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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

“China’s aggressive maritime 

tactics of using surveillance, 

enforcement, and fi shing vessels 

are impressive, particularly since 

none of these methods actually 

cross the ‘redline’ of using PLA 

(People’s Liberation Army) Navy 

assets to expand its infl uence.”

July 24, 2013

China’s Subtle Strategy

in the South China Sea

AARON AUSTIN

E-mail: aaustin@usip.org

PEACEBRIEF154

Summary

• Disputes over territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea are gaining new 

momentum as tensions, rhetoric and confl icts increase over disputed land features in the 

region. China, the leading regional claimant, appears intent on securing vast swaths of ocean 

for its own use and control. 

• China’s subtle and imaginative tactics are successfully compelling countries in the South China 

Sea to back away from disputing their aggressive actions.

• U.S. Mutual Defense Treaties (MDT) in the Asia-Pacifi c off er no assurances that the U.S. will 

become involved in limited disputes over territory to which it stakes no claim. Events on the 

Korean Peninsula in 2010, such as the CHEONAN incident, provide a practical example of how 

post-World War II conceived defense treaties function in the 21st century.

• Extra-regional aff airs have the potential to exacerbate territorial disputes in the SCS and drive 

the region toward confl ict.

Introduction

Although surprising to many and frustrating to most, the United States military—the most 

powerful in the world—remains relatively powerless to stop the advance of unwarranted Chinese 

territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. From tensions with the Philippines over 

territorial claims in Scarborough Shoal to Chinese declarations of the Senkaku Islands being an 

integral part of China, these thorny issues portend possible confl ict with serious potential to both 

escalate and migrate to other disputed regions. The U.S. State Department acknowledges that 

the U.S. has no territorial claims in the region and calls for peaceful negotiations while all parties 

adhere to previously established international norms. The U.S. Navy currently lacks the legal basis 

for involvement in the issue and is likely to continue to show restraint given the high potential for 

regional entanglement and escalation. Countries in the region are loath to challenge China for 

fear of reaping damaging punitive measures with long-term consequences. Taken together, it is 

diffi cult to rationalize a credible counter to excessive Chinese claims in the region. 

Problems of Ownership

Although the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei are vehemently opposed 

to territorial acquiescence, their strong language has yet to stop the inevitable creep of Chinese territorial assertions for future possession and development. The Chinese government’s designation of 
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

China’s Subtle Strategy in the South China Sea

page 2 • PB 154 • July 24, 2013

the prefectural city of Sansha as the municipal administrator for the land features of the South China 

Sea (SCS) not only creates the appearance of Chinese jurisdiction, but attempts to establish exactly 

what the Western world relies on so dearly for legitimacy: the rule of law. The Chinese governmentcontrolled media coverage of events on Sansha Island highlighted an aspect of China’s strategy laden 

with potentially risky unintended consequences, one which sells the idea of the SCS as a Chinese 

possession, while generating nationalist sentiments which are diffi cult to control. A picture of the 

so-called “nine-dotted line” map in Chinese passports continues a charade that China somehow 

owns all of the land features in the SCS due to unilaterally determined and ill-defi ned maps produced 

after World War II. A troubling question is whether China is making empty claims for nationalist 

reasons—or if China has a specifi c goal. Indeed, it seems likely that China is using its economic, 

military and political strength to test the limits—and methods—of international opposition to its 

territorial expansion in the SCS.

Methods of Staking a Claim

China’s aggressive maritime tactics of using surveillance, enforcement, and fi shing vessels are 

impressive, particularly since none of these methods actually cross the ‘redline’ of using PLA 

(People’s Liberation Army) Navy assets to expand its infl uence. 

It is through this sort of subtle methodic process that the Chinese appear to be gaining the 

initiative in the region, while others are scrambling to maintain the status quo and wondering how 

far China will go in pressing its will. Observers should not forget that China Marine Surveillance 

(CMS) is basically a paramilitary maritime law enforcement agency authorized to take off ensive 

action when necessary. As such, the risk of armed engagement with Chinese vessels still exists 

and would not necessarily avoid triggering a reaction under a U.S. mutual defense treaty simply 

because the vessel is not part of the formal Chinese armed forces. 

China is clearly intent on developing the largest military and maritime law enforcement force in 

the Asia-Pacifi c region. Its ability to bring a preponderance of strength to any territorial or maritime dispute in the region will be its greatest asset for securing its interests. Ramming or blocking 

vessels of other nations and overwhelming their counter-eff orts with sheer numbers are very 

eff ective tactics in preventing others from responding with more traditional uses of violent force. 

In any case, as soon as violent force is used to stop so-called “peaceful” Chinese advancements, the 

other nation—not China— would most likely receive the blame for escalating the dispute. 

As an exercise in forethought, it is useful to consider what would happen if China decided it had 

enough economic, political and military leverage to simply engage in a campaign of physically 

claiming land features in the SCS one-by-one. If China decided to peacefully overwhelm Philippine ships and fi sherman in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal and establish a human outpost, how 

would the international community react? China has already demonstrated its fi nesse in using 

“mass presence” or “mass intimidation” as a substitute for kinetic use of force. Should the Philippines be daring enough, a Philippine assault on a Chinese outpost would almost certainly trigger 

a violent and overwhelming response from China. If so, would the U.S. feel compelled to come to 

the aid of the Philippines vis-à-vis its MDT (Mutual Defense Treaty)? And if Chinese reactions to 

the Senkaku Island dispute (see below) with Japan are any indication, if China found the Philippine 

reaction distasteful, it would exact a severe and punitive economic toll.

The CHEONAN Incident as a Game-Changer 

Recent history may also be a useful indicator for deciphering the role 20th century U.S. MDTs will 

play in the region. For example, despite the existence of a MDT, U.S. reactions to North Korea’s 
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

China’s Subtle Strategy in the South China Sea

page 3 • PB 154 • July 24, 2013

sinking of the South Korean Corvette, CHEONAN, in March of 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyong 

Island in November of the same year were quite muted. Every country in the region was watching 

to see how not only the Republic of Korea would respond, but how the world’s most powerful 

military would react to an attack on one of its largest regional allies. South Korea’s limited and 

imprecise artillery response to the shelling of Yeonpyong Island had no discernible impact on any 

North Korean military sites. Fortunately, the confl uence of some important factors helped prevent 

greater escalation. 

First, the cause of the CHEONAN incident was not fully verifi ed until both sections of its hull 

were salvaged and inspected over the next month. This delay allowed emotions on the peninsula 

to cool and diplomatic eff orts to redirect energy previously focused on military retaliation to shift 

toward a more peaceful end-state. Second, when the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyong Island 

subsequently occurred, the resulting deaths and injuries marked one of the worst escalations in 

North-South Korean relations since the 1953 armistice. Yet despite this brazen attack on South 

Korea, U.S. military action was not forthcoming and its lack of retaliatory response with more 

advanced precision weapon systems lost on neither friend nor foe. Although the U.S. brings to 

bear leading-edge technology, the most professionally trained military force in the world, and 

an integrated battle force that far outstrips any competitors, the key enabler the United States 

seems to lack in the region is a clearly defi ned strategic threshold at which it will use any of these 

competitive advantages. This ambiguity has both the capacity to engender riskier behavior or, 

vice versa, deter other aggressors from pushing the limits of what they can achieve. The merits of 

both can be endlessly debated.

A current and relevant instance of a U.S. MDT being tested is the ongoing China-Japan spat over 

the Senkaku Islands. On January 19th, 2012, a Chinese frigate developed a radar lock—commonly 

considered an aggressive act—on a Japanese ship-based helicopter. Eleven days later a Chinese 

warship locked its fi re-control radar on a Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer in the East China 

Sea. These sorts of incidents highlight a growing trend within the PLA-Navy, and the broader 

Chinese maritime fl eet, of a China willing to use intimidation and the threat of deadly force to 

secure its claims. This irresponsible bravado demonstrates a lack of maturity and understanding 

as to how major navies responsibly wield weapons of war in the maritime domain. Without 

confi dence-building measures such as the Incidents-at-Sea (INCSEA) Agreement which the U.S. 

created with the former Soviet Union in 1972, the Chinese are saber-rattling in treacherous waters 

more familiar to their rivals. To be certain, should China ever choose extreme measures to try and 

limit the fl ow of commerce through the region or take military action in defi ance of international 

maritime norms, the U.S. Navy would fast arrive to engage forces threatening commerce feeding 

prosperity to almost the entire globe. Crossing this redline would signal to the rest of the world 

that China intended on single-handedly reestablishing international norms. Thus far, China has 

remained prudent enough not to sail across this wake in the water.

Extra-Regional Infl uences

Outside of the region, U.S. policymakers and defense experts should also worry about the prospect 

of the US being drawn into a major confl ict – namely, back to the Middle East. For example, should 

Israel unilaterally or with the blessing of a U.S. administration conduct a strike on Iran’s nuclear 

development infrastructure, regional escalation would be certain, the negative economic eff ects 

of which would cascade into the Asia-Pacifi c and heighten tensions amongst the countries already 

engaged in regional territorial/maritime disputes. Oil prices would spike, resources would become 

more constrained, and the fl ow of commerce threatened. The attendant increase in the signifi -

cance of SCS and East China Sea resources would add additional pressure on resolving disputed 
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China’s Subtle Strategy in the South China Sea

page 4 • PB 154 • July 24 2013

territories, with no guarantees that they would be solved peacefully. The decline in supply would 

likely increase the chances of violent confrontation as resource valuations increase and nationalist 

sentiments fl are over securing projected sources of rare resources. 

Conclusion

The tense and intransigent nature of territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS imparts on the 

region a peculiar sense of instability bubbling under the surface. Unable to physically rebuff 

Chinese claims to land features of the SCS, regional countries must watch their own perceived 

possessions slowly slip away if China does not change course. Although actions speak louder 

than words, Chinese nationalist rhetoric is helping set the stage for what appears to be future 

concrete actions in the SCS. Even with a coherent and unifi ed political response from the 

international community in opposition to future Chinese territorial gains, without leverage or 

the will to physically block China, China seems poised to overcome its “century of humiliation” 

from the First Opium War (1839-1842) through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945 with a 

focus on regional dominance.

ABOUT THIS BRIEF

This Peace Brief is based on 

Aaron Austin’s experiences and 

observations while deployed 

throughout Asia for the U.S. Navy 

and as an Asia Pacifi c foreign area 

offi cer. Lieutenant Commander 

Austin is currently an Interagency 

Professional in Residence at the 

U.S. institute of Peace. The views 

expressed here are the author’s 

own, and do not necessarily refl ect 

the views of the U.S. Institute of 

Peace or the U.S. Navy.