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SJC-13354

AMY DOUCET1 & another2 vs. FCA US LLC3 & another.4

Essex. February 8, 2023. - June 8, 2023.

Present: Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 

& Georges, JJ.

Jurisdiction, Personal, Long-arm statute, Nonresident. Due 

Process of Law, Jurisdiction over nonresident. Practice, 

Civil, Motion to dismiss.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

May 17, 2021.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Janice W. Howe, J.; a 

motion for reconsideration was considered by her, and entry of 

separate and final judgment was ordered by her.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

1 As guardian of Paul Gregory Doucet.

2 Denise Sutton, as guardian of Paul Gregory Doucet.

3 Formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC.

4 Sudbay Chrysler Dodge, Inc.
2

Deepak Gupta, of the District of Columbia (Andrew D. 

Nebenzahl, Carly J. LaCrosse, & Matthew W.H. Wessler also 

present) for the plaintiffs.

Peter M. Durney (Christopher J. Hurst also present) for FCA 

US LLC.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Ben Robbins & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal 

Foundation.

Jeffrey R. White & Robert S. Peck, of the District of 

Columbia, Peter J. Ainsworth, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, 

& Kyle A. Camilleri for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys 

& another.

Cassandra Burke Robertson, Charles W. Rhodes, & Linda 

Sandstrom Simard, pro se.

Larry E. Coben, of Pennsylvania, Michael Brooks, of the 

District of Columbia, & Michael K. Gillis for Center for Auto 

Safety & another.

KAFKER, J. Paul Doucet was rendered incapacitated by an 

automobile accident in New Hampshire in 2015. His guardians 

(the plaintiffs) have brought a tort suit against the 

manufacturer of the car in which he was a passenger, FCA US LLC 

(FCA US), and the Massachusetts distributor-dealership, Sudbay 

Chrysler Dodge, Inc. (Sudbay).5 The car in question, a 2004 

Chrysler Sebring, was first sold by Sudbay in Massachusetts and 

later purchased in New Hampshire by Doucet, a New Hampshire 

resident. At issue is whether Massachusetts has personal 

jurisdiction over one of the defendants, FCA US, under the 

Commonwealth's long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the due 

5 Sudbay, which is incorporated in and maintains a principal 

place of business in Massachusetts, is not involved in this 

appeal.
3

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. We conclude that it does, and we vacate the trial 

court's dismissal of FCA US as a party to this case.6

1. Background. At this stage of the proceedings, we 

"accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and draw[] 

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Harrington

v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014). FCA US is a Delaware 

limited liability company with its principal place of business 

in Michigan. FCA US's predecessor in interest7 manufactured the 

Sebring around which this case revolves.

A dealership in Rhode Island first received the Sebring 

from the manufacturer before transferring it to Sudbay, a 

dealership in Gloucester. Sudbay initially leased the car to a 

Massachusetts resident in 2003. The car was then purchased by a 

Massachusetts resident in 2006, and it subsequently was sold to 

two other Massachusetts residents, before a New Hampshire 

resident purchased the vehicle in 2011. This resident then sold 

6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by New England 

Legal Foundation; Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and

American Association for Justice; civil procedure and Federal 

courts professors; and Center for Auto Safety and Attorneys 

Information Exchange Group.

7 FCA US is the successor in interest to Chrysler Group LLC

and inherited certain of its liabilities, including the products 

liability claim at issue. Previously, FCA US argued that it did 

not acquire liability for the claims brought by the plaintiffs, 

but it has since abandoned that argument.
4

it in a private sale to Doucet, also a New Hampshire resident, 

in 2013.

In 2015, Doucet was riding in the front passenger's seat of 

the Sebring when it was involved in a front-end collision in New 

Hampshire. He suffered a traumatic brain injury after the 

passenger's side A-pillar (windshield and roof support) struck 

his head. Consequently, the plaintiffs first brought a products 

liability action solely against FCA US in the Superior Court in 

New Hampshire. FCA US removed the case to the United States 

District Court for the District of New Hampshire, where a judge 

ruled in FCA US's favor that New Hampshire lacked personal 

jurisdiction over it, and dismissed the case.

The plaintiffs then filed their suit in the Superior Court

in Suffolk County against both FCA US and Sudbay (collectively, 

the defendants). Again, FCA US removed the case to the Federal 

District Court in the State in which the plaintiffs had filed 

suit -- this time, the United States District Court for the 

District of Massachusetts. The Federal District Court judge 

ruled that Massachusetts has personal jurisdiction over FCA US 

but remanded the matter to the Superior Court for lack of 

subject matter diversity jurisdiction in the Federal court, as 

the inclusion of the defendant Sudbay as a Massachusetts 

corporation prevented complete diversity.
5

FCA US then filed a motion to dismiss for want of personal 

jurisdiction and improper venue in the Superior Court in Suffolk 

County. The motion judge transferred the case to the Superior 

Court in Essex County, the county in which Sudbay operates its 

sole place of business. There, after a hearing on the motion,

the judge ultimately concluded that Massachusetts lacked 

personal jurisdiction over FCA US under both the Commonwealth's

long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the Federal 

Constitution's due process clause.8 The judge dismissed FCA US 

as a party to the case, and the plaintiffs appealed.9 We 

transferred the case sua sponte from the Appeals Court.

2. Discussion. "Jurisdictional questions are questions of 

law, which we review de novo." Bask, Inc. v. Municipal Council 

of Taunton, 490 Mass. 312, 316 (2022). "For a nonresident to be 

subject to the authority of a Massachusetts court, the exercise 

of jurisdiction must satisfy both Massachusetts's long-arm 

statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the requirements of the due 

8 In evaluating personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal 

due process, the judge in the Superior Court in Essex County 

found that the plaintiffs failed to establish "relatedness";

therefore, the judge did not consider other components of this 

analysis.

9 The plaintiffs first filed a motion for reconsideration 

or, in the alternative, entry of separate and final judgment on 

two counts of their complaint against FCA US. The trial court 

denied the former and allowed the latter, paving the way for 

this appeal.
6

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 312, 314 (2018), cert. denied, 

139 S. Ct. 794 (2019) (Exxon Mobil). The plaintiffs argue that

these requirements are satisfied with respect to FCA US, a 

nonresident of Massachusetts, while FCA US maintains that they 

are not. We address each argument in turn, beginning with our 

long-arm statute to "avoid unnecessary consideration of 

constitutional questions." SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478 

Mass. 324, 325 (2017) (SCVNGR). We conclude that Massachusetts 

has personal jurisdiction over FCA US, pursuant to both State 

and Federal law, vis-à-vis the plaintiffs' claims. We therefore

reverse the motion judge's dismissal of FCA US as a defendant to 

this case and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.10

a. Long-arm statute. "General Laws c. 223A, § 3, sets out 

a list of specific instances in which a Massachusetts court may 

acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant." 

Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 767 (1994). Among the 

enumerated options provided is "transacting any business in this 

commonwealth." G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a). We routinely have 

10 The plaintiffs have requested that, should we conclude 

they have not demonstrated personal jurisdiction on the facts 

before us, we grant them jurisdictional discovery. Because we 

conclude that personal jurisdiction exists on these facts, we 

need not reach that issue.
7

construed this clause broadly. Tatro, supra. To meet this

criterion, a plaintiff must allege facts that "satisfy two 

requirements -- the defendant must have transacted business in 

Massachusetts, and the plaintiff's claim must have arisen from 

the transaction of business by the defendant." Id.

Here, the plaintiffs argue that their claims arose from FCA 

US's predecessor's transaction of business in the Commonwealth 

as demonstrated by a Massachusetts distributor-dealership first 

leasing and selling the Sebring, all in the stream of commerce.

In response, FCA US counters that neither it nor its predecessor 

in interest "transact[ed] any business" in connection with the

plaintiffs' claims. First, the Sebring was initially sent to a 

Rhode Island -- not a Massachusetts -- dealership, and second, 

the assumption of liability as a successor in interest does "not 

qualify as" the transaction of business. Furthermore, FCA US 

argues, even if it has transacted business in Massachusetts, the 

plaintiffs' claims did not arise from any such transactions

because Doucet did not purchase the Sebring in Massachusetts.

We first consider whether FCA US, through its predecessor 

in interest, transacted business in the Commonwealth. "Although 

an isolated (and minor) transaction with a Massachusetts 

resident may be insufficient, generally the purposeful and 

successful solicitation of business from residents of the 
8

Commonwealth, by a defendant or its agent, will suffice to 

satisfy this requirement." Tatro, 416 Mass. at 767.

In Exxon Mobil, 479 Mass. at 317-318, we concluded that 

Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon) had transacted business in the 

Commonwealth when it executed franchise agreements with "a 

franchise network of more than 300 retail service stations" in 

Massachusetts. Business deals with "Massachusetts-based limited 

liability compan[ies] . . . represent[ed] Exxon's 'purposeful 

and successful solicitation of business from residents of the 

Commonwealth." Id. at 318, quoting Tatro, supra. Similarly, 

FCA US, formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC, contracts with 

former Chrysler dealerships, like Sudbay, throughout 

Massachusetts, to conduct business under the FCA US name.

Through these preexisting and ongoing business agreements with 

Sudbay and other FCA US dealerships in Massachusetts, FCA US 

engages in the "purposeful and successful solicitation of 

business from residents of the Commonwealth," Exxon Mobil, 

supra, by distributing cars manufactured by FCA US and Chrysler 

as FCA US's predecessor in interest. We conclude, therefore, 

that FCA US has transacted business in Massachusetts.

We turn next to whether the plaintiffs' claims arise from 

FCA US's transaction of business in Massachusetts. To make this 

determination, we employ a "but for" causation test. See Tatro, 

416 Mass. at 770-771 (comparing proximate and "but for" cause 
9

interpretations across several jurisdictions). The "but for" 

causation test requires us to consider whether the distribution 

of the Sebring in Massachusetts by FCA US's predecessor in 

interest is "the first step in a train of events that results in 

the personal injury." Id. at 770. We conclude that it is.

In Tatro, 416 Mass. at 765-768, the defendant, a California 

hotel, contracted with a national organization to provide 

accommodations at a special rate for an upcoming conference, and 

the plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident and member of the 

national organization, booked a room directly with the hotel 

based on the mailing she received from the organization,

advertising the conference rate. During her stay, she fell and 

was allegedly injured in her room. Id. at 766. We recognized 

that, "but for the defendant's solicitation of business in 

Massachusetts," id. at 771, including the hotel's contract with 

the organization and "arrangements with several Massachusetts 

corporations," id. at 766, "and its agreement to provide the 

plaintiff with hotel accommodations in . . . California, the 

plaintiff would not have been injured in a room of the hotel," 

id. at 771-772. The fact that the injury occurred out of State 

did not mean the injury did not arise from those business 

transactions in Massachusetts, see id. at 771, and so "the 

requirements of G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a) [were] satisfied," id. at 

774.
10

Recently, in von Schönau-Riedweg v. Rothschild Bank AG, 95 

Mass. App. Ct. 471, 472, 474 (2019), the plaintiff, a Swiss 

citizen, sought relief against a Swiss bank based on the actions 

of its agent, a director at the bank, for significant monetary 

losses stemming from the director's advice. The director had 

advised the plaintiff to invest in "two Massachusetts-based 

companies" with whom he had extensive business transactions. 

Id. at 472, 489-490. Although the trial court dismissed the 

bank for lack of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm 

statute, the Appeals Court remanded for a hearing after 

concluding that the plaintiff met her prima facie burden that 

jurisdiction existed, should the director be an agent of the 

bank. Id. at 473-474, 490-491. If the director was acting as 

the bank's agent, then "a direct line [could] be drawn from his 

Massachusetts contacts and [his] advice, such that 'but for' 

[his] actions in Massachusetts" the plaintiff would not have 

invested in the Massachusetts businesses. Id. at 490, quoting 

Tatro, 416 Mass. at 771.

We conclude that the "but for" causation requirement is 

satisfied in the instant case. The automobile was first sold in 

Massachusetts and remained here for several years before it was 

sold to a resident of a neighboring State. But for the first 

sale here, the Sebring would not have ended up with Doucet. FCA 

US argues, however, that "the only connection to Massachusetts 
11

is a highly tangential one," because its predecessor initially 

shipped the car to a Rhode Island dealership, and second, once 

FCA US's distributor placed the Sebring into the stream of 

commerce in Massachusetts with the initial lease and sale, 

several others purchased it in Massachusetts and New Hampshire 

before Doucet's purchase and injury in New Hampshire. Although 

there are multiple links in the factual chain, our decision in 

Tatro supports personal jurisdiction. But for FCA US's 

extensive business transactions in Massachusetts, which included 

distributing the Sebring through the Massachusetts dealership, 

Doucet would not have been injured in New Hampshire, making FCA 

US's distribution in Massachusetts "the first step in a train of 

events that results in the personal injury." See Tatro, 416 

Mass. at 770. Consistent with our broad construction of G. L. 

c. 223A, § 3 (a), see id. at 767, we conclude that Doucet's 

claims arose from FCA US's transaction of business in the 

Commonwealth, in satisfaction of our long-arm statute.

b. Federal due process. Having first established

jurisdiction under our long-arm statute, we now consider whether 

specific personal jurisdiction over FCA US in Massachusetts 

comports with due process under the Federal Constitution. See 

SCVNGR, 478 Mass. at 325. "The Fourteenth Amendment's Due 

Process Clause limits a [S]tate court's power to exercise 

jurisdiction over a defendant." Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 
12

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (Ford 

Motor). "The primary focus of" the Federal "personal 

jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant's relationship to the 

forum State." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of 

Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (Bristol-Myers).

This long-standing constitutional requirement for personal 

jurisdiction "depends on the defendant's having such 'contacts' 

with the forum State that 'the maintenance of the suit' is 

'reasonable, in the context of our [F]ederal system of 

government,' and 'does not offend traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice.'" Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1024,

quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-

317 (1945) (Int'l Shoe). Defendants, as well as plaintiffs,

must be treated "fairly," and the principles of "interstate 

federalism" must be respected "to ensure that States with 

'little legitimate interest' in a suit do not encroach on States 

more affected by the controversy." Ford Motor, supra at 1025,

quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 263.

The plaintiffs assert that they have demonstrated these

requirements, whereas FCA US contends that the trial court 

correctly determined that personal jurisdiction fails on the 

ground that the plaintiffs' claims are not sufficiently related 

to FCA US's contacts in the forum, especially in light of recent 

United States Supreme Court decisions.
13

In analyzing these due process requirements, we focus our 

attention on the case-specific facts, particularly the extensive 

business FCA US undertakes in Massachusetts, as well as the 

nexus between the plaintiffs' claims and FCA US's business in 

Massachusetts -- specifically the sale of the automobile first 

in Massachusetts, and then to Doucet in the neighboring State of 

New Hampshire, where he was eventually injured. In this

circumstance, where FCA US engages in extensive business 

dealings in Massachusetts, and a causal relationship between 

those dealings and the plaintiffs' claims exists, we conclude 

that Massachusetts's exercise of personal jurisdiction over FCA 

US, with regard to the plaintiffs' claims, satisfies Federal due 

process.

i. Purposeful availment. We begin with "the contacts 

needed for" specific personal jurisdiction, which "often go by 

the name 'purposeful availment.'" Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 

1024, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 

(1985) (Burger King). To satisfy this prong of the due process 

inquiry for personal jurisdiction, the plaintiffs must 

demonstrate that FCA US "has purposefully avail[ed] itself of 

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, 

thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws" 

(quotation omitted). Knox v. MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685, 

691 (1st Cir. 2019), quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
14

253 (1958). Accord Ford Motor, supra at 1024-1025. This 

"requirement ensures that the exercise of jurisdiction is 

essentially voluntary and foreseeable, and is not premised on a 

defendant's random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts" 

(quotation and citations omitted). Knox, supra. Accord Burger 

King, supra. Foreseeability means "the defendant's conduct and 

connection with the forum State are such that he should 

reasonably anticipate being haled into court there," World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (WorldWide Volkswagen), while "[v]oluntariness requires that the 

defendant's contacts with the forum [S]tate proximately result 

from actions by the defendant himself" (quotation and citation 

omitted), PREP Tours, Inc. v. American Youth Soccer Org., 913 

F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 2019) (PREP Tours). Ultimately, 

foreseeability and voluntariness ensure that the plaintiff's 

"unilateral activity" does not form the basis for jurisdiction 

over the defendant. Id., quoting Burger King, supra at 474.

They also lend "a degree of predictability to the legal system" 

by "allow[ing] potential defendants to structure their primary 

conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct 

will and will not render them liable to suit." PREP Tours, 

supra, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, supra.

In the instant case, this requirement is readily satisfied. 

In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that FCA US "transacts 
15

business and contracts to supply services and/or things in this 

Commonwealth and has derived substantial revenue therefrom." 

That business includes the distribution of automobiles into the 

stream of commerce within Massachusetts, including the Sebring 

in the instant case. The defendant Sudbay, a Massachusetts 

corporation, "operat[es] a car dealership that distributes FCA 

[US] vehicles into the stream of commerce within the 

Commonwealth," including the Sebring at issue. The plaintiffs 

allege that FCA US and Sudbay are also both involved in the 

"inspecting, . . . selling, advertising, and marketing" of these

automobiles. The plaintiffs further allege that Sudbay

initially sold or leased the Sebring "to a Massachusetts 

resident in May 2003," and that Sudbay, and other Massachusetts

dealerships, serviced the vehicle up until it was "sold to a New 

Hampshire resident in April of 2011." FCA US also has a 

registered agent in the Commonwealth.

The plaintiffs have thus clearly alleged that FCA US, 

through these ongoing distribution, maintenance, and marketing 

channels, "has purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within" Massachusetts as "the forum State, 

thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws"

(quotation and citation omitted). Knox, 914 F.3d at 691. See 

Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 (purposeful availment where 

automobile manufacturer's "dealers . . . regularly maintain and 
16

repair" its cars). Massachusetts's exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over FCA US, therefore, results from FCA US's

"voluntary" acts and their "foreseeable" consequences and is not 

premised on "random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts" 

(citation omitted). Knox, supra.11

ii. Relatedness. Although FCA US's extensive, voluntary

business transactions in Massachusetts are a significant part of 

the due process analysis, they are not dispositive, as there 

must also be a relationship between the actions voluntarily 

undertaken in the jurisdiction and the plaintiffs' claims. See 

Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1025. After the plaintiffs 

demonstrate that the defendant "'exploit[ed] a market' in the 

forum State," id., quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285

(2014), they must also show that their claims "'arise out of or 

relate to the defendant's contacts' with the forum," Ford Motor, 

supra, quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262. Known as 

relatedness, this prong of the due process analysis requires a 

11 Plus, FCA US has already faced a products liability suit 

for a car purchased from another Chrysler dealership in 

Massachusetts, Costa v. FCA US LLC, 542 F. Supp. 3d 83, 90 (D. 

Mass. 2021), without "rais[ing] personal jurisdiction 

objections" in that suit, further "bolster[ing]" a "finding of 

purposeful availment," Tom's of Me. v. Acme-Hardesty Co., 565 F. 

Supp. 2d 171, 182 (D. Me. 2008). Literally speaking, FCA US has 

already been "haled into court" in this forum State. See WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
17

"demonstrable nexus" between the claim and "the defendant's 

forum contacts." Knox, 914 F.3d at 691.

In the context of a company doing extensive business in the 

forum State, this requirement is most clearly articulated in the 

United States Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers, 582 

U.S. 255. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that a 

California State court lacked personal jurisdiction over 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS), id. at 268, "a large 

pharmaceutical company . . . incorporated in Delaware and 

headquartered in New York," for the nonresident plaintiffs'[12]

claims for "injuries allegedly caused by" one of the 

prescription drugs manufactured and sold by BMS, id. at 258-259.

In so holding, the Court noted that "[t]he nonresident 

plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained [the drug] through 

California physicians or from any other California source; nor 

did they claim that they were injured by [the drug] or were 

treated for their injuries in California." Bristol-Myers, 582 

U.S. at 259. The nonresident plaintiffs also did not allege 

that the drug "was designed and developed in BMS's California 

research facilities" (citation and alteration omitted). Id. at 

260-261. Instead, they relied on the claims raised by resident

12 BMS did not argue against personal jurisdiction for the 

claims brought by California residents in that mass tort action. 

See Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 259.
18

plaintiffs who "prescribed, obtained, and ingested [the drug] in 

California," id. at 265, seemingly in an attempt to forum shop 

in a favorable State, Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1031.

Thus, the nonresident plaintiffs' claims had no actual 

connection to the forum State because "all the conduct giving 

rise to the nonresidents' claims occurred elsewhere." BristolMyers, 582 U.S. at 265. Simply, there was no "adequate link 

between the [forum] State and the nonresidents' claims." Id. at 

264. Specific personal jurisdiction over BMS for these claims, 

therefore, was inappropriate in California, regardless of BMS's 

"extensive forum contacts that [were] unrelated to those 

claims," because, as the Court explained, "a defendant's general 

connections with the forum are not enough." Id.

In the instant case, unlike in Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 

264, not only did FCA US engage in extensive business dealings 

in the forum, but there is also a causal connection between its

business dealings and the injury, albeit an indirect one, as the 

automobile was first sold in Massachusetts and eventually 

purchased by Doucet, a resident of a neighboring State. As 

explained supra in our discussion of personal jurisdiction under 

the Commonwealth's long-arm statute, "but for" the first sale of 

the automobile in Massachusetts, Doucet would not have ended up 

purchasing, driving, and being injured in the automobile in the 

neighboring State of New Hampshire. FCA US, nonetheless, claims 
19

that this causal connection is too attenuated to support 

jurisdiction in Massachusetts.

In evaluating this attenuation argument, and whether these 

facts are sufficient to establish the necessary nexus between 

the defendant's contacts and the plaintiff's claims, both 

parties turn to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ford 

Motor, 141 S. Ct. 1017, for guidance, as do we. In that case,

the plaintiffs brought separate products liability suits against 

Ford Motor Company (Ford) in the courts of two States where 

serious car accidents occurred and where the victims resided. 

Id. at 1022-1023. Ford had argued that the State courts lacked 

personal jurisdiction "because the particular car involved in 

the crash was not first sold in the forum State, nor was it 

designed or manufactured there." Id. at 1022.13

The court, as well as the concurring opinions, rejected 

this analysis as unduly constrictive. See Ford Motor, 141 S. 

Ct. at 1026; id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the 

judgment); id. at 1039 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the 

13 Thus, Ford was making the exact opposite argument of the 

one being made by the automobile company here: that is, that 

due process required jurisdiction in the State of first sale, 

not the State in which the injury occurred. See Ford Motor, 141 

S. Ct. at 1022-1023. Indeed, FCA US successfully made the same 

argument, albeit before the issuance of Ford Motor, when the 

plaintiffs first sought to bring this suit in New Hampshire. As 

a result, in this case, the plaintiffs have been placed in a 

Kafkaesque procedural predicament by the defense.
20

judgment). They all concluded that the combination of extensive 

business dealings in the forum State and an injury in that State 

was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In so holding, none of 

the opinions expressly ruled out that the combination of 

extensive dealings in the forum State and the first sale of the 

automobile at issue in the forum State would be sufficient. 

Nonetheless, FCA US argues here that such an interpretation is 

implicit in the Court's and the concurrences' reasoning. We 

disagree.

In upholding jurisdiction, Justice Kagan, writing for the 

Court, rejected Ford's strict "causation-only approach" as 

unnecessarily narrowing the bounds of specific personal 

jurisdiction. Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. In so doing, she 

emphasized that causation is one -- but not the only -- way to 

satisfy the "arise out of or relate to" requirement, which may 

be read in two parts. Id. "The first half of that standard 

asks about causation; but the back half, after the 'or,' 

contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction 

without a causal showing." Id. In other words, the "relate to" 

clause captures more conduct than the "arise out of" clause, 

which hews more closely to "proof of causation -- i.e., proof 

that the plaintiff's claim came about because of the defendant's 

in-[S]tate conduct." See id. Furthermore, in evaluating how 

Ford's "conduct" in the forum States "relate[d] to the claims" 
21

presented by forum State resident plaintiffs, the Court 

explained that the plaintiffs' suits "ar[ose] from . . . car 

accident[s] in" States where Ford "advertised, sold, and 

serviced" the allegedly defective car models (emphases added). 

Id. at 1028. The Court concluded, therefore, that this behavior 

established "a strong relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation -- the essential foundation of 

specific jurisdiction" (quotations and citation omitted). Id.

As stated supra, the Court did not rule out jurisdiction 

where the first sale of the automobile at issue occurs in the 

State. Rather, the thrust of the opinion was to expand, not 

contract, jurisdiction, beyond requiring "but for" causation.

See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. Nevertheless, FCA US argues 

here that that was the Court's intent. It does so based mostly 

on the discussion between the Court and Justice Gorsuch's 

concurring opinion, particularly the footnote addressing the 

concurrence written by Justice Gorsuch. See id. at 1027 n.3.

In that footnote, the Court wrote,

"In thus reiterating this Court's longstanding approach, we 

reject Justice Gorsuch's apparent (if oblique) view that a 

[S]tate court should have jurisdiction over a nationwide 

corporation like Ford on any claim, no matter how unrelated 

to the State or Ford's activities there. See [id.] at 

1039. On that view, for example, a California court could 

hear a claim against Ford brought by an Ohio plaintiff 

based on an accident occurring in Ohio involving a car 

purchased in Ohio. Removing the need for any connection 

between the case and forum State would transfigure our 

specific jurisdiction standard as applied to corporations. 
22

"Case-linked" jurisdiction, see [id.] at 1024-1025, would 

then become not case-linked at all."

Id. at 1027 n.3. See id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in 

the judgment).

We reject this interpretation by FCA US of that footnoted 

discussion and of the Court's decision as a whole. Where a 

first sale of the automobile that caused the injury occurred in 

the State, there is a relationship between the claim stemming 

from that injury and the defendant's contacts in the forum. See 

Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. There are not only extensive 

business dealings by the defendant in the State in which 

jurisdiction is sought, but also business dealings related to 

the automobile that is the subject of the litigation. See id. 

at 1022, 1026. Consequently, there is a "strong relationship 

between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" (quotation 

and citation omitted). Id. at 1028. See id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, 

J., concurring in the judgment) (State in which allegedly 

defective automobile at issue in suit is sold has "strong 

interest in ensuring [it does not] become marketplace[] for 

unreasonably dangerous products").14

14 Our interpretation of Ford Motor is consistent with those 

of Federal and other State courts that have applied Ford Motor

since its recent issuance. For example, in the United States 

District Court for the District of Idaho, the court found 

relatedness stemming from a "but for" causation relationship in 

which a foreign corporation sold and shipped products to a 

distributor in Idaho, who then sold the defective product to 
23

iii. Reasonableness and interstate federalism. Lastly, 

"[o]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully 

established minimum contacts within the forum State, these 

contacts may be considered in light of other factors to 

determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would 

comport with 'fair play and substantial justice,'" Burger King, 

471 U.S. at 476, quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320, and the 

principles of interstate federalism, Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 

1025, 1030. We conclude that specific personal jurisdiction in 

Pennsylvania plaintiffs, causing injury to them there in their 

State of residence. See McHugh vs. Vertical Partners W., LLC, 

U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 2:20-cv-00581-DCN, slip op. at 2, 11-12 (D. 

Idaho Apr. 19, 2021). Like this case, the plaintiffs brought 

their suit not in their State of residence, but in the State 

where the defective product was first sold. Id. at 2. Unlike 

this case, however, the plaintiffs purchased the item directly 

from the forum State distributor. Id. Regardless, "but for" 

the foreign corporation first sending its defective product to 

the forum State distributor, the injury would not have occurred 

out of State. See id. That is the same scenario presented 

here: but for FCA US sending the Sebring to a Massachusetts 

dealership-distributor, Doucet's injury would not have occurred 

in New Hampshire.

In a products liability case this year, the First District 

Appellate Court of Illinois recognized personal jurisdiction 

over a South Korean corporation, which manufactured a battery 

that allegedly exploded inside another product and caused injury 

to the plaintiff. Kothawala v. Whole Leaf, LLC, 2023 IL App 

(1st) 210972, ¶¶ 1, 4, 6. The court reasoned that "given that a 

finding of relatedness requires something short of but-for 

causation under Ford [Motor], it [was] difficult to see how 

anyone could plausibly argue that [the] plaintiff's claims 

[were] not at least 'related to'" the foreign corporation's 

"activities in" the forum State, id. at ¶ 54, based on the 

corporation's "direct shipment of battery packs to a distributor 

for resale," id. at ¶ 51, in the forum State.
24

Massachusetts over FCA US LLC for the plaintiffs' claims is 

consistent with these "two sets of values." See id. at 1025, 

citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.

As an initial matter, we emphasize that "a defendant who 

has purposefully directed [its] activities at" the forum "must 

present a compelling case that the presence of some other 

considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Burger 

King, 471 U.S. at 477. As discussed supra, and conceded by FCA 

US at the motion hearing, there is no question that FCA US 

"purposefully directed" its activities at Massachusetts. See 

id. Indeed, those contacts are significant and widespread. The

first sale of the automobile in question also provides a causal 

connection between those activities and the automobile in 

question. See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. That automobile 

also remained on the streets and highways of Massachusetts for 

eight years before it was sold to Doucet in a neighboring State.

Although the Court in Ford Motor, and perhaps Justice Alito

in his concurrence in that case, may suggest that the connection 

to the litigation is stronger in the State in which the injury 

occurred (New Hampshire) than in the State in which the first 

sale occurred (Massachusetts), both are strong enough where the 

defendant does substantial business in the State at issue to 

satisfy the requirements of due process. See Ford Motor, 141 S. 

Ct. at 1030; id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
25

judgment). "When minimum contacts exist, due process demands no 

more than a reasonable forum." O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel 

Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 325 (3d Cir. 2007). It does not demand 

"the best forum."15 Just because "principles of 'interstate 

federalism' support jurisdiction" over the plaintiffs' suit in 

the State in which Doucet was injured and lives does not mean 

these principles do not also support jurisdiction in the State 

of first sale when substantial business is done in that State. 

See Ford Motor, supra at 1029-1030.

As emphasized by Justice Gorsuch in his concurrence in Ford 

Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1035, a State has a significant interest in 

protecting itself against the sale of defective products within 

its borders. Accordingly, FCA US's purposefully directed 

activities within Massachusetts enhance the Commonwealth's 

interest in this litigation, where the allegedly defective 

automobile at issue remained in Massachusetts for eight years

prior to its sale to a resident of a neighboring State, and 

15 Of additional consideration in this instance is the 

presence of two defendants: Sudbay, which is "at home" only in 

Massachusetts, and FCA US, which is not at home in either 

Massachusetts or New Hampshire. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 

U.S. 117, 134-139 (2014). Although Massachusetts may exercise 

its general personal jurisdictional powers over Sudbay, see id., 

the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that Sudbay has the 

minimal contacts related to this suit in New Hampshire to bring 

this suit against it there, see Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1024. 

Massachusetts, therefore, provides an efficient forum for the 

resolution of this case. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 

(discussing importance of "efficient" forum).
26

where there may be other defective vehicles within our borders, 

by virtue of FCA US's ongoing contacts. Finally, there is no 

issue of the plaintiffs bringing a suit in a State to which 

their claims have no connection as a means of forum shopping, as 

there was in Bristol-Myers. See Ford Motor, supra at 1031; 

Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 265-266. The plaintiffs originally 

filed their suit in New Hampshire, the State of residence and 

injury, and only brought this suit in the State of first sale

after the defendants argued, and the Federal District Court in

New Hampshire concluded, prior to the Ford Motor decision, that

jurisdiction did not lie in the State in which the injury 

occurred. As the defendants are now arguing the exact opposite 

position, and the plaintiffs have been bounced from court to 

court for years, the values of "fair play and substantial 

justice," as well as interstate federalism, clearly now support 

jurisdiction in Massachusetts. See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 

1024, 1030, quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Burger King, 

471 U.S. at 476.

3. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 

that personal jurisdiction exists in Massachusetts over FCA US

for these claims, pursuant to both the Commonwealth's long-arm 

statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the due process clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore vacate the judgment 
27

dismissing FCA US as a party to the case and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.