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i 

88–452 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–107] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 8, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, April 8, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request for Atomic Energy 

Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs ............................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, April 8, 2014 ............................................................................................ 35 

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY 

DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Benedict, VADM Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, U.S. 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 5 

Bunn, M. Elaine, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Missile Defense Policy, U.S. Department of Defense ........................................ 3 

Harencak, Maj Gen Garrett, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force ........................................ 5 

Held, Edward Bruce, Acting Administrator and Acting Under Secretary for 

Nuclear Security, National Nuclear Security Administration .......................... 9 

Huizenga, David G., Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Environmental 

Management, U.S. Department of Energy ......................................................... 7 

Richardson, ADM John M., USN, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, U.S. Navy ................................................................................................... 6 

Weber, Hon. Andrew C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, U.S. Department of Defense .............. 2 

Winokur, Dr. Peter S., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board ..... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Benedict, VADM Terry J. ................................................................................ 65 

Bunn, M. Elaine ................................................................................................ 51 

Harencak, Maj Gen Garrett ............................................................................. 76 

Held, Edward Bruce ......................................................................................... 133 

Huizenga, David G. .......................................................................................... 95 

Richardson, ADM John M. ............................................................................... 90 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 39 

Weber, Hon. Andrew C. ................................................................................... 41 

Winokur, Dr. Peter S. ....................................................................................... 106 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Section 1042 Report .......................................................................................... 147 

Letter to Senators Reid and McConnell from Representatives Rogers 

and Cooper ..................................................................................................... 153 

Letter to Secretary Moniz from Representatives McKeon and Rogers ........ 154 

Chart submitted by Mr. Held .......................................................................... 156 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 159 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 159 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 159 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 172 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 177 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 163 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 174 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND NUCLEAR FORCES 

PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 8, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. This subcommittee hearing will 

come to order. I want to welcome our hearing participants on the 

President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request for atomic energy defense activities and nuclear forces programs. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. We are very 

proud to have these witnesses here with us today, and we have a 

lot of ground to cover in this hearing. 

And our distinguished witnesses are the Honorable Andrew 

Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and 

Biological Defense Programs at the U.S. Department of Defense; 

Ms. Elaine Bunn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense; Vice Admiral Terry Benedict, Director of Strategic Systems 

Programs of the U.S. Navy; Major General Garrett Harencak, Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration; Bruce Held, Acting Administrator and Acting Under Secretary 

for Nuclear Security, at the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA]; Admiral John Richardson—happy birthday to you— 

Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, U.S. Navy and National Nuclear Security Administration; Mr. David Huizenga, Senior Advisor for Environmental Management, U.S. Department of 

Energy [DOE]; and Mr. Peter Winokur, Chairman, Defense Nuclear 

Facility Safety Board. That is a mouthful. 

I appreciate all of you taking time to be here at this hearing. As 

always, we appreciate your contributions that each and every one 

of you make. 

Before I hand the floor over to the ranking member, let me highlight just a few issues to which we are paying close attention. First, 

today, 2 years late, we have finally received the administration’s 

proposed nuclear force structure under the New START [Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty]. I am glad to see that the President made 
2 

the right decision, the decision that was obvious to us 2 years ago. 

We will take a hard look at this in the coming weeks, and we will 

discuss it today, I am sure. 

Second, the governance and management of the DOE and NNSA. 

We had a hearing 2 weeks ago to receive the interim report of the 

congressional advisory panel on this topic. It was sobering, and it 

confirmed what this subcommittee has been saying for many years. 

We had 13 members show up at that hearing. I hope that shows 

just how serious we are taking this. We are as serious as a heart 

attack, and we want to make sure that we see some bold actions 

at the NNSA. 

Third, promised capabilities and programs keep slipping despite 

significant budget increases. Fulfillment of the requirement for this 

responsive nuclear infrastructure keeps being pushed into the distant future, and we have wasted billions of dollars with false 

starts. The follow-on to the air-launched cruise missile is pushed 

and may put both the nuclear security enterprise and the Strategic 

Command in a real bind. The interoperable warhead, a key pillar 

of the administration’s future stockpile strategy, has been pushed 

out of sight on the calendar. 

Fourth, integrity and leadership problems in our nuclear forces. 

General Harencak and Admiral Richardson, we appreciate the 

updates you and your services have been providing us. 

The services need to get on top of this. It is particular—in particular, the Air Force needs to take a long, hard look at itself and 

how it is leading and managing its nuclear forces. Recent actions 

give us hope, but they must only be a start. 

Let me end on a bright note. The B61 life extension program, 

which many on this subcommittee and many at the witness table 

have fought to get back on track, is succeeding. NNSA and the Air 

Force are on schedule, on budget, and delivering for the Nation. 

Good work. This is an important first step for rebuilding the 

trust and confidence of the Congress, the American people, and our 

allies. 

Thanks again to our witnesses. I look forward to our discussion. 

And with that, let me recognize the ranking member, my friend 

and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. COOPER. I thank the chairman, my friend. I have no opening 

statement. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I appreciate that. 

And we will now—I think that the witnesses, as you can see, we 

have got a large group of witnesses. Ask you to synopsize your 

opening statement to 3 minutes so we can try to get through the 

panel and get to some healthy questions. 

Mr. Weber, you are recognized first. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW C. WEBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary WEBER. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, 
3 

thank you for giving us the opportunity to discuss the 2015 budget 

request for Department of Defense nuclear forces programs. It is an 

honor to come before you with my Department of Defense and Department of Energy colleagues to testify on our efforts to modernize 

and sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Guided by the Nuclear Weapons Council, our Departments have 

made substantial progress over the last year. However, stark budget realities continue to stress our efforts to update an aging stockpile and infrastructure. 

In January, I accompanied Secretary Hagel on his visits to 

Kirtland and F.E. Warren Air Force Bases and Sandia National 

Laboratories. We had the opportunity to speak with and learn from 

our extraordinary airmen and laboratory personnel, whose dedication and professionalism are an inspiration. While there, Secretary 

Hagel emphasized to them that we are going to invest in the modernization required to maintain an effective deterrent. 

Our most vital modernization efforts include the life extension 

programs for the W76–1 submarine-launched ballistic missile 

[SLBM] warhead and the B61–12 gravity bomb. The B61 life extension program [LEP], which the chairman referred to as a bright 

note, is currently undergoing development engineering and prototypes are being assembled for early testing. Due to sequestration 

impacts, the schedule for first production has been revised to the 

second quarter of 2020. This will just meet U.S. Strategic Command and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] operational 

requirements. 

The B61–12 program will replace four current models with one 

and enable the retirement of the B83, the last megaton bomb in the 

stockpile. 

Stable funding for the B61 life extension program is critical to 

the viability of the B–2 strategic bomber and commitments to our 

NATO allies. We thank you for your continued strong support of 

this program. 

The world is safer today from the threat of full-scale nuclear war 

than it was during the Cold War. While the role and numbers of 

weapons are being reduced, maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile is critical to deterring potential adversaries 

and assuring U.S. allies and partners. We ask for your support of 

the President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request. 

Thank you for the opportunity you have given us to testify today, 

and we look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Weber can be found in the 

Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Bunn, you are recognized for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF M. ELAINE BUNN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 

POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. BUNN. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Thanks for the opportunity to testify on our nuclear forces. I 

would like to address several issues that go beyond my advance 

written statement. 
4 

Russia’s unexpected and dangerous aggression in Ukraine, in violation of international law, compels us to revisit our expectations 

about future Russian behavior and to reassess a number of U.S. 

and NATO policies with regard to Russia. But two of our national 

interests are clear: First, strengthening NATO’s collective defense. 

As General Breedlove said, ‘‘We are going through a paradigm 

shift.’’ NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said at a recent ministerial, ‘‘We are now considering all options to enhance our collective defense, including an update and further development of our 

defense plans, enhanced exercises and also appropriate deployments,’’ unquote. 

Second, this administration, like its predecessors, has sought a 

stable strategic nuclear relationship with Russia, especially during 

times of turbulence elsewhere in the relationship, so we will continue to implement the New START Treaty ratified by the Senate 

in December 2010. We want to continue to implement New START 

with Russia, because it is in our national interest. The inspections 

and notifications under the treaty give us a window into Russian 

strategic forces and limits them for the duration of the treaty. And 

we will continue to pursue our concerns about Russian compliance 

with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 

As Chairman Rogers mentioned, today we announced the strategic force structure that will bring us to the New START limits 

by February 2018 and provided the congressional report required 

under Section 1042. That report has details on this decision, so I 

won’t go into all the details now, but let me just summarize that 

our 700 deployed strategic forces will look like this: 400 deployed 

intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs], 240 deployed SLBMs, 

and 60 deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The 100 nondeployed strategic missile launchers and bombers will consist of 54 

ICBM launchers, including 50 warm ICBM silos—that is, empty 

but still functional—spread across three bases; 40 SLBM launch 

tubes; and 6 bombers. We will also convert 56 SLBM tubes to remove them from treaty accountability and convert 30 B–52 bombers to conventional-only role. 

This force structure achieves right balance of flexibility, survivability, responsiveness of our nuclear forces and supports our national security objectives by providing a mix of force capabilities 

and attributes to ensure the President has an array of options 

available under a broad range of scenarios and preserves a just-incase upload capability for each leg of the triad. 

At present, Russia as well as the U.S. seems determined to preserve the strategic nuclear stability embodied in the New START 

Treaty. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me here today and, again, 

thank you for the work you do to provide for the common defense. 

Look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bunn can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Ms. Bunn. 

And without objection, the Section 1042 report that Ms. Bunn 

referenced will be entered into the record. So ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 147.] 
5 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Benedict. 

STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral BENEDICT. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, 

distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. I represent the men and women of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs. 

My mission as the Director of Strategic Systems Programs [SSP] 

is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure the safety and 

the security of our Navy’s sea-based strategic deterrent capability, 

the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapons System. My written statement, which I respectfully request to be submitted for the record, 

addresses my top priorities. I would like to talk to three this afternoon. 

First, my top priority is the safety and the security of the Navy’s 

nuclear weapons. Custody and accountability of the nuclear assets 

entrusted to the Navy are the cornerstone of this program. Our approach to the nuclear weapons mission is to maintain a culture of 

excellence and self-assessment that produces the highest standards 

of performance and integrity. 

Second, the Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging 

and technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapons System to match the Ohio-class 

submarine service life and to serve as the initial baseline mission 

payload for the Ohio replacement submarine platform. This is 

being accomplished through a life extension program to all the Trident II (D5) sub systems to include launcher, navigation, fire control, guidance, missile, and reentry. 

Finally, I remain concerned with the decline in demand for solid 

rocket motors. While the Navy is maintaining a continuous production of solid rocket motors, the demand from both NASA [National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration] and the Air Force has declined. This has put an entire specialized industry at risk. While 

the efforts of our industrial partners and others have created shortterm relief, the long-term support of the solid rocket motor industry remains a national issue. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I will be 

pleased to take your questions at the appropriate time, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict can be found in the 

Appendix on page 65.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Harencak, you are recognized for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN GARRETT HARENCAK, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND 

NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General HARENCAK. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, 

distinguished committee members, thank you for your continued 

support of our triad and of our Air Force. I appreciate the opportunity to update the subcommittee today on Air Force nuclear programs and policies. I respectfully request that my written statement be entered into the record, and I look forward to your questions. 
6 

[The prepared statement of General Harencak can be found in 

the Appendix on page 76.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Well done. 

All right, birthday boy, Admiral Richardson. Congratulations on 

another birthday. We won’t make you tell us how old you are, 

but— 

Admiral RICHARDSON. All right. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. You are recognized for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ADM JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, DIRECTOR, 

NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to 

testify before you. I am grateful for the consistent and strong support this subcommittee has given to Naval Reactors, and I look forward to the discussion of our fiscal year 2015 budget. 

My budget request this year enables me to meet my primary responsibility to ensure safe and reliable operation of the Nation’s 

nuclear-powered fleet. My fiscal year 2015 request is 26 percent 

higher than my fiscal year 2014 appropriation. This increase directly supports our increased workload, including three discrete national priority projects and sustaining the program’s technical support base. The three projects include designing a new reactor plant 

for the Ohio-class SSBN replacement, refueling a research and 

training reactor in New York, and replacing the spent fuel handling facility in Idaho. The funding for my technical support base, about $950 million, 

is absolutely essential, providing for resolution of emergent fleet 

issues, spent nuclear fuel management, technology development, 

and operation of prototype research and training reactors. It also 

provides my foundational capabilities, such as security, environmental stewardship, and laboratory facilities. In short, my technical base and my laboratories is the intellectual engine that drives 

safe, reliable, and responsible operation of the nuclear-powered 

fleet, past, present, and future. 

$156 million of my request funds a new reactor plant for the 

Ohio-class replacement submarine. The new propulsion plant includes a reactor core designed to last the entire lifetime of that 

submarine, 42 years, without needing to be refueled, and will save 

the Navy over $40 billion in life-cycle costs. 

The request for refueling and overhaul of our land-based prototype reactor, $126 million, is necessary to improving the technologies for that life of the ship core as well as training about 1,000 

nuclear operators for the next 20 years. 

The fiscal year 2015 request for the spent fuel handling recapitalization project, $145 million, is required to refuel aircraft carriers and submarines, providing a safe and effective means of processing and putting their spent fuel into dry storage. The existing 

expended core facility is close to 60 years old, is the oldest spent 

fuel pool of its type in the country. This facility is showing its age, 

including leaking water pool walls and cracked floors. And while 

operated safely and responsibly, it is getting harder every year. 

My fiscal year 2015 request is especially critical in light of my 

fiscal year 2014 funding levels. As just one example, a 23 percent 
7 

shortfall to my operations and infrastructure requirements resulted 

in insufficient funds to do required maintenance on one of my landbased prototypes, and without relief, I will have no choice but to 

shut down that reactor, resulting in 450 nuclear-trained operators 

not reporting to the fleet, putting a greater burden on sailers and 

families that are already sustaining 9- to 10-month deployments. 

Mr. Chairman, with the sustained support of this subcommittee 

to do our work, I will continue to lead my team to execute our work 

on time and on budget, and will search tirelessly for the safest and 

most cost-effective way to support the Nation’s nuclear-powered 

fleet. Thank you again. I am ready to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson can be found in 

the Appendix on page 90.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. 

Mr. Huizenga, you are recognized for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. HUIZENGA, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. HUIZENGA. I am pushing that button. Is it on? 

Mr. ROGERS. There you go. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Oh, there we are. Good. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be 

here today to represent the Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management [EM] and to discuss the many positive 

things the program has achieved and what we plan to accomplish 

under the President’s 2015 budget request. Our request of $5.3 billion for defense-related activities will allow 

the Environmental Management program to continue the safe 

cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored 

nuclear energy research. The request includes $4.865 billion for defense cleanup activities and $463 million for the defense contribution to the uranium enrichment decontamination and decommissioning fund should Congress choose to reauthorize the fund. 

EM continues to pursue its cleanup objectives, guided by three 

overarching principles. Most importantly, we will continue to discharge our responsibilities by conducting cleanup within a safetyfirst culture that integrates environmental, safety, and health requirements and controls into all of our work activities. 

After safety, we are guided by a commitment to comply with our 

regulatory and legal obligations and, finally, to be good stewards of 

the financial and natural resources entrusted to us. 

This marks the 25th anniversary of the Environmental Management program, and we have achieved a great deal in that time. 

When we were created in 1989, we were charged with cleaning up 

107 sites across the country with a total area equal to Rhode Island 

and Delaware combined. In the 25 years since EM has been working on these projects, we have completed 91 of the 107 sites and 

have made significant progress on the remaining 16. 

The President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request will allow us to 

continue to make significant progress on our ongoing cleanup mission. To provide just a few specific highlights, with the requested 
8 

funds, we will complete the treatment of 900,000 gallons of liquid 

radioactive waste at Idaho, emptying the last four of the site’s 

aging waste storage tanks. We will continue construction of the 

waste treatment and mobilization plant at Hanford to process and 

immobilize liquid waste into solid-glass logs for permanent disposal. We will also continue to clean up the bulk of the more than 

500 facilities along the Columbia River at Hanford. 

And at Tennessee, we will complete the preliminary design for an 

outfall for our mercury treatment facility, while continuing to develop the technologies needed to characterize and remediate mercury in the environment. And finally, at Savannah River Site in 

South Carolina, we will immobilize and dispose of a million gallons 

of high-level waste, bringing the site’s high-level waste mission to 

approximately 50 percent completion. 

In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the Office 

of Environmental Management. EM is committed to achieving our 

mission and will continue to apply innovative cleanup strategies to 

complete the work safely, on schedule, and within cost, thereby 

demonstrating a value to the American taxpayers. We made significant progress in the last quarter century, and our 2015 request will 

allow us to capitalize on past investments and successes. 

Thank you, and I will be happy to take questions in turn. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Huizenga can be found in the 

Appendix on page 95.] 

Mr. ROGERS. And I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Dr. Winokur for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PETER S. WINOKUR, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE 

NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 

Dr. WINOKUR. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I am the chairman of 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, known as the DNFSB, 

or Board. We are the only agency that provides independent safety 

oversight of DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. I have submitted a 

written statement for the record that describes the Board’s mission 

and highlights a number of safety issues that are particularly important to ensuring that the DOE defense nuclear complex can 

safely accomplish its missions. 

The Board’s budget is essentially devoted to maintaining and 

supporting an expert staff of engineers and scientists, nearly all of 

whom have technical master’s degrees or doctorates, to accomplish 

our highly specialized work. 

The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2015 includes 

$30.15 million in new budget authority for the Board. It will support 125 personnel. This level of staffing is needed to provide sufficient independent safety oversight of DOE’s defense nuclear complex, given the pace and the scope of DOE’s activities. 

The Board provides safety oversight of the multitude of operations critical to national defense. These operations include assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons, fabrication of plutonium 

pits and weapon components, production and recycling of tritium, 

criticality experiments, subcritical experiments, and a host of activities to address the radioactive legacy resulting from 70 years of 

nuclear weapons operations. 
9 

While the Board supports DOE and NNSA efforts to integrate 

safety into the design of new defense nuclear facilities, continued 

delays regarding the path forward for modernizing uranium and 

plutonium capabilities in a weapons complex requires the Board to 

provide safety oversight of ongoing work in existing aging facilities 

that do not meet modern safety standards. 

In February, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant experienced an 

underground fire and release of radioactive material. The board is 

reviewing available information to assess the causal factors, emergency response, recovery activities, and corrective actions for both 

of these events. Fortunately, no one was seriously hurt in either 

event. These were near misses. 

The fire and radioactive material release events will serve as 

vivid reminders that accidents do happen and that they can have 

major safety consequences and mission impacts. 

The Board continues to stress the importance of emergency preparedness, response, and recovery, and addresses this topic at each 

of its public hearings. 

Let me add in closing that the Board and DOE together have 

built a constructive working relationship. Many of the safety concerns raised by the Board or our staff are addressed without the 

need for formal communications to DOE. I am confident that all 

Board members understand that an efficient, effective, and safe nuclear security enterprise is the highest priority and the needs of the 

Nation must come first. 

This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Winokur can be found in the Appendix on page 106.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Held for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD BRUCE HELD, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR AND ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. HELD. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members 

of the committee, I am honored to be with you today. 

The fiscal year 2015 budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration is a clear expression of President Obama’s 

commitment to America’s nuclear security. Within the fiscal constraints of the Bipartisan Budget Act, the President requests a 4 

percent increase for NNSA to $11.7 billion. This includes a 26 percent increase for naval nuclear reactors and a 7 percent increase 

for nuclear weapons activities. 

NNSA has performance challenges ahead of us, and Secretary 

Moniz will always be straightforward with you about those challenges. At the same time, NNSA has significant successes to build 

on, and the Secretary insists that we get out of our defensive 

crouch and honestly tell our success stories in a way that is meaningful to the American people. 

Regarding nuclear security, for example, our counterintelligence 

program was dysfunctional less than 10 years ago. Today, DOE 

counterintelligence is highly effective, respected, and trusted. Less 

than 10 months ago, NNSA communications with our colleagues on 
10 

the Nuclear Weapons Council [NWC] were strained. Today those 

communications are healthy, more transparent, and this improved 

atmosphere is helping us focus on the big strategic issues for which 

the NWC exists. 

On nonproliferation, in just the last 4 years, 11 countries plus 

Taiwan have eliminated their caches of sensitive nuclear materials 

and security has been hardened at scores of nuclear storage facilities worldwide to prevent theft by potential terrorists. The world 

is a safer place as a result. 

On project management, NNSA has been on the GAO [Government Accountability Office] High Risk List literally since the day 

it was born in March 2000. Since February 2011, however, we have 

consistently been on schedule and on budget for large projects up 

to $750 million. As a result, GAO has taken NNSA off its High 

Risk List for projects of this size for the first time in the organization’s history. 

As you know very well, we still have issues with the multibillion 

dollar mega projects, but thanks to the greater discipline and more 

agile strategy that Secretary Moniz has brought with him, we are 

making progress on those projects as well. 

That leads me to our first and foremost responsibility: nuclear 

safety. For nuclear safety reasons, we simply must modernize the 

aging infrastructure for enriched uranium processing in Oak Ridge; 

we must modernize the aging infrastructure for plutonium processing in Los Alamos; and wherever we can reliably do so, we 

should replace conventional high explosives in our nuclear stockpile 

with safer, insensitive high explosives. 

And if we take a commonsense approach that emphasizes better 

sooner rather than perfect later, all of these are doable within reasonable cost. But if, heaven forbid, we have a nuclear safety accident because we have not done so, then, Mr. Chairman, NNSA will 

truly have failed and we will forever forfeit the trust and confidence of the American people for all things nuclear. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Held can be found in the Appendix on page 133.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

I thank the panel. Well done on the time. 

I am pretty impressed that you all were able to stay within that 

3 minutes. 

Mr. Held, I know that you have done a great service for this 

country by coming in on an interim basis at the NNSA. 

Mr. HELD. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. It looks like, hopefully, we are going to get you relief pretty soon. The ranking member and I sent a letter over to 

the Senate asking them to please take up the confirmation of our 

nominee. 

Mr. HELD. Thanks. That letter, I think, hits this afternoon. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is right. So it looks like the cavalry is on the 

way to help you out, but I wanted it entered into the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 153.] 

Mr. ROGERS. But with that, I do want to make reference to another letter. Mr. Held, Chairman McKeon and I sent a letter to 
11 

Secretary Moniz, which I will introduce in a minute, but to Secretary Moniz in March expressing our deep concern that DOE and 

NNSA had let another multimillion dollar facility construction 

project spin out of control, which you made reference in your opening statement. 

We strongly support the need to replace the decrepit uranium facilities at Y–12, but it seems like NNSA and DOE has once again 

failed the Nation on this large contract. We have already spent 

over $1.2 billion on the design for this big-box uranium processing 

facility, and the NNSA is studying alternatives for that design. It 

seems like the big-box will never be built. So quite a bit of this $1.2 

billion is gone with nothing to show for it. 

I understand that your red team will propose an alternative approach a week from today. And I will introduce the letter that we 

sent to Secretary Moniz for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 154.] 

Mr. ROGERS. My question is, who within the DOE, NNSA, and 

its contractors is being held accountable for this massive failure? 

Mr. HELD. Sir, as you know, that has been a major problem. The 

big-box strategy has not worked for us. We are finding that the better sooner rather than perfect later is the way to go. That seems 

to be working effectively, shows great promise in the plutonium reprocessing facilities up at Los Alamos, and that is the reason why 

we are doing this, taking the same approach down at Oak Ridge 

with uranium. 

The big-box approach that we were on, thanks to the CAPE [Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation] study, was really looking, it 

was going to—it would not be—we would not get into a new facility 

until the year 2038, which is close to 100 years after the original 

building at 9212 was constructed and well after most people who 

are today working at Oak Ridge would be long retired. So we have 

got to do better than that, and that is the reason that I have asked 

Thom Mason, the director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, to 

lead the red team from across the complex to take a look at this 

issue and to get us a better solution by the year 2025 within the 

budget constraints. 

In terms of accountability, I think you have seen that we have 

changed the—we have selected a new management and operating 

[M&O] contractor down at Oak Ridge. We will be driving that contract to performance excellence. Bob Raines, at our Acquisition and 

Project Management, will be doing that. And you have also seen, 

I believe, that the Federal site office manager has been replaced 

over the past year. 

Mr. ROGERS. You are talking about the program manager? 

Mr. HELD. On that, on the Federal site office manager, we 

brought in a new Federal project manager, John Eschenberg. 

Mr. ROGERS. What happened to the project manager who was 

overseeing this when it went off the track? 

Mr. HELD. They are gone now at this point. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are they still employed with the government, or are 

they fired? 
12 

Mr. HELD. I believe they retired. I can take that and check that 

out for you, the factual. We brought in John Eschenberg specifically to take a look at that project. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 159.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Did he have sole responsibility for this project when 

it went off the rail? 

Mr. HELD. John? No. John has been brought in since that time. 

And John does—he is the Federal project manager—— 

Mr. ROGERS. But $1.2 billion. Anybody else lose their job over 

this? 

Mr. HELD. The previous project manager and the previous site office manager are no longer with us, yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Does that mean they are retired or terminated or 

just relocated? 

Mr. HELD. I believe they both retired, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Let me ask this: Do you have any idea as yet 

how much we are going to be able to use of the engineering that 

came from that $1.2 billion in whatever we do and how much is 

just gone? 

Mr. HELD. Some of it is just gone. We need to be frank and honest about that, some. The M&O contractor who was designing it 

made some mistakes. Some of that is gone. 

The effort underway by Dr. Mason is one of the elements of the 

charter letter, the charge letter that I sent to him is to use as much 

of the existing design and to profit from as much of the U.S. taxpayer investment as possible as we look for a smarter and faster 

way to proceed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah. What percentage would you estimate that we 

have just lost, 25 percent, 50 percent of the engineering that we 

paid for? 

Mr. HELD. I would have to get a specific—I will take the question 

and get a specific number for you, but I would guess it is probably 

close to half of it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 159.] 

Mr. ROGERS. That is awful. Will you also provide to the Congress 

an updated detailed project description and project data sheet for 

the uranium facility within 2 weeks, because the fiscal year 2015 

budget request materials are asking us to authorize and appropriate $335 million to continue design activities for a big-box facility that is almost certainly never going to get built? 

Mr. HELD. The—it is—we will get Dr. Mason’s report a week 

from today. I think it unlikely that we will have a big-box strategy. 

I think it unlikely that he will recommend a big-box strategy. And 

we would be using that money to effectively implement a more 

cost-effective and more quicker approach. We really need to get out 

of Building 9212 by the year 2025 at the very latest. 

Mr. ROGERS. When he gets that to you, will you get us to us, 

please? 

Mr. HELD. We will get it very promptly to you, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thanks. 

[The information referred to is For Official Use Only and retained in the committee files.] 
13 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Weber, in the fiscal year 2014 budget cycle, the 

DOD’s CAPE office proposed a large set of efficiencies at NNSA 

that would help NNSA put more money directly toward military 

priorities, particularly the warhead life extension program. The 

Nuclear Weapons Council, including acting NNSA Administrator 

Miller agreed to this multiyear, multibillion dollar set of efficiencies. As executive director of this council, did you review those 

proposed efficiencies, and did you support them in the fiscal year 

2014 budget and out-years? 

Secretary WEBER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

The Nuclear Weapons Council in its certification of the fiscal 

year 2014 budget submission had reviewed those efficiencies, which 

were baked into the—to the budget request in fiscal year 2014. I 

believe it was about $340 million. 

It is not a one-time act. This is a continuous process improvement, and our CAPE office is available on a continuing basis to 

support NNSA in its efforts to drive even more efficiencies. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Last week in my office, you told me that the 

DOD report that has details on these proposed efficiencies, that 

you have it with you today. Do you have that? 

Secretary WEBER. No, Mr. Chairman. We will have that for you. 

And I have spoken to Acting Administrator Bruce Held about this. 

We will have that for you, the full report that is due to you, and 

I apologize that it is tardy, by the end of this month. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. And do you know offhand how much—where 

those efficiencies were for fiscal year 2014? 

Secretary WEBER. I believe the number was $340 million, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. And how about 2015? 

Secretary WEBER. It was over the Future Years Nuclear Security 

Program [FYNSP] of the 5-year plan. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. With that, I yield back, and I recognize the 

ranking member for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank the witnesses for being here. I can’t imagine a heavier responsibility on this Earth than being in charge of the entire 

nuclear weapons enterprise for the United States, so I trust that 

you gentlemen and ladies will do your jobs to keep them safe, secure, and reliable. 

Ms. Bunn, you mentioned the New START 1042 document, and 

it is my understanding that that is solidly supported by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. Is that correct? 

Ms. BUNN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. I think it is important to get that on the record so 

the American people know this isn’t just some Pentagon document, 

this is a consensus of the Joint Chiefs. 

Dr. Winokur, if you could tell me what lessons, if any, we should 

learn from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [WIPP] disaster or near 

disaster that happened in February. 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well, Mr. Cooper, I think there are several lessons 

we can learn from it. If we go back to the immediate cause of the 

accident, the proximate cause, there was obviously a shortfall in 

preventative maintenance. What happened was a salt truck caught 

on fire, so that was certainly an issue that we have to deal with. 
14 

I think that there were issues with emergency response and preparedness that need to be addressed. It is something that the 

Board has a great deal of interest in. 

And there were obviously mistakes made during the response of 

the fire and during the response of the contamination events. That 

is a lesson we should take away from it. 

I think that what we saw, once again, were weaknesses in the 

contractor assurance system and the Federal oversight, and those 

are also areas that we are going to have to strengthen, or I think 

the Department of Energy needs to strengthen over time. 

I think the last I think thing I take away from it, and I said it 

in my spoken statement, is that accidents happen, and we need to 

be prepared for them. It isn’t just Fukushima; these aren’t just 

chance occurrences. There are a lot of low-probability, high-consequence accidents the Department and NNSA need to be willing 

and able to deal with. 

Those are the things I would immediately take from it. 

Mr. COOPER. Is there a timetable for that facility to reopen? 

Dr. WINOKUR. That would be—excuse me—a better question for 

Mr. Huizenga. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Huizenga. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. We have sent teams down into the mine twice 

now into—through the air intake shaft and the salt handling shaft, 

and we have established in a sense a clean area down in the mine 

from which a base of operations. Within the next week or two, we 

will proceed to the waste space and try to understand exactly what 

happened. And really I won’t be able to give you a clear sense of 

timing until we actually get to the waste space and understand 

better what actually occurred. 

Mr. COOPER. Are we weeks away, months away? 

Mr. HUIZENGA. We are probably, you know, within a couple 

weeks of actually getting to the waste space, that would be my 

guess, and at that point, we will—we are already—in anticipation 

of what we might find, we have been working with the chairman, 

Winokur, and his staff to understand, you know, how to make sure 

that we proceed safely as we traverse the probably thousand feet 

or so from our entry point over to the waste space and what we 

might indeed have to do once we get there to ultimately clean up 

the contamination and get back in business, but we are committed 

to do so and committed to do so in a safe manner. 

Mr. COOPER. Admiral Richardson, you mentioned the 26 percent 

increase for Navy nuclear. I think it is very important that people 

understand that in a time of tight budgets, it is not just automatic 

pilot, everybody frozen, but certain priorities need to be funded and 

processed. So I hope that we will be able to take into account needs 

wherever they arise, whether it is a Navy nuclear, whatever, because we can’t just have a one-size-fits-all approach here. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir. And as I said in my opening statement, that increase does directly address those national 

strategic priorities, and we are committed to doing that in the most 

cost-effective but safe manner, safe and reliable manner as we go 

forward. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Held, we have a long way to go. I know it is 

progress for NNSA to be off the High Risk List, but still there are 
15 

many, many other issues. I was interested in that small bit of 

bright news: Eleven nations have curtailed their nonproliferation 

risk of complete disposal of risky materials. Could you elaborate on 

that? 

Mr. HELD. Eleven nations plus Taiwan have completely eliminated their special nuclear materials. They have no more special 

nuclear materials. The world is a much safer place as a result of 

that. 

Mr. COOPER. What percentage of the total problem is 11 nations 

plus Taiwan? 

Mr. HELD. I would need to take that for the record. Anne Harrington is here and might be able to provide more detail. I would 

not say that totally solves the whole problem, though. There—I 

would say that in the last 4 years, we have done an awful lot. 

There is an awful lot to do ahead of us, and our budget request for 

$1.6 billion is an awful lot of taxpayer money to do it with. We are 

looking for ways. As you say, you can’t have a one-size-fits-all approach. You go from the NNSA budget, 26 percent increase for Admiral Richardson’s budget to a 20 percent decrease on the nuclear 

proliferation side for Anne Harrington’s budget. So that is, I think, 

indicative of some deep thought in what we were doing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 159.] 

Mr. HELD. We are taking a moment to step back and look at the 

synergies that we can find between nonproliferation and the weapons program, nonproliferation and civil nuclear energy programs. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Brooks of Alabama for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Harencak, when does our current force of Minuteman III 

ICBMs start aging out? 

General HARENCAK. Sir, we are tasked with the United States 

Air Force to maintain the Minuteman IIIs to 2030. Their ability to 

reach that will require certain improvements and modernization. 

So the answer to that question is we will maintain into 2030. They 

will be safe, secure, and effective to then, but in order to get us 

there, we are going to have to make some—going to have to make 

some choices as to what we would modernize, what we would replace. 

Mr. BROOKS. What life extension programs are currently underway for these ICBMs in order to maximize their life expectancy? 

General HARENCAK. We are looking at upgrades, sir, for the propulsion. We are looking at upgrades in batteries, we are also working on an improvement program for the guidance systems. And, of 

course, we are about to complete the analysis of alternatives [AOA] 

on a follow-on ground-based strategic deterrent. 

Mr. BROOKS. And do we have any plans or programs in place to 

replace the Minuteman III ICBM force as we reach their expected 

lifetime? 

General HARENCAK. Sir, right now, we are focused on sustaining 

it to 2030, but as I said, we are beginning the process to look at 

a potential follow-on, which is what the AOA for the ground-based 

strategic deterrent will do. 
16 

Mr. BROOKS. Do you have a judgment as to when the decision 

should be made for a replacement program, given that there is a 

lead time for the decision being made, the research and development being done, the manufacturing being done, and us actually 

having a replacement that we can put in? 

General HARENCAK. I believe, sir, the plan would be that we 

would be making those decisions in the early 2020s. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. 

And Admiral Benedict and General Harencak again, how do we 

support the industrial base for ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, particularly in solid rocket motors? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. So we currently have a very collaborative program working right now between the United States Navy 

and the United States Air Force. We have identified eight different 

technology areas that we are exchanging data, solid rocket motors 

being one of those eight, and we are working very closely with industry. If we can’t use the exact same propellent, then our next 

mode of investigation is to find common constituents which can be 

mixed to a different formulation, which would address both Navy 

and Air Force needs. That is ongoing effort, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. General, do you have anything to add in that regard? 

General HARENCAK. Yes, sir. And the United States Air Force 

and United States Navy has embarked on a deep set of cooperation 

initiatives where we are going to be able to leverage both of our 

buys, if you will, whether they be in raw materials or completed 

components that I think will certainly provide some efficiencies but 

also help our industrial base. 

Mr. BROOKS. This subcommittee has been informed that there is 

a low-rate production program in place for the D5 submarinelaunched ballistic missile program. Is a similar program in place 

for a Minuteman III and do we need low-rate production for the 

ICBM to sustain the industrial base or provide capabilities to the 

Air Force? 

General HARENCAK. Sir, the first—the answer is no; however, it 

is—we are definitely investigating it, and we will be able to make 

a more reasoned judgment on that as we get the AOA and as we 

start to make decisions on global—on the ground-based strategic 

deterrent. 

Mr. BROOKS. Why not? You said, ‘‘No,’’ but my follow-up is, why 

not? 

General HARENCAK. Again, sir, we are not—we are looking at 

how we are going to sustain this. We are also looking at the analysis of alternatives, which has not come back yet. It will come this 

summer. We will certainly be investigating should we begin a formal program for that, but we have not yet. 

Mr. BROOKS. Admiral Benedict, do you have anything to add? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, we are currently maintaining a low-rate 

motor production program in support of the D5. Today the United 

States Navy is the only program that has strategic propulsion in 

production. I am maintaining a warm line at 12 rocket motors per 

year, which is the minimum sustaining safe rate for solid rocket 

motor production of a size and type to support the United States 

Navy. 
17 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our panel for your testimony here today and the 

work you do on behalf of protecting the country. 

My first question will go to Ms. Bunn. So did—or Secretary 

Weber could also comment—but did opting not to do an environmental assessment of ICBM silos, as DOD had initially planned to 

do and as the Air Force General Counsel had concluded could be 

done, still enable the Secretary of Defense to provide all possible 

options to the President to make a determination on optimal nuclear force structure? 

Ms. BUNN. Congressman Langevin, there was a lot of information gathered over 2 years time. We would have liked to have had 

further information through an environmental assessment [EA] to 

have even more information, but the decision that was made was 

a good one that was supported by the Department of Defense 

broadly. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And to Admiral Benedict, in your military opinion, does reducing sub tubes as opposed to reducing silos provide 

the most survivable and stable deterrent? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. As Secretary Bunn said, we have 

participated extensively in the various analysis on force structure. 

I believe, in my professional opinion, that the decision is very much 

in concert with the course that has been set as we move towards 

the Ohio replacement program of 12 submarines with 16 tubes. So 

the deactivation of four tubes on Ohio is very consistent with the 

long-range decision that has already been made by the Secretary 

of Defense and the administration. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

To the panel, given the concerns about Russian compliance with 

its arms control treaty obligations, should we stop U.S. nuclear reductions or any potential negotiations for further nuclear weapons 

reductions, and how does this impact the need for verification? 

Ms. BUNN. Congressman, we are pursuing the troublesome concerns we have about the INF treaty, Russian compliance with that, 

but that said, they are now abiding by New START provisions, and 

we see it as in our national interests to have the window on their— 

on what—their force structure and where they are headed through 

the inspections and verification measures. So we see it as in our 

interests to continue with the New START Treaty, as I said in my 

opening statement. Especially in times of turbulence elsewhere in 

the relationship, we want to keep that strategic nuclear relationship as stable as you can. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Well, I would tend to agree, but I 

thought it was important to get the question out there, and I appreciate your answer. 

So, for Mr. Held, and I understand Ms. Harrington is available 

to answer questions as well, but I have to say, I am very concerned 

about the downward funding trend for key nonproliferation programs, and this includes the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 

[GTRI], which was reduced by 25 percent since last year and near-
18 

ly 30 percent since fiscal year 2013, and defense—nuclear nonproliferation research and development [R&D], which was reduced 

by 10 percent since fiscal year 2014 and 14 percent since fiscal year 

2013, due to the, and I quote, the need to fund higher NNSA priorities within the broader security—during the broader budget austerity, according to the budget documents. Meanwhile the projections for the—in the fiscal year 2012 budget plan for steady increases. 

Now, while President Obama identified the prevention of nuclear 

proliferation and nuclear terrorism as the top priority identified in 

the Nuclear Posture Review and the nuclear employment guidance 

issue last year and was the focus of the latest nuclear security 

summit. So my question is, what were these high priorities? Why 

doesn’t NNSA funding priorities match up to the President’s priorities? And which would you have accomplished if R&D and GTRI 

had not been cut? 

Mr. HELD. Sir, we are concerned as well for the reductions. The 

pain was—painful decisions had to be made within the caps of the 

Bipartisan Budget Act, and I think the broad spread of the increases and decreases is reflective of very serious consideration and 

balances of what we were trying to achieve. Over half of the reduction on the nonproliferation account is in the—is related to the 

MOX [mixed oxide] project in South Carolina, where cost overruns 

have presented us with a very difficult good government problem 

on how to proceed. 

In these other areas, however, some of the reductions are as a 

result of programs coming to a natural end at the end of the 4-year 

surge that the President announced in Prague 4 years ago. Some 

of them are admittedly painful. They are very valuable programs, 

and we need to protect them. As I said previously, though, $1.6 billion remains an awful lot of 

taxpayer money to spend on these issues, and we are looking for 

ways of driving synergies with other areas of the program to maximize the return to the taxpayer on these things. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I appreciate your answer. My time has expired. 

I would just say that the threats are not decreasing, clearly. I don’t 

believe that NNSA priorities square with what President Obama 

has identified when he talks about prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism as a top priority. I am concerned that 

what I am seeing in this NNSA budget doesn’t reflect that concern. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, 

Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank each of you for being here today. I appreciate your service. I have a special appreciation. I am an alumnus 

of the Department of Energy myself, and so I want to wish you 

well. 

And I do share the concerns of Mr. Langevin, particularly about 

nonproliferation. I am very concerned. And Mr. Held in particular, 

the administration’s decision to place the Savannah River Site 

mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility, MOX, which transforms weapons-grade plutonium into green fuel; by placing this into cold 
19 

standby, I believe it interrupts the environmental cleanup missions 

and disrupts the nonproliferation efforts. 

Last week you and Representative Marcy Kaptur from Ohio discussed the issue. Representative Kaptur cited a report from a January 16th paper published by former Russian negotiators of the initial U.S.-Russia plutonium disposition agreement back in the year 

2000. As Representative Kaptur pointed out, the paper cited that 

if the Americans strayed from the current agreement regarding 

MOX, the Russians would have the ability to consider enrichment 

of their plutonium and would not place a priority on international 

monitors. 

As a concerned member of this committee, I believe we should 

have assurance from Russia that they will not seek this path before 

we even consider placing MOX into cold standby. 

Going back to the hearings last week, Secretary Moniz told Representative Mike Simpson that the Department was considering 

four alternatives to MOX. However, he noted, that only two were 

less expensive than MOX. It is my understanding that these alternatives would require in addition to—in addition to renegotiations 

with the Russians, a change in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act for 

the State of New Mexico to receive the material. 

Have you reviewed this plutonium placement in New Mexico 

with the State of New Mexico and its delegation? What is the opinion of the leadership of New Mexico? 

Mr. HELD. Thank you, sir. First, the world will be a much safer 

place if both the United States and Russia dispose of 34 metric 

tons of weapons-grade uranium. Very simply, the world will be a 

safer place, and the Secretary is committed to that mission. In 

terms of the agreement with the Russians, the original agreement 

in 2000 had us actually both committed to pretty much the use of 

the MOX technology to get rid of the—to dispose of the plutonium. 

At Russian request, we revised the agreement in 2010 to allow 

them to use a fast reactor rather than the MOX approach. So there 

is a precedent for revising the agreement should we have a need 

to do so. And we have not had formal discussions with the Russians on this matter, but we have had informal discussions, before 

the Crimea incident, I must say. And there was an indication, a 

businesslike indication that they would be prepared to talk about 

these things if a need arose to do so. So it really comes down onto 

the question of—a good government question of how do we do this? 

What is the best way? 

And the GAO issued a very good report recently on MOX that 

really kind of made—pointed out the serious mistake was made in 

2007, when we rushed to construction before we had a design. That 

was not a smart thing to do. And we support GAO’s call for a really 

deep look in why we made that decision. So the question is how 

do we best address this mission focus? We have sunk $5 billion into 

the MOX project already. The assessment is that we have got $25 

billion more to go in full life-cycle costs. So the good government 

decision, is there a way to achieve this mission that costs less than 

$25 billion? 

John MacWilliams, who is a former investment banker that Secretary Moniz brought in, has done very, very thorough and very 

clear-eyed look at this. And we do believe that there are options 
20 

that are significantly cheaper. I think we owe it to the committee 

to get you that report as soon as we possibly can so that we can 

all together make a very good government decision. One of the options could still be the MOX project, though, if we can work with 

the M&O contractor and drive down the price of actually making. 

The real question is, what is the smartest way that is cheaper than 

$25 billion? 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I would tell you that indeed the facility is 62 

percent completed. I believe—and not to be critical, NNSA, the contractor, you should be working together, because this can be done. 

The alternative is truly putting our country at risk, I believe, in 

having weapons-grade plutonium either in South Carolina or in 

New Mexico. And it just doesn’t need to be done. And I truly hope 

you will look at the numbers. Because additional facts have come 

out that, indeed, yes, life-cycle, the whole facility, but the result of 

creating fuel offsets truly so much of the cost. And again, this is 

not to be adversarial. I want to work with you. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. HELD. This is really a good government decision. So we appreciate that. It is a really hard decision, and we really owe it to 

you to get you that report so we can actually have this conversation 

in a clear way. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, nuclear cleanup is just so important. So, 

please, thank you. 

Mr. HELD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. His time has expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to continue on this discussion about the MOX facility. 

Mr. Held, you mentioned Russia wants to consider a fast reactor. 

Could you talk about that more? Do you have more information 

about the type of reactor they are talking of using? 

Mr. HELD. That is probably, sir—I am a retired CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] operations officer, used to being in dark alleys 

more than on highly technical things. So I can get you an answer, 

a very detailed technical answer. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 159.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. My understanding is they are interested in the 

PRISM reactor, and Mr. Belikov has recently met to discuss that 

issue. That is not a CIA issue, but that is an open source issue. 

Mr. HELD. That is my understanding, sir, but the technical aspects of that are probably beyond my competency. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. This is your wheelhouse. This is your issue. 

Mr. HELD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am not interested in hearing you say you don’t 

have the technical expertise to discuss this matter, because you are 

one of the primary decisionmakers, are you not? 

Mr. HELD. Yes, sir, I am the acting administrator, and I am 

proud of it, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When will you acquire the technical expertise 

on this matter? 

Mr. HELD. The NNSA has that technical expertise today, sir. 
21 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Apparently, they didn’t bother to brief the acting administrator. Enough said. Let’s move on. 

Mr. HELD. Okay, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do the pits and secondaries that we hold in reserve, are they part of the hedge for our nuclear deterrent, Mr. 

Held? 

Mr. HELD. One of the main reasons, sir, that we are moving to 

interoperable warheads is so that we can actually reduce the size 

of the hedge. The 3+2 strategy allows us to maintain a safe, secure, 

and reliable deterrent based on a smaller deterrent. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I know all that. My question goes directly to the 

pits and secondaries. 

Mr. HELD. And that goes to the design of the pits and 

secondaries. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are they part of the hedge? 

Mr. HELD. Yes, sir, in terms of they are part of the interoperable 

warheads. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And I would appreciate a detailed, detailed 

reply to my question concerning Russia’s apparent interest in the 

PRISM reactor. 

Mr. HELD. They are—yes, sir, we will get you that. They, based 

on the 2010 agreement, they are pursuing the fast reactor. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The other question has to do in your testimony, 

you talked about four different proposals that are being investigated by NNSA. 

Mr. HELD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. But the disposition, the MOX, the one you said, 

reactors, and a nonreactor approach. What is the nonreactor approach that you are looking at? 

Mr. HELD. The nonreactor approach would be dilution and then 

storage in a geographic repository. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. I would appreciate more detail on all 

four of those proposals that you are looking at. 

Mr. HELD. I think the—report will get you that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is the timeframe for that report? 

Mr. HELD. We are hoping to get it out next week, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am sorry, when? 

Mr. HELD. We are hoping to get it out next week. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Good. I will await that. 

My next question goes to Ms. Bunn. Is the DOD planning to reevaluate the number of B61s that would have to undergo life extension? And was that analysis—what was the analysis that determined the number of B61s required? 

Ms. BUNN. Sir, I don’t know of any reevaluation going on. I 

would defer to my colleague, who is the executive director—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Then let’s refer to Mr. Weber. 

Secretary WEBER. The B61 mod 12 will be used both for the 

dual-capable aircraft in Europe in support of our NATO commitments, as well as on the B–2 strategic bomber. So as we go into 

production in early 2020, the total quantity of production is something that will be determined in—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The current budget for the B61 life extension—— 

Secretary WEBER. Yes. 
22 

Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. Presumably is based upon some 

number of B61 bombs that will be extended. Is that true? 

Secretary WEBER. Yes. It is based on the current requirements, 

which are a combination of the Strategic Command requirement 

and the requirement for Europe. But that doesn’t mean that it 

wouldn’t be reviewed between now and the start of production in 

2020. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So sometime between now and 2020, which is 

what, 6 years, 7 years from now, you will have an analysis about 

how many we are actually going to rebuild? 

Secretary WEBER. Yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That is particularly unuseful. Excuse me. You 

have a plan today to rebuild a certain number of bombs which, as 

I understand, is a classified number. 

Secretary WEBER. The stockpile management plan, which has 

those numbers, and the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum 

[NWSM], which has those numbers, have been provided to Congress. But they are certainly subject to change as our nuclear posture evolves. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So we are headed down a path of rebuilding 

B61 bombs at a certain pace, certain number, based upon an analysis that was done when? 

Secretary WEBER. It is a current analysis, but it is subject to review on an annual basis. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So it is not 2020 that we will have the next review. It will be annually. 

Secretary WEBER. Yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. I 

yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I also thank the gentleman from Arizona for yielding. 

Ms. Bunn, last week the New York Times reported in an interview that General Breedlove, commander of European Command 

and NATO Supreme Allied Commander, described Russia’s development of a cruise missile with a range prohibited by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty as a, quote, ‘‘militarily significant development,’’ unquote. He elaborated, ‘‘A weapons capability 

that violates the INF that is introduced into the greater European 

land mass is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with. It 

can’t go unanswered.’’ So our general responsible for prosecuting 

any potential conflict in Europe is saying this changes the military 

calculus. Has your office, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] 

Policy, provided guidance to General Breedlove on this apparent 

violation of INF on how to adjust defense postures, what to say to 

NATO allies, and what the policy implications there are for further 

arms control with Russia? 

Ms. BUNN. Congressman Lamborn, the U.S. and NATO are reviewing a lot of policies right now in the face of what Russia did 

in Ukraine, and in the face of INF compliance concerns. I don’t 

want to get out ahead of our NATO allies in an open session. Be 

happy to come and talk with you about that. 
23 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. So we can talk further a classified setting 

on what the guidance is that you are giving General Breedlove, our 

NATO Allied Supreme Commander. 

Ms. BUNN. We are assessing now. That is where we are in the 

last—that is where we are on this issue. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I understand how the Crimean developments have given a new urgency to this, but we have known about 

the INF treaties for a period of time. So I mean I guess I would 

hope we would be farther along than just still assessing. And as 

a follow-up, the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] states, quote, 

‘‘We,’’ that is the U.S., ‘‘will pursue further negotiated reductions 

with Russia,’’ unquote. Given what we just talked about with Crimea and all those developments, does DOD still support new negotiations with Russia to reduce U.S. nuclear forces? 

Ms. BUNN. Congressman, the Russians have shown no interest in 

further reductions. And I think given where we are with Ukraine, 

we don’t have military to military or civilian—we don’t have contacts on these kinds of issues now for further reductions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, I am glad to hear that that’s the status at the moment. But the QDR was drafted some, you know, 

some months ago. And at that time, those who drafted it said, 

yeah, let’s continue further reducing nuclear forces, including U.S. 

weapons, with the Russians. So—what were you going to say? 

Ms. BUNN. I was going to say that the President last June, when 

he put out his nuclear weapons employment guidance, after several 

years of study and assessment with all of DOD, the combatant 

commanders and so forth, assessed that we could, we could in our 

own national interest, we could reduce by up to a third our deployed nuclear weapons. However, we wanted to pursue that in negotiations with the Russians, not do it unilaterally. As I say, I don’t 

see negotiations on that occurring any time soon. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Did the President know about the Russian cheating at that time? 

Ms. BUNN. This is, as you know from classified hearings that 

have been held in this very room with this subcommittee and others, it is very hard for me to go into much detail on this issue. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I guess I will just make a comment. I don’t see 

how we can be considering a third reduction, a one-third reduction 

of U.S. nuclear forces with someone like Russia, even before Crimea. I mean, Crimea is the icing on the cake. But even before that, 

with the INF cheating, I would think that that should have been 

a nonstarter. Is there anyone in the administration that is contemplating unilateral U.S. nuclear force reductions? 

Ms. BUNN. Not that I have talked with, no, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. I am glad to hear that. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair will recognize Mr. Nugent from Florida. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

our panel for being here today. A lot of questions, obviously. You 

can see the frustration on Members up here in regards to getting 

I guess some specific answers. And Mr. Garamendi is certainly one 

of those that obviously has shown some frustration. 
24 

Your response, though, to Congressman Lamborn as regards to 

the guidance given to General Breedlove. I mean, it was his comment, open-source comment, reference to the fact that there was a 

game changer in regards to the INF, what he believes is an INF 

violation, particularly as it relates to the weapon that—the cruise 

missile that was designed by the Russians. I mean, what direction 

do we give him? I mean, is it like, don’t worry about it; we are 

going to handle this? We are going to staff it; we are going to do 

whatever? I am just a little concerned about where he feels he is. 

Because right now, he is between a rock and a hard spot with everything that is going on in Ukraine. 

Ms. BUNN. General Breedlove has a very hard job at this moment, Congressman. 

Mr. NUGENT. He does. 

Ms. BUNN. He really does. In fact, I was in a meeting with him 

just about a week and a half ago. There are, again, when—it is 

very hard to address this issue in open session. When there are— 

when there are threats that are unexpected, you have to figure out 

what options there are for dealing with them when they arrive— 

before they arrive. There are a lot of options for doing this. 

Mr. NUGENT. Let me ask you this. Have we confronted the Russians about that possible treaty violation? 

Ms. BUNN. Yes, sir. We have. Yes. A number of times. We have 

raised it with them. We were not satisfied with their answer. We 

said, we will keep pressing them on this. It has been raised at a 

number of levels. 

Mr. NUGENT. I don’t think Putin really cares that we care. So, 

you know, I don’t know where you go from there. I mean, I am new 

at this myself, so I am not sure. We will get off that subject. 

But Admiral Benedict, the Ohio-class replacement, particularly it 

is probably one of the strongest—nothing against the other aspects 

of our nuclear deterrent, but it certainly is one that is most survivable. And the Navy’s Strategic Command and Department of Defense have all been very clear that they believe there is a 12-boat 

minimum in regards to that. Am I clear that we are actually not 

going to build 12 boats? That has been discussed or is not. 

Admiral BENEDICT. No, sir, the current program of record is to 

procure 12 boats. 

Mr. NUGENT. Within what time period? 

Admiral BENEDICT. First boat commences construction in 2021, 

delivers in order to support a 2031, and then follows out from 

there. But the program of record is a 12-boat program. 

Mr. NUGENT. Is for 12 boats? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NUGENT. Evidently, the information we had was incorrect. 

Because obviously, I believe that is a huge hedge as we move forward in regards to our nuclear deterrence. And I hate to go to the 

Air Force, having been prior Air Force, but, you know, we certainly 

have had a lot in the press in regards to the Air Force and our 

readiness, at least our training aspect of our readiness. What can 

you do to assure me that we are okay, that we have got—whatever 

the culture issue is going on within the Air Force has been corrected. Because we don’t hear the same issues, you know, coming 

from the Navy. So I would certainly like to hear your take on that. 
25 

General HARENCAK. Yes, sir. As this unfortunate breach of integrity of a small number of our officers occurred at Malmstrom, we 

promised in the Air Force that we were going to aggressively investigate it. And we did that extensively. We said we were going to 

hold anybody found accountable to it, and we have certainly done 

that. But most importantly, what we said is we would get to the 

root cause, what we believe to be the root cause and that we would 

begin a force improvement plan that would address some of the 

issues that we believe were causal. 

Mr. NUGENT. What do you think the number one issue was? 

General HARENCAK. Well, number one issue was, of course, the 

lack of integrity and the belief that there was a—it was necessary 

for these young officers to score a hundred percent on a test that 

they could reliably score a passing grade on. So we have embarked 

on a very aggressive campaign to assess, fix, and make sure that 

we permanently address this particular cultural issue of missileers 

that they had to have a complete and absolute zero defect. We believe, and we have shown for many, many, many decades, that our 

safe, secure, and effective stockpile of the two legs of the triad that 

we do is accomplished with a mission of zero defects. However, 

however, somewhere in there it was translated to these young officers they had to have zero defects, that they could not make any 

mistakes. We have addressed that, and we are going to continuously improve and work on that particular issue. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate that. 

And my time has expired. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

General Harencak, haven’t you all gone to a pass-fail now instead of 100 percent? 

General HARENCAK. That is one issue, but there is many more 

that are going to address, what we believe, to do a blurring of the 

lines between training and evaluation. We believe in that particular career field it was all evaluation and very little training. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Bridenstine for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Held, on March 24, Chairman Turner and I sent you a letter 

describing concerns with NNSA providing multiple integrated laser 

engagement systems, or MILES, to Russia. MILES is a force-onforce trainer, basically a high-tech laser tag system. And given 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and occupation of Crimea, Mr. Turner 

and I believe that sending laser tag systems to Russia free of 

charge is wildly inappropriate. I have your response letter here, 

and I appreciate your very quick response. And I certainly appreciate your promise to cancel the MILES request. Very positive. And 

thank you for that. 

However, there are some additional questions that your letter 

opened up. Despite canceling MILES, your agency is apparently 

still requesting $100 million for nonproliferation programs in Russia. And from our perspective, from my perspective, I will speak for 

myself, giving Moscow nonproliferation money, by doing that, we 

inadvertently subsidize Russia’s nuclear force modernization. While 

our nuclear arsenal is atrophying, Russia continues to develop new 

ICBMs. They are constructing new ballistic missile submarines. 
26 

They are developing new strategic bombers, among other nuclear 

modernization efforts. Clearly, if Moscow has money to spend on its 

own nuclear forces, then it is quite capable of fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations without relying on the U.S. taxpayer. Russia reportedly completed a massive nuclear exercise last week. This 

exercise practiced offensive operations involving the simultaneous 

use of nuclear missiles in a bid to intimidate its neighbors. These 

are all open-source reports. 

Mr. Held, we have a country that is modernizing its nuclear 

forces and exercising offensive strikes. We have a country that has 

invaded two of its neighbors, currently occupying South Ossetia 

and Abkhazia, and now Crimea. And so my question is doesn’t this 

$100 million that you are still requesting directly contradict and 

undermine the Obama administration’s stated policy of suspending 

military-to-military engagement with Russia? 

Mr. HELD. Thank you, sir. Thank you for your letter. And we 

were happy to promptly positively respond to that letter. In this 

situation, it most certainly would have been inappropriate. There 

is, even during the Cold War, which I spent most of my career in, 

there was a long tradition of keeping nuclear security and arms 

control issues, we tried as much as possible to keep those buffered 

from the ups and downs of the overall strategic relationships. That 

is in our national interest as well as the Russians’ national interest. 

As you can imagine, in the current situation, the Secretary has 

issued guidance to we need to be very careful in reviewing all of 

these programs to assure that any money that we are spending 

over there is driven by U.S. national security interests, not Russian. And it is a very fluid situation. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Let me interrupt. I have only got a minute 30 

left. Are you aware today there are news reports indicating that 

your deputy at NNSA, Anne Harrington, who is here today, stated 

that the U.S. is curtailing cooperative threat reduction with Russia? 

Mr. HELD. I am aware of the news reports. The news reports 

were from Russia, and they were inaccurate. That is not what she 

said, according to the transcript of the meeting. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. That is good to hear, that those are inaccurate 

reports. 

Mr. HELD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Weber, the Nuclear Weapons Council, something we talked 

about in my office also, had to certify the fiscal year 2014 and 2015 

budget for NNSA. Is the council satisfied with the NNSA’s work in 

trying to achieve those efficiencies? 

Secretary WEBER. Mr. Chairman, we were able—all of the members of the Nuclear Weapons Council were able to certify the budget. But in doing so, we recognize that there is risk. We were able 

to preserve the highest priorities, but we had to slip some programs, including the interoperable warhead one, the Long-range 

Stand-off Missile [LRSO]. And what is most important is that we 

go back to a situation where we can have long-term certainty and 
27 

stable funding. And with sequestration hanging over our heads in 

2016, that puts a lot of stress on the priorities of the Nuclear 

Weapons Council. 

Mr. ROGERS. So is DOD satisfied with NNSA and their effort on 

these efficiencies? 

Secretary WEBER. We continue to work with our partners in 

NNSA to identify additional efficiencies and to keep that focus on 

delivering the life extension programs for our nuclear weapons. 

And I agree strongly with Acting Administrator Bruce Held that 

the tone of our partnership is very good at the leadership level. We 

talk frequently and in a very civilized manner. These are common 

problems that we have to work on together. 

Mr. ROGERS. So is DOD satisfied with their progress on these efficiencies? I know you want to keep a positive tone, but it is either 

yes or no. 

Secretary WEBER. We have made progress. 

Mr. ROGERS. Make it a positive yes or no. 

Secretary WEBER. We are not fully satisfied, and believe there 

are more opportunities for increased efficiencies. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is a very positive no. 

Mr. Held, are you satisfied—never mind. What efficiencies specifically are you going after in fiscal year 2015, and how much do 

you think you will be able to save? 

Mr. HELD. Yes, sir. They are, on pure management efficiencies— 

there are two streams, management efficiencies and workforce 

prioritization. That is part of the CAPE study. On the management 

efficiencies, our target for fiscal year 2014 was $80 million. Our 

target for fiscal year 2015 is $163 million. And the target across 

the FYNSP [Future Years Nuclear Security Plan] is $1.3 billion. 

For fiscal year 2014, we will not only meet, we will beat the $80 

million target. For fiscal year 2015, we look like we are not only 

going to meet, but we look like we will beat it. And so now we are 

actually projecting out to the fiscal year 2016 efficiencies. So those 

are real efficiencies, where we are getting mission effectiveness at 

greater cost-effectiveness—cost-efficiency. 

On the workforce prioritization, however, this is where we have 

a little bit of a difference, is essentially the argument of the workforce prioritization is—and that is $1.5 billion over the 5-year 

FYNSP. What that calls for is a 25 percent shift of the workforce 

from what would be—what was classed as lower priority work to 

higher priority work. And so what we did, NNSA did two studies, 

one internal, one external. And really what that involves is shifting 

workforce from certification of the stockpile and dismantlement to 

life extension programs. Sir, we don’t believe that is a simple budgetary exercise. We think that is a major policy decision. And so to 

the extent that there is a collegial debate, it goes to that question. 

But let me assure you, back to the original thing, in terms of continuous improvement, we are committed to that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Will you get those specifics reduced to writing and 

submit them? 

Mr. HELD. You bet. You bet. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 159.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 
28 

And finally, Dr. Winokur, Congress has been trying to get your 

organization an inspector general for over 2 years now. I understand that you met with leaders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Inspector General [IG] yesterday. And I also heard that 

the IG and you disagree on how it should carry out its work. My 

question is will you assure this subcommittee that you and your organization will fully cooperate with the IG and provide the information, access, and resources the IG needs to carry out its job? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Mr. Chairman, the Board did meet with the inspector general yesterday. I think it was a very productive meeting. 

The inspector general will brief at an all-hands meeting all the 

Board staff on Friday. And I can assure you that the Board and 

the inspector general will work together effectively and efficiently. 

I don’t see any disagreements at this time between the Board and 

the inspector general. I have heard that there was some of these 

discussions on the Hill. Quite frankly, sir, I don’t believe there is 

any validity to any of those comments. The Board and the inspector 

general will work together effectively. We understand their role 

very well. And we are very confident we will be able to work with 

them. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is the correct answer. 

Dr. WINOKUR. And you have my assurance. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Thank you, sir. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any further 

questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A question on nonproliferation. The Defense Science Board in 

January issued a report that had a number of very disturbing sentences in it. Let me read two. ‘‘In short, for the first time since the 

early decades of the nuclear era, the Nation needs to be equally 

concerned about both vertical proliferation and horizontal proliferation. These factors and others more fully discussed in the report led 

the task force to observe that monitoring for proliferation should be 

a top national security objective, but one for which the Nation is 

not yet organized or fully equipped to address.’’ To any of the panelists, what should we be doing about this to meet the warning of 

the Defense Science Board? 

Mr. HELD. Sir, I think, if I may initially, I think we would agree 

with the Defense Science Board. I think we need to—and it is part 

of our budgetary process—we need to step back and see what is the 

strategic path ahead of us on these issues. We have asked—or one 

of the committees has asked GAO to look into this as well, which 

we are really looking forward to helping that. And the Secretary 

has asked the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board to look into 

these things as well. 

What is the right strategic path? We have had success over the 

past 4 years. We are in a different budgetary environment. We are 

in a different strategic environment. What is the good strategy, the 

right strategy? Do we need to tweak it? And how do we need to 

proceed? We do not know the answers to that right at the moment, 

but we do agree with the need to ask the questions, though. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 
29 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for being here. Always grateful to the people 

that are out trying to look out for the best interests of freedom, and 

especially the United States. 

Ms. Bunn, last week, the New York Times reported that General 

Breedlove, our Supreme Allied Commander, a great man, in my estimation, described Russia’s violation of the INF treaty as a, quote, 

‘‘military significant development.’’ He elaborated, he said, ‘‘A 

weapons capability that violates the INF that is introduced into the 

greater European land mass is absolutely a tool that will have to 

be dealt with. It cannot go unanswered,’’ close quote. 

So this, again, the Supreme Allied Commander responsible for 

prosecuting any conflict or potential conflict in Europe is saying 

that this changes his military calculus. So my question is, has your 

office or OSD Policy provided guidance to General Breedlove on 

this potential violation of the INF and on how to adjust defense 

postures, what to say to NATO allies, and what the policy implications are for further arms control with Russia? 

Ms. BUNN. Congressman Franks, General Breedlove is a very 

good general. I would agree with you there. A lot of respect for him. 

Our careers have passed many times. He is dealing with a lot of 

tough problems right now. As we discussed a few minutes ago, we 

are looking at a lot of options with regard to Russia. If there were, 

if they deployed something like you described, we would have to— 

there are some things we would need to do. There is assessment 

going on right now in the U.S. Government. And that is, as I said 

before, that is about as far as I would feel comfortable going in 

open session. 

Mr. FRANKS. I understand. General Breedlove is someone I have 

a lot of personal gratitude and affection for. He actually took me 

up in an F–16 and did a 360 over the Goldwater Range. And you 

got to really trust a guy to do that. 

Admiral Richardson, it was certainly great meeting you last year 

and hearing about the significance of your mission. Could you describe to us the impacts to the Naval Reactors program after the 

cuts that you took in fiscal year 2014 from the levels that you requested? How have you tried to mitigate those effects—the effects 

of those cuts I should say? And what are the costs and schedule 

impacts to the Navy if the spent fuel handling facility project is not 

funded appropriately in fiscal year 2015? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, thank you for that question. I will 

start with the spent fuel handling facility, if I could. That was one 

of the areas where our appropriation was below our request by 

about $50 million. And additionally, we did not get the new start 

authority. So that project was put on hold, delaying another year 

of funding and 2 years in execution. And to put simply, it is costing 

the country more to delay this facility than it is to just get on with 

building it. So, for instance, last year, it was a $50 million decrease 

between our request and our appropriation. That is going to cost 

about $300 million to $350 million to recover. Each year that we 

delay this is another $100 million to $150 million to the Nation. 

That cost is spent on constructing temporary storage containers for 
30 

the spent nuclear fuel that comes off of aircraft carriers. That fuel 

is—those aircraft carriers are being refueled on a heel-to-toe basis 

down in Virginia. We feel it is a national strategic priority to get 

those carriers turned around and back to sea as quickly as possible. 

And so to accommodate that fuel, we are building temporary storage containers until we can get that facility online. And so appreciate very much this subcommittee’s support for our work there to 

build that new facility. 

With respect to the other cuts from the 2014 request, about $100 

million was applied to my operating and infrastructure budget. It 

is a 23 percent funding cut. That is the budget I use to basically 

maintain and operate my labs, my technical support base. By virtue of the cuts of that year, two major concerns that I have right 

now. One is that by virtue of that funding cut, we were unable to 

purchase a high performance computer. That computer was going 

to be applied to progress the design for the Ohio replacement class 

submarine reactor plant. As I stand right now, I am 6 months behind in that by virtue of being unable to purchase that computer. 

I can most likely recover that if I am funded in 2015. And so that 

is my mitigation. I will reprioritize work. That is a national strategic priority, our number one priority as well. And I can do that. 

But it comes at a cost to that other work. 

Additionally, there was only sufficient funding to perform required maintenance to one of my two training and research reactors in New York. And so we had to commit to one or the other. 

Pending any relief, I am going to have to shut down one of the 

training reactors as fiscal year 2015 starts. That will result in, at 

minimum, 450 operators that will not be trained and sent to the 

fleet, incurring additional stress on the operating force out there. 

And then that number only goes up until I can secure that funding 

and get back on track, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. This 

is really important. And I really appreciate it. There is about 20 

hours of questions that I have, but I will take my remaining 3 minutes—4 minutes and 15 seconds. 

Admiral, you were just talking about the spent fuel at your facility and about some method of disposing of it. Could you just expand on that quickly and tell us how you propose to permanently 

dispose of the spent nuclear fuel from the Naval Reactors? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, I will just describe our process up 

there. So we take our spent fuel from both our submarines and our 

aircraft carriers. We process it off the ships at the shipyards where 

they come in. All of that spent fuel gets sent to my Naval Reactors 

facility in eastern Idaho, on the Idaho National Lab. That fuel is 

processed through a pool where we store the fuel until it can then 

be safely taken out of that pool and placed into dry storage. And 

that is currently how we process it right now, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You said the dry storage remains the permanent disposal? 
31 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, right now, pending a national repository, we maintain that fuel in dry storage at our site in Idaho. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Have you ever heard of the IFR program? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Integral Fast Reactor. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have heard of it, but I am not conversant 

on it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You realize we spent $10 billion figuring out 

how to dispose of this stuff, and figured it out, and then mothballed 

it? Are you aware of that? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I am not. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are you any of you aware of this? Question. All 

of you. Integral Fast Reactor. Oh, my God. Okay. We got a problem, gentlemen and lady. 

Next time you are here I am going to ask you the same question, 

have you ever heard of the IFR, the Integral Fast Reactor? And I 

hope to have an answer that ‘‘I have heard of it, and I know exactly 

what it is.’’ It is a fast reactor that was specifically designed by the 

United States Government to dispose of the highly enriched—excuse me—of the spent nuclear fuels from all of your programs. And 

it worked. It operated for some 10 years—actually, longer than 

that. But I am not going to go into a lesson here, but I expect you 

to know about it the next time you come before this committee. 

It also happens to be the PRISM reactor that is being discussed 

in Moscow and in the United Kingdom to dispose of their plutonium. 

A couple of other questions. 

Excuse me, that was shocking. 

Dr. Winokur, what are the top concerns that you have not yet 

expressed to this committee about the safety of the nuclear enterprise? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well, I think the top concerns from my perspective 

right now is this gap between this aging infrastructure, which is 

50, 60, 70 years old, that requires a lot of oversight and care, and 

we have to monitor and finally determine when it can continue to 

operate in a safe and reliable fashion and when new replacement 

facilities or alternative strategies for plutonium and uranium are 

going to come online. That gap is becoming increasingly a concern. 

Another area where I have concerns, as I said before, formality 

of operations. The Board wrote a recommendation on safety culture. I think formality of operations is one of the better measures 

of safety culture. And we don’t right now see—we see some improvements by the Department, but a lot more has to happen in 

the operational space to have confidence. One area to me, Congressman, that is incredibly important is contractor assurance systems. In the final analysis, the contractors have to be able to get 

the job done. There are a lot more of them. I mean, there is always 

going to be a need for Federal oversight and the Board’s independent oversight. But the contractors have to get the job done. 

These contractor assurance systems, in my opinion, are not improving, not maturing the way they need to. And they have to in the 

long run. The government has to depend upon those contractors. 

There will be oversight, but that has to happen. 
32 

And then, finally, the thing I am concerned about is the fact that 

accidents do happen. And we really do need to learn better lessons 

from Fukushima. I still think there is a sense in the complex that 

these accidents won’t happen. But I think the job of the Board and 

the job of the Department is to make sure they are prepared for 

what I always refer to as the low-probability, high-consequence accident. How to be ready for that. It can happen. It will happen. And 

these sites are very, very complicated. And there are many different facilities and many different operations, and a lot of things 

can go wrong. So it is going to require a lot of drilling, a lot of planning, and a lot of coordination. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You are talking here specifically about the military reactors, military programs, not the commercial. Or are you 

talking about both? 

Dr. WINOKUR. No, I am talking about the defense nuclear facilities under the jurisdiction of the Board, not commercial. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Bridenstine for any more questions 

he might have. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Yes. Mr. Held, I just wanted to follow up with 

the question I asked earlier about the $100 million for nonproliferation programs. All of us believe in nonproliferation. I wanted to get insight. When we talk about, you know, basically subsidizing, if you will, Russian military modernization, especially nuclear modernization, ICBMs, strategic bombers, ballistic missile 

submarines, when we talk about what they are doing within their 

nuclear modernization programs, including violating the INF, and 

while they are doing this, we are in essence subsidizing the security of their current nuclear capabilities, at some point, we as 

Americans have to make a decision that we are subsidizing their 

nuclear modernization program, and we got to stop spending it. 

I am going to ask Chairman Rogers that when we do the mark 

that we really look hard at this $100 million that it seems your 

agency is requesting. I was wondering if you could give us your insight as to at what point do we make a decision that we are inappropriately subsidizing Russian nuclear modernization? 

Mr. HELD. So thank you for the question. Very important question. Things have changed pretty considerably since we built this 

budget request. And so I think we need to look at this in a very 

clear-eyed fashion. We welcome the committee’s interest in this, 

and welcome dialogue on this. I would suggest that we are in the 

business of U.S. national security, not in subsidizing the Russians 

one way or the other. Our responsibility, the responsibility of everybody at this table, and yours as well, is U.S. national security. 

And so if that money is judged not to be serving those interests, 

then we shouldn’t pursue it. And I look forward to talking to you 

about this issue over the time. It is a very fluid situation. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Held. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

I thank the witnesses. A very productive hearing. And I do thank 

all of you for your service to our country. And I appreciate your 
33 

preparing for this hearing and making yourself available. I would 

remind you that the record will be left open for 10 days. 

If any Members who could not make it to the hearing have questions, or those who are here just couldn’t get their questions in and 

they submit them to you, I would ask you to provide a response in 

a timely manner. 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 8, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 8, 2014 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. HELD. NNSA assigned a new Federal Project Director to the project in May 

2012. Shortly after he came on board, he identified the space-fit issue to the Departmental leadership and the Department immediately began recovery efforts. NNSA’s 

commitment to not start construction until design is 90% complete allows the Department to reevaluate its options. NNSA engaged with B&W Y–12’s corporate leadership and performed a root cause analysis for accountability purposes as well as 

to improve performance going forward. Several new personnel were brought in to 

improve the caliber of the project team, significant fee reductions were made, and 

an allowability review for direct costs has been initiated. Specifically, in FY 2012, 

NNSA reduced the fee associated with the design work by 90% ($5.1M), and in FY 

2013, fees were reduced 60%. ($29M) in the areas of Project Management and Leadership primarily due to poor performance on UPF design, thereby sending a strong 

performance signal within the parameters of the contract fee structure. [See page 

12.] 

Mr. HELD. We have not lost $1.2B on design. To date we have expensed approxi- mately $880M on the UPF project. Much work has occurred on the project beyond 

engineering design for the big box structure, such as NEPA, technology development, utilities and road relocation, and safety basis studies and analysis. The design 

efforts to date have focused principally on building 9212 process capabilities, development of process technologies, and the development of the safety analysis and authorization basis. These efforts are readily transportable to a smaller facility that 

contains the 9212 capabilities (ie: casting). [See page 12.] 

Mr. HELD. The NNSA is always striving to find costs savings in support of mission activities, and we welcome all suggestions on how to save taxpayer funds. 

NNSA and its contracting partners, for example, are looking at ways to reduce deferred maintenance, control the growth of pension payments, and constrain medical 

expense growth. NNSA is also asking its Lab and Plant leadership teams to help 

identify savings initiatives. The new Pantex/Y–12 award may serve as a model to 

spur additional cost savings across NNSA. 

The NNSA will continue to balance mission requirements with budget driven adjustments, and looks forward to close coordination with Congressional committees, 

the Department of Defense and other stakeholders to ensure that the budget reflects 

the most effective and efficient operation possible while supporting our mission 

deliverables. Going forward, any additional efficiency targets imposed in the absence 

of a specific plan for their accomplishment would constitute a scope cut and therefore adversely affect the nuclear weapons modernization program, as well as 

NNSA’s broader Weapons Activities mission space to include the stockpile, science, 

infrastructure recapitalization, and counterterrorism. [See page 27.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. HELD. The complete removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from these 

11 countries plus Taiwan represents 322 kilograms or .06% of the total amount of 

HEU at civilian facilities. While the overall percentage is relatively small, the number of countries that have HEU inventories greater than one kilogram was reduced 

by 1/3 during the Four Year Effort. [See page 15.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. HELD. After Russia conducted a reassessment of its plutonium disposition 

program to better align it with its national nuclear energy strategy, Russia proposed 

to the United States that Russia’s disposition program center on the use of fast reactors: the BN–800 under construction and a smaller BN–600 which was already 

part of its disposition program. Russia also proposed a number of significant nonproliferation controls on the use of fast reactors. As a result, the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) was amended, and the agreement entered 

into force in July 2011. It allows Russia to dispose of its weapon-grade plutonium 
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by fabricating it into MOX fuel and irradiating it in fast reactors under certain nonproliferation constraints, particularly with respect to the breeding ratio and reprocessing of breeder blankets. Russia continues to make progress on the BN–800 fast 

reactor, which will be used to support Russian plutonium disposition. [See page 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 8, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. In January, Secretary Hagel provided a report assessing the requirements for plutonium pit manufacturing. This report reaffirmed the requirement for 

a pit production capacity of 50–80 pits per year. 

a. Do you consider achieving a pit production capacity of this level to be part of 

implementing President Obama’s stated goal of a ‘‘responsive nuclear infrastructure?’’ 

b. Should pit production capacity be tied solely to the needs of the life extension 

programs, or should the requirement for a responsive infrastructure also influence 

when we achieve a pit production capacity of 50–80 per year? 

Mr. WEBER. A. A responsive nuclear infrastructure certainly includes a plutonium 

pit production capability. This year the Nuclear Weapons Council will review the 

capacity requirement and the schedule for achieving it. 

B. Pit production is not tied solely to life-extension programs. Secretary Hagel’s 

report provides four drivers for our pit production requirements: 1) policy objectives 

for the nuclear deterrent, especially the desire to reduce the weapons in the hedge 

by implementing a responsive infrastructure; 2) military requirements; 3) stockpile 

aging; and 4) infrastructure cost and capacity. 

Mr. ROGERS. Did the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study examine in 

detail various options for the structure of U.S. nuclear forces, including a dyad and 

potential monad? 

Last summer, the results of this study were released. Why did President Obama 

ultimately decide to reject eliminating a leg of triad? 

Mr. WEBER. The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation study provided a detailed look at U.S. deterrence requirements, including alternative employment strategies and force structures. The Presidential guidance stated that the United States 

will maintain a nuclear triad, which is the best option to maintain strategic stability 

at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you provide the exact amount for the record, and your best 

recollection right now, of the amount of DOD budget authority it has transferred 

to DOE–NNSA in FY15? How much did it provide in FY14 and in previous years? 

Would you say the Department has gotten its money’s worth—is DOD happy with 

NNSA’s execution of key programs like LEPs and major infrastructure construction 

projects? 

Mr. WEBER. Currently, DOD has transferred $1.535 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 

2015 budget authority to NNSA. The following table provides the FY 2011–2015 

total transfers (topline and annual) in millions: 

TY $M FY 

2011 

FY 

2012 

FY 

2013 

FY 

2014 

FY 

2015 

President’s Budget 

Request 2011 

Topline Budget 

Authority Transfer 

642 887 1,082 1,428 1,644 

Uplift 0 290 439 843 1,535 

Total 642 1,177 1,521 2,271 3,179 

Through the Nuclear Weapons Council, DOD has worked with NNSA to prioritize 

programs within the available funding. DOD continues to work with the Department of Energy to improve the weapons procurement process and meet our requirements for life-extension programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. The FY13 NDAA requires the Nuclear Weapons Council to certify 

the budget request for NNSA each year. As the Executive Director of the Council, 
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do the Council members believe this is a useful process and authority? How could 

it be strengthened? 

Was the certification process helpful during budget request formulation? Do you 

have greater confidence that NNSA is applying resources to military priorities? 

Mr. WEBER. The certification process has helped increase communication and 

transparency between DOD and the Department of Energy during budget formulation. It has facilitated the incorporation of DOD priorities. 

Mr. ROGERS. The FY13 budget request terminated the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) (i.e., helicopter). This helicopter was to replace Air Force 

UH–1Ns that average more than 40 years old and fill critical roles in security in 

the ICBM fields. What is the Air Force’s plan to fill the gap in capability left by 

cancellation of this program? 

Mr. WEBER. The Air Force plans to submit a formal report as directed by the 2014 

NDAA on September 30, 2014 outlining the UH–1N Replacement Strategy. The 

strategy is currently under review, and will be determined by the AFROC this summer. The decision facing the Air Force is whether to continue flying the UH–1N via 

a Service Life Extension Program or to replace the UH–1N with another airframe. 

Mr. ROGERS. Does the decision to defer the first interoperable warhead program 

by at least 5 years affect the number of W76–1 warheads to be produced? Do we 

now need more warheads for a hedge? 

Mr. WEBER. DOD is not planning to increase the number of W76–1 warheads produced. The Nuclear Weapons Council will continuously evaluate the hedge requirements and make adjustments if necessary. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you think that NATO allies should be asked to share part of the 

costs of the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) costs currently paid for by the NNSA 

and the Air Force? 

Would having the NATO allies pay for part of the LEP be against the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty? 

Do NATO allies intend to purchase dual-capable aircraft with their own funds? 

Why are B61s necessary for extended deterrence in Europe? 

Please describe why the B61 LEP is needed for our own strategic deterrent, in 

addition to our extended deterrent for NATO and allies in Asia. 

Ms. BUNN. Several of our NATO Allies do make substantial monetary contributions in several ways to offset the costs of stationing nuclear weapons in Europe. 

However, there is no desire for NATO Allies to help fund the LEP both because the 

United States requires the B61–12 for its own nuclear deterrence requirements and 

because U.S.-only funding ensures that the United States retains total control of design and capability decisions for the weapon. This allows the United States to ensure that the weapon has the desired characteristics for the strategic bomber mission as well as the dual-capable aircraft mission. 

The existing nuclear burden-sharing arrangements with NATO are consistent 

with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If Allies were to fund 

of a portion of the B61–12 LEP, by changing the status quo, it might create the perception that the actions of the United States and its NATO Allies are inconsistent 

with the NPT. 

Several NATO Allies currently have, and operate, with their own funds, dual-capable aircraft at various levels of readiness that are capable of delivering nuclear 

weapons. These aircraft are assigned to the NATO nuclear deterrence mission on 

a voluntary basis. We expect that these contributions will continue in accordance 

with NATO’s 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR), which concludes that the current mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities 

for deterrence and defense is appropriate for the Alliance. For some NATO Allies, 

this will eventually require the purchase of new aircraft, or refurbishment of existing aircraft, in order to continue to contribute to this important Alliance mission. 

Some of our NATO allies with dual-capable aircraft have already contributed to the 

research and development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as well expressing their 

intentions to purchase the JSF. 

The B61–12 LEP is necessary to maintain a credible and effective gravity bomb 

capability for the bomber leg of the U.S. nuclear Triad, our dual-capable aircraft, 

and those of our Allies, allowing for the eventual retirement and ultimate dismantlement of every other gravity bomb currently contained in the U.S. stockpile, 

all of which are being maintained well beyond their intended service lives. Completing the B61–12 LEP will demonstrate that the United States intends to maintain the important nuclear deterrence commitments of this and previous Administrations to Allies and partners across the globe and will reassure those Allies and 

partners that they do not need to pursue their own, independent nuclear weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. In the past several years, NATO has made a series of decisions and 

declarations regarding its nuclear posture. Please describe these decisions and 
165 

NATO’s nuclear policy going forward. What is NATO’s policy regarding future 

changes to its nuclear posture? 

Ms. BUNN. NATO’s most recent and definitive declaration regarding its nuclear 

posture is contained in the Alliance’s May 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR). The DDPR affirmed that nuclear weapons are a core component of 

NATO’s overall deterrence and defense capabilities along with conventional and 

missile defense forces; that NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix 

of these capabilities; and that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain 

a nuclear Alliance. 

With respect to possible future changes to NATO’s nuclear posture, the DDPR 

also states that ‘‘the existing mix of capabilities and plans for their development are 

sound,’’ but that ‘‘NATO will continue to adjust its strategy, including with respect 

to the capabilities and other measures required for deterrence and defense, in line 

with trends in the security environment.’’ In this respect, ‘‘NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned 

to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the 

greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the EuroAtlantic area.’’ 

Mr. ROGERS. Please tell us the status of the interagency process that will make 

a determination on whether this cruise missile is a treaty violation? When will this 

determination be made? 

Ms. BUNN. The Administration takes compliance with all arms control agreements 

extremely seriously. 

The Administration will report the most current determinations on arms control 

compliance in the annual compliance report, prepared by the State Department, 

after receiving inputs from the Departments of Defense and Energy, as well as the 

Intelligence Community. 

This year’s report is in the final review phases and will be fully coordinated and 

submitted soon. 

Mr. ROGERS. In January, Secretary Hagel provided a report assessing the requirements for plutonium pit manufacturing. This report reaffirmed the requirement for 

a pit production capacity of 50–80 pits per year. 

Do you consider achieving a pit production capacity of this level to be part of implementing President Obama’s stated goal of a ‘‘responsive nuclear infrastructure?’’ 

Should pit production capacity be tied solely to the needs of the life extension programs, or should the requirement for a responsive infrastructure also influence 

when we achieve a pit production capacity of 50–80 per year? 

Ms. BUNN. The capability to produce 50–80 pits per year is a component of a responsive infrastructure that both meets the needs of our planned and prospective 

life-extension programs and allows the United States to shift away from retaining 

large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical 

surprise, allowing reductions in the nuclear stockpile. The pit production capacity 

of our nuclear infrastructure should take both of these factors into account. 

Mr. ROGERS. Did the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study examine in 

detail various options for the structure of U.S. nuclear forces, including a dyad and 

potential monad? 

Last summer, the results of this study were released. Why did President Obama 

ultimately decide to reject eliminating a leg of triad? 

Ms. BUNN. The review was led by the DOD, and included senior-level participation by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Council staff. The 

review did examine different nuclear force postures; however, the President determined that retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability at 

reasonable costs, while hedging against potential technical problems or 

vulnerabilities and changes to the geopolitical environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. President Obama’s Nuclear Employment Guidance rejects the notion 

of de-alerting U.S. nuclear forces while continuing to examine options to reduce the 

role of ‘‘Launch under Attack’’ in U.S. planning. Please explain why the President 

chose to reject de-alerting U.S. ICBM forces? 

Ms. BUNN. The President determined that U.S. nuclear forces should be operated 

on a day-to-day basis in a manner that maintains strategic stability with Russia 

and China, deters potential regional adversaries, and assures U.S. allies and partners. He has also directed DOD to focus on increasing the decision time and information that would be available to the President in the event of a crisis where nuclear weapons use was being considered. 

Mr. ROGERS. President Obama’s Nuclear Employment Guidance rejects the notion 

of de-alerting U.S. nuclear forces while continuing to examine options to reduce the 
166 

role of ‘‘Launch under Attack’’ in U.S. planning. Please explain why the President 

chose to reject de-alerting U.S. ICBM forces? 

Do you agree with the characterization that we hear that our nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ‘‘hair-trigger alert’’? 

Ms. BUNN. After a comprehensive review, the President concluded that all three 

legs of the Triad should be operated on a day-to-day basis in a manner that maintains strategic stability with Russia and China, deters potential regional adversaries, and assures U.S. allies and partners. He has also directed DOD to institute 

measures that would increase the decision time and information available to the 

President in the event of a crisis where nuclear weapons use is considered or had 

occurred. 

I do not agree with the characterization that our nuclear forces are on ‘‘hair trigger’’ alert. U.S. nuclear forces, even those at high states of readiness, are subject 

to multiple layers of control and strict safeguards. In addition, I fully support the 

President’s decision to continue the practice of open-ocean targeting of our ballistic 

missiles so that in the highly unlikely event of any accidental or unauthorized 

launch of a U.S. ballistic missile, the weapon would land in the open ocean. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe our extended deterrent assurances to allies lose credibility if we continue to slip deadlines for modernizing our stockpile? 

Ms. BUNN. I believe that the credibility of our extended deterrence assurances to 

our allies and partners is based on multiple factors. One of the most important factors is the consistent affirmation that the United States will retain a credible capability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with heavy bombers and dual-capable 

fighter aircraft in support of U.S. allies and partners around the world. Over time, 

it is possible that the absence of the weapons modernization programs would have 

an impact on both deterrence and assurance. The B–61 Life Extension Program 

FPU schedule did slip as a result of sequestration and delays in receiving funding. 

Such events highlight the importance of resolving the fiscal issues that we face, and 

how crucial stable and consistent funding is to the ability of these programs to meet 

cost and schedule deadlines. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the minimum number of Ohio-class replacement submarines 

that are required to fulfill STRATCOM’s requirements for sea-based deterrence? 

Please explain why less than 12 does not meet requirements? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Navy conducted a thorough analysis and determined that a 

force of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs with 16 missile tubes, compared to the 14 

OHIO Class, satisfies strategic deterrent requirements at the most affordable cost 

and meets STRATCOM operational requirements. The requirement to procure 12 

OHIO Replacement SSBNs allows the Navy to provide 10 operational SSBNs during 

class mid-life overhaul period. During these overhauls, two SSBNs will be non-operational while they undergo required mid-life maintenance periods. This force will 

fulfill the combatant commander minimum essential requirement of 10 operational 

SSBNs. Reducing the fleet of SSBNs below 10 operational, now or in the future, will 

reduce survivability and will limit flexibility to respond to an uncertain strategic future 

Mr. ROGERS. What will happen to the Navy and Air Force’s costs for rocket motors 

if NASA chooses to pursue liquid-only technology for future spaceflight rockets? Are 

you comfortable that there is an interagency process between the services and 

NASA to understand the interdependencies between your programs for this? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Navy’s Trident II (D5) rocket motor costs are impacted and 

dependent on NASA’s program decisions. NASA is expected to make a decision in 

the 2016 timeframe on the use of liquid or solid propulsion systems as part of the 

advanced booster for the next generation of space launch vehicles. If NASA decides 

to use liquid propulsion systems for the advanced booster, this will result in significant future unit cost increases and result in diminishing critical skills in the solid 

rocket motor industry. These increased cost and reduced critical skills in an already 

fragile industry will have an impact on the Navy’s Trident II (D5) program. The 

Navy has worked closely with our industry partners to reduce overhead cost and 

streamline the infrastructure in-line with current production needs. The industrial 

base remains volatile and ongoing NASA solid rocket motor development programs 

are vital for sharing significant overhead costs for the Navy. Navy has been working 

closely with NASA and other Services to share and understand interdependencies 

between various programs. There is an effort to formalize this process by establishing a multi-agency team of experts. Solid rocket motors are vital for weapon systems and space applications and the industrial base remains an issue that must be 

addressed at the national level. 

Mr. ROGERS. We have a classified document agreed to by the Navy and NNSA 

regarding the number of W76–1 warheads that will be provided to the Navy by certain dates. Has NNSA been meeting those milestones that were agreed to? 
167 

Have you had to adjust fleet operations at all due to NNSA’s slowdown in delivering W76–1s? What is the likelihood you will have to do so in the future? 

Admiral BENEDICT. NNSA did not meet their commitments for deliveries of W76– 

1s to the Navy in FY13. The NNSA proposed a revised delivery schedule for FY14 

and FY15 to recover and meet its commitment to the Navy. Due to the deficiencies 

of deliveries to the Navy in FY13, Navy worked with STRATCOM to revise the deployment plan for our warhead modernization effort to ensure there are no operational impacts. We are closely monitoring this issue. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please provide us the Navy’s perspective on why we should consider 

including a refresh of the conventional high explosives as part of the W88 ALT 370 

program. 

Admiral BENEDICT. The Navy believes it is prudent to consider a W88/Mk5 conventional high explosive (CHE) replacement as a part of the W88/Mk5 Alteration 

370 (Alt 370) Arming, Fuzing and Firing program. CHE replacement is a practical 

mitigation strategy to sustain the W88/Mk5 into the late 2030s. Executing the replacement in conjunction with the ongoing Alt 370 program is a cost effective option, 

which minimizes impact on the operational Fleet and the overall nuclear weapons 

complex. Many of the planned activities for the Alt 370, including flight and ground 

qualification testing, could be used to test and qualify the warhead after CHE replacement. The W88/Mk5 is a critical component of the sea based leg of the triad. 

The Navy is committed to work with the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure it is 

fully informed of the options available to maintain an effective and credible seabased strategic deterrent capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe the Nuclear Weapons Council and its subgroups, including the Standing Safety Committee that you both sit on, function effectively? 

Would you like to see any changes? 

Admiral BENEDICT. I believe the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) continues to 

improve its oversight of the nuclear complex and has increased transparency and 

accountability. With regard to the subgroups such as the NWC Standing Safety 

Committee (NWC SSC), of which I am a member, our responsibility is to provide 

the information, options, and recommendations to the NWC in order to allow the 

NWC to make informed decisions regarding the nuclear enterprise. One key element 

of the NWC SSC that could be improved is the review of material to a deeper depth 

of understanding; this could happen through debate at the SSC. Another area that 

I would like see improve is better empowerment of the Action Officers (AO) on the 

NWC SSC. The AO core is the backbone of the NWC SSC. As members of the NWC 

SSC, we must better utilize the highly capable and professional AO structure to ensure they are always afforded the opportunity to conduct thorough and thoughtful 

analysis before issues are presented to the NWC SSC or NWC for decision. 

Mr. ROGERS. Does the decision to defer the first interoperable warhead program 

by at least 5 years affect the number of W76–1 warheads to be produced? Do we 

now need more warheads for a hedge? 

Admiral BENEDICT. The decision to defer the first interoperable warhead program 

did not resulted in any changes to W76–1 quantities. I defer to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense to provide a response to the hedge requirements. However, new 

hedge numbers, in light of the delay, would make sense. 

Mr. ROGERS. President Obama’s Nuclear Employment Guidance rejects the notion 

of de-alerting U.S. nuclear forces while continuing to examine options to reduce the 

role of ‘‘Launch under Attack’’ in U.S. planning. Please explain why the President 

chose to reject de-alerting U.S. ICBM forces? 

Do you agree with the characterization that we hear that our nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ‘‘hair-trigger alert?’’ 

General HARENCAK. The assertion that U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBMs) are on ‘‘hair-trigger alert’’ is false. 

The U.S. ICBM force is highly safe, secure, and effective, and is an integral part 

of a command and control system that maximizes Presidential decision time and 

flexibility during times of crisis. As the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review affirmed, the 

current day-to-day alert posture of ICBMs enhances strategic stability, provides significant advantages to the U.S. nuclear force posture through extremely secure command and control, and offers high readiness rates at relatively low operating costs. 

As with other U.S. strategic weapon systems, the use of ICBMs is governed by 

strict, redundant nuclear safety and surety procedures, and their release is possible 

only by direct Presidential authorization. The Air Force believes that maximizing 

Presidential decision time is imperative and can further strengthen strategic stability, especially at lower force levels. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why does the FY15 budget request propose to delay the Long Range 

Standoff (LRSO) weapon by 1–3 years? What is the Air Force’s preference for how 

long that delay actually is? 
168 

General HARENCAK. The Fiscal Year 2015 President’s budget request shifts funding for the LRSO program by three years due to warhead life extension schedule 

delays with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the continuing fiscal challenges of the Budget Control Act. 

The Air Force anticipates partnering with NNSA beginning in 4QFY14 to begin 

the Concept Assessment Phase (6.1) of the LRSO warhead effort. At the same time, 

the Air Force continues risk reduction and early systems engineering work as it assesses options to affordably execute the LRSO program. The Air Force preference 

is to minimize the delay to the extent necessary to align with the NNSA warhead 

program and meet combatant commander initial operating capability requirements. 

Mr. ROGERS. When does our current force of Minuteman III ICBMs start aging 

out? What life extension programs are currently underway for the ICBMs? 

What assessments or surveillance are we doing related to aging in the ICBM 

force? 

What are our plans or programs to extend the life of our Minuteman III ICBMs? 

When must the decision be made to proceed with life extension? 

General HARENCAK. Several modernization efforts for the Minuteman III (MM III) 

program are underway, such as ICBM Fuze Modernization, Solid Rocket Motor 

(SRM) Modernization, and Guidance Modernization that will ensure aging subsystem replacement and viability of MM III operations through 2030, as well as supporting the transition to the MM III follow-on. Age out of MM III subsystems is projected to occur between 2020 and 2030. 

Both acquisition and life extension efforts, to include ICBM Fuze Modernization, 

SRM Modernization and Guidance Modernization programs, will deliver replacement subsystems in FY22, FY23, and FY27 respectively. Additionally, the ongoing 

Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives, expected to be 

completed this fall, will inform requirements, acquisition strategies and plans for 

on-going efforts of SRM and guidance modernization. 

The Air Force regularly conducts Force Development Evaluation flight tests, numerous ground tests, and surveillance programs to determine the reliability of all 

MM III weapon system aspects. These efforts allow for the identification of operational deficiencies that must be addressed to sustain current and future operations. 

Mr. ROGERS. What will happen to the Navy and Air Force’s costs for rocket motors 

if NASA chooses to pursue liquid-only technology for future spaceflight rockets? Are 

you comfortable that there is an interagency process between the services and 

NASA to understand the interdependencies between your programs for this? 

General HARENCAK. Absent significant changes to the SRM industrial base, there 

is no empirical data or forecasted impact to the Air Force’s costs for rocket motors 

should NASA choose to pursue liquid-only technology for future spaceflight rockets. 

The Air Force’s Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Modernization program, funded in the 

FY15 President’s Budget, is based on current industrial base capacity and is not reliant on NASA’s participation. 

The Air Force understands the importance of the current industrial base supporting SRM Modernization program efforts. We will continue to work with other 

services, industry partners, and NASA to explore commonalities, share technologies 

and production practices, and eliminate redundancies throughout the SRM industry. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe the Nuclear Weapons Council and its subgroups, including the Standing Safety Committee that you both sit on, function effectively? 

Would you like to see any changes? 

General HARENCAK. Consistent with the Nuclear Weapons Council Chairman’s 

annual report to Congress, the Council and its subgroup continue to meet its responsibility of ensuring the United States retains a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. As the authority and responsible custodian for two legs of the Triad, 

the Air Force believes it should have a larger and more direct role in shaping the 

processes and decisions that affect the nuclear weapons enterprise. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please update us on the investigation into the fire and radiation release at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. 

a. What has been found? 

b. How long do you expect the shutdown to last? 

c. How is the shutdown at WIPP sending ripple effects across the DOE–EM complex? 

Mr. HUIZENGA. a. Following the February 5th salt haul vehicle fire and the February 14th radiological release events, DOE commissioned two Accident Investigation Boards (AIB). The vehicle fire AIB final report and initial radiological release 

AIB report have been issued and the Department is currently developing formal 

Corrective Action Plans for both. After the final radiological release AIB report is 

prepared and issued, a separate Corrective Action Plan will be prepared. 
169 

DOE continues to investigate the cause of the February 14th radiation release. 

In the underground, the focus has been on taking photographs and videos of the 

waste stacks, taking samples and swipes, and retrieving filter paper from the continuous air monitor. During the month of June, underground entries have been suspended while High Efficiency Particulate Air filters in the ventilation system are 

replaced. After this filter evolution is complete, underground entries will start again 

for further investigation, surveying, maintenance, decontamination and other activities. The information obtained during the investigation is being analyzed by some 

leading experts in various fields of expertise. All of this is being studied to try to 

determine the cause of the release. Based on recent entries into the WIPP underground, the AIB is evaluating the contents of a set of waste drums that came from 

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) that are located in Panel 7. The AIB is 

looking at the possibility that a chemical reaction may have occurred within a drum, 

causing a potential high-heat event and a subsequent release. 

b. The length of the time required to recover from the incident cannot be fully 

known until the cause of the event is understood and recovery planning is completed. 

c. We are carefully evaluating the impacts to other Department of Energy sites 

including impacts on commitments with regulators. Specific impacts being evaluated 

include the Department’s ability to meet: the removal of all legacy transuranic 

(TRU) waste from the Idaho National Laboratory by December 31, 2018, and, certain milestones for the WIPP certification of contact-handled and remote-handled 

TRU located at the Oak Ridge Reservation beginning September 30, 2015. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is EM on track to meet its regulatory and compliance agreements 

for FY14? What about for FY15 and beyond? 

Mr. HUIZENGA. The Environmental Management (EM) program will make significant cleanup progress with the President’s fiscal year (FY) 2015 budget request of 

$5.6 billion. Assuming Congress appropriates the President’s request, key progress 

will include continued efforts on radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and 

disposal; special nuclear material consolidation, stabilization, and disposition; transuranic and mixed/low-level waste disposition; and excess facilities deactivation and 

decommissioning. 

While significant cleanup progress has been achieved and will continue to be 

made in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, several challenges have impacted our progress 

on certain important projects. These challenges include the Balanced Budget and 

Emergency Deficit Control Act, which enacted sequestration, reduced EM funding 

by $394 million in FY 2013, and the FY 2014 lapse in appropriations and partialyear Continuing Resolution delayed work. The culmination of these events is anticipated to delay some FY 2015 milestones that cannot be met even with additional 

funds. 

To the extent milestones are anticipated to be delayed, DOE will follow the provisions of its cleanup agreements for working with regulators regarding milestone adjustments, as necessary. 

Mr. ROGERS. In January, Secretary Hagel provided a report assessing the requirements for plutonium pit manufacturing. This report reaffirmed the requirement for 

a pit production capacity of 50–80 pits per year. 

a. Do you consider achieving a pit production capacity of this level to be part of 

implementing President Obama’s stated goal of a ‘‘responsive nuclear infrastructure?’’ 

b. Should pit production capacity be tied solely to the needs of the life extension 

programs, or should the requirement for a responsive infrastructure also influence 

when we achieve a pit production capacity of 50–80 per year? 

Mr. HELD. a. NNSA considers pit production capability and capacity, as well as 

other capabilities, as components of a responsive enterprise. Each year we assess 

the affordability of our program and make adjustments to balance across our mission space. 

b. NNSA is committed to maintaining key plutonium production and associated 

support capabilities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Moreover, NNSA is 

committed to meeting the requirements that underpin implementation of a responsive infrastructure which includes plans to construct two modular structures that 

will achieve full operating capability not later than 2027. 

NNSA’s commitments are contingent upon the receipt of timely congressional appropriations and authorizations, including the release of previously requested reprogramming funds from the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

(CMRR) project in August 2013. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why does the FY15 budget request propose to delay the Long Range 

Standoff (LRSO) weapon by 1–3 years? Would NNSA prefer a 1, 2, or 3 year delay 

to LRSO? 
170 

a. How would the various delays affect the nuclear security enterprise, particularly production workloads at the plants and design teams at the labs? 

Mr. HELD. In July 2014, the NNSA and Air Force will begin an LRSO Phase 6.1 

Concept Assessment. The Phase 6.1 work includes development of an integrated 

master schedule and aligning the first production unit of the warhead with missile 

development. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) took a preliminary step in this 

program by identifying the W80 and W84 cruise missile warheads as the best candidates for a reuse-based life extension that will be performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The 

funding profile in the Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP) supports a First 

Production Unit (FPU) date of FY 2027, reflecting a three-year delay, in keeping 

with the NWC’s December 2013 meeting decision. This delay defers FYDP (and Future Years Defense Program) costs in order to present a fiscal profile for the Departments of Energy and Defense that is more affordable while simultaneously recognizing the priorities of both departments. 

a. At this early stage of the project, the FPU date could be accelerated by as much 

as 2 years (from the current baseline of 2027 based on funding levels), to 2025, provided there is an increased funding profile to support the change. Production plant 

and design agency impacts of the various delay options have not been fully vetted 

but there appear to be benefits as well as disadvantages to the delay options. For 

example, the currently slated three-year delay in LRSO will cause a production gap 

when the B61–12 life extension program (LEP) and W88 Alt 370 complete production at the end of 2024. This production gap is projected to last until the start of 

LRSO production in 2027. However, design team workloads at SNL may actually 

be smoothed due to this delay as the B61–12 and W88 Alt 370 (SNL and Los Alamos National Laboratory supported) will be entering the production stage (Phase 

6.5) at approximately the time LRSO (SNL and LLNL supported) is entering its 

early design stage (Phase 6.3) when demand for design work will begin to peak. 

Shifting FPU of LRSO back toward 2025 will reduce the production gap but may 

increase demand on SNL as multiple life extension programs incur overlapping design and engineering phases. 

Mr. ROGERS. NNSA’s Weapons Activities is requesting an increase of over half a 

billion dollars compared to the amount appropriated in FY14. At the same time, 

we’re seeing NNSA defer or delay several key programs, including the LRSO warhead and the W78/88 LEP. Why are we being asked to pay so much more but get 

so much less than the program plan that was committed to in the FY14 budget request? 

Mr. HELD. Each year we reassess requirements and costs based on new information, and re-align program and funding as necessary. The objective is to maintain 

balance of activities to accomplish both near and long term requirements. Plans for 

life extension programs, modernization of key capabilities, and delivery platforms 

are coordinated with DOD and decisions are made by the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

The program submitted in the FY 2015 President’s Budget Request reflects a balanced program that sustains and modernizes the current stockpile while maintaining the facilities and workforce necessary to conduct stewardship for the indefinite 

future. The program maintains stockpile warheads through the conduct of routine 

maintenance such as limited life component exchange. It surveils and assesses the 

state of the stockpile so its safety, security, and effectiveness can be assured, and 

undertakes work to prevent or correct any shortfalls. It supports infrastructure and 

personnel across the complex to ensure production and intellectual capabilities are 

available for stewardship. Finally, it provides for the safe, secure, and environmentally compliant operation of these capabilities in support of the stockpile. 

Mr. ROGERS. We have heard that the challenges that still need to be overcome 

to achieve fusion ignition at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Lab are considerable. What is the path forward for NIF in FY14 and 

the out-years? 

a. Why has NNSA rescinded its rule that all non-NNSA customers be charged 

‘‘full freight’’ for use of the facility? Why have we gone so quickly away from the 

full cost recovery model before it was ever even implemented? 

Mr. HELD. NNSA is continuing to follow the plan laid out in the November 2012 

Report to Congress, Path Forward to Achieving Ignition in the Inertial Confinement 

Fusion Program. We are in the process of preparing a report on more specific milestones requested in the FY 2014 Senate Report on Energy and Water Development 

Appropriations. We expect to have it published by August 11, 2014. 

In particular, NNSA has altered its efforts from pursuing the ‘‘point design’’ to 

taking a scientific approach to understanding the barriers to ignition. While we 

have a long way to go, NIF has made considerable progress in improving the thermonuclear yields. We are within a few percentage points of achieving what is known 
171 

as the ‘‘alpha-heating’’ milestone. The weapons programs at both LLNL and LANL 

believe that these yield levels are already sufficient to begin returning valuable data 

on thermonuclear burn to inform our weapons physics efforts under stockpile stewardship. 

a. The response to the announcement that NNSA was implementing this policy 

made clear that it would result in no additional funds for NIF, but would lead to 

the cessation of research programs of interest to NNSA, DOE more broadly, and to 

the national security of the Nation. 

We rescinded this rule when Dr. Moniz became Secretary of Energy because it is 

contrary to the long-standing DOE policy—a policy with a substantial statutory 

backing—not to charge user facility fees for scientific users of DOE’s user facilities 

unless the research is for proprietary uses. It is DOE practice that when we fund 

the operations at a facility, it funds the operations of that facility for all non-proprietary users. A number of interagency reports document DOE and White House Office of Science and Technology Policy agreement that DOE would steward its high 

energy density facilities (NIF, Z and Omega) for broad national use. There are two 

classes of users outside of NNSA for NIF and Z; basic science users and DOD users. 

Basic science grants from the Office of Science or the NNSA under the Stockpile 

Stewardship Academic Alliances program are sized on the basis that principal investigators will not pay user facility fees. Likewise DOD users such as DTRA or MDA 

did not request and have not been appropriated funds to cover the costs of their use 

of NIF or Z. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please provide us NNSA’s perspective on the potential option of including a refresh of the conventional high explosives as part of the W88 ALT 370 

program. 

Mr. HELD. Any decision about high-explosives refresh will be driven and supported by a sound technical basis. Like all of our stockpile weapons, the W88 is 

evaluated in an annual cycle to assess and certify that it meets all requirements. 

As with all systems, there are concerns about continued aging of the systems and 

their components, and aging affects are considered as part of this annual surveillance. The high explosives are examined and monitored as part of this process. The 

Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Design Agency for the W88/Mk5, 

has the responsibility to perform this annual evaluation for the CHE in the W88. 

He continues to assess that the W88 meets military requirements and remains safe, 

secure, and reliable. A new cycle of surveillance data will be collected this year, and 

will add to our overall understanding of how the explosives in the W88 are aging. 

NNSA has studied implementing a CHE refresh of the W88 in conjunction with 

the ALT 370 program. The CHE refresh option could support NNSA’s development 

of alternatives to extend the W88 weapon system lifetime, but refreshing the CHE 

does not explicitly extend the useful lifetime of the W88. CHE refresh does reset 

the beginning of life for several components in the nuclear explosive package, a potentially helpful result if planned life-extension activities (i.e., Interoperable Warhead (IW)–1 or IW–2) for the W88 system are further postponed. 

NNSA completed a W88 CHE Refresh Cost and Feasibility Report, detailing an 

overall cost of $576 million (including management reserve) for implementation. 

Some combination of DOD and NNSA funding would be required to complete this 

activity, and NNSA’s FY 2015 Budget Request does not include fiscal provisions for 

CHE refresh. 

In the near future, the W88 ALT 370 progress will diverge from an alignment 

with CHE refresh activities. Because of stakeholder interest, NNSA has taken steps 

in FY 2014 to allow maximum synergy between the ALT 370 and the CHE refresh 

through FY 2015. These steps preserve our ability to maintain leveraging and trade 

space for future LEPs and reduce the overall estimated cost to the government for 

implementation of both programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please provide us the number of personal service contractors employed by directly by NNSA. How has this number changed over the past 5 years? 

Mr. HELD. The number of personal service contractors employed by NNSA is zero 

and that number has not changed over the last 5 years. To ensure proper use of 

support service contracts, NNSA reviewed existing contracts and verified that terms 

and conditions do not create personal services contracts. Additionally, to assure that 

administration of support service contracts is appropriate and does not inadvertently create a personal services situation, NNSA is training federal employees on 

proper interactions with contractor employees. 

Mr. ROGERS. How is the shutdown at WIPP sending ripple effects across the 

NNSA complex? 

Mr. HELD. It is difficult to determine specifics. Depending on the length of the 

WIPP shutdown, there could be programmatic impacts to Pu Sustainment but as 
172 

of now, LANL is investigating backup options to disposition waste that could mitigate some of the future impact. 

The WIPP shutdown could also impact the Material Recycle and Recovery (MRR) 

program at LANL. Any resumption of MRR work done involving the Plutonium Facility 4 vault de-inventory requires temporary drum storage at LANL until a long 

term storage solution is made available. 

Mr. ROGERS. By law, Congress is supposed to receive the annual Report on Stockpile Assessments, which includes the assessments of stockpile health conducted by 

the laboratory directors and by the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, by 

March 15. Like last year, we still have not yet received this important report that 

we use to inform our legislative and budgetary decisions each year. Why the delay? 

When will we receive it? 

Mr. HELD. a. The coordination process took longer than expected in order to reach 

consensus on a few specific items. 

b. The FY 2013 Report on Stockpile Assessments was signed by the President on 

May 8, 2014. It was delivered to Congress on May 9, 2014. 

Mr. ROGERS. From a technical standpoint, do you believe the B61 LEP schedule 

can be slipped again without impacts to the safety, security, or reliability of the 

weapon? What is the assessment of the NNSA lab directors on this? 

Mr. HELD. NNSA is seeing aging and degradation issues even today. The further 

we extend the schedule, the more risk we are forced to accept in the safety, security 

and reliability of the B61. As stated by Dr. Paul Hommert, President and Director 

of SNL, during his testimony to the HASC–SF in October of 2013 ‘‘In order to sustain high confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of the B61 into the next 

decade, it is our technical judgment that we must complete the life extension program currently being executed.’’ In recent years, his letters have documented concerns related to technology obsolescence and aging. While the B61 is currently safe 

and secure, these concerns continue to increase. For example, in the past three 

years, SNL and LANL have observed time-dependent degradation not seen before 

in electronic, polymer, and high-explosive components. This observation is not surprising given the age of the B61 weapon system, the oldest units of which were 

manufactured and fielded in the late 1970s with some components dating back to 

the 1960s. As planned, the B61 LEP addresses all known aging-related issues and 

also addresses technology obsolescence to ensure the bombs continue to meet DOD 

requirements. 

Mr. ROGERS. Has NNSA benefited from the greater transparency to and involvement with the Nuclear Weapons Council? 

Mr. HELD. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) and its subordinate Standing 

and Safety Committee provide for the Services, Combatant Commands, Department 

of Defense, and Department of Energy to cooperatively determine the actions necessary to provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapon deterrent. Collectively, 

we are able to review options for extending the lives of our weapons, develop a path 

to a responsive infrastructure, and accomplish trade-offs between various programs 

to attain the stockpile necessary to keep the Nation safe. Involvement with the 

NWC ensures options and opinions are discussed, enabling DOD and DOE/NNSA 

to work with Congress and the Administration from a common understanding. 

Mr. ROGERS. Does NNSA’s W76–1 LEP funding in FY15 and out-years meet all 

Navy requirements for regarding scheduled deliveries? 

a. Does the decision to defer the first interoperable warhead program by at least 

5 years affect the number of W76–1 warheads to be produced? Do we now need 

more warheads for a hedge? 

Mr. HELD. Yes. As submitted to Congress in the most recent Selected Acquisition 

Report, the W76–1 LEP funding profile for FY 2015 and subsequent years until 

close out of production in FY 2020 meets all Navy requirements for scheduled deliveries. Production numbers are written in the Selected Acquisition Report and delivery schedules are discussed at the Project Officers’ Group. To prevent any confusion, 

NNSA is drafting a letter that will specify the agreed to deliveries. This letter 

should be sent out by the end of June/early July. 

a. The IW–1 decision did not affect the number of W76–1 to be produced, and 

NNSA has no plans to alter W76–1 production quantities. Decisions about hedge 

quantities would need to be addressed by the NWC. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. The January 2014 Defense Science Board report ‘‘Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies’’ recommended much more focus on 

verification and detection to be able to meet medium and longer-term proliferation 
173 

threats such as proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. There has also been concern about Russia’s compliance on a nuclear arms treaty. The report concluded that 

‘‘technologies and processes designed for current treaty verification and inspections 

are inadequate for monitoring realities.’’ 

What actions are NNSA and DOD taking in response to the Defense Science 

Board’s report? And do you believe the resources and plans are adequate to meet 

this rapidly changing threat and need? 

What is the constraining factor? What more could we be doing if funds were available? 

Ms. BUNN. DOD and NNSA are participating in an effort led by the National Security Council at the Under Secretary level to address the concerns and recommendations in the report. The interagency group will formally analyze each DSB 

recommendation and identify relevant existing and planned activities. It will then 

determine whether resources and plans are adequate. The results will be used to 

assist in planning future activities to close any gaps identified in the report. 

Mr. COOPER. Last year, NNSA had a goal of $320 million in efficiencies but only achieved $80 million. This year, NNSA documents do not identify any new efficiencies. By comparison, DOD budget documents commit DOD to an additional $95 

billion in efficiencies in the next 5 years, on top of efficiencies already being pursued 

such as 20% cut in civilian personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. DOD 

reportedly also identified nearly a billion dollars in efficiencies for NNSA. What efficiencies will NNSA commit to, and is there a plan to achieve the $240 million that 

were promised last year and are there any new efficiencies being considered or pursued? 

Ms. BUNN. As a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council Safety and Security 

Committee, I consistently work with my fellow committee members, including our 

NNSA/DOE colleagues who serve as co-chairs, to pursue increased efficiency and 

cost savings throughout the nuclear enterprise. DOD continues to offer the expertise 

of the Cost Assessment Program Evaluation office to NNSA as it pursues greater 

efficiencies in the future. 

Mr. COOPER. The January 2014 Defense Science Board report ‘‘Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies’’ recommended much more focus on 

verification and detection to be able to meet medium and longer-term proliferation 

threats such as proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. There has also been concern about Russia’s compliance on a nuclear arms treaty. The report concluded that 

‘‘technologies and processes designed for current treaty verification and inspections 

are inadequate for monitoring realities.’’ 

What actions are NNSA and DOD taking in response to the Defense Science 

Board’s report? And do you believe the resources and plans are adequate to meet 

this rapidly changing threat and need? 

What is the constraining factor? What more could we be doing if funds were available? 

Mr. HELD. NNSA agrees with the DSB Report conclusion, ‘‘the technologies and 

processes designed for current treaty verification and inspections are inadequate to 

future monitoring realities,’’ and would expand this conclusion to include both cooperative and non-cooperative regimes. NNSA has invested heavily over the last 50 

years to support current and future monitoring requirements, including using spacebased detection means to support the Limited Test Ban Treaty, developing options 

for warhead verification in collaboration with Russia and international partners, 

and improving confidence in discriminating low-yield underground nuclear explosions from other seismic sources. But work remains and the scope is expanding, as 

the Report describes. For example, NNSA expects future monitoring requirements 

under a cooperative regime may include accounting for deployed and non-deployed 

warheads in addition to delivery platforms; and future proliferation detection requirements under non-cooperative scenarios will likely expand both in capabilities 

sought by existing nuclear states and in the number of actors trying to access these 

capabilities. Solutions will require a continuous process of tailored and persistent 

surveillance for both warhead authentication and monitoring throughout weapon 

lifecycles and for monitoring undesirable nuclear activity throughout the world. In 

anticipation of the DSB Report findings, NNSA has especially emphasized 

verification and monitoring support efforts during the past several fiscal years. For 

example, NNSA has developed a series of national test beds in nonproliferation and 

monitoring to be responsive to future needs and capabilities to be adaptive to activities of a creative adversary. These efforts have included the participation of the Department of State’s Office of Arms Control and Verification (AVC), the Department 

of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD/DTRA), and representatives of 

nearly all of the Intelligence Community. This approach is fully aligned with the 

DSB recommendations on integrated spiral development. NNSA welcomes the op-
174 

portunity to provide more detail and offers a classified briefing that would meet the 

request on both constraining factors and funding. 

Mr. COOPER. Last year, NNSA had a goal of $320 million in efficiencies but only 

achieved $80 million. This year, NNSA documents do not identify any new efficiencies. By comparison, DOD budget documents commit DOD to an additional $95 

billion in efficiencies in the next 5 years, on top of efficiencies already being pursued 

such as 20% cut in civilian personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. DOD 

reportedly also identified nearly a billion dollars in efficiencies for NNSA. What efficiencies will NNSA commit to, and is there a plan to achieve the $240 million that 

were promised last year and are there any new efficiencies being considered or pursued? 

Mr. HELD. In June 2014, NNSA submitted a report to Congress entitled Report 

on National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Efficiencies in FY 2014 which 

detailed how NNSA met its FY 2014 target of $80.0 million in ‘‘cost of doing business’’ efficiencies and noted how pursuing $240 million in ‘‘workforce prioritization’’ 

efficiency targets would harm NNSA’s ability to certify the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile. The Committee requested NNSA identify an additional $59.5 million in ‘‘cost of doing business’’ efficiencies to release the remaining 

portion of the $139.5 million as described in the FY 2014 NDAA. NNSA will soon 

submit an addendum to the June report showing such savings. 

The NNSA is always striving to find costs savings in support of mission activities, 

and we welcome all suggestions on how to save taxpayer funds. The NNSA will continue to balance mission requirements with budget driven adjustments, and looks 

forward to close coordination with Congressional committees, the Department of Defense and other stakeholders to ensure that the budget reflects the most effective 

and efficient operation possible while supporting our mission deliverables. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is to cost around $2.1 

billion. 

Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of the B61 life 

extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in FY14 for its share 

in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing? 

Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent with Article 1 of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says ‘‘nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons’’? 

Mr. WEBER. There are no plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of 

the B61–12 Life Extension Program (LEP). However, NATO basing nations provide 

substantial financial support to the nuclear mission by providing aircraft, aircrews, 

load crews, and security forces, and also by providing facilities and much of the supporting infrastructure and equipment necessary to support the U.S. munitions support squadrons. Several NATO allies have contributed funding to F–35 development 

and have expressed a strong interest in acquiring the F–35 as their dual capable 

delivery system. Without the financial contributions of those NATO allies, the F– 

35 unit cost to the U.S. would increase. NATO common funding has paid for over 

$300 million, approximately 75 percent of the B61 storage security infrastructure 

and upgrades. There are no plans to re-evaluate the number of B61s at this time. 

The existing arrangements for the deployment of U.S.-owned and controlled nuclear weapons in support of NATO are consistent with Article 1 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Allied funding of a portion of the B61 LEP would almost 

certainly create perception problems regarding U.S. and Allied compliance with the 

Nuclear NPT, and any sharing of nuclear weapons design information with non-nuclear States associated with such funding would be problematic. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is to cost around $2.1 

billion. 

Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of the B61 life 

extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in FY14 for its share 

in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing? 

Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent with Article 1 of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says ‘‘nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons’’? 
175 

Ms. BUNN. There are no plans for NATO Allies to make direct contributions to 

the cost of the B61–12 Life Extension Program (LEP) because the United States requires the B61–12 for its own nuclear deterrence requirements; and because U.S.- 

only funding for the B61–12 LEP ensures that the United States retains total control of design and capability decisions. This allows the United States alone to ensure 

the weapon has the desired characteristics for the strategic bomber mission as well 

as the dual-capable aircraft mission. 

NATO basing nations provide substantial financial support to the nuclear mission 

at NATO main operating bases. In addition to providing aircraft, aircrews, load 

crews, and security forces, they also provide facilities and much of the supporting 

infrastructure and equipment for the U.S. munitions support squadrons. Because 

these facilities serve both national and Alliance purposes, and are funded through 

individual Alliance country budgets, it is not possible to provide an accurate assessment of exactly how much NATO basing nations have contributed in Fiscal Year 

2014 toward NATO nuclear burden-sharing, although it is substantial. 

Funding of security enhancements and upgrades, as well as funding of infrastructure upgrades (investment) at the specific European weapon storage sites, is provided through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). There have been 

four NATO weapons storage-related upgrades (Capability Package upgrades) since 

the original NATO Capability Package was approved in 2000. The total contributions are as follows: 

Program Name Total (M) U.S. Contribution 

Initial WS3 Installation ∼$215M USD $51.6M USD

Basic Capability Package (July 2000) 12.8M EUR 3.0M EUR

Addendum 1 (February 2005) 17.9M EUR 4.3M EUR

Addendum 2 (April 2006) 13.0M EUR 3.1M EUR

Addendum 3 (March 2009) 13.0M EUR 3.1M EUR

Addendum 4 (August 2011) 108M EUR 26.2M EUR

The U.S. costs above are estimates that are based on a 24 percent burden-share. 

The U.S. burden-share is generally 22–24 percent of the total NSIP costs. 

The number of B61–12 weapons to be produced through the LEP was evaluated 

by DOD and approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council at the onset of the program. 

This requirement is continuously reviewed throughout the 6.X life cycle management process. The projected quantity of weapons to be refurbished is based upon 

the requirements for extended and strategic deterrence commitments as outlined in 

various plans and policy documents. Should the guidance and/or direction in these 

documents change, the quantity of B61–12 bombs to be produced would be adjusted 

accordingly. NATO’s existing nuclear burden-sharing arrangements are consistent 

with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Allied funding of a 

portion of the B61–12 LEP, by changing the status quo, might create the perception 

that the actions of the United States and its NATO Allies are inconsistent with the 

NPT. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is to cost around $2.1 

billion. 

Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of the B61 life 

extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in FY14 for its share 

in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing? 

Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent with Article 1 of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says ‘‘nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons’’? 

Admiral BENEDICT. I defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide the 

answer to your questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is to cost around $2.1 

billion. 

Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of the B61 life 

extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in FY14 for its share 

in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing? 

Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent with Article 1 of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says ‘‘nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons’’? 
176 

General HARENCAK. There are no plans for North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) partner nations to contribute directly to the cost of the B61 life extension 

program. 

Under the unique nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO, our allies participate 

in nuclear planning, possess nuclear-capable aircraft, and provide special facilities, 

certified equipment and highly trained personnel to safeguard, load, and employ U.S 

nuclear weapons. There are currently no plans to re-evaluate the number of B61s 

that will undergo the life extension program. Initial assessments indicate a very 

limited percentage of program savings could be achieved even if substantial numbers and capability are reduced due to the fixed and variable cost of all facets of 

the Life Extension Process. Life extended B61s will fulfill gravity weapon requirements for both strategic and non-strategic extended deterrence roles. The construct 

through which the U.S. provides extended nuclear deterrence to NATO is consistent 

with our obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The arrangement 

directly contributes to our non-proliferation goals by reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security interests can be protected without their own 

nuclear weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of the mod- ernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is to cost around $2.1 

billion. 

Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of the B61 life 

extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in FY14 for its share 

in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing? 

Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent with Article 1 of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says ‘‘nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons’’? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide 

the answer to your questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of the mod- ernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is to cost around $2.1 

billion. 

Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of the B61 life 

extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in FY14 for its share 

in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing? 

Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent with Article 1 of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says ‘‘nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons’’? 

Mr. HUIZENGA. The total program cost estimate of the B61–12 Life Extension Program as reported in the last Selected Acquisition Report dated 30 September 2013 

is $7,344M with an additional $0.811M leveraged from NNSA stockpile services and 

campaigns. 

The B61–12 is a critical component of the U.S. commitment to NATO through extended deterrence. NATO allies participate in the security alliance through sharing 

arrangements involving the use of facilities, aircraft and personnel but not in the 

direct development or production of U.S. nuclear weapons. These arrangements and 

planned activities to assure aircraft compatibility with the B61–12 are best explained by the Department of Defense. 

During the testimony, Mr. Weber stated that the number of B61–12s is subject 

to change as our nuclear posture evolves and will be assessed annually. Yes, U.S. 

deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of our NATO allies is consistent 

with Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 

This article of the treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted. Under Article I of the Treaty, ‘‘Each nuclear-weapon State Party . . . undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear 

explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; . . . .’’ No such transfer occurs under NATO nuclear defense planning. The 

issue of U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of our NATO Allies 

was thoroughly considered during the negotiation of the NPT in the 1960s. This 

issue was of significant interest to NATO Allies and to the Senate during the NPT 

ratification hearings. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is to cost around $2.1 

billion. 

Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of the B61 life 

extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in FY14 for its share 

in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing? 
177 

Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent with Article 1 of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says ‘‘nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons’’? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Cost information and strategic planning related to nuclear weapons 

programs are outside the jurisdiction of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 

(Board). 

Ms. SANCHEZ. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is to cost around $2.1 

billion. 

Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of the B61 life 

extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in FY14 for its share 

in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing? 

Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent with Article 1 of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says ‘‘nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons’’? 

Mr. HELD. a. The B61–12 is a critical component of the U.S. commitment to 

NATO through extended deterrence. NATO allies participate in the nuclear alliance 

through nuclear sharing arrangements involving the use of facilities, aircraft and 

personnel but not in the direct development or production of U.S. nuclear weapons. 

These agreements, future changes and planned activities to assure continued compatibility with the B61–12 are best explained by the Department of Defense. 

There are no plans for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner nations to contribute directly to the cost of the B61 life extension program. 

Under the unique nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO, our allies participate 

in nuclear planning, possess nuclear-capable aircraft, and provide special facilities, 

certified equipment and highly trained personnel to safeguard, load, and employ 

U.S. nuclear weapons. 

There are currently no plans to re-evaluate the number of B61s that will undergo 

the life extension program. Initial assessments indicate a very limited percentage 

of program savings could be achieved even if substantial numbers and capability are 

reduced due to the fixed and variable cost of all facets of the Life Extension Process. 

Life extended B61s will fulfill gravity weapon requirements for both strategic and 

non-strategic extended deterrence roles. 

The construct through which the U.S. provides extended nuclear deterrence to 

NATO is consistent with our obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The arrangement directly contributes to our non-proliferation goals by reassuring 

non-nuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security interests can be protected 

without their own nuclear weapons. 

b. During the testimony, Mr. Weber stated that the number of B61–12s is subject 

to change as our nuclear posture evolves and will be assessed annually. As stated 

above, the U.S. does not have a cost sharing agreement with NATO for the development or production of nuclear weapons. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When was the last time of the DOD completed an assessment 

of the required number of B–61s required to receive the LEP? Would the DOD concur that in assessing the costs of the LEP program we should conduct a detailed 

analysis of the number of B–61s we retain in the future inventory? 

Mr. WEBER. The 2013 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study reevaluated 

the future stockpile needs and assessed required numbers. The planned number of 

B61–12s is derived from that analysis. The total number required for the future inventory should be analyzed as military requirements evolve. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are there DOD plans to re-evaluate the number of B61s that 

would need to undergo the planned life extension program? Do you think we will 

need to maintain a triad indefinitely? Who thinks about long-term requirements and 

next-generation threats at STRATCOM? Do we need a new nuclear cruise missile 

if we will also develop a new nuclear-capable, stealthy bomber? Why? 

Ms. BUNN. The required number of B61–12s planned for inclusion in the life-extension program (LEP) is reviewed as part of the 6.X life cycle management process. 

The current quantity of weapons to be included is based upon the requirements for 

extended and strategic deterrence commitments contained in various plans and policy documents. Should the guidance and/or direction in these documents change, the 

quantity of weapons to be produced would be reevaluated and adjusted accordingly. 
178 

As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, although the United States seeks 

the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, as long as they exist, 

the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. The President 

stated last year in his new nuclear employment guidance that retaining all three 

Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging 

against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities and geopolitical uncertainty. 

Since we cannot predict what the future holds, the Triad will provide the next generation of U.S. policymakers with a flexible and resilient range of capabilities to provide effective deterrence. 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command’s Resources (J8) and Intelligence (J2) directorates continuously review and collaborate on both requirements and threats, especially in light of on-going nuclear modernization efforts being conducted by several 

nuclear-capable countries. 

We do need the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile, which is the AirLaunched Cruise Missile (ALCM) replacement, and the new Long Range StrikeBomber (LRS–B) that the U.S. Air Force is developing. The stand-off capability of 

the LRSO is important since it will also be carried by B–52 and B–2 bombers which 

are less stealthy than the LRS–B’s design. We want an arsenal that contributes to 

effective deterrence, is survivable and flexible, and provides options for the President. Having both a penetrating bomber and the stand-off capability of a cruise missile is necessary if we want an arsenal that possesses these traits, especially with 

the advent of regional nuclear powers whose intentions and decision processes are 

far from transparent and whose military capabilities are increasingly advanced. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The GAO concluded in a recent report that DOD may be significantly underreporting its 10-estimate for the modernization of nuclear delivery systems, and does not include potential estimates for Air Force efforts to either modernize the ICBMs or develop a new bomber. Will you commit to providing a comprehensive and detailed plan to the committee on what the costs will be in the next 

10 years? And as most of the costs for modernization will increase beyond the next 

10 years, do you have an understanding of when the costs will peak and what planning is needed over the next 20 years? 

Ms. BUNN. I am committed to working with my DOD and other Nuclear Weapon’s 

Council (NWC) counterparts to provide the most accurate and detailed estimate possible of the costs associated with the efforts to modernize the Triad over the next 

10 years. The NWC baseline plan lays out a cost-effective modernization path to 

providing an updated Triad that meets both military and policy requirements well 

beyond the next 20 years. As you are aware, DOD and DOE report annually on the 

costs associated with the modernization plan over the subsequent 10 years in the 

Section 1043 report; the most recent version was delivered to Congress on May 7th, 

2014. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is DOD planning to re-evaluate the number of B61s that would 

have to undergo life extension? What was the analysis that determined the number 

of B61s required? Please provide a copy of this analysis. 

Ms. BUNN. The number of B61–12 weapons to be produced through the Life-Extension Program (LEP) was evaluated by DOD and approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) at the onset of the program. As part of the evaluation, the NWC 

received input and recommendations from several stakeholders and all members of 

the Council. The required number of bombs is continuously reviewed throughout the 

6.X life cycle management process, and the current projected quantity of weapons 

to be refurbished is based upon the requirements for extended and strategic deterrence commitments as outlined in various plans and policy documents. Should the 

guidance and/or direction in these documents change, the quantity of B61–12 bombs 

to be produced would be adjusted accordingly. 

I will work with the NWC Chair to provide you with a brief on the B61 requirements analysis process. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are you confident NNSA can perform 4–5 concurrent life extension programs? 

Ms. BUNN. At the present time, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) baseline 

plan does not exceed two concurrent Life-Extension Programs (LEPs) at any one 

time. I am confident that NNSA can execute the NWC’s priorities; although in the 

current fiscal environment it faces increased risk due to the prospect of inconsistent 

and unstable funding. The NWC is actively updating the baseline plan as well as 

evaluating NNSA’s progress to ensure a stable and steady workflow for the highly 

talented individuals who are working on these LEP programs. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The GAO concluded in a recent report that DOD may be significantly underreporting its 10-estimate for the modernization of nuclear delivery systems, and does not include potential estimates for Air Force efforts to either modernize the ICBMs or develop a new bomber. Will you commit to providing a com-
179 

prehensive and detailed plan to the committee on what the costs will be in the next 

10 years? And as most of the costs for modernization will increase beyond the next 

10 years, do you have an understanding of when the costs will peak and what planning is needed over the next 20 years? 

Admiral BENEDICT. I commit to continue to support the Department of Navy’s 

submission of nuclear deterrent modernization budget estimates in accordance with 

section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The GAO concluded in a recent report that DOD may be significantly underreporting its 10-estimate for the modernization of nuclear delivery systems, and does not include potential estimates for Air Force efforts to either modernize the ICBMs or develop a new bomber. Will you commit to providing a comprehensive and detailed plan to the committee on what the costs will be in the next 

10 years? And as most of the costs for modernization will increase beyond the next 

10 years, do you have an understanding of when the costs will peak and what planning is needed over the next 20 years? 

General HARENCAK. In response to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

report, the Air Force has incorporated 10-year cost estimates for both the Long 

Range Strike-Bomber and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile modernization in the 

Fiscal Year 2015 Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear 

Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear Weapons Command and Control System, as specified in Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. The Air Force will continue providing such estimates to the Congress in the future. 

These estimates are based on programmed amounts reflected in the Zero Real 

Growth (ZRG) Program Force Extended (PFE) data contained in the annual Air 

Force Integrated Planning Force. These budget values reflect the 20-year balanced 

Air Force funding plan at the constrained funding levels required to meet current 

fiscal requirements. Budget figures in this plan are used as the basis for affordability goals for future modernization and sustainment efforts that have not yet become formal acquisition programs (pre-Milestone B), such as Ground Based Strategic Deterrent. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What are your top concerns with regard to providing adequate 

safety across the nuclear enterprise? 

Dr. WINOKUR. The Board’s top safety concerns with regard to providing adequate 

protection across the nuclear weapons enterprise are summarized below. 

Earthquake Hazard at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL): The Board 

believes continued dialogue with the Department of Energy (DOE) is necessary to 

fully resolve issues regarding adequate protection of public health and safety in the 

event of an earthquake affecting the Plutonium Facility at LANL. The design basis 

seismic accident scenario results in unacceptably large offsite radiation dose consequences to the public. The Board’s Recommendation 2009–2, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety, identified the need to improve the 

safety posture of the facility. 

Aging Infrastructure: In our recent Report to Congress: Summary of Significant 

Safety-Related Aging Infrastructure Issues at Operating Defense Nuclear Facilities, 

the Board identified safety- related concerns regarding aging infrastructure at DOE 

defense nuclear facilities. These facilities included Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Facility at LANL, the 9212 Complex at the Y–12 National Security 

Complex, and the Hanford Single-Shell and Double-Shell Tanks as examples of 

some of the most significant safety-related aging infrastructure issues that exist 

today in the DOE defense nuclear complex. 

Two of the most critical facilities with respect to aging infrastructure are the 

CMR Facility at LANL, constructed in 1952, and the 9212 Complex at the Y–12 National Security Complex that began service in 1951. DOE deferred funding for the 

CMR Replacement Project for 5 years, and expects to operate the existing CMR Facility through 2019. The 9212 Complex is comprised of Building 9212 and 13 collocated buildings, portions of which have been in operation for more than 60 years. 

The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is scheduled to replace the 9212 Complex, 

but DOE does not plan to commence operations in UPF until 2025. 

Complex-wide stabilization and disposition of the remnants of nuclear weapons 

production activities enhances public health and safety near DOE sites. The cleanup 

of legacy waste at Hanford presents the most significant challenge in this regard. 

DOE stores more than 50 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste in 177 underground tanks at the Hanford site. Many of the old single-shell tanks have been 

known to leak. In addition, Hanford’s double-shell tanks are aging and are expected 

to be in use well beyond their design life. DOE identified a slow, but continuing leak 

from the primary (inner) tank of double-shell tank AY-102 in August 2012. The 

Board has been closely following DOE’s response to the leak, including DOE’s eval-
180 

uations of other tanks containing similar waste and the potential impact on the 

overall waste retrieval and treatment strategy. 

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), operations at H-Canyon, HB-Line, Defense 

Waste Processing Facility, and the Saltstone Production Facility have permitted 

steady progress in immobilizing radioactive materials in 47 high-level waste tanks. 

However, factors such as budget constraints and facility aging continue to complicate the disposition of legacy waste at SRS. The Board’s oversight will continue 

to focus on the on-going high-level waste operations and the completion of the Salt 

Waste Processing Facility. 

Early Integration of Safety in Design: The Board believes early integration of 

safety in large, complex design projects and timely resolution of safety-related issues 

are key factors to providing adequate protection of public and worker health and 

safety. DOE has struggled with the early integration of safety into its large, complex 

design projects and the timely resolution of safety related issues. 

During 2013, DOE made progress in resolving certain safety issues affecting complex design and construction projects. On other issues, however, DOE encountered 

problems with closure and integration of safety into the design process. DOE continued to struggle with open safety issues at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization 

Plant at the Hanford Site. Beginning in 2012, DOE slowed the construction of two 

of the plant’s key facilities—Pretreatment and High-Level Waste—to resolve safety 

issues and to reevaluate the project’s design. Many of these issues have been outstanding for years. 

Activity-Level Work Planning and Control: The Board’s Technical Report-37, 

Integrated Safety Management at the Activity Level: Work Planning and Control, 

and accompanying Board letter issued on August 28, 2012, outlined challenges in 

the safe performance of work at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. DOE responded 

by proposing new implementation and oversight guidance and is in the process of 

enhancing oversight of activity-level work planning and control by headquarters, 

field offices, and contractors. The Board’s future review efforts will assess the need 

for additional DOE requirements to support improved work planning and control. 

Criticality Safety at the Los Alamos National Laboratory: In May 2013, the 

Board’s staff conducted a review of the criticality safety program at the Plutonium 

Facility at LANL. The staff review team identified several criticality safety concerns, including widespread weaknesses in conduct of operations. On June 27, 2013, 

the LANL Director paused programmatic operations in the Plutonium Facility, in 

part, to enable laboratory management to address nuclear criticality safety concerns 

identified by both internal and external assessments. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) managers briefed the Board on a strategy to develop criticality 

safety evaluations (CSE) for higher-risk operations prior to resumption. The Board 

is aware that this plan has evolved such that the LANL Director intends to resume 

many higher-risk operations without first developing compliant CSEs. 

DOE directives and industry consensus standards require that CSEs unambiguously demonstrate how fissionable material operations will remain subcritical 

under both normal and credible abnormal conditions. These CSEs identify controls 

to ensure safe operation. The Board requested a briefing by NNSA on how federal 

and contractor managers will ensure that adequate controls are identified as the 

contractor resumes higher-risk operations in the Plutonium Facility. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Emergency preparedness and response is a key component of the safety bases for defense nuclear facilities. It is the 

last line of defense to prevent public and worker exposure to hazardous materials. 

The Board believes that the requirements in DOE’s Directives that establish the 

basis for emergency preparedness and response at DOE defense nuclear facilities, 

as well as the current implementation of these Directives, must be strengthened to 

ensure the continued protection of workers and the public. 

Problems with emergency preparedness and response have been discussed at 

Board public hearings and meetings during the past three years, as well as in the 

weekly reports of the Board’s site representatives. On March 21, 2014, and March 

28, 2014, the Board transmitted letters to the Secretary of Energy conveying its concerns regarding the emergency responses at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 

Carlsbad, New Mexico, to the truck fire and radioactive material release events. 

These ineffective responses and the consequences of the accidents demonstrate the 

importance of a strong emergency preparedness and response program. The topic of 

emergency preparedness and response at all defense nuclear facilities will continue 

to be a top priority for the Board. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What will the increased funding over last year’s appropriations 

fund? 
181 

Dr. WINOKUR. The additional $2.1M over the Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 appropriation of $28M will fund nine additional full-time employees (FTE) and an assumed 1% 

civilian pay raise. 

Excluding additional workload requirements levied by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2013, the Board requires 120 FTEs to meet the scope 

of its oversight responsibilities. Both the FY 2012 and FY 2013 (apart from the impact of sequestration) enacted appropriations provided funding for 120 FTEs. The 

President’s Budget for FY 2014 requested $29.9M to fund 120 FTEs; $28M funds 

approximately 116 FTEs. An additional 1$1.1M is needed to fund the assumed 1% 

civilian pay raise and four additional FTEs to reach the required 120 FTE level. An additional $1M is needed to fund five (5) additional FTEs (for a total of 125) 

to address additional workload requirements levied by the NDAA for FY 2013. The 

NDAA included several new provisions that increase staff workload. The Board’s 

staff must now support formal risk assessments by the Board for new recommendations to the Secretary of Energy. The recommendation process was also modified to 

require the production of a draft recommendation and an opportunity for the Secretary of Energy to comment before the recommendation is made final. Additional 

staff workload is anticipated in the analysis of and response to Secretarial comments. Finally, the NDAA for FY 2013 required that the Board enter into an agreement with an agency of the Federal government having expertise in the Board’s 

mission to procure the services of the Inspector General (IG) of such agency in accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978. Subsequently, the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act for FY 2014 assigned the IG of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to also serve as the Board’s IG, and directly appropriated $850,000 to 

the NRC Office of the Inspector General (NRC–OIG) for that effort. The NRC is proposing to dedicate five full-time employees (to be located at the Board’s headquarters) to perform IG services for the Board. Having a dedicated, on-site staff of 

five employees from the NRC–OIG performing IG services will generate significant 

additional workload for the Board. Without additional FTEs, the Board will have 

to absorb that workload to address IG concerns within its existing FTEs. Consequently, the FTEs directly performing the Board’s safety oversight mission will 

decrease. 

Traditional high-risk administrative areas that the NRC–OIG is likely to focus on 

include purchase and travel cards, time and attendance procedures, property accountability, and control of classified information. The NRC–OIG has also preliminarily indicated a potential focus on the following technical performance areas: processes for safety oversight, construction oversight, oversight of decommissioning, public meetings, oversight of controls to prevent inadvertent criticality, and oversight 

of fire protection. Communicating and coordinating with the IG staff, responding to 

requests for data, explaining and documenting work processes, reviewing draft reports, etc., will significantly increase workload in both the Board’s administrative 

and direct mission areas. 

To address these additional FY 2015 workload requirements, the Board requires 

additional staffing of five FTEs in the following areas: 

• A senior-level employee to serve as the Board’s sole interface with the NRC– 

OIG staff. Duties would include receiving and reviewing requests for data from 

the IG staff to support audits and other reviews, coordinating meetings, communicating data requests to appropriate staff for response, reviewing responses 

provided to the IG staff, maintaining a tracking log of pending and completed 

data requests, etc. 

• Two mid-level employees in administrative areas to support the additional 

workload generated from administrative audits and reviews. 

• Two mid-level engineers or technical specialists to support the additional workload generated by formal risk assessments and Secretarial comments on draft 

recommendations, as well as the additional workload generated from technical 

performance audits and reviews. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are you confident safety is a top priority for NNSA and the Department of Energy? 

Dr. WINOKUR. A focus on safety is essential in any nuclear enterprise, and the 

standard for safety in a nuclear enterprise must be much higher than that of a typical industrial activity. The Board recognizes that safety is an integral part of the 

Rules and Directives that govern the work of DOE and NNSA personnel at all DOE 

defense nuclear facilities. The Board also recognizes that many DOE and NNSA 

managers embrace the importance of nuclear safety as essential to the protection 

of the workers and the public, and to the mission itself. 

However, at times, some in DOE and NNSA may lose focus on the importance 

of safety, or may allow mission and schedule pressures to trump safety. This balance between mission and safety can be challenging for managers who must decide 
182 

where to allocate scarce resources. Furthermore, managers may have difficulty 

measuring safety; an absence of accidents may be interpreted as an indication that 

safety programs are no longer needed, leading managers to reduce the staffing levels of safety personnel. The safety violations and accidents that result are the types 

of situations that led Congress to create the Board more than 25 years ago. Today 

and going forward, the Board believes its mission is still essential to safeguard 

against these situations where DOE or NNSA managers lose focus on safety due to 

competing priorities. 

The Board will be conducting two hearings this year to address safety culture at 

DOE defense nuclear facilities and the Board’s Recommendation 2011–1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. At these hearings, the 

Board will explore how DOE balances mission and safety and whether safety is an 

‘‘overriding’’ priority. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please provide more details on possible MOX alternatives that 

NNSA is considering with regards to the disposition of the current nuclear stockpile. 

Mr. HELD. On April 29, 2014 the Department released its ‘‘Analysis of Surplus 

Weapon-Grade Plutonium Disposition Options’’. Attached is a chart from page 35 of 

this report which summarized the options. Additional detail on each option can be 

found in the report which is also posted here: 

http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14-inlinefiles/SurplusPuDisposition 

Options.pdf 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 156.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Can we achieve a 30 or potentially 50-pit production capacity 

with existing facilities? Did NNSA consider using existing facilities across the nuclear enterprise to contribute to the pit analysis and production capacity at Los Alamos? And is NNSA an analysis of alternatives before planning and designing potential new modular facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratories? 

What are your priorities for the plutonium strategy? 

Mr. HELD. The priorities for the plutonium strategy are to: 

1. Achieve 30 pits per year in 2026 through Plutonium Sustainment program investments and investments to optimize the use of existing infrastructure at LANL 

(i.e., the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB) and PF–4) for analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC). 

2. Cease programmatic operations in CMR by 2019. This effort is supported by 

the investments needed to optimize use of the RLUOB and reuse laboratory space 

in PF–4. The NNSA believes that investments in existing infrastructure will support 

30 pits per year production; as demand increases beyond 30 pits per year, additional 

space will likely be needed. After deferral of the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, NF, an 

analysis of options to use existing infrastructure for plutonium support capabilities 

was performed. Results of this analysis indicated that AC and MC capability needs 

could be met by optimizing existing infrastructure at Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

The proposed modular approach provides additional space and extends the lifetime of PF 4. This proposal is in its pre-conceptual phase; an appropriate alternatives analysis will be performed consistent with DOE Order 413.3B as the project 

develops. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do the pits and secondaries we hold in reserve serve as part of 

the hedge for our nuclear deterrent? 

Mr. HELD. No. As described in the report submitted to Congress in June of 2013, 

titled Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 USC, the hedge currently consists of only fully assembled nuclear 

warheads. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Can you guarantee that NNSA can successfully perform 4–5 life 

extensions concurrently, as was planned in FY14? How many concurrent LEPs does 

the FY15 plan envision? 

Mr. HELD. There are many conditions that are required to successfully execute 

multiple life extensions concurrently. There must be sufficient funding, work force 

balancing, adequate capacity, and the absence of significant technical surprises. 

What I can guarantee is that NNSA will do everything possible to ensure success, 

given the requisite resources. The plan described in the FY 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan has a maximum of five life extension programs running 

concurrently in FY 2023–2025, but they are different types of efforts (e.g., development, production) requiring different teams. 

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