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IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE

SECOND EXTENSION: WHERE ARE THEY GOING?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 27, 2015

Serial No. 114–5

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Eric S. Edelman, distinguished fellow, Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments ............................................................................... 5

Mr. John Hannah, senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ......... 19

Mr. Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, Council on Foreign 

Relations ............................................................................................................... 25

The Honorable Robert Einhorn, senior fellow, Foreign Policy Program, The 

Brookings Institution ........................................................................................... 32

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Eric S. Edelman: Prepared statement ......................................... 8

Mr. John Hannah: Prepared statement ................................................................. 21

Mr. Ray Takeyh: Prepared statement .................................................................... 27

The Honorable Robert Einhorn: Prepared statement ........................................... 34

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 78

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 79

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Letter 

from the Hekmati family ..................................................................................... 81

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 82

(1)

IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE 

SECOND EXTENSION: WHERE ARE THEY 

GOING? 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. I will ask all the members if you could take 

your seats and this hearing will come to order. 

This morning we are looking at the prospects for reaching a viable nuclear agreement with Iran; one that increases our national 

security. This has been, and will continue to be one of the committee’s top priorities. For those of us that have worked on his issue 

for a number of years like Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and myself, Mr. 

Sherman, Mr. Engel, we remember well last year or last session. 

We presented legislation here that I and Mr. Engel authored that 

passed this committee unanimously that attempted to bring more 

pressure on Iran by giving the Ayatollah a choice between economic 

collapse or compromise on his nuclear weapons program. It passed 

here unanimously, as I mentioned, and in the floor of the House 

of Representatives, 400 to 20. 

Some would argue—certainly we believe this—that the leverage 

that we brought to bear has helped bring Iran to the table. But we 

have dealt with administrations in the past, whether Democrat or 

Republican. Mr. Sherman and I can tell you in terms of sitting 

through many of these meetings, our frustrations with the delay in 

really bringing the type of leverage and sanctions to bear on Iran 

to get the type of deal that we thought was verifiable. 

Now we have had a decade now of diplomatic negotiations over 

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology in violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions on this subject. These have reached their 

height over the past year, as the Obama administration, along with 

the UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany, have been seeking 

to negotiate a ‘‘long-term comprehensive solution’’ to Iran’s illicit 

nuclear program. During these talks, Iran has agreed to limit its 

nuclear program temporarily in return for some sanctions relief. 

A final agreement would free Iran of sanctions, which was, by 

the way, in our view at least, driven to the negotiating table by the 

previous sanctions that we had enacted here, while allowing it to 

maintain a ‘‘mutually defined enrichment program,’’ to be treated 

2

like any other ‘‘non-nuclear weapon state party to the Nonproliferation Treaty.’’ That best case would leave Iran as a threshold nuclear state. But worse, any limits placed on Iran’s nuclear program 

as part of the ‘‘comprehensive solution’’ would, of course, based on 

this agreement, expire. Maybe in 10 years, maybe sooner. But 

there is an expiration that is being discussed right now in the 

agreement. 

Negotiations, now into their second extension, appear to be stalemated. That is even after U.S. negotiators move closer and closer 

to Iranian positions. According to the administration, ‘‘big gaps’’ remain, and a senior official hinted last week that talks may extend 

again come June’s deadline. 

Meanwhile, the Ayatollah, since he is the one that makes the 

final decision here, has been advancing Iranian nuclear programs: 

Pursuing new reactors; testing a new generation of centrifuges, and 

operating Iran’s illicit procurement network. These actions clearly 

violate the spirit of the interim agreement. Yet, the administration 

appears more concerned that sanctions, designed to strengthen its 

negotiating hand, and which would have no impact, no impact, unless Iran walks away from negotiations, could sink an agreement. 

So let us be clear. If an agreement is sunk, it is because Iran has 

no interest in abandoning its drive to nuclear weapons, which is 

what many of us believe. 

Of course, Iran’s nuclear work isn’t Iran’s only provocation. While 

Iranian diplomats put on a good face in a European negotiating 

room, its IRGC, its Quds Forces, and other proxies have been busy 

working to influence and ultimately dominate the region. And this 

is what we hear from the Gulf States and from our other allies 

throughout the region. Iran is boosting Assad in Syria and 

Hezbollah continues to threaten Israel. In ’06, I watched as those 

rockets from Iran and Syria came down on Haifa. Today, there are 

100,000 such rockets, thanks to Iran’s production. And Iranian-supplied rockets to Hamas rained down recently on Israel. Frankly, 

last week, an Iranian-backed militia displaced the government in 

Yemen, something that we had heard about from the Ambassadors 

from throughout that region; their concern that the Iranians were 

going to topple that government. It was, frankly, the toppling of a 

key counterterrorism partner of ours. Most in the region see Iran 

pocketing a nuclear deal and continuing with its domination, certainly no winning game plan to stabilize the Middle East. Not to 

mention that Iran’s horrendous repression at home continues. This 

isn’t a negotiating partner that gives much confidence. 

If we are going to have any chance of a deal that advances U.S. 

national security interests, Iran’s leaders have to feel that their 

only choice is a verifiable and meaningful agreement. We are far 

from it. Worse, many in the region feel Iran is on the rise. Falling 

oil prices should strengthen our hand, but the Obama administration has yet to explain a single change as to how it will negotiate 

differently with Iran over the coming months, it raises questions. 

And while the administration reaches for a deal, it should do so understanding the regime’s duplicity and militancy. And when I say 

its militancy, the fact that the Ayatollah still leads chants of 

‘‘Death to America’’ and ‘‘Death to Israel’’ and Iran still speaks of 

Israel as ‘‘the one bomb country’’ and still speaks of its long-term 

3

confrontation with the U.S., this again gives the members pause 

who have dealt with Iran for a long period of time. 

In addition to more economic pressure, we should have an Iran 

policy with thought-provoking broadcasting to inspire Iranian dissent, a focus on its horrendous human rights abuses and illicit procurement networks, as well as bolstering allies in the region that 

face Iranian aggression. 

As one former intelligence official told the committee last year, 

‘‘Iran’s nuclear program is just the tip of a revolutionary spear that 

extends across the world and threatens key U.S. interests.’’ This is 

a regime that is playing for keeps. Yet sometimes it seems the administration is more concerned about Congress moving on sanctions than pressuring its treacherous and deadly negotiating partner that is on the other side of that table. 

We look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on the future of these discussions and options we can pursue that would 

truly end the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. And I will now turn 

to Mr. Brad Sherman of California for his remarks. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these critical hearings, our ranking member, Eliot Engel, has been asked by 

the President to join the administration in the memorial service for 

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. 

Some may ask why we are having these hearings at all here in 

Congress. After all, the Executive Branch may take the position 

that Congress is only an advisory body when it comes to foreign affairs. I think we have a co-decisionmaking responsibility and that 

is why I think we need our witnesses here to guide us in making 

those decisions. 

We have universal agreement on the goal: Prevent Iran from 

having nuclear weapons. But we need to get down to the fine 

points. What will a good agreement look like? What sanctions 

should we impose if Iran does not agree to a good deal by June 

30th? And who, or what body here in Washington will be answering these questions? Is it Congress’ role only to advise the President? Or are we supposed to pass laws that are carried out? 

Now Iran is operating under the twice extended Joint Action 

Plan. It is inaccurate, as some have said, to say that that plan has 

halted their program. The centrifuges continue to turn. They build 

their stockpile of 31⁄2 percent enriched uranium. It may be oxidized, 

but it can be returned to gaseous form, ready for further enrichment rather easily. And of course, this analysis doesn’t even include their work on more powerful gas centrifuges, their 

weaponization program, etcetera. 

But the Joint Action Plan has impeded the Iranian program and 

it is better than nothing. Their 20 percent enriched uranium has 

been diluted in most cases or to a great degree. So Iran is a little 

further away from their first bomb or at least having highly-enriched uranium for it, but is getting closer every day to their sixth, 

seventh, or eighth bomb as they continue to build an increasingly 

large stockpile of low-enriched uranium. And it is counter intuitive, 

but as I think our witnesses will illustrate, going from uranium ore 

to 31⁄2 percent enriched uranium, even 31⁄2 percent enriched uranium oxide is more than half the work. Going from 31⁄2 percent to 

93 percent, is the easier part of that effort. 

4

So the issue then is whether we should have sanctions that go 

into effect on July 1. The fact is Iran has a July 1 program. They 

just haven’t had to publish it because they don’t have an open society where they have to make decisions in public. We ought to have 

a July 1 program ready to go and in order to do that, Congress actually has to vote on a bill, rather than not vote until July. 

Now a little history, until 2010 our sanctions toward Iran were 

modest at most, certainly not enough to dissuade them in 2010. 

The President signs CISADA. We got the Menendez-Kirk sanctions 

and we finally began to put some reasonable pressure on Iran. 

Keep in mind the last administration presented us from passing 

any new meaningful legislation, or at least any new major legislation. And the Obama administration opposed sanctions in its first 

few years. But the Obama administration has done a commendable 

job of enforcing the laws that Congress has passed, even the ones 

we passed over their objections. 

We have frozen Iranian assets around the world. We have forced 

a decline in their oil exports, but they were still estimating 2 percent economic growth. That growth will be lower because of the decline of oil prices, but the Iranian economy is slated to grow far 

faster than a majority of countries in the EU. 

I do want to pick up on the chairman’s comments about broadcasting. One approach is that we simply rebroadcast into Iran the 

many Farsi language programs made in California. Now some are 

politically incorrect. We shouldn’t endorse anything there, but we 

could get those retransmitted for pennies a minute and let 1,000 

or at least a dozen flowers bloom where the Iranian people can 

hear all of these different views being presented in their own language free from U.S. Government control. 

As to evaluating the agreement, I think that in addition to looking at how robust their centrifuge program is, we have to ask how 

much uranium will Iran be able to retain in its stockpiles. We can 

do a lot even if they have more centrifuges than we would want 

if every night the uranium enriched is exported to some other country. 

Finally, we could reach a compromise with the administration on 

the whole issue of the timing of legislation. They have said that 

they are going to come up with—talking to them last night—a good 

agreement on the political matters by the end of March. So let us 

pass a bill in the House. Let us pass a bill in the Senate and let 

us go to conference. And let us wait to see what the administration 

can prepare, but only if the administration agrees that they will 

stop efforts to delay new sanctions at that point, except to show us 

the non-technical agreement in principle reached in Switzerland. 

Instead, the President and the administration asks us to slow down 

for this reason and then later slow down for that reason and then 

they are free to tell us to slow down for the next reason, only because we acted faster than the administration wanted and we 

brought Iran to this point. And I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Before we 

go to our witnesses, I will just mention that I think Mr. Sherman’s 

concept of broadcasting into Iran, also some of these cultural programs because we forget that the Ayatollah has made it a sin or 

interprets it as a sin for women to sing. So a lot of popular music 

5

and programs—I remember when that tune ‘‘Happy’’ was recorded 

by some young women in Iran and boy, did they feel the lash because they had sung to that tune. And I think at times we are not 

really focused on the nature of just how brutal this regime is on 

its own people, especially on women, and the way in which a regime treats its own people will sometimes tell you a lot about how 

they might treat their neighbors. 

Let us go to our distinguished group of experts. Ambassador Eric 

Edelman is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments. Previously, he served as U.S. Ambassador 

to Finland during the Clinton administration and to Turkey. Ambassador Edelman also served as Under Secretary for Defense Policy from 2005 to 2009. 

Mr. John Hannah is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as National Security 

Advisor to the Vice President from 2005 to 2009. Mr. Hannah has 

also worked at the State Department. 

Dr. Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the 

Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served as Senior Advisor on Iran at the State Department and was Professor at the National Defense University. 

Mr. Einhorn, Robert Einhorn is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings 

Institution and before joining Brookings in 2013, he served as the 

State Department’s Special Advisor for Non-Proliferation and Arms 

Control. And he was Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. 

And without objection, the witnesses’ full, prepared 

statementswill be made part of the record. And members will have 

5 calendar days to submit statements and questions and extraneous material for the record. So we will start with Ambassador 

Edelman. If you all would just summarize your remarks to 5 minutes, that would be perfect. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ERIC S. EDELMAN, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. EDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will do my best. First, I would 

like to thank you and Ranking Member Engel and Mr. Sherman 

and the other members of the committee for giving me the opportunity to appear today to discuss the implications of the current negotiations on Iran nuclear matters. I remember well, Mr. Royce, 

the codel that you led to Turkey when I was Ambassador more 

than 10 years ago when one of the issues we discussed because, of 

course, Turkey is one of Iran’s neighbors, was this very subject. 

And what I hope to do today is provide both a little bit of a retrospective look back and also a prospective look forward on where we 

stand with Iran. 

Preventing a nuclear weapons capable Iran remains, I think, the 

most pressing national security challenge facing the United States 

today. As President Obama himself said in a speech he gave in 

2012, ‘‘a nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained. It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of 

the Gulf nations, and the stability of the global economy. It risks 

6

triggering a nuclear arms race in the region and the unraveling of 

the nonproliferation treaty.’’

I would submit that the turmoil we currently see in the region 

is in no small part a reflection of Iran’s ‘‘struggle for mastery’’ in 

the Middle East where its aspirations and involvement in a series 

of conflicts have created a dynamic that drives both Sunni and 

Shi’a extremism throughout the area and threatens the regional 

power balance. 

In Iraq, Iran’s patronage of Shi’a militias before and especially 

since the departure of U.S. forces in December 2011 has disrupted 

the domestic political balance and fed the recrudescence of Sunni 

Islamist extremism manifested in the resurgence of the Islamic 

State last year. 

In Syria, the IRGC provides the money, oil, weaponry and with 

the help of Hezbollah, front-line soldiers that the al-Assad regime 

needs to grind down the moderate Sunni opposition. This, in turn, 

feeds the radicalization of the Sunni population and provides fertile 

ground for recruiting by the al Nusra front and the Islamic State. 

Iranian policy also strains Lebanon’s delicate political balance and 

its Western-backed armed forces, thereby increasing the odds of another round of war between Israel and Lebanon. And as you noted 

in your opening statement, much of Hamas’ arsenal and combat 

training have come from Iran, including many of the weapons it 

used to attack Israeli civilians this past summer. 

Finally, again, as you noted in your statement, Houthi rebels in 

Yemen have taken over much of the country in recent weeks, culminating in the resignation of President Hadi and Prime Minister 

Bahah and the collapse of that fragile country’s counterterrorism 

cooperation with the United States against AQAP. This is a development I want to stress that threatens the homeland security of 

the homeland as well as that of our European allies. 

Iran’s regional revisionism is already proceeding at a breath-taking pace even without the sword and shield that a nuclear weapons 

capability would provide it. It is no wonder that our traditional allies in the region worry that a nuclear armed Iran or even an Iran 

on the threshold of nuclear weapons would be emboldened to sow 

even more havoc in the region. 

The prospect of Iran crossing the nuclear threshold has spawned 

more than a decade of diplomacy intended to restrict its potential 

pathways to a bomb. But unfortunately, in my view, the objectives 

of these negotiations have become steadily more limited over the 

years, as Iran’s intransigence has led the United States and its diplomatic partners to repeatedly define down their red lines in favor 

of Iran’s. 

On the eve of the Joint Plan of Action, with Iran perched on the 

nuclear threshold, a task force that I co-chair with Dennis Ross, 

spelled out a series of benchmarks for an acceptable final deal. We 

argued that any such agreement would have to tangibly roll back 

Iran’s ability to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear device, impose a strict inspections regime, adhere to international legal requirements, and resolve the outstanding concerns 

of the International Atomic Energy Agency. To pressure Iran to 

meet these standards, the U.S. and its allies would need to negotiate from a position of strength and implement a strict deadline 

7

for the talks. And I would add use the leverage that the Congress 

has provided it. 

Unhappily, the comprehensive agreement outlined by the Joint 

Plan of Action reflects the P5+1’s receding red lines. And as such, 

I think it falls short of the aforementioned principles, to the serious 

detriment of U.S. national security. 

Despite constant assurances from administration officials, including Secretary Kerry that ‘‘a bad deal is worse than no deal,’’ the 

pattern of concessions and the negotiating dynamic that has been 

established give very strong reasons for outside observers to feel 

that that the negotiations are moving far beyond the parameters 

of an acceptable final agreement. 

It is difficult to envisage such an agreement without a change in 

the trajectory of these negotiations, and without a decisive change 

in Iran’s calculus of its own best interests. American policymakers 

must use all available instruments of coercive diplomacy to restore 

credibility to the oft-repeated statement that every option remains 

on the table to prevent a nuclear Iran. Success is only possible if 

Iran realizes it has more to lose from the failure of diplomacy. 

The U.S. retains an ability to exert pressure through sanctions. 

Moreover, I would argue that today given the current oil market, 

the balance is highly disadvantageous to Iran. Not to put too fine 

a point on it, given the current price of oil, we don’t need to fear 

that having Iranian oil off the market would roil international markets and set back the recovery of the global economy. For these 

reasons, the United States can credibly threaten more stringent 

measures against energy and other vital sectors if Iran continues 

its obstinacy. 

I think American policymakers should clarify and strengthen our 

declaratory policy. I think it would be useful for the Congress to 

hold hearings on the feasibility of the military option in publicizing 

some of the advanced U.S. military capabilities, such as the GBU–

57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a bunker buster designed specifically to reach targets like Iran’s deeply-buried illegal nuclear facilities. 

The United States should also boost the credibility of Israel’s 

military option as well. 

Finally, as one of the other panelists and I argued recently in the 

press, the United States must be willing to compete with Iran rather than actively seeking its partnership. On one level, this requires 

a change in tone, but the administration must emphasize its readiness to exert more pressure on Iran instead of exerting pressure on 

Congress with talking points that come to quote a ranking member 

of the Senate, ‘‘straight out of Tehran.’’

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again and your colleagues for scheduling this hearing and the members for their patience and consideration and I look forward to the rest of the hearing and answering 

any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Edelman follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. Mr. Hannah. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN HANNAH, SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. HANNAH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Sherman, members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to participate in this hearing. I have to confess to having deep concerns about the state of the negotiations with Iran. I 

worry that, starting with the Joint Plan of Action, the United 

States has already agreed to a series of concessions that will make 

the achievement of a good deal very difficult. 

The decision 14 months ago to accede to Iran’s core demand that 

it retain an ability to enrich uranium was indeed a fateful one. It 

reversed longstanding U.S. policy opposing any Iranian enrichment 

and contravened six hard-won U.N. Security Council resolutions. It 

represented a strategic concession by the United States on an issue 

of absolutely central importance to Iran. Whatever the merits of 

the Joint Plan of Action, and I agree with Congressman Sherman 

that it does have merits, the fact is that Iran was required to make 

no reciprocal concession of even remotely similar strategic value to 

the United States. 

On the contrary, every commitment made by Iran under the 

JPOA has been strictly tactical in nature and easily reversible. The 

administration’s concession on enrichment had the effect of transforming the fundamental objective of U.S. strategy toward Iran. It 

represented the abandonment of the goal of eliminating Iran’s capability to produce nuclear weapons. Instead, the United States retreated to the much less ambitious goal of simply extending the 

time it would take Iran to break out to a nuclear bomb. 

The concession on enrichment, unfortunately, set the template 

for what has been a troubling dynamic that has come to characterize the talks. On a number of key issues, virtually all the concessions have come from the P5+1. All the significant movement has 

been away from America’s red lines and toward Iran’s red lines. 

And in the process, in my view, the heart of America’s longtime position with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, that is, the dismantlement, destruction, and irreversible rollback of Iran’s nuclear 

weapons-related infrastructure, has largely been gutted. 

As problematic as this is, perhaps even more troubling is a second concession of enormous strategic consequence that the U.S. 

made to secure the JPOA. I am referring to the so-called sunset 

clause that put an expiration date on any comprehensive deal that 

might be reached. In short, whatever restrictions that a final deal 

imposes on Iran’s nuclear program will themselves only be temporary. 

After a period of years yet to be determined—the U.S. is hoping 

for 15—Iran will not only be free of all sanctions, it will be treated 

on a par with every other non-nuclear weapon state that is a member in good standing of the NPT. That means that Iran can be like 

The Netherlands, which spins hundreds of thousands of centrifuges 

to produce reactor fuel. It can be like Japan that maintains enough 

stockpiled plutonium for thousands of nuclear warheads. It can be 

like Brazil that plans to produce highly enriched uranium of up to 

90 percent to power its nuclear submarines. All of that will be perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:38 Mar 17, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\012715\92850 SHIRL
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fectly permissible—regardless of whether Iran in 15 years is led by 

the equivalent of Ahmadinejad 2.0; regardless of whether its highest political and military leaders continue to call for Israel’s destruction; and regardless of whether Iran remains the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism. 

Some may hope that in those intervening 15 years Iran will be 

transformed into a normal, non-revolutionary power that is prepared to forego its war with the Great Satan and its ambitions to 

dominate the Middle East. Perhaps those hopes will be borne out. 

But who would be willing to bet U.S. national security on it? In my 

mind, that is an enormous risk to run. 

I recognize, of course, that despite the very generous concessions 

that the P5+1 have put forward, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s intransigence continues. We can speculate on why that is the case and 

what more might still be done to break the stalemate by convincing 

the Supreme Leader to make the concessions necessary for a deal, 

including the possibility of legislating prospective sanctions. But at 

the same time, I would simply urge that Congress devote at least 

as much energy to examining the substance of any deal that might 

emerge, with the aim of identifying those outstanding issues where 

Congress might still be able help to stiffen the administration’s positions in ways that would mitigate the risks as much as possible. 

Finding ways to increase pressure on Iran to make a deal is certainly a critical issue. But simply pressuring Iran for the purpose 

of accepting what could amount to a bad deal would be a pyrrhic 

victory, indeed. Thank you again for the opportunity to present my 

views and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hannah follows:]

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STATEMENT OF MR. RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you, members of the committee, for inviting 

me to come back once more. I would echo actually what Chairman 

Royce suggested, namely that the nuclear negotiations between 

Iran and the P5+1 are today stalemated after a decade of patient 

diplomacy. I think the prospect of securing a final deal is becoming 

increasingly remote. The wheels of diplomacy will grind on. There 

have been two extensions already granted. But it is time to acknowledge that the policy of engagement as pursued over the past 

decade was predicated on a series of assumptions that have proven 

logical in concept, but flawed in practice. 

As we reassess our next move, it will be wise to reconsider the 

judgments that underwrite our approach to an adversary that has, 

at the very least, proven rather elusive. 

I would say successive administrations have relied solely on financial stress to temper Iran’s ambitions, nuclear and otherwise. 

At the core, this policy argues for steady economic pressure to 

change the calculus of the Islamic Republic, eventually leading it 

to concede the most disturbing aspects of its nuclear program. This 

was American pragmatism at its most obvious, as economics is 

thought to transcend ideology and history in conditioning national 

priorities. To be sure, the policy has not been without its successes, 

as it solidified a sanctions regime that compelled Iran to change its 

negotiating style. Still, what was missed was that the Islamic Republic is a revolutionary state that rarely makes judicious economic 

decisions. In fact, the notion of integration into the global economy 

is frightening to the regime’s highly ideological rulers, who require 

an external nemesis to justify their hegemony power. 

Among other assumptions that I think we have misdiagnosed is 

the changes in Iran’s political landscape since 2009. The fraudulent 

2009 Presidential election, in my view, was not a passing event, 

but a watershed moment. Watershed moment means after which 

things are very different than anything that went before. Iran 

today is a government very similar to other Middle Eastern dictatorships. The forces of reform have been purged from body politic, 

leaving behind like-minded actors. 

While many in the West continue to see Iran as a country of 

quarreling factions and competing personalities, the Iranians themselves talk of the system. This is not to suggest that there are no 

disagreements among key actors, but the system has forged the 

rough consensus on issues such as repressing dissent at home, pursuing an aggressive policy abroad, and even sustaining the essential trajectory of the nuclear program. The U.S. misdiagnosis was 

most glaring, in my view, when Hassan Rouhani assumed the presidency in 2013. Rouhani’s election was considered a rebuke to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his ideological presumptions, and 

many in Washington convinced themselves that by investing in 

Rouhani they could usher in an age of moderation in Iran. Suddenly, an empowered Rouhani would make important concessions 

on the nuclear issue and even collaborate with the United States 

to steady an unhinged region. Again, missing from all this is how 

the system had come together in the aftermath of 2009, to destroy 

the democratic left. We have sought to manipulate Iran’s factions 

26

at the precise time when factionalism is no longer the defining aspect of Iranian politics. 

Yet another American misapprehension was refusing to listen to 

what the Iranians were actually saying. The United States has offered Iran a number of concessions such as the recognition of its 

enrichment and practice. It was hoped that those concessions 

would cause Iran to settle for a modest program. Thus symbolic offerings from the West would diminish Iran’s expansive nuclear appetite. In this case, we refused to listen to what Iranians were saying, namely that they want an industrial-size nuclear program in 

public and private. Thus far, we have made concessions in that 

particular sense. 

Iran will not easily be deterred from its approach. A strategy of 

coercion must move beyond imposing financial penalties as Chairman Royce suggested. Iran must feel pressure on many fronts. The 

Obama administration, in my view, would be wise to mend fences 

at home and rehabilitate our better alliances in the Middle East. 

It is important for Iran to see no division in its efforts to exploit 

the differences between the White House and the Congress. The 

President would be wise to consult with Congress on various legislation moving forward. Both parties have equities that need to be 

taken into consideration. I think they can be in a genuine conversation between the Executive and Legislative Branches. 

Finally, let me say, there is nothing magical about the July deadline. If there is an agreement by July, Iran will be left with a substantial nuclear infrastructure that is destined to grow over time. 

If there is no agreement in July, Iran will be left with a substantial 

nuclear infrastructure that is destined to grow over time, perhaps 

at an unsteady pace. Therefore, we need to develop a long-term 

strategy for developing how to maintain, contain, regulate Iran 

with nuclear material that is substantial and growing. And that is 

a long-term challenge that I think the Executive Branch and Congress can come together and actually craft. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Doctor. Mr. Einhorn? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT EINHORN, SENIOR 

FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. EINHORN. Chairman Royce, Congressman Sherman, other 

distinguished members of the committee, I want to thank you for 

this opportunity to testify on the Iran nuclear issue. 

The Obama administration is seeking an agreement that would 

lengthen to at least 1 year the time it would take Iran to produce 

enough nuclear material for a single nuclear weapon. It is also 

seeking rigorous monitoring measures that would enable the IAEA 

to detect at the earliest possible time any Iranian attempt to break 

out of an agreement at either declared or covert locations. The goal 

is to make Iran’s potential path to nuclear weapons lengthy and 

readily detectable so that the United States and others would have 

plenty of time to intervene decisively in order to stop them, using 

economic or military means. 

Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries have made 

significant progress over the last year. But Iran has showed little 

flexibility on some central issues, including enrichment capacity 

and the duration of any comprehensive agreement. So it is understandable that many Members of Congress support new sanctions 

to pressure the Iranians to accept the compromises needed to make 

a deal possible. 

I agree that economic pressure brought the Iranians to the negotiating table and continued strong pressure will be essential to get 

them to accept an agreement that meets U.S. requirements. But 

enacting new sanctions legislation at this time, even if sanctions 

would not be imposed until a later date, could have the unintended 

effect of hardening Iran’s negotiating position and weakening international sanctions. 

Iranians are sharply divided on the nuclear issue. Opponents of 

a deal would seize on any new U.S. sanctions legislation to claim 

that the United States has no intention of ultimately removing 

sanctions. They would argue internally that an agreement would 

therefore be pointless and they would oppose Iranian flexibility in 

the negotiations. So even if the Iranians don’t walk out of the talks 

as they have threatened to do, new sanctions legislation could reinforce Iranian rigidity and increase the likelihood that negotiations 

will fail. 

New sanctions legislation could also undermine the unity of the 

International Sanctions Coalition. So far that coalition has stayed 

together because Iran has been seen as the main impediment to 

the negotiations. Key countries would regard new sanctions as premature and unnecessarily provocative. The blame for any impasse 

or breakdown could shift to us and support for tough sanctions 

could begin to unravel. Not only is the new legislation potentially 

counterproductive in terms of Iran’s negotiating posture and the 

unity of international sanctions efforts, it is unnecessary. 

Iran continues to feel immense economic pressure from existing 

sanctions which remain intact under the Joint Plan of Action and 

the steep drop in the price of oil serves as an additional sanction, 

depriving Iran’s economy of another $11 billion over the next 6 

33

months. Under the interim deal, Iran each month receives $700 

million of its own oil revenues that have been held in restricted 

overseas accounts. Compare that to the $40 billion in oil revenues 

that Iran lost in 2014 because of the sanctions. 

So if new sanctions legislation is neither necessary, nor likely to 

have its intended effect, how can we get the Iranians to accept a 

nuclear deal that meets our requirements? First, we should be patient. Our negotiators should continue to work toward concluding 

a deal along the lines we have already proposed by the June deadline. But they need not be in a rush. If Iran remains reluctant to 

compromise, the U.S. and the P5+1 partners can afford to wait. 

Some have argued that the interim deal is advantageous to Iran, 

that the Iranians are stringing us along, using the interim deal to 

play for time. I find this argument hard to understand. Under the 

JPOA, Iran’s nuclear program is frozen in most meaningful respects. And Iran’s economy continues to suffer under punishing 

sanctions, amplified now by the drop in the price of oil. 

It is Iran, not the United States, that is the clear loser the longer 

the JPOA remains in effect. No one wants to prolong the negotiations indefinitely, but if a sound agreement cannot be reached by 

the end of June, the option of another extension should not be 

ruled out. 

Second, the administration should do whatever it can to maintain and enhance the effectiveness of existing sanctions. The Treasury Department should continue its aggressive efforts to remind 

governments and companies around the world that sanctions remain in place and that Iran is not open for business. 

Third, even while negotiations are underway, the administration 

should work with the Congress and its foreign partners on a Plan 

B, a plan for the eventuality that no agreement will be reached. 

The Legislative and Executive Branches should begin now to jointly develop sanctions legislation that would be ready to be voted and 

immediately implemented in the event that the talks end without 

agreement. The administration should also begin now to consult 

key foreign partners on the ratcheting up of sanctions as well as 

on the strengthening of cooperative defense plans that may be warranted in the event of a breakdown of negotiations. 

Of course, it is impossible to know whether Iran will eventually 

come around to the realization that without a nuclear deal its economy will continue to suffer and its international isolation will persist. President Obama puts the odds at less than 50–50. If we cannot achieve an agreement that meets our requirements, then we 

will have little choice but to turn from diplomacy to other means 

of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. And if diplomacy fails, it is critical that we have the strong international support necessary for whatever course we decide to take. We should 

therefore avoid actions at the present time that would widely be 

seen as undermining prospects for an agreement. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. I have got two questions, but one of Iran’s 

paths to a bomb would be through its plutonium reactor at Arak. 

And indeed, in reading through some of your statements, Mr. 

Einhorn, you have referred to this reactor as a plutonium bomb 

factory. 

As I recall, this was the issue that the French were so concerned 

about when that negotiation began, when it looked like we were 

going to into an interim agreement in November 2013. They raised 

the specter of this. And the administration insists that these negotiation will cut off all of Iran’s paths to a bomb. But I was interested when I read the testimony of Ambassador Edelman, you say 

that the administration has relinquished its effort to shut off Iran’s 

plutonium path to a bomb by converting its heavy water reactor at 

Arak. 

And I was going to ask you what is the state of play here, Mr. 

Edelman? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Well, I suspect that Bob has a better fix on what 

the exact state of play is than I do, but it is clear that the administration has retreated to a different standard which is to try and get 

the reactor rearranged, the core of the reactor rearranged in order 

to limit the production of plutonium rather than convert the reactor entirely. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Einhorn? 

Mr. EINHORN. I have no doubt that the Arak reactor was designed in order to become a plutonium factory for nuclear weapons. 

I have no doubt about that. 

But what has happened in the negotiations is that apparently 

Iran has agreed to redesign the reactor to reduce very, very substantially the amount of plutonium that is generated in the spent 

fuel. It was originally designed to operate on natural uranium 

which increases the weapons plutonium content of the spent fuel. 

They have apparently agreed to use enriched uranium fuel which 

greatly reduces the amount of plutonium produced annually to a 

level that makes it infeasible to try to break out using the plutonium route. 

There are still disagreements. The U.S. would like to make this 

a lightwater reactor which makes it less reversible and the Iranians don’t want to do that. 

Chairman ROYCE. But they are not going to do that. They are 

going to reduce it, but not eliminate it. 

Mr. EINHORN. No, you can’t. Any reactor produces plutonium. 

The question is how much. And the way they have agreed to redesign it there are very low amounts. 

Chairman ROYCE. They will reduce the amount. The other question I had was on the expiration date, or the sunset as it is called 

in the agreement. And last year, the committee heard testimony 

from a former State Department official who described the term 

‘‘comprehensive solution’’ as a complete misnomer because according to the interim agreement, the restrictions put in place through 

such a comprehensive solution will only remain in place for a specific amount of time, so it can’t be comprehensive. It is not permanent. 

And as he pointed out, the comprehensive solution looked at that 

way is just an interim step itself. It is going to be an interim step, 

43

a temporary step. It is going to expire and after which Iran can engage on industrial scale enrichment. And it could then undertake 

activities that Holland, Japan, and Brazil are taking today. 

So Mr. Einhorn, you had testified that a sound agreement would 

last about 15 years in your viewpoint. But Mr. Hannah notes that 

the sunset clause kicks in even if Iran is led in the future by the 

equivalent of an Ahmadinejad 2.0 or even if it is still the top sponsor of terrorism. So as Iran continues to reach to dominate the region, what is an acceptable length of time for an agreement? I will 

just ask the panel since this is simply going to be an interim agreement. And after that, it is going to be under their insistence, and 

of course, they are looking for a time frame, I guess, less than 10 

years. But I will just tell you I remember the North Korean nuclear 

framework agreement. That doesn’t seem that long ago and that 

was 20 years ago that we were talked into that. We see what the 

results were. 

Mr. EINHORN. Mr. Chairman, in 2008, the P5+1 countries agreed 

that when Iran convinced the international community that its program was peaceful, then it would be able to pursue a program like 

any NPT party that is compliant. That was already in 2008. 

I think the sunset provision frankly is unfortunate. I would like 

to have it a permanent agreement, but that is water under the 

bridge. But I think it is important to make it as long as possible 

and I say 15 years at a minimum. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. EINHORN. But it is important to recognize that even after 15 

years, there will be very strong disincentives for Iran to go ahead 

and produce nuclear weapons. They would still face a very strong 

threat of not just economic sanctions, but military attack by the 

United States and its partners. So it is not as if they are swinging 

free and easy at that point. There would still be strong deterrent 

against them going that route. 

Chairman ROYCE. Other members of the panel? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I will just say briefly on this, there is nothing permanent about this particular concession. One of the things that I 

suggested that the administration can do is go back and say upon 

the expiration of the sunset clause, Iran will still have to go back 

to the U.N. Security Council as a sort of a probationary hearing 

and they can determine whether it can then proceed toward industrialization of the program and they can make that determination 

based on an entire range of factors such as other aspects of Iran’s 

behavior. But I don’t think this should be an eighth time type 

agreement. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, since the Supreme Leader says he wants 

190,000 centrifuges, he is not thinking along the lines that you just 

articulated. 

Mr. Hannah. 

Mr. HANNAH. Mr. Chairman, I didn’t agree with the decision in 

2008, although that clearly didn’t commit to any kind of deadline 

and time frame. The most I would have done is agree that we 

would have some kind of review committee at some point in time, 

perhaps after 15 years to look at and examine the question. But 

I think in the real world the absence of linkage between any kind 

of special inspection and verification regime and restrictions that 

44

we impose on Iran to divorce that from the basic heart and soul 

and nature of that regime and its war with the United States and 

Israel and our other allies in the regime, I just think it is folly, it 

is dangerous. And I think we will rue the day if we allow that to 

proceed. 

I think I agree with Bob that this has been given away already 

by this administration and I don’t think it can be reversed at this 

point in time without doing damage in the negotiations before you 

probably get a new administration in office. 

Chairman ROYCE. So we will go to Ambassador Edelman. My 

point about the 190,000 centrifuges that the Supreme Leader says 

is his objective, that would be okay under this scheme. I mean if 

it goes 10 years after that, he is in a position to move forward with 

his goal, right? 

Mr. EDELMAN. That is my understanding, Mr. Chairman. Like 

the other panelists, and I guess we are unanimous, all of us, I 

think, lament the fact that this is now a part of the negotiation. 

From my point of view, as a result of that, the only acceptable date 

that would be reasonable would be 20 years. But, partly because 

of the reasons that you just suggested in terms of the scope of ambition that the Supreme Leader has declared for the program. 

I worry about the regional security implications of this going forward, because we will likely be leaving Iran as a threshold state. 

And that means all the other states in the region, notably including 

our allies, Israel, our Sunni Gulf Arab allies, are going to have to 

make a whole series of judgments about their security in a world 

where Iran is much closer to a nuclear weapon than it was in 2008, 

for instance. And I think that is going to have, as Mr. Hannah suggested, some very, very serious consequences for the region. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Ambassador. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let us not get carried away on one thing. Congress has agreed to nothing. No treaty has been submitted to this 

Congress for ratification. And in 2017, the Government of the 

United States is free to take whatever action it chooses at that 

time. Even if Congress were to pass a resolution in support of some 

agreement, not likely, that is binding only on that Congress. 

If Iran wants a permanent agreement with the United States, let 

it agree to something good enough to gain ratification of the United 

States Senate as a treaty. And we have put the world on notice by 

publishing our Constitution, that something signed as a memo with 

one leader is perhaps morally binding on that leader. 

Mr. Einhorn, your comments, I do want to mention first I think 

you have hit on the one best argument against Congress passing 

sanctions now. And that is the most influential American in the 

world, President Obama, has pretty much said that if Congress 

passes sanctions now that the rest of the world shouldn’t follow 

and should regard us, the United States Government, as unreasonable. It may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. It may very well be that 

by announcing to the world that if Congress’ acts were unreasonable, it ties our hands. I don’t think it does, but it might. 

You also, I think, well laid out the 1 year objective that we have 

in these negotiations, but keep in mind once the sanctions are lifted, Iran moves all of its foreign currency into Chinese banks, Cayman Island banks, tens of billions of dollars. And gets years of 

45

breathing room. After that, if they were to break out and we were 

to apply new sanctions, those sanctions wouldn’t bite for a year. So 

the only possible action would be military action and I’m not sure 

this country would take military action. But remember, Iran gets 

to choose the time. So they can wait for the next Ukrainian crisis 

and then see whether the United States will take military action. 

Sanctions cannot go from zero to biting in 1 year, especially if foreign currency reserves have been moved. 

Doctor, what is Iran’s July 1 plan? Would they want a further 

extension and does that sell to the Iranian political powers? Are 

they ready with a breakout? What do they do on July 1, assuming 

they haven’t signed an agreement with President Obama? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I am not part of the Council, but it seems to me 

that they would be prepared for extension of the talks beyond that. 

For how long, I am not sure. Because increasingly, I think the regime will come under pressure from the Atomic Energy Organization and others for introducing new technologies that at this point 

are prohibited under the Joint Plan of Action. So at some point, the 

necessity of extending the talks and the necessity of technologically 

forging ahead of the program are likely to collide. So there is a 

time when Joint Plan of Action doesn’t make sense for Iran’s nuclear agencies who are planning to advance their program. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And if they don’t enter into an extension, and I 

realize they don’t clue you in on this, but you are more clued in 

than I am, what do they do? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I don’t sit around and worry too much about the 

breakdown of negotiations that have thus far lasted 13 years. I 

think these negotiations go on in some way in some form. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I want to move on to Mr. Hannah. 

The question is what additional sanctions would actually bite? The 

most ideal and probably the one we are most likely to adopt is we 

take the Menendez-Kirk sanctions and we put them on a glide path 

all the way to zero. That is to say we turn to each country and with 

a glide path not lasting too long, you can’t buy any Iranian oil and 

still use the U.S. banking system. 

A second idea is that we fill the loophole in what we have already passed as far as government contracting and we declared all 

the major corporate conglomerates of the world that if you want 

even one—that all of your subsidiaries will have to abide by U.S. 

sanctions against Iran, not sell anything other than food and medicine, not buy any oil, if any of your subsidiaries won even one U.S. 

Government contract and we could further and make it state and 

local as well. 

Other than that, does anybody on the panel have any ideas what 

should be in a sanctions bill? 

Mr. HANNAH. I do think the oil one is critical, Congressman, because as you know, and I think as you stated, the world doesn’t 

need Iranian oil any more. Eight years ago under the Bush administration, when we had serious problems with sanctions, there was 

a strong——

Mr. SHERMAN. I do have limited time. The chairman is indulging 

me a bit, but do you have anything on the list to add? I know how 

important that one item is. That is why I listed it first. 

46

Mr. HANNAH. I think you could feasibly shut down transport 

going on, particularly shipping going in and out of Tehran. Ships 

that go into Tehran never get access to any American port. Possibly 

the same for air travel as well. Planes that go to Tehran get no access to American airports and American air space. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Interesting idea. Anybody else have an idea to add 

to the list? 

Mr. EDELMAN. I think, Mr. Sherman, you could add other sectors 

to the economy, construction. There are other things that we could 

do to make life even more difficult. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Please provide a more thorough answer, all of you, 

for the record. Shall I try and sneak in one more question? 

Chairman ROYCE. Sure. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, one more question. Let us say it is 15 years 

from now and Iran has not made extraordinary progress because 

we had such a great deal, but the deal is expired. They are signatory to not only the MPT, but the additional protocol. How quickly 

can they put together a stockpile of six weapons without being 

caught by the limited, intrusive investigations called for by the additional protocol? Does anybody have an answer? 

Or more generally, is the additional protocol good enough by 

itself to prevent Iran from having a successful, covert nuclear program? Don’t all answer at once. 

Mr. Einhorn? 

Mr. EINHORN. The additional protocol, I think, is kind of the gold 

standard now for the international inspections. It is not good 

enough certainly during an agreement for 15 or 20 years. I think 

it has to go well beyond. But I think it is important to remember 

one thing, that at least during the agreement, a covert program 

doesn’t have one facility. It has maybe five or six different facilities. 

It takes 1 or 2 or 3 years to construct that covert program. So getting away with cheating at a covert location isn’t so easy. 

But there are elements that should continue beyond the expiration date as well. For example, the Iranians shouldn’t be able to 

have a reprocessing plant. There are other kinds of things the administration should press on them to accept that go beyond the additional protocol. 

Mr. SHERMAN. My time has expired. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of 

the Middle East Subcommittee and long active in this issue of Iran 

sanctions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As we 

heard this morning, the Senate has officially stated that no new 

sanctions legislation will be brought up for a vote until late March. 

And I think it is important to remember that the first sanctions 

that the U.S. began imposing against Iran were terrorism related. 

And that is being largely neglected as these ill-conceived, these secret and misguided nuclear negotiations continue to be extended 

for reasons passing understanding. In fact, as the negotiations continue, Iran support for terror has not waned, has actually increased. 

Tehran calculates that President Obama is more willing to blame 

Congress for the talks failing than he is likely to blame this murderous and dangerous regime. So the result is that the Obama adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:38 Mar 17, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\012715\92850 SHIRL
47

ministration capitulates to Iran’s demands and we get nothing, 

while Iran’s dangerous actions continue to spread. And we need to 

look no further than the President’s own so-called success story in 

Yemen. 

Just a few days ago, the Iran-backed Houthi rebels arrested control of Yemen’s capital and its government, giving Iran effective 

control over four Arab capitals. Yet, the administration carries on, 

alienating our allies, appeasing our enemies, even enlisting Iran as 

an asset. Just think about that. 

In the battle against al-Qaeda in Yemen, and ISIL in Iraq and 

in Syria, these are situations for which Iran’s terror proxies are responsible. And now the administration finds itself on the same side 

as Iran. Yet, all of this is off the table. It is not part of the nuclear 

negotiations. And the reality of the situation belies the President’s 

narrative. The President threatens to veto Congress’ attempt to 

hold Iran accountable, yet deadlines are repeatedly missed. Iran 

continues to impede the IAEA’s verification efforts at every turn. 

And there are still many numerous other issues regarding the possible military dimension of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 

Recently, it was reported that Iran, along with North Korea, is 

helping to build missile sites and a nuclear reactor in Syria, likely 

to outsource to enrichment capabilities to its proxy in Damascus, 

which would not be a violation of the JPOA. Iran continues its research and development of more advanced centrifuges, yet that also 

is not a violation, according to this administration. Iran is giving 

oil to Syria, not a violation. And it was announced that Iran, with 

the help of Russia, is actually building two new nuclear reactors 

and also somehow that is not a violation. And of course, Iran’s continued progress on its ICBM program, its spread of terror, its support for terrorist groups, and its even-worsening human rights 

records, were never on the table for discussion to begin with. 

So what exactly will the administration consider a violation? The 

implication for these nuclear negotiations are far reaching and we 

cannot be willing to carry on with this farce while Iran perfects its 

enrichment, its weaponization, its missile programs. 

So to the panel, does any of this indicate that Iran is intent on 

actually reaching a nuclear agreement or is the regime use the 

guise of diplomacy to further its ambition including creating a nuclear weapon? And lastly, last week, Tony Blinken, as you saw in 

his testimony, confirmed what most of us already knew, that the 

administration’s goal is not to prevent Iran from ever getting a nuclear weapon. It is merely to delay that action. 

Even if we are successful in delaying nuclear capability for Iran 

to a year or 2, will that be enough to assuage other countries in 

the region like the Saudis, the Emiratis, from seeking their own 

nuclear capability? And do you believe that the administration will 

be willing to walk away from the negotiations if the status quo remains? To anyone who wishes to answer. 

Ambassador. 

Mr. EDELMAN. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, it is very hard to quibble with 

your characterization of where we are. I would say on the question 

of whether—you were talking about Mr. Blinken saying that we 

are likely to have an extension. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Correct. 

48

Mr. EDELMAN. I think that is the most likely outcome in part, because the answer to the first part of your question, ‘‘Has Iran made 

a strategic decision to forego a nuclear weapons program?’’ I think 

the answer is pretty clear. They have not. On the contrary, they 

feel that they have now successfully impressed upon the administration through the statements of the Supreme Leader, etcetera, 

that they must be allowed to have an industrial scale enrichment 

program at the end of this process. And so we have seen a demand 

of the international community that originally was a complete 

freeze on enrichment. Then we were going to have a couple of hundred, then a couple of thousand. Now we are talking about maybe 

as many as 9,000 centrifuges. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Nine thousand. 

Mr. EDELMAN. Perhaps rearranged, perhaps unplugged, etcetera. 

We don’t know yet what the outcome will be. The Iranians have 

19,000 now. If you split the difference, you end up with about 

9,000. And I think the answer to the question is no, they have not 

given up their desire and we have given up our objective of preventing them from having that capability. Instead, as we have discussed on this panel, looking at preventing them from breaking out 

or sneaking out within 1 year. That is where I am afraid we are. 

To your question about how will others in the region see this, I 

think it is going to be very hard, particularly for a country say like 

the United Arab Emirates, which signed a 123 agreement with the 

United States to have its own nuclear power, completely foregoing 

any capability for enrichment, to look across the Gulf and see Iran 

allowed by agreement with the United States to have thousands of 

centrifuges, whatever the actual number ends up being and a capability to continue to enrich without calling into question the wisdom of their earlier agreement with the United States and the reliability of the United States, the guarantor of their security. And I 

think others in the region will make similar kinds of judgments. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ileana. Mr. Ted Deutch, ranking 

member of the Middle East Subcommittee. And I mentioned the 

horrendous human rights situation in Iran in my opening statement. I should add Mr. Deutch has long been active on behalf of 

his constituent, Mr. Levinson, and we would like to see a resolution 

to his case, as well as those of other Americans, including and imprisoned Washington Post reporter, and a former Marine, Amir 

Hekmati. 

And on that note, I would ask unanimous consent to add a letter 

from the Hekmati family into the record. And Mr. Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for making that point. Thank you for pointing out that as part of these 

talks while I know the fate of Bob Levinson, my constituent, and 

the others who are in Iran continues to be brought up, I think it 

is appropriate for us to have some expectation that as these talks 

continue, to see some good faith from the Iranians on these issues 

at least would be helpful to those of us who have concerns about 

the broader deal. 

I want to start with a comment that I heard on one of the Sunday morning shows that if Congress—the suggestion was made 

that if Congress takes any sort of action at all, that Iran will be 

49

able to go to the world and say that the United States negotiated 

in bad faith. I would point out to all my colleagues here and to the 

administration something they know better than anyone, that it is 

inconceivable that anyone could make an argument that the United 

States is not negotiating in good faith when we entered into a 

JPOA which was extended once and which was extended again. 

And to suggest that Congress being involved in this process somehow suggests bad faith is just inaccurate and I think it is important for us to make that point. That is number one. 

Number two. Just within the past few days, the IAEA director, 

speaking in Indonesia, said that in his address to the University 

of Indonesia, he said that ‘‘we are not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material 

and activities in Iran, and therefore, to conclude that all nuclear 

material in Iran is in peaceful activities. In addressing the Iran nuclear issue, two things are important,’’ he said. ‘‘First, with the cooperation of Iran, the agency needs to clarify issues with possible 

military dimensions to the satisfaction of member states. Also, Iran 

needs to implement the additional protocols so that the agency can 

provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear 

material and activities in Iran.’’

The question I have is with everything on the table, Mr. Einhorn 

you said that it is in our interests that Congress shouldn’t act, that 

it is in our interest to get another extension, that the Iranians are 

being hurt more. How is it that we shouldn’t expect that at some 

point in this process in order for us to continue these talks we 

should require that Iran come clean on the possible military dimensions of their program and that they fully work with the IAEA to 

address their concerns? Why shouldn’t that be something that we 

demand before we consider any other concessions going forward? 

Mr. EINHORN. Thank you, Congressman. Let me just mention 

and actually clarify, I wasn’t saying that I support another extension. What I was saying is, if necessary, we can afford it. We 

should push for an agreement as soon as we can get a sound agreement. But if that is not possible, because of Iranian intransigence, 

we can afford another extension because the current interim arrangement is in our interest, not in Iran’s interest. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Einhorn, I like your answer to the question, 

but I would, given what you just said, I would ask also if you could 

explain—and I understand the distinction that is made between 

the relief that is being provided and the money that is being held. 

But at some point, $700 million a month starts to really cut in to 

that $40 billion. And number two, as anyone perceives it, $700 million a month in concessions can’t really be described as inconsequential. 

Mr. EINHORN. Every month, the restricted accounts build up further, so they get deeper in the hole. Yes, they get $700 million a 

month back, but I think it is something like almost $2.5 billion 

that gets deposited in these restricted accounts that they can’t get 

access to. So they are getting deeper into the hole. The $700 million doesn’t mount up. What mounts up is the amount that they 

don’t have access to. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I would like you to address, if you could, perhaps 

after I am finished since I am running out of time, the PMD issue 

50

and maybe all of the members will be able to get back to it, but 

I would just conclude by pointing out that if there is a sense that 

it is okay to come up with a sanctions bill now that won’t go into 

effect unless there is a breakdown in talks or unless Iran walks 

away, that that is exactly what this Congress has been trying to 

do all throughout, number one. 

And number two, to those who are critical of the notion that we 

should increase pressure in order to have a stronger negotiating position with Iran, I would just ask that we stop debating the danger 

posed by the United States Congress and we refocus on the danger 

posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, one that would spark a nuclear 

arms race in the region, that would make Iran’s proxies in Syria 

and Lebanon and Iraq and Yemen more dangerous, that would 

strengthen the terrorist groups that threaten the region and the 

world that Iran supports and controls. That is why some of us believe that since the IAEA isn’t satisfied, we don’t know about the 

military dimensions of the program. We don’t know about what 

else may be happening inside Iran. And all the while, there may 

be penalties that Iran feels on the oil front, but it hasn’t slowed 

them in their support of their terror proxies around the world. We 

need to call an end to this at some point. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I want to thank you, Madam Chairman, 

for calling this hearing and I want to echo the concerns that have 

already been expressed this morning about ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran. I am afraid that if the Obama administration 

reaches a deal with a Iran, it is likely to be a really bad one because we have already conceded far beyond the parameters of what 

would be an acceptable agreement in my view. 

Now just a couple of questions. Various reports indicate that negotiations remain deadlocked over fundamental issues such as the 

size of Iran’s enrichment capability. At this point it is clear that 

Iran is stalling so that it can continue to absorb the $700 million 

per month in hard currency that it is receiving as a result of the 

sanctions relief. In order to change the current trajectory, I believe 

we need to increase the pressure on Iran because Iran does not believe it has much to lose from dragging on this negotiation process. 

That is my view. 

Why should we have any confidence in the administration’s negotiations with Iran? Isn’t it reasonable to conclude that Iran is benefitting from the sanctions as I stated, the relief, pocketing the $700 

million per month in hard currency and just stringing the U.S. 

along as long as possible, and in the end, we are either going to 

end up with no deal or a lousy one? Mr. Edelman? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Well, as I said in my statement, Mr. Chabot, I am 

also very worried about the trajectory of this negotiation. I think 

if you look back, again, as far back as 2003, what one sees is the 

international community’s red line amounting to kind of a serial 

concession to Iranian intransigence. So for instance, in the 2003–

2005 period, there was a freeze on enrichment activity and the Iranians, the then nuclear negotiator for Iran, subsequently explained 

51

in a book saying it was a tactic that the Iranians used in order to 

work out some of the difficulties, the technical difficulties they 

were having in their program. That Iranian nuclear negotiator is 

now the President of Iran, President Rouhani. 

So I think not only does one have to worry about the current 

state of the negotiations, but really the whole history here has been 

one of Iranian intransigence leading to further concessions. And if 

you are sitting in Tehran assessing this, the conclusion you would 

draw from this is the longer you hold out, the more extensions you 

get in the negotiations, the more concessions you are likely to win. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Takeyh, let me turn to you. I am 

already down to only 2 minutes left. You said we should listen to 

what they say, and I tend to agree with you on that. We had the 

previous leader say that he wanted to wipe Israel off the map. We 

have the current leader who still chants ‘‘Death to America.’’ Iran 

has said quite clearly on a number of occasions that they are determined to have a nuclear industrial program. Why should we have 

any confidence that negotiations with these people will end well? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would say the way the negotiating strategy has 

taken place, paradoxically, it makes an impasse more likely. Every 

time, as I think Eric said, we have met Iranian intransigence, we 

have adjusted our red lines. For Iranians to accept our current set 

of concessions means they would have to forego a future set of concessions. As a result, there is sort of a impasse built into these 

talks. 

The policy in the summer of 2012, as Bob knows, was stop, ship, 

shot. That clearly is not the policy today and that clearly was an 

aspect of the Joint Plan of Action. So as the red line has moved, 

and it has moved frankly for a decade across administrations, 

Israeli red lines have moved. The Iranian strategy of being patient 

and has a measure of forbearance has yielded, unfortunately, nuclear concessions. 

Mr. CHABOT. I am almost out of time. Mr. Einhorn? 

Mr. EINHORN. Congressman, you mentioned that Iran would simply pocket $700 million a month. Let me just point out that for 

every month they lose about $2.14 billion worth of oil revenues, 

about $15 billion over the next 6 months and that they are going 

to take a hit because of the reduction in the price of oil. As time 

goes on, they get deeper in the hole. 

Mr. CHABOT. I am almost out of time. Let me just conclude by 

saying that my concern is that the Obama administration is so desperate for a deal that Israel and our allies in the region and ultimately the United States itself, our security is in jeopardy. And 

that is why I am so disappointed, concerned, and this has been a 

disaster as far as I am concerned. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Ms. kelly of Illinois. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair. For years, Iran used a secret facility at Fordow, built into the side of a mountain to advance 

their nuclear program. We know Iran has the history with the covert program. A potential deal with Iran rests on our assumption 

that Iran is not continuing an overt nuclear program. What steps 

need to be taken to ensure that they are not racing toward a bomb 

at a covert facility? 

52

Mr. HANNAH. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would just say that 

in terms of what my testimony was about and trying to stiffen the 

administration’s position to mitigate the risk that I think we run 

of the kind of the deal that we are heading towards, I think we 

really need to pay attention to the verification and inspection regime. I think the IAEA additional protocol is not sufficient. I do believe we need a special inspection and verification regime for Iran. 

I think the Congress should insist on that. If it could it put in a 

joint resolution, I think it would be fantastic. But it essentially has 

to be what South Africa did when it gave up its nuclear weapons: 

Evidence that it had truly made a strategic decision to give up its 

nuclear weapons and agree to inspections that would be as close to 

the ideal as possible of any time, anywhere, anyone you want to 

interview you get access to. And I think that would be a very good 

barometer of whether or not the Iranians have, in fact, made a 

strategic choice to give up their ambition to have nuclear weapons. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. 

Mr. EDELMAN. Ms. Kelly, if I could just add to my colleague’s 

comment, several members have raised the issue of the past military dimensions of the Iranian program. And I think it is absolutely incumbent on the administration to make sure that the 

IAEA gets satisfaction on this before we reach a final agreement 

because, for the life of me, I don’t understand how one would begin 

to design the kind of inspection regime that John was just talking 

about until we have gotten to the bottom of all of the suspected 

military dimensions of the Iranian program. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I will just say one thing before yielding to Bob. 

There is a lot of discussion about the type of inspection regime that 

should accompany an agreement. IAEA does not have satisfactory 

access to Iranian nuclear facilities today, as acknowledged by IAEA 

reports. There has been a work plan negotiated between IAEA and 

Iran that remains incomplete. The first work plan was negotiated 

in 2006, 9 years ago. So at the very least the negotiators should 

demand that IAEA complete the work plan and Iran give access 

today, not as a component of a prospective agreement. 

Mr. EINHORN. Can I say that I agree with John that the additional protocol is not enough. We have to have what I call additional protocol plus. We have to have much greater access. We have 

to have access to military installations. The Iranians are resisting 

this. We have to insist on the ability to go to military installations. 

The IAEA has to be satisfied with Iran’s record of the past, these 

possible military dimensions. I don’t think it is going to be possible 

to learn everything about the past, but we need to insist on knowing enough about the past so we are confident that those activities 

are not continuing in the present and will not continue in the future. 

Ms. KELLY. How will we know what enough is? What will be that 

measure to know what enough is? 

Mr. EINHORN. Well, it is a combination of what we hear from 

them about the past, plus what we are prepared to—what they are 

prepared to agree to in terms of intrusive measures going forward. 

I think the combination of the two would hopefully give us the confidence that they don’t have a covert program. 

Ms. KELLY. Any other comments? Thank you. I yield back. 

53

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my colleague yield? 

Ms. KELLY. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Hannah, I really am 

struck with your suggestion because it just seems to me Congress 

is once again probably going down a rather feckless road. It makes 

us feel good. It allows us to pound our chest and prove our bona 

fides, but it is not efficacious. The idea of an inspection regime 

modeled after, for example, South Africa, that kind of agreement 

is to me a very helpful thing for you to suggest. So that is definitely 

something I think we ought to be exploring frankly before we start 

going down the road of additional sanctions which could only probably probably queer the deal. And I don’t think Congress wants to 

take responsibility for queering the deal. Do you want to comment? 

Mr. HANNAH. Thank you, Congressman. On South Africa, I think 

it is also worthwhile knowing that despite the fact that South Africa up front made that admission and made that agreement to that 

kind of inspection regime incredibly intrusive, according to Olli 

Heinonen, the former IAEA deputy director for inspections in Iran, 

that took 17 years to verify everything that South Africa had and 

to make sure we had a full understanding of the South African program. Here, we are talking about at best, at best, 15 years for a 

regime that is still engaged in a lie that goes to the hear of what 

this negotiation is all about, that they continue to maintain that 

they have never had any kind of ambition to have nuclear weapons 

which will be——

Mr. POE [presiding]. The gentlelady’s time has expired. The 

Chair will recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Judge Poe. And thank each of you for 

being here today. I think it has been very helpful. And Ambassador 

Edelman, your concerns about the course of negotiations with your 

background, this is really important for the American people to 

know. 

Additionally, to me, it is really unfortunate that this administration did not give, I believe, sufficient encouragement to the young 

people of Iran who years ago, just a few years ago, were seeking 

to rebuild a modern, advanced nation. We could have given encouragement. I will never forget the young accountant who bled to 

death as she was laying on the street. The people of Iran want better. And we need to be encouraging them. 

In regard to that, Mr. Hannah, what is your analysis of the logic 

to the President’s negotiating strategy that the threat of stronger 

sanctions will drive the Iranians away, rather than compel them to 

make a better and real agreement? It seems illogical to me and 

many of my constituents in the reverse of reality. 

Mr. HANNAH. I think it is unfortunate that the President, the 

way he has approached the issue of prospective sanctions. I think 

he is essentially bought into an Iranian narrative and I think up 

front in advance he is essentially granting legitimacy if Iran decides to act on prospective sanctions and walk away from this deal. 

They have essentially got the President of the United States more 

or less saying they would be justified in doing that, that he has 

been much tougher on the Congress than he has been on Iran in 

these talks. And I think the focus of sanctions, I don’t believe it 

54

would lead Iran to walk away from these negotiations. If it did it 

would be only temporary. I think pressure is the only thing that 

has worked with the Iranian regime and I think pressure is our 

best means of getting a diplomatic settlement in this situation and 

actually avoiding war. Quite the contrary to what the President 

suggests. 

Mr. WILSON. Avoiding war and threat to America, our allies. 

Dr. Takeyh, Iran for decades has sponsored numerous terrorist 

attacks in places as far flung as Thailand, Beirut, New Delhi, 

Lagos, Nairobi, including the 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi 

Arabian Ambassador to the United States and bomb the Israeli and 

Saudi Embassies in Washington. How can the United States trust 

such a government to keep any agreement? This is in the context 

of demonstrators in Tehran carrying signs in English proclaiming 

‘‘Death to America. Death to Israel.’’

Mr. TAKEYH. I think that is a fair point. I would suggest that in 

Islamic republics’ conception, international law and international 

norms are conspiracies, forged by the Western powers and inflicted 

upon it in an unfair and injudicious way. It is kind of difficult to 

suggest that Iran can be a member of the NPT in good standing 

while at the same time being a leading sponsor of terrorism. The 

two states cannot be cojoined in a sort of a logical construct. That 

is why I think once there is an agreement, the immediate challenge 

of it is detection of inevitable Iranian violations. And I am not 

quite sure how in the aftermath of an agreement you can deal with 

those violations in a sort of a systematic way with re-instructional 

sanctions and penalties because I think the inclination would be to 

have an American delegation meet an Iranian delegation and highlight those disagreements and those violations and presumably 

they take some corrective action. But I suspect if Iran does not violate its arms control agreement prospectively, it is the first time in 

history it has not violated international legal instrument. 

Mr. WILSON. That is incredible. Thank you. Additionally, the 

American people need to know as Iran is claiming or the regime, 

that this is for peaceful purposes, they are also, Mr. Einhorn, developing a ballistic missile capability. Already they have a capability of striking as far as Southeastern Europe, Greece, Bulgaria, 

Romania. And they are developing a greater ICBM. They have 

launched a satellite. In light of that, with this delivery system, 

should the long-term agreement include limitations on a ballistic 

missile capability? 

Mr. EINHORN. I think it would be good if there could be ballistic 

missile constraints in a nuclear deal. I don’t think it is going to 

happen. The Iranians say that their missiles are for conventional 

weapons delivery, not for nuclear, so this has no part to play. I 

think we are going to have to pursue quite aggressively the question of Iranian ballistic missile capability, but separately from 

these negotiations. I think it is very important. I think the administration tries very hard to interdict procurement by Iran of equipment and technology for Iran’s missile program. I think this should 

be a top priority. The ballistic missile defense programs we have 

we are working on with our European partners are designed to 

counter Iran’s ballistic missile capability. But I think making it a 

part of the nuclear negotiations is going to be hard. 

55

Mr. TAKEYH. I will just add one thing. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman’s 

time has expired. Thank you. The Chair recognizes one of our new 

members from Pennsylvania, Mr. Boyle, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BOYLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be 

on such an important committee. I am someone who is generally 

a supporter of the President and this administration. That having 

been said, I have a difficult time understanding the logic that if 

Congress were to act and say not sanctions today, but sanctions by 

a date certain if negotiations were to fail, that somehow that is unreasonable or somehow then we would be responsible for sinking 

these negotiations. When we were up against the November 24th 

deadline, and then we decided and agreed to yet another round of 

overtime to push things another 7 months, I think many reasonable people, who even might not have been supporters of sanctions 

at that time, came over to the view that clearly we cannot allow 

negotiations to go on indefinitely. 

George Mitchell, who successfully negotiated the Good Friday 

agreement in Belfast, talked about the importance of having a 

deadline for those negotiations because there were some issues that 

have been debated for hundreds of years and could go on being debated for centuries to come. 

So I have to say before I get to my question, I really disagree 

with the view that if Congress were to act and make clear what 

sanctions would be in the event these negotiations fail, I disagree 

that that would somehow be irresponsible. 

Now getting to the possibility of a deal, knowing that Rouhani 

is not the ultimate decider, he is not the great leader. That said, 

there does seem to be somewhat of a moderating force in Iran that 

is more concerned with ending the sanction regime and being an 

economic power rather than going down the military path. 

How much of a percentage of the Iranian regime do you think 

that represents? And frankly, how emboldened would they be even 

if there were a deal that they wanted to accept? What authority or 

power would they really have ultimately to be able to agree to 

that? 

Mr. TAKEYH. On the ballistic missile issue, the U.N. Resolution 

1625 has that which was negotiated in May 2010. I think there is 

one difference between President Rouhani and the office of the Supreme Leader. President Rouhani seems to recognize that Iran’s 

economic situation is unlikely to improve without an arms control 

agreement. That particular logic is not obvious to the office of the 

Supreme Leader. But I would answer that by saying so what? So 

what does President Rouhani’s recognition of that fact mean, given 

the fact that unlike President Ahmadinejad is not willing to buck 

the system? He is likely to remain within the parameters and red 

lines that are negotiated between his office and those of the Supreme Leader. 

So irrespective of that agreement, which I think there is some indication that there is, it is a disagreement without significant consequence. 

Mr. BOYLE. Does anyone else have a comment on that? Well, before I yield back, I would just say something that I believe my colleague, Congressman Sherman said at the very beginning of these 

56

hearings. To the extent that we can do anything with hard power, 

but also with soft power to embolden moderating forces and modernizing forces in Iran, it is certainly in our interest and certainly 

seems there can be far more to do than what we have been doing. 

Do you have a comment? 

Mr. HANNAH. Thank you, Congressman. Can I just ask the chair 

first if I could have entered into the record a new FDD Report, 

‘‘Foundation for Defense and Democracy, The Case for Deadline 

Triggered Sanctions on Iran?’’

Mr. POE. Without objection, the document will be entered into 

the record. 

Mr. HANNAH. Thank you, sir. What I would say, Congressman, 

is we have had this debate over time in the past with the Congress 

consistently saying that we need more leverage, we need more 

sanctions in order to get Iran to have any possibility of getting a 

deal with the Iranians. And consistently administrations have argued to the Congress that, in fact, no that really won’t be helpful. 

They go too far. You will alienate our international partners and 

you will empower radicals inside of Iran who want to keep pushing 

that nuclear program forward. 

I would say we had a definitive answer to that argument when 

Congress finally went ahead and got the administration to agree to 

those crippling sanctions in 2012. By the time those went into effect in the middle of 2012, within a year, not only had the entire 

Iranian political system thrown upside down and the Supreme 

Leader allowing a more moderate, pragmatic face like Hassan 

Rouhani to come into power, but you also had Hassan Rouhani racing as fast as he could back to the negotiating table to try and halt 

the continued escalation of U.S. sanctions which was happening at 

that time. That, to me, is pretty good evidence that I think on these 

issues, Congress’ judgment has been pretty good historically. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair recognizes 

himself for 5 minutes. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

In the State of the Union address, the President said this:

‘‘Our diplomacy is at work with respect to Iran, where for the 

first time in a decade we have halted the progress of its nuclear program and reduced its stockpile of nuclear material.’’

That statement earned the President three Pinocchios from the 

Washington Post. It is not true. It is either a mistake or it is a 

falsehood. It seems to me that the United States and Western Europe in dealing with Iran and expecting some deal where we continue to back off sanctions, we are nothing more than gullible and 

playing the chamberlain on this issue. It seems to me that this hug 

diplomacy with Iran is like the West being the timid sheep and if 

we lay down with the jackal of the desert, we will become the mutton meal of the jackal. 

I want to ask you specifically about the statement of the President. Mr. Takeyh, would you like to comment on that statement? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I will yield to Bob in a minute. I do think the Joint 

Plan of Action has imposed some interim restraints on various aspects of the Iranian program such as production of medium-range 

fuel and 20 percent and the installation of new centrifuges. And it 

57

hasn’t addressed some other issues such as research and development which I think is particularly glaring. 

Now under the Joint Plan of Action, Iran had to maintain a 

threshold of w enriched uranium to some degree. Bob will know the 

number for sure. I think somehow they have gone above that at 

times. But I do think it has exercised some interim steps and restraints into the Iranian program. 

Mr. POE. I have more questions and if we have time we will come 

back for the comments. I am glad you all are excited about answering these questions. 

Mr. Takeyh, you said that the Iranians have never—is that right, 

did you say they have never agreed or fulfilled an international 

agreement in the past? Is that what you said? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think it is the genetic propensity of the system to 

regard international law as an unfair imposition resulting from 

Western conspiracy. 

Mr. POE. Have they ever agreed to an agreement? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Compliance is always tentative. 

Mr. POE. Compliance. So they have never complied? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Compliance is always tentative. 

Mr. POE. Tentative. All right. It seems to me that the policy of 

the Iran Government is reflected in the Supreme Leader’s statement that it is the goal of Iran to destroy the United States and 

Israel in reverse order, Israel first, then the United States. 

As far as you know, has that policy, that foreign policy, changed? 

Ambassador. 

Mr. EDELMAN. Well, I defer to Ray who is more expert than I on 

Iran. But I think Iranian foreign policy has been from a strategic 

point of view rather consistent since the revolution in 1979. There 

have been lots of tactical shifts and moves back and forth, but the 

overall objective of the revolution’s foreign policy I think has been 

consistent. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Hannah? 

Mr. HANNAH. I think the answer is no. It hasn’t changed and if 

you do actually listen to their words and believe what they say, 

they are telling you every week some senior political or military 

leader in that regime is telling you that their objectives of world 

without America and destroying the State of Israel is still very 

much in place. 

Mr. POE. So that is their goal. Does the United States policy deal 

with that issue? Are we hoping to change their mind or are we hoping to force them to change their mind? What is our policy toward 

the comment that they want to eliminate us? All right, Mr. 

Einhorn, you have been wanting to answer a question. This one is 

yours. 

Mr. EINHORN. Okay. It is the policy to counter Iran’s destabilizing behavior wherever it is and to beef up the defenses of our 

partners in the region so that they can withstand intimidation and 

pressure from the Iranians. 

Mr. POE. Let me interrupt you there. If the Iranians get nuclear 

weapons, don’t you think that there will be a rush with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt to get nuclear weapon programs, Mr. 

Takeyh? 

58

Mr. TAKEYH. I do think there will be an inclination to move toward appropriation of such technologies. And that is something for 

the United States to be very mindful of proliferation. I do think at 

times we tend to have exaggerated views of cascades and so forth, 

namely that one nuclear power can trigger similar things. And that 

would be a very great challenge for the United States to temper——

Mr. POE. Do you think those three countries will be encouraged 

by the fact that Iran gets nuclear weapons to have their own nuclear weapon program? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think they are already encouraged to move in the 

direction of indigenous enrichment which is a precursor to such 

weaponry. 

Mr. POE. My time has expired. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses for being here today to discuss this incredibly important 

issue. I, for one, am grateful to the administration for their efforts 

to bring the Iranian Government to the table for these historic negotiations. I think it is important that we remember exactly what 

we are talking about here if the negotiations were to fall apart. At 

the moment, the administration is attempting to reach a diplomatic 

solution to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Should 

these negotiations fail, the United States, the international community together must be prepared to respond appropriately including 

by using force, if necessary. But I think it is absolutely vital that 

we undertake in good faith every reasonable effort that we can to 

reach a non-military solution and devote all the time and energy 

necessary to do that. 

The President has asked Congress to give him until the end of 

June to reach a deal and I, for one, am inclined to honor that request. However, we all agree that Iran has to understand this process will not be open ended or indefinite. 

And with that, I go to my first question. The administration has 

said that the Iranian economy has been crippled by the sanctions. 

A recent State Department fact sheet said that Iran’s economy contracted nearly 7 percent in the last year and contracted a further 

3.4 percent through December 2013. Yet, we have also seen recent 

economic analysis that says that the Iranian economy is beginning 

to recover as a result of the sanctions relief under the Joint Plan 

of Action. Who is right? What has the impact been of the limited 

sanction relief that we have already provided? Are the sanctions 

still providing for us the kind of leverage that we need at the negotiating table to get the right deal? And what has been the impact 

of the drop in oil prices on the Iranian economy? And I invite whoever has the best and most accurate information with respect to 

this issue. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would just say they are both right. The State Department Fact Sheet that captured the situation in 2013 is correct 

and the IMF report that has suggested incremental growth in the 

Iranian economy since then is also correct. 

Mr. EINHORN. Congressman, I think what has happened is a 

kind of Rouhani effect. Rouhani’s economic managers are much 

more competent than Ahmadinejad’s economic managers. And so 

59

you have had some incremental improvements. But I think especially with the oil price drop and the continuation of our sanctions, 

the Iranian economy cannot possibly recover. I think sensible Iranians understand that. There has been a huge drop in per capita 

GDP. The rial, their currency, has dropped something like 56 percent from earlier years and even something like 19 percent from 

November 2013. I think the data indicates that their economy is 

in really bad shape. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said it is like 

they are at the bottom, they are stagnating at the bottom of a recession. And I think that is the reality. 

Mr. HANNAH. Congressman, if I can, I would just say that whatever Bob says might be true, but I have no doubt that the IMF is 

right despite all of the—and they are in deep trouble economically. 

The trendline and trajectory is slowly upward, a reduction of economic pressure from where it was when the JPAO was signed. And 

I would just say that we have no historical experience of successfully denuclearizing its state when the economic, political, and military pressures are all going in the wrong direction, that is, decreasing, rather than intensifying. 

Mr. CICILLINE. My second question is that some observers have 

suggested to us that Iran, the political leadership in Iran, the Supreme Leader, and the Iranian people, as a result of their efforts, 

have been convinced that somehow a nuclear weapons capability is 

either essential to their national identity or essential to their self 

defense. If that is true that they successfully persuaded themselves 

and the Iranian people of that, does that make a final deal on this 

impossible? Because in the end if they conclude, however erroneous 

it is, that it is essential for their self defense and they have convinced the Iranian people of that and in the context of Rouhani sort 

of running on some effort to change this sanctions regime, does it 

make both a deal impossible because a deal can obviously not include their ability to have nuclear weapons? And secondly, does it 

make the collapse of negotiations inevitable and a replacement of 

Rouhani by someone who is more hard line. And I will start with 

you, Mr. Einhorn. 

Mr. EINHORN. Congressman, Iran’s leaders have convinced the 

Iranian public that their enrichment capability is almost a national 

birthright, a source of dignity and so forth. I think there is a consensus across the political spectrum. They are not prepared to give 

up enrichment. 

They haven’t convinced the Iranian people that nuclear weapons 

are essential. Quite the opposite. The Supreme Leader says there 

is a religious decree of fatwa against nuclear weapons which is a 

good thing. Whether or not it is honest, it is a good thing because 

in the Iranian public they have the impression that this is not the 

policy of their country 

Mr. HANNAH. Congressman, I would just note that I think it is 

going to be very difficult to get a deal. I don’t think it is impossible, 

but I think you really have to be able to present the regime with 

a choice that either they are going to continue with this program 

or their regime is going to be held at real serious risk of either economic collapse or military attack. I think the Congress had put the 

administration in a position where that kind of choice was coming 

60

true for the Iranians in the fall of 2013. And I now worry that that 

is not necessarily the choice they are facing any more. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. We go to 

Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Take me back and kind of a review for maybe the new people and 

myself of why we started the negotiations? Who started it? Did we 

initiate it or did Iran come to the table and say we want to negotiate? Just real briefly any of you. 

Mr. EDELMAN. Congressman, I think I said in my statement we 

have had about 10 years’ worth of diplomacy. So this really goes 

back to 2003 when the EU–3 was negotiating with Iran over the 

early stages of its enrichment program after it was exposed by the 

national——

Mr. YOHO. What I mean, if I can cut you off, what I mean is with 

the negotiation and the release of the sanctions here recently, the 

current ones. 

Mr. EDELMAN. The Joint Plan of Action? 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. EDELMAN. That was undertaken after the election of President Rouhani. 

Mr. YOHO. Did they come to us or did we say hey, let us start 

negotiating on this and straighten this out? 

Mr. EDELMAN. I think it would be fair to say that the administration since President Obama came in had been reaching out to Iran 

in the hope that they could engage them in a negotiation. It became possible after Rouhani was elected. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Hannah, what did we get out of the negotiation? 

What was the benefit for us out of this? 

Mr. HANNAH. I think as Mr. Einhorn has explained that the 

JPAO does commit Iran to certain tactical pauses in certain elements of its current nuclear program. It happens to be on the enrichment end that they were pausing elements of the program that 

they have already quite perfected, that they don’t really need to improve in order to race forward to a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. YOHO. And that is something I want to bring out because if 

you look over the past 25, 30 years, they have been progressing 

this way as an isolated state for the most part with sanctions on 

or off. And I see them progressing to this point. And I don’t see 

that we got really a whole lot out of beginning these negotiations. 

Let me ask you, 10 years from now do you see a nuclear armed 

Iran? Mr.—how do you pronounce your name? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I got the easy one. Ten years from now will Iran 

have nuclear weapons? I am not sure I can answer that question, 

Congressman, with any degree of precision. 

Mr. YOHO. Let me tell you what I have heard over the last 2 

years, my first term in Congress. We have had all kinds of experts 

sitting right where you are and they said within 6 months and this 

was going back to 2013, that within 6 months Iran would have 

enough nuclear materials within 6 months to have five or six weapons. So I can only assume these experts, some of you guys might 

have been on that panel, you know, they were correct. So I can asVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:38 Mar 17, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\012715\92850 SHIRL
61

sume at this point, listening to the experts that Iran has the capability of that. 

In addition, we know they have detonated a trigger device. They 

have their ICBM missiles. So I will get to where I want to go on 

this. But when I was in vet school, I had a professor, things were 

real simple for us. He said if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, 

smells and quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck. 

What I see with the intent of Iran is the same thing. With the 

rhetoric coming out, the extinction of Israel, the death of the Great 

Satan, the Little Satan, Israel, one bomb nation, the end of Zionism 

and all the other rhetoric that comes out of there, I have to believe 

what they say is they don’t mean to carry on just a nuclear power 

program, that they are intent on getting a nuclear weapon, if so, 

and I really believe they are hell bent on doing that. What are we 

doing? Because what I see is this is an exercise in futility, especially with the sunset clause. 

Regardless of what we negotiate within 5, 10 years or whatever 

that date is, all restrictions are gone, so therefore they are going 

to be that. You know, to answer my own question, I see them either having it, the capability, or already having it. What are we 

doing as a nation to protect when that point comes? What are we 

doing to prepare for that next phase? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would say one thing in point of agreement with 

you, it is at times suggested that Iran will have all the ingredients 

of nuclear weapons, but not cross the line. I think if they get there, 

they will cross. 

Now what are we doing in the region? I think at this point if 

there is an agreement, I suspect that any administration in power 

will try to enhance the security of the regional allies to various deployments and various anti-missile forces and so on. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Einhorn, and then I want to add one more comment at the end. 

Mr. EINHORN. The U.S. intelligence community has decided year 

after year after year that Iran is insisting on preserving an option 

the Supreme Leader wrote, but it has made no decision yet on 

whether actually to build nuclear weapons. I think this is an issue 

for the future. What we can do through an agreement is to deter 

them from making that decision to cross the line. We can do it by 

making the path ahead to nuclear weapons very long, long breakout time, getting the capability to detect breakout at a very early 

stage and also threatening them with consequences if we detect 

breakout, so that they know that they will not be able to succeed. 

I think that is the theory of the case. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go to Mr. Alan Lowenthal of 

California. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Did I go out of order here? 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes, I missed Mr. Gerry Connolly. I best go by 

seniority. Mr. Connolly, Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Lowenthal. Welcome to the panel. 

Mr. Hannah, if I heard you correctly, you basically said and I 

don’t want to put—but what I heard you say to us was it is worth 

the gamble if the past is prologue, sanctions didn’t drive them 

62

away. In fact, sanctions helped bring them to the table. What probability though would you put on that not working this time, that 

unintentionally—we have got to remember Iran also was a political 

system and there are factions. And there is probably a faction that 

would like to resolve this issue more in our favor than not and then 

there is another faction, probably the Supreme Leader leads that 

faction that is very suspicious of this and frankly wants to see the 

status and everything else that flows from becoming a nuclear 

power. 

We need to be careful that we are not unwittingly playing to a 

faction not in our interest, not that we have friendly factions, but 

less friendly factions. Don’t we need to be a little bit careful about 

new sanctions and the risk that the fact the Iranians walk away 

from the table and use it as an excuse to say we are done. And 

then the only option is what a previous panelist referred to as kinetic options. 

Mr. HANNAH. Thank you, Congressman. I do think that you have 

to, however low the probability you place on it, you have to hold 

out the contingency that perhaps the President is right and that 

Iran will try and use this as a chance to break out and resume its 

nuclear program. I think it is unfortunate that it might be part of 

a self-fulfilling prophecy and that I think the President is now giving the Iranians, as well as some of our international partners, the 

grounds and the arguments to do exactly that. The President didn’t 

have to do that. I can think of a much different approach he would 

have taken in which he would have said I don’t agree with the 

Congress, I don’t think I need this power. I don’t think it is in violation of the letter of the JPOA. We have got enough waivers in 

these prospective sanctions that if necessary I will continue to prevent sanctions from going into place on the Iranians, but still make 

the argument that if the Iranians made the fateful choice to try 

and break out, this Congress and this Executive Branch would be 

completely unified in mobilizing our international partners to say 

that would be outrageous, and that if Iran wanted to play that dangerous game, there is a much higher, higher price to pay for them 

potentially beyond whatever is being considered in these new prospective sanctions. But I do think you have to take it into account 

and plan for it that that could be an outside possibility. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ambassador Edelman. 

Mr. EDELMAN. Mr. Connolly, if I could add to Mr. Hannah’s answer. I, from my own experience in government, am somewhat 

skeptical of arguments about sanctions driving people away from 

the negotiating table. During the course of the six party talks with 

North Korea in the Bush administration in 2007, we were told unless the Banco Delta Asia sanctions were lifted, North Korea was 

going to walk away from the table. We lifted those sanctions. 

We then took North Korea off the terrorism list in the summer 

of 2008. We then got them out from under the restrictions of the 

Trading With the Enemy Act and those negotiations collapsed and 

failed anyway, despite the relief of sanctions. I think that was because North Korea had not made a fundamental decision to limit 

its nuclear weapons program and give it up and I think that is the 

same issue we are facing now with Iran. 

63

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am going to ask the chair if he will indulge the 

other two panelists to answer the same question. 

Chairman ROYCE. Proceed. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. I do want to say to you, Ambassador Edelman, I take your point. But what if you are wrong? 

It is a rhetorical question. But I mean as a member who has to 

vote I would hope every one of us takes that responsibility seriously. 

Mr. EDELMAN. And you should. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. When Congress queers the deal in foreign policy 

it is a big deal. The League of Nations comes to mind. I am not 

sure that was our finest moment. And so we have got to tread carefully. We can’t just be facile about this, not that you are being, but 

we must weigh this very carefully and we do have to ask the question what if we are wrong? 

May I ask the other two panelists, if either one wanted to answer 

the question? And I thank the chair for his indulgence. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think there are a number of reasons why Iran has 

remained on the table that have nothing to do with the nuclear 

issue. Number one is it seeks legitimization of its nuclear program. 

That can only come at the table. Number two, it does get a measure of economic relief, not in terms of the $700 million, but in 

terms of the atmosphere that is conducive to economic growth. 

That would also evaporate if it leaves the table. 

Finally, Iran’s very aggressive policies in the region are not being 

really challenged by the United States partly because of the nuclear negotiations so that veneer of protection will move. So there 

are a lot of reasons why Iranians have an interest in the table, in 

the negotiations, even if those negotiations are impassed. 

Mr. EINHORN. Congressman, no one knows for sure whether new 

sanctions legislation will scuttle the deal. By the way, all of the 

P5+1 partners, all of whom have Embassies in Tehran and have 

good contacts with the Iranians, all of them believe that it would 

be very dangerous for us to pursue this course and it could well undermine the negotiations. But we just don’t know. I tend to believe, 

I tend to agree with Eric, I tend to believe they won’t walk out, but 

I think it could have a deleterious effect on the prospect for greater 

Iranian flexibility. The question is are they necessary? Is it worth 

the risk? Should we take that risk? Because right now we have 

strong economic sanctions in place that are continuing to hurt the 

Iranians. We have the oil price drop which is also hurting the Iranians. 

And we can always come back. If we need to in June, we can 

come back quickly and we can legislate new sanctions at that point. 

And I suggested in my statement earlier, the Executive and the 

Legislative Branches should be working now on new sanctions legislation. Work them out. Get agreement. Work together and have 

something that can be voted on quickly and implemented quickly, 

if necessary, at the end of June or whenever. So I think that is the 

question congressmen have to ask themselves, is it worth the risk? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Can I just say one thing about a conversation that 

you and I had, Congressman Connolly, at this hearing and when 

I said to you that the administration has to come back and say why 

does it think at the time of the last extension the next 6 months 

64

will be different than the last 6 months? You and I had that conversation. 

It turned out the last 6 months were not that different from the 

previous one. Whatever your view on sanctions is, the administration is obligated to come to this House and say why do they think 

the next 6 months will be different than the last 6 months? Why 

do they think they have sufficient coercive leverage in the negotiations that are admittedly stalemated? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And Mr. Chairman, picking up on that——

Mr. PERRY [presiding]. Will the gentleman suspend? I appreciate 

your time, but you have got to let folks weigh in. The gentleman’s 

time has expired. The Chair recognizes Mr. Zeldin. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank Chairman 

Ed Royce and the Foreign Affairs Committee for taking a leadership role on this issue. Regardless of whether the President is getting played or he is just playing along, when the President gets 

played, my country gets played. Senator Bob Menendez made a 

comment of the leader from his own party that it seemed like his 

talking points were coming directly from Tehran. 

When the President says and his administration says that there 

is an agreement and the leadership of Iran is immediately refuting 

the terms of that agreement, in any way, there is no meeting of the 

minds at all. Over the course of this debate, whether we go back 

10 years or we go back over the course of the last 12 to 18 months, 

Iran has made a tactical decision that they will benefit from billions of dollars of economic benefit in return for pursuing nuclear 

capability, but doing it just a little bit slower than they were previously. I think we need to understand that our enemies do not respect weakness. They only respect strength. 

I support increased sanction. Mr. Sherman said at the beginning 

of this hearing that it is important that we have a July 1st game 

plan. This only goes into effect if there is no deal. 

I was criticized for my expression of gratitude for the Israeli 

prime minister accepting the invite to come address a joint Congress. Some say that having the Israeli prime minister here undercuts America’s foreign policy. One colleague on the other side of the 

aisle said yesterday that it is a subversion. If having the Israeli 

prime minister come address a joint session of Congress is undercutting American policy, then there is something wrong with America’s foreign policy. 

I think that we need to be posturing ourselves always from positions of strength and not weakness. I believe in American 

exceptionalism. We are a great country. We have seen it in Iran 

as we have seen it in other foreign policy challenges our country 

faces. There is nothing to apologize for if the President sees himself 

with leverage going into negotiations. 

And my question in some form or fashion with my colleagues before me has been asked, but I would just like you to speak to the 

very simple question of if Congress passes increased sanctions, does 

that give this President—which only go into effect if there is no 

deal—does that give this President more leverage or less in his 

talks? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Congressman Zeldin, I cannot imagine how it cannot give him more leverage as the previous sanctions have already 

65

given us leverage. I agree with Ray that economic sanctions alone 

are not enough. I think we need to do a few other things. I spoke 

in my statement about the importance of convincing Iran that the 

military option is serious and real. The administration likes to say 

all options are on the table. I think when the Supreme Leader 

gives speeches ridiculing that behind banners that say ‘‘America 

can’t do a damn thing to us,’’ it tells you that they are not convinced that it is real and they need to be convinced that it is real 

because that is part of getting them to the point that I think Mr. 

Hannah was talking about earlier, concluding that a diplomatic solution is the best option for them because the other options, both 

economic and military are worse. 

Mr. HANNAH. Congressman, I think that in theory it should give 

you more leverage, makes it much more difficult to have more leverage when you have the leader of the negotiations, the President 

of the United States himself arguing against it, saying he doesn’t 

want it and saying that such action would, in fact, constitute 

grounds for unraveling the international coalition and for our 

enemy walking away from the table and resuming its nuclear program. So I think that is extremely problematic. I think it could 

work, but I am worried about it. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I will say that if it is the administration’s position 

that the sanctions are unnecessary at this stage, then they are obligated to say how do they propose to change the dynamics of stalemated talks. 

Mr. EINHORN. The administration says pressure is necessary at 

this stage. It just believes that there is sufficient pressure now augmented by the drop in the oil prices. There is sufficient pressure. 

The question is whether there should be what would be perceived 

internationally as a premature and unnecessary provocation. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I thank the panel and again to the committee and 

to the chairman. Last night I was in my office rereading the U.S. 

Constitution and I see components of it talking about the power of 

the purse of Congress, the ratification of treaties, the declaration 

of war. Those out there who said that this body is not an equal 

branch of government and does not have a role in America’s foreign 

policy I would recommend that it would be good reading to look at 

the U.S. Constitution and some of its analysis. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. PERRY. The gentleman yields. The gentleman from California, Mr. Lowenthal, is recognized. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I want to thank the 

panelists for having this discussion today and educating us. It 

couldn’t be more timely obviously at this moment, especially after 

the President in the State of the Union asked Congress not to impose any sanctions until the final details of the agreement come 

out. 

So my question and I think you have all dealt with it and I first 

want to associate myself with many of the comments by other 

members, especially Mr. Cicilline, who I am very supportive of diplomacy if it works. So the question I have in a much more specific 

way is in the Senate there is the Kirk-Menendez Bill that has been 

introduced, which really talks about specific, what to do now, specifically. And I think Mr. Einhorn has already kind of answered 

66

this question, but I would like to know from Ambassador Edelman 

and Mr. Hannah and Mr. Takeyh, would you recommend that we 

take up that bill or a bill similar to that, that specific bill which 

really does do—increases sanctions if the interim agreement 

doesn’t lead to a comprehensive agreement. It is real clear. Should 

we be dealing with that specific bill now? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Mr. Lowenthal, I would, were I in your shoes, 

bearing in mind, the understandable concerns that Mr. Connolly 

and others have raised. Look, I spent 30 years as a career diplomat, so I, too, support diplomatic efforts. I don’t think there is 

anybody on this panel or really very many people who follow this 

issue who don’t believe that a diplomatic solution would be far preferable to having to resort to other means, particularly military. But 

having said that, the key, I think, is what you said. Supporting diplomacy, if it is successful. And one of the challenges of diplomacy 

is not losing sight of what the objective is. And I have seen unfortunately many times where negotiators, understandably having been 

involved for a very long time, become very committed to the success 

of the negotiation with less concern about exactly what the outcome 

is. And we need to remember what outcome I think all of us are 

hoping for which is that we end up with a region that does not 

have an Iran that has a nuclear weapons capability or on the 

threshold of one. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Just before I go on to Mr. Hannah and 

Mr. Takeyh, I want to follow up on your answer. You know, timing is obviously critically important and I think that is what you 

are really saying in part is all the timing. 

Recently, Prime Minister David Cameron said it is the opinion 

of the United Kingdom that further sanctions or the threat of sanctions won’t help at all now. And as was pointed out already by the 

representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, European 

Union recently wrote a very powerful op ed piece saying that new 

sanctions now introduced could eliminate this coalition, could break 

the unity. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. EDELMAN. It is clearly a challenge for alliance management, 

but I think some of that challenge has to be met by firm leadership 

from the United States. Secondly, I think the question is are the 

sanctions that are being discussed now immediate or are they prospective? Somehow the Iranians are free to announce that they are 

building two more nuclear facilities which couldn’t be less in the 

spirit of these negotiations than saying if the negotiations don’t 

reach a successful outcome, then Iran would be subject to more 

sanctions. Somehow that is not a provocation to us, but the Congress considering sanctions is. 

I will tell you, Mr. Lowenthal, one of the reasons I don’t believe 

the Iranians have been terribly serious about this process and 

bringing it to a conclusion, one of the signals to me that they are 

not, is the fact that they are not demanding that the administration come to the Congress for approval of whatever agreement is 

reached. If they were serious, and were intent on an agreement 

that would outlive this Presidential administration, they would say 

we will only agree to something that you take to the Congress so 

that we know it has gone some permanence to it. 

67

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you. I would like to go on to Mr. Hannah. 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, I would associate myself with Ambassador 

Edelman’s remarks, Congressman, and just simply note that if I 

was sitting across the table from the Iranians, I would want the 

Congress as active and making as much noise and being as frustrated as possible. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. So you would be supportive of us taking up the 

Kirk-Menendez Bill as soon as possible? 

Mr. HANNAH. I certainly would. I think any activity up here does 

give, should give our negotiators leverage to say this Congress is 

running out of patience. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Regardless what our other members of the 

P5+1 are saying? 

Mr. HANNAH. So long as the President of the United States is 

agreeing with them that this is grounds for collapsing these negotiations, if you had the United States explaining to our P5+1 what 

needs to happen here and what these sanctions are all about, I 

think you would mitigate the problem enormously. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Mr. Takeyh? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would say, Congressman, that at this particular 

stage, given the differences between Congress and the President on 

this issue has not helped the negotiations at all and is not helping 

our negotiators. I would actually advise instead of the Congress, 

the White House to come to Congress and negotiate with it what 

kind of a sanctions bill they want, what kind of equities they want 

to negotiate. I think Bob mentioned that. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Before the end of June they should be coming, 

now publicly, after they have asked us not to do sanctions? 

Mr. TAKEYH. They should have come long ago saying this is what 

we want to see in a sanctions bill and the Legislative and the Executive Branch can work something out. They do have interlocutors 

on the Hill, far more ready than they do in Tehran. And in that 

sense, I think the unity of the two branches of government are critical for success of diplomacy. 

Mr. PERRY. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Emmer from Minnesota. 

Mr. EMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to the distinguished 

panel, thank you for your time. I just have a couple of follow ups. 

For Ambassador Edelman, I think you have answered it now. At 

the beginning, you talked about recommending. You recommended 

threatening or imposing new sanctions or additional sanctions. 

From your most recent comments are you focused now on sanctions 

in the event these current negotiations are not concluded by the 

pending deadline? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. EMMER. And if you could do me one more favor and maybe 

I will take this to others, sanctions are only as effective, can only 

be effective if they are not hollow, in other words, if they have an 

impact. It really doesn’t matter what somebody says whether they 

are going to honor it or not. If additional sanctions are imposed, 

68

whether now or once the deadline expires, are those sanctions 

going to be effective? Is that a rhetorical question? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Obviously, Mr. Emmer, it will depend a little bit 

on what you and your colleagues consider and what you put into 

the bill and how it is structured. I do think that there is, although 

Ray has written elsewhere, that Iran is the most sanctioned country in the world, I do think that there is still room, there are other 

sectors of the economy that haven’t been hit yet, so I think there 

is still room to turn up the pressure. And I think there are other 

things we can do and members of the panel have suggested it, Mr. 

Sherman for one, others have. It shouldn’t be just economic pressure. I think there ought to be support for democracy movements 

inside Iran. I think there ought to be broadcasting. I think there 

is a whole panoply of things we ought to be doing to put the regime 

on notice that we will oppose it across the board as it seeks to exert 

its hegemony in the region. 

Mr. EMMER. Mr. Einhorn, in the interest of time I have a different question for you. In the beginning, during your testimony, 

you indicated that you believe continued strong pressure, but not 

sanctions, additional sanctions at this point, would be the prudent 

course of action. But then you went on to say that we have time, 

that we don’t need to act now and if the current deadline expires, 

comes and goes, that we still have time. How much time do we 

have, sir? What do you recommend? Another 6 months? 

Mr. EINHORN. I wouldn’t put any arbitrary time limit on it. All 

I am saying is that the current interim arrangement works to our 

benefit much more than it works for Iran. Their nuclear program 

is frozen in all meaningful respects. The sanctions are biting very 

hard. I think if we cannot get the deal we want to get, we can afford to wait. They are under much more pressure than we are. 

Mr. EMMER. Let me ask you, sorry to interrupt, but in the interest of time, if the United States, our interest is peace and prosperity, not only in that region, but across the globe, and presumably that is one of the underlying reasons for these negotiations 

with this regime, what is Iran’s incentive for a viable deal? 

Mr. EINHORN. Their main incentive is to get out from under the 

sanctions that are crippling their economy. I think that is what 

brought them to the table. That is their incentive. 

Mr. EMMER. But sir, and again, we get limited with time, we 

have already heard testimony that their policy has not changed. 

Their goal remains the same and that is the elimination of Israel 

and the United States. So getting out from underneath sanctions, 

again, I am going to ask you, what is their incentive then is just 

to bypass any real solution so that they can accomplish their goal? 

Mr. EINHORN. A number of panelists have made this point. They 

have to have a clear choice. They have to realize that they can’t 

achieve their goal except by agreeing to a deal that meets our requirements. 

Mr. EMMER. Well then, let me ask Dr. Takeyh. Isn’t the only way 

that you can give them a clear choice is if you have some choice? 

In other words, you either reach an agreement and eliminate the 

nuclear prospect or these sanctions will be imposed? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think at this particular stage, even in the aftermath of an agreement, Iran will maintain a nuclear infrastructure 

69

of some capability and after expiration of a period of time, perhaps 

a decade or so, then is free to move toward industrialization of that 

capability. So we will have to live with or without an agreement 

with an Iran with a sizeable nuclear infrastructure. 

Mr. EMMER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. Chair thanks the gentleman and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Clawson. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Thanks for hanging in there y’all. I think this is 

just about it. Israeli leaders have repeatedly indicated that they 

are prepared to take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. They have also stated that they will not feel constrained from 

such action even if the P5+1 signs a deal with Tehran that leaves 

its uranium enrichment program intact. And there we have in our 

office what we call the Tel Aviv conundrum. The administration 

cuts a deal with Tehran. The Israelis feel even more vulnerable 

and even more unprotected. 

I guess my question is how do you all view that? What would the 

Obama administration do and how should we think about that? 

Israel’s defense and safety is of very big importance to me and my 

constituents and it feels like this train is just going down the track 

and our friends are going to be left by the wayside. Am I seeing 

something incorrect here or how would you all respond? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Mr. Clawson, let me make just a couple of points 

in response to what you said. Number one, I do think that Israeli 

potential, Israeli action is a major concern for Tehran and I will 

give you some evidence for that. You may recall a couple of years 

back, Prime Minister Netanyahu made a speech at the U.N. General Assembly where he had the cartoon with the sort of Wile E. 

Coyote bomb and had the marker for how much 20 percent low-enriched uranium Iran would have to get before he would feel constrained to do something. And what was interesting is between 

that period and then the negotiation between the Joint Plan of Action and the Iranians very, very carefully kept below that level. 

They were down blending even then, even before the Joint Plan of 

Action, some of their 20 percent low enriched uranium. 

That suggests to me that at least somebody’s red line had some—

held some concern for the Iranian leadership. Point number one. 

Two, I said in my statement that I think the United States ought 

to be talking with Israel now about what kinds of capabilities 

Israel thinks it needs to deal with this problem, in part, because 

I think that is an incentive for Iran to reach a deal. I think just 

the process of beginning those discussions with Israel could begin 

to have some impact on Tehran’s calculus about this. 

And then the final point I would make is I think it was, I am 

not sure who it was in the administration who gave an interview 

with The Atlantic with Jeff Goldberg, thank you, suggesting that 

the administration had blocked Israel from taking any action on 

this, but I think it was very, very ill considered both because of the 

manner in which it treated an ally, but also because it undercut 

the potential impact that Israeli calculations might have on 

Tehran. 

Mr. CLAWSON. So are you implying that Israel is a more effective 

deterrent to Tehran than we are, given the approach of our current 

administration? 

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Mr. EDELMAN. Mr. Clawson, deterrence is always a function of 

capability and will. And I think in this case, I think right now 

Israel might not, well, they don’t have as much capability as the 

United States does to inflict military damage on Iran’s program, 

but——

Mr. CLAWSON. But they have more will. 

Mr. EDELMAN. But they probably are perceived to have more will. 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, Congressman, I would just say I agree with 

Ambassador Edelman that it is unbelievably unfortunate that the 

United States has actually been talking down the Israeli military 

option, the way they have, because I think the credibility of an 

Israeli strike is something that has been or should be quite useful 

and helpful to the United States. 

Having said all of that, I think if we get to the kind of agreement 

that we are headed to with only a 12-month margin in which the 

Iranians could race to a bomb, if we sign on to that, if the international community does, I think it will put an Israeli military option at great jeopardy. It will put Israel in an unbelievably difficult 

position. And I would hope that the United States, as part of any 

agreement, would come to the Israelis and provide some very concrete, specific assurances on what action we will take, including 

military action at the first indication we have of an Iranian material violation of any agreement going forward. I think that kind of 

agreement with the Israelis is going to be essential if we are not 

going to force the Israelis to either go it alone or swallow an agreement that leaves them 7 minutes away from an Iranian ballistic 

missile with a warhead on it. 

Mr. CLAWSON. So what I am hearing from all of you, at least the 

two that have spoken, is that our current approach is disjointed, 

not just from Congress, but moreover from our biggest friends in 

the region. 

Mr. HANNAH. I would agree. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The gentleman yields. Gentlemen, you are at the finish line, however, you have got me standing in the way, you and 

lunch, so I will try and be brief here. I do find it somewhat fascinating that the conversations, some of them, center around the 

fact that if we impose or have this discussion about the imposition 

of more sanctions or the panoply of other measures, as the Ambassador says it, that somehow we are the ones that are scuttling the 

negotiations. I find that fascinating in the context of these folks, 

the Iranians in particular, that have obfuscated, have been historical obfuscators and strategic delayers of unparalleled proportion. 

And I think the world can see that over the course of time, they 

have marched forward, maybe in fits and starts at some point, but 

have marched forward with their program and the rest of the world 

has found a way over time to forgive more and more and more of 

it and this is just a continuation of that. 

So with that though, I am just curious, the IAEA has uncovered 

significant evidence that Iran has engaged in activities related to 

the development of nuclear explosive devices or warheads and it refers to such activities as possible military dimensions or PMD. 

Ambassador, can you tell us were these issues mentioned in the 

interim agreement, the PMD issues? 

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Mr. EDELMAN. In the Joint Plan of Action, the issues of PMD are 

left to the IAEA to adjudicate with Iran and so far the IAEA has 

not been able to make very much progress on that. And in some 

areas, like the military explosive activity that may have taken 

place at the Parchin facility, it seems pretty clear from IAEA reports that the Iranians are very far along in cleansing and cleaning 

up that site, so it won’t be possible to really learn much from going 

there. 

Mr. PERRY. So we are leaving it up to the IAEA, but wouldn’t you 

agree that that the PMD, the military dimension, if Iran were 

seeking purely a civilian power generation kind of approach to this 

whole thing, I don’t think a whole lot of the world would have as 

much difficulty as we have right now. It is the military dimension. 

What is in the United States’ or the West’s interest and the coalition partners’ interest to allow the IAEA to negotiate that portion 

of the agreement? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Well, the IAEA certainly has a lot of technical expertise that can help them get to the bottom of this, but I agree, 

I think, with the thrust of your question as I said earlier, it is inconceivable to me that we can design a monitoring and verification 

regime for any agreement without having satisfied ourselves that 

we understand the past military dimensions of Iranian activity. I 

don’t know how you would even know where to look if you hadn’t 

gotten to the bottom of most of these issues, if not all of them. 

Mr. PERRY. It seems to me that regarding the military dimension 

certainly we want the IAEA’s technical expertise, but we must set 

the course and the foundation and the vision for what will be allowed and what will not be allowed, and if we leave that lock, 

stock, and barrel to them, who knows where we might end up. It 

sounds incredibly irresponsible to me which goes to the other point 

where some folks say well, the President should be coming to the 

Congress to discuss what is next and what sanctions may be. I 

don’t know if you have watched current events, if you are aware, 

but he has just said you folks stay out of it, I will handle it. So 

we are duty bound by our duty to the country and to our constituents to do something in the face of what we see as irresponsibility. 

With that, a key component is the delivery system, the delivery 

capability. Shouldn’t the long-term agreement include limitations 

on the ballistic missile capability? 

Go ahead, Mr. Ambassador? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Well, I certainly agree with that. I think it is a 

fact that no country in the world has had a ballistic missile program of the scale and scope of Iran’s without actually moving forward to develop a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Hannah, should we be concerned? I just saw recent reports. I am sure you saw the photographs of the tower of 

the alleged ballistic missile located within. Should we, as Americans, be concerned? Is this something expected, unexpected? 

Mr. HANNAH. I think we absolutely should be concerned, Congressman. There is absolutely no purpose for Iran to have an intercontinental ballistic missile system capable of hitting the United 

States and Western Europe unless it is married to a nuclear warhead. There is no military rationale for it. 

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Mr. PERRY. I mean this may seem elementary, but what purpose 

does the ballistic missile system have regarding a nuclear warhead 

in a peaceful nuclear program? Where is the nexus? What am I 

missing? What are the American people—what are all of us fools 

missing that think that we ought to impose the panoply on Iran? 

What are we missing? Am I missing something, Mr. Hannah? 

Mr. HANNAH. I don’t think so, Congressman, other than the fact 

that the Iranians have insisted this is a red line for them. They 

will not discuss it and if we want a deal on the nuclear issues, then 

we need to leave this issue of ballistic missiles out of the negotiations. That is all I am aware of. 

Mr. PERRY. It is nice to know they are in the driver’s seat. With 

that, I will yield back. Sorry, I thought you were free, but Mr. Issa 

is here, so I recognize the gentleman from California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. You are almost free. I want to try to put 

something in perspective and then ask a very broad question. I 

think when you are the last to ask a wrap-up question sometimes 

has less fact and more history. 

A silver-haired gentleman over my shoulder, the late Henry 

Hyde, he hadn’t served 5 years in this body, even though he served 

35 years, when Iran, under its present government using the guise 

of ‘‘students,’’ took hostage all of our Embassy personnel and kept 

them for 1,000 days. Negotiating with the Jimmy Carter administration as though there was something to negotiate, but never providing them until it was in their best interest. Mr. Hyde was still 

a junior member, a lot less gray hair, as they proceeded to fund 

terrorism around the world including blowing up our Marines in 

’82 in Beirut, including the formation funding of Hezbollah from its 

inception until today. 

Hafez Assad was still running Syria and counted on Iran to provide him with money and munitions for decades between the time 

Henry Hyde was a fairly young man and now approaching his 

100th birthday. We have gone 35 years with a government that 

funds and exports terrorism, who has used its vast oil wealth not 

even to create in their country, even to create the ability to refine 

their own oil into gasoline. Their priorities have been on exporting 

terrorism, destabilizing both the Sunni Arab world and quite frankly the opportunity for peace in Israel. For 35 years, you can point 

to Iran as the single closest reason of why we do not have peace 

for the Palestinians and the Israelis. 

So let me ask the question. I will start with Mr. Hannah, I will 

go to all of you. Why in the world are we negotiating and talking 

today about a small part of a small delay in their ambition to have 

the ultimate weapon to give them impunity to continue doing what 

they have been doing for 35 years? 

Mr. HANNAH. If that is the objective, and if that is where we are 

headed, as I have said in my testimony, Congressman, I don’t think 

it is worth a candle to be going down that route, especially if we 

are ignoring the fact that this export of terror has only escalated 

and accelerated in the last year. I don’t think that should be the 

objective. I think our objective should be to present them with a 

choice, that either you stop this nuclear program that is the greatest threat to international security that exists today or your regime 

will be put at serious risk by the United States, by the combination 

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of a threat of military force that is very credible and crippling economic sanctions that essentially shut down the Iranian economy. 

Without that choice, I think this is a fool’s errand. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Takeyh, obviously, the whole day we have been 

talking about a fairly narrow part of our relationship or lack thereof with Tehran, but again, a fundamental question. It has been 

asked wonderfully as to whether or not we should tag on to the 

back end of the President’s negotiations, but the bigger question is 

why is a Member of Congress who is still a first lieutenant in the 

Army with no gray hair—not much hair actually at the time—and 

now 35 years later is sitting here, why is it that I should believe 

that we should even be talking about the scope of well, if you will 

just slow down to a crawl your nuclear development then we have 

got a deal and completely ignore the human rights violations inside 

Tehran, or Iran, but particularly the constant export of terrorism 

in which country by country, it is Iran’s goal to in fact, destabilize 

countries, both are friends and our foes within the Arab and Muslim world? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think I agree with the thrust of your question, 

Congressman. We shouldn’t be ignoring human rights abuses in 

Iran. We shouldn’t be ignoring the fact that Iran has a very aggressive regional policy today, and particularly, we shouldn’t be ignoring the fact that something that we don’t talk about is Iran today 

is undertaking military invasion of Iraq with the seeming complicity of the Iraqi Government and at least the passive indifference of the international community. 

Mr. ISSA. I don’t mean to interrupt you, because your answers 

are great, but as many of us that were on the dais earlier know, 

Iran was providing the expertise to blow up, dismember and kill 

our people from the very first days we put boots on the ground in 

Iraq, they were providing advanced IED capability. So it is not like 

they haven’t been doing that steadily including hundreds, perhaps 

thousands of Americans are dead because of their assistance, but 

please continue. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would just say that all activities of Iran that are 

unsavory of which the catalog is a long one, and the principal victims of the Iranian regime are the Iranian people. And then everybody else in the region. All those should be part of the American 

policy. Nuclear agreement or not, in my view, we are destined to 

remain adversaries with this particular regime and we should approach the relationship accordingly. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Mr. Einhorn. 

Mr. EINHORN. Congressman, you asked the basic question, why 

should we be negotiating on the nuclear issue with a regime that 

has done all these terrible, destabilizing things. And I think the 

reason is that if we can stop their march toward nuclear weapons, 

then we can prevent a situation where they can do all of these bad 

things, but under the cover of a nuclear weapons capability. In 

other words, they could be empowered to do much worse. That is 

why it is important to deal with the nuclear issue. At the same 

time——

Mr. ISSA. Let me characterize, Chairman, if you will give me a 

little indulgence. If I am characterizing your statement, what you 

are saying in a nutshell is if they get a nuke, we will never be able 

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to stop them from terrorizing all of their neighbors, exporting terrorism with impunity? 

Mr. EINHORN. I don’t mean to say that. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, but you are saying is we can stop them, they 

won’t be able to do it. For 35 years, they have never quit doing it. 

So if they get a nuke, not only will they not quit doing it, but we 

won’t be able to encourage them to quit doing it. Is that correct? 

Mr. EINHORN. I think with a nuke, they will be empowered to do 

worse. It doesn’t mean that if we get a nuclear agreement they are 

going to stop doing that. We are going to have to counter them on 

these other behaviors with or without a nuclear agreement and we 

should be doing more of that as some of the other panelists have 

mentioned. 

Mr. ISSA. Ambassador, you look like you have got your mic on? 

Mr. EDELMAN. Yes, Congressman Issa, your question cuts very 

close to the bone for me. When I was a junior foreign service officer 

and was special assistant to George Schultz, I was the person who 

had to wake him up in the middle of the night when the Marine 

barracks was bombed in Beirut. I went to Beirut with him in April 

1983 after our Embassy was blown up and Bob Ames, the national 

intelligence officer for Middle East was killed. I served as Under 

Secretary for Defense for Policy for 4 years in the Bush administration from 2005 to 2009. And had to watch as the Sheibani Network 

and others, as you indicated, were killing American men and 

women in Iraq. I had to watch after I made six trips to Lebanon 

to help arm the Lebanese armed forces to try and create an independent military to withstand—to stand the country up after Syrian forces had withdrawn after the assassination of Rafik Hariri 

and watched Iran’s terrorist proxies in Lebanon, upend all of that 

in May 2008. 

So I feel the gravamen of your question to my core. And as I suggested in my statement, we have to be prepared to contest Iran in 

its struggle to dominate the region across the board on all dimensions. I do think it is worth negotiating with them on the nuclear 

issue if we can stop them from getting a nuclear capability. I have 

very grave concerns, as I said earlier in the hearing, that we have 

retreated well beyond that red line to the point that what we may 

end up doing is ratifying an Iran with an industrial scale enrichment capability on the threshold of a nuclear bomb. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, in closing I pointed to my 

old friend, the late Henry Hyde. When I was a freshman of Lebanese-American descent or Lebanese descent, an American, Henry 

Hyde allowed me to go on a codel. And the first speech I ever made 

in a foreign country I made in Lebanon at our Embassy there, just 

above the monument, the memorial to those men and women that 

were killed both at the barracks and at the Embassy because our 

Embassy was also blown up. And at that time I said Hezbollah is 

a cancer on Lebanese society. What I wish I could go back and say 

in that speech is something a little fuller. Hezbollah is a cancer on 

Lebanese society funded, supported, paid for by Iran and until we 

stop Iran from exporting terrorism, there will not be free people in 

Iran, in Syria, in Lebanon, and I fear in most of the Arab and Muslim world. 

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So Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for this hearing today. It 

is a good start on pushing back against giving up something that 

is as worth fighting for as the Cold War was for most of my parents’ lives. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The gentleman yields. The Chair thanks the gentlemen for their testimony and their service today and also the participants in the hearing and with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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[NOTE: Material submitted for the record by Mr. John Hannah, senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, entitled ‘‘The Case for Deadline-Triggered Sanctions on Iran,’’ is not reprinted here but is available in committee records or may 

be accessed via the Internet at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20150127/

102846/HHRG-114-FA00-Wstate-HannahJ-20150127-SD001.pdf] 

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