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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

HALF PIPE, LLC,

Petitioner-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED April 25, 2017

v No. 329197 Michigan Tax Tribunal TOWNSHIP OF LIVINGSTON, LC No. 14-001723-TT

Respondent-Appellee.

Before: R ONAYNE K RAUSE , P.J., and O’C ONNELL and M ETER , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Petitioner appeals by right from the portion of the consent ju dgment entered by the Michigan Tax Tribunal that denie d petitioner’s challenge to the 2013 tax year assessment on his property. The Tax Tribunal granted petitioner relief, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, for the 2014 and 2015 tax years, but held that because petitioner’s pet ition was untimely after he

received notice of the 2013 asse ssment, the Tax Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the 2013 assessment. We reverse and remand for entry of the parties’ st ipulated consent judgment in its original form to whic h the parties agreed.

The property at issue is vacant commercial real estate that ha s been on the market for some considerable time. Petitioner contends that the property was seriously over-valued at the time petitioner acquired it. T he deed prepared by petitioner’s attorney bore an incorrect address; respondent mailed tax assessment notices to that address, and p etitioner never received them. At some point, petitioner called th e township assessor to inquire into the property’s tax information, and on March 6, 2014, respondent faxed a copy of the tax assess ment to petitioner. Petitioner immediately initiated proceedi ngs in the March 2014 Board of Re view to challenge the 2013 and 2014 assessments. Obtaining no relief, petitioner appealed to the Tax Tribuna l on May 23, 2014. Primarily at issue in this appeal is the Tax Tribunal’s determi nation, citing MCL 211.27b(6) 1 and

1 We will not further discuss MCL 211.27b(6) because it is obvio usly inapplicable; by its own terms, appeals under that section are limited to “whether a tra nsfer of ownership has occurred” or the correction of arithmetical errors, and expressly not valuation disputes. It is exceedingly difficult to understand how the Tax Tribunal could have possibl y considered this matter to be anything other than a valua tion dispute, and i ndeed both partie s essentially describe it as such.-2- MCL 205.735a(6) that, because petitioner failed to commence its appeal within 35 days of receiving the fax, the Tax Tri bunal’s subject-matter jurisdicti on was not invoked for the 2013 tax year and therefore it was power less to grant pe titioner any rel ief for that year.

Questions of law, including issu es of statutory interpretation , are reviewed de novo. Michigan Properties LLC v Meridian Twp , 491 Mich 518, 528; 817 NW2d 548 (2012). Factual findings made by the Tax Tribunal “are final if they are suppor ted by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record,” and the Tax Tribunal ’s final decisions are likewise final “[i]n the absence of fra ud, error of law or the adoption of wrong principles.” Id . at 527-528.

Constitutional issues are also reviewed de novo. Sidun v Wayne Co Treasurer , 481 Mich 503, 508; 751 NW2d 453 (2008). Finally, we also review de novo the determination of the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. Steiner School v Ann Arbor Twp , 237 Mich App 721, 730; 605 NW2d 18 (1999).

The time requirements in MCL 205.735, and therefore by implica tion MCL 205.735a, which applies to proceedings commenced after December 31, 2006, are jurisdictional. Electronic Data Systems Corp v Twp of Flint , 253 Mich App 538, 542-544; 656 NW2d 215 (2002). Consequently, if a petitioner fails to comply with the timing requirements therein without complying with another s ection that otherwise confers j urisdiction, the Tax Tribunal has no power to consider the petition. Id . However, that “jurisdiction” i s in the nature of perfecting an appeal; the invocation of the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Parkview Mem Ass ’ n v City of

Livonia , 183 Mich App 116, 120-121; 454 NW2d 169 (1990). Strictly spe aking, “subject-matter jurisdiction” does not refer to t he power to adjudicate any par ticular case, but rather whether the court in the abstract has the power to adjudicate that class of cases or matters of a particular legal

nature. Joy v Two-Bit Corp , 287 Mich 244, 253-254; 283 NW 45 (1938). The Tax Tribunal’s true subject matter jurisdic tion is set forth in MCL 205.731 an d unambiguously includes the kind of dispute at issue here.

We therefore find it unnecessary to delve into the quagmire of whether, under the odd circumstances of this case, peti tioner did in fact comply with the procedural requirements of MCL 205.735a. The Tax Tribunal had subject matter jurisdiction over the kind of case at bar. There is a vast difference between want of jurisdiction and err oneous exercise of jurisdiction: the former renders a judgment void, the latter can only be atta cked on appeal. See Clohset v No Name Corp , 302 Mich App 550, 563-564; 840 NW2d 375 (2013). Critically, a court is empowered to enter a consent j udgment in a case properly before it even if some elements of that judgment would otherwise exceed the court’s jurisdiction. See Clohset generally. We need not consider whether the Tax Tribunal should have entertained petit ioner’s petition to the extent it addressed the 2013 tax year; rather, we find that the Tax Tribu nal critically erred when it refused to enter the parties’ stipulated consent judgment as the parties agreed to it. Doing so would not-3- have violated the Tax Tribunal’ s jurisdiction, because the case itself was properly within the penumbra thereof.

We therefore reverse the Tax Tribunal’s judgment and remand fo r entry of the parties’ stipulated consent judgment in its original form to which the p arties agreed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause

/s/ Patrick M. Meter