the 

jury and the misconduct resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of impacting the 

jury’s verdict. Id. at 761. 

But even when one instance of improper conduct is not prejudicial, “the cumulative effect 

of repetitive prosecutorial misconduct may be so flagrant that no instruction or series of 

instructions could erase their combined prejudicial effect.” State v. Cook, 17 Wn. App. 2d 96, 106, 

484 P.3d 13 (2021). 

Here, Phillips did not directly object during any of the three instances of improper conduct. 

First, Phillips failed to object to the prosecutor’s improper closing argument about the absence of 

medical evidence. Second, although Phillips initially objected to the State’s improper questioning 

of Detective O’Dell about whether his letters constituted extortion, Phillips failed to object to the 

improper follow-up questions. And finally, Phillips failed to object to the improper 

characterization of Sergeant Finch.

Although the State suggests that the questioning of Detective O’Dell could, by itself, 

require a new trial, neither party provides an actual analysis of whether any one of these instances, 

in isolation, was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting 

prejudice. 

But even if these instances do not, standing alone, rise to the level of being incurable 

misconduct, collectively they do. Put together, the State’s conduct resulted in the jury (1) hearing 
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there was no medical evidence when the prosecutor knew there was, (2) hearing the opinion from 

a law enforcement officer that Phillip’s letters constituted extortion, and (3) hearing a warm, but 

irrelevant, description of the alleged victim, Sergeant Finch, designed solely to engender 

sympathy. We accept the State’s concession and hold that, cumulatively, these instances are so 

flagrant that no instruction or series of instructions could erase their combined prejudicial effect. 

We remand for a new trial. 

III. PHILLIPS’ SAG CLAIMS

Phillips asserts 19 additional grounds for review in his SAG—18 of which fail to inform 

us of the nature and occurrence of the alleged errors, including allegations related to federal 

copyright law, the First Amendment, the Second Amendment, standing for the State to bring a 

case against Phillips, and the refusal of the prosecutor to answer interrogatories. We determine 

each of those 18 grounds fails. RAP 10.10(c) (SAG claims are required to inform the court of the 

nature and occurrence of the alleged errors). 

The only potentially cognizable ground in Phillips’ SAG is an allegation that his speedy 

trial rights were violated. However, our record for review does not include any trial setting orders

or related continuance orders. Without these orders, the record is insufficient to review whether a 

violation of Phillips’ speedy trial right occurred. State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 569, 192 P.3d 

345 (2008) (the court “cannot review” claims that rely on evidence outside of the appellate record).

CONCLUSION

We hold the documents charging Phillips with second degree extortion were not defective. 

We also determine that Phillips is not entitled to relief on his SAG claims. However, we accept 
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the State’s concession that Phillips is entitled to a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, 

we reverse Phillips’ conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

PRICE, J.

We concur:

MAXA, P.J.

VELJACIC, J.