UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BEG INVESTMENTS, LLC, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 13-cv-0182 (RC)

:

v. : Re Document Nos.: 14, 18, 21

:

NICHOLAS ALBERTI, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE OR DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT,

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL 

COMPLAINT, AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff BEG Investments, LLC, operated Twelve Restaurant and Lounge, a nightclub in 

the District of Columbia. As a consequence, Plaintiff’s business was regulated by the D.C. 

Alcohol Beverage Control Board (“the Board”), an administrative body tasked with approving, 

changing, suspending, and revoking liquor licenses for establishments serving alcoholic 

beverages in the District. In June 2011, after reports of multiple violent incidents at Plaintiff’s 

establishment, the Board granted Plaintiff’s application to renew its liquor license, but did so on 

the condition that Plaintiff hire a police detail to patrol the area surrounding its establishment 

when Plaintiff provided certain types of live entertainment. Plaintiff filed suit against six 

members of the Board in February 2013, arguing that the condition on its liquor license was 

discriminatory and extortionate. This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s six-count complaint on March 

31, 2014, on qualified immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim, but gave Plaintiff leave 
to amend its First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims. Plaintiff filed an amended 

complaint on April 30, 2014.

On June 6, 2014, after an assault occurred at Plaintiff’s establishment, the Board 

summarily suspended Plaintiff’s liquor license. Plaintiff views the suspension and other actions 

taken by the Board after Plaintiff filed its first complaint as retaliatory, and Plaintiff filed a 

motion to supplement its complaint with these allegations on July 16, 2014. The supplemental 

complaint named two additional Board members as Defendants, as well as a Sergeant with MPD 

and an attorney for the District of Columbia’s Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”). Now 

before the Court are Defendants’ motion to strike the amended complaint or, in the alternative, to 

dismiss all claims, Plaintiff’s motion to supplement its complaint, and Defendants’ motion for 

Rule 11 sanctions. Upon consideration of the parties’ motions and the memoranda in support 

thereof and opposition thereto, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to strike or dismiss the 

amended complaint, grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff’s motion to supplement its complaint, 

and grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s First Complaint

Plaintiff is a company that formerly operated Twelve Restaurant and Lounge in the 

District of Columbia. Defendants Nicholas Alberti, Donald Brooks, Herman Jones, Calvin 

Nophlin, Mike Silverstein, and Ruthanne Miller are members of the Board who have issued a 

series of orders pertaining to Plaintiff’s liquor license.

1

 

1 The term “liquor license” is used to refer to Plaintiff’s Retailers’ Class CT License to 

serve alcoholic beverages.

2

 
As detailed in this Court’s Memorandum Opinion of March 31, 2014,2 the Board was 

established by D.C. Code § 25-201, and it is authorized to “issue licenses to persons who meet 

the requirements” set forth in the Alcoholic Beverage Statute and to impose “certain conditions” 

on those licenses if the Board “determines that the inclusion of the conditions will be in the best 

interest of the locality . . . where the licensed establishment is to be located.” D.C. Code § 25-

104(a), (e). The Board also oversees the Alcoholic Beverage Regulation Administration 

(“ABRA”), which provides “professional, technical, and administrative staff assistance to the 

Board in the performance of its functions.” D.C. Code § 25-202.

On June 22, 2011, the Board issued an order on Plaintiff’s application for renewal of its 

liquor license. Board Order 2011-289 at 7, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 19-2; 3 Compl. ¶ 26, ECF No. 

1. 4

 After finding that there had been three assaults and fifteen calls to the Metropolitan Police 

Department (“MPD”) at the establishment’s address, and that MPD had increased patrols in the 

area due to intoxicated individuals leaving Plaintiff’s establishment, the Board granted Plaintiff’s 

application for renewal of its license on the condition that Plaintiff hire an MPD reimbursable 

2 The Court hereby incorporates by reference the facts set forth in its earlier 

Memorandum Opinion. See generally BEG Investments, LLC v. Alberti, 34 F. Supp. 3d 68 

(D.D.C. 2014), ECF No. 9.

3 Page numbers refer to the numbers generated by the Court's ECF filing system.

4 Defendants attached a complete copy of the pertinent Board orders, Board transcripts, 

and ABRA investigative report on which Plaintiff’s complaint relies. See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, 

ECF No. 14-3; Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Leave to Suppl., ECF No. 19-2. Plaintiff quotes from and 

refers to the documents repeatedly, incorporating them in both its amended and supplemental 

complaints. See, e.g., Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶ 31 (citing and quoting from Board Order 2011-289); 

Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 36–37 ECF No. 18–1 (summarizing and citing Board Order 2014-218). 

Plaintiff has not disputed the authenticity of the documents, which are a matter of public record. 

Accordingly, the Court may consider the documents without turning Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 

117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (in deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), a court may consider “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the 

complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice”).

3

 
detail “whenever the establishment provides any entertainment permitted by the establishment’s 

entertainment endorsement.” Board Order 2011-289 at 4, 7, Defs.’ Ex. A. A reimbursable detail 

is comprised of “MPD officers [who] patrol the surrounding area of an establishment for the 

purpose of maintaining public safety.” See D.C. Code § 25-798(a)(3); Emergency Suspension of 

Liquor Licenses Act of 2005, D.C. Act 16-20. 

Upon Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the Board modified its June 22 order on 

August 10, 2011, ordering that Plaintiff hire an MPD reimbursable detail “whenever the 

establishment provides any DJs or live music as entertainment at the establishment.” Board 

Order 2011-368 at 12, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 19-2. Additionally, the modified order required 

that the MPD detail “be hired for a minimum of four hours and shall end no sooner than one hour 

after closing.” Id. On July 11, 2012, the Board fined Plaintiff $1500 for failing to hire an MPD 

reimbursable detail when a DJ performed at Plaintiff’s establishment on October 9, 2011. Board 

Order 2012-301 at 22, Defs.’ Ex. C., ECF No. 19-2.

 Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a six-count complaint against Defendants in their 

individual capacities on February 11, 2013. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff claimed 

that the Board’s orders requiring Plaintiff to hire an MPD detail at a rate of over $55 per hour –

more than double the basic wage of police officers – was unlawful and extortionate. Plaintiff 

alleged: (1) racketeering in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); (2) conspiracy to commit 

racketeering in violation of RICO § 1962(d); (3) deprivation of equal protection of the law; (4) 

deprivation of property in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (5) 

deprivation of freedom of speech in violation the First Amendment; and (6) conspiracy to 

deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Defendants 

4
moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court 

granted Defendants’ motion. See Order, ECF No. 8.

In its Memorandum Opinion, this Court explained that Plaintiff’s RICO claims, which 

were predicated on violations of the Hobbs Act, failed because the unlawfulness of Defendants’ 

imposition of a reimbursable detail was not clearly established. BEG Investments, 34 F. Supp. 

3d. at 80–84. As a result, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the RICO and 

Hobbs Act claims. Id. Additionally, the Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations were inadequate 

to state an Equal Protection Clause, Fifth Amendment, or First Amendment claim. Id. at 84–88. 

Although the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety, it did grant Plaintiff leave to 

amend its claims brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment 

because Plaintiff had alleged additional facts pertaining to those claims in its opposition brief. 

Order, ECF No. 8. 

B. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

On April 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the same six Defendants, 

this time in both their individual and official capacities. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 12. 

Notably, the amended complaint was not limited to Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause and First 

Amendment claims, which the Court had given Plaintiff leave to amend. Instead, the amended 

complaint reasserted all six of Plaintiff’s previously dismissed claims and added a seventh claim 

that Defendants violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by targeting establishments like Plaintiff’s 

“for the purpose of inhibiting the free association of young black African Americans and to 

inhibit the playing of ‘urban’ styles of music such as R&B, Hip-Hop and Go-Go music.” Am. 

Compl. ¶ 119. 

5
Defendants, pointing out that Plaintiff had not obtained either their consent or the Court’s 

leave to amend as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), have moved to strike the 

amended complaint, with the exception of Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause and First 

Amendment claims. Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 6, ECF No. 14-1. Alternatively, Defendants move to 

dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim. Id. at 1. 

C. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Complaint

On July 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed a two-page motion for leave to file a supplemental 

complaint to include events that occurred after Plaintiff filed its first complaint, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). Pl.’s Mot. Leave to Suppl. Compl. at 1–2., ECF No. 18. 

The supplemental complaint named four new Defendants: Amy Schmidt-Banker, an OAG 

attorney who prosecuted a noise violation complaint against Plaintiff; Alexander Pope, III, a

Sergeant with MPD who responded to an assault at Plaintiff’s establishment and reported to an 

ABRA investigator regarding Plaintiff’s handling of the incident; and Board members Victor 

Rodriguez and James Short, Jr. The supplemental complaint also included six new claims: three 

claims of First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 a defamation per se claim, a 

defamation per quod claim, and an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

According to Plaintiff, Ms. Schmidt violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by 

fabricating a noise complaint against Plaintiff in retaliation for the filing of this lawsuit. Suppl. 

Compl. ¶¶ 58–63, ECF No. 18-1. Plaintiff alleges that it received a Notice of Status Hearing and 

5 In light of the request in Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint for damages, as well as 

Plaintiff’s assertion of constitutional violations against individuals acting under color of state 

authority, the Court infers that Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims – Counts VII, XI, 

and X – are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing civil liability against persons acting 

under color of District of Columbia law who violate the constitution).

6

 
Show Cause hearing on March 13, 2013 – approximately one month after Plaintiff filed its first 

complaint – detailing a noise complaint that allegedly occurred more than seven months prior, on 

July 26, 2012. Id. ¶¶ 6–9. Citing inconsistent allegations regarding the time the noise violation 

occurred, the inability of the ABRA investigator to provide details about the complainant, and 

the Board’s decision to dismiss the charge for lack of sufficient evidence, Plaintiff alleges that 

the investigative report and other documents related to the noise complaint “were wholly

fabricated by Schmidt and other unknown persons” after Plaintiff filed its first complaint in this 

case. Id. ¶¶ 10–24.

Next, Plaintiff alleges that the Board cancelled Plaintiff’s liquor license and closed its 

establishment on May 14, 2014, for the improper purpose of interfering with this suit and in 

violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Id. ¶¶ 72–79. By way of background, Plaintiff 

explains that it properly submitted its license renewal application on September 6, 2013, but that 

Plaintiff’s representative became ill and failed to appear or to request a continuance of Plaintiff’s 

December 11, 2013, status hearing. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. As a consequence of Plaintiff’s failure to 

appear, the Board dismissed the September 2013 renewal application. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff 

subsequently requested that its application be reinstated, but the Board refused, so Plaintiff 

reapplied for renewal on February 7, 2014. Id. ¶¶ 28–30. The Board held a hearing on the 

second renewal application on April 21, 2014, but Plaintiff contends it did not receive notice of 

the scheduling of the hearing. Id. ¶¶ 31–33. When Plaintiff again failed to appear, the Board 

dismissed the second renewal application and instructed Plaintiff that it could request 

reinstatement of its application within ten days. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34. Plaintiff did not request 

reinstatement of the second renewal application and instead submitted a third renewal application 

to ABRA on April 28, 2014. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35. On May 12, 2014, the Board ordered Plaintiff to 

7
cease selling alcoholic beverages, citing Plaintiff’s failure to apply for reinstatement of its second 

renewal application. Id. ¶¶ 36–37. The Board’s order, however, failed to acknowledge the fact 

that Plaintiff had already filed a third renewal application with ABRA. Id. Plaintiff alleges that 

its third application was readily evident, that its license was not yet expired, and that the Board’s 

decision to order Plaintiff to cease operations was predicated on “information they knew or 

should have known by reasonable inquiry to be false.” Id. ¶¶ 36–37, 74–76. The Board 

subsequently vacated the May 12 order on May 21, 2014, and it permitted Plaintiff to resume 

operations while its third renewal application was being processed. Board Order 2014-228 at 67, 

Defs.’ Ex. J, ECF No. 19-2.

On May 24, 2014, three days after the Board allowed Plaintiff to resume operations, an 

assault occurred in Plaintiff’s establishment. See Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 38–39. The Chief of MPD 

temporarily suspended the operation of Plaintiff’s establishment, finding that the violent crime 

was directly connected to Plaintiff’s establishment and that it severely endangered the public. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that MPD’s Sergeant Pope, who responded to the assault, falsely reported to an 

ABRA investigator that the establishment did not immediately comply with police instructions 

after the assault, that emergency respondents had difficulty reaching and transporting the victim 

due to the establishment’s lack of assistance, that Plaintiff’s staff were not cooperative, and that 

the scene was chaotic. Id. ¶¶ 40–46. Plaintiff contends that Sergeant Pope denied making those 

allegations when he took the stand at a subsequent evidentiary hearing before the Board, that 

video evidence contradicted a number of the allegations, and that the Board’s June 6, 2014, order 

suspending Plaintiff’s liquor license contained a number of factual assertions that lacked 

evidentiary support. Id. ¶¶ 46–56. Accordingly, Plaintiff claims that the Board’s June 2014 

8
order was based on information known by the Board to be false and intended to interfere with 

Plaintiff’s prosecution of this case in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Sergeant Pope’s false statements to the ABRA investigator 

constitute defamation per se and defamation per quod, id. ¶¶ 80–94, and that Defendants have 

conspired to deprive Plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

Id. ¶¶ 95–98.

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion to file a supplemental complaint on the grounds 

that to allow it would be futile. Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Leave to Suppl. Compl., ECF No. 19.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Legal Standards for Amending and Supplementing a Complaint

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, if a plaintiff wants to amend his complaint 

more than 21 days after a responsive pleading has been filed, he must seek consent from the 

defendants or leave from the Court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Virtue v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters 

Ret. & Family Prot. Plan, 893 F. Supp. 2d 46, 47–48 (D.D.C. 2012). Pursuant to Rule 15, a 

court should grant leave to amend a complaint when “justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2); see also Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

However, a court may deny a motion to amend if the amendment would be futile. Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.

Cir. 1996). “An amendment would be futile if it merely restates the same facts as the original 

complaint in different terms, reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a 

legal theory or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.

Supp. 2d 101, 114 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Oladokun v. Corr. Treatment Facility, No. 13-cv0358, 2013 WL 6147940, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2013) (“[I]n assessing an argument that an 

9
amendment would be futile, the court must assess the proposed amendments under the same 

standard as would be applied to a motion to dismiss.”).

Unlike an amended complaint, which “typically rest on matters in place prior to the filing 

of the original pleading,” United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2002), a 

supplemental complaint sets forth “transaction[s], occurrence[s], or event[s] that happened after 

the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). A supplemental complaint 

is used “to set forth new facts that update the original pleading or provide the basis for additional 

relief; to put forward new claims or defenses based on events that took place after the original 

complaint or answer was filed; [and] to include new parties where subsequent events have made 

it necessary to do so.” Hicks, 283 F.3d at 386 (citing 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller 

& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1504 (3d ed. 2010)). 

Before filing a supplemental complaint, a plaintiff must first seek the Court’s permission. 

Hall v. C.I.A., 437 F.3d 94, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Such supplements always require leave of the 

court.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (providing that a court “may, on just terms, permit a party 

to serve a supplemental pleading”). A motion to supplement a pleading is “to be freely granted 

when doing so will promote the economic and speedy disposition of the entire controversy 

between the parties, will not cause undue delay or trial inconvenience, and will not prejudice the 

rights of any of the other parties to the action.” Hall, 437 F.3d at 101 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). As is the case when a plaintiff seeks leave to amend a complaint, however, a court 

may deny a motion to file a supplemental complaint as futile “if the proposed claim[s] would not 

survive a motion to dismiss.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 

(affirming denial of leave to file a supplemental complaint); Oladokun, 2013 WL 6147940, at *3

(explaining that when a party argues that a claim is futile because it would not survive a motion 

10
to dismiss, the claim is analyzed “under the same standard as would be applied to a motion to 

dismiss” pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)). 

B. Legal Standard for Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds 

upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 

(per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff’s ultimate 

likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. 

See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A court considering such a motion presumes 

that the complaint’s factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff’s 

favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). It 

is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of its prima facie case in the complaint. 

See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–14 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F. Supp. 

2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2010).

Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007)). This means that a plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true 

(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (citations omitted). “Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are 

therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not 

11
accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of the 

legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Failure to Seek Leave to Amend: RICO & Takings Clause Claims

Defendants first argue that this Court should strike Plaintiff’s amended complaint – with 

the exception of those claims for which Plaintiff received the Court’s leave to amend – because 

Plaintiff failed to abide by the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Rule 15(a) 

provides that a plaintiff “may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent

or the court’s leave,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (emphasis added), and Plaintiff obtained neither. 

By way of response, Plaintiff argues that it had already received the Court’s leave to amend its 

First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims, and it is aware of “no authority for the 

proposition that once leave is granted to a Plaintiff to amend a Complaint, such amendments are 

somehow confined to the exceptions specifically noted by the Court in granting the amendment.” 

Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. Strike at 1–2, ECF No. 16. 

To find such authority, Plaintiff need only have consulted the plain language of this 

Court’s March 31, 2014, Order. In that Order, the Court clearly stated that “Plaintiff is granted 

leave to amend its claims brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and the First 

Amendment.”6

 Order at 1 (emphasis added). The Order did not contain a general grant of leave 

to amend. Neither did it provide Plaintiff with leave to amend its two RICO claims, which the 

6 Although Rule 15(a) does not explicitly authorize courts to impose conditions, 

restrictions, or limitations when granting leave to amend, courts have long held that such 

authority exists. See, e.g., 6 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 1486 (3d ed. 2010) (collecting cases and explaining that a court “may narrow the 

scope of the amendment” under Rule 15(a), and that “refusal to comply with the conditions 

imposed by the court normally will result in a denial of the right to amend”).

12

 
Court dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. Similarly absent was a grant of leave to amend 

Plaintiff’s Takings Clause claim, which the Court dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because 

the claim was premised on the payment of funds to MPD and an obligation to pay money does 

not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. See BEG Investments, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 87–

88. And yet, Plaintiff has reasserted both its Takings Clause claim and its RICO claims without 

seeking leave to do so. 

This is not the first time that Plaintiff has attempted to amend its complaint in an 

improper manner. Indeed, the Court’s limited grant of leave to amend was intended to allow 

Plaintiff to correct precisely that problem. As the Court’s Memorandum Opinion explained, 

Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss contained new facts pertinent to 

its First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims that did not appear in Plaintiff’s 

complaint. BEG Investments, 34 F. Supp. 3d. at 85–86. Because “a complaint may not be 

amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss,” Coleman v. Pension Ben. Guar. 

Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24 n.8 (D.D.C. 2000), the Court was unable to consider those new facts 

when ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In the interests of justice, however, the Court 

elected to grant Plaintiff leave to amend its Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment 

claims sua sponte so that Plaintiff might include all facts pertinent to those claims in its 

complaint. BEG Investments, 34 F. Supp. 3d. at 85–86, 88.

Once more, however, Plaintiff has attempted to amend its complaint in an impermissible 

manner, this time by ignoring the limitations of this Court’s Order and failing to comply with 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Plaintiff is correct that “this Court has denied motions to 

strike amended pleadings when a party intended to comply with, and did not cavalierly disregard, 

a scheduling order,” Greggs v. Autism Speaks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2014), but 

13
Plaintiff has given no indication that this is such a case. Plaintiff is represented by counsel, and 

in the event that Plaintiff’s attorney was unfamiliar with the requirements of Rule 15(a), 

Defendants’ motion to strike the amended complaint clearly set forth those requirements. To 

this day, however, Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend its complaint. Neither has Plaintiff 

suggested a plausible reading of the Court’s Order that would authorize Plaintiff to amend all 

claims, and the Court is at a loss to supply one. 

Plaintiff’s final effort to defend its course of action is to assert that “Defendants’ 

hypertechnical and baseless claim that the Plaintiff violated Rule 15(a) will matter little to 

anyone” when Plaintiff files its supplemental complaint, which “will make these amendments 

pale in comparison.” See Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 3. Though Plaintiff’s clear violation of the 

Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Order may “matter little” to Plaintiff, the Court does 

not share this view. If Plaintiff viewed the Court’s sua sponte grant of leave to amend as too 

narrow, Plaintiff was free to seek the Court’s leave to make additional amendments. Plaintiff 

was not, however, free to simply ignore the limitations of the Court’s Order and the requirements 

of the Federal Rules. 

The Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion to strike Counts I, II, and V – Plaintiff’s 

RICO and Fifth Amendment claims – from the amended complaint. See Purchasing Power, LLC 

v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-258-WSD, 2014 WL 1870734, at *12 (N.D. Ga. May 9, 

2014) (dismissing two counts of an amended complaint where the plaintiff did not seek the 

Court’s leave to amend as required by Rule 15(a)(2), and the claims were not among those that 

the Court’s order previously gave plaintiff leave to amend); Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 975 

F. Supp. 2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2013) (striking second amended complaint filed without first seeking 

court’s leave); see also United States ex rel. Mathews v. HealthSouth Corp., 332 F.3d 293, 296 

14
(5th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailing to request leave from the court when leave is required makes a 

pleading more than technically deficient. The failure to obtain leave results in an amended 

complaint having no legal effect.”); Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 1998) 

(“Because Murray's amended complaint was not properly filed pursuant to Rule 15 [because he 

failed to seek leave of court or consent of defendants before filing], it had no legal effect . . . .”).

B. Futility of Amendment: RICO & Takings Clause Claims

Alternatively, even if Plaintiff had sought leave to amend Counts I, II, and V as required 

by Rule 15, the Court would not have granted it on grounds of futility. An amendment is futile 

“if it merely restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms, reasserts a claim 

on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion 

to dismiss.” Robinson, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 114. “Courts may deny a motion to amend a 

complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.” James 

Madison Ltd., 82 F.3d at 1099. 

1. Individual Capacity RICO Claims

As Defendants correctly point out, the RICO and RICO conspiracy claims in Plaintiff’s

amended complaint are virtually identical to those previously considered and dismissed by this 

Court, reflecting only two changes. First, in the “relevant facts” section of Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint, Plaintiff adds that “[i]n some instances, an establishment will schedule and pay for 

the Reimbursable Detail, but no officers will show up for the detail.” Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Second, 

Plaintiff has added to Count I the assertion of an interstate commerce nexus. See id. ¶ 107(e) 

(“By demanding payment to Reimbursable Detail program for the purpose of extorting money 

from the Plaintiff, the Defendants have obstructed, delayed, and affected commerce within the 

District of Columbia in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.”). Count II, alleging a 

15
RICO conspiracy, is entirely unchanged from Plaintiff’s first complaint. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 

87–90 with Am. Compl. ¶¶ 108–11.

Plaintiff asserts generally that it “has endeavored to address and rehabilitate [its claims] 

to the Court’s satisfaction.” See Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 2. But Plaintiff offers no argument or 

explanation as to how either of Plaintiff’s proposed amendments could be considered responsive 

to the basis of this Court’s earlier dismissal of Plaintiff’s RICO claims against Defendants in 

their individual capacities. The Court did not dismiss the claims due to Plaintiff’s failure to 

allege either the existence of an interstate commerce nexus or the occasional unreliability of 

reimbursable details. Rather, the Court found that Defendants were “entitled to qualified 

immunity on the RICO and Hobbs Act claims because Plaintiff has failed to allege that 

Defendants’ imposition of a Reimbursable Detail violated clearly established law.” BEG 

Investments, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 80. Plaintiff’s proposed amendments do not change this 

conclusion. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s RICO claims are unable to survive a motion to 

dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, see id. at 80–84, and that Plaintiff’s proposed RICO and 

RICO conspiracy claims against Defendants in their individual capacities would be futile. See

Robinson, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 114 (“An amendment would be futile if it merely . . . reasserts a 

claim on which the court previously ruled . . . .”).

2. Official Capacity RICO Claims

Plaintiff’s RICO claims against Defendants in their official capacities, presented for the 

first time in the amended complaint, are just as infirm as Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims. 

“Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not 

the named official,” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991), Plaintiff’s RICO claims against the 

Board members in their official capacities are effectively RICO claims against the District of 

16
Columbia. Defendants maintain that this is a fatal defect, because a civil RICO claim “cannot be 

maintained against a municipal corporation.” Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 

914 (3d Cir. 1991). 

RICO provides a right of action against any “person,” defined as “any individual or entity 

capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property,” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3), and dictates 

that a successful plaintiff “shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the 

suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee,” § 1964(c). There is no question that the District of 

Columbia is a “person” within the meaning of RICO, but that fact alone does not end the Court’s 

inquiry. Two additional matters bear on the ability of this Court to find the District liable under 

RICO: (1) the punitive nature of RICO’s treble damages provision, and (2) the inability of a 

governmental entity to form the malicious intent necessary to commit the underlying Hobbs Act 

violation that gives rise to RICO liability. 

In Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), the Supreme Court described the 

well-established common law proposition that municipal corporations are immune from punitive 

damages. Id. at 259–63. The Court explained that “officials’ malice should not be attributed to 

the taxpaying citizens of the community” via an award of punitive damages. See id. at 261. The 

Court also cited with approval a state supreme court opinion finding that “a municipality could 

not be found liable for treble damages under a trespass statute, notwithstanding the statute’s 

authorization of such damages against ‘any person,’” because municipal corporations, unlike 

their officers, cannot commit willful and malicious acts. See id. (citing Hunt v. City of Boonville, 

65 Mo. 620, 625 (1877)). The Court went on to observe that “[j]udicial disinclination to award 

punitive damages against a municipality has persisted to the present day in the vast majority of 

jurisdictions,” id. at 260, and that “[t]he general rule today is that no punitive damages are 

17
allowed unless expressly authorized by statute.” Id. at 260 n. 21; see also Smith v. District of 

Columbia, 336 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C. 1975) (per curiam) (holding that the “District of Columbia is 

not liable for punitive damages”).

Applying the Supreme Court’s municipal immunity analysis to RICO, the Third Circuit 

observed in Genty that RICO requires an award of treble damages, “a civil remedy far in excess 

of the amount necessary to compensate an injured RICO victim.” Genty, 937 F.2d at 912. 

“[B]earing in mind the strong weight of authority which supports the characterization of treble 

damages as punitive,” as well as the absence of any express statutory language providing for 

municipal liability, the Genty court held “that RICO’s overall purpose to thwart the generalized 

harm wrought by racketeering activity, its dependence on statutory crimes, and the mandatory 

provision for treble damages are sufficient evidence of Congress’ intention that the treble 

damages provision serve a predominantly punitive purpose.” Id. at 914. As a consequence, the 

court concluded that a civil RICO claim could not be maintained against a municipal 

corporation. Id. at 914; see also Tengood v. City of Philadelphia, 529 F. App’x 204, 209 (3d Cir. 

2013) (applying Genty and affirming dismissal of civil RICO claims against a city); Navajo 

Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 269, 272 (D.D.C. 2002) (describing the Court’s 

earlier grant of a motion to dismiss RICO claims against a municipal corporation that could not 

be liable under RICO for punitive damages).

The Third Circuit is not alone in finding municipal corporations immune from civil RICO 

liability. In Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope Valley Hospital District, 940 F.2d 397 

(9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit held that RICO claims brought against government entities 

must fail. Id. at 404. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[s]ince civil RICO damages are not 

merely compensatory, but are trebled, Newport is compelling,” and “public policy is offended if 

18
all the citizens of a state are made liable for extraordinary damages as a result of the actions of a 

few dishonest officials.” Id. at 404–05. Moreover, the court explained, “government entities are 

incapable of forming a malicious intent.” Id. at 404; see also Newport, 453 U.S. at 263 n.23

(citing “respectable authority” that municipal corporations “cannot, as such, be supposed capable 

of doing a criminal act, or a willful and malicious wrong”). Because the plaintiff’s RICO claim 

was based on a predicate criminal act with an intent requirement, the court concluded that 

municipal liability was not available. Id. at 261; see also Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 

(9th Cir. 1996) (applying Lancaster and summarily rejecting RICO claims against a city because

“government entities are incapable of forming the malicious intent necessary to support a RICO 

action”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Second Circuit has also rejected claims that a municipality can be liable under RICO. 

See Rogers v. City of New York, 359 F. App’x 201, 204 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Pedrina and 

holding that “there is no municipal liability under RICO”); Frooks v. Town of Cortlandt, 997 F. 

Supp. 438, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) aff'd, 182 F.3d 899 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “every court in 

this Circuit that has considered the issue has held that a municipality cannot form the requisite 

criminal intent to establish a predicate act, and has therefore dismissed the claim against the 

municipality”).

Against the weight of opinions from the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits,7 Plaintiff has 

failed to point this Court to a single case holding that a civil RICO action may be maintained 

against a municipal defendant. Plaintiff nevertheless characterizes Defendants’ reliance on 

Genty as improper and argues that this Court should rely instead on First American Corp. v. Al7 See also United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2004) (distinguishing 

between naming a municipal entity as part of a RICO enterprise, which is permissible as a matter 

of law, and naming a municipality as a defendant in a RICO case, which is arguably a legal 

impossibility).

19

 
Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107 (D.D.C. 1996), which held that “[a]lthough the treble damages 

provisions of a civil RICO suit may suggest a punitive element, the overriding purpose of RICO 

is to provide a remedy to persons injured as a result of racketeering activity.” Id. at 1122.

Plaintiff’s reliance on First American, a case that did not address the subject of municipal 

liability under RICO, is unavailing. The Court in First American considered the question of 

whether RICO is primarily punitive or remedial only for the purpose of determining whether a 

civil RICO suit could survive the death of the defendant. Id. at 1122. Additionally, First 

American expressly distinguished the facts in Genty, where the treble damages provision was

punitive because the case involved “potential municipal liability where actual damages were 

easily calculated,” from the facts in First American, where “the actual damages arising from a 

specific defendant's actions may be difficult to assess.” Id. Plaintiff, however, has not suggested

that the actual damages caused by the District in this case may be difficult to assess, and the

Court has no reason to doubt that damages could be easily calculated based on the payments 

Plaintiff made to the Reimbursable Detail. 

Even if this Court were inclined to extend First American’s holding that RICO’s treble 

damages provision is not primarily punitive to the facts at hand, Plaintiff has entirely failed to 

respond to Defendants’ argument that a municipal corporation cannot, as a matter of law, form 

the intent necessary to commit the predicate criminal offense that gives rise to civil RICO 

liability. See Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 11 (citing Pedrina, 97 F.3d at 1300; Brewer v. Vill. of Old 

Field, 311 F. Supp. 2d 390, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)); see also Nu-Life Constr. Corp. v. Bd. of Educ. 

of N.Y., 779 F. Supp. 248, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that governmental entities “are not 

capable of forming the criminal intent necessary for the commission of the predicate violations 

of the Hobbs Act, and therefore cannot be held liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)”). In the 

20
absence of any opposition to Defendants’ assertion that the District is incapable as a matter of 

law of forming the necessary criminal intent to violate the Hobbs Act and thus subject itself it 

RICO liability, the Court deems the matter conceded. See Local Civil Rule 7(b); Hopkins v. 

Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[W]hen a 

plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised 

by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as 

conceded.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that to permit amendment of Plaintiff’s complaint to 

include RICO claims against the Board members in their official capacities would be futile.

3. Takings Clause Claim

Similarly, even if Plaintiff had sought leave to amend its Fifth Amendment Takings 

Clause claim, the Court would have denied the amendment as futile. Plaintiff’s Takings Clause 

claim, Count V, is premised on the Board’s order requiring Plaintiff to hire reimbursable details, 

thereby requiring Plaintiff to pay MPD thousands of dollars for policing services. Am. Compl. 

§§ 125–130. This Court previously dismissed Count V for failure to state a claim, explaining 

that “a mere payment of money, without more, is not a taking within the meaning of the Takings 

Clause.” BEG Investments, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 87. Plaintiff’s amended complaint adds a single 

assertion to those allegations previously found inadequate by the Court: “Defendants have forced 

the Plaintiff to pay extortionate monetary payments to receive business permits without any 

legitimate governmental purpose.” Am. Compl. ¶ 129. Defendants, in response, have argued 

that res judicata bars the claim, and they have incorporated by reference their prior arguments 

for dismissing Count V for failure to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment. See Defs.’ Mot. 

Strike at 8–9, 9 n.5.

21
Plaintiff’s opposition, however, offers no counter-argument on the subject; indeed, 

Plaintiff’s opposition is devoid of any reference whatsoever to the Fifth Amendment generally or 

Plaintiff’s Takings Clause claim specifically. In light of Plaintiff’s failure to respond to 

Defendants’ arguments in favor of striking or dismissing the Takings Clause claim as futile, the 

Court shall treat the matter as conceded. See Local Civil Rule 7(b); Jordan v. District of 

Columbia, 949 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing two claims because “[b]y failing to 

respond in their opposition, the plaintiffs have conceded [the defendant’s] argument”); Hopkins, 

284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[W]hen a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive 

motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those 

arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”).

C. Failure to Seek Leave to Amend: Title VI Claim

New to Plaintiff’s amended complaint is Count IV, a claim that alleges a violation of 

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Although Plaintiff did not seek 

leave to amend its complaint to include a claim of race discrimination under Title VI, like the 

Equal Protection Clause, Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimination. Alexander v. 

Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280–81 (2001); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n.23

(2003) (holding that “discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment committed by an institution that accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of 

Title VI”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (“Title VI must be held 

to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the 

Fifth Amendment.”). And Plaintiff’s allegations in support of its Equal Protection Clause 

claims, which the Court did grant Plaintiff leave to amend, are virtually identical to the 

allegations offered in support of Plaintiff’s Title VI claim. Compare Am. Compl. ¶ 114 (alleging 

22
Equal Protection Clause violation on the basis of the imposition of reimbursable details “to 

unlawfully inhibit the free assembly of minorities . . . and to unlawfully inhibit the performance 

of certain kinds of music”) with id. ¶ 119 (alleging Title VI violation on the basis of the 

imposition of reimbursable details “for the purpose of inhibiting the free association of young 

black African Americans and to inhibit the playing of ‘urban’ styles of music”). 

Accordingly, in the interests of justice and in the absence of any demonstrated prejudice 

to Defendants, the Court will treat the addition of Plaintiff’s Title IV claim as an amendment of 

Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause claims permitted by this Court’s Order. 8 The Court will not 

strike Count IV, Plaintiff’s Title VI claim, for failure to comply with Rule 15, and will proceed 

to consider Defendants’ alternative argument that even those claims in Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint that are properly before the Court must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 

Rule 12(b)(6).

D. Failure to State a Claim: Equal Protection Clause & Title VI Claims

Defendants next assert that Counts III, IV, and VII, which assert violations of the Equal 

Protection Clause,9 Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, respectively, must be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim. Count III alleges that Defendants’ imposition of the reimbursable detail condition 

on Plaintiff’s establishment, “but not all other similarly situated businesses,” deprived Plaintiff of 

the equal protection of the laws. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants imposed the condition “for a 

8 Defendants have also failed to assert any prejudice resulting from Plaintiff’s decision at 

this pre-discovery stage of litigation to amend its Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment 

claims to include claims against Defendants in their official capacities. The Court’s grant of 

leave to amend those claims did not restrict Plaintiff to raising solely individual capacity claims. 

See Order at 1. Accordingly, and in the absence of any assertion of prejudice, the Court denies 

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment claims 

against Defendants in their official capacities. 

9 The Fifth Amendment’s due process clause is applicable to the District of Columbia and 

“has been construed to incorporate a guarantee of equal protection of the law.” United States v. 

Jackson, 553 F.2d 109, 119 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

23

 
discriminatory purpose,” “to unlawfully inhibit the free assembly of minorities and certain 

economic or social classes, and to unlawfully inhibit the performance of certain kinds of music.” 

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 114, 116. Count IV similarly alleges that Defendants’ imposition of the 

reimbursable detail condition “targeted establishments such as the Plaintiff’s . . . for the purpose 

of inhibiting the free association of young black African Americans and to inhibit the playing of 

‘urban’ styles of music such as R&B, Hip-Hop and Go-Go music,” in violation of Title VI of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. ¶¶ 9, 119. And Count VII, which is unchanged from Plaintiff’s 

first complaint, alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff “of the equal protection of 

the laws.” Id. ¶ 138. Pertinent to all three claims are Plaintiff’s new factual allegations that 

BEG’s establishment is patronized “almost entirely” by “black African Americans between the 

ages of 25-40,” id. ¶ 29, and that the music it plays “consists mostly of R&B, Hip-Hop and GoGo music” id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff also alleges that four other establishments that played similar music 

and had primarily African-American patrons were also subject to reimbursable detail conditions, 

see id. ¶¶ 40–95, and that a fifth, although not required to hire a reimbursable detail, was 

required to provide the names of two Go-Go bands’ members to the Board before its indefinite 

suspension could be lifted, id. ¶¶ 96–103.

Defendants contend that these allegations are not enough to make out a plausible claim 

for relief under the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, or § 1985. Specifically, Defendants point 

out that aside from a conclusory assertion that “not all other similarly situated businesses” were 

subject to a reimbursable detail condition, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that any 

establishment similarly situated to Plaintiff’s, but for some protected category, was treated 

differently by the Board. Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 13–16. Without such allegations, Defendants 

contend, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible discrimination claim.

24
Plaintiff counters that it has adequately alleged facts showing “palpable discriminatory 

animus,” citing four paragraphs of its complaint that describe the Board’s regulation of an 

establishment owned by a non-party. Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 14–15. In those paragraphs, 

Plaintiff alleges that the Board voted to continue the suspension of an establishment’s license 

until the establishment “provided to them the names of band members of two Go-Go bands,” that 

the Board required the establishment “to submit a list of its entertainment events . . . on a 

monthly basis,” that the establishment “submitted a proffer letter” to the Board stating that it

would not employ the two Go-Go bands at issue, and that the Board accepted the proffer and 

permitted the reestablishment to reopen on that basis. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 101–04. Accepting these 

allegations as true, one could infer that the Board harbors animus towards certain Go-Go bands, 

and that when restricting the abilities of those bands to perform at a particular establishment, it 

may have violated the rights of individuals who are not parties to this litigation. But such 

inferences are insufficient to support Plaintiff’s claims that the Board violated the rights of 

Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s patrons by imposing reimbursable details in a discriminatory manner on 

the basis of race and musical genre.

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court explained that to survive a 

motion to dismiss, a complaint must offer “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement 

to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that allegation that the FBI arrested 

and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men after September 11 did not plausibly establish 

discrimination on account of race, religion, or national origin where it was just as likely that the 

men were detained for non-discriminatory, national security purposes). In accordance with 

25
Iqbal, this Court warned Plaintiff in its prior Memorandum Opinion that although Plaintiff had 

leave to amend its Equal Protection Clause claims, Plaintiff was advised that “generalized claims 

of discrimination cannot survive a motion to dismiss if not supported by alleged facts.” BEG 

Investments, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 85 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). This 

warning is no less applicable to Plaintiff’s Title VI claims, which also requires factual allegations 

showing intentional discrimination. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 281 (“Title VI itself directly

reaches only instances of intentional discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

A careful review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint shows that it lacks adequate factual 

allegations to make its conclusory assertions of discrimination plausible rather than merely 

possible. The Court accepts as true Plaintiff’s non-conclusory assertions that five establishments 

in the District of Columbia, including Plaintiff’s, that play primarily R&B, Hip-Hop, and Go-Go 

Music and that are patronized primarily by African-Americans, have been required to hire 

reimbursable details. Missing from Plaintiff’s complaint, however, are any factual allegations 

supporting its conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent and differential treatment. For 

example, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants have placed any genre- or band-related 

restrictions on Plaintiff, or even that the Board was aware that Plaintiff played R&B, Go-Go, and 

Hip-Hop music. And the only mention of musical genres in the Board’s Order imposing the

reimbursable detail condition on Plaintiff is a factual summary of the testimony of the 

establishment’s manager, who said that “[o]cassionally, the establishment . . . has jazz groups 

perform on Sundays.” See Board Order 2011-289 at 4, Defs.’ Ex. A. Additionally, Plaintiff has 

failed to allege that the Board members who imposed the reimbursable condition, professedly in 

the interest of public safety following reports of multiple violent incidents at Plaintiff’s 

establishment, were aware that the majority of Plaintiff’s patrons were African American. 

26
The amended complaint is also devoid of any factual allegations suggesting that similar 

establishments that were patronized primarily by other races or that played primarily other 

genres of music were not subject to reimbursable detail conditions. Plaintiff’s conclusory 

assertion that the Board imposed reimbursable detail conditions on “Plaintiff but not all similarly 

situated businesses,” Am. Compl. ¶ 115, is no substitute for factual allegations. See Mpras v. 

District of Columbia, No. 2014-CV-00220, 2014 WL 6603303, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2014) 

(rejecting as conclusory the complaint’s allegation that the plaintiff was treated differently from 

those “similarly situated” where complaint did not allege any supporting facts “about who these 

other persons are or how they were similarly situated”); Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Gray, 27 F. 

Supp. 3d 142, 159 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that plaintiff’s failure “to identify any neighborhood, 

much less one that is a similarly situated . . . that has been treated more favorably . . . is 

insufficient to demonstrate a racially discriminatory purpose behind Defendant’s actions and, 

therefore, insufficient to ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief’ under the Equal 

Protection Clause”). 

Plaintiff does allege that its “attorney’s research has indicated no kind of imposition of 

police details upon establishments not catering to young black African Americans,” but it does 

so only in its opposition brief. Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 14. As this Court previously informed 

Plaintiff, however, “the Court cannot consider facts alleged in the briefing when ruling on a 

Motion to Dismiss. ‘It is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in 

opposition to a motion to dismiss.’” BEG Investments, 34 F. Supp. 3d. at 85 (quoting Coleman 

v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24 n.8 (D.D.C. 2000)).

Plaintiff also protests that it is not its burden at any point in this litigation to “prove a 

negative,” and that it should be the Defendants’ burden to come forward with evidence that 

27
establishments patronized by other races were treated similarly. See Pl.’s Opp’n. Mot. Strike at 

14. Plaintiff then cites a series of cases suggesting that a party ought not be required to prove a 

negative, and that the preferred approach is to put “the burden of coming forward with evidence 

on the party with superior access to the affirmative information.” Sissoko v. Rocha, 440 F.3d 

1145, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006) opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh'g, 509 F.3d 947 

(9th Cir. 2007).

As Defendants point out, however, Board orders – including those imposing reimbursable 

detail conditions on other establishment – are publically available, and indeed, Plaintiff cites a 

number of them in its amended complaint. More to the point, burdens of proof and production 

are irrelevant to the issue at hand: Plaintiff’s pleading obligations.10 Plaintiff need not come 

forward with any evidence at this stage of the proceedings, but its failure to allege any facts

supporting its assertion of discriminatory intent or demonstrating that any similarly situated 

establishments were treated differently makes the claim of discriminatory treatment less than 

plausible.

11 See Jones v. Nat'l Council on Disability, No. CV 13-1691, 2014 WL 4359167, at *6 

(D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2014) (“To advance an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must assert facts that 

10 Plaintiff’s discussion of summary judgment standards, including the McDonnell 

Douglas burden-shifting framework and establishment of a prima facie case, see Pl.’s Opp’n 

Mot. Strike at 12–17, is also not pertinent at this stage of the litigation.

11 See Smith v. Henderson, 982 F. Supp. 2d 32, 49–50 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining that to 

show intentional discrimination as required by the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI where a 

plaintiff does not allege that a law or regulation explicitly differentiates on the basis of race, the 

plaintiff must allege facts to show either “that a facially neutral law or policy has been applied 

differently on the basis of race” or that the facially neutral policy “is, in fact, motivated by

discriminatory intent and has a racially discriminatory impact”); see also Arlington Heights v. 

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977) (explaining that discriminatory intent can 

be established through a pattern of racially-discriminatory impact “unexplainable on grounds 

other than race,” departures from normal procedures, “contemporary statements by members of 

the decisionmaking body,” or a suspicious “sequence of events leading up to the challenged 

decision,” such as when a property that had always been zoned to allow housing was only rezoned when the town learned of plans to make the housing integrated).

28

 
support the allegation that the government intentionally treated him differently from others who 

were similarly situated . . . .” (emphasis added)), aff'd, No. 14-5244, 2015 WL 653308 (D.C. Cir. 

Feb. 5, 2015). As a consequence, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim of 

discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI, and the Court will grant 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts III, IV, and VII.12

E. Failure to State a Claim: First Amendment Free Speech Claim

The last remaining claim in Plaintiff’s amended complaint is Count VI, which alleges that 

Defendants’ imposition of the reimbursable detail condition unconstitutionally burdened 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to play certain kinds of music at its establishment. Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 131–36. After noting that “[r]egulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech 

on the basis of content presumptively violate the First Amendment,” Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants exercised their “unlimited discretion to impose reimbursable details upon the 

Plaintiff” in a manner that “imposes burdens upon its establishment for playing certain types of 

music.” Id. ¶¶ 132, 136; see also Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 20 (arguing that the “Board is 

impermissibly driving certain ideas or viewpoints from nightclubs in the District”). Plaintiff 

adds that its “establishment plays music specifically for the enjoyment of young black African 

Americans,” Am. Compl. ¶ 135, and that its music consists “mostly of R&B, Hip-Hop and GoGo music,” id. ¶ 30.

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is, in 

fact, a selective enforcement claim cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause and not the 

First Amendment. Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 12–13. Defendants note that although Plaintiff’s 

12 Because the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient 

facts to state a discrimination claim, it will not address Defendants’ additional arguments for 

dismissal of the Title VI claim: that individuals are not liable under Title VI and that the Board 

did not receive federal funds. 

29

 
complaint recites legal provisions applicable to the First amendment and “content-based 

regulations,” Plaintiff does not actually allege that the Board’s order imposing the reimbursable 

detail was itself content-based. See id. at 12. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the Board has 

exercised its regulatory power unconstitutionally by imposing reimbursable detail conditions on 

certain establishments in an effort to discourage them from playing certain kinds of music. 

Because Plaintiff’s claim is a selective enforcement claim, Defendants contend, it must be 

analyzed pursuant to Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, and because Plaintiff has failed to 

allege that it was singled out from similarly situated establishments, the “First Amendment” 

claim must be dismissed. Id. at 12–16. Alternatively, Defendants argue that to the extent 

Plaintiff truly did intend to state a First Amendment claim, it has failed to do so because neither 

the statute that authorized the Board to act nor the condition that the Board imposed regulates or 

references content, and the stated purpose for asserting the condition was the content-neutral 

governmental interest in curbing violence and noise. Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 12 n.8.

The precise nature of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is not immediately obvious from 

the amended complaint, which first cites legal principles applicable to content-based regulations 

that must be analyzed with strict scrutiny, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 132–33, and then complains of the 

Board’s exercise of its “unlimited discretion” to burden Plaintiff’s establishment “for playing 

certain types of music,” Am. Compl. ¶ 136. Plaintiff’s opposition brief, which contains multiple 

pages of case citations, summaries, and quotations – the applicability of which Plaintiff does not 

discuss – offers only three sentences of argument that shed little light on the nature of Plaintiff’s 

claim. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n at 17 (acknowledging Defendants’ argument about its “intermingled 

constitutional claim,” but responding only that such claims “are not without precedent,” without 

addressing whether analysis of the claim as one for selective enforcement under the Equal 

30
Protection Clause is appropriate). In an abundance of caution, the Court will consider first 

whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged the imposition of a content-based restriction that 

violates the First Amendment, and then whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make out 

a plausible claim of selective enforcement.

To the extent that Plaintiff’s amended complaint could be read as suggesting that the 

reimbursable detail condition on Plaintiff’s liquor license is an unconstitutional “content-based 

regulation,” Plaintiff’s claim fails. “Content-based laws are . . . ‘presumptively invalid, and the 

government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.’” Act Now to Stop War & End Racism 

Coal. v. District of Columbia, 798 F. Supp. 2d 134, 145–46 (quoting United States v. Playboy 

Entm’t Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000)). But Plaintiff does not allege – and the condition 

itself does not reflect – that the Board imposed any restrictions whatsoever on the content or 

genre of music that Plaintiff may play while maintaining its liquor license. According to the 

Board’s order, Plaintiff was required to hire a reimbursable detail only if it elected to provide 

certain forms of live entertainment – a DJ or live music – regardless of whether the music played 

was go-go or gospel. See Board Order 2011-289 at 5–7, Defs.’ Ex. A. Furthermore, the Board’s 

explanation for its imposition of the condition was content-neutral. See id. (expressly stating that 

the Board was imposing the reimbursable detail condition to alleviate “negative impacts on the 

neighborhood” and in response to “concerns regarding the establishment’s effect on peace, order, 

and quiet” after “a number of violent incidents . . . occurred at the establishment”). 

There is thus no question that the reimbursable detail condition is facially content-neutral, 

impacting indirectly only the “time, place or manner of expression,” purportedly for the purpose 

of ameliorating the establishment’s negative effects on the surrounding neighborhood. Cf. Ward 

v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989) (holding that where a sound-amplification 

31
guideline was justified by “the city's desire to control noise levels[,] . . . to retain the character of 

the [area], and to avoid undue intrusion into residential areas,” the justification had “nothing to 

do with content and . . . satisfie[d] the requirement that time, place, or manner regulations be 

content neutral” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Board order imposing the 

condition proffers substantial, content-neutral justifications for imposing the reimbursable detail 

condition on Plaintiff after reports of violent incidents and intoxicated patrons disturbing the 

neighborhood. See Board Order 2011-289 at 5–7, Defs.’ Ex. A. And Plaintiff has not alleged 

that the condition has limited its alternative avenues of expression or communication, let alone 

that it has done so unreasonably. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 

(1986) (“‘[C]ontent-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they 

are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit 

alternative avenues of communication.”).

Although Plaintiff appears to argue that the content-neutral condition violated the First 

Amendment because it is the product of the illicit motivations of the Board’s members, the 

Supreme Court has long-since foreclosed such intent-based arguments. Even if the government 

intended “to restrict respondents’ exercise of First Amendment rights,” that alone is an 

insufficient basis to find that a content-neutral ordinance violates the First Amendment. See id.

at 47–48 (refusing to consider allegations of illicit intent when the plain terms of an ordinance 

express a content-neutral intent); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 

(1989) (“Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified

without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 13

13 In the interest of completeness, the Court notes that to the extent that Plaintiff’s 

complaint could be viewed as encompassing a facial challenge to the D.C. Code provision 

providing the Board with allegedly “unlimited discretion” to impose license conditions, 

32

 
Nevertheless, this Court recognized in its prior Memorandum Opinion that even a 

content-neutral regulation like a reimbursable detail requirement could be selectively applied in a 

content-discriminatory way, and it gave Plaintiff leave to amend its First Amendment claim to 

allege facts supporting a theory of selective enforcement. See BEG Investments, 34 F. Supp. 3d. 

at 86 (“In essence, the Plaintiff attacks the unwritten discriminatory policy, only manifested by 

the Board’s application of its statutory authority. See, e.g., Tipton v. Univ. of Hawaii, 15 F.3d 

922, 927 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

The circuit courts have expressed a range of opinions regarding whether a selective 

enforcement claim is properly considered a First Amendment or Equal Protection Clause claim. 

Compare McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F.3d 45, 61 (1st Cir. 2004) (treating as a First Amendment asapplied challenge a claim “based on the idea that the law itself is neutral and constitutional in all 

fact situations, but that it has been enforced selectively in a viewpoint discriminatory way”) with 

Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 855 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the court “generally 

classified such challenges as selective enforcement equal protection claims”). In Sanjour v. 

EPA, 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995), this Circuit held that selective enforcement claims are 

Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss advances no such theory. Moreover, it is 

doubtful that such a theory could be maintained in this case where the Board’s consideration of 

Plaintiff’s license renewal was subject to consideration of those factors set forth in D.C. Code § 

25-313 and 23 DCMR § 400.1(a), in addition to a wealth of other code provisions and 

administrative regulations, and where the Board’s Order was subject to reconsideration and 

direct appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, D.C. Code § 2-510. See Thomas v. 

Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323–24 (2002) (rejecting challenge based on licensing 

official’s allegedly unduly broad discretion to grant or deny a permit where regulations provided 

“adequate standards to guide the official’s decision” and it was “subject to effective judicial 

review”); see also The Tool Box v. Ogden City Corp., 355 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2004) 

(en banc) (holding that the building permit restrictions at issue were “exempt from a First 

Amendment challenge that they permited unbridled discretion,” because they were aimed at “all 

features of a business” rather than conduct commonly associated with expression, and they did 

not “’permit licensing determinations to be made on the basis of ongoing expression or the words

about to be spoken’” (quoting Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S.750, 760–01 

(1988)).

33

 
properly analyzed as Equal Protection Clause claims, and that even if a plaintiff alleges that 

selective enforcement was intended to prevent him from exercising his First Amendment rights, 

“it does not transform an equal protection ‘selective enforcement’ claim into a First Amendment 

‘as applied’ challenge.” Id. at 92 n.9 (“The critical inquiry in such cases is thus not whether 

legislation is constitutional ‘as applied’ to a particular set of facts, but rather whether the 

government may constitutionally ‘apply’ the same rule to some individuals but not to others 

similarly situated.”).

As a consequence, Plaintiff must allege sufficient factual matter to show that the Board’s 

purportedly content-discriminatory exercise of its authority to impose license conditions “singled 

[Plaintiff] out from others similarly situated” or that the application of the condition to Plaintiff 

was improperly motivated by the Board’s desire to discriminate against the viewpoint conveyed 

by the music played in Plaintiff’s nightclub. See id. (quoting Juluke v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1553, 

1561 (D.C.Cir.1987)); see also Hoye, 653 F.3d at 855 (“Under both the First Circuit's ‘asapplied’ approach and our standard ‘selective enforcement’ approach, a plaintiff must show that 

a municipality's content-discriminatory enforcement of an ordinance is the result of an 

intentional policy or practice.”). But as described above in Part IV.D of this Opinion, Plaintiff 

has not provided factual allegations to suggest that the Board treated similarly situated 

establishments – i.e., establishments like Plaintiff’s but for the fact that they did not play 

primarily Hip-Hop, R&B, and Go-Go music – any differently. Indeed, the only establishment 

that Plaintiff does not allege was subject to a reimbursable detail condition played the very same 

types of music as did Plaintiff for patrons of the same race. See Am. Compl. ¶ 98.

And although Plaintiff contends that the condition was imposed to discriminate against its 

playing of primarily Hip-Hop, R&B, and Go-Go music for the enjoyment of African-Americans, 

34
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts suggesting that the Board knew that Plaintiff favored those 

types of music when it imposed the condition, let alone any facts supporting a plausible claim of 

discriminatory intent. See Board Order 2011-289 at 4, Defs.’ Ex. A (finding that “[o]cassionally, 

the establishment . . . has jazz groups perform on Sundays,” but not identifying any other genres 

of music played at Plaintiff’s establishment). In short, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to 

support the conclusory allegation that the Board imposed the reimbursable detail condition on 

Plaintiff with the intent to inhibit it from playing certain types of music. As discussed in Part 

IV.D of this Opinion, the failure to allege such facts is fatal to Plaintiff’s discriminatory 

enforcement claim.

Having found no theory under which Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim could be viewed 

as stating a plausible claim for relief, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VI.14

F. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Supplement its Complaint 

The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint 

setting forth additional claims based on “transaction[s], occurrence[s], or event[s] that happened 

after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Plaintiff’s 

supplemental complaint first alleges that in response to its filing of this suit – an activity 

protected by the First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances –

Defendants retaliated by fabricating a noise complaint against Plaintiff and by twice closing its 

establishment “to intimidate and punish the Plaintiff, and to interfere with the Plaintiff’s 

prosecution of its claims before this Court.” Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 58–79. These acts, Plaintiff 

14 Having determined that each of the claims in Plaintiff’s amended complaint that are 

properly before the Court fail to state a claim, the Court need not consider Defendants’ additional 

argument that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff failed to 

allege a “policy or custom” of the District played a part in the Board members’ alleged violations 

of federal law. Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 9–10 (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)). 

35

 
argues, give rise to three First Amendment retaliation claims. Additionally, Plaintiff’s 

supplemental complaint includes a claim of conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of the equal 

protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and two claims of defamation in 

violation of District of Columbia law.

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion to supplement, arguing that granting Plaintiff leave 

to supplement its complaint with the above-described claims would be futile, because the claims 

would not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants offer an array of 

arguments in favor of a finding of futility, including that: (1) all of the Board members are 

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for their actions at show cause hearings; (2) quasiprosecutorial immunity bars a § 1983 claim against Ms. Schmidt in her individual capacity for 

her actions taken while representing the government before the Board; (3) Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim against Ms. Schmidt for fabricating and prosecuting a false noise 

complaint is futile because the complaint was investigated four months before this suit was filed; 

(4) pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim relating to the closure of its establishment on June 6, 2014, 

because those Board proceedings are ongoing; (5) Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to 

state a First Amendment retaliation claim for the closure of its establishment on May 14, 2014;

(6) Sergeant Pope is entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiff’s defamation claims; (7) 

Plaintiff failed to state a claim for defamation because the alleged statements were not inherently 

defamatory and Plaintiff failed to make particularized allegations of harm; and (8) the § 1985 

claim contains only a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action and fails to state 

a plausible claim for relief. See generally Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Suppl., ECF No. 19.

36
In reply to Defendants’ twenty-page brief arguing that all of Plaintiff’s supplemental 

claims are futile and should not be permitted, Plaintiff makes only two responsive arguments: (1) 

futility analysis is not appropriate when considering a supplemental complaint, and (2) 

Defendants’ factual denials of the allegations supporting Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation

claims should not be considered. Pl.’s Reply at 3–4, ECF No. 20. Plaintiff makes no response 

whatsoever to Defendants’ arguments pertaining to immunity, Younger abstention, failure to 

state a defamation claim, or failure to state a § 1985 claim. Instead, Plaintiff has pinned its hopes 

on its belief that “Defendants’ futility analysis has no place in the supplementation of a 

complaint.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff is mistaken.

The case law of this Circuit confirms that futility is an appropriate basis for denying a 

motion for leave to supplement a complaint. See, e.g., Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 

480 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s decision to deny leave to file a supplemental 

complaint because “[t]he proposed amendments would have been futile”); Nat'l ATM Council, 

Inc. v. Visa Inc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 51, 57 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[A] court does not abuse its discretion if it 

denies leave to amend or supplement based on futility.”); Wildearth Guardians v. Kempthorne, 

592 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The decision whether to grant leave to amend or 

supplement a complaint is within the discretion of the district court, but leave should be freely 

given unless there is a good reason, such as futility, to the contrary.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is devoid of merit and relies entirely on two out-ofcircuit cases, both of which flatly contradict Plaintiff’s position. In Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 

71 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit explicitly recognized that “futility” was a basis for 

denying a motion to supplement a pleading, but the court found that leave to supplement would 

37
not have been futile in that case. Id. at 65–66. Similarly, Saratoga Potato Chips Co. v. Classic 

Foods, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-452, 2014 WL 2930495 (N.D. Ind. June 27, 2014), does not, as 

Plaintiff incorrectly asserts, “reject[] futility analysis in a supplemental complaint.” Pl.’s Reply 

at 3. Rather, the district court in that case recognized futility of amendment as a basis for 

denying leave to supplement, conducted a futility analysis, and determined that with the 

exception of two claims, granting leave to supplement would not be futile. Saratoga Potato 

Chips Co., 2014 WL 2930495, at *2–6. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to consider 

Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff’s motion to supplement its complaint should be denied on 

the basis of futility.

1. Count VIII: First Amendment Retaliation Claim against Ms. Schmidt

The first claim in Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint is brought against Ms. Schmidt, an 

OAG attorney, in her individual capacity. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Schmidt “fabricated a noise 

complaint and procured false testimony against the Plaintiff” at a hearing before the Board on 

January 15, 2014, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing of this lawsuit and in violation of Plaintiff’s 

First Amendment rights. Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 6–24, 58–63. Plaintiff alleges that it did not receive 

notice of a noise complaint said to have occurred on July 26, 2012, and described in an ABRA 

investigative report finalized on August 28, 2012, until March 13, 2013 – approximately one 

month after Plaintiff filed this suit. Id. ¶¶ 6–9. Additionally, Plaintiff notes that although the 

investigative report did not state the time that the alleged violation occurred on July 26, the 

notice that Plaintiff received stated that it occurred at approximately 2:15 AM, and Ms. Schmidt 

later stated at hearing that 2:15 was a “misprint,” and that the alleged complaint occurred 

between 11:30 PM and midnight. Id. ¶¶ 8–12. Based on the delayed notice and inconsistent 

38
allegations regarding the time of the noise complaint, Plaintiff believes that July 26 complaint 

was fabricated by Ms. Schmidt and persons unknown after Plaintiff filed this suit. See id. ¶ 59.

Plaintiff further states that at a show cause hearing before the Board on January 15, 2014, 

ABRA investigator Earl Jones, who claims to have investigated the complaint and who signed 

the August 28 investigative report, testified under oath that he responded to the noise complaint 

on July 26, 2012, and that he interviewed a complainant who said that she could hear music from 

Plaintiff’s establishment in her home. See id. ¶¶ 13–14; Board Hearing Transcript, Jan. 15, 2014, 

at 43–48, Defs.’ Ex. E, ECF No. 19-2; ABRA Investigative Report at 184–88, Defs.’ Ex. N, ECF 

No. 19-2. Investigator Jones produced photographs that he took of the complainant’s home and 

Plaintiff’s establishment, but he was unable to recall the complainant’s name or her specific

address at the show cause hearing, and he did not produce any contemporaneous notes related to 

his investigation. Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 15–19. Ultimately, Ms. Schmidt failed to offer sufficient 

evidence to support the charge that she was prosecuting, and the Board dismissed the noise 

violation charge for insufficient evidence. Id. ¶¶ 20–24; Board Order 2014-087 at 29–30m 33, 

Defs.’ Ex. D, ECF No.19-2. From these facts, Plaintiff concludes that Ms. Schmidt procured and 

used “knowingly fabricated” evidence and testimony against Plaintiff at the show cause hearing 

in January 2014 in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing of this lawsuit in February 2013. Suppl. 

Compl. ¶¶ 59–62. 

Defendants contend that the First Amendment retaliation claim against Ms. Schmidt is 

futile as it could not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. As for the 

assertion that Ms. Schmidt fabricated the allegations in the August 2012 ABRA investigative 

report in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing of this suit, Defendants argue that the report could not be

retaliatory because it was finalized several months before Plaintiff initiated this suit in February

39
2013. Defs.’ Opp’n at 10–11. As to the allegation that Ms. Schmidt procured false testimony 

and used fabricated evidence against Plaintiff at the January 2014 show cause hearing, 

Defendants argue that Ms. Schmidt is entitled to quasi-prosecutorial immunity, which “provides 

an absolute bar to civil liability against her in her personal capacity for any conduct—including 

suborning perjury—done in the course of prosecuting charges against Plaintiff.” Id. at 11 (citing 

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S 409 (1976)).

In Imbler, the Supreme Court held that a government prosecutor has absolute immunity 

from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts taken in her role as an advocate for the State. 424 U.S. 

at 424–31; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978) (observing that “agency 

officials performing certain functions analogous to those of a prosecutor should be able to claim 

absolute immunity with respect to such acts”); Gray v. Poole, 243 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (holding that government attorneys have absolute immunity for their conduct in initiating 

and prosecuting civil child neglect cases). As Defendants point out, absolute immunity extends 

to the decision to prosecute, Moore v. United States, 213 F.3d 705, 709 (D.C. Cir. 2000), as well 

as to a prosecutor’s willful use of perjured testimony in proceedings against a defendant, Imbler, 

424 U.S. at 431 n.34.

Plaintiff makes no response to Defendants’ argument that Ms. Schmidt is entitled to 

absolute immunity for her activities in presenting the District’s case before the Board at the 

January 2014 show cause hearing. In the absence of any opposition or response to Defendants’ 

assertion of immunity, the Court deems the matter of immunity conceded. See Cannon v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that where a plaintiff failed to 

respond to the defendants’ futility arguments, the Court would treat the arguments as conceded 

and deny leave to amend as futile); Romeo v. Aid to the Developmentally Disabled, Inc., No. 11-

40
CV-6340, 2013 WL 1209098, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2013) (holding that where plaintiffs 

sought leave to plead a new claim and defendants argued that it would be futile, plaintiff’s failure 

to respond to defendants’ arguments in their reply brief caused the court to deem plaintiff’s 

request abandoned); see also Hopkins, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (holding that when a plaintiff 

opposes a defendants’ dispositive motion but addresses only certain arguments, “a court may 

treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded”). 

For the reasons stated by Defendants, the Court finds that Ms. Schmidt is immune from 

suit for her initiation and presentation of the case against Plaintiff at the January 2015 show

cause hearing before the Board. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

claim against Ms. Schmidt is premised on the acts she took and the evidence she presented while 

prosecuting the noise violation against Plaintiff at the show cause hearing, the claim is futile and 

leave to supplement is denied.

Prosecutorial immunity does not extend, however, to Ms. Schmidt’s actions pertaining to 

the creation or investigation of a noise complaint prior to charging and prosecuting the alleged 

violation. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (holding that absolute 

immunity does not apply “[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally 

performed by a detective or police officer”). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

is premised on Ms. Schmidt’s alleged fabrication of a noise complaint prior to charging Plaintiff 

with a violation, Ms. Schmidt is not immune from suit. See id. at 275–76 (holding that 

prosecutor who allegedly fabricated evidence during the preliminary investigation of a crime was 

only entitled to qualified immunity, not absolute immunity). The Court therefore proceeds to the 

question of whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against 

Ms. Schmidt for her alleged fabrication of the noise complaint against Plaintiff.

41
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s claim must fail because the investigative report 

pertaining to the noise complaint against Plaintiff was prepared and finalized months before 

Plaintiff filed this suit, meaning that it could not possibly support a claim of retaliation. Defs.’

Opp’n Mot. Suppl. at 10–11. In response, Plaintiff asserts that it has alleged: (1) “that it was 

engaged in constitutionally protected litigation against these Defendants,” (2) “ that since the 

time of the filing of the initial Complaint, the Defendants and other persons have severely injured 

the Plaintiff in a manner that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to 

engage in that activity,” and (3) “that the Defendants’ action was substantially motivated as a 

response to the Plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.”15 Pl.’s Reply at 4.

According to Plaintiff, “[f]actual denials of these allegations have no place in the Court’s 

consideration of the Plaintiff’s Supplemental Complaint.” Id.

To the extent that Plaintiff’s argument suggests that this Court must accept the wellpleaded factual allegations in Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint as true, Plaintiff is undoubtedly 

correct. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). 

Nevertheless, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

15 Although Plaintiff cites no case law in support of its recitation of the elements of a 

First Amendment retaliation claim, it appears that Plaintiff is borrowing from a line of case law 

applicable to prisoner retaliation claims. See, e.g., Aref v. Holder, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 169 

(D.D.C. 2011) (“A prisoner alleging a First Amendment claim of retaliation must allege that ‘(1) 

he engaged in conduct protected under the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took some 

retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff's position from 

speaking again; and (3) a causal link between the exercise of a constitutional right and the 

adverse action taken against him.’” (quoting Banks v. York, 515 F. Supp. 2d 89, 111 (D.D.C.

2007)); see also Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 584–86 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In 

the absence of any argument from Defendants that the elements of a retaliation claim are 

different in the case of a private citizen as opposed to a prisoner or public employee, the Court 

will accept Plaintiff’s description of the applicable elements of its claim for the purpose of the 

Court’s futility analysis.

42

 
at 570). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements,” are insufficient. Id. at 678. And the Court is not obligated to “accept as true the 

complaint's factual allegations insofar as they contradict exhibits to the complaint or matters 

subject to judicial notice.” Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 963–65 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding 

that documents cited in but not attached to complaint were public records subject to judicial 

notice where documents were appended to defendant’s motion to dismiss, referred to in the 

complaint, and integral to plaintiff’s claim).

Here, Defendants argue that investigation of an allegation that occurred before Plaintiff 

filed suit cannot support a plausible claim of retaliation for filing suit, and the Court agrees. 

Plaintiff protests that the Court should not consider Defendants’ “factual denials” of its 

allegations, and Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint does allege that Ms. Schmidt fabricated the 

July 26 noise complaint “starting just one month after the filing of this lawsuit.” Suppl. Compl. 

¶ 59. But by Plaintiff’s own admission, the investigative report into the July 26 noise complaint 

bears “a final signature date of August 28, 2012,” id. ¶ 8; see also ABRA Investigative Report at 

188, Defs.’ Ex. N (indicating that Investigator Jones signed and dated the report on August 27, 

2012, and that Johnnie E. Jackson, Jr. signed and approved the report on August 28, 2012). 

Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until February 11, 2013, Suppl. Compl. ¶ 6, and it no longer 

claims that the investigative report was fabricated or forged. See infra Part IV.G.2; Pl.’s Opp’n 

Mot. Sanctions at 8 n.2, ECF No. 22 (describing as “bizarre” that suggestion that Plaintiff 

alleged that the investigate report was forged). Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged facts 

indicating that Ms. Schmidt was aware of this lawsuit when she notified Plaintiff of the alleged 

noise violation, or that she had any reason to harbor retaliatory animus against Plaintiff for filing 

a lawsuit to which she was not a party. Cf. Lacey v. Yates Cnty., 30 F. Supp. 3d 213, 229

43
(W.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that plaintiff “failed to allege any facts tending to support his 

conclusory allegation that [the defendant] assisted in the fabrication of grand jury testimony 

against Plaintiff or that [the defendant] sought to retaliate against Plaintiff” for making a 

complaint where the plaintiff did not even allege that the defendant was told that the plaintiff had 

made a complaint). 

Based on the facts alleged by Plaintiff, the claim that Ms. Schmidt retaliated against 

Plaintiff for filing a lawsuit in 2013 by fabricating a noise complaint that was investigated in 

2012 is, at best, implausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not 

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 

alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)); see also Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 295 (D.D.C. 2005) 

(“The bad faith of government actors is notoriously easy to allege and difficult to disprove, and 

[plaintiff] cannot avail himself of the discovery process in the hopes of stumbling upon such 

evidence where he can point to no indication that it exists to begin with. [Plaintiff’s] First 

Amendment claim therefore must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.”). The Court 

therefore denies as futile Plaintiff’s motion to supplement its complaint with a claim that Ms. 

Schmidt fabricated a noise complaint against Plaintiff in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

rights.

2. Count IX: First Amendment Retaliation Claim Based on Board Order of June 6, 2014 

Plaintiff’s next claim is brought against seven Board members, Ms. Miller, Mr. Alberti, 

Mr. Brooks, Mr. Jones, Mr. Silverstein, Mr. Rodriguez, and Mr. Short, in both their individual 

and official capacities. The claim is based on a June 6, 2014, Board order that summarily 

suspended Plaintiff’s liquor license following an assault that occurred in Plaintiff’s establishment 

44
on May 24, 2014. See Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 65; Board Order 2014-247 at 86, Defs.’ Ex. K, ECF 

No. 19-2. The Board found that the continued operation of Plaintiff’s establishment posed an 

imminent danger to the public, based on: (1) the establishment’s failure to follow its security 

plan, (2) its “failure to protect the crime scene” after a violent incident occurred within the 

establishment, (3) a finding that the establishment did “not have sufficient procedures to manage 

[its] crowd,” and (4) a finding that the establishment had endangered a victim with a head wound 

by carrying the injured patron down the stairs to the front door. Board Order 2014-247 at 81–85, 

Defs.’ Ex. K. Plaintiff disagrees with a number of the Board’s findings, alleging that the Board’s 

indefinite closure of its establishment was predicated on information that the Board members 

knew to be false, and that it was intended to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing this lawsuit in 

violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 38–57, 64–71.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against the Board members is futile due 

to a combination of quasi-judicial immunity and Younger abstention. Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Suppl. 

at 11–12. Defendants first argue that the Board members are quasi-judicial actors entitled to 

absolute immunity for their adjudicatory decisions following show cause hearings. See D.C. 

Code § 25-204.01(c)(2)(E) (recognizing that the Board may exercise “quasi-judicial functions” 

when “deliberating or making a decision in an adjudication action or proceeding”); see also Butz, 

438 U.S. at 511–13 (holding that administrative hearing officers were entitled to judicial 

immunity); Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (recognizing as quasijudicial an official whose functions are comparable to those of judge, involved in controversies 

intense enough to make harassment by litigants realistic, where the system contains adequate 

safeguards to dispense with private damages suits); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (stating that

“injunctive relief shall not be granted” in any action brought under § 1983 against “a judicial

45
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,” “unless a declaratory 

decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”). Defendants cite this action as 

evidence that show cause hearings before the Board are likely to give rise to civil suits by 

dissatisfied litigants, and they note the availability of direct review of Board decisions by the 

District’s Court of Appeals pursuant to D.C. Code § 2-2510. Accordingly, Defendants maintain 

that Board members cannot be held liable in their individual capacities for issuing a decision 

following an adversarial show cause hearing regarding alleged violations of the conditions of a

liquor license. 

Once again, Plaintiff has failed to offer any response to Defendants’ immunity argument. 

In the absence of any opposition from Plaintiff, the Court deems the matter conceded and finds 

that for the reasons set forth by Defendants, the Board members acted in a quasi-judicial capacity 

and are entitled to absolute immunity for their June 2014 decision to continue the summary 

suspension of Plaintiff’s liquor license. See Cannon, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Romeo, No. 11-CV6340, 2013 WL 1209098, at *12; see also Hopkins, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 25.

Plaintiff has also failed to respond to Defendants’ argument that Younger abstention is 

appropriate as to this claim because quasi-judicial state agency proceedings pertaining to the 

June 2014 Board order were ongoing at the time that Plaintiff filed this supplemental claim. 

Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Suppl. at 11–12 (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., 

Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986)); see Board Order 2014-247 at 86, Defs.’ Ex. K (summarily 

suspending Plaintiff’s license “until the Board issues its final order in a future show cause 

proceeding related to the incident on May 24, 2014”). 

In Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the Supreme Court extended the Younger abstention 

doctrine – a doctrine rooted in principles of equity, comity, and federalism that prevents federal 

46
courts from exercising jurisdiction over ongoing state court proceedings – to state administrative 

proceedings. 477 U.S. at 627–29 (listing “administrative proceedings looking toward the 

revocation of a license to practice medicine” as the type of proceeding in which important state 

interests may be vindicated). The Court explained that even if a state administrative proceeding

did not allow a plaintiff to raise his constitutional claims directly before the agency, Younger

abstention was still necessary so long as the plaintiff could obtain review of his constitutional 

claims “in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceedings.” Id. at 629; see also 

Delaney v. District of Columbia, 659 F. Supp. 2d 185, 194 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Younger precludes 

federal adjudication when three criteria are met: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are 

judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the 

proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.”). 

Plaintiff has failed to offer any response to or refutation of Defendants’ argument that 

Younger abstention is required under Ohio Civil Rights Commission. Plaintiff does not dispute 

that state administrative proceedings were ongoing at the time it filed this claim, that the 

proceedings implicate important state interests, or that Plaintiff will be afforded an adequate 

opportunity to raise its constitutional claim before the D.C. Court of Appeals. In the absence of 

any opposition from Plaintiff, the Court deems conceded the argument that Younger abstention is 

appropriate as it pertains to Plaintiff’s claim regarding the June 2014 Board order. See Cannon, 

952 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Romeo, No. 11-CV-6340, 2013 WL 1209098, at *12; see also Hopkins, 

284 F. Supp. 2d at 25.

In light of Defendants’ unopposed assertions of judicial immunity and Younger

abstention, the Court agrees that granting Plaintiff leave to supplement its complaint with a First 

Amendment retaliation claim premised on the Board’s June 2014 order would be futile.

47
3. Count X: First Amendment Retaliation Claim Based on Board Order of May 14, 2014

Plaintiff’s final First Amendment retaliation claim is based on the May 14, 2014, order

approved by six Board members – Ms. Miller, Mr. Brooks, Mr. Jones, Mr. Silverstein, Mr. 

Rodriguez, and Mr. Short – that required Plaintiff to cease and desist selling alcoholic beverages

and cancelled Plaintiff’s liquor license. Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 25–37, 72–79; Board Order 2014-218

at 63, Defs.’ Ex. I, ECF No. 19-2. The May 2014 order states that Plaintiff failed to appear at a 

roll call hearing on April 21, 2014, pertaining to Plaintiff’s application for renewal of its liquor 

license. Board Order 2014-218 at 62–63. The Board instructed Plaintiff that it had ten days to 

file a motion for reinstatement, but because the Board did not receive one, on May 14, 2014, the 

Board dismissed Plaintiff’s application for renewal, which in turn obligated the Board to cancel 

Plaintiff’s then-expired liquor license. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the Board’s decision to cancel its 

license was a closure predicated “upon information they knew or should have known by 

reasonable inquiry to be false.” Suppl. Compl. ¶ 74. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the 

Board’s reliance on Plaintiff’s failure to file a motion for reinstatement as a basis for cancelling 

its license was inexplicable because Plaintiff had filed a renewal application with ABRA on 

April 28, 2014. See id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff thus concludes that the Board’s decision to cancel its 

license was done “to retaliate against the Plaintiff for the filing of this lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 75.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts stating a plausible First 

Amendment retaliation claim and that, in any case, the Board members are entitled to quasijudicial immunity for issuing the May 2014 order. Although Plaintiff asserts that it was not 

aware of the April 21 hearing schedule, it does not dispute either its failure to appear or its 

failure to apply for reinstatement of its application within ten days. See Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 32–35. 

Instead, Plaintiff asserts that it filed another renewal application with ABRA on April 28, 2014, 

48
of which the Board “knew or should have known by reasonable inquiry,” because the pendency 

of Plaintiff’s renewal application was “readily evident.” See Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 35, 37, 74. 

Plaintiff maintains that the Board’s decision to cancel Plaintiff’s license for failure to apply for 

reinstatement was retaliatory when the Board knew or should have known of Plaintiff’s April 

2014 application.

There can be no question that as of May 2014, at least the four Board members who were 

named as Defendants in this suit were aware that Plaintiff had filed a civil complaint against 

them in February 2013. But it is not at all clear, Defendants argue, that the Board members were 

aware of Plaintiff’s April 2014 renewal application that it had filed two weeks prior with a 

separate entity: ABRA. Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Suppl. at 13–14. Plaintiff alleges that its application 

was “readily evident” and that the Board “knew or should have known by reasonable inquiry” 

about the application, but Defendants argue that actual knowledge of the application was 

required in order for the Board’s decision to disregard the application to have been retaliatory.

Although Plaintiff does not describe why the pendency of its renewal application should 

have been “readily evident,” Plaintiff does assert that it filed its application with an entity 

overseen by the Board, and that it did so more than two weeks prior to the Board’s 

announcement of its May 14, 2014 order. See Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 35–36; see also Pl.’s Reply at 4 

(arguing that Plaintiff adequately alleged the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim). 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegation that the Board should have known of the renewal application 

is accompanied by the alternative allegation that the Board members “knew” of it, that they 

nevertheless predicated their decision on incorrect information, and that this resulted in the 

closure of Plaintiff’s establishment. See Suppl. Compl. ¶ 74. The Court therefore finds that 

49
Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim is not futile due to a failure to allege facts 

suggesting that the Board had actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s renewal application.

Defendants next argue that, as was the case with Count IX, Count X of Plaintiff’s 

supplemental complaint is futile because it is barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. 

Defendants note that Plaintiff’s claim is premised on the Board members’ adjudication of

Plaintiff’s application in their quasi-judicial roles, and that as a consequence, the Board members

are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983. Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Suppl. at 14. Once 

more, however, Plaintiff has failed to oppose or respond to Defendants’ assertion of immunity, 

and the Court deems the issue of quasi-judicial immunity conceded. See Cannon, 952 F. Supp. 

2d at 11; Romeo, No. 11-CV-6340, 2013 WL 1209098, at *12; see also Hopkins, 284 F. Supp. 2d 

at 25. Accordingly, for the reasons stated by Defendants, the Court finds that the retaliation 

claim against the Board members in their individual capacities based on the May 14, 2014 order 

is futile.

This does not end the matter, however, because Plaintiff has brought suit against the 

Board members in both their individual and official capacities, and the doctrine of quasi-judicial 

immunity extends only to individual capacity claims. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) 

(“[T]he only immunities available to the defendant in an official-capacity action are those that 

the governmental entity possesses.”); Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 

F.3d 478, 482–86 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that quasi-judicial immunity is inapplicable in 

official-capacity suits). Defendants do not argue, and the record does not clearly establish, that 

Younger abstention is appropriate as to this claim. The Court therefore must consider whether

granting Plaintiff leave to supplement its complaint with this First Amendment retaliation claim 

against six Board members in their official capacities would be futile.

50
“Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity 

and not the named official,” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted), Plaintiff’s 

official capacity claim against the Board members is effectively a claim against the District of 

Columbia. However, municipalities are not liable under § 1983 for constitutional torts 

committed by their employees. Municipalities are liable “only for constitutional torts arising 

from ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy.’” Triplett v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 

1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978)). And while Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint does allege that the Board members were 

acting “under color of state authority as members of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board for 

the District of Columbia Government,” Suppl. Compl. ¶ 78, it does not allege that the May 2014 

Board Order could be considered a product of the District’s policy or custom.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff has argued that such a showing is not required because the Board 

members are policymakers, and municipal liability is available if a municipality’s “authorized 

decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right.” Pl.’s Opp’n 

Mot. Strike at 3–5 (quoting Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)). Given 

the broad discretion that the Board has to decide the matters before it, Plaintiff argues, the Board 

members must be considered policymakers. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff also notes that a policymaker 

“has authority that is final in the special sense that there is no higher authority,” id. at 6 (quoting 

Gernetzke v. Kemosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2001), and that 

Board orders are reviewable only by the District’s Court of Appeals, id. at 6. 

Plaintiff is correct that “municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by 

municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Singletary v. District of Columbia, 

766 F.3d 66, 73–74 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (holding 

51
that D.C. Board of Parole’s statutory “authority to render final revocation decisions in individual 

cases” was “insufficient to create municipal liability unless the decisionmaker had been granted 

final policymaking authority under D.C. law in the area of parole revocation”). Plaintiff is also 

correct in noting that the Board has broad authority to make decisions on renewal applications. 

See, e.g., D.C. Code § 25-313 (requiring applicants to demonstrate the appropriateness of their 

license renewal request “to the satisfaction of the Board”). Although Plaintiff will ultimately be 

required to prove that the Board members had final policymaking authority under District law to 

prevail on its claim, at this stage of the litigation, the Court will not reject Plaintiff’s official 

capacity claim premised on the Board’s May 2014 order as futile.

Plaintiff is therefore granted leave to bring its First Amendment retaliation against the 

Board members in their official capacities based on the Board’s May 2014 order, and the claim 

shall be deemed filed as of today. See Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Suppl. at 1 n.1 (requesting that if the 

Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to supplement in full or in part, that it be deemed filed as of the 

date of the Court’s decision to permit Defendants to file a motion to dismiss).

4. Counts XI, XII, & XIII: Defamation and 42 U.S.C. § 1985

Counts XI and XII of Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint assert that Sergeant Pope 

committed defamation per se and defamation per quod under District of Columbia law by 

making statements about Plaintiff’s handling of an assault to an ABRA investigator. Suppl. 

Compl. ¶¶ 80–94. Count XIII alleges that all Defendants were involved in a conspiracy to 

deprive Plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. ¶¶ 95–

98. Defendants argue that all three claims are futile, and that leave to supplement should be 

denied. They contend first that Sergeant Pope, as a law enforcement officer, is entitled to 

absolute immunity for statements he made to an investigator in the course of his official duties 

52
while performing discretionary functions. Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Suppl. at 14–19 (citing District of 

Columbia v. Jones, 919 A.2d 604, 607–08 (D.C. 2007); Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1020–

22 (D.C. 1990)). Additionally, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 

defamation per se or defamation per quod. Id. at 19–20 (arguing that alleged statements were 

neither inherently defamatory nor the cause of the Board’s decision and Plaintiff’s harm). 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim is futile because Plaintiff has not specified 

the basis of the claim, providing only a formulaic recitation of the cause of action devoid of any 

factual content and failing to state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 20 (citing Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555).

Although Plaintiff’s reply did defend the adequacy of its allegations pertaining to its First 

Amendment retaliation claims, in the face of Defendants’ futility arguments, Plaintiff mounted 

no defense whatsoever of either its defamation claims or its § 1985 claim. Plaintiff neither 

disputes Sergeant Pope’s assertion of absolute immunity nor defends the adequacy of its 

defamation or § 1985 allegations. The Court therefore deems Defendants’ arguments conceded 

and denies as futile Plaintiff’s motion to supplement its complaint with two defamation claims 

and a § 1985 conspiracy claim. See Cannon, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Romeo, No. 11-CV-6340, 

2013 WL 1209098, at *12; see also Hopkins, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 25.

G. Defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions

The final matter before the Court is Defendants’ motion for sanctions pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 11 based on the claims and allegations contained in Plaintiff’s amended 

and supplemental complaints. Defs.’ Mot. Sanctions, ECF No. 21. As to Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacked a good faith basis for reasserting claims that 

this Court has already dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 6–7. As to Plaintiff’s supplemental 

53
complaint, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacked a good faith basis for alleging that Ms. Schmidt 

forged an ABRA investigative report in retaliation for Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Id. at 7–9. 

Accordingly, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff violated Rule 11’s requirements that an attorney 

not file frivolous claims and that the attorney’s representations must be based on information, 

and belief “formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

11(b). Defendants seek sanctions in the form of an order that Plaintiff withdraw those claims 

barred by res judicata and its claim against Ms. Schmidt, as well as an award of Defendants’ 

costs in bringing the motion for sanctions and $5,000 in additional sanctions to deter future 

misconduct.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the Court may impose sanctions if “a 

pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . [is] presented for any improper purpose[;] . . . the 

claims, defenses, and other legal contentions [therein] are [un]warranted by existing law[;] . . . 

the factual contentions have [no] evidentiary support[; or] the denials of factual contentions are 

[un]warranted on the evidence[.]” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), (c). The Court applies “an 

objective standard of reasonable inquiry on represented parties who sign papers or pleadings.” 

Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 554 (1991). Rule 11 is 

designed to ensure that allegations made in a filing “are supported by a sufficient factual 

predicate at the time that the claims are asserted.” City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 106 

F.R.D. 524, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). As such, it is “no answer to a motion seeking Rule 11 

sanctions for asserting a baseless claim of fraud to suggest that plaintiffs needed discovery to 

ascertain whether the claim asserted was well founded.” Id. 

54
1. Reassertion of Previously Dismissed Claims

In response to Defendants’ motion for sanctions, Plaintiff maintains that its re-assertion 

of previously-dismissed claims in its amended complaint was neither frivolous nor done for an 

improper purpose. Instead, Plaintiff argues that it had two grounds for re-stating the previously 

dismissed claims: (1) a concern that the claims not be construed as abandoned for the purpose of 

an appeal, and (2) Plaintiff’s belief that res judicata does not apply to the dismissal of claims that 

were pending reconsideration pursuant to a motion under Rule 59(e). Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. 

Sanctions at 4–5. Plaintiff contends that because it filed a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration 

challenging the Court’s dismissal of its claims, no appellate jurisdiction attaches until this Court 

decides the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 4 (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff argues that the decision to omit from its amended complaint those claims pending 

reconsideration could have caused the Court of Appeals to treat them as abandoned. Id. at 5 

(citing Elliott v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 547 F. Supp. 2d 15, 23 (D.D.C. 2008)). Plaintiff also 

contends that a decision to which a pending motion for reconsideration is attached is not yet a 

final judgment that can give rise to “any kind of res judicata.” Id. at 5 (citing Smalls v. United 

States, 471 F.3d 186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 

In reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiff is “simply wrong.” Defs.’ Reply at 1, ECF No. 

23. Defendants first reject Plaintiff’s argument that re-assertion was necessary to preserve the 

claims for appellate review, noting that the Elliott decision on which Plaintiff relies is entirely 

inapposite, and that it is well-established that a plaintiff can “obtain appellate review of the 

district court’s dismissal of her claims . . . [after] she . . . obtain[s] a final judgment from the 

district court.” Id. at 1–2 (quoting Blue v. D.C. Pub. Schs., 764 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see 

also Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1990) (“It is not waiver—it is 

55
prudence and economy—for parties not to reassert a position that the trial judge has rejected.”); 

Owens v. Fleet Car Lease, Inc., No. 09-CV-0967-MJR, 2010 WL 2542028, at *2–4 (S.D. Ill. 

June 18, 2010) (imposing sanctions and rejecting plaintiff’s argument that its refiling of 

previously dismissed claims was not in bad faith because it believed it was necessary to preserve 

the claims for appeal). Defendants further argue that regardless of whether res judicata applies, 

after this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims as being without legal merit, Plaintiff knew that they 

were without legal merit, and its decision to repeat the same claims nearly verbatim in an 

amended complaint is sanctionable. See Serritella v. Markum, 119 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) 

(affirming imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for the repleading of claims previously rejected by the 

Court and deeming spurious plaintiff’s counsel’s argument that he believed that repleading was 

necessary for the purpose of appeal).

The Court agrees with Defendants that Elliott provides no support for Plaintiff’s position 

regarding the need to repeat previously dismissed claims in order to preserve them for appellate 

review. In Elliott, the court rejected a plaintiff’s request for reconsideration of his Privacy Act 

claim not because he failed to reassert it after dismissal, but because the plaintiff had previously 

conceded in an earlier filing “that his initial designation did not constitute a Privacy Act 

violation.” 547 F. Supp. 2d at 22–23. In the absence of any authority to support Plaintiff’s belief 

that reassertion of its dismissed claims was necessary, the Court is sympathetic to Defendants’ 

view that Plaintiff’s decision to repeat its RICO and Takings Clause claims nearly verbatim after 

they were dismissed by this Court raises serious questions regarding whether Plaintiff had a good 

faith belief that those claims were supported by law.

 Nevertheless, the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is not something courts take lightly; 

instead, “Rule 11 sanctions are an extreme punishment for filing pleadings that frustrate judicial 

56
proceedings.” Henok v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 926 F. Supp. 2d 100, 104 (D.D.C. 2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s decision to reassert previously dismissed claims 

was inadvisable at best. But unlike the attorney in Serritella, Plaintiff’s counsel had not 

previously been warned by this Court that such conduct was sanctionable. See Serritella, 119 

F.3d at 510–11 (affirming $1500 sanction against attorney who continued to reassert claim and 

arguments that had previously been rejected by the district court when the court had already 

admonished and censured counsel for that very behavior); see also Lewis v. Parker, No. CV 14-

163, 2014 WL 4460279, at *15 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2014) (warning the parties that reasserting 

claims previously considered and rejected by the Court could lead to Rule 11 sanctions). 

Additionally, this Court did not expressly dismiss the claims at issue with prejudice, and 

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of those claims remained undecided at the time that 

Plaintiff amended its complaint. On these facts, the Court finds that bad faith is not readily 

apparent, and it will not impose monetary sanctions on the basis of Plaintiff’s reassertion of 

previously dismissed claims. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(C)(5) (disallowing monetary sanctions 

“against a represented party for violating Rule 11(b)(2)”).

Additionally, because the Court is dismissing Plaintiff’s RICO and Takings Clause 

claims for failure to seek leave to amend and, alternatively, on grounds of futility, the request 

that this Court dismiss the claims as a Rule 11 sanction is moot. See Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. 

Supp. 2d 159, 172 (D.D.C. 2013) (choosing “not to impute bad faith on the part of the Plaintiffs, 

[and] finding ample grounds for dismissing the complaint on . . . substantive grounds”). The 

Court will therefore deny Defendants’ request for Rule 11 Sanctions for Plaintiff’s reassertion of 

previously dismissed claims. See Cobell v. Norton, 211 F.R.D. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that 

“the Court has the discretion to determine both whether a Rule 11 violation has occurred and 

57
what sanctions should be imposed if there has been a violation.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

2. Allegation that Ms. Schmidt Fabricated an Investigative Report

Defendants next argue that sanctions are appropriate because Plaintiff brought baseless 

claims of fabricating documents against Ms. Schmidt, an attorney with the District’s OAG. 

Defs.’ Mot. Sanctions at 3–5, 7–9. Defendant contends that the allegation that Ms. Schmidt 

fabricated an ABRA investigative report and related documents in retaliation for Plaintiff’s 

initiation of this suit is wholly unsupported by facts, and that sanctions are appropriate in light of 

Plaintiff’s failure to undertake a reasonable investigation to determine the truth of its allegation 

prior to including it in a court filing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (requiring that an attorney who 

signs a court filing “certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, 

formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the factual contentions have 

evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a 

reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery”). 

Emphasizing “the inherent implausibility of this claim,” Defendants note that the 

investigative report that Ms. Schmidt allegedly fabricated bears signatures that pre-date the filing 

of this case, and that the ABRA investigator who authored the report testified under oath at a 

hearing in January 2014 that a noise complaint against Plaintiff was reported by a neighbor of 

Plaintiff’s establishment in July 2012 as indicated in the report. Defs.’ Mot. Sanctions at 8. 

Additionally, Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s attorney could not have believed the allegation that 

Ms. Schmidt fabricated the noise complaint and report to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing this 

suit because, according to an e-mail that Plaintiff’s counsel wrote three months after Ms. 

Schmidt provided Plaintiff with notice of the charge, Ms. Schmidt “was wholly unaware of the 

58
pendency of the lawsuit.” E-mail from Mr. LeFande at 87, Defs.’ Ex. F, ECF No. 21–2. And 

even if Plaintiff’s attorney did not know that its allegation was untrue, Defendants contend that 

he certainly failed to undertake a reasonable investigation into the matter prior to asserting the 

claim.

In response, Plaintiff argues that the facts set forth in the supplemental complaint 

describe circumstances that give a “strong factual basis” for Plaintiff’s claims against Ms. 

Schmidt. Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Sanctions at 8. Plaintiff once again mentions the changing 

allegations regarding the time of day that the noise violation occurred, the seven-month delay in 

bringing the charge against Plaintiff, and Investigator Jones’s inability to remember the 

complainant’s name and precise address at the show cause hearing, as facts suggesting that the 

noise violation was fabricated. Id. at 6–8. As for the e-mail conceding that Ms. Schmidt was 

unaware of this lawsuit months after she charged Plaintiff with the noise violation, Plaintiff’s 

counsel asserts that he was not yet aware that Ms. Schmidt had fabricated the noise complaint at 

the time he wrote the e-mail, and that discovery is needed to determine what Ms. Schmidt “knew 

or did not know.” Id. at 9 n.3.

Plaintiff then proceeds to assert that its claim against Ms. Schmidt is premised on her 

fabrication of an alleged noise complaint, not fabrication of the ABRA investigative report

pertaining to the complaint, and that “Plaintiff has never alleged that the investigative report 

itself was somehow a forgery. That allegation standing alone is rather bizarre under the 

circumstances and the undersigned attorney does not comprehend its origin.” Id. at 8 n.2. 

Plaintiff’s attorney’s contention is nothing short of baffling, considering that Plaintiff’s 

supplemental complaint clearly alleges that “[o]n information and belief, the August 28, 2012 

59
Investigative Report and other documents related to the March 12, 2013 Notice were wholly 

fabricated by Schmidt . . . .” Suppl. Compl. ¶ 10 (emphasis added).

If the allegation was included in Plaintiff’s filing inadvertently, Plaintiff could have

sought to remove it after it the error was brought to its attention by Defendants’ “safe harbor 

letter” on August 7, 2014. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). But Plaintiff has not sought to remove 

or amend the allegation, which remains a part of Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint to this day, 

despite the fact that Plaintiff’s counsel admits that the claim “is rather bizarre.” Instead, Plaintiff

elected to file an incredibly serious allegation of misconduct premised on Plaintiff’s “information 

and belief” that Plaintiff’s counsel now professes not only not to believe, but not to have made in 

the first place. Plaintiff’s attorney’s disavowal of the contents of his own filing makes clear that 

he has not complied with his “affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts . . .

before filing.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 

(1991); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 709 n. 42 (1997) (“Sanctions may be appropriate 

where a claim is presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, including any claim 

based on allegations and other factual contentions lacking evidentiary support or unlikely to 

prove well-grounded after reasonable investigation.” (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted)).

The Court is deeply troubled by Plaintiff’s counsel’s apparent disregard for the factual 

content of the pleadings he files before this Court. Particularly given the gravity of the allegation 

that Ms. Schmidt fabricated an investigative report and other documents, the Court is wholly 

unimpressed by counsel’s effort to defend its factual allegation by simply denying the 

allegation’s existence. Worse yet, Plaintiff’s counsel’s response to the Defendants’ safe harbor 

letter – a mechanism designed to allow parties to address situations like this without the need for 

60
the imposition of sanctions – was cavalier and dismissive. See Defs.’ Mot. Sanctions at 2 n.1 

(explaining that Plaintiff’s counsel responded to Defendants’ safe harbor letter in less than thirty 

minutes, stating “[g]ood luck with that”). And this is not the first time that Plaintiff’s counsel

has made a baseless allegation that an attorney fabricated documents. See Cannon v. District of 

Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 272, 286 n.12 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that “Plaintiffs' unfounded 

allegations that defendant's attorneys fabricated evidence . . . have already been rejected by the 

Court” (internal citations omitted)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 717 F.3d 200 

(D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 246 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding 

that a court considering sanctions may consider “events which did not occur in the case proper 

but occurred in other cases and are, by their nature, relevant to the pending controversy”). 

In sum, Plaintiff’s admittedly “bizarre” and apparently baseless allegation that Ms. 

Schmidt fabricated an investigate report and other documents is a serious matter. The allegation 

itself is grave, and the decision to reject the opportunity afforded by Defendants’ safe harbor 

letter to correct the matter and avoid sanctions, choosing instead to maintain the allegation while 

denying its existence, is inexplicable. Given the fact that this is not the first time that Plaintiff’s 

attorney has made such unfounded allegations, this Court finds that Rule 11 sanctions are 

warranted to deter future repetition of the conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court therefore 

awards Defendants reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred for their motion for sanctions. 

Had this matter progressed further towards trial, the Court may well have considered additional 

monetary sanctions, but in light of the facts as they stand, the Court believes that awarding fees 

and costs provides adequate deterrence without imposing a sanction that is more severe than is 

necessary. See Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[A] district 

61
court should impose the least severe sanction adequate to the purpose of Rule 11.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to strike the amended complaint or, in the 

alternative, to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, is granted, Plaintiff’s motion to file a supplemental 

complaint is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants’ motion for sanctions is granted 

in part and denied in part. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and 

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: March 24, 2015 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge

62