Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A04-1708-CR-1872 | February 12, 2018 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Daniel J. Vanderpool

Vanderpool Law Firm, PC

Warsaw, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela N. Sanchez

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kristina L. Brown,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 12, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

85A04-1708-CR-1872

Appeal from the 

Wabash Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Robert R. McCallen III, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

85C01-1511-F4-1024

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Following her convictions on two counts of dealing in cocaine, each as a Level 

4 felony,

1 and the trial court’s imposition of an aggregate six-year executed 

sentence, Kristina Brown (“Brown”) appeals, raising the following restated 

issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied her motion for separate trials for each of her 

counts; and 

II. Whether her sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] D.J. had a history of criminal offenses and worked as a confidential informant 

with the Wabash County Drug Task Force (“DTF”). On July 31, 2015, he

contacted the DTF, telling the officers that he had arranged a drug buy for crack 

cocaine from a person identified as J.G. After finding that J.G. was not at

home, D.J. and his DTF contact decided to go to the home of J.G.’s supplier, 

Brown. 

[4] Upon their arrival, Brown was sitting outside on the porch, and D.J. decided to 

attempt a purchase from her directly. After a brief conversation, D.J. believed 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(c)(2). 
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that he had talked Brown into the sale. Knowing that she would not make a 

sale with his friend there, D.J. took the contact home and returned to Brown’s 

home. She got into D.J.’s car, and they drove around the block. Brown gave 

D.J. a small package wrapped in thin paper, and D.J. gave her $100.00. He

then dropped her off at her house and went to another location for a post-buy 

search and to give the officers of the DTF the package he had received. The 

package was found to contain cocaine of less than one gram. 

[5] About two weeks after the first transaction, D.J. again called Brown. He asked 

her whether she had more cocaine, and she replied that she did. D.J. then 

called the DTF, who arranged for the pre-buy search. Once again, after the 

search, D.J. went to Brown’s home. On this occasion, two of Brown’s children 

were outside. When D.J. drove up, Brown came directly to his car, removed a 

small package from her bra and gave the package to D.J. D.J. gave Brown

$100.00 and left. He then met with the officers of the DTF and gave them the 

package he had received from Brown. The package was found to contain 

cocaine of less than one gram.

[6] Brown was charged with two counts of Level 4 felony dealing in cocaine. Prior 

to trial, Brown filed a Motion to Separate the Trials of the two counts,

contending that the offenses were not part of the same scheme or plan and that 

separate trials were necessary for a fair trial on the charges. At the hearing on 

her motion, Brown argued that the charges were joined simply because they 

were of the same or similar character. The State responded that the charges 

were not joined for trial due to their similarity, but because they were a part of a 
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larger effort to show that the Brown dealt drugs, and were, therefore,

connected. The trial court denied Brown’s Motion for Separate Trials.

[7] Brown was convicted of two counts of Level 4 felony dealing in cocaine, and a

pre-sentence investigation report was submitted to the trial court. It revealed 

that Brown had four prior A misdemeanor convictions as an adult. One of 

those was for possession of marijuana, and the rest were for driving while 

suspended. In addition, while the case was pending, she was also convicted of 

a Class B misdemeanor offense, failing to stop after an accident. 

[8] At sentencing, the trial court found that the aggravating circumstances 

outweighed any mitigating circumstances. On Count I, it ordered that Brown 

be incarcerated for eight years, with two years suspended. On Count II, the 

trial court ordered that Brown be incarcerated for six years, with no time

suspended. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for an 

aggregate six-year executed sentence. Brown now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Denial of Motion for Separate Trials

[9] Indiana Code section 35-34-1-9(a) provides that two or more offenses, stated in 

separate counts, may be joined in the same indictment or information when the 

offenses “(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single 

scheme or plan; or (2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts 

connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” However, 

Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a) “provides defendants with the right to 
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severance where ‘two (2) or more offenses have been joined for trial in the same 

indictment or information solely on the ground that they are of the same or 

similar character. . . .’” Craig v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ind. 2000). 

[10] “As the statute explicitly states, severance is required as a matter of right under 

this provision only if the sole ground for joining is that the offenses are of the 

same or similar character.” Id. (citing Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1141, 

1145 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1108 (1999)). “Offenses may be 

sufficiently ‘connected together’ to justify joinder under subsection 9(a)(2) ‘if the 

State can establish that a common modus operandi linked the crimes and that the 

same motive induced that criminal behavior.’” Id. (emphasis in original)

(citations omitted). “Because the trial court has no discretion when severing 

charges that were joined solely on the ground that they were of the same or 

similar character, we review the trial court’s decision employing a de novo 

standard.” Booker v. State, 790 N.E.2d 491, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 

[11] Here, the two charges were not joined solely because they were of the same 

character. To the contrary, the evidence presented demonstrated striking 

similarities beyond the mere “same or similar character” of Brown’s offenses. 

First, the two offenses were close in time occurring two weeks apart. Second, 

on both occasions, D.J. contacted Brown at the same location, namely, her 

residence. Third, both offenses involved the sale of the same drug (crack 

cocaine), the same amount (less than one gram), and the same price (one 

hundred dollars ($100.00)). Fourth, on both occasions, the illegal drugs were 
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on Brown’s person or in close proximity. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Brown’s motion for separate trials.

II. Sentencing

[12] Brown argues that her eight-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of the offense and her character. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 

7(B), this Court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” Our Supreme Court has explained that the principal role of appellate 

review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived 

correct result in each case. Brown v. State, 52 N.E.3d 945, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)), trans. denied. 

We independently examine the nature of a defendant’s offenses and his 

character under Appellate Rule 7(B) with substantial deference to the trial 

court’s sentence. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015). “In 

conducting our review, we do not look to see whether the defendant’s sentence 

is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test 

is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of 

persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Brown, 52 N.E.3d at 954. 

[13] “As to the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point the 

legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” 
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Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Here, Brown was 

convicted of two counts of dealing in cocaine as Level 4 felonies. A Level 4 

felony is subject to a sentence between two and twelve years, with six years 

being the advisory. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. Brown received a sentence of eight 

years, with two years suspended to probation, for one count and six years with 

no time suspended for the other count. Her sentences were ordered to be served 

concurrently for an aggregate executed sentence of six years. Therefore, she 

received an executed term of the advisory sentence for one of her offenses and 

the opportunity to be incarcerated for no more than the advisory if she proves 

herself capable of complying with the terms of probation. 

[14] The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the 

commission of the offense and the defendant’s participation. Croy v. State, 953 

N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Brown’s sentence is not inappropriate in 

light of her crimes. In this case, she sold crack cocaine on two occasions, 

approximately two weeks apart. Both times, the deals began at her home while 

her children were present. One of the sales occurred in a community park 

where children were likely to be present. D.J. came to Brown’s house because 

he believed that she was the cocaine supplier to the person from whom he had 

originally arranged to buy. Finally, Brown had the drugs in her possession and 

readily available for sale. Brown fails to show that the nature of her crimes 

warrant a reduction in her sentence.

[15] “The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender’s life 

and conduct.” Croy, 953 N.E.2d at 664. Brown also fails to prove that her 
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sentence is inappropriate as to her character. She has not accepted 

responsibility for her actions in this case and, to the contrary, has attempted to 

divert blame onto others for her own actions. She has also exposed her young 

children to the dangers of the drugs that she was selling from their home and in 

their presence. Brown has not shown the traits or character that warrant a 

revision of her sentence. To the contrary, Brown has a persistent history of 

criminal and delinquent conduct that has been unaffected by numerous

opportunities for reform. Since 2002, Brown has been convicted or adjudicated 

delinquent in thirteen separate cases. As a juvenile, she was adjudicated 

delinquent for resisting law enforcement twice, possession of alcohol, disorderly 

conduct, incorrigibility, and being a runaway. She received formal and 

informal probation, intensive supervision program, and placement at the 

Indiana Girl’s School. As an adult, she has been convicted of possession of 

marijuana, driving while license suspended three times, and failure to stop after 

an accident. She was also on probation at the time she committed the crimes in 

this case, and she committed another offense while on bond awaiting trial. We 

conclude that Brown’s sentence is not inappropriate based on the nature of her 

offenses and her character.

[16] Affirmed.

[17] Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.