January 2015 

NASA/CR–2015-218673

Systems Engineering Management Plan 

NASA Traffic Aware Planner 

Integration into P-180 Airborne Test-Bed 

John Maris 

Advanced Aerospace Solutions, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
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Hampton, Virginia 23681-2199 under Contract NNL12AA06C 

 

January 2015 

NASA/CR–2015-218673

Systems Engineering Management Plan 

NASA Traffic Aware Planner 

Integration into P-180 Airborne Test-Bed 

John Maris 

Advanced Aerospace Solutions, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
Available from: 

NASA STI Program / Mail Stop 148 

NASA Langley Research Center 

Hampton, VA 23681-2199 

Fax: 757-864-6500 
 

i 

Acknowledgements 

This project was funded by NASA under contract NNL12AA06C. Development of the 

TAP software system was performed by Engility Corporation, the Prime Contractor for the 

project. Many of the materials in this report were generated from source documents prepared or 

reviewed by program personnel. Particular thanks to: Mark Haynes (AdvAero); Sharon Woods 

(P.I.), Bob Vivona, and Jeff Henderson (Engility Corporation); David Wing (NASA Technical 

Monitor) and Mark Ballin (NASA Project Scientist); and Bob Maxson (National Weather 

Service, TAP Test Subject, and co-author of DAV 715 TAP research paper). Sincere 

appreciation is also extended to Dr. Bruce Conway of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University for 

formally reviewing this manuscript. 

 
 

ii 

Table of Contents 

Page 

1 Overview ................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Scope ......................................................................................................................... 2

1.2 Limitations ................................................................................................................. 3

2 Applicable Documents .............................................................................................................. 3

2.1 Supporting Project Documents .................................................................................. 3

2.2 Government / Regulatory Documents ....................................................................... 4

2.3 Industry Reference Documents ................................................................................. 4

3 General Description of System Architecture ............................................................................. 5

4 System Engineering Process ...................................................................................................... 6

4.1 System Operational Requirements ............................................................................ 7

4.1.1 TAP software functionality requirements .................................................. 7

4.1.2 Flight trial requirements ............................................................................ 7

4.1.3 Commercialization technical requirements ............................................... 7

4.2 Maintenance Concept ................................................................................................ 8

4.3 Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) ................................................................ 8

4.4 Functional Analysis ................................................................................................... 9

4.4.1 TAP Use Cases .......................................................................................... 9

4.4.2 TAP functional requirements .................................................................. 10

4.5 Requirement Allocation ........................................................................................... 10

4.6 System Synthesis, Analysis, and Design Optimization ........................................... 11

4.6.1 Test Vehicle ............................................................................................. 12

4.6.2 EFB and ADS-B subsystems ................................................................... 13

4.6.3 AID subsystem ........................................................................................ 16

4.6.4 Broadband subsystem .............................................................................. 18

4.6.5 Test vehicle computer and data provisions .............................................. 20

4.7 System Test and Evaluation .................................................................................... 21

4.7.1 Incremental Test Approach ..................................................................... 21

4.7.2 Flight Test Program ................................................................................. 22

4.7.3 Individual Flight Profiles ......................................................................... 22

4.7.4 Flight Test Envelope ................................................................................ 25
 

iii 

4.8 Construction/Production Requirements ................................................................... 25

4.9 System Utilization and Sustaining Support ............................................................. 25

4.10 System Retirement and Material Recycling/Disposal ........................................... 26

5 Technical Program Planning, Implementation, and Control ................................................... 26

5.1 Program Requirements/Statement of Work (SOW) ................................................ 26

5.2 Organization ............................................................................................................ 26

5.2.1 Producer/Contractor Organization ........................................................... 26

5.2.2 System Engineering Organization ........................................................... 27

5.2.3 Program Tasks ......................................................................................... 28

5.2.4 Supplier Requirements ............................................................................ 28

5.3 Key Organizational Interfaces ................................................................................. 29

5.4 Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) ......................................................................... 29

5.4.1 Class 2 EFB selection and installation and certification ......................... 30

5.4.2 AID selection, installation, and certification ........................................... 30

5.4.3 Autopilot-state annunciation interface ..................................................... 30

5.4.4 EFB Landing gear and flap position sensing ........................................... 30

5.4.5 ADS-B TCAS upgrade ............................................................................ 30

5.4.6 TCAS / transponder control head upgrade .............................................. 30

5.4.7 ADS-B transponder upgrade ................................................................... 30

5.4.8 Satellite broadband system selection, installation, and certification ....... 30

5.4.9 Broadband antenna installation ............................................................... 30

5.4.10 Miscellaneous TAP Provisions ............................................................... 30

5.4.11 Workstation data and video interfaces .................................................... 30

5.4.12 Workstation power switch relocation ..................................................... 30

5.5 Project Schedule and Milestone Charts ................................................................... 30

5.6 Technical Performance Measurement “Tracking” ................................................. 32

5.7 Program Cost ........................................................................................................... 32

5.8 Technical Communications ..................................................................................... 32

5.9 Program Monitoring and Control ............................................................................ 32

5.9.1 Operator Certification & Training Standards .......................................... 32

5.9.2 Operator Audit ......................................................................................... 33

5.9.3 Flight Test Governance ........................................................................... 33

5.9.4 Aircraft Maintenance ............................................................................... 34
 

iv 

6 Engineering Specialty Integration ........................................................................................... 35

6.1 Functional Engineering ........................................................................................... 35

6.1.1 Test pilot .................................................................................................. 35

6.1.2 Flight test engineer .................................................................................. 36

6.1.3 Safety specialist ....................................................................................... 36

6.1.4 Avionics specialist and structural engineer ............................................. 36

6.1.5 HF engineer ............................................................................................. 36

6.2 Software Engineering .............................................................................................. 36

6.3 Reliability Engineering ............................................................................................ 37

6.4 Maintainability Engineering .................................................................................... 37

6.5 Human Factors (HF) Engineering ........................................................................... 37

6.6 Safety Engineering .................................................................................................. 40

6.7 Security Engineering ............................................................................................... 41

6.8 Manufacturing and Production Engineering ............................................................ 41

6.9 Logistics and Supportability Engineering ............................................................... 41

6.10 Disposability Engineering ..................................................................................... 41

6.11 Quality Engineering ............................................................................................... 42

6.12 Environmental Engineering ................................................................................... 42

6.13 Value/Cost Engineering ......................................................................................... 42

6.14 Other Engineering Disciplines ............................................................................... 42

7 Configuration Management ..................................................................................................... 42

8 Data Management (DM) .......................................................................................................... 42

9 Program Technology Requirements ........................................................................................ 43

10 Special International Requirements ....................................................................................... 43

11 Risk Management .................................................................................................................. 43

12 References ............................................................................................................................. 49

APPENDIX 1 AW&ST Article ..................................................................................................... 51

 
 

v 

List of Tables 

Table Page 

Table 1. TAP Operational Scenarios ............................................................................................. 10

Table 2. TAP Functional Allocation .............................................................................................. 11

Table 3. Broadband Options Compared ........................................................................................ 19

Table 4. TAP Mission Test Activity Sequence ................................................................................ 23

Table 5. TAP Evaluation Flight Test Envelope .............................................................................. 25

Table 6. TAP Principal Flight Test System Engineering Tasks ..................................................... 28

Table 7. TAP Reporting Interfaces ................................................................................................ 29
 

vi 

List of Figures 

Figure Page 

Figure 1. Sample TAP screen. ........................................................................................................ 1

Figure 2. Test-platform system architecture. .................................................................................. 6

Figure 3. Test-vehicle flight test station and cabin. ...................................................................... 13

Figure 4. Goodrich SmartDisplay® EFB ..................................................................................... 15

Figure 5. ACSS TCAS 3000SP .................................................................................................... 16

Figure 6. Honeywell AspireTM 200 architecture. .......................................................................... 20

Figure 7. Test-bed cockpit. The EFB is mounted on the right-side windshield. ......................... 21

Figure 8. Representative TAP test - plan view. ............................................................................ 24

Figure 9. Representative TAP test - profile view. ........................................................................ 24

Figure 10. AdvAero TAP Integrated Product Team. .................................................................... 27

Figure 11. Program schedule ........................................................................................................ 31

Figure 12. Sample Avtrak® maintenance tracking software printout. ......................................... 35

Figure 13. Sample Bedford workload rating scale. ...................................................................... 39

Figure 14. Test-vehicle cockpit partitioning. ................................................................................ 41

Figure 15. NASA Airworthiness and Safety Review Board (ASRB) Process. ............................ 45

Figure 16. NASA ASRB process (cont.) ...................................................................................... 46

Figure 17. TAP risk assessment and safety briefing. ................................................................... 47

Figure 18. TAP safety briefing (cont.) ......................................................................................... 48

 
 

vii 

ACRONYMS 

ADC Air Data Computer 

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 

AID Aircraft Interface Device 

AOP Autonomous Operations Planner 

ASP Airspace Systems Program (NASA) 

ASRB Airworthiness and Safety Review Board 

ATC Air Traffic Control 

ATOL Air Traffic Operations Lab – NASA Langley 

CCU Communications Convergence Unit 

CITI Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative 

C of A Certificate of Airworthiness 

COM Company Operations Manual 

COO Chief Operating Officer 

COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 

CTD NextGen Concepts and Technology Development (NASA) 

EFB Electronic Flight Bag 

EFIS Electronic Flight Instrumentation System 

EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 

FDR Flight Data Recorder 

FL Flight Level 

FMS Flight Management System 

FSR Flight Safety Release 

FTE Flight Test Engineer 

FTOM Flight Test Operations Manual 

FTOSR Flight Test Operations and Safety Report 

FTRR Flight Test Readiness Review 

GFE Government Furnished Equipment 

HDU High Speed Data Unit 

HMI Human-Machine Interface 

ICA Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness 

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 

ICD Interface Control Document 

IFR Instrument Flight Rules 

INS Inertial Navigation System 

IPT Integrated Product Team 

IRB Institutional Review Board 

MEA Minimum Enroute Altitude 

MSL Mean Sea Level 

MTGW Maximum Take-off Gross Weight 

NAS National Airspace System 

NextGen FAA Next Generation Air Transportation System 
 

viii 

OPL Operator Performance Laboratory – University of Iowa 

OS Operating System 

PI Principal Investigator 

PIC Pilot in Command 

SEMP Systems Engineering Management Plan 

SMS Safety Management System 

SOW Statement of Work 

STC Supplemental Type Certificate 

SUA Special Use Airspace 

TAP Traffic Aware Planner 

TASAR Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests 

TCAS Traffic (Alert and) Collision Avoidance System 

TM Technical Monitor (NASA) 

TPM Technical Performance Measure 

TRL Technology Readiness Level 

TSO Technical Standard Order 

UAT Universal Access Transceiver 

WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System 

WBS Work Breakdown Structure 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 1 

 

1 OVERVIEW

This Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) addresses the test-vehicle design, 

integration, and flight-testing for NASA’s Traffic Aware Planner (TAP) software application. 

TAP is a three-dimensional aircraft trajectory optimizer developed to support NASA’s Airspace 

Systems Program (ASP) and NextGen Concepts and Technology Development (CTD) projects. 

TAP uses a pattern-based genetic algorithm to generate flight path optimizations, based on ownstate information combined with traffic, weather, and airspace boundary inputs obtained from 

external sources. TAP uses these data to offer aircrew vertical and lateral flight-path 

optimizations which can achieve significant fuel and time savings, while automatically avoiding 

traffic, weather, and restricted airspace conflicts. A sample TAP screen is shown in Figure 1. 

Figure 1. Sample TAP screen. 

TAP’s architecture and algorithms were derived from the NASA Autonomous Operations 

Planner (AOP) (Ballin, Sharma, Vivona, Johnson, & Ramiscal, 2002; Vivona, Karr, & Roscoe, 

2013) incorporated in NASA Langley’s Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL) (NASA, 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 2 

 

2013). The flight-evaluation program entailed the migration of TAP from the simulator to an 

aircraft in order to validate its usability in a representative airborne environment. The program 

comprised three major activities: (1) development of the TAP application for Class 2 (portable) 

EFB applications (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012); (2) development and assessment of 

the TAP Human Machine Interface (HMI); and (3) assessment of TAP in a representative flight 

environment. This plan addresses the 24-month development program culminating in the TAP 

flight evaluations that were successfully concluded in November 2013. 

TAP data sources include: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) data; 

satellite broadband data; and Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) traffic 

files. These capabilities are already available to a large cross-section of Air Transport and 

business aircraft that form the initial target market for TAP. The Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) has mandated ADS-B Out installation on most aircraft operating in U.S. airspace by 

January 1, 2020 as part of its Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). TCAS is 

already broadly mandated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for 

installation in large (>13,000lb) transport aircraft, and an increasing number of aircraft already 

have installed broadband capability. 

A key step in achieving the rapid operational deployment of TAP is the successful 

verification and validation of the system in a representative flight environment. This posed 

several challenges in the development program. Among the most significant was the requirement 

to port the foundational Autonomous Operations Planner (AOP) software from its original 

embedded-avionics simulator-based origins to an embedded avionics environment on the flight 

deck, hosted on an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) platform. Considerable attention must also be 

paid to the selection and modification of a suitable flight-test platform that will maximize the 

long-term potential for the operational deployment of TAP, while minimizing immediate program 

risks. The systems engineering approach used to achieve these objectives is outlined in this 

document. 

1.1 Scope 

This SEMP relates to the integration of the TAP software into a suitably modified 

Piaggio P180 Avanti test platform (S/N 1037) for the purposes of evaluating TAP; it does not 

address the TAP software development process, except for the integration aspects. The SEMP 

captures the essence of the extensive systems engineering planning activities that went into the 

program, but it is not strictly a plan, because the TAP flight trials were successfully completed in 

November 2013. Most of the following sections reflect completed process, with known outcomes 

to the decisions that were taken over the past two years. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 3 

 

1.2 Limitations 

 Advanced Aerospace Solutions, LLC. (“AdvAero”) conducted the TAP integration and 

testing as a subcontractor to Engility Corporation, NASA’s prime contractor for the program. 

Because of these relationships, much of the material is confidential in nature and cannot be freely 

reproduced within this document. This material only addresses a small subset of the program 

technical documentation, but sufficient information has been included wherever possible to 

facilitate a good understanding of the system engineering process that were used. 

2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

The latest revisions of the following documents apply: 

2.1 Supporting Project Documents 

A. ADV-TASAR-DEL-005 Flight-Demonstration Aircraft Modification Plan, Initial 

Issue, May 17, 2012. 

B. Marinvent Corporation Flight Test Operations Manual (FTOM), Rev 1 August 

12, 2011. 

C. Marinvent Corporation STC SA 05-104 Honeywell Epic Control Display System 

Installation Piaggio P180 Avanti C-GJMM / 1037 Issue No. 1 dated November 

02, 2005. 

D. Marinvent Corporation STC O-LSA12-151/D Str. Prov. GPS Antenna & 

Miscellaneous Equipment Installation, Issue No. 1 dated October 19, 2012. 

E. Marinvent Corporation STC O-LSA12-171/D EMS Aviation Aspire Satcom 

System Installation, Issue No. 1 dated October 24, 2012. 

F. Marinvent Corporation STC O-LSA12-172/D NASA TASAR Program Provisions, 

Issue No. 1 dated October 22, 2012. 

G. NASA LaRC Minutes of May 10, 2012 Meeting of the Airworthiness and Safety 

Review Board (ASRB) dated May 15, 2012. 

H. NNL12AA06C, Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR) Traffic 

Aware Planner (TAP) Interface Control Document (ICD), Version 1.8, January 

22, 2013. 

I. NNL12AA06C, Initial Analysis of Operational Use Cases and Methodologies, 

Jeff Henderson (Engility Corporation), May 31, 2012w. 

J. NNL12AA06C DEL 7 NASA & FAA Flight-Trial Approval Requirements, Initial 

Issue, June 30, 2012. 

K. NNL12AA06C, Statement of Work for Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests 

(TASAR) Analysis and Development, as approved. 

L. NNL12AA06C, TASAR Flight-Trial Hazard Analysis, v1.0 Nov 9, 2012. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 4 

 

M. NNL12AA06C DEL 11, TASAR Flight Trial Research Plan, Draft V1.0, Dec 21, 

2012. 

N. NNL12AA06C FTOSR DEL-19, Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Request Flight 

Test Operations and Safety Report. Version 1.3 August 13, 2013. 

O. NNL12AA06C TASAR Flight Trial Test Plan, v1.0 Dec 21, 2012. 

P. Skyservice SMS Manual, No. 23, Issue 2, CAR 573, November 15, 2012. 

2.2 Government / Regulatory Documents 

Q. 14 CFR Part 1230, Protection of Human Subjects, June 18, 1991 or later edition. 

R. LMS-CP-0904, Authorizing Flight Aboard Non-LaRC Aircraft, Rev C, July 26, 

2012. 

S. LMS-OP-7831NASA Langley, Conducting Research Activities in the Research 

Directorate (RD), Rev A: RD. 

T. LPR 7100.10 NASA Langley Procedural Requirements Protection of Human 

Research Subjects, October 29, 2010. 

U. NASA DOP-0-300, Aircrew Flight Operations Manual, Revision l, Expires 

October 22, 2015. 

V. NPD 7100.8E NASA Policy Directive Protection of Human Research Subjects

(Revalidated with admin. changes 6/14/2007): May 31, 2002. 

W. NPD 7900.4C NASA Policy Directive, NASA Aircraft Operations Management, 

April 08, 2009. 

X. NPR 7100.1 NASA Procedural Requirements, Protection of Human Research 

Subjects (Revalidated 7/7/08), effective date: March 28, 2003. 

Y. NPR 7900.3C NASA Procedural Requirements, Aircraft Operations Management 

Manual, July 15, 2011. 

2.3 Industry Reference Documents 

Z. ARINC 424 Navigation System Data Base Standard, ARINC, Inc. 

AA. ARINC 429 Digital Information Transfer System, ARINC, Inc. 

BB. ARINC 834 Aircraft Data Interface Function (ADIF) standard, ARINC, Inc. 

CC. RTCA-DO-160G Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne 

Equipment. 12/08/2010. RTCA, Inc. 

DD. Federal Aviation Administration AC 23.1309-1E System safety analysis and 

assessment for part 23 airplanes, 2011. 

EE. RTCA-DO-178C Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 

Certification. 12/13/2011. RTCA, Inc. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 5 

 

FF. RTCA-DO-254 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware. 

4/19/00. RTCA, Inc. 

GG. RTCA DO-260B Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz 

Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and 

Traffic Information Services – Broadcast (TIS-B), 12/13/2011. RTCA Inc. 

HH. SAE ARP 4754. Guidelines for development of civil aircraft and systems. 

(Rev A ed.) SAE International. 2010. 

3 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

The TAP test system architecture derives from the fundamental requirement of 

integrating the TAP software into the airborne test vehicle. TAP is a WindowsTM application 

which is hosted on a suitable EFB, laptop, or PC computer that is in turn interfaced to aircraft 

data sources for own-state, ADS–B, TCAS, and broadband connectivity. Multiple instantiations 

of the TAP software may be hosted simultaneously on different computer platforms via wired 

(Ethernet) or wireless (Wi-Fi) connectivity. The test system architecture comprises the following 

principal elements as shown in Figure 2. 

1. The airborne test-platform, including instrumentation and data sub-systems; 

2. ADS-B/TCAS sub-system; 

3. Broadband sub-system; 

4. Aircraft Interface Device (AID) sub-system, responsible for the interface between the 

TAP software and the aircraft data systems; 

5. PC, EFB, and laptop computer sub-systems; and 

6. The TAP software. 

The relationship between these elements is shown in Figure 2 below. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 6 

 

Figure 2. Test-platform system architecture. 

4 SYSTEM ENGINEERING PROCESS

A rapid-prototyping research paradigm was adopted for the TAP flight test program. 

This required a degree of modification to Blanchard’s (2008) classical “top down, integrated, lifecycle approach to system design and development.” Four principal factors imposed severe 

systems engineering challenges that necessitated a novel approach to the design process: 

1. The FAA has yet to fully-define the ADS-B In system requirements that are key to TAP 

functionality, and there is no timetable for an ADS-B In regulatory mandate. The 

principal means of communicating ADS-B data to TAP was therefore not fully defined 

before the system was subjected to a formal flight trial. 

2. As indicated in the introduction, TAP’s architecture and algorithms were derived from 

NASA’s AOP software that has never been deployed in an airborne environment. 

3. Because of the very demanding schedule, development of the TAP software was 

conducted in parallel with the development of the airborne test-bed. This posed 

particular challenges because the two programs were completely co-dependent, yet there 

was no outside framework of top-level system requirements (technical or regulatory) to 

help guide and harmonize these parallel rapid-prototyping development processes. 

Piaggio Avanti test‐

platform

Aircraft

Instrumentation

and data sub‐

systems

Broadband

subsystem

Aircraft Interface

Device (AID)

PC subsystem

TAP instantiation

EFB subsystem

TAP instatiation

Laptop subsystem

TAP instantiation

TCAS and ADS‐B

subsystem
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 7 

 

4. The 24-month development schedule from the formation of the Integrated Product Team 

(IPT) to the conduct of the flight trials was extremely compressed, particularly in light of 

the parallel development of the software and the test vehicle. 

5. As discussed in section 5.1 below, a primary objective of the program was to facilitate 

the rapid commercial deployment of the TAP while minimizing changes to existing 

avionics architectures or displays for near-term forward-fit applications. This objective 

imposed conflicting demands of implementing a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 9 

“production ready” integration solution using TRL 4 (laboratory) software. 

4.1 System Operational Requirements 

The TAP program was governed by three sets of operational requirements: (1) TAP 

software functionality requirements, which dictated the capabilities of the software as installed; 

(2) Strategic flight trial requirements, which transcended the performance of the system and 

imposed significant additional data requirements; and (3) commercialization technical 

requirements, which had a major influence on the TAP implementation options in the test vehicle. 

4.1.1 TAP software functionality requirements 

This SEMP does not address the TAP software functionality in detail, as the software is 

Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), delivered “as is.” The data inputs required by the 

software did, however, define important system interfaces with the EFB hardware system and the 

test-bed systems, as discussed in section 4.4. 

4.1.2 Flight trial requirements 

The TAP Statement of Work (SOW) (Project document reference K) includes the 

following flight trial objectives: 

1. Identification of operational factors unique to the in-flight environment that may affect 

TAP functionality, its data requirements, HMI, and operating procedures. 

2. Development of pilot procedures that are compatible with realistic hardware and 

procedural environments for TAP commercial deployment. 

3. Promotion of readiness for further simulation experiments and flight evaluations geared 

towards making TASAR operations available to the aviation community (avionics 

developers, aircraft operators, and regulatory officials) for near-term operational use. 

4.1.3 Commercialization technical requirements 

NASA requires the TAP system to impose the minimum feasible changes to the existing 

avionics architectures and displays for near-term forward-fit applications on Air Carrier aircraft. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 8 

 

This objective severely limits the system architectures that can be adopted for the test vehicle, 

essentially eliminating any “breadboard” or “orange wire” (experimental) implementations, 

because these would not be deployable as end-customer solutions. This entailed the maximum 

use of FAA certified Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, as discussed in section 4.6. 

4.2 Maintenance Concept 

All equipment installed as part of the TAP test program will be certified in accordance 

with the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). Explicit Instructions for Continuing 

Airworthiness (ICA) were a necessary part of such approvals. The ICAs listed majority of the 

equipment installed for TAP as subject to on-condition maintenance. The few life-limited items 

are tracked electronically using Avtrak® software, along with all of the life-limited systems and 

components in the aircraft. 

4.3 Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) 

Two classes of TPMs applied to the TAP flight test program: (1) TAP system 

performance measures; and (2) regulatory performance measures required for certification of the 

TAP installation and approval for the conduct of the flight trials. The TAP system TPMs for the 

flight trials were very straightforward: the single criterion was the successful functioning of TAP, 

defined by the provision of meaningful trajectory optimizations, while operating in the National 

Airspace System (NAS). Although it would have been possible to define more granular TPMs, 

such as successful Automatic and Manual mode TAP operation, this was not deemed necessary, 

because any successful TAP advisory would indicate that the entire system integration activity 

had been successful. The formal test planning documents included detailed evaluations of every 

TAP mode and function, but these were not success criteria for the test. 

Three forms of regulatory approval applied the TAP installation: (1) Airworthiness 

certification by the regulatory authorities; (2) FAA operational approval for flight in the NAS; 

and (3) NASA approval for the conduct of the experiment. All of these approvals were 

accomplished in accordance with the applicable regulatory and guidance documents, and detailed 

compliance plans were developed for each. The airworthiness approvals for the ADS-B system 

contained extensive TPMs as defined in RTCA DO-260B (Reference GG). All installed avionics 

were additionally certified to meet the extensive TPMs specified in: 

1. DO-160G Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment

(Reference CC) 

2. FAA AC 23.1309-1E System safety analysis and assessment for part 23 airplanes

(Reference DD) 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 9 

 

3. DO-178C Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification

(Reference EE) 

4. RTCA-DO-254 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware 

(Reference FF) 

5. SAE ARP 4754. Guidelines for development of civil aircraft and systems (Reference 

HH) 

4.4 Functional Analysis 

The top-level functional requirements for TAP flow from the Concept of Operations: 

(TAP) offers onboard automation for the purpose of advising the pilot of traffic 

compatible trajectory changes that would be beneficial to the flight. The TAP onboard 

automation is expected to be hosted on a Class 2 Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) and 

leverages ADS-B surveillance information to increase the likelihood of ATC approval of 

pilot-initiated trajectory change requests, thereby increasing the portion of the flight flown 

on or near a desired business trajectory. All automation and pilot procedures are fully 

dedicated to a single aircraft which allows tailoring of optimization criteria to the specific 

objectives of each flight and provides for timely responses to changing situations 

(Henderson, 2013). 

4.4.1 TAP Use Cases 

The following Use Cases were derived from the Concept of Use. TAP will support three 

types of optimization maneuvers, in both automatic and manual modes, as shown in the following 

table. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 10 

 

Table 1. 

TAP Operational Scenarios

Optimization Trajectory Change Options 

Lateral 1. Direct to downstream waypoint 

2. Change one or two waypoints along route then 

reconnect to route upstream of arrival fix 

Vertical  Climb or descend to another altitude 

Combined 

Lateral & 

Vertical 

1. Direct to downstream waypoint 

2. Change one or two waypoints along route then 

reconnect to route upstream of arrival fix 

3. Climb or descend to another altitude 

Note. Adapted from NNL12AA06C (Project Reference N).

Further details of the TAP test scenarios appear in section 4.7. 

4.4.2 TAP functional requirements 

TAP requires following logical interfaces to be supported by the test vehicle architecture: 

1. Comprehensive own-aircraft state information; 

2. ADS-B and TCAS traffic data; 

3. Polygonized Special Use Airspace (SUA) data; 

4. Third-party flight tracking data; 

5. Wind-field data; and 

6. Broadband Internet access. 

4.5 Requirement Allocation 

The existing aircraft architecture determines the allocation of the TAP functions to the 

individual test-bed sub-systems as shown in Table 2. 

 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 11 

 

Table 2. 

TAP Functional Allocation

TAP Function, sub-function System allocation Interface Type 

1 Own-aircraft state 

1.1 Air Data (altitude, airspeed, etc.) #1 Air Data 

Computer (ADC) 

via Aircraft 

Interface Device 

(AID) 

ARINC 429 

1.2 Navigation data #1 Flight 

Management 

System (FMS) via 

AID 

#1 GPS 

ARINC 429 

ARINC 429 

1.3 Flight plan data #1 FMS via AID ARINC 429 

1.4 Waypoint geo data TAP internal ARINC 424 

1.5 Autopilot data Flight Data 

Recorder (FDR) 

Bus via AID 

ARINC 429 

2 ADS-B and TCAS traffic data TCAS 3000 SP 

via AID 

ARINC 429 per 

RTCA DO-260A 

3 SUA data Broadband 

via AID 

Packed, proprietary 

4 3rd

 Party Flight Tracking Data Broadband 

via AID 

Provisions only 

5 Wind-field data Broadband 

via AID 

Packed, proprietary 

6 Broadband Internet Iridium satellite 

sub system 

Ethernet 

Note. Adapted from ADV-TASAR-DEL-005 (Project reference A). 

4.6 System Synthesis, Analysis, and Design Optimization 

The decomposition of the allocated system functions into the architectural elements of the 

test vehicle was governed by two “hard” external constraints: the selected aircraft was required to 

retain its Normal Category Certificate of Airworthiness, and it also had to retain its certification 

for single-pilot operations. The former avoids numerous operational restrictions, including 

geographic and weather limitations and constrained passenger carriage; the latter removes 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 12 

 

restrictions regarding who may occupy the copilot’s seat, and also mitigates the use of uncertified 

software on the non-handling side of the cockpit. Design decisions regarding specific hardware 

requirements were based on the system functional allocations from Table 2, subject to these two 

constraints. 

4.6.1 Test Vehicle 

The test vehicle was the principal element of the system architecture, as it had to support 

all of the functionality required by TAP and its associated systems. In addition to supporting the 

TAP software functionality requirements, the test vehicle also supported the additional 

commercialization and flight trial requirements derived from section 4.1. 

4.6.1.1 Test vehicle top-level system requirements 

The test vehicle shall: 

1. Accommodate the TAP software and all required internal and external interfaces defined 

in the TAP Interface Control Documents (ICD) (Program reference H). 

2. Accommodate a full test crew of seven personnel, comprising: a safety pilot, a testsubject pilot, a test director, a flight test engineer, a data engineer, a TAP software 

specialist, and a NASA monitor or observer. 

3. Have a broad flight envelope (speed and altitude) representative of the turbine business 

aircraft and Air Carrier target market for TAP. A cruise Mach number of 0.6 and a cruise 

altitude in excess of 36,000 feet were deemed representative based on focus group 

discussions. 

4. Have adequate endurance at mid and high altitudes (10,000 – 36,000 feet) to support the 

planned flight durations of 2.5 – 3.0 hours, with legally required IFR reserves. 

5. Be capable of day and night VFR (Visual Flight Rules) and IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) 

day and night operations in moderate icing conditions, to maximize mission flexibility 

and probability of success. 

6. Be capable of performing all of the preceding under single-pilot operations, for the 

reasons already discussed. 

7. Possess a Normal Category Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A), to avoid excessive test 

restrictions associated with Experimental flight permits. 

4.6.1.2 Test vehicle selection 

The AdvAero Piaggio P180 Avanti test-bed aircraft was selected as the TAP test 

platform. The Avanti is a very high performance turboprop pressurized all-weather twin powered 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 13 

 

by two Pratt & Whitney PT6A-66 turboprops (2x 850 SHP). The aircraft has a very broad flight 

envelope with a cruise speed of approximately 375 KTAS (0.65M) at 28,000 ft. and a ceiling of 

41,000 ft. at ISA. The fuel capacity of 2,900 lbs. yields a maximum endurance of approximately 

four hours, and a maximum range of approximately 1,200 NM. The aircraft is certified with a 

Normal Category Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) for single pilot day/night/VFR/IFR 

operations in known icing conditions. The aircraft’s payload of 1,560 lbs. allows for a test crew 

of seven, including two pilots, to be flown on most missions. The cabin is arranged with a flight 

test station behind the cockpits which seats two test personnel, and club seating for four 

additional test-crew in the aft cabin, as shown in Figure 3 below. The Piaggio P180 Avanti is one 

of a very few aircraft that meet all of the operational requirements for the TASAR trials. 

 

Figure 3. Test-vehicle flight test station and cabin. 

4.6.2 EFB and ADS-B subsystems 

The EFB and ADS-B systems are two closely integrated TAP components that were not 

part of the test-vehicle’s baseline avionics suite. As previously discussed, the FAA has yet to 

fully-define the ADS-B-In system requirements, and there are very few commercially deployed 

and certified systems. The selected systems must therefore accommodate future growth via 

firmware upgrades to avoid a rapid obsolescence as the regulations mature. An additional factor 

for the ADS-B selection is the operating band. The two options are 1090 MHz Extended-squitter 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 14 

 

(1090ES) and the 978 MHz Universal Access Transceiver (UAT). The UAT alternative has 

several advantages, including a less-congested frequency spectrum, but the system is prohibited 

for ADS-B Out operations above 18,000 ft., and is unusable outside the domestic USA, including 

Canada. Both these considerations could limit severely the downstream application of a UATbased TAP system, despite its other benefits. 

The EFB must support an FAA certified operating system (OS), to preclude having to 

change platforms should the FAA decide that the TAP intended functionality merits a certified 

installation in accordance with RTCA DO-178C (Program reference DD). For example, existing 

regulations already prohibit the airborne display of aircraft position using uncertified OSs, and 

might even preclude a graphical TAP user interface. These problems were mitigated from the 

outset by selecting an EFB with a certified OS option. The EFB, TCAS, and ADS-B subsystems 

also require demonstrated interoperability, in order to avoid significant schedule and technical 

risks associated with the integration of three complex dissimilar systems. Accordingly, the EFB 

and ADS-B requirements are as follows: 

4.6.2.1 EFB and ADS-B subsystem requirements 

The EFB system shall: 

1. A Class 2 EFB shall be integrated with the test-vehicle and TAP software (the Class of 

EFB is a SOW constraint). 

2. The EFB shall have sufficient processing power, memory, and display resolution, to 

support TAP in accordance with the TAP ICD (Program reference H). 

3. The EFB shall have the option to host a certified OS. 

4. The ADS-B system shall be compatible with the aircraft’s existing avionics to avoid cost 

and schedule risks. 

5. The ADS-B system shall support the 1090ES standard. 

6. The ADS-B, EFB, and TCAS subsystems shall have demonstrated interoperability. 

7. The ADS-B, EFB, and TCAS subsystems shall be certified for aviation applications. 

4.6.2.2 EFB subsystem selection 

Of all of the stated EFB requirements, the need for a certified OS governed, because only 

two COTS EFBs offered this option: the Astronautics NEXISTM1

 and the Goodrich 

SmartDisplayTM. The NEXISTM form factor is not suitable for the confined cockpit of the Piaggio 

Avanti, leaving the Goodrich solution as the only alternative (Figure 4). This unit includes the 

 

1 http://tinyurl.com/7vktspg 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 15 

 

certified DEOSTM OS, which is suitable for all classes of EFB hardware and software types. The 

Goodrich SmartDisplayTM also supports the Windows XP® embedded OS, which will be used to 

host the TAP software if the DEOS certified option is not required. 

Figure 4. Goodrich SmartDisplay® EFB 

4.6.2.3 ADS-B subsystem selection 

The ACSS TCAS 3000SP2

 system (Figure 5) was selected to perform the TCAS and 

ADS-B functions for the following reasons: 

 

2 http://www.acssdealeronline.com/prodTCAS300SP.aspx 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 16 

 

1. The system is a derivative of the aircraft’s existing T2CAS system, which minimized the 

risks associated with preforming and certifying the upgrade. 

2. The TCAS 3000SP has demonstrated the required interoperability with the Goodrich 

SmartDisplay EFB: the combination hosts the commercially available SafeRouteTM 

application suite. 

3. The TCAS 3000SP is a leading-edge design which supports firmware updates to 

accommodate new functionality as the ADS-B In standards continue to evolve. 

4. The FAA has selected this unit for its test fleet at the W.J.H. Technical Centre, and the 

FAA has subsidized JetBlue Airlines $4.2M to equip 35 Airbuses with this equipment.3

 

These factors may assist the future commercial deployment of TAP on similarly equipped 

aircraft. 

Figure 5. ACSS TCAS 3000SP. © 2014 Advanced Aero Solutions, LLC. Reprinted 

with permission. 

Trade names and trademarks are used in this report for identification only. 

Their usage does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or implied, 

by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 

4.6.3 AID subsystem 

The TASAR flight trials will require the integration and dissemination of data from 

numerous disparate sources (TCAS, ADS-B, Datalink, etc.). The commercialization 

 

3 http://tinyurl.com/6tsdspr. "Avionics Today - JetBlue Announce Partnership Agreement for ADS-B Equipage." 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 17 

 

requirements (section 4.1.3) precluded extensive custom wiring for these interfaces in customer 

aircraft because of cost and certification considerations. For this reason, a data concentrator 

approach was selected to handle all of the communications between the TAP platform and the 

aircraft. Data concentrators used in such applications are commonly referred to as Aircraft 

Interface Devices (AID), which is the nomenclature adopted for this program. The AID 

interfaces between the EFB and TAP to the following subsystems: 

1. Dual Honeywell CDS/R Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) IC-1080 display 

computers driving 8”x10” LCD displays; 

2. Universal UNS1-EW FMS with LPV and RNP capability; 

3. Honeywell Laseref V Micro Inertial Reference Unit; 

4. Dual Honeywell AZ 950 micro-ADCs; 

5. Collins APS-65 flight guidance computer and autopilot; and 

6. The aircraft’s R2D2 and workstation computers (c.f. section 4.6.5 below). 

4.6.3.1 AID requirements 

The AID shall: 

1. Accommodate the internal and external interfaces contained in the TAP software ICD 

(Program reference H), including: 

a. Air Data (altitude, airspeed, etc.); 

b. FMS Navigation data and flight plan data; 

c. GPS position data; 

d. Autopilot state; 

e. ADS-B and TCAS traffic data; and 

f. Broadband Internet connectivity. 

2. Provide all required power and data interfaces to the EFBs that host the TAP application. 

3. Use industry-standard data protocols to interface with EFB hardware to facilitate 

downstream installations. 

4. Be certified for aviation applications. 

4.6.3.2 AID selection 

The Goodrich AID was selected for the following reasons: 

1. It is a certified data concentrator that packages ARINC 429 data into a standard network 

protocol (TCP) for transmission over Ethernet, using the Simple Text Avionics Protocol 

(STAP) defined by the ARINC 834 “Aircraft Data Interface Function (ADIF)” standard. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 18 

 

2. The unit’s physical interface is based on the ARINC 828 “EFB Standard Interface” 

standard for universal EFB connectors. 

In summary, the combination of the ACSS TCAS 3000SP with the Goodrich 

SmartDisplayTM and AID is the only currently identified system that meets the TAP constraints, 

and which is suitable for installation in the Avanti test-bed aircraft. This combination has the 

advantages of a certified OS option, industry standard interfaces, and proven interoperability 

between the ADS-B and EFB components. These factors should significantly reduce program 

risk, and enhance the prospects of an early commercial deployment of the TASAR system. As an 

added benefit, the ACSS TCAS3000 is at the forefront of Air Carrier deployment for ADS-B 

operations, which will facilitate the eventual deployment of TAP to these customers. 

4.6.4 Broadband subsystem 

The broadband subsystem serves two functions: provision of specified data via Internet 

connectivity, and provision of distributed network services throughout the aircraft cabin for 

wireless TAP clients. 

4.6.4.1 Broadband requirements 

The broadband system shall: 

1. Interface to a suitable terrestrial Internet source to support the TAP broadband data 

performance requirements defined in the TAP ICD (Program reference H). 

2. Be of a form factor suitable for mounting on the test-bed aircraft, including antenna 

installations. 

3. Provide a router function that supports a minimum of two wired and six wireless clients 

for the broadband data. 

4. Be certified for aviation applications. 

4.6.4.2 Broadband subsystem selection 

Three currently available options offer the required broadband connectivity: Ku-band 

satellite, Inmarsat satellite, and cellular air-to-ground solutions. The Ku option is impractical for 

small aircraft such as the Avanti, and was therefore eliminated. Table 3 contrasts the Inmarsat 

Aspire® solution offered by Honeywell Aerospace with the GogGo® cellular alternative offered 

by Aircell. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 19 

 

Table 3. 

Broadband Options Compared

Characteristic Honeywell 

Aspire 200® 

Aircell GoGo Biz ® 

ATG2000 

Communication method Inmarsat I-4 satellite network Aircell air-ground cellular 

network 

Antennas One blade, top mounted Two blades, bottom mounted 

Usable altitude All, including on ground Geographically dependent, 

typically above 10,000 ft. 

Bandwidth 200 kbps Unpublished 

Data content Text only Voice and text support 

Wi-Fi WAN support 802.11 b/g Wi-Fi® 

access, up to 54 clients 

No 

Pricing Comparable Comparable 

Note. Adapted from published on-line marketing materials 

http://aerospace.honeywell.com/en/products/communication-nav-andsurveillance/satellite-communications/terminal-products-inmarsat-l-band/aspire-200

http://aircell.com/services/gogo-biz/#ATG2000

 The Honeywell AspireTM 200 SATCOM was selected primarily because the Avanti testbed did not have sufficient space available to mount the twin bottom-mounted antennas used by 

the Aircell unit, due to other system installations. In addition, the GoGo would have required the 

addition of a router to support the wireless requirement, which would have added weight and 

complexity. 

4.6.4.3 Broadband subsystem description 

The Aspire system was installed and certified via three Canadian Supplemental Type 

Certificates (STC) that covered the antenna structural provisions and the system integration 

aspects (References D, E, and F). Figure 6 shows a schematic of the Aspire 200, as installed. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 20 

 

Figure 6. Generic representation of the Honeywell AspireTM 200 architecture. 

The CCU-200 is a full-service multi-port router and Wi-Fi® Access Point that provides 

network connectivity to multiple cabin users with a programmable digital I/O. The unit has eight 

Ethernet LAN 10/100 ports, and can support 54 wireless clients using the 802.11-b/g protocols. 

4.6.5 Test vehicle computer and data provisions 

The existing flight-test provisions on the aircraft comprise a dedicated workstation, an 

auxiliary computer (“R2D2”), and sophisticated data interfaces to the aircraft’s systems. The 

flight test workstation contains a powerful dual-core computer interfaced with 32 ARINC 429 

busses, 32 discretes, and a Wi-Fi broadcast system. The workstation also incorporates a 15-inch 

XGA display and a six-channel digital video recorder, with internal and external camera feeds. 

Workstation SGA video can also be routed to the 8”x10” Multi-Function Display (MFD) on the 

copilot’s instrument panel which can function as a Class 3 EFB. The “R2D2” auxiliary computer 

is also interfaced to several of the aircraft’s ARINC busses through the AID, has Wi-Fi 

capability, and can drive the copilot’s MFD remote display. Both the workstation and R2D2 

computers are capable of hosting TAP, although these are not the principal TAP computers. No 

changes were required to these systems for the TAP flight trials. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 21 

 

Figure 7. Test-bed cockpit. The EFB is mounted on the right-side windshield. 

© 2014 Advanced Aerospace Solutions, LLC. Reprinted with permission. 

 

4.7 System Test and Evaluation 

The TAP testing is detailed in numerous program documents, including the Flight Trial 

Research Plan and the Flight Test Plan. The following sections highlight important details from 

these plans. 

4.7.1 Incremental Test Approach 

An incremental risk-mitigation approach was applied to the preparation for the flight 

trials. Testing began with the development of functional human factors mockups of the TAP 

software, followed by a number of incremental builds of the operational software. Three sets of 

simulations were conducted to validate different performance aspects of the TAP software: 

1. Extensive testing was performed at the NASA ATOL to verify the basic TAP algorithms 

and validate the proposed test scenarios. 

2. End-to-end simulations were conducted at the Operator Performance Laboratory (OPL) 

of the University of Iowa to refine the TAP software, interfaces, operating procedures, 

Human-Machine Interface (HMI), and test procedures (including briefings, debriefings, 

questionnaires, etc.). 

3. Further simulations were conducted using AdvAero’s systems and human factors 

simulator, which has an avionics architecture designed to replicate the Avanti aircraft. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 22 

 

The objective of these tests was to further debug the TAP software and integration with 

the aircraft data systems. An additional goal was to practice and refine the specific test 

scenarios to be used during the flight trials. 

4.7.2 Flight Test Program 

The flight test program began upon the successful conclusion of the simulator evaluations 

and incorporated lessons learned from the simulations, where practical. Initial testing comprised 

30 hours of opportunity “shakedown” testing with the TAP system installed and functioning 

while the aircraft was engaged in other duties. The purpose of the shakedown tests was to further 

debug the TAP integration with the aircraft systems. The shakedown phase was followed by a 

36-hour formal test program, including ten formal assessment missions and two demonstration 

flights. 

4.7.3 Individual Flight Profiles 

The formal flight-testing was designed to exercise TAP functionality in four increasingly 

challenging steps: 

1. Verification of the operational data flows to TAP, and verification that TAP was able to 

successfully process the information in real-time. 

2. Verification of TAP interface functionality, per the system requirements. 

3. Observation of test subject interactions with TAP in an operational environment. 

4. Use of TAP to generate an aircrew request to ATC, with optional execution of the 

request. 

A nominal TAP flight comprised a 2.5-hour profile, of which approximately 30 minutes 

were allocated to the departure and arrival segments below 10,000 feet where TAP was in 

Standby mode. The remaining 120 minutes of flight above 10,000 ft. were dedicated to the TAP 

In-Flight Assessment. A typical sequence of test events is shown in Table 4. 

 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 23 

 

Table 4. 

TAP Mission Test Activity Sequence

Time Operation

TO – 10 minutes  Power-up aircraft 

 Power-up flight test engineers computers 

and EFB 

TO - 9 minutes  Validate data is flowing to each TAP 

installation 

TO - 2 minutes  Power-down and stow all non-essential 

hardware 

TO  Take off 

TO + 15 minutes  Alt > FL100 

 Power up flight test engineers computers 

and EFB 

 Validate data is flowing to each TAP 

installation 

 Flight assessment scenarios 

Landing - 20 minutes  Prepare for landing < FL100 

 Power down and stow all non-essential 

hardware 

Landing  Landing 

Landing + 1 minute  Power-up flight test engineer computers, 

if necessary 

 Backup all collected data 

 Power-down flight test engineer 

computers 

Landing + 10 minutes  Power-down aircraft, Exit 

Note. Adapted from NASA Flight Test Operations and Safety Report (FTOSR) (Project 

Reference N). 

All of the flight plans comprised outbound and inbound phases, terminating at the airport 

of origin as shown in Figure 8. Each phase comprised a number of legs upon which the TAP 

optimizer acted. Special Use Airspace (SUA), which must be avoided, was incorporated in some 

of these routings to challenge the TAP trajectory optimizer. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 24 

 

Figure 8. Representative TAP test - plan view. © 2014 Advanced Aerospace 

Solutions, LLC. Reprinted with permission. 

The vertical test profiles were all conducted at a constant predefined cruising altitude 

above 10,000 feet, the floor for TAP operations, as shown in Figure 9. Vertical deviations 

resulting from optimizer recommendations were allowed. 

Figure 9. Representative TAP test - profile view. © 2014 Advanced Aerospace 

Solutions, LLC. Reprinted with permission. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 25 

 

4.7.4 Flight Test Envelope 

All TAP operations were conducted near the center of the aircraft’s Normal Category 

flight envelope. The TAP system remained in Standby mode below 10,000 ft. MSL, the floor 

altitude for the TAP evaluations. Aircraft payload/range limitations effectively limited the 

maximum altitude to FL380 (the aircraft’s certified ceiling is FL410). TAP operations were 

conducted near the aircraft’s maneuvering speed (approximately 200 KIAS / 260 KTAS @ 

FL150), which afforded the maximum margin between the stall and Mmo/Vmo conditions. TAP 

evaluations were conducted with the autopilot engaged, which ensured that all maneuvers 

remained within the aircraft’s certified flight envelope. These parameters are summarized in 

Table 5. 

Table 5. 

TAP Evaluation Flight Test Envelope

Parameter Planned Value Notes 

Altitude FL150 – FL200 FL100/MEA Minimum 

FL300 Maximum 

Airspeed 200 – 220 KIAS Approximately Va 

Lateral TAP Maneuver Autopilot turn-to-heading 

Vertical TAP Maneuver Autopilot climb/descent 

Load Factor Max 1.15 (30 ̊ Bank) Autopilot limited 

Autopilot Mode Autopilot and Yaw Damper 

engaged 

Weight and Balance Within normal envelope 

Aircraft Certification Part 23 Normal Category 

C of A 

Weather VMC/IMC 

Note. Adapted from NNL12AA06C (Project Reference N).

4.8 Construction/Production Requirements 

The principal TAP aircraft modifications used COTS products installed by authorized 

aircraft modification centers in accordance with the applicable regulations and facility 

certifications. 

4.9 System Utilization and Sustaining Support 

All TAP COTS hardware is maintained and supported in accordance with manufacturer’s 

procedures using approved service resources. The TAP software was maintained by the software 

specialists involved in the program. TAP is designed to be uninstalled between flight trials, and 

will therefore not require any ongoing support. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 26 

 

4.10 System Retirement and Material Recycling/Disposal 

All modifications incorporated for the TAP program were FAA certified and permanently 

installed in the aircraft. The systems will remain installed to facilitate planned future testing until 

obsolescence or unserviceability dictate. In this event, the equipment will be disposed of in 

accordance with appropriate procedures for COTS electronics. 

5 TECHNICAL PROGRAM PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION, AND CONTROL

5.1 Program Requirements/Statement of Work (SOW) 

The TAP SOW (project reference K) is confidential, but key program objectives 

pertaining to this SEMP include: 

1. Selection, with technical justification, of a Class 2 EFB hardware system to host the TAP 

software for developmental testing. 

2. Integration of TAP with the selected Class 2 EFB hardware system. 

3. Support for broadband Internet connectivity for the provision of external TAP data. 

4. Minimal changes to existing avionics architectures or displays for near-term forward-fit 

applications. 

5. Accomplish FAA certification and NASA operational approvals for the conduct of the TAP 

flight trials. 

6. Conduct an in-flight assessment of the TAP Application with the objective of identifying 

operational factors unique to the in-flight environment that may affect TASAR application 

functionality, data requirements, Human-Machine Interface (HMI), and operational 

procedures, with the objective of refining the TAP application and concept. 

5.2 Organization 

The TAP program originated from NASA Research Announcement NNH10ZZEA001N, 

Research Opportunities in Aeronautics – 2010, Amendment 7, Subtask 5, Traffic Aware Strategic 

Aircrew Requests (TASAR) Analysis and Development. The contract was awarded to Engility 

Corporation as the Prime Contractor, with AdvAero as the subcontractor. A parallel and 

independent contract was awarded to the University of Iowa Operator Performance Laboratory 

(OPL) for the conduct of some of the full flight-deck TAP simulations. 

5.2.1 Producer/Contractor Organization 

The project customer was NASA Langley and the producers were Engility (Prime) and 

AdvAero (sub contractor). AdvAero was the flight test lead, reporting directly to NASA for the 

conduct of the flight tests. The AdvAero research aircraft remained under the operational control 

of Skyservice of Montreal. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 27 

 

5.2.2 System Engineering Organization 

AdvAero adopted an Integrated Product Team for the system engineering functions, as 

shown Figure 10 below. Some of the positions were filled by the same individuals as noted in 

section 6.1, except for those designated as independent in the figure. 

Figure 10. AdvAero TAP Integrated Product Team. © 2014 Advanced 

Aerospace Solutions, LLC. Reprinted with permission. 

NASA

Technical Monitor (TM)

AdvAero P.I

Flight Operations Department

Test Pilot

Flight Test Engineers

Safety Specialists

Engineering Department

Systems Engineer

HF Engineer

Software Developer

Outsourced Services

Skyservice

Aircaft Modification Center

Structures Specialist

Avionics Specialist

AdvAero Independent 

Safety and QA

NASA Specialists (HF, IRB, 

Safety, Flight Operations)
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 28 

 

5.2.3 Program Tasks 

The system engineering program tasks approximated Blanchard’s outline (2008, fig. 6.6), as 

shown in Table 6 below. 

Table 6. 

TAP Principal Flight Test System Engineering Tasks

Output Primary Responsibility

Develop Concept of Operations Prime contractor 

Develop operational Use Cases Prime contractor 

Develop flight-trial aircraft modifications plan AdvAero 

Develop HMI Mockup AdvAero 

Define flight-trial approval requirements AdvAero 

Prepare flight-trial PER presentation package AdvAero 

Prepare benefits assessment report Prime contractor 

Develop flight-trial research plan AdvAero 

Perform flight-trial hazard analysis AdvAero 

Select Class 2 EFB system AdvAero 

Develop TAP prototype build Prime contractor 

Develop Pilot Procedures AdvAero 

Prepare Flight-trial IRB approval package AdvAero 

Prepare Flight Test Operations and Safety Report (FTOSR) AdvAero 

Present flight-trial Final Experimental Review AdvAero 

Prepare flight-trial approval artifacts package AdvAero 

Prepare flight-trial Readiness Review (FTRR) package AdvAero 

Prepare flight-trial reports AdvAero 

TAP final build Prime contractor 

Develop HMI-procedures design guidelines All 

Prepare final report All 

Note. Adapted from project SOW (Reference K). 

5.2.4 Supplier Requirements 

 Requirements for equipment suppliers and sub-contractors to AdvAero are fully 

defined by the applicable Federal Aviation Regulations. All applicable quality requirements from 

the project SOW were flowed down to these suppliers, ensuring that overall program quality 

goals were maintained. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 29 

 

5.3 Key Organizational Interfaces 

The key organizational interfaces differed between contractual and system engineering 

viewpoints. Contractually, the AdvAero Chief Operating Officer reported via the Prime 

Contractor’s Principal Investigator (P.I.) to the NASA Technical Monitor. In practice, a number 

of peer-to-peer reporting paths were followed for efficiency purposes, with all pertinent 

information being sent in parallel via the contractually mandated path. These paths are shown in 

the table below: 

Table 7. 

TAP Reporting Interfaces

Function Interface 

Program administration AdvAero COO to Prime P.I. 

Flight operations and safety AdvAero P.I. to NASA T.M. 

Safety and QA AdvAero P.I. to NASA T.M. 

Software engineering Peer-to-peer, cc. P.I. 

Note. Adapted from project SOW (Reference K). 

5.4 Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 

The detailed WBS is contained in the Flight-Demonstration Aircraft Modification Plan 

(Reference A), which is incorporated into this SEMP by reference. The top-level work packages 

were as follows: 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 30 

 

5.4.1 Class 2 EFB selection and installation and certification 

5.4.2 AID selection, installation, and certification 

5.4.3 Autopilot-state annunciation interface 

5.4.4 EFB Landing gear and flap position sensing 

5.4.5 ADS-B TCAS upgrade 

5.4.6 TCAS / transponder control head upgrade 

5.4.7 ADS-B transponder upgrade 

5.4.8 Satellite broadband system selection, installation, and certification 

5.4.9 Broadband antenna installation 

5.4.10 Miscellaneous TAP Provisions 

5.4.11 Workstation data and video interfaces 

5.4.12 Workstation power switch relocation 

5.5 Project Schedule and Milestone Charts 

The project schedule is shown in Figure 11 on the following page. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 31 

 

Figure 11. Program schedule © 2014 Advanced Aerospace Solutions, LLC. 

Reprinted with permission. 

The milestones leading to the flight demonstrations included: 

1. ASRB Design and Operational Safety Reviews 

2. Institutional Review Board (IRB) Review 

3. ATOL TAP Build 2 integration testing 

4. AdvAero Simulator TAP HMI evaluations 

5. University of Iowa Operator Performance Laboratory (OPL) Use Case evaluations 

6. Final Experimental Review Briefing 

7. Flight Trial artifact approval 

8. Flight Trial Readiness Review data package distribution 

9. ATOL TAP Build 3 integration testing 

10. Flight Trial Readiness Review (FTRR) 

11. Flight Release Issuance 

12. Flight Demonstrations 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 32 

 

5.6 Technical Performance Measurement “Tracking” 

The NASA Technical Monitor was responsible for tracking performance measures, 

primarily using qualitative methods. This was primarily achieved via the regular status reviews 

and acceptance of the formal deliverables discussed in sections 5.8 and 5.9, respectively. 

5.7 Program Cost 

NASA awarded the TAP flight test program under a firm-fixed-price contract. The cost 

details are confidential. Internally, AdvAero maintains Key Performance Indicators, earned value 

metrics, and cost data using the Ceridian DayforceTM system. 

5.8 Technical Communications 

The primary means of technical communications was via scheduled weekly conference 

calls of approximately two hours duration between the NASA Technical Monitor, NASA support 

experts, and the prime contractor’s and sub-contractor’s teams. These calls will be increased in 

frequency – in some cases daily, or even hourly, during the flight trial execution. When 

necessary, direct peer-to-peer communications between engineers were authorized, and the 

Principal Investigators (PI) were always kept informed of the outcome of such discussions. The 

weekly meetings were supplemented by monthly status reports, semi-annual meetings, and 

numerous formal documentation deliverables as discussed below. 

5.9 Program Monitoring and Control 

The NASA Technical Monitor (TM) was responsible for the monitoring and control of 

the program. The two Principal Investigators from Engility and AdvAero were, in turn, 

responsible for achieving the software and flight test objectives, respectively. Issues were 

addressed at the lowest level of the reporting hierarchy and escalated as necessary up to the TM, 

with an attitude of full and open communications and disclosure. The PIs provided formal 

monthly status reports that updated and summarized the accomplishments, action items, program 

risks and mitigations since the last report. The TAP test team also attended semi-annual meetings 

at NASA Langley, and additional meetings were convened on an opportunity basis during 

intervening essential on-site reviews. These included the preliminary and final Flight Test 

Operations and Safety Report (FTOSR) presentations to the NASA Airworthiness and Safety 

Review Board (ASRB). 

5.9.1 Operator Certification & Training Standards 

AdvAero’s test aircraft is professionally maintained, operated, and managed by 

Skyservice of Montreal, QC, Canada (http://www.skyservice.com/managedservices.php). 

Skyservice was founded in 1986, and is one of Canada’s premier full service business aviation 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 33 

 

organizations. The test aircraft operations were governed by Skyservice processes pertaining to 

Part VII, Subpart 702, of the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) (Aerial Work – Flight Test 

Operations). The aircraft and crew were also fully certified by Skyservice to operate under CAR 

Subpart 703, Air Taxi operations. Skyservice has a comprehensive Safety Management System 

(SMS) approved by Transport Canada to Air Carrier standards. 

5.9.2 Operator Audit 

An on-site NASA safety audit of the test aircraft, its installed systems, and the applicable 

documentation was successfully concluded on March 13, 2013 at the Newport News / 

Williamsburg International Airport (KPHF), in parallel with the FTOSR. 

5.9.3 Flight Test Governance 

AdvAero’s flight operations are governed by Skyservice’s Transport Canada-approved 

Company Operations Manual (COM) and Safety Management System (SMS), which include 

provisions for 24/7 flight following and alerting. AdvAero’s flight-test operations are further 

governed by its Transport Canada-approved Flight Test Operations Manual (Project Reference 

B). This document is more conservative than the stringent commercial air carrier specifications 

that normally govern the operation of the test aircraft. The FTOM addresses the top-level policy 

and requirements for the following operational aspects of all AdvAero flight- test programs: 

1. Categories of flight test; 

2. Flight test operations control system; 

3. Safety and risk management system; 

4. Aircraft modifications; 

5. Flight authorities; 

6. Test planning and conduct; 

7. Aircrew qualifications, training and currency; 

8. Duty time limitations; 

9. Record-keeping procedures; and 

10. Delegated function. 

All flight operations were conducted in compliance with the more conservative of the 

following applicable documents and regulations: 

• Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs); 

• Transport Canada Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs); 

• Skyservice Company Operations Manual; 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 34 

 

• AdvAero Flight Test Operations Manual (Project Reference B); 

• NASA Procedural Requirements: Aircraft Operations Management Manual NPR 

7900.3C (Project Reference Y).  

The AdvAero FTOM was submitted to NASA on June 11, 2012 for validation against the 

requirements ofNPR7900.3C and approved by LARC-D1 on July17, 2012. 

5.9.4 Aircraft Maintenance 

Skyservice maintains the test aircraft to Transport Canada Air Carrier (CAR 703) 

standards. The company employs factory-trained personnel (Piaggio Aircraft Industries and Pratt 

& Whitney Canada), and all maintenance releases are performed by Transport Canada certified 

personnel. The aircraft’s PT6A-66 engines are maintained to the highest available Pratt & 

Whitney standard (“ESP Gold”), and the majority of the avionics are either new, or registered 

under the manufacturer’s ongoing warranty plans. The aircraft is always hangared at its home 

base and when it is deployed, subject to availability. 

Skyservice maintains on site a complete electronic and/or paper subscription of all 

required maintenance and technical documentation for the aircraft, its engines, systems, and 

avionics. All maintenance is tracked electronically using Avtrak® software as shown in Figure 

12. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 35 

 

 

Figure 12. Sample Avtrak® maintenance tracking software printout. 

6 ENGINEERING SPECIALTY INTEGRATION 

6.1 Functional Engineering 

The following engineering disciplines were employed for the TAP development and 

testing. Several of the roles were combined for this program: 

1. Test Pilot; 

2. Flight Test Engineer (FTE); 

3. System Engineer; 

4. Safety Specialist; 

5. Avionics specialist; 

6. Structural Engineer; 

7. HF engineer; and 

8. Software developer. 

6.1.1 Test pilot 

The test pilot, who was also the P.I. for the flight test program, was responsible for the 

safe and efficient planning and conduct of the flight tests. He was also delegated to perform the 

overall systems engineering and certification activities for the test installation, including the 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 36 

 

Flight Analyst, Human Factors, and TSO approvals. The test pilot acted as the safety monitor 

and final authority for decision-making during the flight tests. 

6.1.2 Flight test engineer 

FTEs were responsible for the safe and effective operation of the installed test and safety 

equipment in the aircraft. The in-flight Test Director was appointed from the flight test engineer 

specialty, as were the Data Engineers. All FTEs also performed system-engineering functions for 

their specialized subsystems. 

6.1.3 Safety specialist 

The Test Pilot / P.I. and Test Director were the two designated safety specialists for this 

program. The safety specialist was responsible for leading the safety planning processes, and was 

directly accountable to the NASA safety organization structure. The Test Director safety 

specialist also led the Institutional Review Board (IRB) activities related to the experimental 

design and protection of the human subjects. 

6.1.4 Avionics specialist and structural engineer 

Both the avionics specialist and structural engineer disciplines were outsourced as part of 

the avionics installation activity. The avionics specialists and structural engineering disciplines 

were required for the FAA certification of the TAP hardware. The avionics specialist was 

responsible for the safety analysis of the avionics architecture for the safe certified systems. The 

structural engineer was required to perform the analysis of the ADS-B antenna installation, which 

required specific FAA approval because it pierced the 9.0-PSI cabin pressure vessel. 

6.1.5 HF engineer 

The HF engineer was responsible for the ergonomic design, HF evaluation, and HF 

compliance of the installed TAP equipment. The Flight Test P.I. performed this function. This 

discipline differs from the prime contractors HF engineer, who was responsible for the human 

factors of the TAP display. 

6.2 Software Engineering 

This SEMP does not address the TAP software engineering, except to the degree that it 

impacted the overall system design. AdvAero software developers performed all analysis, 

design, and coding for the aircraft-side integration of TAP with the other aircraft systems. A 

classic “design to the interfaces” approach was adopted for this task. The data and mechanical 

ICDs were therefore of paramount importance, and required continual updating as the highly 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 37 

 

iterative development program evolved. AdvAero employed AgileTM techniques to ensure that 

the interim system engineering builds were functional and available for integration testing by its 

partners. Similarly, the prime contractor delivered a number of interim TAP software builds for 

use in the system integration testing activity. A classic waterfall software development model 

would not have worked in this environment, because of the time constraints and interdependencies of this highly iterative development program. 

6.3 Reliability Engineering 

No dedicated reliability engineering was performed because of the extensive use of 

COTS components and the FAA-certified installation. The test system inherited the reliability 

engineering from these processes and certifications. This SEMP does not address the TAP 

software development program, whose reliability engineering considerations remain proprietary 

to Engility Corporation. 

6.4 Maintainability Engineering 

The hardware installed for this program was COTS sourced and the sub-system 

installations were FAA certified for aviation applications. Careful consideration was given to the 

maintainability aspects of the EFB equipment, particularly regarding in-flight access for 

troubleshooting purposes. The TAP software incorporated extensive built-in test, logging, and 

debugging provisions, and a software engineer was dedicated to monitoring the application’s 

health status during the flight trials. No maintainability problems were encountered related to the 

system installation. 

6.5 Human Factors (HF) Engineering 

The HF engineering for the COTS test installations was in accordance with the Intended 

Function provisions of 14 CFR 23.1301, as determined by the program P.I. and test pilot. No 

specific additional HF processes were employed for the aircraft modifications. 

Although this SEMP does not address the HF engineering for the TAP software, the 

process did have an influence on the system and test design. The program was governed by 

NASA’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) processes, including all required experimental 

reviews. All test team personnel with possible contact with the test subjects were required to take 

on-line IRB training from the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI). 

The test design entailed the generation of a number of Use Cases (Reference I) designed 

to probe TAP’s functionality. Robust Pilot Procedures were created from the Use Cases as the 

backbones for the airborne TAP evaluations, and the detailed flight plans were derived from these 

Pilot Procedures. An incremental methodology governed the build up of the test cases, 

commencing with rapid-prototyping usability studies, through two levels of simulation, and 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 38 

 

culminating in the flight evaluations. Ten test-subjects were scheduled to fly a single 2.5-hour 

mission as part of a between-subjects design. 

TAP was evaluated through a highly structured test program using the Bedford Workload 

rating scale (Figure 13), hand-recorded data, in-flight surveys, digital audio/video recordings, and 

extensive recording from the aircraft’s ARINC 429 data-busses and from the computers hosting 

TAP. The survey instruments were evaluated during the OPL pilot simulation studies and during 

a dry run which preceded the first formal flight evaluations. Prior to their flight, each subject 

received a two-hour formal preflight experimental briefing and TAP training session. During the 

flights, the Test Director administered comprehensive subjective questionnaires and Bedford 

assessments to the test subject at several break points during each mission. An additional onehour electronic survey (using Lime software) was administered to each subject during the mission 

debriefing within an hour of flight completion. This formed the basis of a two-hour open 

debriefing, attended by most of the test team members as well as NASA human factors 

specialists. The paper and electronic surveys were supplemented by full-time digital cockpit 

audio/video recordings and comprehensive digital recordings from each computer hosting TAP. 

The existing aircraft-side data systems also allowed a keystroke-by-keystroke recreation of each 

FMS button-push and readout, with a complete cockpit visualization capability and Google 

EarthTM flight path recreation. The ARINC 429 data logging also allowed each profile to be 

replayed through AdvAero’s research simulator. All of these data will be used to evaluate TAP’s 

performance and to improve its functionality and interface. 

An intense 36-hour flight test program was successfully completed in two weeks, marred 

only by a single aircraft unserviceability unrelated to the TAP installation. Based on the 

preliminary data reduction, many significant and useful findings have already been made in 

relation to the original program objectives. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 39 

 

Figure 13. Sample Bedford workload rating scale. 

Adapted from Roscoe and Ellis, 1990. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 40 

 

6.6 Safety Engineering 

The test-vehicle is FAA certified with a Normal Category C of A under14 CFR Part 23. 

The aircraft incorporates a fully firewalled flight-test architecture which functionally and 

physically partitions the copilot’s test station from the triple redundant safety pilot’s (captain’s) 

station as shown in Figure 14. This partitioning required the aircraft to be certified for single-pilot 

operation, as previously discussed. 

All equipment installed for the TAP flight-trials was FAA certified and therefore 

compliant with the safety engineering requirements for its respective certification basis. In 

general, major aircraft modifications were certified using the Supplemental Type Certificate 

(STC) process. Individual systems were certified via Technical Standard Order (TSO) approval, 

where applicable. These certifications invoked RTCA DO-160 (Reference CC) for 

environmental certification, DO-178B (Reference DD) for software, and DO-254 (Reference FF) 

for computer hardware. The System Safety processes defined in SAE ARP 4754 (Reference HH) 

and AC 23-1309-1E (Reference DD) were followed for the overall system integration and hazard 

analyses. 

The Principal Investigator, a Canadian government Design Approval Representative test 

pilot, evaluated the TAP installation during several dedicated test flights and 30 hours of 

shakedown testing, for safety and human factors acceptability, prior to the issuance of the 

certification and operational approvals of the system. No substantive issues or shortcomings were 

noted, and the TAP flight evaluations were completed without incident, with the exception of a 

single, unrelated, aircraft system unserviceability. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 41 

 

Figure 14. Test-vehicle cockpit partitioning. © 2012 Marinvent Corporation. 

Reprinted with permission. 

6.7 Security Engineering 

The TAP software has no ability to affect other aircraft systems because of its advisory 

nature. Accordingly, there were no specific Security Engineering considerations for this 

program. 

6.8 Manufacturing and Production Engineering 

With the exception of the TAP software and small miscellaneous wiring harness 

materials, all equipment for this program was COTS. Accordingly, there were no manufacturing 

or production engineering considerations, except for lead-time allowances and aircraft downtime 

scheduling. 

6.9 Logistics and Supportability Engineering 

With the exception of the TAP software, all systems related to the test program were 

FAA certified COTS items. The logistics and support were therefore based on the normal supply 

chain for the test vehicle and its systems. 

6.10 Disposability Engineering 

All COTS items will be disposed at the end of their useful lives using industry best 

practices. 

Firewalled Copilot Test 

Station & 

Class 3 EFB. 

No crew limitations 

PIC / Safety-pilot 

Station has triple-redundant, 

firewalled, systems, certified 

for single-pilot operations 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 42 

 

6.11 Quality Engineering 

With the exception of the TAP software, all COTS equipment will be certified in 

accordance with the quality standards applicable to the equipment’s respective certification basis. 

The TAP software was developed using best industry practices for software rapid prototyping 

activities. 

6.12 Environmental Engineering 

The TAP flight trials involved the normal operation of a 14 CFR Part 23 certified General 

Aviation aircraft. There were therefore no specific environmental engineering considerations, 

although the Avanti test-vehicle is the world’s most fuel-efficient multi-engine turbine business 

aircraft, which conferred obvious environmental benefits to the program 

6.13 Value/Cost Engineering 

As with any complex fixed-price research project, very careful control was maintained 

over program costs. The major cost influence was “scope creep” from two sources: (1) early 

successes encouraged the leadership team to adopt more ambitious goals as the program 

progressed; and (2) the parallel rapid-prototyping activity between the four main stakeholders 

proved resource intensive. Countering these factors, the chosen test-vehicle was already very 

well equipped to accommodate the proposed testing, which minimized overheads and nonrecurring expenses. Significant efforts were made to ensure that the system architecture was 

scalable and resistant to obsolescence. This was achieved by the extensive use of expandable 

COTS components that featured software updates to accommodate upcoming capabilities. 

6.14 Other Engineering Disciplines 

N/A 

7 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

All artifacts produced by this program were subject to full versioning, access control, and 

configuration management, as dictated by NASA. AdvAero uses MKS Source IntegrityTM, 

AtlassianTM collaboration tools, and CertPro, a flight test suite developed by AdvAero for flight 

test planning and control. 

8 DATA MANAGEMENT (DM) 

Data collection included video, digital, and hand-recorded media were all managed using 

the collaborative tools described above. Of particular importance, all test subject data were deidentified in accordance with NASA IRB procedures defined in the Flight Trial Research Plan 

and Flight Trial Test Plan. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 43 

 

9 PROGRAM TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 

With the exception of the NASA ATOL facility (Sections 0 and 4.7.1), the prime and sub 

contractor teams provided all the required technologies to perform the software programming, 

system engineering, and flight-test tasks associated with the program. 

10 SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The Avanti test-platform is a Canadian-owned and registered aircraft. Accordingly, 

revenue flight-test operations in the U.S.A. required specific FAA authorization. This was 

achieved via OpSpec #056 “NAFTA approval for flight-test operations by C-GJMM in U.S. 

Airspace” which remains in force until Mar 1, 2014. 

11 RISK MANAGEMENT

The TAP flight-trial risk management process was governed by the most conservative 

criteria from the following documents: 

1. The NASA Airworthiness and Safety Review Board (ASRB) Process LMS CP–5580 

(Figure 15 and Figure 16); 

2. The AdvAero Flight Test Operations Manual (Project Reference B); 

3. Skyservice SMS Manual (Project Reference P); and 

4. The applicable Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). 

The following points contained in these documents were salient to the Hazard Analysis: 

1. The test aircraft will operate under an unrestricted Normal category Certificate of 

Airworthiness, with approvals for day, night, VMC, and IMC operations, including 

approval for flight in known icing conditions. 

2. All TASAR modifications were certified via a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 

process, and none of the equipment was experimental. 

3. The aircraft is equipped with state-of the art avionics, including Kalman filtered Inertial 

Navigation System (INS)/GPS navigation with approach capability, Enhanced Ground 

Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), TCAS, satellite data-link, Doppler radar, and 

lightning detection. This equipment exceeds the requirements of section §3.1.3.6 of the 

Aircraft Operations Management Manual (NPR7900-3C - reference Y) pertaining to 

FAA-approved TCAS and EGPWS systems. 

4. The aircraft was operated and maintained by Skyservice, a leading aircraft management 

company, and maintained using Avtrak® computerized maintenance tracking. The 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 44 

 

aircraft’s engines are maintained to the highest available Pratt & Whitney standard (“ESP 

Gold”), and the avionics are under the manufacturers’ warranties. 

5. The Pilot-In-Command was an experienced graduate of a recognized one-year Test Pilot 

school, and the aircraft was operated to Public Transport standards by a professional crew 

licensed for such operations, in compliance with the provisions of LMS-CP-0904, 

“Authorizing Flight Aboard Non-LaRC Aircraft” (Reference R). 

6. AdvAero’s routine operations are governed by Skyservice’s Company Operations 

Manual (COM) and Safety Management System (SMS), which includes 24/7 flight 

following. AdvAero’s flight-test operations are further governed by its Transport 

Canada-approved Flight Test Operations Manual (Reference B). The FTOM is generally 

more conservative than the stringent commercial air carrier specifications that normally 

govern the operation of the test aircraft. 

The AdvAero FTOM was accepted by LaRC Flight Operations as compliant with 

NASA’s NPR 7900.3C Aircraft Operations Management Manual (reference Y). The TASAR 

Flight Test Operations and Safety Report (Reference N) and Hazard Analysis (Reference L) 

received approval by the NASA Airworthiness and Safety Review Board (ASRB) on Mar 14, 

2013 and a Flight Safety Release (FSR) was issued on September 11, 2013 to conduct the flight 

demonstrations per LMS-CP-5580. The FSR remained in force until December 20, 2013, 

approximately one month following the completion of the TAP flight trials. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 45 

 

Figure 15. NASA Airworthiness and Safety Review Board (ASRB) Process. 

Page 1 of 12

Verify correct revision before use by checking the LMS Web Site

AIRWORTHINESS AND SAFETY REVIEW BOARD 

(ASRB)

LMS-CP-5580

Rev.C: ED

Expires 8/31/2015

START

Project Manager

Complete an 

LF 434, LF 435 or 

LF 444

(see Note 1)

Objectives:

-to conduct reviews and provide guidance 

for all research-related aircraft flight 

operations (manned or unmanned) 

conducted or managed by LaRC

-to recommend airworthiness and safety 

requirements, standards, procedures,

specialized personnel qualifications, and 

training for these operations

Approval Original signed on file November 28, 2010

 Deputy Director Date

 Develop a brief for 

the ASRB chair 

with the Principal 

Investigator and 

Project Manager 

(see Note 2)

Review 

required?

Send out an 

announcement of 

the review via email

ASRB Recording

Secretary

Yes

END

No

Obtain copies of 

the project's 

Requirements 

Review Results 

and the System 

Safety Program 

Plan from the 

technical team 

and forward for 

inclusion

Convene the board 

to conduct an 

introductory review

(see Note 3)

Airworthiness and Safety

Review Board (ASRB) 

Chair 

Compile the 

meeting minutes, 

Request(s) for 

Action, and 

distribute as 

needed

(see Note 4)

Prepare the ASRB 

package and 

forward to the 

ASRB recording 

secretary for 

inclusion in the 

review process

(see Note 5)

Review the ASRB 

package and 

determine the type 

of safety reviews 

that will be 

conducted

(see Note 6)

Conduct ASRB 

safety review and 

distribute the 

meeting minutes 

and Request(s) for 

Action via the 

ASRB recording 

secretary

(see Note 4)

To next page

Conduct the next 

scheduled design 

review and forward 

the ASRB package 

to the ASRB 

recording secretary

All reviews 

complete No

Yes

Note 1

For flight experiments using LaRC aircraft, use Simulation and Flight Work 

Request (LF 444). For other flight experiments, use either Initiation 

Request for Flight Research Projects Utilizing Non-LaRC Flight Assets (LF 

434) or Initiation Request for Flight Research Projects Utilizing Unmanned 

Aerial System (UAS) LaRC Flight Assets (LF 435). 

Route the request for approval and signature as indicated on the forms.

Note 2

-The Principal Investigator/Project Manager represents the project team

 and requests a meeting with the ASRB Chair who determines if a safety

 review is needed

-Discuss project goals and proposed methods for fulfilling the goals to

 achieve the desired results

-A limited number of project members and board members attend the

 discussions with the ASRB Chair

-If a presentation is made, retain the documents in the ASRB file

Note 3

The introductory review provides in-depth information about the project to 

the entire ASRB.

Definitions 

Design Review: For flight experiments using LaRC aircraft, reviews shall 

be conducted per LMS-CP-0960, Conducting Flight Experiments Utilizing 

Research Directorate (RD) Aircraft. All others shall conduct reviews per 

LPR 7120.7, Space Flight Independent Life Cycle Review Procedural 

Requirements, in accordance with NPR 7120.5; or LPR 7130, Project and 

Task Review Procedural Requirements, in accordance with NPR 7120.8, 

NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management 

Requirements

ASRB Package: The package of documents forwarded to the ASRB 

Recording Secretary ten (10) days prior to the board convening.

ASRB Review: Any and all safety reviews conducted by the Airworthiness 

and Safety Review Board, either in whole or in part and in accordance with 

LAPD 1710.1 and LPR 1710.16

Note 4

Distribute a paper copy to the:

-Executive Safety Council (ESC) Chairperson

-ASRB files

Distribute electronic copies to all ASRB members as follows:

-All meeting attendees

-Select members of the ESC

-Designated Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) flight operations personnel

General Information

The following records are generated by this procedure and should be 

maintained in accordance with LPR 1440.7:

-Initiation Request for Flight Research Projects Utilizing Non-LaRC Assets, 

LF 434

-Initiation Request for Flight Projects Utilizing Unmanned Aerial System 

(UAS) LaRC Flight Assets, LF 435

-Simulation and Flight Work Request, LF 444

-Meeting Minutes (including, but not limited to, Requests for Action)

-Flight Safety Release (FSR)

-Flight Test Operations and Safety Report (FTOSR)
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 46 

 

Figure 16. NASA ASRB process (cont.) 

 

Page 2 of 12

Verify correct revision before use by checking the LMS Web Site

From 

previous page

Airworthiness and Safety

Review Board Chair (ASRB)

Project Manager

Finalize/revise the 

FTOSR, Hazard 

Analysis, and 

responses to 

Request(s) for 

Action and forward 

to the board for 

review

Approve the 

project?

No

Waiver 

required?

(see Note 7)

Yes

Forward to the 

executive safety 

council chair to 

resolve any 

remaining issues

Prepare a Flight 

Safety Release

(see Note 8)

Yes

No

END

Note 5

The ASRB Package shall be provided to the Recording Secretary ten (10) days prior to 

the scheduled review and includes:

-The current Flight Test Operations and Safety Report (FTOSR)--Exhibit A is the 

recommended outline to follow for the FTOSR, for both the document and various 

presentations

-The current Hazard Analysis

-Responses to Request(s) for Action initiated through the design review process

-Responses to Request(s) for Action initiated through the ASRB safety review process

-Meeting minutes from design review(s)

-Exhibit B, which is a recommended outline, when requesting permission for flights 

involving Unmanned Aerial Systems or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Projects should 

consult NASA Interim Directive NM 7900-83 for classifications of UAVs and use it as a 

guide for content.

Note 6

ASRB is empowered to conduct the following types of reviews:

-Preliminary safety review: this review must cover all aspects of the project as

 presented by the Project Manager and will look at airworthiness as well as safety

 issues. A copy of meeting handouts is placed in the ASRB secured file by the

 Recording Secretary.

-Design safety review: this formal review is conducted before the full Board deals with

 safety and airworthiness issues following the projects lock-down or baselining of the

 final design. Meeting minutes and Request(s) for Action are distributed by the

 Recording Secretary to all concerned with a copy to the Secured Files for the project.

-Operational safety review: this is the last formal ASRB review. This review ensures

 that all issues have been addressed and the experiment is cleared to proceed. The

 ASRB Chair has the discretion and authority at this stage to issue a Flight Safety

 Release, which authorizes the experiment to begin.

Distribution of ASRB review material is as follows:

-All ASRB Board Members

-All Project Members

-Project Engineer

-Principal Investigator

-Select members of the ESC

Note 7

A waiver is requested by ASRB in cases where the risk defined in the Hazard Analysis 

is of a magnitude that is beyond the authority of the ASRB to adjudicate. In those 

cases, the ASRB makes a formal request for review recommendation to the Executive 

Safety Council through the ASRB Chair. The Executive Safety Council Chair then 

notifies the ASRB Chair of any rulings on the risk.

Note 8

The Flight Safety Release (FSR) is a memo memorializing the activities of the ASRB 

and flight reviews and authorizing the project to proceed with its planned flight 

activities. The ASRB Chair notes the effective duration of the FSR and any restrictions 

or cautions that may be necessary for the project along with signing off that all safety 

reviews have been successfully completed. The original memo is sent to the Project 

Manager (PM) with a copy to the ASRB Secured Files for this project. The responsilble 

PM for the FSR must renew prior to flight operations if the expiration date is eminent.

Note 9

The project status review or debrief is an informal presentation to the ASRB of either the 

project status or of a final Lessons Learned at the end of a project. This review activity 

is not a required one, and does not produce any formal Minutes or Records. However, 

any presentation material which may have been used by the project team in this activity 

is made a part of the Secured Files for this project maintained by the ASRB Recording 

Secretary.

Perform the 

mission or flight 

operations 

validation 

according to the 

Project Plan and 

present a project 

status review or 

debrief to ASRB if 

requested

 by the ASRB chair

(see Note 9)

LMS-CP-5580

Rev.C: ED

Expires 8/31/2015
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 47 

 

A summary of the Hazards, Mitigations, Residual Risk severity, and Residual Risk 

probability are shown below. The overall assessment was an Extremely Improbable chance of a 

catastrophic failure condition, which represents a LOW overall risk. 

Figure 17. TAP risk assessment and safety briefing. 

 

NASA TASAR / TAP Safety Briefing 

 TEST OBJECTIVE(S) MISSION DATE/SEQUENCE: AIRCRAFT: C-GJMM 

1. Verification of the operational data flows to TAP, and that TAP is able to successfully process the information in real-time. 

2. Verification of TAP interface functionality, per the system requirements. 

3. Observation of test subject interactions with TAP in an operational environment. 

4. Use of TAP to generate an aircrew request to ATC, with optional execution of the request. 

HAZARDS AND UNDESIRED EVENTS 

Per approved Forms 273 from FTOSR v1.3 dated August 16, 2013

001 Damage to aircraft structure due to crew distraction or workload could lead to an aircraft limitation being exceeded (e.g. 

Vmo/Mmo, limit load factor, etc.) 

002 Personal injury due to falls, impact with workstation, or blows from unsecured TASAR equipment 

003 Personal injury due to experimental system rack breaking loose and impacting crew personnel 

004 Personal injury due to fire originating from Workstation, TASAR equipment, or Personal Electronic Devices (PED). 

005 CFIT due to crew distraction, workload, or Hazardously Misleading TASAR information which, if followed, could lead to a 

compromise in terrain clearance 

006 Loss of Separation due to crew distraction, workload, or Hazardously Misleading TASAR information which, if followed, could lead 

to compromised aircraft separation 

007 Personal Injury resulting from adverse Weather Encounter due to crew distraction, workload, or hazardously misleading 

TASAR information 

008 Personal Injury resulting from inability to execute emergency egress from the aircraft on the ground due to obstruction caused 

by workstation AND/OR loose TASAR hardware and cables 

009 Personal Injury due to Cabin Depressurization. Loss of cabin airtight integrity due to failure of hardware related to the TASAR 

installation

010 Compromise or loss of normal aircraft system operation because TASAR systems interfere electrically or electromagnetically 

with existing aircraft systems 

CONTROLS / CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO BE BRIEFED 

Flight 

Conduct 

1. The Pilot-in-Command (PIC) / Safety Pilot will not participate in the TASAR evaluation and will monitor autopilot and flight

envelope at all times and will have a primary responsibility of maintaining ATC coordination, weather avoidance, and 

aircraft separation. 

2. Operations will be conducted in the heart of the aircraft’s flight envelope (10,000’ – FL300), within approximately 20 KIAS 

of the aircraft’s maneuvering speed (Va). 

3. The Hard-Deck for TASAR operations will be 10,000ft or the MEA, whichever is higher, so terrain clearance will be 

assured for all TASAR operations. 

4. All flight-testing will be conducted in an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) environment, with normal ATC separation standards. 

5. ATC clearance will be obtained prior to any non-emergency (e.g. TCAS RA or EGPWS escape) course or altitude 

modifications. 

6. All crewmembers will be briefed on the importance of lookout, see-and-avoid, and the use of the clock system for locating 

targets. 

7. Traffic conflicts and TCAS Traffic Advisories or RAs will be automatic cause for “knock-it-off” for all test points. 

8. Unexpected adverse weather encounters, EGPWS cautions and warnings, and TCAS Resolution Advisories will be 

automatic cause for “knock-it-off” for all TASAR test points. 

9. The PIC will call “knock-it-off” at any time if there is concern about the envelope being exceeded. 

Cabin 

Safety

10. All occupants will remain seated with safety belts secured, unless the PIC approves deviations from this requirement using

a challenge and response protocol, considering applicable operational factors (turbulence, anticipated maneuvering, etc.). 

11. The PIC will advise the crew of any pending maneuvers or anticipated turbulence encounters. 

12. Movement about the cabin and seat-changes will be kept to a practical minimum, and will only be performed in smooth air.

13. EFBs and other loose equipment will be stowed when not in use, and for takeoff, landing, and critical flight phases 

(generally 10,000’ MSL and below). 

Cabin 

EPs 

14. The aircraft is equipped with a full fire fighting kit, including a firefighter’s smoke hood with built-in oxygen and a portable 

HalonTM extinguisher. 

15. AdvAero’s Flight test Operations Manual FTOM requires a designated fire-fighter crewmember, and smoke and fire 

procedures are required to be briefed prior to each flight. 

16. The flight-crew are provided with state-of-art 2-second single-hand-donning oxygen masks and all cabin personnel are 

provided with drop-down oxygen masks that automatically activate at 14,250 ± 250 ft. cabin altitude. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 48 

 

Figure 18. TAP safety briefing (cont.) 

 

RESIDUAL RISK (circled)

FAILURE CONDITION

FAILURE PROBABILITY

MINOR MAJOR HAZARDOUS CATASTROPHIC

Probable LOW MEDIUM HIGH HIGH

Improbable-Remote LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH

Extremely Remote LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM

Extremely Improbable LOW LOW LOW LOW

BRIEFING ELEMENTS STATUS

1. 

Roles and Responsibilities: 

SAFETY PILOT / PIC: FINAL AUTHORITY over safety of flight, positive aircraft control, adherence to regs. and limits. 

TEST DIRECTOR: optimizes flow and completion of test points, coordinates crew to achieve test objectives. 

DATA ENGINEER: collection of data in accordance with Test Director’s requirements. 

FIRE CHIEF: in charge of firex and smoke hood. Distributes smoke goggles to pilots. Performs cabin fire drill. 

N/A Briefed 

2. 

Aircraft Identification and Requirements (incl. Flight Permit and any restrictions, especially re. autopilot usage) 

C-GJMM. Standard C of A. OpSpec #056 (NAFTA approval for flight-test operations by C-GJMM in U.S. Airspace) 

Issued March 1, 2013, valid until Mar 1, 2014 

N/A Briefed 

3. Flight Envelope / Configurations / Weight & Balance / Limits 

Normal P180 Flight envelope. 10,000 MSL TAP floor. Approx. Va at cruise for TAP operation. N/A Briefed 

4. 

Aircraft Safety Brief and Personal Equipment 

Exits, evacuation, O2 masks, life jackets, brace positions, survival and first aid kits, fire extinguisher and smoke hood, 

signals. Gravol, airsickness bags, “potty” procedures and access.

N/A Briefed 

5. Cockpit Brief 

Safety harness, O2 masks, ICS /radio selection and volume, EFIS, ELT operation, emergency speeds and configurations. N/A Briefed 

6. Test Point Conduct and Abort Procedures 

“Abort, Abort” (except during take-off roll). P1 recovers to level flight or escape manoeuvre, as required. N/A Briefed 

7. Radio procedures 

Sterile cockpit below 10,000 ft. Minimize intercom usage. Brief Intercom silence hand-signal. N/A Briefed 

8. 

Traffic procedures 

Use of clock reference, high/low/threat/no threat. Pilot subjects can take control to avoid traffic in extreme circumstances, 

except during take-off and landing. 

N/A Briefed 

9. Data/Photo/Video Requirements 

In accordance with AdvAero NNL12AA06C TASAR Flight Trial Data Collection Plan dated Nov 8, 2013, or later edition. N/A Briefed 

10. Weather Minima and Flight Rules 

Standard IFR minima apply. N/A Briefed 

11. ATC Coordination, special airspace requirements 

Standard TAP Flight Plans on file with ATC and ATCC. N/A Briefed 

12. Fuel Requirements and Bingo fuel 

Standard IFR reserves, including 45 min. reserve after completing approach at alternate airport. N/A Briefed 

13. N/A Briefed 

14. N/A Briefed 

MISSION BRIEFING AND RISK ACKNOWLEDGEMENT (PRINT AND SIGN) DATE: 

SAFETY PILOT PIC: JOHN MARIS PARTICIPANT PILOT: 

TEST DIRECTOR: MARK HAYNES AIRCRAFT ENGINEER: 

SOFTWARE ENGINEER: NASA MONITOR: 

OTHER: OTHER: 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 49 

 

12 REFERENCES

ARINC. (2012). 834-3 aircraft data interface function (ADIE). (No. 828-3). Annapolis 

MD: ARINC Incorporated. 

Ballin, M., Sharma, V., Vivona, R., Johnson, E., & Ramiscal, E. (2002). A flight deck 

decision support tool for autonomous airborne operations. 2002 AIAA Conference on 

Guidance, Navigation, and Control, Monterey, CA.

Blanchard, B. S. (2008). Systems engineering management (4th ed.) Hoboken, NJ: John 

Wiley & Sons, Inc. 

Federal Aviation Administration (2012). Guidelines for the certification, airworthiness, 

and operational use of portable electronic flight bags. (Advisory Circular No. AC 

120-76B). Washington, DC: AFS-400. (Electronic Flight Bag (EFB)) 

Henderson, J. (2012). Initial analysis of operational use cases and methodologies. (No. 

NNL12AA06C). NASA. 

Henderson, J. (2013). Traffic aware strategic aircrew requests (TASAR) concept of 

operations. (No. CR-2013-218001). NASA. 

Maris, J. (2011). Flight test operations manual (FTOM), revision 1. (No. MVTSFTSMS-02). Quebec, Canada: Marinvent Corporation. 

NASA. (2010). NASA Langley procedural requirements protection of human research 

subjects. (No. LPR 7100.10). NASA. 

NASA. (2013). Air traffic operations lab. Retrieved September 19, 2013, from 

http://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/multimedia/iotw-atol.html#.UjuiwRZa5SY 

Roscoe, A., and Ellis, G., "A Subjective Rating Scale for Assessing Pilot Workload in 

Flight: A Decade of Practical Use," Royal Aerospace Establishment, ADA227864, 

Farnborough, U.K., 1990. 

RTCA SC-135. (2010). Environmental conditions and test procedures for airborne 

equipment. (No. RTCA/DO-160G). Washington, D.C.: RTCA, Inc. 

RTCA SC-205. (2011). DO-178C software consideration in airborne systems and 

equipment certification. Washington, D.C.: RTCA, Inc. 

SAE Aerospace S-18, & WG-63. (2010). ARP 4754. Guidelines for development of civil 

aircraft and systems. (Rev. A) SAE International. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 50 

 

TASAR flight test operations and safety report. (V 1.1, Mar 6, 2013). (No. 

NNL12AA06C DEL 19). Langley, VA: Advanced Aerospace Solutions, LLC. 

TASAR flight trial approval requirements. (Rev 2.0, Feb 21, 2013). (No. NNL12AA06C 

DEL 7). Langley, VA: Advanced Aerospace Solutions, LLC. 

TASAR flight trial test plan. (V1.1 May 31, 2013). (No. NNL12AA06C FTP). Langley, 

VA: Advanced Aerospace Solutions, LLC. 

TASAR flight-trial hazard analysis. (V 2.0, Feb 13, 2013). (No. NNL12AA06C DEL 12). 

Langley, VA: Advanced Aerospace Solutions, LLC. 

Vivona, R., Karr, D., & Roscoe, D. (2013). Pattern-based genetic algorithm for airborne 

conflict resolution. 2006 AIAA Conference on Guidance, Navigation, and Control, 

Keystone, CO. 
NASA TASAR Systems Engineering Management Plan 51 

 

APPENDIX 1 AW&ST Article 

Aviation Week and Space Technology Report on TAP, December 2, 2013 

© 2013 John Croft Aviation Week and Space Technology. Reprinted with permission. 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

2. REPORT TYPE 

Contractor Report

 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Systems Engineering Management Plan NASA Traffic Aware Planner 

Integration Into P-180 Airborne Test-Bed

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

NNL12AA06C

 6. AUTHOR(S)

.

Maris, John

 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

NASA Langley Research Center

Hampton, VA 23681-2199

 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546-0001

 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

 REPORT NUMBER

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

NASA

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Langley Technical Monitor: David J. Wing

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Unclassified - Unlimited

Subject Category 03

Availability: NASA STI Program (757) 864-9658

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

STI Help Desk (email: help@sti.nasa.gov)

14. ABSTRACT

NASA’s Traffic Aware Planner (TAP) is a cockpit decision support tool that provides aircrew with vertical and lateral 

flight-path optimizations with the intent of achieving significant fuel and time savings, while automatically avoiding traffic,

weather, and restricted airspace conflicts. A key step towards the maturation and deployment of TAP concerned its operational 

evaluation in a representative flight environment. This Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) addresses the 

test-vehicle design, systems integration, and flight-test planning for the first TAP operational flight evaluations, which were

successfully completed in November 2013. The trial outcomes are documented in the Traffic Aware Planner (TAP) flight 

evaluation paper presented at the 14th AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference, Atlanta, GA. 

(AIAA-2014-2166, Maris, J. M., Haynes, M. A., Wing, D. J., Burke, K. A., Henderson, J., & Woods, S. E., 2014). 

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Electronic flight bag; Flight test; Route optimization; Traffic aware planner; User requests

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64

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(757) 864-9658

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