DEFENSE MAJOR 

AUTOMATED 

INFORMATION 

SYSTEMS

Cost and Schedule 

Commitments Need to 

Be Established Earlier

Report to Congressional Committees

February 2015

GAO-15-282

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-15-282, a report to 

congressional committees

February 2015

DEFENSE MAJOR AUTOMATED INFORMATION 

SYSTEMS

Cost and Schedule Commitments Need to Be 

Established Earlier 

Why GAO Did This Study

The National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that 

GAO select, assess, and report on 

DOD MAIS programs annually through 

March 2018. This report discusses the 

results of GAO’s third assessment.

GAO’s objectives included: (1) 

determine whether selected MAIS 

programs are meeting time frames for 

establishing program baselines and 

deploying capabilities, (2) assess 

selected MAIS programs’ actions to 

manage risks, and (3) assess the 

extent to which selected MAIS 

programs have used key information 

technology acquisition best practices.

For its first objective, GAO selected a 

sample of 20 MAIS programs based on 

a few factors, such as programs that 

were designated as first (or only) 

increments. For the other objectives, 

GAO identified 4 out of 40 programs 

based on several factors, such as 

representation from multiple DOD 

components (1 from Air Force, 2 from 

Army, and 1 from Navy), and assessed 

them against selected acquisition best 

practices for risk management, 

requirements development, and project 

planning.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other 

things, that DOD require programs to 

establish a baseline within 2 years of 

beginning work and direct the Air Force

program and the Army logistics 

program to address weaknesses in 

their project planning acquisition

practices. DOD concurred with all 

recommendations except one, with 

which it partially concurred. GAO 

maintains that establishing baselines 

within 2 years would improve 

outcomes and increase accountability.

What GAO Found

A majority of the 20 selected Department of Defense (DOD) major automated 

information systems (MAIS) programs had not established their first baselines

(which consist of a life cycle cost estimate, a schedule estimate, and 

performance targets) within 2 years from program start; over half met or planned 

to meet a statutorily established time frame for deploying capabilities. While the 

Defense Science Board supports that programs should establish their baselines 

within 2 years, 12 programs spent, on average, 5 years and 2 months and about 

$452 million prior to establishing baselines. Programs that have not established 

baselines are subject to less oversight and cannot be measured against cost, 

schedule, and performance targets. Also, the propensity to carry out MAIS 

programs for multiple years prior to committing to baselines is inconsistent with

incremental and rapid development as called for in federal law, Office of 

Management and Budget guidance, and a Defense Science Board 

recommendation. Notably, over half of the 20 programs met or planned to meet

the time frame established by a DOD-specific law for deciding to fully deploy 

system capabilities, in part because they were restructured into smaller, 

incremental programs. Until programs establish their cost and schedule 

baselines within 2 years, they may continue to spend hundreds of millions of 

dollars with limited oversight and accountability.

Of four selected MAIS programs, two had fully defined and managed their key 

risks, and two were on track to do so. For example, while the Air Force program

did not always identify completion targets for its risk mitigation plans, it had a 

plan in place to correct this by March 2015. The four programs varied in their 

implementation of the selected acquisition best practices—requirements 

development and project planning. Specifically, two programs implemented 

requirements development best practices and the others were on track to do so. 

Two programs were on track to implement key planning practices, but the other

two had not developed schedules that incorporated all best practices. Further, 

DOD had not fully developed a comprehensive plan for implementing the Army 

logistics program, including testing to ensure that its financial statements are 

auditable. Without effective project planning, these programs risk not meeting

cost and schedule targets and implementing systems that do not meet needs.

Selected MAIS Programs’ Implementation of Acquisition Best Practices

Program

Risk 

management

Requirements 

development

Project 

planning

Navy’s Distributed Common Ground 

System - Navy Increment 2

● ◍ ◍

Army’s Integrated Personnel and Pay 

System - Army Increment 2

◍ ◍ ◍

Air Force’s Joint Space Operations 

Center Mission System Increment 2

◍ ● ◐

Army’s Logistics Modernization Program 

Increment 2 ● ● ◐

● Fully implemented ◐ Partially implemented ◍ On track to fully implement ○ Not implemented

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. I GAO-15-282

View GAO-15-282. For more information, 

contact Carol R.Cha at (202) 512-4456 or 

chac@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Letter 1

Background 5

Many Programs Spent Years to Establish Cost and Schedule 

Baselines; Over Half Were Positioned to Meet Time Frames for 

Deploying Capabilities 14

Selected MAIS Programs Changed Cost and Schedule Estimates, 

and One Did Not Fully Meet Performance Targets 27

Selected Programs Fully Implemented or Were on Track to Fully 

Implement Key Risk Management Practices 31

Selected Programs Have Made Mixed Progress in Applying Key 

IT Acquisition Best Practices 37

Conclusions 55

Recommendations for Executive Action 56

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 56

Appendix I Descriptions of Selected MAIS Programs 61

Appendix II Profiles of Selected MAIS Programs 65

Appendix III Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 75

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 85

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 88

Tables

Table 1: Summary of Selected MAIS Programs’ Time Frames for 

Establishing First Acquisition Program Baselines 17

Table 2: Selected MAIS Programs’ Time Frames and Cost for 

Establishing First Acquisition Program Baselines 19

Table 3: Causes for Delays in Establishing Acquisition Program 

Baselines for the 12 Selected Programs 21

Contents
Page ii GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Table 4: Selected MAIS Programs’ Time Frames for Reaching Full 

Deployment Decision 23

Table 5: Causes for Delays in Reaching Full Deployment Decision 

for the 5 Selected Programs 25

Table 6: Summary of Cost, Schedule, and System Performance 

Results for the Selected Programs 27

Table 7: Selected MAIS Programs’ Schedule Delays Compared 

with First Approved Baseline Schedules or Initial 

Estimates 30

Table 8: Selected MAIS Programs’ Implementation of Risk 

Management Best Practices 31

Table 9: Selected MAIS Programs’ Implementation of 

Requirements Development and Project Planning Best 

Practices 37

Table 10: Selected DOD MAIS Programs 61

Figures

Figure 1: Simplified DOD Organizational Structure 5

Figure 2: Generic Acquisition Model from the Defense Acquisition 

System Framework 7
Page iii GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Abbreviations

AFIPPS Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System

APB acquisition program baseline

BITI Base Information Transport Infrastructure 

CAC2S Common Aviation Command and Control System

CANES Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services

CMMI-ACQ Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition 

DAI Defense Agencies Initiative

DCGS-A Distributed Common Ground System-Army

DCGS-N Distributed Common Ground System-Navy

DEAMS Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System

DHA Defense Health Agency

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOD Department of Defense

ECSS Expeditionary Combat Support System

FIRST Financial Information Resource System 

GCSS-Army Global Combat Support System-Army

GCSS-MC Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps

iEHR Integrated Electronic Health Record

IPPS-A Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army

IT information technology

IV&V independent verification and validation

JMS Joint Space Operations Center Mission System

LMP Logistics Modernization Program

MAIS major automated information system 

Navy ERP Navy Enterprise Resource Planning

NGEN Next Generation Enterprise Network 

OASA (FM&C) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial 

Management and Comptroller

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PMBOK® Project Management Body of Knowledge

TMC Tactical Mission Command

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

February 26, 2015

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) is one of the largest and most 

complex organizations in the world. To meet its mission, it relies heavily 

on the use of information technology (IT). In this regard, according to 

DOD’s IT investment portfolio for fiscal year 2013, the department 

reportedly spent approximately $31.9 billion for its IT investments.1 Of this 

amount, DOD officials reported that approximately $4.4 billion was spent 

on major automated information system (MAIS) programs, which are 

intended to help the department sustain its key operations.

DOD IT investments that fall within one of the following categories are 

designated as MAIS programs: (1) program costs in any single year 

exceed $32 million, (2) total program acquisition costs exceed $126 

million, or (3) total life-cycle costs exceed $378 million.2 The Secretary of 

Defense can also use discretion to designate a program as a MAIS.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated 

that we select, assess, and report on DOD MAIS programs annually 

through March 2018.3 This is the third assessment in our series of annual 

reviews. Our objectives for this assessment were to (1) determine 

whether selected MAIS programs are meeting time frames for 

establishing program baselines and deploying capabilities, (2) describe 

the extent to which selected MAIS programs have changed their planned 

cost and schedule estimates and met performance targets, (3) assess 

selected MAIS programs’ actions to manage risks, and (4) assess the 

extent to which selected MAIS programs have used key IT acquisition 

best practices.

To accomplish the first objective, we selected a sample of 20 programs 

from the 29 DOD MAIS programs that were included in our prior MAIS 

 1

DOD’s IT investment portfolio identifies its IT investments and associated costs within the 

department and its components.

2

10 U.S.C. § 2445a(a). Dollars are in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.

3

Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1078 (Dec. 31, 2011) requires that we report on these 

assessments no later than March 30 of each year from 2013 through 2018.
Page 2 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

reviews plus the 4 MAIS programs included in the other objectives of this 

review (as discussed later). To narrow the list of programs, we included 

only those that were designated as first (or only) increments, as opposed 

to subsequent increments for each program, which resulted in our list of 

20 programs. See appendix I for descriptions of each program.

To determine whether these programs met time frames supported by the 

Defense Science Board for establishing their first acquisition program 

baselines (APB), we determined the amount of time between when 

program officials reported beginning work on their programs4 and the date 

that each program’s first APB was approved and compared it to the 2-

year time frame for developing APBs that was supported by the Defense 

Science Board.5 To determine whether these programs met or planned to 

meet the statutorily established time frame for deploying capabilities, we 

determined for each program the amount of time between the start date 

of the 5-year period within which the law anticipates that each MAIS 

program will achieve a full deployment decision (this date is either 

milestone A in DOD’s acquisition process or, if a program did not have 

milestone A, the date that the program’s preferred alternative was 

selected, which in certain instances can be several years after a program 

was started) and the date that each program actually achieved or planned 

to achieve a full deployment decision.6 We also interviewed officials from 

the selected programs for information on the time they took to establish 

the programs’ first APBs and reach full deployment decision.

 4

This date is different than what DOD considers formal program initiation—the date that a 

program achieves milestone B, which is when a decision is made to allow the program to 

enter into the engineering and manufacturing development phase and award development 

contracts.

5

Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 

Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information 

Technology (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). Pursuant to § 1078(a)(2)(C) of Pub. L. No. 

112-81 (Dec. 31, 2011), we are required to assess whether the DOD MAIS programs 

employ best practices for the acquisition of information technology systems as identified 

by the Defense Science Board along with DOD and GAO.

6

10 U.S.C. § 2445c. Prior to the December 19, 2014, enactment of the Carl Levin and 

Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, if it 

was determined that a program did not reach a full deployment decision within 5 years of 

reaching the milestone A decision or selecting a preferred alternative, DOD was required 

to, among other things, report a critical change to Congress.
Page 3 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

To address the second, third, and fourth objectives, we first identified 

programs from the total population of 40 MAIS programs7 that met several 

criteria, including those that had planned to obligate funds in fiscal year 

2014, represented multiple DOD components, and were not included in 

our first or second MAIS reviews. Eight of DOD’s MAIS programs met all 

of these criteria. From these eight, we first selected the three programs 

that had the highest planned spending for fiscal year 2014.8 For the final 

program, we selected the Navy’s Distributed Common Ground SystemNavy (DCGS-N) Increment 2 program—the only Navy program in the list 

of eight potential programs—to ensure that we had representation from all 

military departments.

To determine the extent to which each of the four programs had changed 

their planned cost and schedule estimates, we compared the program’s 

best cost (in then-year dollars) and schedule estimates established in the 

first APB (where available) to the latest planned total life-cycle cost and 

schedule estimates.9 For the programs that had not established APBs, we 

compared the cost and schedule estimates established in these 

programs’ initial estimates to the latest planned total life-cycle cost 

estimates (in then-year dollars) and schedule estimates.10

Additionally, to determine whether system performance targets were met, 

we compared each program’s system performance targets against actual 

performance data, and reviewed the results of operational assessments 

and program evaluations conducted on the systems. We then aggregated 

and summarized the results of our cost, schedule, and performance 

 7

This was the total number of MAIS programs as of February 2014. 

8

The three programs were: Air Force’s Joint Space Operations Center Mission System 

(JMS) Increment 2; and Army’s Integrated Personnel and Pay System – Army (IPPS-A) 

Increment 2 and Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) Increment 2 programs.

9

An estimate in then-year dollars includes the effects of economic inflation. The first APB 

is established after the program has assessed the viability of various technologies and 

refined user requirements to identify the most appropriate technology solution that 

demonstrates that it can meet users’ needs. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (which 

complements and further explains DOD’s acquisition policies and process) refers to a 

program’s best cost and schedule estimates as objective estimates.

10Prior to establishing an APB, programs establish initial cost and schedule estimates. 

These estimates are based on limited information about the program’s requirements and 

the viability of technologies available to meet the program’s needs. 
Page 4 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

analyses across the programs, as well as developed individual program 

profiles, which are presented in appendix II.

To assess each program’s actions to manage risks, we identified key risk 

management practices from the Software Engineering Institute’s 

Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ) and 

the Project Management Institute’s Guide to the Project Management 

Body of Knowledge (PMBOK®), and assessed each of the four programs 

against these criteria.11 Specifically, for each of the four selected 

programs, we analyzed risk management documentation, such as risk 

logs and mitigation plans, to identify levels of risks and determine the 

status of each program’s key risks and the actions that were taken to 

manage these risks. Additionally, we interviewed program officials about 

the risks and risk management practices that they used.

To determine the extent to which the programs were implementing key 

acquisition best practices, we selected requirements development and 

project planning best practices. We analyzed each selected program’s IT 

acquisition documentation and compared it to best practices identified in 

CMMI-ACQ, PMBOK® Guide practices, and best practices identified by 

GAO.12 We assessed program planning and systems documentation, 

such as system requirements, integrated master schedules, life-cycle cost 

estimates, monthly program management review briefings, and business 

process reengineering analyses, as appropriate. We interviewed program 

officials to obtain additional information on each program’s IT acquisition 

processes in these areas.

 11Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition 

(CMMI-ACQ), Version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010); Project Management 

Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth 

Edition, (Newton Square, Pa.: 2013). “PMBOK” is a trademark of the Project Management 

Institute, Inc.

12CMMI-ACQ; PMBOK® Guide; and GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: 

Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP

(Washington, D.C.: March 2009), Information Technology: DHS Needs to Improve Its 

Independent Acquisition Reviews, GAO-11-581 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011), 

Information Technology: Critical Factors Underlying Successful Major Acquisitions, 

GAO-12-7 (Washington, D.C., Oct. 21, 2011), and GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: 

Best Practices for Project Schedules—Exposure Draft, GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: 

May 2012).
Page 5 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

We conducted this performance audit from April 2014 to February 2015 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix III for a more 

detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology.

DOD is a massive and complex organization. It includes the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, 

numerous defense agencies and field activities, and various unified 

combatant commands that contribute to the oversight of DOD’s 

acquisition programs. Figure 1 presents a simplified depiction of DOD’s 

organizational structure.

Figure 1: Simplified DOD Organizational Structure

a

For acquisition matters, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(USD (AT&L)) generally takes precedence in DOD, including over the secretaries of the military 

departments, after the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

b

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesperson for the commanders of the 

combatant commands, particularly for the operational requirements of the commands.

Background
Page 6 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Of the approximately $31.9 billion that DOD reported spending on its IT 

investments for fiscal year 2013, approximately $4.4 billion was for MAIS 

programs, according to DOD officials. The MAIS programs include a 

range of systems, such as communications systems, business systems 

(e.g., logistics management and financial management systems), and 

command and control systems, which are intended to provide department 

and component officials with easy access to information to effectively 

organize, plan, direct, and monitor mission operations.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics (USD (AT&L)) serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive and 

is the official responsible for supervising the acquisition of MAIS 

programs. The USD (AT&L) has policy and procedural authority for the 

defense acquisition system, which establishes the steps that DOD 

programs generally take as DOD plans, designs, acquires, deploys, 

operates, and maintains its IT systems (discussed in more detail below). 

Additionally, the USD (AT&L) is the principal acquisition official of the 

department, and is the acquisition advisor to the Secretary of Defense. 

The USD (AT&L)’s authority includes directing the military services and 

defense agencies on acquisition matters and making milestone decisions 

for MAIS programs.

Prior to January 2015, MAIS programs were required to comply with 

DOD’s interim instruction that outlined operation of the defense 

acquisition system framework.13 This framework consisted of six models 

for acquiring and deploying a program, including four basic models that 

each describe how a program may be structured based on the type of 

product being acquired (e.g., software-intensive programs and hardwareintensive programs), and two hybrid models that each combine strategies 

from various basic models.14 A generic acquisition model that shows all of 

 13Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, Interim 

Instruction 5000.02 (Nov. 26, 2013). DOD recently updated and finalized this guidance in 

January 2015. This updated framework was not used during this review. Department of 

Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, Instruction 5000.02 (Jan. 7, 2015).

14This DOD interim guidance noted that milestone decision authorities have full latitude to 

tailor programs in the most effective and efficient structure possible, to include eliminating 

phases and combining or eliminating milestones and decision points, unless constrained 

by statute. See Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,

Interim Instruction 5000.02, para. 5.c(2)(b)(5) (Nov. 26, 2013).

DOD’s Acquisition 

Guidance for MAIS

Programs
Page 7 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

the program life-cycle phases and related decision points is shown in 

figure 2 and described following the figure.

Figure 2: Generic Acquisition Model from the Defense Acquisition System 

Framework

• Materiel solution analysis: Refine the initial system solution 

(concept) and create a strategy for acquiring the solution. A 

decision—referred to as milestone A—is made at the end of this 

phase to authorize entry into the technology maturation and risk 

reduction phase.

• Technology maturation and risk reduction: Determine the 

preferred technology solution and validate that it is affordable, 

satisfies program requirements, and has acceptable technical risk. A 

decision—referred to as milestone B—is made at the end of this 

phase to authorize entry of the program into the engineering and 

manufacturing development phase and award development contracts. 

An APB is first established at the milestone B decision point. A 

program’s first APB contains the original life-cycle cost estimate 

(which includes acquisition and operations and maintenance costs), 

the schedule estimate (which consists of major milestones and 

decision points for the program), and performance parameters that 

were approved for that program by the milestone decision authority. 

The first APB is established after the program has refined user 

requirements and identified the most appropriate technology solution 

that demonstrates that it can meet users’ needs.
Page 8 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Engineering and manufacturing development: Develop a system 

and demonstrate through testing that the system meets all program 

requirements. A decision—referred to as milestone C—is made during 

this phase to authorize entry of the system into the production and 

deployment phase or into limited deployment in support of operational 

testing.

• Production and deployment: Achieve an operational capability that 

meets program requirements, as verified through independent 

operational tests and evaluation, and implement the system at all 

applicable locations.

• Operations and support: Operationally sustain the system in the 

most cost-effective manner over its life cycle.

In addition to the three milestone decision points included in this 

framework (milestones A, B, and C), the framework also included four 

other decision points: (1) materiel development decision, which initiated 

the materiel solution analysis phase and authorized officials to conduct 

analyses to assess the potential solutions that can satisfy the program’s 

requirements; (2) capability development document validation, which 

committed the program to the set of requirements that were to be used for 

preliminary design activities, development, and production; (3) 

development request for proposals release, which authorized the release 

of a request for proposals to industry for product development; and (4) full 

deployment decision, which authorized the system to be deployed to all 

remaining locations beyond limited fielding locations.15

MAIS programs must also comply with annual and quarterly reporting 

requirements identified in statute.16 In this regard, each calendar year, 

DOD must submit to Congress budget justification documents on each 

MAIS program, including information on its cost, schedule, and 

performance. Specifically, these programs must report, among other 

things, development and implementation schedules and total acquisition 

and full life-cycle cost estimates and provide a summary of the key 

 15Limited fielding is the deployment of a capability to a limited number of users to test the 

capability in an operational environment. 

1610 U.S.C. §§ 2445b and 2445c.

Statutory Reporting 

Requirements for MAIS 

Programs
Page 9 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

performance parameters for each program. DOD must also provide a 

summary of any significant changes to information previously provided for 

each MAIS program.

Moreover, on a quarterly basis, the program manager for each MAIS 

program is required to provide the senior DOD official responsible for the 

program a written report that identifies any variance in the program’s cost, 

schedule, or performance. Depending on the determination after 

reviewing the variances identified in the quarterly report, the senior DOD 

official must notify the congressional defense committees of any 

programs that have experienced either a significant or critical change. 

During our review, MAIS programs were required to comply with the 

following reporting requirements:

• Significant change. A significant change must be declared if a 

program has experienced a schedule delay of more than 6 months but 

less than a year; estimated total acquisition or full life-cycle cost for 

the program has increased by at least 15 percent but less than 25 

percent; or there has been a significant adverse change in the 

expected performance of the system. If such an event occurs, the 

senior DOD official must notify the congressional defense committees 

in writing no later than 45 days after receiving the quarterly report 

from the program manager.

• Critical change. A critical change must be declared if a program 

failed to achieve a full deployment decision within 5 years after the 

milestone A decision or, if there was no milestone A decision, the date 

when the preferred alternative was selected for the program; 

experienced a schedule delay of 1 year or more; experienced an 

estimated total acquisition or full life-cycle cost increase of 25 percent 

or more over the original estimate; or experienced a change in the 

expected performance of the system that will undermine the ability of 

the system to perform as intended. If such an event occurs, the senior 

DOD official must carry out an evaluation of the program and submit a 

report to the congressional defense committees no later than 60 days 

after receiving the quarterly report from the program manager.17

 17In certain cases, DOD does not need to carry out an evaluation and submit a report. 

Specifically, if the senior DOD official with milestone decision authority determines that a 

critical change is primarily due to an extension of a program and involves minimal 

developmental risk, the official may instead submit to the congressional defense 

committees a certification that the official has made those determinations. This 

certification must be submitted within 45 days after receiving the quarterly report.
Page 10 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

For programs that declare a critical change, the evaluation must assess 

the projected cost and schedule for completing the program if current 

requirements are not modified; assess the projected cost and schedule 

for completing the program based on a reasonable modification of 

requirements; and assess the rough order of magnitude of the cost and 

schedule for any reasonable alternative system or capability.

Since the December 19, 2014, enactment of the Carl Levin and Howard 

P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2015, MAIS programs are now required to declare a significant change—

instead of a critical change—if they fail to achieve a full deployment 

decision within 5 years after the milestone A decision or, if there was no 

milestone A decision, the date when the preferred alternative was 

selected for the program (excluding any time during which program 

activity is delayed as a result of a bid protest).

Entities such as the Project Management Institute, the Software 

Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, and GAO have 

developed and identified best practices to help guide organizations to 

effectively plan and manage their acquisitions of major IT systems, such 

as the MAIS programs.18 Our prior reviews have shown that proper 

implementation of such practices can significantly increase the likelihood 

of delivering promised system capabilities on time and within budget.19

These practices include, but are not limited to:

• Risk management: A process for anticipating problems and taking 

appropriate steps to mitigate risks and minimize their impact on 

program commitments. It involves identifying and documenting risks, 

categorizing them based on their estimated impact, prioritizing them, 

developing risk mitigation strategies, and tracking progress in 

executing the strategies.

 18PMBOK® Guide; CMMI-ACQ; and GAO, Executive Guide: Information Technology 

Investment Management, A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity,

GAO-04-394G (Washington, D.C.: March 2004).

19See, for example, GAO, Information Technology: Foundational Steps Being Taken to 

Make Needed FBI Systems Modernization Management Improvements, GAO-04-842

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2004) and Information Technology: FBI Is Implementing Key 

Acquisition Methods on Its New Case Management System, but Related Agencywide 

Guidance Needs to Be Improved, GAO-08-1014 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2008).

Best Practices for 

Managing IT Acquisition 

Programs
Page 11 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Requirements development: Requirements establish what the 

system is to do, how well it is to do it, and how it is to interact with 

other systems. Appropriate requirements development involves 

eliciting and developing customer and stakeholder requirements, and 

analyzing them to ensure that they will meet users’ needs and 

expectations. It also consists of validating requirements as the system 

is being developed to ensure that the final system to be deployed will 

perform as intended in an operational environment.

• Project planning: Establishes project objectives and outlines the 

course of action required to attain those objectives. It also provides a 

means to track, review, and report progress and performance of the 

project by defining project activities and developing cost and schedule 

estimates, among other things. It also includes business process 

reengineering efforts, which is an approach to redesigning the way 

work is done to better support the organization’s mission and reduce 

costs; including identifying; analyzing; and redesigning an 

organization’s core business processes. This practice also includes 

planning for the use of an independent verification and validation 

(IV&V) agent—a process whereby organizations can reduce risks by 

having a knowledgeable, independent party determine that the system 

or product fulfills its intended purpose.

We have previously reported and made recommendations on DOD’s 

efforts to implement MAIS programs.

• In May 2011, we found that the Air Force’s Joint Space Operations 

Center Mission System (JMS) faced development challenges and 

risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning to 

deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and 

more manageable increments.20 We recommended, among other 

things, that DOD ensure that key program risks are fully assessed to 

help ensure cost, schedule, and performance goals are met. We also 

noted in the report that implementing this recommendation may 

require dividing the program into separate increments, which the Air 

Force later did in December 2011. DOD agreed with this 

recommendation and took actions to implement it.

 20GAO, Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering 

Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities, GAO-11-545 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 27, 2011).

GAO Previously Reported 

on DOD’s Challenges in 

Implementing MAIS 

Programs
Page 12 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• We reported in March 2013 that large variations existed in the extent 

to which 14 selected programs stayed within planned cost and 

schedule estimates and met system performance targets.21 We also 

noted that three selected programs—Air Force’s Defense Enterprise 

Accounting and Management System, Army’s Global Combat Support 

System-Army, and Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and 

Enterprise Services—demonstrated mixed results in effectively

defining and managing risks of various levels, and in implementing 

key requirements management and project monitoring and control 

best practices. We made recommendations to the Army program to 

address weaknesses in its risk management and IV&V practices. 

DOD concurred with these recommendations and has since taken 

actions to address the risk management-related recommendation.

• Two months later, in May 2013, we reported that the Army’s 

Integrated Personnel and Pay System–Army program had generally 

complied with DOD’s business process reengineering guidance for 

asserting compliance with the business system modernization 

requirements in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. This act requires that, prior to 

the obligation of funds, DOD certify that any defense business system 

program with a total cost of more than $1 million has, among other 

things, taken appropriate business process reengineering efforts. 

However, the program provided limited documentation of root cause 

analyses that would trace symptoms back to the underlying factors 

that required the program to reengineer its business processes.22 We 

recommended, among other things, that DOD ensure that complete 

documentation be provided as part of the fiscal year 2014 certification 

and approval process for the program. DOD agreed with this 

recommendation. Since our report was issued, the Integrated 

Personnel and Pay System–Army program was restructured in 

response to findings of an independent program assessment in 2013. 

As a result, the Army did not request funds to be certified for the 

program in fiscal year 2014. Program officials stated that, 

subsequently, the program’s fiscal year 2014 and 2015 funds were 

certified based, in part, on the program’s “problem statement” 

 21GAO, Major Automated Information Systems: Selected Defense Programs Need to 

Implement Key Acquisition Practices, GAO-13-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2013).

22GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Further Actions Needed to Address 

Challenges and Improve Accountability, GAO-13-557 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2013).
Page 13 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

document, which, according to officials, addressed business process 

reengineering. Officials also added that the program plans to submit a 

business process reengineering assessment for certification for its 

fiscal year 2016 funds.

• Additionally, we determined in November 2013 that the Army had 

made progress using the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) to 

support its industrial operations.23 However, because the Army had 

not established a process for tracking LMP’s financial benefits, it was 

not in a position to determine whether it was realizing a return on its 

sizeable investment in this program. As a result, we recommended 

that DOD develop and implement a process to track the extent of 

financial benefits realized from the use of LMP during the remaining 

course of its life cycle. Further, this process should be linked with the 

LMP performance baseline. The Army concurred with our 

recommendation; however, as of November 2014, the Army had yet 

to finalize its plans for measuring financial benefits.

• Moreover, about a year ago—in March 2014—we reported that there 

were large variations in the extent to which programs had changed 

their planned cost and schedule estimates and met system 

performance targets.24 We also noted that three selected programs—

Defense Health Agency’s Theater Medical Information Program-Joint 

Increment 2, Navy’s Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps 

program, and the Defense Logistics Agency’s Defense Agencies 

Initiative program—had demonstrated mixed progress in effectively 

defining and managing risks and in implementing key requirements 

management and project monitoring and control best practices. We 

made recommendations to the three programs to address respective 

weaknesses in their risk management, requirements management, 

and project monitoring and control practices. The department 

concurred with six of our eight recommendations and partially 

 23GAO, Defense Logistics: Army Should Track Financial Benefits Realized from its 

Logistics Modernization Program, GAO-14-51 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2013).

24GAO, Major Automated Information Systems: Selected Defense Programs Need to 

Implement Key Acquisition Practices, GAO-14-309 (Washington, D.C., Mar. 27, 2014).
Page 14 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

concurred with the other two.25 Program officials have recently taken 

steps aimed at addressing several recommendations.

A majority of the 20 programs selected for our review had not established 

their baselines within 2 years from starting work on their programs. 

Specifically, 8 programs established an APB within 2 years, while 12 did 

not. While a recommendation by the Defense Science Board26

encouraged programs to be delivered in smaller increments and the 

Board supported programs establishing their cost and schedule baselines 

within 2 years, these 12 programs took, on average, 5 years and 2 

months and spent about $452 million on their programs prior to 

establishing their baselines. The delays in establishing baselines have 

resulted in multiple negative implications, including limited oversight and 

accountability. For example, programs that have not established APBs 

are subject to less DOD executive-level and congressional oversight 

compared to MAIS programs that have established APBs. These 

programs are also able to proceed without being measurable against 

cost, schedule, and performance targets. Until programs establish their 

cost and schedule baselines within 2 years, they may continue to spend 

hundreds of millions of dollars with limited oversight and accountability.

A majority of the 20 selected programs met or planned to meet the 5-year 

statutorily established time frame to decide to fully deploy system 

 25DOD partially concurred with our recommendations to update the Defense Health 

Agency program’s capabilities baseline to reflect program scope changes and trace all 

capabilities to their associated requirements in the requirements traceability matrix. In its 

partial concurrence, the department stated that the program office will update that 

program’s capabilities baseline to reflect program scope changes and will ensure that all 

future program capabilities are traced to their associated requirements in the appropriate 

requirements traceability matrices. However, DOD also stated that there is no benefit in 

updating the requirements documentation for capabilities that have already been built, 

tested, and deployed. We disagree with that assertion. Without updating its requirements 

documentation to reflect all program capabilities and how each capability will be 

addressed, key agency governing boards and congressional committees will not have a 

clear picture of what capabilities were originally planned to be delivered and how, and 

whether there are any gaps between what was planned and actually delivered.

26The Defense Science Board is made up of experts that advise DOD on a variety of 

topics, including acquisition best practices. Pursuant to § 1078(a)(2)(C) of Pub. L. No. 

112-81 (Dec. 31, 2011), we are required to assess whether the DOD MAIS programs 

employ best practices for the acquisition of IT systems as identified by the Defense 

Science Board along with DOD and GAO.

Many Programs 

Spent Years to 

Establish Cost and 

Schedule Baselines; 

Over Half Were 

Positioned to Meet 

Time Frames for 

Deploying 

Capabilities
Page 15 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

capabilities.27 About half of the programs that met or planned to meet this 

condition had been positioned to do so because they had been 

restructured and split into smaller, incremental programs, which is 

consistent with a Defense Science Board recommendation, Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and a statutory requirement to 

use incremental contracting to the maximum extent practicable for major 

IT acquisitions.28 Four of the five programs that were unable to meet the 

time frame, however, satisfied their statutory reporting obligations to notify 

Congress of the delay. Continued submissions of such reports to 

Congress, along with the subsequent oversight provided by DOD and key 

congressional committees, will help to ensure that programs are held 

accountable for delivering the intended functionality to users within 

agreed-upon costs and time frames.

In March 2009, the Defense Science Board reported on the need for the 

department to establish a new acquisition process that could 

accommodate the rapid evolution of IT.29 Specifically, the board found 

that DOD’s acquisition process was too long and cumbersome to fit the 

needs of the many IT systems that require continuous changes and 

upgrades. Accordingly, the board proposed a new acquisition model that 

was intended to encourage programs to be delivered incrementally, in 

smaller subsets of capabilities. As part of this model, the board supported 

an acquisition cycle that allowed a program to have up to 2 years to 

establish a cost and schedule baseline.

A USD (AT&L) Senior Acquisition Analyst and Primary Action Officer for 

our review stated that DOD did not incorporate this suggested 2-year time 

 27As specified by law, the start date of the 5-year period is milestone A or the date that the 

preferred alternative is selected. This date may be the same as the start of a program or it 

may occur at some point after program start, which can be several years later. It generally 

occurs before a program establishes its APB.

2841 U.S.C. § 2308 and the FAR implementing regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 39.103; OMB, 

Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular No. A-130 Revised.

29Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 

Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information 

Technology (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

Over Half of Selected 

MAIS Programs Had Not 

Established Baselines 

within 2 Years of Starting 

Work
Page 16 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

frame in the department’s interim defense acquisition system framework30

because the department did not want to force programs to commit to cost 

and schedule parameters that were not yet understood well enough to 

baseline. However, as we previously reported, the Defense Science 

Board’s recommendation to break up large and complex programs into 

smaller increments enables programs to reduce risk and increases the 

likelihood that each program will achieve its cost, schedule, and 

performance goals.31 Thus a program that requires more than 2 years to 

commit to a cost and schedule baseline is likely too large and complex 

and could benefit from being divided into smaller increments.

Moreover, we have previously concluded that prior IT projects too often 

have produced failed results—that is, projects with multimillion dollar cost 

overruns and schedule delays measured in years, with questionable 

mission-related achievements.32 To help resolve these issues, federal 

statute and OMB guidance have called for agencies to deliver 

investments in smaller increments, in order to reduce investment risk, 

deliver capabilities more quickly, and facilitate the adoption of emerging 

technologies.33 In 2010, OMB placed a renewed emphasis on incremental 

IT development by calling for major IT investments to deliver functionality 

at least every 12 months. Subsequently, OMB made this directive more 

stringent, and annual budget guidance now states that each project 

associated with major IT investments is to deliver functionality every 6 

months.34

 30As discussed in footnote 13, DOD recently updated and finalized this guidance in 

January 2015. This updated framework was not used during this review. Department of 

Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, Instruction 5000.02 (Jan. 7, 2015).

31GAO, Information Technology: Agencies Need to Establish and Implement Incremental 

Development Policies, GAO-14-361 (Washington, D.C., May 1, 2014).

32GAO, OMB and Agencies Need to More Effectively Implement Major Initiatives to Save 

Billions of Dollars, GAO-13-796T (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013). 

3341 U.S.C. § 2308 and the FAR implementing regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 39.103; OMB, 

Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular No. A-130 Revised.

34OMB, Guidance on Exhibits 53 and 300—Information Technology and E-Government

(2013); Guidance on Exhibits 53 and 300—Information Technology and E-Government

(2012); Guidance on Exhibit 300—Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, and Management of 

Information Technology Capital Assets (2011).
Page 17 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Of the 20 selected MAIS programs in our review, 8 programs had 

established an APB within 2 years of starting the program, while 12 did 

not.35 Table 1 provides a summary of the selected programs’ time frames 

for establishing their first APBs.

Table 1: Summary of Selected MAIS Programs’ Time Frames for Establishing First Acquisition Program Baselines

Component Program

Established an acquisition 

program baseline within 2 years 

of program start

Did not establish an acquisition 

program baseline within 2 years of 

program start

Air Force Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay 

System (AFIPPS)



Base Information Transport 

Infrastructure (BITI) Wired 



BITI Wireless 

Defense Enterprise Accounting and 

Management System (DEAMS) 

Increment 1



Expeditionary Combat Support System 

(ECSS) Increment 1a 

Financial Information Resource System 

(FIRST)



Joint Space Operations Center Mission 

System (JMS) Increment 1



Army Distributed Common Ground System –

Army (DCGS-A) Increment 1



Global Combat Support System – Army 

(GCSS-Army)



Integrated Personnel and Pay System 

– Army (IPPS-A) Increment 1



Tactical Mission Command (TMC) 

Defense 

Health 

Agency 

(DHA)

Integrated Electronic Health Record 

(iEHR) Increment 1



Defense 

Logistics 

Agency

(DLA)

Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) 

Increment 1



 35The time to establish an APB was based on the time from when program officials 

reported starting work on their programs until the APB was approved by the milestone 

decision authority. See app. I for descriptions of each program.
Page 18 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Component Program

Established an acquisition 

program baseline within 2 years 

of program start

Did not establish an acquisition 

program baseline within 2 years of 

program start

EProcurement 

Navy Common Aviation Command and 

Control System (CAC2S) Increment 1



Consolidated Afloat Networks and 

Enterprise Services (CANES)



Distributed Common Ground System –

Navy (DCGS-N) Increment 1



Global Combat Support SystemMarine Corps (GCSS-MC) Increment 1

Navy Enterprise Resource Planning 

(ERP)



Next Generation Enterprise Network 

(NGEN) Increment 1



Total 8 12

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. I GAO-15-282

Note: See app. I for descriptions of each program.

a

Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System was canceled in December 2012, about 9 years 

after the program began. It never established an acquisition program baseline.

The eight programs that had established an APB within 2 years took, on 

average, 1 year and 2 months and spent about $33.9 million to do so. For 

example,

• Navy’s DCGS-N Increment 1 program took 1 year, 11 months, and 

spent approximately $51 million before establishing its first APB;

• Air Force’s BITI Wired program took 5 months and expended about 

$4 million before establishing its first APB; and

• Defense Health Agency’s iEHR Increment 1 program took 1 year, 11 

months, and spent about $96 million before establishing its first APB.

In comparison, the 12 programs that did not establish APBs within 2 

years took, on average, 5 years, 2 months, and spent about $452 million. 

For instance,
Page 19 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Navy’s NGEN Increment 1 program took 6 years, 5 months, and 

expended approximately $2.82 billion prior to establishing its first 

APB;36

• Army’s GCSS-Army program took 4 years, 9 months, and spent 

approximately $398 million prior to establishing its first APB; and

• Air Force’s ECSS Increment 1 program took about 9 years, 2 months, 

and expended about $1.03 billion before it was canceled and program 

shutdown activities (e.g., contract closeout activities) were complete; it 

never established an APB.

Table 2 provides a summary of the time it took the 20 selected MAIS 

programs to establish their first APBs and the amount each program 

spent prior to establishing those APBs.

Table 2: Selected MAIS Programs’ Time Frames and Cost for Establishing First Acquisition Program Baselines

Component Program

Time to establish first acquisition 

program baseline

Amount spent prior to 

establishing first acquisition 

program baseline

($ in millions)

Air Force DEAMS Increment 1 8 years, 6 months $313

AFIPPS 6 years, 3 monthsa 102b

JMS Increment 1 4 years 141

BITI Wireless 10 months 1

FIRST 6 months 4

BITI Wired 5 months 4

ECSS Increment 1 9 years, 2 monthsc 1,030c

Army DCGS-A Increment 1 5 years, 6 months 153

GCSS-Army 4 years, 9 months 398

IPPS-A Increment 1 2 years, 6 months 85

TMC 6 months 1

DHA iEHR Increment 1 1 year, 11 months 96

DLA EProcurement 4 years, 5 months 221

DAI Increment 1 3 years, 7 months 88

 36In June 2013, about 6 years after NGEN was initiated, USD (AT&L) decided that the 

program’s cost estimate in the December 2013 MAIS Annual Report would serve as the 

APB for the program.
Page 20 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Component Program

Time to establish first acquisition 

program baseline

Amount spent prior to 

establishing first acquisition 

program baseline

($ in millions)

Navy NGEN Increment 1 6 years, 5 months 2,818

GCSS-MC Increment 1 3 years, 8 months 69

CAC2S Increment 1 3 years 8

CANES 2 years 73

DCGS-N Increment 1 1 year, 11 months 51

Navy ERP 1 year, 1 month 42

Source: GAO analysis based on agency data and data reported by program officials. I GAO-15-282

a

As of November 2014, the Air Force’s AFIPPS had not yet established its first APB; it planned to do 

so in December 2015, about 6 years and 3 months after the program was initiated.

b

According to program officials, as of October 2014, the Air Force’s AFIPPS had spent approximately 

$102 million since the program began; the program had not yet established its first APB, which it 

planned to do in December 2015.

c

Air Force’s ECSS Increment 1 was canceled before establishing an APB—thus these figures 

represent the time and money it spent prior to being canceled and completing shutdown activities.

Of the eight programs that established their first APBs within 2 years, two 

were positioned to meet the 2-year time frame due, in part, to the fact that 

they were being developed incrementally. Specifically, the BITI Wired and 

BITI Wireless programs were started after a prior MAIS program—the 

Combat Information Transport System37—was restructured and split into 

multiple smaller programs, including these two BITI MAIS programs and 

seven non-MAIS programs. This is to the credit of these programs since, 

as previously mentioned, faster development of smaller increments of IT 

programs has been advocated by OMB and the Defense Science Board. 

Additionally, the recently passed Federal Information Technology 

Acquisition Reform provisions of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” 

McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 require 

agency chief information officers to certify that IT investments are 

appropriately implementing incremental development.38

Program officials from the 12 programs that did not establish APBs in 2 

years attributed the delay to multiple reasons, including, among others, 

 37The Combat Information Transport System program portfolio was intended to provide 

the information infrastructure, network management, and network defense capabilities to 

meet the multimedia information transport needs of Air Force bases.

38See Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 831(a) (Dec. 19, 2014).
Page 21 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

the addition of new requirements and program restructures. Table 3 

identifies causes cited by the programs for the delays in establishing the 

APBs.

Table 3: Causes for Delays in Establishing Acquisition Program Baselines for the 12 Selected Programs

Component/program

More 

time 

needed 

for 

planning 

activities

Changes to 

acquisition 

or 

deployment 

strategies

Increased 

scope

Contract 

award 

delays

Contractor 

performance 

problems

Organizational 

restructure

Underestimated 

system 

development 

complexity

Air Force

DEAMS Increment 1   

AFIPPS  

ECSS Increment 1    

JMS Increment 1  

Army

DCGS-A Increment 1   

GCSS-Army  

IPPS-A Increment 1  

DLA

DAI Increment 1 

EProcurement  

Navy

NGEN Increment 1   

GCSS-MC Increment 1    

CAC2S Increment 1 

Total 10 7 3 3 2 1 3

Source: GAO analysis based on data reported by DOD officials. I GAO-15-282

The delay in establishing baselines for these major, multibillion dollar IT 

acquisition programs has multiple negative implications. Specifically,

• MAIS programs that have not established APBs receive less oversight 

from USD (AT&L) and Congress than those that have established 

APBs. For example, while baselined MAIS programs are required to 

submit quarterly reports to USD (AT&L), which include information on 

cost, schedule, and performance, as well as assessments from the 
Page 22 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

program managers, unbaselined MAIS programs generally are not 

required to do so.39 Moreover, the additional oversight provided by 

USD (AT&L) in conducting monthly deep-dive reviews on baselined 

programs is generally not extended to unbaselined MAIS programs. 

Further, while the Secretary of Defense is required to submit to 

Congress annual budget justification documents for both baselined 

and unbaselined MAIS programs, DOD guidance further clarifies that 

unbaselined programs should limit cost information to 4 years of 

funding needs and are not required to provide schedule information in 

the reports.

• The delays in establishing program baselines also have implications 

for these programs’ accountability. In the absence of baselines, 

programs lack cost, schedule, and performance targets that they need 

to meet. As a result, programs are able to proceed without focusing 

on meeting such targets.

• Lastly, as previously mentioned, OMB guidance calls for IT 

investments to deliver rapidly, incrementally, and every 6 months. 

However, delays in establishing baselines reduce programs’ ability to 

meet OMB’s requirements.

Until programs establish their cost and schedule baselines within 2 years 

of beginning work, they may continue to spend hundreds of millions of 

dollars with limited oversight and accountability and fail to meet the 

incremental and rapid development requirements called for in federal law 

and OMB guidance.

As established by law,40 a MAIS program should achieve a full 

deployment decision (which authorizes system deployment to all planned 

locations) within 5 years of milestone A or the date that the preferred 

alternative is selected for the program. This date may be the same as the 

start of a program, or it may occur at some point afterward, which can be 

several years later. If it is determined that a program has not reached a 

full deployment decision within 5 years, DOD is required to, among other 

 39According to a USD (AT&L) Senior Acquisition Analyst and Primary Action Officer for 

our review, unbaselined programs are not required to submit quarterly reports to USD 

(AT&L) unless the program’s milestone decision authority or the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics requests that they do so. 

4010 U.S.C. § 2445c.

Most Selected MAIS 

Programs Met or Planned 

to Meet Time Frames for 

Deploying Capabilities
Page 23 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

things, report to Congress. Of the 20 selected MAIS programs, 11 

programs reached or planned to reach their full deployment decisions 

within 5 years, while 5 programs did not; for the remaining 4 programs, 

the 5-year time frame was not applicable.41

Table 4 summarizes the selected programs’ time frames for reaching a 

full deployment decision.

Table 4: Selected MAIS Programs’ Time Frames for Reaching Full Deployment Decision

Component Program

Reached full deployment decision within 

5 years after milestone A decision or 

selecting preferred alternative

(actual or planned time)

Did not reach full deployment decision 

within 5 years after milestone A decision 

or selecting preferred alternative

(actual or planned time)

Air Force AFIPPSa,b 

(5 years, 3 months)

BITI Wiredb 

(4 years, 6 months)

BITI Wireless 

(1 year, 7 months)

DEAMS Increment 1b 

(10 years)

ECSS Increment 1  c

FIRST Not applicabled Not applicabled

JMS Increment 1 

(2 years, 3 months)

Army DCGS-A Increment 1 

(5 years)

GCSS-Army 

(4 years, 5 months)

IPPS-A Increment 1 

(3 years, 6 months)

TMC Not applicabled Not applicabled

 41The 5-year time frame was not applicable for 3 programs because they achieved full 

deployment decision before the 5-year requirement went into effect. One program—

Defense Logistics Agency’s DAI Increment 1 program—was not a MAIS program at the 

time it achieved full deployment decision; as such, the 5-year time frame was not 

applicable to it.
Page 24 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Component Program

Reached full deployment decision within 

5 years after milestone A decision or 

selecting preferred alternative

(actual or planned time)

Did not reach full deployment decision 

within 5 years after milestone A decision 

or selecting preferred alternative

(actual or planned time)

DHA iEHR Increment 1b 

(3 years, 8 months)

DLA DAI Increment 1 Not applicablee Not applicablee

EProcurement 

(4 years, 11 months)

Navy CAC2S Increment 1 

(2 years, 6 months)f

CANESb 

(6 years, 6 months)

DCGS-N Increment 1 

(2 years, 7 months)

GCSS-MC Increment 1b 

(10 years, 4 months)

Navy ERP Not applicabled Not applicabled

NGEN Increment 1b 

(4 years, 4 months)

Total 11 5

Source: GAO analysis based on agency data. I GAO-15-282

a

As of November 2014, AFIPPS had not established an APB; as a result, its estimated time frame for 

reaching full deployment decision was based on the program’s latest pre-baseline schedule estimate, 

as of November 2014.

b

As of November 2014, the AFIPPS, BITI Wired, CANES, DEAMS, and GCSS-MC programs had not 

yet reached full deployment decision; the time frames listed are based on their latest estimates for 

achieving full deployment decision, as of November 2014.

c

After the start of its 5-years to full deployment decision time frame, the ECSS program went on for 7 

years and 7 months before it was canceled by DOD in December 2012. It never established an APB 

or reached full deployment decision.

d

The 5-years-to-full deployment decision time frame was not applicable for FIRST, TMC, or Navy 

ERP because those programs achieved full deployment decision before the 5-year condition went 

into effect.

e

DAI Increment 1 was not a MAIS program at the time it achieved full deployment decision; as such, 

the 5-year condition was not applicable to it.

f

CAC2S achieved full deployment decision within the 5-year time frame; however, this was over 11 

years after the program had established its first APB. In April 2009, CAC2S experienced a critical 

change and program restructure because it could not achieve initial operational capability (now called 

full deployment decision) as planned due to significant system performance problems. The program’s 

5-year time frame did not begin until after this program restructure.

For the 11 programs that met or planned to meet the 5-year time frame, 

these programs reached their full deployment decision within, on average, 

3 years, 7 months. Of these 11 programs, 5 had been restructured and 

split into smaller, incremental programs. For example, the Air Force’s 
Page 25 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

JMS program was restructured into multiple increments after an 

independent program assessment found that the plan to implement the 

program in a single increment increased program risk. According to a 

USD (AT&L) Senior Acquisition Analyst and Primary Action Officer for our 

review, the 5-year time frame for reaching full deployment decision 

encouraged DOD to start breaking up programs into smaller, more 

incremental programs in order to meet this condition.

Of the five programs that did not reach a full deployment decision within 

the 5-year period, one program—Air Force’s ECSS—was canceled about 

9 years after the program began. The remaining four programs planned to 

reach full deployment decision within, on average, 8 years. Program 

officials attributed these longer development time frames to multiple 

causes, including the addition of new requirements and system 

performance issues. Table 5 identifies causes cited by the programs for 

the delays in reaching full deployment decision.

Table 5: Causes for Delays in Reaching Full Deployment Decision for the 5 Selected Programs

Component/ 

program

More 

time 

needed 

for 

planning 

activities

Changes to 

acquisition 

or 

deployment 

strategies

Increased 

scope

Contract 

award 

delays

Contractor 

performance 

problems

System 

performance 

problems

Underestimated 

system 

development 

complexity

Delays in 

availability 

of test 

environment

Budget 

delays 

and 

reduction

Air Force

AFIPPS  

DEAMS 

Increment 1

  

ECSS 

Increment 1

    

Navy

CANES   

GCSS-MC 

Increment 1



Total 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1

Source: GAO analysis based on data reported by DOD officials. I GAO-15-282

These delays for the five programs have resulted in capabilities not being 

delivered for several years. For example, as previously discussed, as of 

November 2014, the Air Force’s DEAMS program expected to reach full 

deployment decision and deploy capabilities in May 2015, which is 10 

years after the program selected its preferred development approach and 

nearly 12 years after the program was initiated.
Page 26 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

As required by law,42 four of the five programs that did not reach their full 

deployment decision within the 5-year time frame (Air Force’s DEAMS 

and ECSS, and Navy’s CANES and GCSS-MC) reported to 

congressional defense committees their critical changes.43 Also, as 

required by law, these four programs conducted evaluations on (1) 

projected costs and schedules for completing their programs if current 

requirements were not modified, (2) projected costs and schedules for 

completing their programs based on reasonable modifications of their 

requirements, and (3) rough order of magnitude costs and schedules for 

any reasonable alternative systems or capabilities.

These evaluations and the subsequent oversight provided by Congress, 

OMB, and DOD helped to improve the programs when possible and 

prevent them from spending additional resources when they were not 

delivering needed capabilities to users. For example, Navy’s GCSS-MC 

Increment 1 program reported a critical change in February 2013 because 

its full deployment decision date had slipped by more than 1 year. 

Subsequently, based on the program’s evaluation of the critical change, 

the Marine Corps removed the second of the two planned releases from 

the program due to technical challenges experienced when developing 

that release. Continued reporting to Congress and the additional 

oversight provided by DOD and Congress when programs do not reach a 

full deployment decision in 5 years will help to ensure that programs are 

held accountable for delivering the intended functionality to users within 

agreed-upon costs and time frames.

 4210 U.S.C. § 2445c. 

43As of November 2014, while the AFIPPS program had not yet established an APB, its 

latest estimate for achieving full deployment decision was March 2019, which would be 

more than 5 years after the start of its 5-year period. Since the program has not yet 

experienced a breach of the 5-year period, it is not yet required to report to the 

congressional defense committees.
Page 27 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

The four MAIS programs selected for our study varied in the extent to 

which they had changed their planned cost and schedule estimates and 

met system performance targets. Of the four selected MAIS programs, all 

had cost and schedule data available, while two had system performance 

data available. Of these four programs, two had experienced changes in 

their cost estimates, while two did not. Additionally, three programs had 

experienced changes in their schedule estimates—all of which were

schedule slippages—and one program did not experience a change in its 

schedule. Further, of the two programs that had system performance data 

available, one program reported meeting its system performance targets, 

while the other did not meet its targets. Table 6 provides a summary of 

the cost, schedule, and performance results for the four selected 

programs.

Table 6: Summary of Cost, Schedule, and System Performance Results for the Selected Programs

Component/

program

No change in 

cost estimate

Change in 

cost estimate 

(%)

No change in 

schedule 

estimate

Change in 

schedule 

estimate

Met system 

performance 

targets

Did not fully meet 

system performance 

targets

Air Force

JMS Increment 2   5 months 

Army

IPPS-A Increment 2a,b  4  2 years

LMP Increment 2   

Navy

DCGS-N Increment 2b,c  7  3.5 years

Total 2 2 1 3 1 1

Legend:  cost increase  cost decrease  schedule slippage  schedule acceleration

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials. I GAO-15-282

a

IPPS-A Increment 2 had not established an APB. As such, we compared the program’s latest lifecycle cost estimate to the Army’s initial cost estimate for the program. We also compared the 

program’s latest schedule estimate for achieving milestone B to its initial schedule estimate for that 

milestone. These pre-APB cost and schedule estimates were based on limited information about the 

program’s requirements.

b

System performance data for the DCGS-N Increment 2 and IPPS-A Increment 2 programs were not 

available because these programs were early in their planning phases and no portions of the systems 

were fully developed.

c

As of November 2014, DCGS-N Increment 2 had not established an APB. As such, we compared 

the latest estimate developed by the program office to its initial estimate.

Selected MAIS 

Programs Changed 

Cost and Schedule 

Estimates, and One 

Did Not Fully Meet 

Performance Targets
Page 28 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Two of the four selected programs had experienced changes in their 

planned total life-cycle cost estimates, while two did not experience 

changes in these estimates. Specifically, Army’s IPPS-A Increment 2 had 

reduced its estimate, and Navy’s DCGS-N Increment 2 had increased its 

estimate; these two programs had not yet established approved APBs.

• As of November 2014, IPPS-A Increment 2’s latest, pre-APB planned 

total life-cycle cost estimate was about $2.0 billion, which was an 

approximately 4 percent decrease from the program’s initial April 2014 

estimate of about $2.1 billion. According to program officials, this 

decrease was due, in part, to a change in the number of expected 

labor hours and the average labor rates, and the program’s 

negotiation of sustainment costs with the Defense Information 

Systems Agency, which is to host the system.

• The latest life-cycle cost estimate for Navy’s DCGS-N Increment 2 

program as of November 2014 had increased about 7 percent 

compared to its initial estimate from February 2009—from 

approximately $2.64 billion to about $2.82 billion.44 DCGS-N officials 

attributed the increase, in part, to having a better understanding of the 

program, changes in the installation schedule based on ship 

availability, and a 3-year extension in the program’s planned 

operations and maintenance phase.

As of November 2014, the other two selected programs had not 

experienced any cost increases or decreases in their planned total lifecycle cost estimates.

• The latest cost estimate (as of November 2014) for Army’s LMP 

Increment 2 program was about $729.9 million, which is the same as 

the program’s first APB estimate, which was established in August 

2013.

• Air Force’s JMS Increment 2 program’s latest cost estimate was 

approximately $1.1 billion, which is consistent with its first APB 

established in June 2013.

 44DCGS-N Increment 2’s latest cost estimate was developed by the program office; it was 

not an APB and had not been approved by the program’s milestone decision authority.

Two Selected Programs 

Experienced Changes in 

Their Cost Estimates
Page 29 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Three of the four selected programs experienced slippages in their 

schedule estimates. These delays ranged from about 5 months to 

approximately 3.5 years.

• Compared to its first APB schedule established in June 2013, Air 

Force’s JMS Increment 2 program had experienced about a 5-month 

slippage in the planned date of milestone C—from the end of March 

2016 to early September 2016. Program officials attributed this delay 

to a variety of factors, including fiscal year 2013 and 2014 funding 

reductions (e.g., rescissions in previously approved budget authority 

and automatic budget cuts—referred to as sequestration); 

implementation of newly mandated information assurance and cyber 

testing requirements; and impacts from the October 2013 government 

shutdown.

• Army’s IPPS-A Increment 2 program experienced about a 2-year 

delay in the planned date for milestone B (which authorizes a program 

to begin system development) compared with its initial schedule—

from the first quarter of fiscal year 2013 to December 2014. Program 

officials attributed this slippage, in part, to the IPPS-A program being 

directed to conduct an assessment of the sufficiency of the program’s 

design, the implementation of recommendations based on that 

assessment, the source selection process taking about 2 years, and a 

restructuring to deliver the program incrementally through waves and 

releases.

• Navy’s DCGS-N Increment 2 program experienced about a 3.5-year 

slip in the planned date for milestone B compared with its initial 

schedule—from the third quarter of fiscal year 2012 to the second 

quarter of fiscal year 2016. Navy officials attributed the slippage 

primarily to the program taking longer than planned to analyze the 

alternative approaches for developing the system once the program 

decided to add a cloud-based solution to its analysis. Program 

officials also attributed the schedule slip to 2013 and 2014 automatic 

budget cuts (i.e., sequestration) and continuing resolutions.

One of the selected programs did not experience a change in its schedule 

estimate. Specifically, the Army’s LMP Increment 2 program’s schedule 

estimate did not change.

Table 7 provides a summary of the slippages experienced by the selected 

MAIS programs.

Three Selected Programs 

Experienced Schedule 

Delays
Page 30 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Table 7: Selected MAIS Programs’ Schedule Delays Compared with First Approved Baseline Schedules or Initial Estimates

Component Program

Schedule slippage since first acquisition 

program baseline (delayed milestone)

Schedule slippage since initial 

estimate (delayed milestone)a

Air Force JMS Increment 2 5 months (milestone C)

Army IPPS-A Increment 2 2 years (milestone B)

LMP Increment 2 None

Navy DCGS-N Increment 2 3.5 years (milestone B)

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials. I GAO-15-282

a

IPPS-A Increment 2 and DCGS-N Increment 2 had not yet established program baselines. As such, 

we compared these programs’ latest schedule estimates to their initial schedule estimates.

One of the four selected programs reported fully meeting its system 

performance targets, one did not fully meet its targets, and two programs 

did not yet have system performance data. Specifically, the Army’s LMP 

Increment 2 program reported meeting its system performance targets, as 

of September 2014. In particular, while the program had identified 157 

deficiencies with LMP Increment 2, wave 2, capabilities during 

developmental tests from January through September 2014, the program 

reported that these deficiencies were fully addressed by September 2014.

By contrast, the Air Force’s JMS Increment 2 program reported 

experiencing system performance problems, which resulted in the system 

not performing as intended. Specifically, the program had identified 

category 1 and category 2 urgent deficiencies45 prior to and during 

developmental and integrated testing from March through September 

2014. As of November 2014, the program reported that it had addressed 

96 percent of the category 1 deficiencies and 65 percent of the category 2 

deficiencies. Program officials expected to address the remaining 

deficiencies in the program’s next two releases, which were expected to 

be fielded beginning in October 2015 and February 2016, respectively.

Two programs did not yet have system performance data available. 

Specifically, Navy’s DCGS-N Increment 2 and Army’s IPPS-A Increment 

2 programs were in the planning stages and had not yet fully developed 

any portion of their systems.

 45Category 1 deficiencies are those that, among other things, critically restrict the combat 

readiness capabilities of the using organization; category 2 deficiencies are those that 

impede or constrain successful mission operations.

One Program Reported 

Meeting System 

Performance Targets, 

while Another Did Not; the 

Remaining Two Were in 

Planning Phase
Page 31 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

According to CMMI-ACQ and the PMBOK® Guide, an effective risk 

management process identifies potential problems before they occur, so 

that risk-handling activities may be planned and invoked, as needed, 

across the life of the project in order to mitigate adverse impacts on 

achieving objectives. Specifically, key risk management practices include

• identifying risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts;

• evaluating and categorizing each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, and 

determining each risk’s relative priority;

• developing risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence; and

• monitoring the status of each risk periodically and implementing the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate.

Navy’s DCGS-N Increment 2 and Army’s LMP Increment 2 had defined 

and managed their key risks, while Army’s IPPS-A Increment 2 and Air 

Force’s JMS Increment 2 have made improvements and are in the 

process of finalizing their risk management practices. Table 8 provides a 

summary of the selected MAIS programs’ implementation of risk 

management best practices.

Table 8: Selected MAIS Programs’ Implementation of Risk Management Best 

Practices

Program Implementation of best practices

DCGS-N Increment 2 ●

IPPS-A Increment 2 ◍

JMS Increment 2 ◍

LMP Increment 2 ●

●Fully implemented ◐Partially implemented ◍On track to fully implement ○Not implemented

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. I GAO-15-282

DCGS-N Increment 2 is intended to converge afloat and ashore 

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities into 

an integrated enterprise solution. This increment is also intended to 

replace the DCGS-N Increment 1 system and improve the Navy’s ability 

to process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence from the Navy’s 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Additionally, the 

Selected Programs 

Fully Implemented or 

Were on Track to 

Fully Implement Key 

Risk Management 

Practices

The Navy Program Had 

Implemented Key Risk 

Management Practices
Page 32 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

system is intended to enhance the Navy’s ability to detect and identify 

maritime threats, and improve access to intelligence community data for 

Maritime Forces. DCGS-N Increment 2 capabilities are planned to be 

implemented in five releases. As of November 2014, DCGS-N Increment 

2 expected to achieve milestone B (which authorizes a program to begin 

system development) in the second quarter of fiscal year 2016.

The DCGS-N Increment 2 program had implemented key risk 

management practices as part of its risk management process.

• Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. DCGS-N had identified risks, threats, and 

vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts. For example, 

as of October 2014, a key risk for the program was the possibility of 

another Navy program not providing infrastructure needed by DCGSN Increment 2 on time.

• Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. The program had 

evaluated and categorized its risks based on probability and impact. 

For example, as of October 2014, the program had categorized 1 of 

its 15 risks as low risk, 9 as medium risk, and 5 as high risk.

• Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. DCGS-N had 

developed risk mitigation plans to proactively reduce the potential 

impact of risk occurrence. For example, to mitigate the medium-level 

risk that another Navy program may not provide infrastructure needed 

by DCGS-N Increment 2 on time, DCGS-N officials have been 

collaborating with officials from that other program to further define 

DCGS-N’s infrastructure requirements and identify potential shortfalls.

• Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. DCGS-N monitored its risks 

and documented the status of risk mitigation actions that had been 

taken. For example, the program had monitored its risks on a monthly 

basis and tracked the open mitigation steps for each risk.

In taking these actions, the DCGS-N Increment 2 program had 

established and utilized effective risk management practices. Doing so 

should better position the program to mitigate adverse impacts from 

potential problems before they occur.
Page 33 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

The Army’s IPPS-A program is intended to provide a 24-hour, web-based, 

integrated human resources system to soldiers, human resources 

professionals, combatant commanders, personnel and pay managers, 

and other authorized Army users. Specifically, IPPS-A Increment 2 is to 

include four releases, which are intended to build on the database of 

personnel information that was delivered by IPPS-A Increment 1.

The IPPS-A Increment 2 program has efforts under way to improve risk 

management weaknesses described below.

• Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. The IPPS-A Increment 2 program had identified 

risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work 

efforts. In May 2014, a new IPPS-A program manager was hired and 

directed the program to revamp its approach to risk management for 

IPPS-A Increment 2, which the program began to do in June 2014. As 

part of this revamped approach, officials planned to establish an 

updated risk management plan and validate IPPS-A Increment 2’s 

risks. As of early January 2015, officials expected the program’s risk 

management plan to be finalized by the end of January 2015. 

Additionally, the program completed its validation of program risks 

and mitigation plans in October 2014. For example, as of November 

2014, a key risk for the program was the possibility that if the 

requirements for a certain capability were not adequately identified, 

then system deployment may be delayed and sensitive data could be 

compromised.

• Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. The program had 

evaluated and categorized its risks based on probability and 

consequence. For example, as of November 2014, the program had 

categorized 15 of its 18 risks as medium risk and 3 as high risk.

• Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. The program had 

developed mitigation plans for its identified risks. For example, to 

mitigate the high-level risk that system deployment may be delayed if 

requirements were not adequately identified, the program planned to, 

among other things, establish a working group, identify lessons 

learned from other efforts, and engage the system integrator after its 

contract was awarded.

Army’s Human Resources 

System Program Recently 

Took Steps to Address 

Risk Management 

Weaknesses
Page 34 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. As part of improvements to its 

risk management process, the program also updated the charter for 

IPPS-A’s Risk Management Control Board. As of early January 2015, 

the program expected to finalize this charter by the end of the month.

Once the program officials finalize the risk management plan and the Risk 

Management Control Board charter, the program should be better 

positioned to appropriately identify and mitigate program risks and avoid 

the likelihood that its risks materialize into issues.

Air Force’s JMS program is intended to deliver service capabilities, such 

as a space catalog (knowledge of space objects) and predicting and 

reporting of orbital conjunctions (collisions of space objects); mission 

applications that are to enhance the accuracy, sustainability, and 

responsiveness of space surveillance capabilities; and infrastructure that 

will enable migration off of legacy systems. JMS increment 2 capabilities 

are to be implemented in four releases, which the program refers to as 

service packs 7, 9, 11, and 13. In November 2014, the program received 

temporary approval to modify the system so that a subset of the service 

pack 7 capabilities (about 90 percent) could be deployed into operations. 

Additionally, as of November 2014, the program was developing service 

pack 9 capabilities, designing service pack 11 capabilities, and planning 

the effort required for service pack 13.

The Air Force had taken steps to implement key risk management 

practices for JMS, and the program has a plan in place to improve its risk 

mitigation steps.

• Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. As of October 2014, the JMS program had 

identified program risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could 

negatively affect work efforts. For example, a key risk identified for the 

program was the possibility that the deployment of space catalog 

capabilities would be delayed if the Joint Space Operations Center 

lacked resources in the future.

• Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. The program had 

evaluated and categorized its identified risks based on likelihood and 

impact. For example, as of October 2014, the program had 

The Air Force Program 

Had Taken Steps to 

Implement Risk 

Management Practices, 

and Is on Track to Resolve 

Risk Mitigation 

Weaknesses
Page 35 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

categorized 4 of its 14 risks as low risk, 5 as medium risk, and 5 as 

high risk.

• Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. JMS had 

developed mitigation plans for its identified risks; however, aspects of 

those plans were not being developed in accordance with the 

program’s risk management plan. Specifically, while JMS’s risk 

management plan stated that the program should document planned 

dates for implementing its risk mitigation steps and track actual versus 

planned progress in implementing these steps, JMS did not always 

identify or track the planned and actual completion dates for all of its 

mitigation steps. In October 2014, program officials stated that, for the 

missing planned completion dates, the program needed more 

information to determine how best to mitigate that risk and, for the 

missing actual completion dates, the risk log was still in draft so the 

actual completion dates had not yet been incorporated into the log. 

JMS officials also stated that the program is in the process of updating 

its risk mitigation plans to align with the Space and Missile Systems 

Center’s risk management standards. Officials expected to complete 

this alignment by March 2015 and intend to replace the planned dates 

with actual dates as the steps are completed.

• Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. The program monitored its risks 

and implemented its risk mitigation plans; however, as previously 

stated, the program was updating its mitigation plans to align with the 

Space and Missile Systems Center’s risk management standards. 

JMS officials expected to complete this alignment by March 2015.

Once the Air Force program completes its updates to the risk mitigation 

plans, the program should be better positioned to appropriately mitigate 

program risks.

The Army’s LMP system is intended to streamline the maintenance, 

repair, and overhaul; planning; finance; acquisition; and supply of weapon 

systems, spare parts, services, and material for the Army’s working 

capital fund. LMP is a key component of the DOD plan for achieving fully 

auditable financial statements by September 30, 2017, as required by the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. LMP Increment 

2 is intended to fully enable near real-time, end-to-end supply chain 

visibility and, among other things, automate processes for tracking labor 

and material expenses, and improve processes for receiving, storing, and 

Army’s Logistics System 

Program Implemented Key 

Risk Management 

Practices
Page 36 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

issuing ammunition. LMP Increment 2 is to be developed in three waves, 

which are comprised of seven releases.

The Army had implemented key risk management practices for LMP.

• Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. The LMP program had identified risks, threats, 

and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts. For 

example, as of October 2014, one of the program’s key risks was the 

possibility of the program not achieving financial auditability by the 

September 30, 2017, deadline established in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.

• Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. The program had 

evaluated and categorized its risks based on probability and impact. 

For example, as of October 2014, LMP’s Risk Management Board 

had categorized 5 of the program’s 16 risks as low risk and 11 as 

medium risk; it did not categorize any risks as high risk.

• Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. LMP had 

developed mitigation plans to proactively reduce the potential impact 

of risk occurrence. Specifically, the program office’s risk log and the 

system integrator’s risk log both outlined mitigation steps for their 

associated risks.

• Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. The program monitored its risks 

and documented the status of risk mitigation actions that had been 

taken. Specifically, in its monthly risk logs, the program documented 

the mitigation steps for each risk and tracked the implementation 

status of each of mitigation step.

In taking these actions, the LMP Increment 2 program had established 

and used effective risk management practices. Doing so should help 

enable the program to mitigate adverse impacts from potential problems 

before they occur.
Page 37 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Key IT acquisition best practices identified by CMMI-ACQ, the PMBOK® 

Guide, and our prior work include, among other areas, requirements 

development and project planning. The four selected MAIS programs 

varied in their implementation of IT acquisition best practices for 

requirements development and project planning. Specifically, DCGS-N 

Increment 2 and IPPS-A Increment 2 were both in their planning phases 

and were in the process of implementing key requirements development 

practices. However, the JMS Increment 2 and LMP Increment 2 programs 

had not developed schedules that incorporated all selected scheduling 

best practices. Further, DOD had not fully developed a project plan for 

implementation of the LMP Increment 2 program, including when it would 

test the auditability of LMP Increment 2 functionality to ensure that such 

testing occurs prior to the LMP program management office deploying 

future functionality. Without fully implementing effective acquisition 

management practices, these programs may be at risk of not meeting 

planned cost and schedule milestones, and may implement systems that 

do not fully meet user needs.

Table 9 provides a summary of the selected MAIS programs’ 

implementation of requirements development and project planning best 

practices.

Table 9: Selected MAIS Programs’ Implementation of Requirements Development 

and Project Planning Best Practices

Program name Requirements development Project planning

DCGS-N Increment 2a ◍ ◍

IPPS-A Increment 2a ◍ ◍

JMS Increment 2 ● ◐

LMP Increment 2 ● ◐

● Fully implemented ◐ Partially implemented ◍On track to fully implement ○Not implemented

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. I GAO-15-282

a

As of November 2014, DCGS-N Increment 2 and IPPS-A Increment 2 were both in their planning 

phases and were in the process of implementing many of the selected project planning and 

requirements development best practices.

Selected Programs 

Have Made Mixed 

Progress in Applying 

Key IT Acquisition 

Best Practices
Page 38 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

According to CMMI-ACQ and the PMBOK® Guide, effective requirements 

development involves46

• eliciting stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and 

transforming them into prioritized customer requirements;

• developing and reviewing operational concepts and scenarios to 

refine and discover requirements;

• analyzing requirements to ensure that they are complete, feasible, 

and verifiable;

• analyzing requirements to balance stakeholder needs and constraints; 

and

• testing and validating the system as it is being developed.

Two of the four selected programs in our review had fully implemented 

these practices, while the other two were in the process of implementing 

them, as discussed in more detail below.

The DCGS-N Increment 2 program was early in its planning phase and 

was in the process of implementing requirements development best 

practices.

• Elicit stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and 

transform them into prioritized customer requirements. The 

program had elicited stakeholder needs, expectations, and 

constraints, and translated them into draft customer requirements. 

Specifically, officials stated that the program elicited customer 

requirements through weekly teleconferences and brainstorming 

sessions with stakeholders, and participated in DCGS-N Increment 1 

post-deployment reviews to collect end-user satisfaction results. The 

program used the results of these activities to develop DCGS-N 

Increment 2’s draft requirements. The Navy approved these 

requirements in October 2014, and program officials expected DOD’s 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council to approve them in the second 

quarter of fiscal year 2015.

 46CMMI-ACQ, Version 1.3 (November 2010), and PMBOK® Guide, Fifth Edition, (2013).

Two Selected MAIS 

Programs Fully 

Implemented Key 

Requirements 

Development Best 

Practices; Two Were on 

Track to do so

Navy’s Program Was on Track 

to Implement Key 

Requirements Development 

Practices
Page 39 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Develop and review operational concepts and scenarios to refine 

and discover requirements. DCGS-N had developed draft 

operational concepts and scenarios to refine and discover 

requirements. Similar to the program’s requirements, the Navy 

approved the program’s operational concepts in October 2014 and 

expected DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council to approve 

them in the second quarter of fiscal year 2015.

• Analyze requirements to ensure that they are complete, feasible, 

and verifiable. Given that the program was early in its planning 

phase and its requirements had not yet been approved by DOD (as 

discussed earlier), DCGS-N had not yet fully analyzed its draft 

requirements to ensure that they were complete, feasible, and 

verifiable. In December 2014, program officials stated that they were 

completing this analysis and expected to finish in February 2015.

• Analyze requirements to balance stakeholder needs and 

constraints. As discussed previously, DCGS-N officials did not 

expect the program’s requirements to be approved by DOD until the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2015; accordingly, the program had not 

yet analyzed its draft requirements to balance stakeholder needs and 

constraints. Program officials stated that they planned to do this for 

the first release of DCGS-N Increment 2 by the end of the fourth 

quarter of fiscal year 2015 and planned to analyze requirements for 

releases 2 through 5 annually, consistent with the program’s 

development approach.

• Test and validate the system as it is being developed. As stated 

previously, DCGS-N Increment 2 was early in its planning phase. 

Thus, the program had not started system development and could not 

yet test and validate the system to identify issues and unstated 

requirements.

Going forward, implementation of these remaining requirements 

development best practices should increase the likelihood that the 

program will deliver a system with all intended functionality to meet users’

needs.

The Army’s IPPS-A program was nearing the end of its planning phase 

and was in the process of implementing many of the selected 

requirements development best practices.

Army’s Human Resources 

System Program Was in the 

Process of Implementing Key 

Requirements Development 

Practices
Page 40 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Elicit stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and 

transform them into prioritized customer requirements. The 

program had elicited stakeholder needs, expectations, and 

constraints, and translated them into draft customer requirements. 

Specifically, IPPS-A officials stated the program was leveraging the 

Army’s portion of requirements that were developed for the nowcanceled DOD-wide Defense Integrated Military Human Resources 

System program. According to officials, since fiscal year 2011, IPPS-A 

had been working to review and refine those requirements into lowerlevel requirements. The program’s proposed requirements were 

documented in IPPS-A Increment 2’s draft business case, which 

program officials expected to be approved by the end of January 

2015. The Army had also prioritized IPPS-A Increment 2’s draft 

requirements into four releases. These requirements and their 

associated releases were documented in the program’s requirements 

traceability matrix.

• Develop and review operational concepts and scenarios to refine 

and discover requirements. IPPS-A had developed an operational 

concept to refine and discover requirements. For example, IPPS-A 

had developed a high-level graphic to visually depict the operational 

capabilities that the IPPS-A system is intended to provide. The 

program had also developed additional operational and system views 

for each of the program’s four planned releases.

• Analyze requirements to ensure that they are complete, feasible, 

and verifiable. As discussed previously, IPPS-A Increment 2 was in 

its planning phase as of November 2014, and its requirements had 

not yet been approved by DOD. DOD officials stated that analysis of 

program requirements would be completed during the program’s two 

system design reviews, which are intended to ensure that 

requirements are defined and feasible, and that the proposed design 

can meet those requirements within cost, schedule, and other system 

constraints. As of November 2014, these reviews were planned for 

the third quarter of fiscal year 2015 through the third quarter of fiscal 

year 2016.

• Analyze requirements to balance stakeholder needs and 

constraints. As discussed previously, IPPS-A officials do not expect 

the program’s requirements to be approved by DOD until the end of 

January 2015. Officials stated that the program will analyze IPPS-A’s 

requirements during the program’s two system design reviews, which 

were planned for the third quarter of fiscal year 2015 through the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2016.
Page 41 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Test and validate the system as it is being developed. As stated 

previously, as of November 2014, IPPS-A Increment 2 was in its 

planning phase. Thus, the program had not started system design and 

development and could not yet test and validate the system to identify 

issues and unstated requirements. IPPS-A officials expected the 

program’s requirements to be validated by the program’s systems 

integrator and program stakeholders in June 2015.

Implementation of these remaining requirements development practices 

should help ensure that the system will be developed with all intended 

functionality to meet users’ needs.

JMS had fully implemented key best practices for its requirements 

development process.

• Elicit stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and 

transform them into prioritized customer requirements. JMS had 

elicited stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and 

transformed them into prioritized customer requirements. Specifically, 

JMS had prioritized its requirements into four releases, which the 

program refers to as “service packs.”

• Develop and review operational concepts and scenarios to refine 

and discover requirements. The program had reviewed operational 

concepts and scenarios to refine and discover requirements. For 

example, during an April 2014 user engagement session, the JMS 

program office reviewed with stakeholders from the Joint Space 

Operations Center an operational concept for one of the JMS 

system’s mission applications.

• Analyze requirements to ensure that they are complete, feasible, 

and verifiable. The program analyzed its requirements to ensure that 

they were complete, feasible, and verifiable. For example, the 

program mapped its lower-level requirements to its higher-level 

requirements to ensure that the lower requirements would provide the 

essential capabilities needed to successfully conduct mission 

operations.

• Analyze requirements to balance stakeholder needs and 

constraints. The Air Force analyzed requirements to balance 

stakeholder needs and constraints. Specifically, the Air Force 

conducted prototypes to help determine the solution that would best 

The Air Force Program’s Key 

Requirements Development 

Practices Were Sound
Page 42 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

meet stakeholder needs, and leveraged lessons learned from building 

the prototypes to finalize requirements.

• Test and validate the system as it is being developed. JMS had 

tested and validated the system as it was being developed. For 

example, between March and September 2014, the program 

conducted developmental and integrated tests on the first service 

pack of JMS Increment 2. As a result of these tests, the program 

identified category 1 and category 2 urgent deficiencies.47 As of 

November 2014, the program reported that it had addressed 96 

percent of the category 1 deficiencies and 65 percent of the category 

2 deficiencies. Program officials expected to address the remaining 

deficiencies in service packs 9 and 11, which are expected to be 

fielded beginning in October 2015 and February 2016, respectively.

As a result, the JMS program had established and utilized effective 

requirements development practices, which should increase the likelihood 

that the program delivers a system that meets users’ needs.

The Army had fully implemented key requirements development best 

practices for LMP Increment 2.

• Elicit stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and 

transform them into prioritized customer requirements. LMP had 

elicited stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and 

transformed them into prioritized customer requirements. Specifically, 

the program had prioritized its requirements into three waves, which 

are made up of seven releases.

• Develop and review operational concepts and scenarios to refine 

and discover requirements. LMP had developed and reviewed 

operational concepts and scenarios to refine and discover 

requirements. Specifically, the program reviewed and approved its 

operational concepts and scenarios at design reviews for each of its 

three waves.

 47Category 1 deficiencies are those that, among other things, critically restrict the combat 

readiness capabilities of the using organization; category 2 deficiencies are those that 

impede or constrain successful mission operations.

Army’s Logistics System 

Program Fully Implemented 

Key Requirements 

Development Best Practices
Page 43 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Analyze requirements to ensure that they are complete, feasible, 

and verifiable. LMP had analyzed its requirements during design 

workshops to determine whether they were complete, feasible, and 

verifiable. As a result of this analysis, and due to funding and resource 

constraints, the program decided to defer selected ammunition-related 

requirements to a future increment.

• Analyze requirements to balance stakeholder needs and 

constraints. LMP analyzed requirements to balance stakeholder 

needs and constraints. For example, the program analyzed whether 

its lower-level requirements could be met by the planned commercial, 

off-the-shelf system solution. According to LMP program officials, if a 

requirement could not be met by the commercial system, stakeholders 

had to justify to senior management why it was necessary to spend 

money to develop the functionality to meet the requirement.

• Test and validate the system as it is being developed. LMP had 

tested and validated the system as it was being developed. For 

example, from January 2014 through September 2014, the program 

conducted developmental tests on LMP Increment 2, wave 2. During 

these tests the program identified 157 deficiencies and, as of 

September 2014, had addressed all of them.

As a result, the LMP program had established effective requirements 

development best practices, which should help ensure that the LMP 

system will be deployed with functionality that meets users’ needs.

According to CMMI-ACQ, the PMBOK® Guide, and our prior work, an 

effective project planning process establishes project objectives and 

outlines the course of action required to attain those objectives. It also 

provides a means to track, review, and report progress and performance 

of the project by defining project activities and developing cost and 

schedule estimates, among other things. Key activities in planning the 

program include

• establishing and maintaining the program’s acquisition strategy;

• developing and maintaining the program’s cost estimate;

• establishing and maintaining the program’s schedule estimate;

Air Force, Army, and Navy 

Programs Had 

Implemented Many Key 

Project Planning 

Practices, but Lacked 

Others
Page 44 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• identifying the necessary knowledge and skills needed to carry out the 

program, and ensuring staff have the needed knowledge and skills;

• conducting business process reengineering;

• developing and maintaining the overall project plan, and obtaining 

commitment from relevant stakeholders;

• planning for the use of an IV&V agent; and

• planning for and maintaining stable leadership.

The four selected programs varied in the extent to which they 

implemented these practices, as discussed in detail below.

DCGS-N Increment 2 was early in its planning phase and was in the 

process of implementing many of the selected project planning best 

practices.

• Establish and maintain the program’s acquisition strategy. The 

Navy was working to develop the program’s acquisition strategy, 

which officials expected to be finalized in the third quarter of fiscal 

year 2015.

• Develop and maintain the program’s cost estimate. The program 

office had developed and updated its pre-baseline cost estimate (see 

the DCGS-N Increment 2 profile in app. II for more details on these 

estimates). The program had not yet established its APB, which will 

include the program’s life-cycle cost estimate approved by DCGS-N’s 

milestone decision authority. Program officials expected the APB to 

be approved by DOD at milestone B, which was planned for the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2016.

• Establish and maintain the program’s schedule estimate. Similar 

to the program’s cost estimate, DCGS-N officials had developed and 

updated the program’s pre-baseline schedule estimate (see the 

DCGS-N Increment 2 profile in app. II for more details on these 

estimates). The program had not yet established its APB—including a 

schedule estimate approved by the program’s milestone decision 

authority—but expected to establish it at milestone B, which was 

planned for the second quarter of fiscal year 2016.

The Navy Program Made 

Progress in Implementing 

Project Planning Practices
Page 45 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Identify the necessary knowledge and skills needed to carry out 

the program, and ensure staff have the needed knowledge and 

skills. The program had not yet identified the necessary knowledge 

and skills needed to carry out the program; however, DCGS-N 

officials stated that they considered the program office to be fully 

staffed (excluding Lead System Integrator positions and contractor 

support). Officials reported that they expected to complete a 

knowledge and skills gap assessment during early fiscal year 2015.

• Conduct business process reengineering. DCGS-N Increment 2 is 

not designated as a defense business system that is subject to DOD 

business process reengineering assessment requirements;48

accordingly, we did not assess the program’s business process 

reengineering efforts.

• Develop and maintain the overall project plan, and obtain 

commitment from relevant stakeholders. DCGS-N had not yet 

developed an overall project plan. Officials reported that the project 

plan and other planning information, such as a resource plan and 

stakeholder involvement plan, are expected to be finalized in the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2015.

• Plan for the use of an IV&V agent. The program had planned for the 

use of an IV&V agent. Specifically, DCGS-N officials stated that IV&V 

will be part of the program’s formal development test events. Officials 

expected planning for IV&V to occur in fiscal year 2015.

• Plan for and maintain stable leadership. The program had 

maintained stable leadership by establishing and aiming to carry out 

program manager tenure agreements. Specifically, since the program 

began in February 2009, there had been two program managers for 

DCGS-N—the first program manager was also the program manager 

for DCGS-N Increment 1 and completed his tenure with the DCGS-N 

program in September 2011, and the second program manager has 

been with the program since then to serve out his tenure.

 4810 U.S.C. § 2222(a) requires that, prior to the obligation of funds, defense business 

system program investments with a total cost in excess of $1 million over the department’s 

6-year financial plan period (referred to as the Future-Years Defense Program) be certified 

as demonstrating that appropriate business process reengineering efforts have been 

undertaken.
Page 46 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Implementation of these project planning best practices should better 

position the program to track program progress and manage the program 

going forward.

The Army was in the process of implementing selected practices for 

planning the IPPS-A Increment 2 program.

• Establish and maintain the program’s acquisition strategy. The 

IPPS-A program was near the end of its planning phase and had 

developed a draft business case that outlined the high-level 

acquisition approach for the program. Officials expected the business 

case to be approved by the end of January 2015.

• Develop and maintain the program’s cost estimate. The Army had 

developed a draft, pre-baseline life-cycle cost estimate for IPPS-A 

Increment 2. The program expected the cost estimate to be approved 

by DOD by the end of January 2015.

• Establish and maintain the program’s schedule estimate. Similar 

to the program’s cost estimate, IPPS-A had developed a draft, prebaseline schedule estimate. The program expected the schedule 

estimate to be approved by DOD by the end of January 2015.

• Identify the necessary knowledge and skills needed to carry out 

the program, and ensure staff have the needed knowledge and 

skills. The IPPS-A program had ensured existing staff had the 

needed knowledge and skills to perform their designated 

responsibilities, but the Army had not yet identified the necessary 

knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program. Specifically, 

while the program prepared a preliminary estimate in October 2013 

that indicated the program was at about a 42 percent staffing level, in 

response to our inquiries, IPPS-A Increment 2 officials told us in 

January 2015 that they were reassessing the program’s staffing 

requirements to determine what gaps currently exist and did not yet 

know when the assessment would be complete. Once the program 

completes this analysis and takes steps to fill any existing skill gaps, 

the IPPS-A program should be better positioned to deliver the system 

on time and within budget.

• Conduct business process reengineering. The IPPS-A Increment 2 

program completed its second—and most recent—business process 

reengineering effort in October 2014. According to program officials, 

this included the assessment of 146 business processes associated 

with IPPS-A Increment 2 against the commercial, off-the-shelf product 

Army’s Human Resources 

System Program Was Well 

Under Way in Its 

Implementation of Project 

Planning Practices
Page 47 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

the program plans to use. Officials stated that this effort reduced the 

number of needed business processes from 146 to 31. The program 

completed its assessment near the end of our audit; thus, we did not 

review the results of this assessment.

• Develop and maintain the overall project plan, and obtain 

commitment from relevant stakeholders. IPPS-A had developed 

draft program planning documents, such as the program’s business 

case, risk management plan, and systems engineering plan. IPPS-A 

obtained commitment from relevant stakeholders for the systems 

engineering plan in September through December 2014, and officials 

expected to obtain stakeholder commitment for the other documents 

by the end of January 2015. Additionally, the program had developed 

draft cost and schedule estimates, which the program expected to be 

approved by the end of January 2015.

• Plan for the use of an IV&V agent. The IPPS-A Increment 2 

program had not yet developed specific plans for the use of an IV&V 

agent; however, in August 2014, the recently hired IPPS-A program 

manager stated that he planned to use an IV&V agent for the 

program. IPPS-A officials also stated that the Army’s Program 

Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems had engaged an 

IV&V agent that IPPS-A Increment 2 could use.

• Plan for and maintain stable leadership. As of November 2014, the 

IPPS-A Increment 2 program was still in its planning phase and had 

maintained stable leadership by establishing and intending to carry 

out program manager tenure agreements. Specifically, according to 

program officials, IPPS-A had two program managers since IPPS-A 

Increment 2 was initiated in October 2011. The tenures of these 

program managers were: October 2011 to May 2014, and May 2014 

to present (as of November 2014). According to IPPS-A officials, the 

first program manager (who was also a program manager for IPPS-A 

Increment 1) left in May 2014 after the IPPS-A Increment 1 program 

achieved two milestones, which officials stated was a requirement 

identified in the program manager’s tenure agreement. The current 

program manager has a 4-year, 3-month tenure agreement.

Establishing and using these project planning best practices should 

increase the likelihood that the program will be effectively implemented 

and managed going forward.
Page 48 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

The program had implemented nearly all key practices for project 

planning, but the program’s schedule estimate was not reliable.

• Establish and maintain the program’s acquisition strategy. JMS 

had established and maintained its acquisition strategy. For example, 

the strategy identified the capabilities that the program is intended to 

deliver, the acquisition approach, and the type of supplier agreements 

that will be used to procure commercial software and licenses, and 

engineering support services.

• Develop and maintain the program’s cost estimate. JMS had 

developed and maintained a life-cycle cost estimate that substantially 

met selected best practices for developing a reliable cost estimate. 

Specifically, consistent with best practices from our cost guide,49 JMS 

had determined the cost estimating structure, including developing a 

work breakdown structure and a dictionary that defined the scope of 

each work breakdown structure element;50 identified ground rules and 

assumptions; obtained historical data to provide insight into actual 

costs on similar programs; and developed the point estimate51 and 

compared it to an independent cost estimate.

• Establish and maintain the program’s schedule estimate. Of the 

three selected scheduling best practices that we evaluated from our 

schedule assessment guide exposure draft,52 the program had 

substantially met one of the practices (capturing all activities in the 

schedule) and partially met the other two. JMS’s schedule estimate 

partially met the best practice of sequencing all activities within the 

schedule. Specifically, according to best practices, activities should be 

logically sequenced in the order that they are to be carried out, and no 

artificial date constraints should be included in the schedule. 

However, the program had used artificial schedule constraints (e.g., 

specifying a specific date by which an activity must start) on 69 of its 

 49GAO-09-3SP.

50A work breakdown structure defines, in detail, the work necessary to accomplish a 

project’s objectives.

51A point estimate is a single cost estimate number representing the most likely cost.

52GAO-12-120G. 

The Air Force Program Had 

Implemented Most Project 

Planning Best Practices, but 

the Program’s Schedule 

Estimate Was Not Reliable
Page 49 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

remaining 1,849 milestone and detail53 activities, which affected the 

schedule’s ability to properly calculate dates and predict changes in 

the future. Without the correct linkages between activities, the 

schedule cannot predict future delays or identify opportunities for 

efficiency where activities may start earlier than originally planned.

Further, the program’s schedule estimate partially met the best 

practice of updating the schedule with actual progress and logical 

relationships between activities (e.g., identifying predecessor and 

successor activities, and identifying dependencies between those 

activities in order to depict the sequence in which activities occur). 

Specifically, best practices call for the schedule to be updated with 

actual dates, dependencies between activities, and progress in order 

to adjust forecasts of when the remaining effort will occur. 

Additionally, all changes made to the schedule should be documented 

and justified, along with their likely effect on future planned activities.

While JMS’s schedule had been updated to reflect current progress, 

the schedule had more than 100 illogical or incongruous data points 

and did not have a well-documented narrative explaining the status 

updates. For example, the schedule showed that progress had been 

made in conducting a developmental activity, but the schedule did not 

identify an actual start date for that activity. Program officials 

attributed the data inconsistencies to the program’s use of an Agile 

development methodology. In particular, officials stated that there are 

time lags associated with its activities because details are not 

incorporated into the schedule until developmental periods—which 

may include multiple developmental activities—are completed. 

Additionally, program officials stated that they only document 

significant changes in the schedule narrative. However, these data 

inconsistencies and lack of a narrative explaining all updates made to 

the schedule make the reliability of the schedule questionable. Until 

such inconsistencies in the schedule’s data are corrected, 

management will be limited in its understanding of what work has 

been started or completed to date. Further, until these schedule 

issues are addressed, it will be unclear whether the program will be 

able to meet the planned dates for its remaining milestones (see app. 

 53Detail activities (also known as “normal” or “work” activities) are at the lowest level of the 

work breakdown structure and represent actual discrete work that is planned to be 

performed in the project.
Page 50 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

II for more information on JMS’s remaining schedule milestones and 

dates).

• Identify the necessary knowledge and skills needed to carry out 

the program, and ensure staff have the needed knowledge and 

skills. DOD identified the necessary knowledge and skills needed to 

carry out the program, and ensured that staff had the required 

knowledge and skills. For example, in 2012, DOD conducted an 

independent program assessment of JMS Increment 2 and identified 

the knowledge and skills needed to perform the program, such as the 

need for a certified developmental and operational testing lead. 

Subsequently, according to JMS officials, the program hired additional 

personnel based on the results of the independent assessment.

• Conduct business process reengineering. JMS Increment 2 is not 

designated as a defense business system that DOD subjects to 

business process reengineering assessment requirements; as such, 

we did not assess the program’s business process reengineering

efforts.54

• Develop and maintain the overall project plan, and obtain 

commitment from relevant stakeholders. JMS had established and 

maintained its project planning documentation, including the 

acquisition strategy, and obtained commitment from relevant 

stakeholders. For example, the program received approval for its 

acquisition strategy from senior management, including the Secretary 

of the Air Force and the USD (AT&L). Additionally, these planning 

documents have been periodically updated to reflect changes to the 

program. For example, the program added an addendum to its 

acquisition strategy after it had further defined the contract strategy 

and scope for JMS Increment 2.

• Plan for the use of an IV&V agent. The program planned for and 

used an IV&V agent to conduct developmental and integrated testing 

on the system. For example, from March 2014 to September 2014, an 

 5410 U.S.C. § 2222(a) requires that, prior to the obligation of funds, defense business 

system program investments with a total cost in excess of $1 million over the department’s 

6-year financial plan period (referred to as the Future-Years Defense Program) be certified 

as demonstrating that appropriate business process reengineering efforts have been 

undertaken.
Page 51 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

independent Air Force test agency evaluated a subset of capabilities 

of the JMS system.

• Plan for and maintain stable leadership. While the program 

experienced early turnover with the program managers, more recently 

the program had planned for and maintained stable leadership. 

Specifically, the program reported that it has had three program 

managers since JMS Increment 2 was initiated in December 2011. 

The tenures of these program managers were December 2011 to 

June 2012, June 2012 to May 2014, and May 2014 to present (as of 

November 2014). According to JMS officials, the first program 

manager (who was also the program manager prior to the 2011 

decision to restructure the JMS program from a single increment into 

multiple increments) retired in June 2012, and the second program 

manager left in May 2014 after he was promoted to another position. 

The current program manager has been assigned to the program for a 

minimum of 3 years, per the Air Force’s typical tenure agreement 

terms.

Similar to JMS, the Army had implemented project planning best 

practices for LMP Increment 2, but the program had not implemented all 

selected schedule estimating best practices or fully developed a project 

plan for when it will conduct auditability testing of LMP Increment 2 

functionality to ensure that such testing occurs prior to the LMP program 

management office deploying future functionality.

• Establish and maintain the program’s acquisition strategy. LMP 

had established and maintained its acquisition strategy. For example, 

the program’s business case identified the capabilities that the 

program is intended to deliver, as well as the planned approach for 

acquiring LMP Increment 2.

• Develop and maintain the program’s cost estimate. LMP had 

developed and maintained a life-cycle cost estimate that substantially 

met selected best practices for developing a reliable cost estimate. 

Specifically, consistent with best practices from our cost guide,55 LMP 

Increment 2 had substantially determined the cost estimating 

structure, including developing a work breakdown structure and 

associated dictionary; identified assumptions used in developing the 

 55GAO-09-3SP.

Army’s Logistics System 

Program Implemented Key 

Project Planning Best 

Practices, but More Work 

Remains
Page 52 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

estimate; obtained historical data to provide insight into actual costs 

on similar programs; and developed the point estimate and compared 

it to a second cost estimate developed outside of the program office.

• Establish and maintain the program’s schedule estimate. Of the 

three selected scheduling best practices that we assessed, the 

program had substantially met two of the practices and partially met 

one of the practices. LMP had substantially met the best practices of 

capturing all activities in the schedule and updating it with actual 

progress and logical relationships between activities. The program’s 

schedule estimate partially met the best practice of sequencing all 

activities. As of October 2014, the program’s schedule had a large 

number of unjustified constraints (e.g., specifying a date that an 

activity must start); potential issues with several activities that all must 

be completed before a single successor activity can begin, which 

decreases the chances of the successor activity starting on time; and 

a significant number of leads, which allow successor activities to start 

before their predecessor activities are completed. These scheduling 

practices had affected the schedule’s ability to properly calculate 

dates and predict changes in the future.

LMP officials acknowledged these issues and stated that they would 

update the schedule to correct the issues by the end of October 2014. 

However, as of November 2014, while the program had improved the 

schedule to remove all leads in it, the schedule continued to have a 

large number of unjustified constraints on activity start dates, and had 

a lag on an activity that is being used to delay the start date of a 

successor activity by more than a month without justifying the delay.56

Program officials stated that they believe their current process is 

working and that they do not consider it worth the effort to update the 

schedule to justify these delays. Nevertheless, until the program either 

justifies why these constraints and lag are needed in the schedule or 

removes them, the program will be limited in its ability to use the 

schedule to identify opportunities for efficiency and, when available, to 

start activities earlier than originally planned.

• Identify the necessary knowledge and skills needed to carry out 

the program, and ensure staff have the needed knowledge and 

skills. The program had identified the necessary knowledge and skills 

 56A lag in a schedule denotes the passage of time between two activities.
Page 53 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

needed to carry out the program, and ensured existing staff had the 

needed knowledge and skills. For example, LMP officials stated that 

when the program began they had conducted an assessment to 

determine the program’s necessary knowledge and skills. Officials 

also stated that the program management office used what they 

learned from implementing LMP Increment 1 when they assessed the 

necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to successfully 

deliver LMP Increment 2. Additionally, the program had ensured that 

its acquisition staff were appropriately certified for their positions.

• Conduct business process reengineering. The LMP program had 

reengineered its business processes. For example, according to 

officials, in May 2014, the program submitted a business process 

reengineering assessment to the Army’s Office of Business 

Transformation and DOD’s Office of the Deputy Chief Management 

Officer. Based on this assessment, the program determined that LMP 

Increment 2 would use 57 existing business processes from LMP 

Increment 1, modify 60 existing processes, and add 13 new business 

processes to support the requirements for Increment 2. This 

submission also provided supporting objective evidence for the 

program’s assessment.57

• Develop and maintain the overall project plan, and obtain 

commitment from relevant stakeholders. DOD had not developed 

and maintained a comprehensive program plan for development of 

LMP Increment 2, including auditability testing of the Increment 2 

system. Specifically, while the LMP program had developed and 

obtained commitment from stakeholders for a plan that covered key 

program planning aspects, such as defining the program’s budget, 

schedule, and acquisition approach, LMP Increment 2’s program plan 

did not include time frames for when the auditability of the overall LMP 

system would be tested. However, as previously stated, LMP is a key 

component of DOD’s plan for achieving fully auditable financial 

statements by fiscal year 2017. The lack of auditability-testing time 

frames in the program’s schedule was also identified in a January 

2012 report by the House Armed Services Committee’s Panel on 

Defense Financial Management and Auditability Reform;58 the report 

 57We reviewed whether LMP had provided supporting objective evidence for its business 

process reengineering assessment, but we did not evaluate the quality of the assessment.

58House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Financial Management and 

Auditability Reform Findings and Recommendations (Jan. 24, 2012).
Page 54 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

recommended that enterprise resource planning program offices—

including LMP—integrate milestones from DOD’s Financial 

Improvement and Audit Readiness strategy for achieving auditability 

into their program schedules.59

According to LMP and officials from the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA 

(FM&C)), the LMP program office is not responsible for planning or 

testing the overall auditability of the LMP system; instead, these 

officials stated that the office of the ASA (FM&C) holds this 

responsibility. However, ASA (FM&C) did not have a plan for 

auditability testing of LMP Increment 2 functionality. As a 

consequence, LMP had deployed four releases without determining 

whether auditability testing was needed. Only recently, in November 

2014, and in response to our inquiries—nearly 11 months after 

release 1 was deployed, and 3 months after releases 2, 3, and 4 were 

deployed—did the Army reportedly assess these releases to 

determine if any of the new functionality needed to be tested to 

ensure it enabled auditability.

Further, ASA (FM&C) had not yet begun to develop a plan for 

auditability testing of LMP Increment 2 wave 3 functionality, which is 

to include releases 5, 6, and 7. The Army Working Capital Fund Audit 

Readiness Director, ASA (FM&C) said that he expects that wave 3 

functionality will impact auditability functions. In lieu of a plan that 

outlined time frames for the auditability testing of LMP, the Director 

stated that ASA (FM&C) expects to assess which functionality needs 

auditability testing after the LMP program management office deploys 

the new functionality. As a result, the LMP Increment 2 program will 

continue to develop and deploy new functionality without knowing 

whether the functionality enables auditability of the system. Until ASA 

(FM&C) completes a plan for conducting auditability testing of LMP 

Increment 2 functionality to ensure that such testing occurs prior to 

the LMP program management office deploying future functionality, 

DOD will be limited in its assurance that it is developing and deploying 

needed functionality for financial management improvement and audit 

readiness.

 59We have ongoing work to examine DOD’s efforts to address the recommendations 

made in this January 2012 report by the House Armed Services Committee’s Panel on 

Defense Financial Management and Auditability Reform.
Page 55 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Plan for the use of an IV&V agent. The LMP program planned for 

and used an IV&V agent. For example, as of October 2014, an IV&V 

contractor had reviewed areas such as testing and training for LMP 

Increment 2, wave 3.

• Plan for and maintain stable leadership. The program had planned 

for and maintained stable leadership by establishing and intending to 

carry out its program manager tenure agreements. Specifically, the 

LMP Increment 2 program had two program managers since the 

program began in December 2011. The tenures of these program 

managers were December 2011 to July 2014 and July 2014 to 

present (as of December 2014). The current program manager was 

assigned to the program for 3 years, consistent with the Army’s typical 

tenure agreement terms.

Without baselines, MAIS programs are allowed to spend hundreds of 

millions of dollars without concern for meeting cost, schedule, or 

performance targets. Additionally, such programs are subject to limited 

oversight by USD (AT&L) and Congress until they establish their 

baselines. This is especially problematic when a majority of MAIS 

programs are taking more than 2 years to baseline, and in some cases 

are taking up to 9 years and spending—on average—$452 million. Until 

MAIS programs are required to establish cost, schedule, and 

performance baselines within 2 years of starting, they may continue along 

this troubling course, and fail to use more incremental development best 

practices, as called for by federal law and OMB guidance.

Notably, over half of the selected MAIS programs have met or planned to 

meet the statutorily established time frame to fully deploy capabilities 

within 5 years; four programs that were unable to do so, however, met 

their statutory obligations to report specific information to congressional 

defense committees in response to the breach. This reporting 

requirement and the additional subsequent oversight provided by DOD 

and Congress will help to ensure that programs are held accountable for 

delivering the intended functionality to users within agreed-upon costs 

and time frames.

Of the four selected MAIS programs, three had experienced a cost 

increase, schedule slippage, or system performance problems. 

Consequently, these programs were either costing more than planned or 

taking longer than planned—or the systems had not performed as 

intended.

Conclusions
Page 56 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

While all four had implemented best practices in the key areas of risk 

management, requirements development, and project planning, areas for 

improvement exist. Specifically, until the inconsistencies in the Air Force’s 

JMS Increment 2 program’s schedule are addressed, management’s 

understanding and oversight of the program will continue to be limited. 

Additionally, the Army’s LMP Increment 2 program’s use of unjustified 

constraints on planned activities in its schedule limits the program’s ability 

to use the schedule to identify opportunities for efficiency. Moreover, until 

ASA (FM&C) develops a plan for conducting auditability testing of LMP 

Increment 2 functionality, DOD will be limited in its assurance that it is 

developing and deploying releases that will enable LMP to have fully 

auditable financial statements.

We are making four recommendations, in total. First, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to require MAIS programs to 

establish their first APB within 2 years of beginning work on the programs.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Air Force to direct the JMS program office to develop a schedule that fully 

incorporates best practices, including sequencing all activities and 

updating the schedule with actual progress and logic.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of 

the Army to direct the LMP program office to develop a schedule that fully 

incorporates the best practice of properly sequencing all schedule 

activities.

Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Army to direct the Army (Financial Management and 

Comptroller) to complete a plan for conducting auditability testing of LMP 

Increment 2 functionality to ensure that such testing occurs prior to the 

LMP program management office deploying future functionality.

We received written comments on a draft of this report from DOD’s 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). The comments are reprinted 

in appendix IV.

In its comments, the department concurred with three of our four 

recommendations and partially concurred with the other one. Specifically, 

the department concurred with our recommendations that the JMS and 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 57 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

LMP programs develop schedules that fully incorporate best practices, 

and our recommendation that the Army (Financial Management and 

Comptroller) complete a plan for conducting auditability testing of LMP 

Increment 2 functionality to ensure that such testing occurs prior to the 

LMP program management office deploying future functionality.

The department partially concurred with our recommendation to require 

MAIS programs to establish their first APB within 2 years of beginning 

work on the programs. In this regard, the department stated that it agreed 

with the sentiment that an APB should be established as soon as 

possible. However, DOD commented that the 2-year time frame is too 

specific and problematic. Specifically, the department stated that the time 

needed to establish a reliable APB depends on the period the program 

must spend in the technology maturation and risk reduction phase of 

acquisition (during this phase a program is to determine the preferred 

technology solution and validate that it is affordable, satisfies program 

requirements, and has acceptable technical risk). The department 

specified that some programs will require considerable time in this phase 

while others will not. 

Rather than requiring programs to baseline within 2 years, in its 

comments, the department stated it would like to develop a nuanced 

policy that accommodates the variety of risks found among MAIS 

programs and also outlined potential ideas for a new policy that it is 

considering, such as setting target dates for baselining and reporting 

progress. The department noted that, prior to establishing such a policy, 

considerable work and coordination among the department’s components 

is necessary.

We support the department’s tentative plans to begin working to develop 

a new policy on establishing APBs for MAIS programs; however, we 

maintain that establishing a baseline within 2 years of beginning work is a 

reasonable expectation. As previously discussed, MAIS programs that 

have not established APBs receive less oversight from USD (AT&L) and 

Congress than those that have established APBs. And, while we agree 

that programs should spend a sufficient amount of time in planning to 

ensure that the preferred technology solution is appropriate and 

acceptable, we disagree that the 2-year time frame is too specific and 

problematic. As we stated in the report, programs that require more than 

2 years to commit to a cost and schedule baseline are likely too large and 

complex and could benefit from being divided into smaller increments with 

fewer requirements and less risk. In fact, our report showed that 

restructuring programs into smaller increments helped them to 
Page 58 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

successfully reach full deployment decision within 5 years. Developing IT 

solutions in smaller increments—as advocated by the Defense Science 

Board, federal statute, and OMB guidance—increases the likelihood that 

a program will achieve its cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

In addition, the department provided an explanation of steps it has taken 

to address our recommendation that the JMS program develop a 

schedule that fully incorporates best practices, including sequencing all 

activities and updating the schedule with actual progress and logic. In this 

regard, the department explained that the JMS program had removed the 

69 activities that we found had artificial schedule constraints. However, 

the program’s schedule also had more than 100 illogical or incongruous 

data points and did not have a well-documented narrative explaining 

updates made. Therefore, while the program’s reported actions should 

help improve their schedule, additional actions are still needed to fully 

implement our recommendation. 

In addition, we received technical comments from DOD officials, which we 

have incorporated, as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; and other interested parties. This 

report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staffs have any questions on information discussed in 

this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4456 or ChaC@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

Carol R. Cha

Director

Information Technology Acquisition Management Issues
Page 59 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ron Johnson

Chairman

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz

Chairman

The Honorable Elijah Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives
Page 60 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Descriptions of Selected MAIS 

Programs

Page 61 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Table 10 provides descriptions of each of the selected MAIS programs 

that are included in this review.

Table 10: Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Component/ Program Name Description

Air Force

Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay 

System (AFIPPS)

Intended to provide a comprehensive, web-based solution to integrate existing personnel 

and pay processes from 30 of the Air Force’s existing systems into one self-service 

system that can be accessed worldwide. Further, it is intended to support the Air Force’s 

Regular, Reserve, and Air National Guard components. 

Base Information Transport Infrastructure 

Wired (BITI Wired)

Expected to provide the core network infrastructure, such as network cables and servers, 

for over 150 active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard bases. Specifically, 

the program is to update the fixed local area network and all necessary information 

transport infrastructure in order to support current and future communications needs of 

the Air Force and Joint Command warfighter. 

Base Information Transport Infrastructure 

Wireless (BITI Wireless)

The program provides a secure wireless infrastructure, which includes features such as 

intrusion detection, monitoring, and central administration that incorporates highavailability and multitiered network administration for wireless entry into local area 

networks at 97 Air Force bases worldwide. 

Defense Enterprise Accounting and 

Management System (DEAMS) Increment 1

The program is intended to provide 60 percent of the Air Force with the entire spectrum 

of financial management capabilities, including collections; commitments and obligations; 

cost accounting; general ledger; funds control; receipts and acceptance; accounts 

payable and disbursement; billing; and financial reporting. DEAMS is also intended to be 

a key component of the DOD plan for achieving fully auditable financial statements by 

September 30, 2017, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010.

Expeditionary Combat Support System 

(ECSS) Increment 1

It is to provide the Air Force with a single, integrated logistics system—including 

transportation, supply, maintenance and repair, engineering, and acquisition. ECSS was 

also intended to provide financial management and accounting functions. It was to be a 

key component of the DOD plan for achieving fully auditable financial statements by 

September 30, 2017, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010. However, the program was canceled in December 2012.

Financial Information Resource System 

(FIRST)

The system maintained an inventory of the department’s force structure (i.e., 

organizations, weapons systems, and flying hours), and enabled users to perform 

functions such as allocating aircraft vehicles and forecasting future aircraft attrition. 

FIRST was retired in July 2013.

Joint Space Operations Center Mission 

System (JMS) Increment 1

Intended to provide an integrated, network-based, space situational awareness and 

command and control capability for the Joint Force Component Commander for Space at 

the Joint Space Operations Center near Lompoc, California. Specifically, it established 

the foundational capabilities for future JMS increments, including deploying an initial set 

of operator mission tools, such as providing automated links to existing data sources and 

a user-defined operational picture to integrate and display information.

Appendix I: Descriptions of Selected MAIS 

Programs
Appendix I: Descriptions of Selected MAIS 

Programs

Page 62 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Component/ Program Name Description

JMS Increment 2 It is intended to provide an integrated, network-based, space situational awareness and 

command and control capability for the Joint Force Component Commander for Space at 

the Joint Space Operations Center near Lompoc, California. Specifically, JMS Increment 

2 is intended to provide service capabilities (e.g., a catalog of space objects, and 

predicting and reporting of collisions of space objects) and mission applications that are 

to enhance the accuracy, sustainability, and responsiveness of space surveillance 

capabilities. Additionally, JMS Increment 2 will provide infrastructure that will enable 

migration off of legacy systems.

Army

Distributed Common Ground System-Army 

(DCGS-A) Increment 1

The program is intended to be the Army’s primary system for collecting, processing, 

integrating, and displaying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information 

about potential adversarial forces, the weather, and the terrain to Army Commanders at 

all echelons. It is intended to acquire and synthesize data from multiple intelligence 

sources, such as humans, geospatial information (e.g., imagery of earth’s terrain), and 

information derived from electronic transmissions.

Global Combat Support System-Army 

(GCSS-Army)

It is to provide all active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve tactical units 

worldwide with the capability to track supplies, spare parts, and organizational 

equipment. It is also to be used to track unit maintenance, total cost of ownership, and 

other financial transactions related to logistics for all Army units. Additionally, GCSSArmy is intended to be a key component of the DOD plan for achieving fully auditable 

financial statements by September 30, 2017, as required by the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 

Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army 

(IPPS-A) Increment 1

This increment is intended to provide a 24-hour, web-based, integrated human resources 

system to soldiers, human resources professionals, combatant commanders, personnel 

and pay managers, and other authorized Army users. Specifically, IPPS-A Increment 1 is 

intended to provide a consolidated, foundational database of trusted personnel data that 

is extracted from 15 existing human resources systems (additional functionality is 

intended to be part of a different MAIS program—IPPS-A Increment 2, as discussed 

below).

IPPS-A Increment 2 This subsequent increment is intended to provide a 24-hour, web-based, integrated 

human resources system to soldiers, human resources professionals, combatant 

commanders, personnel and pay managers, and other authorized Army users. 

Specifically, IPPS-A Increment 2 is intended to provide integrated personnel and pay 

services for all Army Components (Active, National Guard, and Reserve), building on the 

database delivered by the IPPS-A Increment 1 program.

Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) 

Increment 2

It is intended to streamline the maintenance, repair, and overhaul; planning; finance; 

acquisition; and supply of weapon systems, spare parts, services, and material for the 

Army’s working capital fund. LMP is a key component of the DOD plan for achieving fully 

auditable financial statements by September 30, 2017, as required by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. LMP Increment 2 is intended to fully 

enable real-time, end-to-end supply chain visibility and, among other things, automate 

processes for tracking labor and material expenses, and improve processes for receiving, 

storing, and issuing ammunition.

Tactical Mission Command (TMC) It is a suite of products—including both hardware and software—that are intended to 

provide Army and joint community commanders and their staffs with improved battle 

command capabilities, such as real-time situational awareness, and displays of unified 

information on subject matters, such as friendly forces and enemy forces (referred to as 

the common operational picture). TMC products have been fielded worldwide and are 

intended to support decision making, planning, rehearsal, and execution management.
Appendix I: Descriptions of Selected MAIS 

Programs

Page 63 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Defense Health Agency

Integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR) 

Increment 1

It is to provide the infrastructure and services for standardizing and integrating electronic 

healthcare data between DOD’s and VA’s systems. Specifically, increment 1 of iEHR is 

intended to provide DOD with seven capabilities: (1) enhance user sign-in, (2) enhance 

medical record views among multiple systems, (3) allow users to roam among multiple 

devices, (4) upgrade a DOD medical record database, (5) deploy a testing facility for 

DOD and VA electronic record integration, (6) develop a pilot to consolidate data centers, 

and (7) develop a pilot graphical user interface.

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) Increment 

1

The system is intended to modernize the financial management processes of 21 defense 

agencies and components by streamlining financial management capabilities and 

transforming the budget, finance, and accounting operations. When DAI is fully 

implemented, it is expected to have the capability to control and account for all 

appropriated working capital and revolving funds at each of the 21 agencies and 

components. DAI is also intended to be a key component of the DOD plan for achieving 

fully auditable financial statements by September 30, 2017, as required by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 

EProcurement Intended to provide enterprise-wide procurement capabilities, such as managing 

purchase requests and contract awards, for Defense Logistics Agency acquisition and 

procurement users. The system is to replace multiple legacy procurement systems to 

reduce redundancy and cost, and to standardize a contract writing and administration 

methodology across the agency. 

Navy

Common Aviation Command and Control 

System (CAC2S) Increment 1

Expected to be a scalable and flexible command, control, and communications system of 

systems that can be deployed via Humvees, helicopters, airplanes, amphibious ships, 

and landing craft within 24 hours of receiving a movement order, to effectively command, 

control, and coordinate aviation operations. 

Consolidated Afloat Networks and 

Enterprise Services (CANES)

Designed to consolidate and standardize the Navy’s existing network infrastructures and 

services. This system is intended to, among other things, reduce and eliminate existing 

standalone afloat (i.e., surface ships and submarines) networks, provide a technology 

platform that can rapidly adjust to changing warfighting requirements, and reduce the 

hardware footprint on 259 afloat and maritime operations center platforms.

Distributed Common Ground System-Navy 

(DCGS-N) Increment 1

Intended to provide integration of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 

targeting support capabilities to the Navy’s commanders on vessels and ashore to 

increase their battlespace awareness. It is intended to merge three existing Navy 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems into a single system. 

DCGS-N Increment 2 This increment is expected to converge afloat and ashore intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities into an integrated enterprise solution. It is to 

replace the DCGS-N Increment 1 system and improve the Navy’s ability to process, 

exploit, and disseminate intelligence from the Navy’s intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance systems. Additionally, the system is intended to enhance the Navy’s 

ability to detect and identify maritime threats, and improve access to intelligence 

community data for Maritime Forces.

Global Combat Support System-Marine 

Corps (GCSS-MC) Increment 1

Intended to be the primary technology enabler for the Marine Corps logistics 

modernization strategy and provides the backbone for all logistics information required by 

the Marine Air Ground Task Force. GCSS-MC Increment 1 is intended to support 

logistics planners and operators worldwide to manage combat logistics, including 

planning, warehousing, distribution, depot maintenance, and asset visibility.
Appendix I: Descriptions of Selected MAIS 

Programs

Page 64 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) According to DOD officials, Navy ERP streamlines the Navy’s financial and supply-chain 

management business operations to enable visibility to senior leadership. In addition, 

DOD officials stated that it enables financial compliance and auditability. In particular, 

Navy ERP replaced segregated legacy systems with a single integrated software system 

that provides an end-to-end supply chain solution for receiving, processing, and fulfilling 

requests for resources; integrated financial management; workforce management; 

inventory management; material operations; and rapid response to logistical needs of 

operating forces.

Next Generation Enterprise Network 

(NGEN) Increment 1

The program is to replace and improve the enterprise network and services (e.g., data 

storage, e-mail, and video teleconferencing) that were provided by the Navy Marine 

Corps Intranet through a department-wide network services contract to Navy and Marine 

Corps personnel worldwide. NGEN Increment 1 will transition the service provider, while 

maintaining the same network infrastructure and services that were provided by the Navy 

Marine Corps Intranet. Increment 1 is also intended to form the foundation for the Navy’s 

future networking environment.

Source: Data provided by DOD officials.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS 

Programs

Page 65 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

This section contains profiles of the four selected major automated 

information system (MAIS) programs for which we determined whether 

they had changed their planned cost and schedule estimates and met 

performance measures. Each profile presents data on the program’s 

purpose and status, its latest cost and schedule estimates compared to 

the first acquisition program baseline (APB) (where established) or initial 

estimates (where an APB had not yet been established), as well as 

system performance data, where available.1

The first page of each two-page profile contains a description of the 

program’s purpose and a figure that provides a comparison of the 

program’s first APB (where established) or initial schedule to the 

program’s latest schedule. The years depicted on the figure represent 

calendar years, and the milestones represent the program’s best 

estimates of dates for those milestones. The program’s start represents 

the date that program officials reported that they first started work on the 

program.2 The first page also provides (1) essential program details, such 

as the name of the prime contractor, the total number of active 

contractors—which includes the prime contractor—and any other 

contractors (and in some cases subcontractors) supporting the program; 

(2) program costs (in then-year dollars), comparing the program’s latest 

life-cycle cost estimate (separated into acquisition and operations and 

maintenance costs) to its first APB (where established) or initial estimate 

(subsequent APBs that may have been established are not identified);3

(3) deployment details, such as the number of expected users and 

locations to which the system will be deployed; and (4) a summary of the 

cost, schedule, and performance of each program, which is further 

discussed on the second page of the profile. The arrows included in the 

summary box on the first page of each profile and in the headings on the 

second page represent whether a program’s cost estimate had increased 

() or decreased (), and whether the program’s schedule estimate had 

 1

A program’s first APB contains the original life-cycle cost estimate, schedule estimate, 

and performance parameters that were approved for that program by the milestone 

decision authority. The first APB is established after the program has assessed the 

viability of various technologies and refined user requirements to identify the most 

appropriate technology solution that demonstrates that it can meet users’ needs. 

2

This date is different than what DOD considers formal program initiation—the date that a 

program achieves milestone B. 

3

An estimate in then-year dollars includes the effects of economic inflation.

Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS 

Programs
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS 

Programs

Page 66 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

slipped () or been accelerated to meet milestones earlier than planned 

().

The second page of each profile provides detailed information on each 

program’s status, costs, schedule, and performance. In the status section, 

we discuss recent and upcoming milestones and events for each 

program. In the cost section, we identify the extent to which the program’s 

life-cycle cost estimate has changed from its first APB (where 

established) or initial estimate, as well as the causes for any changes 

identified. In the schedule section, we discuss the extent to which the 

program’s schedule has changed from its first APB (where established) or 

initial estimate, and the causes for any schedule changes identified. 

Finally, in the performance section, we identify the extent to which each 

program has met its established measures, as well as discuss the results 

of system performance tests. These performance ratings represent a 

point-in-time assessment as reported by the program. System 

performance targets were rated as “met” when (1) system tests were 

passed with no deficiencies or limitations, (2) the program fully met all of 

its key performance parameters, or (3) a program had addressed all 

deficiencies or limitations that were identified during system tests. System 

performance was rated as “not fully met” when a program either (1) did 

not fully pass system testing and was still in the process of addressing the 

deficiencies or limitations identified during system testing or (2) did not 

pass system testing and subsequently removed the problematic 

functionality from the system in order to pass subsequent system tests, 

instead of fixing the problematic functionality and keeping it in the planned 

release of the system.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS Programs

Page 67 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Distributed Common Ground System – Navy (DCGS-N) Increment 2 

DCGS-N Increment 2 is intended to converge afloat and ashore intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, 

and targeting capabilities into an integrated enterprise solution. DCGS-N Increment 2 is to replace the 

DCGS-N Increment 1 system and improve the Navy’s ability to process, exploit, and disseminate 

intelligence from its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Additionally, the system is 

intended to enhance the Navy’s ability to detect and identify maritime threats, and improve access to 

intelligence community data for Maritime Forces. DCGS-N Increment 2 capabilities are planned to be 

implemented in 5 releases. 

 a 

 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. a

The program has not yet awarded its development contract, which it plans to do in fiscal year 2016.

Program Essentials (as of November 2014)

DOD component: Department of the Navy

Program owner: Program Executive Office for Command, 

Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence

Prime contractor: Not applicablea

Total number of contractors: 2 

Fiscal year 2015 funding requested: $16.4 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

 Initial Latest

 estimate estimate 

 (02/2009) (11/2014)

Life-cycle cost estimate $2,641.1 $2,816.3

 Acquisition 696.5 682.8

 Operations and maintenance 1,944.6 2,133.6

 --------------- 

Amount spent to date $40.7

(as of September 2014) 

System Deployment Details (as of November 2014)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of ~2000

Current number of total expected locations: 0 of ~30

Legacy systems to be replaced: 1 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $21.9 million

Number of expected system interfaces: 21

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Unavailable system performance data 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS Programs

Page 68 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

DCGS-N Increment 2 

Program Status

The DCGS-N Increment 2 program was started in February 2009. Since then, the program has conducted 

pre-acquisition activities, including participating in an analysis of alternatives for developing the system, to 

further define the program’s acquisition strategy. As of November 2014, program officials reported that the 

program was developing selected DCGS-N Increment 2 capabilities that are to be included in a prototyping 

effort of the system. Among other things, this prototyping effort is intended to (1) demonstrate cloud 

computing capabilities,

1 (2) assess certain key performance parameters for the DCGS-N system, and (3) 

help the program mature its Agile software development support processes.

2 As of November 2014, the 

program expected to reach milestone B (the point at which an APB would be established) in mid-fiscal year 

2016.

Change in Cost Estimate () 

The program’s planned total life-cycle cost estimate had increased by about 7 percent. Specifically, while 

the program had not established an APB as of November 2014, the program’s initial cost estimate of about 

$2.64 billion, established in February 2009, had increased to about $2.82 billion in its latest estimate, as of 

November 2014. DCGS-N officials attributed the increase, in part, to having a better understanding of the 

program, changes in the installation schedule based on ship availability, and a 3-year extension in the 

program’s planned operations and maintenance phase. 

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

The program experienced about a 3.5-year schedule slip in the planned date for milestone B (which 

authorizes a program to begin system development) when compared to its initial schedule—from the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2012 to the second quarter of fiscal year 2016, which is approximately 7 years after 

DCGS-N Increment 2 was started. Program officials attributed the slippage primarily to the program taking 

longer than planned to analyze the alternative approaches for developing the system once the program 

decided to add a cloud-based solution to its analysis. Program officials also attributed the schedule slip to 

2013 and 2014 sequestration actions and continuing resolution delays.

Unavailable System Performance Data 

As of November 2014, the program did not expect to deploy any functionality until the fourth quarter of 

fiscal year 2017. Consequently, system performance data were not available.

 

1

Cloud computing is a model for delivering computing services through access to a shared pool of configurable 

computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly released with 

minimal management effort or service provider interaction.

2

Among other things, Agile software development supports the practice of delivering working software to users in 

small, short increments rather than in the long, sequential phases in which IT investments are often developed.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS Programs

Page 69 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) Increment 2

IPPS-A is intended to provide a 24-hour, web-based, integrated human resources system to soldiers, 

human resources professionals, combatant commanders, personnel and pay managers, and other 

authorized Army users. IPPS-A Increment 2 is to build on the database of personnel records that was 

delivered by IPPS-A Increment 1, and is to include four releases—referred to as releases 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 

5.0. Release 2.0 is intended to provide personnel management services (e.g., information on 

promotions/demotions and member benefits) to the Army National Guard; release 3.0 is to extend these 

services to the Active Component and Army Reserve; release 4.0 is to focus on pay services, such as 

providing information on base pay, bonuses, and leave; and release 5.0 is to address the remaining

personnel-related services not included in the prior releases. 

 a 

 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

a

IPPS-A Increment 2 is intended to be a web-based system that will be available worldwide.

Program Essentials (as of November 2014)

DOD component: Department of the Army 

Program owner: Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 

Prime contractor: CACI–ISS, Inc. (as of December 2014)

Total number of contractors: 5 

Fiscal year 2015 funding requested: $176.2 million 

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

 Initial Latest

 estimate estimate

 (04/2014) (11/2014)

Life-cycle cost estimate $2,143.6 $2,048.8

 Acquisition 1,050.9 787.1

 Operations and maintenance 1,092.7 1,261.7

 --------------- 

Amount spent to date $26.2

(as of October 2014)

System Deployment Details (as of November 2014)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of 1.1 million

Current number of total expected locations: Not 

applicablea

Legacy systems to be replaced: 43

Annual cost of legacy systems: $39.2 million 

Number of expected system interfaces: 80

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Unavailable system performance data 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS Programs

Page 70 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

IPPS-A Increment 2

Program Status

In July 2011, the IPPS-A program was restructured from a single increment into two increments with a total 

of five releases in order to comply with the Federal Chief Information Officer’s guidance for federal 

agencies to use modular and Agile practices in the acquisition of IT programs.1 According to program 

officials, in October 2014, the program completed a business process reengineering effort that assessed 

146 business processes associated with IPPS-A Increment 2 against the commercial, off-the-shelf product 

that the program plans to use. Officials stated that this effort reduced the number of needed business 

processes from 146 to 31. Additionally, the program achieved milestone B (which authorizes a program to 

begin system development) in December 2014. As of November 2014, the program expected to receive 

approval to begin fielding release 2.0 in December 2017, release 3.0 in November 2018, full deployment 

decision—including fielding release 4.0—in August 2019, and release 5.0 in April 2020. 

Change in Cost Estimate () 

The program’s cost estimate decreased by about 4 percent. Specifically, while IPPS-A Increment 2 had not 

yet established an APB as of November 2014, the program’s latest pre-APB cost estimate was 

approximately $2.0 billion—an approximately 4 percent decrease from its initial April 2014 estimate of 

about $2.1 billion. According to program officials, this decrease was due, in part, to a change in the number 

of expected labor hours and the average labor rates that were used to develop the cost estimate, and the 

program’s negotiation of sustainment costs with the Defense Information Systems Agency, which is to host 

the system. The program expected its first APB to be approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

by the end of January 2015. 

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

The IPPS-A Increment 2 program had experienced an approximately 2-year schedule slip in its planned 

date for milestone B when compared to its initial schedule established in August 2011—from the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2013 to December 2014. Program officials reported that the program’s delay in 

milestone B was due, in part, to an independent review that was conducted of the design of the IPPS-A 

Increment 1 database—which IPPS-A Increment 2 is dependent upon. Specifically, in May 2013, the Army 

Acquisition Executive directed the IPPS-A program to task an independent organization to conduct a 

review to determine the adequacy and completeness of the IPPS-A Increment 1 database, and whether it 

would meet the program’s requirements. The independent review was completed in August 2013 and 

found that the current design of IPPS-A Increment 1 was at low risk for not meeting the program’s 

requirements, and that the system design was not complete. Program officials also attributed the slip in 

milestone B for IPPS-A Increment 2 to the program’s implementation of recommendations made by the 

independent review organization, a source selection process that took about 2 years to complete, and a 

major restructure of the program into waves and releases.

Unavailable System Performance Data

As of November 2014, the program was in its planning phase and had not developed any portion of the 

system. Thus, system performance data were not available. 

 

1

According to the Federal Chief Information Officer’s IT Reform Plan, modular development is a system development 

technique that delivers functionality in shorter time frames by creating requirements at a high level and then refining 

them through an iterative process, with extensive engagement and feedback from stakeholders.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS Programs

Page 71 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) Increment 2 

JMS is intended to provide an integrated, network-based, space situational awareness and command and 

control capability at the Joint Space Operations Center in California. JMS Increment 2 is intended to be 

implemented in four releases, which the program refers to as service packs 7, 9, 11, and 13. Service packs 

7 and 9 are intended to deliver service capabilities (e.g., a catalog of space objects and predicting and 

reporting of collisions of space objects) and mission applications that are to enhance the accuracy, 

sustainability, and responsiveness of space surveillance capabilities. Service packs 11 and 13 are to 

complete the delivery of the service capabilities and mission applications, and provide infrastructure that 

will enable migration off of legacy systems. 

 a 

 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. a

The government is directly managing the integration of government and commercially developed software onto commercial, off-the-shelf hardware. b

This represents the number of concurrent users who have access to a subset of service pack 7 capabilities that have been deployed. This number 

fluctuates based on the number of ongoing exercises and events at the Joint Space Operations Center.

c

The maximum number of concurrent users is 800.

Program Essentials (as of November 2014)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force

Program owner: Air Force Space Command

Prime contractor: Not applicablea

Total number of contractors: 8 

Fiscal year 2015 funding requested: $73.8 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

 Latest

 First APB estimate

 (06/2013) (11/2014)

Life-cycle cost estimate $1,100.5 $1,100.5

 Acquisition 312.7 312.7

 Operations and maintenance 787.8 787.8

 --------------- 

Amount spent to date $146.6

(as of October 2014) 

System Deployment Details (as of November 2014)

Current number of total expected users: 20-40b of 800c

Current number of total expected locations: 1 of 1

Legacy systems to be replaced: 3 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $34 million

Number of expected system interfaces: ~120

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» No change in cost estimate

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS Programs

Page 72 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

JMS Increment 2

Program Status

In December 2011, the JMS program was restructured from a single increment into multiple increments to 

address programmatic challenges that were identified in a February 2011 independent program 

assessment. Specifically, the assessment found that, among other things, the Air Force’s plan to 

implement JMS in a single increment increased program risk and did not optimally support the warfighter. 

Following the program restructure, JMS Increment 2 was started in December 2011. In November 2014, 

the program received temporary approval to modify the system so that a subset of the service pack 7 

capabilities (about 90 percent) could be deployed into operations. Additionally, as of November 2014, the 

program was developing service pack 9 capabilities, designing service pack 11 capabilities, and planning 

the effort required for service pack 13. 

No Change in Cost Estimate

As of November 2014, the program had not experienced a change in its cost estimate since its first APB, 

which was established in June 2013.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

As of November 2014, the program had experienced about a 5-month schedule slip in the planned date for 

milestone C when compared to its first APB schedule—from the end of March 2016 to early September 

2016. Program officials attributed the majority of this delay to fiscal years 2013 and 2014 funding 

reductions (e.g., rescissions in previously approved budget authority and automatic budget cuts—referred 

to as sequestration), which accounted for approximately 4 months of funding for the program. Officials 

added that other factors that contributed to the schedule slippage were the implementation of newly 

mandated information assurance and cyber testing requirements, and impacts from the October 2013 

government shutdown.

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

The program conducted developmental and integrated testing on JMS Increment 2 service pack 7 

capabilities from March 2014 to September 2014. As a result of these tests, the program identified category 

1 and category 2 urgent deficiencies prior to and during developmental testing, and identified category 1 

and category 2 urgent deficiencies during integrated testing.1 As of November 2014, the program reported 

that it had addressed 96 percent of the category 1 deficiencies and 65 percent of the category 2 

deficiencies. Program officials expected to address the remaining deficiencies in service packs 9 and 11,

which are expected to be fielded beginning in October 2015 and February 2016, respectively. 

 

1

Category 1 deficiencies are those that, among other things, critically restrict the combat readiness capabilities of the 

using organization; category 2 deficiencies are those that impede or constrain successful mission operations.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS Programs

Page 73 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) Increment 2

The overall LMP system—including Increment 1 and Increment 2—is intended to streamline the 

maintenance, repair, and overhaul; planning; finance; acquisition; and supply of weapon systems, spare 

parts, services, and material for the Army’s working capital fund. LMP is a key component of the DOD plan 

for achieving fully auditable financial statements by September 30, 2017, as required by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.1 LMP Increment 2 specifically is intended to fully enable 

near real-time, end-to-end supply chain visibility and, among other things, automate processes for tracking 

labor and material expenses, and improve processes for receiving, storing, and issuing ammunition. LMP 

Increment 2 is to be developed in three waves, which consist of seven releases. 1

Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1003(a) (2009).

a

According to LMP officials, the program achieved milestone B in June 2013. The memo documenting the milestone decision authority’s approval of 

this was signed in August 2013.

 a 

 

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

Program Essentials (as of November 2014)

DOD component: Department of the Army 

Program owner: Program Executive Office, Enterprise 

Information Systems, Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Prime contractor: Computer Sciences Corporation 

Total number of contractors: 24

Fiscal year 2015 funding requested: $125.3 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions) 

 Latest

 First APB estimate

 (08/2013) (11/2014)

Life-cycle cost estimate $729.9 $729.9

 Acquisition 405.1 405.1

 Operations and maintenance 324.8 324.8

 -------------- 

Amount spent to date $328.8

(as of October 2014) 

System Deployment Details (as of November 2014)

Current number of total expected users: 374 of 14,500 

Current number of total expected locations: 50 of 50 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 18

Annual cost of legacy systems: $17.3 million

Number of expected system interfaces: 96

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» No change in cost estimate

» No change in schedule estimate

» Met system performance targets
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected MAIS Programs

Page 74 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems 

LMP Increment 2

Program Status

The LMP Increment 2 program was established in December 2011 to expand the capabilities of the fully 

deployed LMP Increment 1 system. According to program officials, LMP Increment 2 was also deemed 

necessary to enable the Army to generate auditable financial statements—which LMP Increment 1 was 

unable to do—as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. LMP Increment 

2 deployed its first wave, which included the first release, in January 2014. This release provided new 

capabilities for integrating with other Army enterprise resource planning systems. In August 2014, LMP 

Increment 2 began limited fielding of wave 2, which included releases 2, 3, and 4. Specifically, release 2 

was intended to enhance integration with additional Army and Defense Logistics Agency enterprise 

resource planning systems; release 3 was to allow LMP users to control and maintain visibility over Armyowned material that is not managed by the Army (e.g., Army assets managed by the Defense Logistics 

Agency); and release 4 was to enable planning and management of war reserve inventory. As of 

November 2014, the program was working to develop the third wave, which was to include releases 5, 6, 

and 7. These releases are intended to provide expanded capabilities for managing repair operations at 

Army installations; managing ammunition, including improving processes for receiving, storing, and issuing 

ammunition; and tracking repair and manufacturing operations, respectively. As of November 2014, 

program officials expected to achieve milestone C (which would allow limited fielding of wave 3) in May 

2015. 

No Change in Cost Estimate

As of November 2014, LMP Increment 2 had not experienced a change in its cost estimate since 

establishing its first APB in August 2013. 

No Change in Schedule Estimate

As of November 2014, the program had not experienced a change in its schedule estimate when compared 

to its first APB schedule, which was established in August 2013. As of November 2014, the program 

planned to achieve full deployment decision in October 2015, at which point it would set the date for full 

deployment.

Met System Performance Targets

As of November 2014, LMP Increment 2 had conducted developmental tests on two of its three waves. 

Specifically, in February 2014, the U.S. Army Evaluation Center reported that LMP Increment 2, wave 1, 

was effective, suitable, and survivable with limitations. The test report noted that the Army’s Test and 

Evaluation Command did not conduct formal survivability testing on the system because it was deemed to 

be low risk due, in part, to wave 1 including only one new interface to a system with which LMP already 

interfaced; instead, the Army Test and Evaluation Command used existing LMP Increment 1 and Increment 

2 testing documentation in its assessment. The test report also noted that a preliminary assessment report 

of the then-ongoing DOD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process identified 30 

deficiencies in the LMP system. According to LMP officials, all 30 deficiencies were addressed by August 

2014. Additionally, from January 2014 through September 2014, the program conducted developmental 

tests on LMP Increment 2, wave 2. During these tests the program identified 157 deficiencies and, as of 

September 2014, had addressed all of them. As of November 2014, the program expected to begin testing 

of wave 3 capabilities in January 2015. 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 75 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated 

that we select, assess, and report on selected Department of Defense 

(DOD) major automated information system (MAIS) programs annually 

through March 2018.1 This report is the third in our series of annual 

assessments. Our objectives were to (1) determine whether selected 

MAIS programs are meeting time frames for establishing program 

baselines and deploying capabilities; (2) describe the extent to which 

selected MAIS programs have changed their planned cost and schedule 

estimates and met performance targets; (3) assess selected MAIS 

programs’ actions to manage risks; and (4) assess the extent to which 

selected MAIS programs used key information technology (IT) acquisition 

best practices.

To address the first objective, of the 40 total MAIS programs, we 

established the following criteria for selecting a sample from the subset of 

29 DOD MAIS programs that were included in our prior MAIS reviews and 

the 4 MAIS programs included in the other objectives of this review (as 

discussed later). To narrow the list of programs, we excluded those that 

were follow-on increments (e.g., increment 2) because those programs 

generally establish a baseline and begin shortly after the prior increment 

ends. As a result, we selected the following 20 programs:

• the Air Force’s

• Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System;

• Base Information Transport Infrastructure Wired (formerly called 

Information Transport Services Increment 1);

• Base Information Transport Infrastructure Wireless;

• Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System 

Increment 1;

• Expeditionary Combat Support System Increment 1;

• Financial Information Resource System; and

• Joint Space Operations Center Mission System Increment 1.

• The Army’s

• Distributed Common Ground System-Army Increment 1;

 1

Pub. L. No. 112-81 § 1078 (Dec. 31, 2011).

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 76 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Global Combat Support System – Army;

• Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) Increment 

1; and

• Tactical Mission Command.

• The Defense Health Agency’s Integrated Electronic Health Record 

Increment 1;

• The Defense Logistics Agency’s

• Defense Agencies Initiative Increment 1 and

• EProcurement.

• The Navy’s

• Common Aviation Command and Control System Increment 1;

• Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services;

• Distributed Common Ground System – Navy (DCGS-N) Increment 

1;

• Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps Increment 1;

• Navy Enterprise Resource Planning; and

• Next Generation Enterprise Network Increment 1.

To determine whether these programs met time frames for establishing 

their first acquisition program baselines (APB), we determined the amount 

of time between when program officials reported starting work on the 

program2 and the date that each program’s first APB was approved and 

compared it to the 2-year time frame for developing APBs that was 

supported by the Defense Science Board.3 To determine whether these 

programs met or planned to meet a 5-year time frame, specified by law, 

for deciding to fully deploy capabilities,4 we determined the amount of 

 2

This date is different than what DOD considers formal program initiation—the date that a 

program achieves milestone B.

3

Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 

Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information 

Technology (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). Pursuant to § 1078(a)(2)(C) of Pub. L. No. 

112-81 (Dec. 31, 2011), we are required to assess whether the DOD MAIS programs 

employ best practices for the acquisition of information technology systems as identified 

by the Defense Science Board along with DOD and GAO.

4

10 U.S.C. § 2445c. 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 77 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

time between the start date of each program’s 5-year period (by law, this 

date is either milestone A in DOD’s acquisition process or, if a program 

did not have milestone A, the date that the program’s preferred 

development approach was selected, which in certain instances can be 

several years after a program was started) and the date that each 

program achieved or planned to achieve full deployment decision, and 

compared it to the 5-year time frame. Prior to the December 2014 

enactment of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, if a program did not 

reach full deployment decision within 5 years of reaching the milestone A 

decision or selecting a preferred alternative, it was required to, among 

other things, report a critical change to Congress. We also interviewed 

officials with the selected programs for information on the time they took 

to establish the programs’ first APBs and reach full deployment decision. 

Further, we interviewed appropriate DOD officials regarding DOD’s 

guidance on time frames for establishing program baselines, and to 

determine the oversight controls that were in place for DOD to manage 

unbaselined programs.

To address the second, third, and fourth objectives, we established the 

following criteria for selecting 4 of the 40 DOD MAIS programs that were 

included in DOD’s February 2014 official list of MAIS Programs:

5

• the program had planned to spend money in fiscal year 2014;

• the program was not fully implemented or recently approved for 

termination;

• the program was not included in our first or second MAIS annual 

reviews;6

• the program was not included in a recent GAO review that examined 

the program’s cost, schedule, and/or system performance;

• at least one enterprise resource planning system was included in our 

review;7 and

 5

As of December 2014, DOD had 35 MAIS programs. 

6

GAO, Major Automated Information Systems: Selected Defense Programs Need to 

Implement Key Acquisition Practices, GAO-13-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2013) and

Major Automated Information Systems: Selected Defense Programs Need to Implement 

Key Acquisition Practices, GAO-14-309 (Washington, D.C., Mar. 27, 2014). 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 78 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• the programs represented a variety of DOD components.

Eight of DOD’s MAIS programs met all of these criteria. From these eight, 

we first selected the three programs that had the highest planned 

spending for fiscal year 2014. These programs were:

• Army’s Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) Increment 2;

• Air Force’s Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) 

Increment 2; and

• Army’s IPPS-A Increment 2.

For the final program, we selected the Navy’s DCGS-N Increment 2 

program—the only Navy program in the list of eight potential programs—

to ensure that we had representation from all military departments.

To address the second objective, we analyzed and compared each 

selected program’s first APB objective cost estimate (in then-year dollars) 

to the latest life-cycle objective estimate to determine the extent to which 

planned program costs had changed.8 For the programs that had not 

established APB estimates—Navy’s DCGS-N Increment 2 and Army’s 

IPPS-A Increment 2—we compared these programs’ initial life-cycle cost 

estimates to their latest cost estimates (in then-year dollars). Similarly, to 

determine the extent to which these programs had changed their planned 

schedule estimates, we compared each program’s first APB schedule (or 

initial schedule, for the programs that had not established APBs) to the 

latest schedule. We did not compare the latest cost or schedule estimates 

to subsequent APBs established after the first APB, as this was outside 

the scope of our review. We relied on the thresholds established by 

statute to describe the amount of any deviation (i.e., significant or critical) 

that each program’s latest life-cycle cost and schedule estimates 

 7

An enterprise resource planning system is an automated system using commercial offthe-shelf software consisting of multiple, integrated functional modules that perform a 

variety of business-related tasks, such as general ledger accounting, payroll, and supply 

chain management.

8

The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (which complements and further explains DOD’s 

acquisition policies and process) refers to a program’s best cost and schedule estimates 

as objective estimates.
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 79 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

experienced from the first APB.9 To develop the schedule graphics 

included in each program profile in appendix II, we used DOD’s interim 

Instruction on the Operation of the Defense Acquisition System that was 

established in November 2013.

10

To determine whether the selected programs met their performance 

targets, we compared system performance targets against actual 

performance data in test reports. We reviewed the results of operational 

assessments and program evaluations conducted on the systems. We 

also reviewed additional information on each program’s cost, schedule, 

and performance, including program documentation such as DOD’s MAIS 

annual reports, APBs, monthly status briefings, and system test reports. 

We also interviewed program officials from each of the selected MAIS 

programs to obtain additional information on cost, schedule, and 

performance. System performance targets were rated as “met” when (1) 

system tests were passed with no deficiencies or limitations, (2) the 

program met all of its key performance parameters, or (3) a program had 

addressed all deficiencies or limitations that were identified during system 

tests. System performance was rated as “not fully met” when a program 

either (1) did not fully pass system testing and was still in the process of 

addressing the deficiencies or limitations identified during system testing 

or (2) did not pass system testing and subsequently removed the 

problematic functionality from the system in order to pass subsequent 

system tests, instead of fixing the problematic functionality and keeping it 

in the planned release of the system. We provided our assessments to 

 9

10 U.S.C. § 2445c(c), (d). With regard to schedule and cost deviations, a program is

considered to have undergone a “significant” change when it has (1) experienced a 

schedule change that will cause a delay of more than 6 months but less than a year; (2) 

estimated its acquisition or life-cycle costs to have increased by at least 15 percent, but 

less than 25 percent, over the original estimate; or (3) experienced a significant, adverse 

change in the expected performance of the system. A program is considered to have 

undergone a “critical” change when it has (1) experienced a schedule change that will 

cause a delay of 1 year or more; (2) estimated its acquisition or life-cycle costs to have 

increased by 25 percent or more over the original estimate; (3) failed to achieve a full 

deployment decision within 5 years after the milestone A decision for the program or, if 

there was no milestone A decision, the date when the preferred alternative is selected for 

the program; or (4) experienced a change in the expected performance of the system or 

major IT investment to be acquired under the program that will undermine the ability of the 

system to perform the functions anticipated.

10DOD recently updated and finalized this guidance in January 2015. This updated 

framework was not used during this review. Department of Defense, Operation of the 

Defense Acquisition System, Instruction 5000.02 (Jan. 7, 2015).
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 80 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

the program management offices of each selected program for comment. 

We aggregated and summarized the results of these analyses across the 

programs, as well as developed individual profiles for each program (see 

app. II).

To address the third objective, we reviewed risk management 

documentation from the four selected programs and compared it to key 

risk management best practices, including the Software Engineering 

Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition (CMMIACQ) and Project Management Institute’s Guide to the Project 

Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK®).11 These key practices are

• identifying risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts;

• evaluating and categorizing each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, and 

determining each risk’s relative priority;

• developing risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence; and

• monitoring the status of each risk periodically and implementing the 

risk mitigation plan, as appropriate.

Specifically, to identify levels of risks and determine the status of each 

program’s key risks and the actions that were taken to manage these 

risks, we analyzed program risk documentation, including monthly risk 

logs and reports, risk-level assignments, risk management plans, risk 

mitigation plans, and risk board meeting minutes. Additionally, we 

interviewed program officials to obtain additional information about their 

risks and risk management practices.

To address the fourth objective, we analyzed each selected program’s IT 

acquisition documentation and compared it to key requirements 

development and project planning best practices—including CMMI-ACQ 

and PMBOK Guide® practices, and best practices identified by GAO—to 

 11Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition 

(CMMI-ACQ), Version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010); Project Management 

Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth 

Edition, (Newton Square, Pa.: 2013). “PMBOK” is a trademark of the Project Management 

Institute, Inc. 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 81 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

determine the extent to which the programs were implementing these 

selected acquisition best practices.12 In particular, the key requirements 

development best practices were:

• elicit stakeholder needs, expectations, constraints, and interfaces and 

transform them into prioritized customer requirements;

• develop and review operational concepts and scenarios to refine and 

discover requirements;

• analyze requirements to ensure that they are complete, feasible, and 

verifiable;

• analyze requirements to balance stakeholder needs and constraints; 

and

• test and validate the system as it is being developed.

Additionally, the key project planning best practices were:

• establish and maintain the program’s acquisition strategy;

• develop and maintain the program’s cost estimate;

• establish and maintain the program’s schedule estimate;

• identify the necessary knowledge and skills needed to perform the 

program, and ensure staff have the needed knowledge and skills;

• conduct business process reengineering;

• develop and maintain the overall project plan, and obtain commitment 

from relevant stakeholders;

• plan for the use of an independent verification and validation agent; 

and

• plan for and maintain stable leadership.

 12CMMI-ACQ, PMBOK Guide®, and GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: 

Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP

(Washington, D.C.: March 2009), Information Technology: DHS Needs to Improve Its 

Independent Acquisition Reviews, GAO-11-581 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011) and 

Information Technology: Critical Factors Underlying Successful Major Acquisitions, 

GAO-12-7 (Washington, D.C., Oct. 21, 2011), and GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: 

Best Practices for Project Schedules—Exposure Draft, GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: 

May 2012).
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 82 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Specifically, we analyzed monthly program management review briefings, 

business cases, acquisition strategies, concepts of operations, milestone 

and baseline review documentation, independent verification and 

validation reports, system requirements documentation, minutes from 

requirements development and project planning meetings, and test and 

evaluation master plans. We also interviewed program officials to obtain 

additional information on each program’s requirements development and 

project planning processes. An internal subject matter expert validated 

our assessments on the four selected programs’ implementation of key 

requirements development and project planning best practices.

Regarding business process reengineering—within the project planning 

best practices area—10 U.S.C. 2222 requires that, prior to the obligation

of funds, business system program investments with a total cost in 

excess of $1 million over the department’s 6-year financial plan period 

(referred to as the Future-Years Defense Program) be certified as 

demonstrating that appropriate business process reengineering efforts 

have been undertaken. Accordingly, we chose to review whether the two 

business systems included in this review—LMP Increment 2 and IPPS-A 

Increment 2—had supporting documentation for their business process 

reengineering assessments; we did not evaluate the quality of these 

assessments. We did not review any business process reengineering 

efforts for DCGS-N Increment 2 or JMS Increment 2. During our review, 

officials told us that IPPS-A Increment 2 was in the process of conducting 

its business process reengineering assessment, which the program did 

not complete until near the end of our audit; thus, we did not review this 

program’s assessment or supporting documentation. For the LMP 

program, to determine whether the program had objective supporting 

evidence for its reengineering assessment, we analyzed all supporting 

documentation that the program had submitted with its assessment to 

DOD’s Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer.

Additionally, to assess the reliability of the schedules for Army’s LMP 

Increment 2 and Air Force’s JMS Increment 2 programs, we obtained and 

reviewed documentation, including integrated master schedules and work 

breakdown structures. We assessed these programs’ scheduling 

practices against three relevant selected best practices in the exposure 

draft of the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide.13 Specifically, these best 

 13GAO-12-120G. 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 83 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

practices were to (1) capture all activities, (2) sequence all activities, and 

(3) update the schedule using actual progress and logic. To assess the 

reliability of these programs’ life-cycle cost estimates, we used our cost 

guide to evaluate the respective Program Management Offices’ 

estimating methodologies, assumptions, and results.14 These best 

practices were (1) determine the estimating structure; (2) identify ground 

rules and assumptions; (3) obtain the data; and (4) develop the point 

estimate and compare it to an independent cost estimate. We also 

obtained and reviewed documentation from each of these programs, 

including the program office estimate, software cost model, independent 

cost estimate, and risk and uncertainty analysis. Further, we interviewed 

key program officials to obtain information about the programs’ schedule 

and cost estimating practices.

Regarding our assessments of the selected programs’ efforts to manage 

risks and implement requirements development and project planning best 

practices, we assessed a practice area as being fully implemented if the 

evidence provided by DOD officials demonstrated all aspects of the 

leading practices in that area. We assessed a practice area as being not 

implemented if the evidence did not demonstrate any aspect of the 

leading practices, or if no evidence was provided by DOD for that practice 

area. We assessed a practice area as being partially implemented if the 

evidence demonstrated some, but not all, aspects of the leading practices 

in that area. Finally, we assessed a practice area as “on track to fully 

implement” if a program was in its planning phase or had concrete plans 

under way that demonstrated the program was working to satisfy the 

aspects of the leading practices or had plans to implement the practices 

in that area.

To assess the reliability of the data that we used to support the findings in 

this report, we corroborated relevant program documentation and 

interviews with agency officials. We determined that the data used in this 

report were sufficiently reliable, with the exception of selected schedule 

data provided by Air Force’s JMS Increment 2 program and Army’s LMP 

Increment 2 program. We discuss limitations of these data in the report. 

We have also made appropriate attribution indicating the sources of the 

data.

 14GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 84 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

We conducted this performance audit from April 2014 to February 2015 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 85 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 86 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 87 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 88 GAO-15-282 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Carol R. Cha at (202) 512-4456 or ChaC@gao.gov

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff also made key 

contributions to this report: Shannin O’Neill, Assistant Director; Juaná 

Collymore; Jennifer Echard; Rebecca Eyler; Nancy Glover; Javier Irizarry; 

Zaka Kazi; Emily Kuhn; Jennifer Leotta; Vernetta Marquis; Lee 

McCracken; and Madhav Panwar.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(311608)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov.

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.