### J.S23032/16

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee :

: v. : : BRUCE NORRIS, : : Appellant :

: No. 2512 EDA 2015 Ap peal from the PCRA Order July 14, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP
- 51 -CR- 0618592 - 1975 BEFORE: PANELLA, OTT, and FITZGERALD, * 

### JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2016 Appellant, Bruce Norris, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his Post Conviction Relief Act 1 

### (“PCRA”) petition based upon Counsel’s Finley2 

### letter and untimeliness. Appellant claims that the petition was timely under the PCRA’s “new ly recognized constitutional right” exception in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), following the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). He avers that he filed his pro se PCRA petition within sixty

* 

### Former Justice specially assigned to the Superi or Court. 1 

### 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 -9546.
2 

### Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc); see also Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).

### J.S23032/16

- 2 -

days of March 21, 2012, the date the Supreme Court rendered its decisions in Lafler and Frye . We affirm. We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth in the PCRA court’s opinion. 3 

### See PCRA Ct. Op., 8/28/15, at 1
- 3. Appellant timely appealed from the order dismissing the instant petition. 4 

### Appellant raises the following issue in his pro se brief: Was Appellant deprived of effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when his trial counsel failed to advise him fully regarding an offer from the Commonwealth that would have allowed him to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of 25 years? Appellant’s Brief at 3. This Court has stated: Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the court’s rulings are supported by the evidence of record and free of legal error. This Court treats t he findings of the PCRA court with deference if the record supports those findings. It is an appellant’s burden to persuade this Court that the PCRA court erred and that relief is due. * * *

3 

### We note that the reconstructed certified record in the case sub judice only contains docum ents related to the instant PCRA petition. The docket indicates that the pro se PCRA petition was filed on April 18, 2012. It is not contained in the certified record. Given our disposition, this is of no moment.
4 

### The PCRA court did not issue a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order.

### J.S23032/16

- 3 - The PCRA time limitations, and exceptions the reto, are set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)
- (iii). That section states: (b) Time for filing petition. — (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becom es final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively. To invoke one of these exceptions, the petitioner must plead it and satisfy the burden of proof. Additionally, any exception must be raised within sixty days of the date that the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9545(b)(2). Our Supreme Court “has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1274
- 75 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some citations omitted). “[A] judgment becomes final at the con clusion of direct review, including discretionary review in . . . Supreme Court of

### J.S23032/16

- 4 -

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant filed the instant serial PCRA petition on April 18, 2012, thus it is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Therefore, we determine whether, as averred by Appellant, any timeliness exception applies in this case. The PCRA court court concluded that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Lafler and Frye did not create a new constitutional right to overcome the time
- bar. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 6. The Feliciano Court considered this precise issue as follows:

“The right to effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process has been recogn ized for decades.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, [ ] 106 S. Ct. 366, [ ] (1985) (holding that “the two

- part Strickland [ v. Washington ], [ ] 104 S. Ct. 2052 [ ][(1984)], test applies to challenges to g uilty pleas based on the ineffective assistance of counsel”); Padilla v. Kentucky, [ ] 130 S. Ct. 1473 [ ] (2010) (“Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.”)). In Frye, the United State Supreme Court merely clarified that this well
-established right “extends to the negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected.” Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404 (emphasis added). In other words, the Frye Court held “that, as a gen eral rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Id. at 1408. In determining whether counsel has satisfied this obligation, the two
- part test set forth in Strickland applies. See id. at 1409. In Lafler, the Court explained that to meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test where the alleged

### J.S23032/16

- 5 - ineffectiveness of counsel involves the defendant’s rejection of a plea offer, the defenda nt must show, that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e. , that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385. It is apparent that neither Frye nor Lafler created a new constitutional right . Instead, these decisions simply applied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Strickland test for demonstrating counsel’s ineffectiveness, to the particular circumstances at hand, i.e. where counsel’s conduct resulted in a plea offer lapsing or being rejected to the defendant’s detriment. Feliciano, 69 A.3d at 1276
- 77 (some emphasis added and footnotes omitted). As neither Lafler nor Frye created a new constitutional right, Appellant’s argument that those decisions provided a time

- bar exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) is meritless. See id. at 1277. We find that this issue has been settled by our decision in Feliciano, and thus detect no basis upon which to conclude that the PCRA court erred in dismissing the instant petition as untimely. Thus, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing the PCRA petition as untimely. Order affirmed.

### J.S23032/16

- 6 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 3/17/2016Circulated 02/23/2016 04:54 PM

IN 

### THE COURT 

### Or COMMON PLEAS 

### FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

### CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH

VS. v Norris. Bruce opinion

III/IihIIiiiiiiiiijj 73 38z8z7s1 

### BRUCE 

### NORRIS

BRINKLEY, J. CP-51-CR-141-819-27775 

# FILE

AUG 

### 282015 Criminal 

### Appeals Unit 

### first Judicial District of PA 

### SUPERIOR COURT 2512 

### EDA 2014



### AUGUST 28, 2015 

### OPINION Defendant 

### Bruce 

### Norris filed a petition for 

### reliefpursuant to the 

### Post Conviction 

### Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. (eff. Jan. 16, 1996), raising a 

### claim 

### of ineffective assistance 

### of counsel based 

### upon the 

### retroactive application 

### of a 

### constitutional right. After independent review 

### ofDefendant's 

### pro se PCRA petition and PCRA 

### counsel's Finley letter, this Court dismissed 

### Defendant's petition without a hearing based upon 

### Counsel's Finley letter and untimeliness. 

### Defendant 

### appealed the dismissal 

### of his 

### petition to the 

### Superior Court. The sole issue addressed in this 

### Opinion is 

### whether this Court properly 

### dismissed 

### Defendant's petition based upon 

### Counsel's Finley 

### letter and untimeliness. This 

### Court's decision should be affirmed. 

### PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND 

### FACTS On June 30, 1975, 

### Defendant was arrested and charged with 

### murder and related offenses. On October 31, 1975, 

### following a 

### jury trial, Defendant was found guilty 

### of second -degree murder, robbery, 

### criminal 

### conspiracy, possessing instruments 

### of crime 

### (PIC), and 

### possessing prohibited weapons. On 

### January 19, 1976, the 

### Honorable Alex 

### Bonavitacola sentenced

1 Circulated 02/23/2016 04:54 PMDefendant to life 

### imprisonment on the murder charge, 5 to 10 years state 

### incarceration on the robbery charge, and 5 to 10 years state incarceration on the 

### conspiracy charge. The sentences on all charges were to run 

### consecutively to one another. In addition, 

### Judge Bonavitacola further sentenced 

### Defendant to 2V to 5 years state incarceration on 

### "the 

### remaining count ", to run concurrently with the 

### sentences on the other charges, although he did not specify which 

### of Defendant's two 

### remaining charges this sentence applied to. On 

### November 6, 1975, 

### Defendant filed a motion for a 

### new trial. On 

### February 17, 1976, Defendant filed an appeal 

### with the Supreme Court 

### of Pennsylvania. On 

### December 1, 1977, the Supreme Court affirmed the 

### judgment 

### of sentence. On June 2, 1978, 

### Defendant filed a petition for 

### relief pursuant to the 

### Post

### -Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 

### alleging ineffective assistance 

### of counsel based upon trial 

### counsel's failure to obtain the statement 

### of Defendant's co-defendant, to object to the 

### Commonwealth 

### Attorney's improper argument, to cross 

### -examine the co- defendant

as to bias and 

### credibility, to cross 

### -examine a witness based 

### upon 

### their inability to identify Defendant at a 

### previous 

### lineup, and to raise these issues on appeal. On 

### September 23, 1981, the PCHA Court found 

### Defendant's petition to be without merit. 

### Defendant appealed the dismissal 

### of his petition to the 

### Superior Court and, on October I, 1982, the 

### Superior Court affirmed the dismissal 

### ofDefendant's petition. On April 18, 2012, 

### Defendant filed the instant petition for 

### reliefpursuant to the Post - Conviction 

### ReliefAct 

### (PCRA), alleging ineffective assistance 

### of counsel based upon trial 

### counsel's advising him to 

### reject the 

### Commonwealth's plea offer 

### of 25 years state incarceration without first advising 

### Defendant 

### of the advantages and 

### disadvantages 

### of accepting the offer. On April 9, 2014, 

### Barnaby Wittels, Esquire, was appointed as PCRA 

### counsel. On February 25, 2015, Mr. Wittels filed a Finley letter stating that the issues raised in 

### Defendant's petition were

2untimely, waived, and 

### without merit. On June 12, 2015, this 

### Court' sent 

### Defendant a notice pursuant to Rule 907, 

### indicating that his petition would be 

### dismissed based upon 

### Counsel's Finley letter and 

### untimeliness. Defendant did not file a 

### response to the 907 notice. On July 15, 2015, after 

### independent 

### review 

### of Defendant's 

### pro se petition and 

### Counsel's Finley letter, this Court dismissed 

### Defendant's petition without a hearing based upon 

### Counsel's Finley letter and untimeliness. On August 13, 2015, Defendant appealed the 

### dismissal 

### of his 

### petition to the Superior Court. 

### ISSUE I. 

### WHETHER THIS COURT 

### PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANT'S 

### PETITION BASED UPON 

### COUNSEL'S 

### FINLEY 

### LETTER AND 

### UNTIMELINESS. DISCUSSION I. 

### THIS 

### COURT 

### PROPERLY DISMISSED 

### DEFENDANT'S 

### PETITION BASED 

### UPON 

### COUNSEL'S FINLEY 

### LETTER AND 

### UNTIMELINESS. This Court 

### properly 

### dismissed Defendant's petition based 

### upon 

### Counsel's Finley letter and untimeliness. When 

### reviewing the denial 

### of PCRA relief, the 

### appellate 

### court's review is limited to 

### determining 

### whether the PCRA 

### court's findings are 

### supported by the record and without legal error. 

### Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 619 Pa. 549, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (2013) (citing Commonwealth v. 

### Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94, 97 n. 4 (2001)). The 

### court's scope 

### of review is limited to the 

### findings 

### of the PCRA court and the 

### evidence on the record 

### of the PCRA 

### court's hearing, viewed in light 

### most favorable to the 

### prevailing party. 

### Commonwealth v. Fahy, 598 Pa. 584, 959 A.2d 312, 316 (2008) (citing 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Duffey, 585 Pa. 493, 889 A.2d 56, 61 (2005)). The 

### burden is on the 

### petitioner in the PCRA 

### petition to 

### demonstrate by a preponderance 

### of the 

### evidence that he or she is eligible for 

### PCRA 

### relief 42 

### Pa.C.S.A § 9543.

On March 13, 2015, Defendant's PCRA petition was reassigned to this Court. 3It is well -settled in 

### Pennsylvania that all petitions under the 

### PCRA, including subsequent petitions, must be filed 

### within one year 

### of the date the 

### judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges, and the 

### petitioner proves, an exception to the one 

### -year time period. Commonwealth v. 

### Albrecht, 606 Pa. 64, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (2010) 

### (citing Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 598 Pa. 85, 953 

### A.2d 1248, 1252 (2008)). The 

### exceptions 

### apply where the petition successfully alleges and 

### proves one or more 

### ofthe following: (i) the failure to raise this claim previously was the 

### result 

### of interference by 

### government officials with presentation 

### of the claim in 

### violation 

### of the 

### Constitution 

### of laws 

### ofthis Commonwealth or the 

### Constitution or laws 

### of the United States; (ii) the facts upon 

### which the claim is predicated were 

### unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

### of due 

### diligence; or (iii) the right 

### asserted is a constitutional right that was 

### recognized by the Supreme Court 

### of the United States or the Supreme Court 

### of Pennsylvania after the time period 

### provided in this section and has been held by that 

### court to apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 

### 9545(b)(1)(i)- (iii). A 

### petition invoking one 

### of these 

### exceptions must be filed within 60 days 

### ofthe 

### date the 

### claim could first have been presented. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). The petitioner must plead and 

### prove specific facts that 

### demonstrate his 

### claim was raised within the 60 day time frame. 

### Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 -52 (2013). The 

### PCRA's timeliness requirements are 

### jurisdictional in nature. 

### Commonwealth v. Johnston, 2012 PA Super 67, 42 A.3d 1120, 1130 (2012) (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267 -68 (2008)). The time 

### "limitations are 

### mandatory and are interpreted literally; thus, a 

### court has no authority to extend filing 

### periods except as statute permits." 

### Commonwealth v. Seskey, 2014 PA Super 27, 86 A.3d 237, 242 (2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999)). 

### "If the 

### petition is determined

to be untimely, and no 

### exception has been pled and proven, the 

### petition must be dismissed without hearing because 

### Pennsylvania courts are without

### jurisdiction to 

### consider the merits 

### of

4the petition." Id. 

### (quoting 

### Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518 -19 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1285 (2008)). Counsel should be 

### strongly presumed to have rendered 

### adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 

### exercise 

### of reasonable professional

### judgment, and the burden to show that counsel's 

### performance was 

### deficient rests squarely on the defendant. 

### Commonwealth v. Reyes- Rodriguez, 2015 PA Super 47, 111 A.3d 775, 780 (2015) 

### (quoting Burt v. Titlow, --- U.S.

- - -, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013)). To establish trial counsel's 

### ineffectiveness, a 

### petitioner must demonstrate: (1) the 

### underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) 

### counsel had no 

### reasonable basis for the course 

### of action or 

### inaction chosen; and (3) counsel's action or inaction 

### prejudiced the petitioner. 

### Commonwealth v. Freeland, 2014 PA Super 274, 106 A.3d 768, 775 (2014) (citing Commonwealth v. 

### Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987)). A PCRA 

### petitioner will be granted 

### relief only when he 

### proves, by a 

### preponderance 

### of the 

### evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from the 

### ineffective assistance 

### ofcounsel which, in the 

### circumstances 

### of the particular case, so 

### undermined the truth -determining process that no 

### reliable adjudication 

### of guilt

or innocence could have taken place. Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 

### 9543(a)(2)(ii)). Counsel's assistance is deemed 

### constitutionally 

### effective once the court determines that the 

### defendant has not established any one 

### of the 

### prongs 

### ofthe ineffectiveness test. Id. 

### (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 406 

### (Pa.Super.2008)). To establish prejudice, the 

### defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

### probability that the 

### outcome 

### of the 

### proceedings would have been different but for counsel's action or inaction. 

### Commonwealth v. Davido, 106 A.3d 611, 621 (Pa. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. 

### Williams, 587 Pa. 304, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006)). The 

### decision 

### whether to plead guilty or contest a criminal charge is 

### probably the most important single 

### decision in any criminal case. 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Chazin,

5 2005 PA Super 143,873 A.2d 732, 735 (2005) (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Copeland, 381 Pa.Super. 382, 554 A.2d 54, 60 (1988)). This 

### decision must finally be left to the client's wishes; 

### counsel cannot plead a man guilty, or not guilty, 

### against his will. Id. But counsel may and must give the client the benefit 

### of his professional advice on this crucial decision, and often he can 

### protect the client adequately only by using a 

### considerable amount 

### ofpersuasion to convince the client that one course or the other is in the client's best interest. Id. In order to be entitled to relief, 

### defendant will have the burden 

### of proving that: (1) an 

### offer for a plea was made; (2) trial 

### counsel failed to inform him 

### of such offer; (3) trial 

### counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to inform him 

### of the plea offer; and (4) he was 

### prejudiced thereby. Id. In the case at bar, 

### Defendant'sjudgment became final on 

### March 1, 1978, when his time

to file a petition for a writ 

### of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. Consequently, 

### Defendant had until March 1, 1979 to file a timely 

### petition pursuant to the PCRA. Defendant filed the instant 

### petition on April 18, 2012, more than 33 years after the deadline to file a timely 

### petition had passed. To escape the time -bar, 

### Defendant alleged the retroactive application 

### of a 

### constitutional right 

### exception based upon the United States Supreme 

### Court's holdings in Lafler v. 

### Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, both decided on 

### March 21, 2012, in which the Court held that counsel may be 

### ineffective by failing to explain the 

### advantages and disadvantages 

### of accepting an 

### offered plea deal. See Lafler v. Cooper, - -- U.S. - --, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012); see also Missouri v. Frye, - -- U.S. - - -, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012). However, 

### Defendant's reliance on Lafler and Frye to avoid the time-bar is misplaced. Contrary to 

### Defendant's claims, neither case announced a new 

### constitutional right in Pennsylvania which 

### would 

### allow Defendant to avoid the time -bar. To the 

### contrary, 

### Defendant's

own memorandum 

### of law in 

### support 

### of his 

### pro se 

### petition cites to a 1978 

### Superior Court case,

6Commonwealth v. Napper, in which that Court held that counsel had a duty not only to communicate the terms 

### of an 

### offer to his or her client but to also 

### discuss the relative merits 

### of the offer compared to the 

### defendant's chances at trial. See 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Napper, 254 Pa.Super. 54, 385 A.2d 521,524 (1978). Furthermore, on January 23, 1997, the 

### Supreme Court 

### of Pennsylvania held, in 

### Commonwealth v. Boyd, that the failure 

### of trial 

### counsel to explain the advantages and 

### disadvantages 

### of a 

### plea offer prior to advising the 

### defendant to decline the offer

was cognizable as 

### ineffective assistance 

### of counsel under 

### §9543(a)(2)(v) 

### of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 547 Pa. 111, 688 A.2d 1172, 1174 -75 (1997). 

### Moreover, in Commonwealth ex rel. 

### Dadario v. Goldberg, the Supreme Court held, on 

### June 19, 2001, that claims 

### of ineffective 

### assistance 

### of counsel during the plea 

### bargaining stage were cognizable under §9543(a)(2)(ii) 

### of the 

### PCRA, following the repeal 

### of §9543(a)(2)(v). See Commonwealth

ex rel. Dadario v. Goldberg, 565 Pa. 280, 773 A.2d 126, 131 (2001). While 

### Defendant should have filed his 

### petition in 1978 or 1997, even under the most 

### generous standard, Defendant had until August 18, 2001, 60 days from the Supreme 

### Court's decision in 

### Commonwealth ex rel. Dadario v. Goldberg, to file a 

### timely PCRA 

### petition alleging 

### ineffective assistance o_'counsel during the plea 

### bargaining process. As Defendant did not file the instant 

### petition until April 18, 2012, it is 

### consequently untimely. Even 

### if Lafler and Frye did 

### provide a means for 

### Defendant to 

### avoid the time -bar, his petition is still 

### without merit and waived. Defendant has failed to 

### offer any evidence that the Commonwealth offered him the 

### claimed plea deal 

### of 25 years state 

### incarceration or that trial counsel failed to discuss the 

### advantages and disadvantages 

### of the 

### offer 

### prior to advising Defendant to decline the offer. To the contrary, the strength 

### of the 

### Commonwealth's case against Defendant, including 

### multiple witnesses who saw 

### Defendant shoot the 

### decedent and 

### Defendant's

7own statement to the police in which he admitted to shooting the 

### decedent, makes it unlikely that the Commonwealth 

### would have offered him a plea deal 

### of 25 years 

### incarceration when he was facing a sentence 

### of life 

### imprisonment. Moreover, Defendant 

### attached an 

### affidavit tc his 

### pro se petition that he was aware that an 

### offer had been made, was 

### counseled to reject it, and was never told that he could receive a 

### harsher sentence. However, once he received a life sentence, he was fully aware that this was 

### greater than a 25 -year sentence and could have raised this issue on direct appeal. However, he failed to do so, thereby waiving this claim 

### of ineffectiveness. Furthermore, 

### Defendant waited 

### more than three decades to raise these 

### claims, long after the 1999 death 

### of his trial counsel, Stanley Stern, Esquire, the retirement 

### of his first PCHA attorney, Henry Wessel, and removal from the bar 

### of his second PCHA attorney. 

### Those events notwithstanding, no 

### benefit accrues to this defendant by such delay, as 

### defendant 

### himself gave an inculpatory statement, 

### actually admitting to being the shooter, and did so in the presence 

### of

numerous witnesses, 

### negating the likelihood that any such 

### offer would have been made by the Commonwealth in the first place. Thus, even 

### ifDefendant's petition was timely, his claims therein are 

### nevertheless 

### without merit and no 

### relief is due. 

### Accordingly, this Court properly dismissed 

### Defendant's 

### petition based upon PCRA 

### counsel's Finley 

### letter and untimeliness.

8

### CONCLUSION After 

### review 

### ofthe 

### applicable case law, testimony and statutes, this Court committed no

error. 

### Defendant's PCRA 

### petition was properly dismissed based upon 

### PCRA 

### counsel's Finley letter and untimeliness. 

### Accordingly, this 

### Court's decision should be affirmed.

9