140 Nev., Advance Opinion 07 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

BO JONES AND DAN JONES, 

HUSBAND AND WIFE, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

HAMED GHADIRI, AN INDIVIDUAL, 

Respondent. 

No. 85305 

FIED 

Appeal from a district court summary judgment in a real 

property dispute. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Crystal 

Eller, Judge. 

Affirrned. 

Black & Wadharns and Allison R. Schmidt, Las Vegas, 

for Appellants. 

Law Office of Malik W. Ahmad and Malik W. Ahnnad, Las Vegas, 

for Respondent. 

Maupin, Cox & LeGoy and Rick R. Hsu, Reno, 

for Amicus Curiae the State Bar of Nevada, Real Property Section. 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.1

1The Honorable Patricia Lee, Justice, being disqualified, did not 

participate in the decision of this matter. 

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OPINION 

By the Court, STIGLICH, J.: 

Long before the parties acquired ownership of their respective 

properties, a block wall was erected to divide the neighboring lots. When 

respondent discovered that the wall did not follow the property line and, 

consequently, that he was being denied the use of his property, he sought to 

remove the wall and build a new one on the property line. In response, 

appellants filed a complaint in the district court for, among other things, a 

prescriptive easement or adverse possession. The district court found that 

appellants could not prevail on their claim for adverse possession because 

they did not pay the property taxes on the disputed property. The district 

court further found that a prescriptive easement was unavailable because 

it would result in respondent's complete exclusion from the subject 

property. Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment for 

respondent, determining that appellants are not entitled to a prescriptive 

easement or adverse possession as a matter of law. 

We take this opportunity to distinguish the two concepts, as 

they are fundamentally different and give rise to distinct relief. As Nevada 

law does not concretely declare whether we recognize comprehensive 

prescriptive easements, easements that result in the complete exclusion of 

the servient estate from the subject property, we examine the approaches 

taken by sister jurisdictions. While several states have categorically 

rejected comprehensive prescriptive easements, California has adopted the 

view that exceptional circumstances may give rise to such easements. 

Considering both our caselaw and California caselaw, we are persuaded 

that exceptional circumstances may warrant comprehensive prescriptive 

easements. However, we stress that such relief is rare. As appellants have 

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not demonstrated exceptional circumstances, we affirm the district court's 

order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

In 2015, appellants Bo and Dan Jones purchased property in 

Las Vegas. Immediately thereafter, the Joneses made substantial 

improvements near a block wall that had been erected in 1989 and that ran 

between their property and the neighboring property. These improvements 

included the installation of recreational vehicle utility hookups and a new 

iron gate. When not traveling, the Joneses also stored their recreational 

vehicle next to the block wall. 

In 2016, respondent Hamed Ghadiri purchased the propertv 

located on the other side of the block wall. Several years later, Ghadiri 

discovered that a portion of his property was on the Joneses' side of the 

block wall (the disputed property). The disputed property is 591 square feet 

in size. Ghadiri commissioned a survey of the property line, which 

confirmed that the wall was not on the property line and that the disputed 

property was on Ghadiri's side of the lot line. Ghadiri acquired a permit to 

destroy the block wall and install a new wall on the property line at his 

expense. 

The Joneses filed a complaint against Ghadiri for, inter alia, a 

prescriptive easement, adverse possession, and a temporary restraining 

order. Although the district court granted a temporary restraining order, it 

denied the Joneses' subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction. This 

court affirmed the district court's denial, Jones v. Ghadiri, No. 83184, 2022 

WL 3336143 (Nev. Aug. 11, 2022) (Order of Affirmance), and Ghadiri 

removed the wall sometime thereafter. 

Later, Ghadiri moved for summary judgment against the 

Joneses' claims for adverse possession and a prescriptive easement. 

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Ghadiri asked the court to dismiss the Joneses claim for adverse possession 

because the Joneses had not paid property taxes on the disputed property. 

Relying heavily on California caselaw, Ghadiri further contended that a 

prescriptive easement was unavailable, as it would result in his complete 

exclusion from the disputed property. The Joneses asserted that a question 

of fact remained as to who paid taxes on the disputed property and that 

Nevada caselaw recognizes prescriptive easements resulting in a 

landowner's complete exclusion frorn the subject property.2

After granting summary judgment in Ghadiri's favor as to the 

claim for adverse possession, the district court noted that the Joneses' claim 

for a prescriptive easement was "essentially a meshing of adverse 

possession with a prescriptive easement." Given the dearth of Nevada 

caselaw on the availability of such easements, the district court considered 

cases from neighboring states, such as California and Arizona. Following 

those cases, the court determined that a prescriptive easement "simply 

cannot be so extensive as to create the practical equivalent of an exclusive 

possessory estate" and that adverse use, as an element of a claim for a 

prescriptive easement, "cannot result in the complete exclusion of the owner 

of the servient estate." The district court noted that an unpublished Nevada 

case, CSA Development, LLC v. Bryant, No. 68444, 2016 WL 7105072 (Nev. 

Dec. 2, 2016) (Order of Affirmance), arguably recognized the availability of 

prescriptive easements that result in the servient estates' complete 

exclusion from the subject property. Ultimately, however, the district court 

21n relation to their claim for adverse possession, the Joneses argued 

that a question of fact remained as to who paid taxes on the disputed 

property because property taxes are partly based on visual inspections 

conducted every five years. As the Joneses do not challenge the district 

court's order as to their claim for adverse possession, we do not address it 

further. 

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indicated that the case had little persuasive value because it lacked clarity 

as to when such a prescriptive easement was available. Finding that no 

exceptional circumstances justified the Joneses' requested prescriptive 

easement, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri 

on the claim. The Joneses now appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

The Joneses primary contention on appeal is that because they 

were entitled to a prescriptive easement as a matter of law, the district court 

erred in granting Ghadiri's motion for summary judgment.3 We review a 

district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 

121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). "Surnmary judgment is 

appropriate . . . when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are properly before 

the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the 

moving party is entitled to judgrnent as a matter of law." Id. at 731, 121 

P.3d at 1031. We "review questions of law, including interpretation of 

caselaw, de novo." Martin v. Martin, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 78, 520 P.3d 813, 

817 (2022). 

Adverse possession versus easements 

As acknowledged by the district court, the arguments and 

claims for adverse possession and a prescriptive easement became muddled 

below. And while the Joneses do not challenge the district court's rejection 

of their adverse possession claim, it is necessary for us to distinguish the 

3The Joneses also contend that the district court erred by admitting 

Ghadiri's survey because it was unauthenticated. As the Joneses did not 

raise this argument below, we decline to entertain it. See Diamond Enters., 

Inc. v. Lau, 113 Nev, 1376, 1378, 951 P.2d 73, 74 (1997) ("It is well 

established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal need not be 

considered by this court."). 

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concepts before considering the propriety of the Joneses' claim for a 

prescriptive easement. 

"Adverse possession is a doctrine under which a person in 

possession of real property owned by someone else may acquire valid 

title . . . ." 142 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 349 (originally published in 2014). 

The holder of valid title is vested with all property rights, including the 

right to exclusively control the property, subject to any easernents. See City 

of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) 

(explaining that generally, "an owner has the right to the exclusive 

possession and control of his property") (citing Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo., 

389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965)). "[A]n adverse possessor is required to show 

that the occupation of the property is hostile, actual, peaceable, open, 

notorious, continuous and uninterrupted." Triplett v. David H. Fulstone 

Co., 109 Nev. 216, 219, 849 P.2d 334, 336 (1993) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). An adverse possessor must also show "that the land has been 

occupied and claimed for the period of 5 years, continuously, and that the 

party or persons, their predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes, state, 

county and municipal, which may have been levied and assessed against 

the land for the period mentioned." NRS 11.150. 

A prescriptive easement is a common law claim by which one 

may acquire the legal right to use land that he or she does not own. See 

Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 1.2(1) (1998) (explaining 

that easements create "a nonpossessory right to use land in the possession 

of another" (emphasis added)). "[A]dverse, continuous, open and peaceable 

use for a five-year period are the requisite elements for claiming" a 

prescriptive easement. Jordan v. Bailey, 113 Nev. 1038, 1044, 944 P.2d 828, 

832 (1997). Importantly, an easement, whether prescriptive, implied, or 

otherwise, generally grants a "non-possessory interest in the land of another 

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which entitles the owner of the easement to a limited use or enjoyment of 

said land." Hall & Buckley, Nevada Real Property Practice & Procedural 

Manual, 32 (Nev. State Bar 2021) (citing Restatement (First) of Property 

§ 450 (1944)) (emphases added). As this court explained in Boyd v. 

McDonald,"[a]n easement is a right, distinct from ownership, to use in some 

way the land of another. . . . It gives no right to possess the land upon which 

it is imposed, but a right merely to the party in whom the easement is vested 

to enjoy it." 81 Nev. 642, 647, 408 P.2d 717, 720 (1965) (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). Thus, the crucial difference between 

adverse possession and an easement is that the former results in the 

acquisition of title and the right to exclusively control the subject property 

while the latter results in the right to a limited use of the subject property. 

Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 231 n.3 (Minn. 2008). 

Here, the Joneses asserted a claim for a prescriptive easement, 

but their requested relief aligns with adverse possession. After all, the 

Joneses demanded more than the rnere use of the disputed property; they 

sought exclusive control of it. And to seek exclusive control of the disputed 

property is to seek adverse possession. The trouble for the Joneses, as 

recognized by the district court, is that they have not paid the requisite 

property taxes on the disputed property. Thus, the Joneses sought adverse 

possession under the guise of an extraordinary prescriptive easement. This 

type of easement is known as a "comprehensive prescriptive easement," as, 

unlike a typical easement, it results in the owner of the servient estate being 

completely excluded from the subject property. Will Saxe, When 

"Comprehensive" Prescriptive Easements Overlap Adverse Possession: 

Shifting Theories of "Use" and "Possession," 33 B.C. Env't Aff. L. Rev. 175, 

193 (2006). 

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We will not lightly allow the long-recognized distinction 

between adverse possession and prescriptive easements to collapse. Nor 

will we lightly allow parties to reap the fruits of adverse possession without 

complying with statutory requirements. We therefore reject the liberal use 

of comprehensive prescriptive easements and clarify when comprehensive 

prescriptive easements may be available in Nevada. 

Comprehensive prescriptive easernents are available only in exceptional 

circumstances 

The Joneses argue that Nevada law recognizes comprehensive 

prescriptive easements and that the district court erred by relying on 

California authority to hold otherwise. The Real Property Section of the 

Nevada State Bar, as amicus curiae, argues that CSA blurred the line 

between adverse possession and prescriptive easements and that the 

distinction between the two, as recognized in Boyd, should be followed. 

Ghadiri argues that this court should follow California cases, which he 

asserts have rejected comprehensive prescriptive easements. We begin by 

examining Nevada caselaw to see whether comprehensive prescriptive 

easernents are available. 

In CSA, Patrick and Eleanor Bryant graded their lot and 

constructed a block wall thereon. No. 68444, 2016 WL 7105072, at *1. The 

block wall encroached onto an adjacent vacant lot. Id. At least 16 years 

later, CSA purchased the vacant lot and filed suit, alleging quiet title, 

nuisance, trespass, and unjust enrichment. Id. The Bryants claimed they 

had a prescriptive easement over the area encroached upon by the block 

wall, and the district court agreed. Id. Although CSA affirmed the district 

court's ruling, id. at *3, this court did not consider or analyze the 

circumstances under which we will recognize comprehensive prescriptive 

easements. As is common of unpublished dispositions, CSA also did not 

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include a detailed factual backgroundi such as a description of the wall, how 

much it encroached onto the vacant property, or whether the easement 

would prevent CSA from using and enjoying a substantial portion of its 

property. As a result, we are unable to rely on CSA for the broad 

interpretation proposed by the Joneses. Thus, we disavow any language in 

CSA that may be read as allowing for a comprehensive prescriptive 

easement without articulation of a rationale for granting such an 

extraordinary easement. 

The Joneses' reliance on our decision in Boyd, where we 

affirmed a district court order granting an easement that resulted in the 

servient estate's complete exclusion from the subject property, is likewise 

misplaced. 81 Nev. at 652, 408 P.2d at 722. In Boyd, a supporting wall and 

overhanging roof of a motel extended 2.6 feet onto an adjacent property. Id. 

Additionally, the motel maintained a sign that was "some distance from the 

boundary" line.4 Id. at 644, 408 P.2d at 718. After recognizing that "[a]n 

easement is a right, distinct from ownership," this court concluded that an 

easement existed only as to the 2.6-foot encroaching wall and roof. Id. at 

647, 408 P.2d at 720 (internal quotations omitted). However, we held that 

the sign could not be classified as an easement because it was too far from 

the boundary line. Id. at 652, 408 P.2d at 722-23. 

Unmistakably, there was no argument for a prescriptive 

easement in Boyd. Id. at 650 n.8, 408 P.2d at 721 n.8. Rather, this court 

considered whether there was an easement by implication, or whether "the 

owner of two parcels had so used one to the benefit of his other that, on 

selling the benefited parcel, a purchaser could reasonably have expected, 

without further inquiry, that these benefits were included in the sale." Id. 

4Also in dispute was a patio and driveway; however, this court 

remanded those issues for further proceedings. Id. at 652, 408 P.2d at 723. 

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at 649, 408 P.2d at 721. Unlike a prescriptive easement, which we described 

in passing as "a condition generally analogous to adverse possession," an 

easement by implication depends on the intention of the parties, as shown 

by the reasonable expectation of a person purchasing or receiving land. Id. 

at 647-49, 408 P.2c1 at 720-21. Despite the different type of easement at 

issue, Boyd is instructive as it recognized a comprehensive easement only 

as to the roof and wall that encroached a mere 2.6 feet; this court refused to 

extend such an easement to the sign that "was so removed from the 

boundary . . . that no reasonable purchaser could have considered it part of 

the transaction without at least some inquiry." Id. at 652, 408 P.2d at 722-

23. Thus, Boyd implicitly acknowledged limits on a comprehensive 

easement, albeit not in the context of a prescriptive easement. 

Because Nevada lacks caselaw directly on point, we turn to the 

approaches taken by jurisdictions that, like Nevada, require adverse 

possessors to pay taxes on property subject to an adverse possession claim. 

Many of these jurisdictions, including Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Montana, 

and Utah, have categorically rejected comprehensive prescriptive 

easements. See generally Etz v. Marnerow, 233 P.2d 443, 444 (Ariz. 1951); 

Platt v. Pietras, 382 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Oakley Valley 

Stone, Inc. v. Alastra, 715 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Idaho 1985); Burlingame v. 

Marjerrison, 665 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Mont. 1983); Nyman v. Anchor Dev., LLC, 

73 P.3d 357, 362 (Utah 2003). They have done so for two common reasons. 

First, comprehensive prescriptive easements blur the distinction between 

adverse possession and easements. Second, comprehensive prescriptive 

easements subvert the tax requirement for adverse possession. 

California, however, has recognized that a comprehensive 

prescriptive easement may be warranted in exceptional circumstances. See 

Mehdizadeh v. Mincer, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 290 (Ct. App. 1996) ("There are 

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some circumstances in which the grant of an exclusive easement, which 

resembles or is nearly the equivalent of a fee interest, can be justified."). 

Such circumstances may include a "socially important duty of a utility to 

provide an essential service, such as water or electricitykr id. at 290, or 

where public health or safety is at issue, cf. Otay Water Dist. v. Beckwith, 3 

Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 226 (Ct. App. 1991). 

Though the categorical rejection of comprehensive prescriptive 

easements is well-reasoned, we adopt the view, as taken by California, that 

comprehensive prescriptive easements may be warranted if a party 

demonstrates exceptional circumstances. While there is no exhaustive list 

of exceptional circumstances that will justify a comprehensive prescriptive 

easement, the deterrnination as to whether a circumstance is exceptional is 

generally a fact-intensive question. 

Here, the Joneses have not demonstrated exceptional 

circumstances warranting a comprehensive prescriptive easement. Unlike 

our decision in Boyd, where we recognized a comprehensive easement when 

a nonmovable building encroached by a mere 2.6 feet and resulted in a de 

rninimus loss of usable property for the servient estate, here the Joneses 

merely made improvements to an RV parking space and the grant of a 

comprehensive prescriptive easement would deprive Ghadiri of nearly 600 

square feet of usable space. We therefore conclude that the district court 

did not err and affirm the district court's grant of Ghadiri's rnotion for 

summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION 

Nevada has long recognized the distinction between adverse 

possession and prescriptive easements. While we continue to recognize that 

important distinction, today we also recognize that exceptional 

circumstances may warrant comprehensive prescriptive easements. The 

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determination as to when an exceptional circumstance is present is 

generally a fact-intensive question. As the Joneses failed to demonstrate 

any such circumstance, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

We concur: 

Al4GAX

Stiglich 

, J. 

(a/2

Cadish 

, C.J. 

'1 

J 

Pickering 

- 

Herndon 

cl-A-A

Parragu 

1 J 

J 

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