### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs S ep te m be r 19, 200 7

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . MARCUS RICHARDS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. II-CR101400A &B Timot hy L. E aster , Judge

No. M2006- 02179-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 6, 2008

Def endant pled guilty

to misdemeanor possession of c ocaine . Prior to his plea, Def endant f iled and the trial cour

t hear d a suppression motion. The trial court, afte r the hear ing a nd submissi on of brief

s by the par ties, denied the motion. Def endant properly prese rved a ce rtified question of law . After a t h o ro u gh re v i ew o f t h e re co rd , we re v er s e t h e j u d gm en t o f t h e t ri al co u rt an d d i s m i s s t h e c h ar ge a g a ins t D e fe nd ant. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed; Indictm ent Dism issed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J ERRY L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

Ve nu s N ine r, F ra

nk lin , T e nn e sse e , f

or the Ap pe lla

nt, Ma rc us Ric ha

rd s.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; B e nja min A. B a ll, As sis tant Att or ne y Ge ne ra l; Rona ldL . Da vi s, Di st ri ct A tt orn ey Gen eral ; an d S ean B. Dud dy , As si st ant Di st ri ct A tt orn ey Gen eral , for the A ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I. Bac kgr ound
The arre st of Defenda

nt arose out of a tip from a citizen informant. The identity of the c itiz en inf or mant w a s n ot r e ve a le d at th e su pp re ssi on he ari ng , a lth ou g h th e of fi c e r who too k th e c a ll, Serg eant Chris C lausi, testified at the hearing

. Serg eant Clausi testified that the c itiz en informa nt called him and stated that he ( “he” is being used as a gende r-ne utral pronoun, because the g ender of the citizen informant was not re veale d) had se en a dr ug transac tion at t h e p i cnic table behind 144 Ninth Avenue in F ranklin. The citiz en informant told S erg eant Clausi that Tre nt Covington (who resided a t 144 Ninth A venue with his mother) was involved and so was the dr iver of a maroon SUV. Serg eant Clausi testified that he kne w Mauric e He ad dro v e a maroon SUV and be lieved that wa s who the citizen informant wa s ref err ing to. The cit i zen informant also identified a woman sitting

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at the tab le a s b e in g a p e r s o n w h o w a s in D r u g Co u rt. D e f

e n d an t w a s n o t n a me d b y th e citizen informant and Ser g eant Clausi test i fi ed t h at only three people we re me ntioned by the citizen informant.

Se rg e ant C la

us i te sti fi e d th a t th e c iti zen inf or mant ha d ca lle d him be fo re and g ive n a c c ur a te information about drugtransac tions and those involved in the transac tions in this ne ighbor hood. He fu rt h er t es tified that this person was not a paid informant or

someone who w as “w orking off char g es.” A s far

as Serg eant Clausi knew the citizen informant had not been co nvicted of a ny crimes, a l t h o u gh h e d i d testify that he had not pe rfor

med a c riminal history

chec k on the per son. When Serg eant Clausi arrived at 144 Ninth Ave nue, he f ound the g roup of pe ople the citizen informant desc ribed sitting at the picnic table be hind the home.
After rec eiving the phone c all, Serg eant Clausi contac ted the offic ers who usua lly patrol that
are a, Of fice rs Rose and Da

vis. He told them that he had r ece ived a phone call fr om a citizen informant about possible drugactivity “behind Tr ent’s house at the picnic table with the g irl from DrugCourt.” Off

icer s Rose and Davis arrive d first on the sce ne and w ere conducting the investigation when Serg eant Clausi ar rived.
Offic er Rose te stified that, upon rec eiving Serg eant Clausi’s information, Office r Davis and he advise d Serg eant Clausi that they would park on N inth Avenue a nd Natche z S tree t and appr oach the home fr om the left side. Offic er Rose testified that it wa s a tac tical dec ision to not approa ch the home from the f

ront. Be cause of the knowle dg e that nar cotics ca n easily be destroy ed, he did not want the pe ople seated at the table to see him approa ch unti l he was close. Of fice r Rose testified that he wa s dressed in plain c lothes. Offic er Rose state d that one of the subjects (Maur ice He ad) notice d the of fi c e rs a s th e y

a pp ro a c he d. Mr . H e a d d

ro pp e d s ome thi ngbe tw e e n his le g s. Of fi c e r R os e a lso observe d Mr. Hea d swee p t h e t able of f with his hand. Off

icer Rose testified that he sa id “don’t move, police, nobody move.” Mr. Hea d then moved as if to g et up and wa s told ag ain not to move. Offic er Rose testified t hat he could not deter mine what wa s dropped by Mr. Hea d until he arrive d at t he picnic table and saw a “cor ner bag g ie” on the ground. Also at t he picnic ta ble, he obse rved a white powde r substance “dusting ” the g round and spr inkled on the table.
Offic er D avis, who wa s in uniform during the incident, stated that when Mr. He ad noticed the o f f ic e r s , h e p la c e d s o me th in g o n th e g r o un d an d th a t a t th a t p o int O f f ic e r D a v is c o u ld not deter mine what the “something ” was. He testified that Offic er Rose then s aid s omething like “ hey stop what y ou’re doing, just kee p y our hands up where we can see them.” Officer Davis stated on
cross-e x amination that this was said in a manne r that wa s not conversational. Office r Davis testified that none of the white substance found on the table, on the ground, or near the cor ner ba g g ie was se nt to b e te ste d at th e c ri me la bo rator y . O ff ic e r D a vis state d th a t he se arc he d D e fe nd ant t wi c e

. Th e fi rs t time was without consent bec ause he “had immediate acc ess to the coc aine” an d t o ensure that De fe nd ant d id no t have any “ we a po ns or any thi ngob vio us .” Af

te r p a tti nghim

do wn , O ff

ic e r D a vis told Defe ndant to sit back down.

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The off icer s then sear ched Mr . Covington and f ound a white substanc e in his whee lchair. Offic er D avis testified that Serg eant Clausi then told him to “go a head a nd do a ful l s ea rch on [ Defendant]. ” Of

fi c e r D avis c omp lie d w ithSe rg e a nt C la us i’ s r e qu e st a

nd fo un d a ba g g ie in Def endant’ s pant pocke t. The bag g ie containe d what wa s believed to be coc aine a nd marijuana

(later confirme d by

lab tests). De fenda

nt was plac ed under

arr est. Def

endant pled g uilty

to misdemeanor possession of coc aine a

nd proper ly

prese rved a s a ce rtified question of law the following issue:
Whether the e vidence seized from the de fenda nt should have bee n suppressed beca use t he continued seizure and searc h of the pe rson of the de fenda nt by the police was not supported by

probable cause or re asonable s u s p i ci o n in violation of the Four th Amendment to the Unit ed S tates Constitut ion and Article I , Section 7 of the Tenne ssee Constitution.

II. Ana lys is
A. Standard of

Review The finding s of fa ct made by the trial court at the hear ing on a motion to suppress are binding upon this court unless t h e ev i d en ce contained in the r ecor d preponde rate s ag ainst them. State v. Ro ss , 49 S.W .3d 833, 839 (Tenn. 2001). T h e trial court, a s the trier of fac t, is able to assess the
cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s, determine the weig ht and value to be aff orded the evidenc e and re solve any conflicts in the evide nce. State v. Odom , 9 28 S.W. 2d 18 , 23 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . T he pr e va ili ngpa rt y is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate vie w of the e vidence and all re asonable infere nces dr awn f rom that evidenc e. State v. Hick s , 55 S.W .3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001). Howeve r, this court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law

. State v. Simpson , 968 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998) . The application of the law to the facts found by the trial cour

t are questions of law that this court re views de novo

. State v. Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 42 0 , 4 2 3 (T en n

. 2 0 00). The de fenda nt has the burde n of establishing that the evidenc e contained in the rec ord pre ponderates ag ainst the finding s of fa ct made by the trial cour

t. Braz ie l v . S

tate , 529 S.W .2d 501, 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)

. The F ourth Amendment to the United States Const itution, made applicable to the States by the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt, pr ov ide s:
Th e ri g ht o f t

he pe op le to b e se c ur e in t heir per so ns , h ou se s, pa

pe rs , a nd e ff e c ts,
a g a ins t unre a so na

ble se arc he s and

se izur e s, sh a ll n ot b e vio late d, and no wa rr ants shall issue, but upon pro b ab l e ca use, supported by

oath or a ffirmation, and particula rly descr ibing the pla ce to be sear ched, and the person or things to be se ized.

Ar tic le I , s e c tio n 7 of

the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion pr ov ide s th a t: People sh al l b e secure in their persons, houses, pa

pers a nd possessions, from
unrea sonable sea

rche s and seizures; and that g ener al war rants, whe reby

an off icer may be commande d to searc h suspected pla ces, w ithout e v idence of the fa ct

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committed, or to seize any person orpersons not name d, whose off ence s are not particula rly descr ibed and supporte d by evidenc e, ar e dange rous to liberty and oug ht not to be g rante d.
Both of the se constitutional provisions are intende d to “safe g uard the priv ac y and sec urity of individuals a g ainst arbitra ry invasions of g overnme nt officials.” Cam ara v . M un ic ipa l Co ur t , 387 U. S. 5 23 , 5 28 , 87 S. Ct. 17 27 , 1 73 0, 18 L . E d. 2d 93 0 ( 19 67 ); se e als o S

tate v . Ke ith , 978 S.W .2d 861, 865 (Tenn.1998)

. Under bo t h t h e fe dera l and state c onstitut ions, warr antless seizures ar e pre sumed
unre a so na

ble and evi den c e ob ta ine d f

ro m su c h s e izur e s sh ou ld b e su pp re sse d unle ss t

he State demonstrates by

a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the sear ch or seizure wa s conducte d pursuant to an e xce pti on to the wa

rr ant r e qu ir e me nt. Se e Coo lid ge v . New H

am ps hir e , 403 U.S. 443, 454-455, 91 S. Ct

. 2022, 2032, 29 L . Ed. 2d 564 (1971); State v. W atkins , 827 S.W .2d 293, 295 (Tenn.1992)

. Our Supreme Court has outlined these ex ceptions as se arc hes incident to ar rest, plain view, stop a

nd fr isk ba se d o n r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

of c ri min a l a c tiv ity , exig e nt c ir c ums tanc e s b a se d o n p ro ba ble
cause , hot pursuit, and consent. State v. Bartram , 925 S.W .2d 227, 230 n.2 (Tenn. 1996)

. B. The Reliability

of the Citiz en Informant
When an i n fo rm ant is a member of the “ criminal milieu” the re liability of his information is determined unde r the Aq uil ar-S pin e llistandard. See Spinelli v . Un i t ed S t ates , 393 U.S. 410 (1 96 9) ; A q uilar v. Texas , 3 7 8 U.S. 108 (1964). This test must be used to ensure the basis of the informant’s knowledg e and the cr edibility or the re liability

of the infor

mation. Sta te v . J

ac um in , 778 S.W .2d 430, 432 (Tenn. 1989)

. When informati o n is gathere d from a c itiz en with no ties to the criminal community , the
re lia bil ity of th e in for matio n is pr e sume d. An a ff ida vit fo r a se arc h w arr ant d oe s n ot h a ve to establish the cr edibility

prongof Aq uilar-S

pin e lli

. State v. Me lson , 638 S.W .2d 342, 355 (Tenn. 1982). While the instant case doe s not involve a search warr ant, t he st andar d for r eliability of the informant’s i n fo rm at i o n rema ins the same. See State v . Dennis W . Menzies , No. W1998-00608- CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 424277 at *5-7 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, A pril 20, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug . 10, 2000). I n order to be presumed reliable, there must be information about the citizen informant’s status or his re lationsh i p t o t h e events or per sons involved. Melson , 638 S.W .2d at 354-56. Simpl e claims that the informant was a conce rned citizen, was not paid for the inf or matio n, wa s n ot “ wo rk ingof f charg e s, ” and

wa s a c tin g out of

a c ivi c duty

are ins uf fi c ie nt t o establish that the i ndividual qualifies as a citizen informant. See State v . Steve ns , 989 S.W .2d 290, 29 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . In o rd e r t o d e te rm ine if so me on e is a

c iti zen inf or mant t he a ff ida vit mus t c on ta in particula rized information as to how he obta ined the information. Steve ns , 9 89 S.W. 2d a t 29 4. Th is is especia lly

rele vant when the information provided is something like the location of drug s which would more likely be known by someone of the criminal milieu. Id

. (quoting 2 Way ne R. L aF ave, Se ar c h a nd

Se izu re § 3. 4( a ) (3 d e d. 19 96 ))

. I n or de r to de te rm ine if a c iti zen inf orman t, who se

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identity is unknown, is reliable , we must look to the t otality of t he circumstance s surrounding the aff idavit. Melson , 638 S.W .2d at 356.

I n the instant case , the citizen informant was known to Serg eant Clausi a s havingprovided
re lia ble inf or matio n in the pa st. Th e c iti zen

inf or mant s tate d th a t he ha d seen a “ dr ugde a l” involving Tre nt (who re sided at the home the transac tion occur red) , a man dr iving a

maroon SUV, and a w o m an , who the citizen informant identified a s being a member of drugcourt. The citizen informant told Serg eant Clausi that he ha d observe d the drug transac tion. “ The fa ct that information g iven by the i nformant is based upon his persona l observation is a reliable basis for [the] conclusion that his statements are true.” Id

. at 3 5 5 (c i t i n g United S t a t es v. Rollins , 522 F.2d. 160 ( 2nd Cir. 1975)). B eca

use Serg eant Clausi had infor mation f rom this c itiz en that had proved reliable in the pa s t an d b e c a

u s e th e c it iz e n in f

o r ma n t g a v e a c c u r a te in f

o r mati o n a s to w h o w a s p r esent a t the incident and because the i nformation was from a persona l observation by the citizen informant, the
c iti zen inf or mant i s p re sume d to be re lia ble ba se d o n th e tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s.
C. T he Se izur e of

De fe nd ant
Whe n O ff

ic e rs Ros e and

Da vis a pp ro a c he d D e fe nd ant a

nd oth e rs se a te d at the pic nic ta ble they testified that they

saw one of the individuals drop something

. Offic er Rose testified he y elled, “don’t move, police , nobody move.” In Florida v . Bostick, 5 0 1 U

. S

. 4 2 9 , 1 1 1 S

. C t

. 2 3 8 2 , 1 1 5 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991) the Supreme Court held, “ in o rd er to determine whether a par ticular e ncounter c on sti tut e s a

se izur e , a

c ourt mus t c on sid e r a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s sur rou nd ingthe e nc ounte r t o deter mine whether

police conduc t w ould ha

ve communicated to a

rea sonable pe rson that the per son was not fr ee to decline the of fice r’s re quest or other

wise terminate the enc ounter.” Bostick , 5 01 U. S. at 440, 111 S. Ct. at 2389. The Tenne ssee Supreme Court ha s held that courts should consider , as pa rt of the tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s te st, the fo llo wi ng :

t h e t i me, place and purpose of the e ncounter ; the words used by the offic er; the office r’s tone of

voice; the of

fice r’s statements to others who wer e pre sent duringthe encounte r; the threatening prese nce of s ev er al office rs; the display of a w eapon by an off icer ; and the phy sical touchingof the pe rson of the c itiz en. State v. Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 420 (Tenn. 2000)

. I n the instant c ase, the Def endant was seized when Of fice r Rose said “don’ t move, police,
no bo dy mov e .” Whe n a

pe rs on a t the ta ble tr ie d to g e t up , th e y

(t ho se se a te d at th e ta

ble ) w e re tol d ag ain not to move. Offic er Rose a g ree d that he y elled this statement, and Of fice r Davis testified that Offic er Rose w as not using a “conve rsational tone” when h e m ad e the state ment. There wer e two office rs pre sent when the statement was made, but very soon afte r at least two more of fice rs ar rived. No re asonable person in that situation would have be lieved he w as fr ee to lea ve.
D. The Initial Search of

Def endant

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Of fi c e r D avis te sti fi e d th a t he se arc he d De fe nd ant a t fi rs t fo r tw o dif fe re nt r e a so ns . H e fi rs t stated that he sear ched Def endant beca

use he was in the immediate are a of the white powder on the picnic table. Offic er Davis then testified that he patted down Def endant to look for w eapons. The trial court, in its findings of fac t, determined that the first sear ch wa s conducte d in order to e nsure the offic ers’ safe ty . As such, it falls wit hin an ex ception to the warrant requireme nt under the “stop and fr isk” exception. Se e Te rry v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. C t. 1868, 20 L . Ed. 2d 889 (1968).

I n order to “stop and fr isk” a person, rea sonable suspicion is re quired. Rea sonable suspicion is suspicion ba sed upon specific and articula ble fac ts that a criminal offe nse has been, is being , or is about to be committed. Te rry , 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct

. at 1880. I n deter mining whe ther a

police
o ff i ce r h as a r ea s o n ab l e s u s p i ci o n , a co u rt m u s t co n s i d er t h e t o t al i t y o f t h e c i rc u m s t an ce s i n cl u d i n g, but not lim ited to, the office r' s persona l ob j ec t ive observations, information obtained from other office rs, information obtained f rom citizens, and the patter n of oper ation of ce rtain cr iminals. See United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct.690, 695, 66 L . Ed. 2d 621; State v. W atkins , 827 S.W .2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992) . The police office r “must be a ble to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticula rized suspicion or hunch.” United St ates v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L . Ed. 2d 1 (1989).

I n the i nstant case , Offic er D avis had infor mation from Serg eant Clausi that a possible drug transac tion had taken place involving “Tre nt a nd the g irl from DrugCourt” behind Tre nt’s house. Upon ar riving Offic er D avis saw Tr ent, a woma n, and two men sitting at a p i cn i c table behind Tr e nt’ s h ou se . O ff

ic e r D avis te sti fi e d th a t he saw M r. He a d dr op so me thi ng to the g ro un d. He a lso t es t i fi edt h at al l t h o s e a tt h e t ab l e h ada l o o k l i k e “ o h , h er e’ s t h e p o l i ce

. I ’m d o i n g s o m et h i n g I shouldn’t be doing .” He stated t hat hi s knowledg e of this ty pe of look came fr om his ex perie nce a s a police of

fice r. When the off

icer s approa ched the table, they observe d a white powder scatter ed on the table a

nd on the gr o u n d b en ea th the table. Mr. He ad also ha d his fist clenche d and, whe n he
c omp lied wi th a

re qu e st t o o pe n h is h and by Of fi c e r R os e , th e of

fi c e rs sa w a ro lle d u p d oll ar b ill with a white re sidue on it. The offic er s t es t i fi ed that this was, in their e x perie nce, use d to snort
coca ine. Off

icer Davis testified that he then patted down D efe ndant for “ wea pons or any

thing obvious.” The pat down reve aled nothing, and the officers told Def endant to si t back down. O ffice r Davis neither

asked f or conse nt nor rec eived c onsent to sear ch De fenda nt.
E. The Sec ond Searc h of De fenda nt

I t is wel l se ttl e d la

w that a “ se izur e that is lawf

ul at it s in c e pti on

c an v iol a te the F ourt

h Amendmen t if its manner of e x ecution unre asonably infring es intere sts protected by the Constit ution.” Illinois v. Caball es , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S. C t. 834, 837, 160 L .E.2d 842 (2005) (c i t i n g United States v. J

acobsen , 46 U.S. 109, 124, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1663, 80 L

. Ed. 2d 85 (1984))

. I n the instant case , the offic ers ha d no articula ble re asons for the s econd searc h of Defenda nt. The ini tia l pat do wn

re ve a le d n oth ingthat w ou ld h a ve g ive n th e m pr ob a ble cau se or eve n r e a so na ble suspicion to conduct a se cond sea rch. The only

circ umstance that chang ed wa s coca ine found in Mr. Covington’s whe elcha ir.

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The fa cts of State v. Keith A. Otey rese mble those in the instant case . I n Otey , the def endant was stopped a fter leaving the hom e of a rece ntly arr ested drugdeale r. The of fice r in cha

rg e of the investigation obtained a warr an t t o s earch the home and orde red a nother off

icer to stop any one leavingthe re sidence

. State v. Keith A. Otey , No . M2000-01809-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL560960, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, April 16, 2002) perm. app. de nied (Tenn. June 28, 2002). The defe ndant was stopped a fter pa ssing the of fice r on his way

to execute t he search warr ant. Otey , 2002 WL 560960 at *3. Neither the off icer who orde red the defe ndant to be stopped nor the office r who actua lly stopped the def

endant ha d observe d him eng ag e in i lleg al or suspicious ac tivity

. Id . T his Court held that mere prese nce a t [ the ar rested dr ug dea l er ’s] residence , without more, does not establish rea sonable suspicion to justify a stop . . . ” Id

. at *5. This Court based its holding on Y ba rra v . I lli no is , 444 U.S. 85 , 9 1 , 1 00 S. Ct . 338, 342, 62 L . Ed. 2d 238 (1979), where in the Supreme Court held, “ a per s o n ’s m ere propinquity to others independe ntly

suspected of

criminal activity does not without more, g ive rise to probable cause to searc h that person.” All the office rs testified that t hey did not see Defe ndant enga g e in any illega l activity

. Serg eant Clausi testified that Def endant wa s not among those identified by the citizen infor mant as prese nt at the drugtransac tion. Be cause the only

circ umstance that chang ed betwe en the f irst and sec ond sear ches of Def endant wa s that a wh ite po wd e r wa s fo un d in Mr

. Cov ing ton ’s wh e e lc ha ir , th e of fi c e rs did no t ha ve “ pr ob a ble
cause particula

rized with respec t to [ Def endant].” Y

ba rra , 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S. Ct . at 342.
The fa ct that the off

icer s lacke d probable cause to se arc h Def endant a sec ond time disposes of the State’s argument that the ex ige nt circ umstance ex ception apply . Our Supreme Court held that exigent cir cumstance s is a n exception to the war

rant require ment only

when the c ircumstance s are “supported by probable cause .” Bartram , 92 5 S.W. 2d a t 23 0 n .2 . T he of fi c e rs la c ke d p ro ba

ble c a us e as to Def endant a nd there fore this ex ception does not a pply

. CO NC LU SION
Th e ini tia l sei zur e and

se arc h o f D e fe nd ant w a s n ot a vio latio n o f h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts

. The off icer s had re asonable suspicion based on a totality of the circ umstances f rom the informa

nt’s information and their

own observations to seiz e Def endant. The office rs, pursuant to Te rry v . O hio , wer e author ized to “pat-down” Def endant in or der to e nsure their safe ty

. Howeve r, whe n the seizure
c on tin ue d p a st this and

the of fi c e rs tol d D e fe nd ant t o s it b a c k d ow n, the se izur e be c a me unconstitutional because it went bey ond what wa s n ecessary for a Te rry

sear ch. The subsequent
se arc h o f De fe nd ant le a din g to the dis c ov e ry of the na rc oti c s w a s th e re by

un c on sti tut ion a l a s w e ll. Th e re wa s n o in div idu a lize d pro bab le c a us e a s to De fe nd ant a

nd the re fo re no c on sti tut ion a l ba sis for the se arc h.

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e jud g me nt o f t he trial c ourt

is r e ve rs e d a

nd the ind ic tme nt i s dismiss ed.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL L , J UDGE