UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 96-4206

JOSEPH CRUM,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Benson E. Legg, District Judge.

(CR-94-384-L)

Submitted: November 12, 1996

Decided: December 6, 1996

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and MICHAEL, Circuit

Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Kenneth D. Auerbach, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne

A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Katharine J. Armentrout, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Crum appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute

powder and crack cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to

distribute. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Testimony at trial revealed that Crum led a drug ring that operated

primarily out of Carver Hall, a housing project in Baltimore. Crum

contracted with Donovan Dorsey to use Dorsey's home near Carver

Hall as a stash house for the organization. Crum and other members

of his organization went to the house each day to count drug proceeds

and check on inventory.

Although Crum's workers already carried guns, Crum wanted more

guns. Dorsey introduced Crum to Tyrone McLaughlin, who could

purchase guns legitimately. McLaughlin supplied Crum with the guns

he had ordered and then provided information about the organization

to the police. During his dealings with Crum, McLaughlin had seen

drugs and money in Dorsey's house and had witnessed at least one

drug transaction there.

Law enforcement authorities had been investigating the Crum organization for some time prior to McLaughlin's contact with police.

After McLaughlin provided the police with information about

addresses used by members of the organization, police obtained

search warrants for many of those locations, including Dorsey's

home. Among the items recovered from the search were guns, crack

cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and cash.

After the search of his home, Dorsey began to provide information

to the police. He informed authorities that Crum travelled to New

York by train to obtain fresh supplies of cocaine. Dorsey also told

authorities about the vehicles that members of Crum's organization

used.

Officers then set up surveillance around Carver Hall to watch for

any of the vehicles Dorsey had identified. They followed one of the

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cars, driven by Crum lieutenant Tyrone Watts, from the project to

Penn Station in Baltimore. Watts picked up Crum and a female companion at the train station. Before Crum got into the car, officers saw

him remove a jacket from a bag he was carrying. They noticed in the

corners of the bags two objects which officers believed from experience might be packages of narcotics.

Watts and his passengers drove off. Officers decided to stop the

vehicle based on their suspicion that it contained narcotics. Instead of

pulling over, Watts led police on a high-speed chase through Baltimore. The chase ended only when Watts got caught in traffic. He,

Crum, and a passenger bailed out but were later apprehended. Officers obtained a search warrant for the car and discovered two packages of cocaine.

The district court denied Crum's motion to suppress evidence

seized during the search of the car. A jury convicted Crum, who now

appeals his convictions.

Crum claims that the district court erred when it denied his motion

to suppress. He contends that the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion that wrongdoing was afoot and that they therefore lacked authority to stop the car Watts was driving.

Officers are permitted to stop a vehicle if there exists a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring. United States

v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 926

(1992); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Courts look at the

totality of the circumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion existed. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).

In this case, there was ample reason to suspect that criminal activity was afoot. Officers had been investigating the Crum organization

for several months. They had information that Watts was a key member of the organization and knew that he was driving a car associated

with the organization. He drove from Carver Hall, where the drug

ring conducted most of its business, to Penn Station. Officers knew

that Crum traveled by train to New York to obtain drugs. Watts

picked Crum up at the train station, and Crum held a bag that

appeared to experienced officers to contain packages of narcotics.

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Given these facts, there was ample reason to suspect that criminal

activity was afoot, and there was no Fourth Amendment violation in

this case.

Crum next asserts that the district court erred when it allowed certain testimony by Dorsey and McLaughlin. Because Crum did not

object to these statements at trial, we review their admission for plain

error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993).

Under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), a statement made by a coconspirator of a defendant during the course and in furtherance of the

conspiracy is not hearsay when it is offered against the defendant. To

admit a co-conspirator's statement, the record must demonstrate that

there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the defendant and

that the statements were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1256 (4th Cir. 1992).

It is not necessary for the district court to set forth a detailed rationale

for admitting the statement as long as the record demonstrates the

statement's admissibility. Id.

Crum contends that Dorsey, a co-conspirator, should not have been

allowed to testify that Watts told him, after Crum's arrest, that business would continue while Crum was in jail and that Crum would be

out of jail soon to continue running Carver Hall. This statement was

proper under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Watts' statement shows that the conspiracy was ongoing while Crum was in jail and that Watts, a coconspirator, would run the organization until Crum's release. Further,

there was other testimony at trial that the ring continued to operate

despite Crum's incarceration. For instance, a letter from Crum to

Watts was read into the record. In the letter, Crum told Watts that he

was "to call the shots and make moves." Dorsey's testimony was

entirely proper. See United States v. Shores, 33 F.3d 438, 443 & n.4

(4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 63 U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S.

Mar. 20, 1995) (No. 94-7025).

McLaughlin's statements, although not made to a co-conspirator,

were also admissible. McLaughlin testified about two statements

made by Watts to McLaughlin: that a shoebox contained $5000; and

that Crum had work for Watts to do. The reference to the $5000 was

made after McLaughlin drove Watts to Dorsey's house, where Watts

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picked up a shoebox. Watts expressed his concern about how he

might hide the money in the shoebox and whether someone might

question him having so much money on his person. Later that day,

Watts informed McLaughlin, who was still driving Watts around, that

Crum had called him, informing him that his trip had been cancelled

because Crum had work for him [Watts] to do. These statements were

made by Watts, a co-conspirator. And they were made while

McLaughlin assisted Watts in carrying out his duties as a member of

the conspiracy. Thus, they were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

McLaughlin also testified that an unidentified co-conspirator told

him that they intended to file the serial numbers off guns that

McLaughlin provided to the organization. When this statement was

made, the unidentified co-conspirator was at the Dorsey stash house,

he was handling the guns that McLaughlin had provided, and the

statement related to what was to be done to the guns. The man was

clearly a member of the organization. His statement was made in an

effort to allay McLaughlin's fears that the guns might be traced back

to him in the hope that either he would not report them stolen or that

he would continue to supply the organization with guns. Again, the

statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Finally, Dorsey contends that certain testimony by an investigating

officer was inadmissible. Three of the statements were admissible

because they were not offered for their truth but were offered to provide background information about the investigation. United States v.

Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.

1081 (1986). The other three statements to which Crum objects were

hearsay. However, given the overwhelming strength of the case

against Crum, the admission of these statements was not reversible

error.

We therefore affirm the convictions. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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