AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A P u b l i c at i o n o f t h e A f r i c a C e n t e r f o r S t r at e g i c S t u d i e s

n o . 3 0 / Fe b r uary 2 0 1 5

1

The 5,000-nautical mile (nmi) 

coastline of the wider Gulf of Guinea 

offers seemingly idyllic conditions 

for shipping. It is host to numerous 

natural harbors and is largely devoid 

of chokepoints and extreme weather 

conditions. It is also rich in hydrocarbons, fish, and other resources. These 

attributes provide immense potential 

for maritime commerce, resource extraction, shipping, and development. 

Indeed, container traffic in West African ports has grown 14 percent annually since 1995, the fastest of any 

region in Sub-Saharan Africa.1

The wider Gulf of Guinea, 

stretching from Cape Verde to Angola (Figure 1), is the main transit hub and facilitator to 

the region’s rapid economic growth which has averaged 7 

percent since 2012. The Gulf of Guinea has also become a 

hub for global energy supplies with significant quantities of 

all petroleum products consumed in Europe, North America, 

and Asia transiting this waterway.2

This economic boom, however, is threatened. In 2012, 

the Gulf of Guinea surpassed that of the Gulf of Aden (infaCombating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

By Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo

u An escalation in piracy and other transnational maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea has exposed the 

limited levels of maritime domain awareness in the region.

u The highly fungible nature of maritime security threats means that this challenge cannot be addressed 

solely by individual states but requires cohesive regional security cooperation. 

u While progress has been made, stronger political commitment is needed if regional maritime security 

cooperation plans are to be operationalized. H I G H L I G H T S

mous for high-seas hijackings) as the region with the highest 

number of reported piracy attacks in the world. These attacks 

also tended to be more violent. Given the limited maritime 

security presence off the West African coast, South American narcotics traffickers have found the region an attractive 

transit route to Europe. Oil theft and illegal bunkering plague 

the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria alone loses between 40,000 and 

100,000 barrels a day due to theft.3 With 40 percent of the 

FIGURE 1. Wider Gulf of Guinea Maritime Region
Rear Admiral Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo is an officer in 

the Nigeria Navy. His three decades of experience include 

participation in operations and sea exercises in the Gulf 

of Guinea, the Mediterranean, and the Caribbean. He 

served as an expert in the development of the Africa 

Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050. 

2

ernments downplay incidents to avoid increased shipping 

costs or a reputation for insecurity. Incidents reported to the 

International Maritime Bureau indicate that the affected 

area is substantial. Anchorages and approaches to the ports 

of Bonny and Lagos (Nigeria), Cotonou (Benin), Lomé 

(Togo), Tema (Ghana), and Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) are 

particularly vulnerable with large numbers of merchant ships 

often loitering in these areas (Figure 2). In the busy port of 

Lagos, hundreds of vessels loiter for days along the roadsteads 

(calm areas of water near harbors where ships can anchor) 

due to the limited capacity of West and Central African 

ports for offloading. Control measures in the approaches to 

these ports remain weak. The beaching of 25 ships on the 

Lagos coast following a rough, 2-hour storm in 2010 revealed 

that many vessels in harbors are unmanned and unmonitored. The then Director-General of the Nigeria Maritime 

Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) suggested 

that such boats may also serve as hideouts and blinds for 

pirates and robbers.

When a vessel is boarded by pirates, equipment and 

cargo are often stolen. Occasionally members of the crew 

are kidnapped for ransom. Ships may be hijacked and sailed 

to distant locations across maritime borders where cargo is 

transferred to other vessels. Recent attacks in the Gulf of 

Guinea indicate a preference for ships laden with crude oil 

and oil products. Such attacks are known to have occurred 

along the Ghana-to-Angola and Nigeria-to-Côte d’Ivoire 

axes. For example the MT Kerala was found in waters near 

region’s annual catch estimated to be illegal, unregulated, or unreported, West 

Africa’s waters also endure the highest 

level of illegal fishing in the world.4

Trade partners have taken note. In 

2013, almost all of the estimated $10.2 

billion worth of regional trade with the 

United Kingdom moving through the 

Gulf of Guinea was declared at risk of 

theft.5 With the increase in risk to ships, 

cargo, and seafarers, insurance premiums have soared and companies have 

taken on additional burdens to secure 

their ships.

Insufficient state presence in the 

Gulf of Guinea makes the economic 

losses incurred by the region difficult to 

estimate with precision. These are certainly substantial, however. Estimates of 

the annual cost of piracy to the Gulf of 

Guinea range from $565 million to $2 

billion.6 The strategic development plans of many countries 

in the region rely on 60 percent of their revenues coming 

from hydrocarbon resources either sourced from or transiting 

through the Gulf.7

Governments in the region have been late to realize 

how their absence in the maritime domain not only costs 

them untold revenue but also undermines security on land, 

as criminal activities on the sea start and end onshore. To the 

extent that the global economy relies on increasingly interdependent shipping and energy supply networks, the maritime 

threats in the Gulf of Guinea constitute a collective challenge to all stakeholders in the region and internationally.

The Unique Nature Of the Gulf of 

Guinea’s Maritime Insecurity

Piracy attacks (and armed robbery at sea)8 in the Gulf of 

Guinea comprised a fifth of all recorded maritime incidents 

globally in 2013. These figures represent only a fraction of 

the actual attacks in the region as ship owners and govFIGURE 2. Criminal Incidents Along the Gulf of Guinea 

Coast, 2006-2013

Source: GISIS, IMO, UNITAR/UNOSAT, 2014.9
3

Ghana’s Tema Port on January 

28, 2014, with a sizable amount 

of her oil cargo missing after being 

seized near Luanda 8 days earlier. 

In other cases, support vessels to 

offshore installations are attacked, 

sometimes with such speed and 

precision as to raise suspicion of 

complicity of the offshore crews 

in the theft and illicit sale of oil.

Gulf of Guinea piracy is increasingly characterized by violent 

assaults against vessels and hostage 

takings—1,871 seafarers were victims of attacks and 279 were taken 

hostage in 2013 (Figure 3).10 Incidents of fierce resistance to naval 

patrols have also increased. Pirates 

aboard a passenger boat opened fire on a Nigerian Navy 

(NN) craft during a routine patrol along the Cameroonian 

border in August 2013. Six pirates were killed in the exchange. In another incident just weeks prior, pirates tried 

to flee the gasoline tanker MT Notre after eight NN vessels 

surrounded it. Twelve of the 16 pirates were killed and their 

boat sank during the 30-minute gun battle. In April 2013, 

two crew members were killed after pirates boarded the SP 

Brussels off Nigeria’s coast. Just 18 months earlier, five crew 

were taken hostage when pirates robbed the same vessel 

while it was 40 miles off the coast of the Niger Delta.

Oil theft is often the result of collusion among local 

gangs, compromised elements in the oil industry and security 

agencies, and organized criminal networks from Eastern Europe and Asia.11 While Nigerian nationals have been most 

involved in the region’s piracy, other Africans, Eastern Europeans, and Filipinos have been arrested in Gulf waters for 

crude-oil theft, illegal bunkering, and attacks on shipping. In 

March 2014, 2 Britons, employees of a UK-based maritime 

security firm, were arrested with 12 Nigerians for attempting 

to offload crude from a vessel that itself had been seized for 

stealing oil.12 

BUILDING A COLLECTIVE MARITIME

SECURITY RESPONSE

Attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Guinea have exposed the vulnerability of the region’s maritime space. This 

has precipitated various countermeasures. In 2010, improvements in operational collaboration between the NN and NIMASA resulted in substantial reductions in attacks around 

Lagos Harbor. Under the collaboration, jointly manned vessels conduct law enforcement and antipiracy patrols backed 

with electronic surveillance assets, particularly within the 

territorial seas and harbor approaches. 

Unfortunately, the gains in Nigeria led to increased 

attacks off the coast of neighboring Benin. After reporting 

no attacks in 2009 and only 1 in 2010, Benin experienced 

a surge of more than 20 incidents in 2011.13 As a result, tonnage at Cotonou Port fell by more than 15 percent resulting 

in a loss of $81 million in customs revenue.14 The development compelled Benin’s President Boni Yayi to request assistance from Nigeria. In September 2011, NN-NIMASA 

vessels began jointly patrolling waters with Beninese security 

forces. The number of actual and attempted attacks on ships 

around Cotonou Port dropped from 20 in 2011 to 2 in 2012 

and 0 in 2013. Consequently, shipping activities resurged.

Reflecting the interconnected nature of this threat, enhanced patrolling around Cotonou led to a sharp increase 

in attacks in 2012 on shipping and hostage taking off the 

neighboring coasts of Togo (attacks–15, hostages–79) and 

again Nigeria (attacks–27, hostages–61). Over 80 percent 

of the attacks recorded in Nigeria occurred in waters off the 

Niger Delta, where the NN-NIMASA collaboration was 

less robust. Notably, Togo and Nigeria accounted for over 

70 percent of the attacks and hostage taking in West Africa 

in 2012-2014. 

In May 2013, two private maritime security firms collaborated with the NN to launch the Secure Anchorage 

Area (SAA), which provides security to vessels in a designated area off Lagos Port. The SAA offers armed protection 

for vessels wishing to either anchor or conduct ship-to-ship 

Source: GISIS, IMO, UNITAR/UNOSAT, 2014.

FIGURE 3. Evolution of Types of Attack in Gulf of Guinea
4

transfer operations offshore. In 2014, NIMASA, 

in collaboration with the NN and the Nigerian 

Air Force, unveiled a Satellite Surveillance Centre 

(SSC). The SSC tracks all vessels in Nigerian waters 

and can identify each vessel’s International Maritime 

Organization (IMO) number. This initiative complements the existing array of sensors installed along Nigeria’s coastline under the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) program supported by the 

United States and the United Kingdom. Various 

other regional and international partners also adopted 

supportive resolutions and programs, including the 

African Union, United Nations, European Union, 

IMO, and G8.

In the meantime, drawing on lessons learned 

from the Gulf of Aden, the shipping industry created 

the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for 

the Gulf of Guinea (MTISC-GOG). With the goal 

of becoming a dedicated focal point for incident reporting, information sharing, and the latest maritime security 

guidance, the MTISC-GOG was tested in 2013 and 2014 

during the regional maritime exercise Obangame Express. 

The MTISC-GOG is headquartered at the Regional Maritime University in Accra, Ghana and provides participating vessels with 24-hour-per-day security reportage. It can 

also provide information to national maritime operational 

centers in the region and Interpol. 

In response to the growing maritime threat, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) developed an Integrated Strategy for Maritime Security (ISMS) 

in 2008, which called for a common regional framework for 

regulating maritime activities off Central Africa. In 2009, it 

activated the Regional Coordination Center for Maritime 

Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) in Pointe-Noire, 

Republic of Congo. Under the ISMS, CRESMAC is responsible for commanding three centers for multinational 

coordination (CMCs), one for each zone of Central African 

waters: Zones A, B, and D (Figure 4). The primary value of 

this initiative is to bridge information sharing and authorization protocols required in the pursuit of suspect vessels across 

maritime boundaries. 

The CMC for Zone D, operational since 2009, coordinates antipiracy efforts by the navies of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe. This 

collaboration has resulted in a reduction in maritime crime 

and hostage taking as well as over 17 citations for illegal fishing that resulted in hefty fines in Cameroon alone.15

There is an ongoing effort to consummate an Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Integrated 

Maritime Strategy (EIMS) modeled after the ECCAS effort, including creating a regional coordination center for 

maritime security in West Africa and three zones (E, F, and 

G) overseen by multinational maritime coordination centers 

(MMCCs). The pilot for these is ECOWAS’ Zone E (the 

waters off Benin, Nigeria, and Togo).

The reality of a constantly shifting threat informed the 

Yaoundé Declaration of June 2013 in which the heads of 

government from ECOWAS and ECCAS agreed to establish a Maritime Inter-Regional Coordination Center 

(MICC) in Yaoundé, Cameroon. A “Code of Conduct 

Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery 

against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and 

Central Africa” was adopted to further promote collective 

efforts on information sharing, interdiction, prosecution, and 

support to victims. Implementation of the nonbinding Code 

of Conduct has been slow going, however. In particular, the 

delayed operationalization of the MICC highlights the need 

for greater political will.

CONTINUING CHALLENGES

The highly adaptive nature of piracy networks in the 

Gulf of Guinea mirrors the situation in the Gulf of Aden 

whereby the gains of the multinational antipiracy effort 

off the coast of Somalia mutated into expanded threats 

elsewhere in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. While 

single-state solutions may achieve short-term gains, they are 

insufficient to curtail the fluid strategies adopted by piracy 

networks. Accordingly, a strategy of concentrating only on 

Source: International Crisis Group (2014)16

FIGURE 4. Multinational Maritime Coordination 

Zones in West and Central Africa
5

transit vulnerabilities is insufficient as pirates will constantly 

adapt to circumvent naval countermeasures. The more fundamental issues of how to manage maritime space and to 

counter what motivates pirates and their support structures 

on land must also be addressed. 

Continental causalities. Man lives on land and not at 

sea. While the Gulf of Guinea provides an ideal shipping 

and fishing venue, the ease with which robbers can disappear along the coastline after an attack exposes another, less 

favorable aspect about the region—limitations of surveillance, intelligence, and community policing in the coastal 

areas. In particular, political and socioeconomic conditions 

onshore, especially the growing army of jobless youth, are 

drivers of piracy in the region. In the Niger Delta, for instance, the government’s amnesty program for ex-militants 

in 2009 caused an immediate abatement in attacks on shipping. The resurgence in 2013 has been attributed partly to 

challenges in sustaining gainful employment opportunities 

to growing numbers of youth in the area.17

Governments are equally obligated to pursue more effective enforcement actions against piracy networks on land. 

For example, the illicit markets where pirated goods (especially oil) are sold around the world remain largely unimpeded. 

Capacity. Operationalizing political, interagency, and 

interstate commitments to combat piracy and related crimes 

in waters of the Gulf of Guinea will depend on establishing 

robust capacity for surveillance, response, and enforcement. 

• Surveillance. Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and 

Senegal have improved their coastal surveillance assets with the assistance of partners such as the United 

States and the EU. Unfortunately, the ability to 

detect vessels without active automatic independent 

surveillance (AIS) beyond radar range (30-40 nmi) 

remains a challenge for many states in the region. 

Similarly, access to affordable broadband and local 

maintenance capacity to facilitate communication 

and patrols presents a problem for many states.18

• Response. Central and West African navies and coast 

guards have limited patrol capacity (Table 1). Even 

if the entire current inventory of platforms were 

deployed, there still would not be enough vessels to 

provide for a sustained patrol of one craft for every 

250 nmi of coastline. The variety of equipment suppliers poses additional challenges of interoperability 

and sustainability of fleet vessels, the majority of 

which are over 25 years old. Nonetheless, maintaining the availability of these vessels is vital. At 

the beginning of 2014, the Nigerian government 

announced a 60-percent drop in crude-oil theft 

(from 100,000 to about 40,000 barrels a day) due 

to, among other things, the deployment of newly 

acquired patrol boats at strategic access routes in the 

waters of the Niger Delta.19 Additions such as fast 

Inshore Patrol Craft and Seaward Defence Boats 

(SDBs), including ex-U.S. Coast Guard cutters, 

were notable in this regard. Sustaining such modest success requires significant bolstering of patrol 

inventory with more Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) 

and coastal patrol boats.

• Enforcement. Frustration over the lack of effective 

prosecution of pirates and maritime criminals is 

prevalent in many Central and West African states. 

This stems from an absence of requisite domestic 

laws for prosecuting piracy and, in other instances, 

weak penalties and judicial processes. In many states, 

navies, coast guards, and maritime security agencies lack prosecution powers and rely on the police 

and other agencies for such a vital element of the 

enforcement cycle. In the restive Niger Delta, for 

example, trial for many suspects of oil theft and piracy 

comes several months after arrest due to insufficient 

availability of judicial officers.20 During that time, 

challenges in the preservation of evidence and limitations of detention periods often weigh in favor of 

the suspects who regain freedom soon after arrest. 

Commercialization of antipiracy efforts. The increase 

in attacks to shipping in the Gulf of Guinea has prompted 

various commercial countermeasures. In Nigeria, oil companies have hired private military and security contractors 

(PMSCs) to provide protected transit in the waters off the 

Niger Delta. The exponential rise in the number of PMSCs 

in recent years demonstrates the lucrativeness of such ventures. The engagement of PMSCs by NIMASA and the 

government of Togo to guard ports, moreover, underscores 

the expanding opportunities for PMSCs in the region. 

The profit-oriented focus of PMSCs, however, introduces fundamental questions over sovereignty, equity, 

and governance imperatives. What happens to such profitoriented ventures when the piracy threat abates? Will such 

outfits direct sufficient attention to the onshore networks 

and drivers of piracy, including tracking the products and 

proceeds of such criminal activities? A scenario whereby 

PMSCs own more patrol vessels than navies or coast guards 

raises questions over roles and responsibilities for national 

security. A concerted effort among the IMO, the regional 

bodies, and national governments must address these questions before inevitable conflicts of interest and conspiracy 

theories build up. 
6

WAY FORWARD

Combating piracy and armed attacks on shipping in 

the Gulf of Guinea requires more effective measures across 

the piracy cycle from shore-based causes and offshore transit 

vulnerabilities to shore-based markets for piracy proceeds. 

Stemming the tide of attacks equally demands more deliberate cross-cutting efforts that incorporate preventive, 

deterrent, and collaborative measures among national and 

regional stakeholders. 

Maritime space management. Improving security is 

more about the strategic management of maritime space 

than it is about naval fleets and patrol craft. Central and 

West African states must define clearer transit corridors 

and anchorage sites for protection of merchant vessels in 

their territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones, 

which extend 200 nmi from a country’s coast. This would 

be akin to the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor that has functioned well in the Gulf of Aden and has 

been replicated as a Voluntary Reporting Area in the Gulf 

of Guinea by the MTISC-GOG. Such arrangements require 

a combination of regional and national collaboration that 

the proposed MICC could facilitate. Further to the protected 

Secured Anchorage Area in Lagos Harbor, similar concepts 

should be established around approaches to all ports in the 

region, including enforcement and sanction processes for 

vessel violations. Such procedures will improve vessel safety 

as well as simplify the patrol and surveillance demands on 

maritime authorities. Estimates are that effective maritime 

domain awareness capability in the area can be realized and 

sustained at a reasonable cost.22

To advance regional maritime space management, 

there is a need to fast-track the activation process of the 

MICC and the pilot Zone E mechanisms. This will facilitate information sharing among law enforcement agencies, 

maritime commerce stakeholders, and international partners. In particular, the establishment of national maritime 

operation centers (MOCs) could resolve some difficulties in 

interagency cooperation among navies and port- and flagstate control authorities.

Enforcement harmonization. The limited number of 

piracy-related trials underscores the need for greater harmonization of legal efforts in the region as stated in the Memorandum of Understanding between ECCAS, ECOWAS, 

and the Gulf of Guinea Commission. To do so, a thorough 

review of each country’s legal framework should be undertaken to enable each to effectively prosecute piracy perpetrators. 

Efforts to fast-track extraditions and to synchronize penalties 

for crimes at sea across jurisdictions would prevent pirates 

from finding more lenient treatment across coastal boundaries. Members of the judicial system should be trained in 

coordination with maritime enforcement agencies in order 

to speed up and standardize the process of evidence collection and preservation to facilitate efficient and fair trials. 

Creating courts dedicated to handling piracy and sea robbery 

prosecutions may help minimize these delays. 

Internavy cooperation. Authorization of a standing 

forum for Zone E heads of navies by the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) could provide 

much-needed synergy for coordination efforts of the region’s 

navies. This protocol needs to be replicated among other 

zones under ECOWAS. The Political Affairs, Peace and 

Security Department of ECOWAS has the responsibility 

in this regard to encourage the activation of the zonal coordination mechanisms for all member states, including common understandings and prosecutions of cross-border and 

extraterritorial crimes. Consummation and implementation 

of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy, therefore, 

deserves the urgent attention and commitment of all stakeSource: IHS Jane’s, 2013.21 Country Coastline (nmi) Frigate Corvette Large Patrol Boats Small Patrol Craft (IPC/SDB) Landing Craft Maritime Patrol Aircraft Large Craft Acquisition in 15 yrs Small Craft Acquisition in 10 yrs Sources of Acquisition

Benin 65 7 7 China, France

Cabo 

Verde 530 2 3 1 2 4 China, Germany, US

Côte 

d’Ivoire 281 3 France

The 

Gambia 43 10 US, UK 

Ghana 292 8 9 1 6 4 US, Germany

Guinea 173 4 3 US

GuineaBissau 189 2 Portugal

Liberia 360 2 2 US

Nigeria 459 2 10 15 4 7 25

France, Germany, 

US, Italy, UK, 

Singapore, China, 

Israel, Nigeria, 

Netherlands

Senegal 286 3 8 3 1 9 France, Spain

Sierra 

Leone 217 4 4 China, US

Togo 30 4 2 France, US

TABLE 1. Platform Profile of West African 

Navies and Coast Guards 
7

holders, including the affected coastal communities. 

Asset Requirements. A layered deterrent mechanism 

characterized by maritime air patrols, ship-borne patrols 

(made up of OPVs and SDBs), and terrestrial- and satellitebased surveillance assets will be needed to monitor and secure 

the Gulf of Guinea. A theoretical 100-nmi radar coverage 

and patrol radius should be assumed for each patrol vessel. 

For every vessel at sea one should be on standby while another would be undergoing routine maintenance. Based on 

these assumptions and West Africa’s approximately 3,000-

nmi coast, the aggregated minimum OPV requirement for 

effective deterrence and response amounts to 90 craft. Compared to the current inventory of 32 OPVs/equivalent assets 

(frigates, corvettes, and large patrol craft as categorized in 

Table 1), governments should consider the 58-OPV deficit 

as a working guide on future capitalization efforts. In the 

relatively calm and open waters of the region, OPVs of under 1,000-ton displacement with minimal weaponry would 

suffice. SDB requirements would enable effective presence 

in the approaches to all ports in the region with a similar 

provision that two additional SDBs be available for each 

one deployed. States with long coastlines or piracy hotspots 

should consider acquisition of fixed and rotary wing maritime 

patrol aircraft. These projections, though ambitious, provide 

a planning guide for governments, navies, foreign partners, 

and investors.

Profiling piracy networks. Breaking the cyclical chain 

of attacks on shipping in a cost-effective manner requires a 

robust capacity for profiling maritime crime and sharing information among stakeholders in the region. Such a capacity 

would involve monitoring transiting vessels, their crews, and 

their ownership with a view to profiling suspicious vessels 

and individuals, including activities in coastal communities. 

A watch list for suspect vessels as well as human accomplices 

should be developed, updated, and shared. 

An international campaign to close off markets and 

financial centers to stolen oil and its proceeds would raise the 

cost of stealing from the Gulf of Guinea.23 This would require 

more concerted efforts between Central and West African 

states and their global partners to identify and sanction criminal networks involved in the laundering of proceeds from 

piracy and related crimes. Sanctioning vessel owners and 

organizations known to be the beneficiaries of proceeds from 

attacks and oil theft would be extremely useful and yet is a 

significant gap in the collaboration between the EU, Asian, 

and African states. 

Partnership Engagement. More collaboration is needed among international partners and African governments 

in the international waters around the Gulf of Guinea. Operations Atalanta, Ocean Shield and Combined Task Force 

150/151 in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean provide an 

adaptable template. There would also be value in the US, 

European and Asian partners strengthening naval and coast 

guard capacity in the region through effective collaboration 

with the evolving MICC, MMCC/CMC and MOCs. 

Targeted economic development on the coast. The 

situation in the Niger Delta and widespread poverty in the 

region underscore the need for more concerted infrastructural development, youth employment generation, and 

coastal environmental protections. Given that the waters 

off the Niger Delta account for over half of the piracy attacks 

recorded in recent years, there is a need to improve economic 

opportunities for coastal communities there. Likewise, given 

the socioeconomic impacts of illegal fishing, pollution, and 

environmental degradation, state and local governments 

across the region must focus on maritime-related policy 

matters that directly impact coastal residents. This includes 

enforcing laws governing foreign companies’ intrastate 

shipping, proper application of environmental laws, and 

expanding shipbuilding, fishing, and other industries where 

significant production deficiencies still exist. Such advancements would reduce the incentives that drive youth into 

piracy and create shared interests among communities, the 

state, and the private sector in a secure and vibrant maritime 

economy. Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Bill, which incorporates measures aimed at deepening responsible exploitation, 

improving local community participation, and benefitting 

host communities with economic, social, and infrastructural 

development could also emphasize enhanced economic opportunities in coastal areas. At the very least, multinational 

oil companies should rethink their current community development strategies. 

CONCLUSION

As countries in the Gulf of Guinea increasingly rely 

on the seas for economic prosperity, the evolving violent 

attacks on shipping with transnational dimensions call for 

multilateral remedies. Fast-tracking initiatives such as the 

MICC, the Zone E MMCC, and other operational models 

already underway across the region offers a cost-effective and 

quick-impact approach toward enhancing security in the 

“improving security is more about 

the strategic management of maritime 

space than it is about naval fleets and 

patrol craft”
8

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports United States 

foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity 

of African states to identify and resolve security challenges in ways 

that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic 

values, and safeguard human rights. Toward these aims, ACSS is 

committed to building networks of African, American, European, and 

international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ACSS, 

the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the U.S. 

Government.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

http://www.africacenter.org

Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies

Director: 

Kate Almquist Knopf

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 20

Fort McNair

Washington, D.C. 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Website: www.africacenter.org

Africa Security Briefs

Director of Research:

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Phone: +1 202-685-6808

Email: SiegleJ@ndu.edu

ISSN 2164-4047 (print)

ISSN 2164-4039 (online)

short term. While acknowledging the necessity of PMSCs as 

a stopgap measure, there is a need for caution on the part of 

vessel owners, governments, and regional bodies against the 

over-commercialization of maritime security. Governments 

must also uproot the drivers of piracy as well as expand the 

resources and shared interests in a secure maritime domain. 

None of these recommendations will gain enough traction to 

be self-sustaining, however, until the discussion of maritime 

security in the Gulf of Guinea is raised from the operational 

to the ministerial level where the purse strings are held. Until there is political will in each Central and West African 

country to protect the region’s waters, the Gulf of Guinea 

will remain a challenged security space.

NOTES

1 “Beyond the Bottlenecks: Ports in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Ocean 

Shipping Consultants, Ltd. for the Africa Infrastructure Country 

Diagnostic project (June 2008), 1.

2 Adjoa Anyimadu, Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: 

Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean, Africa 2013/02 (London: 

Chatham House, July 2013).

3 “EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea,” press release from the 

Council of the European Union, March 17, 2014. 

4 Maíra Martini, “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 

and Corruption,” U4 Expert Answer No. 392 (Berlin: Transparency 

International, September 2013).

5 “How the lack of security in the Gulf of Guinea affects the UK’s 

economy,” UK Chamber of Shipping, July 2014.

6 Jens Vestergaard Madsen, Conor Seyle, Kellie Brandt, Ben 

Purser, Heather Randall, and Kellie Roy, The State of Maritime Piracy 

2013 (Colorado: Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2014), 55. Report of the 

United Nations assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (7 to 

24 November 2011) (UN doc. S/2012/45, January 2012), 11.

7 Loïc Moudouma, Lead Maritime Security Expert, ECCAS, and 

Commander in the Navy of Gabon (panelist discussion at the National 

Defense University’s Round Table, “Africa’s Security and the United 

States: Converging Interests and Expanding Partnership,” Fort McNair, 

Washington, DC, July 29, 2014).

8 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

(UNCLOS) defines piracy as an attack on a vessel “outside the jurisdiction of any state,” or beyond 12 nmi from shore. The International 

Maritime Organization (IMO) defines armed robbery as an attack on 

a vessel made within 12 nmi—within the jurisdiction of the state. 

For simplicity, references to piracy in this paper comprise all attacks 

on vessels.

9 UNOSAT Global Report on Maritime Piracy: a geospatial analysis 

1995-2013 (New York: UNITAR, 2014), 32.

10 Madsen et al., 68.

11 Tim Cocks, “Balkans, Singapore Top Buyers of Stolen 

Nigerian Oil – Expert,” Reuters, October 22, 2012. Christina Katsouris 

and Aaron Sayne, Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to 

Combat the Export of Stolen Oil,Chatham House Report(London: Royal 

Institute of International Affairs, September 2013), 33-36.

12 Samuel Oyadongha, “JTF Arrests 2 Britons, 12 Nigerians for 

Illegal Bunkering,” Vanguard, March 29, 2014.

13 Report of the United Nations, 3.

14 Ibid, 5.

15 Sylvestre Fonkoua Mbah, “The Multinational Center of 

Coordination, Zone D” (presentation delivered at OPV Africa 

Conference, Lagos, Nigeria, August 26-29, 2013).

16 Thierry Vircoulon, “Gulf of Guinea: A Regional Solution 

to Piracy?” International Crisis Group’s In Pursuit of Peace Blog, 

September 4, 2014.

17 “Bryan Abell, “Return to Chaos: The 2013 Resurgence of 

Nigerian Piracy and 2014 Forecast,” gCaptain Blog, January 14, 2014.

18 Augustus Vogel, “Investing in Science and Technology to 

Meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges,” Africa Security Brief, 

No. 10, (July 2011).” - and replace with: “Augustus Vogel, Investing 

in Science and Technology to Meet Africa’s Maritime Security 

Challenges, Africa Security Brief No. 10 (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press, February 2011).

19 Anayo Ezugwu, “New Initiatives to Curb Crude Oil Theft,” 

Real News, January 27, 2014. 

20 Author interview with Mr. Desmond Agu, Commander, 

Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, Bayela State, Nigeria, 

December 19, 2013.

21 IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2013-2014, ed. Commodore Stephen 

Saunders RN (London: Jane’s Information Group, July 2013), 1021. 

22 Commodore Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo, “Africa Partnership 

Station Helps All Sides,” Proceedings 137/7/1,301 (MD: U.S. Naval 

Institute, July 2011), 60.

23 Katsouris and Sayne, ix.