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S. HRG. 113–579 

SECTION 123: CIVILIAN NUCLEAR 

COOPERATION AGREEMENTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 30, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4 

Countryman, Hon. Thomas M., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 70 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio . 72 

Fertel, Marvin S., president and CEO, Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington, 

DC, prepared statement ...................................................................................... 37 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio . 77 

Attachment: List of Components in a Typical Nuclear Power Plant ........... 81 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1 

Poneman, Hon. Daniel B., Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department 

of Energy, Washington, DC ................................................................................. 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 71 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio . 73 

Sokolski, Henry D., executive director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Arlington, VA, oral statement ...................................................................... 50 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 51 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio . 75 

Squassoni, Sharon, director and senior fellow, Proliferation Preventioon Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 43 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio . 76 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

A Statement and Seven Letters Submitted by Henry Sokolski: 

Prepared statement of Victor Gilinsky ........................................................... 58 

February 14, 2012, Letter to President Barack Obama ................................ 59 

November 15, 2010, Letter to President Barack Obama .............................. 60 

September 20, 2012, Letter to President Barack Obama .............................. 62 

Department of Energy letter to Henry Sokolski ............................................ 63 

Letter from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to Daniel Poneman 

and Ellen O. Tauscher .................................................................................. 65 

August 23, 2010, letter from Congress to President Barack Obama ........... 67 

Letter from Senator Richard Lugar to Hon. John F. Kerry .......................... 69 

Analysis of Export Licenses Under Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Submitted by Senator Senator Edward J. Markey .................................................. 96 

(III)

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(1) 

SECTION 123: CIVILIAN NUCLEAR 

COOPERATION AGREEMENTS 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine, 

Markey, Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. 

Let me welcome our panelists today. We appreciate your participation. 

This year we have several agreements before the committee: an 

updated agreement with Taiwan, an extension of the agreement 

with the IAEA, both of which have been submitted to Congress. 

The Vietnam agreement has been initialed, as I understand it, and 

we are looking forward to reviewing it when it is submitted to Congress. Other countries are also seeking to negotiate such agreements with the United States. 

Over the last several years, the administration has conducted 

and recently completed a policy review of 123 agreements, and we 

are looking forward today to hearing the results of this review. 

One question is how the review dealt with what has become 

known as the ‘‘gold standard.’’ Should the United States require 

countries with which it enters into 123 agreements to completely 

forgo enrichment and reprocessing? And in that respect, I will look 

forward to hearing that response. 

You know, we have the United Arab Emirates Agreement, which 

is, in my mind, the gold standard. And yet, we are in the midst 

of negotiations with Iran which would permit, from everything I 

gather from the joint plan of action, some level of enrichment to 

take place. And so in one respect you have a very staunch ally who 

you have this very high standard for. In another respect, you have 

a country that ultimately engages in a series of support of terrorism across the globe, that is engaged in Syria, that has challenged the world with its nuclear ambitions, and we are headed to 

something that is far less than the UAE standard. So I think it is 

important to get a sense of how we pursue these agreements. 

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2 

If the administration has settled on a case-by-case basis, we 

would like to know what are the criteria for pursuing or not pursuing the gold standard. 

In the 1970s nonproliferation concerns prompted Congress to 

pass the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 requiring states to 

comply with much more robust nonproliferation conditions before 

signing nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States. 

A lot of water has passed under the bridge since then. Iran and 

North Korea have sought to use the pretense of a civilian nuclear 

program to work toward nuclear weapons, and the A.Q. Khan network spread nuclear technology across the globe. 

Another important issue related to 123 agreements is the declining role of the United States in the global export market for 

nuclear technology. Until the end of the cold war, the United 

States was the dominant global supplier of commercial nuclear 

energy technology. Over the last 30 years, we have seen a significant decline in the U.S. share of the market and in our ability to 

promote national security objectives through peaceful nuclear 

cooperation. 

For Congress, the question is how can we support our nuclear 

industry while at the same time upholding high nonproliferation 

standards. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act charges the Congress and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in particular, 

with important oversight duties related to these agreements. It is 

now up to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Congress, broadly, to decide whether we believe the agreement meets 

the nonproliferation criteria of the Atomic Energy Act and is in the 

best interests of the United States. 

We look forward to our panelists helping to shed light on these 

issues and understanding a better sense of how the administration 

views them in the performance of our oversight duties. 

Let me recognize Senator Corker, who has had a great deal of 

interest in this field, and we look forward to his remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you very 

much for having this hearing. I know we had a number of discussions and I appreciate the way that the minority and the majority 

work together on these kinds of issues. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. 

I have some brief opening comments, and because this is a little 

more technical in nature, if I could, I would like my full written 

opening comments to be part of the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Senator CORKER. Today we have the opportunity to examine and 

begin the process to weigh in on what shape U.S. policy in this 

arena should take and review and calls to be more robust the role 

that Congress plays in entering into these important decisions. 

I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before us today. I 

am particularly interested in hearing from our private panel as we 

examine U.S. policy in relation to civil nuclear cooperation agreements and the role that they play in achieving U.S. nonproliferation goals. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

I am concerned about the administration’s current policy or, 

rather, lack of consistent policy toward the negotiation of civil 

nuclear cooperation agreements. Their acceptance of enrichment 

and reprocessing, E&R, capabilities in some but not all new agreements with countries where no such capability currently exists is 

inconsistent and confusing. 

The gold standard where nations foreswear domestic E&R capabilities was finalized under this administration with the completion 

of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab 

Emirates. This agreement signaled our country’s strong commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and established a high standard 

to ensure tight control of potentially dangerous technologies. 

The absence of a consistent policy weakens our nuclear nonproliferation efforts and sends mixed signals to those nations we 

seek to prevent from gaining or enhancing such capability and signals to our partners that the gold standard is actually no standard 

at all. 

I am equally concerned that the current administration has 

taken an economics industry first national security second 

approach to entering into these 123 agreements. Also, we need to 

understand how the agreement with Iran, as the chairman mentioned and as we have talked about privately, relates to other civilian agreements in our overall nonproliferation strategy. I do not 

see how, in essence, agreeing to the type of thing that we have 

agreed to with Iran does not undermine our ability in these 123 

agreements with every other country that seeks an agreement with 

us. 

This agreement with Iran is a de facto signoff on enrichment, 

and while we are not negotiating a 123 agreement with Iran, these 

negotiations will have implications for our global nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

This committee has an important obligation to review and provide recommendations to the full Congress on all 123 agreements 

submitted for consideration under the Atomic Energy Act. The 123 

agreement with Taiwan was submitted to our committee for consideration on January 7, 2014. While this agreement preserves the 

gold standard, I am concerned about the decision to make the 

agreement of unlimited duration, bypassing congressional review of 

the agreement beyond the current 60-day statutory review period. 

Later this year, we will be asked to review a 123 agreement with 

Vietnam. This agreement reportedly does not meet the gold standard. Rather, it relies on a political side note that Vietnam will seek 

to meet its fuel requirements through the international nuclear 

fuel market. 

With this great inconsistency across agreements, which standards can we expect the administration to reach for negotiating new 

agreements with Jordan or Saudi Arabia? 

I also appreciate the opportunity to raise prospects for an 

enhanced congressional role in the 123 process. I think most of us 

know the process that we now have is really no process at all and 

it really does not allow us to weigh in in the way we should appropriately weigh in. I am concerned that Congress will be increasingly marginalized if we do not explore changes to the current process for congressional review. We should examine whether it is time 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

for Congress to provide a resolution for approval on all agreements 

except perhaps in the case where an agreement reaches the gold 

standard. 

I welcome our witnesses’ comments and observations on this and 

other proposals. 

In closing, the United States must lead with high standards that 

prevent the proliferation of technologies if we are to have a credible 

and effective nuclear nonproliferation policy. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the most effective avenues for achieving 

this primary goal. 

And again, I want to thank the chairman for having this hearing 

and for those who are here pursuing appropriate oversight on 

something that is so important to our country. So thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Corker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB CORKER

Chairman Menendez, thank you for agreeing to hold this important and timely 

hearing today. 

Not only have I requested that we hold this hearing for some time now, but nearly 

2 years ago Senator Lugar sent a letter to then Chairman Kerry requesting this 

very same hearing. 

Now, 2 years later, we have the opportunity to examine and begin the process to 

weigh in on what shape U.S. policy in this arena should take and review—and cause 

to be more robust—the role that Congress plays in entering into these important 

decisions. 

I also want to thank the witnesses for appearing before us today. I am particularly interested in hearing from our private panel today, as we examine U.S. policy 

as it relates to civil nuclear cooperation agreements and the role they play in achieving U.S. nonproliferation goals. 

As I stated in a letter to Secretary Kerry on October 28 of last year, I am deeply 

concerned about the administration’s current policy—or rather lack of consistent 

policy—toward negotiation of civil nuclear cooperation agreements. The administration’s acceptance of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) capabilities in some, but not 

all, new agreements with countries where no ENR capability currently exists is 

inconsistent and confusing, potentially compromising our Nation’s nonproliferation 

policies and goals. 

The ‘‘gold standard,’’ where nations forswear domestic ENR capabilities, was finalized under this administration with the completion of the civil nuclear cooperation 

agreement with the United Arab Emirates. The UAE 123 agreement signaled the 

United States strong commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and established a high 

standard to ensure tight control of potentially dangerous technologies that can also 

be used for the foundations of a nuclear weapons program. 

The absence of a consistent policy weakens our nuclear nonproliferation efforts, 

and sends a mixed message to those nations we seek to prevent from gaining or 

enhancing such capability, and signals to our partners that the ‘‘gold standard’’ is 

no standard at all. 

I am equally concerned that the current administration has taken an ‘‘economics’’/ 

industry first, national security second approach to entering into 123 agreements. 

Also, we need to understand how the agreement with Iran relates to our other 

civilian nuclear agreements and our overall nonproliferation strategy. 

The agreement with Iran is a de facto sign-off on enrichment, and while we are 

not negotiating a 123 agreement with Iran, these negotiations will have implications 

for our global nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

As many of us may recall, during the review of the India 123 agreement several 

years ago, the administration at that time indicated that the value of the agreement, in addition to demonstrating a growing commitment to the bilateral relationship, was in the nature of contracts for our domestic nuclear suppliers. 

Those contracts have yet to appear for U.S. industry, likely never will appear, and 

we are left holding a bag of goods. To say many in Congress have buyer’s remorse 

would probably be an understatement as it pertains to the concessions made in this 

agreement in order to ‘‘open the market’’ for U.S. industry. 

It was this administration, following in the disappointing footsteps of the India 

agreement that negotiated the first ‘‘gold standard’’ agreement between the United 

States and the UAE. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

This standard, welcomed by Congress, has since been set aside for a ‘‘case-bycase’’ approach that no longer seeks these strong commitments from our partners. 

In a 2012 editorial titled ‘‘Shall We Call it the Bronze Standard,’’ the New York 

Times rightly pointed out the following with regard to the new, relaxed standard: 

American officials now say that asking for too much could cost America’s 

nuclear industry valuable new business. Officials also insist that once 

American businesses have contracts in hand, Washington can still use its 

nuclear trade rules and suasion to urge countries signing nuclear deals to 

limit enrichment and reprocessing and meet other nonproliferation standards so there is no diversion. 

But if the administration doesn’t make curbing the spread of enrichment 

and reprocessing an explicit priority, it will never happen. As for the business rationale, the Bush and Obama administrations and the nuclear industry made similar claims when they cast proliferation concerns aside and 

gave India an overly generous nuclear deal in 2008. The Indians are still 

mainly buying from others because they have yet to institute a sufficient 

liability regime to protect American firms. 

The blowback from not pressing others to accept the same deal as the 

U.A.E could also be significant. If Vietnam is given easier terms, charges 

will inevitably arise that Washington is tougher on the Arab world. If the 

provision is not in the agreement with Jordan or others in the Mideast, the 

U.A.E. has the right to renegotiate its deal.’’ 

Within this committee, we have an important obligation to review and provide 

recommendations to the full Congress on all 123 agreements submitted for consideration under the Atomic Energy Act. 

This year, we have already passed an extension to the ROK 123 agreement, providing another 2 years for the administration to reach a new comprehensive deal. 

Maintaining uninterrupted civilian nuclear cooperation is important for U.S. political and commercial interests. And while I was pleased to support this extension, 

I am concerned that the administration will not hold the line on advanced consent 

for enrichment and reprocessing. 

We are also presently asked to review the 123 agreement with Taiwan, which was 

submitted to our committee for consideration on January 7, 2014. 

While this agreement preserves the ‘‘gold standard,’’ I am concerned about the 

decision to make the agreement of unlimited duration thereby bypassing congressional review of the agreement beyond this current 60-day statutory review period. 

I do hope that our government witnesses will address the reasons for concluding 

that this was the best approach, but caution that it should not become common 

practice. 

Later this year, we will be asked to review a 123 agreement with Vietnam. This 

agreement reportedly does not meet the ‘‘gold standard.’’ Rather it relies on a political side note that Vietnam will seek to meet its fuel requirements utilizing the 

international nuclear fuel market. 

If the Vietnamese are willing to buy their nuclear fuel on the international market, why aren’t they willing to agree to legally binding language forswearing enrichment and reprocessing technologies? 

With this great inconsistency across agreements, which standards can we expect 

the administration to reach for in negotiating new agreements with Jordan or Saudi 

Arabia? 

I also appreciate the opportunity to raise prospects for an enhanced congressional 

role in the 123 approval process. While Congress provides an important check on 

the administration to ensure that our national security interests are placed first and 

are being met with each agreement, I am concerned that we will be increasingly 

marginalized if we do not explore changes to the current process for congressional 

approval. 

The law governing the current congressional role was written decades ago and has 

had little updating since. With a packed domestic agenda and a growing number 

of members with little to no background in civil nuclear cooperation agreements, the 

process by which an agreement goes into effect absent a resolution of ‘‘disapproval’’ 

opens the door for less and less review of these important agreements. 

We should examine whether it is time to call on Congress to provide a resolution 

of approval on all agreements prior to them becoming law, except perhaps in the 

case where an agreement reaches the ‘‘gold standard.’’ I welcome our witness’s comments and observations on this and other proposals to update the Atomic Energy 

Act. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker, and thank you for 

your contributions to this effort. 

Our first panel is Thomas Countryman, the Assistant Secretary 

of State for the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Deputy Secretary of Energy, Daniel Poneman. Thank 

you both for your presence here today. We look forward to your testimony. Your full statements will be included in the record without 

objection. And I would ask you to try to summarize your statements in about 5 minutes or so, so we could enter into a dialogue. 

With that, Mr. Secretary, do you want to start off? 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL B. PONEMAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. PONEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, distinguished 

members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify 

before you today on the administration’s policies regarding civil 

nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation. 

I first worked on this issue as a summer intern in 1975 for my 

home State senator, John Glenn. I was working on S. 1439, the 

Export Reorganization Act, which, in fact, became the 1978 Nonproliferation Act that you referred to, Mr. Chairman. So I have 

nearly 40 years on this subject, including serving 6 years on the 

National Security Council staff both for President George Herbert 

Walker Bush and President Clinton. 

At the NSC, I was proud to be part of the team under President 

Bush that negotiated the deal to purchase 500 metric tons of highly 

enriched uranium from Russia, 20,000 weapons worth of bombs, 

three a day that have been taken down, and we have successfully 

concluded that deal just in December. I was also proud to serve on 

the team that stopped North Korea’s plutonium production for a 

number of years under President Clinton. 

In short, for four decades my preeminent concern has been to 

stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to stop dangerous materials and technologies from falling into the wrong hands. Throughout our policy has benefited from an enormous degree of bipartisan 

cooperation and consensus, going back to President Eisenhower’s 

1953 ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ speech in which he sought to secure the 

benefits of the peaceful use of the atom while guarding against 

misuse for military or other destructive aims. Every President 

since President Eisenhower has embraced these goals. 

So when President Obama delivered his compelling vision to 

advance our nuclear security in his 2009 speech in Prague, he was 

following firmly in the footsteps of all of his predecessors in 

advancing a strong vision of global leadership in reducing nuclear 

threats. 

It has always been U.S. policy that 123 agreements should support U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Indeed, our 123 agreements 

are the world’s strongest framework agreements for peaceful 

nuclear cooperation precisely because of the 1978 Nonproliferation 

Act. 

Consider the specific provisions. The United States requires our 

partners to commit to the legal obligations contained in section 123 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7 

of the Atomic Energy Act. The U.S. Government requires nonnuclear-weapon state partner countries to have in place IAEA safeguards over all nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities. The 

United States requires guarantees that any nuclear material and 

the equipment transferred be used only for peaceful purposes; 123 

agreements also provide the United States with the right to 

demand the return of any U.S.-obligated material and equipment 

if a non-nuclear-weapon state detonates a weapon or abrogates its 

safeguard agreement. Partners may not retransfer any nuclear 

material or equipment supplied by U.S. companies without permission of the U.S. Government. Partners may not enrich, reprocess, 

or otherwise alter in form or content U.S.-obligated material without U.S. Government consent. Partners also must adhere to the 

U.S. requirements for physical security and storage of U.S. nuclear 

material and equipment. 

Our 123 agreements set the bar high discouraging a nonproliferation race to the bottom in which potential partners negotiate 

peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with suboptimal nonproliferation controls. 

Therefore, in our view, the more 123 agreements that exist in the 

world, the stronger the nonproliferation controls that will apply to 

all nuclear commerce. Consequently, it is in the U.S. national security interest to maximize the number of countries with which the 

United States has 123 agreements. 

A decade ago, I joined with then-Professor Ernest Moniz and 

other colleagues to propose a global regime that minimized acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Such a regime 

would achieve that minimization goal not by legal diktat or diplomatic pressure, but rather by addressing the underlying concern in 

many countries to secure reliable nuclear fuel services from the 

commercial marketplace. This approach of acquiring services from 

the existing market would save nations billions of dollars in unnecessary investments in fuel cycle facilitates, thereby becoming a far 

more attractive prospect. 

We want other nations to enter into 123 agreements with the 

United States because our standards are the highest in the world. 

When we enter into 123 agreements, we bring our nonproliferation 

standards to the partner country and thereby enhance our national 

security. Conversely, when a state opts to enter into an agreement 

for civil nuclear cooperation only with another country, not the 

United States, then U.S. influence on that nation’s nonproliferation 

regime decreases, as does our influence over the global regime. 

In short, we have a variety of tools, in addition to the 123 agreements, Mr. Chairman, which I think Mr. Countryman will go into 

in great detail, but the bottom line is that the United States has 

the highest nonproliferation standards in the world. Our 123 agreements remain a highly effective tool in promulgating those standards, though they are far from the only tool, and it is therefore in 

our national security interest to ensure that we can renew current 

and achieve new 123 agreements with partner countries. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Poneman follows:] 

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8 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY DANIEL B. PONEMAN

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished members of the 

committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the administration’s policies regarding civil nuclear cooperation. 

I first worked on this issue as a summer intern in 1975 for my home State Senator, John Glenn of Ohio. That summer I was assigned to work on S. 1439, the 

Export Reorganization Act, which was designed to address some of the shortcomings 

in our system and strengthen our nonproliferation controls. That legislation eventually evolved into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. So I have nearly 40 

years of experience with this issue, including 6 years on the National Security Council (NSC) staff under President George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton, for 

whom I served as the first Special Assistant to the President for Nonproliferation 

and Export Controls. 

At the NSC, I was proud to be part of the initial team under President Bush that 

negotiated the agreement with Russia to purchase 500 metric tons of highly 

enriched uranium to be blended down into commercial reactor fuel. That 20-year 

deal concluded last month, having eliminated 20,000 bombs-worth of nuclear material, while providing one-tenth of America’s electricity for the last generation. And 

I was proud to serve on the team under President Clinton that worked to reduce 

the proliferation threat emanating from North Korea’s nuclear programs, an issue 

that we continue to confront today. 

In short, for four decades I have done my best to prevent nuclear weapons or the 

materials and technologies that can be used to build them from falling into the 

wrong hands, and have benefited throughout from the wide degree of bipartisan consensus supporting U.S. nonproliferation policy. That consensus was well articulated 

by President Eisenhower in his historic 1953 ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ speech, then institutionalized in 1957 with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA), and ultimately universalized through the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT) of 1968, all of which seek to secure to humankind the benefits of the peaceful 

use of the atom while guarding against its misuse for military or other destructive 

aims. Every President since Eisenhower has embraced these goals, each applying 

the flexibility of his own policies to achieve these goals. 

This is indeed fortunate, since there is no more important task than succeeding 

in this daunting yet imperative national security mission. So when President 

Obama delivered his compelling vision to advance our global nuclear security in his 

2009 Prague speech, he was following firmly in the footsteps of his predecessors in 

advancing a strong vision of global leadership in reducing nuclear threats. The 

Department of Energy (DOE), through its national laboratories and production 

plants, and in close partnership with the State Department, Department of Defense, 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other U.S. Government and international partners, has worked and will continue to work tirelessly to reduce this 

threat and enhance the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

In your letter, Mr. Chairman, you asked about the administration’s policy on 123 

agreements. At the broadest level, it is and always has been U.S. policy that 123 

agreements should support U.S. nonproliferation objectives, to combat the threat 

that nuclear weapons and related materials and technologies should fall into the 

wrong hands. And, by their structure, 123 agreements serve that mission well. 

Indeed, our 123 agreements are the world’s strongest framework agreements for 

peaceful nuclear cooperation. No government requires more stringent nonproliferation conditions than the United States. 

Consider the specific provisions of our 123 agreements. The United States 

requires our trading partners to commit to the legal obligations contained in section 

123 of the Atomic Energy Act. These obligations are purposely stringent and set the 

global standard for nuclear commerce. The U.S. Government requires non-nuclearweapon-state partner countries to have in place IAEA safeguards over all nuclear 

materials in peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its 

jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. Additionally, the cooperating 

party must guarantee that safeguards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation 

will be maintained in perpetuity with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to the 123 agreement and any special nuclear material 

used in or produced by such material and equipment. The United States requires 

guarantees that any nuclear material and equipment transferred be used only for 

peaceful purposes. 123 agreements also require that the United States has the right 

to demand the return of any U.S.-obligated material and equipment if a nonnuclear-weapon state detonates a weapon or abrogates its safeguards agreement. 

Partners may not retransfer any nuclear material or equipment supplied by U.S. 

companies without the permission of the U.S. Government. Partners may not 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

enrich, reprocess, or otherwise alter in form or content U.S.-obligated material without U.S. Government permission. Partners also must adhere to U.S. requirements 

for physical security and storage of U.S. nuclear material and equipment. 

It is therefore in the U.S. national interest to encourage other governments that 

are considering commercial nuclear programs and that are in compliance with their 

nuclear nonproliferation obligations to sign 123 agreements with the United States. 

Our 123 agreements set the global nonproliferation standard, thereby discouraging 

a nonproliferation ‘‘race to the bottom,’’ in which potential partners negotiate peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with suboptimal nonproliferation controls. 

The more 123 agreements that exist in the world, the stronger the nonproliferation controls that will apply to all nuclear commerce. Consequently, it is in the U.S. 

national security interest to maximize the number of countries with which the 

United States has 123 agreements. 

There is nothing new in this logic. Indeed, a decade ago, I joined with then-professor, Ernest Moniz, and other colleagues to argue in favor of a global regime that 

minimized acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Such a regime 

would achieve this minimization goal, not by legal diktat or diplomatic pressure, but 

rather by addressing the underlying concern in many countries to secure reliable 

nuclear fuel services from the commercial marketplace. This approach of acquiring 

services from the existing market would save nations billions of dollars in unnecessary investments in fuel cycle facilities, thereby becoming a far more attractive prospect. Of course, to be effective, these nuclear fuel service supply assurances would 

have to be credible—for example, they could only be revoked if the country in question violated its nonproliferation obligations, and not for other important but distinct issues of concern to the United States. 

We want other nations to enter into 123 agreements with the United States 

because our standards are the highest in the world—bar none. When we enter into 

new 123 agreements, we bring our nonproliferation standards to the partner country, and thereby enhance our national security. Conversely, when a state opts to 

enter into an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation only with another country but 

not the United States, then U.S. influence on that state’s nonproliferation regime 

decreases. 

Some people have mistakenly viewed U.S. economic interests in nuclear trade as 

somehow at odds with a strong nonproliferation policy. This is a false dichotomy. 

A strong U.S. commercial nuclear industry does not weaken our nonproliferation; 

on the contrary it strengthens U.S. nonproliferation efforts, since it ultimately provides the basis for countries to enter into 123 agreements. Conversely, failure to 

reach a 123 agreement with a potential partner country prevents the United States 

from extending the coverage of its nonproliferation controls, thus weakening our 

nonproliferation efforts. 

The U.S. commercial nuclear industry is no longer dominant in the global marketplace. Over time, the U.S. share of global exports for enriched uranium and other 

sensitive nuclear materials declined dramatically. As reported in a 1987 GAO 

report, the U.S. share of the global non-Communist market in enriched uranium 

declined from 100 percent in 1969 to 50 percent in 1987, Since that report, the 

decline in market share has continued to just 10 percent of the overall market in 

2008. Diminishing U.S. market share means diminished controls over materials 

worldwide and diminished influence over the safety, security, and nonproliferation 

cultures of those markets. 

It is important to remember that 123 agreements are not the only tools in our 

nonproliferation arsenal. In addition, we have the NPT regime; IAEA safeguards, 

now strengthened by the Additional Protocol; U.N. Resolution 1540; nuclear fuel 

banks; the Nuclear Suppliers Group; as well as a number of nonproliferation conventions on such matters as physical protection, safety, and radioactive waste. All 

of these tools advance the U.S. national security interest in achieving the lowest 

number of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and technologies (specifically enrichment and reprocessing). 

Mr. Chairman, you asked whether the section 123 requirements need to be modified or updated. In our judgment, Mr. Chairman, the current requirements are 

strong, relevant, and effective. Indeed, in our view no country has more robust nonproliferation criteria, and the current requirements represent a major increase in 

rigor compared to those in effect prior to the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The 

nonproliferation criteria of section 123 should not lightly be changed. The U.S. Government has been persuading other countries to accept our existing rigorous set of 

constraints for 30 years, but we will undermine our ability to negotiate agreements 

and extend our strong nonproliferation controls if we keep changing the rules of the 

game and cause other countries to view the United States as an unreliable partner. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

I would argue that changes made in 1978 were justified, as they addressed genuine weaknesses in the nuclear export regime. Indeed, they have been very successful in minimizing the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies like enrichment 

and reprocessing. While I understand well-meaning efforts to further constrain the 

acquisition and development of enrichment and reprocessing around the world, 

ratcheting up restrictions yet again will drive countries away from the United 

States and therefore out of the reach of U.S. 123 controls. A perfect policy that 

applies to zero percent of the market would be a perfect failure. 

Mr. Chairman, you asked about the proposed Taiwan 123 Agreement. Recently, 

the President submitted this agreement to Congress for review. As required under 

the Taiwan Relations Act, the agreement was concluded between the American 

Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 

Office (TECRO). 

Entry into force of this agreement constitutes an important step forward in our 

cooperation with the authorities on Taiwan in the field of civil nuclear energy. The 

United States supplies all of their power and research reactors, along with the fuel 

to power them. The AIT–TECRO 123 Agreement will allow this cooperation to 

develop further. 

In the AIT–TECRO Agreement and the supporting side letter, the authorities represented by TECRO renew their commitment to strong nonproliferation norms, 

including giving legal weight to their existing policy not to seek enrichment and 

reprocessing technologies. The proposed agreement prohibits the possession by the 

authorities on Taiwan of sensitive nuclear facilities and any engagement in activities involving sensitive nuclear technology in the territory of the authorities represented by TECRO. Assistant Secretary of State Tom Countryman will discuss the 

Taiwan 123 Agreement in greater detail. I simply want to reaffirm the basic point 

that the 123 agreement with TECRO is another 123 agreement that implements the 

longstanding U.S. goal to use 123 agreements as one means to achieve the lowest 

number of enrichment and reprocessing facilities around the world. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, you asked about the role of Congress in formulating 123 

policy. As the committee knows, the role of Congress has been vital in this area, 

as has been expressed through the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Congress developed and enacted this comprehensive framework, institutionalizing its 

vital review and oversight function. The documentation required to accompany a 

123 agreement is extensive and requires a joint letter from the Secretaries of State 

and Energy, supplemented by separate input from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Director of National Intelligence. That documentation is reviewed by 

both Houses of Congress. We believe it is a good system, with a robust role for Congress. As long as the President retains his prerogatives in the area of foreign diplomacy, the nonproliferation criteria of section 123 should not lightly be changed, for 

the same reasons our policy should not lightly be changed; the United States should 

be both strong and steadfast. 

CONCLUSION

The United States has the highest nonproliferation standards in the world. Our 

123 agreements remain a highly effective tool in promulgating those standards— 

though they are far from the only tool. It is in our national security interests to 

assure that we can renew current and achieve new future 123 agreements. 

Though the strategy for engaging with individual nations is tailored to the nation 

at hand, the underlying principle remains the same: we must do what is necessary 

to minimize the acquisition and development of enrichment and reprocessing technology and provide persuasive alternatives. 

Well-intended changes to requirements for 123 agreements risk making the perfect the enemy of the good—arriving at a policy that is strong on paper and nowhere 

else. We run the risk of countries moving forward without us—choosing instead to 

partner with countries that have less stringent nonproliferation controls and losing 

the opportunity to help new partners and allies use peaceful nuclear power. 

The Department of Energy remains committed to implementing President 

Obama’s policies and goals on nuclear nonproliferation and use of civil nuclear cooperation, as President Eisenhower expressed 60 years ago—that cooperation in the 

peaceful use of nuclear power will bring together an international community 

committed to using ‘‘their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of 

mankind.’’ 

Thank you for the opportunity to address to committee, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Countryman. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the 

ranking member and the other members of the committee for this 

opportunity. Even more, I want to thank you for decades of strong 

congressional interest and support in the issue of nonproliferation. 

This enduring support, together with the direct interest of President Obama, has ensured that for the last several years the United 

States has maintained leadership of a nonproliferation regime globally that is not only strong but effective. 

The 123 agreements must be understood within the context of a 

comprehensive nonproliferation policy that the United States has 

long pursued and continues to strengthen. This includes our efforts 

to minimize the further production of fissile material around the 

world, an effort to prevent the proliferation of sensitive technologies. It includes the President’s efforts under the nuclear security summit process to secure fissile material around the world. It 

includes U.S. leadership within the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

which, again, under U.S. leadership established 3 years ago the 

strongest possible standards for preventing transfer of enrichment 

and reprocessing technology. And it also includes the strong support of the United States and again with the crucial support of the 

Congress for making the International Atomic Energy Agency the 

most credible and expert institution in the world for preventing 

proliferation. 

Nonproliferation is an element of our dialogue with partners 

around the world. It is a crucial issue for the G8 grouping. We have 

also not just done the diplomatic work. We do the hard work, in 

this case led by the Department of Energy, to establish world fuel 

banks in the United States, in Russia under the leadership of the 

IAEA that can assure a reliable supply for countries pursuing civilian nuclear power. 

It is in this context that 123 agreements have their importance. 

They are another vital tool in the toolkit that limits the proliferation of E&R technology and of weapons-grade material. As you 

know, by law 123 agreements contain stringent nonproliferation 

agreements, making them stronger than those pursued by any 

other country in the world when they sign nuclear cooperation 

agreements. They require partner countries to apply full-scope 

IAEA safeguards. They require that material and equipment transferred under the agreement will be used only for peaceful purposes. 

They require adequate physical protection of material which we 

can verify and many other requirements. 

In approaching any particular negotiation of a 123 agreement, a 

process led by the Department of State, we consistently ask in 

every instance how we can best prevent the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies. It is simply not accurate to say that the 

economic interests have primacy over our nonproliferation interests, and the policy review conducted by the administration 

reaffirmed the primacy of our nonproliferation interests. 

An approach that would be more restrictive or that would seek 

to make 123 agreements not only meet high standards but to be 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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uniform we fear would be self-defeating. On the particular issue of 

requiring a binding legal commitment from every country, we do 

believe that many countries would prefer not to pursue such an 

agreement rather than to agree to renounce forever a theoretical 

right. 

In any 123 agreement, we seek to meet the legal requirements 

of the Atomic Energy Act and to maintain our principled stance, 

our leadership stance on enrichment and reprocessing. These are 

the primary goals. The exact structure, the exact text of the agreement are the means by which we reach those goals. 

Mr. Chairman, you have in my written testimony additional comments about the specific questions raised on Vietnam and on Taiwan, which we are happy to expand on as you wish. I simply want 

to emphasize that we have crafted through the 123 agreements 

nuclear cooperation policies that are not only strong, they are effective. And that is borne out by the record that we have sustained 

in limiting the spread of such technologies. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Countryman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today before the committee. The question of the appropriate role of our civil nuclear 

cooperation agreements in U.S. nonproliferation policy is an important one, and it 

is my privilege to be here to address it. 

LIMITING THE SPREAD OF ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING

Since taking office, this administration has made minimizing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons material a top priority. In order to do so, the administration has undertaken a large number of different activities designed to reinforce 

our longstanding policy of minimizing the further proliferation of enrichment and 

reprocessing, or ENR, technologies and initiated new efforts to this end. We have 

many tools to achieve this end, and for many years we’ve focused our efforts on raising global standards in this regard. 

For example, in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 6 years of effort culminated 

in the 2011 revised Guidelines establishing criteria for ENR transfers. These new 

criteria include full compliance by the recipient with the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), safeguards; reporting on export controls to the United Nations Security Council’s 1540 Committee; 

commitment to IAEA safety standards and adherence to accepted international safety conventions; and conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement with the supplier 

nation including assurances regarding nonexplosive use, effective safeguards in perpetuity, and retransfer. Suppliers also undertook to avoid, as far as practicable, the 

transfer of enabling design and manufacturing technology associated with nuclear 

transfers. The NSG has committed to facilitate access to nuclear material for the 

peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to encourage states, within the scope of Article 

IV of the NPT, to rely on the international commercial market and other available 

international mechanisms for nuclear fuel services that do not undermine the global 

fuel market. 

We’ve also worked with our global partners to create incentives for states to rely 

on international markets for low enriched uranium fuel, including separate fuel 

banks established by the U.S. Department of Energy, Russia, the IAEA, and a fuel 

assurance initiative from the United Kingdom. 

123 AGREEMENTS POLICY

The implementation of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation, or 123 agreements, is another tool we have to limit the further proliferation of ENR. As you 

know, 123 agreements contain many stringent nonproliferation conditions, making 

them the strongest civil nuclear cooperation agreements in the world in terms of 

nonproliferation requirements. Our 123 agreements require partner countries to 

apply full scope IAEA safeguards to non-nuclear-weapon states; require that all 

material and equipment transferred under the agreement and special nuclear mateFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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rial used in or produced therefrom, will be for peaceful purposes; require adequate 

physical protection of material transferred under the agreement; and grant U.S. 

consent rights over storage of the most sensitive materials, and over the enrichment, reprocessing, alteration in form or content, storage, and retransfer of U.S.- 

obligated nuclear material. With such high standards, it follows that the more 123 

agreements we conclude, the stronger the nonproliferation controls that will apply 

to global nuclear commerce. Consequently, it is in the national security interests of 

the United States to maximize the number of countries with which we conclude 123 

agreements. Put simply, global security is enhanced through our 123 agreements. 

Some have advocated an approach that would require all future U.S. 123 agreement partners to agree to legal obligations not to pursue ENR technologies from any 

source. We do not believe such a ‘‘one size fits all’’ approach is in our national security interests. This type of blanket requirement would reduce our ability to extend 

our strong nonproliferation norms to new parts of the world—norms that have a 

real impact in preventing proliferation. Instead this blanket approach would likely 

drive states with emerging nuclear power programs into the arms of suppliers with 

lower nonproliferation standards. 

Moving forward on future 123 agreement negotiations, we will maintain flexibility 

in the structure of our agreements in order to meet the requirements of U.S. law 

and advance our primary objective of combating the proliferation of ENR technologies. The commitments we seek may take a range of forms depending on the 

approach that best suits our primary policy objective of minimizing the further proliferation of ENR technologies. 

OUR POLICY APPLIED TO VIETNAM

The text of the agreement we initialed with Vietnam in October is a good example 

of how our 123 agreement policy advances our objective of minimizing the proliferation of ENR technologies. In the text, Vietnam states its political commitment to 

rely on international fuel services and comply with the supplier controls adopted by 

the NSG rather than pursuing its own ENR facilities. This was an important step 

taken by the Government of Vietnam, because it is a public affirmation that domestic ENR facilities are not necessary. The scale of Vietnam’s intended program does 

not warrant the investment, and international fuel cycle services are adequate to 

provide for its needs. I would note that this is also the case for the vast majority 

of states with emerging civil nuclear programs. The text of the 123 agreement with 

Vietnam is also fully compliant with all Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) requirements, including the requirement that Vietnam secure our consent before it can 

enrich or reprocess U.S.-origin materials. The agreement does not provide any 

advance consent in this regard. 

Our 123 agreement negotiations with Vietnam also demonstrate the additional 

follow-on nonproliferation benefits that can accrue when we enter into 123 agreements with new partners. Since we began negotiating, Vietnam has brought into 

force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, begun participating in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We are also seeing greater 

interest from Vietnam in endorsing the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

CONGRESSIONAL ROLE/TAIWAN

In addition to outlining our 123 policy, you asked us to address three issues. First, 

you asked about the nonproliferation criteria each 123 agreement is required to 

meet. In 1978, Congress amended the AEA, thereby strengthening the legal requirements for 123 agreements. These changes addressed major issues associated with 

civil nuclear cooperation, including nuclear security and nuclear safeguards, ensuring that U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreements have the strongest nonproliferation requirements in the world. We feel that these requirements in our 123 agreements, in combination with the other tools I have discussed, are sufficient. With 

regard to the role of Congress in 123 agreements, we believe congressional oversight 

has worked well over the years. As mentioned previously, the changes that Congress 

made in 1978 to the AEA have addressed the primary nonproliferation concerns 

about U.S. civil nuclear cooperation. To the fullest extent consistent with Presidential prerogatives in the area of foreign diplomacy and the negotiation of international agreements, we will continue to keep Congress informed of our progress in 

negotiating specific 123 agreements, and address concerns that Congress may raise 

in the course of our 123 agreement negotiations with potential partners. 

Finally, you asked us to address the proposed Taiwan 123 Agreement, recently 

submitted for congressional review. Under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, any 

programs, transactions or other relations conducted or carried out by the President 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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or any agency of the United States Government relative to Taiwan are entered into 

by the American Institute in Taiwan, or AIT, and such agreements are concluded 

with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, 

or TECRO, as the representative of the authorities on Taiwan. As a consequence, 

this proposed agreement is between AIT and TECRO. Upon entry into force, this 

agreement would replace a similar 1972 agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. 

The authorities on Taiwan have been longstanding partners of the United States 

in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and we have cooperated closely in developing 

their civil nuclear program. All their power reactors and their existing research 

reactor were supplied by U.S. companies. All fuel for these reactors is supplied by 

the United States. As the President noted in his message transmitting the AIT– 

TECRO 123 agreement to Congress the authorities on Taiwan, over the last two 

decades, have established a reliable record on nonproliferation and on commitments 

to nonproliferation. For example, theirs was the first nuclear power program to 

accept application of the measures of the Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards 

agreements. These commitments were reiterated in the letter from TECRO to AIT 

provided at the time the proposed agreement was signed. 

The AIT–TECRO agreement contains all the provisions required by section 123 

of the AEA, as amended, but it also contains additional provisions. One important 

provision that the authorities on Taiwan reiterated as a legal element in the agreement is their longstanding policy not to seek enrichment and reprocessing 

technologies. 

Also under the terms of the agreement, all nuclear supply to the authorities on 

Taiwan from any source is treated as though it is supplied by the United States 

and is brought under the terms and conditions of the agreement. This provision 

ensures, inter alia, that all nuclear activities on Taiwan are subject to the safeguards requirements of the existing IAEA safeguards agreement, which normally 

applies only to material, equipment, components, or information supplied under the 

1972 agreement and any superseding agreement. It has been U.S. practice for over 

30 years to allow foreign suppliers to use the 1972 agreement, under appropriate 

conditions, and to bring nuclear activities on Taiwan under that agreement, in order 

to maintain full scope safeguards on Taiwan. The new AIT–TECRO agreement ensures that this continues to be the case, establishing a full scope safeguards requirement for the authorities on Taiwan and bringing the full scope of nuclear activities 

on Taiwan under the various consent requirements of the new agreement. 

A third important feature is the indefinite term of the new agreement, unless the 

agreement is terminated by either of the parties on 1-year’s notice. A 30-year term 

with rolling renewal for 5-year terms has been the usual practice in recent U.S. 

nuclear cooperation agreements. In this case, however, the agreement provides more 

than just a vehicle for U.S. supply. According to its terms, the safeguards agreement 

among the authorities on Taiwan, the United States, and the IAEA remains in force 

only as long as the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between the authorities 

in the United States and the authorities in Taiwan, including any superseding 

agreement, remains in force. The new AIT–TECRO agreement will be such a superseding agreement. If the safeguards agreement is terminated the IAEA would have 

the right to apply safeguards to existing nuclear material and to produced special 

fissionable material; however, no new material or equipment could be safeguarded. 

Without a new safeguards agreement, all nuclear trade with the authorities on Taiwan that required safeguards would cease. 

In short, the AIT–TECRO agreement is unique, one of the strongest 123 agreements that the United States has ever negotiated, and one that will ensure the continued ability of U.S. industry to work with its partners on Taiwan. 

NEXT STEPS

Going forward, we will use our 123 agreement negotiations to achieve a broad 

range of nonproliferation commitments with our partners. Beyond these commitments, the conclusion of 123 agreements with new partners yields even more nonproliferation benefits: the ability to influence the partner’s nuclear programs in such 

a way that it comports with the highest global standards of safety, security, and 

nonproliferation. When we establish new nuclear partnerships, our government and 

private sector experts build new relationships and open up new venues for cooperation across the spectrum of nuclear activities. This gives us the opportunity to guide 

and shape the policies and practices of emerging nuclear states, and these opportunities are only available to us if we forge new nuclear cooperation relationships. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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CONCLUSION

With these nonproliferation benefits in mind, we have crafted nuclear cooperation 

policies that are practical and pragmatic. Make no mistake, our policy is to pursue 

123 agreements that minimize the further proliferation of ENR technologies worldwide. The United States wants all nations interested in developing civil nuclear 

power to rely on the international market for fuel services rather than seek indigenous ENR capabilities. These capabilities are expensive and unnecessary, and reliable supply alternatives are available in the global fuel cycle market. 

We will continue to advance the highest possible nonproliferation standards 

worldwide, and at the center of these efforts is limiting the spread of ENR. Our 123 

agreements are important tools in that regard, and the principles that we have 

established for their negotiation will maintain U.S. leadership in preventing the 

spread of nuclear weapons. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both. I listened to your testimony and it is largely a restatement of what the law is. So let us 

explore things that are beyond the restatement of what the law is. 

Secretary Countryman, is the United Arab Emirates a foe or an 

ally? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. The United Arab Emirates is a crucial partner 

of the United States. 

The CHAIRMAN. And is Iran a foe or an ally? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I hesitate to call people foe, but there is no 

question that they are not an ally. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. So we have one country that is an ally, 

another country that clearly is not an ally. We created a gold 

standard with the United Arab Emirates which basically makes a 

pledge to no enrichment in its 123 agreement with us. And then 

we take a country that is not an ally at least, which I think is the 

most charitable definition of Iran’s relationship with us, and we in 

the interim agreement basically already have given up the essence 

of what the gold standard is, which is a commitment to have some 

level of enrichment. 

So how does that policy at the end of the day inure to our benefit 

to ask other countries in the world to live up to the gold standard? 

I just do not get it. So I must be missing something here. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Several points, if you will permit, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know the State Department is great. They 

should be Senators because they can filibuster. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. No, sir. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. As long as you get to the core essence of my 

question, I am happy to listen to several points. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, sir. 

First, we were pleased that the United Arab Emirates volunteered to make these clearest possible statement to foreswear 

future attempts to have reprocessing and enrichment. That was 

valuable. It strengthens our ability to present this to you for your 

approval. It was the first such time that a country had volunteered 

to make such a commitment, and of course, we welcomed it. 

Secondly, we are not with Iran negotiating a 123 agreement. We 

are negotiating an end to a program that is a security threat not 

only to the United States but to our allies. We are not negotiating 

an agreement in which the United States would provide sensitive 

technology to Iran. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Third, the current joint program of action under the interim 

agreement does not contain a right to enrich. The right to enrich 

is not explicitly stated in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 

The CHAIRMAN. But we may not have said the right to enrich, 

but clearly there is no question—I think you would be insulting the 

intelligence of the committee to suggest that, in fact, there is not 

some level of enrichment, whether you consider it a right or not, 

that is contemplated in this agreement. I mean, the plain reading 

of it says that. Am I mistaken about that? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. No, sir, you are not mistaken. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So my core question is, okay, you are not 

negotiating a 123 agreement. I get that. I understand that. But the 

question is what standards do you set that ultimately say to UAE 

who is an ally, well, you know what? Here is your neighbor. They 

went on a path to not only nuclear enrichment, but from all 

accounts militarization of it, weaponization of it. And we are going 

to negotiate with them to stop, hopefully, their weaponization, but 

we will allow an enrichment to take place, and you, who live in the 

same neighborhood, cannot have that right which would give you 

a pathway at some time in the future if you decided you needed 

it for your national protection to achieve nuclear weapons. 

I just do not get it. I do not understand how we are going to be 

able to have a lot more gold standards if this is the path that we 

are on. And I understand that we are not negotiating with Iran a 

123 agreement, but by the same token, I think the ability to negotiate future 123 agreements, which my view of it is to get the Good 

Housekeeping Seal of the United States on it, but at the same time 

has not necessarily generated the ability for our nuclear industry 

to ultimately be the provider of that sensitive technology and 

wherewithal. 

So I am trying to understand how it is that we are sending from 

my perspective mixed messages. 

Let me ask Secretary Poneman. You know, I referred to the UAE 

agreement as the gold standard by including a legally binding obligation not to engage in enrichment or reprocessing activities, period, no matter from where the uranium or spent fuel comes from. 

And the Obama administration in its first term actually toughened 

this commitment from that which the Bush administration originally required. 

I have not seen the Vietnam agreement yet. It has not been sent 

to us. But I have seen accounts of it. 

Can you explain in a straightforward way what the standard is? 

Are there different standards for the Middle East versus East 

Asia? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I can explain, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

the question. The standard is the less of these activities that is 

present, the safer we will all be. And Mr. Countryman said something very important. It was April 2008 that the UAE announced 

its own decision not to do these things. They took a sovereign decision they were comfortable with because they viewed that as in 

their best interest. 

What we are trying to do in Iran is drive them down. They are 

starting with a far more, unfortunately, advanced nuclear capability, and we are trying to roll it back. So the thing that we are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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trying to do in every case is to minimize those materials, that 

equipment that can produce nuclear weapons. 

The CHAIRMAN. So are there different standards for the Middle 

East versus East Asia? 

Mr. PONEMAN. There are different tools. The standard is always 

the same. Whatever we can do to minimize the threat that weapons will spread, including through these technologies, we will do. 

It may be that in a country you have more of a problem of a transit 

of loose export controls. That might be the higher value effort then 

in our effort in that country. We should always do that which is 

most likely to reduce the threat that the spread of weapons—— 

The CHAIRMAN. So I understand that Vietnam was willing to 

declare its intention, which is not legally binding, to only use foreign-supplied fuel for foreign-supplied reactors. That is close to the 

gold standard, but it is not the gold standard. So maybe we could 

call it the silver standard. 

Why was Vietnam not required to make this lesser but still 

important statement of intent into a binding part of its new agreement? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. First on the Middle East, if we are successful 

with Iran, we will dramatically reduce the temptation or incentive 

for any other country in the region to pursue the self-defeating 

path that Iran has taken. 

The CHAIRMAN. Not if all you do is mothball. We are hearing a 

lot of difference between dismantling their illicit nuclear program 

and permitting maybe some very low level for civilian enrichment 

and medical research versus largely allowing their infrastructure to 

stay in place, mothballing it, yes, having safeguards that will give 

us warning signs in the future if they decide to break out, but at 

that time, there will be no sanctions regime left, and the only 

option for this President a couple of years from now or some future 

President will be whether or not you accept a nuclear-armed Iran 

or you exercise a military option. That is really an undesirable set 

of circumstances. So I am not quite sure how we make that 

argument. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will not predict the outcome 

of negotiations that are just beginning, but I can assure you no one 

looks at the goal as simply mothballing facilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is good to hear. We will see where we 

head on that. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Yes, sir, thank you, and I appreciate your questions. 

Mr. Countryman, I guess one of the reasons this hearing is taking place is, look, we all talk with folks within the Department and 

get a general sense of how these negotiations take place. It is our 

understanding that when these negotiations begin, that the 

Department does not even necessarily begin by talking with other 

countries about the gold standard. It is an ad hoc decision that we 

will talk to this country this way, we will talk to this country that 

way. Why would we not in every single case begin with a strong 

definition of what our gold standard is and cause these countries— 

why is that not the beginning position in every single country we 

deal with? I do not understand that. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

The fact that we analyze each country differently does not mean 

that it is an ad hoc approach. We describe to each country what 

we are looking for and specifically how we can assure the world, 

and in particular the U.S. Congress, that this agreement is good 

for the global nonproliferation regime, and that is where we begin 

a discussion with all of our partners. 

Senator CORKER. What is it you look at? So we are going to go 

to UAE, as the chairman mentioned—and I know they announced 

unilaterally, but let us use them for an example. And then we are 

going to go to Vietnam, and it is a little different. They are going 

to give a political statement. They are not actually going to sign 

something. I mean, what is it you look at? So you look at X country. What is the environment that you look at there to decide, well, 

we are not really going to push for a strong agreement with them. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Sir, there is a wide range of factors that we 

would look at. They would include the regional situation and the 

threat perception of not only that country but of neighboring countries. It would include their record on nuclear—— 

Senator CORKER. Those things change, do they not? I mean, we 

began ourselves working with Iran back in 1950, and situations 

change quite a bit. Why would you assume that a region is going 

to stay as it is? And does it not create tremendous hypocrisy when 

we go from one country to another and have differing kinds of 

agreements? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. First, there is no such assumption that things 

never change. That is why our agreements, which include requirements for continued U.S. control on the use and retransfer of U.S.- 

provided materials, are backed up by vigorous cooperation and 

enforcement. 

Secondly, it is the fact that U.S. involvement by corporations, by 

the U.S. Government, and through the International Atomic 

Energy Agency are the most effective means of ensuring and monitoring any move in a dangerous direction. 

Senator CORKER. So actually you brought up a point that— 

I know Mr. Poneman is here and I know he was just down at Oak 

Ridge in Tennessee, and Tennessee is a great partner, if you will, 

in nuclear efforts. And I am really, really proud of that and I am 

a strong supporter of nuclear energy. 

On the other hand, in fairness—I say this with warmth, Mr. 

Poneman. I appreciate the role that you play at the Department of 

Energy. But I think there are concerns that all of our entities become captured by the people that they regulate and that your involvement actually in these negotiations is sometimes what drives 

us to have these happenstance, ad hoc agreements because potentially U.S. commercial interests trump the nuclear nonproliferation 

piece. So I would love for you to respond to that if you would. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Thank you, Senator. I will not be outflanked in 

my opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons. Period. There is 

no commercial benefit that is worth a proliferation risk. Period. I 

think it is an unfortunate thing that that impression may have 

been created. Of course, the Congress split the Atomic Energy 

Commission in 1974 into ERDA and NRC to avoid exactly the conflict that you said. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19 

I think the important thing is this, Senator. What we want is the 

123 agreements to be in place. That is the prize. That is when we 

get the consent rights. That is when we have actual legal controls 

to stop retransfers, to stop subsequent use in reprocessing. So we 

want those agreements to be there. If we make those agreements 

hard for other governments to accept, nonproliferation loses first, 

and we have not even begun any kind of commercial discussion. So 

I think that is what we have to keep in mind. 

Senator CORKER. Well, what is it that drives countries? You 

know, we have got all kinds of agreements relative to dealing with 

spent fuel. What is that drives countries? I know Jordan may talk 

with us. Our great friend, Jordan. I know they have some uranium 

deposits in their own country and they may want to talk with us 

about enrichment. And yet, we know that it is not financially something that is even productive to them. 

So you act as if entering into a 123 agreement that does not have 

the gold standard somehow—or let me put it having the gold standard is somehow something that disables us from entering into 

these agreements. And yet, what is it that drives these countries 

to want to enrich or to want to reprocess when we have other ways 

of dealing with that? 

Mr. PONEMAN. My experience, Senator—it is a great question. I 

do not think there is a lot of demand for this activity. It is very, 

very expensive. If you are just getting a couple of reactors, it does 

not make much sense. But I can tell you, sir, that I have had people say to me, because other governments have interagency processes too, why did you say these things. I did not have anybody in 

my country wanting to enrich, and now I do. 

What is a problem, in my judgment, is if we turn something into 

a test of what they will view as their national sovereignty for a 

purely theoretical proposition instead of negotiating a practical 

agreement which, once it enters into effect, will actually constrain 

them. 

Senator CORKER. Could we shorten the duration of these agreements? I mean, if they are worried about forever, if you will, not 

being able to enrich or reprocess, would it make sense to look at 

the duration of these agreements and instead of entering into a 30- 

year agreement, enter into a 10-year agreement? 

Mr. PONEMAN. That is a great question, Senator. I would say two 

things. 

Number one, the 123 agreements themselves I think generally 

serve our purpose the longer they are in effect because we get all 

those great, tough nonproliferation controls—the best in the world. 

However, when we have done things, as Professor Moniz and I suggested in this article, to ask people to go further and to voluntarily 

give up some of these rights, then I think the ability for them to 

say, hey, I am not giving it up forever, we can revisit this in 10 

years or whatever, I think that becomes a valuable negotiating tool. 

Senator CORKER. One final question. I know that other panelists 

here have questions. Look, Congress plays zero role in this really. 

The way this is now set up, it is almost impossible for us to have 

an issue when you do not, in essence, negotiate a gold standard. 

Does it not make sense for us to have the ability as a Congress 

that if you do not enter into an agreement that is, in fact, a pure 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

gold standard agreement, for us to vote up or down on it versus 

going through this resolution of disapproval process, which in 

essence gives us no real say because obviously the administration 

is negotiating these—they are going to veto. So would that not 

make sense and give you actually greater strength as you try to 

negotiate a gold standard with other countries? 

Mr. PONEMAN. So, first, Senator—and I was proud of this. The 

congressional role is actually dispositive. You all wrote the Atomic 

Energy Act. I worked on the Nonproliferation Act. There was 

robust oversight. All those great controls that we are now getting 

the benefit—those were all congressional creatures. And we come 

up every time we have a 123 agreement with a classified nonproliferation assessment statement with all the agencies. So we believe 

Congress has played a very strong—— 

Senator CORKER. Would it be inappropriate for us to vote up or 

down if you violate the gold standard? 

Mr. PONEMAN. First of all, with all due respect, Senator, I think 

the whole phrase, ‘‘the gold standard,’’ has reduced to a bumper 

sticker something in a very unhelpful way because we are now 

focusing on one tool out of a toolbox instead of the goal. The goal 

is stopping weapons, and the goal to get to that is stopping the 

technology. So if that is to be the standard, obviously we welcome, 

obviously, the oversight of the Congress, but in terms of doing more 

things that could make the United States appear in the eyes of 

other countries less reliable and less likely to sustain the commitments that we make to them through the course of these negotiations, I think that would create a problem in getting people to 

accept the 123 restrictions that we already have in legislation. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Senator, could I make just one brief comment? 

And that is, Senator, the Congress is present even when you do not 

know that you are. At the beginning of our internal deliberations 

in approaching a 123 at the beginning of our bilateral consultations 

with a new partner, we go through and emphasize the strong interest of the Congress and the strong support of the Congress for nonproliferation goals. It is a huge influence. 

Senator CORKER. Yes, I think we might want to express it ourselves, but thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank both of you for your long service to our country. 

We all share the nonproliferation objectives, and the 123 agreements are certainly a very valuable part of that. So I agree with 

you. It is in the U.S. interest to negotiate these agreements. 

But I just really want to turn this around a little bit. It is in the 

interests of the countries we are negotiating with also to have a 

123 agreement. This is not one-sided. They are getting access to 

the best technology in the world, the most reliable partner in the 

world. It is in their interest to have the United States as a partner 

in dealing with their nonmilitary use of nuclear material for purposes of energy or for purposes of medical. 

And my question really deals with our expectations in countries 

that do not share our values, whether this is used in the toolbox 

to advance those values. Vietnam is a country in transition. I think 

we all would acknowledge that. They have made incredible 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

progress in a relatively short period of time, but they have a long 

way to go on respecting internationally recognized human rights. 

Can you share with me what discussions take place when you 

are determining countries to get involved with and how you use 

this tool in our toolbox, the 123 agreements, to advance universal 

values in countries that are deficient that we are engaged with? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

I can only speak generally about the reasons that have driven 

the United States and Vietnam to seek a strategic partnership with 

each other. These include a mutual interest in the security of 

Southeast Asia. It includes the great economic potential that the 

two countries offer each other. 

Senator CARDIN. I understand. I am really interested in the 

human rights and good governance issues. I understand all that. 

And by analogy, we hear the same thing on trade agreements. You 

know, it is in our interest. We are in the country. We are enhancing security. I want to know what you are doing to enhance the 

change in Vietnam and other countries on basic internationally recognized human rights protections. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. This is a central issue of the strategic dialogue that we have with Vietnam. It is constantly in the context 

that we have at senior levels. It is the important work of our 

Ambassador in Hanoi on a daily basis. We see some progress, but 

we also recognize that our engagement with Vietnam is a primary 

means for having seen some of that progress. We do not, however, 

link it directly to the negotiation of a 123 agreement. We have 

another channel for doing that. 

Senator CARDIN. What is the other channel? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. It is the strategic partnership dialogue which 

includes a human rights dialogue. 

Senator CARDIN. Which is a consultation type of a process. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I think it is stronger than consultations. 

Senator CARDIN. In what respect? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Well, sir, I am sorry but I will give you a 

detailed answer from our East Asia Bureau. I do not do this on a 

daily basis, and I apologize for that. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, you also indicate that this is part of your 

discussions. Can you share with me in regards to Vietnam how this 

has come up in the 123 agreement? I understand from your point 

of view it is not tied to the agreement, but can you share with us 

how the discussions have taken place in regards to the 123 agreement with Vietnam—good governance and human rights? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Human rights has not been a topic in the 123 

agreement negotiations. It was among the topics that were considered, I believe, at the time that we decided to respond to Vietnam’s 

request to negotiate such an agreement. 

Senator CARDIN. I do not understand that. Was it or was it not 

talked about in regards to the 123 agreement? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Within the United States, yes. With Vietnam, 

I do not believe so but I would have to go back and look at the 

record of negotiation. 

Senator CARDIN. So it is not on the table with Vietnam. It does 

not come up in any discussions. There are no expectations from our 

involvement with Vietnam in this agreement that we do not care 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

what type of government they have as it relates to respect for their 

own people. That is the message we are sending in regards to these 

negotiations? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I do not agree that that is the message we are 

sending. 

Senator CARDIN. And how are we sending a different message? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Because of our daily work with the Vietnamese Government and our pressing them through a number of 

other channels. 

Senator CARDIN. I am talking about in regards to the 123 agreement. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. In regards to the 123 agreement, your first 

statement was correct. It is not linked to human rights issues. 

Senator CARDIN. I did not asked if it was linked. I asked is it 

part of the conversation. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Briefly, no. 

Senator CARDIN. I find that very disappointing. I think, as I 

pointed out before, there is mutual benefit. Vietnam gets benefits 

out of having U.S. technology. Yes, we get benefits, too. And I find 

it somewhat surprising that we work in tunnel vision and we do 

not try to coordinate a policy that can help advance the respect for 

basic international human rights. There are a lot of countries in 

the world we can work with, but why are we interested in making 

this type of information available to a country that abuses the 

rights of its own citizens? What type of protections are built in? I 

understand that we have military protections, but we do not have 

other protections built in because we are not talking about how 

this is used. So I find that somewhat surprising. I knew it was not 

tied together, but I thought you would use this opportunity to 

advance a central part of our strategic plan, as I thought it was, 

in dealing with Vietnam. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Senator, if I may. I am not part of the Vietnam 

negotiations. But as to the broader issue, there has been a longstanding bipartisan tradition that nuclear weapons are different, 

and when we are doing things, including in the days of the Soviet 

Union when it had horrible repression—— 

Senator CARDIN. There was a longstanding view that trade was 

different also. There was a longstanding view that bilateral discussions would leave out human rights because it was just not important in dealing with our relationships with other countries. As long 

as we take that position, human rights will always be a secondary 

matter. The basic protection of human rights should always be at 

the table in U.S. negotiations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that and 

thank you for holding this hearing. 

Gentlemen, I want to come at this from a little different tack. As 

you know, Idaho is home to the Idaho National Laboratory, the 

lead nuclear energy laboratory in America. As you also know, they 

play a role in the 123 agreements in not only providing the background and help for negotiating but also in the execution of the 

agreements. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

The Idaho National Laboratory, as you know, has the experience 

over many, many years. It has got the technical expertise and the 

scientific research that are so crucial in successfully running 

nuclear facilities and in negotiating these agreements. And the lab 

has been a valuable and a proven asset when working with foreign 

countries in negotiating these agreements. 

So we are open for business. We are ready to help. We got great 

people working there, and we want to do all we can to help you. 

Having said that, some of the concerns that were expressed here 

I think are legitimate concerns, and they are going to have to be 

dealt with. Once you get past that, we are ready to help. 

I think that we are in the very insipient stages of other countries 

turning to the more developed countries to produce nuclear energy. 

As this century goes forward and even I think into the next century, countries are going to be looking for places like the Idaho 

National Laboratory and the United States of America to help 

them get their nuclear programs up and running. If we do not do 

it, there are other players in this sandbox, as we know, and they 

are very aggressive and they are out there competing against us. 

And it is in our national security interest, obviously, to have these 

agreements because it allows us to have a negotiated agreement as 

to how the materials will be handled, and also it gets us into their 

business that could be very dangerous if we were not in the 

business. 

So I admire what you do. I appreciate what you do, and just 

know that Idaho is ready to help. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Before I turn to Senator Shaheen, I want Senator Cardin to 

know that when the senior staff of the committee was in Vietnam, 

they told the Vice Foreign Minister that it would be my intention, 

when we consider a 123 agreement on Vietnam, to move a parallel 

resolution on human rights as part of our comprehensive partnership understanding. And so we would look forward to working with 

you in that regard. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Poneman, in a 2012 letter, you said that you thought it best 

to deal with enrichment in each 123 agreement based on its merits, 

taking into account a partner’s domestic politics and laws, proliferation concerns, and negotiability. Is that still the rough list of 

criteria that the administration applies? And can you elaborate on 

exactly what we are looking for in terms of politics and laws, negotiability? What exactly are you talking about? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

What we were trying to express is that, again, the zenith of what 

we are trying to do is to stop weapons. To stop weapons, we want 

as little possible fissile material that we can obtain. That means 

as little reprocessing and enrichment. 

Each country has a different set of factors that they take into account. Vietnam has nothing on the boards, but they had a pile of 

HEU. So we got the highly enriched uranium back. That was important. I would not want to waste negotiating leverage on getting 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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something that they were not going for and then leave the highly 

enriched uranium sitting unprotected. So that is what I mean. 

It is very, very consistent. We want to get that stuff out of there. 

We want the least technology and the fewest weapons. Period. 

And because 185 countries all have—for the UAE, they did not 

care. What they did care about was setting a good example. That 

is what they cared a lot about, and they did a great job. And, of 

course, we embraced that. So that is what I mean. Every case is 

different, but we are always animated by that same top objective. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, to follow on Senator Risch’s line of comment, as I understand it, most other nuclear suppliers use less 

restrictive export guidelines to govern their nuclear cooperation. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I would say we have the best in the world. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And so it seems like one concern that is out 

there about raising our own standards is that it would drive potential partners toward less demanding countries. Is that accurate? 

Mr. PONEMAN. That is very much our concern. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So what other steps, short of mandating a 

gold standard-like agreement, can we use to encourage countries 

not to seek enrichment capabilities? I mean, what else is out there 

that we can be doing that we should be doing? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Senator, we have been working very hard under 

the Prague framework that the President put out in April 2009 

where he called for a new framework of civil nuclear cooperation 

to assure countries that if they have a civil nuclear program, they 

do not need to enrich. It is multibillion dollars they do not need to 

spend. It makes no economic sense in most cases. And so if we can 

say to them, look, we have got an IAEA fuel bank, they will guarantee you fuel supplies, we can enter into long-term cooperation 

with them in which we can provide certain kinds of assurances, 

which we have done in the past. We can enter into various forms 

of infrastructure development together and even, to take Senator 

Risch’s point, enter into peaceful cooperation in nonproliferative 

nuclear technology in places like the Idaho National Laboratory. 

There is a whole suite of tools that we can apply, and I think we 

have to be very muscular in putting those on the table. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, again, in your prepared remarks, you 

argued that even well-intentioned changes to the law would risk 

making the perfect the enemy of the good. But do you not think 

there are ways that we can tweak it or address the negotiations 

that would put the United States in a better position as we are trying to encourage other countries to not seek nuclear development? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Senator, I think we are always open, including 

working with the distinguished members of this committee, to 

think of constantly ways we can enhance what we have that we 

can put forward. And I just gave just a few examples, but I am 

sure there are many more. We would be very happy to work with 

you on that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. To switch to the Taiwan agreement, are there 

concerns about Taiwan’s ability to enforce necessary export 

controls? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I will turn to my State Department colleague for 

that. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Over the last two decades, the Taiwan authorities have established a very reliable record on nonproliferation and on commitments to nonproliferation. In a letter that accompanies this 123 

agreement, they have assured us that they will cooperate only with 

responsible states in executing Taiwan’s civil nuclear program, and 

they reaffirmed their commitment to abide by the NPT and by all 

United Nations Security Council resolutions addressing nuclear 

activities. They stated their intent to engage in cooperation with 

third parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, consistent with 

the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 

In the nuclear proliferation assessment statement that we provided, together with the text of the 123, there is an assessment 

with a comprehensive analysis of the export control system of Taiwan with respect to nuclear-related matters. And this is an area 

in which we work very closely with Taiwan authorities, and I 

would be very happy to discuss our cooperation on these kinds of 

issues in a closed session. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, just to follow up to try and elicit whatever you can say about the situation, as Taiwan looks to more normalize their relationships with mainland China, how concerned are 

we about the exchange of technology and any opportunities that 

might exist from the 123 agreement to share information? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Again, in this setting, what I would say is I 

would not characterize it as a concern, but it is an area where we 

cooperate with Taiwan and have a good, practical, and effective 

relationship. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps we should have a classified 

discussion. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We will certainly consider that. 

Senator Rubio has deferred to Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am new to this issue, so I just want to step back and understand a little bit more of the history, understand a little bit more 

of the broad range and spectrum of what different countries are 

doing and what the capabilities are, where they are getting their 

supplies, and how it has all been handled. So I will start with you, 

Mr. Poneman. 

The chairman was talking about we have gone from the premier 

supplier at the end of the cold war till this point in time. Can you 

describe that transition for me? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

It has been a painful one to watch. In 1969, the United States 

had virtually 100 percent of the non-Communist fuel market in the 

world, and every fuel rod with a U.S. flag brings all those controls. 

We are now at 10 percent. 

Senator JOHNSON. And who has filled that gap? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Well, you have URENCO, which is providing fuel 

from Europe. You have countries that are developing their own 

capabilities. The French obviously have had their sales. And when 

it comes to reactors, now—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Let us stick on fuels. So who does not maintain a good standard when they supply that fuel? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26 

Mr. PONEMAN. Well, in terms of a good standard versus a bad 

standard, I do not think anyone has the kind of controls under the 

Nonproliferation Act that we have in the 123. We are the only ones 

who have that kind of extended control over all aspects. And one 

fuel rod goes into the reactor and then the whole reactor is safeguarded. 

Senator JOHNSON. Is it more expensive for people to comply with 

123 versus getting material from other countries? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Well, of course, the 123 is not a commercial 

arrangement. 

Senator JOHNSON. I understand. 

Mr. PONEMAN. But I think what is fair to say is that other competitors in the global marketplace have complete backing, including 

state loans and so forth, to sell their fuel. So when the Russians 

are out selling fuel, for example—and this is not confined to 

them—they can bring to bear—and people are looking for credit 

support. And so there are ways that they can make a more attractive commercial arrangement than is often available to a U.S. 

company. 

Senator JOHNSON. How many countries, just in general, utilize 

nuclear power? We have 23 countries with the 123 agreement. How 

many countries actually engage in nuclear activity? 

Mr. PONEMAN. About 25 or 30. We can get you the exact number. 

There are about 365 gigawatts installed globally. There are 70 reactors now under construction in a dozen countries, but to give you 

a precise answer of how many there are, we will come back to you. 

Senator JOHNSON. Other than the nuclear powers, how many 

countries that are engaged in nuclear power actually enrich uranium themselves? 

Mr. PONEMAN. China and Russia, the URENCO countries. The 

consortium is the Netherlands, Germany, and the U.K. Japan has 

a modest enrichment capacity. France and the United States, of 

course. 

Senator JOHNSON. You said enriching uranium is very, very expensive. Can you put somewhat of a ball park dollar figure on that? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Sure. It costs billions of dollars. Rough order of magnitude, you can consider $4 billion or it could be more. The 

MIT study of 2003 said from a commercial standpoint, it does not 

make sense for a country to invest in its own enrichment unless 

it has roughly on the order of 25,000 megawatts of installed power. 

Senator JOHNSON. So how many countries would have that level 

of installed power? 

Mr. PONEMAN. The only country outside of those that already 

have commercial scale enrichment that is in that ball pack would 

be South Korea. 

Senator JOHNSON. So it does not really make sense, unless you 

have a very large need for nuclear power, to have any enrichment 

whatsoever. 

Mr. PONEMAN. It makes much more sense to rely on the commercial marketplace. 

Senator JOHNSON. So why would Iran try and enrich uranium? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Senator, it is a very good point. And when we 

have the kind of proposal that Professor Moniz has before the Secretary and I put out, one of the things it does is it provides a safe 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27 

harbor for all those other countries that actually want energy, and 

it puts a sharper spotlight on the countries like Iran. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Countryman, answer the question. Why 

would Iran enrich uranium? There is really only one reason. Is 

there not? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. There is no rational economic reason. 

Senator JOHNSON. There is only one reason. Is there not? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. And we should start acknowledging that as 

this Nation. Should we not? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Sure. 

Senator JOHNSON. I have no further questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Just some basics, and I will start kind of like Senator Johnson. 

This is the first hearing I have been to about these. So I want to 

make sure I understand the process. Especially the concern about 

whether our policies are ad hoc or not worry me. So I kind of want 

to understand what part of our policies are ad hoc and what are 

not. 

The agreements we are talking about are all negotiated pursuant 

to a congressional statute, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, and there 

are nine nonproliferation criteria in that statute that were all 

passed by Congress. Correct? And when a deal is negotiated, the 

administration has to come to Congress and specify how the deal 

meets each of the nine criteria. Correct? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Correct. 

Senator KAINE. One of the criteria deals with E&R activity, but 

it is E&R activity based on material from the United States, and 

the provision is that a country cannot engage in E&R capacity with 

material from the United States absent a separately negotiated 

agreement. Correct? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Correct. 

Senator KAINE. When the agreements come to the United States 

to Congress, there is a briefing of Congress and Congress can act 

by resolution of disapproval to disapprove an agreement. Correct? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. A number of briefings all through the process, 

yes. 

Senator KAINE. And has Congress disapproved any of the 23 current agreements when they have been presented to Congress? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. No. 

Senator KAINE. Has any House of Congress disapproved? Not a 

total disapproval, but has any House of Congress disapproved of 

one of the 23 earlier agreements? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. No, sir. 

Senator KAINE. The first of the 23 agreements that had a gold 

standard provision was the UAE agreement. Correct? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes. 

Senator KAINE. So the earlier agreements did not have a gold 

standard provision with respect to E&R activity that is domestic as 

opposed to the use of U.S. material. Correct? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, and yet they have succeeded in preventing or in discouraging those countries from pursuing E&R. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28 

Senator KAINE. So countries that do not have the gold standard—many of them do not pursue E&R but some do as your 

answer to Senator Johnson indicated. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. For the very strong economic reasons that the 

Deputy Secretary mentioned, it makes no sense for most countries 

to go down the E&R path. 

Senator KAINE. With respect to the issue about ad hoc, a President can recommend or the administration can recommend to Congress an agreement that does not meet all nine criteria. There is 

a waiver provision that allows such a recommendation, but none of 

the current agreements were recommended to Congress short of 

meeting all nine criteria. Correct? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. My colleague reminds me that the exception 

is India, which required special legislation of the Congress. 

Senator KAINE. If a President were to recommend to Congress an 

agreement that did not meet all nine criteria, there is a special 

approval. It is not a resolution of disapproval in that instance. It 

is a resolution of approval. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. It requires affirmative action by the Congress. 

Senator KAINE. Are the agreements fixed in time with periodic 

renegotiation required, or are they open-ended, once negotiated, 

there forever? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. We have both. 

Senator KAINE. Can you just kind of generally—are half of them 

to be renegotiated periodically and half open-ended? Or describe 

that for me. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. We could give you a list of the ones, but I 

think in general we are now seeking, and our partners are seeking, 

longer term or open-ended. I would emphasize that this does not 

mean that the U.S. role or the congressional role is ended. 

Senator KAINE. One of the ones that you are facing right now 

that is not an open-ended one is the status of the South Korea 123 

agreement. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator KAINE. And there is a 2014 renegotiation process underway with South Korea. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. We are deep into the renegotiation process. I 

was in Seoul earlier this month for that purpose. And it is a good 

opportunity for me to thank the members of this committee for the 

action to extend the validity of the current agreement for 2 years 

so that we have time to complete a very complex agreement with 

the ROK. 

Senator KAINE. So would it be fair to say that with respect to the 

claim that the approach to these agreements is ad hoc, that there 

are nine criteria that are specified by Congress that have to be met 

with respect to all of these agreements? And so to that extent, the 

framework that Congress has set up—and Congress has the ability 

to disapprove an agreement, which it has never done. Those are 

specified by Congress. They are not ad hoc. 

But this issue about E&R activity that a country may pursue 

domestically—that is an ad hoc criteria in the sense that you were 

describing, that on a case-by-case basis, you negotiate. The UAE 

provision has it and none of the others do. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I think we would make a decision as to 

whether and how strongly and in what form to seek such a commitment specific to the country with whom we are negotiating and the 

position that they present. But it will always be with the purpose 

of meeting that very high standard of preventing proliferation of 

such technology. 

Senator KAINE. Switching gears, to follow up on another line that 

Senator Johnson opened up that I think is interesting, you indicated that at an earlier period in history of the civilian nuclear 

capacity material sold around the world, in the non-Communist 

bloc we were essentially almost the sole supplier, but now we are 

down to about 10 percent of the supply. 

Would it be a good thing for the safety of the world, in your view, 

if the United States share of sales of our activity in this area was 

increasing rather than shrinking? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Let me say yes, but that is not the goal with 

which we pursue 123. 

Senator KAINE. Right. The 123 is about weapons. I understand. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, and I would only reinforce, Senator, to say 

that from a security and a safety standpoint, we believe the U.S. 

fuel is as good as any in the world. 

And on your earlier question, I am reminded that after 

Tiananmen Square, Congress did pass legislation to suspend implementation of that 123 agreement. 

Senator KAINE. I see. Thank you for that correction. 

And then I will ask this of the second panel as well, just as my 

last question. If it would be in the better interests of nuclear safety 

for the United States to have a larger market share—and recognizing that is not the purpose of the 123 agreements—what are the 

current opportunities that we have, either technology opportunities 

or relationships with particular countries that are interested in 

safe nuclear power? What are the current opportunities that the 

United States has to maybe regain a little bit of our market share 

to the good of the safety of these programs worldwide? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Senator, I have been around the world a lot since 

March 11, 2011, the Fukishima accident. And I can tell you at the 

IAEA, at the International Nuclear Framework for Nuclear 

Cooperation, there is much more interest in U.S. fuel because it is 

safe and reactor components as well. So because of our importance 

that we attach to nuclear security and nuclear safety, there is an 

opportunity within this horrible situation that the world has 

endured to emphasize that particular American advantage. 

Senator KAINE. And that kind of underlies a point that Senator 

Cardin was making, that these are not one-way deals. The countries that are engaged in these 123 negotiations with us—they 

really have something to gain from these negotiations, and that can 

affect our sense of leverage in the negotiations. 

Mr. PONEMAN. It certainly can, Senator. And again, since for us 

the prize is to get those legal constraints that you were talking 

about in place, that is why we want to get those American agreements signed up to with countries that are actually going to build 

these units. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. No further question, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to reexamine this issue again. It is new for a lot of us 

that have been here just a couple of years, as Senator Johnson signaled a moment ago. 

The competing equities—of course, you have the existing or the 

previous policy, the gold standard policy, largely driven toward 

nonproliferation, and then there is this notion that that now stands 

in the way of being able to execute some of these deals. And we 

want to have these sorts of transactions with these companies 

because it gives us more influence in terms of the direction that 

they are taking their energy programs. 

So here is my question about this new flexible approach, and perhaps it has been raised already by some members of the committee. 

How is this not a house of cards? How does this not begin to now 

implode? For example, if you are the Jordanians and you are seeing 

the current negotiations with Iran or even the Saudis for that matter, how would we ever go to them and say you cannot enrich and 

you cannot reprocess if in fact one of their neighbors is doing so? 

The same with the South Koreans who would look to Japan or perhaps other parts of the world and are insisting upon the same. 

How is this not a house of cards? In essence, how is it that at the 

end of the day we actually are going to be able to pick and choose 

in this so-called flexibility who we negotiate the ability to enrich 

and who does not? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Senator, I think it is important to get the premise 

right. The United States policy has not changed. We have always 

sought to minimize enrichment and reprocessing. It happened, as 

far as I know, once in history that a country on its own before the 

123 agreement volunteered through their own white paper and so 

forth not to do this. So our policy has not changed, and there is no 

new flexibility. 

And I have been personally doing this, trying to talk the North 

Koreans out of it. I went to Vienna and got the Iranians to agree 

to ship 1,200 kilograms of LEU out of Natanz. So we are absolutely 

consistent in trying to minimize that wherever we go. We start 

from different starting points. If there is a country that, unfortunately, has gotten as far down the road as Iran has, we have got 

to pull them back from being out there into a place more compliant 

with international norms. So I do not see any inconsistency. 

Senator RUBIO. Let me ask you that question. What has been the 

impact since this recent negotiation with Iran has been announced? 

What has been the impact that it has had in our conversations 

with other countries? What impact has that had? How do they view 

it now in light of what appears to be the acquiescence to some sort 

of enrichment capability on the part of Iran? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Allow me to make a brief comment and then the 

State Department may wish to add to this. 

We have had a continuing and robust conversation with those 

countries, including those countries in the region, that are deeply, 

deeply concerned. And they have been deeply concerned about the 

situation in Iran. That is why when I went out to talk them into 

making sure their oil exports kept up so the sanctions that you all 

passed could be effective, they were strong partners with us. They 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31 

understand now where we are in terms of the negotiation with Iran 

and trying to bring them back to a much less nuclear—— 

Senator RUBIO. How can we, in the future or even now in the 

past, with some of our existing agreements ask a country, particularly a neighboring country, not to enrich if at the end of these negotiations, in fact, Iran retains any capability to do so? How do we 

go to an ally and say you guys are not going to get to do what a 

stated enemy of the United States—we have agreed to allow them 

to do or to acknowledge that they have the capability to do? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Senator, the other problem is countries make 

decisions internally. They do actually not need the United States 

permission to do these activities. So that is why getting to the 

whole discussion as if this were a right for the United States to 

confer upon them gets us into a dangerous place. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Let me add. I would say that Iran has an 

enrichment capability whether the United States acknowledges it 

or not. If we succeed in the Iran negotiations—— 

Senator RUBIO. But they did not get it from us. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Correct, and that is a crucial difference 

between the Iran case and a 123 negotiation. If we get to the point 

of assuring the world and the region that Iran no longer has the 

capability to pursue nuclear weapons, the temptation for any other 

regional state to go down the economically stupid path of pursuing 

enrichment and reprocessing—that will be greatly—— 

Senator RUBIO. But the enrichment or reprocessing capability— 

the infrastructure of reprocessing and the infrastructure behind 

enrichment—once it is in place, it is basically just a policy decision 

at that point about whether you want to continue to move forward 

toward at least a threshold weapons capability. So the retention of 

any enrichment process or any reprocessing capability does, in fact, 

put a country at the threshold of making such a move in pretty 

quick order. No? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. That is an argument about Iran, on which I 

am not leading the negotiations, but I believe we will have other 

testimony next week on that point. 

In terms of our partners, those with whom we work, we do 123 

agreements with strong assurances on enrichment and reprocessing and with strong assurances on how they can do it in an economically rational way specifically so that that infrastructure is not 

developed. 

Senator RUBIO. But again, my point is that once that infrastructure is in place in another country—let us say the country now has 

access to—because you talk about these assurances. Once a country 

has built the infrastructure that allows them to reprocess or enrich, 

if in the future the future leadership of that country decides that 

they want to turn that capability into a weapons capability—the 

design of a weapon is not nearly as complicated as the creation of 

that infrastructure. Is that not the singular, largest hurdle that a 

country has to overcome, is getting the fuel? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Typically, Senator, that is exactly right. That is 

exactly why we are doing everything we can to minimize the countries that have that material. There is not a lot of demand for these 

activities. We do not want to stimulate the demand by turning it 

into some kind of a test of national will. We are finding that if you 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32 

go to countries and say we can satisfy your fuel requirements and 

you will not have to spend $4 billion or $6 billion, $8 billion, most 

countries other than Iran will welcome that opportunity. And I 

think we should embrace that. It works in our favor. 

Senator RUBIO. But there are countries that do want to have that 

capability and that will point to the fact that other countries have 

that capability, especially if that number has now grown, to say, 

well, how come you are cooperative or seem to acquiesce to this 

country having that capability but us not having it. 

Mr. PONEMAN. You are absolutely correct. Other countries will 

make that argument. The agreement with Iran will not change our 

approach to seeking the highest nonproliferation standards in 123 

agreements. 

Senator RUBIO. And my argument—it may not change our 

approach, but it might change theirs. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. That is correct. And that is why the 

United States needs to stand firm on the consistent approach that 

we have had to seek to limit E&R technology around the world. 

That is what we do today. It is what we will continue to do if and 

when we succeed with Iran. 

Senator RUBIO. Would we not be stronger in that insistence if 

our stated and open position in any negotiations was Iran does not 

have a right to enrich? 

Mr. PONEMAN. We will be stronger when we succeed in getting 

an agreement with Iran that gives us all confidence they cannot 

pursue nuclear weapons. That is the goal. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

I am, unfortunately, going to have to go to the floor over the flood 

insurance legislation. So Senator Shaheen has graciously agreed to 

chair the rest of the hearing. 

To our second panel, I want you to know my staff is here and 

we are going to be listening intently to—we have your remarks, but 

to some of the answers to the questions. 

There are three questions that I want to pose for the record that 

I would like you to answer at length for the record. 

One is—we got deviated because we started talking about Iran. 

I put a question to you, Secretary Countryman, about why Vietnam 

was not made to include their lesser but nonetheless important 

statement into a binding part of the agreement. I would like to 

have an answer to that. 

Secondly, we may be the best in the world, which I believe we 

are, in this technology, but second best and far cheaper entities 

often win the bids. So has the administration considered filing a 

complaint with the World Trade Organization for unfair trading 

practice against these subsidized foreign competitors? 

And thirdly, when China joined the Nuclear Supplier Group, a 

move the United States had to support since the group does so by 

consensus, it agreed not to provide nuclear reactors to countries 

that do not have comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all their 

nuclear activities. Yet, China continues to build new reactors in 

Pakistan, which does not have such comprehensive safeguards. 

This arguably weakens in my view the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 

What price should China pay for its noncompliance? And should it 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33 

be an issue when a new China cooperation agreement comes before 

the Congress? 

I would like very significant responses to those questions. 

Senator Markey is next. And, Senator Shaheen, I appreciate you 

taking the chair. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

In the 1970’s, the United States was still in a bitter war with 

Vietnam while at the same time the Ford and Carter administrations were planning to sell six nuclear power plants to the Shah 

of Iran, our ally, thinking that he would stay in power forever. We 

would have been the supplier of the nuclear fuel, the nuclear power 

plants, in that country. Thank God we did not send it before the 

Shah fell. 

Now Iran may be on the brink of developing a nuclear weapon 

while the administration just completed a nuclear cooperation 

agreement with Vietnam that does not require Vietnam to forgo 

the most dangerous aspects of a nuclear program. 

So we should just be humble here. Iraq, Iran, North Korea. We 

are now living with the consequences of not having a high standard 

internationally on the transfer of nuclear technologies. And it is the 

United States that intervenes, plays the role of the policeman when 

these programs go awry. 

So there is a fine line between peaceful nuclear energy programs 

producing megawatts of electricity and a deadly nuclear weapons 

program producing megatons that can threaten the whole world. 

Sitting directly on that line are uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. These processes can produce both 

fuel for nuclear reactors and material for nuclear weapons. They 

have a dual identity. That is why it has been and should continue 

to be U.S. policy to limit the spread of enrichments and reprocessing around the world. 

The nuclear industry says requiring this of nuclear cooperation 

agreements comes down to a choice between nonproliferation and 

the industry’s assertion that these agreements will bring billions of 

dollars to the economy. But a look at the facts tell quite a different 

story. 

Today I am releasing an analysis, which I would also request be 

added to the record of today’s hearing, of every export license 

issued under nuclear cooperation agreements since 1996. It shows 

that exports of nuclear reactor technologies under nuclear cooperation agreements make up less than 1 percent of the nuclear industry’s profits. In fact, 86 percent of all exports under nuclear cooperation agreements come from the sale of nuclear fuel, and even 

that amounts to a very small fraction of the industry’s total annual 

revenues. 

The industry exports nuclear fuel to almost two-thirds of the 53 

countries with whom we have nuclear cooperation agreements. The 

way I see it is that limiting the spread of the technology that could 

be used to make nuclear fuel not only limits the competition for 

nuclear weapons but also limits competition to the main source of 

the industry’s export revenues. 

So here are my questions. I think it is pretty clear and everyone 

understands that in order to build a nuclear weapon, you need to 

know either how to enrich uranium or to extract weapons-grade 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34 

plutonium. We just stipulate that. And we do not want these countries to develop that capacity. We are very fortunate that we were 

not the enabler of the Shah. 

We cannot predict what the status of any of these countries is 

going to be 20 or 30 or 40 years from now, but they will have these 

nuclear power plants and they will have that fuel in their countries. So this is a very important decision that we have to make. 

When the administration negotiated its agreement with the 

United Arab Emirates, the UAE made a legally binding promise 

that it would not seek to acquire enrichment or reprocessing 

technology. That is the gold standard. They will not seek those 

technologies. 

Is it not true that if a future agreement allowed Jordan or Saudi 

Arabia to enrich or reprocess, then the United Arab Emirates could 

demand to renegotiate its nonproliferation commitments as well? 

Mr. PONEMAN. There is a most favored nation clause, Senator. 

Senator MARKEY. Precisely. So here it is. We got an agreement 

with the UAE. That is the gold standard, but in that deal is if we 

lower it, that they can renegotiate and they can go lower. So that 

is not, I think, where the United States wants to be. 

The administration has signed an agreement with Vietnam that 

does not require the same nonproliferation commitment that the 

United Arab Emirates made. So the UAE is the gold standard; 

Vietnam is not the gold standard. 

Your negotiations right now with South Korea reportedly stalled 

over South Korea’s desire to develop fuel-making technologies. 

They do not have this capacity right now. So this is a big question. 

Do they move in that direction? Well, I think that the terms of the 

Vietnam agreement are going to make it more likely that South 

Korea is going to demand that they be given the same status as 

Vietnam, a Communist country that we were at war with. 

So I guess my question to you then is will you insist on South 

Korea having a gold standard so that Vietnam does not become the 

precedent that would then spread to country after country around 

the world. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Senator, I am currently leading the negotiations with the Republic of Korea on a renewal of the 123 agreement. I do not want to get into great detail about exactly what we 

discuss. You are quite correct that the issue about advance consent 

for reprocessing and enrichment is a central issue on which we 

have a lot more work to do before we come to an agreement. 

I do not quite agree that the Vietnam agreement has a precedential value for the ROK agreement. We are already far along in our 

discussions and on kind of a different plane of discussion. I will 

simply reaffirm that with the ROK, despite the fact that it is one 

of our very best allies, we continue to focus not on the political, not 

on the economic, but on the consistent nonproliferation policy, what 

best strengthens the global nonproliferation regime. That remains 

our consistent guiding star. 

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Markey. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

35 

In other words, if we do not support this agreement, it is pretty 

clear that the Vietnamese have other avenues of acquiring this 

capability. Would you agree, Mr. Countryman? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, sir. Of acquiring nuclear technology, a 

nuclear power plant, yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Yes. 

And that could be France or China or Russia or who else? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. According to the press, they have been in 

active discussion and signed some preliminary agreements with 

both Russia and Japan. 

Senator MCCAIN. So it clearly would not be in our interest to see 

an agreement with Russia on the part of the Vietnamese. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Well, I think it would be in our interest, first, 

to make sure that they uphold all the reforms in nonproliferation 

they did as part of our negotiation process. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you think that that is a very likely demand 

that the Russians might make? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. No. The Russians have strong export controls. 

What they and other suppliers do not have are the kind of language in their nuclear cooperation agreements that we have. 

I do want to note that Russia and the United States cooperated 

on the removal of highly enriched uranium from Vietnam last year, 

and that was an important achievement of the negotiation process 

itself. 

Senator MCCAIN. Tell us how it is in the U.S. national interest 

to see Vietnam conclude a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with 

Russia or anybody else. How is it in any way in the United States 

national security interest? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. That is a good question. I look at it this way, 

that it is in our national security interest that they conclude with 

us. We do not necessarily want to block them from agreeing with 

such an agreement with anyone else. 

Senator MCCAIN. I am not sure we can. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. No, we cannot. 

And they have a genuine interest in having a variety of bidders 

for their contracts. 

What we can do, both through our agreement through the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group, through the G8, and other bodies, is to 

ensure that we are not competing with each other on a loosening 

of nonproliferation standards. 

Mr. PONEMAN. If I might just add, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could I just respond real quick? That is that 

if you think that these other countries would adhere to the same 

standards that we do I think flies in the face of past performances. 

Go ahead, Mr. Poneman. 

Mr. PONEMAN. I was just going to say, as I said in my testimony, 

Senator, we are trying to avoid a race to the bottom. We have very 

strong nonproliferation cooperation with all of the P5, including 

France and Russia and everybody else. So I am not casting aspersions on them, but I am very proud of, and feel confident in, the 

United States that we have the best standards in the world, bar 

none in terms of nonproliferation, safety, and security. 

Senator MCCAIN. I hope that should surprise none of us that we 

have the highest standards. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

36 

But again, I want to point out the important factor here is that 

the Vietnamese can shop in other places. 

The Vietnamese are still guilty of human rights abuses, much to 

my dismay. And there is a number of us that continuously raise 

this issue with the Vietnamese and are very disappointed from 

time to time at some of their actions. But if you look at the Vietnam of 15 years ago and you look at Vietnam today, it is a dramatically changed nation. There are 16,000 Vietnamese students in 

the United States of America today studying in the United States. 

So as frustrated as some of us get over this human rights record— 

some of it just seems to be senseless like the persecution of Buddhists—the fact is that there has been dramatic improvement in 

Vietnamese behavior and in our relationship since we normalized 

relations between the two countries. Would you agree? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. So this agreement is another step in what has 

evolved into a partnership between the United States and Vietnam, 

particularly given events that are transpiring now in that part of 

the world. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, sir. And I think if more Americans recognized or were able to see how dramatically relations with Vietnam 

have improved in several different areas just in the last 20 years, 

it would be terribly impressive to all of us. 

Senator MCCAIN. And so despite the fact that 20 years from now 

there may be an overthrow of the government and takeover by 

al-Qaeda, the fact is that they are on a path that should encourage 

all of us, and this agreement many of us feel is another step in the 

direction of a better nation with a better relationship and with, 

frankly, a nation that we can, to some degree, count on as times 

may worsen in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I absolutely agree. And two additional quick 

points. 

As we said before, we do not assume, in negotiating these agreements, that times never change. That is why we retain controls, 

inspections, and everything else. 

And secondly, if al-Qaeda takes over Vietnam in 20 years—God 

forbid—a binding political agreement today—or legal agreement 

never to seek E&R will not mean a damn thing at that point. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. 

Madam Chairman, let me say that I believe that this agreement 

is not a perfect agreement, and we focused on the technical details. 

But I think from a macro point of view, that this is an important 

agreement and one that we should support and one that I think 

will pay a benefit to us in more ways than one. 

I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Thank you very much, Deputy Secretary Poneman and Assistant 

Secretary Countryman, for your testimony. 

As Chairman Menendez has said, we have a very limited amount 

of time. So I am going to ask the next panel to come forward. With 

Ranking Member Corker’s agreement, what we will do is take your 

statements for the record, and for those Senators who wish to 

remain, go right into questioning. Is that agreeable to you, Senator 

Corker? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37 

Senator CORKER. That would be fine. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Fertel, Ms. Squassoni, and Mr. 

Sokolski follow:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARVIN S. FERTEL

Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Corker, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today on this important issue. I am Marvin Fertel, President and Chief 

Executive Officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute 1 (NEI). Our 350 members represent all aspects of peaceful nuclear technology, from nuclear power plant operators 

and reactor vendors, to major architect/engineering firms, to fuel suppliers and component manufacturers, to educational and research organizations. On behalf of our 

members, we appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on U.S. peaceful 

nuclear energy cooperation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

INDUSTRY VIEW ON SECTION 123 AGREEMENTS

U.S. nuclear cooperation and commercial engagement in other countries’ new and 

expanding nuclear power programs advance global nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation. U.S. commercial involvement ensures the highest possible levels of 

nuclear power plant safety and reliability, maintains U.S. leadership in nuclear energy technology and maintains U.S. influence over global nuclear nonproliferation 

policy and practices. Noted national security experts agree that ‘‘one of our Nation’s 

most powerful tools for guaranteeing that countries acquiring this [nuclear] technology continue to use it exclusively for peaceful purposes is to ensure that the U.S. 

commercial nuclear industry continues to play a leading role in the international 

civil nuclear marketplace.’’ 2

In order to create American jobs and support critical U.S. foreign policy interests, 

the United States must be fully engaged in the global expansion of nuclear energy 

already underway. The U.S. nuclear energy industry: 

• Supports efforts to limit the spread of uranium enrichment and used fuel reprocessing (E&R) technologies consistent with current U.S. policy. The United 

States has a broad portfolio of bilateral and multilateral policy instruments that 

can be used to advance this policy, including: Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, assurances of fuel supply, multilateral guarantees of fuel supply and used 

fuel disposition, bilateral commitments, and other assurances required by the 

Atomic Energy Act. 

• Opposes initiatives to condition U.S. nuclear cooperation on new terms that our 

potential partners will not accept and other supplier nations will not require. 

Each bilateral relationship is unique and complex. Whether and how E&R provisions should be included in a Section 123 agreement, beyond what is already 

in practice and in statute, should reflect the unique circumstances of each bilateral relationship. Pragmatism should continue to guide the United States as it 

negotiates Section 123 agreements. NEI supports the flexibility in the Atomic 

Energy Act that allows the executive branch to negotiate agreements based on 

the concerns and imperatives specific to each nation or region. 

• Supports prompt negotiation of new and renewal bilateral agreements for 

peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. These agreements are essential for substantial U.S. nuclear exports. We are concerned that the Republic of Korea 

agreement has required a temporary extension to avoid a lapse and that the 

renewal Taiwan agreement was submitted for congressional review so late that 

it may lapse as well. We also note that three agreements were allowed to expire 

in the past 21 months 3 and that two others will almost certainly expire by July 

of this year.4

Prompt negotiation of 123 agreements will allow Congress the necessary time 

to conduct deliberative and effective oversight. It will also avoid the uncertainly 

created by the ‘‘just in time’’ nature of new and renewal agreements that, 

according to foreign customers, casts doubt on the United States as a reliable 

supplier nation. 

• Supports a proactive approach for the negotiation of Section 123 agreements 

with nations with new or expanding peaceful nuclear energy programs. It is in 

the U.S. national security, nuclear safety, and economic interest to secure 

agreements early and with a broad set of partners rather than to sit idly by 

as these nations partner with other nuclear suppliers. Without agreements in 

force, we forfeit exports, jobs, and commercial benefits, and we will fail to influence these programs in terms of their nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation norms. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR MARKET AND U.S. MARKET SHARE

Beginning with President Eisenhower’s ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ vision 60 years ago, 

American expertise established the world’s largest nuclear energy program and fostered the use of this technology around the world. Our dedication to excellence 

maintains 100 U.S. reactors at world-class levels of safety and reliability. More than 

60 percent of the world’s 437 operating reactors are based on technology developed 

in the United States. Our nuclear industry has the knowledge, experience, and 

infrastructure to support nuclear facility construction, operation, and maintenance 

around the world. In addition, U.S. firms are making major investments in technology development to continue their tradition of innovation. These investments 

include development of small modular reactors, advanced technologies for uranium 

enrichment, more advanced large reactors with improved safety features and 

advanced manufacturing techniques to improve quality and reduce costs. 

Today, there are 71 new nuclear power stations under construction worldwide, of 

which 5 are under construction in the United States. An additional 172 are in the 

licensing and advanced planning stages and virtually all of these plants will be built 

abroad where the demand for reliable, affordable, and clean baseload electricity is 

growing. Electricity from nuclear energy will help economies expand and lift hundreds of millions from poverty while having a minimal impact on the environment. 

But with this growing nuclear market comes growing competition from other 

nuclear supplier nations, which can now provide a full range of products and 

services. 

Over the past two decades, new supplier nations have entered the growing global 

nuclear market and multinational partnerships and consortia have been formed to 

develop nuclear energy facilities. According to a 2010 GAO report, ‘‘while the value 

of U.S. exports of nuclear reactors, major components and minor components have 

increased, the U.S. share of global exports declined slightly’’ from 1994 to 2008.5

Over the same period, the U.S. share in the fuel market declined sharply from onethird to one-tenth of the market. 

The declining U.S. share of the global reactor, major component and minor component market is largely attributable to the growth of international competitors who 

began as suppliers to their domestic markets and over time expanded their offerings 

to the global market. For example, France’s AREVA and Russia’s Rosatom have 

steadily increased their presence in the global market. Although 11 of the reactors 

under construction today are U.S. designs, four are French and 16 are Russian.6

One of the newest entrants in the global nuclear market is the Republic of Korea. 

In December 2009, Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation awarded a multibillion 

dollar tender to a Korea Electric Power Corporation-led consortium to build the first 

nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, there has 

been an expansion of indigenous technologies developed for domestic markets. For 

example, 20 of the 71 nuclear plants under construction globally are Chinese reactors being built in China.7

As additional reactors are brought into service, a growing portion of the global 

nuclear market is nuclear fuel: uranium, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication. Over the past 20 years, economically attractive supplies of nuclear fuel have 

become available from an increasing number of supplier nations. Australia holds the 

most extensive identified resources, at 31 percent of the world’s total. In recent 

years, Kazakhstan has emerged at the world’s largest uranium producer, producing 

over 36 percent of global primary production in 2012. Conversion, enrichment and 

fabrication of fuel also operate as a wide-ranging international commercial market. 

STATE OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY

Although major components such as ultra-large forgings and reactor pressure vessels are no longer manufactured in the United States, the U.S. nuclear industry continues to manufacture a wide range of equipment, components, and fuel for nuclear 

power plants around the world. U.S. firms also supply the global market with highvalue services, including site evaluation, engineering and construction, fuel supply 

and transport, expertise in plant operation, decommissioning and more. After a 

nuclear power plant is constructed, U.S. firms can remain engaged throughout its 

life, which can last half a century or more, thus having a physical presence at 

nuclear facilities and influence over safe operational practice. 

For example, Westinghouse Electric Company, headquartered near Pittsburgh, 

PA, employs nearly 13,000 people, including engineers, technicians, and other professionals (8,000 in the United States) who support its global business to provide 

fuel, services, technology, plant design and equipment to electric utility and industrial customers in the worldwide commercial nuclear electric power industry. Four 

Westinghouse AP1000® nuclear power reactors are currently under construction in 

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China. Westinghouse is in discussions to contract support for an additional eight 

plants, with more expected. Support of these follow-on projects employs significant 

quantities of U.S. content from high-end precision manufacturing to instrumentation and control systems. 

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, headquartered in Wilmington, NC, employs more 

than 1,500 skilled professionals in its U.S. operations. GE Hitachi designs, services, 

and manufactures nuclear components and fuel for the U.S. and global markets, including Taiwan and Mexico. Nearly one-fifth of nuclear reactors in operation around 

the world are based on GE’s boiling water technology and GE Hitachi has made significant investments in advanced reactor designs and innovative uranium enrichment technology. 

The U.S. nuclear industry does not just supply technology. For example, CurtissWright, an American company that traces its roots back to the Wright Brothers’ 

first flight, employs 10,000 skilled professionals with facilities in some 30 states, is 

a manufacturer of precision nuclear components such as reactor coolant pumps, 

advanced valves, and electrical components. These safety-critical components are 

produced to the highest quality and safety standards for customers in the United 

States and abroad. As with many nuclear suppliers, Curtiss-Wright’s business is increasingly abroad where it supplies components to nuclear facilities around the 

world including China, Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, UAE and the U.K. Roughly a quarter of Curtiss-Wright’s nuclear energy business comes from international markets 

and this is expected to grow significantly in the coming years as nuclear construction outside of the United States accelerates. 

In addition to large companies, small businesses also benefit from nuclear exports. 

For example, Precision Custom Components of York, PA, employs 270 Americans to 

manufacture high-end specialized components such as reactor vessel internals and 

integrated head packages for the U.S. and international markets including China. 

Nuclear exports support manufacturing jobs in more than 30 States. 

SECTION 123 AGREEMENTS OF CURRENT INTEREST

NEI and our members are grateful that this committee recently approved an 

extension of the current Section 123 agreement with the Republic of Korea (ROK), 

and will soon consider renewal agreements with Taiwan and the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a new agreement with Vietnam. Each of these 

agreements has significant potential benefits for U.S. exports and U.S. jobs. For 

every $1 billion in exports, between 5,000 and 10,000 U.S. jobs are created or sustained. 

• Republic of Korea.—South Korea is the world’s fourth-largest generator of nuclear energy and a major global supplier in its own right. Nineteen of South 

Korea’s 23 operating plants—and all of South Korea’s power plants under construction, on order or planned—are based on U.S. technology.8 South Korea’s 

licensing of U.S. technologies and export of U.S. components, fuel and services 

have earned billions for U.S. suppliers. Significant U.S. content in the Korean 

APR–1400 power plant and other U.S.-South Korea supply relationships earned 

U.S. suppliers more than $2 billion in the U.A.E. tender. That project alone is 

supporting thousands of jobs across 17 states.9

• Taiwan.—Two General Electric nuclear energy facilities are under construction 

in Taiwan at Lungmen, and other U.S. companies provide equipment, services, 

and fuel to Taiwan’s six operating nuclear power plants. Fuel exports to Taiwan’s reactors from AREVA North America in Richland, Washington, help support the more than 650 jobs at this facility. Renewal of the bilateral cooperation 

agreement will result in up to $10 billion of U.S. exports. 

• IAEA.—The IAEA does not operate nuclear power plants, but the IAEA agreement is commercially significant because, in combination with other agreements, it enables U.S. nuclear energy trade with Mexico. Currently, Mexico 

operates two General Electric-supplied Boiling Water Reactors at Laguna 

Verde. In 2012, the Mexican Government announced plans to explore expansion 

of its nuclear program with additional units at the Laguna Verde site. 

• Vietnam.—Vietnam is implementing an ambitious national plan to develop up 

to 10,000 megawatts of nuclear generating capacity by 2030 with the first reactors coming on line in 2020. Russia and Japan have already secured agreements 

to develop nuclear energy projects in Vietnam, while U.S. firms have been sidelined absent this important agreement. Conclusion of a Section 123 agreement 

with Vietnam has the potential to result in $10–20 billion in U.S. nuclear 

exports. 

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SECTION 123 AGREEMENTS ENSURE U.S. NONPROLIFERATION AIMS

Section 123 agreements provide critical nonproliferation benefits. These include 

significant commitments to safeguard materials, to prevent material diversion for 

nonpeaceful purposes, and to provide adequate security for materials. The agreements provide for U.S. consent rights over the enrichment, reprocessing and 

retransfer of U.S. materials. This means that obligations are attached to these materials, which include stringent nonproliferation assurances that these materials 

will not contribute to weapons programs. 

Within this framework, Section 123 agreements ensure that U.S. partners agree 

to rigorous nonproliferation and nuclear security requirements as a prerequisite to 

nuclear cooperation with the United States. The nine U.S. requirements include 

prior U.S. consent for any enrichment or reprocessing of U.S. materials and, in postNuclear Non-Proliferation Act agreements, consent for reprocessing of nuclear fuel 

that has been used in a U.S.-supplied reactor. The U.S. nuclear energy industry has 

always supported this approach. 

U.S. nuclear energy cooperation is an essential element of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which forms the basis of the global nonproliferation regime. 

Countries commit not to pursue nuclear weapons and, in exchange, are guaranteed 

support for their right to develop civil nuclear power and other peaceful uses of 

nuclear energy, subject to international supervision. The United States has relied 

on this framework for decades to advance its global nuclear nonproliferation agenda. 

LIMITING ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING (E&R)

The nuclear industry supports efforts to limit the spread of E&R consistent with 

current U.S. policy. The United States currently has in force 23 nuclear cooperation 

agreements covering 50 countries, Taiwan, and the IAEA. All agreements negotiated 

since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 provide for U.S. consent rights for 

enrichment or reprocessing of U.S.-flagged materials. 

A unilateral and inflexible requirement that potential trading partner countries 

forswear their rights to E&R as a condition for a Section 123 agreement would have 

the perverse effect of undermining U.S. nonproliferation interests by significantly 

reducing the number of countries willing to engage in civil nuclear commerce with 

the United States. 

Other nuclear suppliers—like Russia, France, Japan, and South Korea—stand 

ready to engage in nuclear commerce with other countries, whether or not those 

countries have concluded a 123 agreement with the United States. As a result, the 

net effect of refusing to conclude 123 agreements with countries that are unwilling 

to renounce E&R would be to encourage them to do business with other suppliers, 

thereby forgoing the economic and national security benefits of commercial nuclear 

engagement. 

When a country like the UAE is willing, in the context of a Section 123 agreement 

with the United States, to renounce E&R, the United States should include that 

commitment in the Section 123 agreement. But when a country, which otherwise 

demonstrates its intent to develop an exclusively peaceful commercial nuclear 

energy program, makes clear that it is unwilling to renounce these rights in a bilateral agreement with the United States, it would be self-defeating to forgo the nonproliferation and other benefits to the United States of concluding a Section 123 

agreement with that country. 

Industry is pleased that Taiwan and UAE have committed not to develop E&R, 

but we believe they are special cases. Taiwan, for example, has minimal need for 

E&R because its fleet of nuclear power plants is small and will eventually be phased 

out under the current national energy policy. The United States had unusual leverage in negotiation of the renewal agreement because Taiwan relies on it to enable 

its nuclear trade with other supplier countries, and because of the important U.S.- 

Taiwan security partnership. For all of these reasons, we believe the Section 123 

with Taiwan is not a realistic model for other countries. 

CONCLUSION

NEI believes that the global expansion of nuclear energy infrastructure provides 

the United States a unique opportunity to meet several national imperatives at the 

same time: (1) increasing U.S. influence over nuclear nonproliferation policy and 

practices around the world; (2) ensuring the highest possible levels of nuclear power 

plant safety and reliability around the world, by exporting U.S. advanced reactor 

designs and America’s world-class operational expertise; (3) maintaining U.S. leadership in nuclear energy technology; and, (4) creating tens of thousands of jobs and 

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maintaining a healthy manufacturing base for nuclear energy technology and 

services. 

If U.S. exporters were able to capture 25 percent of the global market—estimated 

at $500 billion to $750 billion over the next 10 years—this would create (or sustain) 

up to 185,000 high-paying American jobs. 

To maintain U.S. influence over global nonproliferation policy and international 

nuclear safety, the U.S. commercial nuclear energy sector must participate in the 

rapidly expanding global market for nuclear energy technologies (437 commercial 

nuclear reactors in operation around the world, 71 under construction, 172 planned 

or on order). 

The U.S. nuclear industry is competitive, but we must be allowed to compete. This 

requires Section 123 agreements in place. The industry: 

• Supports efforts to limit the spread of uranium enrichment and used fuel 

reprocessing (E&R) technologies consistent with current U.S. policy. 

• Opposes initiatives to require new conditions for U.S. nuclear cooperation unilaterally that our potential partners will not accept and that other supplier 

nations do not impose. Pragmatism should continue to guide the United States 

as it negotiates Section 123 agreements. 

• Supports prompt negotiation of new and renewal bilateral agreements for 

peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. These agreements are essential for meaningful U.S. nuclear exports. 

• Supports a proactive approach for the negotiation of Section 123 agreements 

with nations with new or expanding peaceful nuclear energy programs, including the ROK, Taiwan, and Vietnam. It is in the U.S. national security, nuclear 

safety and economic interest to secure agreements early and with a broad set 

of partners rather than to sit idly by as these nations partner with other 

nuclear suppliers. Without agreements in force, we forfeit exports, jobs, and 

commercial benefits, and we will fail to influence these programs in terms of 

their nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation norms. 

Engaging in nuclear energy markets allows the United States to promote several 

of its interests at the same time; disengagement is a net loss for safety, security, 

and the U.S. economy. Without U.S. commercial engagement, the United States 

would have substantially diminished influence over other nations’ nonproliferation 

policies and practices. U.S. technology and U.S. industry form a critical engine that 

drives U.S. nonproliferation policies. 

———————— 

End Notes 

1The Nuclear Energy Institute is responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy 

on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including regulatory, financial, technical, and 

legislative issues. NEI members include all companies licensed to operate commercial nuclear 

power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, 

fuel cycle facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the 

nuclear energy industry. 2 April 25, 2013, letter to President Obama from Senator William S. Cohen, Dr. James Schlesinger, Admiral Michael Mullen, Dr. John Hamre, General Brent Scowcroft, General James 

Jones, Senator Pete Domenici and Ms. Susan Eisenhower (attached). 3 Bangladesh (June 2012), Peru (April 2012) and Columbia (September 2013). 

4Thailand (June 2014) and Norway (July 2014). 

5 ‘‘Global Nuclear Commerce: Governmentwide Strategy Could Help Increase Commercial Benefits From U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Other Countries,’’ United States Government Accountability Office Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, November 2010. 6 International Atomic Energy Agency, 2014. 

7 Ibid. 

8 ‘‘Nuclear Power in South Korea,’’ World Nuclear Association, December 2012. 

9 Ex-Im Bank News Release, September 7, 2012. 

ATTACHMENT: 

CSIS, 

WASHINGTON, DC, 

April 25, 2013. 

President BARACK OBAMA, 

The White House, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We write to underscore the importance of preventing 

nuclear weapons proliferation, and to caution against the adoption of policies that 

could inadvertently weaken the ability of the United States to continue to provide 

international leadership on this critically important issue. 

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For more than half a century, the cornerstone of global efforts to prevent nuclear 

weapons proliferation has been the ‘‘atoms for peace’’ formula. With very few exceptions, the countries of the world have accepted this formula. Countries that enter 

into it commit not to pursue nuclear weapons, and in exchange are guaranteed support for their right to develop civil nuclear power and other peaceful uses of atomic 

energy, and submit to international supervision. 

The Atoms for Peace formula has been very successful. Access to commercial 

nuclear technology was not seen as a threat to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, 

but rather as a sign of the health of that regime and an essential means for implementing it. One of our nation’s most powerful tools for guaranteeing that the countries acquiring this technology continue to use it exclusively for peaceful purposes 

is to ensure that the U.S. commercial nuclear industry continues to play a leading 

role in the international civil nuclear marketplace. Here the news is not encouraging. 

While the United States and one or two other countries had a near-monopoly on 

civil nuclear technology in the 1950s, today the list of countries actively competing 

in the international civil nuclear marketplace includes Russia, France, Canada, 

Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea. And it is likely 

soon that China and India will become active participants in the international 

nuclear marketplace. According to a November 2010 Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) report on nuclear commerce, the U.S. share of global exports of ‘‘nuclear reactors, major components and equipment, and minor reactor parts’’ fell from 

11 percent to just 7 percent between 1994 and 2008. The U.S. share of global exports of nuclear fuel fell from 29 percent to just 10 percent over that same period 

of time. 

This decline in U.S. market share translates to substantially diminished U.S. 

influence in such areas as nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear safety. As a result, 

the United States is in an increasingly weak position to unilaterally impose onerous 

requirements on potential buyers of civil nuclear technology, simply because buyers 

have so many alternatives to U.S. sources of supply. It follows that, in order to 

restore its nonproliferation influence around the globe, the United States Government must find ways to strengthen the competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry, 

and avoid policies that threaten to further weaken it. 

We therefore urge that, as part of your export control reform initiative, streamlining of the process for licensing civil nuclear exports be made a top priority. We 

know that there are experts who argue that we should make access to American 

nuclear technology even more restrictive in the future. This would have the unintended effect of further diminishing America’s competitiveness in the global nuclear 

marketplace. America’s ability to lead the global nuclear nonproliferation regime 

will diminish steadily as America abandons the field. 

Consistent with the Atoms for Peace policy framework, America restricts the right 

of other countries to buy from American nuclear suppliers unless those countries 

agreed to stringent security procedures and conditions (the so-called 123 process). 

Historically we have managed this process on a sensible case-by-case basis. If we 

adopt a much more restrictive approach, we will not prevent countries from acquiring nuclear technology, but instead will encourage nations to turn to suppliers that 

do not impose difficult standards. The nonproliferation regime is weakened in that 

circumstance. 

We share your administration’s concern about the risks associated with the potential spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing. But as our Nation seeks to reduce these risks, we must be careful not 

to diminish America’s influence in the international civil nuclear marketplace. 

America’s nuclear industry exports are shrinking, and this is bad for nonproliferation policy. 

The U.S. Government must recognize that the U.S. civil nuclear industry is one 

of its most powerful tools for advancing its nuclear nonproliferation agenda. It is 

critical to adopt policies that will strengthen that tool. Weakening it will merely 

cede foreign markets to other suppliers less concerned about nonproliferation than 

the United States. 

Sincerely, 

Senator William S. Cohen, Former Secretary of Defense; General Brent 

Scowcroft, Former National Security Adviser; Dr. James Schlesinger, 

Former Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense and Director, CIA; 

General James Jones, Former National Security Adviser; Admiral 

Michael Mullen, Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Senator 

Pete Domenici, Former Chairman Senate Budget Committee; Dr. 

John Hamre, Former Deputy Secretary of Defense; Ms. Susan Eisenhower, Chairman Emeritus, Eisenhower Institute. 

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PREPARED STATEMENT SHARON SQUASSONI

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the committee, I would like to 

thank you for this opportunity to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss U.S. policy on peaceful nuclear cooperation and specifically, the 

draft agreement with Taiwan recently submitted to Congress. 

BACKGROUND

For almost 70 years, trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology has 

been heavily regulated by the United States and many other countries for one fundamental reason: supplies intended for peaceful purposes can be diverted to help 

make nuclear weapons. For almost a decade after the first atomic explosion, the 

United States discouraged the spread of any nuclear technology, advocating international control of nuclear materials and technology to deter or prevent their military use. The 1946 Atomic Energy Act expressly prohibited even exchanges of information until ‘‘effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of 

atomic energy for destructive purposes’’ were in place. A few years later, the Soviet 

and British nuclear tests, as well as nascent nuclear weapons programs in other 

countries, underscored the futility of trying to keep the lid on this Pandora’s box 

of nuclear energy, and a new approach was born: the Atoms for Peace program. 

President Eisenhower’s December 1953 initiative boldly coupled engagement in the 

peaceful uses of nuclear energy with reducing the nuclear threat. The establishment 

of the International Atomic Energy Agency followed within a few years, but the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty took more than a decade to take shape. 

Ensuring that nuclear energy is used only for peaceful purposes is a sine qua non 

of the nuclear nonproliferation regime that has grown up since then. To do this, the 

regime has focused on making diversion from peaceful purposes difficult—from the 

legal agreements signed by recipients of technology (i.e., NPT and IAEA safeguards 

agreements) to implementation of accounting and inspections by the IAEA, supplier 

guidelines promulgated within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), multilateral and 

national sanctions, and finally, national export control regimes. Peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements are a mechanism for sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear 

energy, but also for promoting national priorities in export control and nonproliferation. In the U.S. case, they establish the scope and guidelines for collaboration, 

including expectations for and demonstrations of nonproliferation. 

The United States has been a leader in both the military and civilian uses of 

nuclear energy, but its dominance of the civilian market faded some decades ago. 

While early cooperation agreements envisioned the United States supplying all reactors and enriched uranium for small nuclear power programs in, for example, South 

Korea and even EURATOM, that kind of supplier relationship is no longer desired 

or possible. Today, three factors are leading to a reassessment of the role of U.S. 

nuclear cooperation policy: the need to renew many of the agreements renegotiated 

after passage of the landmark Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA); the 

potential for new agreements with countries considering nuclear power for the first 

time; and a desire to enshrine policy restrictions on sensitive nuclear technologies 

like enrichment and reprocessing. 

RENEWAL OF EXISTING NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 

in several important respects, but particularly by incorporating nine requirements 

in section 123 that helped to ensure that U.S. nuclear cooperation would not be 

diverted for military uses. India’s 1974 nuclear test certainly played a role in 

increasing concerns that there were not enough safeguards in place to ensure that 

peaceful nuclear atoms were not misused for weapons, but attempts by countries 

like Brazil, Pakistan, and South Korea to openly acquire full fuel cycle capabilities 

from U.S. allies also played a role. The nine provisions, briefly, included requirements for: 

1. The perpetuity of safeguards on all material and equipment supplied; 

2. Full-scope safeguards (safeguards on all nuclear material in a country) for 

nonnuclear weapon states; 

3. Assurances that nothing transferred or subsequently produced from U.S. 

material, equipment, or technology would be used for nuclear explosive purposes 

or for any other military purpose; 

4. The right of return in the event a recipient state detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement; 

5. Prior consent by the United States for any transfers; 

6. Adequate physical protection; 

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7. Prior consent by the United States for enrichment, reprocessing, or other 

alteration in form or content of U.S.-supplied material or material used in or 

produced through the use of U.S.-supplied material equipment or facilities; 

8. Approval in advance of storage facilities; and 

9. Application of all the previous requirements by a recipient state to any special nuclear material, production facility or utilization facility produced or constructed by or through the use of any sensitive nuclear technology transferred 

under a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. 

A detailed analysis of these requirements and how they have been applied over time 

and how they can be strengthened is available in a report written by Fred 

McGoldrick and published by CSIS entitled ‘‘Nuclear Trade Controls: Minding the 

Gaps’’ (January 2013).1

These requirements provided a benchmark against which the U.S. Congress could 

judge the adequacy of peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements and were folded into 

export licensing requirements. Many, but not all, existing U.S. nuclear cooperation 

agreements were renegotiated after the NNPA was enacted (section 404 of the 

NNPA required renegotiation of all existing cooperation agreements) and the few 

that remained outside are now up for renewal, including those with Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea. The agreement with Taiwan was submitted to this committee on January 7, 2014, and the Senate recently voted to extend the existing 

South Korean agreement for 2 years. 

Other agreements with approaching expirations include Norway (2014), China 

(2015), Egypt (2021) and Morocco (2022). The 1988 agreement with Japan has a 30- 

year duration but specifies that it will remain in force thereafter (2018) unless terminated by either party with 6-months notice. Since the negotiation of the agreement with Japan, subsequent U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements have adopted 

increasingly creative approaches to duration, with the practical impact of reducing 

congressional approval responsibilities. Whereas agreements written prior to the 

NNPA did not commonly include language on extensions of duration (for example, 

the Taiwanese and South Korean agreements have simple 42- and 41-year durations, respectively), those following the NNPA all refer to either mutually agreed 

extensions, automatic 5- or 10-year rolling extensions, or in the case of the agreement with Japan and the draft agreement with Taiwan, indefinite extensions or indefinite duration. While mutually agreed extensions may require legislative action, 

the automatic, rolling and indefinite extensions seem designed to circumvent the 

congressional approval process in the long run. 

THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH TAIWAN

Earlier this month, the President submitted the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and 

Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) Concerning Peaceful 

Uses of Atomic Energy to this committee. 

The draft agreement supersedes a 1972 agreement (amended in 1974) signed with 

the Republic of China (the first such cooperation agreement dates back to 1955) that 

is similar to the 1974 agreement signed with South Korea. It provided for all 

enriched uranium fuel for Taiwan’s reactors at the time (ChinShan I and II) with 

an option to seek outside sources if the then-U.S. Atomic Energy Commission could 

not supply the requisite amount. It also allowed for reprocessing ‘‘in facilities acceptable to both Parties‘‘ upon a joint determination that safeguards could be applied. 

Taiwan would retain title to special nuclear material resulting from reprocessing. 

Although the Republic of China ratified the NPT in 1970, the agreement provided 

for U.S. safeguards and the application of IAEA safeguards under a 1964 trilateral 

(U.S., ROC, IAEA) that could be replaced by IAEA NPT safeguards once they came 

into effect. In light of what we now know about Taiwan’s clandestine activities at 

the time, the fuel assurances on the front end and relative lack of restrictions on 

the back end seem too little and too late. 

Although the unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement refers only 

to ‘‘the direction of the nuclear program of the authorities on Taiwan in the 1970s 

and 1980s’’ as having been ‘‘widely reported in the press,’’ the classified version 

should provide this committee with the details of a Taiwanese nuclear weapons program that reportedly began in the mid-1960s and continued somewhere into the 

1980s, at least according to IAEA reports of undeclared plutonium activities and 

other sources. The plutonium program included a research reactor (from Canada), 

heavy water production, and plutonium separation. U.S. official documents released 

under the Freedom of Information Act detail repeated demarches to Taiwanese representatives by U.S. Government officials in the mid-1970s to halt clandestine 

nuclear activities.2

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With the establishment of U.S. diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of 

China in 1979, Taiwan’s political status changed and although Taiwan is prevented 

from formally joining multilateral treaties and export control regimes, the authorities on Taiwan have voluntarily committed to adhering to all the major nonproliferation-related agreements and initiatives. A U.S.-Taiwan nuclear cooperation 

agreement is critical for Taiwan to engage in nuclear supply relationships with 

other countries, since the trilateral safeguards transfer agreement provides the 

functional equivalent of Taiwan’s adoption of full-scope safeguards under the NPT. 

In other words, the 123 agreement with the United States is critical for Taiwan’s 

nuclear power program as long as it intends to operate those reactors. From November 2011, authorities on Taiwan have declared they will phase out nuclear power 

eventually. 

The current Taiwan agreement has a few notable characteristics: Article 7 provides that TECRO shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities or otherwise engage 

in activities related to enrichment or reprocessing of material or alteration in form 

or content and it is the first agreement to specify an indefinite duration. Like the 

UAE agreement, there is a provision for advance consent to transfer irradiated 

source or special fissionable material to France or other countries as agreed for storage or reprocessing. In the Agreed Minute, the scope of the agreement specifically 

covers tritium, an item that is not found in many other agreements. 

The Taiwan agreement has been heralded in some press reports as a victory for 

the ‘‘gold standard’’—that is, for the United States requiring that its nuclear partners rely on the international market for fuel supply services instead of leaving 

future options open for domestic enrichment or reprocessing. As a country of unique 

political status that is overwhelmingly dependent on U.S. nuclear technology and 

trade, with a documented history of clandestine nuclear activities, it is hard to see 

how Taiwan would have otherwise reacted to a U.S. request for such restrictions. 

In light of Taiwan’s envisioned phase-out of nuclear energy, it would also have been 

difficult to insist on leaving its options open for future domestic enrichment or 

reprocessing. Thus, while the Taiwan agreement may helpfully build a norm of 

countries declaring they will rely on the international market, it is hardly a bellwether for future agreements. 

NEW AGREEMENTS WITH COUNTRIES AND POLICY RESTRICTIONS

ON ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING

The rising enthusiasm for nuclear energy of the past decade, tempered somewhat 

by the 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, has 

spurred interest in cooperation agreements with new nuclear partners, including 

those in the Middle East (the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan) and 

in Southeast Asia (Vietnam). Concerns about the spread of sensitive nuclear technology are particularly high in the Middle East in light of Iran’s continued development of uranium enrichment technology. The conclusion of an agreement in 2009 

with the UAE that incorporated language in Article 7 specifying that the UAE 

would not possess sensitive nuclear facilities on its soil or otherwise engage in 

reprocessing of spent fuel or enrichment of uranium raised expectations that the 

United States would require similar commitments by other nuclear partners in the 

Middle East, or even globally. In fact, the 1981 U.S. agreement with Egypt contains 

an agreed minute that any reprocessing that might in future take place would be 

conducted outside of Egypt, which has the same practical effect of the UAE agreement (although Egypt did not make the same commitment for uranium enrichment). 

Like Taiwan, the nonproliferation ‘‘win’’ in the UAE case may also have resulted 

from other mitigating circumstances. The UAE already had a policy not to seek 

domestic enrichment and reprocessing, whether to burnish its nonproliferation credentials as the first state in the Middle East with nuclear power or because it simply did not make economic sense. Although it would be useful for the UAE to enlist 

other countries in the region to create an Enrichment-&-Reprocessing-Free-Zone, 

other countries currently seeking nuclear power are slow to follow. For example, 

Saudi Arabia reportedly has signed a memorandum of understanding with the 

United States to that effect, but there is no evidence that Saudi officials are eager 

to tout their nonproliferation credentials openly or that such language would make 

its way into a formal peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. Jordan has resisted 

U.S. requirements for similar restrictions in its draft agreement with the United 

States. Outside of the Middle East, Vietnam reportedly has agreed to rely on the 

international market for fuel cycle services but is not eager to put such language 

in a legally binding agreement. 

New agreements, particularly with states that have few if any nuclear power 

plants operating, are not an unreasonable place to begin to strengthen standards 

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for nuclear cooperation agreements. Since 2009, the policy debate about the ‘‘gold 

standard’’ has centered on whether, in the absence of a consistent policy that applies 

to all U.S. nuclear partners, the executive branch can persuade other countries that 

it is pursuing a politically neutral nonproliferation goal. Critics of the case-by-case 

approach believe that a consistent policy strengthens U.S. negotiating leverage 

because it cuts off debates in negotiations about prestige, national sovereignty or 

allies’ worthiness while proponents believe that an inflexible approach will result in 

fewer nuclear cooperation partners for the United States, with diminished nonproliferation returns. 

U.S. policy for many years has proceeded on a ‘‘case-by-case’’ basis in order to preserve flexibility in negotiating, despite an extended period of review under the 

Obama administration. Recently, administration officials have reiterated their policy 

goal of discouraging the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. However, this has been articulated as a comprehensive policy that extends beyond the 

scope of peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements and officials have suggested that 

other policy tools to achieve this objective may be preferable to incorporating specific 

language in 123 agreements. Acting Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller 

told an Atlantic Council audience in December 2013 that legally binding requirements were too inflexible and that many tools were available, referring to the 2011 

revised NSG guidelines on restraint in transferring sensitive nuclear technology and 

to the availability of fuel banks of low-enriched uranium for fuel. Privately, administration officials have suggested that Vietnam’s reported willingness to rely on the 

international market for nuclear fuel and the U.S. consent rights for enrichment or 

reprocessing are enough. 

Clearly, the Obama administration should use multiple tools to discourage the 

spread of enrichment and reprocessing. In thinking about the broader nonproliferation tools that could be applied, however, it is important to step back and place this 

debate in context. 

A CHANGING LANDSCAPE

The proliferation landscape has shifted over time, both in terms of the technologies that are perceived as posing significant proliferation risks and the countries 

(or nonstate actors) that may have clandestine intentions. For example, at the time 

of NPT negotiations, experts assumed that the tremendous costs, energy requirements and physical footprint of uranium enrichment plants (based on gaseous diffusion technology) would make clandestine enrichment very difficult if not impossible. 

This is certainly not the case today, as we have discovered with Iran and North 

Korea. In fact, the major difficulty is in detecting such clandestine enrichment. 

Looking forward, the commercial development of laser enrichment could shrink 

detection parameters even further. 

Not all elements of the system adapt at the same time in the face of changing 

technical and/or political proliferation risks and some do not adapt at all. The NPT 

remains constant, while IAEA safeguards were strengthened in response to Iraq’s 

nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s (i.e., with the adoption of the Additional Protocol in 1998). Although some observers might wish for stronger withdrawal provisions or penalties for noncompliance in the NPT, the tension among its 

states parties makes amendment a rather risky enterprise. The Nuclear Suppliers 

Group, for its part, responded relatively quickly to Iraq’s noncompliance by finally 

implementing a requirement for full-scope safeguards for nuclear trade in 1992 that 

several members had adopted more than a decade earlier (e.g., Canada, Japan, 

United States, Australia). In response to revelations in 2004 about the A.Q. Khan 

nuclear black market network, the NSG was a bit slower: after 7 years of debate, 

the NSG tweaked its restrictions regarding sensitive nuclear technology transfers in 

2011. 

Sanctions, on the other hand, can be quite flexible, for better or worse: some U.S. 

sanctions imposed on Pakistan and India after the 1998 nuclear tests were famously 

short-lived, while imposition of other sanctions was delayed until it was no longer 

possible to hold them off (e.g., declaring that Pakistan was in possession of nuclear 

weapons). In the multilateral realm, U.N. sanctions have generally been slower to 

ramp up but fairly flexible: in the case of Iran, the scope of sanctions has expanded 

from those targeted on the nuclear program and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

to wider petroleum-related investments and trade over the course of a decade. They 

could shrink substantially if Iran responds well to the latest negotiated deal. 

National export control regimes, including policies and laws governing nuclear cooperation and exports, can also be flexible compared to other tools and powerful if 

harmonized with those of other countries. In the United States, the Atoms for Peace 

program required a big shift from the 1946 Atomic Energy Act to allow interFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

47 

national cooperation. Section 3e of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 called for ‘‘A program of international cooperation to promote the common defense and security and 

to make available to cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of 

atomic energy as widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common 

defense and security will permit.’’ The scope of activities included: ‘‘(1) refining, 

purification, and subsequent treatment of source material; (2) civilian reactor development; (3) production of special nuclear material; (4) health and safety; (5) industrial and other applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; and (6) research 

and development relating to the foregoing.’’ The United States put in place bilateral 

research agreements, the first of which was signed in 1955 with Turkey. According 

to the Congressional Research Service, the ‘‘United States established its own program for promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy with the idea that later they 

would be coordinated with and even undertaken by the International [Atomic 

Energy] Agency.’’ 3 By the end of 1967, the United States had 34 agreements in 

place with countries or groups of countries (e.g., EURATOM); of these, about twothirds were strictly for research. 

Comparing U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements of almost 50 years ago with those 

of today, two changes are striking: We have changed partners several times (sometimes in reaction to bad behavior and sometimes not) and we have changed what 

we are willing to supply. This is fairly unsurprising over a span of 50 years, but 

provides a few lessons. 

In 1967, the United States had agreements with some countries with which it 

does not now have agreements: Iran, Israel, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Cooperation 

with the Soviet Union over the years was sporadic until a 123 agreement entered 

into force in 2010.4 In addition to Iran and Israel, two others on the 1967 list of 

partner countries are still cooperating partners, but had at that time nuclear weapons programs that were subsequently abandoned: South Korea and South Africa.5

The nature of cooperation has also changed over time. First, the 1954 Atomic 

Energy Act allowed for cooperation in the production of special nuclear material. 

The Ford administration adopted the first restraint policy in the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology and facilities in 1974, prohibiting export of reprocessing 

and other nuclear technologies, firmly opposing reprocessing in Korea and Taiwan, 

and negotiating agreements for cooperation with Egypt and Israel that contained 

‘‘the strictest reprocessing provisions.’’ 6 In his 1976 statement on nuclear policy, 

President Ford called on all nations to join the United States ‘‘in exercising maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such sensitive exports or commitments for a period of at least 3 

years.’’ 7 This policy of restraint has endured despite the fact that the Atomic 

Energy Act itself does not prohibit sharing of enrichment and reprocessing technologies (although the NNPA amendments ensured that any production facilities 

transferred would be subject to all the nonproliferation requirements outlined in 

section 123). 

Second, for many years, the United States exported quantities of uranium 

enriched between 20 percent and 90 percent (in U–235), U–233 and plutonium routinely under nuclear cooperation agreements. In 1993, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission reported to Congress that the United States had exported 25 metric 

tons of HEU, at which time about 17 metric tons were still abroad. By 1978, the 

United States began a program (the Reduced Enrichment for Test Reactors program, now encompassed in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Convert Program) 

to encourage the use of lower enriched uranium in research reactors abroad that 

continues today. The current policy of the U.S. Government is to support the minimization of HEU in civilian nuclear commerce where technically and economically 

feasible.8

The examples above illustrate that nuclear cooperation does and must shift over 

time to reflect changing circumstances, whether or not laws change. The trend over 

time largely has been to tighten restrictions. Exceptions to that trend should be undertaken only in circumstances where a country overwhelmingly has demonstrated 

its commitment to nonproliferation. Even then, it is far better to adopt an approach 

that is justifiable for how it reduces the risk of proliferation than what was simply 

politically possible at the time. 

The current justification for adopting a case-by-case approach to U.S. 123 agreements is the need for diplomatic flexibility. But the examples above should also suggest that a principled approach could weather political changes in governments 

much better and help minimize the costs of walking back less restrictive policies. 

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THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Although peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements tend to be treated as foreign 

policy initiatives, they fall squarely within the Congress’ constitutional mandate to 

regulate trade. Activism on this issue by Congress has varied with the agreements: 

more controversial countries and capabilities have attracted more attention. 

Although early legislation may have envisioned a bigger role for committees in vetting peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements (for example, in the 30-day period 

after initial transmittal), many are submitted as boilerplate agreements (the India 

agreement notwithstanding). The NNPA’s adoption of a more streamlined approval 

process for new agreements, as well as a relatively short (15 days) approval process 

for subsequent arrangements (e.g., arrangements for partner countries to reprocess 

U.S.-origin material) has made significant congressional involvement less likely. The 

fact that 123 agreements compliant with section 123 requirements enter into force 

unless Congress passes a law otherwise presents a serious bar for disapproval that 

subsequent legislation (e.g., 1984 Proxmire amendment to the Export Administration Act) has attempted to address without success. 

Members of Congress may want to consider the following issues: 

1. Approval of 123 agreements may become a historical relic 

Administrations since the enactment of the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 

have lengthened the duration of agreements, including bestowing rolling or indefinite extensions on certain nuclear cooperation partners (Australia, Canada, 

EURATOM, Switzerland and Turkey have 5-year rolling extensions; India has a 10- 

year rolling extension and Peru has one automatic 10-year extension). Japan’s 

agreement from 1987 has such an ‘‘indefinite’’ extension while the Taiwan agreement duration itself is indefinite. Whether this is intended to minimize congressional interference by eliminating the need for congressional approval for renewals 

or whether this is the result of demands from cooperating partners is not clear. 

However, it seems similar to the Reagan administration’s development of the practice of ‘‘advance consent’’ as a form of prior consent. In other words, it seems to contradict the intention of the law. Members of Congress may want to consider whether 

specific language regarding extensions or congressional review is desirable to protect 

its equities in ensuring that U.S. nuclear cooperation does not contribute inadvertently to proliferation. 

2. The Atomic Energy Act does not reflect longstanding policies 

There are several key nuclear nonproliferation policy initiatives that usefully 

could be supported and strengthened by incorporation into law. 

a. Additional Protocol 

The first is to require all new nuclear partners (and in renewal agreements) to 

have Additional Protocols in force before a 123 agreement can be approved. U.S. policy is to seek inclusion of language in 123 agreements but this could be strengthened legally. It should be noted that the NSG has not been able to make the Additional Protocol a condition of supply, despite the fact that many members do require 

it. Two particular holdouts are Argentina and Brazil, although there are others. 

Making the Additional Protocol a legally binding requirement could eventually help 

NSG adoption, in much the same way that countries adopted full-scope safeguards 

as a condition of supply before the NSG did. In addition, Congress might consider 

whether additional language in the AEA would be useful regarding the incorporation of improvements in the IAEA safeguards system into U.S. 123 agreements 

beyond the Additional Protocol. There has been talk of provisions that might 

amount to the ‘‘Additional Protocol Plus’’ in the case of Iran. Language requiring 

the executive branch to report on status of IAEA safeguards improvements, particularly with respect to safeguards for reprocessing and enrichment plants, including 

an IAEA assessment of the effectiveness of current black-boxing techniques for enrichment technology could help inform the Congress and potentially lead to some 

on-the-ground improvements. 

b. Interim storage over reprocessing 

The United States as a matter of policy prefers interim storage over reprocessing, 

both for itself and its partners where proliferation or security risks might be a concern. And yet, recent 123 agreements do not reflect this. In the UAE and Taiwan 

agreements, advance consent is given for transfer to storage or reprocessing facilities (in third countries like the U.K., France, or other). Although some flexibility 

with regard to the final destination for irradiated fuel may be desirable, U.S. policy 

clearly places priority on interim storage over reprocessing and this should be 

reflected in all future agreements. 

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3. Implementation of certain Atomic Energy Act and 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Act provisions are weak 

a. NPAS makeover 

The 1978 NNPA requires the executive branch to submit a Nuclear Proliferation 

Assessment Statement with each new agreement or renewal agreement. If the current trend toward indefinitely extended agreements deepens, the ability of Congress 

to judge the nonproliferation worthiness of partner countries will diminish even 

more. Even if Members of Congress see no drawback to these agreements of indefinite duration, it may be worthwhile to mandate periodic NPASs from the executive 

branch. Separately, the Atomic Energy Act provides no guidance to either Congress 

or the executive branch on the kinds of issues that should be covered in an NPAS. 

Some of these documents (at least the unclassified versions) do little more than 

recite how the agreement meets section 123 criteria. At a minimum, the Congress 

could require the executive branch to consult with Members on the general scope 

of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements or about individual NPASs before 

they are written or more substantially, Congress could enact legislation to specify 

reporting requirements for NPASs. 

b. Title V 

Title V of the NNPA required the United States to conduct nonnuclear energy cooperation and energy assessment assistance with developing states. All countries 

need help pursuing low-carbon, renewable options for generating electricity. This 

title should be funded, implemented and monitored by Congress. 

c. International fuel cycle collaboration and multilateral approaches 

A holistic and multilateral approach that reduces proliferation risks from nuclear 

cooperation and fuel cycle activities continues to elude the U.S. Government. This, 

however, was not always the case. In the late 1970s, U.S. nonproliferation policies 

at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue seemed to recognize that promotion of nuclear 

energy cannot come at the expense of nuclear nonproliferation. In the words of 

Henry Kissinger, ‘‘We must take into account that plutonium is an essential ingredient of nuclear explosives and that in the immediate future the amount of plutonium generated by peaceful nuclear reactors will be multiplied many times. Heretofore the United States and a number of other countries have widely supplied 

nuclear fuels and other nuclear materials in order to promote the use of nuclear 

energy for peaceful purposes. This policy cannot continue if it leads to the proliferation of nuclear explosives. Sales of these materials can no longer be treated by anyone as a purely commercial competitive enterprise.’’ 9

This dilemma is no longer painted so starkly. More often now, one hears the argument that if the United States adopts stricter controls, other states will step in to 

supply nuclear reactors and components with lower requirements, creating a loselose proposition for both U.S. nuclear industry and nonproliferation. 

However, the nuclear industry has shrunk since the 1980s, and a truly zero-sum 

competitive market does not exist—there are many more interdependent suppliers 

than was the case decades ago. Rather than undercutting each other with government subsidies for nuclear deals, suppliers should be cooperating to encourage the 

sustainability of their enterprise. Fundamentally, this will require confronting 

nuclear waste challenges up front to provide favorable options for new recipients 

(like interim storage for spent nuclear fuel or space in a shared repository) and 

opportunities to invest in nuclear capacities they cannot themselves develop. A market-driven twist on collaborative fuel cycle approaches, if it is implemented in an 

equitable fashion among advanced and developing nuclear states, could overcome 

the inertia that has swallowed virtually all proposals to internationalize the fuel 

cycle and perhaps, finally, bring much-needed balance to the task of reducing proliferation risks. 

———————— 

End Notes 

1 Available at: http://csis.org/publication/nuclear-trade-controls. 

2 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 221, available at http:// 

www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb221/. 3 Ellen C. Collier, ‘‘United States Foreign Policy on Nuclear Energy,’’ Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, May 6, 1968, p. LRS–7. 4 Collier, op. cit., describes an arrangement in 1967 for cooperation in atomic desalination; in 

1973, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a 10-year agreement for cooperation in 

fast breeder reactors, fusion, and fundamental research. See Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘‘U.S.–Russian 

Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress,’’ CRS Report, RL34655, January 

11, 2011. 

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5 In the case of South Africa, the U.S. first signed a 50-year nuclear cooperation agreement 

in 1957. Cooperation lapsed in the 1970s because of evidence of South Africa’s nuclear weapons 

program. When South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons and joined the NPT in 1991, the 

United States negotiated a new cooperation agreement that entered into force in 1997. 6President Ford, ‘‘Statement on Nuclear Policy,’’ October 28, 1976, reprinted in Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, Senate Print 103–111, December 1994, pp. 48–62. 7President Ford, ‘‘Statement on Nuclear Policy,’’ op. cit., page 54. 

8 ttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/belgium-france-netherlands-unitedstates-joint-statement-minimization-he. 9 Henry Kissinger, ‘‘An Age of Interdependence: Common Disaster or Community,’’ Address 

before the 29th United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 1974. 

ORAL STATEMENT OF HENRY SOKOLSKI

Mr. Menendez, Mr. Corker, members of the committee, I want to thank you for 

holding this hearing. Let me start by noting that the last time Congress adjusted 

the Atomic Energy Act to proliferation realities of the day was over 35 years ago. 

After watching India set off a ‘‘peaceful’’ nuclear explosive with U.S. technology and 

materials, Congress required new deals with non-NPT states be backed by a joint 

congressional resolution of approval. Since then, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Syria, and 

Libya all developed weapons programs in violation of their NPT pledges, used their 

safeguarded ‘‘peaceful’’ programs as covers to import nuclear technology and goods 

from nuclear suppliers, including the U.S., and endeavored to enrich or reprocess 

nuclear weapons usable fuels to make bombs. 

In light of this history, the U.S. has recently insisted that the UAE and Taiwan 

forswear engaging in these nuclear activities in their nuclear cooperative agreements with the U.S. It now is trying to persuade South Korea to do the same. What 

all of this suggests is that there’s a clear need for Congress to adjust, again, what 

kinds of agreements should require a congressional joint resolution. In trying to 

determine the specifics any such adjustment, this committee should focus on three 

points: 

1. Arguments that further congressional involvement in reviewing and approving 

nuclear deals is unnecessary or will somehow undermine nonproliferation are dead 

wrong. Nuclear industry’s supporters and Foggy Bottom clearly prefer the status 

quo. They argued against the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NPPA) of 1978 using 

the very same arguments they are now making against any additional congressional 

involvement in nuclear negotiations. Passage of the NNPA, though, was needed to 

impose controls over the export of dual use nuclear goods which, in turn, made it 

possible for the U.S. to persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to adopt similar restraints. This now enables the Proliferation Security Initiative to track and 

interdict the fulsome list of nuclear goods. Getting other nuclear suppliers to uphold 

the Gold Standard, which is not yet the focus of our diplomacy but should be, will 

require no less. Foggy Bottom is hardly 100 percent behind this. As such, unless 

Congress makes it clear that new 123s that don’t meet the Gold Standard must 

secure a joint congressional resolution of approval, the Executive will, in due course, 

give up. 

2. Congressional review of the Executive’s nuclear dealmaking should extend 

beyond what has already been proposed. Many in Congress have been frustrated in 

their attempts to engage the Executive over the final shape of any nuclear deal with 

Iran. Congress was equally frustrated a decade ago regarding the implementation 

of the North Korean nuclear Agreed Framework. H.R. 3677 addresses a number of 

needed changes to the Atomic Energy Act. In specific, it understands that 123s that 

don’t meet the Gold Standard are more like a mutual security pact than a technical 

trade agreement. Yet, what 3677 does not consider is amending the act so any 

nuclear understanding the Executive reaches with states violating existing U.N. resolutions relating to dangerous nuclear activities, IAEA safeguards agreements or 

the NPT must be voted on within 30 days and secure a congressional joint resolution of approval. As with nuclear cooperative agreements that fail to meet key nonproliferation criteria, the long-term national security implications of such agreements are serious. Such agreements deserve to be treated more like treaties or laws 

than minor understandings that need only sit before Congress a number of days 

before automatically coming into force. Here, the committee’s own 2001 study of 

teatking making done by CRS is excellent reading. 

3. Finally, the primary premise for any revisions to the act should be security. 

Business can only be good business if it’s safe. We learned this after conducting 

nuclear commerce under lax conditions with India in the l960s and after sharing 

reactor technology under the Agreed Framework with North Korea free of routine 

IAEA safeguards. We now are learning it with Iran and risk learning it yet with 

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South Korea, Japan, Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The hearing today should 

aim to prevent that. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY D. SOKOLSKI

Mr. Menendez, Mr. Corker, members of the committee, I want to thank you for 

holding this hearing. The principles behind U.S. nuclear export and control policies, 

nonproliferation, and our diplomacy efforts to reduce the spread of enrichment and 

reprocessing activities have been matters of keen interest for several years.1 Generally, these matters have been discussed in the context of promoting nuclear power’s further expansion overseas, of increasing the number of jobs or of concluding 

nuclear agreements and cooperation initiatives more generally. All of these considerations are important. They are not, however, the primarily lens that should be used 

for weighing these matters. 

I’ve served in the U.S. Senate as military legislative aide to a senior member of 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, in the Pentagon as a deputy assistant secretary-level official responsible for nuclear proliferation matters, as a member of two 

congressionally mandated commissions on strategic weapons proliferation threats, 

as a former consultant on proliferation issues to the CIA and the Commission on 

Strategic Posture of the United States, and as a DOD contractor with a Pentagon 

office that details future threat assessments directly to the Secretary of Defense. In 

each of these positions, my key focus has been on clarifying the national and international security implications of the further spread of dual-use nuclear technology. 

These security concerns should be the first business of our government. Certainly, 

the most profound contributions Congress has made to promoting and controlling 

truly peaceful foreign nuclear activities were premised on putting U.S. national security first. This was true in 1946 when Congress created the Atomic Energy Commission, in 1978 when it passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, in the 1990s 

when it conditioned the Nuclear Agreed Framework with North Korea, and today 

as it considers legislation relating to our nuclear negotiations with Iran. 

That said, the last time Congress revamped the Atomic Energy Act signficantly 

was over 35 years ago. That overhaul, finalized in 1978, followed Taiwanese and 

South Korean efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and India’s explosion of a ‘‘peaceful’’ nuclear explosive. India’s bomb used U.S. civilian nuclear technology and materials in violation of India’s peaceful pledges to the United States. Given these 

events, Congress demanded that any future U.S. nuclear deals with states that, like 

India (which did not have all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and 

were not members of the NPT), could only come into force with a congressional joint 

resolution of approval. 

That was three and half decades ago. Since then, Iraq used its safeguarded 

‘‘peaceful’’ nuclear program to develop a nuclear weapons option; India and Pakistan 

broke their pledges (including several to the United States) not to develop nuclear 

weapons or to test; North Korea developed a covert enrichment program, in violation of the Agreed Framework, and withdrew from the NPT even as it imported and 

perfected U.S. light water reactor technology; Syria and Libya both violated their 

IAEA safeguards agreements and nearly completed an enrichment plant (in Libya’s 

case) and a plutonium production reactor (in Syria’s) covertly; and Iran imported 

foreign and U.S. nuclear assistance (which began in 1957) under IAEA safeguards, 

developed a nuclear weapons option by enriching uranium claiming it is peaceful 

and now is negotiating to keep as much of its nuclear program as it can. 

Most recently, and in light of the concerns that other states might inch closer to 

making bombs by enriching or reprocessing, the United States insisted that the 

UAE and Taiwan foreswear engaging in these nuclear activities in their nuclear cooperative agreements with the United States. It now is trying to persuade South 

Korea to do the same. 

This is a good deal of history—more than enough to suggest that there is a clear 

need for Congress to adjust again what kinds of agreements should be expedited 

under the Atomic Energy Act and which should require a congressional joint resolution. 

In trying to determine the specifics of any such adjustment, three general points 

are worth keeping in mind: 

1. One should resist arguments that further congressional involvement in reviewing 

and approving nuclear deals is either unnecessary or unhelpful. Nuclear industry’s 

supporters and our own government negotiators clearly prefer that no additional 

congressional review or voting be allowed. They argued against the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NPPA) of 1978 using the very same arguments they are now using 

for any additional congressional involvement in nuclear deal making.2 Passage of 

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the NNPA, though, was critical to raise U.S. nonproliferation standards and impose 

controls over the export of dual use nuclear goods. This, in turn, made it possible 

for the United States to persuade all of the members of the international Nuclear 

Suppliers Group (NSG) to adopt similar restraints on their own exports. Without 

NSG adoption of these controls, the Proliferation Security Initiative would be unable 

to track the fulsome list of nuclear goods it does with so many other states. This 

would clearly be against our national security interests. Similarly, if as our government claims, we want other nuclear suppliers to promote the Gold Standard, we 

must be willing to set an example. Establishing a stronger international presumption against ever more states enriching uranium and reprocessing weapons usable 

plutonium certainly is unlikely unless Congress makes it clear to the Executive that 

if it brings new nuclear cooperative agreements to the Hill that don’t meet the Gold 

Standard, they will not come into force until Congress votes to approve them 

because both Houses are persuaded that they are in the Nation’s security interest. 

Delay in voting on these matters should not be allowed. 

2. Congressional review of nuclear deals ought to be considered beyond what has 

already been proposed in the House. Congress is currently frustrated by its inability 

to engage the Executive over what the final shape of a nuclear agreement with Iran 

might look like. It was equally frustrated a decade ago regarding the implementation of the nuclear Agreed Framework with North Korea. Congresswoman Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen and Congressman Brad Sherman recently reintroduced draft legislation H.R. 3677 that the House Foreign Affairs Committee first approved back in 

2011. It addresses a number of needed changes to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 

What it does not consider, however, is amending the act so that any nuclear understanding that the Executive might reach with a state that is in violation of existing 

United Nations resolutions relating to suspect nuclear activities, IAEA safeguards 

agreements or the NPT need to be approved by a joint resolution of Congress before 

it can come into force. The rational for such a provision would be the same as for 

voting on nuclear cooperative agreements with states that fail to meet key nonproliferation criteria: Such agreements and their long-term national security implications should be treated not as executive agreements or as minor understandings 

that need only sit before Congress a number of legislative days before automatically 

coming into force. Instead, they should be treated as being as important as a treaty 

or, at the very least, as being at least as important as a law.3 Certainly, the 

national security implications of the U.S.–Iran nuclear cooperative agreement of 

1957 (which Congress did not even bother to hold a hearing on) now dwarfs the importance of benign trade agreements that Congress routinely votes upon. Finally, it 

would be useful to amend the Atomic Energy Act to require the Executive to routinely assess what the IAEA’s ability is to prevent military diversions of the 

declared materials and activities it must safeguard and to detect undeclared covert 

nuclear efforts and materials. This would be in line with the recommendations of 

the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism and the most recent Defense Science Board report on monitoring nuclear 

threats.4 These assessments should be shared with Congress and the IAEA. Additional routine assessments should be made of what our own intelligence system can 

detect. Without this baseline information, there is no way to know whether the risks 

of nuclear proliferation are growing or are under control. 

3. The primary point of departure for considering any revisions to the act should 

be security. Any business the United Staes engages in can only be considered to be 

good business if it safe. If not, it’s not just bad business, it’s dangerous. We learned 

this after conducting nuclear commerce under lax conditions with India in the l960s. 

We learned after sharing reactor technology with North Korea with no routine IAEA 

safeguards in place under the Agreed Framework. We certainly are learning it now 

with Iran. If we do not take proper care, we may come to learn it with others including South Korea, Japan, Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The most recent 

Defense Science Board study on nuclear monitoring warns us all that the proliferation threat will be far more challenging in the future than it ever has been in the 

past. All of this recommends that we take our nuclear dealings and their potential 

security implications more seriously. We say we want South Korea not to enrich or 

reprocess. Yet, we have encouraged Japan to do so even now that its nuclear fleet 

is unlikely ever to be more than half of its pre-911 size. Worse, the State Department believes the United States should not bother taking the option of renewing its 

agreement with Japan even though we are insisting on doing so with our other key 

Asian ally, South Korea. This not only is insulting to Seoul, but reckless. If Japan 

ever decided to open its large reprocessing plant at Rokashho, it would be producing 

roughly 2,000 bombs worth of nuclear weapons usable plutonium a year. This would 

almost certainly prompt South Korea to initiate nuclear enrichment or reprocessing 

of their own as hedge or weapons option. And China? What would it do in response? 

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We don’t know but whatever it might choose to do would likely challenge not only 

Japan’s and South Korea’s security, but our own treaty commitment to defend our 

Asian allies. For all these reasons, Congress should demand that our government 

encourage Japan to review its nuclear plans openly by calling for renegotiation of 

our nuclear cooperative agreement with them. We may not chose to change any of 

the terms of the current agreement but we should do all we can to encourage Japan 

to use the negotiations to clarify their own plans. More congressional review, not 

less will help assure the best policies are pursued. 

———————— 

End Notes 

1This hearing was first requested nearly 2 years ago. See letter from Senator Richard Lugar 

to Senator John Kerry, February 10, 2012 available at http://www.npolicy.org/articlelfile/LetterlfromlSenatorlLugarltolSenatorlKerry.pdf. 2See Jodi Lieberman, ‘‘Nonproliferation, Congress, and Nuclear Trade: Plus ca chang, plus 

c’est la meme chose,’’ CSIS Policy Perspectives (Washington, DC: CSIS November 15, 20111), 

available at http://csis.org/files/publication/111116lnonproliferationlcongresslandlnuclear 

trade.pdf. 3 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaties and Other International Agreements; 

The Role of the United States Senate: A Study Prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (Washington, DC: Committee Print, January 2001), pp. 24–25. Available at http:// 

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/html/CPRT-106SPRT66922.htm. 4See Bob Graham, et. al., ‘‘World At Risk,’’ (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2008), pp. xx. Also 

see 44–46, 49–50 and U.S. Department of Defense Defense Science Board, Task Force Report: 

Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies, January 2014, available at 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/NuclearMonitoringAndVerificationTechnologies.pdf. 

Senator SHAHEEN. While they are changing out panels, let me 

just introduce the second panel who is going to be here with us. 

First we have Mr. Marvin Fertel, who is the president and CEO 

of the Nuclear Energy Institute. We have Ms. Sharon Squassoni— 

hopefully I am pronouncing your name correctly—director and senior fellow with the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, and Mr. Henry Sokolski— 

close enough? Good?—who is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. 

Again, let me apologize to each of you for the fact that the Senate 

schedule has changed since this hearing was scheduled. We have 

four votes beginning at 11:15. So having people run back and forth 

probably is not the most expeditious way to do this. So if you all 

are agreeable, we will go right into questions. 

I will pose to each of you the question that I asked Mr. Poneman. 

Are their potential reforms to the 123 agreement process that 

would improve our ability to serve what they both acknowledged 

was the U.S. goal? And that is to reduce proliferation of nuclear 

materials in the world. And I do not know who would like to 

answer that first. 

Ms. SQUASSONI. Thank you, Senator. 

May I ask? These are potential reforms for Congress to consider? 

Senator SHAHEEN. You are welcome to address Congress or if you 

think there are things that the administration should be looking at 

differently, feel free to address that as well. 

Ms. SQUASSONI. Well, I think members of this committee correctly identified the fact that the process itself has really limited 

congressional input, particularly this trend over time of increasing 

the duration of these agreements. So many of the agreements for 

the last 20 years or so have had 5-year rolling extensions, 10, and 

now we see the Taiwan agreement with indefinite extension. 

I think that members may want to consider whether they would 

like to put specific language regarding extensions or some kind of 

congressional review. The earlier panel talked about the gold 

standard, should gold standard agreements have the option of 

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indefinite extension because that is good for nonproliferation. Deputy Secretary Poneman said, well, countries, if you have to twist 

their arm a little bit, might want a shorter duration. In any event, 

I think that Congress needs to look very specifically at that issue 

of duration and tie it so that there are incentives to countries. 

One other point on the nuclear proliferation assessment statement. We did not talk very much about Taiwan, but Taiwan is one 

of the few agreements that was never renegotiated after the 1978 

NNPA. And what this means for you is this is the first time that 

there has ever been or that you have received a nuclear proliferation assessment statement. 

I would suggest—I hope that the classified version of that document details the activities that Taiwan was involved in in the 

1970s and 1980s and how U.S. engagement and cooperation helped 

bring them back from the brink of nuclear weapons. 

But what is very interesting is you might consider how you 

might direct the administration better to scope its nuclear proliferation assessment statements. Right now, they look almost as if 

they are just checking the box on all the criteria. I think you need 

something a little more substantial, and that is perfectly within 

your purview. I think that would help the process. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sokolski. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. First, I think it is critical that you reverse the 

question of how do we influence customers to stomach conditions 

on nonproliferation and start understanding that the real leverage 

is convincing other allied and friendly nuclear suppliers to come up 

to this plate. I think we have lost the bubble on this. Not once in 

the previous panel was that focused on. But that is the game. It 

has always been the game. It has not been the customer so much 

as the supplier. 

In that regard, I think there have been 4 years of pleas to the 

Executive to be more consistent. I have a list of letters—I would 

love to submit them for the record—that have been sent. 

Senator SHAHEEN. We will accept those for the record. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Congress needs now to step up and say here is the 

deal. 

I know you cannot always do this. I know there are lots of cases 

where we have to pay attention like India. You know, you voted for 

India. But the presumption has got to be if you do not do it, we 

are definitely going to bind us, the Congress, to review it, and that 

means a vote. Without a vote, you know as well as I, there have 

been nuclear cooperative agreements where you have not even held 

a hearing. I can list those if you would like. 

Last of all, I think this point that Sharon has raised complies 

with the points that were raised by the commission I served on. 

Pay attention to each one of those. And I think one other. 

You folks ought to expand your review. There are these deals 

with countries that have violated U.N. resolutions, safeguards. 

They are called the great frameworks. They are called interim 

deals. I think when that happens, you ought to be voting before 

they go into force. I would not tell them what they should look like. 

Vote on them, and believe me, they will be coming to you to ask 

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for your advice. Do not vote? Back of the hand. That is the way it 

works. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Fertel. 

Mr. FERTEL. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I would, first of all, say I think a little bit more transparency on 

the process would be good for everybody, and that might even 

include a timeline of when they are starting and when they expect 

to finish and what they will be producing. 

I actually would very carefully think about whether you want to 

be voting on this. Right now, the United States is at a disadvantage in the market. I heard what Henry said about dealing with 

the suppliers. The suppliers are countries, particularly the Russians who are very aggressive, the Chinese who will be aggressive. 

And we are competing against them. 

And if I put the commercial interests aside for a second and talk 

about the two things that you discussed in the previous panel— 

mostly it was nonproliferation. My background is much more safety 

than nonproliferation, and I think that is a bigger risk in the near 

term, to be honest, than nonproliferation. You are not going to get 

to weapons very quickly, but you can certainly mess up in safety. 

As you heard from the previous panel, we not only have the best 

technology from a safety standpoint, but we also have really the 

best safety culture, the best operating experience, and the best regulator. And us in the marketplace as a country, not just the commercial side, will make a difference on how we deal with nuclear 

safety, how we deal with nonproliferation, and to be honest, how 

we deal with addressing issues like climate change. 

Senator Markey raised a number of very good points on fuels and 

so forth. A real advantage of the 123 process today is consent 

rights. So if our fuel is in a reactor, we have consent rights. It goes 

a little bit to what Secretary Countryman said. If they go rogue, 

it does not matter whether we have legal binding conditions or not. 

They will do what they want. But if we have consent rights, they 

cannot do anything without our permission. So us either providing 

them a reactor and they can put any fuel in it, we still have consent rights or us providing them fuel in someone else’s reactor 

actually gives us a significant nonproliferation lever. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I appreciate you being here and we apologize again for you not 

being able to set the tone with opening comments. 

But I think there has been some allusion to this already in some 

of the other comments made, but do the three of you believe that 

the administration does have a clearly articulated approach to the 

123 agreements that are being negotiated? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. In a word, no. I think they wanted to and they 

backed off when they realized it would cause friction with the people they were negotiating with. And if you take a look at the statements, at one point the administration officials were quoted saying, 

well, one standard should apply to the Middle East but we do not 

need to apply it to Asia. Now they have backed off that because 

they feel the pressure coming from this committee. Fine. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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First it was about reactors. Well, we can sell reactors. Vietnam 

is the biggest market in Asia they claimed. Now, of course, Vietnam announced it is not even going to build its first reactor for 6 

years. So now it is about fuel. 

I think you need to understand that unless you bring these 

agreements before the committee and you exercise your authority 

to approve them, it does not matter what they do. They will be able 

to do it. And the reasoning will change country to country because 

Vietnam—that is an agreement about China I think and pressuring China. The agreement about the UAE. Well, there are other 

things going on. In other words, these agreements are poor man’s 

mutual security pacts as much as they are about nuclear commerce. If indeed this is about selling nuclear fuel after all, you 

need to keep in mind there is no way on God’s green earth the 

United States is going to dominate that market any more than it 

is going to dominate reactor sales. Therefore, if we do not use our 

leverage with the suppliers—and we do have leverage, and I can 

go through that if you would like—to get them to raise their standards, you have lost the ball. And you will not get the Executive to 

lean on those suppliers unless they realize they have to to get their 

agreements past you. It is hard ball, but that is the way it is 

played. 

I have watched this as long as Mr. Poneman. He and I are contemporaries, and we both went to the same schools and we studied 

the same things. We ended up in different places as to how we 

think, but I do not think he would disagree about that point. Not 

at all. 

Senator CORKER. Others? 

Ms. SQUASSONI. Thank you. I am not a contemporary. I am 

younger, Henry. [Laughter.] 

Senator CORKER. It is very noticeable too. 

Ms. SQUASSONI. Thank you. 

But I fundamentally agree with you. I understand. I did work in 

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the State Department. I understand the need for diplomatic flexibility. But when 

you do not have a consistent policy, what you will come up against 

as a negotiator is one country, such as South Korea, arguing that 

we are just as good an ally as the next country. Why are you not 

providing us those benefits? So I think that our negotiating position would actually be stronger with a consistent policy. And it is 

not just on whether or not a country should foreswear enrichment 

and reprocessing but this issue of consent rights. That is exactly 

what we are—and they are very important—coming up against in 

the ROK agreement. 

One last point. The administration should not undersell the 

value of building norms in our 123 agreements. A lot of the multilateral improvements that we have made came from national policies. You need those national policies such as full-scope safeguards 

as a requirement of supply. Countries did that individually before 

the Nuclear Suppliers Group managed to get it. So I think we do 

need more consistency. 

Mr. FERTEL. I actually thought that Deputy Secretary Poneman 

and Assistant Secretary Countryman certainly stayed to one standard that they talked about, which was to control the fissile mateFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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rial. And what they are saying is that they are looking at the toolbox for doing that. 

I do not think—and again, Sharon and Henry are much more 

steeped in this than I am. I do not think that since the 1978 

amendments, in any agreement we have signed, anybody has gone 

and done anything from the standpoint of weapons development. 

And I think that since that time, as a country and also as a world 

with the enhanced safeguards that IAEA has come out with and we 

mandate and require, we probably have improved the process. 

As far as actually the committee approving things all the time, 

with all due respect, one of the problems that I have from a commercial business standpoint this time is the uncertainty it creates, 

not that you will disapprove. I am willing to accept you are allowed 

to do that and you might. It is the time. We are competing against 

really other—not just other competitors, not other suppliers but 

governments, and they can offer a lot of things that the United 

States actually cannot from the standpoint of even financing at 

times, even taking spent fuel back, which the Russians are willing 

to do. We think that would be a good thing for our country to be 

able to do, but until we have our own program working, it is very 

hard to discuss that in America. 

So I would caution gravely against moving to an approval process 

without a lot more discussion of the impact of unintended consequences where all we would do is not get agreements or get 

agreements that nobody ever exercises on the other side. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Might I add? I actually agree with Marvin. If you 

do law, get the vote on a time-certain basis. The idea, though, that 

Congress should somehow see that it is an impediment to the 

review process or somehow is going to be unhelpful—I do not think 

that is right. You can do this. You put a time limit on how you vote 

and you get it done. You can tighten up the current process for 

sure. 

Senator CORKER. So we are both going to have to run for a vote. 

But just briefly, how much of a rub is there? First of all, I am a 

strong proponent of nuclear energy, and I come from a State that, 

generally speaking, strongly supports nuclear energy, and I hope 

we continue along that path here in the United States. 

On the other hand, look, I have been in business too for a long 

time, and I understand the rubs that can exist. Is there pressure 

on the administration and other administrations from the nuclear 

industry to pursue agreements in a way that water down some of 

the standards in order to get them done to be able to compete 

appropriately against other countries? And I will ask you, Mr. 

Fertel, only and if you think he said something totally inappropriate, respond. Otherwise, we are probably going to bolt. 

Mr. FERTEL. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

The simple answer, to be honest, is no. From my personal perspective, let alone our whole industry, the last thing we ever want 

to see are accidents from a safety standpoint or proliferation out 

of control. Okay. That is absolutely the last thing we would ever 

want as an industry is to have that happen. 

The pressure that I think we try to put on is actually timely 

behavior by the administration, whichever one it is, and greater 

transparency. But it is never to cut corners. And to be honest, in 

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this country we never know what they are saying anyway. They do 

not tell us anything. In other countries, the industry may even 

know because the industry is owned by the government and they 

do it collaboratively. 

But the answer to your question, sir, is absolutely not. 

Senator CORKER. Well, Madam Chairman, thank you for letting 

me go over a little bit. 

I thank the three of you for being here, and if you do not object, 

since we did not really have the full kind of discussion we normally 

have, our office would like to follow up with you all and ask additional questions. But thank you so much for being here. I appreciate it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you and thank you all very much. 

Let me just point out, as Senator Corker suggested, we will leave 

the record open until close of business tomorrow for other questions. 

Yes, sir? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Madam Chairman, is it possible for us to submit 

an oral version of our statement in addition to the statement if 

they are different? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Absolutely. If you have additional comments 

that you would like to submit, please do that. We will include it 

in the record. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Okay, because there are several things I need to 

submit. Thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

A Statement and Seven Letters Submitted by Henry Sokolski: 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICTOR GILINSKY, ENERGY CONSULTANT AND SERVED AS

A NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONER UNDER PRESIDENTS FORD, CARTER, AND

REAGAN

The issue before the committee—what standard to apply to U.S. nuclear exports— 

is one Congress and the Executive have struggled with since the beginning of the 

nuclear age. 

A bit of history provides a useful perspective on current arguments. 

The security dangers associated with nuclear fuel technologies were clear from the 

beginning. A country that can enrich uranium, or reprocess spent fuel to extract 

plutonium is within easy reach of the Bomb. 

In the early days of the cold war, despite an awareness of the dangers, we could 

not resist taking political and commercial advantage of our then-leading position in 

nuclear technology. Atoms for Peace, launched by President Eisenhower, allowed 

worldwide access with minimal protection to most of our nuclear technology, including reprocessing. The 1954 version of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, covering 

agreements for cooperation, hardly required more than a recipient’s promise to stick 

to peaceful uses. 

President Eisenhower rationalized that so long as projects were small, they did 

not pose problems. But information flow did pose a problem, and in time nuclear 

projects got bigger. 

The shock of the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion brought home how easily plutonium separated for ‘‘peaceful purposes’’ can end up in a bomb. It became evident 

that effective nonproliferation had to include restrictions on fuel cycle technologies. 

In 1975 the United States took the lead in creating the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

as a way of informally plugging the gaps in permissive trade rules. 

In 1976 President Ford changed U.S. nuclear policy to exclude plutonium separation. He urged other countries to adopt the same course until ‘‘the world community 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation.’’ President Carter continued in this direction. 

The 95th Congress was powerfully affected by the discovery that India had used 

U.S.-supplied heavy water to produce its bomb plutonium, in violation of a peaceful 

uses pledge. In the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, Congress substantially 

tightened Section 123 provisions, including adding the requirements that recipients 

accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all their facilities and prior U.S. consent 

over reprocessing of U.S.-supplied materials. 

That was the ‘‘gold standard’’ of the time. It required renegotiating some agreements for cooperation—a process strongly, and even bitterly, opposed by commercial 

interests. 

It was said we would lose business and jobs to nuclear suppliers with laxer rules, 

and that only if we are a major exporter and apply flexible rules will we have the 

leverage to influence recipients to act responsibly (‘‘you have to play the game if you 

want a hand in setting the rules’’). 

We hear the same arguments repeated today in opposition to including the current ‘‘gold standard’’—which requires a country buying U.S. power plants to promise 

not to enrich or reprocess—in future Section 123 agreements. The standard reflects 

our increased understanding that centrifuge technology threatens to make uranium 

enrichment widely available; and that there is no economic rationale for reprocessing so that it should have no place in the commercial nuclear fuel cycle. 

The fundamental question before us, now as in the past, is one of priorities. 

Which comes first—short-term commercial gain, or long-term national security? Do 

we accept prevailing standards, and stamp as futile any hope of reining in dangerous nuclear technologies? Or do we set higher standards, and provide leadership 

to convince the rest of the world to aim higher, too? 

President Ford’s 1976 answer was: ‘‘We must be sure that all nations recognize 

that the U.S. believes that nonproliferation objectives must take precedence over 

economic and energy benefits if a choice must be made.’’ We need such leadership 

today, because ultimately the only way we can make the gold standard stick is by 

persuading countries that it is in their interest. 

Business and jobs are of course important, but it needs to be said that the jobs 

issue has been very much exaggerated. The projections of future nuclear capacity 

that are tossed about by opponents of tighter export standards are based on 

extremely bullish IAEA forecasts and equally overly optimistic estimates of the U.S. 

share of foreign business. Recall that India was held out as a case where U.S. 

nuclear business prospects were excellent if we only relaxed our export restriction. 

We did that in 2008—at great political cost among Non-Proliferation Treaty members—and have yet to see any business. 

As to the notion that flexible export rules gain us leverage—history tells us that 

when the circumstances require using our leverage the flexibility proponents argue 

strenuously against applying it. The truth is that flexibility is just code for going 

with the flow. 

There remains the immediate legislative question whether Congress should at 

least have to explicitly approve non-gold standard 123 agreements. That it should 

makes good sense, especially as gold standard waivers could have far-reaching 

national security consequences. In fact, the entire process of negotiating 123 agreements would be improved if Congress had a greater role. 

This may be our last chance to craft a system of rules on the international use 

of nuclear energy that is compatible with international security. It’s important to 

understand there is no technical fix. As a 2006 Bush administration nuclear strategy paper underlined (the italics were in the original), ‘‘there is no technology ‘silver 

bullet’ that can be built into an enrichment plant or reprocessing plant that can prevent a country from diverting these commercial fuel cycle facilities to non-peaceful 

use.’’ 

Our choice is to do the hard but necessary thing, or resign ourselves to a world 

full of countries with fuel facilities that put them within arm’s reach of a bomb. It 

is to avoid that future that we need strict 123 agreements. 

FEBRUARY 14, 2012. 

Hon. BARACK OBAMA, 

President of the United States, 

The White House, Washington, DC. 

DEAR PRESIDENT OBAMA: We write to urge you to uphold the so-called nonproliferation ‘‘Gold Standard’’ in all future U.S. civil nuclear cooperative agreements 

with countries that lack nuclear weapons. This new standard—which was created 

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by the U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates 

(U.A.E.) that President Bush began and that you finalized—requires non-nuclearweapons states not only to forgo uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing, and 

other nuclear fuel-making activities, but also to open themselves up to intrusive 

international inspections. 

The nonproliferation Gold Standard enjoys strong bipartisan support because it 

creates a powerful model for constructive nuclear behavior throughout the world— 

one that isolates Iran’s dangerous efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability in 

violation of its international obligations. News reports, however, suggest that your 

administration has decided to abandon this standard in favor of a ‘‘case-by-case 

review.’’ We believe that dropping this standard is a prescription for nuclear proliferation mischief that will only embolden Iran and other potential nuclear weapons-seeking states. 

The ‘‘case-by-case’’ approach risks displeasing our friend, the United Arab Emirates. The Emirates was asked to meet the nonproliferation Gold Standard and 

obliged. The U.A.E. agreement, however, stipulated that if the United States negotiates more generous terms with any other Middle Eastern state, then the Emirates 

has a right to demand similar treatment. If your administration takes the ‘‘case-bycase’’ approach in negotiating future civil nuclear cooperation agreements with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries, then this will only ensure the undoing of 

the new standard entirely. Undermining our good relations with the Emirates would 

only add insult to this injury. 

More important, if the United States is willing to allow Vietnam, Jordan, or South 

Korea to make nuclear fuel—a process that brings nations to the very brink of 

acquiring nuclear weapons—how will the United States and its supporters be able 

to persuade other states, including Iran, to forgo such dangerous nuclear activities? 

The question answers itself. 

The counterargument made by officials in the State and Energy Departments is 

that the United States must be in the nuclear export business to have any hope of 

controlling it, and that tightening nonproliferation conditions on U.S. nuclear 

exports will only reduce America’s sales opportunities. This line of argument, however, is misguided and poorly informed. Certainly, after the Fukushima nuclear disasters in Japan, demand for nuclear power has declined, especially for reactors from 

U.S. vendors, all of whom require the prospective recipient to forswear ever suing 

them in the case of a nuclear accident. As such, new significant exports of controlled 

U.S. nuclear goods are unlikely. 

Instead, the United States itself is an important market for foreign nuclear fuelmaking and reactor vendors. Rather than abandon efforts to tighten nonproliferation controls on civil nuclear exports, the United States should be leveraging access 

to our market to encourage French, Russian, and Asian nuclear suppliers to tighten 

their own rules to meet the nonproliferation Gold Standard. 

We stand ready to support you in making such an effort. We certainly believe the 

current course that you have reportedly set is the wrong one. 

Sincerely, 

John R. Bolton; Stephen J. Hadley; Kori Schake; Jack David; John P. 

Hannah; Gary J. Schmitt; Paula A. DeSutter; Robert G. Joseph; 

Henry D. Sokolski; Eric S. Edelman; Clifford D. May; William H. 

Tobey; Jamie M. Fly; Gary Milhollin; Mark D. Wallace; Christopher 

A. Ford; Samantha Ravich; R. James Woolsey; Victor Gilinsky; Henry 

S. Rowen; Dov S. Zakheim. 

NOVEMBER 15, 2010. 

President BARACK OBAMA, 

The White House, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are writing to ask that you begin to apply a more forward-leaning policy to prevent the international spread of easy-to-militarize nuclear 

fuel making activities, such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel recycling. As 

part of this policy, we believe the U.S. Government should declare that it will not 

provide U.S. federal energy loan guarantees, federal contracts, or other subsidies or 

assistance to help foreign government-backed nuclear firms expand their nuclear 

business in the U.S. unless they have committed to apply the nonproliferation 

standards (including with respect to enrichment and spent fuel recycling) established in the U.S.-United Arab Emirates (UAE) civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in all of their future civilian nuclear cooperation agreements. 

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Consistent with this policy, we urge you not to grant Electricite ́ de France (EDF), 

a French Government-owned utility, any federal energy loan guarantees for the construction of a new nuclear power plant at Calvert Cliffs, Maryland, unless the 

French Government is willing to uphold the nonproliferation standards established 

in the U.S.-UAE agreement in its future civilian nuclear cooperation agreements. 

Further, we recommend that the $2 billion conditional loan guarantee recently 

approved by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to Areva, another French Government-owned firm, to build a uranium enrichment facility in Idaho be conditioned 

upon adoption by the French Government of these standards. 

Some of the signatories below oppose federal loan guarantees for any energy commercialization project. A few oppose loan guarantees specifically for commercial 

nuclear energy; and a smaller number have taken no position on the general advisability of federal energy loan guarantees. Yet, all of us believe that it makes no 

sense for our government to help foreign firms expand their nuclear business in the 

U.S. with federal loan guarantees, government contracts, or Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission licenses unless they are willing to support the very toughest nuclear 

nonproliferation standards our own government has developed in the U.S.-UAE 

deal. 

Under the U.S.-UAE deal, initially negotiated under the Bush administration but 

refined and finalized under yours, the U.S. extended nuclear cooperation and the 

sale of U.S.-controlled nuclear goods in exchange for the UAE promising not to 

enrich uranium or recycle spent fuel and to ratify a enhanced nuclear inspection 

agreement known as the Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency. This set of sound nonproliferation conditions was rightly hailed as a major 

nonproliferation breakthrough. Unfortunately, too little was done to get other major 

nuclear supplier states, including close allies such as France, to adopt a similar set 

of nonproliferation conditions. 

We are concerned that approving $9.5 billion dollars in federal loan guarantees 

to help the French Government expand its nuclear business here in the U.S. without first securing its commitment to support the nonproliferation standards of the 

U.S.–UAE agreement will set a bad precedent. First, it cannot help but be seen as 

a reward to a nuclear supplier that has given U.S. nonproliferation policy insufficient support. Second, a key argument that U.S. policy makers (both Democratic 

and Republican) have made repeatedly is that nuclear fuel making (uranium enrichment and recycling of spent reactor fuel) is unnecessary and uneconomical for 

emerging nuclear power programs. Certainly, our government’s willingness to 

assume virtually all of the financial risks associated with several domestic reactors 

and nuclear fuel plant projects demonstrates that they are not yet commercially viable in the U.S. either. If the U.S. Government is willing to assume these financial 

risks, on what grounds can our government argue that other governments should 

not do likewise? 

In this regard, limiting future federal assistance to building only power reactors 

in the U.S. would do little to reduce this moral hazard. The reason why is plain: 

First-generation nuclear fuel making facilities generally cost much less to build than 

new, large nuclear power plants. If our government is willing to massively subsidize 

the construction of new nuclear power plants, it naturally follows that the lack of 

profitability of much less expensive fuel making facilities should weigh even less in 

other governments’ calculations. 

These points are basic. The success of U.S. efforts to reduce the dangers of nuclear 

proliferation depends critically upon the U.S. upholding the standards it sets and 

doing all it can to encourage others to do likewise. That is why we believe that guaranteeing billions of dollars in federal loans to foreign nuclear suppliers, such as 

EDF, to expand their nuclear business in the U.S. without first requiring such suppliers to uphold the nonproliferation standards that U.S. nuclear vendors must live 

by is not just bad business, but dangerous. 

Respectfully, 

Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 

DOD Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy under Bush (41); 

Charles Ferguson, President, Federation of American Scientists; 

Jamie Fly, Executive Director, Foreign Policy Initiative, NSC director for Counterproliferation Policy under Bush (43); 

Jeffrey Kueter, President, George C. Marshall Institute; 

Victor Gilinsky, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner under Ford, Carter, and 

Reagan; 

Henry S. Rowen, Hoover Institution, Assistant Secretary of Defense under Bush 

(41), Chairman of the National Intelligence Council under Reagan; 

Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association; 

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Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation under Bush (43); 

Peter Bradford, University of Vermont, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner 

under Carter; 

Thomas Cochran, Chief Nuclear Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council; 

Chris Ford, Hudson Institute, U.S. Representative to NPT Review Conference under 

Bush (43); 

David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security; 

Mark Wallace, President, United Against Nuclear Iran, U.S. Ambassador to the 

U.N. under Bush (43); 

Gary Milhollin, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; 

Frank Von Hippel, Princeton University, Assistant Director for National Security in 

the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy under Clinton; 

Jack David, Hudson Institute, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Combating 

WMD and Negotiations Policy under Bush (43). 

SEPTEMBER 20, 2012. 

Hon. BARACK OBAMA, 

President of the United States, 

The White House, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are encouraged by reports that Taiwan has embraced 

the nonproliferation ‘‘Gold Standard’’ for civil nuclear activities in the forthcoming 

renewal of its existing nuclear cooperative agreement with the U.S., expressly giving 

up enriching uranium and recycling spent fuel to extract plutonium. We are concerned, however, that the State Department may not secure similar commitments 

in negotiations for civil nuclear cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, South 

Korea, Jordan, Vietnam, and other non-nuclear-weapon states. We therefore urge 

you to clarify U.S. policy on seeking such commitments before either negotiating or 

initialing any additional civil nuclear cooperation agreements beyond that with Taiwan. 

As recent experience with Iran demonstrates, mastery of the technical steps involved in making nuclear fuel brings states perilously close to acquiring nuclear 

weapons. That is why the U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United 

Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), which entered into force in December 2009, was pathbreaking. Through this agreement, the U.A.E. pledged not only to foreswear nuclear 

fuel-making activities, but to sign and implement the so-called ‘‘Additional Protocol,’’ 

which allows the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct much more intrusive nuclear inspections than those permitted under standard safeguards agreements. 

When the text of the U.S.-U.A.E. nuclear agreement was made public, the State 

Department described it as creating a new nonproliferation ‘‘Gold Standard’’ for civil 

nuclear cooperation agreements. At the time, you praised the agreement as a ‘‘tangible expression’’ of America’s desire to cooperate to develop peaceful nuclear power 

with states in ‘‘the Middle East, and elsewhere’’ in ‘‘a manner consistent with the 

highest nonproliferation, safety and security standards.’’ Yet, in an unfortunate reversal of policy earlier this year, senior officials from the State and Energy Departments told Congress in a letter that they believed efforts to universally apply the 

new standard would disadvantage the U.S. nuclear industry and, as a consequence, 

the U.S. instead would take a ‘‘case-by-case’’ approach. 

We understand that in response to congressional and public criticism of the decision to abandon the nonproliferation ‘‘Gold Standard,’’ the executive branch 

launched an interagency review, which the State Department has now completed 

and submitted to the National Security Council. 

Defining the nonproliferation conditions the United States intends to place on its 

civil nuclear cooperation in general is essential to protecting U.S. interests, and we 

believe requiring that the ‘‘Gold Standard’’ be met in all U.S. nuclear cooperative 

agreements with states that lack nuclear weapons is the necessary set of conditions 

to achieve that end. 

Indeed, we believe our government should not only support such requirements, 

but actively encourage other nuclear supplier states to do so as well. Therefore, we 

urge you to end the ambiguity that has arisen concerning this vital issue and to 

clearly state that it is U.S. policy to apply the ‘‘Gold Standard.’’ 

Sincerely, 

Congressman Howard L. Berman; Ambassador John R. Bolton; Peter A. 

Bradford; Charles D. Ferguson; Jamie M. Fly; Congressman Jeff 

Fortenberry; Victor Gilinsky; Daryl G. Kimball; Jodi Lieberman; ConFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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gressman Edward J. Markey; Gary Milhollin; Christopher E. Paine; 

Kingston Reif; Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen; Congressman 

Ed Royce; Congresswomen Loretta Sanchez; Gary J. Schmitt; Congressman Brad Sherman; Henry D. Sokolski; Leonard S. Spector; 

William H. Tobey; Leonard Weiss. 

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RESPONSES OF HON. THOMAS COUNTRYMAN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. I understand that Vietnam was willing to declare its intention, which 

is not legally binding, to only use foreign-supplied fuel for foreign-supplied reactors. 

That is close to the Gold Standard, if Vietnam cannot build its own reactors; call 

it, the ‘‘Silver Standard.’’ 

♦ My question is, why wasn’t Vietnam required to make this lesser, but still important, statement of intent into a binding part of its new agreement? Have you 

asked them to do that? 

Answer. Our approach to 123 agreements allows for flexibility in structuring the 

legal and political commitments while meeting the requirements for U.S. law and 

maintaining our principled stance that seeks the fewest number of additional weapons and enrichment and reprocessing facilities around the world. The United States 

firmly believes that it is in our national interest to enter into 123 agreements with 

as many countries as possible so that we can maximize the reach of U.S. nonproliferation controls, which are the most stringent in the world. 

With respect to Vietnam, the United States secured a political commitment from 

the Government of Vietnam to rely on the existing international market to satisfy 

their need for nuclear fuel services, rather than acquiring sensitive nuclear technologies. Vietnam has stated that it has no intent to enrich or reprocess nuclear 

material, and lacks the capability to do so. Given that there is no evidence that 

Vietnam has interest, activity, or capability in the ENR area, the United States concluded the agreement that incorporates the Vietnamese political commitment in the 

context of other legally binding U.S. nonproliferation controls contained in all 123 

agreements. 

Along with the terms of the 123 Agreement, the United States also secured Vietnam’s support for significant nonproliferation initiatives and steps. Since 2010, Vietnam has: 

• Brought into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA; 

• Brought into force the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; 

• Endorsed the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; 

• Completed conversion of the Dalat reactor from using HEU fuel to LEU and 

returned the last of its HEU fresh fuel and spent fuel to Russia; 

• Acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety; and 

• Brought into force the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. 

Question. When China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group—a move that the 

United States had to support, since the NSG operates on consensus—it agreed not 

to provide nuclear reactors to countries that do not have comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities. Yet, China continues to build new reactors in 

Pakistan, which does not have such comprehensive safeguards; this arguably weakens the NSG. 

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♦ What price should China pay for such noncompliance? Should it be an issue 

when a new China cooperation agreement comes to the Congress next year? 

Answer. China’s expanding civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan raises serious 

concerns and we urge China to be more transparent regarding this cooperation. 

The United States believes that the announced agreement for Chinese provision 

to Pakistan of new nuclear reactors extends beyond cooperation that was ‘‘grandfathered’’ when China was approved for Nuclear Security Group (NSG) membership 

in 2004. NSG Participating Governments have discussed the issue of China’s expansion of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan at the last several NSG plenary sessions, 

with the United States and other NSG members stating that they view the Chinese 

supply of these reactors as being inconsistent with the NSG Guidelines. We expect 

that the issue will continue to be raised by Participating Governments at NSG plenary sessions until China provides a comprehensive explanation or the cooperation 

is halted. 

The administration is currently in negotiations with China on a new 123 agreement. The issue of China’s potential nuclear cooperation with Pakistan will be 

further addressed when the new 123 agreement package for China comes before 

Congress. 

Question. In past section 123 agreements, we have touched upon environmental, 

health, and safety issues related to the use of nuclear energy. For example, in our 

agreement with Russia, article 17 has the parties cooperate in protecting the international environment from contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities, 

and our agreements with Japan and the Republic of Korea calls on the parties to 

exchange information in matters of health and safety. However, these treaty requirements are quite vague. 

♦ In light of the Fukushima disaster, should we consider changing this approach 

to flesh out and detail our conditions for addressing health, safety, and environmental impacts in future nuclear agreements? 

♦ Shouldn’t we be insisting that nations entering into new agreements commit to 

international best practices with regards to safety and protecting the environment? 

Answer. The United States has always placed the highest priority on ensuring 

that civil nuclear power reactors are operated in the safest and most reliable manner possible. The tragic events at Fukushima served to heighten U.S. efforts in this 

regard. 

The United States has a wide variety of means to enhance the safety of civil 

nuclear power. In this regard, the United States is currently working in bilateral 

and multilateral fora to encourage states to apply high standards of safety and environmental responsibility in conducting nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. We 

urge all states considering nuclear programs to take early account of the obligations 

of Contracting Parties under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, to become parties 

to that Convention, and participate in International Atomic Energy Agency peer 

review missions. All countries to which we have supplied a power reactor subject 

to one of our Agreements for Cooperation are parties to this Convention. 

The United States has a robust engagement strategy to work with those countries 

considering nuclear power programs to help them incorporate nuclear safety standards. We work bilaterally through programs such as the safety assistance programs 

offered by the U.S. Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and 

internationally through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regional nuclear safety organizations, such as the Asia Nuclear Safety Network. We 

also play a leadership role in the IAEA’s safety activities, working to establish a set 

of internationally accepted best practices. We believe this current combination of 

efforts has been, and will continue to be, extremely effective in raising the bar on 

global nuclear safety efforts in the post-Fukushima era. 

The United States also addresses the nuclear safety issues in the context of 123 

agreements. In both the terms of the agreements, and the NRC’s export licensing 

process, the United States ensures that any country engaging in civil nuclear cooperation with the United States abides by the highest nuclear safety standards in 

the world. 

RESPONSES OF DANIEL B. PONEMAN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Over the last 30 years, we have seen a significant decline in the U.S 

share of the market and in our ability to promote national security objectives 

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through peaceful nuclear cooperation. What are the principle reasons behind this 

decline? 

Answer. The reasons for the decline in U.S. share of the global civilian nuclear 

market are mainly due to three factors: (1) Lack of financing for U.S. technology; 

(2) more competition in the market; and (3) concerns about reliability of supply 

given the debate about the future of the U.S. civil nuclear program. While the first 

two elements are not within the administration’s direct control, assuring our partners that U.S. companies will remain reliable suppliers is of paramount importance. 

As our vendors become more engaged in finding solutions to financing concerns 

and buyers realize that the U.S. has the safest most reliable technology, our ability 

to put more 123s in place and promote our national security objectives will increase. 

Question. As you know, U.S. vendors are usually outbid by state-subsidized foreign competitors; U.S. reactors may be the best in the world, but second-best and 

far cheaper often win the bids. U.S. reactor vendors do not play on a fair playing 

field: what is the administration doing about that? Has the administration considered filing a complaint with the World Trade Organization for unfair trading practices against these subsidized foreign competitors? 

Answer. The administration has not considered filing a complaint with the World 

Trade Organization (WTO) for unfair trading practices against foreign competitors. 

In looking at the situation, while many competitors are partly or wholly owned by 

their governments, we do not believe that taking action in the WTO would be beneficial for our vendors or the global nuclear industry. Instead we are seeking ways 

to find financing solutions for U.S. companies to take advantage of when bidding 

on foreign projects. The administration has been working with Ex-Im Bank and 

other financial institutions to provide options that would place U.S. vendors on a 

level playing field with our foreign competitors. 

RESPONSES OF HON. THOMAS COUNTRYMAN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. Do nonnuclear weapons states have the right to enrich uranium or 

reprocess plutonium under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)? 

Answer. The NPT does not specifically delineate rights that Non-Nuclear Weapon 

States have to any particular type of nuclear technology. Rather, the treaty states 

that all parties to the treaty have the inalienable right to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, the treaty makes 

an important qualification; the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be 

exercised according to a party’s nonproliferation obligations. A party, like Iran, that 

has repeatedly developed clandestine capabilities that could support a nuclear weapons program, remained in chronic violation of IAEA safeguards, and failed satisfactorily to explain that possible military dimensions are, in fact, part of a purely 

peaceful program, has not fulfilled its nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, 

therefore has no right to technologies—like enrichment—that otherwise could be 

permissible under Article IV of the treaty. NPT states party that violate the terms 

of their safeguards agreements are not entitled to the benefits of peaceful nuclear 

cooperation under the treaty. 

Question. Do you think the existence of a (now internationally accepted) uranium 

enrichment program in Iran will make it more or less difficult to limit the spread 

of ENR technology? 

Answer. The United States and its international partners have not ‘‘accepted’’ 

Iran’s uranium enrichment program and certainly do not accept Iran’s claim that 

it has a ‘‘right’’ to enrich. The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in no way acknowledges 

Iran’s quest for recognition of any ‘‘right to enrichment.’’ 

In line with the Obama administration’s long-standing policy opposing the spread 

of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies, the JPOA halts progress on the 

most worrisome elements of Iran’s nuclear program and rolls it back in key respects, 

including by limiting Iran’s enrichment capacity and diluting or converting Iran’s 

stockpile of near 20 percent low enriched uranium. 

As the United States conducts negotiations on a long-term comprehensive solution 

to provide confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, we will 

continue our efforts to combat the proliferation of ENR technologies, making use of 

the various tools at our disposal to achieve our nonproliferation goals. 

Question. Do you agree with the assessment in the recently released Defense 

Science Board study that there is a serious and growing gap in our nuclear moniFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

73 

toring and verification capabilities to prevent further nuclear proliferation diversions from ostensibly ‘‘peaceful’’ nuclear programs? 

Answer. The United States has long supported efforts to strengthen international 

verification of peaceful nuclear activities through the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thanks in no small measure to U.S. technical assistance that dates back to 1977, the IAEA has a robust technical capability 

to monitor declared nuclear materials and facilities. 

Even with this capability, we recognize that there are limits to the capability of 

nuclear monitoring techniques to detect clandestine nuclear activities, especially at 

undeclared locations. Since the early 1990s, when Iraq’s clandestine nuclear activities came to light, we have made it a priority to strengthen the IAEA’s ability to 

respond to indications of undeclared nuclear activities, in order to fulfill its mandate 

to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in a given state. The international community now expects the IAEA to follow up on credible information from any source, 

including intelligence sources. The Additional Protocol gives the IAEA expanded 

information and access rights to enable it to provide an assurance of the absence 

of undeclared activities. Since 1997, 122 countries, including the United States, 

have brought additional protocols in force. 

We have also redoubled our efforts to strengthen IAEA technical tools to detect 

clandestine nuclear activity. The State Department provided financial and technical 

support to the successful project to upgrade the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories. 

In 2008, the Department of Energy launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to strengthen its technical capabilities to support IAEA safeguards, 

including by revitalizing the technology and human capital base at national 

laboratories. 

For any comment on our intelligence posture and capabilities I would refer you 

to the Intelligence Community. As for the report itself we are reviewing the findings 

and recommendations and will continue to look for ways to enhance international 

verification measures. 

Question. Have you or any other administration official actually asked their foreign counterparts in other key nuclear supplier states—e.g., Russia, China, Japan, 

Korea, Holland, Germany, France—if they would be willing to adhere to the Gold 

Standard in their own exports of nuclear goods? 

Answer. The United States has ongoing, robust discussions with the major 

nuclear suppliers about efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime 

and prevent further proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. 

In 2004, the United States proposed a new initiative in the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group (NSG), which includes all the major nuclear supplier states, to ban new 

transfers of ENR technologies to states that did not already possess such fully operational facilities. It took years of U.S.-led global diplomatic efforts and a new 

approach to finally achieve a revision in 2011 to the NSG Guidelines that significantly tightened the criteria regarding possible ENR technology transfers. The revision limits transfers of ENR technology to only those partners that meet significant 

nonproliferation and economic criteria and can only be transferred in a way that 

does not allow recipients to gain access to key sensitive technologies (a so-called 

‘‘black box.’’) The NSG continues to explore ways to further tighten and clarify its 

guidelines. 

Additionally, the United States consults bilaterally with other supplier states on 

a regular basis, and we consistently reinforce our long-standing policy to combat the 

proliferation of ENR technologies and our desire for other suppliers to adopt similar 

measures. Through these consultations, we see no indication that other suppliers 

have any interest in providing these sensitive technologies to states that do not 

already possess them. 

RESPONSES OF DANIEL B. PONEMAN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. Do nonnuclear weapons states have the right to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? 

Answer. The NPT does not specifically delineate rights that Non-Nuclear Weapon 

States have to any particular type of nuclear technology. Rather, the treaty states 

that all parties to the treaty have the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, the treaty makes an 

important qualification; the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be exercised according to a party’s nonproliferation obligations. A party, like Iran, that has 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

74 

repeatedly developed clandestine capabilities that could support a nuclear weapons 

program, remained in chronic violation of IEA safeguards, and failed satisfactorily 

to explain that possible military dimensions are in fact part of a purely peaceful program, has not fulfilled its nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, therefore has 

no right to technologies—like enrichment—that otherwise could be permissible 

under article IV of the treaty. NPT States Party that violate the terms of their safeguards agreements are not entitled to the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation 

under the treaty. 

Question. Do you think the existence of a (now internationally accepted) uranium 

enrichment program in Iran will make it more or less difficult to limit the spread 

of ENR technology? 

Answer. The United States and its international partners have not ‘‘accepted’’ 

Iran’s uranium enrichment program and certainly do not accept Iran’s claim that 

it has a ‘‘right’’ to enrich. The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in no way acknowledges 

Iran’s quest for recognition of any ‘‘right to enrichment.’’ 

In line with the Obama administration’s long-standing policy opposing the spread 

of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies, the JPOA halts progress on the 

most worrisome elements of Iran’s nuclear program and rolls it back in key respects, 

including by limiting Iran’s enrichment capacity and diluting or converting Iran’s 

stockpile of near 20-percent low enriched uranium. 

As the United States conducts negotiations on a long-term comprehensive solution 

to provide confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, we will 

continue our efforts to combat the proliferation of ENR technologies, making use of 

the various tools at our disposal to achieve our nonproliferation goals. 

Question. Do you agree with the assessment in the recently released Defense 

Science Board study that there is a serious and growing gap in our nuclear monitoring and verification capabilities to prevent further nuclear proliferation diversions from ostensibly ‘‘peaceful’’ nuclear programs? 

Answer. The United States has long supported efforts to strengthen international 

verification of peaceful nuclear activities through the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thanks in no small measure to U.S. technical assistance that dates back to 1977, the IAEA has a robust technical capability 

to monitor declared nuclear materials and facilities. 

Even with this capability, we recognize that there are limits to the capability of 

nuclear monitoring techniques to detect clandestine nuclear activities, especially at 

undeclared locations. Since the early 1990s, when Iraq’s clandestine nuclear activities came to light, we have made it a priority to strengthen the IAEA’s ability to 

respond to indications of undeclared nuclear activities, in order to fulfill its mandate 

to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in a given state. The international community now expects the IAEA to follow up on credible information from any source, 

including intelligence sources. The Additional Protocol gives the IAEA expanded 

information and access rights to enable it to provide an assurance of the absence 

of undeclared activities. Since 1997, 122 countries, including the United States, 

have brought additional protocols in force. 

We have also redoubled our efforts to strengthen IAEA technical tools to detect 

clandestine nuclear activity. The State Department provided financial and technical 

support to the successful project to upgrade the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories. 

In 2008, the Department of Energy launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to strengthen its technical capabilities to support IAEA safeguards, 

including by revitalizing the technology and human capital base at national laboratories. 

For any comment on our intelligence posture and capabilities I would refer you 

to the intelligence community. As for the report itself we are reviewing the findings 

and recommendations and will continue to look for ways to enhance international 

verification measures. 

Question. Have you or any other administration official actually asked their foreign counterparts in other key nuclear supplier states—e.g., Russia, China, Japan, 

Korea, Holland, Germany, France) if they would be willing to adhere to the Gold 

Standard in their own exports of nuclear goods? 

Answer. The United States has ongoing, robust discussions with the major 

nuclear suppliers about efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime 

and prevent further proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. 

In 2004, the United States proposed a new initiative in the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group (NSG), which includes all the major nuclear supplier states, to ban new 

transfers of ENR technologies to states that did not already possess such fully operFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

75 

ational facilities. It took years of U.S.-led global diplomatic efforts and a new 

approach to finally achieve a revision in 2011 to the NSG Guidelines that significantly tightened the criteria regarding possible ENR technology transfers. The revision limits transfers of ENR technology to only those partners that meet significant 

nonproliferation and economic criteria and can only be transferred in a way that 

does not allow recipients to gain access to key sensitive technologies (a so-called 

‘‘black box.’’) The NSG continues to explore ways to further tighten and clarify its 

guidelines. 

Additionally, the United States consults bilaterally with other supplier states on 

a regular basis, and we consistently reinforce our long-standing policy to combat the 

proliferation of ENR technologies and our desire for other suppliers to adopt similar 

measures. Through these consultations, we see no indication that other suppliers 

have any interest in providing these sensitive technologies to states that do not 

already possess them. 

RESPONSES OF HENRY D. SOKOLSKI TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. Do you agree with the Congressional Research Service’s tally of U.S.- 

controlled nuclear exports over the last 4 years being roughly $1.4 billion (i.e., just 

roughly $300–$400 million a year) and that most of these exports were nuclear fuel 

services (enriched gas)? 

How many American jobs do you estimate are generated by these nuclear exports? 

Have you done a nuclear specific analysis? 

Answer. The Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) and, Senator Markey recently released analyses based on official and 

industry trade figures and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission export license 

records. According to the GAO 2010 report, which tracked exports from 1994–2008, 

the United States on average exported $1.4 billion annually in nuclear fuel and 

$290 million in reactor components. Using the Commerce Department figure of $1 

billion in exports is worth 5,000–10,000 jobs, the number of jobs U.S. nuclear 

exports represents would be 8,500 to 17,000. This range, however, may need to be 

pushed downward because GAO determined U.S. share of global nuclear exports 

annually declined during this period 25 percent down to 10 percent. Also, the 

amount of U.S. domestic manufacturing of U.S.-designed reactor parts declined significantly during this period. So it would be likely that the exports represented U.S.- 

designed parts that were manufactured oversees in whole or in part much more 

today than in 1994. This would reduce the jobs numbers even further. 

Question. Isn’t it correct that given that most of the U.S. nuclear industry’s business is in nuclear fuel services, the industry actually benefits when countries commit to not enrich or reprocess? 

Answer. Yes. The nuclear vending industry, however, is opposed to any additional 

restrictions on potential future markets, perhaps, because the value of their industry will only decline unless they can convince investors that every one of the inflated 

number of reactor sales they claim are possible are certain and will actually occur. 

Question. The nuclear industry has argued that Vietnam is the largest prospective 

nuclear market for U.S. companies in Asia. If so, what do you make of Vietnam’s 

recent announcement that it is delaying the start of construction of its first Russian 

nuclear plant by at least 6 years to 2020? 

Answer. The take away from this news is that our negotiators apparently were 

overeager in striking this deal with Vietnam as early as they did. It appears that, 

at the very least, they prematurely short on the nonproliferation conditions they 

might otherwise have gotten. Whether the United States could have gotten a better 

deal would have depended largely on whether or not our negotiators made a serious 

effort to convince ROSATOM, URENCO, AREVA, and Japanese and Korean nuclear 

vendors who either wish to do significant business in the United States or who currently do, to adopt nonproliferation conditions similar to those we asked for of the 

UAE and Taiwan. Since we have yet to seriously negotiate for the adoption of the 

Gold Standard with other nuclear suppliers, though, we don’t yet know what is 

possible. 

Question. If this is the best market for U.S. nuclear exports in East Asia, what 

does this tell us about the prospects for sales elsewhere? Where exactly are these 

U.S. reactor markets outside of countries with which we already have 123 agreements? 

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Answer. What it tells us is that the prospects for the United States selling any 

reactors to states that don’t already have a 123 agreement are poor with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia. Outside of the Saudi market, U.S. reactor sales will 

be few and far between for quite awhile. Europe is closing down at least as many 

reactors as it might be interested in building and the handful of new Euro builds 

are more likely to be Russian and French machines than plants built by Westinghouse or GE in cooperation with Japanese nuclear vendors. Japan will not be 

importing new U.S. reactors nor will Korea or China. Each, moreover, has scaled 

back their pre-Fukushima nuclear building plans. Whatever reactors they do build 

will be constructed almost entirely with domestic engineers and domestic content. 

India, meanwhile, is unlikely to change its nuclear accident liability laws to suit the 

demands of any U.S. nuclear exporter. This leaves the Saudi market, which is most 

controversial. The Saudis, who have sovereign credit of their own, say they want 

to import 16 reactors by 2030. Senior Saudis, though, have also made it clear that 

Saudi Arabia is interested in developing a bomb option if Iran is allowed to get 

nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear industry officials and State officials have not yet 

come out in favor yet of cutting any deal that would allow Saudi Arabia to enrich 

or reprocess. This possibility, however, deserves watching. 

RESPONSES OF SHARON SQUASSONI TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. Do you agree with the Congressional Research Service’s tally of U.S. 

nuclear exports over the last 4 years being roughly $1.4 billion (roughly $300–$400 

million per year) and that most of these exports were nuclear fuel services? 

Answer. Assigning a figure to U.S. nuclear exports has been difficult because of 

deficiencies in reporting. The November 2010 GAO report on Nuclear Commerce 

(GAO 11–36) highlighted the fact that the government does not track the amount 

and value of exports associated with U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. 

The only figures available are from the industry itself, but even industry experts 

acknowledge that it is difficult to tally. 

The U.S. has not exported reactors in the last 4 years, but it has probably 

exported major components and certainly it has exported services, including uranium enrichment. Its engineering, procurement and construction firms (e.g., Bechtel, URS, Shaw) have been involved in many reactor retrofits and new construction 

projects. In the case of reactor sales to China (AP–1000), the Westinghouse agreement allowed for significant indigenous supply, reducing the potential for U.S. 

exports. 

Fuel exports and services (conversion, uranium enrichment) certainly constitute 

a significant market within the nuclear industry. Of a total market of about $25 

billion annually for reactor fuel (estimate from 2009 from URENCO for 2015), the 

market value is broken down as follows: 

Yellowcake (U3O8)—$14 billion; 

Conversion—$1 billion; 

Enrichment—$8 billion; 

Fuel fabrication—$2 billion. 

In enrichment, U.S. enrichment (USEC) was supplying about a quarter of that 

market, or $2 billion. 

Question. How many American jobs do you estimate are generated by these 

nuclear exports? Have you done a nuclear-specific analysis? 

Answer. I have not done an analysis of the employment implications of U.S. 

nuclear exports because the relative lack of data does not support a credible analysis. However, if one assumes that those exports are confined to nuclear fuel services, then one could estimate employment levels in uranium conversion (the only 

plant is the Honeywell-Converdyn facility in Metropolis, IL) and enrichment (USEC 

and the URENCO LES facility) and the percentage of that employment devoted to 

exports. However, the numbers are tricky because of the globalization of nuclear 

industry services. Although USEC supplies 25 percent of the international market, 

U.S. reactors constitute 25 percent of global enrichment demand. However, U.S. 

utilities have purchased a predominant portion of their enrichment from overseas, 

precisely because USEC is exporting its enrichment services. This ‘‘swap’’ actually 

serves U.S. nonproliferation policy quite well by attaching U.S. conditions on fuel 

that otherwise might not have such nonproliferation conditions. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Question. Isn’t it correct that, given that most of the U.S. nuclear industry’s business is in nuclear fuel services, the industry actually benefits when countries commit to not enrich or reprocess? 

Answer. Current providers of enrichment and reprocessing services do benefit 

from a market wherein entry is constrained, either by virtue of the industry’s oligopolistic nature or because of political commitments. Since the United States does not 

reprocess, it has no industry that would benefit from commitments not to reprocess. 

In the case of enrichment, U.S. firms would benefit as would French, Russian, and 

European firms. That market is characterized by high barriers to entry (in terms 

of investment and technology), a small number of technology holders, long-term contracts, and longstanding supply arrangements. It is very difficult for new suppliers 

to enter into the market. Nonetheless, this argues for emphasis on political commitments, precisely because it calls into question the economic motivations for new 

entrants into the fuel cycle services market. 

Question. The nuclear industry has argued that Vietnam is the largest prospective 

nuclear market for U.S. companies in Asia. If so, what do you make of Vietnam’s 

recent announcement that it is delaying the start of construction of its first Russian 

nuclear plant by at least 5 years to 2020? 

Answer. Any significant growth in nuclear power globally will occur in Asia— 

mostly in China and Korea, with new entrants into nuclear power in Southeast 

Asia, like Vietnam. Since both China and Korea are moving aggressively to indigenize their own supply chains, there is likely little opportunity for U.S. fuel services. 

Vietnam is the first of several countries in Southeast Asia to move forward with nuclear power and is significantly more organized than other countries in the region. 

The extent to which this represents a market for U.S. nuclear fuel is another question. If Vietnam builds Russian VVER reactors, the first few fuel cores are likely 

to be sourced solely by Russia. In the future, perhaps, Vietnam could contract out 

for other fuel services on the front end. In any event, the postponement of 

construction of the first VVERs is a negative development for all nuclear suppliers 

involved. 

Question. If this is the best market for U.S. nuclear exports in Southeast Asia, 

what does this tell us about the prospects for sales elsewhere? Where exactly are 

these U.S. reactor markets outside of countries with which we already have 123 

agreements? 

Answer. The countries most likely to build nuclear power plants in the next 10 

years include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Jordan. The United States has 

123 agreements with the UAEA and Turkey, but no agreements yet with Saudi 

Arabia or Jordan. Those two countries are unlikely to agree to a clause in their 123 

agreements restricting enrichment and reprocessing. In fact, the delay in signing 

agreements with those countries is in part due to negotiations over such provisions. 

RESPONSES OF MARVIN S. FERTEL TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. Do you agree with the Congressional Research Service’s tally of U.S.- 

controlled nuclear exports over the last 4 years being roughly $1.4 billion (i.e., just 

roughly $300–$400 million a year) and that most of these exports were nuclear fuel 

services (enriched gas)? 

Answer. We disagree for the following reasons: 

• The CRS tally is $9.1 billion over the last 4 years. The only recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) tally of commercial nuclear exports of which we 

are aware is dated November 19, 2013. It totals $9.1 billion for 2009 to 2012 

($7.7 billion in natural and enriched uranium and plutonium and $1.4 billion 

in nuclear reactors and major components) or roughly $2.3 billion per year. 

Although the CRS tally indicates that there were more substantially more 

exports under specific commodity codes for natural uranium (284410) and 

enriched uranium/plutonium (284420) than for nuclear reactors (8401), the 

report does not specify that ‘‘most of these nuclear exports were nuclear fuel 

services (enriched gas.)’’ If your question refers to a different assessment, please 

forward it and we would be happy to provide you with feedback. 

• Both GAO and CRS note data omissions. The November 2013 CRS tally aims 

to update a 2010 GAO analysis of U.S. nuclear exports from 1994 to 2008. The 

GAO analysis indicates that ‘‘no single federal agency systematically tracks and 

reports the data necessary to determine the amount and value of U.S. nuclear 

exports . . .’’ (p.10). The GAO adopted a methodology which uses U.N. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Comtrade data as a proxy for nuclear exports and notes further that there was 

‘‘no available data regarding exports of services.’’ The CRS memo also mentions 

significant inconsistencies in the data available to assess nuclear exports. It 

specifically cites the absence in U.N. Comtrade data of Taiwan as an importer 

of U.S. nuclear products or components. During CRS’ data period, GE-Hitachi 

has been constructing two nuclear power plants in Taiwan, and the United 

States is the main exporter of nuclear components, fuel and services to Taiwan. 

Coupled with the acknowledged lack of services data, it appears that the U.N. 

Comtrade data (on which both the CRS tally and GAO report are based) contains significant omissions. 

• GAO and CRS methodology does not accurately reflect the scope of nuclear 

exports. Both the GAO report and the CRS memo count exports based only on 

a limited subset of the items that are typically included in the export scope of 

a nuclear energy project. Depending on the maturity of the nuclear market, the 

project scope can include many elements from the Nuclear Island, Turbine 

Island, Balance of Plant and Construction and Site Preparation (see attached 

list of components in a typical nuclear plant). In addition to components, such 

things as project management services, engineering and design, construction 

management, commissioning, training, licensing and other ongoing service and 

support are typically exported as part of a nuclear power project’s full scope. 

U.S. nuclear exports to China provide a good example of the difference 

between the U.N. Comtrade’s reported value of a narrow set of exports (8401) 

and the total value of nuclear exports associated with a project’s scope. U.N. 

Comtrade indicates the total value of Chinese imports from the United States 

under code 8401 from 2009 to 2012 at less than $100 million, yet the U.S. manufactured equipment and manpower scope for just the four Westinghouse 

AP1000 units in China exceeds $3 billion. Coupled with the data limitations 

noted above, this clearly demonstrates that the GAO and CRS tallies underestimate the value of U.S. nuclear exports by a substantial degree. 

Question. How many American jobs do you estimate are generated by these 

nuclear exports? Have you done a nuclear specific analysis? 

Answer. Although no nuclear-specific analysis exists, the Department of Commerce estimates that each $1 billion in exports creates or sustains 5,000 to 10,000 

jobs. If U.S. exporters were able to capture 25 percent of the global nuclear market—estimated at $500 billion to $750 billion over the next 10 years—this would 

create (or sustain) up to 185,000 high-paying American jobs. 

Question. Isn’t it correct that given that most of the U.S. nuclear industry’s business is in nuclear fuel services, the industry actually benefits when countries commit to not enrich or reprocess? 

Answer. As stated above, the U.N. Comtrade data that GAO and CRS selected 

omit all high-value service exports and many high-value component exports. Based 

on these omissions and the other flaws in the data noted above, it is not possible 

to conclude that exports of nuclear fuel services are greater than other types of 

nuclear exports. 

We are aware of claims by foreign critics of binding restrictions on enrichment 

and reprocessing (such as the so-called ‘‘gold standard’’) that the U.S. Government 

is promoting such restrictions in order to advance the economic interests of the U.S. 

civil nuclear industry. While we cannot speak for the U.S. Government, we have no 

reason to believe that the U.S. Government is promoting such restrictions for reasons other than nuclear nonproliferation. And like the U.S, Government, the U.S. 

nuclear industry has a vested interest in ensuring that peaceful nuclear technology 

is not diverted for other purposes. As I stated in my testimony, the nuclear industry 

supports efforts to limit the spread of uranium enrichment and used fuel reprocessing (E&R) consistent with current U.S. policy. But all indications are that a unilateral and inflexible requirement that potential trading partner countries forswear 

E&R as a condition for a Section 123 agreement would have the perverse effect of 

undermining U.S. nonproliferation interests by significantly reducing the number of 

countries willing to engage in civil nuclear commerce with the United States. 

Other nuclear suppliers—like Russia, France, Japan and South Korea—stand 

ready to engage in nuclear commerce with other countries, whether or not those 

countries have concluded a 123 agreement with the United States, and in many 

cases whether or not they intend to refrain from E&R. As a result, the net effect 

of refusing to conclude 123 agreements with countries that are unwilling to 

renounce E&R would be to encourage them to do business with other suppliers, 

thereby forgoing the economic and national security benefits of commercial nuclear 

engagement. 

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When a country like the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) is willing, in the context 

of a Section 123 agreement with the United States, to renounce E&R, the United 

States should include that commitment in the Section 123 agreement. But when a 

country, which otherwise demonstrates its intent to develop an exclusively peaceful 

commercial nuclear energy program, makes clear that it is unwilling to renounce 

E&R in a bilateral agreement with the United States, it would be self-defeating to 

forego the nonproliferation and other benefits to the United States of concluding a 

Section 123 agreement with that country. 

Industry respects the decisions by Taiwan and U.A.E. to commit not to develop 

E&R, but the circumstances that led these governments to make that commitment 

will not be present in all cases. Taiwan, for example, has minimal need for E&R 

because its fleet of nuclear power plants is small. 

The United States also had unusual leverage in negotiation of the renewal agreement because Taiwan relies on the United States to enable its nuclear trade with 

other supplier countries, and because of the important United States-Taiwan security partnership. 

Question. The nuclear industry has argued that Vietnam is the largest prospective 

nuclear market for U.S. companies in Asia. If so, what do you make of Vietnam’s 

recent announcement that it is delaying the start of construction of its first Russian 

nuclear plant by at least 6 years to 2020? 

Answer. We have seen media reports that the Vietnamese Government has 

decided to delay the construction of two VVER–1000 reactors supplied by Russia’s 

AtomStroyExport at Ninh Thuan and may also delay the Japanese-supplied units 

at Vinh Hai. Although some early reports mentioned a delay of up to 6 years, recent 

statements indicate that the delay is expected to be only 2 or 3 years. 

News reports and public statements attribute this delay to technology selection 

and ensuring that nuclear energy is developed in a safe manner. The U.S. nuclear 

industry places paramount value on nuclear safety and stands ready to assist the 

Vietnamese in developing a world-class, safe and secure nuclear energy program. 

We see the obvious priority Vietnam is attaching to nuclear safety as an encouraging sign for future U.S. nuclear cooperation. We therefore commend the Vietnamese Government for placing a very high priority on ensuring nuclear safety, and 

we also laud the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its leadership in 

ensuring that new nuclear nations have the support needed to understand the true 

requirements of implementing a nuclear energy program. 

Question. If this is the best market for U.S. nuclear exports in East Asia, what 

does this tell us about the prospects for sales elsewhere? Where exactly are these 

U.S. reactor markets outside of countries with which we already have 123 agreements? 

Answer. Worldwide, 172 nuclear power plants are planned or on order. According 

to the World Nuclear Association, over 45 countries are, as of January 2014, actively 

considering embarking on nuclear power programs. These range from sophisticated 

economies to developing ones. Multiple countries planning to develop nuclear energy 

for the first time lack a Section 123 agreement with the United States. Among these 

countries, Saudi Arabia has the most ambitious development plans—16 nuclear 

power plants at an estimated cost of $112 billion. In addition to Vietnam and Saudi 

Arabia, nations like Jordan and Malaysia have near-term plans for nuclear development. Longer term, nations like the Gulf States, Chile, and the Philippines have 

expressed interest in developing nuclear energy programs. Further, several existing 

nuclear trading partners have Section 123 agreements that require renewal in the 

next 2 years. These include China and the Republic of Korea. All of these markets 

provide excellent prospects for U.S. nuclear exports if we are allowed to participate 

in them. 

Question. Mr. Fertel, given the stakes if countries seeking civilian nuclear programs exploit that technology and knowhow to develop a nuclear weapons program, 

what, if any, additional congressional oversight is the U.S. nuclear industry willing 

to accept to mediate the proliferation risk? 

Answer. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) provides Congress with substantial oversight responsibilities. Congress may request briefings, hold hearings, 

and report a recommendation to approve or disapprove agreements for civil nuclear 

cooperation. Our industry would be pleased to provide briefings or testimony on the 

merits of any specific agreement. If Congress finds an agreement lacking, Section 

130i of the AEA provides expedited procedures for a resolution of disapproval to be 

filed and acted on. 

As stated in my testimony, securing these agreements early and with a broad set 

of partners serves the U.S. national security, nuclear safety, and economic interest. 

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Any change in the process introduces additional obstacles or delays will increase the 

risk that these nations will partner with other nuclear suppliers. Without agreements in force, we forfeit exports, jobs, and commercial benefits, and we will fail 

to influence these programs in terms of their nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation norms. 

There may, of course, be room to improve the consultative process between Congress and the executive branch as 123 agreements are negotiated, but as an industry we defer to those two branches of government to work out any improvements 

to that process. 

Question. Mr. Fertel, what nuclear deal or commerce would be jeopardized if Congress was allowed to vote on any new nuclear cooperation agreement that did not 

meet the Gold Standard? 

Answer. It is my belief that a requirement for affirmative approval of Section 123 

agreements will discourage their entry into force. And certainly supporters of this 

idea acknowledge that their intention is to make it harder to bring into force certain 

123 agreements. Nothing in current law prevents Congress from voting to disapprove or modify a Section 123 agreement. As stated above, Section 130i of the 

AEA provides expedited procedures to facilitate a vote. In the past, Congress has 

taken the initiative to legislate on Section 123 agreements with China, India, and 

most recently the Republic of Korea. 

As stated in my testimony, we believe that few potential export markets will be 

willing to follow the United Arab Emirates and Taiwan in renouncing E&R in a bilateral 123 agreement with the United States. In practice, a statutory requirement 

that Congress vote on agreements without the ‘‘gold standard’’ would require an 

affirmative vote on most future Section 123 agreements. The delay and uncertainty 

associated with an affirmative vote requirement would send a discouraging signal 

to prospective partners, and cause an immediate decline U.S. exports, jobs and 

influence on global nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation. 

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ATTACHMENT: LIST OF COMPONENTS IN A TYPICAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

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ANALYSIS OF EXPORT LICENSES UNDER NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

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