FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

DECEMBER 13, 2010

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 09-12483

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D. C. Docket No. 07-00107-CV-5-RS-MD

JOSEPH CHESTER PARZYCK, III,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

PRISON HEALTH SERVICES INC., et al.,

Defendants,

DANIEL P. CHERRY,

DR,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

_________________________

(December 13, 2010)
Before BARKETT and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and HUNT, District Judge.

*

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

Joseph Parzyck, III, a Florida prisoner, appeals the dismissal without

prejudice of his third amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which was enacted as part of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Parzyck filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983

complaint alleging that prison medical personnel were deliberately indifferent to

his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Ultimately, he

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filed the third amended complaint at issue in this case, leaving Dr. Daniel Cherry,

the Chief Health Officer at the Apalachee Correctional Institution (“ACI”), as the

sole defendant. Parzyck alleged that Dr. Cherry, as Chief Health Officer, violated

his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him consultations with an orthopedic

specialist recommended by prison medical personnel for his severe back pain. The

only issue before us in this appeal is whether Parzyck exhausted his administrative

remedies prior to filing suit.

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 Honorable Willis B. Hunt, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of *

Georgia, sitting by designation.

 Although Parzyck initially appealed pro se, this Court appointed counsel and ordered 1

supplemental briefing.

 We review de novo the dismissal of a lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative 2

remedies under § 1997e(a). Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000).

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Section 1997e(a), enacted as part of the PLRA, provides that a prisoner must

exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a federal action

challenging prison conditions. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001).

The PLRA seeks to eliminate unwarranted interference with the administration of

prisons in order to “afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address

complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

“Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by

the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).

The grievance procedures promulgated by the Florida Department of

Corrections (“FDOC”) require an inmate to (1) file an informal grievance to the

staff member responsible for the particular area of the problem, Fla. Admin. Code

Ann. r. 33-103.005(1)(a); (2) file a formal grievance with the warden’s office, id. at

r. 33-103.006(1); and (3) submit an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of the

FDOC, id. at r. 33-103.007(1). However, if an inmate is filing a medical

grievance, as was the case here, the initial informal grievance step may be omitted.

Id. at r. 33-103.006(3)(e).

In November 2006, Parzyck filed an informal grievance complaining that he

had been waiting three months for a promised orthopedic consultation for his

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continual and severe back pain and asking to be seen by an orthopedist

immediately. The grievance was returned with instructions to file a formal

grievance, as an informal grievance was unnecessary for a medical complaint.

Parzyck did so and received a response stating that his medical chart would be

reviewed. When he was still not granted a referral, Parzyck submitted an appeal to

the Office of the Secretary. In January 2007, while the appeal was pending, Dr.

Cherry was appointed as Chief Health Officer and Parzyck again requested an

orthopedic consultation, which was denied by Dr. Cherry. On March 13, 2007, the

Office of the Secretary denied Parzyck’s appeal on the ground that it was “the

responsibility of [the] Chief Health Officer to determine the appropriate treatment

regimen for the condition [he was] experiencing.” On May 17, 2007 – two months

after having completely exhausted the FDOC’s administrative grievance

procedures – Parzyck filed his original complaint in federal court.

While his lawsuit was pending, Parzyck again filed a grievance regarding

the failure to provide promised referrals to specialists for his severe back pain. Dr.

Cherry denied this grievance, and Parzyck appealed to the Office of the Secretary,

specifically referencing Dr. Cherry’s earlier denial of his request for an orthopedic

consultation. This appeal was denied on July 22, 2008. Three months after fully

exhausting this second round of the FDOC’s administrative grievance procedures –

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on October 28, 2008 – Parzyck filed his third amended complaint.

The district court determined that because Parzyck’s first grievance only

addressed acts and omissions that occurred before Dr. Cherry’s appointment as

Chief Health Officer, Dr. Cherry could not be held liable and therefore, Parzyck’s

first grievance did not exhaust administrative remedies as to any claim against him.

As to the second grievance, the district court held that it did not exhaust

administrative remedies because Parzyck did not complete the administrative

review process before he filed his original complaint, even though it had been

completed before his third amended complaint was filed.

We find that under the facts of this case, the district court erred in

concluding that Parzyck had not exhausted all available administrative remedies

before filing the original complaint. In holding that Parzyck had not exhausted his

first grievance against Dr. Cherry because it referenced acts that occurred before he

became Chief Health Officer, the district court confused the question of Dr.

Cherry’s liability on the merits of the claim with the separate and distinct question

of whether Parzyck exhausted his administrative remedies. A prisoner need not

name any particular defendant in a grievance in order to properly exhaust his

claim. Jones, 549 U.S. at 219; see also Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th

Cir. 2000) (“[W]hile § 1997e(a) requires that a prisoner provide as much relevant

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information as he reasonably can in the administrative grievance process, it does

not require that he do more than that.”). Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion

requirement is designed “to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide

personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued . . . .” Jones, 549 U.S. at

219 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004)). The statute

merely requires inmates to complete the administrative review process in

compliance with the prison’s grievance procedures, so that there is “time and

opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a

federal case.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

Although Parzyck’s first grievance did not name Dr. Cherry, it accomplished

§ 1997e(a)’s purpose by alerting prison officials to the problem and giving them

the opportunity to resolve it before being sued. Parzyck was not required to initiate

another round of the administrative grievance process on the exact same issue each

time another request for an orthopedic consultation was denied. See Howard v.

Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Howard was not required to begin

the grievance process anew . . . [because] further grievances complaining of the

same living situation would have been redundant.”); Johnson, 385 F.3d at 521 (“As

a practical matter, Johnson could not have been expected to file a new grievance . .

. each time he was assaulted . . . . Johnson’s grievances were sufficient to exhaust

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claims that arose from the same continuing failure to protect him from sexual

assault.”).

Nothing in the FDOC’s grievance procedures requires inmates to file new

grievances addressing every subsequent act by a prison official that contributes to

the continuation of a problem already raised in an earlier grievance. The only

FDOC requirements regarding the contents of grievances are that they must

accurately state the facts and “address only one issue or complaint.” Fla. Admin.

Code Ann. rr. 33-103.006(2)(e) and (2)(f). Parzyck properly exhausted his

administrative remedies by complying with these requirements and completing the

administrative review process before filing his original complaint.

Parzyck demonstrated meticulous respect for the FDOC’s administrative

grievance procedures and gave prison officials ample opportunity to respond

internally before Dr. Cherry was brought into court. Because he complied with the

letter and purpose of § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement, we reverse the dismissal

of his third amended complaint and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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