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TECHNOLOGY NEEDED TO SECURE 

AMERICA’S BORDER 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 

& 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 31, 2014 

Serial No. 113–90 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY WEBER, Texas 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

KATHERINE CLARK, Massachusetts 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana, Chair 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

FEDERICA WILSON, Florida 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

July 31, 2014 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Larry Bucshon, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Research and Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Statement by Representative Daniel Lipinski, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9 

Statement by Representative Paul Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12 

Statement by Representative Dan Maffei, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 14 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 15 

Witnesses: 

Dr. K. Jack Riley, Vice President, RAND National Security Research Division; 

Director, RAND National Defense Research Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 29 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 31 

Dr. Joseph D. Eyerman, Director, Health Security Program, RTI International; Director for Research and Management, Institute for Homeland 

Security Solutions, Duke University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 49 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 51 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 57 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. K. Jack Riley, Vice President, RAND National Security Research Division; 

Director, RAND National Defense Research Institute ...................................... 68 

Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 71 
Page

IV 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Prepared statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 82 

Supporting information requested by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 84 
(1) 

TECHNOLOGY NEEDED TO SECURE 

AMERICA’S BORDER 

THURSDAY, JULY 31, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Larry Bucshon 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Technology] presiding. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 

Chairman BUCSHON. Good morning. This joint hearing of the 

Subcommittee on Research and Technology and the Subcommittee 

on Oversight will come to order. 

Good morning, and welcome to today’s joint hearing titled ‘‘Technology Needed to Secure America’s Border.’’ 

In front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies and Truth in Testimony disclosures for today’s witnesses. 

Before we get started, since this is a joint hearing involving two 

Subcommittees, I want to explain how we will operate procedurally 

so that all Members understand how the question-and-answer period will be handled. We will recognize those Members present at 

the gavel in order of seniority on the full Committee and those 

coming in after the gavel will be recognized in order of arrival. I 

recognize myself now for five minutes for an opening statement. 

Twelve years ago, the Homeland Security Act established the Directorate for Science and Technology within the Department of 

Homeland Security. The S&T Directorate manages and carries out 

science and technology research for our federal homeland security 

needs. The Directorate is also responsible for coordinating this research with other federal research entities. The Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology shares oversight of the S&T Directorate with the Homeland Security Committee. 

Since this spring, this Subcommittee had been planning a joint 

hearing with our counterparts in the Homeland Security Committee to hear from the Department of Homeland Security S&T Directorate, so this has been a long-planned hearing. It is just that 

today is the day that it would work for us to do this. Unfortunately, 

the Department of Homeland Security could not work that into 

their schedule but there will be another hearing in September that 

will complete this hearing. 

Unfortunately, we could not make the calendars come together, 

like I said, and I am looking forward to the Department of Homeland Security testifying in September. 

The DHS S&T Directorate is responsible for developing new technologies from basic research to development for use, including technologies that can help to secure our Nation’s border. From unmanned aerial vehicles, to tunnel detection, from anti-counterfeit 

standards to biometrics, there are existing and promising new technologies that can act as force multipliers for Border Patrol agents 

and the Coast Guard to augment their day-to-day work on border 

security related issues. 

We will hear this morning from the Government Accountability 

Office, which has issued a series of reports about DHS technology 

research and development, and from two private-sector experts, 

each of whom can contribute on a different aspect of border security technology. I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bucshon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

CHAIRMAN LARRY BUCSHON

Twelve years ago, the Homeland Security Act (PL 107-296) established the Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T Directorate) within the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). 
8 

The S&T Directorate manages and carries out science and technology research for 

our federal homeland security needs. The Directorate is also responsible for coordinating this research with other federal research entities. The Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology shares oversight of the S&T Directorate with the Homeland 

Security Committee. 

Since this spring, this Subcommittee had been planning a joint hearing with our 

counterparts in the Homeland Security Committee to hear from the Department of 

Homeland Security S&T Directorate. Unfortunately, we could not make our Subcommittee’s calendars meet this month so we will use this hearing to inform a joint 

hearing in September. At that hearing, we will focus on testimony and discussion 

with the head of DHS S&T. 

The DHS S&T Directorate is responsible developing new technologies from basic 

research to development for use, including technologies that can help to secure our 

nation’s border. From unmanned aerial vehicles, to tunnel detection, from anti-counterfeit standards to biometrics, there are existing and promising new technologies 

that can act as force multipliers for border patrol agents and the Coast Guard to 

augment their day to day work on border security related issues. 

We will hear this morning from the Government Accountability Office, which has 

issued a series of reports about DHS Technology research and development, and 

from two private sector experts, each of whom can contribute on a different aspect 

of border security technology. I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses. 

Chairman BUCSHON. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 

gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Lipinski, for an opening statement. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing 

today, and thank you to our witnesses for providing valuable testimony on this issue. 

Today we will hear about how the Department of Homeland Security can improve its research and development efforts on technology to secure America’s borders. With growing turmoil around 

the world, the threats we face at our borders are more pressing 

than ever. These threats include terrorists and criminals entering 

our country, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and other dangerous materials and substances being smuggled into the United 

States. As has been said many times, those wishing America harm 

only need to get it right once. To keep America safe, we need to 

get it right every time. This daunting task falls largely on the 

shoulders of DHS. 

As a member of both the Science, Space, and Technology Committee and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, I am 

especially concerned with border security as it relates to transportation. Last week I met with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, Gil Kerlikowske, on their efforts to develop 

technologies such as the fingerprint scanners at O’Hare Airport in 

Chicago as part of CBP’s Global Entry program. 

Science and technology plays a critical role in addressing our 

homeland security challenge. However, the Department has been 

plagued with problems in its planning and management of research 

and development. The agency is young, having been only created 

11 years ago. While I do not envy the task of stitching together several government programs and functions into a new agency, I remain concerned that several of the problems we saw in the agency’s initial years remain today. 

As GAO has previously stated, the Department cannot tell us 

how much they invest in R&D. There is a lack of effective communication between operational components and the Science and 

Technology Directorate. Furthermore, there is still no strategic 

plan in place to guide the Department’s research and development 

activities. 
9 

It is important to understand the steps the agency goes through 

when identifying and solving a technological problem, whether for 

border security or another mission need. When agents in the field 

identify a technological challenge, how is this need passed along to 

the researchers developing the technology? The communication between the operational components of DHS and the researchers at 

the Science and Technology Directorate has to be improved. 

Once a technology is developed, it must be thoroughly tested and 

evaluated to see that it not only functions as intended, but is 

adapted for the environment in which it will operate. Understanding how CBP agents or other customers in the field will use 

the technology and what additional improvements should be made 

is a key step in successfully deploying the technology. Without understanding the human elements in this process, I am concerned 

we could be investing significant federal resources in potentially 

unusable technology. I look forward to hearing from Dr. Eyerman 

about the importance of social science in the evaluation and deployment of new technologies at DHS. 

Securing our borders is a difficult and complex problem. People 

and materials can enter by air, land, and sea. This requires our 

border security efforts to not only effectively communicate internally, but also coordinate with other federal agencies, as well as 

state and local governments. I hope our discussion today provides 

the Committee with recommendations to inform our oversight and 

legislative responsibilities for R&D at the Department of Homeland 

Security. And I look forward to hearing about how public- and private-sector innovation can help protect the American border. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lipinski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

RANKING MINORITY MEMBER DANIEL LIPINSKI

Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing today, and thank you to the witnesses for providing valuable testimony on this issue. 

Today we will hear about how the Department of Homeland Security can improve 

its research and development efforts on technology to secure America’s borders. 

With growing turmoil around the world, the threats we face at our borders are more 

pressing than ever. These threats include terrorists and criminals entering our 

country, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and other dangerous materials and 

substances being smuggled into the U.S. As has been said many times, those wishing America harm only need to get it right once—to keep America safe, we need 

to get it right every time. This daunting task falls largely on the shoulders of DHS. 

As a member of both the Science, Space, and Technology Committee and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, I am especially concerned with border security as it relates to transportation. Last week I met with the Commissioner of 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Gil Kerlikowske, on their efforts to develop 

technologies such as the fingerprint scanners at O’Hare Airport in Chicago as part 

of CBP’s Global Entry program. 

Science and technology plays a critical role in addressing our homeland security 

challenges. However, the Department has been plagued with problems in its planning and management of research and development. The agency is young, having 

only been created 11 years ago. While I do not envy the task of stitching together 

several government programs and functions into a new agency, I remain concerned 

that several of the problems we saw in the agency’s initial yearsremain today. 

As GAO has previously stated, the Department cannot tell us how much they invest in R&D. There is a lack of effective communication between operational components and the Science & Technology Directorate. Furthermore, there is still no strategic plan in place to guide the Department’s research and development activities. 
10 

It is important to understand the steps the agency goes through when identifying 

and solving a technological problem, whether for border security or another mission 

need. When agents in the field identify a technological challenge, how is this need 

passed along to the researchers developing the technology? The communication between the operational components of DHS and the researchers at the Science & 

Technology Directorate must be improved. 

Once a technology is developed it must be thoroughly tested and evaluated to see 

that it not only functions as intended, but is adapted for the environment in which 

it will operate. Understanding how CBP agents or other customers in the field will 

use the technology and what additional improvements should be made is a key step 

in successfully deploying the technology. Without understanding the human elements in this process, I am concerned we could be investing significant federal resources in potentially unusable technology. I look forward to hearing from Dr. 

Eyerman about the importance of social science in the evaluation and deployment 

of new technologies at DHS. 

Securing our borders is a difficult and complex problem. People and materials can 

enter by air, land, and sea. This requires our border security efforts to not only effectively communicate internally, but also coordinate with other federal agencies, as 

well as state and local governments. I hope our discussion today provides the Committee with recommendations to inform our oversight and legislative responsibilities 

for R&D at the Department of Homeland Security. And I look forward to hearing 

about how public and private sector innovation can help protect the American border. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 
11 

Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. The Chair now 

recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, the 

gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Broun, for his opening statement. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Bucshon, and I welcome all of 

you all here today as witnesses, and I am looking forward to hearing from all of you all about this very important issue. 

Earlier this month, I traveled to the southern border of our country with the Homeland Security Committee. We held a field hearing in McAllen, Texas, on July 3rd where we discussed the recent 

surge of unaccompanied minors (UACs) crossing the border. I was 

astounded to learn that the number of children illegally entering 

the United States from Central America has grown from approximately 5,000 of them a year to an estimated 57,000 so far this 

year, and they are projecting up to 90,000 in this fiscal year. An 

influx of this extent raises questions about the security of our 

southern border. Currently, Border Patrol agents are inundated 

with processing unaccompanied minors and not fulfilling their primary mission to safeguard the border against terrorists entering 

the country under the radar as well as drugs and other things that 

are entering. It is a national security issue as far as I am concerned. 

In order to protect the nearly 2,000-mile southwest border, patrol 

agents would benefit from advances in modern technology such as 

video monitors, sensors, radars, cameras, thermal-imaging devices, 

and drones. However, there are many flaws within the various 

DHS components that conduct technology research and development, which include problems in the management, coordination, 

and acquisition of items needed to help secure our American border. 

A 2012 GAO report notes that, ‘‘The Department of Homeland 

Security does not know the total amount its components invest in 

research and development and does not have policies and guidance 

for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across the Department.’’ Further, a 2013 GAO report cites examples where projects 

were delayed and cancelled due to an inability to obtain data from 

DHS. This is intolerable. 

The DHS Science and Technology Directorate states on its own 

Web site that it is ‘‘the primary research and development arm of 

the Department of Homeland Security and manages science and 

technology research, from development through transition, for the 

Department’s operational components and first responders to protect the homeland.’’ How can this primary research and development arm not have any idea of the total amount of taxpayer money 

being invested on technology to detect, prevent, and mitigate 

threats to our Nation? This is not the prescription to protect our 

homeland. 

As the Chairman of this Committee’s Oversight Subcommittee, I 

value transparency and accountability. The S&T Directorate needs 

to lay out a clear and comprehensive plan to manage research and 

development activities and coordinate with other entities to ensure 

the deployment of effective state-of-the-art technology in a timely 

fashion. Absent a strategic technology roadmap, our citizens will 

remain vulnerable to threats stemming from our unsecure border. 
12 

Thank you, Dr. Bucshon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing, and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

CHAIRMAN PAUL BROUN

Earlier this month, I traveled to the Southern border of our country with the 

Homeland Security Committee. We held a field hearing in McAllen, Texas, where 

we discussed the recent surge of unaccompanied minors crossing the border. I was 

astounded to learn that the number of children illegally entering the United States 

from Central America has grown from under 5,000 a year to an estimated 57,000 

so far this year. An influx of this extent raises questions about the security of our 

Southern border. Currently, border patrol agents are inundated with processing unaccompanied minors and not fulfilling their primary mission to safeguard the border 

against terrorists entering the country under the radar. 

In order to protect the nearly 2,000 mile Southwest border, patrol agents would 

benefit from advances in modern technology such as video monitors, sensors, radars, 

cameras, thermal-imaging devices, and drones. However, there are many flaws within the various DHS components that conduct technology research and development, 

which include problems in the management, coordination, and acquisition of items 

needed to help secure the American border. 

A 2012 GAO report notes that, ‘‘The Department of Homeland Security does not 

know the total amount its components invest in research and development and does 

not have policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources 

across the Department.’’ Further, a 2013 GAO report cites examples where projects 

were delayed and cancelled due to an inability to obtain data from DHS. 

This is intolerable. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate states on its own 

website that it is ‘‘the primary research and development arm of the Department 

of Homeland Security and manages science and technology research, from development through transition, for the Department’s operational components and first responders to protect the homeland.’’ How can this primary research and development 

arm not have any idea of the total amount of taxpayer money being invested on 

technology to detect, prevent, and mitigate threats to our nation? This is not the 

prescription to protect our homeland. 

As the Chairman of this Committee’s Oversight Subcommittee, I value transparency and accountability. The S&T Directorate needs to lay out a clear and comprehensive plan to manage research and development activities, and coordinate with 

other entities to ensure the deployment of effective state-of-the-art technology in a 

timely fashion. Absent a strategic technology roadmap, our citizens will remain vulnerable to the threats stemming from an unsecure border. 

Thank you again, Chairman Bucshon, for holding this very important hearing, 

and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you, Dr. Broun. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Mr. Maffei of New York, for his opening statement. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Chairman Bucshon, for holding this hearing, and I want to 

thank Chairman Broun as well and Ranking Member Lipinski. 

Our current system and approach to immigration is clearly not 

working. The challenges are complex and must be dealt with in a 

bipartisan way. The only way to fully address these challenges and 

make sure the crisis of unaccompanied children coming over the 

border is taken care of is to enact bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform. That is why I have cosponsored the bipartisan legislation that would, bolster security at our borders and uphold the 

immigration laws already on the books. The Senate has already 

passed this bipartisan immigration reform bill by a wide margin, 

and I do believe it is time for the House to act as well, at least to 

bring it up for a vote. 
13 

What is essential is that we strengthen our borders and enforce 

our laws. That is essential to any nation’s sovereignty, to control 

its own borders. But I want to say that I agree with Mr. Broun, 

my friend, Mr. Broun from Georgia, that border security must be 

focused on keeping terrorists and weapons of mass destruction as 

well as illegal firearms and dangerous drugs entering the United 

States, again, the need for reform. 

For the purposes of this hearing, I look forward to hearing witnesses’ testimony on the research, development, and implementation of new technologies on America’s border and potential new 

technologies that might be more effective. It is unfortunate that the 

Committee was unable to obtain witnesses from the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate or host a 

joint hearing with the House Homeland Security Committee, as 

there is much overlap in this area, and that would have been more 

helpful. 

That said, I am very grateful to the Chairs for calling this hearing. It is extremely important. It is important in my district, which 

does have a border. It is a border with Canada, but I do want to 

also know what is going on in the northern border, and I know Dr. 

Maurer would probably share that interest since his family is from 

Wayne County, which is in my district and does have that water 

border with Canada. 

Being able to accurately monitor the integrity of U.S. borders is 

essential to maintaining border and national security, which is essential to our sovereignty. I look forward to our witnesses helping 

us to better understand the science behind these issues, and evaluate how technology can augment and support the human resources 

that are ultimately responsible for maintaining our border security. 

I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maffei follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

RANKING MINORITY MEMBER DAN MAFFEI

Thank you Chairman Broun and Chairman Buschon for holding this hearing 

today. 

I believe we need to get serious and work to secure and strengthen our borders 

and enforce the laws already on the books. Our current system and approach to immigration is not working and we need comprehensive reform now, which is why I’ve 

cosponsored bipartisan legislation that would, bolster security at our borders and 

uphold the immigration laws already on the books. The Senate has already passed 

this bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform bill by a wide margin and it is 

time for the House to act as well. Border security is also about keeping terrorists 

and weapons of mass destruction from reaching our shores. 

For the purposes of this hearing, I look forward to hearing witness testimony on 

the research, development, and implementation of new technologies on America’s 

border. It is unfortunate that the Committee was unable to obtain witnesses from 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Science & Technology (S&T) Directorate or 

host a joint hearing with the House Homeland Security Committee, as there is 

much overlap in this issue area. 

My District shares a nautical border with Canada, and I would like to know learn 

more about what is being done to secure the Northern Border, in addition to the 

Southern Border. 

Being able to accurately monitor the integrity of U.S. borders is essential to maintaining border and national security. I look forward to our witnesses helping us to 

better understand the science behind these issues, and evaluate how technology can 

augment and support our human resources that are ultimately responsible for maintaining U.S border security. 
14 

Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you. I now recognize the Chairman 

of the full Committee, the gentleman from Texas. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Now, we all are aware of the impact of illegal immigrant children 

who stream across our southern border. This is both a national security and a humanitarian crisis that we cannot allow to continue. 

A country that has lost control of its borders has lost control of its 

future. 

The President has ignored, failed to enforce, undermined, and 

unilaterally changed current immigration laws. As a result, millions of young people have risked their lives to make the dangerous 

trip and come here illegally. Further, the Administration has yet 

to present a plan to secure our Nation’s borders. As border agents 

are forced to turn increased attention to the surge of minors concentrated in certain areas along the border, it leaves much of the 

rest of the border unprotected. 

Technology is a key component to securing our 2,000 mile Southern border. Customs and Border Protection and National Guard 

troops cannot be everywhere. Sensors deployed along the border 

can detect and track the ‘‘coyotes’’ who smuggle children as well as 

illegal drugs and firearms across the border. Sensors will help Border Patrol agents know where coyotes are so that they can intercept and stop them. And ground-penetrating radar can find buried 

tunnels that crisscross our border. 

We need to get this technology in the hands of our immigration 

officers. Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security has 

a poor track record when it comes to developing and fielding sensors and tactical communications infrastructure along the southwest border. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) finds the Department of Homeland Security’s research and development efforts to 

be ‘‘fragmented and overlapping.’’ The Department’s Science and 

Technology Directorate will spend $1.2 billion this year on numerous projects, some related to border security, but many are not. As 

in previous years, the GAO found hundreds of millions of dollars 

being spent each year on duplicative R&D projects by other offices 

within the Department. Frankly, no one knows who is in charge of 

research and development, or what the goal is. The GAO reports 

that the Science and Technology Directorate lost touch with its end 

users about what technologies and R&D projects should be a priority. 

Today’s witnesses will testify on the need for the Department of 

Homeland Security to develop a plan to secure America’s borders 

and how best to carry out that plan. Research and technology are 

key components to securing America’s borders. 

In September, we will hear from the Department of Homeland 

Security Undersecretary for Science and Technology, a position created by this Committee in founding the Department, in a joint 

hearing with the Homeland Security Committee. We are working 

with them on draft legislation to set priorities for the Science and 

Technology Directorate on how to secure America’s borders. I look 

forward to working with my colleagues in the weeks ahead to turn 

this goal into a reality. 
15 

While there may be mixed feelings about the current situation on 

our southern border, we should all be able to agree that we can and 

we must secure America’s borders with the help of technology. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FULL COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN LAMAR S. SMITH

Thank you, Chairman Bucshon for holding this hearing. We all are aware of the 

impact of illegal immigrant children who stream across our Southern border. This 

is both a national security and a humanitarian crisis that we cannot allow to continue. A country that has lost control of its borders has lost control of its future. 

The President has ignored, failed to enforce, undermined, and unilaterally 

changed current immigration laws. As a result, millions of young people have risked 

their lives to make the dangerous trip and come here illegally. 

Further, the Administration has yet to present a plan to secure our nation’s borders. As border agents are forced to turn increased attention to the surge of minors 

concentrated in certain areas along the border, it leaves much of the rest of the border unprotected. 

Technology is a key component to securing our 2,000 mile Southern border. Customs and Border Protection and National Guard troops cannot be everywhere. 

Sensors deployed along the border can detect and track the ‘‘coyotes’’ who smuggle 

children—as well as illegal drugs and firearms—across the border. Sensors will help 

Border Patrol agents know where coyotes are so that they can intercept and stop 

them. And ground-penetrating radar can find buried tunnels that crisscross our border. 

We need to get this technology in the hands of our immigration officers. Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security has a poor track record when it comes 

to developing and fielding sensors and tactical communications infrastructure along 

the Southwest border. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) finds the Department of Homeland 

Security’s research and development (R&D) efforts to be ‘‘fragmented and overlapping.’’ The Department’s Science and Technology Directorate will spend $1.2 billion this 

year on numerous projects, some related to border security, but many are not. As 

in previous years, the GAO found hundreds of millions of dollars being spent each 

year on duplicative R&D projects by other offices within the department. 

Frankly, no one knows who’s in charge of research and development, or what the 

goal is. The GAO reports that the Science and Technology Directorate lost touch 

with its end-users about what technologies and R&D projects should be a priority. 

Today’s witnesses will testify on the need for the Department of Homeland Security to develop a plan to secure America’s borders and how best to carry out that 

plan. Research and technology are key components to securing America’s borders. 

In September, we will hear from the Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary for Science and Technology—a position created by this Committee in founding the department—in a joint hearing with the Homeland Security Committee. 

We are working with them on draft legislation to set priorities for the Science and 

Technology Directorate on how to secure America’s borders.I look forward to working with my colleagues in the weeks ahead to turn this goal into a reality. While 

there may be mixed feelings about the current situation on our Southern border, 

we should all be able to agree that we can—and we must—secure America’s borders 

with the help of technology. 

Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you, Chairman. 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

Chairman BUCSHON. At this point I would like to introduce our 

witnesses. Our first witness, Dr. Jack Riley, is Vice President of 

RAND’s National Security Research Division and Director of the 

National Defense Research Institute. Dr. Riley received his bachelor’s from the University of Michigan, his master’s from Georgetown, and his Ph.D. from the RAND Graduate School. 
16 

Our second witness is Mr. David Maurer. He is a Director at the 

U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Homeland Security and 

Justice Team. Mr. Maurer earned his bachelor’s from Michigan 

State, the competition right next door, and his two master’s degrees from the University of Michigan and National Defense University. 

Our third witness is Dr. Joseph Eyerman. Dr. Eyerman is Co-Director of the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, a senior research methodologist, and the Director of RTI International Center 

for Security, Safety and Defense. Dr. Eyerman received his bachelor’s from Muskingum University, his two master’s degrees from 

Florida State University and Miami University, and his Ph.D. from 

Florida State University. Welcome to all our witnesses. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each after which Members of the Committee will have 

five minutes each to ask questions. 

It is the practice of the Subcommittee on Oversight to receive 

testimony under oath. Does anyone have a problem with that? If 

not, please stand and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear 

to affirm to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 

you God? Let the record reflect that all the witnesses—you may be 

seated. Let the record reflect that all the witnesses participating 

have taken the oath. 

At this point I recognize Dr. Riley for five minutes to present his 

testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. K. JACK RILEY, VICE PRESIDENT, 

RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION; 

DIRECTOR, RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

Dr. RILEY. Thank you, Chairmen Bucshon and Broun and Ranking Members Lipinski and Maffei, for the opportunity to testify 

today about strategic planning and technology needs for air, land 

and sea border security. 

Almost exactly eight years ago, I testified before two Homeland 

Security Subcommittees on this same topic, and at that time I said, 

and I quote, ‘‘We have woefully underinvested in developing, evaluating and refining a comprehensive and integrated border security 

strategy. We have invested in numerous border security programs 

and initiatives but the impacts and the costs and the cost-effectiveness of virtually all of these initiatives are poorly understood.’’ 

Unfortunately, nearly a decade later, the same concerns still 

largely apply. So let me turn to three points that I will make in 

this testimony. 

First, we need to invest in measurement and data so that we 

have an empirical basis from which to have policy debates; second, 

we need to invest in more systematically understanding the costeffectiveness of programs and policies; and third and finally, we 

need to systematically track and document how border control efforts affect the larger economy and society. 

Let me start my first point by explaining why the data gaps are 

so worrisome. Effective border security begins with understanding 

why and how people and contraband cross the border. Different 

motivations may require different policies. Migration, for example, 

motivated by the desire for economic betterment may be best con-
17 

trolled by a combination of border deterrence and labor-market enforcement. In contrast, smuggling of contraband may be best addressed by deterrence and technological detection. 

In my written testimony, I detail some of the ways in which we 

can capture this kind of data. However, as far as I can tell, none 

of these estimation methods have been formally adopted nor do 

they receive continued support for development and refinement. 

They should, however, so that they can become the foundation for 

a border security scorecard. 

I will turn now to my second point, why it is important to know 

about cost-effectiveness. Imagine that Secretary Johnson is presented with the opportunity to add 10,000 Border Patrol agents. 

Using the kind of data I just mentioned, he could not only assess 

the effectiveness of additional agents but give guidance on where 

and how to deploy them. We could also give guidance on what technologies might be good substitutes for or complements to the additional personnel. But equally importantly, we could say something 

about how migrants and smugglers would adapt to the presence of 

additional personnel. Indeed, with better data, we might be able to 

predict how behavior might adapt, and correspondingly modify our 

policies. At minimum, we would likely detect the changes in behavior earlier, which in turn would help improving future policymaking. 

Third, a word about the broader economic and social implications 

of the border. Policies designed to improve control over the border 

can propagate widely throughout the economy and society. To give 

one example, after 9/11 we changed visa policies to make it more 

difficult for terrorists to travel to the United States. However, by 

making it more difficult, we deter not only terrorists but also an 

unknown number of legitimate travelers—foreign tourists, foreign 

students, qualified foreign workers, whose presence provide great 

benefits to our economy and the vibrancy of our culture. In short, 

border enforcement directly and indirectly touches on every aspect 

of the economy and our livelihoods, and we should be systemically 

tracking these effects so that we understand the full costs and the 

full benefits of border security programs. 

At the beginning of this oral statement I mentioned I have three 

points. However, I want to add a fourth. Border security is one of 

the greatest analytic challenges of the post-9/11 generation. It is a 

topic that can and should attract the best and the brightest minds. 

But it remains frustratingly difficult to work on the topic both because of departmental restrictions on access to the data that are 

collected and also because of departmental restrictions on publishing and academic engagement. Good science demands public 

scrutiny and rigorous academic engagement. I urge this Committee 

and the Subcommittees to exercise its oversight role and help make 

this topic better grounded in science and more attractive to the 

best analysts and researchers. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Riley follows:] 
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Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you very much. 

I now recognize Mr. Maurer for five minutes for his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVID C. MAURER, 

DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MAURER. Good morning, Chairman Bucshon, Chairman 

Broun, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Lipinski, Ranking 

Member Maffei, and Members and staff. I am pleased to be here 

this morning to talk about the results of our recently issued work 

looking at research and development at the Department of Homeland Security and how those efforts are being used to enhance border security. 

R&D matters at DHS for a couple of reasons. First, the taxpayers provide DHS over $1 billion a year to support research and development. For that reason alone, the Department needs to ensure its 

R&D activities work as planned. R&D can also help DHS better 

execute its various missions. For example, improved technology to 

detect people or nuclear material helps DHS secure the border and 

ultimately the homeland. 

DHS has made important strides in recent years towards taking 

a more strategic approach. For example, the Science and Technology Directorate has a strategic plan, periodically reviews its 

portfolio of projects, and has developed new ways to coordinate 

with other DHS components. That last point is especially important 

since S&T strives to conduct its R&D work side by side with the 

eventual end users. But that said, DHS clearly has a lot of work 

ahead to bring coherence and structure to its research and development efforts. 

Our work over the past two years identified three key areas 

where DHS needs to improve. We found that DHS needed to define 

R&D, do a better job tracking R&D, and improve how it coordinates R&D. I will briefly expand on these three points. 

In September 2012, we reported that DHS lacked a common definition of research and development, and we found a lot of activity 

across the Department that could be considered R&D, and by law, 

S&T is responsible for coordinating and overseeing all of it, but 

they can’t do that if the various DHS components aren’t working 

from the same definition and agree on what should be coordinated. 

Our work also found several problems in DHS’s efforts to essentially track R&D. As it turned out, DHS struggled to answer basic 

questions such as how much are you spending, which components 

are doing R&D, what projects are currently underway, and do completed projects meet the needs of their customers. For example, we 

found that DHS did not know how much its components invested 

in R&D, and that makes it really difficult to oversee activities 

across the entire Department. This inability to centrally track R&D 

also places DHS at risk of overlapping and duplicative efforts. We 

identified 35 instances where contracted R&D activity in one component overlapped with another. 

Our work also identified problems in DHS’s ability to coordinate 

R&D. There are several R&D coordination mechanisms within 

DHS but they need to work better. For example, the report we 

issued last year on border and maritime found a mixed picture. 
30 

The good news is that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and 

the Coast Guard regularly reach out to end users of their completed R&D Projects. However, S&T lacked any formal approach to 

follow-up with the end users of its deliverables. S&T’s customers 

are also much more likely to report that S&T deliverables did not 

meet end-user needs, and in some instances, we were unable to locate an end user for an S&T project. For example, S&T spent more 

than $1 million on a project to enhance CBP’s ability to track maritime vessels without having a specific customer at CBP. Our recent 

work also found problems in DHS’s coordination of R&D work with 

the national labs. 

So what is DHS doing to better define, track and coordinate 

R&D? On the plus side, the Department now has a common definition for R&D, and that is an important first step. However, while 

DHS has taken some actions, they are still not sufficient to address 

our recommendations to improve how they track and coordinate 

R&D, and that is important because clearly defined, closely tracked 

and well-coordinated R&D activities will help translate state-ofthe-art science into usable tools that can help enhance the security 

of our borders. We will keep the Committee informed on the Department’s ongoing efforts to address our recommendations. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. That concludes my opening remarks. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer follows:] 
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Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you very much. 

I now recognize Dr. Eyerman for five minutes for his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH D. EYERMAN, DIRECTOR, 

HEALTH SECURITY PROGRAM, RTI INTERNATIONAL; 

DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT, 

INSTITUTE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY SOLUTIONS, 

DUKE UNIVERSITY 

Dr. EYERMAN. Good morning, Chairman Bucshon, Chairman 

Broun, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Lipinski and Ranking 

Member Maffei, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding technology 

needed to secure America’s borders. I have prepared written testimony, and request that it be entered into the record. 

I have been working closely with DHS Science and Technology 

Directorate on a series of program and technology evaluations for 

the past six years in my role as Director of the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions at RTI International. Our work with DHS 

is part of a larger RTI Project to better understand the human factors that contribute to the transition of new technologies into the 

public sector and the private market. 

I am a social scientist by training, and in my role with IHSS, I 

have had the opportunity to apply social science research methods 

to the evaluation of DHS programs and the application of new technologies. In my expert opinion, social science can help us understand the general public, that is, the customers, and the DHS staff 

who will use the new technologies. This is just as important when 

developing technologies for securing our borders as it is for the 

next big project from Apple or Google. Failure to understand the 

customer can cause us to develop new technologies that are never 

adopted or never used to their full potential. This increases cost 

and delays the transition to application. 

In our work with the DHS, we use social science methods to support technology development by S&T programs to better understand the end users and customers and things like staffing and 

training requirements, usability of the new technology, and public 

perceptions about privacy and safety. As part of our work, we have 

been fortunate enough to employ these methods in support of several DHS technologies including a DHS S&T-funded assessment of 

the rapid DNA pilot test, part of a study to develop technology for 

field DNA tests to support applications by refugees for entrance 

into the United States; a DHS S&T-funded examination of nontechnical barriers encountered by program managers designed to 

identify trends and patterns that can guide the program managers 

in the transition of future technologies; and finally, an assessment 

of non-technical factors that will contribute to the safe and successful transition of unmanned aircraft into the routine aspects of our 

economic and social lives. 

Some of the key findings of these studies that are relevant to the 

transition of DHS technology to border security are, first, strong 

and potentially beneficial technologies can be derailed by non-technical problems stemming from a failure to understand the needs 

and abilities of the workforce, the complexities of public perceptions 
50 

and the willingness of the public to accept certain types of technologies into their daily lives. Second, the social science evaluation 

model is rarely applied to new technologies by DHS, and when it 

is applied, it is used in a limited and non-standard manner. This 

may delay the transition of technologies and may limit our ability 

to assess the impact and effectiveness of those technologies on the 

agency missions. Finally, complex technologies can develop at a 

slower rate than the operational realities of the components. This 

often results in technologies that are developed without a clear 

operational partner for implementation because needs have 

changed and priorities have shifted. 

My written testimony includes more detail on these and other 

technology assessments. We continue to examine these challenges 

and make recommendations for changes that will expedite the 

transition process to bring new technologies to bear on our security 

needs in a more efficient and timely manner. 

Thank you for your interest, and thank you for any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Eyerman follows:] 
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Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you very much. I want to thank the 

witnesses for their testimony, and at this point remind Members 

that Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes. The Chair 

at this point will open the round of questions. I recognize myself 

for five minutes. 

Dr. Riley, what is the feasibility of adopting existing surveillance 

systems such as those used in Iraq and Afghanistan on the southern border? 

Dr. RILEY. It is hard to answer the question without additional 

information. 

Chairman BUCSHON. Well, for example, DoD has surveillance 

equipment that we currently use in Iraq and Afghanistan, mobile 

equipment and others that have some potential that we may not 

need to do duplicative scientific and technical research on that 

would make them applicable with the dual-use purpose of being 

used on the southern border, a similar concept. 

Dr. RILEY. I would be in favor of a structured test to understand 

how they would work at the U.S. border and in which ways they 

can be effective, but at this point I am not convinced that we need 

significant investment in new technologies more than we need careful assessment of what we already have in place and how well the 

pieces work together. 

Chairman BUCSHON. Understood. 

Mr. Maurer, from your past work with S&T, what are the most 

important lessons learned that you would like—you would share 

with the new S&T leadership? 

Mr. MAURER. Well, I think first and foremost, I would highlight 

the two remaining outstanding areas they have to show some more 

progress on, which is namely do a better job tracking and a better 

job coordinating the R&D efforts, not just within the Science and 

Technology Directorate but across the entire Department. S&T has 

had statutory responsibility, and frankly, they have struggled with 

having a close—having close coordination with some of the other 

operational components that are doing R&D activities. I would encourage them to take action on that front and ensure that what 

they—the other thing I would have them do is ensure that they are 

more tightly in tune with the needs of the eventual end users of 

the technologies they are developing. They are making strides toward that. His predecessor spent a lot of time and effort trying to 

get S&T more tightly bound with not just R&D but getting involved in acquisition as well, and I think that is a good step. 

Chairman BUCSHON. I would agree with that, that it may very 

well be important to coordinate with the potential end user, although sometimes the end users don’t really know what they might 

need until the inventors or people invent something that might be 

useful. I think Apple did that. That was kind of why they did no 

product research because they felt like people didn’t really know 

what they would use until you develop it. So there is two arguments there, but I do think better coordination is very important. 

Through its authorizing statute, DHS S&T is responsible for developing a national policy and strategic plan for the federal government’s civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures for 

emerging terrorist threats. S&T is also tasked with coordinating 

the development and management of science and technology agen-
58 

da for DHS. To the best of my knowledge, DHS S&T has not yet 

accomplished either of these responsibilities. 

Dr. Riley and Mr. Maurer, both of you testified about the lack 

of coordination for border technology R&D within DHS. As we look 

toward reauthorizing the S&T Directorate, should these strategic 

planning and coordination responsibilities remain within DHS 

S&T? If so, how can we prompt movement on these important 

tasks? If not, where might they better be situated, and why? Mr. 

Maurer? 

Mr. MAURER. Yeah, I think it is important under the current 

statutory framework for S&T and the Department to do what the 

law required them to do, which is establish a strategy for within 

the Department and work with our partners across government. 

The broader policy issue of whether they should continue to have 

that responsibility and others, there is reauthorization language, is 

really a policy consideration. One thing that is important to keep 

in mind is that the amount of money that DHS spends on R&D is 

about one-sixth of the total that is spent across the entire federal 

government on Homeland Security-related R&D. So somebody 

somewhere is going to have to be involved in trying to bring coherence and coordination and oversight on that—on those funds. 

Chairman BUCSHON. Dr. Riley? 

Dr. RILEY. I will just add that one of the things that may or may 

not help—I am not sure I have made up my mind on this—is better 

use of Under Secretary of Policy in the Department of Homeland 

Security. Right now that is an Assistant Secretary position, and 

one of the ways in which stitches may be dropped between the generation of technology and implementation and effective use of them 

is perhaps not having a counterpart on policy formulation and execution. 

Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you. I recognize Mr. Lipinski for his 

line of questioning. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

Dr. Eyerman, you have been working directly with DHS S&T for 

the past six years in evaluating their programs. In the latter part 

of your testimony, you listed a variety of barriers to successful 

transition of new technologies from the laboratory to the operational setting in the DHS components. Could you elaborate on 

what DHS can do to further the transfer of technology to users, 

and do you have any idea what has held DHS back in developing 

a strategy to address these challenges? 

Dr. EYERMAN. Thank you for your question, Mr. Lipinski. I would 

say there are two issues that have affected the ability to increase 

the involvement of social science research in DHS technology transition. One is the absence of a standardized process for inserting 

social science research that involves the end users and the customers and the DHS staff in the study design, the project implementation and the assessment of the results, and I think that is 

primarily due to a lack of coordination within S&T around the social sciences. At one point there was a division in S&T focused on 

the human factors. That division has been removed and merged in 

with another division, and staff have been eliminated. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Was there any particular reason that that was removed that you know of? 
59 

Dr. EYERMAN. I don’t know the reason behind that. That is beyond my knowledge. I do know that many of the staff were retained but the second barrier, I think, to the adoption is the number of staff that are focused on social science research methods at 

DHS. I think the first issue could be addressed with better coordination and planning and a standardized process for inserting evaluation of the customers and the workers in the R&D cycle. The second one is more of a staffing and budget issue. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

Dr. Riley, you mentioned in your testimony that after many 

years, we are still lacking the analytic capability to measure the effectiveness of our border security tools and policy mechanisms. I 

understand your solution for measuring this is further investment 

in developing a strategy for R&D and investment in technology infrastructure. Considering there are various types of illegal border 

activity with no one-size-fits-all solution, what types of technologies 

should we invest in to get the necessary data and models? 

Dr. RILEY. Well, in terms of technology development and investment in that area, I think one of the things I would be looking for 

is a tighter and better designed requirements generation process so 

that we understand where the frontline providers of border security 

feel the need for new technologies and perceive the need for additional technology development. There has been some progress made 

in that area but generally, for example, the connection between 

technology transfer and requirements development in DHS is not 

as mature as it is, say, in the Department of Defense. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. What is the reason for that? Just, it has not been 

developed? 

Dr. RILEY. I think growing pains, and there are significant structural differences between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security but I think the mere process of trying to incorporate all of the different elements that went into DHS 

and get them functioning smoothly is probably a limiting factor. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Okay. And Mr. Maurer, according to multiple GAO 

reports, DHS is missing a strategic plan, which we had talked 

about. Further, it can’t track its investments in R&D and thus cannot identify the total investment it has made in R&D. GAO has 

made recommendations to solve these problems but DHS has been 

quite vague, saying that it has taken some steps to update guidance. Since your office has been monitoring their progress, do you 

have an idea as to what has been getting in the way of developing 

this plan? 

Mr. MAURER. That is a really good question because we have 

been recommending—some of this goes back to a report that was 

issued two years ago, so DHS would be better placed to give the 

specific reasons. Our sense is that they certainly made progress on 

defining R&D, so that is the first step, but we would like to see 

them develop a strategy for the whole Department. We would like 

to see them develop a way to clearly articulate what processes and 

coordination mechanisms need to be in place, have a more effective 

way of implementing the various R&D projects across the Department. I would hope that the relatively new Under Secretary would 

take this on as one of his top priorities in his new role. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. That—I yield back. 
60 

Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you, and I now recognize Chairman 

Broun for five minutes. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up 

on a question. In my opening statement, I mentioned that DHS 

needs a technology roadmap to manage its R&D activities. What is 

DHS’s biggest impediment to developing that organized and comprehensive national border security strategy? I will start with Mr. 

Maurer. 

Mr. MAURER. I would say that probably the biggest challenge 

they face is just the sheer complexity of the task that they are trying to accomplish. It involves predominantly at CBP but it is going 

to involve Science and Technology and other parts of the Department as well. It is a multifaceted problem, which touches on many 

different aspects of the Department, so it is a difficult challenge 

that they face, and trying to come up with a comprehensive strategy is also difficult. Now, we have been somewhat critical of the 

Department on different aspects of border security and their ability 

to measure the impact of the technology investments, for example, 

that they have made over the past many years. If they can make 

progress on that front, that would help get them further down the 

road where they need to be on developing a comprehensive strategy 

for border security. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, if you can give us part of what we call 

QFR, questions for the record, recommendations of how to get over 

this impediment. 

Dr. Riley, do you have any comments on this also? 

Dr. RILEY. Just jotting a note to myself. The border is obviously 

a complex issue. Different pieces of bureaucracy even within the 

Department of Homeland Security touch on the border, and nobody 

really owns it. We need to find a way to get a greater single point 

of accountability on the breadth of border issues, whether that is 

something that is, as I said in previous comment, integrated in an 

Under Secretary for Policy, whether it is the appointment of a border czar as we have done on other policy issues in other contexts. 

I am not quite sure. But there is no single point of accountability 

on the border, and having that may be something that prompts 

progress. 

Chairman BROUN. Mr. Maurer, let me read to you a few sentences from your own testimony related to DHS R&D activities. 

You said, ‘‘S&T officials told us at the time that a process did not 

exist at DHS or within S&T to prevent overlap or unnecessary duplication. We also found in September 2012 that neither DHS nor 

S&T tracked all ongoing R&D projects across the Department including R&D activities contracted through the National Laboratories. As part of our review, we identified 11 components that reimbursed the National Laboratories for R&D from fiscal years 2010 

through 2012, but S&T’s Office of National Laboratories could not 

provide us with any information on those activities and told us it 

did not track them. As of July 2014, DHS has not developed new 

policy guidance.’’ 

These are issues going back for a couple of years. Now, I understand that in some areas, DHS appears to be taking initial steps 

to meet GAO’s multiple recommendations such as conducting portfolio reviews across the Department and collecting feedback from 
61 

customers, but this Department is no longer in its infancy. In fact, 

it has been around for over a decade now, and when I read that 

DHS has not yet determined the most effective path to guide R&D 

across the Department or that S&T has not developed new policy 

guidance, I have to ask, should some or all of DHS’s R&D components be placed on GAO’s high-risk list, which, as you know, is reserved for agencies in program areas vulnerable to fraud, waste, 

abuse and mismanagement, or are they in most need of transformation? So should they be on the high-risk list? 

Mr. MAURER. Well, to some extent, they already are. We have an 

existing high-risk area for—— 

Chairman BROUN. But have you named them on the high-risk 

list? 

Mr. MAURER. Specifically to R&D? 

Chairman BROUN. Yes. 

Mr. MAURER. We don’t have a specific shout-out to R&D but the 

problems that they face in terms of coordination and tracking are 

rooted in more fundamental issues with the Department’s inability 

to stitch itself together in a comprehensive way, so we have a highrisk area for management at DHS, which has been critical of DHS’s 

efforts to develop a common approach to acquisition and financial 

management, information technology, human capital. A lot of these 

things are the building blocks of organizations, and to some extent 

are some of the root causes as to why DHS doesn’t have visibility 

over R&D spending. They don’t have the financial systems that 

allow them to do that, for example. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, my time is about up. I encourage you to 

put them on the high-risk list because just by your own testimony, 

there is just tremendous problems there, and I think they should 

be and I encourage you to do so. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you. Votes have been called but we 

do have some time, so we are going to go ahead—I am going to go 

ahead and recognize Mr. Maffei for his line of questioning, and 

then we will see where we are and then go from there. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Maurer, first of all, I apologize for giving you a doctorate in 

my opening statement. You can pick that up after the hearing. 

I really appreciate the work of all the witnesses on this, and it 

has been a very informative hearing. 

One thing I want to ask you, Mr. Maurer, is, DHS has had some 

rather large R&D failures. One example is that they canceled a 

very large and one of the most comprehensive technological investments, SBInet, after investing nearly a billion dollars. Has this 

changed at all the way they are approaching it, and are they able 

to salvage any of that technology? 

Mr. MAURER. You are absolutely right. SBInet was a failed 

project at DHS. DHS has a slightly different approach to developing new technology for the border. They have the Arizona Technology Plan. DHS’s current approach is to rely more extensively on 

commercial off-the-shelf technology and using that to deploy for security—for helping secure the border. We still have some concerns 

about how that particular program is being implemented, specifically in the area of testing. We have issued reports and we have 
62 

testified previously that we don’t believe that the amount of testing 

that is going to be done for the Arizona Technology Plan is sufficient. That was one of the root causes of the problems that plagued 

SBInet, so our hope is that DHS will take us up and adopt our recommendation. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you. 

Dr. Riley, can you give me any sense, how robust is this technology? I don’t want to be cynical but sometimes you get the impression that—I mean, I have got a bunch of friends from high 

school who are really good technically and they could come up, set 

up motion sensors, cameras, lasers, even UAVs now, and for much 

a cheaper cost do a lot of the same thing. Tell me I am wrong. 

Dr. RILEY. The technologies are good and mature. I think one of 

the areas where DHS and, frankly, many government agencies 

struggle is kind of the tooth to tail, where do you have the people 

to back up and integrate with the technology to make the most and 

best effective use of it. DHS is making progress in this area. Their 

acquisition processes are maturing, but they are certainly not perfect at this point. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thanks. 

Dr. Eyerman, do you have anything to add, particularly involving 

that human—the human element there? 

Dr. EYERMAN. Absolutely. I completely agree with Dr. Riley’s 

comments. We worked on an evaluation of a technology for biometric identification at the airports. The technology was quite ready. 

It was off the shelf. It was effective. The problem was, is the technology couldn’t be integrated into the human systems, and that is 

where it would break down, because if it was integrated into the 

human systems, it would result in large delays at the airport. It 

was unclear who would be responsible for implementing the technology, and there were serious cost implications for the airlines 

which couldn’t be addressed by the technology, only by research 

into the humans. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you very much. I am going to yield my final 

two minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut, Ms. Esty. 

Ms. ESTY. Thank you. 

A quick question, a follow-up for you, Mr. Maurer. You had mentioned that only a sixth of the R&D funding around border issues 

is actually done with DHS. We have already heard considerable 

testimony how that isn’t even managed very well. So where is the 

other five-sixths? Who are the lead agencies and how should we be 

thinking about who sets the strategic goals, how can they be better 

coordinated? I would really like your advice, and then if others 

want to chime in. Thank you. 

Mr. MAURER. Sure. Absolutely. DHS is one-sixth of the total pie 

for all of Homeland Security R&D, so we don’t know how it breaks 

out specifically for border, but the other five-sixths for all Homeland Security, a lot of it is being done at DoD and the Department 

of Health and Human Services. Writ large one thing that would 

help that overall coordination is the development of the statutorily 

required, government-wide approach to Homeland Security R&D, 

and that is something that has been on the books for a number of 

years. 

Ms. ESTY. Thank you. Anybody else? 
63 

Dr. RILEY. I will just say that I think in conversations and discussion about the border, it is common to lapse into thinking only 

about the southern land border and we really need to be more careful thinking holistically about air, sea and land borders north and 

south. 

Ms. ESTY. Coming from Connecticut, we think about this in 

terms of our ports, and it is an issue. We have the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in my state. We have nuclear plants all up and down 

the East Coast that are right on the coast, and I heartily agree. We 

can’t just be thinking about the southern border. Thank you. 

Chairman BUCSHON. I now yield to the Chairman of the full 

Committee, Mr. Smith. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I would like to enter into the record two items from 

Petro Data Communications. 

Chairman BUCSHON. No objections. So ordered. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you. 

[The information appears in Appendix I] 

Chairman SMITH. And let me say to our witnesses, we are going 

to try to squeeze in two more questions in the next 7 or 8 minutes, 

so if you could give brief responses to my questions, we will see if 

that works. 

Dr. Riley, let me address my first question to you, and that is, 

in 2011, the Administration canceled a Secure Border Initiative. In 

2012, it withdrew 1,200 National Guard troops from the border. Do 

you think the result of those actions made it easier for illegal immigrants to cross the border? 

Dr. RILEY. It is difficult to say, Mr. Chairman, but both of those 

were important initiatives that I frankly would like to see followed 

through on in the near future. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you. 

My next question is to all three of you all, if you would, and that 

is, how would you grade the Department of Homeland Security on 

its use of technology today to secure the border? Real quickly, Dr. 

Riley? 

Dr. RILEY. Incomplete. 

Chairman SMITH. Dr. Maurer? 

Mr. MAURER. I would say the same thing, incomplete. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. And Dr. Eyerman? 

Dr. EYERMAN. I agree. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. What type of technology are they using, 

Dr. Riley or Dr. Maurer? 

Mr. MAURER. There is a large range of technologies from unmanned aerial stats and—— 

Chairman SMITH. You are saying just a lot more they could be 

doing? Is that what you meant by ‘‘incomplete’’? 

Dr. RILEY. It is simply too complicated an issue to grade out in 

a few minutes before a Committee like this, I think. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Well, we will take the ‘‘incomplete’’ for 

the time being. 

Mr. Maurer, I want to ask you a question about the GAO. In 

2011, you took a look at, I think, 873 miles of border and you said 

only 15 percent was under control of the Border Patrol. What did 

you mean by ‘‘under control’’? How would you define that? 
64 

Mr. MAURER. In that report, we were using a measure that CBP 

used at that time for operational control of the border. CBP no 

longer uses that particular measure in their effort to assess border 

security. 

Chairman SMITH. But my question was, what did the definition 

mean when you undertook this study of control of the border only 

15 percent? 

Mr. MAURER. I think that was part of the problem, and that is 

part of the reason why CBP moved away from that definition. It 

was open to a wide interpretation. 

Chairman SMITH. I think the reason they moved away because 

it was embarrassing that only 15 percent of the border was under 

full control, myself, but again, full control, I was told in a previous 

hearing, meant that there was a high likelihood that illegal immigrants would be intercepted. 

Mr. MAURER. That is correct. That tracks back to the work that 

we did in 2011. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Which led to 85 percent of the border 

under something less than full control. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield now the remainder of my time to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Schweikert. 

Chairman BUCSHON. I ask unanimous consent to allow Mr. 

Schweikert to participate in the hearing. Without objection, the 

Chair then— it is ordered. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. You mean I could have objected to myself being 

here? 

Okay. Let us see if we can do a quick lightning round here. Dr. 

Riley, in your written testimony, and I think actually in your spoken testimony, there was a comment about some of the access to 

data and how much data was sort of off the books or you were not 

allowed to gain access to. Can you give me a quick snippet of how 

that affects trying to create policy and design? 

Dr. RILEY. It limits the ability to interact in the academic and 

analytic communities, and it has a stifling effect on being able to 

develop innovative approaches to border security. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. So if Dr. Eyerman is trying to look at data sets 

to build human interaction, he doesn’t actually have enough robust 

data sets to work from? 

Dr. RILEY. It is not only the availability of the data, although 

that is certainly the case. Those data need to be collected and the 

data sets built, but it is also the ability to draw on our academic 

partners. IHSS has a consortium with Duke and UNC, and many 

of the universities won’t work on data that is not publishable. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Well, and formerly Dr. Mr. Maurer, you actually almost just touched on this, that for many of us who are trying 

to get our heads around border policy, being from a border state, 

the definitions keep changing on me. One day we calculate it this 

way, the next day we calculate it this way. One day, for human 

smuggling, you know, if you are captured in this distance, you are 

considered deportation. The next day that is redefined. When you 

are doing your analysis, is this a continued problem of constantly 

moving the definitions, let alone the access to the actual data for 

the researchers? 
65 

Mr. MAURER. That certainly makes it more difficult to have a 

consistent—they don’t have consistent measures for assessing border security, and they change from year to year going back to 2011, 

so that does make that more challenging. And we have had reports 

that have talked about the important need for that, most critically 

having a need to assess the impact of the technologies that have 

been deployed on the border. We have been critical of CBP’s inability to demonstrate the extent to which deployed technology, what 

impact it has security. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, I know I am over time but from 

my understanding, this is actually a bigger issue than a lot of people understand. It is hard to know what you are chasing when two 

things happen: they don’t tell you or they change that definition. 

And then there’s the whole more cultural decision of can you ever 

have a large bureaucracy be as nimble and flexible when trying to 

design fixed technologies when the other side is incentivized to constantly beat that technology and be more nimble for the profit side. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BUCSHON. Thank you. 

At this point I would like to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony. We will not be returning after votes. We will be adjourning here shortly as everyone has been able to ask their questions. Your written testimony and your oral testimony is very valuable to the Subcommittee. Members of the Committee may have 

additional questions for you, and we will ask that you respond to 

those in writing. The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments and written questions from Members. 

At this point the witnesses are excused and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(67) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
68 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. K. Jack Riley 
69 
70 
71 

Responses by Mr. David C. Maurer 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 

(81) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
82 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FULL COMMITTEE

RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON
83 
84 

ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING INFORMATION REQUESTED BY

FULL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LAMAR S. SMITH
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 

Æ