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*********************************************** 
DAVID MUCKLE v. RONALD PRESSLEY ET AL.

(AC 40582)

DiPentima, C. J., and Prescott and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for the diminished value of his motor vehicle that was caused by the alleged negligence of the defendants. The plaintiff’s motor vehicle had sustained

significant damage when it was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant P in the course of his employment for the defendant city of New

Haven. The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages for the repair of

the vehicle, for costs of a rental car for which he had not been reimbursed

and for the diminished value of the vehicle. The court, however, rejected

the plaintiff’s claim for prejudgment interest. On appeal, the plaintiff

claimed that the trial court, in awarding damages, improperly denied

his claim for prejudgment interest and that the applicable statutes (§§ 37-

3a and 37-3b) do not extinguish the common-law right to prejudgment

interest in this type of civil action. Held that, given the present statutory

framework, the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s request for

prejudgment interest: under § 37-3a, prejudgment interest may be recovered and allowed in civil actions, but that general rule does not apply

to actions to recover damages for injury to a person, or to real or

personal property caused by negligence, § 37-3b provides for an award

of postjudgment interest in negligence cases, and although, pursuant to

statute (§ 52-192a), prejudgment interest is permitted in negligence cases

where a plaintiff files an offer of compromise that is rejected by the

defendant and the plaintiff recovers an amount equal to or greater than

the offer of compromise, the damages awarded here were less than the

amount of an offer of compromise filed by the plaintiff; moreover, the

plaintiff, in support of his claim, relied on case law that predated the

effective date of the current statutory framework, which now limits the

automatic award of interest in negligence actions to postjudgment time

periods, the plaintiff’s claim that §§ 37-3a and 37-3b have not abrogated

the common-law right to prejudgment interest was unavailing, as the

plaintiff failed to establish that prejudgment interest in negligence cases

existed under the common law, and there was no merit to the plaintiff’s

claim that he was entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a,

which does not apply to actions to recover damages to property caused

by negligence.

Argued May 15—officially released October 16, 2018

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the diminished value of

the plaintiff’s motor vehicle caused by the defendants’

alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex and

tried to the court, Domnarski, J.; judgment in favor of

the plaintiff, from which the plaintiff appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Matthew Julian Forrest, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Roderick R. Williams, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The plaintiff, David Muckle,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his

claim for prejudgment interest against the defendants,

Ronald Pressley and the city of New Haven. On appeal,

the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded

that General Statutes § 37-3b permits only postjudgment interest in negligence actions. We disagree with

the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history, as set

forth in the court’s March 30, 2017 memorandum of

decision, are relevant to our discussion. On July 20,

2014, the plaintiff’s 2013 Subaru XV Crosstrek vehicle

was parked on a street in New Haven. Pressley, an

employee of the city of New Haven, struck the plaintiff’s

vehicle while operating a motor vehicle in the course

of his employment. The collision caused significant

damage to the plaintiff’s vehicle, which was repaired

at a cost of $15,096.60. ‘‘According to the experts who

testified at trial, the [plaintiff’s] vehicle had a value

between $20,037 and $23,500 prior to the accident. The

experts also testified that the value of the vehicle after

repairs was between $14,500 and $21,150.’’

The plaintiff sought damages for the diminished value

of his vehicle following the postcollision repair work.

After considering the evidence from the parties’

experts, the court credited the defendants’ expert that

the diminished value of the plaintiff’s vehicle was $2350,

which amounts to ‘‘a 10 percent reduction in the vehicle’s valuation because of the accident.’’ The court further found that the plaintiff had incurred damages for

the repair of the vehicle and for a rental car for which

he had not been reimbursed. The court awarded the

plaintiff $1067.77 for these damages in addition to the

$2350 for vehicle’s diminished value, for a total of

$3,417.77.

The court did not award the plaintiff damages ‘‘for

the inconvenience of having to contend with submission

of the claim to his insurance company, obtaining a

rental car, and dealing with the auto body shop regarding the repair of his vehicle.’’1 The court also rejected

the plaintiff’s claim of interest from the date of the

accident, July 20, 2014, stating: ‘‘The plaintiff’s claims

are grounded in the negligence of the defendants. In

negligence actions, interest is allowed only after judgment. General Statutes § 37-3b.’’

On April 17, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration of the denial of prejudgment interest.

In his motion, the plaintiff alleged that he was entitled

to $915.77 in prejudgment interest.2

In their objection,

the defendants argued, inter alia, that the cases relied

on by the plaintiff, Hammarlund v. Troiano, 146 Conn.

470, 152 A.2d 314 (1959), Stults v. Palmer, 141 Conn.
709, 109 A.2d 592 (1954), and Littlejohn v. Elionsky,

130 Conn. 541, 36 A.2d 52 (1944), predated the 1981

enactment of, and 1997 amendment to § 37-3b. Accordingly, the defendants claimed that these cases did not

constitute good law on the issue of prejudgment interest

in negligence cases. The court granted the plaintiff’s

motion, but denied the relief requested. This appeal

followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that in diminished

value cases, the court is required to include prejudgment interest in the damages award. He contends that

General Statutes §§ 37-3a and 37-3b do not extinguish

the common-law right to prejudgment interest in this

type of civil action. The defendants counter that following the 1981 amendment to § 37-3a and the enactment

of § 37-3b, only postjudgment interest is available in

negligence cases. We agree that, under the present statutory framework, the court properly denied the plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest in the present

case.

We begin with our standard of review. ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to

ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the

legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine,

in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory

language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including

the question of whether the language actually does

apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text

of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.

If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,

extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall

not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we

also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative

history and circumstances surrounding its enactment,

to the legislative policy it was designed to implement,

and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject

matter . . . . In cases in which more than one [statutory provision] is involved, we presume that the legislature intended [those provisions] to be read together to

create a harmonious body of law . . . and we construe

the [provisions], if possible, to avoid conflict between

them.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology

Group, P.C., 297 Conn. 105, 148–49, 998 A.2d 730 (2010);

see also Valliere v. Commissioner of Social Services,

328 Conn. 294, 318, 178 A.3d 346 (2018). Our review is

de novo. Lagueux v. Leonardi, 148 Conn. App. 234, 239,

85 A.3d 13 (2014).
We begin, therefore, with the text of the relevant

statutes. Section 37-3a (a) provides in relevant part:

‘‘Except as provided in sections 37-3b, 37-3c and 52-

192a, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no

more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions

. . . .’’ Section 37-3b, titled3

‘‘[r]ate of interest recoverable in negligence actions’’ provides in relevant part:

‘‘(a) For a cause of action arising on or after May 27,

1997, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no

more, shall be recovered and allowed in any action to

recover damages for injury to the person, or to real

or personal property, caused by negligence, computed

from the date that is twenty days after the date of

judgment or the date that is ninety days after the date

of verdict, whichever is earlier, upon the amount of

the judgment.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Finally, General Statutes § 52-192a (c) provides in

relevant part: ‘‘After trial the court shall examine the

record to determine whether the plaintiff made an offer

of compromise which the defendant failed to accept.

If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff

has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the

sum certain specified in the plaintiff’s offer of compromise, the court shall add to the amount so recovered

eight per cent annual interest on said amount . . . .

The interest shall be computed from the date the complaint in the civil action or application under section

8-132 was filed with the court if the offer of compromise

was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing

of such complaint or application. If such offer was filed

later than eighteen months from the date of filing of the

complaint or application, the interest shall be computed

from the date the offer of compromise was filed.’’4

Thus, under the present statutory framework, prejudgment interest may be recovered and allowed in civil

actions at a rate of 10 percent a year. General Statutes

§ 37-3a (a).5 This general rule, however, does not apply

to actions to recover damages for injury to a person,

or real or personal property caused by negligence. See

Sikorsky Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts, 315

Conn. 433, 442 n.4, 108 A.3d 228 (2015). In negligence

cases, interest at a rate of 10 percent a year, and no

more, shall be recovered and allowed, computed from

the earlier of twenty days after the judgment date or

ninety days after the date of the verdict. See General

Statutes §§ 37-3a (a) and 37-3b (a). Section 52-192a

offers an opportunity for prejudgment interest in negligence cases, but requires the filing of an offer of compromise by a plaintiff, rejection of that offer by a

defendant, and recovery by a plaintiff of an amount

equal to or greater than the offer of compromise. See,

e.g., DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group,

P.C., supra, 297 Conn. 152–53. Such an award is mandatory. Id., 153.

On appeal, as he did before the trial court, the plaintiff
relies on case law that predates the current statutory

framework for prejudgment interest. Specifically, he

cites to Littlejohn v. Elionsky, supra, 130 Conn. 541. In

that case, our Supreme Court stated that in a negligence

action involving a car accident, ‘‘the measure of damages is the difference in value between the property

before and after the loss, with interest from date of

loss.’’ Id., 543 (quoting Hawkins v. Garford Trucking

Co., Inc., 96 Conn. 337, 341, 114 A. 94 [1921]). The

plaintiff also directs us to Stults v. Palmer, supra, 141

Conn. 712, where our Supreme Court explained: ‘‘The

true rule is that the measure of damages is the difference

between the fair market value of the car before the

collision and its fair market value afterwards, plus interest from the date of loss.’’ See also Hammarlund v.

Troiano, supra, 146 Conn. 473 (noting that measure of

recovery for damage to automobile stated in Stults v.

Palmer, supra, 712, and that rule requires, inter alia,

proof of difference between fair market value before

accident and after accident).

All of the cases cited by the plaintiff were decided

decades before the effective date of the present statutory scheme.6

In the years following those cases, our

legislature has limited the automatic award of interest

in negligence actions to postjudgment time periods. See

DiLieto v. County Obstetrics and Gynecology Group,

P.C., supra 310 Conn. 48 (‘‘[t]his legislative genealogy

leaves no doubt that the legislature, in amending [§ 37-

3b in 1997], was seeking to convert § 37-3b from a statute that permitted an award of postjudgment interest

in the discretion of the trial court into one that mandates

such an award’’); Hicks v. State, 297 Conn 798, 803–804,

1 A.3d 39 (2010) (interest pursuant to § 37-3b is computed only after judgment, upon amount rendered

therein, and accrues only if judgment is not paid).

The plaintiff maintains, however, that §§ 37-3a and

37-3b have not abrogated the ‘‘common-law’’ right to

prejudgment interest. The flaw in this argument is that

the plaintiff has failed to establish that prejudgment

interest in negligence cases existed under the common

law. Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, the right to

this type of interest existed by virtue of our statutes.

In Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139, 147, 742 A.2d

379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928, 746 A.2d 789

(2000), we stated that ‘‘[n]oncontractual interest on

money wrongfully detained was not sanctioned at common law; see K. Conway, ‘Interest on Damages in Connecticut,’ 30 Conn. B.J. 407 (1956); but has long been

awarded pursuant to statute in Connecticut. General

Statutes [1949 Rev.] § 6778; General Statutes (1902 Rev.)

[§ 4600]; General Statutes (1888 Rev.) [§ 2942].’’ See also

General Statues (1958 Rev.) § 37-3; General Statutes

(1930 Rev.) § 4731; Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn.

App. 712, 737, 682 A.2d 1026 (trial court correctly noted

that there is no right to prejudgment interest in civil

action unless statutes provide for such interest), cert.
denied, 239 Conn. 931, 683 A.2d 397 (1996).

The plaintiff failed to support his assertion of a common-law right to prejudgment interest in this type of

case.7 The plaintiff having failed to establish the prerequisite that the right to prejudgment interest in negligence cases existed at common law, we need not

consider the plaintiff’s claim that §§ 37-3a and 37-3b

abrogated such an entitlement. Simply stated, as aptly

set forth by Judge Moore in a recent decision from

the Superior Court, ‘‘[a]s a matter of law, prejudgment

interest is not available on any damages that may be

awarded by the court to the plaintiff. Prejudgment interest is only available by statute, and there is no statutory

provision for prejudgment interest on a claim of negligence. General Statutes § 37-3a allows prejudgment

interest, but does not apply to negligence claims. General Statutes § 37-3b applies to negligence claims, but

allows only postjudgment, and not prejudgment interest. Further, while a party can be awarded prejudgment

interest if damages awarded exceed its offer of compromise under General Statutes § 52-192a, the plaintiff did

not file an offer of compromise with the court prior to

trial.’’ Sun Val, LLC v. Commissioner of Transportation, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield,

Docket No. CV-14-6010907-S (August 19, 2016). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim must fail.

The plaintiff also contends that he is entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a. As we have indicated in this opinion, § 37-3a, by its explicit reference

to § 37-3b, does not apply to actions to recover damages

to property caused by negligence. Additionally we previously have concluded: ‘‘Prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a is appropriate only where the essence of

the action itself involves the wrongful withholding of

money due and payable to the plaintiff. The prejudgment interest statute does not apply when the essence

of the action is the recovery of damages to compensate

a plaintiff for injury, damage or costs incurred as a

result of a defendant’s negligence. . . . The prejudgment interest statute does not apply to such actions

because they do not advance claims based on the

wrongful withholding of money, but rather seek damages to compensate for losses incurred as a result of

a defendant’s negligence. Moreover, such damages are

not considered due and payable until after a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff has been rendered.’’ (Emphasis

added.) Tang v. Bou-Fakhreddine, 75 Conn. App. 334,

349, 815 A.2d 1276 (2003); see also Foley v. Huntington

Co., supra, 42 Conn. App. 739 (§ 37-3a does not apply

to claims not involving wrongful detention of money

such as personal injury claims). Accordingly, we conclude that this claim is without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to support this
particular claim for damages with any evidence of monetary loss.

2

In their appellate brief, the defendants also dispute the plaintiff’s prejudgment interest calculation.

3 We are mindful of our Supreme Court’s direction that ‘‘[w]here there is

ambiguity in the wording of a statute, the title of the legislation is an aid

to statutory construction. . . . But if the language is clear and not subject to

interpretation, titles are of less significance.’’ (Citations omitted.) Algonquin

Gas Transmission Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 162 Conn. 50, 55, 291

A.2d 204 (1971).

4 The plaintiff filed an offer of compromise on September 21, 2015, in the

amount of $6000. The plaintiff ultimately recovered $3417.77 in damages,

or approximately 57 percent of the offer of compromise. We, therefore,

disagree with the comments of the plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument that

the damages awarded in this case were ‘‘just shy,’’ ‘‘really close’’ and ‘‘almost

right on’’ to the offer of compromise.

In addition to his misstatement at oral argument, the plaintiff’s counsel

failed to include a copy of the complaint in his appellate appendix and

inaccurately quoted a Supreme Court opinion in his appellate brief, which

we will address later in this opinion. We take this opportunity to remind

all counsel who appear before this court to take all necessary and prudent

steps to comply with our rules of practice and to ensure the accuracy of

his or her representations, both oral and written, to this court.

5 Our Supreme Court has stated that § 37-3a is not confined by its terms

to prejudgment interest and has served as a source for postjudgment interest

where § 37-3b does not apply. DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology

Group, P.C., 310 Conn. 38, 50 n.12, 74 A.3d 1212 (2013).

6 The plaintiff cites to Damico v. Dalton, 1 Conn. App. 186, 187, 469 A.2d

795 (1984), where this court relied on the trilogy of Hammarlund v. Troiano,

supra, 146 Conn. 470, Stults v. Palmer, supra, 141 Conn. 709, and Littlejohn

v. Elionsk, supra, 130 Conn. 541, in stating: ‘‘In the present case there can

be no doubt that the measure of damages to the defendant’s automobile

[with respect to the defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiff] was the

difference between its value immediately prior to the collision and its value

immediately thereafter.’’ Although in that case there was a verdict for the

plaintiff with respect to the defendant’s counterclaim, we note that this

court did not address or discuss the issue of prejudgment interest. Damico,

therefore provides no support to the plaintiff in this appeal.

We also note that in Bombero v. Marchionne, 11 Conn. App. 485, 494,

528 A.2d 396, cert. denied, 205 Conn. 801, 529 A.2d 719 (1987), we directly

quoted the ‘‘true rule’’ of damages from Stults v. Palmer, supra, 141 Conn.

709, as ‘‘the difference between the fair market of the car before the collision

and its fair market value afterwards, plus interest from the date of loss.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The issue before this court in Bombero,

however, was not whether the plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest;

rather, whether the trial court improperly refused to take judicial notice of

the 1981 sales tax as an element of the damages. Id. This court declined to

consider the merits of this claim as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to present

an adequate record. Id., 495. Accordingly, as the issue of prejudgment interest

was not present in Bombero, we conclude that Bombero does not support

the plaintiff in the present appeal.

7

In his brief, the plaintiff refers us to the concuring opinion in Ballou v.

Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., 304 Conn. 348, 367, 39 A.3d 1075

(2012) (Zarella, J., concurring). The quotation contained in the plaintiff’s

brief, however, does not appear, however, in this concurrence. Furthermore,

in that case, Justice Zarella did not discuss whether the availability or right

to prejudgment interest in a negligence action existed at common law.

Finally, we note that a concurring opinion from our Supreme Court is not

binding authority. See, e.g., State v. DeJesus, 91 Conn. App. 47, 58 n.4, 880

A.2d 910 (2005), rev’d in part on other grounds, 288 Conn. 418, 953 A.2d 45

(2008); see generally United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2016).

The plaintiff’s reliance on Foley v. Huntington Co., supra, 42 Conn. App.

712, is equally unavailing. Specifically, he refers to language in that case

that § 37-3a applies to only certain cases, and, therefore, claims that the

common-law right to prejudgment interest in negligence actions survived

the enactment of §§ 37-3a and 37-3b. Foley v. Huntington Co., supra, 739.

This analysis ignores the discussion in Foley that prejudgment interest was

not permitted on awards for punitive damages or personal injury claims.

See id. We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff failed to support his claim

of a common-law right to prejudgment interest and that such a right survived

the enactment of §§ 37-3a and 37-3b.