Filed 9/11/24 Yaya v. SC Medical CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

PETER N. YAYA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SC MEDICAL, INC.,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B330912

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CHCV00124)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Stephen P. Pfahler, Judge. Affirmed.

Peter N. Yaya, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Alysia B. Carroll; 

Carroll, Kelly, Trotter & Franzen, Michael J. Trotter and Michael 

Edward deCoster for Defendant and Respondent.
2

Peter N. Yaya (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered 

after the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings pursuant 

to Code of Civil Procedure section 438 on appellant’s claims 

against respondent SC Medical, Inc., doing business as AFC 

Urgent Care of Valencia (AFC). We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant’s first amended complaint alleges on or about 

December 21, 2021, appellant entered AFC’s facility in Valencia, 

California, seeking medical treatment. Appellant has a deviated 

septum, which “is an impairment that substantially limits one or 

more major life activity, including the functions of the respiratory 

system.” When appellant entered the facility, he was asked by 

the receptionist if he had a face mask. Appellant responded he 

has a disability and is unable to wear one. The receptionist 

asked appellant to fill out intake paperwork and then wait 

outside. Appellant complied.

After a while the receptionist called appellant’s cell phone 

and told him in order to reenter the facility appellant was 

required to wear a face mask as a condition of being seen for 

treatment. Appellant disconnected the call and reentered the 

facility without a face mask. He asked to speak to the facility 

office manager.

The facility office manager, Alexandra Martinez, told 

appellant it was company policy for all patients to wear a face 

mask. Appellant responded the policy was in violation of Civil 

Code section 51 and several other state and federal laws. 

Martinez repeated AFC’s policy of requiring all patients to wear 

face masks. Appellant asked that his paperwork be returned, his 
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personal information deleted, and then left the facility without 

receiving treatment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 24, 2022, appellant filed the initial complaint 

in this matter against AFC. On April 1, 2022, AFC filed an 

answer, and on October 24, 2022, AFC filed a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. The hearing was scheduled for 

November 17, 2022.

On November 3, 2022, before the hearing on AFC’s motion 

for judgment on the pleadings, appellant filed the operative first 

amended complaint without leave of court. On November 8, 

2022, appellant filed opposition to AFC’s motion for judgment on 

the pleadings. Appellant also filed a “doe amendment” correcting 

AFC’s title and adding Martinez as a named defendant. Causes 

of action for violation of Civil Code section 51 (Unruh Civil Rights 

Act); slander per se in violation of Civil Code section 46, 

subdivision (2); violation of the Patient’s Bill of Rights, California 

Code of Regulations, title 22, section 72527, subdivision (a)(4); 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress were included.

AFC filed a reply in support of its motion on February 1, 

2023. The motion was heard on February 7, 2023. After 

considering the moving papers and oral argument, the trial court 

determined the filing of the first amended complaint prior to the 

hearing on AFC’s motion “constitute[ed] a concession to the 

merits of the motion” challenging the original complaint. The 

court granted AFC’s motion without prejudice and deemed 

appellant’s first amended complaint filed as of November 3, 2022.

On March 14, 2023, AFC filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings as to appellant’s first amended complaint. AFC took 
4

the position it was immune from liability for appellant’s claims 

under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act 

(PREP Act) (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d). Further, AFC argued that 

even if it were not immune under the PREP Act, it was entitled 

to judgment on the pleadings because appellant failed to plead 

facts sufficient to support any of his causes of action.

Appellant filed an opposition to AFC’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings on March 28, 2023. AFC’s reply was filed on 

April 4, 2023. The matter was heard on April 11, 2023.

After considering the papers and hearing oral argument, 

the trial court granted AFC’s motion and issued a written ruling 

the same day. The court noted the operative complaint alleged 

appellant sought medical treatment on December 21, 2021, 

during a time when the Secretary of Health and Human Services 

had declared a public health emergency due to COVID-19. The 

time frame and COVID-19 emergency declaration were 

undisputed. The court found AFC was a covered person under 

the PREP Act, “engaging in defined countermeasures” thus 

“categorically and unequivocally” precluding any state or federal 

claims regardless of any claimed disability. Appellant provided 

no basis for any exception. Further, the court noted, even if 

appellant could state an exception to immunity, the trial court 

was an improper forum. Finally, the court noted, regardless of 

immunity, appellant’s claims lacked merit. The court granted 

AFC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings with prejudice.

On May 3, 2023, the court entered judgment in favor of 

AFC. Notice of entry of judgment was served the same date. 

Appellant filed his notice of appeal from the judgment on June 9, 

2023.
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DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is “equivalent to a 

demurrer and is governed by the same standard of review.” 

(Mack v. State Bar (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 957, 961.) “All material 

facts which were properly pleaded are deemed true, but not 

contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.” (Ibid.)

“If leave to amend was not granted, we determine whether 

the complaint states a cause of action and whether the defect can 

reasonably be cured by amendment.” (Mack v. State Bar, supra, 

92 Cal.App.4th at p. 961.) The appellant bears the burden of 

proof as to whether the pleading defect can be cured. (Ibid.) The 

trial court’s denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. (Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 

Cal.App.4th 592, 602.)

II. PREP Act immunity

Appellant first argues the trial court erred in applying 

PREP Act immunity to AFC’s conduct.

A. The PREP Act

“‘Congress passed the [PREP] Act in 2005 to encourage 

during times of crisis the “development and deployment of 

medical countermeasures” (such as diagnostics, treatments, and 

vaccines) by limiting legal liability relating to their 

administration.’” (Hampton v. California (9th Cir. 2023) 83 F.4th 

754, 762 (Hampton).) “The statute offers ‘covered person[s]’ 

immunity ‘from suit and liability’ for claims ‘caused by, arising 

out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the 

use by an individual of a covered countermeasure.’” (Ibid.; see 42 

U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1).) The immunity “‘applies to any claim for 

loss that has a causal relationship with the administration to or 
6

use by an individual of a covered countermeasure.’” (Ibid.; see 42 

U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(B).)

Immunity under the PREP Act lies dormant until the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services “makes a determination 

that a disease . . . constitutes a public health emergency” and 

“make[s] a declaration, through publication in the Federal 

Register,” that the Act’s immunity “is in effect.” (42 U.S.C. 247d6d(b)(1).)

On March 17, 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services issued a declaration that COVID-19 “constitutes a public 

health emergency” and “immunity as prescribed in the PREP 

Act” was in effect for the “manufacture, testing, development, 

distribution, administration, and use of” covered 

countermeasures. (Declaration Under the Public Readiness and 

Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures 

Against COVID-19, 85 Fed.Reg. 15198, 15201 (Mar. 17, 2020)

(Declaration).) “Covered [c]ountermeasures” were broadly 

defined to include “any antiviral, any other drug, any biologic, 

any diagnostic, any other device, or any vaccine, used to treat, 

diagnose, cure, prevent, or mitigate COVID-19.” (Id. at p. 15202.)

The sole exception to the immunity from suit is for “an 

exclusive Federal cause of action against a covered person for 

death or serious physical injury proximately caused by willful 

misconduct.” (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1).) Any lawsuit for willful 

misconduct “shall be filed and maintained only in the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia.” (42 U.S.C. 

§ 247d-6d(e)(1).) Thus, the PREP Act provides an exclusive, 

federal remedy in the Federal District Court for the District of 

Columbia for plaintiffs seeking to circumvent the immunity 

provided by the PREP Act.
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B. Application of the PREP Act to appellant’s 

claims

Appellant does not dispute that AFC is a “covered person” 

under the PREP Act. The statute specifically includes a licensed 

health professional or other individuals who are authorized to 

prescribe, administer, or dispense countermeasures under the 

law. (42 U.S.C. 247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(iii)-(iv).) Thus, AFC is covered 

under the PREP Act.

Appellant’s claims are for loss under the PREP Act. The 

statute provides broad immunity to covered persons “with respect 

to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or 

resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual 

of a covered countermeasure.” (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1).) The 

term “loss” is defined as “any type of loss,” including “death; [¶] 

. . . physical, mental, or emotional injury, illness, disability . . . ; 

[¶] . . . fear of physical, mental, or emotional injury, illness, 

disability, or condition, including any need for medical 

monitoring; and [¶] . . . loss of or damage to property, including 

business interruption loss.” (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(A).) 

Appellant’s claims of severe emotional distress and continued 

physical discomfort fall within the PREP Act’s definition of loss. 

The statute provides no exception for civil rights violations, and 

appellant provides no binding legal authority suggesting such an

exception exists.1 We therefore reject appellant’s suggestion that 

PREP Act immunity does not include civil rights violations.

1 Appellant’s citation to two articles (The Law and the 

Pandemic: Civil Rights, the PREP Act, and Liability by Bruce 

Adelson and Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act 

(PREP Act) Overview, Oregon Health Authority) do not convince 
8

Pursuant to the PREP Act, immunity applies to any claim 

for a loss that has a causal relationship with the administration 

or use of a covered countermeasure, including “a causal 

relationship with the design, development, clinical testing or 

investigation, manufacture, labeling, distribution, . . . promotion, 

sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, 

licensing, or use of such countermeasure.” (42 U.S.C. 247d6d(a)(2)(B).) Covered countermeasures under the PREP Act 

include devices authorized for emergency use and respiratory 

protective devices. (42 U.S.C. 247d-6d(i)(1).) AFC’s face mask 

policy constituted the use of a covered countermeasure under the 

PREP Act.2

Appellant’s claimed injuries were caused by the 

administration or use of covered countermeasures under the 

us the PREP Act is inapplicable in this case, in that appellant’s 

claims for civil rights violations fall squarely within the PREP 

Act’s immunity.

2 Hampton, supra, 83 F.4th 754, relied upon by appellant, is 

distinguishable. In Hampton, the spouse of an inmate who died 

of COVID-19 after being transferred from one prison to another 

during the COVID-19 pandemic sued various state officials 

claiming violations of Hampton’s constitutional and statutory 

rights. The plaintiff alleged that Hampton’s death was caused at 

least in part by the defendants’ failure to administer COVID tests 

to inmates prior to transferring them. (Id. at p. 763.) The Ninth 

Circuit held that PREP Act immunity did not apply, as “the 

PREP Act provides immunity only from claims that relate to ‘the 

administration to or the use by an individual of’ a covered 

countermeasure—not such a measure’s non-administration or 

non-use.” (Ibid.) Here, appellant is suing based on AFC’s use of a 

covered countermeasure—enforcement of a mask policy at a 

medical facility engaged in COVID testing and treatment.
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PREP Act. The Secretary of Health and Human Service’s March

2020 declaration defined the term “Administration of a Covered 

Countermeasure” to include “physical provision of a 

countermeasure to a recipient, . . . and to activities related to 

management and operation of programs and locations for 

providing countermeasures to recipients, such as decisions and 

actions involving security and queuing.” (Declaration, section IX, 

85 Fed.Reg. 15200.) AFC’s establishment and enforcement of its 

mask policy was part of the operation and management of its 

facility, therefore there is a causal relationship between 

appellant’s claims for loss and AFC’s administration or use of a 

covered countermeasure. AFC is immune from appellant’s claims 

under the PREP Act.

Appellant asserts AFC’s actions failed to recognize the 

state’s exemption from the mask mandate for those with a 

disability. Appellant cites the November 16, 2020 California 

Department of Public Health “Guidance for the Use of Face 

Coverings,” as well as the Los Angeles County Public Health 

“Mask Wearing Rules and Recommendations” as support for his 

argument that such policies provided exceptions for people with 

disabilities that prevent wearing face masks. Appellant cites no 

authority suggesting that AFC, a private entity, was required to 

follow the referenced publications. To the extent appellant 

attempts to allege willful conduct falling outside the PREP Act, 

an action in the Federal District Court in the District of 

Columbia is his exclusive remedy.3 (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)(4),

(e)(1)(5).)

3 Appellant cites Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC (9th 

Cir. 2022) 27 F.4th 679 as support for his position that 
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III. Leave to amend

Appellant asserts the trial court should have granted him 

leave to amend. However, he fails to support this contention by 

demonstrating how the complaint can be amended to state a 

cause of action. (Dey v. Continental Central Credit (2008) 170 

Cal.App.4th 721, 731 [“To show an abuse of discretion, ‘“the 

plaintiff must show how the complaint can be amended to state a 

cause of action.”’”].) Instead, appellant asserts the present 

matter has nothing to do with the PREP Act and his claims

warrant adjudication as they are. Appellant has failed to meet 

his burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying appellant leave to amend.

jurisdiction in California state court is proper. Saldana is not 

persuasive as it involved different claims. The plaintiffs, 

relatives of a nursing home resident who allegedly died of 

COVID-19, brought claims of elder abuse, custodial negligence, 

and wrongful death against the care facility. The defendant 

removed the case to federal court and appealed when the matter 

was remanded to state court. The Saldana court found complete 

federal preemption was not a ground for federal jurisdiction, 

holding the PREP Act does not “completely preempt all state-law 

claims related to the pandemic.” (Saldana, at p. 688.) Saldana 

does not convince us that appellant’s claims, which arise directly 

from AFC’s use of a covered countermeasure, may be heard in 

state court.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs 

of appeal.

________________________

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________

LUI, P. J.

________________________

ASHMANN-GERST, J.