1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 08 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### C H AMB ERS v . UNIT E D STATE S CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVE NT H CIRCUIT No. 06–1 12 06. Ar g u ed November10, 200 8—Dec i ded Ja n u a r y13, 200 9 The Armed Career Crimin al Ac t (AC CA) i m poses a 1 5 -y earman d ator y

prison term on a felon unlawfully inpossessionof a fir e ar m w h o h a s t h ree prior co nvict i ons for c o m m i tt ing cert a i n drug crim e s or “avio

len tfelon y ,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1 ), defin e d as a c r i me pu n i sh able by mor e than one y e ar ’ s impr iso n ment that, in ter alia , “involves conduct that presents a serious po te ntial risko f p h y s i c a li n j u r yt o a n o t h e r , ” §924(e)( 2 )(B)(i i). At petit i on erCh amber s ’ sen t en c i n gfor bein ga felon in possess ion of a firearm, the Gov e rnment sought ACCA’s 15-y e ar man d ator ypr isonter m . Chamber s di sputed one of his prior co nvic

tions—fai ling to report for weekend co nfinement—as fa lling outside the ACCA def i nition of “v iolent felony .” The District Court treated t h e fa ilure t o reporta s aformof wha t t h e releva nts t at e s t at ut e ca ll s “escape from [a] penal ins t itution,” and held that i tq u alified a s a “v iolent felony” under ACCA. The Sev e nth Circuit ag reed. Held: Illinois’ crime of failure to report for penal confine m ent fall s out

side the scope of ACCA’s “v io lent felony” definition. Pp. 3–8.

(a) For purpos es of ACCA’s definition s, it is the g e neric crime that count s , notho w t h e crim e wa s com m i tt ed on apa rt icula rocca s i on. Taylorv. U n i t ed Stat es , 49 5 U. S. 575, 602. Th is c a teg o r i c a l ap

proa ch req u ir es court s t o choos e t h e rightca t e gory, a n d s o m e times the choice is not obvious. T h e na ture of the behavior that likely un

der lies a s t a t u t or yph r a se matter s inth i s r e spec t. Th e sta t e st atu t e at i ssu e plac e s tog e th erina sin g le sec t io nsev e r a l differ e n tkin d s of b e havior, which, a s releva nt here, ma y be ca tegorized either a s fa il

ure t o reportfor det e nt ion or a s es ca pe fr omcus t ody. Fa ilure t o re portis as e pa r a t e crim e fromes ca pe. It s underlyin g b e havior differs fromt h e m o re a ggres s i ve b e havior unde r l y ing escape, a n d it is li ste d separ a te lyin th e statu t e’ s t i tle an d bodyan d is of a differ e n tfelon y2 CHAMBER S v. UNITED STATES Sy llabu s
c l ass than esc a pe. Atthe s a me t i me, th e st atu t or yph r a ses set t in g forth the various kinds of f a ilure to reportdes crib e roughly s i m ila r for m s of behav i or , thus c o ns titutingas i ngle ca tegory. C o ns eq uently, for ACCA purposes, the s t at ute contains a tleas t two se p a rate crimes, esc a pe an d fai l u r e to r e por t
. Pp. 3–5.

(b) The “failur e to r e por t” cr ime does not satisfyACC A’ s “v iolent felony” definition. Although it is punish able by i m pri s onment ex

ceeding one ye ar, it satisfie s none of the other parts of the definition. Mos tcrit i ca lly, itdoes not“ i nvolv[ e] cond uct that presents a serious potential ri sk of physical inj u ry toanother.” Conceptually speaking, the c r i me amounts to a for mof inac ti on, and there is no reason to be

lieve thatan offender who fails to report is otherwise doing some

th in gth at poses a ser i ou s poten t ial r i sk o f ph y s ic al in jur y . Th e G o v er nment’ s ar gument that a failur e t o re portrevea l s t h e offende r ’s spec ial, str o n gav er sionto pen a l c u stody

—poin tin gto 3 state an d federal case s over 30 years in which individuals shotat officers at

temptingto r e c a ptur e them—is unc onv i nc ing. Ev en assum i ngthe relevance of vi olence that may occur lo ng after an offender fails to re

port, the offender’s aversion to pena l custo d y is bes i de th e point. The question is whether such an offenderis significantly more likely than ot hers t o at t a ck or res i s tan a pprehende r, thereby pro d ucing a seri

ous ris kof ph ys ica linj u ry. Herea Unite dState s Sent encing Com

mission report, showing no violencein 1 60 federa l fa il ure-to-report c a ses ov er2 r e c e n ty e ar s, h e lps pr ovide a negative answe r . The three report ed ca s e s t o whic h t h e Gover n ment p o ints do not show the c o n trary. Simple multiplica t io n (2 ye ar s v e rsu s 30 y e ar s; feder a l alon e v e r s u s feder a l-plu s -st a te) su g g e sts th atth eysh owon ly a st ati s tic a lly insignificant risk of physical viol ence. And the Government provides n o oth e rempi r i c a l in for m ati o n . Pp. 5–8. 473 F. 3d 72 4, r e v e r s ed an d reman d ed.

B REYER , J., delivered the o p inion of the Cour t, in whic h R OBERTS , C. J., an d S T EVENS , S CALI A , K ENNEDY , S OUTER , an d G IN SB U R G , JJ., joined. ALIT O , J., filed an opinion concurri ngin the judgment, in which T HOMAS , JJ., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 06–1 12 06 

### DE ON DERY CHAMB ERS, P E TI TIONE R v. UNITE D STAT ES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SEVE NTH CIRCUI T [Jan u a r y13, 2009] 

### J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. The question before us is whether a “failure to report” for penal c o nfinementis a “ ‘viol e nt felony’ ” within the terms of the Armed Career Cri m inal Act. 18 U. S. C. §924(e). We hold that it is not. I The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACC A) imposes a 15

- year manda t ory prison term on an individual convicted of being a felon in poss es sion of a fir e arm if that individual has “three previous convictions . . . for aviolent felony ora serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one ano ther.” §924 (e)(1). ACCA defines a “violent felony” as a“crime puni shable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” thatalso either “(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force a g ainst the person of another; or “(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosive s , or otherwise involves conduct that pre

sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an

-2 CHAMBER S v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### other.” §924(e)(2)(B). Clause (ii), ACCA’s so-called residual clause, is at issue here. II The petitioner, Deondery Chambers, pleaded guilty to a charge of b e ing a felon unlawfully in possession of a fire

arm. §922(g). At sentencing the Government asked the District Co urt to apply A C C A’s 1 5 -year man d atorypris on term becau s e, in its view, three of Chambers’ prior con v ic

tions qualified as an A CCA “serious drug off e nse” or “vi o lent felony. ” Chambers conc eded that two of his pri o r convictions, namely a1998 conviction for r o bbery and aggra v ated battery an d a 1999 dru gcrime conviction, fell within AC CA’s definitions. But he disputed the Gover n ment’s clai m as to athird conviction. That third convic

tion arose out of Chambers’ sentence for his 1998 robbery and battery offense. T h e sentence required Chambers to report to a local prison for 11 weekends of in carceration. He failed to report for weekend co nfinement on four occ a sions, and was later convicted of the crime of “fail[ing] to report to a penal institution.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720 , §5/31–6(a) (W est Supp. 2008). The Distric tCourt tre ated the “f ailure to report” as a form of what the relevant Illinoi s statute calls “escape from [a] penal institution,” ibid., and held that the crim e qualified as a “violent felony” under ACCA. The Court of Appeals agreed. 473 F. 3d 724 (CA7 2007). Inlight of disagreement among the Circuits as to whether failure t o report for imprisonment falls within the scope of ACC A’s definition of “violent felony,” we granted certi orari. Com

pare United Statesv. Winn , 364 F. 3d 7, 1 2 (CA1 2004) (failure to report is a “v iolent felony”), with UnitedStates v. Pi ccolo , 441 F. 3d 1084, 1088 (CA9 2006) (failure to report is not a “violent felony”).3 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### III We initiallyconsider the classific a tion of the crime. In ordinary sp eech, words such as “c rime” and “felony” ca n refer not o n ly to a ge neric se t of acts, sa y, burglary in general, but also to a specific act committed on a partic u lar occasion, say the burglary that the defendant engage d in last month. We have made clear, however, that, fo r purposes of ACCA’s de finitions, it is the generic sense of the word “felony” that c o unts. Taylor v. UnitedStates , 495 U. S. 575, 602 (1990); see a l so Sh ep a r dv. United S t a t es , 544 U. S. 1 3 , 16–17 (2 005)

. The statute’s defining lan

guage, read naturally, uses “felon y” to refer to a crime a s generally committed. And by so construing the statute, one avoids the practica l difficulty of trying to ascertain a t sentencing, perhaps from a paper record mentioning only a guilty plea, whether the present defendant’s prior crime, as committed on a particular occ a sion, did or did not i n volve violent behavior. See id., at 20–21. Th us, to deter

mine, for example, wh ether a ttem p ted bur glary is a“v io

lent felony, ” we have had to examine, not the unsuccessful burglary th e defendan t attempte d on a par t icular occa

sion, but the generic crime of attempted burg l ary. James v. United States , 550 U. S. 192, 204–206 (2007). This categorical appro a ch requires courts to choose the right cate g o ry. And s o metimes t h e choice is not obvious. The nature of the behavior t hat l i kely underlies a statu

tory phrase matters in this respect. Where Massachu

setts, for example, placed within a single, separately numbered statutory section (entitled “Brea k ing and enter

ing at night,” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 266, §16 (West 2008)) burglary of a “b uilding, ship, vessel or vehicle,” this Court found that the behavior u n derlying, say, breakin g into a building, differs so signif icantly from the behavior underlying, say, breaking into a vehicle, that for ACCA purposes a sentencing court must treat the t w o as differ

ent crimes. See Shepard , supr a , at 16–17; see also Taylor ,4 CHAMBER S v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### supra , at 59 8. The Illinois statute no w before us, like the Massachu

setts statute, places togetherin asingle nu mbered statu

tory section several different kinds of behavior. It sepa

rately describes thos e b e haviors as (1) escape f r om a penal institution, (2) escape from the custody of an employee of a penal instit ution, (3) f a iling to report to a penal institu

tion, (4) failing to report for peri odic imprisonment, (5) failing to return from furlough, (6) failing to return from work and day release, and (7) failing to abide by the terms of home con f inement. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/31–6(a); see Appen d ix A, infra. We k n ow from the state-court information in the record thatCha m bers pleaded guilty to “knowingl yfail[ing] to report” fo rperiodic imprisonment “to the Jefferson County Jail, a penal institu t ion.” App. 68; see Shepard , supr a , at 25 (sen tencing court may look, for example, to chargin gdocument , plea agreement, jury instructions, or transcript of plea colloquy t o determine crime at issue). But we must d e cide whether for AC CA purposes a failure to report counts as a separate crime. Unlike the lower courts, we believe that a failure to report (as described in the statutory provi s ion’s third, fourth, fifth, and sixth phrase s) is a separate crime, differ

ent from escape (the subject matter of the statute’s first and second phrases), a n d from the potentiallyless seri ous failure to abide by the terms of home confinement (the subject of the final p h rase). T h e behavior that likely underlies a failure to report would seem less likely t o involve a ri sk of physical harm tha nthe less passive, more aggressive behavior underlying an escape from custody. See Begayv. Uni t ed S t ates , 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 7). Moreover, the statute i t self not on l ylists esca pe and failure to report s e parately (in its title and its body) but also p l aces the behaviors in two different felon y classes (Cla ss Two and Class Three) of differen tdegrees of seriousness

. See Appendix A, infra

.5 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### At the sa me time, we believe the statutory phrase s setting fort h various kinds of failure to report (or to re

turn) descri be roughly similar for m s of beh avior. Each is characteriz e d by afailure to p r esent oneself for detention on a specif ied occasion. All am ount to variations ona single theme. For t hat reason we consid er them as to

gether constituting a single category. Cf. Jam e s , sup ra , a t 207–209 (determining that where separately listed behav

iors pose asimilar degree of risk, sentencing courts m a y consider all listed b e haviors as a s i ngle crime)

. We conse

quently treat the statute for ACCA purposes as containing at least two separate crimes, nam ely escape f r om custody on the one hand, and a failure to report on the other. Failure to abide by home confinement terms—potentially the least se rious of the offenses—is not at issue here. IV We now m u st consider whether the “failure to repor t” crime satisfies ACCA’s “violentfelony” definition. It clearly satisfies the fir s t part of t hat definition, for it is a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)( B). But it satisfies n o ne of the othe r parts. It does not h a ve “as an element th e use, attem p ted use, o rthreatened use of physical force against the person of another.” §924(e)(2)( B)(i). It does not consist of “burglary, arson, orextortion,” or “involv[e] use of expl osives.” §9 24(e)(2)(B)(ii). And, m o re critically for present purposes, it does not“ ‘involve conduct tha t presents a serious potential risk of ph ysical injury to another.’ ” See Begay , 553 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2–4); id. , at ___ (slip op., at 6) (S CAL IA 

### , J., concurring in judg

ment) (treating serious risk of ph ysical injury to another as critical definitional factor); id. , at ___ (sl i p op., at 2) (ALITO 

### , J., dissenting) (same). Conceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of inaction, a far cry fr om the “purposeful, ‘ v iolent,’ and6 CHAMBER S v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### ‘agg ressive’ conduct” po tentially at issue when an offender uses explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or engages i ncertain fo rms of exto r tion. Cf. id ., at ___ (slip op., at 7)

. While an offender wh o fails to report must of course be doing some thing att h e relevant time, there is no reason to believe t hat the some thing poses a serious potential riskof physical injury. Cf. James , 550 U. S., at 203–204. To the contrary, an indi

vidual who fails to report would s eem unlikely, not likely, to call atte ntion to his whereabouts by sim u ltaneously engaging in additional violent and unlawful conduct. The Government argues thata failure to report reveals the offende r ’s special, strong aversion to penal custody. And it points to three cases arising over a period of 30 years in which reported opinions indicate that individuals shot at offic e rs attempting to recapture them. See United Sta t es v. Eaglin , 571 F. 2d 1069, 1072 (CA9 1 977); Sta t ev. Johnson , 245 S. W. 3d 288, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jones , 96 Wash. App. 369, 371–372, 979 P. 2d 898, 899 (1999). But even if we assume f o r argument’s sake th e relevance of violence that may occu r long after an offender fails to report, we are not convinc e d by the Government’s argument. The offender’s aver sion to penal custody, even if special, i s beside the point. T h e questionis whether such an offender is significantly more likely than others to attac k , or physically to resist, an apprehender, thereby producing a “serious potential risk of phys ical injury.” §924(e)(2)( B)(ii). An d here a United Sta t es Sentencin g Commission report helps provid e a conclusive, negative answer. Se e Report on Federal Escape Offens es in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, p. 6 (Nov. 2 008) (hereinafter Com

mission’s Report), repr inted in pa rt in Appen d ix B, infra. See also 47 3 F. 3d, at 727 (Posner, J.) (urgi n g that su ch research be done). The Commission’s Report identifies every federal case in 2006 or 2007 in which a federal sentencing court applied7 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### the Sentencing Guideline, “Escape, Instigati n g or Assis t

ing Escape ,” 1 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2P1.1 (Nov. 2008), and in whi c h sufficient detail was provided, say, in thepresenten c e report, about the circ umstances of the crime to permit analysis. The analysis included calculation of the likeli

hood that violence wo uld accompany commission of th e escape or the offender’s later appre h ension. Of 414 such cases, 160 involved a failure to report either for incarceration (42) or for custody after having been temporarily released ( 118). Com m ission’s R e port 7; see also Appendix B, inf r a. Of these 160 cases, none at all involved violence—notduring commissiono f the offen s e itself, notduring the offende r ’s later apprehensio n
— although in 5 instances (3.1%) th e offenders were armed. Ibid. The upshot is that the study strongly supports the intuitive belief that failure to report does not involve a serious potential risk of physical injury. The three reported c a ses to which the Government points do not show the contrar y . The Sentencing Commi s sion culled its 160 instances from a set of federal sentences imposed over a period of 2 years. The Government appar

ently culle d its three examples from a setof state a n d federal sent ences impos e d over a period of 30 years. Com

pare Eagli n , supra (CA9 1977) with Johnson , supra(Mo. Ct. App. 20 08). Given the largerset, the presence of three instances of violence is consistentwith the Commission’ s data. Simple multiplication (2 years vers us 30 years; federal alone versus federal-pl us-state) suggests that they show only a small risk of ph ysical violence (less than one in several thousand). And the Government provides no other empirical information. For these reasons we conclude that the crime here at issue falls outside the scope of ACCA’s definition of “vio

lent felony. ” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Th e judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for pro

-8 CHAMBER S v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### ceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so orde red.Opinion of theCourt 9 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) Appendix A to opinion of theCourt 

### APPENDIXA TO OPI N ION OF T H E COURT “Escape; fai l ure to report to a penal institutionor to report for periodic imprisonment. “A personconvictedof a felony, adjud i cated a delinquentminor f o r the com m issionof a felony offense un der the Ju venile Cou rt Act of 1987, or charged with the commissionof a felony who intentionally escapes f r om any penal institution or from the custody of a nemployeeof that in stitution commits a Class 2 felony; ho wever, a person convicted of a felony or adjudica ted a delinquent minor for the commissionof a fe lon yoffense under the Juvenile Court Act o f 1987 who knowingly fails to report to a penal ins t itution or to report for periodic imprisonment at an y time orknowingly fails to return from furlough or from workand day releaseor who knowinglyfails to abide by the terms of home confinemen t is guilty of a Class 3 felony.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 72 0, §5/31–6(a) (West Supp. 2008).Opinion of theCourt 10 CHAMBER S v. UNITED STATES Appendix B to opinion of theCourt 

### APPENDIXB TO OPI N ION OF T H E COURT Report on Federal Escape Offenses in Fiscal Years 200 6 and 2007, p. 7, fig. 1 (Nov. 2008).* Leaving Secure Cus

tody Leaving LawEnforcement Custody Leaving Nonse

cure Custody Fail

ing to Report Fail

ing to Re

turn

Number of Cases 64 13 177 42 118 Force 10 (15.6%) 1 (7.7%) 3 (1.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Danger

ous Weapon 20 (31.3%) 1 (7.7%) 4 (2.3%) 3 (7.1%) 2 (1.7%) Injury 7 (10.9%) 2 (15.4%) 3 (1.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

——————

* Cases c a n fall into mor e than one category. For exa m ple, one case could involve b o t hforce a n d inj u ry. S u ch aca s e would b e repres ent e d inth e table forforc e an d also forin jury. Therefore , thereader sho u ld n o t ag g r eg ate th e n u m ber s inan y c o lu mn ._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) ALITO , J ., con c urrin ginj u dg m e nt 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 06–1 12 06 

### DE ON DERY CHAMB ERS, P E TI TIONE R v. UNITE D STAT ES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SEVE NTH CIRCUI T [Jan u a r y13, 2009] 

### J USTICE 

### ALITO 

### , withwhom J U S TICE 

### T HO MAS 

### joins, concurring i nthe judgm e nt. As I have previously expl ained, I believe that the Court’s app r oach in Begay , like its approach in this case, “cannot be reconciled with the statutory text.” Be ga yv. UnitedS t a t es , 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 1) (dissenting opinion). I nonetheles s recognize that “ st ar e decisi sin respect to statutory in t e rpretation has ‘special force,’ ” Joh nR. Sand & Gravel Co. v. UnitedSta t es , 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (s lip op., at 8), and I am sympatheti c to the majority’s effort s to provide a workable interpreta

tion of the “r esidual cla u se” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACC A) , while retaining the “categoric a l approac h” that we ado p ted in Tay lor v. Uni t ed Sta t es , 495 U. S. 575, 602 (1990). In light of Taylor and Begay , I agree that thi s case should be remand ed for resentencing. I write sepa

rately, however, to e m phasize that only C o ngress ca n rescue the federal courts fromthe mire into which ACC A’s draftsmans hip and Taylor’s “ca t e gorical approach” ha ve pushed us. In 1986, when Congress enacted ACCA’s residual clause, 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), few could have fore

seen the difficulties that lay ahead. 1 

### Only fo ur months

——————

1 Con g r e ss or igin allyen ac tedACC A in 19 84. See §1 80 2, 93 St at.2 CHAMBER S v. UNITED STATES ALITO , J ., con c urrin ginj u dg m e nt 

### before Congress fram ed the residual clause, this Cour t upheld a state sentencing pr ovision that imposed a man

datory minimum sent ence where the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visib l y possessed a firearm during the commission of certain feloni es (in c luding robbery). See McMillanv. Penn syl

vania , 477 U. S. 79 (1 986). Legislating agai nst the back

ground of McMillan , Congress may have assumed that ACCA’s residual claus e would similarly require federal sentencing judges to determine whether t h e particul a r facts of a p a rticular ca se triggereda mandato r y minimum sentence. But history tooka different track

. In Taylor , t h e C o urt held that ACCA requir e s “the sent encing court to look only to the fact that the defe ndant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain catego ries, and not to the facts underlying the prior co nvictions.” 495 U. S., a t600. Thus , we held tha tsentencin gjudg es should apply a “categoric a l approach” to determine whether an underlying stat e offense meets the “generic” defi nition of burglary that thi s Court—notCongress—created. Id. , at 59 8. The Court justified its decision with a 10-page discussion of ACCA’s purpose and legislative history, id. , at 581–590; see also id. , at 603 (S CALI A 

### , J., concurringin part and concurrin g in judgment) (criticizi ng the Court’s approa ch), and ex

plained that its conclusion was necessary to undo “an inadvertent casualty [i n AC CA’s] co mplex drafting proc

ess,” id. , at 589–590. ACC A’s cla r ity has been the true inadvertent casualty.

—————— 218 5, 18 U. S

. C. App. §1202(a) (1 9 82 ed. an d Su pp. II) (r epealed in 198 6 byFir e a r ms Own er ’ s Pr otec tionAc t, §104(b), 1 00 Sta t . 45 9). Th a t s t atute, however, a pplied a ma nda t or y se ntencing enhancement to on ly two predicate felonies—robbery an d bu r g lar y—wh i chth e statu t e expressly defi ned. 18 U. S. C. App. §§1202(c)(8)–(9) ( 1 982 ed., Supp. I I ). Congres s did not a d d the u n defined “otherwis e cla u s e ” until 1 9 8 6

. See Car eerCr imin als Amen d m e n t Ac t of 1986, §1402, 1 00 St at. 320 7– 39.3 Cite as: 55 5 U

. S. ____ (2009) ALITO , J ., con c urrin ginj u dg m e nt 

### After almost two decades with Taylor’s “categorical ap

proach,” onl yone thing is clear: A CCA’s resid ual clause is nearly impossible to ap ply cons istently. Indeed, the “cate

gorical approach” to pre d icate offenses has created numer

ous splits among the lower federa l courts, 2 

### the resolution of which could occupy this Cou rt for years. What is worse is that each new appl ication of the residual clause seems to lead us further and further away from the statutory text. Toda y’s decision, for example, turns on little mor e than a statistical analysis of a research report prepared by the United States Sentencing Commission. An te , at 6–7; 10 (App. B).

At this point, the only tenable, long-term solution is f o r

——————

2 For example, the lower courts have sp li t o v er whethe r it is a “violent felony” under ACCA’s resid u al clause to commit rape, compare United Statesv. Saw y ers , 409 F. 3d 732 (CA6 2 005) (st a tu tor yr a pe n o t c a te

gorically violent), with United States v. Williams , 120 F. 3d 5 7 5 (C A5 199 7) (induc ement of minorto c o mmi t sodomyv i olen t), and United States v. Th omas , 231 Fed

. Appx . 765 (CA9 2 0 0 7 ) (al lr a pe v i olen t); ret a liat e a g ains ta governm e ntofficer, co m p a r e United States v. Mon t

gom ery , 402 F. 3d 48 2 (C A 5 2 005) (n ot v i olen t), with Sawyers , supra (v iolent); atte mpt orc o nspir e to c o mmi t bur g lar y , compar e United States v. Fell , 511 F. 3d 103 5 (CA1 0 2 007) (ev e nafter J a m es v. United States, 550 U. S. 19 2 (2 00 7), an d ev enwh er e sta t u t e r e qu ir es anov er t ac t, c o nspir a c yto c o mmi t b u r g lar ynot v i olent), with United Stat es v. Moore , 108 F. 3d 87 8 (CA8 1 997) (a ttem p t e d bu r g lar y v i olen t if statu t e requires proof of overt act); ca r r ya c o n c ea led weapon , compar e United States v. Whi t field , 907 F. 2 d79 8 ( CA8 1 9 90) (n otv i olen t), withUnited States v. Hall , 77 F. 3d 398 ( CA11 199 6) (v iolen t); an d posses s a sawed

off sh otg u nas a felon , c o mpar e United St ates v. Am os , 501 F. 3d52 4 (CA6 2007) (not violent), with United S t ates v. Bishop , 453 F. 3d 3 0 (CA1 20 06) (v iolen t). Compar e also Un it edSt at es v. Sanch ez - Garcia , 501 F. 3d 12 0 8(CA 10 2 0 0 7 ) (u n a u t h o r i zed u s e of a mo t o rv e h i c l e n o t a “violent felony” under 18 U. S. C. §16 (b), which cl osely resembl e s ACCA’s resid u al clause), w i th United States v. Relifo rd , 471 F. 3d 9 1 3 (CA8 20 06) ( a utomobi l e t a mperin gv i olent under ACCA’s residua l c l au se), an d United Stat esv. Galvan-Ro d riguez , 169 F. 3d 217 (CA 5 199 9) (per cu riam ) (una uthorized us e of amotor vehicle a“violent felony” unde r §1 6 (b )).4 CHAMBER S v. UNITED STATES ALITO , J ., con c urrin ginj u dg m e nt 

### Congress to formulate a specificli st of expressly define d crimes that are deemed to be worth y of A CCA’s sentencing enhancement. That is the approach that Congress took in 1984, when it applied ACCA to two enumerated and ex

pressly defined felonies. See n. 1, supra . And that ap

proach is the only way t o right AC C A’s ship.